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gao_GAO-12-613 | gao_GAO-12-613_0 | Background
Export Control System
The current U.S. export control system seeks to limit sensitive items from falling into the wrong hands and, at the same time, allow legitimate trade to occur. When compliance activities, such as end-use checks, result in unfavorable determinations, Commerce or State may take further action, such as denying a license or referring involved entities to enforcement agencies for investigation and possible penalties. These activities include (1) vetting transactions prior to export by screening applications against four categories of lists of parties of concern, among other steps, (2) analyzing shipping data and monitoring end use of items, and (3) educating companies and foreign governments about the risks of illicit transshipment, although State’s outreach efforts have been largely inactive since 2008. To confirm that the results of end-use checks are incorporated into the license application review process, we analyzed a random, nongeneralizable sample of 21 State end-use checks and 56 Commerce end-use checks during our site visits in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the UAE. The VEU is an export licensing framework that allows validated end users to receive eligible items on the Commerce Control List without a license. Commerce and State address illicit transshipment risk by verifying the end use of controlled items. For example, agencies discovered that U.S. electronics components and devices were used to build improvised explosive devices that were deployed against Coalition forces in Iraq after they were illicitly transshipped to Iran through Hong Kong. Exporters and Foreign Governments about Illicit Transshipment Risks, but One Program Is Largely Inactive
To educate companies and foreign governments about illicit transshipment risks, agencies have programs to review the internal controls of U.S. companies’ compliance programs, conduct outreach to U.S. companies and universities, and provide training to foreign governments. In contrast, several compliance officials stated that risks could include the burden on Commerce’s and State’s capacity to monitor the end use of an increased number of items and the loss of information prior to export resulting from fewer license requirements. However, the agencies did not evaluate the implications of these risks on their resource needs. Agencies Propose to Move Items from State to Commerce and to Introduce a New License Exception
As an interim step to creating a single control list, the administration proposed revising the list of items controlled by Commerce and State. Agencies Have Not Fully Assessed Potential Impact of Control List Reforms on All Compliance Activities but Have Assessed the Estimated Resource Impact on License Review
U.S. agencies have not fully assessed the potential impact that export control reform of control lists might pose for the resource needs of the range of compliance activities agencies undertake, as suggested by federal internal control standards and executive branch requirements. State also has not assessed the risks of reform proposals on its compliance activities. Agencies have stated some potential benefits for national security and for exporters as a result of reform. In fact, Commerce has focused more end-use checks on unlicensed items. Requiring this information, according to BIS, would allow it to determine more quickly the accuracy of a claimed use of authority to ship without a license or pursuant to a license exception, in some transactions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this review, we (1) examined how U.S. agencies use compliance activities to address the risk of illicit transshipment and (2) analyzed the extent to which U.S. agencies assessed the impact of the export control reform on the resource needs of compliance activities. We also analyzed available data, including licensing statistics, numbers of end-use checks for 13 transshipment countries, numbers of designations on various lists for entities from the 13 GAO- designated transshipment countries, numbers of 13 transshipment countries that are partner countries for Export Control and Related Border Security program training, Department of Commerce correspondence to Validated End-User designees, and agency outreach materials for companies. To analyze the extent to which agencies assessed the potential impact of the export control reform initiative for the resource needs of compliance activities, we reviewed the proposed export control reform initiatives, White House press releases on the export reform initiatives, relevant executive orders, Federal Register notices, comments from the public, relevant laws and regulations, and agency documentation and studies on the proposed impact of the reform initiative on their compliance activities. We identified eight export control compliance activities that the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury conduct to encourage compliance with export control laws and to prevent the diversion or misuse of exported items against U.S. allies or interests. Export Controls: Improvements Needed to Prevent Unauthorized Technology Releases to Foreign Nationals in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
To protect its national security and commercial interests, the United States has implemented an export control system to limit sensitive technologies from falling into the wrong hands. The Department of State regulates U.S. defense exports and the Department of Commerce regulates dual-use exports that have commercial and military applications. Each agency uses a separate control list of items that may require a license to export. Agencies use compliance activities to prevent the diversion or misuse of exported items against U.S. interests or allies. Misuse can occur through illicit transshipment, the diversion of items from their origin through an intermediary country to an unauthorized destination. In 2010, the President announced reforms to the export control system.
This review examines (1) agencies compliance activities to address transshipment risk and (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies assessed the impact of export control reforms on the resource needs for compliance activities. GAO analyzed U.S. licensing data for 13 transshipment countries and visited Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies engaged in export controls use various compliance activities to prevent the diversion or misuse of exported items against U.S. interests or allies and reduce illicit transshipment risk. Compliance activities include (1) vetting transactions prior to export, (2) analyzing shipping data and monitoring the end use of items, and (3) educating companies and foreign governments about illicit transshipment risks. To vet transactions, agencies review license applications for the export of controlled items, consult multiple lists of entities known or suspected of violating export control laws or regulations, and screen foreign end users to determine their eligibility to receive items without a license. Agencies also review shipping records to identify patterns of abuse and to plan end-use checksvisiting foreign companies to verify the approved use and location of exported items on both licensed items and those eligible for export without a license. From 2008 to 2010, Commerce conducted 56 percent of its end-use checks on unlicensed exports. In the 13 transshipment countries, unlicensed exports accounted for about 94 percent of unfavorable end-use check determinations, which indicates that the end use or end user of an export were not appropriate. For example, some unlicensed items transshipped illicitly to Iran through Hong Kong were used to build improvised explosive devices used against Coalition troops in Iraq. When an unfavorable determination is made, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) or Department of State (State) may take further action, such as denying a license or referring involved entities to enforcement agencies for investigation and possible penalties. To educate U.S. companies and foreign governments about illicit transshipment risks, Commerce and State review the internal controls of companies compliance programs; conduct outreach to U.S. companies to inform exporters of their responsibilities to comply with export control laws and regulations; and provide training to foreign governments.
Agencies have not fully assessed the potential impact that control list reforms may pose for the resource needs of their compliance activities. Agencies estimate that Commerce will receive between 16,000 and 30,000 additional license applications as a result of proposed reforms to move less sensitive items from State to Commerce. Agency documents state that this step would allow them to focus resources on items most critical to national security and may make compliance easier for exporters because Commerce imposes fewer requirements than States controls. However, Commerce has not assessed the impact this added responsibility would have on its end-use check resource needs. Also, under the reforms, fewer items may require export licenses, thereby reducing uncertainty as to whether export sales will be approved. Some agency officials suggested potential risks, such as an increased need for more end-use checks and the loss of information from reviewing exports through the licensing process prior to export. The agencies have not yet assessed the impact of these potential risks on their resource needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Commerce and State should assess the potential impact of control list reforms on the resource needs of their compliance activities. Commerce and State concurred with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-141 | gao_GAO-09-141_0 | BOP Lacked Written Policies and Procedures for Processing Requests for Lateral Transfers
BOP has no written policies for lateral transfers and provides no guidance to facilities on how to process requests for lateral transfers or criteria for granting such requests. Requests for lateral transfers are generally handled on a case-by-case basis, and the processes and criteria used for granting those requests varied across facilities in our review. We have previously reported that agencywide policies and procedures help ensure consistent treatment when agencies are geographically dispersed. Without such documentation, BOP was not able to determine BOP-wide the number of staff who requested lateral transfers, the number of times an employee requested a transfer, the number of requests approved or denied, or the reasons for denial. At the facility level, if the warden at the employee’s current facility decided not to forward the request or the warden at the desired facility denied the request, BOP had no formal process for reconsideration. The absence of BOP-wide policies and procedures for lateral transfers diminishes BOP’s ability to ensure consistent treatment of staff across BOP’s 114 facilities in 6 regions. As part of a cost-reduction strategy involving temporary assignments that began in 2004, in 2005 BOP designated certain posts as “mission critical,” that is, assignments that were deemed essential for the safe and secure operations of its facilities and would be vacated only in rare circumstances. The mission critical post initiative was intended to reduce facilities’ reliance on overtime and non- correctional services staff, both of which had typically been used for temporary assignments. BOP generally does not review data on temporary assignments at any level. Such an evaluation would have been consistent with both the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which provide that federal agencies are to employ internal control activities, such as top-level review, to help ensure that management’s directives are carried out and resources are effectively and efficiently used, and BOP’s Management Control and Program Review Manual, which lays out the basic components of its system of management controls, which include assessing program performance regularly. Manual Review of Temporary Assignments Shows That BOP Facilities Left Mission Critical Posts Unassigned and Relied on Overtime and Non- Correctional Services Staff to Varying Degrees
Our review of BOP’s management of temporary assignments included determining how BOP temporarily assigned staff, specifically the extent to which the facilities in our review left mission critical posts unassigned and relied on overtime and non-correctional services staff for temporary assignments. Conclusions
BOP does not have written policies and procedures for managing lateral transfers. Without such assessments, BOP is not employing internal control activities specified in federal standards and BOP policy and, therefore, cannot determine whether it is achieving the desired cost savings or determine the effect, if any, of unassigned mission critical posts on the safety and security of its facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Attorney General direct the Director of BOP to develop and implement specific policies and procedures for administering employee requests for lateral transfers, including the collection of data on such requests and their outcomes and the development of a system of oversight to ensure the consistent treatment of BOP staff and systematically assess temporary assignments to ensure that BOP is meeting the objectives of the mission critical post initiative and effectively and efficiently using resources. Staff who made major contributions are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify whether BOP had policies and procedures and how it assessed the management of those policies and procedures for (1) permanent reassignments of BOP employees between correctional facilities and (2) temporary assignments of BOP employees within a correctional facility. We interviewed the relevant officials at BOP’s central and regional offices, and at each of the selected facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for the custody and care of more than 202,000 federal offenders with approximately 35,000 employees, almost half of whom are correctional officers, dispersed across BOP's 114 correctional facilities in 6 regions. In response to a request, GAO identified whether BOP had policies and procedures and how it assessed the management of those policies and procedures for (1) employee-requested lateral transfers of BOP employees between correctional facilities and (2) day-to-day changes in correctional services or temporary assignments of BOP employees within a correctional facility. GAO reviewed available documentation on BOP's policies and procedures on lateral transfers and temporary assignments. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's central and regional offices and seven facilities selected on the basis of the number of staff; at least one facility was selected from within each of BOP's six regions.
What GAO Found
BOP does not have written policies and procedures on lateral transfers of staff. Each correctional facility evaluates requests for lateral transfers on a case-by-case basis. Typically, when an employee requests a lateral transfer to another facility, the warden at the employee's current facility determines whether to forward the request to the desired facility's warden. The processes for requesting a lateral transfer and the criteria for forwarding, granting, or denying such requests varied across the facilities GAO reviewed, and generally no documentation on decisions reached or actions taken was maintained. Further, BOP does not systematically review decisions concerning these requests at any level. As a result, BOP cannot determine the number of requests for lateral transfers, the outcome of these requests, or whether requests were handled consistently within or among facilities. GAO has previously reported that agencywide policies and procedures help ensure consistent treatment of staff when agencies have geographically dispersed locations. Other Department of Justice law-enforcement components have written policies, procedures, and a review process concerning requests for lateral transfers. Unlike lateral transfers, BOP has written policies and procedures on how facilities are to temporarily assign staff to fill in for absences or to meet other needs that arise in a facility. However, BOP has not systematically assessed how facilities are managing temporary assignments. As part of a costreduction strategy affecting temporary assignments, in 2005, BOP designated mission critical posts, that is, assignments that were deemed essential for the safe and secure operations of its facilities and that would be vacated only in rare circumstances. The mission critical post initiative was intended to reduce facilities' reliance on overtime and non-correctional services staff, who had typically been used for temporary assignments. A memorandum from the Assistant Director of Correctional Programs described how each facility was to gather information for 6 months on overtime and staffing under the mission critical post initiative and how BOP would evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative. However, BOP conducted no such evaluation. BOP officials also generally do not review temporary assignments at any level, including the effect of leaving mission critical posts unassigned. According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal agencies are to employ internal control activities, such as top-level review, to help ensure that management's directives are carried out and to determine if agencies are effectively and efficiently using resources. Without assessing its mission critical post initiative and data on temporary assignments, BOP does not know whether it is efficiently and effectively using staff for temporary assignments or achieving the desired cost savings. Also, without reviewing the effect of leaving mission critical posts unassigned, BOP cannot assess the effect, if any, of unassigned posts on the safety and security of its facilities. |
gao_GAO-05-535 | gao_GAO-05-535_0 | Trading costs are generally measured differently for retail and institutional investors. Investors’ Trading Costs Have Declined Since Decimalization, but Reduced Market Transparency Has Caused Firms to Adopt New Trading Strategies
Trading costs for both retail and institutional investors fell after the implementation of decimal pricing and the corresponding reduction in tick size. Total trading costs declined by about 53 percent for NYSE stocks, falling from about 33 cents per share in early 2001 to about 15.5 cents (fig. The various sources of data we collected and analyzed indicated that after decimal pricing and the 1-cent tick were implemented in 2001, the volume of shares shown as available for sale—or displayed depth—on U.S. stock markets declined significantly. Some Stock Intermediaries Have Experienced Lower Profits since Decimalization, but Other Factors Have Contributed to the Declines
Although overall securities industry profits have returned to levels similar to those in the past, some market intermediaries, particularly those broker- dealers acting as exchange specialists and NASDAQ market makers, have been significantly affected by the implementation of decimal pricing. Sharp declines in the overall level of prices in the stock market, the growing use of trading strategies that bypass active intermediary involvement, and heightened competition from ECNs and other electronic trading venues have affected revenues and profits. Many of the market intermediaries but fewer than half of the institutional investors we contacted favored this move. Broker-dealers Revenues from NASDAQ Activities Have Also Fallen since Decimal Pricing Began
Decimal pricing has also generally negatively affected the profitability of firms that make markets in NASDAQ stocks. One major impact on firms’ revenues since 2000 has been the sharp multiyear decline in overall stock market prices. In addition, officials at several firms noted that such a pilot is unnecessary because institutional investors have already adjusted to penny ticks. For example, an official of a large market-making firm stated that decimalization in the options market was “a small ripple in a huge pond.”
Although Decimal Pricing Not Significant, Key Measures of Options Markets’ Quality Have Improved
Although decimal pricing’s impact was not seen as significant, various measures used to assess market quality have shown improvements in U.S. options markets in recent years. Traditionally, trading on U.S. options markets had occurred on the floors of the various exchanges. In response to the reduced displayed market depth, institutional investors are splitting larger orders into smaller lots to reduce the market impact of their trading and accelerating their adoption of electronic trading technologies and alternative trading venues. Methodology for GAO Analysis of Trade and Quotes Data
To assess the impact of decimal pricing, one of the activities we performed was to analyze data from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Trade and Quote (TAQ) database spanning the 5-year period between February 2000 (before the conversion to decimal pricing) and November 2004 (after the adoption of decimal pricing) to determine how trading costs for retail investors changed and how various market statistics changed, such as the average number of shares displayed at the best prices before and after decimalization. Tick size (or minimum price increment)
The smallest price difference by which a stock price can change (up or down). | Why GAO Did This Study
In early 2001, U.S. stock and option markets began quoting prices in decimal increments rather than fractions of a dollar. At the same time, the minimum price increment, or tick size, was reduced to a penny on the stock markets and to 10 cents and 5 cents on the option markets. Although many believe that decimal pricing has benefited small individual (retail) investors, concerns have been raised that the smaller tick sizes have made trading more challenging and costly for large institutional investors, including mutual funds and pension plans. In addition, there is concern that the financial livelihood of market intermediaries, such as the broker-dealers that trade on floor-based and electronic markets, has been negatively affected by the lower ticks, potentially altering the roles these firms play in the U.S. capital market. GAO assessed the effect of decimal pricing on retail and institutional investors and on market intermediaries.
What GAO Found
Trading costs, a key measure of market quality, have declined significantly for retail and institutional investors since the implementation of decimal pricing in 2001. Retail investors now pay less when they buy and receive more when they sell stock because of the substantially reduced spreads--the difference between the best quoted prices to buy or sell. GAO's analysis of data from firms that analyze institutional investor trades indicated that trading costs for large investors have also declined, falling between 30 to 53 percent. Further, 87 percent of the 23 institutional investor firms we contacted reported that their trading costs had either declined or remained the same since decimal pricing began. Although trading is less costly, the move to the 1-cent tick has reduced market transparency. Fewer shares are now generally displayed as available for purchase or sale in U.S. markets. However, large investors have adapted by breaking up large orders into smaller lots and increasing their use of electronic trading technologies and alternative trading venues. Although conditions in the securities industry overall have improved recently, market intermediaries, particularly exchange specialists and NASDAQ market makers, have faced more challenging operating conditions since 2001. From 2000 to 2004, the revenues of the broker-dealers acting as New York Stock Exchange specialists declined over 50 percent, revenues for firms making markets on NASDAQ fell over 70 percent, and the number of firms conducting such activities shrank from almost 500 to about 260. However, factors other than decimal pricing have also contributed to these conditions, including the sharp decline in overall stock prices since 2000, increased electronic trading, and heightened competition from trading venues. |
gao_GAO-13-396 | gao_GAO-13-396_0 | Technology, Design, and Construction Challenges Pose Risk to Lead Ship Cost and Schedule Outcomes
While construction of CVN 78 is more than halfway complete, the Navy and shipbuilder must still overcome significant technology development, design, and construction challenges in order to deliver a fully functional ship to the fleet at the currently budgeted cost of $12.8 billion and the February 2016 delivery date. This strategy introduces the risk of late and costly design changes aboard the ship. In contrast to the knowledge- based approach used by leading commercial ship buyers, the Navy, in an effort to meet required installation dates aboard CVN 78, elected to produce these systems prior to demonstrating their maturity. By comparison, progress constructing CVN 78 has been constrained by inefficient out-of-sequence work driven largely by material shortfalls, engineering challenges, and delays developing and installing certain critical technology systems (provided by the Navy to the shipbuilder for installation). Demonstration of Ship Capabilities after Delivery Is Limited by Test Plan Deficiencies and Reliability Shortfalls
Several factors are likely to hamper the Navy’s plans to demonstrate CVN 78 capabilities after it accepts delivery of the ship. In particular, significant risk is introduced due to the Navy’s plan to conduct integration testing of critical technologies concurrently with the ship’s IOT&E. This strategy will constrain opportunities to implement timely, corrective actions if problems are discovered with key ship systems. If significant discoveries are made during IOT&E, initial deployment could be delayed. Further, key ship systems face reliability shortfalls that the Navy does not expect to resolve until many years after CVN 78 commissioning, which will limit the ship’s mission effectiveness during initial deployments and likely increase costs to the government. DOD and Navy operational test officials stated that they share these concerns. Delayed Availability of Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft Has Hampered Integration Efforts
The Ford-class is designed to accommodate the new Joint Strike Fighter carrier variant aircraft (F-35C), but aircraft development and testing delays have affected integration activities on CVN 78. The projected reliability shortfalls for these key systems—even under the Navy’s optimistic assumptions—could delay CVN 78’s planned entry into IOT&E in 2017. Lead Ship Unknowns Complicate the Navy’s Ability to Determine Follow-on Ship Cost Outcomes
The Navy and shipbuilder are implementing changes to the build strategy for CVN 79 aimed at reducing that ship’s costs before the construction contract is awarded, currently planned for September 2013. Remaining technical and design risks with CVN 78, however, could interfere with the Navy’s ability to achieve its desired cost savings for CVN 79. These uncertainties also affect the Navy and contractor’s ability to assess the likely CVN 79 costs ahead of contract award and, when coupled with the existing sole source environment for aircraft carrier construction, compromise the government’s negotiating position for CVN 79. The shipbuilder plans to employ a new build strategy for CVN 79 that (1) allots more time to fund and construct the ship compared to CVN 78 and (2) implements process improvements aimed at completing more work earlier in the build process—steps that the Navy anticipates will achieve construction efficiency improvements as compared to CVN 78. One key component of the CVN 79 cost estimate is a Navy assumption that 15 percent fewer labor hours will be required to construct the follow- on ship as compared to the lead ship. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following five actions: To ensure Ford-class carrier acquisitions are supported by sound requirements and a comprehensive testing strategy, and to promote the introduction of reliable, warfighting capable ships into the fleet, take the following actions prior to accepting delivery of CVN 78:
Conduct a cost-benefit analysis on (1) currently required capabilities, including increased sortie generation rates and reduced manning and (2) the time and money needed to field systems to provide these capabilities, in light of known and projected reliability shortfalls for critical systems. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II, DOD concurred with one of our recommendations, partially concurred with three recommendations, and did not concur with one recommendation. Waiting until IOT&E is completed may be too late to make effective tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report evaluates the Navy’s acquisition of Ford-class aircraft carriers. Specifically, we (1) assessed technical, design, and construction challenges the Navy faces in delivering the lead ship, CVN 78, within current budget and schedule estimates; (2) evaluated whether the Navy’s post-delivery test and evaluation strategy for CVN 78 will provide timely demonstration of required capabilities; and (3) identified actions the Navy is taking to improve cost outcomes for the first follow-on ship, CVN 79, ahead of contract award for detail design and construction. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy plans to spend over $43 billion to produce three Ford-class aircraft carriers. The lead ship, CVN 78, is under construction, and preparation work is underway for the second, CVN 79. These ships will feature new technologies designed to increase capability and reduce crew size. GAO was asked to evaluate the progress of the Ford class. This report examines (1) technical, design, and construction challenges to delivering the lead ship within budget and schedule estimates; (2) the Navy's test strategy for demonstrating CVN 78's required capabilities; and (3) actions the Navy is taking to improve CVN 79 cost outcomes. GAO analyzed documents related to mission requirements, acquisition plans and performance, and testing strategies, and interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The Navy faces technical, design, and construction challenges to completing Gerald R. Ford ( CVN 78) that have led to significant cost increases and reduced the likelihood that a fully functional ship will be delivered on time. The Navy has achieved mixed progress to date developing CVN 78's critical technologies, such as a system intended to more effectively launch aircraft from the ship. In an effort to meet required installation dates aboard CVN 78, the Navy has elected to produce some of these systems prior to demonstrating their maturity--a strategy that GAO's previous work has shown introduces risk of late and costly design changes and rework, and leaves little margin to incorporate additional weight growth in the ship. In addition, progress in constructing CVN 78 has been overshadowed by inefficient out-of-sequence work, driven largely by material shortfalls, engineering challenges, and delays developing and installing critical technology systems. These events are occurring in a constrained budget environment, even as lead ship costs have increased by over 22 percent since construction authorization in fiscal year 2008--to $12.8 billion. Additional increases could follow due to uncertainties facing critical technology systems and shipbuilder underperformance.
The Navy's strategy for providing timely demonstration of CVN 78 capabilities is hampered by post-delivery test plan deficiencies, Joint Strike Fighter aircraft delays, and reliability shortfalls affecting key ship systems. Additional risk is introduced due to the Navy's plan to conduct integration testing of key systems with the ship at the same time as initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E). This strategy will constrain opportunities to implement timely, corrective actions if problems are discovered with key ship systems. In addition, significant discoveries during IOT&E could delay demonstration of ship capabilities. The Joint Strike Fighter, intended to operate with the carrier, has faced delays, and there is the likelihood of costly retrofits to the ship to accommodate the aircraft after CVN 78 is delivered to the Navy. But even after the ship commissions, several key ship systems will continue to face significant reliability shortfalls that will likely increase costs to the government and limit the ship's mission effectiveness. The extent of these limitations will not be known until after IOT&E. GAO contemplated making a recommendation to delay CVN 78 commissioning until the ship successfully completes IOT&E. However, based on additional information provided by DOD, GAO decided not to include this recommendation in the report.
The Navy and shipbuilder are implementing process improvements aimed at reducing the cost of the follow-on ship, John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), ahead of the main construction contract award for that ship, currently planned for September 2013. CVN 79 is to be of nearly identical design to CVN 78. The shipbuilder plans to employ a new, more efficient build strategy, but remaining technical and design risks with the lead ship could interfere with the Navy's ability to achieve its desired cost savings for CVN 79. These uncertainties also affect the soundness of the Navy's current CVN 79 cost estimate, which is optimistic. These factors, when coupled with the existing sole source environment for aircraft carrier construction, may compromise the government's negotiating position for CVN 79.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take several actions aimed at ensuring Ford-class carrier acquisitions are supported by sound requirements and a comprehensive testing strategy, including conducting a cost-benefit analysis of required capabilities and associated costs. GAO is also recommending actions to improve the Navys knowledge about CVN 79 capabilities and costs before beginning contract negotiations. DOD concurred with one recommendation, partially concurred with three others, and did not concur with the recommendation to defer CVN 79s detail design and construction contract award. GAO maintains that DODs current schedule for awarding this contract undermines the governments negotiating position. |
gao_GAO-04-11 | gao_GAO-04-11_0 | Because of the number’s uniqueness and broad applicability, the SSN has become the identifier of choice for government agencies and private businesses, and thus it is used for a myriad of non–Social Security purposes. They may provide their services to a variety of customers, either to specific business clients or through the Internet to anyone willing to pay a fee. We testified before the Subcommittee on Social Security, House Committee on Ways and Means, about SSA’s enumeration and verification processes, and reported that the aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases, as well as the public display of SSNs in various public records, may provide criminals the opportunity to commit identity crimes. Private Sector Entities Routinely Obtain SSNS from Their Business Clients and Use Them Largely as a Tool to Identify Individuals
Information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations routinely obtain SSNs from their business clients and use SSNs for various purposes, such as to build tools that verify an individual’s identity or match existing records. Like information resellers, CRAs also obtain SSNs from their customers or the businesses that furnish data to them, as well as from private and public sources. Finally, health care organization officials said that they obtain SSNs from individuals themselves and companies that offer health care plans. CRAs Use SSNs as Identifiers and to Match Incoming Data with Their Existing Databases
CRAs use SSNs as the primary identifier of individuals that enables them to match the information they receive from their business clients with the information stored in their databases on individuals. Federal and State Laws Affect the Disclosure of Personal Information, and Businesses Say They Have a Proprietary Interest in Safeguarding SSNs
Information resellers, CRAs, and health care organization officials said that certain federal laws have helped to limit the disclosures they are allowed to make to their customers. Finally, at least six states have enacted laws to restrict the private sector’s use of SSNs, and California’s SSN law has had some effect nationwide. In addition, our review of state legislation and interviews of state and industry officials show several state laws are very similar to California’s law. Some State Laws and Regulations Extend beyond Similar Federal Restrictions
We found that regulations and laws in 2 of the 18 states we reviewed do not address SSNs specifically but do extend beyond federal restrictions regarding the sharing of “personal information,” which may include SSNs. Private sector officials we spoke to agreed that, given the continued rise in identity crimes, removing SSNs from public display is a step in the right direction. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe how information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations obtain and use SSNs, we expanded on previous GAO work in this area and we interviewed officials from large information resellers, CRAs, health care organizations, the Consumer Data Industry Association (an international trade association that represents consumer information companies), and the Social Security Administration. We also had our investigators access six Internet-based information resellers’ Web sites. Each association asked some of its members to determine how they obtained and used SSNs. To determine the laws and practices relevant to safeguarding SSNs, we determined what federal laws were helping to protect SSNs through our discussions with information resellers, CRAs, health care organizations, and the Federal Trade Commission. These permissible uses include: for use by any government agency in carrying out its functions; for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; motor vehicle market research activities, including survey research; for use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business, but only to verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to the business and, if such information is not correct, to obtain the correct information but only for purposes of preventing fraud by pursuing legal remedies against, or recovering on a debt or security interest against, the individual; for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any federal, state, or local court or agency; for use in research activities; for use by any insurer or insurance support organization in connection with claims investigation activities; for use in providing notice to the owners of towed or impounded vehicles; for use by a private investigative agency for any purpose permitted under the DPPA; for use by an employer or its agent or insurer to obtain information relating to the holder of a commercial driver’s license; for use in connection with the operation of private toll transportation facilities; for any other use, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom a request for personal information pertains; for bulk distribution of surveys, marketing, or solicitations, if the state has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains; for use by any requester, if the requester demonstrates that it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains; for any other use specifically authorized under a state law, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. Congress has limited the use of consumer reports to protect consumers’ privacy. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1936, the Social Security Administration (SSA) established the Social Security number (SSN) to track workers' earnings for Social Security benefit purposes. However, the SSN is also used for a myriad of non-Social Security purposes. Today, public and private sector entities view the SSN as a key piece of information that enables them to conduct their business and deliver services. However, given the apparent rise in identity crimes as well as the rapidly increasing availability of information over the Internet, Congress has raised concern over how certain private sector entities obtain, use, and safeguard SSN data. In previous reports, we discussed the benefits of government and commercial entities using SSNs. We also examined how certain private sector entities and the government obtain, use, and safeguard SSNs. This report provides additional information on private sector uses of SSNs. The Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, House Committee on Ways and Means, asked that GAO examine the private sector use of SSNs by businesses most likely to obtain and use them including information resellers, consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), and health care organizations. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) describe how information resellers, CRAs, and some health care organizations obtain and use SSNs and (2) discuss the laws and practices relevant to safeguarding SSNs and consumers' privacy. GAO makes no recommendations.
What GAO Found
Information resellers, consumer reporting agencies, and some health care organizations routinely obtain SSNs from their customers and have come to rely on SSNs as identifiers that help them determine an individual's identity and accumulate information about individuals. Larger information resellers usually obtain SSNs from their customers and use them to determine the identity of an individual for purposes such as employment screening, credit information, and criminal history. Other Internet-based information resellers whose Web sites we accessed also obtain SSNs from their customers and scour public records and other publicly available information to provide the information to persons willing to pay a fee. CRAs, too, are large users of SSNs. They obtain SSNs from businesses that furnish individuals' data to them and use SSNs to determine consumers' identities and match the information they receive from businesses with information stored in consumers' credit files. Finally, health care organizations obtain SSNs from individuals themselves and companies that offer health care plans and use them as identifiers. Some health care organizations use SSNs as member identification numbers. Certain federal laws help to safeguard consumers' personal information, including SSNs, by restricting the disclosure of and access to such information, and private sector officials we spoke with said that they indeed take steps to safeguard the SSN information they collect. Information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations told us they take steps to safeguard SSN data in part for business purposes but also because of federal and state laws that require such safeguards. Finally, some states are taking steps, legislatively, to address consumer concerns regarding SSN use and privacy of their personal information. Of the 18 states we examined, at least 6 had enacted laws specifically restricting private sector use and display of SSNs. California's law, in particular, has had some nationwide effect on business practices in places where some businesses have discontinued the display of SSNs in all of their locations. Also, our review shows that several state laws are similar to California's. In addition, while some state laws and regulations we reviewed did not restrict or prohibit SSN use or display specifically, they did extend beyond federal restrictions regarding the sharing of personal information. |
gao_GAO-11-390 | gao_GAO-11-390_0 | These funds may also support exhibit-related and public-programming expenses. Federal Laws and Regulations, NARA Policies, and Individual Library Agreements Provide Guidance on the Library–Foundation Relationship
Federal Laws Govern Library Creation
The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. Federal Regulations Govern the Use of Library Facilities by Outside Organizations
NARA’s building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of the presidential library facilities by other groups. The regulations prohibit the use of the facilities for profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. Federal Laws and Regulations Govern the Use of Staff
Federal laws and regulations specify for all federal employees—including federal employees working at presidential libraries—what they may and may not do in their official capacity. For example, federal employees may not engage in commercial or political activity associated with their federal positions. That office has developed systemwide policies, including the Presidential Libraries Manual, which discusses museum activities and records topics, and the NARA / Office of Presidential Libraries Architecture and Design Standards for Presidential Libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries also works with the NARA General Counsel on the development of policies governing the library–foundation relationship. The NARA General Counsel has issued legal opinions on foundations’ use of library facilities, when and how library staff can support foundation activities, and if library staff can fundraise for the foundations. Library–Foundation Agreements Further Define Their Relationship
Each presidential library has a written agreement with its associated foundation and, if applicable, the associated university that governs aspects of the relationship between the entities. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities. These agreements must be consistent with the applicable statutes and NARA regulations. According to NARA officials, these supplemental policies may provide further detail on the library–foundation relationship regarding facilities, staff, and political activities. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to NARA. NARA had no substantive comments and provided technical comments by e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) operates presidential libraries for all of the former U.S. presidents since Herbert Hoover. These libraries received over 2.4 million visits in 2009, including researchers, public program attendees, and museum visitors. Each library is associated with a private foundation, which raised the funds to build the library and then turned the library facility over to the federal government. These foundations typically have ongoing relationships with the libraries they built, and some of these library-foundation relationships involve sharing of staff and facilities. Per congressional request, this report describes the principal laws, regulations, and NARA policies that govern library-foundation relationships and the appropriate use of library facilities and staff. GAO reviewed specific laws governing presidential libraries, and NARA regulations and policies. We also reviewed applicable laws and regulations governing activities held on government property and acceptable activities of federal employees. Further, we interviewed relevant NARA officials. NARA reviewed a draft of this report and had no substantive comments. NARA made technical suggestions which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. NARA building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of presidential library facilities by outside organizations. Prohibited uses include profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. Other laws and regulations govern what federal employees may and may not do in their official capacity. As federal employees, NARA library employees must follow these rules in their interactions with the foundation associated with the library. NARA's Office of Presidential Libraries has developed a policy manual and standards that address topics such as museum activities and records. This office also works with the NARA General Counsel to develop guidance governing the library-foundation relationship, such as those related to the foundations' use of library facilities and when and how library staff can support foundation activities. The libraries also have one or more written agreements with their associated foundation that govern different aspects of the relationship. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities. |
gao_T-GGD-98-178 | gao_T-GGD-98-178_0 | Preliminary Observations on the Results to Date of the Dress Rehearsal and the Census Bureau’s Readiness for 2000
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here today to provide an update on the Census Bureau’s dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census and the Bureau’s readiness for carrying out the 2000 Decennial Census. At your request, my statement focuses on how key census-taking operations have performed thus far during the dress rehearsal and the implications that may exist for 2000. When we last testified before Congress in March 1998, we noted that, although the Bureau had made progress in addressing some of the problems that occurred during the 1990 Census, key activities faced continuing challenges. On the one hand, certain census activities, such as staffing the dress rehearsal operations, appear to have gone well. On the other hand, measures of other activities, such as the mail response rate, suggest that the Bureau still faces major obstacles to a cost-effective census. Further, the Bureau’s general ability to conduct the dress rehearsal according to its operational plan, while encouraging, is not necessarily a predictor of success in 2000. Because the dress rehearsal was performed at three sites, the capacity of regional and headquarters offices, as well as a number of essential census-taking operations, could not be fully tested under census-like conditions. In summary, Mr. Chairman, within the constraints and limitations imposed by the dress rehearsal setting, the Bureau to date has shown a general ability to implement the dress rehearsal at the three sites according to its operational timetable and plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Bureau of the Census' dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census and the Bureau's readiness for carrying out the 2000 Decennial Census, focusing on how key census-taking operations have performed thus far during the dress rehearsal and the implications that may exist for 2000.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) when it last testified before Congress in March 1998, GAO noted that although the Census Bureau had made progress in addressing some of the problems that occurred during the 1990 Census, key decennial census activities faced continuing challenges; (2) the census dress rehearsal, under way at three sites, is the last remaining field test before the decennial census is administered; (3) within the constraints and limitations imposed by the dress rehearsal setting, the Bureau to date has shown a general ability to implement the dress rehearsal at the three locations according to its operational timetable and plan; (4) certain census activities, such as staffing the dress rehearsal operations and completing field operations on schedule, appear to have gone well; (5) however, the dress rehearsal experiences also have underscored the fact that the Bureau still faces major obstacles to a cost-effective census; (6) for example, mail response rates remain problematic, and local partnerships had limited success; (7) further, the Bureau's general ability to conduct the dress rehearsal according to its operational plan, while encouraging, is not necessarily a predictor of success in 2000; (8) because the dress rehearsal was performed at three sites, the capacity of regional and headquarters offices, as well as a number of essential census-taking operations, could not be fully tested under census-like conditions; and (9) the most important outcome measure--the quality of the census data collected--is not yet available. |
gao_GAO-10-1057T | gao_GAO-10-1057T_0 | Problems Were Identified in the CBP Round 1 Bidding Process in Providing Suppliers with Bid Submission Information, but Some Improvements Were Made in the CBP Round 1 Rebid Process
For CBP round 1, we found problems with the bidding process, including poor timing and lack of clarity in bid submission information and CMS’s inability to inform suppliers of missing financial documentation. In comparison with CBP round 1, CMS provided CBP round 1 rebid bidding information to suppliers earlier, and its financial documentation instructions were clearer and suppliers were notified of missing documentation. For example, CMS provided new bidding information several times after the bid window opened, such as announcing the 10 financial measures used to evaluate the financial viability of bidding suppliers; clarified CBP round 1’s bidding information in response to supplier confusion, such as providing additional explanatory information concerning the request-for- bid instructions; and extended the bid window deadline. These changes in bidding information made it more difficult for suppliers to submit correct bids. Prior to the bid window opening, the rebid’s request-for-bid instructions had been available to potential bidding suppliers for over 2 months, since August 3, 2009, and CMS had already held seven informational bidder conference calls. First, on the day the bid window opened, CMS provided the actual bid submission deadlines, including the covered document review date, and provided further instructions on how a supplier needed to approve a bid in the online bidding system and would submit the required hard copy financial documents. The request-for-bid instructions included a chart—Required Financial Documents by Business Type—that more clearly explained which documents were to be submitted by business type. CMS officials told us that 791 suppliers submitted their financial documentation by the CBP round 1 rebid covered document review date and 321 were notified that they had missing documentation. Electronic Bid Submission System Used in CBP Round 1 Had Operational Problems, and CMS Developed a New Bid System for the CBP Round 1 Rebid
CMS acknowledged that CBP round 1’s competitive bid submission system—CBSS—had operational problems that affected suppliers’ ability to submit their bids. CMS officials also acknowledged that the CBSS user guide was not very detailed or user friendly. CMS developed a new electronic bid submission—DBidS—for the CBP round 1 rebid. CMS officials told us that DBids did not have significant operational issues and only a few suppliers experienced minor problems. CMS Did Not Effectively Notify All Suppliers about the Postbidding Review Opportunity in CBP Round 1, and Plans to Communicate with All Losing Suppliers in the CBP Round 1 Rebid after Contract Suppliers are Announced
In CBP round 1, CMS sent notification letters to both the winning and losing suppliers before announcing the final winning suppliers that accepted contracts for the CBP. We found that CMS had not effectively notified suppliers about the opportunity for this postbidding review process. To improve future rounds of the CBP, we recommended in our 2009 report that if CMS decides to conduct a review of disqualification decisions made during the CBP round 1 rebid and future rounds, CMS should notify all suppliers of any such process, give suppliers equal opportunity for such reviews, and clearly indicate how they can request a review. CMS officials said the letters will explain the process by which suppliers may ask questions and express concerns. CMS officials also stated that in the course of responding to such questions or concerns, if CMS determines an error was made, it is possible that a CBP contract may be offered to the supplier. Agency Comments
In commenting on the information presented in this testimony, CMS officials stated they appreciated GAO noting the administrative improvements to the competitive bidding process the agency made for the round 1 rebid. The officials further stated that they believe that CMS made many improvements to the CBP. Medicare: CMS Working to Address Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program. GAO-10-27. Medicare: Covert Testing Exposes Weaknesses in the Durable Medical Equipment Supplier Screening Process. | Why GAO Did This Study
To reduce spending on durable medical equipment (DME) and related items, under federal law the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is phasing in, with several rounds of bidding, a competitive bidding program (CBP) for certain DME and other items. Because of numerous concerns, the Medicare Improvements for Patient and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) terminated the CBP round 1 supplier contracts and required CMS to repeat the CBP round 1, the rebid that began in 2009. In November 2009, GAO issued the report Medicare: CMS Working to Address Problems from Round 1 of the Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program (GAO-10-27) that documented problems in CMS's implementation of CBP round 1. This statement discusses some of the problems GAO identified and how CMS has or plans to address them in the ongoing CBP rebid bidding process, particularly (1) the bid submission information provided to suppliers, (2) the electronic bid submission system, and (3) the bid disqualification notification process. For the 2009 report, GAO reviewed data provided by CMS and relevant laws and regulations, and interviewed CMS officials. For this statement, GAO also obtained select information on how CMS addressed the CBP round 1 problems identified in GAO's report by reviewing agency documents and interviewing CMS officials in August and September 2010.
What GAO Found
In the November 2009 report on CBP round 1, GAO noted that problems with the bidding process included poor timing and lack of clarity in bid submission information and the inability to inform suppliers of missing financial documentation. Several times after the CBP round 1 bid window opened, CMS provided new bidding information and clarified other bidding information. The bid window was also extended beyond the initial deadline. These changes made it more difficult for suppliers to submit correct bids. CMS improved implementation of these steps in the bidding process for the CBP round 1 rebid. For example, for the CBP round 1 rebid, CMS provided bidding information to suppliers prior to the bid window opening, including the rebid's request-for-bid instructions, which were available to potential bidding suppliers for over 2 months before the bid window opening. CMS also provided clearer financial documentation instructions and additional financial documentation tools to guide suppliers in the CBP round 1 rebid. For example, the request-for-bid instructions included a chart that more clearly explained which documents were to be submitted by the supplier's business type, for example, a sole proprietorship. CMS also conducted a financial document review during the round 1 rebid, which informed suppliers whether their bid submission was missing required financial documents. Of the 321 suppliers that were notified they had missing documentation, only 14 did not subsequently submit the missing documents. As CMS acknowledged, suppliers had difficulty entering bidding information in the bid submission system used in CBP round 1 and its user guide was not sufficiently detailed. CMS developed a new electronic bid submission system for the CBP round 1 rebid. CMS officials told us that the new system did not have significant operational issues and only a few suppliers experienced minor problems. GAO found that CMS had not effectively notified all suppliers about the opportunity for a postbidding review process in CBP round 1. To address GAO's 2009 recommendation that the agency effectively notify all suppliers of all aspects of the CBP round 1 rebid and future rounds, including any process to review disqualifications, CMS officials stated that the agency plans to notify the losing suppliers of the disqualification reasons by sending each of these suppliers a letter that will explain the process for asking questions or expressing concerns. Officials also stated that in the course of responding to suppliers' questions or concerns, if CMS determines an error was made, it is possible that the supplier may be offered a contract. In commenting on the information presented in this testimony, CMS officials stated they appreciated GAO noting the administrative improvements to the competitive bidding process the agency made for the round 1 rebid. The officials further stated that they believe that CMS made many improvements to the CBP. |
gao_GAO-14-161 | gao_GAO-14-161_0 | Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the United States from providing assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S. Agencies Have Disbursed or Committed Most of the $671 Million Allocated for Security- Related Assistance Programs for Lebanon in Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013
The United States allocated $671 million for security-related assistance for Lebanon from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or committed. For the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, DOD had committed about $352 million of the $481 million allocated from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. DOD and State Monitor End Use of Equipment Transferred to Lebanese Security Forces, but Gaps in Documentation and Security Checks May Limit Efforts to Safeguard Some Equipment
DOD and State conduct end-use monitoring for equipment each has provided or authorized for sale to Lebanese security forces, but gaps in implementation of procedures may limit efforts to safeguard some equipment. DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial number, as required by its policy; however, U.S. embassy officials in Beirut have not always used DOD’s required checklists to document compliance with security safeguards and accountability procedures. With respect to enhanced end-use monitoring, DSCA’s policy manual for end-use monitoring, the Security Assistance Management Manual, and the associated standard operating procedures for Beirut require DOD officials annually to conduct a physical inventory of 100 percent of designated defense articles, conduct physical security checks of facilities where the equipment is kept, and use and maintain records of equipment-specific checklists that outline the physical security requirements for Lebanese facilities that store the equipment. Use of the checklists would help ensure that DOD officials document compliance with physical security requirements for defense items transferred to the LAF. However, State did not provide support this statement. While INL officials annually inventory all equipment INL has provided to the ISF, INL may not be ensuring that the ISF is implementing recommended physical security safeguards for defense articles because INL lacks procedures to identify defense articles and the recommended safeguards for storing them. On the basis of our cross-check analysis of a sample of names from six training rosters against INVEST data, we estimated that State vetted for potential human rights violations all Lebanese students who attended security forces training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013. Therefore, we estimate that 100 percent of the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended U.S. training during that period were vetted for human rights violations through INVEST before they received training (see table 3). Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to assess the extent to which the U.S. government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces, and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for human rights violations. To address these objectives, we obtained funding data from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) on programs that provide security-related assistance to Lebanon. We interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; at the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida; and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, as well as officials of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Beirut, Lebanon. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2009, the United States has allocated $671 million in security-related assistance for Lebanon to train, modernize, and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. The U.S. government established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that defense equipment is safeguarded. The Foreign Assistance Act prohibits certain assistance to any unit of foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible information that such a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. GAO was asked to examine U.S. security-related assistance for Lebanon.
This report assesses the extent to which the U.S. government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces, and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed agency data, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, Lebanon.
What GAO Found
The United States allocated $671 million for Lebanese security forces from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or committed. For the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, the Department of Defense (DOD) had committed about $352 million of the $481 million allocated in fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
Consistent with end-use monitoring requirements, DOD and the Department of State (State) conduct annual inventories for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces. However, GAO found gaps in efforts to document and monitor physical security of some U.S. equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces that may weaken efforts to safeguard physical security of some equipment. First, while DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial number, as required by its policy, U.S embassy officials in Beirut have not always used DOD's required checklists to document compliance with physical security safeguards. Second, State did not fully document 4 of the 10 end-use monitoring checks it conducted in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 for defense equipment the Lebanese government purchased commercially. State end-use monitoring guidance requires that specific information be documented and maintained for all such checks. Third, while State conducts an annual inventory of the equipment it transfers to the Lebanese security forces, State may not be ensuring that the recipients of defense articles implement recommended physical security safeguards because State lacks procedures to identify defense articles and any recommended safeguards for storing them.
Examples of Items Subject to End-Use Monitoring in Lebanon
GAO estimates that State vetted 100 percent of the Lebanese students that attended U.S.-funded security-related training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013, for human rights violations. On the basis of a cross-check analysis of vetting data and a sample of names from six training rosters, GAO estimates that State vetted all of the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended training during that period.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD ensure U.S. officials use required checklists to confirm Lebanese facilities' compliance with required safeguards, and that State maintain proper documentation of end-use checks and establish formal procedures to ensure that bureaus identify defense articles and any recommended physical security safeguards for storing them. DOD and State concurred. |
gao_GAO-06-403T | gao_GAO-06-403T_0 | FEMA’s Controls to Prevent Potentially Fraudulent Payments Were Not Effective
We found weak or nonexistent controls in the process that FEMA used to review disaster registrations and approve assistance payments that leave the federal government vulnerable to fraud and abuse. In the critical aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA moved swiftly to distribute expedited assistance payments to allow disaster victims to mitigate and overcome the effects of the disasters. The lack of identity verification for telephone registrations and any address validation exposed the government to fraud and abuse of the IHP program. Although the identity verification process appeared to have worked for most Internet registrations, it did not identify a small number of registrations with invalid SSNs. For registrants who registered only via telephone, or registrants who called FEMA subsequent to being denied on the Internet, FEMA did not have controls in place to verify that the SSN had been issued, that the SSN matched with the name, that the SSN did not belong to a deceased individual, or whether the registrants had been rejected on prior Internet registrations. For both portals, we tested FEMA’s controls by providing falsified identities and bogus addresses. Potentially Fraudulent Activities Resulting from Weak or Nonexistent FEMA IHP Controls
With limited or nonexistent validation of registrants’ identities and the reported damaged addresses, it is not surprising that our data mining and investigations found substantial indicators of potential fraud and abuse related to false or duplicate information submitted on disaster registrations. Case Study Examples Show That Control Weaknesses Have Been Exploited
Our audits and investigations of 20 case studies demonstrate that the weak or nonexistent controls over the registration and payment processes have opened the door to improper payments and individuals seeking to obtain IHP payments through fraudulent means. Some were vacant lots, others turned out to be bogus apartment buildings and units. In addition, some individuals in the cases cited below submitted additional registrations but had not received payments as of mid December 2005. However, our physical inspection of these addresses revealed that 10 of the addresses were bogus addresses. We also found that the automated edits established in NEMIS identified these registrations as potential duplicates. The weaknesses identified through data mining include ineffective controls to detect (1) SSNs that were never issued or belonged to deceased or other individuals, (2) SSNs used more than once, and (3) other duplicate information. Controls over Debit Cards Were Ineffective in Preventing Duplicate Payments and Improper Use
In the days following hurricane Katrina, FEMA experimented with the use of debit cards to expedite payments of $2,000 to about 11,000 disaster victims at three Texas shelters who, according to FEMA, had difficulties accessing their bank accounts. Thousands of Debit Card Recipients Received Multiple Expedited Assistance Payments
Based on a comparison of FEMA’s IHP payments and the list of debit card recipients, we found that over 5,000 of the 11,000 debit card recipients received more than one $2,000 expedited assistance payment because they received a debit card and another form of payment (check or EFT). We found that in isolated instances, debit cards were used for adult entertainment, to purchase weapons, and for purchases at a massage parlor that had been previously raided by local police for prostitution. The majority of the remaining transactions was associated with purchases of food, clothing, and personal necessities. In this regard, FEMA regulation provides that IHP assistance be used for housing-related needs and items or services that are essential to a registrant’s ability to overcome disaster related hardship. To determine whether indications existed of fraud and abuse in expedited assistance and other disbursements, we provided FEMA data to the Social Security Administration (SSA) to verify against their records of valid social security numbers (SSNs). | Why GAO Did This Study
As a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the federal response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO conducted an audit of the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) under Comptroller General of the United States statutory authority. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. In the wake of these natural disasters, FEMA faced the challenge of providing assistance quickly and with minimal "red tape," while having sufficient controls to provide assurance that benefits were paid only to eligible individuals and households. In response to this challenge, FEMA provided $2,000 in IHP payments to affected households via its Expedited Assistance (EA) program. Victims who received EA may qualify for up to $26,200 in IHP assistance. As of mid-December 2005, IHP payments totaled about $5.4 billion, with $2.3 billion provided in the form of EA. These payments were made via checks, electronic fund transfers, and a small number of debit cards. GAO's testimony will provide the results to date related to whether (1) controls are in place and operating effectively to limit EA to qualified applicants, (2) indications exist of fraud and abuse in the application for and receipt of EA and other payments, and (3) controls are in place and operating effectively over debit cards to prevent duplicate EA payments and improper usage.
What GAO Found
We identified significant flaws in the process for registering disaster victims that leave the federal government vulnerable to fraud and abuse of EA payments. For Internet applications, limited automated controls were in place to verify a registrant's identity. However, we found no independent verification of the identity of registrants who registered for disaster assistance over the telephone. To demonstrate the vulnerability inherent in the call-in applications, we used falsified identities, bogus addresses, and fabricated disaster stories to register for IHP. We also found that FEMA's automated system frequently identified potentially fraudulent registrations, such as multiple registrations with identical social security numbers (SSN) but different addresses. However, the manual process used to review these registrations did not prevent EA and other payments from being issued. Other control weaknesses include the lack of any validation of damaged property addresses for both Internet and telephone registrations. Given the weak or non existent controls, it is not surprising that our data mining and investigations to date show the potential for substantial fraud and abuse of EA. Thousands of registrants misused SSNs, i.e., used SSNs that were never issued or belonged to deceased or other individuals. Our case study investigations of several hundred registrations also indicate significant misuse of SSNs and the use of bogus damaged property addresses. For example, our visits to over 200 of the case study damaged properties in Texas and Louisiana showed that at least 80 of these properties were bogus--including vacant lots and nonexistent apartments. We found that FEMA also made duplicate EA payments to about 5,000 of the nearly 11,000 debit card recipients--once through the distribution of debit cards and again by check or electronic funds transfer. We found that while debit cards were used predominantly to obtain cash, food, clothing, and personal necessities, a small number were used for adult entertainment, bail bond services and weapons purchase, which do not appear to be items or services that are essential to satisfy disaster related essential needs. |
gao_GAO-15-261 | gao_GAO-15-261_0 | TSA also maintains a current list of prohibited items on its public website. TSA has developed checkpoint screening standard operating procedures that establish the process and standards by which TSOs are to screen passengers and their carry-on items at the screening checkpoint. For example, in 2005, TSA modified the PIL in response to a statutory requirement to prohibit passengers from carrying any type of lighter on their person or in their accessible property on board aircraft. TSA Considers Several Factors when Modifying the PIL, but Did Not Fully Assess Risk or Stakeholder Perspectives when Evaluating Its Small Knives Proposal
TSA Considers Several Factors when Evaluating Potential PIL Modifications
TSA officials told us that when evaluating whether or not to change the PIL, they generally consider the following four factors: (1) the security risks posed by each item on the current PIL or potential item to be added, (2) opportunities a potential change may have to improving checkpoint screening and passenger experience, (3) harmonization with international aviation security standards and recommended practices published by ICAO, and (4) stakeholder perspectives on the change. TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risk Prior to Its Decision to Remove Small Knives from the PIL
As previously discussed, TSA used its risk assessment to conclude that overall risk to aviation security would be lowered by allowing small knives onto aircraft because security screeners would be able to better focus on identifying higher-risk items, such as IEDs. However, TSA did not conduct sufficient analysis to show that removing small knives would ultimately reduce risk and improve checkpoint screening. Such an analysis would have allowed TSA to actually measure whether airport screeners would be better able to identify explosives if they no longer had to screen for small knives, and better determine whether the added risk of allowing small knives onto aircraft would be offset by potential efficiencies in screening for explosives. We previously recommended in 2007 that TSA strengthen its evaluation of proposed modifications to the PIL and other checkpoint screening procedures to better justify its decisions. As a result, we recommended that TSA, when operationally testing proposed modifications to its checkpoint screening procedures, such as the PIL, develop sound evaluation methods to assist it in determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended result, such as enhancing the agency’s ability to better detect prohibited items, and free up existing TSO resources. Some of these groups later raised strong objections after TSA publicly announced the change. For example, TSA did not coordinate with or obtain input from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), which is its primary external advisory group for aviation security matters and whose membership includes various airline industry associations.stakeholders—from whom TSA did not adequately solicit feedback— subsequently expressed strong opposition to the proposal, which contributed to TSA reversing its decision to implement the proposal. TSA officials also stated that they would have benefited from broader engagement earlier in the process with external groups, such as the ASAC and flight attendants. This could help avoid rescission of those changes after investing resources in training TSOs and informing the general public of the change, as was the case with the proposed change to remove small knives from the PIL. These types of analyses would be consistent with the previous recommendation we made that TSA should strengthen its evaluation of proposed modifications to checkpoint screening procedures. However, by not taking the necessary steps to sufficiently consult with relevant external stakeholders who may be directly affected by the proposal to allow small knives onto aircraft, TSA ultimately reversed its decision to implement the small knives change to the PIL after having already publicly announced its decision and invested resources in training and implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure its proposed PIL modifications fully account for the views of key external stakeholders in the aviation industry, we recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s Administrator establish a formal process to ensure the solicitation of input from relevant external stakeholders on proposed changes to the PIL, including when in the PIL modification process TSA officials are to coordinate with such stakeholders, before deciding to make a PIL change. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its responsibilities for securing civil aviation, TSA ensures that all passengers and their accessible property are screened and prohibits individuals from carrying onto aircraft items that it determines to be a threat.TSA maintains a public list of such items, known as the Prohibited Items List, and updates it as necessary. In March 2013, TSA announced it would modify the PIL to allow small knives and certain sporting equipment onto aircraft, stating the change would result in more efficient security screening. However, several aviation industry groups opposed the decision, leading TSA to reverse its decision to implement the change. GAO was asked to review TSA's procedures for modifying the PIL.
This report examines, among other issues, (1) on what basis TSA modifies the PIL and the extent to which TSA assessed risk when considering recent modifications to the PIL, and (2) the extent to which TSA involved stakeholders when considering these modifications. GAO reviewed TSA's standard operating procedures, risk assessment, documentation of its decisions and stakeholder outreach, and interviewed TSA officials at six airports. This is a public version of a report with Sensitive Security Information that GAO issued in December 2014. Information TSA deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials stated that TSA considers four factors when determining whether to make modifications to the Prohibited Items List (PIL), but the agency did not fully assess risk when considering its recent proposed PIL modifications, as GAO has previously recommended. TSA generally considers the following four factors when determining whether to modify the PIL: (1) the security risks posed by each carry-on item, (2) opportunities to improve screening operations and passenger experience, (3) harmonization with international security standards and practices, and (4) stakeholder perspectives. While TSA considered these four factors when making its March 5, 2013, decision to allow small knives and certain sporting equipment on aircraft, TSA officials also reasoned that the proposed change could help screening personnel focus less on lower-threat items, such as small knives, and more on higher-threat items, such as explosives, thereby potentially increasing security for passengers. However, TSA did not conduct sufficient analysis to show that the increased risk of allowing small knives on aircraft—as determined in its risk assessment—would be offset by a resulting reduction in risk from improved screening for explosives. GAO has previously recommended that TSA strengthen its evaluation methods for operationally testing proposed modifications to checkpoint screening procedures, including changes to the PIL. However, TSA has not consistently implemented this recommendation. Conducting additional risk analysis would have allowed TSA to actually measure whether airport screeners would be better able to identify explosives if they no longer had to screen for small knives. GAO continues to believe that TSA should develop and apply sound evaluation methods when considering modifications to the PIL, as GAO recommended in April 2007.
TSA did not effectively solicit feedback on its 2013 PIL decision from relevant external stakeholders, some of whom subsequently expressed strong opposition to the decision to remove small knives from the PIL. For example, prior to announcing its decision, TSA did not coordinate with or obtain input from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which is TSA's primary external advisory group for aviation security matters and whose membership includes various airline industry associations. Some relevant stakeholders, such as flight attendant groups—from whom TSA did not adequately solicit feedback—subsequently expressed strong opposition to the proposal, which contributed to TSA reversing its decision to implement the change after having already trained screening personnel for its implementation. Having a defined process and associated procedures in place to communicate with relevant stakeholders earlier in the decision-making process could allow TSA to ensure appropriate consideration of their perspectives in the decision-making process. Use of a defined process and associated procedures could also allow TSA to better avoid rescission of any future changes after investing resources in training screening personnel and informing the general public of the change—as happened in the case of TSA's 2013 PIL decision.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA establish a formal process for soliciting input from relevant external stakeholders on proposed modifications to the PIL before making changes to it. DHS agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-700 | gao_GAO-15-700_0 | State Conducts a Range of Activities to Assess Risks to Residences Overseas, but Weaknesses Exist in Security Surveys at Posts
State assesses risks to U.S. diplomatic residences overseas using a range of activities, but many security surveys were not completed for residences we visited. We found that State (1) records and monitors information on overseas residences in its property database, (2) establishes threat levels at overseas posts, (3) develops security standards for residences, and (4) uses these standards to conduct security surveys of residences to identify vulnerabilities. Without up-to-date security surveys of all its overseas residences, State has limited ability to effectively and efficiently identify vulnerabilities or make informed decisions about where to allocate resources for security upgrades to address such vulnerabilities. State’s Updates of Security Standards for Residences Have Not Been Timely, and the Standards Are Difficult to Use
Over the last decade, State has taken steps to develop or revise several sets of OSPB residential security standards. Moreover, the OSPB standards and other security-related guidance for residences are confusing in nature and contain gaps and inconsistencies, thereby complicating posts’ efforts to apply the appropriate security measures and potentially leaving residences at risk. According to DS officials, it should take about 75 days to make an update to the OSPB standards. Relevant Security Standards and Other Security-Related Guidance for Residences Are Confusing in Nature and Contain Gaps and Inconsistencies, Making Them Difficult to Use
According to federal internal control standards, policy standards should be clear, complete, and consistent in order to facilitate good decision making in support of agency objectives. In instances when a residence does not and cannot meet the applicable security standards, posts are required to either seek other residences or request exceptions, which identify steps the posts will take to mitigate vulnerabilities. Without all necessary exceptions in place, State lacks information that could provide decision makers with a clearer picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and enable them to make better risk management decisions. State Uses Security Upgrades to Address Residential Security Vulnerabilities
State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences by installing various kinds of upgrades intended to help residences meet, or in some cases exceed, the applicable standards. Nearly All of the Residences We Visited That Did Not Meet All Mandatory Standards Were Missing Required Exceptions
Of the 38 residences we reviewed that did not meet all of the applicable mandatory standards, DS had an exception on file for only 1. State Has Taken Steps to Manage Risks to Schools and Other Soft Targets, but Its Efforts May Be Constrained by Limited Awareness of Relevant Guidance and Tools
State’s efforts to protect U.S. personnel and their families at schools and other soft targets include funding physical security upgrades, providing threat information and security-related advice, and conducting security surveys of various soft target facilities. However, RSOs at most of the accompanied posts we visited were unaware of some guidance and tools for securing these facilities. State has established guidance for RSOs regarding the security of schools and other soft targets as well as tools to assist RSOs’ security-related outreach with schools, but half of the RSOs we met with at the six accompanied posts stated that the only guidance or tools they were aware of with respect to schools and soft targets was a cable with information on the types of items that can be funded through the Soft Target Program. Because of limited awareness of the guidance and tools for securing schools and other soft targets, State may not be fully leveraging its existing programs and resources for addressing the security needs of schools and other soft targets. While State has taken significant measures to enhance security at its embassies and consulates since the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, these same actions have given rise to concerns that would-be attackers may shift their focus to what they perceive as more accessible targets, such as diplomatic residences, schools, and other places frequented by U.S. personnel and their families. Institute procedures to improve posts’ compliance with requirements for conducting residential security surveys. Develop procedures for ensuring that all residences at posts overseas either meet applicable standards or have required exceptions on file. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to evaluate (1) how the Department of State (State) assesses risks to residences overseas; (2) the timeliness, clarity, and consistency of State’s security standards for residences; (3) how State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences; and (4) how State manages risks to other soft targets overseas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1998 East Africa bombings, U.S. diplomatic personnel working overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security. State has built many new embassies and consulates since 1998 and enhanced security measures at others. Increased security at such facilities has raised concerns that residences, schools, and other places where U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families congregate may be viewed by terrorists as more attractive “soft targets.” GAO was asked to review the security of residences and other soft targets overseas. GAO evaluated (1) how State assesses risks to U.S. diplomatic residences overseas; (2) the timeliness, clarity, and consistency of residential security standards; (3) how State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences; and (4) how State manages risks to other soft targets. GAO reviewed agency documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork at a judgmental sample of seven higher-threat, higher-risk posts in four of State's six geographic regions. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in June 2015.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) conducts a range of activities to assess risks to residences overseas. For instance, State tracks information on overseas residences in its property database, establishes threat levels at overseas posts, develops security standards for different types of residences and threat levels, and requires posts to periodically conduct residential security surveys. However, 17 of the 68 surveys for residences GAO reviewed were untimely or missing. Without up-to-date security surveys of all its overseas residences, State's ability to identify and address vulnerabilities or make informed decisions about where to allocate resources for security upgrades is limited.
State has taken steps to update its residential security standards; however, these updates have not been timely, and the standards are difficult to use. According to State officials, updating residential security standards should take about 75 days, but all three updates since 2005 took more than 3 years each. State is making efforts to improve the timeliness of such updates in response to a prior GAO recommendation. In addition, while federal internal control standards state that policy standards should be clear and consistent to support good decision making, State's standards and other security-related guidance for residences have gaps and inconsistencies, complicating posts' efforts to determine and apply the appropriate security measures and potentially leaving some residences at risk.
State addresses security vulnerabilities at residences by installing various upgrades intended to help residences meet security standards, but 38 of the 68 residences GAO reviewed did not meet all applicable standards. For example, 8 residences did not meet the standards for perimeter barriers. When residences do not and cannot meet all applicable security standards, posts are required to request exceptions, which identify steps the posts will take to mitigate vulnerabilities. However, State had an exception on file for only 1 of the 38 residences that did not meet all applicable standards. As a result, State lacks key information that could provide it with a clearer picture of security vulnerabilities at residences and enable it to make better risk management decisions.
State manages risks to schools and other soft targets overseas in several ways, but its efforts may be constrained by limited awareness of relevant guidance and tools. In fiscal years 2010 through 2015, State awarded almost 400 grants in total for security upgrades at schools and other soft targets. While federal internal control standards call for timely communication of relevant information to staff responsible for program objectives, officials at most of the posts GAO visited were unaware of some guidance and tools for securing schools and other soft targets. As a result, State may not be fully leveraging existing programs and resources for addressing security needs at these facilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State, among other things, institute procedures to ensure residential security surveys are completed as required, clarify its standards and security-related guidance for residences, develop procedures to ensure residences either meet standards or have exceptions on file, and take steps to ensure posts are aware of existing guidance and tools regarding the security of schools and other soft targets. State concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-282 | gao_GAO-13-282_0 | We reviewed OPM’s To review the extent to which HUD’s resource management system reflects identified standards, we reviewed HUD documents describing its activities and compared them to the identified standards in the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) report for developing an effective resource management system for HUD. Background
As noted earlier, HUD has faced longstanding challenges with staff resource estimation and management. HUD Reports That it is Moving Forward with Strategic Human Capital and Workforce Planning Efforts after Several Years of Delays
HUD Has Awarded Contracts to Further Planning Efforts
In April 2012, the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer began soliciting a contractor to help HUD conduct a workforce analysis and update both the human capital and workforce plans. HUD’s most recent human capital and workforce plans expired in 2009. Although HUD has since launched several workforce planning efforts, it reported that these efforts were preempted by other priorities. In February 2010, HUD engaged key program office staff in training that emphasized the need to determine upfront the staff HUD could afford to hire. In June 2012, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reported on its review of HUD’s human capital management and found that HUD’s human capital and workforce planning activities did not always follow certain Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework standards, or key principles. Specifically, OPM found:
Human resources policies and programs are not aligned with organizational mission, strategic goals, and performance outcomes. As a result of these weaknesses, OPM concluded that HUD cannot continually assess and improve human capital planning and investments or measure the impact on mission accomplishment. HUD Is Reexamining Its Resource Management Processes, which Do Not Fully Consider Identified Standards
HUD Is Reexamining Its Resource Management Processes
In 2012, HUD began taking steps to reexamine its resource management process. According to the NAPA report, HUD’s system should: comprehensively define HUD’s workload; provide central guidance on how work is defined and data collected; allow program assistant secretaries to retain decision-making authority over the systems used in their organizations; involve headquarters and field staff in the workload definition process; link workload and resources so that Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)-required performance goals can be matched with resources to accomplish the goals; measure how resources used are related to results; and create incentives for staff to report accurate data for the system. Officials from the three HUD program offices we met with reported they selectively used data from REAP’s validation component, known as the Total Estimation and Allocation Mechanism (TEAM), as a starting point for budget formulation and staff allocation decisions. TEAM compares actual staff time to estimated staff time. As previously discussed, HUD’s program offices selectively use REAP to help define workload and estimate resources. Moreover, there are no routine data reliability checks on the information REAP produces and there is no widespread agreement that REAP produces the quality of data needed to accurately determine resource needs. As a result, staff are entering information into TEAM on an inconsistent basis and information is often not used to inform decisionmaking. HUD’s Budget Submission Could More Clearly Explain the Underlying Rationale for Its Request
Primary users of the congressional budget justification (CBJ) have raised questions about HUD’s budget presentation. They said that CBJs from fiscal years 2008 through 2012 generally contained data tables for some program offices and did not always contain narrative that explained or justified the FTE request. According to HUD officials, HUD provided data tables because prior submissions with more detail did not prompt questions from Congress. Although primary users of the CBJs agree that the fiscal year 2013 changes improved the clarity and utility of the justifications, some have raised additional questions about the uniformity and reliability of the information presented. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the human capital planning, workforce planning, and resource management processes at HUD, we recommend that the Secretary of HUD take the following three actions: 1. follow through on developing and maintaining strategic human capital and workforce plans; 2. ensure that human capital and workforce plans clearly incorporate key 3. collect data that are used for decision-making, thus creating incentives for staff to report accurate data for the resource management system. To improve the quality of HUD’s CBJ, we further recommend that the Secretary of HUD take the following action: 4. consult with users of the CBJ, such as congressional decision makers, to determine what additional information about resource decisions should be presented, and how, in its CBJ. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
HUD has faced challenges accurately determining the staff resources it needs to fulfill its mission of creating strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality affordable homes for all. GAO's prior work has shown that strategic human capital management, including efficient and effective workforce planning, helps ensure agencies have people with the skills needed to carry out their missions. GAO was directed to review the status of HUD's workforce planning efforts. GAO reviewed (1) HUD's strategic human capital and workforce planning efforts; (2) the extent to which HUD's resource management systems reflects identified standards; and (3) how clearly HUD presents its rationale behind staff resource requests in the budget request. GAO reviewed department-wide human capital and resource management efforts and selected four of the largest HUD program offices for further review. GAO reviewed documentation of HUD planning efforts and interviewed HUD officials and relevant congressional staff. The results from the reviews of the four program offices cannot be generalized to all offices within HUD.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports that it is moving forward with strategic human capital and workforce planning efforts after several years of delays. HUD's most recent workforce plan expired in 2009 and since then HUD has launched several planning efforts. According to HUD, these efforts were preempted by other important priorities, such as responding to the economic crisis. HUD undertook initiatives such as training key program office staff on the need to determine up front the staff HUD could afford to hire. In HUD's latest effort, a contractor is expected to complete human capital and workforce plans no later than fiscal year 2014. In June 2012, an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) review found that HUD's human capital and workforce planning activities did not always follow key principles for planning, implementing, and evaluating the results of human capital management policies and practices. For example, the review found that HUD's human resources policies and programs are not aligned with the organization's mission, strategic goals, or performance outcomes. As a result of these weaknesses, OPM concluded that HUD cannot continually assess and improve human capital planning and investments or measure the impact on mission accomplishment.
HUD is reexamining its resource management processes, which do not fully consider all standards identified by the National Academy of Public Administration in a 1999 report on ways that HUD could address its resource management challenges. GAO's review found that HUD provides central guidance on how work is defined and collected, and involves headquarters and field staff in the workload definition process. However, HUD has not created incentives or accountability for staff to report accurate workload data. GAO found that HUD's program offices selectively use the department's resource estimation and allocation process (REAP) to define workload and estimate resources and there is no widespread agreement that the process produces the quality of data needed to effectively estimate resources. As a result, staff are entering information into the Total Estimation and Allocation Mechanism (TEAM), REAP's validation component (which compares actual staff time to estimated staff time) on an inconsistent basis and officials report that the information is often not used to inform decision-making.
HUD's budget submission could more clearly explain the underlying rationale for HUD's budget request, even though primary users acknowledge that 2013 was an improvement over prior years. The primary users of the congressional budget justification (CBJ) are appropriations staff who said that CBJs from fiscal years 2008 to 2012 generally contained data tables for some program areas and did not always contain narrative that explained or justified the full-time equivalent request. According to HUD officials, HUD provided data tables because prior submissions with more detail did not prompt questions from Congress. Users of the CBJs GAO spoke to agreed that the fiscal year 2013 changes which provided more detail improved the clarity and utility of the justifications, but some still raised questions about the lack of adequate, consistent information available to help Congress make resource allocation decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of HUD follow through on developing and maintaining human capital and workforce plans that clearly incorporate key principles; create incentives for staff to report accurate data for managing staff resources; and consult with congressional decision makers to determine what additional information about resource decisions should be presented, and how, in its CBJ. HUD agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-285T | gao_GAO-04-285T_0 | Background
The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a long- standing concern. Limited Information Exists on the Effectiveness of Aviation Security Initiatives
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security, but it has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these initiatives, particularly its passenger screening program. Challenges in Strengthening TSA’s Passenger Screening Program
In addition to collecting performance data on the effectiveness of its passenger screening program, TSA can strengthen other areas of the program to help improve screeners’ ability to detect threat objects. Since that report was issued, TSA has identified a number of actions it has taken or plans to take to address these concerns. To help accomplish this, TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial screener training programs. Although TSA has deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. TSA officials acknowledged that their initial staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce, and reported that as they work to further reduce the screener workforce, they will solicit input from the Federal Security Directors as well as airport and air carrier officials. Assessment of Contract Screening Pilot Program
Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract screeners at five commercial airports. These challenges include implementing the new Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System; strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, air cargo, and general aviation security; managing the costs of aviation security initiatives; and managing human capital. Among the most significant are the following: concerns about travelers’ privacy rights and the safeguards established to protect passenger data; the accuracy of the databases being used by the CAPPS II system and whether inaccuracies could generate a high number of false positives and erroneously prevent or delay passengers from boarding their flights; the length of time that data will be retained by TSA; the availability of a redress process through which passengers could get erroneous information corrected; concerns that identify theft, in which someone steals relevant data and impersonates another individual to obtain that person’s low risk score, may not be detected and thereby negate the security benefits of the system; and obtaining the international cooperation needed for CAPPS II to be fully effective, as some countries consider the passenger information required by CAPPS II as a potential violation of their privacy laws. However, TSA faced challenges in meeting the mandated implementation date. In addition to fielding the EDS systems at airports, difficulties exist in integrating these systems into airport baggage-handling systems. TSA is taking some additional action to strengthen security at general aviation airports, including developing a risk-based self-assessment tool for general aviation airports to use in identifying security concerns. Aviation Security Funding
TSA faces two key funding and accountability challenges in securing the commercial aviation system: (1) paying for increased aviation security, and (2) ensuring that these costs are controlled. Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead. Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Commercial aviation has been a long-standing target for terrorists. Since the tragic attacts of September 11, 2001, substantial changes have been made to enhance security--including the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the federalization of the passenger screener workforce. However, despite these changes, vulnerabilities in aviation security continue to exist. Accordingly, GAO was asked to describe TSA's efforts to (1) measure the effectiveness of its aviation security initiatives, (2) strengthen its passenger screening program, and (3) address additional challenges in further enhancing aviation security.
What GAO Found
TSA has implemented numerous initiatives designed to enhance aviation security, but has collected limited information on the effectiveness of these initiatives in protecting commercial aircraft. Our recent work on passenger screening found that little testing or other data exist that measure the performance of screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA is taking steps to collect additional data, including developing a 5-year performance plan detailing numerous performance measures, as well as fielding the Threat Image Projection system and increasing screener testing. In addition to collecting performance data, TSA could further strengthen passenger screening by fully deploying recurrent and supervisory training programs, determining the appropriate levels of screeners at the nation's airports, and improving oversight of the contract screener pilot program. Although TSA has developed and deployed basic and remedial training programs, it has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory training programs. In addition, TSA acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances at the nation's airports, and that it has taken limited action to assess the performance of the pilot airports using private, versus federal, screeners. TSA is undertaking a number of actions to address these concerns, including strengthening its training program and awarding contracts to assess its staffing model and the performance of the contract pilot airports. TSA faces a number of other challenges as it continues to enhance aviation security. Significant challenges include implementing the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II), as well as strengthening baggage screening, airport perimeter and access controls, and air cargo and general aviation security. In implementing CAPPS II, TSA must ensure it addresses concerns surrounding travelers' privacy rights, the accuracy of databases used by CAPPS II, and obtaining international cooperation needed for the system to be fully operational. Additional challenges include integrating explosive detection systems into airport's in-line baggage handling systems, identifying cost-effective perimeter security technologies, effectively targeting air cargo for screening, and improving security at general aviation airports. Further, TSA faces challenges in funding increased aviation security measures and ensuring that these costs are controlled. |
gao_GAO-13-290 | gao_GAO-13-290_0 | Research has shown that WIC helps to improve birth and dietary outcomes and contain health care costs, and USDA considers WIC to be one of the nation’s most successful and cost-effective nutrition intervention programs. USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) oversees the program, which is administered by state and local agencies through approximately 10,000 clinic sites. In enacting WIC, Congress intended the program to provide women, infants, and young children with supplemental foods during critical times of growth and development. Federal law and regulations set the WIC income eligibility threshold at a maximum of 185 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, specify certain income sources that must be included and excluded when determining income eligibility, and require applicants to provide proof of income. For example, federal regulations indicate that state agencies have the flexibility to decide whether to use an applicant’s annual or current rate of income, as well as the specific time period that equals current income, when determining applicants’ income eligibility. The Exercise of Allowable Discretion Has Led to Some Variation in State and Local Income Eligibility Policies
The discretion granted by federal law, regulations, and guidance in certain areas of WIC income eligibility determination has resulted in some variation in policy across states and localities. According to national survey data, most states assess current income to determine eligibility for all applicants. In 5 of the 10 state WIC policy manuals we reviewed, 2 define current income as income from the last 30 days, 1 defines it as income from the last 60 days, and 2 others do not clearly define it. This is consistent with national survey data, which show that about half of the states pass some of the federally-allowed discretion for WIC income eligibility determination on to their local agencies. Another area in which states are given flexibility is in determining an applicant’s family size. State policies also vary to some extent as to the sources of income that are included when determining an applicant’s income eligibility for WIC. Because income data were not reported for an additional 7 percent of participants who were adjunctively eligible, we could not determine if these participants were also eligible for WIC solely due to adjunctive eligibility in that year. While studies generally find that Medicaid recipients are more likely to participate in WIC than others, some studies suggest that expanded Medicaid income eligibility has not had a substantial impact on WIC participation because eligible families with relatively higher incomes are less likely to participate in WIC than lower-income families. FNS Assists and Monitors States’ Income Eligibility Determinations; However, It Does Not Currently Use Monitoring Results to Target Assistance
FNS regularly provides assistance to states in administering WIC, though this assistance has generally not been focused on key income eligibility requirements, such as determination of family size and the time period of income assessed, in recent years. FNS regularly monitors state and local WIC administration through Management Evaluations conducted by its regional offices, and in one- third of the states reviewed since 2010, FNS found problems with income eligibility determination policies and procedures. Although FNS plans to begin regularly reviewing Management Evaluation findings at the national level to identify areas of program risk and target assistance accordingly, officials had not previously done so because findings were not easily compiled at FNS headquarters. In the case of WIC and Medicaid, two-thirds of WIC participants are now eligible for WIC benefits due to their receipt of Medicaid, and data show that increases in Medicaid’s income eligibility thresholds have enabled some women, infants, and children to receive WIC who would otherwise have been found ineligible. Because officials have said they plan to do such reviews in the future, a timeline for reviewing its monitoring results could better position FNS to demonstrate progress towards completing its planned actions. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve WIC oversight and administration, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct FNS to develop a timeline for reviewing Management Evaluation reports to assess program risks at a national level and target assistance to states. Appendix I: Other Datasets that Provide Information on WIC Participant Incomes
In addition to the national administrative data on participants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), two Census Bureau datasets have been used by other researchers to examine WIC participant characteristics, including incomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
WIC provides nutritious foods and assistance to low-income pregnant and postpartum women, infants, and young children. Research has shown that WIC helps to improve birth and dietary outcomes and contain health care costs. USDA's FNS oversees the program, which is administered by state and local agencies. While federal regulations define criteria that must be used to determine applicants' income eligibility for WIC, state and local agencies are also given some discretion. In addition, since 1989, federal law has allowed families who participate in other assistance programs, such as Medicaid, to be automatically income-eligible for WIC. GAO was asked to provide information on WIC income eligibility determination. GAO assessed: (1) How do state and local criteria for determining WIC income eligibility vary? (2) To what extent are individuals who would otherwise be ineligible for WIC deemed eligible due to their participation in other programs? (3) How does USDA assist and monitor state determination of WIC income eligibility? GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations; analyzed USDA's national data from 2010, recent survey findings, and monitoring reports; reviewed WIC policy manuals from 10 states chosen to provide population size and geographic diversity; and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
The discretion granted by federal law, regulations, and guidance in certain areas of income eligibility determination for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) has resulted in policy variation across states and localities. For example, while national survey data show that many states use an applicant's current income to determine income eligibility, GAO's review of 10 state policy manuals found that states differ in how they define the time period covered by current income, with some looking at income from the most recent 30 days and others using longer time periods. WIC administrators also have discretion in determining which members of an applicant's household should be considered part of the applicant's family, and both national data and state policy manuals suggest that states often provide local agencies with guidance in this area at the same time as they pass this flexibility to them. State policies also vary to some extent as to the sources of income that are included and excluded when determining an applicant's income eligibility for the program, according to national survey data.
GAO's analysis of administrative data found that 2 percent of WIC participants in 2010 were eligible solely because of their participation in another program, as they had incomes over the federal WIC income limit. Because income data were not available for an additional 7 percent of participants in 2010, GAO could not determine if these participants also had incomes over the federal WIC income limit. In recent years, some states have expanded Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women, infants, and children with incomes above the WIC income limit, and many WIC participants who are eligible for WIC due to their participation in another program receive Medicaid. However, the relationship between Medicaid expansions and WIC participation is unclear. While studies generally find that Medicaid recipients are more likely to participate in WIC than others, some suggest that expanded Medicaid income eligibility has not had a substantial effect on WIC participation because eligible families with relatively higher incomes are less likely to participate in WIC than lower-income families.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) regularly assists and monitors states' administration of WIC, but it does not review monitoring results at the national level to target assistance to states. Although FNS regularly provides assistance to states in administering WIC, this assistance has generally not been focused on key income eligibility requirements, such as determination of family size and the time period of income assessed, in recent years. However, through its monitoring reports from the last few years, FNS has identified problems with or concerns about income eligibility determination policies or procedures in one-third of the states reviewed. Although FNS officials said that they plan to begin regularly reviewing monitoring findings at the national level to identify areas of program risk and target assistance to states accordingly, officials did not indicate when those reviews will begin. A timeline for reviewing monitoring reports to assess national program risks could better position FNS to show progress in completing its planned actions. GAO recommends that USDA develop a timeline for reviewing its monitoring reports to assess national program risks and target assistance. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA develop a timeline for reviewing its monitoring reports to assess national program risks and target assistance. USDA agreed with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-95-174 | gao_NSIAD-95-174_0 | It used the remainder of the fee, along with other corporate resources, for capital equipment purchases, real and leasehold property improvements, and other unreimbursed expenditures. In fiscal year 1993, Aerospace spent about $11.5 million, or 74 percent, of the Air Force fee for sponsored research. A 1962 report to the President on government contracting for research and development, known as the Bell report, supported the continuation of fee payments for research because most nonprofit organizations must conduct some independent, self-initiated research if they are to attract and retain staff.On the other hand, an August 1965 congressional report on Aerospace noted that some research would normally be a reimbursable expense and therefore all of the research could be provided under reimbursement.Similarly, in December 1994, the DOD Inspector General concluded that FFRDC-sponsored research should be reimbursed as contract costs to the extent that is allowable and reasonable. Most recently, in May 1995, a DOD study, completed at the direction of the Congress, focused on ways to limit the use of fee. Unreimbursed Expenses
In fiscal year 1993, Aerospace spent $1.9 million from fee and other corporate funds on unreimbursed costs, that it considered ordinary and necessary to the FFRDC. Although the Air Force and Aerospace discuss Aerospace’s need for fee and planned use of fee by cost category, Aerospace exercises some discretion in spending the fee and determining what expenditures funded from fee are ordinary and necessary. Since Aerospace’s fee is based on its need, the manner in which Aerospace uses its corporate resources, including fee, in any one year may affect its need for an Air Force fee in the following year. Implementing this recommendation should provide the Air Force with a better basis for negotiating fee award. Further, DOD said it was actively working to improve the fee management process based on the findings and recommendations made in DOD’s May 1995 report on fee management, as well as work done by us and the DOD Inspector General. To determine the regulatory requirements governing the determination and use of fee, we reviewed applicable Office of Federal Procurement Policy guidance; FAR and DFARS provisions; Air Force operating instructions and procedures; and Air Force correspondence, contracts, and sponsoring agreement with Aerospace. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Aerospace Corporation used a $15.5-million contract fee provided by the Air Force in fiscal year 1993 to operate a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), focusing on the regulatory requirements governing the determination and use of this fee.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Aerospace spent $11.5 million, or 74 percent, of its $15.5-million fee for research; (2) Aerospace spent the remaining $4 million for capital equipment purchases, real and leasehold property improvements, and unreimbursed expenses; (3) even though the Air Force and Aerospace discuss Aerospace's specific fee needs and intended use as a basis for fee award, the contract contains the total fee amount; (4) once the Air Force awards the fee, Aerospace exercises some discretion over how to spend it and other sources of corporate funds, such as interest income and fee from other contracts; (5) the manner in which Aerospace spends its corporate funds in a given year can affect how much Air Force fee is needed in the following year; (6) in May 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report to the Congress on fee management at defense FFRDCs; (7) the report focused on ways to limit the use of fee and recommended, among other things, that: (a) defense FFRDC fee amounts be based on the contracting officer's determination of fee need and not on the application of weighted guidelines; (b) all allowable and allocable costs be moved from fee to the cost reimbursement portion of the contract; and (c) guidance be developed regarding what costs are to be considered ordinary and necessary to the operation of an FFRDC; and (8) DOD has indicated that it is working to improve the fee management process based on these recommendations, as well as the most recent GAO and DOD Inspector General work on this issue. |
gao_GAO-03-352G | gao_GAO-03-352G_0 | GAO’s Internal Control Standards provide the criteria for federal agencies to follow in establishing internal control over their operations, including T&A reporting. To do this the agency should have a well-defined organizational structure and flow of T&A information with clearly written and communicated policies and procedures setting forth the responsibilities of employees, timekeepers (if applicable), supervisors, and others regarding recording, examining, approving, and reporting on T&A information; apply available technology and concepts to achieve efficient and effective T&A system processes and controls in accordance with applicable legal and other requirements, this guidance, associated risks, and the environment in which the agency operates; and review and test all aspects of the T&A systems’ processing procedures and controls with sufficient scope, depth, and frequency to provide reasonable assurance that key procedures and controls are effective in meeting legal and other requirements, and that data integrity is maintained. Several alternatives exist for recording changes to established schedules. Alternative Workplace Arrangements
Alternative workplace arrangements involve working at locations other than the traditional government office. 2. 3. When deciding on an electronic signature system for T&A data, agencies should identify and/or develop and document the criteria used in the selection of the signature system and how the criteria and the selected system comply with the GPEA definition of an electronic signature. Streamlining the Payment Process While Maintaining Effective Internal Control. System Requirements for Managerial Cost Accounting Checklist. | What GAO Found
Technological advances and changes in workplace habits have increasingly affected the operating environment for time and attendance (T&A) reporting in recent years. Perhaps the most significant influence on changes to T&A reporting, however, is advancing technology and the accelerated adoption of automation driven largely by the need for increased efficiency, as promoted by the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA). Although focused on electronic systems that process information obtained from and provided to sources outside the government, GPEA encourages agencies to seek internal applications of paperless systems and use of electronic signatures. This document (1) provides agencies with the flexibility needed to streamline T&A reporting systems and reduce their costs while maintaining adequate internal control, (2) updates the requirements for electronic signature control, and (3) addresses the need for controls over alternative workplace arrangements. |
gao_GAO-06-51 | gao_GAO-06-51_0 | Scope and Methodology
To assess IRS’s 2005 filing season performance in the four key filing season activities—processing, telephone assistance, face-to-face assistance, and Web site—compared to goals, past performance, as well as initiatives intended to improve performance, we reviewed and analyzed IRS reports, testimonies, budget submissions, and other documents and data, including workload data and data from IRS’s current suite of balanced performance measures and annual goals; reviewed legislation, policies, and procedures; reviewed related TIGTA reports and interviewed TIGTA officials about IRS’s performance and initiatives; followed up on our recommendations made in prior filing season and tested for statistical differences between yearly changes for various observed operations at IRS’s Atlanta paper processing center, and Atlanta and Pittsburgh call centers, all of which are managed by IRS’s Wage and Investment operating division (W&I); 3 of IRS’s approximately 400 walk-in locations; and 3 of over 14,000 volunteer sites. However, stakeholders have noted information is lacking on the costs and burdens of mandating electronic filing. For the First Time, More Than Half of All Individual Tax Returns Were Filed Electronically
Electronic filing remains important to IRS because electronic returns cost less to process than paper returns. IRS Has Taken Actions to Encourage Electronic Filing but Will Not Meet Long-term Goal
Over the years, IRS has taken numerous actions to encourage electronic filing by taxpayers and tax practitioners, including making electronic filing free to most taxpayers via the Free File Alliance program on the IRS Web site; making the process totally paperless if a taxpayer uses a personal identification number to sign their tax return; making over 99 percent of all individual tax forms suitable for electronic allowing electronic payment of balance due payments; and surveying taxpayers and tax practitioners in response to a recommendation in our 2001 filing season report to determine why 40 million tax returns were prepared on a computer but filed on paper. Despite these actions, IRS is not on track to achieve its long-term goal of having 80 percent of all individual income tax returns filed electronically by 2007. The growing use of mandates by the states could lead to more discussion of mandates at the federal level. IRS Reduced Access to Telephone Assistors, but Accuracy of Tax Law and Account Responses Significantly Improved
IRS made a strategic decision to reduce access to its telephone service to accommodate a budget reduction because IRS officials viewed it as flexible area for absorbing such reductions without significantly affecting taxpayer service. IRS officials chose to reduce telephone access because they viewed it as a more flexible area to absorb budget reductions than, for example, processing. However, IRS lacks reliable data on quality that could be used to compare the two services and understand the impact of IRS’s strategy on taxpayers. The declines in walk-in usage were consistent with IRS’s strategy of reducing costly face-to-face assistance in favor of other service options such as the telephone and Web site. However, at this time IRS does not have a schedule for finalizing its long- term goals. Because of the difficulty, IRS has experienced delays in finalizing its proposed goals. IRS Has Taken Numerous Actions to Deal with the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but Implications for the 2006 Filing Season Are Not Yet Known
IRS has taken numerous actions to address the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, including assessing employee and infrastructure needs, providing tax relief, and providing assistance to federal partners. However, because of overall budget constraints and its strategy of shifting resources from service to enforcement, IRS will be challenged to continue improving service. Walk-in & volunteer sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the filing season, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processes about 130 million individual tax returns, issues refunds, and responds to millions of inquiries. Budget cuts combined with IRS's strategy of shifting resources from taxpayer service to enforcement make providing quality service a challenge. GAO was asked to assess IRS's 2005 filing season performance compared to past years and 2005 goals in the processing of paper and electronic tax returns, telephone service, face-to-face assistance, and Web site service. GAO also examined whether IRS has long-term goals to help assess progress and guide in making decisions. Finally, GAO summarized IRS's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and their possible effects on IRS's performance.
What GAO Found
IRS improved some filing season services. According to officials, IRS made a strategic decision to reduce others to accommodate budget cuts. IRS's processing of returns and refunds went smoothly. Accuracy of responses to telephone inquiries about tax law and about taxpayers' accounts significantly improved. And, IRS's Web site performed well. On the other hand, in response to budget cuts, IRS reduced access to telephone assistors, resulting in longer wait-times and more callers hanging up. IRS officials viewed telephone access as a more flexible area for absorbing budget cuts than, for example, processing. The number of taxpayers visiting IRS walk-in sites continued to decline, while the number of tax returns prepared at volunteer sites increased. This is consistent with IRS's strategy of reducing the number of its employees providing expensive face-to-face assistance. IRS continues to lack reliable data on the accuracy of walk-in and volunteer site assistance but has plans in place to improve quality measurement. For the first time, more than half of individual tax returns were filed electronically, which is important because electronic filing has allowed IRS to reduce resources devoted to processing paper returns. However, despite IRS's actions to promote electronic filing, it is not on track to achieve its long-term goal of having 80 percent of such returns filed electronically by 2007. State mandated electronic filing has proven effective at encouraging electronic filing at the federal level and one IRS advisory group has recommended a federal mandate. However, little is known about the costs and burdens of such mandates. IRS has been developing long-term goals to help assess agency progress and understand the impact of budget decisions. Because of the difficulty in developing goals, IRS has experienced delays and lacks a schedule for finalizing those goals. IRS is taking numerous actions to assist taxpayers affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Most of the impact on IRS, such as more questions from taxpayers, will be felt during the 2006 filing season and beyond. |
gao_GAO-04-234 | gao_GAO-04-234_0 | Court and District Procedures Were Used to Appoint New Judges, but Three Issues—One Related to the Qualification Requirements— Delayed Some Appointments
Although the Superior Court and the District followed established procedures to appoint new judges to the Family Court, an issue related to the qualification requirements and two other factors deferred the appointment of 2 of the 3 associate judges sought by the Superior Court. The other two candidates nominated by the President for the Family Court included a magistrate judge serving in Family Court and an attorney with the D.C. Public Defender Service, who was found during a Senate background investigation to have had delinquent federal and District tax filing issues a few years prior to his nomination, though this was not in violation of the Family Court Act. After further questioning, the committee determined that the training and delinquent tax issues were adequately resolved. Almost All Cases Have Been Transferred to the Family Court, and Timeframes for Resolving Pending Case Proceedings Have Decreased
To consolidate all abuse and neglect cases in the Family Court, the D.C. Family Court Act required that judges in other divisions of the Superior Court transfer their abuse and neglect cases into the Family Court. Progress Has Been Made in Procuring Permanent Physical Space for Family Court, but the New Space Will Not Consolidate All Court Operations
The D.C. Courts, comprising all components of the District’s judiciary branch, has made progress in procuring permanent space for the Family Court, but all Family Court operations will not be consolidated under the current plan. Superior Court and the District Are Making Progress toward Exchanging Data among Their Computer Systems, but the District Has Not Yet Resolved Several Critical Issues
The Superior Court and the District of Columbia are exchanging some data and making progress toward developing a broader capability to share data among their respective information systems. In August 2003, the Superior Court began using the Integrated Justice Information System (IJIS), which is intended to help the Superior Court better manage its caseload and share data with District agencies. While the District has made progress, it has not yet fully addressed or resolved several critical issues we reported in August 2002. This includes exchanges of data to help meet information needs until the final data exchange capability with District agencies is developed and implemented. OCTO plans to address these issues as part of its current efforts, and incorporate the solutions into OCTO’s modernization plans and activities. Other contacts and staff acknowledgements are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix discusses in more detail the scope and methodology for assessing the progress of the Family Court since its transition from the Family Division of the Superior Court, as mandated by the D.C. Family Court Act, to determine: (1) the procedures used to make initial judicial appointments to the Family Court and the effect of qualification requirements on the length of time to make these appointments; (2) the timeliness of the Family Court in meeting established timeframes for transferring and resolving pending cases, and the impact of magistrate judges on the workload of judges and other court personnel; (3) the D.C. Court’s progress in procuring permanent physical space; and (4) the Superior Court and relevant District of Columbia agencies’ progress in sharing data from their computer systems. In addition, we analyzed Family Court data on the barriers to finding permanent homes for children. | Why GAO Did This Study
The D.C. Family Court Act (P.L. 107-114) mandated that GAO examine the performance of the D.C. Family Court. GAO addressed the following objectives: (1) What procedures were used to make judicial appointments to the Family Court and what effect did qualification requirements have on appointment timeframes? (2) How timely was the Family Court in meeting established timeframes for transferring and resolving abuse and neglect cases, and what impact did magistrate judges have on the workload of judges and other personnel? (3) What progress has the D.C. Courts made in procuring permanent space? And (4) What progress have the Superior Court and District agencies made in sharing data from their computer systems? To address these objectives, GAO analyzed court data on its timeliness in resolving cases, reviewed the Family Court Act, applicable District laws, and reports required by the act; reviewed documents regarding the Family Court's progress in acquiring permanent space and those related to sharing data from the computer systems of the Superior Court and the District; and interviewed relevant District, Superior Court, and Family Court officials. In commenting on this report, the Superior Court agreed with our conclusions and cited additional progress. The Deputy Mayor for Children, Youth, Families, and Elders clarified the roles and responsibilities of various District offices.
What GAO Found
The Superior Court and the District of Columbia used established procedures to appoint magistrate and associate judges to the Family Court, but an issue related to qualification requirements and other factors delayed appointments. One nominee expressed some reluctance to meeting Family Court training requirements. A second nominee was found to have had delinquent tax filing issues a few years prior to his nomination. The Senate Committee charged with approving the nominees determined that these issues were adequately resolved, but chose to defer their confirmation until other Superior Court nominees were approved. The Family Court met its statutory deadlines for transferring cases into the court from other Superior Court divisions and closed 620, or 19 percent, of these cases. The court has also decreased the timeframes for resolving abuse and neglect matters and magistrate judges have played a key role in handling cases. Several factors, however, such as shortages of substance abuse treatment services, posed barriers to achieving Family Court goals. To accommodate the operations of the Family Court, D.C. Courts--comprised of all components of the District's judiciary branch--has made progress in procuring permanent space for the Family Court. This new space, expected to be complete in late 2009, will consolidate 76 percent of the Family Court functions and associated personnel. The Superior Court and the District of Columbia have made progress in exchanging data from their respective information systems. In August 2003, the Superior Court implemented the Integrated Justice Information System, which is used to manage its cases and exchange data with other agencies. Although the District has developed a model to enable the exchange of data between various District agencies and the court, it has not fully resolved several critical issues we reported in August 2002. The District plans to address these issues as it incorporates solutions into the plans it is developing to modernize District agency computer systems. |
gao_GAO-17-660 | gao_GAO-17-660_0 | 1). These funds support schools and districts with high concentrations of students from low-income families. Stakeholders and Selected States View ESSA’s Accountability Provisions as Flexible
Stakeholders See ESSA as Flexible and Said Some States Are Making More Changes to Their Accountability Systems Than Others
Representatives of all nine national stakeholder groups we spoke with saw ESSA’s accountability provisions as somewhat flexible, with most indicating that ESSA strikes a good balance between flexibility and requirements. One stakeholder said, for example, that ESSA “threads the needle very well” between giving states flexibility in designing their accountability systems and placing requirements on states to help ensure that all children have an opportunity to get a good education. Ohio’s and California’s Approaches to Incorporating ESSA Provisions into Their Accountability Systems
Ohio and California, the two states we visited, illustrate how different states are using the flexibilities in ESSA to develop accountability systems that are tailored to meet state needs as well as ESSA requirements for each of the four key components of state accountability systems: determine long-term goals, develop performance indicators, differentiate schools, and identify and assist low performers. Differentiate Schools (distinguishing between levels of performance) accountability system, including the four academic indicators, for all students and for each subgroup of students; and include differentiation of any school in which any subgroup of students is determined by the state to be consistently under-performing. Under the proposal, schools would receive a letter grade on each indicator. Ohio state officials told us that they also intend to roll up indicator scores into an overall letter grade for schools in 2018. California officials said they plan to distinguish performance of schools and student subgroups by using a dashboard in which school and student subgroup performance would be color-coded based on each of six state indicators. Unlike Ohio, California does not plan to aggregate the indicators into overall scores for schools and student subgroups. In contrast, reporting individual indicators allows key distinctions to be maintained in performance across a variety of factors. Developing and Implementing State Monitoring Plans Is a Key Next Step for Education in ESSA Implementation
Given current timelines, Education officials said that the department is currently focused on the review and approval process for state plans and providing assistance to states in developing their plans. Under ESSA, the Secretary of Education is responsible for establishing a peer-review process to assist in the review of state plans, and for approving state plans that meet the requirements of ESSA. Education officials told us that they are developing monitoring protocols that they will pilot with eight or nine states in early 2018. These protocols are intended to guide in-depth reviews of state activities related to ESSA implementation. ESSA requires states and Education to report annually on specific aspects of ESSA implementation and states to submit significant changes to their plans to Education for review (see sidebar for a summary of these requirements). Annual report to Congress: ESSA also requires the Secretary of Education to submit an annual report to specified congressional committees that provides both national and state-level data on the information collected from the states’ reports. On June 16, 2017 we provided a draft of this report to Education for comment. Education provided technical comments on our draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal, state, and local governments spent about $640 billion in 2015 to educate nearly 50 million public school children in the United States. ESSA, enacted in December 2015, reauthorized the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. To receive federal education funds for school districts with high concentrations of students from low-income families, ESSA requires states to have accountability systems that meet certain requirements, but gives states flexibility in how they design their systems.
GAO was asked to review states' early experiences with ESSA. This report examines (1) selected stakeholders' and states' views of ESSA's flexibilities as states redesign accountability systems, and (2) Education's next steps in implementing ESSA.
GAO interviewed representatives of nine prominent national education stakeholder groups, selected for their knowledge about state accountability systems; met with education officials in California and Ohio—states that were among those stakeholders cited as offering differing approaches to developing their systems; interviewed Department of Education officials; reviewed relevant federal laws and guidance; and reviewed accountability system guidance from California and Ohio and these states' draft state plans.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Education provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
According to most of the nine education stakeholder groups GAO interviewed and officials in the two states GAO visited, the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) strikes a good balance between flexibility to meet state needs and ESSA requirements. Accountability systems measure student and school performance to identify and assist low-performers. States are currently developing plans for accountability systems under ESSA. According to stakeholders, some states are using ESSA's flexibilities to significantly change their accountability systems while others are making more limited changes. Changes stakeholders discussed pertained mostly to four key components (see figure). GAO visited California and Ohio and these two states reported using ESSA's flexibilities to distinguish between levels of school performance, among other things. For example, Ohio plans to assign letter grades to schools on each of six performance indicators. Under Ohio's proposal, schools will also receive overall letter grades beginning in 2018. California plans to distinguish performance with grades for performance on each of six state indicators. Their proposed system will not provide overall scores for schools. California officials said reporting on individual indicators will allow them to show key distinctions in performance that an overall score could mask.
Four Key Components of Accountability Systems Under the Every Student Succeeds Act
Education officials said next steps in implementing ESSA are the review and approval of ESSA-required state plans, and to continue to provide technical assistance to states. Officials also said that they are developing monitoring protocols for in-depth reviews of states' ESSA-related activities and will pilot them in early 2018. ESSA also includes certain reporting and review requirements, for example, (1) annual state reports to Education on student and school performance; (2) annual Education reports to Congress on state reported data; and (3) approval by the Secretary of Education of significant changes to state plans. |
gao_GAO-13-383 | gao_GAO-13-383_0 | Federal Grants Management Reforms
In the past 14 years, since the passage of P.L. 106-107, there has been a series of legislative- and executive-sponsored initiatives aimed at simplifying aspects of the grants management life cycle; minimizing the administrative burden for grantees, particularly those that obtain grants from multiple federal agencies; and ensuring accountability by improving the transparency of the federal grants life cycle. Process Initiatives Helped Reform Aspects of the Grants Management Life Cycle, but Management and Coordination Challenges Could Hinder Further Progress
Since the passage of P.L. 106-107, OMB and other entities involved with federal grants management have overseen several ongoing initiatives intended to address the challenges grantees encounter throughout the grants life cycle. These initiatives include consolidating and revising grants management circulars, simplifying the pre-award phase, promoting shared IT solutions for grants management, and improving the timeliness of grant closeout and reducing undisbursed balances. However, management and coordination challenges could hinder the progress of some of these initiatives. Promoting Post-Award Shared Information Technology Solutions for Grants Management
Promoting shared information technology (IT) solutions for managing grants—an original goal of P.L. However, it is unclear whether promoting shared IT systems for grants management is still a priority, and if so, which agency is in charge of this effort. Since 2012, there has been uncertainty regarding the status of and future plans for the operational elements of what was the GMLOB. After receiving a draft copy of this report for its review and comment, OMB issued a “Controller Alert” on April 29, 2013, announcing that, for fiscal year 2013, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Innovation and Transformation (FIT) will serve as Managing Partner and the Program Management Office for the FMLOB. In its April 29, 2013, Controller Alert, OMB stated that in accordance with OMB’s guidance on shared services, the Treasury’s FIT will “lead efforts to transform federal financial management, reduce costs, increase transparency, and improve delivery of agencies’ missions by operating at scale, relying on common standards, shared services, and using state-of-the-art technology.” However, OMB’s Controller Alert did not address whether the roles of NSF, HHS, and Education would change as a result of FIT’s leadership in this area. 2. 3. Agency officials involved with current grants management reforms told us that the roles and responsibilities for various streamlining initiatives are not always clear. Members of the grantee community told us they continue to have concerns because they do not see a role for themselves as OMB and COFAR develop priorities for reforming federal grants management. Although COFAR recently identified some priorities, it has not yet released to the public an implementation plan that includes performance targets, mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made towards stated goals, and goal leaders who can be held accountable for those goals. Although OMB officials provided us with some additional and updated information in their comment letter that we were unable to assess or validate, they agreed with our recommendations that OMB and COFAR need to develop an implementation schedule and mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and report on results, clarify roles and responsibilities for the various streamlining initiatives and engagement with federal stakeholders, and develop an effective two-way communication strategy that includes the grant recipient community. To accomplish this, we reviewed (1) what the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal grants governance bodies have done since the passage of P.L. 106-107 in 1999 to reform grants management processes and reduce unnecessary burdens on applicants, grantees, and federal agencies; and (2) what actions, if any, have been taken to address what we have found to be persistent management challenges, such as the lack of a comprehensive plan for implementing reforms, confusion over roles and responsibilities among grants governance bodies, and inconsistent two-way communication with stakeholders. We also reviewed action plans created by former and current interagency councils with responsibility for overseeing grants management reforms, as well as our previous work and other literature on grants management initiatives and the related challenges that have undermined the government’s ability to simplify grants management processes, reduce unnecessary burden on applicants, grantees, and federal agencies, and improve delivery of services to the public. We also reviewed our previous work on collaborative mechanisms and management consolidation efforts. OMB replaced the GPC in 2011 with the Council on Financial Assistance Reform (COFAR). OMB charged COFAR with identifying emerging issues, challenges, and opportunities in grants management and policy and providing recommendations to OMB on policies and actions to improve grants administration. It provided a number of strategies such as establishing annual performance targets for timely grant close out. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously identified several management challenges that have hindered grants management reform efforts. GAO was asked to review recent federal grants management reform efforts. GAO reviewed (1) what OMB and other federal grants governance bodies have done since the passage of P.L. 106-107 to reform grants management processes, and (2) what actions, if any, have been taken to address what GAO has found to be persistent management challenges. GAO reviewed relevant legislation, OMB circulars and guidance, action plans of interagency councils responsible for overseeing grants management reforms, and previous GAO work and other literature on grants management reforms. GAO also reviewed its previous work on collaborative mechanisms and management consolidation efforts. GAO also interviewed officials from OMB, grant-making agencies, and associations representing a variety of grantee types.
What GAO Found
In the past 14 years, since the passage of the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-107), there has been a series of legislative- and executive-sponsored initiatives aimed at reforming aspects of the grants management life cycle. Recently, a new grants reform governance body, the Council on Financial Assistance Reform (COFAR), replaced two former federal boards--the Grants Policy Committee (GPC) and Grants Executive Board (GEB). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) created COFAR and charged it with identifying emerging issues, challenges, and opportunities in grants management and policy and providing recommendations to OMB on policies and actions to improve grants administration.
In addition to this new governance structure, OMB and other entities involved with federal grants management are overseeing several ongoing reform initiatives intended to address the challenges grantees encounter throughout the grants life cycle. These initiatives include consolidating and revising grants management circulars, simplifying the pre-award phase, promoting shared information technology (IT) solutions such as the development of shared end-to-end grants management systems, and improving the timeliness of grant close out and reducing undisbursed balances. Management and coordination challenges could hinder the progress of some of these initiatives. For example, although promoting shared IT solutions for grants management--an original goal of P.L. 106-107--remains a priority, there has been uncertainty regarding the status of this initiative and future plans for it. The lead agency for this initiative changed several times since 2012, and it has been unclear at times whether promoting shared IT systems for grants management would continue to be a priority, and if so, which agency was in charge. After receiving GAO's draft report for review, OMB issued a "Controller Alert" on April 29, 2013, announcing that the Department of the Treasury would lead efforts to transform federal financial management by, among other things, relying on common standards, shared services, and using state-of-the-art technology.
Although COFAR has recently identified several high-level priority goals for 2013 through 2015, it faces some of the same management challenges identified in previous GAO reports on grants management, such as the lack of a comprehensive plan for implementing reforms, confusion over roles and responsibilities among grants governance bodies, and inconsistent communication and outreach to the grantee community. COFAR has not yet released to the public an implementation plan that includes key elements such as performance targets and goal leaders for each goal, and mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made toward stated goals. Furthermore, agencies involved with current grants management reforms are not always clear on their roles and responsibilities for various streamlining initiatives which may cause such initiatives to languish. Finally, GAO found that members of the grant recipient community continue to voice concern because they do not see a role for themselves as OMB and COFAR develop priorities for reforming federal grants management. In the comments it provided on April 29, 2013, OMB described actions it is taking to address these challenges, such as using a more detailed project plan internally and scheduling outreach events with federal partners and members of the grantee community.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB: (1) develop and make publiclyavailable an implementation schedule that includes performance targets, goal leaders who can be held accountable for each goal, and mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (2) clarify the roles and responsibilities for various streamlining initiatives; and (3) develop an effective two-way communication strategy with relevant stakeholders. OMB generally concurred with our recommendations and provided additional and updated information, which was incorporated into the report as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-96-51 | gao_HEHS-96-51_0 | Introduction
The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs are the two largest federal programs providing cash and medical assistance to people with severe, long-term disabilities, at an annual cost of more than $100 billion. One such provision authorized the plan for achieving self-support (PASS) program as part of the SSI program in 1972. 2.1.) All 4 million DI beneficiaries are potentially eligible for a PASS. Participants Are Largely DI Beneficiaries; Many Gain SSI Eligibility Through PASS Program
The PASS program encompasses primarily DI beneficiaries, who can exclude their DI benefits under a PASS. Among the SSI population, former PASS program participants were more likely than other SSI recipients to have sufficient earnings to reduce their SSI benefits, but few left the rolls as a result of their earnings. However, applicants are not required to use this form. Compliance Monitoring Is Infrequent and Nonstandardized
The periodic reviews SSA requires to determine whether PASS program participants are complying with their plans are infrequent and nonstandardized. Few Penalties Exist for Willful Noncompliance
Guidance to field office staff does not make a distinction between willful noncompliance and noncompliance for other reasons. Conclusions, Matter for Congressional Consideration, and Recommendations
SSA has done a poor job implementing and managing the PASS program. Finally, SSA has not addressed internal control weaknesses that have left the program vulnerable to abuse and undermined program integrity. We recommend that the Commissioner take the following actions, or, if necessary, seek legislation to do the following: clarify the goals of the PASS program; decide whether fees paid to third parties should continue to be disregarded when calculating benefit payment amounts and whether the amount of disregarded fees should be capped; standardize the PASS program, including the application, reporting guidelines on expenditures for compliance reviews, and informational and educational materials for PASS preparers; improve support to field staff, including enhancing their ability to evaluate the feasibility of proposed work goals, and requiring PASSes to incorporate additional data relevant to determining their feasibility, including the applicant’s disability, previous work experience, if any, and education; gather additional management data on PASS program participation and impact, and use these data to evaluate the impact of PASS program participation on employment; and strengthen internal controls by establishing more specific guidelines on acceptable PASS expenditures, developing penalties for willful noncompliance with the PASS program, including a determination of whether subsequent plans are permissible, examining the role of third-party preparers, including their potential financial conflicts of interest, and considering the strength of existing safeguards against abuse when determining the appropriate limits on the length and number of PASSes individual participants may have. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) Program, focusing on: (1) SSA management of the program and its impact on employment of the disabled; and (2) the program's vulnerability to abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SSA has poorly implemented and managed the PASS program and has not given its field office staff adequate program guidance, support, or training; (2) the diversity of individual plans' goals and expenditures reflects the diversity of the disability population; (3) the PASS program has grown over the past 5 years as program awareness has increased, and further growth is predicted because millions of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries are eligible; (4) about 40 percent of PASS program participants, who are mainly DI beneficiaries, would not be eligible for SSI benefits if some of their income was not excluded under PASS; (5) the impact of the PASS program cannot be accurately determined because SSA does not have basic data on program participation and has not defined clear program goals; (6) former PASS participants are more likely than other SSI beneficiaries to have earnings that reduce their SSI benefits, but few have left the SSI and DI rolls; (7) PASS participation increases SSI benefit outlays by about $30 million annually; (8) the PASS program is vulnerable to abuse because internal controls are weak, guidelines are vague, applications are not uniform, there is no limit on individuals' participation, compliance monitoring is infrequent and nonstandardized, and few penalties exist for willful noncompliance; and (9) SSA has not addressed the potential financial conflicts of interest caused by professional PASS preparers. |
gao_GAO-04-814 | gao_GAO-04-814_0 | Moreover, eligible survivors are also entitled to recurring Social Security benefit payments. For three of the four hypothetical situations, the recurring payments for deceased servicemembers’ survivors exceed the recurring payments that at least one-half of the states provide. In contrast, the recurring payments for deceased servicemembers’ survivors in the same three situations are lower than those that at least one-half of the cities provide. The military provides more types of noncash benefits to survivors of deceased servicemembers than do civilian government entities provide to the survivors of deceased general government employees. Servicemembers’ Survivors and General Government Employees’ Survivors Receive Comparable Types of Cash Survivor Benefits, but Benefit Amounts Differ
Survivors of deceased servicemembers and most deceased general government employees receive lump sum payments through comparable sources—Social Security, a death gratuity, burial expenses, and life insurance; the federal government, 16 states, and the District of Columbia provide additional lump sum payments through their respective retirement plans (see table 1 for a summary and appendix II for descriptions of how the payments are calculated for each entity). The military’s death gratuity ranks above that paid by 55 of the 61 civilian government entities. The military and the 9 cities do not provide a lump sum survivor benefit as part of their retirement plans. For the four hypothetical situations, the lump sum payments—excluding Social Security—for survivors of deceased servicemembers are almost always higher than those for the survivors of deceased civilian government employees in general. In most instances, it would take years of inflation-adjusted recurring payments for the survivors of those general state and city government employees to reach the total lump sum and recurring payment benefits provided to the survivors of the servicemembers. Servicemembers’ Survivors Receive More Noncash Benefits Than Do General Government Employees’ Survivors
The military provides more noncash survivor benefits than do the federal, state, and city governments, with some benefits being comparable in type and others differing among the entities (see table 4 for examples of the most common benefits). Most Federal, State, and City Governments Supplement Their General Survivor Benefits for Employees in High-Risk Occupations
The survivors of civilian government employees in selected high-risk occupations may receive supplemental benefits beyond those that the entities provide to government employees in general (see table 5 for a summary and appendix IV for the descriptions of how the payments are calculated for each entity). Employees in selected high-risk occupations in the 61 civilian government entities may receive an additional cash benefit through the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits (PSOB) Program. When these supplemental cash benefits are added to the benefits for general government employees, the total cash benefits that the entities provide to the survivors of deceased civilian government employees in high-risk occupations may be higher than those provided to deceased servicemembers’ survivors. Other staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent that survivor benefits provided to servicemembers’ survivors differ from those provided to federal, state, and city general government employees’ survivors, we gathered benefits information that covered the active duty military and the largest group of employees for each of 61 civilian government entities: the federal government, 50 states and the District of Columbia, and the 9 cities with a population of at least 1 million. Although the civilian government entities typically provide benefits to survivors of those who die while not in the line of duty, those benefits are not separately identified from the line-of-duty benefits in this report. Cash Survivor Benefits Provided by Government Entities for Employees in High-Risk Occupations
This appendix describes the cash benefits available to eligible survivors of civilian government employees who die in the line of duty while performing in the high-risk occupations of law enforcement or firefighting. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 noted that it was the sense of the Congress that "the sacrifices made by the members of the Armed Forces are significant and are worthy of meaningful expressions of gratitude by the United States, especially in cases of sacrifice through loss of life." In addition to offering expressions of gratitude, the government offers a variety of benefits, including Social Security benefits, to survivors of servicemembers who die while on active duty. GAO was asked to address two questions: (1) To what extent are the survivor benefits provided to servicemembers different from those provided to federal, state, and city government employees in general and (2) To what extent do federal, state, and city governments supplement their general survivor benefits for employees in high-risk occupations?
What GAO Found
The military provides survivor benefits that are comparable in type but not in amount to those provided by 61 civilian government entities (federal government, 50 states and the District of Columbia, and 9 cities with populations of at least 1 million) when employees die in the line of duty. Social Security payments, a death gratuity, burial expenses, and life insurance are four types of lump sum survivor benefits provided by the military and at least some civilian government entities; the federal government and some states additionally provide a lump sum payment through their retirement plans. Recurring payments are also provided by Social Security to the survivors for deceased servicemembers and most deceased government employees in the 61 civilian government entities GAO studied. Other types of recurring payments are specific to the military or civilian government entities. GAO identified two programs with recurring payments for the military and two other types of programs for the civilian government entities. For the four hypothetical situations GAO used to examine the amount of cash payments provided to survivors, survivors of deceased servicemembers almost always obtain higher lump sums than do the survivors of the deceased employees from the 61 civilian government entities. The amount of recurring payments to deceased servicemembers' survivors in three of the four situations exceeds those provided by the federal government, typically exceeds those provided by at least one-half of the states, but are typically less than those provided by over one-half the cities. The military also provides more types of noncash survivor benefits than do civilian government entities, with some benefits being comparable in type and others differing among the entities. The survivors of civilian government employees in some high-risk occupations may receive supplemental benefits--a death gratuity, higher life insurance, higher benefits from the retirement plan, or a combination of the three--beyond those that the entities provide to civilian government employees in general. For example, survivors of federal, state, and city government law enforcement officers and firefighters who die in the line of duty may be entitled to a lump sum payment of more than $267,000 under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act. Further, 34 states and 5 cities provide survivors of employees in high-risk occupations with additional cash benefits that are not available to survivors of state and city employees in general. The addition of these supplemental cash benefits to those provided to the survivors of deceased general government employees can result in lump sum and recurring payments being generally higher for survivors of government employees in high-risk occupations than for servicemembers' survivors. |
gao_GAO-11-710 | gao_GAO-11-710_0 | USAID also provides direct assistance by awarding funds to the multilateral World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The United States More Than Tripled Its Awards of Direct Assistance to Afghanistan in 2010 through USAID and DOD
The United States more than tripled its awards and contributions of USAID and DOD direct assistance funds to the Afghan government in fiscal year 2010 compared with fiscal year 2009 (see fig. As shown in table 2, USAID awards of direct assistance to Afghanistan increased from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to more than $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. DOD direct assistance to MOD and MOI, including contributions to LOTFA, grew from about $195 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $576 million in fiscal year 2010. However, we found that USAID’s policies for assessing direct assistance risks do not require preaward risk assessments in all cases. USAID has established various financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with ministries that go beyond what is required by its policies. DOD personnel in Afghanistan have assessed the risk of providing funds to MOD and MOI through quarterly reviews of each ministry’s capacity. Similarly, USAID documented only three instances in which it had approved any of the Ministry of Public Health’s 19 prefinancing contract documents. USAID has taken steps to ensure that bilateral direct assistance awards are audited. USAID Has Not Consistently Assessed Risks of Contributions to ARTF, While DOD Has Recently Established Risk Assessment Guidance for LOTFA
USAID and DOD generally rely on the World Bank and UNDP to ensure accountability over U.S. direct assistance provided multilaterally through ARTF and LOTFA. For example, in March 2010, USAID did not conduct a risk assessment before awarding an additional $1.3 billion to the World Bank for ARTF. During our review, DOD established procedures in June 2011 requiring that it assess risks before contributing funds to LOTFA. World Bank and UNDP controls over ARTF and LOTFA funds include the use of hired monitoring agents to help ensure that ministries use donor contributions as intended. However, these controls face challenges posed by security conditions and by weaknesses in Afghan ministries. For example, the ARTF monitoring agent resigned in June 2011 due to security concerns, while weaknesses in MOI’s systems for paying wages to Afghan police challenge UNDP efforts to ensure that MOI is using LOTFA funds as intended. USAID Has Not Consistently Assessed the Risk of Relying on the World Bank for Ensuring the Accountability of Its ARTF Contributions
USAID has not consistently followed its own policies for assessing the risk associated with its awards to the World Bank for ARTF, which have increased from $5 million in 2002 to a total of more than $2 billion. The World Bank reports that it is seeking a new monitoring agent, has received many expressions of interest, and does not anticipate a gap in monitoring. To safeguard U.S. direct assistance funds, it is important that (1) the USAID Administrator follow through on his July 2010 commitment to Congress to assess risks associated with each Afghan government entity before awarding funds, (2) USAID consistently implement controls it establishes in bilateral direct assistance agreements, and (3) USAID consistently adhere to its risk assessment policies for multilateral trust funds in awarding funds to ARTF. With regard to our recommendation that USAID establish and implement policies requiring USAID staff to complete risk assessments before awarding bilateral direct assistance funds to Afghan government entities in all cases, USAID stated that its existing policies and procedures in ADS already include requirements for risk assessment for each form of government-to-government assistance mechanism. Although USAID policy in ADS includes some form of risk assessment for the funding mechanisms in use in Afghanistan, it does not require that a risk assessment be conducted in all cases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have increased direct assistance, (2) USAID’s and DOD’s steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) USAID’s and DOD’s steps to ensure accountability for multilateral direct assistance. To assess steps taken by USAID and DOD to help ensure the accountability of their direct assistance to Afghan ministries through multilateral trust funds, we reviewed the policies and practices the agencies use to assess risks associated with direct assistance and to establish control mechanisms over the use of direct assistance funds. We also reviewed United Nations Development Program (UNDP) documents and reports concerning the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and interviewed DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, as well as UNDP officials in Kabul. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) award direct assistance to Afghanistan, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds that provide funds through the Afghan national budget. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which the United States, through USAID and DOD, has increased direct assistance, (2) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for direct assistance via multilateral trust funds for Afghanistan. GAO reviewed USAID, DOD, and multilateral documents and met with U.S. officials and staffs of multilateral trust funds in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The United States more than tripled its awards of direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010 compared with fiscal year 2009. USAID awards of direct assistance grew from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. USAID awarded $1.3 billion to the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in fiscal year 2010, of which the bank has received $265 million as of July 2011. DOD direct assistance to two ministries grew from about $195 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $576 million in fiscal year 2010, including contributions to fund police salaries through the United Nations Development Program-administered (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). USAID and DOD have taken steps to help ensure the accountability of their bilateral direct assistance to Afghan ministries, but USAID has not required risk assessments in all cases before awarding these funds. For example, USAID did not complete preaward risk assessments in two of the eight cases GAO identified. Although current USAID policy does not require preaward risk assessments in all cases, these two awards were made after the USAID Administrator's July 2010 commitment to Congress that USAID would not proceed with direct assistance to an Afghan public institution before assessing its capabilities. In these two cases, USAID awarded $46 million to institutions whose financial management capacity were later assessed as "high risk." USAID has established various financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements, such as requiring separate bank accounts and audits of the funds. USAID has generally complied with these controls, but GAO identified instances in which it did not. For example, in only 3 of 19 cases did USAID document that it had approved one ministry's prefinancing contract documents. DOD personnel in Afghanistan assess the risk of providing funds to two security ministries through quarterly reviews of each ministry's capacity. DOD officials also review records of ministry expenditures to assess whether ministries have used funds as intended. DOD established formal risk assessment procedures in June 2011, following GAO discussions with DOD about initial findings. USAID and DOD generally rely on the World Bank and UNDP to ensure accountability over U.S. direct assistance provided multilaterally through ARTF and LOTFA, but USAID has not consistently complied with its risk assessment policies in awarding funds to ARTF. During GAO's review, DOD established procedures in June 2011 requiring that it assess risks before contributing funds to LOTFA. The World Bank and UNDP use ARTF and LOTFA monitoring agents to help ensure that ministries use contributions as intended. However, security conditions and weaknesses in Afghan ministries pose challenges to their oversight. For example, the ARTF monitoring agent recently resigned due to security concerns. The World Bank is now seeking a new monitoring agent and does not anticipate a gap in monitoring. In addition, weaknesses in the Ministry of Interior's systems for paying wages to police challenge UNDP efforts to ensure that the ministry is using LOTFA funds as intended.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID (1) establish and implement policy requiring risk assessments in all cases before awarding bilateral direct assistance funds, (2) take additional steps to help ensure it implements controls for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) ensure adherence to its risk assessment policies for ARTF. In commenting on the first recommendation, USAID stated that its existing policies call for some form of risk assessment for all awards and that it has taken new steps to ensure risk assessment. GAO retained its recommendation because existing USAID policies do not require preaward risk assessments in all cases. USAID concurred with GAO's other recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-351 | gao_GAO-15-351_0 | Overview of VOCA Grant Programs and Grantees
From fiscal years 2010 through 2013, OJJDP awarded about $74 million in funding under the following five VOCA grant programs established in response to the Victims of Child Abuse Act. OJJDP Processes Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That VOCA Grant Funding Is Being Expended in a Timely Manner
OJJDP’s Administrative Processes Contribute to Delays in Grantees’ Expenditure of VOCA Funds; Current Project Period May Be Unrealistic
OJJDP has several administrative review and approval processes in place that have contributed to delays in VOCA grantees’ ability to begin spending their funds, and OJJDP may have set an unrealistic project period in light of the time it takes to complete these processes. VOCA grantees cannot submit these conference cost approval requests to DOJ until OCFO has approved their grant project budgets—a process that has taken more than 2 months, on average, from the project period start date, as discussed above. However, of the 73 grant extension requests OJJDP approved from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, 72 did not contain such a narrative. However, the OJP Financial Guide states that, generally, only one extension per award should be granted, and that, generally, the maximum allowable extension is for 12 months. OJJDP’s Performance Measures and Its Data Collection Methods Are Not Fully Aligned, Hindering Its Ability to Assess Grantee Performance
OJJDP does not have the performance data necessary to assess VOCA grantees’ performance because the measures it has established to assess performance do not fully align with the tools it has created to collect desired performance information from grantees. Accordingly, OJJDP does not have complete data to assess grantees’ performance against the performance measures it established in the solicitation. However, five of the six VOCA grantees told us that they have not received guidance or feedback from OJJDP on which optional DCTAT measures to include in their reports. Further, OJJDP does not have complete information by which to evaluate the performance of VOCA grantees against established performance measures to ensure that VOCA grant funds are being used effectively to support improvements in the investigation and prosecution of child abuse. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the timely expenditure of VOCA grant funds and thereby limit the carryover of unexpended grant balances, minimize the need for multiple grant extensions, and strengthen OJJDP’s capacity to collect and assess grantee performance information, we recommend that the Assistant Attorney General for OJP work with the Administrator of OJJDP to take the following four actions: 1. conduct a study to examine whether any of its administrative processes contribute to unnecessary delays in grantees’ ability to expend VOCA funds within the established 12-month project period and make modifications to these processes as appropriate; 2. considering the results of this study, examine whether the current 12- month project period is realistic in light of any administrative processes that cause delay but cannot be modified and extend the project period if necessary; 3. establish and enforce clear requirements for approving no-cost grant 4. ensure that the performance measures outlined in its VOCA grant solicitations correspond to existing DCTAT measures and clarify to VOCA grantees that they are to report on such measures using the DCTAT system. Additionally, OJP stated that OJJDP will contact all the VOCA grantees in fiscal year 2015 to clarify their requirement to submit performance measurement data. Appendix II: Victims of Child Abuse Act (VOCA) Grant Recipients and Funding, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2013
This appendix provides information on funding for the VOCA grant programs from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, as well as the purposes and recipients of this funding. Appendix III: Administrative Processes and Overlap of Victims of Child Abuse Act Grant Funds Awarded in Fiscal Years 2010 - 2013
This appendix provides a graphical presentation of how delays as a result of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) administrative review processes and routine approval of grant extension requests contribute to a backlog of grant funds amongst grant recipients. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) OJJDP, housed within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), awarded about $74 million in VOCA grants from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. VOCA grants are designed to help improve the investigation and prosecution of child abuse cases. Senate Report 113-78 included a provision for GAO to conduct a review related to the administration of OJJDP grant programs.
This report addresses the extent to which OJJDP (1) ensures the timely expenditure of VOCA grants and (2) assesses the performance of VOCA grantees. GAO analyzed OJJDP documentation—such as program guidelines, grantee progress reports, and expenditure data—from fiscal years 2010 through 2013. Additionally, GAO interviewed DOJ officials and the universe of VOCA grantees about their experiences with the program.
What GAO Found
For the 28 Victims of Child Abuse Act (VOCA) grants the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) awarded from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, grantees expended less than 20 percent, on average, of each grant they received during the original 12-month project period. OJJDP has several administrative review and approval processes in place that have contributed to delays in grantees' ability to begin spending their funds. For instance, grantees cannot access their funds until OJJDP completes its internal review of grantees' budgets, a step that has taken more than 2 months, on average, after the project period began. Further, OJJDP's guidance on grant extensions is unclear and irregularly enforced. For example, one document states that generally only one extension per award is permissible, while another states that multiple extensions may be granted for up to a total of 5 years. OJJDP guidance further requires grantees to submit a narrative justification with their requests. However, OJJDP approved 72 of 73 extension requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2013 without such justification. Examining the delays associated with its administrative review processes and clarifying and enforcing the extension policy for VOCA grants would help OJJDP ensure the effective administration and timely use of grant funds.
a The Assistant Attorney General for OJP is responsible for officially notifying applicants that they have received an award.
OJJDP does not have complete data to assess VOCA grantees' performance against the measures it has established. Specifically, OJJDP establishes performance measures in the VOCA grant solicitations and requires grantees to submit data on these measures. However, the performance measures it has established for the VOCA grant program do not fully align with the tools it has created to collect data for all OJJDP grants. Further, five of the six VOCA grantees reported that they have not received guidance on which measures to include in their required reports. Accordingly, grantees did not consistently report on the established performance measures as required. Better aligning the established VOCA performance measures with existing data collection tools and clarifying grantee reporting requirements would better ensure OJJDP has the data it needs to assess the effectiveness of the VOCA grant programs.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure the effective administration of VOCA grant funds, GAO recommends, among other things, that OJP work with OJJDP to examine and address its administrative review processes to reduce delays in VOCA spending, establish and enforce a clear grant extension policy, and better align the VOCA performance measures with available data collection tools while also clarifying grantee reporting requirements. OJP concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-553 | gao_GAO-01-553_0 | The CVP, located in California’s Central Valley Basin, is the one of the Bureau’s largest multiple purpose water projects. Conclusions
Water marketing costs have increased significantly, but we found no evidence that the costs were derived from activities other than normal O&M activities that are recoverable under applicable law. However, our analysis of the information provided to water customers confirmed that the customers were not able to determine whether (1) budgeted activities were ones that would actually be charged to them, and (2) budgeted amounts for the coming year’s activities represented increases in previous estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses the water marketing activities of the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project and their associated costs.
What GAO Found
Water marketing costs have risen significantly since 1989, but GAO found no evidence that the costs were associated with activities other than normal operation and maintenance activities that are recoverable from water customers under applicable law. GAO reviewed the information provided to customers and found that the customers were unable to determine whether (1) budgeted activities were the ones that would actually be charged to them and (2) budgeted amounts for the coming year's activities represented increases in previous estimates. |
gao_GAO-03-538 | gao_GAO-03-538_0 | Since its first financial statement audit for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1991, the Forest Service has faced numerous serious accounting and financial reporting weaknesses that have prevented it from receiving a positive audit opinion. In January 1999, due to the longstanding serious accounting and financial reporting problems, we designated Forest Service financial management as a high- risk area. The Forest Service Has Made Significant Progress toward Achieving Financial Accountability
The Forest Service has made significant progress toward achieving financial accountability. To achieve this milestone, the Forest Service’s top management dedicated considerable resources and focused staff efforts to address accounting and reporting deficiencies that had prevented a favorable opinion in the past. Despite Progress Made, Accountability Challenges Remain
Achieving financial accountability involves more than obtaining a clean audit opinion by producing reliable onetime year-end numbers for financial statement purposes. The agency also faces the challenge of implementing a financial management field organization that supports effective and efficient day-to-day financial operations. In its fiscal year 2002 audit report on the Forest Service’s financial statements, the auditor continued to report serious internal control weaknesses with regard to the Forest Service’s two major asset accounts-- fund balance with Treasury and property, plant, and equipment. Also, KPMG reported material deficiencies related to certain estimated liabilities, payroll processes, general controls and certain application software computer controls. One example of noncompliance with federal financial management systems requirements was that the Forest Service did not have required certification and accreditations of security controls performed timely on its procurement and property systems. In its fiscal year 2002 report on Forest Service’s Information Technology, the auditor reported certain weaknesses in internal controls related to the feeder systems. Corrective Actions Are Underway or Planned to Resolve Remaining Problems
While the conditions discussed above present a major challenge to achieving financial accountability, the Forest Service has several efforts underway or planned, that if implemented, should help to resolve many of its financial management problems and to move toward sustainable financial management business processes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure sustained commitment and timely implementation of financial management improvement efforts, we recommend that the Chief of the Forest Service direct the Chief Financial Officer to develop a comprehensive financial management strategic plan that clearly defines long-term and short-term financial management goals specifies corrective actions to address financial management challenges, including internal control weaknesses, FFMIA compliance deficiencies, system problems and organization issues; includes target dates and resources necessary to implement corrective identifies the responsible parties for carrying out corrective actions; and prioritizes and links the various improvement initiatives underway and planned, including USDA financial management systems enhancement efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1996, we have periodically reported on Forest Service financial management problems that we, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Office of the Inspector General, and other independent auditors have identified. We have designated the Forest Service financial management as a high-risk area since 1999. Because of these longstanding financial management deficiencies, the House Committee on Resource's Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health asked GAO to report on the Forest Service's progress in correcting its financial management problems and on remaining challenges and actions underway to address those challenges.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service has made significant progress toward achieving financial accountability, receiving its first "clean" or unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements for fiscal year 2002. This was attained because top management dedicated considerable resources to address accounting and reporting deficiencies. We consider this a positive step; however, sustaining this outcome and achieving financial accountability will require more than obtaining year-end numbers for financial statement purposes. The Forest Service continues to face several major challenges, many of which resulted in unfavorable audit opinions in the past. Specifically, the Forest Service's fiscal year 2002 financial statement audit report disclosed material internal control weaknesses related to its two major asset accounts--fund balance with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and property, plant, and equipment--as well as for certain estimated liabilities, payroll processes, computer security controls, and software application controls related to its procurement and property systems. Further, the Forest Service has not addressed the challenges of replacing or enhancing legacy feeder systems and implementing a financial management field operation that supports efficient and effective day-to-day financial operations and routinely produces reliable and timely financial information. The Forest Service has corrective actions underway or planned that are intended to resolve these problems, including a financial management strategic plan. If this plan is to serve as a "road map" toward financial accountability, the Forest Service needs to ensure that its plan is comprehensive, integrating and prioritizing the various corrective action initiatives underway and planned. |
gao_T-GGD-96-93 | gao_T-GGD-96-93_0 | Government Statistics: Proposal to Form a Federal Statistical Service
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the proposed creation of a new Federal Statistical Service, which would be formed by consolidating the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Department of Labor. These 11 agencies, which include Census, BEA, and BLS, together spend approximately $1.1 billion. Coordination within the federal statistical system has also been limited by statutes that restrict data sharing among statistical agencies in order to protect the confidentiality of individuals, businesses, and organizations that provide data. enhancing the efficiency of operations, enhancing adherence to professional standards, establishing clear national priorities for statistical programs, and ensuring the quality of data. While Canada’s centralized system may appear to offer several advantages over the U.S. system, several factors need to be considered as part of the comparison. The United States is a much larger nation and has a larger and more complex economy than Canada. The task facing the federal statistical system in the United States thus is larger and more complex than that facing Statistics Canada. The Canadian statistical system is much smaller than the U.S. system. The Canadian public has accepted that a government agency will have broad access to all government records for statistical purposes. In our view, reorganizing statistical agencies would impose similar requirements for successful implementation. Oversight
Sustained congressional oversight will be needed to ensure the effective implementation of the reorganization envisioned under H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed proposed legislation that would create a Federal Statistical Service by consolidating the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) any reorganization of these agencies should consider the principles of coordination, goal orientation, organization, implementation, and oversight; (2) coordination among statistical agencies is limited by statues that restrict data sharing, and the proposed legislation would not specifically remove those restrictions or restrictions affecting other statistical agencies; (3) goals to consider in establishing the new agency could include enhanced operational efficiency, adherence to professional standards, national priorities for statistical programs, and enhanced data quality; (4) alternatives for addressing problems in the federal statistical system include privatization, improving the current decentralized system by increasing data sharing, consolidating Census, BEA, and BLS, or consolidating additional federal statistical agencies; (5) while Canada's centralized statistics agency appears to offer advantages over the U.S. system, the United States is a much larger and more complex nation than Canada, the Canadian statistical system is much smaller, and the Canadian public has accepted that a government agency will have broad access to statistical information; (6) adequate planning will be necessary for successful implementation of a consolidated statistical agency; and (7) sustained congressional oversight will be required to ensure successful implementation of a consolidated agency. |
gao_GAO-01-681T | gao_GAO-01-681T_0 | These weaknesses not only hamper the department’s ability to produce timely and accurate financial management information, but also make the cost of carrying out missions unnecessarily high. As the results of the department’s fiscal year 2000 financial audit and other recent auditors’ reports demonstrate, DOD continues to confront serious weaknesses in the following areas. Financial management systems. In closing, while DOD has made incremental improvement, it has a long way to go to address its long-standing, serious financial management weaknesses as part of a comprehensive, integrated reform of the department’s business support operations. Such an overhaul must include not only DOD’s financial management and other management challenges, but also its high-risk areas of information technology and human capital management. Personnel throughout the department must share the common goal of reforming the department’s business support structure. | What GAO Found
The results of the Defense Department (DOD) financial audit for fiscal year 2000 highlight long-standing financial management weaknesses that continue to plague the military. These weaknesses not only hamper the department's ability to produce timely and accurate financial management information but also unnecessarily increase the cost of carrying out its missions. Although DOD has made incremental improvement, it has a long way to go to overcome its long-standing, serious financial management weaknesses as part of a comprehensive, integrated reform of the department's business support operations. Such an overhaul must include not only DOD's financial management and other management challenges but also its high-risk areas of information technology and human capital management. Personnel throughout the department must share the common goal of reforming the department's business support structure. Without reengineering, DOD will have little chance of radically improving its cumbersome and bureaucratic processes. |
gao_GAO-08-438T | gao_GAO-08-438T_0 | Progress Made to Estimate and Reduce Improper Payments
Agencies reported improper payment estimates of almost $55 billion in their fiscal year 2007 PARs or annual reports, an increase from the fiscal year 2006 estimate of about $41 billion. The reported increase was primarily attributable to a component of the Medicaid program reporting improper payment estimates for the first time totaling about $13 billion for fiscal year 2007, which we view as a positive step to improve transparency over the full magnitude of improper payments. The $55 billion estimate consists of 78 programs in 21 agencies (see app. Also, of the total improper payment estimate of $55 billion, we identified 19 programs and activities that estimated improper payments for the first time in their fiscal year 2007 PARs, totaling about $16 billion. OMB noted that further reductions in agency program estimated error rates are expected as agencies take steps to address payment errors attributed to insufficient or lack of documentation. Challenges Continue with IPIA Implementation
While agencies have shown progress, major challenges remain in meeting the goals of IPIA and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. Specifically, some agencies have not yet reported estimates for all risk- susceptible programs, the total improper payment estimate does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies, noncompliance issues continue to exist, reported statutory or regulatory barriers limit agencies’ ability to reduce improper payments, and agencies continue to face challenges in the implementation or design of internal controls to identify and prevent improper payments. We also noted that four agencies reported that they did not conduct a risk assessment of all of their programs and activities because OMB guidance allows agency programs deemed not risk-susceptible to conduct a risk assessment generally every 3 years. After the enactment of IPIA, OMB’s implementing guidance required that these programs continue to report improper payment information under IPIA. Further, we found a few instances where estimates were not based on a 12-month reporting period. Of this universe, only 9 agency programs reported on recovery of improper payments under IPIA. Of the 5, agency auditors for all except USAID reported noncompliance issues related to the key requirements of the act, including risk assessments, sampling methodologies, implementing corrective actions, recovering improper payments, and inadequate documentation. Agency auditors at the Department of Transportation (Transportation) and DOD reported noncompliance with IPIA for a second year. Over half of the agencies’ OIG identified management or performance challenges that could increase the risk of improper payments, including challenges related to internal controls. Agencies’ Efforts to Report Recovery Auditing Information Continue
Section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 provides an impetus for applicable agencies to systematically identify and recover contract overpayments. Beginning in fiscal year 2004, OMB required that applicable agencies publicly report on their recovery auditing efforts as part of their PAR reporting of improper payment information. From these reviews, agencies reported identifying about $121 million in improper payments for recovery and actually recovering about $87 million, or an estimated overall rate of recovery of approximately 72 percent, as shown in table 2. We found that the number of agencies reporting recovery audit information remained the same when compared to the prior year. However, the fiscal year 2007 dollar amounts identified for recovery significantly decreased by about $217 million from fiscal year 2006. Of the 21 agencies reporting recovery auditing information for fiscal year 2007, 9 reported they contracted out their recovery audit services, 3 conducted in-house recovery audits, 5 reported using both in-house and recovery audit contractors, and two were silent. The remaining 2 agencies—HUD and Labor—did not conduct recovery audits as they reported it was not cost beneficial. However, less than half, or 8 agencies reported on their corrective action plans to address root causes of contract payment errors. However, Energy did not report on corrective actions to address the root causes of contract overpayments. Appendix II: Improper Payment Estimates Reported in Agency Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 Performance and Accountability Reports or Annual Reports
Appendix II: Improper Payment Estimates Reported in Agency Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 Performance and Accountability Reports or Annual Reports Fiscal year 2006 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions) rate (percent)
Cooperative Agreements, Grants, and Contracts Child and Adult Care Food Program Conservation Security Program (previously Farm Security and Rural Investment)
Fiscal year 2006 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions) rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent) millions) rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2006 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions) rate (percent)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement—Detention and Removal OperationsImmigration and Customs Enforcement—Federal Protective Service Immigration and Customs Enforcement— InvestigationsBlock Grant (Entitlement Grants, States/Small Cities)
Fiscal year 2006 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions) rate (percent)
77 All programs and activities 79 All programs and activities 80 All programs and activities 83 Retirement Program (Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System) 84 All programs and activities 85 All programs and activities 30 Railroad Retirement Board 86 Railroad Unemployment Companies (Debentures)
Companies (Guaranties) 92 7(a) Business Loan Program (Guaranty Purchases) 93 7(a) Business Loan Program (Guaranty Approvals)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent) millions) rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2006 total estimate (dollars in millions)
Fiscal year 2006 error rate (percent)
Fiscal year 2007 total estimate (dollars in millions) rate (percent) nnual improper pyment etimte or error rte. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars and is responsible for safeguarding those funds against improper payments and recouping those funds when improper payments occur. The Congress enacted the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, commonly known as the Recovery Auditing Act, to address these issues. GAO was asked to testify on agencies' efforts to eliminate and recover improper payments. Specifically, GAO focused on (1) progress made in agencies' implementation and reporting under IPIA for fiscal year 2007, (2) major challenges that continue to hinder full reporting of improper payment information, and (3) agencies' efforts to report on recovery auditing and recoup contract overpayments. This testimony is based in part on a recently issued report (GAO-08-377R) in addition to a further review and analysis of improper payment and recovery auditing information reported in agencies' fiscal year 2007 performance and accountability reports (PAR) or annual reports. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided technical comments which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
While agencies have made progress, GAO identified ongoing challenges in key areas related to IPIA and recovery auditing implementation and reporting. (1) Progress made in agencies' implementation and reporting under IPIA: Agencies reported improper payment estimates of about $55 billion in their fiscal year 2007 performance and accountability reports (PAR) or annual reports, an increase from the almost $41 billion reported in fiscal year 2006. The reported increase was primarily attributable to a component of the Medicaid program reporting improper payments for the first time totaling about $13 billion, which GAO viewed as a positive step to improve transparency over the full magnitude of improper payments. The $55 billion estimate consists of 21 agencies reporting for 78 programs, including 19 agency programs or activities reporting for the first time in fiscal year 2007. Further, select agency programs that first reported an error rate in fiscal year 2004 reported an overall decrease in their error rate estimates when compared to fiscal year 2007. OMB noted that further reductions in error rates are expected as agencies take steps to address payment errors resulting from insufficient or no documentation. (2) Challenges with IPIA implementation: Not all agencies reported conducting risk assessments of all of their programs and activities as required under IPIA. Further, agencies have not estimated for 14 risk-susceptible programs with outlays totaling about $170 billion. Additionally, in some instances, agencies did not measure improper payments for a 12-month period as generally required by OMB's implementing guidance, nor did the estimates reflect improper payments for the entire program. Four agency auditors reported noncompliance issues with IPIA regarding risk assessments, sampling methodologies, corrective actions, recovery of improper payments, and inadequate documentation. Agencies also reported that statutory or regulatory barriers may limit corrective actions to reduce improper payments. Lastly, agencies continue to face challenges in the implementation or design of internal controls to identify and prevent improper payments. Specifically, over half of agencies' Offices of Inspectors General identified management or performance challenges that could increase the risk of improper payments. (3) Agencies' efforts to report recovery auditing information continue: In total, 21 agencies reported identifying about $121 million in improper payments in fiscal year 2007 for recovery and actually recovering about $87 million, a decrease of about $217 million when compared to the reported amount identified for recovery in the prior year. Most of the decrease can be attributed to the Department of Defense's decision to stop reporting voluntary refunds. GAO noted that few agencies reported on corrective action plans to address the root causes of contract payment errors. Also, two agencies reported that conducting recovery audits was not cost beneficial. All but two agencies reported they contracted out recovery audit services, conducted in-house recovery audits, or both. The other two were silent on this on matter. |
gao_GAO-13-134 | gao_GAO-13-134_0 | Without a plan to guide and encourage joint bases to pursue cost savings and efficiencies and without a method to track joint basing-specific costs, savings, and efficiencies, DOD will likely miss opportunities for cost savings and continue to be unaware of the extent to which joint bases have been able to meet the objectives laid out in the 2005 BRAC recommendation on joint basing. We have previously reported that successful organizational transformations—such as merging components and transforming organizational cultures—in both the public and private sector, involve several key practices, including ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation, setting implementation goals and a timeline to show progress from day one, and establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress. DOD Has Developed a Method of Identifying Costs and Efficiencies on Joint Bases, but This Method Cannot Yet Accurately Isolate the Effects of Joint Basing
In addition to not having an implementation plan, DOD does not yet have a fully developed method for accurately gathering information on costs, estimated savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically as a consequence of joint basing, and as a result it does not have an estimate of the extent to which joint basing has realized actual cost savings. Joint Bases Report Meeting Many Common Standards, but the Usefulness of the Standards as a Common Framework to Manage Installation Support Services Is Limited
In fiscal years 2010 and 2011 the joint bases reported meeting the common standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, the lack of clarity in some standards, the fact that unclear standards are not always reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and the fact that the data collection and reporting on the standards in some cases adhere to individual service standards rather than the common standard hinders the effectiveness of the standards as a common framework for managing installation support services. These common standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for installation support services. Information technology services and management. Without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and comparable data with which to assess their service support levels, and OSD cannot be assured of receiving reliable and comparable data on the level of support services the joint bases are providing. OSD and Joint Bases Have Processes to Identify Joint Basing Implementation Challenges, but Lack of Routine Communication Limits Opportunities for Greater Efficiencies
OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address challenges in achieving joint basing goals, but these mechanisms do not routinely facilitate the identification of common challenges among the joint bases or the development of common solutions to these challenges. Specifically, we found that the joint bases do not have a formal method of routinely sharing information among the joint bases on identified challenges and potential solutions or guidance on developing and providing training for new joint base personnel on how the joint bases provide installation support services. The Joint Management Oversight Structure. These challenges cover a wide range of issues, from differing expectations among the military services about how particular base support services should be provided to the incompatibility of information technology systems. It also states that for an entity to run and control its operations, the entity must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal events, and that information is needed throughout the agency to Without a means of identifying common achieve all of its objectives.challenges and sharing best practices and lessons learned in order to identify common solutions, DOD is likely to miss opportunities to efficiently resolve joint base challenges using common methods. However, to date OSD has not developed and implemented a plan to guide the joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enable DOD to achieve cost savings and efficiencies and to track its progress toward achieving these goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following two actions: Develop and implement a plan that provides measurable goals linked to achieving savings and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide guidance to the joint bases that directs them to identify opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies. DOD partially concurred with the remainder of our recommendations; however, in most instances, DOD did not identify what, if any, actions the department plans to take to implement the recommendations. To evaluate the extent to which joint base common standards have provided a common framework for defining and reporting installation support services, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance related to the common standards; the standards themselves, including both functional areas and specific standards; and federal internal control standards and key elements of successful performance measures.reviewed the joint bases’ reporting on the joint base common standards for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. GAO-12-513T. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-08-20. Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated DOD support infrastructure as an area of high risk and included one key related category--installation support--as an area for potential savings. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings and, in 2010, completed this consolidation. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint bases, (2) joint base common standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for installation support services, and (3) DOD has a process to consistently identify and address any implementation challenges. GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance on joint basing, visited 3 joint bases and obtained answers to written questions from the other 9, interviewed OSD and military service officials, and analyzed performance data on joint base support services.
What GAO Found
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not developed or implemented a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) originally estimated saving $2.3 billion from joint basing over 20 years, but in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate has fallen by almost 90 percent. OSD also does not yet have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing. GAO previously reported that organizational transformations such as merging components and transforming organizational cultures should be driven by top leadership, have implementation goals and a timeline to show progress, and include a communication strategy. Although the joint bases anecdotally reported achieving some savings and efficiencies, without an implementation plan to drive savings and a means to collect reliable information on the specific costs, estimated savings, and efficiencies from joint basing, DOD will not be able to facilitate achievement of the goals of cost savings and efficiencies, track the extent to which these goals have been achieved, or evaluate the continuation or expansion of joint basing.
The joint bases implemented common standards for installation support services developed by OSD, and in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 reported meeting the standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, three factors limited the usefulness of the reported standards as a common tool for managing installation support services: the lack of clarity in some standards, unclear standards that were not reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and data collection and reporting on the standards that in some cases adhered to individual service standards rather than the common standard. DOD guidance states that the purpose of the joint base common standards framework was to provide a common language to serve as a basis for planning and management across the joint bases, and GAO previously reported that performance measures should be clear and follow standard procedures. Without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, OSD and the joint bases will not have reliable or comparable data with which to assess their service support levels.
OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address challenges in achieving joint basing goals, such as a joint management oversight structure and annual OSD-joint base review meetings, but none of these routinely facilitates communication among the joint bases to identify solutions to common challenges. The reported challenges cover a wide range of issues, from different expectations among military services as to how base support services should be provided to incompatible information technology networks. However, the absence of a formal method to routinely share information on common challenges and possible solutions, or guidance on developing and providing training for new personnel on how joint bases provide installation support, means DOD is likely to miss opportunities to develop common solutions to common challenges. Federal internal control standards state that for an entity to control its operations, it must have relevant and timely communications, and information is needed throughout the agency to achieve objectives. In addition, without processes to identify common challenges and share information across the joint bases, DOD may miss opportunities for greater efficiencies and be unable to provide uniform policies across the joint bases.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take six actions, such as developing a plan to achieve cost savings, prioritizing review and revision of unclear common standards, and developing a strategy to share solutions to common challenges. DOD partially agreed with five recommendations and did not concur with the recommendation to develop a plan to achieve cost savings, because it stated that such goals are not appropriate at this time. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid as discussed further in the report. |
gao_GAO-02-79 | gao_GAO-02-79_0 | USPS Is Revising Its Management Structure and Processes for Developing and Overseeing Its E-Commerce Initiatives
Overall management of USPS’ e-commerce program has been fragmented and inconsistent across the nine business units involved in developing and managing e-commerce and Internet-related initiatives. In September 2001, the Postmaster General announced a sweeping management restructuring, changing both the reporting structure and managers responsible for its e-commerce program. Without complete, accurate, and consistent information, USPS will not be in a position to assess progress toward meeting its overall financial performance goal that e-commerce products and services in the aggregate are to cover their incremental costs and thus not be cross-subsidized. Reported Performance for E-Commerce Initiatives Has Not Met Expectations
To date, performance of the e-commerce initiatives has reportedly fallen short of USPS’ expectations. Concerns continue to be raised in Congress about whether USPS’ e- commerce initiatives in the aggregate are being cross-subsidized by other postal products and services. Without comprehensive policies and procedures in this area, inconsistencies in reporting are likely to continue. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that USPS develops reliable and consistent financial information for all of its new products and services, we recommend that the Postmaster General develop a comprehensive set of policies and procedures for capturing, attributing, and reporting revenues and expenses associated with its new products and services and that are consistent with PRC’s cost attribution policies; provide an annual report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House Committee on Government Reform, and PRC showing its revenues and expenses for new products and services individually and in aggregate that has been audited by an independent entity for the purpose of determining that the report was prepared in accordance with the Service’s policies and procedures and generally accepted accounting principles; and provide the audited report for fiscal year 2001 by May 1, 2002, and by May 1 for each subsequent year. USPS reportedly has developed privacy policies and practices for its e- commerce customers that exceed those required by federal law, and is also voluntarily engaging in additional self-regulatory privacy practices to safeguard customers’ personal information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Management of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) e-commerce program has been fragmented, and implementation of e-commerce initiatives has varied at different business units. Overall, USPS' performance in this area has fallen short of expectations. Last year, the Postmaster General announced a sweeping management restructuring that changed both the reporting structure and program managers. USPS also revised its procedures for approving and implementing new Internet initiatives, including e-commerce. However, concerns persist about whether USPS' e-commerce initiatives are being cross-subsidized by other postal products and services. USPS managers contend that e-commerce products and services must cover their incremental costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that this goal has not been met and it is unclear when it might be achieved. Without accurate, complete, and consistent financial information, USPS cannot assess its progress toward its financial performance goals for e-commerce. USPS also lacks clear and comprehensive policies and procedures for reporting direct and indirect revenues and costs for e-commerce and other new products and services. As a result, reporting inconsistencies are likely to continue. In contrast, USPS has reportedly developed privacy policies and practices for its e-commerce customers that exceed those required by federal law. |
gao_GAO-13-242 | gao_GAO-13-242_0 | In some cases, such as in Alaska, the need to adapt has already become a reality. Roads and Bridges, Wastewater Management Systems, and NASA Centers Are Vulnerable to Changes in the Climate
According to NRC and USGCRP assessments, changes in the climate have been observed in the United States and its coastal waters and are projected to grow in severity in the future, thereby increasing the vulnerability of infrastructure such as roads and bridges, wastewater management systems, and NASA centers. Storm surge, combined with sea level rise, is projected to generate a wide range of negative impacts on roads and bridges. Collectively, Louisiana State Highway 1 currently supports 18 percent of the nation’s oil supply. Flooding of this road effectively closes the port. However, within 15 years, NOAA anticipates that the at-grade portions of Louisiana State Highway 1 will be inundated by tides an average of 30 times annually even in the absence of extreme weather. Due to past problems with sewer overflows, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District in Wisconsin significantly increased the capacity of its sewer system. Key factors that enabled these decision makers to undertake such measures and overcome the challenges that have deterred others from integrating climate change into infrastructure planning were that (1) their local circumstances were conducive to addressing climate-related risks, (2) they learned to use available climate information, (3) they had access to local assistance, or (4) they considered climate impacts within existing planning processes in the same context as other potential risks. Access to local assistance was instrumental to decision makers’ ability to undertake climate adaptation efforts at the sites we visited. Improving Infrastructure Decision Makers’ Access to and Use of Available Information
According to relevant studies, local decision makers from our site visits, and other stakeholders, future federal efforts to improve access and use of available climate-related information could better focus on the needs of local decision makers. While coordinating available climate-related data is a first step in making more informed adaptation decisions, another key step is to ensure decision makers have access to the best available data. Considering Climate Change in Existing Planning Processes
Notwithstanding the limited federal role in planning for transportation and wastewater infrastructure, several emerging federal adaptation efforts could help local infrastructure decision makers consider climate change in existing processes, according to studies, local site visit decision makers, and other stakeholders. Planning for transportation and wastewater infrastructure in this country remains largely within the domain of state and local governments, but emerging federal efforts are under way to facilitate and enable more informed decisions about adaptation. Specifically:
Federal agencies and academic institutions collect a vast array of climate-related data, but local infrastructure decision makers face difficulty identifying, accessing, and using them, because as noted by a 2010 NRC study, this information exists in an uncoordinated confederation of networks and institutions. According to the 2010 NRC report, the end result of this information not being easily accessible is that people may make decisions—or choose not to act—without it. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the resilience of the nation’s infrastructure to climate change, we are making the following four recommendations: that the Executive Director of the United States Global Change Research Program or other federal entity designated by the Executive Office of the President work with relevant agencies to identify for decision makers the “best available” climate-related information for infrastructure planning and update this information over time and clarify sources of local assistance for incorporating climate-related information and analysis into infrastructure planning, and communicate how such assistance will be provided over time; that the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality finalize guidance on how federal agencies can consider the effects of climate change in their evaluations of proposed federal actions under the National Environmental Policy Act; and that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency work with relevant professional associations to incorporate climate change information into design standards. They did not provide official written comments but instead provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes what is known about the impacts of climate change on the nation’s infrastructure, specifically roads and bridges, wastewater management systems, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) centers; (2) analyzes the extent to which potential climate change impacts are incorporated into infrastructure planning; (3) identifies the factors that enabled certain decision makers to integrate climate change impacts into infrastructure planning; and (4) analyzes federal efforts to address the adaptation needs of local infrastructure decision makers and describes potential opportunities for improvement identified by studies, local decision makers who integrated climate change into infrastructure planning, and other stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government invests billions of dollars annually in infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, facing increasing risks from climate change. Adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change-- can help manage these risks by making infrastructure more resilient.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to infrastructure decision making and climate change. This report examines (1) the impacts of climate change on roads and bridges, wastewater systems, and NASA centers; (2) the extent to which climate change is incorporated into infrastructure planning; (3) factors that enabled some decision makers to implement adaptive measures; and (4) federal efforts to address local adaptation needs, as well as potential opportunities for improvement.
GAO reviewed climate change assessments; analyzed relevant reports; interviewed stakeholders from professional associations and federal agencies; and visited infrastructure projects and interviewed local decision makers at seven sites where adaptive measures have been implemented.
What GAO Found
According to the National Research Council (NRC) and others, infrastructure such as roads and bridges, wastewater systems, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) centers are vulnerable to changes in the climate. Changes in precipitation and sea levels, as well as increased intensity and frequency of extreme events, are projected by NRC and others to impact infrastructure in a variety of ways. When the climate changes, infrastructure-- typically designed to operate within past climate conditions--may not operate as well or for as long as planned, leading to economic, environmental, and social impacts. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that, within 15 years, segments of Louisiana State Highway 1-- providing the only road access to a port servicing 18 percent of the nation's oil supply--will be inundated by tides an average of 30 times annually due to relative sea level rise. Flooding of this road effectively closes the port.
Decision makers have not systematically considered climate change in infrastructure planning for various reasons, according to representatives of professional associations and agency officials who work with these decision makers. For example, more immediate priorities--such as managing aging infrastructure--consume time and resources, limiting decision makers' ability to consider and implement climate adaptation measures. Difficulties in obtaining and using information needed to understand vulnerabilities and inform adaptation decisions pose additional challenges.
Key factors enabled some local decision makers to integrate climate change into infrastructure planning. As illustrated by GAO's site visits and relevant studies, these factors included (1) having local circumstances such as weather-related crises that spurred action, (2) learning how to use available information, (3) having access to local expertise, and (4) considering climate impacts within existing planning processes. As one example, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District managed risks associated with more frequent extreme rainfall events by enhancing its natural systems' ability to absorb runoff by, for instance, preserving wetlands. This effort simultaneously expanded the sewer system's capacity while providing other community and environmental benefits. District leaders enabled these changes by prioritizing adaptation, using available locallevel climate projections, and utilizing local experts for assistance.
GAO's report identifies several emerging federal efforts under way to facilitate more informed adaptation decisions, but these efforts could better support the needs of local infrastructure decision makers in the future, according to studies, local decision makers at the sites GAO visited, and other stakeholders. For example, among its key efforts, the federal government plays a critical role in producing the information needed to facilitate more informed local infrastructure adaptation decisions. However, as noted by NRC studies, this information exists in an uncoordinated confederation of networks and institutions, and the end result of it not being easily accessible is that people may make decisions--or choose not to act--without it. Accordingly, a range of studies and local decision makers GAO interviewed cited the need for the federal government to improve local decision makers' access to the best available information to use in infrastructure planning.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that a federal entity designated by the Executive Office of the President (EOP) work with agencies to identify for local infrastructure decision makers the best available climaterelated information for planning, and also to update this information over time. Relevant EOP entities did not provide official comments, but instead provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-133 | gao_NSIAD-96-133_0 | Industrial Base Considered Adequate to Satisfy Defense Planning Guidance
The key role of the ammunition industrial base is to replenish the ammunition stockpile. According to DOD, the supplier base and the technical ability to manufacture Copperhead parts have disappeared. DOD officials stated that shortages of preferred munitions will be likely if two major regional conflicts arise and that shortages will be met with substitute munitions. Two of the key studies were DOD’s 1994 and 1995 studies that attempted to evaluate the financial viability of all the firms comprising the industrial base. DOD assumed that the remaining 45 firms were financially viable, even though it did not have enough financial data to perform break-even analyses. Therefore, DOD is continuing to monitor these firms to ensure it retains its necessary production capacity. Assessment of the Adequacy of the Industrial Base Depends on Assumptions Used
If the key assumptions in the Defense Planning Guidance and DOD’s industrial base studies are correct, the industrial base will be capable of simultaneously supplying peacetime ammunition needs and replenishing the ammunition stockpile as required, following one or two major regional conflicts. However, most of the private studies have concluded that the industrial base is inadequate to meet the services’ ammunition requirements. We identified the differences in underlying assumptions that caused wide differences in the reports’ conclusions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to meet peacetime ammunition requirements, and to replenish the ammunition stockpile following two major regional conflicts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) according to DOD, the ammunition stockpile has no major shortages due to the industrial base; (2) there is no longer a requirement to surge the industrial base during conflicts; (3) the most lethal, preferred munitions will be at a premium, and some requisitions will be filled with older, substitute munitions, but DOD considers these items adequate to defeat the expected threat; (4) DOD is confident in the results of its financial viability studies of firms comprising the ammunition industrial base, even though it did not receive sufficient data to evaluate the financial condition of all firms in the industrial base; (5) changes to DOD assumptions could cause the DOD industrial base assessment to change even if production capacity remains stable; and (6) private studies that have concluded that the industrial base is inadequate to meet replenishment requirements during and following a national emergency are based on underlying assumptions that differ considerably from DOD assumptions. |
gao_GAO-12-698 | gao_GAO-12-698_0 | Investors and Market Participants Cited Limitations of Continuing Disclosures
Many market participants told us that primary market disclosure for municipal securities investors is generally useful. Investors and Market Participants Most Commonly Cited Timeliness, Frequency, and Completeness as Disclosure Limitations
Many market participants told us primary market disclosure is generally useful for investors and EMMA has improved investor and market participants’ ability to access disclosure documents, but investors and market participants have identified limitations to disclosure. Completeness—Investors and other market participants said that issuers do not always provide all of the financial information, event notices, or other information they agreed to provide in a continuing disclosure agreement for the lifetime of a security. Specifically, in June 2010, SEC amended Rule 15c2-12 and issued interpretive guidance to specify that event notices be submitted to EMMA in a timely manner not in excess of 10 business days of the occurrence of the underlying event, rather than merely “in a timely manner” as was previously required; remove the general materiality condition for determining whether notice of an event is to be submitted to EMMA—thereby, requiring that notification be provided for certain events when they occur regardless of whether they are determined to be material (including principal and interest payment delinquencies, and unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting financial difficulties, among others), while adding separately a materiality condition to select events (including nonpayment-related defaults and bond calls); increase the number of events for which notice must be provided; remove an exemption from reporting disclosure information for certain variable-rate securities; and reaffirm its previous interpretation that underwriters must form a reasonable belief in the accuracy and completeness of representations made by issuers or other obligated persons in disclosures as a basis for recommending the securities, including making a reasonable determination that the issuer will likely provide the continuing disclosure information it agreed to provide. Effect of Limitations of Disclosure Regulations on Individual Investors Largely Is Unknown
The risk posed to investors by the limitations of disclosure regulations cited by market participants is largely unknown because (1) there is limited information about the extent to which investors use disclosures to make investment decisions, (2) there is limited information about the extent to which disclosure limitations about which investors were concerned actually have occurred, and (3) there is a low incidence of defaults and other characteristics of the municipal market that mitigate investor risk. Some of the options would require statutory changes while others could be achieved within existing statutory authority. Some Options Identified to Improve Disclosure Would Require Statutory Changes
Experts and market participant groups we surveyed suggested some options to improve disclosure that would require statutory changes. While many suggested repealing the Tower Amendment, regulators said it would have no effect on what they could require issuers to disclose. SEC staff said the Securities Act exempts municipal issuers from SEC registration requirements. Some experts believe that repealing these provisions would allow federal regulators to directly require issuers to provide continuing disclosures, and thereby address concerns about incomplete submissions or failures to meet obligations under continuing disclosure agreements, but SEC and MSRB staff did not agree and said additional changes would be needed for them to directly regulate issuers. As noted previously, the Tower Amendment prohibits SEC and MSRB from requiring state and local governments to file presale information with them in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of municipal securities. SEC and MSRB staff agreed that repealing the Tower Amendment would remove a prohibition on requiring issuers to file presale information. MSRB does not otherwise have affirmative authority to regulate municipal issuers. See GAO, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Role of Governmental Accounting Standards Board in the Municipal Securities Markets and Its Past Funding, GAO-11-267R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2011). Other Options for Improving Continuing Disclosure Could Be Achieved within Existing Regulatory Framework
Experts and market participant groups we surveyed and others with whom we spoke suggested other options for improving disclosure that could be implemented within the existing regulatory framework. MSRB and SEC Have Been Taking Steps to Address Some Options
MSRB has taken recent actions to improve the timeliness of disclosure of financial information, the frequency of disclosure, and the completeness of disclosure filings through improvements to EMMA with a focus on the system’s functionality. SEC staff expect to release their staff report in 2012, and include legislative, regulatory, and industry best practices and recommendations to SEC Commissioners for measures to improve primary and secondary market disclosure practices, measures to improve market practices, and associated regulation. SEC and MSRB provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. FINRA did not provide comments on the draft report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) examine the extent to which information currently provided on municipal securities is useful and the extent to which existing regulation reflects principles for effective disclosure; and (2) identify options for improving the information issuers disclose to investors of municipal securities, and the related benefits and challenges of these options for investors and issuers. Appendix III: Principles of Effective Disclosure Compared with Current Disclosure Regulations for Municipal Securities
We compared requirements for continuing disclosure in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 15c2-12 and SEC’s antifraud authorities with principles for effective disclosure that were developed by an international organization of securities commissions, which included SEC, and certain plain English principles developed by SEC. We found that the current municipal securities disclosure requirements broadly reflect the seven principles for effective disclosure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Municipal securities are debt instruments that state and local governments issue to finance diverse public projects. As of March 31, 2012, individual investors held up to 75 percent of the total value of municipal securities outstanding. These securities are exempt from certain federal disclosure requirements applicable to other securities sold publicly. Disclosure provided in the primary market, where these securities are issued, generally consists of official statements. Continuing disclosure is information provided in the secondary market, where these securities are bought and sold after issuance. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to review the information issuers of municipal securities must disclose for the benefit of investors.
This report addresses (1) the extent to which information currently provided on municipal securities is useful for investors and the extent to which existing regulations reflect principles for effective disclosure, and (2) options for improving the information issuers disclose to investors of municipal securities. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed disclosure rules and compared them with principles for effective disclosure cited by SEC and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, surveyed selected experts and market participants, and interviewed issuers.
GAO provided a draft of this report to SEC, MSRB, and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). SEC and MSRB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate. FINRA did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
Market participants indicated that primary market disclosure for municipal securitiesofficial statementsgenerally provides useful information, but investors and market participants cited a number of limitations to continuing disclosures. The most frequently cited limitations were timeliness, frequency, and completeness. For example, investors and other market participants said that issuers do not always provide all the financial information, event notices, or other information they pledged to provide for the lifetime of a security. While GAO's analysis of current regulatory requirements for municipal securities disclosure found that they largely reflected the seven principles of effective disclosure, regulators and market participants said that there are some limitations on the enforceability and efficiency of the regulations. However, the effect of these limitations on individual investors largely is unknown because limited information exists about the extent to which individual investors use disclosures to make investment decisions. Nevertheless, regulators remain concerned about this market, in part due to its size and the participation of individual investors. As discussed below, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) have been taking or plan to take actions to improve disclosure.
Experts and market participant groups GAO surveyed suggested options for improving disclosure, some of which would require statutory changes while others could be achieved within the existing regulatory framework. One suggested statutory change was the repeal of the Tower Amendment, which some experts believed would allow federal regulators to directly require issuers to make disclosures, but SEC and MSRB staff did not agree. The Tower Amendment prohibits SEC and MSRB from requiring issuers of municipal securities to file certain materials with them. While MSRB and SEC staff said that repealing the Tower Amendment would remove the prohibitions on requiring issuers to file certain materials with them, they noted that it would have no real effect on what they can require issuers to disclose because municipal issuers are exempt from SEC registration and MSRB does not otherwise have affirmative authority to regulate municipal issuers. Other suggestions from experts and market participant groups requiring statutory changes included mandating accounting standards and requiring the submission of financial information at intervals more frequent than annually. Experts and market participant groups suggested other options to improve disclosure that could be achieved within the existing regulatory framework, including further improving and promoting MSRB's Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) system, which since July 2009 has served as the official central repository for disclosures about municipal securities. While experts and market participants said that EMMA had greatly improved their access to information on municipal securities, many suggested that further enhancements to EMMA would increase the usefulness of the system to investors and issuers. MSRB issued a plan in January 2012 to improve EMMA and recently has taken steps to enhance EMMA's functionality. Further, SEC staff indicated their plan to release a staff report in 2012 to include recommendations on measures to improve primary and secondary market disclosure practices, market practices, and associated regulation. |
gao_GAO-17-69 | gao_GAO-17-69_0 | Eligibility Policies and Relevant Laws
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides the legal framework for eligibility policies used by workplace retirement plans, including minimum-age and minimum-service policies. The rules were designed, in part, to help sponsors provide profit sharing contributions, but after 401(k) plans were introduced, employer matching contributions became common. Treasury is responsible for developing proposals for legislative changes, which could include changes regarding eligibility and vesting requirements. Many Plan Sponsors In Our Survey Use Policies that Determine Workers’ Eligibility to Save in 401(k) Plans and to Retain Employer Contributions, Often to Reduce Costs and Employee Turnover
Many Plan Sponsors In Our Survey Use Minimum- Age and Minimum-Service Policies to Determine Plan Eligibility
Information from our non-generalizable survey of 80 plan sponsors ranging in size from fewer than 100 participants to more than 5,000, and our review of industry data, show that many 401(k) plans have minimum- age policies that do not allow workers to save in plans until they reach age 21 instead of immediately upon employment. Many Plans Have Vesting Policies that Affect Participants’ Ability to Retain Employer Contributions
Based on our survey of 80 plans, we found that 57 have vesting policies that require employees to work for a certain period of time before the employer contributions in their accounts are vested. Industry data from Vanguard show that more than 55 percent of its plans also have vesting policies for matching contributions. Our Projections Suggest that Plans’ Use of Minimum-Age and Minimum-Service Policies Can Reduce Workers’ Access to Workplace Retirement Plans and Can Result in Foregone Retirement Savings
Currently, the law permits 401(k) plans to require a minimum age of 21 and at least 1,000 hours of service over 1 year for a worker to be eligible to join an employer’s 401(k) plan. For example, based on analysis of our hypothetical scenario, the savings of an otherwise eligible 18-year-old earning $15,822 per year could have been $134,456 at retirement, or $36,422 in 2016 dollars, if that individual had also received an employer match of their contribution up to 3 percent of salary from age 18 to 20. Additionally, the more often a worker changes jobs the larger the potential effect of a minimum-service eligibility policy on the worker’s retirement savings (see fig. Our Projections Suggest that Current Employer Contribution Policies Can Also Reduce Workers’ Retirement Savings in 401(k) Plans
Current law permits 401(k) plan sponsors to require participants to be employed on the last day of the plan year to be eligible to receive employer contributions to their account. Information from our survey of 80 plan sponsors and plan professionals showed that plan sponsors often use these two requirements together. Although plan sponsors may have previously found these two policies to be beneficial, our projections suggest they may also potentially reduce workers’ retirement savings. Last Day Policies Can Reduce Workers’ Retirement Savings, Based on Our Projections
The law permits plans to apply policies that limit a participant’s ability to receive employer contributions without additional service each year—last day policies—which can reduce participants’ potential retirement savings. Given a relatively mobile workforce, the requirement to be employed on the last day of the plan year to receive an employer’s contributions for that year puts workers who separate from their job at risk of losing some of their potential retirement savings. (See Appendix II Table 8 for examples of how a last day policy could potentially reduce retirement savings.) For example, our projections suggest that for a worker who twice separates from employment (at age 20 and 40) after 2 years without satisfying a 3-year cliff vesting policy, forfeiting the employer contributions already in their account, the lost savings could have grown to $81,743 by retirement ($22,143 in 2016 dollars). However, a Treasury official told us that the agency has not recently proposed any changes to the vesting rules and has not conducted an assessment to determine what vesting policies are appropriate today. Clearer Policy Descriptions by 401(k) Plans Could Help Participants to Better Understand Eligibility and Vesting Policies GAO’s Nongeneralizable Survey Found that While Knowledge Varied, Some Plan Participants Lacked Knowledge on Eligibility, Employer Contribution, and Vesting Policies
To examine plan participants’ understanding of eligibility, employer contribution, and vesting policies, we analyzed 46 responses to an online survey administered to participants in four 401(k) plans in which they were asked about their own plans. Given the mobility of today’s workforce, all workers are potentially affected by these policies. With respect to our recommendation that Treasury evaluate existing maximum vesting policies, Treasury had no formal comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Overview of Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) what is known about the prevalence of 401(k) plans’ eligibility and vesting policies and why plans use them, (2) the potential effects of eligibility and vesting policies on workers’ retirement savings, and (3) participants’ understanding of these policies. We also interviewed officials from the Department of Labor, Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as a total of 21 retirement professionals and academic researchers to discuss what is known about these policies’ effects on savings over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
ERISA allows sponsors to opt to set up 401(k) plans—which are the predominant type of plan offered by many employers to promote workers' retirement savings—and to set eligibility and vesting policies for the plans. GAO was asked to examine 401(k) plans' use of these policies. Among other objectives, this report examines 1) what is known about the prevalence of these policies and why plans use them, and 2) the potential effects of these policies on workers' retirement savings.
GAO conducted a nongeneralizable survey of 80 plan sponsors and plan professionals regarding plans' use of eligibility and vesting policies and the reasons for using them; reviewed industry data on plans' use of eligibility and vesting policies; and projected potential effects on retirement savings based on hypothetical scenarios. GAO also interviewed federal officials and 21 retirement professionals and academic researchers.
What GAO Found
GAO's nongeneralizable survey of 80 401(k) plans ranging in size from fewer than 100 participants to more than 5,000 and its review of industry data found that many plans have policies that affect workers' ability to (1) save in plans (eligibility policies), (2) receive employer contributions, and (3) keep those employer contributions if they leave their job (vesting policies). Thirty-three of 80 plans surveyed had policies that did not allow workers younger than age 21 to participate in the plan. In addition, 19 plans required participants to be employed on the last day of the year to receive any employer contribution for that year. Fifty-seven plans had vesting policies requiring employees to work for a certain period of time before employer contributions to their accounts are vested. Plan sponsors and plan professionals GAO surveyed identified lowering costs and reducing employee turnover as the primary reasons that plans use these policies.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) allows plan sponsors to set eligibility and vesting policies. Specifically, federal law permits 401(k) plan sponsors to require that workers be at least age 21 to be eligible to join the plan. The law also permits plans to use rules affecting 401(k) plan participants' receipt of employer contributions and the vesting of contributions already received. However, over time workers have come to rely less on traditional pensions and more on their 401(k) plan savings for retirement security. Further, while the rules were designed, in part, to help sponsors provide profit sharing contributions, today 401(k) plan sponsors are more likely to provide matching contributions and today's workers may be likely to change jobs frequently. GAO's projections for hypothetical scenarios suggest that these policies could potentially reduce workers' retirement savings. For example, assuming a minimum age policy of 21, GAO projections estimate that a medium-level earner who does not save in a plan or receive a 3 percent employer matching contribution from age 18 to 20 could have $134,456 less savings by their retirement at age 67 ($36,422 in 2016 dollars). Saving early for retirement is consistent with Department of Labor guidance as well as previous legislation and allows workers to benefit from compound interest, which can grow their savings over decades. In addition, the law permits plans to require that participants be employed on the last day of the year to receive employer contributions each year, which could reduce savings for today's mobile workforce. For example, GAO's projections suggest that if a medium-level earner did not meet a last day policy when leaving a job at age 30, the employer's 3 percent matching contribution not received for that year could have been worth $29,297 by the worker's retirement at age 67 ($8,150 in 2016 dollars). GAO's projections also suggest that vesting policies may also potentially reduce retirement savings. For example, if a worker leaves two jobs after 2 years, at ages 20 and 40, where the plan requires 3 years for full vesting, the employer contributions forfeited could be worth $81,743 at retirement ($22,143 in 2016 dollars).The Department of Treasury (Treasury) is responsible for evaluating and developing proposals for legislative changes for 401(k) plan policies, but has not recently done so for vesting policies. Vesting caps for employer matching contributions in 401(k) plans are 15 years old. A re-evaluation of these caps would help to assess whether they unduly reduce the retirement savings of today's mobile workers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests Congress consider a number of changes to ERISA, including changes to the minimum age for plan eligibility and plans' use of a last-day policy. GAO is also making two recommendations, including that Treasury reevaluate existing vesting policies to assess if current policies are appropriate for today's mobile workforce. Treasury had no comment on the recommendation. GAO believes that such an evaluation would be beneficial, given the potential for vesting policies to reduce retirement savings. |
gao_GAO-17-768 | gao_GAO-17-768_0 | DOD’s 2016 Report Did Not Fully Address Two of Four Elements in the Senate Report Direction and Did Not Include Information That Would Have Provided Further Insight into Risks
DOD’s Report Fully Addressed Two Elements, Partially Addressed One Element, and Did Not Address One Element
DOD’s October 2016 report on single source of supply risks fully addressed two elements of the direction in the Senate Report, partially addressed one element, and did not address one element. While DOD is not required to update its 2016 report on single source of supply risks, the department regularly reports information to congressional committees on the defense industrial base, such as through an annual report. This DOD organic asset was not included in the October 2016 report. Without information about DOD organic facilities that are critical single sources of supply, such as TCAs, including the potential effects on defense capabilities and risk mitigation actions, congressional and DOD decision makers may not be fully aware of, and prepared to address, potential risks associated with the loss of facilities that are single sources of supply for weapon systems. In addition, service officials from the offices above for the nine selected programs were not aware that the program had an item supplied by a TCA. Having relevant information generated through the annual CAIP, such as the type of information included in the October 2016 report, would help program managers to be aware of parts supplied by a single source that is considered to be a most critical risk (i.e., a TCA), and thus have complete and current information that could provide important focus for managing these risks. Program Offices May Have Limited Information from Contractors on Single Source of Supply Risks
Program offices often rely heavily on the prime contractor to identify existing and potential single source of supply risks, among other types of risks, but in some cases they may have limited information from contractors to help them be aware of and manage those risks. However, DOD has not developed a mechanism to ensure the timely and comprehensive sharing of information on single-source risks from contractors to program offices. Timely and comprehensive information from contractors about single source of supply risks would help program offices be aware of risks early enough to take proactive steps to understand and, where necessary, mitigate those risks. DOD has reported cost savings from proactive DMSMS management. The official leading DMSMS stated that a DMSMS policy could require a service-specific, dedicated lead for DMSMS, the development of a DMSMS plan for each program office throughout the acquisition life cycle, and the use of consistent metrics for monitoring the program. Without more complete information, such as the risks to and effects from potential losses of commercial and organic single sources, congressional and DOD decision makers do not have a full understanding of potential risks associated with the loss of facilities that are single sources of supply for weapon systems. Second, program offices often rely heavily on the prime contractor to identify single source of supply risks, but DOD does not have a mechanism to ensure that program offices obtain information on risks from contractors. Third, the DMSMS program is intended to provide information regarding the loss of suppliers and parts shortages and to proactively manage these risks, but program offices varied in their implementation of this program due to the lack of a department-wide policy, such as an instruction, that clearly defines requirements or procedures for DMSMS management by program offices. Identify major defense acquisition programs with operational implications. 2. To determine the extent to which DOD’s weapon systems program offices have information for identifying and managing single source of supply risks, we reviewed DOD and military department guidance related to acquisitions, program management, and risk mitigation, as well as guidance regarding the Diminishing Manufacturing Source and Material Shortages (DMSMS) program. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has an extensive network of suppliers that provide millions of parts needed to sustain its weapon systems. Some parts are provided by a single source of supply (e.g., one manufacturing facility), and if that single source were no longer able to provide the part, DOD could face challenges in maintaining systems. Senate Report 114-49 directed DOD to report on risks associated with single sources of supply. DOD completed its report in October 2016.
House Report 114-102, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, included a provision that GAO review single sources of supply for major defense acquisition programs. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD's 2016 report addressed the direction in the Senate report and (2) DOD's weapon systems program offices have information for identifying and managing single source of supply risks. GAO reviewed DOD policy and procedures, analyzed DOD's report, and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable selection sample of nine program offices.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2016 report on risks associated with single sources of supply did not fully address two of the four elements directed by a Senate report and did not include other information that would have provided further insight into those risks. DOD included information on major defense acquisition programs and supporting parts provided by each single source of supply. However, DOD did not include implementation plans and timelines for risk mitigation actions or information about the effects of the loss of suppliers, as directed. In addition, complete information about DOD organic facilities was not included. While DOD is not required to update its report, it regularly reports industrial base information to congressional committees. Without complete information about critical suppliers, congressional and DOD decision makers do not know all potential risks and effects associated with the loss of single sources of supply for weapon systems.
Program offices do not have complete information to fully identify and manage single source of supply risks. First, program officials GAO spoke with were not aware of DOD's 2016 report, and thus did not have information about parts from single-source suppliers that are considered to be most critical, which could provide important focus for managing these risks. Second, program offices often rely on the prime contractor to identify single source of supply risks, among other types of risks, and GAO found that program offices in some instances had limited information to manage those risks because DOD does not have a mechanism to ensure program offices obtain complete information from contractors. Without such a mechanism, program offices may not be aware of risks early enough to take proactive actions to understand and, as appropriate, mitigate those risks. Third, DOD has a program intended to provide information regarding the loss of suppliers and shortages and to proactively manage these risks, called the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) program, but GAO found that DMSMS implementation varied at selected program offices. DOD is taking steps toward improving DMSMS management, but there is no department-wide policy that clearly defines the requirements for DMSMS implementation at the program office level throughout the acquisition life cycle. Without such a policy there is no clearly defined requirement for program managers to proactively manage DMSMS issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD provide complete information to decision makers on risk mitigation plans and timeframes, potential effects from losses, and all critical facilities, commercial and organic, regarding risks from single sources of supply; share information on critical risks with program offices; develop a mechanism to ensure program offices obtain complete information; and issue a DMSMS policy. DOD concurred with GAO's six recommendations. |
gao_GGD-99-15 | gao_GGD-99-15_0 | H.R. We gathered pertinent information from the Service’s Finance Department to develop profiles, including financial data, on the remaining new products the Service marketed and/or had under development during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997 and that had been publicly announced as of November 1997. Statutory and Regulatory Authorities and Constraints Governing the Postal Service’s Ability to Market New Products and Recent Reform Proposals
The Postal Service has broad statutory authority to develop, test, approve, and market a variety of new products, including new capital, philatelic, domestic and international postal, and nonpostal products. First, since it is the underlying statutory mission of the Postal Service to provide postal services to bind the nation together, the Service needs to be able to explain how any new product it develops will further that mission. Second, under its statutory authority, before marketing (including test marketing) a new domestic postal product, which necessarily involves classification of mail, the Service must request a recommended decision from PRC regarding the propriety of the Service’s proposed classification, rates, or fees for the new product. Prior to issuing its recommended decision, PRC is required to hold hearings on the Service’s proposal. Finally, the Service’s ability to market new products can be constrained or influenced by congressional oversight, restrictions imposed during the appropriations process, or other legislative actions. 22 or legislative changes offered by the Postal Service would amend the Service’s current statutory authority to develop, test, approve, and market new products. 22 would place new restrictions on the introduction of new, nonpostal products and international postal products. However, H.R. 22 would provide the Service with broader latitude to test market experimental postal products. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the Postal Service is subject to at least three constraints that affect postal operations, including the development and marketing of new products. The requirement to request a recommended decision from PRC before marketing a new product applies, however, only to new domestic postal products. The Postal Service’s Board of Governors may approve, allow under protest, reject, or modify PRC decisions as provided for in statute. H.R. H.R. The Marketing Department’s CustomerPerfect! To oversee this work, Marketing established a New Business Initiatives and Products Group. Additionally, to facilitate the process of developing and introducing new products and to ensure effective management control, the Service developed a formalized system of checks and balances that requires top management buy-in at critical stages of the development process. Under the new product development process, new products initiated by the Marketing Department’s New Business Initiatives and Products Group go through four distinct stages: the (1) concept stage, (2) business plan stage, (3) test stage, and (4) implementation stage. Total revenues and expenses reported for the 19 products, through fiscal year 1997, were $148.8 million and $233.5 million, respectively, resulting in a net loss of $84.7 million. new product development process was implemented. new product development process following adoption of that process in June 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Postal Service's (USPS) development and marketing of new products and provided information on the expense and revenues associated with the products, focusing on: (1) the statutory and regulatory authorities and constraints covering all major groups of new products; (2) the potential impact that enactment of H.R. 22 and USPS' proposed reform legislation could have on new products; (3) providing information on USPS Marketing Department's new product development process and determining, for three selected products, how closely that process was followed; and (4) providing information, including financial data, on all new postal and nonpostal products USPS marketed or had under development during fiscal years (FY) 1995, 1996, and 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the statutory and regulatory authorities governing USPS provide USPS broad latitude to develop and market a wide variety of new products; (2) GAO's analysis shows that USPS is subject to at least three constraints in developing and marketing new products; (3) since it is the underlying statutory mission of USPS to provide postal services to bind the nation together, USPS needs to be able to explain how any new product it develops will further that mission; (4) under its statutory authority, before marketing a new domestic postal product, USPS must request a recommended decision from the Postal Rate Commission (PRC) regarding the propriety of USPS' proposed classification, rates, or fees for the new product; (5) prior to issuing its recommended decision, PRC is required to hold hearings on USPS' proposal; (6) the Postal Board of Governors may reject or modify PRC's recommended decision; (7) USPS is not required to request a recommended decision from PRC in the case of nonpostal products; (8) USPS' ability to market new products can be constrained by congressional oversight, restrictions imposed during the appropriations process, or other legislative actions; (9) adoption of either H.R. 22 or legislative changes offered by USPS would amend USPS' current statutory authority to develop, test, approve, and market new products; (10) H.R. 22 should place new restrictions on the introduction of new, nonpostal products and international postal products; (11) however, H.R. 22 would provide USPS with broader latitude to test market experimental postal products; (12) USPS' Marketing Department established the New Business Initiatives and Products Group, which implemented a new product development process, CustomerPerfect!; (13) it is intended to ensure effective management control through a formalized system of checks and balances that require top management buy-in at four critical stages: (a) concept; (b) business plan; (c) test; and (d) implementation; (14) three judgmentally selected products showed that in developing these products, the Marketing Department's New Business Initiatives and Products Group generally followed the CustomerPerfect! new product development process; (15) information and financial data show that during fiscal years 1995, 1996, and 1997, USPS marketed, or had under development, 19 new products that had been publicly announced; and (16) total revenues and expenses for the 19 products, from inception through FY 1997 were $148.8 million and $233.5 million. |
gao_GAO-17-85 | gao_GAO-17-85_0 | Audits of the Army’s, Navy’s, and Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budgetary Schedules Resulted in Disclaimers of Opinion
The Army, Navy, and Air Force asserted audit readiness for their Budgetary Schedules in 2014 and underwent their first Budgetary Schedule audits for fiscal year 2015. The IPAs for all three military services reported each of these reportable findings as a stand-alone material weakness or as part of a larger, combined material weakness. Army, Navy, and Air Force management generally concurred with the findings in the respective IPA reports and stated that they will develop and execute corrective actions to address the IPAs’ related findings. For all three military services, auditors found that adequate documentation to support disbursements and obligations was not always available. The Military Services Did Not Sufficiently Design Their Processes to Address Financial Management Deficiencies
The IPAs for the Army, Navy, and Air Force collectively issued over 700 notices of findings and recommendations to the respective military services during the course of the fiscal year 2015 Budgetary Schedule audits. Each military service is responsible for establishing its own processes for addressing these findings and recommendations by (1) identifying and tracking them, (2) prioritizing them, (3) developing corrective action plans (CAP) to address them, and (4) monitoring the status of CAP implementation. If the Air Force does not identify and track the complete universe of its unresolved deficiencies related to financial management, it cannot provide reasonable assurance that all such deficiencies will be addressed in a timely manner, which can ultimately affect the reliability of its financial information and the auditability of its financial statements. DOD’s Process for Monitoring and Reporting on Audit Remediation Efforts Lacks Comprehensive Information
Although the DOD Comptroller’s office has established several elements of a department-wide audit readiness remediation process, it does not have the comprehensive information on the status of all CAPs throughout the department needed to fully monitor and report on the progress being made to resolve financial management-related deficiencies that preclude DOD from being auditable. Specifically, (1) the DOD Comptroller’s office is not able to fully assess the military services’ progress because it does not obtain complete, detailed information on all of their CAPs related to critical capabilities—those identified in the FIAR Guidance as necessary to achieve auditability—and (2) reports to internal stakeholders and external stakeholders, such as DOD OIG, OMB, GAO, and Congress, on the status of audit readiness do not provide comprehensive information. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Internal Review Directorate under the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, to develop written policies and procedures for all financial management-related audit findings and recommendations under its purview that include the following: how the status of the recommendations will be tracked; the process and criteria to be followed for prioritizing the findings and recommendations; the process for developing CAPs to remediate the findings and recommendations, including the detailed CAP elements recommended by the Implementation Guide for OMB Circular A- 123; and the process for monitoring the status and progress of the CAPs, including the documentation to be maintained for monitoring CAP status and any actions to be taken if a lack of progress is found. In their written comments, reprinted in appendix IV, the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred with our respective recommendations to them, while DOD concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with two other recommendations that we made to it. Given the short amount of time remaining before the statutory date of March 31, 2019, for submitting to Congress the results of an audit of DOD’s fiscal year 2018 financial statements, having complete and reliable, detailed information on the department-wide status of CAPs related to critical capabilities is essential for DOD and its stakeholders so that they can (1) measure and communicate DOD’s progress in addressing the financial management deficiencies and (2) determine if additional actions are necessary to expedite the remediation process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) report the results of the audits of the fiscal year 2015 Schedules of Budgetary Activity (Budgetary Schedule) for the military services, (2) determine the extent to which each military service designed a process to address identified financial management-related findings and recommendations, and (3) determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has designed a department-wide strategy to monitor and report on audit readiness remediation efforts. Budgetary resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD remains on GAO's High-Risk List because of its long-standing financial management deficiencies. These deficiencies negatively affect DOD's audit readiness and its ability to make sound mission and operational decisions. The Army, Navy, and Air Force underwent their first Budgetary Schedule audits for fiscal year 2015.
This report, developed in connection with fulfilling GAO's mandate to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements, examines (1) the results of the audits of the fiscal year 2015 Budgetary Schedules for the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (2) the extent to which each military service designed a process to address financial management-related audit findings and recommendations; and (3) the extent to which DOD has designed a department-wide process to monitor and report on audit readiness remediation efforts. GAO reviewed IPA reports and documentation from the military services and DOD Comptroller and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Schedules of Budgetary Activity (Budgetary Schedules) for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for fiscal year 2015 reflected current year budget activity as an interim step toward producing an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources that will reflect multiyear budget activity. All three of the independent public accountants (IPA) contracted to audit these fiscal year 2015 Budgetary Schedules issued disclaimers, meaning that the IPAs were unable to express an opinion because of a lack of sufficient evidence to support the amounts presented. The IPAs for all three military services also identified material weaknesses in internal control and collectively issued a total of over 700 findings and recommendations. These weaknesses included, among other things, the military services' inability to reasonably assure that the Budgetary Schedules reflected all of the relevant financial transactions that occurred and that documentation was available to support such transactions. Army, Navy, and Air Force management generally concurred with these findings and stated that they would develop and implement corrective actions to address the IPAs' recommendations.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense's (DOD) Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance include the following steps for addressing these and other financial management-related findings and recommendations reported by external auditors: (1) identify and track them, (2) prioritize them, (3) develop corrective action plans (CAP) to remediate them, and (4) monitor the implementation status of the CAPs. GAO found that the remediation processes designed by each military service had deficiencies in one or more of these areas. For example, each military service's policies and procedures lacked sufficient controls to reasonably assure that they identified and tracked the complete universe of open findings and recommendations related to financial management. Without identifying and tracking the complete universe of unresolved deficiencies, the military services cannot provide reasonable assurance that the deficiencies will be addressed in a timely manner, which can ultimately affect the reliability of financial information and the auditability of their financial statements.
The DOD Comptroller has established several elements of a department-wide audit readiness remediation process, but it does not have comprehensive information on the status of CAPs throughout the department needed to fully monitor and report on the progress being made to resolve financial management-related deficiencies. Specifically, (1) the DOD Comptroller does not obtain complete, detailed information on all CAPs from the military services related to the department's critical capabilities to be able to fully assess progress and (2) reports to external stakeholders such as the Congress on the status of audit readiness do not provide comprehensive information. A lack of comprehensive information on the CAPs limits the ability of DOD and Congress to evaluate DOD's progress toward achieving audit readiness, especially given the short amount of time remaining before the statutory deadline to submit to Congress the results of an audit of the department-wide financial statements for fiscal year 2018.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making a total of eight recommendations to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and DOD to improve processes for tracking and monitoring financial management-related audit findings and recommendations. The military services concurred with the five recommendations to them, while DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with two of the recommendations directed to it. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-07-36 | gao_GAO-07-36_0 | Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA’s Security Program
Although NNSA has improved its headquarters oversight of security across the nuclear weapons complex, NNSA continues to experience difficulties in developing a safeguards and security program that provides reasonable assurance that all protection objectives are being met, especially at certain locations and in several topical areas, most notably cyber security, according to our review of NNSA site office surveys and independent inspections by DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight. While the results of the surveys and inspections are not entirely consistent, they do identify weaknesses with physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Y-12 National Security Complex, and weaknesses throughout NNSA in the cyber security area. While NNSA has recently improved its headquarters oversight of security, it has been hampered over the last 7 years by several factors, including (1) the lack of an effective headquarters organization, (2) security staffing shortages at its site offices, (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for its site office security staff, and (4) the lack of a complete security information database and framework for evaluating security review results. To his credit, the current Associate Administrator for DNS has taken numerous steps to build an effective headquarters security organization. First, it has implemented the Defense Nuclear Security Intern Program. NNSA Lacks Security Metrics to Gauge the Effectiveness of Its Safeguards and Security Program and Has Not Effectively Communicated Lessons Learned to Guide Security Improvements
NNSA does not have comprehensive metrics regarding the overall effectiveness of its safeguards and security program and is not communicating lessons-learned to guide security improvements across the complex. In addition, NNSA does not have complete data for tracking security deficiencies identified by security oversight reviews. Problems continue, in part, because NNSA and DOE have not yet fully agreed on how NNSA should function within the department. DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate as a Separately Organized Agency within DOE
NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, but it and DOE continue to struggle with establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. Several factors have contributed to this situation. Budgeting. Sandia National Laboratories now follows the DOE requirement. Create a National Nuclear Weapons Agency. As a result, NNSA has not significantly reduced project delivery times or costs. Recognizing the importance of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions, such as initiating a project and program management improvement team and developing a program management policy. Identify and train program managers. Establish an independent analysis unit. Unlike DOD, NNSA has not established an independent group responsible for reviewing program proposals, verifying cost estimates, and analyzing alternatives. With respect to project management, we recommend that NNSA take the following seven actions: establish an NNSA-specific project management policy to ensure application of the DOE project management manual; prepare a project management improvement plan; reinstitute annual reporting to the Congress on project management include major projects, such as the Stockpile Life Extension refurbishments, in DOE’s Project Assessment and Reporting System; complete a comprehensive database of all projects’ reports on management lessons learned to improve project management throughout NNSA; develop benchmark data on individual contractors’ project management performance to assist managers in improving contractor performance; and require that contractors’ project managers receive project manager training and attain project manager certification. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to security and management weaknesses, in 1999 the Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to a NNSA unclassified computer system, and cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO reviewed the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; and interviewed current and former NNSA and DOE officials.
What GAO Found
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, the results of internal and independent security oversight assessments have identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, Sandia National Laboratories and the Y-12 National Security Complex, and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. The following factors have contributed to this situation: Weak organization of headquarters security. Until recently, NNSA did not have consistent leadership or direction at the headquarters level for its security program. Security staffing shortages at NNSA site offices. Since NNSA became operational, five of its six site offices have not been staffed at the required levels, according to GAO's analysis. Site offices oversee NNSA contractor security operations. Inadequate security staff training. NNSA has not implemented a training program that provides federal security officials with the skills needed to effectively oversee contractor security programs. Incomplete security data. DOE's database for tracking security deficiencies identified by security oversight assessments is incomplete, and, as a result, NNSA lacks a comprehensive understanding of the overall effectiveness of its security program. NNSA has taken several actions to improve its management practices, including developing a planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation process. However, management problems continue, in part, because NNSA and DOE have not fully agreed on how NNSA should function within the department as a separately organized agency. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. GAO also identified the following areas where additional management improvements are needed: Project management. NNSA has not developed a project management policy, implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts, and fully shared project management lessons learned between its sites. Program management. NNSA has not identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level of competency. Financial management. NNSA has not established an independent analysis unit to review program budget proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze budget alternatives. |
gao_GAO-02-170 | gao_GAO-02-170_0 | In addition, the Service reported in its fiscal year 2000 audited financial statements an outstanding liability for future retirement benefits of $32.2 billion (excluding $16.5 billion of future related interest charges over 30 years) due to obligations that made the Service liable for pay increases that employees received under terms of new labor contracts and for COLAs to retirees, who retired on or after July 1, 1971, and their survivors, under the CSRS retirement plan. An Additional Retirement Benefit: The Post-Retirement Health Benefit Program
Although not part of a retirement plan, the Post-Retirement Health Benefit Program is an additional benefit available to USPS retirees. USPS estimates that the annual cost of this benefit will increase from $744 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $2 billion in fiscal year 2010. When the cost of the post-retirement health benefits of $744 million for fiscal year 2000 is added to the Service’s total retirement costs of $8.5 billion for fiscal year 2000, the total for retirement-related costs becomes $9.3 billion in fiscal year 2000. USPS projects that in fiscal year 2010, these total retirement-related costs will increase to $2 billion and $14 billion, respectively, for a total of $16 billion. Questions for Further Consideration and Analysis
As the Transformation Plan Task Force examines the impact of these retirement costs and liabilities on the Service’s overall financial condition and future operations, there are key questions that need to be addressed. | What GAO Found
This report identifies long-term structural or operational issues that may affect the U. S. Postal Services's (USPS) ability to provide affordable universal postal service on a break-even basis. One key issue is the Service's retirement costs and future liabilities. USPS had a net loss of $199 million in fiscal year 2000 and recently announced a $1.7 billion net loss for fiscal year 2001. The impact of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax mailings on the volume and the cost of future mail service is unclear. USPS' annual retirement plan costs are projected to rise significantly in the next 10 years--from $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $14 billion in fiscal year 2010. USPS also faces mounting debt because of pay increases resulting from new labor contracts and annual cost-of-living adjustments for retirees. USPS reported an outstanding liability for future retirement benefits of $32.2 billion as of September 2000, and anticipates paying another $16.5 billion in interest on this liability over 30 years. The Post-Retirement Health Benefit Program--an additional benefit available to USPS retirees--cost $744 million in fiscal year 2000. When this benefit is added to the retirement plan, it raises total retirement costs for fiscal year 2000 to $9.3 billion. USPS projects that this additional post-retirement health benefit will cost $2 billion in fiscal year 2010, raising the Service's total retirement costs to $16 billion that year. |
gao_GAO-06-735 | gao_GAO-06-735_0 | U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, that is, petitioners, can request or petition USCIS to allow certain relatives to immigrate to the United States. According to USCIS officials, background security checks were conducted on all beneficiaries prior to September 11. Hundreds of Convicted Sex Offenders Have Petitioned for Spouses, Fiancé(e)s, and other Relatives, including Children
At least 398 convicted sex offenders filed petitions for spouses, fiancé(e)s, children, and other relatives in fiscal year 2005 based upon matching several data elements from USCIS’s database with data from FBI’s National Sex Offender Registry. There may be additional convicted sex offenders who filed family-based petitions. The 398 sex offenders filed a total of 420 petitions. The 398 sex offenders were convicted of at least 411 sex offenses, including sexual assault, rape, and child molestation, according to conviction data contained in the NSOR. At least 45 of the convictions were for sex offenses against children. Convicted sex offenders are not prohibited by the INA from petitioning to bring their spouses, fiancé(e)s, or children into the United States. Therefore, consular officers have no legal basis to deny a visa to a noncitizen based solely on the fact that the petitioner has a criminal sexual background. Agencies Have a Framework for Disclosing Petitioners’ Criminal Sexual History to Noncitizen Beneficiaries
According to both USCIS and Department of State officials, the compelling circumstances exception to the Privacy Act of 1974 provides authority to disclose a petitioner’s criminal sexual history to a noncitizen beneficiary on a case-by-case basis. The recently enacted International Marriage Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA) of 2005 requires disclosure of a U.S. citizen’s criminal background information, including sex crimes, to certain prospective immigrants, essentially noncitizen fiancé(e)s, but some spouses and children as well. On May 3, 2006, USCIS issued Privacy Act interim guidance advising adjudicators of when it may be appropriate to disclose a petitioner’s criminal history involving violence or sex offenses to potential visa beneficiaries under the compelling circumstances exception. In a letter to GAO, the Chief, Advisory Opinions Branch, of the Department of State’s Visa Office wrote, “the clear possibility of abuse that an immigrant child would face while living in the same household as a convicted sex offender provides a strong basis for applying the health and safety exception in these cases.” The Department of State asserts that its position is “consistent with overall U.S. policy balancing the need to inform the public of the potential threat to a community posed by a child sex offender with the privacy interests of the offender.” According to the Department, consular officials are to consult with the department’s visa policy and legal staff prior to disclosure of a criminal record or other negative factors. New Statute Requires Disclosure of Petitioner’s Criminal Background Information to Some Noncitizen Beneficiaries
For certain noncitizen beneficiaries, disclosure of the petitioner’s criminal background information is now mandatory based on new authority granted to USCIS and the Department of State. Supplementing the disclosure by mail, IMBRA also requires Department of State consular officers to “provide for the disclosure of such criminal background information to the visa applicant at the consular interview in the primary language of the visa applicant.”
IMBRA’s mandatory disclosure requirement only extends to fiancé(e)s, spouses, and their minor children (i.e., unmarried children under 21 years old), who are sponsored by U.S. citizens and enter the United States on a K nonimmigrant visa issued by the Department of State. In fiscal year 2005, about 80 percent of all family-based petitions filed were for other than K visas. USCIS has not yet revised the petition. The officials said that they are preparing to issue disclosure guidance to consular officers that will cover discretionary Privacy Act disclosures not covered under IMBRA and are finalizing separate guidance with regard to the mandatory disclosures required under IMBRA. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State and the Attorney General. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) family-based petitioner data with data on individuals contained in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Convicted Sexual Offender Registry File, known as the National Sex Offender Registry. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2005, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents filed about 730,000 petitions with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to sponsor noncitizen family members, including spouses, fiances, and children, to immigrate to the United States. Those doing the sponsoring are called petitioners; those benefiting from the sponsoring are called beneficiaries. If USCIS approves the petition, overseas beneficiaries must also file a visa application with the Department of State to enter the United States. In January 2002, USCIS started to conduct background security checks on all petitioners in addition to the beneficiaries. These background checks revealed that some of the petitioners had convictions for criminal sex offenses; further, some of those criminal sex offenders were filing family-based petitions for children (those under the age of 21). This report addresses the number of convicted sex offenders who filed family-based petitions in fiscal year 2005 based upon a computer match of USCIS data with individuals in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Sex Offender Registry and discusses USCIS's and the Department of State's framework for disclosing a sponsor's criminal sexual background to the beneficiary. DHS, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice reviewed a draft of this report. Only technical comments were provided and have been incorporated into this report.
What GAO Found
At least 398 convicted sex offenders filed a total of 420 petitions in fiscal year 2005 for spouses, fiances, children, and other relatives. Immigration law does not prohibit convicted sex offenders from petitioning to bring their spouses, fiances, or children into the United States and generally USCIS cannot deny a petition based solely on the fact that the petitioner is a convicted sex offender. The sex offenders were convicted of at least 411 sex-related crimes, including sexual assault and rape, according to data in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Sex Offender Registry. At least 45 convictions involved crimes against children. While most beneficiaries were spouses and fiances, criminal sex offenders petitioned for at least 60 children. According to USCIS and Department of State officials, an exception to the Privacy Act of 1974 gives them authority to disclose a petitioner's criminal sex offender history if there are "compelling circumstances affecting the health and safety" of the beneficiary. For certain noncitizen beneficiaries, disclosure of the petitioner's criminal background information is now mandatory based on new authority granted to USCIS and the Department of State. The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 (IMBRA) requires disclosure of a U.S. citizen's criminal background information, including sex crimes, to certain prospective immigrants, essentially noncitizen fiances, but some spouses and minor children as well. Mandatory disclosure is not required for beneficiaries not covered by IMBRA, though these beneficiaries may receive information about a petitioner's criminal background on a discretionary basis under the Privacy Act exception. GAO estimates that IMBRA's mandatory disclosure requirement will cover about 20 percent of family-based beneficiaries based on fiscal year 2005 data. On May 3, 2006, USCIS issued interim guidance to its adjudicators on when it may be appropriate to disclose information related to a petitioner's criminal history under the "compelling circumstances" exception to the Privacy Act. USCIS plans to issue separate guidance related to disclosure requirements under IMBRA. Department of State officials said that they are preparing to issue Privacy Act disclosure guidance and are finalizing separate IMBRA disclosure guidance. |
gao_AIMD-96-61 | gao_AIMD-96-61_0 | Comptroller General of the United States United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 Comptroller General of the United States To the Board of Directors Panama Canal Commission Our audits of the Panama Canal Commission found the fiscal years 1995 and 1994 financial statements to be reliable in all material respects; although certain internal controls to help assure compliance with a statutory spending limitation should be improved, management fairly stated that internal controls in place on September 30, 1995, were effective in safeguarding assets from material loss, assuring material compliance with laws governing the use of budget authority and with other relevant laws and regulations, and assuring that there were no material misstatements in the financial statements; and reportable noncompliance with laws and regulations we tested for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1995. To comply with this provision, the Commission is required to identify and fully fund its liabilities by that date. Opinion on Financial Statements
The financial statements including the accompanying notes present fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the Commission’s assets, liabilities, and capital; operating revenue and expenses; changes in capital; and cash flows. Management of the Commission fairly stated that those controls in effect on September 30, 1995, provided reasonable assurance that losses, noncompliance, or misstatements material to the financial statements would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO audited the Panama Canal Commission's financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 30, 1995 and 1994, focusing on: (1) the statements' reliability; (2) internal controls; and (3) compliance with selected applicable laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, the Commission's financial position as of September 30, 1995 and 1994, and the results of its operations, changes in capital, and cash flows for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles; (2) although improvements are needed, the Commission's internal controls in effect as of September 30, 1995, reasonably ensured that losses, noncompliance, or material misstatements would be prevented or detected; (3) the Commission disclosed a nonmaterial violation of the Antideficiency Act and has implemented internal controls that should prevent any future violations; (4) there were no other reportable instances of noncompliance with applicable laws and regulations; (5) the Commission has improved its general controls over its computerized information systems to correct previously identified weaknesses; and (6) the Commission expects to have its liabilities fully funded by the time the Canal is transferred to Panama. |
gao_GAO-12-461 | gao_GAO-12-461_0 | While investments in IT have the potential to improve lives and organizations, some federally funded IT projects can—and have— become risky, costly, unproductive mistakes. Federal IT Reform Plan Strives to Address Persistent Challenges
After assessing the most persistent challenges in acquiring, managing, and operating IT systems, in December 2010, the Federal CIO established a 25-point IT Reform Plan designed to address challenges in IT acquisition, improve operational efficiencies, and deliver more IT value to the American taxpayer. OMB and Key Federal Agencies Have Made Progress on IT Reform Action Items, But Much Remains to Be Done
OMB and key federal agencies have made progress on selected action items identified in the IT Reform Plan, but there are several areas where more remains to be done. Of the 10 key action items we reviewed, 3 were completed and the other 7 were partially completed by December 2011. The agency reported that of the 10 action items, 7 were completed and 3 were partially completed. They noted that work will continue on all of the initiatives even after OMB declares the related action items to be completed under the IT Reform Plan. We disagree with this approach. In prematurely declaring the action items to be completed, OMB risks losing momentum on the progress it has made to date. Until OMB and the agencies complete the action items called for in the IT Reform Plan, the benefits of the reform initiatives—including increased operational efficiencies and more effective management of large-scale IT programs—may be delayed. OMB and the agencies have plans for addressing all seven of the action items that we identified as behind schedule, but lack time frames for completing five of them. OMB officials stated that it plans to propose new authorities as part of the 2013 President’s Budget, and intends to work with congressional committees throughout the budget rollout process. OMB is behind schedule in consolidating commodity IT spending under agency CIOs. However, there is no time frame for completing this activity. Until OMB and the agencies establish time frames for completing corrective actions, they increase the risk that key actions will not be effectively managed to closure. However, OMB has not established performance measures for 6 of the 10 action items we reviewed. OMB has not established performance measures for gauging the success of most of its reform initiatives. For example, while OMB is tracking the number of services that agencies move to a cloud computing environment and the number of data center closures, it is not tracking the usefulness of its efforts to develop a best practices collaboration portal or a cadre of IT acquisition professionals. Specifically we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Federal Chief Information Officer to ensure that the action items called for in the IT Reform Plan are completed by the responsible parties prior to the completion of the IT Reform Plan’s 18 month deadline of June 2012, or if the June 2012 deadline cannot be met, by another clearly defined deadline; provide clear time frames for addressing the shortfalls associated with the IT Reform Plan action items; accurately characterize the status of the IT Reform Plan action items in the upcoming progress report in order to keep momentum going on action items that are not yet completed; and establish outcome-oriented measures for each applicable action item in the IT Reform Plan. OMB considers these action items to be completed. Thus, we believe that our recommendation to OMB to accurately characterize the status of IT Reform action items is valid. Until OMB establishes and tracks measureable, outcome-oriented performance measures for each of the action items in the IT Reform Plan, the agency will be limited in its ability to evaluate progress that has been made and whether or not the initiative is achieving its goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the progress the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and key federal agencies have made on selected action items in the Information Technology (IT) Reform Plan, (2) assess the plans for addressing any action items that are behind schedule, and (3) assess the extent to which sound measures are in place to evaluate the success of the IT reform initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
While investments in IT have the potential to improve lives and organizations, federal IT projects too often experience cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. To address acquisition challenges, improve operational efficiencies, and deliver more value to the American taxpayer, in December 2010, OMBs Federal CIO issued a 25-point IT Reform Plan.
GAO was asked to (1) evaluate the progress OMB and key federal agencies have made on selected action items in the IT Reform Plan, (2) assess the plans for addressing action items that are behind schedule, and (3) assess the extent to which sound measures are in place to evaluate the success of the IT reform initiatives. To do so, GAO selected 10 of the 25 action items from the IT Reform Plan, focusing on the more important activities due to be completed by December 2011; analyzed agency documentation; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and key federal agencies have made progress on action items in the Information Technology (IT) Reform Plan, but there are several areas where more remains to be done. Of the 10 key action items GAO reviewed, 3 were completed and 7 were partially completed by December 2011, in part because the initiatives are complex. OMB reported greater progress than GAO determined, stating that 7 of the 10 action items were completed and that 3 were partially completed. While OMB officials acknowledge that there is more to do in each of the topic areas, they consider the key action items to be completed because the IT Reform Plan has served its purpose as a catalyst for a set of broader initiatives. They explained that work will continue on all of the initiatives even after OMB declares that the related action items are completed under the IT Reform Plan. We disagree with this approach. In prematurely declaring the action items to be completed, OMB risks losing momentum on the progress it has made to date. Until OMB and the agencies complete the action items, the benefits of the reform initiativesincluding increased operational efficiencies and more effective management of large-scale IT programswill likely be delayed.
OMB and key agencies plan to continue efforts to address the seven items that GAO identified as behind schedule, but lack time frames for completing most of them. For example, OMB plans to work with congressional committees during the fiscal year 2013 budget process to assist in exploring legislative proposals to establish flexible budget models and to consolidate certain routine IT purchases under agency chief information officers (CIO). However, OMB has not established time frames for completing five of the seven IT Reform Plan action items that are behind schedule. Until OMB and the agencies establish time frames for completing these corrective actions, they increase the risk that key action items will not be completed or effectively managed to closure. Further, they diminish the likelihood of achieving the full benefits of IT reform.
OMB has not established performance measures for evaluating the results of most of the IT reform initiatives GAO reviewed. Specifically, OMB has established performance measures for 4 of the 10 action items, including data center consolidation and cloud computing. However, no performance measures exist for 6 other action items, including establishing the best practices collaboration platform and developing a cadre of IT acquisition professionals. Until outcome-oriented performance measures are in place for each of the action items, OMB will be limited in its ability to evaluate progress that has been made and to determine whether or not the initiative is achieving its intended results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to three agencies to complete key IT Reform action items; the agencies generally concurred. GAO is also making recommendations to OMB to complete key action items, accurately characterize the items status, and establish measures for IT reform initiatives. OMB agreed to complete key action items, but disagreed with the latter recommendations, noting that the agency believes it is characterizing the items status correctly and that measures are not warranted. GAO maintains that its recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-16-55 | gao_GAO-16-55_0 | According to the 2011 Military Leadership Diversity Commission report, the military can recruit from a pool of individuals using specific eligibility requirements that can potentially present a barrier to service. Accession Rates of Female Officers Have Slightly Increased, and DOD and the Coast Guard Have Not Determined Resources and Funding to Increase the Recruitment and Accessions of Female Officers
DOD and Coast Guard data from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014 show a slight percentage increase for female officer accessions. Although collectively the services slightly increased female officer accession rates during this time period, female officer accessions for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force individually fluctuated from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. DOD and the Coast Guard Have Not Determined Resources and Funding for Increasing the Recruitment and Accessions of Women into the Officer Corps
DOD and the Coast Guard have not determined the resources and funding to increase the recruitment and, ultimately the accessions, of women into the officer corps. DOD has budget line items in its operation and maintenance budget for recruiting and advertising totaling over $1 billion for fiscal year 2016 (see table 2). DOD and the Coast Guard Reported Initiatives for Increasing the Recruitment and Accessions of Women into the Officer Corps, but Do Not Have an Oversight Framework and Evaluations for Key Initiatives
In response to our questionnaire, DOD and the Coast Guard reported 10 initiatives directed specifically at increasing the recruitment and accessions of women into the officer corps. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have not conducted evaluations of all of these initiatives, which could help ensure key initiatives are achieving their intended purpose. For example, as discussed earlier, U.S. Coast Guard Academy admissions officers visit all-female high schools to promote the opportunities available for women at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Although DOD and Coast Guard officials agree that increasing the representation of women is important, DOD and the Coast Guard do not have a clearly defined role for providing oversight of the various initiatives and the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard do not have program goals for their initiatives directed at increasing the recruitment of women into the officer corps. To improve the Coast Guard’s management of initiatives to increase the recruitment and accessions of women into the officer corps, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following actions:
Develop an oversight framework that includes or incorporates (consistent with applicable law):
Service-wide program goals for initiatives directed at female officers’ recruitment, such as goals related to the composition of the applicant pool;
Performance measures linked to program goals; and
Resource allocations linked to program goals. In summary, DOD concurred with the first recommendation and did not state whether it concurred with the second recommendation. DHS concurred with both of the recommendations. DOD did not state whether it concurred with the second recommendation to conduct evaluations for key recruitment initiatives to help ensure these initiatives are achieving their intended purpose. For our first objective, to evaluate the extent to which accessions of women into the officer corps have increased, and DOD and the Coast Guard have determined resources and funding to increase the accessions of women into the officer corps, we obtained accessions data maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. GAO-14-93. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the end of the Second World War, the role of women in the military has been evolving. Changes to laws and DOD policies have either eliminated or clarified restrictions on women serving in the military. A 2011 Military Leadership Diversity Commission reported that women comprise more than 50 percent of the recruiting pool for the officer corps.
Public Law 113-291 included a provision for GAO to review the Armed Forces' outreach and recruitment efforts directed at women's representation in the officer corps, among other things. GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) accessions of women into the officer corps have increased, and DOD and the Coast Guard have determined resources and funding to increase the accessions of women into the officer corps and (2) DOD and the Coast Guard have initiatives and an oversight framework to increase the recruitment and accessions of female officers.
GAO analyzed fiscal years 2010-14 female officer accessions data, reviewed budget reports, distributed a questionnaire to offices responsible for the recruitment and accessions of female officers, and interviewed agency officials about their efforts.
What GAO Found
Department of Defense (DOD) and Coast Guard fiscal year 2010-14 data show an overall slight increase in female officer accessions rates (e.g. the number of female officer accessions during a period of time, expressed as a percentage of total accessions) for all of the Armed Forces, with the Coast Guard having the highest percentage increase. Female officer accession rates for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force fluctuated from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. The Marine Corps had slight increases from 7.6 percent to 11.8 percent.
DOD and the Coast Guard have not determined the resources and funding to increase accessions of women. DOD has requested $1.36 billion in general for recruiting and advertising in its fiscal year 2016 operation and maintenance budget request. However, DOD and the Coast Guard have not identified resources for all initiatives directed at the recruitment and accessions of female officers.
In response to GAO's questionnaire, DOD and the Coast Guard reported 10 initiatives specifically designed to increase the recruitment and accessions of female officers. For example, Coast Guard officials reported that U.S. Coast Guard Academy admissions officers visit all-female high schools to promote the opportunities available for women at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. However, DOD and the Coast Guard do not have an oversight framework for recruitment initiatives, to include program goals, performance measures, and resource allocation linked to program goals. One of the five Armed Forces has a goal related to the recruitment of women into the officer corps; however, the others do not. DOD and the Coast Guard also have not conducted evaluations of all 10 initiatives. Without an oversight framework and evaluations of initiatives, which can demonstrate that initiatives are achieving their intended purpose, DOD and the Coast Guard will be limited in identifying which initiatives are the most effective at increasing the recruitment and accessions of women, and in directing limited resources to the most effective initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and the Coast Guard develop an oversight framework and conduct evaluations for initiatives. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and did not state whether it concurred with the second recommendation. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with both of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-930T | gao_GAO-10-930T_0 | Bridge Conditions Have Improved, but the Impact of the HBP Is Difficult to Determine
Bridge Conditions Have Improved but a Significant Number of Bridges Remain in Poor Condition
Of the 602,977 bridges on the nation’s roadways, one in four is classified as deficient. Data indicate that the total number of deficient bridges has decreased since 1998, even as the total number of bridges has increased. HBP’s Impact Is Difficult to Determine Due to Incomplete Information on Spending, Expansion of Bridge Project Eligibility, and Limitations in Bridge Condition Data
The impact of the federal investment in the HBP is difficult to measure in part because there are no comprehensive and complementary data for state and local spending on bridges. The lack of comprehensive information on state and local spending makes it impossible to (1) distinguish the impact of HBP funding from other funding to improve bridge conditions and (2) determine the extent to which states may be substituting increased HBP funding for state and local funds that they would otherwise have spent on bridges. Therefore, simply measuring changes in the number of structurally deficient or functionally obsolete bridges does not reflec full impact of the program, since these measures do not capture the impact of the HBP investment in the other eligible activities—such as preventive maintenance—that do not necessarily result in an im reduction in the number of deficient bridges. by the HBP—on the overall condition of the nation’s bridges. The HBP Lacks Focus, Performance Measures, and Sustainability
As we reported in 2008, the HBP does not fully align with our principles for re-examining surface transportation programs in that the bridge program lacks focus, performance measures, and sustainability. First, HBP’s goals are not focused on a clearly identified federal interest. Over the years, the program’s statutory goals have expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting activities like seismic retrofitt and preventive maintenance, thus expanding eligibility for HBP funds to include almost any bridge in the country. Since our 2008 report, FHWA reports that it has taken a number of steps to work with Congress to address our recommendations. According to FHWA, efforts are under way to incorporate the underlying principles we developed to guide the re-examination of surface transportation programs, such as the need for specific national goals and performance measures to gauge progress toward national goals, encouraging states to use and share best tools and practices, and aligning funding mechanisms to support program goals. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
One in four bridges in the United States is either structurally deficient and in need of repair, or functionally obsolete and is not adequate for today's traffic. The Highway Bridge Program (HBP), the primary source of federal funding for bridges, provided about $7 billion to states in fiscal year 2010. This testimony addresses (1) the current state of the nation's bridges and the impacts of the HBP and (2) the extent to which the HBP aligns with principles GAO developed to guide the re-examination of surface transportation programs. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports, updated with bridge data and information provided by agency officials.
What GAO Found
There are over 600,000 bridges on the nation's roadways, of which one in four is deficient in some sense. Data indicate that the total number of deficient bridges has decreased over the past 12 years, even as the total number of bridges has increased, because of a reduction in the number of structurally deficient bridges. However, the impact of the federal investment in the HBP is difficult to measure, in part because there are no comprehensive and complementary data for state and local bridge spending. The lack of comprehensive information on state and local spending makes it impossible to (1) distinguish the impact of HBP funding from other funding to improve bridge conditions and (2) determine the extent to which states may be substituting increased HBP funding for state and local funds that they would otherwise have spent on bridges. Evaluating the impact of the HBP is important not only to understand the outcome of past spending but also to determine how to sensibly invest future federal resources. The HBP does not fully align with GAO's principles for re-examining surface transportation programs in that the program lacks focus, performance measures, and fiscal sustainability. The program's statutory goals are not focused on a clearly identified national interest but rather have expanded from improving deficient bridges to supporting preventive maintenance and many other projects, thus expanding eligibility to include almost any bridge. In addition, the program lacks measures linking funding to performance and does not utilize new tools such as bridge management systems. Fiscal sustainability also remains a challenge given the nearly $30 billion in additional revenues added to the Highway Account since fiscal year 2008.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. In 2008, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Transportation work with Congress to (1) identify and define national goals for HBP, (2) develop and implement performance measures, (3) identify and evaluate best tools and practices, and (4) review and evaluate HBP funding mechanisms to align funding with performance. DOT generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken some actions to work with Congress to address issues GAO raised regarding the HBP, but much work remains. GAO provided a draft of this testimony to FHWA for review. We incorporated FHWA comments, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-52 | gao_GAO-06-52_0 | DOT issued its guidance in 2001. Several Types of Language Access Services Are Provided, but Little Is Known about the Effects and Costs of Services
The types of language access services provided by the transit agencies and MPOs we visited included translated service brochures, multilingual telephone lines, translated Web sites, bilingual customer service staffs, and a host of other services. However, the effects and costs of these services are largely unknown. Little is also known about the costs of providing such services, and most agencies saw the language access they provide as a cost of doing business as opposed to an additional cost; however, agencies told us that costs could become prohibitive if services were substantially expanded or provided in several additional languages. Some agencies also employed more direct tactics to include LEP groups in the planning process. In addition, several agencies we visited distributed translated public meeting notices in various establishments throughout the community. Furthermore, few of the agencies we visited had conducted a formalized assessment of the needs of the LEP populations in their service areas, or had assessed the success of their language access activities in meeting these needs, although DOT’s LEP guidance recommends that they do so. DOT Assists Grantees on Language Access Services through Its Guidance and Other Activities, but These Resources Are Not Often Accessed by Local Agencies
DOT’s LEP guidance provides grantees with a five-step framework for how to provide meaningful access to LEP populations, along with some information on how to implement such a framework; however, officials at the majority of the 20 transit agencies and 7 MPOs we visited were not aware of the LEP guidance. Officials at transit agencies and MPOs we visited stated that training and technical assistance that is widely available, and specific to language access and how to implement DOT’s LEP guidance, could help them more effectively provide access to LEP populations. DOT’s LEP Guidance Provides Steps to Meaningful Access, but DOT Took Limited Steps to Make Grantees Aware of Guidance
DOT’s 2001 LEP guidance outlines five steps funding recipients should take to provide meaningful access for LEP persons, including (1) conducting an assessment of the language groups within their service areas and the language needs of these groups; (2) developing and implementing written plans outlining their strategies for ensuring access to services for LEP populations; (3) making staff aware of the LEP access plan, training them, and providing them with the tools necessary to carry out the plan; (4) ensuring that language access services are actually provided in a consistent manner and that LEP populations are aware of these services; and (5) developing monitoring programs that allow agencies to assess the success of their LEP access programs and to identify needed modifications. Besides offering workshops, DOT also participates in the Federal Interagency Working Group on Limited-English Proficiency, which provides resources to federal grantees mainly through its Web site, http://www.lep.gov. The transit agency credits this effort with increasing its ridership. An official from NHI identified two training courses in which language issues were discussed. However, these reviews do not fully take into account Executive Order 13166 or DOT’s LEP guidance, and the criteria for finding a deficiency with regard to providing language access are inconsistent. At smaller agencies, we interviewed the general managers as well as other agency officials. We reviewed oversight documents pertaining to Title VI compliance reviews, triennial reviews, and planning certification reviews to determine how language access is considered by these reviews (i.e., specific questions regarding language access activities) and to what degree these reviews incorporate DOT’s LEP guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 10 million people in the United States are of limited English proficiency (LEP), in that they do not speak English at all or do not speak English well. These persons tend to rely on public transit more than English speakers. Executive Order 13166 directs federal agencies to develop guidance for their grantees on making their services accessible to LEP persons. The Department of Transportation (DOT) issued its guidance in 2001, with revised guidance pending issuance. This report reviews (1) the language access services transit agencies and metropolitan planning organizations have provided, and the effects and costs of these services; (2) how DOT assists its grantees in providing language access services; and (3) how DOT monitors its grantees' provision of these services.
What GAO Found
Transit agencies and metropolitan planning organizations provide a variety of language access services, predominantly in Spanish, but the effects and costs of these services are largely unknown. Types of services provided included, among other things, translated brochures and signs; multilingual telephone lines; bilingual drivers; and interpreters at public meetings. However, few agencies we visited had conducted an assessment of the language needs in their service areas, or had conducted an evaluation of their language access efforts. As a result, it is unclear whether agencies' efforts are comprehensive enough to meet the needs of LEP persons, and community groups in the areas we visited saw important gaps in agencies' services. In addition, although those costs are largely unknown, several agencies saw providing language access as a cost of doing business, not as an additional cost. However, if efforts were to be expanded to include additional services or languages, agency officials told us that costs could become prohibitive. DOT assists grantees in providing language access through its guidance and other activities, but DOT has made limited efforts to ensure that grantees are aware of the available assistance, which was not often accessed by the agencies we visited. This assistance includes DOT's guidance--which provides a five-step framework for how to provide meaningful language access--as well as workshops and peer-exchange programs that include language access practices, and training courses that touch on language issues. DOT also participates in a federal LEP clearinghouse, www.lep.gov . However, few agencies we visited had accessed these resources. Several local officials stated that easily accessible training and assistance specific to language access and examples of how to implement DOT's guidance could help them more effectively provide access to LEP populations. Transit agencies' and metropolitan planning organizations' provision of language access services are monitored through in-depth civil rights compliance reviews and two broader reviews--triennial reviews of transit agencies and planning certification reviews. However, these reviews do not have consistent criteria for determining whether an agency is deficient in providing such services. Furthermore, these reviews do not fully reflect Executive Order 13166 or DOT's guidance. Without thorough and consistent monitoring that takes into account the guidance, local agencies' language access activities will likely remain varied and inconsistent. |
gao_GAO-01-452 | gao_GAO-01-452_0 | GSA is responsible for identifying, funding, and completing needed repairs and alterations at the federal buildings it manages. In examining the 27 projects, GSA officials used a multifaceted process that relied on empirical data and professional judgment coupled with specific selection criteria and computer analysis that compared each of the competing projects. Our report concluded that inadequate program data on repairs and alterations, the lack of a strategic plan for managing repair and alteration projects, and limited funding were three long- standing obstacles that impeded GSA’s ability to satisfy its repair and alteration needs. Conclusions
GSA’s multifaceted prospectus-level repair and alteration selection process identified needed projects for funding in fiscal year 2001. Therefore, the other 15 projects remain in GSA’s multibillion-dollar repair and alteration inventory. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine the General Services Administration’s (GSA) process for assessing and selecting prospectus-level repair and alteration design projects for funding, (2) identify any obstacles that impede GSA from satisfying its repair and alteration requirements, and (3) document consequences associated with deferring needed repairs and alterations at selected buildings. A health and safety risk exists. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA), the federal government's real property manager, it is responsible for identifying, funding, and completing needed repairs and alterations at federal buildings. This report examines (1) GSA's process for assessing and selecting prospectus-level major repair and alteration design projects for funding, (2) the obstacles that impede GSA from satisfying its repair and alteration requirements, and (3) the consequences associated with deferring needed repairs and alterations at selected buildings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in fiscal year 2001, GSA assessed the merits of 27 prospectus-level repair and alteration design projects and recommended 12 for funding. These projects were selected by a multifaceted process that relied on empirical data and professional judgment coupled with specific selection criteria and computer analysis that compared competing projects. GSA explained its decisions when it recommended lower-ranked projects for repairs. However, because of insufficient funding, those projects were placed on GSA's growing repair and alteration inventory. GSA has faced long-standing obstacles, including inadequate program data, the lack of a multiyear repair and alteration plan, and limited funding, in reducing this multibillion-dollar inventory. In addition, funding limitations remain a major obstacle. Delaying or not performing needed repairs and alterations may have serious consequences, including health and safety problems. |
gao_GAO-04-412T | gao_GAO-04-412T_0 | Background
While there is no uniformly accepted definition of predatory lending, a number of practices are widely acknowledged to be predatory. No comprehensive data are available on the incidence of these practices, but banking regulators, consumer advocates, and industry participants generally agree that predatory loans are most likely to occur in the market for “subprime” loans. Among federal agencies, FTC has a prominent role in combating predatory lending because of its responsibilities in implementing and enforcing certain federal laws among lending institutions that are not depository institutions supervised by federal banking regulators. FTC reported that it has filed 19 complaints—17 since 1998—alleging deceptive or other illegal practices by mortgage lenders or brokers and that some actions have resulted in multimillion dollar settlements. Federal banking regulators have stated that their monitoring and examination activities have uncovered little evidence of predatory lending in federally regulated depository institutions. Issues related to federal oversight and regulation of certain nonbank mortgage lenders may challenge efforts to combat predatory lending. Nonbank mortgage lending companies owned by financial or bank holding companies (i.e., nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries) account for an estimated 24 percent of subprime loan orginations, according to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and some have been the target of notable federal and state enforcement actions involving allegations of abusive lending. Many States Have Passed Laws Addressing Predatory Lending, but Federal Agencies Have Preempted Some Statutes
In response to concerns about the growth of predatory lending and the limitations of existing laws, 25 states, the District of Columbia, and 11 localities have passed their own laws addressing predatory lending practices, according to a database that tracks such laws. Some states have also increased the regulation of and licensing requirements for mortgage lenders and brokers, in part to address concerns that some unscrupulous lenders and brokers have been responsible for lending abuses and that these entities have not been adequately regulated. The regulators also said they found little to no evidence of predatory lending by the institutions they regulate. A number of factors may make the elderly particularly susceptible to predatory lending practices. For example: Diseases and physical impairments associated with aging—such as declining vision, hearing, or mobility—can restrict elderly consumers’ ability to access financial information and compare credit terms. Elderly homeowners often live in older homes and are more likely to need someone to do repairs for them. The Usefulness of Consumer Education, Counseling, and Disclosures in Deterring Predatory Lending May Be Limited
While representatives of the mortgage lending industry and consumer groups have noted that financial education may make some consumers less susceptible to abusive lending practices, GAO’s review of literature and interviews with consumer and federal officials suggest that consumer education by itself has limits as a tool for deterring predatory lending. Prepurchase mortgage counseling—which can offer a “third party” review of a prospective mortgage loan—may help borrowers avoid predatory loans, in part by alerting consumers to predatory loan terms and practices. While beneficial, the role of mortgage counseling in preventing predatory lending is likely to be limited. However, the secondary market may also inadvertently facilitate predatory lending by providing a source of funds for unscrupulous originators, allowing them to quickly sell off loans with predatory terms. However, the degree of due diligence purchasers undertake varies. In contrast, according to some market participants, the due diligence of other secondary market purchasers of residential mortgages may be more narrowly focused on the creditworthiness of the loans and on their compliance with federal, state, and local laws. | Why GAO Did This Study
While there is no universally accepted definition, the term "predatory lending" is used to characterize a range of practices, including deception, fraud, or manipulation, that a mortgage broker or lender may use to make a loan with terms that are disadvantageous to the borrower. Concerns about predatory lending have increasingly garnered the attention and concern of policymakers, consumer advocates and participants in the mortgage industry. This statement is based on GAO's report, released at today's hearing, and discusses federal and state efforts to combat predatory lending; factors that may make elderly consumers more susceptible to predatory lending; the roles of consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosures in preventing predatory lending; and how the secondary mortgage market can affect predatory lending.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have taken a number of enforcement actions, sometimes jointly, using various federal consumer protection laws to combat predatory lending. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has played the most prominent enforcement role, filing 19 complaints and reaching multimillion dollar settlements. The Departments of Justice and Housing and Urban Development have also taken various predatory lending-related enforcement actions. Federal banking regulators report little evidence of predatory lending by the institutions they supervise. However, concerns exist about nonbank mortgage lending companies owned by financial or bank holding companies. While FTC is the primary federal enforcer of consumer protection laws for these entities, it is a law enforcement agency that conducts targeted investigations. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Board is well equipped to routinely monitor and examine these entities and, thus, potentially deter predatory lending activities, but its authority in this regard is less clear. As of January 2004, 25 states, as well as several localities, had passed laws to address predatory lending, often by restricting the terms or provisions of certain high-cost loans; however, federal banking regulators have preempted some state laws for the institutions they supervise. Also, some states have strengthened their regulation and licensing of mortgage lenders and brokers. While there are no comprehensive data, federal, state, and consumer advocacy officials report that elderly people have disproportionately been victims of predatory lending. According to these officials and relevant studies, predatory lenders target older consumers in part because they are more likely to have substantial home equity or may live on limited incomes that make them more susceptible to offers for quick access to cash. Older consumers may also have cognitive or physical impairments such as poor eyesight, hearing, or mobility that limit their ability to access competitive sources of credit. GAO's review of literature and interviews with consumer and federal officials suggest that consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosures are useful, but may be of limited effectiveness in reducing predatory lending. A variety of factors limit their effectiveness, including the complexity of mortgage transactions, difficulties in reaching target audiences, and counselors' inability to review loan documents. The secondary market--where mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities are bought and sold--benefits borrowers by expanding credit, but may facilitate predatory lending by allowing unscrupulous lenders to quickly sell off loans with predatory terms. In part to avoid certain risks, secondary market participants perform varying degrees of "due diligence" to screen out loans with predatory terms, but may be unable to identify all such loans. |
gao_GAO-08-1168T | gao_GAO-08-1168T_0 | Currently, the IRIS database contains assessments of more than 540 chemicals. While the process used to develop IRIS chemical assessments includes numerous individual steps, or activities, major assessment steps include (1) a review of the scientific literature; (2) preparation of a draft IRIS assessment; (3) internal EPA reviews of draft assessments; (4) two OMB/interagency reviews, managed by OMB, that provide input from OMB as well as from other federal agencies, including those that may be affected by the IRIS assessments if they lead to regulatory or other actions; (5) an independent peer review conducted by a panel of experts; and (6) the completion of a final assessment that is posted to the IRIS Web site. Findings and Recommendations from Our March 2008 Report on the Credibility and Usefulness of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
The IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease a backlog of 70 ongoing assessments. In addition, the changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering at the time of our review would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. These time frames are problematic because of the substantial rework such cases often require to take into account changing science and methodologies before they can be completed. One of the factors that has contributed to EPA’s inability to complete assessments in a timely manner—the new OMB-directed OMB/interagency review process—also limits the credibility of the assessments because it lacks transparency. In addition, the OMB/interagency reviews have hindered EPA’s ability to independently manage its IRIS assessments. For example, without communicating its rationale for doing so, OMB directed EPA to terminate five IRIS assessments that for the first time addressed acute, rather than chronic exposure—even though EPA initiated this type of assessment to help it implement the Clean Air Act. The Expansion of Agencies’ Roles in IRIS Assessments That EPA Was Considering at the Time of Our Review Would Have Caused Further Delays and Limited the Assessments’ Credibility
For our March 2008 report, we reviewed the additional assessment process changes EPA was planning and concluded that they would likely exacerbate delays in completing IRIS assessments and further affect their credibility. These additional process steps, which would have lengthened assessment times considerably, include giving federal agencies and the public 45 days to identify additional information on a chemical for EPA’s consideration in its assessment or to correct any errors on an additional assessment draft that would provide qualitative information; giving potentially affected federal agencies 30 days to review the public comments EPA received and initiate a meeting with EPA if they want to discuss a particular set of comments; allowing potentially affected federal agencies to have assessments suspended for up to 18 months to fill a data gap or eliminate an uncertainty factor that EPA plans to use in its assessment; and allowing other federal agencies to weigh in on (1) the level of independent peer review that would be sought (that is, whether the peer reviews would be conducted by EPA Science Advisory Board panels, National Academies’ panels, or panels organized by an EPA contractor); (2) the areas of scientific expertise needed on the panel; and (3) the scope of the peer reviews and the specific issues they would address. Recommendations Made in Our March 2008 Report
To address the productivity and credibility issues we identified, we recommended that the EPA Administrator require the Office of Research and Development to re-evaluate its draft proposed changes to the IRIS assessment process in light of the issues raised in our report and ensure that any revised process, among other things, clearly defines and documents an IRIS assessment process that will enable the agency to develop the timely chemical risk information it needs to effectively conduct its mission. Key Aspects of the Revised IRIS Assessment Process Implemented in April 2008 Which Is Not Responsive to Our Recommendations
On April 10, 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process, effective immediately. Overall, EPA’s revised process is not responsive to the recommendations made in our March 2008 report—it is largely the same as the draft proposed process we evaluated in our March 2008 report (see app. Moreover, changes EPA did incorporate into the final process are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility issues we identified in our report. However, EPA’s revised process institutionalizes a process that the agency estimates will take up to 6 years to complete. Given the importance and sensitivity of IRIS assessments, we believe it is critical that input from all parties, particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments, be publicly available. However, the dialogue should not bias or otherwise color the risk assessment conducted, and the activities should remain distinct; that is, risk assessors should not be performing risk management activities.”
EPA’s Progress in Completing Assessments in Fiscal Year 2008
EPA’s progress in completing assessments continues to be slow—only four final assessments have been completed in fiscal year 2008. Moreover, little or no progress has been made on assessments of the key chemicals highlighted in our report—naphthalene, formaldehyde, Royal Demolition Explosive (RDX), trichloroethylene (TCE), tetrachloroethylene (perc), and 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (dioxin). Examples include the following: Naphthalene. Appendix IV: EPA’s IRIS Assessment Process as of April 10, 2008
No, it is not mission critical. critical? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. Toxicity assessments in the IRIS database constitute the first two critical steps of the risk assessment process, which in turn, provides the foundation for risk management decisions. Thus, IRIS is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental decisions, policies, and regulations. This testimony discusses (1) highlights of GAO's March 2008 report, Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System; (2) key aspects of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process, released on April 10, 2008; and (3) progress EPA has made in completing assessments in fiscal year 2008. For the March 2008 report, GAO reviewed and analyzed EPA data and interviewed officials at relevant agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For this testimony, GAO supplemented the prior audit work with a review of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process announced on April 10, 2008. We also updated our information on EPA's assessment productivity through September 12, 2008.
What GAO Found
In March 2008, GAO concluded that the IRIS database was at serious risk of becoming obsolete because EPA had not been able to complete timely, credible assessments or decrease its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments--a total of 4 were completed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition, assessment process changes EPA had recently made, as well as other changes EPA was considering at the time of GAO's review, would further reduce the credibility and timeliness of IRIS assessments. We concluded the following: EPA's efforts to finalize assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors, including two new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies and by EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await new research. The two new OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments involve other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility of IRIS assessments and hinders EPA's ability to manage them. For example, the OMB/interagency reviews lack transparency, and OMB required EPA to terminate five assessments EPA had initiated to help it implement the Clean Air Act. The changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering, but had not yet issued at the time of our review, would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. EPA issued its revised IRIS assessment process in April 2008. The new process is largely the same as the draft GAO evaluated and does not respond to the recommendations in GAO's March 2008 report. Moreover, some key changes are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility concerns GAO identified. For example, while the draft process would have made comments from other federal agencies on IRIS assessments part of the public record, EPA's new process defines such comments as "deliberative" and excludes them from the public record. GAO continues to believe that it is critical that input from all parties--particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments--be publicly available. In addition, the estimated time frames under the new process, especially for chemicals of key concern, will likely perpetuate the cycle of delays to which the majority of ongoing assessments have been subject. Instead of streamlining the process, as GAO recommended, EPA has institutionalized a process that from the outset is estimated to take 6 to 8 years. This is problematic because of the substantial rework such cases often require to take into account changing science and methodologies. EPA's progress in completing assessments continues to be slow--only four assessments have been completed in fiscal year 2008. Further, these assessments cover a group of four related chemicals that were processed and peer reviewed together but finalized individually. Little or no progress has been made on assessments of chemicals highlighted in our report, including naphthalene, formaldehyde, and trichloroethylene (TCE). |
gao_GGD-99-43 | gao_GGD-99-43_0 | The law made willful unauthorized inspection of taxpayer data illegal. We also did not assess the effectiveness of the various actions taken by IRS since enactment of Public Law 105-35. According to IRS, modernization will (1) allow it to restrict employees’ access to only those taxpayer records that they have a specific work-related reason to look at and (2) enable it to detect unauthorized accesses almost as soon as they happen. However, IRS does not expect to implement those modernization efforts for several years. In the meantime, IRS has taken several steps directed at deterring, preventing, and detecting unauthorized access and ensuring that appropriate disciplinary action is taken when unauthorized access is proven. These actions focus on awareness. In an attempt to make certain that all employees are explicitly informed about unauthorized access and the related penalties, IRS, among other things, adopted a policy that proven instances of unauthorized access will result in removal from IRS, absent any extenuating circumstances; sent a memo in October 1997 to all IRS employees that discussed, among other things, the penalties associated with unauthorized access; started giving annual agencywide briefings in November 1997 to inform all employees of IRS’ unauthorized access policy and the penalties for violations; created a form that is to be signed by employees and managers to acknowledge attendance at a briefing and receipt of guides on what constitutes unauthorized access; created a policy that all employees who join or return to IRS after the annual awareness briefings have been administered will be given their briefing within 30 days; developed a standard message to be given in all training courses in which access to tax information is discussed; developed a video and guides on unauthorized access to ensure that managers deliver a consistent message in briefing employees; and finally, established an unauthorized access steering committee and unauthorized access support team to address questions and issues raised by employees and managers. In the meantime, IRS has taken some steps to prevent unauthorized access. Number of Potential and Proven Instances of Unauthorized Access and the Penalties Imposed
Between October 1, 1997, and November 30, 1998, the Office of the Chief Inspector received 5,468 leads (information indicating potential unauthorized accesses) and completed work on 4,392 of those leads. As of January 25, 1999, action had been completed on 36 of these cases, and 28 remained open. In 15 of the 36 completed cases, IRS determined that an intentional unauthorized access had occurred. According to IRS, the offending employees in those 15 cases either resigned in lieu of termination or were terminated. According to IRS data, proven cases of unauthorized access that occurred after enactment of Public Law 105-35 have generally been referred to U.S. Attorneys for possible prosecution. In almost every case, according to IRS data, the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute. As of February 2, 1999, one case had been accepted for prosecution. According to IRS, although the case was still open, the employee had been removed from the agency. Pursuant to the law, IRS notified the three taxpayers whose data the employee had accessed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) implementation of the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act, focusing on: (1) actions IRS has taken to implement the law; and (2) the number of potential and proven incidents of unauthorized access by IRS employees that IRS has identified since enactment of the law, as well as penalties imposed in cases where unauthorized access was proven.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the IRS has two approaches for implementing the law; (2) over the long term, IRS believes that modernizing its core automated systems offers the best means to prevent and detect unauthorized access to taxpayer data; (3) according to IRS, modernization will: (a) allow it to restrict employees' access to only those taxpayer records that they have a specific work-related reason to look at; and (b) enable it to detect unauthorized accesses almost as soon as they happen; (4) it will be several years, however, before this modernization becomes a reality; (5) in the meantime, IRS has taken several other steps directed at deterring, preventing, and detecting unauthorized access and ensuring that consistent disciplinary action is taken when unauthorized access is proven; (6) between October 1, 1997, and November 30, 1998, the Office of the Chief Inspector identified 5,468 potential instances of unauthorized access and completed preliminary investigative work on 4,392 of those leads; (7) of those 4,392 leads, 338 were determined to warrant further investigation; (8) many of these 338 cases were still under investigation or adjudication as of January 25, 1999; (9) using data provided by IRS, GAO identified 36 cases for which investigation and adjudication had been completed; (10) of those 36 cases, 15 involved an IRS determination that IRS employees had intentionally accessed taxpayer data without authorization; (11) in the other 21 cases, IRS determined that either there was no unauthorized access or the access was accidental; (12) according to IRS, employees involved in the 15 cases of intentional unauthorized access either resigned in lieu of termination or were terminated; (13) according to IRS data, proven cases of unauthorized access that occurred after enactment of Public Law 105-35 have generally been referred to U.S. Attorneys for prosecution, and these U.S. Attorneys have, with one exception, declined to prosecute; (14) according to IRS, the one case that was accepted for prosecution was still open as of February 2, 1999, but the employee had been removed from the agency; and (15) as required by the law, IRS notified the three taxpayers whose data the employee had accessed. |
gao_GAO-15-338 | gao_GAO-15-338_0 | To meet these mission requirements, the office relies on several mission-related systems, as well as servers, networks, and the data center managed by the Library’s central IT office—ITS. However, we and others have identified challenges with this environment. For example, external users have described limitations in the performance and usability of the office’s registration system, and the Copyright Office has expressed concerns about the integrity of the files stored in the Library’s servers. Organizationally, responsibility for managing the office’s IT environment is shared between the Copyright Office’s Office of the CIO and ITS. However, as we recently reported, the Library has serious weaknesses in its IT management, which have also hindered the ability of the Library and the Copyright Office to meet mission requirements. For example, the Library has not had a permanent CIO in over 2 years and instead has had a series of temporary CIOs; according to the Register of Copyrights, this has caused a breakdown in communication between Library management and the Copyright Office related to IT. For example, by law, the office must be able to receive and examine copyright registration applications, collect and maintain deposited copies of copyrighted works as necessary to support the production of “facsimile reproductions” and retention of works up to 120 years, produce certificates of registration and certified copies of applications, maintain records of the transfer of copyright ownership. The Office’s Current Technical Environment Has Challenges
Our work, Copyright Office employees, and external users have all identified challenges with the Copyright Office’s current IT environment, including eCO and the infrastructure supporting that system that is managed by the Library’s central IT office (ITS), as described below: Both internal and external users have described challenges with eCO related to performance, stability, and usability. The Copyright Office, as a service unit within the Library of Congress, is subject to the organization’s IT policies and procedures. Specifically, while the office has identified several proposed IT initiatives for improving its IT environment and requested over $7 million to fund these initiatives, it has not yet developed plans and proposals to justify these investments, including identifying the business need they will meet and their expected costs and benefits. In addition, the office has not yet developed an IT strategic plan to help ensure that its IT goals are aligned with the agency’s strategic goals, stating that it is difficult to do so when the Library does not yet have an IT strategic plan. We agree that the Copyright Office’s IT strategic planning should be aligned with the Library’s own efforts in this regard. The Copyright Office Has Proposed Upgrades to Address Technical Challenges
According to Copyright Office officials, the office requested funding for four initiatives to address immediate technical challenges: (1) reengineering the recordation function, (2) developing a secure digital repository for digital deposits, (3) developing a software application development environment, and (4) developing a data management team. This investment would create a development environment for all future copyright-specific applications (e.g., an online system for the recordation process). The office requested $2.43 million in fiscal year 2015, but did not receive funding for this investment. By identifying mission needs and plans in investment proposals and charters, and by presenting the requests to the IT Steering Committee as part of the Library’s investment selection process, decision makers at the Library and the Copyright Office would have greater assurance that the selected investments meet mission needs and do not duplicate existing efforts. In our review of the Library’s IT management, we noted that the Library does not have an IT strategic plan and that efforts to develop such a plan have just recently begun. Conclusions
The Copyright Office has an important legal mission supporting the creative industries that significantly contribute to the United States economy, and the office relies heavily on IT to carry out this mission. Recommendations
To help ensure that the Copyright Office makes improvements to its current IT environment, we are recommending that the Librarian of Congress direct the Register of Copyrights to take the following two actions:
For current and proposed initiatives to improve the IT environment at the Copyright Office, develop plans including investment proposals that identify the business problem, a proposed solution, the expected benefits, how the solution aligns with the Library’s strategic plan, an initial 3-year cost estimate, and expected funding sources, and bring those to the Library’s IT Steering Committee for review, as required by Library policy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Senate Appropriations Committee report accompanying the fiscal year 2015 legislative branch appropriations bill (S. Rep. No. Our specific objectives for this review were to (1) describe the legal, technical, and organizational aspects of the Copyright Office’s current IT environment and (2) describe and evaluate the Copyright Office’s plans for modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the Copyright Office, a service unit within the Library of Congress, is to promote creativity by administering and sustaining a national copyright system. As part of this mission, the Copyright Office registers about 500,000 creative works a year for copyright and records documentation related to copyright transfer and sale. In recent years, the Register of Copyrights has discussed the need for a modernized Copyright Office, to include upgrades to the current IT environment.
The Senate Appropriations Committee report accompanying the 2015 legislative branch appropriations bill required GAO to review the Copyright Office's current IT environment and plans for the future. This report (1) describes the legal, technical, and organizational aspects of the Copyright Office's current IT environment, and (2) describes and evaluates the Copyright Office's plans for modernization. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed Library policies and related best practices, comments by stakeholders, IT funding requests, and other relevant documentation, and interviewed key Library and Copyright Office officials.
What GAO Found
The Copyright Office has a legal mission supporting the creative industries that significantly contribute to the United States economy and relies heavily on information technology (IT) to carry out this mission. For example, by law, the office must be able to receive and examine copyright registration applications, collect and maintain deposited copies of copyrighted works, and maintain records of the transfer of copyright ownership. To meet these mission requirements, the office relies on several IT systems, as well as the infrastructure managed by the Library of Congress's central IT office. However, GAO and others have identified challenges with this environment. For example, comments solicited by the Copyright Office from external users have described limitations in the performance and usability of the office's electronic copyright registration system, and the Copyright Office has expressed concerns about the integrity of the files stored in the Library's servers. Organizationally, responsibility for managing the office's IT environment is shared between the Copyright Office's Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Library's central IT office. The Library has serious weaknesses in its IT management, which have hindered the ability of the Library and the Copyright Office to meet mission requirements. For example, the Library has not had a permanent CIO in over 2 years.
The Copyright Office requested over $7 million in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 to address four key challenges: (1) reengineer recordation—one of the office's key business processes—to include developing an online filing capability; (2) develop a secure digital repository for its electronic materials (e.g., books and music); (3) develop a software application development environment; and (4) establish a data management team, to include developing data standards. The office has also published a report that summarizes stakeholder comments on the current IT environment and makes several recommendations to improve this environment.
However, the office has not adequately justified these proposed investments. Specifically, it has not identified the business needs they are intended to meet, expected costs, or how they align with the agency's strategic plan, as called for by Library IT investment management policy. The office also did not present the investments to the Library's IT investment review board, which was established to select investments for funding that meet defined criteria and ensure that such investments are not duplicative of existing investments or activities performed within the Library. Copyright officials stated that these initiatives were in early stages and the office was not yet in a position to develop this information. However, without identifying key costs and benefits of proposed initiatives and presenting this information to the Library-wide investment review board, decision makers at the Library and the Copyright Office do not have the assurance that the selected investments support the organization's goals and do not duplicate existing activities. In addition, the office does not have an IT strategic plan, and officials described difficulties in developing such a plan given that the Library has not yet developed one. As noted in a recent GAO review of the Library's IT management, the Library has recently committed to developing an updated IT strategic plan, and it will be important for the Copyright Office's own strategic planning to be aligned with this effort.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Copyright Office (1) develop key information to support proposed initiatives for improving its IT environment and submit them to the Library's IT investment review board for review, and (2) develop an IT strategic plan that is aligned with the Library's strategic planning efforts. The office neither agreed nor disagreed. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are warranted. |
gao_GAO-06-375 | gao_GAO-06-375_0 | Currently, this information resides primarily in the paper-based A-Files. To improve the reliability and currency of the A-Files, as well as their accessibility to geographically and organizationally dispersed users, USCIS intends to automate the A-Files, beginning with scanning certain forms contained in the A-Files and storing the resulting electronic images. USCIS estimates that it currently has more than 55 million of these paper- based files, each of which is to be maintained for a 75-year period. Under this strategy, according to USCIS officials, long-term solutions to its A-Files automation needs will be pursued within the context of business process re- engineering. USCIS Effectiveness in Managing Long-Term A-Files Automation Efforts Remains to Be Seen, but Near-Term Document Digitization Program Is Not Being Effectively Managed
It is not yet possible to determine the effectiveness of USCIS’s management of its long-term A-Files automation effort because this effort is not yet under way. Specifically, USCIS has not developed a program management plan to guide program execution and provide the basis for reliable cost and schedule estimates, and it does not have a plan for evaluating its IDDMP concept of operations pilot test of a document scanning capability. Without effective planning, IDDMP is at risk of falling short of expectations and its funding requests cannot be justified. USCIS has yet to develop either an IDDMP management plan or a pilot evaluation plan. Nevertheless, USCIS has awarded four contracts and is in the process of awarding a fifth related to the program; these contracts total about $20 million, including an ongoing digitization and storage technology pilot test, and it estimates that it will spend $190 million over an 8-year period on the program. At the same time, officials told us they do not yet know which of the roughly 50 types of forms associated with A-Files will be scanned and stored or the sequence in which form types will be scanned. Conclusions
While it is too early to determine how effectively USCIS is managing its long-term A-Files automation effort, USCIS’s recent decision to reconsider its long-term IT modernization plans—including the role of IT in the agency’s broader organizational and business transformation efforts—was both warranted and appropriate. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is effectively managing its alien files (A-Files) automation efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relies on about 55 million paper-based files to adjudicate applications for immigration status and other benefits. Ensuring the currency and availability of these manual files, referred to as alien files, or A-Files, is a major challenge. To address this challenge, USCIS has initiated efforts, both long and near term, to automate the A-Files. The long-term effort is now being re-examined within the context of a larger USCIS organizational transformation initiative. In the near term, USCIS has begun a digitization program, which it estimates will cost about $190 million over an 8-year period to electronically scan existing paper files and store and share the scanned images. GAO was asked to determine whether USCIS was effectively managing its A-Files automation efforts.
What GAO Found
USCIS's effectiveness in managing its long-term effort for automating the A-Files cannot yet be determined because the scope, content, and approach for moving from paper-based to paperless A-Files has yet to be defined. Nevertheless, GAO believes that USCIS's recent decision to re-examine prior agency plans for a strategic A-Files automation solution within the context of an agencywide transformation strategy appropriately recognizes the integral support role that information technology plays in organizational and business transformation. GAO also believes that the success of USCIS's organizational transformation depends on other key supporting practices, such as having a comprehensive and integrated transformation plan (goals and schedules) and results-oriented performance measures. With respect to USCIS's near-term A-Files automation effort, known as the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program (IDDMP), effective planning is not occurring. In particular, USCIS has not developed a plan governing how it will manage this program and its contractors, and it has not developed an evaluation plan for its ongoing digitization concept of operations pilot test, even though it has either awarded or plans to award contracts totaling about $20 million for this pilot. In addition, USCIS officials told us they do not yet know which A-Files immigration forms will be scanned. Without a defined scope and adequate planning, this program is at risk of falling short of expectations. |
gao_GAO-10-708T | gao_GAO-10-708T_0 | Background
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to protect the interests of participants and beneficiaries covered by private sector employee benefit plans. The changes were to discourage withdrawals, which shift liabilities to PBGC’s insurance program. The funding requirements of PPA took effect just as the nation entered a severe economic recession in the fall of 2007. Key Differences Exist Between Multiemployer and Single-Employer Pension Plans
While ERISA and PBGC funding rules apply to both single- and multiemployer plans, there are several important differences that affect the structure and stability of each type of plan. Since the inception of the multiemployer insurance program in 1980, PBGC has provided $500 million in financial assistance to 62 plans. Individual employers in multiemployer plans do not assume a fiduciary role in plan management, which is instead handled by a board of trustees. Single-employer plans, on the other hand, are administered by one employer and may or may not be collectively bargained, so the employer generally assumes fiduciary duty for the pension plan. Multiemployer pension plans typically continue to operate long after an individual employer, or sponsor, goes out of business, because the plan’s remaining employers are jointly liable for funding benefits for all vested participants. Portability of benefits: Multiemployer plans provide participants some benefit portability because they allow workers to keep and continue to accrue pension benefits when they change jobs as long as their new employer also participates in the same plan. According to PBGC, this greater financial risk on employers and lower guaranteed benefit level for participants in multiemployer plans, in practice, create incentives for employers, participants, and their collective bargaining representatives to avoid insolvency and to collaborate in trying to find solutions to the plan’s financial difficulties. Multiemployer Plans Continue to Face Funding and Demographic Challenges That Could Significantly Affect PBGC
Multiemployer plans face ongoing funding and demographic challenges that have the potential to place an additional financial burden on PBGC. According to PBGC, multiemployer plans have not been fully funded at the 100 percent or above level since 2000 and their net funding has declined significantly since that time. 1.) Multiemployer plans also face demographic challenges: reductions in the number of plans, an aging workforce, and few opportunities to attract new employers and workers into plans. 2.) Yet collective bargaining has declined in the United States since the early 1950s. The conditions that plans currently face increase the risk of insolvency and the likelihood PBGC will be forced to provide financial assistance. Congress has given PBGC tools to monitor the overall financial health of multiemployer plans and a means to provide financial assistance to help these plans weather difficult financial times. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, which are created by collective bargaining agreements covering more than one employer and generally operated under the joint trusteeship of labor and management, provide pension coverage to over 10.4 million participants in the 1,500 multiemployer plans insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Changes to the structure of the multiemployer plan framework and to PBGC's role as insurer have sought to improve plan funding. Reports of declines in plan funding have prompted questions about the financial health of these plans. The committee asked GAO to provide information on (1) the unique characteristics of multiemployer plans and (2) the challenges that multiemployer plans face and how they may affect PBGC. GAO provided a draft of this testimony to PBGC for review and comment. PBGC provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate. To address these objectives, GAO relied primarily on its previously published reports on multiemployer plans ( GAO-04-423 and GAO-04-542T), and data publicly available from PBGC. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
While the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 funding rules apply to most private sector pension plans, the nation's collectively bargained multiemployer plans have a unique structure intended to provide a certain level of plan stability and benefit portability while mitigating the risks to their insurer, PBGC. Multiemployer plans provide portable benefits to workers who change employers, distribute risk among participating employers and participants, and continue to operate long after an individual employer, or sponsor, goes out of business, because their framework makes remaining employers jointly liable for funding benefits for all vested participants. Multiemployer plans also pay a low insurance premium to PBGC because they typically do not require PBGC assistance. When needed, PBGC will provide loans to a plan that becomes insolvent and can no longer pay benefits at the level guaranteed by PBGC. Since the inception of the multiemployer insurance program in 1980, PBGC has paid $500 million in financial assistance to 62 insolvent plans. Multiemployer plans face ongoing funding and demographic challenges that potentially increase the financial burden on PBGC. According to PBGC, multiemployer plans have not been fully funded at the 100 percent or above level since 2000. Other challenges include continuing decreases in the number of these plans and an aging participant base. Further, a decline in collective bargaining in the United States has left few opportunities for plans to attract new employers and workers. As a result, the proportion of active participants paying into the fund to others who are no longer paying into the fund has decreased, thereby increasing plan liabilities and the likelihood that PBGC will have to provide financial assistance in the future. |
gao_GAO-07-150 | gao_GAO-07-150_0 | The growth of public television’s station infrastructure has been the work of decades, as civic leaders, universities, and state and local governments have marshaled funding and operational support from public and private sources to establish and operate noncommercial educational television stations to serve their communities. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting Provides Federal Support to Stations and Other Public Television Entities
Funding has been a continual concern for public television. The Public Broadcasting Service Is a Nonprofit Organization That Provides Technical and Programming Support to Stations
One of the goals of the Public Broadcasting Act was to establish a system to interconnect the individual public television stations for the distribution of programming. PBS’s activities and services include the following: acquiring and promoting the programs for children’s and prime-time broadcast that make up PBS’s “National Programming Service;” operating a satellite-based interconnection system for distributing programming to member stations for broadcast to their local communities; providing educational services, such as its Web-based TeacherSource; assisting member stations with fund-raising and development support, as well as a variety of engineering and technology development issues, such as the digital transition. PBS prime-time and children’s programming constitute a majority of broadcast hours for most public television stations. However, stations supplement these programs with both locally produced and instructional programming to meet the needs of their communities. Local Programming. We identified four primary types of nonbroadcast services: educational, civic engagement, health, and emergency services. In 2005, public television licensees reported annual revenues of $1.8 billion, of which 15 percent came from federal sources. Finally, federal funds help support PBS and the production of national programming. Public Television Licensees Receive Funding from Many Sources; However, Small Licensees and Licensees in Small Television Markets Exhibit Greater Dependence on Federal Funds
Public television licensees receive the majority of their revenues from four sources: individuals, businesses, and the federal and state governments. Community licensees received a significant percentage of revenues from individuals, businesses, and the federal government through CPB. Eleven licensees said that the station would discontinue operations if federal funding were eliminated; these were generally smaller licensees in smaller television markets. Public Television Stations Are Pursuing a Variety of Nonfederal Funding Sources, but Substantial Growth to Offset a Reduction or Elimination of Federal Support Appears Unlikely
While contributions from individual members represent a significant source of revenue, this source is not expected to grow significantly in the future. These licensees said that greater underwriting flexibility would not generate increased underwriting revenues, since corporations and advertisers desire programming with high ratings and a targeted demographic, which some licensees said public television cannot deliver; would upset viewers and contribute to a decline in membership support; could threaten a licensee’s ability to receive financial support from a would be inconsistent with the mission of public television and could alter programming decisions. Because of the large costs and risks associated with developing and producing television programming, entities providing a significant share of the funding and assuming the financial risk seek and generally receive a greater portion of the rights to back-end revenues. Few Programs Are Successful. For both commercial and public television, we found that the net proceeds to producers and investors in program-related business ventures are a small fraction of the retail sales prices. In general, CPB and PBS contribute less than 50 percent of the production budget associated with programming. In particular, the report provides information on (1) the organizational structure of public television, (2) the programming and other services that public television provides, (3) the current funding sources for public television, (4) the extent to which public television stations are increasing their nonfederal funding support and developing new sources of nonfederal support, and (5) the extent to which public television benefits financially from business ventures associated with programming and how this compares with commercial broadcasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
How to fund public television has been a concern since the first noncommercial educational station went on the air in 1953. The use of federal funds to help support public television has been a particular point of discussion and debate. This report reviews (1) the organizational structure of public television, (2) the programming and other services that public television provides, (3) the current funding sources for public television, (4) the extent to which public television stations are increasing their nonfederal funding sources and developing new sources of nonfederal support, and (5) the extent to which public television benefits financially from business ventures associated with programming and how this compares with commercial broadcasters. GAO reviewed revenue, membership, and programming data for all public television licensees. GAO also interviewed officials from 54 of public television's 173 licensees, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Public Broadcasting Service, federal agencies, and producers of commercial and public television programming
What GAO Found
Public television is a largely decentralized enterprise of 349 local stations, owned and operated by 173 independent licensees. The stations' operations are funded in part by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nongovernmental entity that receives federal appropriations. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), a nonprofit organization funded by fees paid by member licensees and CPB grants, operates a satellite-based interconnection system to distribute programs to local stations. These programs are created by producers inside public television and by outside production entities. Public television stations broadcast national and local programs and provide a variety of nonbroadcast services to their communities. PBS prime-time and children's programs account for the majority of broadcast hours, to which stations add instructional and local programs tailored to meet the needs and interests of their communities. Nonbroadcast services include educational, civic engagement, health, and emergency-alert services. In 2005, public television licensees reported annual revenues of $1.8 billion, of which 15 percent came from federal sources and the rest from a variety of nonfederal sources including individuals, businesses, and state and local governments. Federal funds help licensees leverage funds from nonfederal sources. Thirty of 54 licensees GAO interviewed said that cuts in federal funding could lead to a reduction in staff, local programming, or services. In general, smaller licensees receive a higher percent of revenue from federal sources and 11 said that cuts in federal support might force the station to shut down. Substantial growth of nonfederal funding appears unlikely. The one area with growth potential is major gifts, which many licensees are pursuing with help from CPB. Program underwriting by businesses and foundations has traditionally been an important source of revenues. A few licensees believe that these revenues could be increased if restrictions on the content of on-air underwriting acknowledgments were relaxed. Many licensees, however, believe that this would go against the noncommercial character of public television and could cause a loss of funding support from other sources. Public television sometimes benefits from business ventures associated with its programs, but these opportunities are infrequent and do not generate significant revenue. Public television does not have the financial resources to invest heavily in the cost of program production to secure a larger share of any resulting back-end revenues. Moreover, the sale of merchandise associated with a program generally returns only a small percentage of the retail price to the program's producer and investors, as is also true for commercial television programs. GAO provided CPB and PBS with a draft of the report for their review and comment. CPB and PBS agreed with the report. |
gao_GAO-15-65 | gao_GAO-15-65_0 | FEMA’s Administrative Costs Have Doubled, and an Integrated Plan Could Help Meet Its Goals of Reducing and Better Controlling These Costs
FEMA Administrative Costs
FEMA obligated $12.7 billion from the DRF to cover its administrative costs for the 650 major disasters declared during fiscal years 2004 through 2013. As shown in figure 3, the $12.7 billion represents 13 percent of the $95.2 billion obligated from the DRF for the 650 major disasters during this time period. FEMA Has Taken Steps to Better Control and Reduce Administrative Costs, But Lacks An Integrated Plan to Achieve These Goals
As we reported in 2012, FEMA officials said that it was difficult to identify the principal factors causing increases in administrative costs since fiscal year 1989 because of the complexities associated with the underlying factors, particularly in light of the span of time involved. Strategic plan goal. Other ongoing steps to reduce administrative costs. However, despite FEMA’s efforts since November 2010, FEMA’s average administrative cost percentages have not significantly decreased. During our interviews with FEMA officials, they agreed that indentifying agency officials who will be accountable, and creating a plan, would be beneficial to reach the agency’s goals to better control and reduce administrative costs. FEMA Could Better Track and Analyze Administrative Costs by DRF Program
In analyzing FEMA administrative costs, we found that that the agency does not track or analyze its administrative costs for major disasters by individual DRF program—including PA, Individual Assistance, and Hazard For example, FEMA could tell us how much it obligated for its Mitigation.own administrative costs, in total, for the Hurricane Sandy disaster response, but not how much it has obligated for its administrative costs related to each DRF program. FEMA Obligated $1.7 Billion in Administrative Costs to Grantees and Subgrantees during Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013; 2007 Rule Led to Increased Complexity and Workload
Grantee and Subgrantee Administrative Costs
For the 650 major disasters declared during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, FEMA obligated $1.7 billion to reimburse grantees and subgrantees for all types of administrative costs associated with PA grants. 2007 Rule Change Led to Increased Workload for FEMA, Grantees, and Subgrantees; FEMA’s Guidance for Direct Administrative Costs Lack Clarity and Specificity
In November 2007, FEMA implemented a rule change that was intended to simplify and clarify the method it uses to reimburse grantees and subgrantees for certain costs incurred while administering PA grants. However, according to FEMA officials, the 2007 rule change led to an unexpectedly high rate of claims for direct administrative costs. Therefore, despite FEMA’s potential new rule, recovery operations for hundreds of disasters could benefit from FEMA officials clarifying the agencies’ guidance and minimum documentation requirements for direct administrative costs claims, which would help FEMA and its grantees better determine whether administrative costs are reasonable and potentially help reduce complexity in the process. Doing so could provide FEMA with information to better manage these costs. 2. Clarify the agency’s guidance and minimum documentation requirements for direct administrative costs claims by grantees and subgrantees of the Public Assistance program. DHS also concurred with our second recommendation that FEMA assess the costs versus the benefits of tracking FEMA’s administrative costs data for major disasters by Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Mission Assignment, and if feasible track this information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent were disaster relief funds (DRF) obligated to cover the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) administrative costs for major disasters during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and what steps, if any, has FEMA taken to control its administrative costs, and (2) To what extent were DRF funds obligated to cover grantee and subgrantee administrative costs for Public Assistance (PA) grants, and what has been the impact of FEMA’s November 2007 regulatory changes on administrative costs reimbursed to grantees and subgrantees for the PA program. We reviewed and analyzed FEMA policies, procedures, and guidance specific to state and local administrative costs, such as its Disaster Assistance Policy and associated memorandum and evaluated them using practices for good guidance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligates funds from the Disaster Relief Fund to help jurisdictions respond to and recover from declared disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
FEMA leads federal efforts to respond to and recover from disasters, and provides grants to states and localities through the DRF. For each major disaster, funds can be obligated from the DRF to cover administrative costs—the costs of providing and managing disaster assistance—for FEMA, states, tribes, localities, and certain nonprofits, among others. GAO was asked to review these administrative costs along with FEMA policy changes.
This report addresses the extent to which DRF funds were obligated to cover (1) FEMA's administrative costs for major disasters during fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and the steps FEMA has taken to control these costs, and (2) Grantee and subgrantee administrative costs for PA grants, and the impact FEMA's 2007 policy changes had on PA program administrative costs reimbursements. GAO analyzed FEMA's administrative costs data and policies and PA guidance for administrative cost reimbursements; and interviewed FEMA, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated $12.7 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for its administrative costs from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 and has taken some steps to reduce and better control these costs. This $12.7 billion represents 13 percent of the $95.2 billion obligated from the DRF for the 650 major disasters declared during this time frame. FEMA's average administrative cost percentages for major disasters during the 10 fiscal years 2004 to 2013 doubled the average during the 10 fiscal years 1989 to 1998. FEMA recognized that administrative costs have increased and has taken steps intended to better control and reduce these costs, such as setting a goal in its recent strategic plan to lower these costs, and creating administrative cost targets. However, FEMA does not require these targets be met, and GAO found that had FEMA met its targets, administrative costs could have been reduced by hundreds of millions of dollars. GAO also found that FEMA lacks an integrated plan with time frames and milestones to hold senior officials accountable for achieving its goals to reduce and more effectively control costs. Such a plan could help FEMA to better oversee and control these costs. In addition, GAO found that FEMA does not track administrative costs by major disaster program, such as Individual or Public Assistance, and has not assessed the costs versus the benefits of tracking such information. Doing so could provide FEMA with better information to manage these costs.
From fiscal years 2004 through 2013, FEMA obligated $1.7 billion to reimburse grantees (states) and subgrantees (localities) for administrative costs related to Public Assistance (PA) grants, and its 2007 policy change has led to additional complexity and workload for FEMA and its grantees. FEMA's 2007 rule was intended to simplify and clarify the method FEMA uses to reimburse grantees and subgrantees for certain costs incurred for administering PA grants. However, according to FEMA, the 2007 rule led to an unexpectedly high rate of claims for direct administrative costs. Grantee, subgrantee, and FEMA officials told GAO that FEMA policies and guidance do not adequately specify the requirements for determining reasonableness, eligibility, and supporting documentation to support reimbursement of direct administrative costs. Clarifying the agency's guidance and minimum documentation requirements would help grantees and subgrantees submit, and FEMA review requests for administrative costs reimbursement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA (1) develop an integrated plan to better control and reduce its administrative costs for major disasters, (2) assess the costs versus the benefits of tracking FEMA administrative costs by DRF program, and (3) clarify the agency's guidance and minimum documentation requirements for direct administrative costs. FEMA agreed with the report and its recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-466 | gao_GAO-07-466_0 | These GPCIs adjust physician fees for variations in physicians’ costs of providing care in different geographic areas. Physician Payment Localities Are Primarily Consolidations of the Carrier-Defined Localities That Were Established in 1966, Which CMS Has Since Revised Using Three Approaches That Were Not Uniformly Applied
The current 89 physician payment localities are primarily consolidations of the payment localities that Medicare carriers first defined in 1966. 3). To facilitate this transition, CMS continued to use the 240 carrier-defined payment localities, but permitted state medical associations to petition to consolidate their state into one statewide payment locality. In revising the payment localities in 1997, CMS used two different approaches. More Than Half of the Physician Payment Localities Had Counties within Them with Large Payment Differences
More than half of the physician payment localities we analyzed—47 of 87—had at least one county within them with a large payment difference— that is, there was a payment difference of 5 percent or more between physicians’ costs and Medicare’s geographic adjustment for an area. However, a disproportionate number were located in five states. Specifically, 60 percent of counties with large payment differences were located in California, Georgia, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia. Large payment differences occur because many payment localities combine counties with very different costs. Large payment differences may also be due to the fact that although large demographic changes have occurred in certain geographic areas, CMS has not revised the payment localities in accordance with these changes. Several Alternative Approaches to the Physician Payment Localities Could Improve Payment Accuracy While Generally Imposing Minimal Additional Administrative Burden
Many alternative approaches could be used to revise the geographic boundaries of the current payment localities. We examined five possible approaches and found that three would improve payment accuracy while generally imposing a minimal amount of additional administrative burden on CMS, Medicare carriers, and physicians. Compared to the current payment localities, four of the five alternative approaches would improve payment accuracy, the extent to which each approach accurately measures variations in physicians’ costs of providing care. 14). Currently, CMS has no mechanism in place to periodically update the physician payment localities to ensure that the geographic boundaries of the payment localities accurately address variations in the costs of operating a private medical practice. These states represent geographically diverse areas, as well as Medicare physician payment localities that were established in 1966 using carrier definitions, localities that were revised from 1992 through 1995 using a physician overwhelming support approach for a statewide locality, and localities that were revised in 1997 using a CMS approach designed to consolidate carrier-defined localities. We constructed a proxy measure of the costs physicians incur for providing services in a particular county (the county-specific GAF) and compared this measure with Medicare’s geographic adjustment for the locality to which that county is assigned and is a proxy for physicians’ costs in a locality (the locality GAF). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) adjusts Medicare physician fees for geographic differences in the costs of operating a medical practice. CMS uses 89 physician payment localities among which fees are adjusted. Concerns have been raised that the boundaries of some payment localities do not accurately address variations in physicians' costs. GAO was asked to examine how CMS has revised the localities; the extent to which they accurately reflect variations in physicians' costs; and alternative approaches to constructing the localities. To do so, GAO reviewed selected Federal Register documents; compared data on the costs physicians incur in different areas with the Medicare geographic adjustment; and used the physician cost data to construct and evaluate alternative approaches.
What GAO Found
The current 89 physician payment localities are primarily consolidations of the 240 localities that Medicare carriers--CMS contractors responsible for processing physician claims--established in 1966. Since then, CMS has revised the payment localities using three different approaches that were not uniformly applied. From 1992 through 1995, CMS permitted state medical associations to petition to consolidate into a statewide locality if the state's physicians demonstrated "overwhelming support" for the change. In 1997, CMS revised the 28 states with multiple payment localities using two approaches: CMS consolidated carrier-defined localities in 25 states and created entirely new localities in 3 states. More than half of the current physician payment localities had counties within them with a large payment difference--that is, a payment difference of 5 percent or more between GAO's measure of physicians' costs and Medicare's geographic adjustment for an area. These 447 counties--representing 14 percent of all counties--were located across the United States, but a disproportionate number were located in California, Georgia, Minnesota, Ohio, and Virginia. Large payment differences occur because certain localities combine counties with different costs, which may be due to several factors. For example, although substantial population growth has occurred in certain areas, potentially leading to increased costs, CMS has not revised the payment localities in accordance with these changes. Many alternative approaches could be used to revise the geographic boundaries of the current payment localities. GAO identified three possible approaches that would improve payment accuracy while generally imposing a minimal amount of additional administrative burden on CMS, Medicare carriers, and physicians. One approach, for example, would improve payment accuracy, the extent to which each approach accurately measures variations in physicians' costs, by 52 percent over the current localities. |
gao_GAO-02-485T | gao_GAO-02-485T_0 | In fiscal year 2001, the targeted programs were funded at roughly $1.7 billion. In addition, some of the programs are available to the general homeless or low-income population; others are reserved for specific groups within these populations. HUD has taken steps to improve coordination among its McKinney-Vento programs and reduce the administrative burden caused by different program requirements. Recognizing the need to move further, both your bill and the Administration’s budget propose consolidating HUD’s McKinney-Vento programs. Homeless People Encounter Barriers to Using Mainstream Programs
Despite the availability of a wide array of programs, we reported in July 2000 that homeless people are often unable to access and use federal mainstream programs because of the inherent conditions of homelessness as well as the structure and operations of the programs themselves. All low-income populations face barriers to applying for, retaining, and using the services provided by mainstream programs; however, these barriers are compounded by the inherent conditions of homelessness, such as transience, instability, and a lack of basic resources. Furthermore, as we reported in July 2000, the underlying structure and operations of federal mainstream programs are often not conducive to ensuring that the special needs of homeless people are met. They said that federal agencies could do more to incorporate into mainstream programs the “best practices” for serving the homeless population that have been learned from past demonstration and research projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many people are homeless for only a short time and get back on their feet with minimal assistance, but others are chronically homeless and need intensive and ongoing assistance. Fifty federal programs exist to help the homeless with housing. Sixteen of these are targeted exclusively to the homeless, and the others are mainstream programs. Targeted programs were funded at $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2001.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been unable to ensure that adequate coordination occurs among the programs without creating undue administrative burdens for the states and communities. Steps have been taken to improve the coordination of homeless assistance programs within communities and to reduce some of the administrative burdens caused by separate programs. Although low-income populations face barriers to obtaining services provided by mainstream programs, these barriers are compounded by homelessness. In addition, the underlying structure and operations of federal mainstream programs do not ensure that the special needs of homeless people are met. Consolidating HUD's McKinney-Vento programs could help reduce the administrative burden. However, to end chronic homelessness in 10 years, federal agencies must strive to eliminate the barriers that homeless people encounter as they seek services from mainstream programs. |
gao_GAO-07-797T | gao_GAO-07-797T_0 | EPA has issued drinking water regulations for more than 90 contaminants. Perchlorate Has Been Found At 395 Sites Including 153 Public Drinking Water Systems
Because information on the extent of perchlorate contamination was not readily available, we thoroughly reviewed available perchlorate sampling reports and discussed them with federal and state environmental officials. We identified 395 sites in 35 states, the District of Columbia, and 2 commonwealths of the United States where perchlorate has been found in drinking water, groundwater, surface water, sediment, or soil. The perchlorate concentrations ranged from the minimum reporting level of 4 parts per billion to in more than 3.7 million parts per billion—a level found in groundwater at one of the sites. As shown in figure 2, our analysis found that, at 110 of the 395 sites, the perchlorate source was related to propellant manufacturing, rocket motor testing firing, and explosives testing and disposal at DOD, NASA, and defense-related industries. EPA officials said the agency does not centrally track or monitor perchlorate detections or the status of cleanup activities. As a result, it is difficult to determine the extent of perchlorate contamination in the U.S. EPA maintains a list of sites where cleanup or other response actions are underway but the list does not include sites not reported to EPA. Further, states are not required to routinely notify EPA about perchlorate contamination they discover. Recent Research Indicates that Perchlorate Exposure May be a Concern for Pregnant Women
In our May 2005 review, we conducted a literature search for studies of perchlorate health risks published from 1998 to 2005 and identified 125 studies on perchlorate and the thyroid. The findings of 26 of these studies indicated that perchlorate had an adverse effect on thyroid function and human health. In January 2005, the National Academy of Sciences considered many of these same studies and concluded that the studies did not support a clear link between perchlorate exposure and changes in the thyroid function or thyroid cancer in adults. Consequently, the Academy recommended additional research into the effect of perchlorate exposure on children and pregnant women but did not recommend a drinking water standard. For another 29 studies, researchers reviewed several publicly available human and animal studies and used data derived from these studies to determine the process by which perchlorate affects the human thyroid and the highest exposure levels that did not adversely affect humans. About 36 percent of U.S. women have these lower iodine levels. The study found decreases in a thyroid hormone that helps regulate the body’s metabolism and is needed for proper fetal neural development in pregnant women. | Why GAO Did This Study
Perchlorate has been used for decades by the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the defense industry in manufacturing, testing, and firing missiles and rockets. Other uses include fireworks, fertilizers, and explosives. Perchlorate is readily dissolved and transported in water and has been found in groundwater, surface water, and soil across the country. Perchlorate emerged as a contaminant of concern because health studies have shown that it can affect the thyroid gland, which helps regulate the body's metabolism, and may cause developmental impairment in fetuses of pregnant women. In 2005, EPA set a reference dose of 24.5 parts per billion (ppb)--the exposure level not expected to cause adverse effect in humans. Today's testimony updates GAO's May 2005 report, Perchlorate: A System to Track Sampling and Cleanup Results is Needed, GAO-05-462 . It summarizes GAO's (1) compilation of the extent of perchlorate contamination in the U.S. and (2) review of peer-reviewed studies about perchlorate's health risks. GAO's 2005 report recommended that EPA work to track and monitor perchlorate detections and cleanup efforts. In December 2006, EPA reiterated its disagreement with this recommendation. GAO continues to believe such a system would better inform the public and others about perchlorate's presence in their communities.
What GAO Found
Perchlorate has been found at 395 sites in the U.S.--including 153 public drinking water systems--in concentrations ranging from 4 ppb to more than 3.7 million ppb. More than half the sites are in California and Texas, with the highest concentrations found in Arkansas, California, Texas, Nevada, and Utah. About 28 percent of sites were contaminated by defense and aerospace activities related to propellant manufacturing, rocket motor research and test firing, or explosives disposal. Federal and state agencies are not required to routinely report perchlorate findings to EPA, which does not track or monitor perchlorate detections or cleanup status. EPA recently decided not to regulate perchlorate in drinking water supplies pending further study. GAO reviewed 90 studies of health risks from perchlorate published from 1998 to 2005, and one-quarter indicated that perchlorate had an adverse effect on human health, and thyroid function in particular. In January 2005, the National Academy of Sciences also reviewed several studies and concluded that they did not support a clear link between perchlorate exposure and changes in the thyroid function. The academy did not recommend a drinking water standard but recommended additional research into the effect of perchlorate exposure on children and pregnant women. More recently, a large study by CDC scientists has identified adverse thyroid effects from perchlorate in women with low iodine levels that are found in about 36 percent of U.S. women. |
gao_GAO-02-460 | gao_GAO-02-460_0 | Interior’s Aviation Accident Rate Has Improved Dramatically Since OAS’s Safety Program Was Established
Since 1975 Interior’s aviation accident rate has been cut in half, from 18.8 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in fiscal year 1975 to 8.7 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in fiscal year 2001. OAS officials attribute the department’s reduced accident rate, in part, to the implementation of a standard aviation operating policy. These standards exceed the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) requirements. OAS recovers its costs from users by charging for its services. Additionally, OAS did not include in its calculations all the costs that needed to be considered in setting rates. The 2001 study found that all but 1 of the 89 aircraft reviewed to be cost effective. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that all program costs are fully recovered and to improve the rate-setting process, we recommend that the secretary of the Department of the Interior direct OAS to obtain forecasts of future usage from the bureaus and use these forecasts, as well as other relevant information, to set rates; and direct OAS and the bureaus, upon completion of the rate-setting process and calculation of associated payments, to determine whether the rates recovered all costs and, if not, whether adjustments in the process used to calculate the rates are necessary. 4. | What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior has cut its aviation accident rate in half since 1975--from 18.8 accidents to 8.7 per 100,000 flight hours. The department's lower accident rate can be attributed to the implementation of a standard aviation operating policy and to aviation safety standards that exceed the Federal Aviation Administration's requirements. The Office of Aircraft Services (OAS) has not fully recovered aviation program costs. From fiscal years 1999 to 2000, OAS has charged bureaus about $4 million less than actual costs, representing an undercharge of about two percent. OAS set rates that were based on flight hour projections of actual usage that turned out to be low, and OAS did not include all the cost elements that needed to be considered. Periodic monitoring of the rates and actual costs would ensure that all costs are recovered. OAS has yet to develop a more cost-effective approach for using aircraft. To cut costs, OAS has reduced its staffing levels by 24 percent since 1992. |
gao_GAO-07-817 | gao_GAO-07-817_0 | Countries Have Various Policies and Practices That May Help Some Women and Low-Wage/Low- Skilled Workers Enter and Remain in the Labor Force
Governments and employers in the countries we studied developed a variety of laws, government policies, and formal and informal practices, including periods of leave, flexible work schedules, childcare, and training. Each of the countries we reviewed has some form of paid family leave, such as maternity, paternity, or parental leave, that attempts to balance the needs of employers and employees and, often, attempts to help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the workforce. In addition to family leave for parents, countries provide other types of leave, and have established workplace flexibility arrangements for workers. All of the countries also subsidize childcare for some working parents through a variety of means, such as direct benefits to parents for childcare and tax credits. Last, governments and employers have a range of training and apprenticeship programs to help unemployed people find jobs and to help those already in the workforce advance in their careers. For example, in Denmark, employed women with a work history of at least 120 hours in the 13 weeks prior to the leave are allowed 18 weeks of paid maternity leave. In other cases employers have developed new opportunities. In Canada, for example, the government provides direct financial support of $100 a month to eligible parents for each child under 6. Women are also more likely to enter and remain in the workforce if they have paid family leave, although the length of leave affects their employment. An extensive review of available research by the European Commission shows mixed results in whether training helps the unemployed get jobs. Some training initiatives have shown promise but have not been formally evaluated. While Several Factors Affect Uptake, Employees’ Use of Workplace Benefits Can Have Implications for Employers and Employees
The experiences of the countries we reviewed have shown that characteristics of policies, such as the level of payment during leave, can affect whether an employee uses various workplace benefits. For example, the province of Saskatchewan in Canada provides 12 days of unpaid leave per year, for time away from work to deal with emergencies or sickness. However, according to a Saskatchewan government official, low-wage workers cannot always afford to take the unpaid leave. Employees’ use of workplace benefits can create management challenges for their employers. In addition, some part-time jobs have no career advancement opportunities and limited access to other benefits, such as payment during leave and training. Since employers tend to target their training to higher-skilled and full-time workers, employees who opt to work part-time may have fewer opportunities for on-the-job training that could help them advance, according to university researchers in the Netherlands. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
To describe the policies and practices implemented in other developed countries that may help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the labor force, and to identify the factors that affected employees’ use of workplace benefits and the resulting workplace implications, we conducted site visits or in-depth interviews with various officials in four developed countries—Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, and Denmark. To examine the change in the targeted groups’ employment following the implementation of the policies and practices, as well as to identify the factors that affected employees’ use of workplace benefits and the resulting workplace implications, we conducted an extensive literature review of workforce flexibility and training strategies in a range of developed countries. Our review of these studies was limited to the extent that they were available in English. To provide context, we identified relevant national policies in the United States. However, we did not conduct a comprehensive review of similar workplace flexibility and training strategies in the United States, nor did we seek to determine whether other countries’ strategies could be implemented in the United States. The U.S. Older Workers: Policies of Other Nations to Increase Labor Force Participation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing retirements and declining fertility rates, among other factors, could affect the labor force growth in many developed countries. To maintain the size and productivity of the labor force, many governments and employers have introduced strategies to keep workers, such as women and low-skilled workers, in the workforce throughout their working lives. Because other countries have also undertaken efforts to address issues similar to those occurring in the U.S., GAO was asked to (1) describe the policies and practices implemented in other developed countries that may help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the labor force; (2) examine the targeted groups' employment following the implementation of the policies and practices; and (3) identify the factors that affect employees' use of workplace benefits and the resulting implications. We conducted an extensive review of workplace flexibility and training strategies in a range of developed countries, and we conducted site visits to selected countries. Our reviews were limited to materials that were available in English. While we identified relevant national policies in the U.S., we did not determine whether other countries' strategies could be implemented here. Labor provided technical comments, and State had no comments on this report.
What GAO Found
Governments and employers have developed a variety of laws, government policies, and formal and informal practices, including periods of leave, flexible work schedules, child care, and training. Each of the countries we reviewed has some form of family leave, such as maternity, paternity, or parental leave, that attempts to balance the needs of employers and employees, and, often, attempts to help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the workforce. In Denmark, employed women with a work history of at least 120 hours in the 13 weeks prior to the leave are allowed 18 weeks of paid maternity leave. In addition to family leave for parents, countries provide other types of leave, and have established workplace flexibility arrangements for workers. U.S. federal law allows for unpaid leave under certain circumstances. All of the countries we reviewed, including the United States, also subsidize child care for some working parents through a variety of means, such as direct benefits to parents for child care or tax credits. For example, in Canada, the government provides direct financial support of $100 a month per child, to eligible parents for each child under 6. Last, governments and employers have a range of training and apprenticeship programs to help unemployed people find jobs and to help those already in the workforce advance in their careers. Although research shows that benefits such as parental leave are associated with increased employment, research on training programs is mixed. Leave reduces the amount of time that mothers spend out of the labor force. Cross-national studies show that child care--particularly when it is subsidized and regulated with quality standards--is positively related to women's employment. Available research on training in some of the countries we reviewed shows mixed results in helping the unemployed get jobs. While some initiatives have shown promise, some evaluations of specific practices have not been conducted. Some country officials said it is difficult to attribute effects to a specific policy because the policies are either new or because they codified long-standing practices. While policies do appear to affect workforce participation, many factors can affect the uptake of workplace benefits, and employees' use of these benefits can have implications for employers and employees. For example, employees' use of workplace benefits can create management challenges for their employers. Additionally, employees are more likely to take family leave if they feel that their employer is supportive. However, while a Canadian province provides 12 days of unpaid leave to deal with emergencies or sickness, low-wage workers cannot always afford to take it. Similarly, the uptake of available benefits can also have larger implications for an employee's career. Some part-time jobs have no career advancement opportunities and limited access to other benefits. Since employers tend to target their training to higher-skilled and full-time workers, employees who opt to work part-time may have fewer opportunities for on-the-job training that could help them advance, according to researchers in the Netherlands. |
gao_GAO-14-620T | gao_GAO-14-620T_0 | If the specialty care provider accepts the consult—determines the consult is needed and is appropriate—an appointment is made for the patient to receive the consultation or procedure. In response to task force recommendations, in May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative to standardize aspects of the consult process, with the goal of developing consistent and reliable information on consults across all VAMCs. Officials at VHA’s central office, VISNs, and VAMCs all have oversight responsibilities for the implementation of VHA’s scheduling policy. GAO’s Preliminary Work Identified Examples of Delays in Specialty Care, and Limitations in VHA’s Implementation of Its Business Rules Impede Its Ability to Assess Delays
As we reported in our April 9, 2014, testimony statement, our preliminary work identified examples of delays in veterans receiving requested VAMC officials outpatient specialty care at the five VAMCs we reviewed.cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments, among the factors that hinder their ability to meet VHA’s guideline for completing consults within 90 days. For 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults we reviewed for one VAMC, we found that between 108 and 152 days elapsed, with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. In 1 of these cases, several months passed before the veteran was referred to non-VA care, and he was seen 252 days after the initial consult request. As we also reported, our preliminary work identified variation in how the five VAMCs we reviewed have implemented key aspects of VHA’s business rules, which limits the usefulness of the data in monitoring and overseeing consults systemwide. As previously noted, VHA’s business rules were designed to standardize aspects of the consult process, thus creating consistency in VAMCs’ management of consults. For example, VAMCs have developed different strategies for managing future care consults— requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. In addition, oversight of the implementation of VHA’s business rules has been limited and has not included independent verification of VAMC actions. If the patient fails to do so within this time frame, the specialty care provider may discontinue the consult. Reliability of Reported Outpatient Medical Appointment Wait Times and Scheduling Oversight Need Improvement, and VA Has Initiated Actions to Address Related GAO Recommendations
In December 2012, we reported that VHA’s reported outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable and that inconsistent implementation of VHA’s scheduling policy may have resulted in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely outpatient medical appointments. Since, at the time of our review, VHA measured medical appointment wait times as the number of days elapsed from the desired date, the reliability of reported wait time performance was dependent on the consistency with which VAMC schedulers recorded the desired date in the VistA scheduling system. However, VHA’s scheduling policy and training documents were unclear and did not ensure consistent use of the desired date. For example, we found the electronic wait list was not always used to track new patients that needed medical appointments as required by VHA scheduling policy, putting these patients at risk for delays in care. VA concurred with the four recommendations included in our December 2012 report and reported continuing actions to address them. First, we recommended that the Secretary of VA direct the Under Secretary for Health to take actions to improve the reliability of its outpatient medical appointment wait time measures. In response, VHA officials stated that the department is in the process of revising the VHA scheduling policy to include changes, such as the new methodology for measuring wait times, and improvements and standardization of the use of the electronic wait list. In April 2014, VHA officials stated that they expected to receive the first report in approximately 2 months. Although VA has initiated actions to address our recommendations, we believe that continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA’s ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if access is delayed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring that veterans obtain needed medical care. Over the past few years, there have been numerous reports of VAMCs failing to provide timely care to patients, including specialty care, and in some cases, these delays have resulted in harm to patients.
In December 2012, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the reliability of VHA's reported medical appointment wait times, as well as oversight of the appointment scheduling process. Also in 2012, VHA found that systemwide consult data could not be adequately used to determine the extent to which veterans experienced delays in receiving outpatient specialty care. In May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative with the aim of standardizing aspects of the consults process.
This statement highlights (1) preliminary observations GAO made in an April 9, 2014, testimony statement regarding VHA's management of outpatient specialty care consults, and (2) concerns GAO raised in its December 2012 report regarding VHA's outpatient medical appointment scheduling, and progress made implementing GAO's recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from VHA's central office. Additionally, GAO interviewed officials from five VAMCs for the consults work and four VAMCs for the scheduling work that varied based on size, complexity, and location.
What GAO Found
As GAO previously reported in its testimony on April 9, 2014, its preliminary work examining the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA), Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) management of outpatient specialty care consults identified examples of delays in veterans receiving outpatient specialty care, as well as limitations in the implementation of new consult business rules designed to standardize aspects of the clinical consult process. For example, for 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults GAO reviewed for one VA medical center (VAMC), between 108 and 152 days elapsed with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. For 1 of these consults, several months passed before the veteran was referred for care to a non-VA health care facility. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments among the factors that lead to delays and hinder their ability to meet VHA's guideline of completing consults within 90 days of being requested. GAO's preliminary work also identified variation in how the five VAMCs reviewed have implemented key aspects of VHA's business rules, such as strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. Such variation may limit the usefulness of VHA's data in monitoring and overseeing consults systemwide. Furthermore, oversight of the implementation of the business rules has been limited and has not included independent verification of VAMC actions. Because of the preliminary nature of this work, GAO is not making recommendations on VHA's consult process at this time.
In its December 2012 report, GAO found that VHA's outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable. The reliability of reported wait time performance measures was dependent in part on the consistency with which schedulers recorded desired date—defined as the date on which the patient or health care provider wants the patient to be seen—in the scheduling system. However, VHA's scheduling policy and training documents were unclear and did not ensure consistent use of the desired date. GAO also found that inconsistent implementation of VHA's scheduling policy may have resulted in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely medical appointments. For example, GAO identified clinics that did not use the electronic wait list to track new patients in need of medical appointments as required by VHA policy, putting these patients at risk for not receiving timely care. VA concurred with the four recommendations included in the report and, in April 2014, reported continued actions to address them. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation for VA to take actions to improve the reliability of its medical appointment wait time measures, officials stated the department has implemented new patient wait time measures that no longer rely on desired date recorded by a scheduler. VHA officials stated that the department also is continuing to address GAO's three additional recommendations. Although VA has initiated actions to address GAO's recommendations, continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA's ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if access is delayed. |
gao_GAO-16-492 | gao_GAO-16-492_0 | The spending requirements for SBIR and STTR are to be calculated as a percentage of each agency’s extramural R&D obligations, provided their extramural obligations exceed the participation thresholds of $100 million for SBIR and $1 billion for STTR. Instead, these agencies continued to submit their proposed extramural R&D budgets. One Agency’s Obligations Exceeded the STTR Threshold, but It Did Not Establish a Program
In fiscal year 2014, USDA reported extramural R&D obligations of $1.1 billion but did not establish an STTR program as required. Some Agencies Have Taken Steps to Meet Certain Reporting Requirements, but Most Agencies Are Still Not Fully Compliant
All of the agencies participating in the SBIR and STTR programs submitted methodology reports to SBA for fiscal year 2014, and some agencies provided more detail than they did in fiscal year 2013. Specifically, in fiscal year 2013, the Department of Transportation (DOT) provided an itemized description of its exclusions, including dollar amounts. SBA Has Not Submitted Its Required Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2014
The Small Business Act requires SBA to report to certain congressional committees on the SBIR and STTR programs—including an analysis of the agencies’ methodology reports—not less than annually, but the act does not specify a date that the report is due. For example, if the spending requirements were calculated based on an agency’s total R&D budget authority rather than its extramural R&D obligations using the same percentages and participation thresholds defined in current law, we estimate that total spending requirements in fiscal year 2014 for the SBIR and STTR programs would have increased from $2.3 billion to $4.2 billion, an increase of roughly $1.9 billion, or 83 percent, based on our analysis of budget authority data and data submitted to SBA. In particular, some program managers said that increasing the amount of money that goes to the SBIR and STTR programs could reduce the amount of resources available for other R&D conducted by the agency. Total Administrative Spending in Fiscal Year 2014 Is Unknown, but Seven Agencies Spent $19.1 Million on the Administrative Pilot Program
Little is known about total administrative spending for fiscal year 2014 because the agencies that participate in the SBIR and STTR programs do not—and are not required to—fully track these costs. SBA Has Not Evaluated Potential Constraints in the Administrative Pilot Program
More agencies participated in the administrative pilot program in fiscal year 2014 than in the previous year, but some agencies identified potential constraints that limited their participation, including the temporary nature of the program and the requirement to expend funds only on new activities. Such a report could include an evaluation of the constraints that have hindered agencies’ participation in the program. SBA officials told us that they plan to include information on the administrative pilot program in their annual report to Congress. Until SBA submits its fiscal year 2014 report and includes information on the administrative pilot program, SBA and Congress will not have the information they need to know whether the administrative pilot program has met its goals or whether there are constraints to participating, such as those that we identified. Conclusions
Federal agencies have spent billions of dollars with small businesses under the SBIR and STTR programs to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. Restoring this guidance could help SBA fully evaluate and report to Congress on the accuracy of agencies’ methodology reports. Third, because SBA has not submitted a report on the administrative pilot program to Congress for fiscal year 2014, it has not evaluated the effects of potential constraints on agencies’ ability to participate in the pilot program for that year and the steps needed to address these constraints. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure full compliance with SBIR and STTR spending and reporting requirements and improve participation in the administrative pilot program, we recommend that the SBA Administrator take the following three actions:
Review SBA guidance regarding when an agency is required to start up an SBIR or STTR program, and if necessary, update the guidance to provide greater clarity to agencies with R&D obligations greater than the thresholds for participating. In an e-mail response, SBA generally agreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Agencies’ Compliance with Spending Requirements for the Small Business Innovation Research Program for Fiscal Year 2014, according to Agency Data
The data that the agencies submitted to the Small Business Administration (SBA) indicate that 9 of the 11 participating agencies spent amounts for the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program that met or exceeded their fiscal year 2014 spending requirements, while spending for the remaining 2 agencies did not meet the requirements. Appendix II: Agencies’ Compliance with Spending Requirements for the Small Business Technology Transfer Program for Fiscal Year 2014, according to Agency Data
The data that the agencies submitted to the Small Business Administration (SBA) indicate that four of the five participating agencies spent amounts for the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program that met or exceeded their fiscal year 2014 spending requirements, while 1 agency did not. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies have awarded contracts and grants totaling more than $40 billion through the SBIR and STTR programs to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. The Small Business Act requires agencies with extramural R&D obligations that meet certain thresholds—$100 million for SBIR and $1 billion for STTR—to spend a percentage of these funds on the programs. The agencies are to report on their activities to SBA, and in turn, SBA is to report to Congress.
The 2011 reauthorization of the programs includes a provision for GAO to review compliance with spending and reporting requirements and other program aspects. This report examines, for fiscal year 2014, (1) the extent to which participating agencies complied with spending requirements, (2) the extent to which agencies and SBA complied with certain reporting requirements, (3) the potential effects of basing spending requirements on total R&D budget authority, and (4) what is known about the amounts spent to administer the programs. GAO reviewed agency spending data and reports and interviewed program officials from SBA and the 11 participating agencies.
What GAO Found
Agency data indicate that 9 of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and 4 of the 5 agencies participating in the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program complied with spending requirements in fiscal year 2014. One agency—the Department of Agriculture (USDA)—had extramural R&D obligations greater than $1 billion, but did not implement an STTR program, as required in the Small Business Act. This is, in part, because the Small Business Administration's (SBA) guidance does not address when an agency should establish a new STTR program. As a result, in fiscal year 2014, less money was available for awards to small businesses through this program.
Most participating agencies did not fully comply with certain reporting requirements. For example, while all participating agencies submitted the required methodology reports for fiscal year 2014, 6 of the 11 did not fully itemize the specific programs they excluded from their extramural R&D, did not fully explain the reasons why they excluded the programs, or both. Additionally, 2 agencies did not submit complete information on the dollar amounts of exclusions in fiscal year 2014 because of a change in SBA's fiscal year 2014 guidance. Restoring this guidance could provide information to help SBA assess the accuracy of agency methodology reports.
GAO's analysis shows that basing SBIR and STTR spending requirements on an agency's total R&D budget authority instead of its extramural R&D obligations could increase the amount each agency has to spend on the programs and increase the number of agencies required to participate in the programs. Some agency officials identified benefits of this potential change, such as more funding to make awards to small businesses, but some agencies identified drawbacks, such as limiting resources for other R&D programs.
Total administrative spending on the SBIR and STTR programs in fiscal year 2014 is unknown, but agencies participating in the administrative pilot program spent about $19 million on new activities. Agencies do not and are not required to track total administrative costs, and therefore total spending could not be calculated for fiscal year 2014. Seven agencies participated in the administrative pilot program and tracked the amounts of program funds they spent on new administrative and oversight activities in fiscal year 2014. While these 7 agencies spent more on the program in fiscal year 2014 than in the previous year, some of these agencies identified constraints that limited their participation. For example, agency officials pointed to guidance that requires agencies to only spend money on new initiatives and the limited length of the pilot. Agency officials told GAO these constraints kept them from achieving program goals by preventing them from undertaking some initiatives and hiring individuals for administrative purposes. SBA plans to include its required evaluation of the pilot program in its annual report to Congress, which could include an evaluation of such constraints and the steps needed to address them, but it has not yet submitted its fiscal year 2014 report to Congress. Until SBA submits its evaluation of the pilot program, SBA and Congress will not have needed information about the pilot for fiscal year 2014 or potential constraints for participants.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA clarify guidance for when an agency is to start up an STTR program, restore guidance about dollar amounts of exclusions in the methodology report, and complete the required report to Congress for fiscal year 2014.
SBA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-751 | gao_GAO-08-751_0 | FDA Approved Mifeprex under the Subpart H Restricted Distribution Provision After Concluding That Clinical Evidence Supported Its Safety and Efficacy
FDA approved Mifeprex after three review cycles. In its initial review, FDA concluded that reliance on historical controls in three key clinical trials was appropriate and consistent with FDA regulations and that the available data supported the safety and efficacy of the drug. In an approvable letter, FDA notified the sponsor that it needed to provide additional data and more detail on its proposal to restrict the drug’s distribution before an approval decision could be made. The agency issued a second approvable letter after finding that new data confirmed Mifeprex’s safety and efficacy but also that the sponsor needed to revise its distribution plan and address labeling and manufacturing deficiencies. FDA further concluded that the drug was a candidate for approval under Subpart H. In the final review cycle, FDA concluded that the sponsor’s revised distribution plan and other revisions were sufficient to address FDA’s comments. FDA also concluded that Mifeprex met the scope of Subpart H and that approval under the restricted distribution provision of Subpart H was necessary to ensure that only qualified physicians prescribed the drug. In the case of the Mifeprex NDA, FDA determined that the historically controlled trials provided substantial evidence of safety and efficacy because the outcomes of women taking the Mifeprex regimen were compared with the well-documented data on the natural course of pregnancy, including rates of miscarriage, and the effect of the drug—termination of a pregnancy—was obvious. This submission included updated safety data from ongoing trials and international postmarket experience, international product labeling, and revisions to the distribution plan. Throughout the approval process, the sponsor was opposed to approval under Subpart H. Specifically, the sponsor argued that the drug did not fit within the scope of Subpart H because pregnancy itself is not a serious or life threatening illness. Postmarketing Study Commitments: In both the September 1996 and February 2000 approvable letters, FDA had reminded the sponsor of its commitment to conduct a series of six postmarket studies to address comments raised in the 1996 advisory committee meeting. Approval Process for Mifeprex Was Generally Consistent with That of the Other Eight Subpart H Restricted Drugs
Although each drug had unique risks and benefits, the approval process for Mifeprex was generally consistent with the approval processes for the other eight Subpart H restricted drugs. One common element across the approval processes for the Subpart H restricted drugs was that for seven of the drugs, including Mifeprex, FDA needed to evaluate potential limitations in key clinical data supporting the NDA. We also found that the types of distribution restrictions FDA imposed on Mifeprex were similar to those imposed on the other Subpart H restricted drugs, though the specifics of the restrictions depended on FDA’s safe use concern for the drug. FDA’s Postmarket Oversight of Mifeprex Has Been Consistent with the Agency’s Oversight of the Other Subpart H Restricted Drugs
The actions FDA has taken to oversee Mifeprex have been consistent with the actions it has taken to oversee the other Subpart H restricted drugs. (See table 3 for an overview of FDA’s postmarket oversight of these drugs.) To Oversee Compliance with Distribution Restrictions, FDA Relied on Information Submitted by All Drug Sponsors and Its Own Inspections for Some of the Drugs, Including Mifeprex
For all nine of the drugs that have been approved under the restricted distribution provision of Subpart H, FDA has relied mainly on information submitted by sponsors in required reports to oversee the sponsors’ compliance with distribution restrictions. To Oversee Compliance with Adverse Event Reporting Requirements, FDA Reviewed Sponsors’ Data, Conducted Inspections and Identified Deficiencies for Most of the Drugs
To oversee compliance with adverse event reporting requirements, FDA has both reviewed data submitted by sponsors in required reports and conducted inspections. FDA officials have said that the relationship between the infections and the use of unapproved regimens of Mifeprex and misoprostol remains unknown. In response to concerns about serious infections and associated deaths—all of which involved an off-label use of the drug— FDA issued Public Health Advisories to notify healthcare providers about patient deaths and the treatment regimens used in those cases, and to remind them of the regimen FDA has approved, and that FDA has not established the safety of alternative regimens. Agency Comments
We provided HHS with a draft of this report for review. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), approved the drug Mifeprex for use in terminating early term pregnancy. FDA approved the drug under a provision of its Subpart H regulations, allowing it to restrict the drug's distribution to assure its safe use. Critics have questioned aspects of the Mifeprex approval process, including the reliance on historically-controlled clinical trials that compare a drug's effects on a condition to the known course of the condition rather than to another drug or placebo. Critics argued that Mifeprex does not fit within the scope of Subpart H, which applies to drugs that treat serious or life-threatening illnesses. Concerns have also been raised about FDA's oversight of the drug since approval, including the agency's response to deaths in U.S. women who had taken the drug. In this report GAO (1) describes FDA's approval of Mifeprex, including the evidence considered and the restrictions placed on its distribution; (2) compares the Mifeprex approval process to the approval processes for other Subpart H restricted drugs; and (3) compares FDA's postmarket oversight of Mifeprex to its oversight of other Subpart H restricted drugs. GAO reviewed FDA regulations, policies, and records pertaining to its approval and oversight of Mifeprex and the eight other Subpart H restricted drugs. In addition, GAO interviewed FDA officials and external stakeholders.
What GAO Found
FDA approved Mifeprex after evaluating the sponsor's initial and revised new drug application through three review cycles. In the first cycle, FDA concluded that the available data supported the safety and efficacy of Mifeprex and that, because the course of pregnancy was well-documented and the effects of the drug were self-evident, the use of historical controls was consistent with FDA regulations. FDA also concluded that before the drug could be approved, the sponsor needed to provide final data from an ongoing U.S. trial, and more detail on restricting the drug's distribution. In the second cycle, FDA concluded that while the U.S. trial data confirmed the drug's safety and efficacy, the sponsor needed to revise its distribution plan and address labeling and manufacturing deficiencies. In the final review, FDA concluded that termination of unwanted pregnancy is a serious condition and imposing restrictions under Subpart H was necessary. FDA approved Mifeprex, but required that the sponsor commit to conduct two postmarketing studies, imposed several distribution restrictions intended to ensure that only qualified physicians prescribe the drug, and required that patients attest to understanding the treatment's potential complications. The approval process for Mifeprex was consistent with the processes for the other Subpart H restricted drugs, although the details of FDA's approval depended on the unique risks and benefits of each drug. Common elements of the approval processes included that FDA needed to evaluate potential limitations in key clinical data (Mifeprex and six of the other drugs), did not approve the drugs in the first review cycle (Mifeprex and five others), and imposed similar types of distribution restrictions on Mifeprex and the other drugs, though the specific details of the restrictions varied across the drugs. FDA's postmarket oversight of Mifeprex has been consistent with its oversight of other Subpart H restricted drugs. To oversee compliance with distribution restrictions, FDA has reviewed data from all sponsors and conducted inspections for Mifeprex and two other drugs. To oversee compliance with postmarketing study commitments, FDA has relied on required updates from sponsors and found unfulfilled commitments for most drugs, including Mifeprex. To oversee compliance with adverse event reporting requirements, FDA has evaluated data in sponsors' reports and, for Mifeprex and seven other drugs, has conducted inspections that revealed deficiencies for most of these drugs, including Mifeprex. Lastly, FDA has taken similar steps to oversee postmarket safety across the drugs, such as analyzing adverse events. For Mifeprex, FDA investigated the deaths of six U.S. women who developed a severe infection after taking the drug and concluded that the evidence did not establish a causal relationship between Mifeprex and the infections. Finally, FDA has taken similar actions to address emerging safety concerns across the drugs, such as changing labeling. HHS reviewed a draft of this report and informed GAO that it did not have comments. |
gao_GAO-04-342 | gao_GAO-04-342_0 | Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD’s Requests
Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past 5 fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent of these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire systems at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003 the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7 Predators, but Congress provided over $131 million—an increase of approximately 470 percent— enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet operational demands in the war against terrorism. DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs into the Force Structure
DOD’s planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force structure efficiently, although the department has taken certain positive steps to improve its management of the UAV program. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current programs, identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. The Task Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended actions. Officials from each of the services indicated that their UAV roadmap was developed to primarily address their individual service’s requirements and operational concepts. Conclusions
Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance that its investment will result in UAV programs being effectively integrated into the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and logistics costs; increase the risk of future interoperability problems; and unnecessarily duplicate efforts from one service to the next. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with development plans to ensure that the services develop systems that complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed, and avoid duplication and designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan’s direction, and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed department and service documentation for major operational UAV programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under development and to be procured by 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services. GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.
What GAO Found
During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 Predators. DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program's management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those of other services. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future interoperability problems. |
gao_GAO-06-416 | gao_GAO-06-416_0 | Complaint investigations for all survey organizations are unannounced. Validation reviews are one of CMS’s primary oversight tools. We also found that the lack of a straightforward linkage between CLIA requirements and the CLIA-equivalent requirements of some survey organizations makes it virtually impossible to assess lab quality in a standardized manner, such as identifying the proportion of labs with condition-level deficiencies. Limited Data Are Available on the Quality of Labs Inspected by State Survey Agencies
CMS’s OSCAR database contains limited data on the quality of labs inspected by state survey agencies and, as a result, it is not possible to analyze changes in the quality of lab testing over time. Proficiency Testing Results Suggest that Quality Has Not Improved at Hospital Labs in Recent Years
Although CMS noted that proficiency testing trend data show a decrease in failures for labs as a whole, the data suggest that lab quality may not have improved at hospital labs for the period 1999 through 2003. Proficiency testing is an important oversight tool for survey organizations because it is an objective indicator of a lab’s ability to consistently produce accurate test results and is conducted more frequently than surveys—three times a year versus once every 2 years. Survey weaknesses include: (1) inspections that most organizations announce ahead of the visit, which allows labs to prepare for their inspections and portray themselves in a manner that may not accurately reflect their day-to-day quality assurance processes; (2) variability in the proportion of labs with condition-level deficiencies in 2004, which suggests surveys are not conducted in a consistent manner; and (3) the goal of educating lab workers during surveys taking precedence over, or precluding, the identification and reporting of deficiencies. Announced Surveys May Result in Unrealistic Picture of Lab Quality
Because labs can and do prepare for surveys, CMS regional office officials and most of the state survey agencies acknowledged that announced surveys may not always provide a realistic picture of lab quality. For example, according to officials from a state survey agency we interviewed, surveyors prefer not to cite condition-level deficiencies. Lab Workers Who File Complaints About Quality Problems in Lab Testing Not Afforded Whistle- blower Protections
Some lab workers may not be filing complaints about quality problems at their labs because of anonymity concerns or because they may not be familiar with filing procedures. Finally, CMS does not adequately use data, such as the results of surveys, to monitor survey organization activities and processes. CLIA requires that proficiency testing be conducted “on a quarterly basis, except where the Secretary determines for technical and scientific reasons that a particular examination or procedure may be tested less frequently (but not less often than twice per year).” The committee report on the bill that forms the basis for much of CLIA indicated that “proficiency testing should be the central element in determining a laboratory’s competence, since it purports to measure actual test outcomes rather than merely gauging the potential for accurate outcomes.”
In CMS’s 1992 rule implementing CLIA, the agency provided a rationale for reducing the frequency of proficiency testing, but did not provide a technical and scientific basis for reducing the frequency for particular procedures or tests. For example: Accrediting organizations provide labs more advance notice about upcoming surveys than CMS allows state survey agencies to give to the labs they inspect. Many CMS Validation Reviews Lack Independence and Reviews Skip Some State Survey Agencies
CMS validation reviews that are intended to evaluate lab surveys conducted by both states and accrediting organizations do not provide CMS with an independent assessment of the extent to which surveys identify all serious—that is, condition-level or condition-level equivalent— deficiencies. Without validating at least some surveys in each state, CMS is unable to determine if the states are appropriately identifying deficiencies. CMS Use of Data for Oversight of CLIA Program Is Limited
CMS does not routinely collect and analyze data essential for effective oversight of the CLIA program but has initiatives to automate some available data to make them more accessible for analysis. CMS is developing, and plans to launch, a complaints database in March 2006. Allow the CLIA program to utilize revenues generated by the program to hire sufficient staff to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. COLA said that our recommendations to improve CMS oversight of survey organizations had merit. JCAHO said that our recommendation that all survey organizations develop and require labs to prominently display posters that instruct lab workers on how to file anonymous complaints was too narrow and prescriptive and may inadvertently limit organizations from using other, more effective ways to educate lab workers on this topic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) strengthened and extended quality requirements for labs that perform tests to diagnose or treat disease. About 36,000 labs that perform certain complex tests must be surveyed biennially by either a state or one of six private accrediting organizations. CMS oversees implementation of CLIA requirements and the activities of survey organizations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the quality of lab testing; (2) the effectiveness of surveys, complaint investigations, and enforcement actions in detecting and addressing lab problems; and (3) the adequacy of CMS's CLIA oversight.
What GAO Found
Because of limited comparable data from CMS and survey organizations, too little is known about the quality of lab testing. For example, a standardized assessment of lab quality across survey organizations is not possible because of different definitions of what constitutes a serious quality problem. One survey organization had no systematic way of identifying the problematic labs it inspects. However, GAO's analysis of an indicator that measures a lab's ability to consistently produce accurate test results suggests that lab quality may not have improved at hospital labs in recent years. Based on an analysis of available data and interviews with CMS and survey organizations, real and potential lab quality problems are masked by survey, complaint, and enforcement weaknesses. Because most survey organizations announce the timing of biennial surveys, allowing labs to prepare for inspections, surveys may not provide a realistic picture of lab quality. Although two survey organizations that generally inspect hospital labs plan to begin unannounced surveys in 2006, they may not be possible at physician office labs that have irregular hours. Survey organizations that typically inspect such labs, however, provide more advance notice about upcoming inspections than CMS allows states to provide. Several other factors suggest that surveys and complaints do not present a realistic picture of lab quality. Interviews with officials from a sample of states confirmed that some survey organizations do not cite all serious deficiencies, as evidenced by variability in the limited available lab survey data. Officials said that surveyors may be reluctant to cite deficiencies because they view their role as educational, not regulatory; moreover, CMS has instructed state surveyors not to cite some deficiencies for over 2 years after implementing new lab requirements. Finally, lab workers may file complaints infrequently because of concern about retaliation and a lack of understanding about how to file a complaint. CMS rarely imposes sanctions, even for labs with the same repeat deficiencies, a reflection of the educational focus of the CLIA program. CMS does not require labs to participate in a key quality assurance test as frequently as CLIA requires. Although funded by lab fees, CMS officials indicated that the program has not been allowed to hire sufficient staff to carry out the agency's oversight responsibilities. Moreover, CMS's principal oversight tool, intended to determine if all serious deficiencies were identified, lacks independence because many oversight reviews are conducted simultaneously with survey organizations. CMS's presence may make surveyors more attentive to survey tasks than when they are not being observed. Compared to independent reviews, simultaneous reviews rarely identify missed deficiencies. Furthermore, CMS does not collect and analyze data on serious deficiencies identified by each survey organization and thus, is unable to assess whether lab quality is improving or declining. Nor does CMS effectively analyze other key data such as the use of sanctions. To improve oversight, CMS is establishing a nationwide complaints database. CMS is also instituting annual survey organization performance reviews. |
gao_GAO-06-878T | gao_GAO-06-878T_0 | RMA Has Strengthened Procedures for Preventing Questionable Claims, but the Program Remains Vulnerable to Potential Abuse
RMA has taken a number of steps to improve its procedures and processes to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, such as data mining, expanded field inspections and quality assurance reviews. However, our review showed that RMA is not effectively using all of the tools it has available and that some farmers and others continue to take advantage of the program, as the following discussion indicates. Inspections during the growing season are not being used to maximum effect. RMA’s data analysis of the largest farming operations is incomplete. Using FSA data, we examined the extent to which (1) farming operations report all members who have a substantial beneficial interest in the operation, (2) these farming operations file questionable crop insurance claims, and (3) agents or claims adjusters had financial interests in the claim. The average ownership interest of the persons not disclosed for the 21,310 entities was 33 percent; as a result, RMA should be able to recover up to $74 million in claims payments. RMA is not effectively overseeing insurance companies’ quality assurance programs. RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuses. While not all of these policy irregularities were necessarily sanctionable, RMA imposed only 114 sanctions from 2001 through 2004. According to RMA officials, RMA requested and imposed few sanctions because it had not issued regulations to implement its expanded authority under ARPA. RMA’s Regulations and Some Statutory Requirements Hinder Efforts to Reduce Abuse in the Crop Insurance Program
While RMA can improve its day-to-day oversight of the federal crop insurance program in a number of ways, the program’s design, as laid out in RMA’s regulations or as required by statute, hinders officials’ efforts to administer certain program provisions to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, as the following discussion indicates. RMA’s regulations allow farmers the option of insuring their fields individually rather than combined as one unit. Insuring fields separately enables farmers to “switch” production among fields—reporting production of a crop from one field that was actually produced on another field—either to make false insurance claims based on low production or to build up a higher yield history on a particular field in order to increase its eligibility for higher future insurance guarantees. Economic incentives to control program costs associated with fraud, waste, and abuse are commensurate with financial exposure. Annually, RMA pays about $300 million in claims for prevented planting. High premium subsidies may inhibit RMA’s ability to control program abuse. High premium subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums. Recently Prosecuted Crop Insurance Fraud Cases Highlight Program Vulnerabilities
Some of the issues we identified are reflected in eight recent crop insurance fraud cases that USDA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated and that resulted in criminal prosecution between June 2003 and April 2005. The cases show how a few farmers, sometimes in collusion with others, falsely report planting, claims of damage, and production to try to circumvent RMA’s procedures. Several of these cases also demonstrate the importance of having FSA and RMA work together to identify and share information on questionable farming practices/activities. We made eight recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture to strengthen program oversight and reduce vulnerability to fraud, waste and abuse, including improved sharing of information between RMA and FSA, improved inspection practices, regulations to implement sanctions, and stronger oversight of companies’ quality control procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2005, the program cost $2.7 billion, including an estimated $117 million in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) provided new tools to monitor and control abuses, such as providing RMA sanction authority to address program abuse and having USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspect farmers' fields. This testimony is based on GAO's September 30, 2005, report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (GAO-05-528). GAO assessed (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse, and (2) the extent to which the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse.
What GAO Found
RMA has taken a number of steps to improve its procedures and processes to address fraud, waste and abuse in selling and servicing crop insurance policies and has reported more than $300 million in savings from 2001 to 2004. However, RMA is not effectively using all of its tools. GAO identified weaknesses in four key areas. First, FSA inspections during the growing season are not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA had requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. Second, RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations is incomplete. According to GAO's analysis, in 2003 about 21,000 of the largest farming operations in the program did not report individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations as required. Without this information RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA did not give RMA access to the data needed to identify such individuals or entities. USDA should be able to recover up to $74 million in improper claims payments. Third, RMA is not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. GAO's review of 120 cases showed that companies did not complete all of the required quality assurance reviews of claims and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. Fourth, RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuse. RMA has not issued regulations to implement its new sanction authority under ARPA and imposed only 114 sanctions from 2001 through 2004, although it annually identifies about 3,000 questionable claims, not all of which are necessarily sanctionable. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create program design problems that hinder RMA's efforts to reduce program abuse. For example, RMA's regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than all fields combined. This option enables farmers to "switch" reporting of yield among fields to either make false claims or build up a higher yield history on a field to increase its eligibility for higher insurance guarantees. High premium subsidies, established by statute, may also limit RMA's ability to control program abuse because the subsidies shield farmers from the full effect of paying higher premiums associated with frequent claims. Eight recent crop insurance fraud cases, investigated by USDA's Office of Inspector General and resulting in criminal prosecutions between June 2003 and April 2005, reflect the issues GAO noted. These cases show how farmers, sometimes in collusion with insurance agents and others, falsely claim prevented planting and low production. Several of these cases also demonstrate the importance of having FSA and RMA work together to identify and share information on questionable farming practices/activities. |
gao_GAO-13-447 | gao_GAO-13-447_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Establish an Enduring Expeditionary Forensic Capability, but Additional Actions Are Needed
DOD has taken some important steps to establish an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations, and a directive that calls for a strategic plan addressing DOD’s enterprise-wide forensics, including expeditionary forensics, but has not completed its strategic plan or reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of DOD components’ budget estimates. Further, OUSD(AT&L) officials said that while the DOD directive calls for OUSD(AT&L) to conduct a review of forensic-related programs and budget submissions, it does not provide guidance on how forensic budget data should be collected and reported by the DOD components. DOD Has Issued Guidance but Its Draft Strategic Plan Does Not Include Some Key Elements
DOD has taken some important steps to establish an expeditionary forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations in 2008 and a directive in 2011 to establish policy and assign responsibilities. Consistent with the directive, DOD has drafted a strategic plan to guide the activities of the Defense Forensic Enterprise, including expeditionary forensics. However, DOD’s strategic plan does not include three of the five key elements identified by GAO as integral to a well-developed strategic plan. The plan includes a mission statement and goals and objectives, but does not include approaches for how these goals and objectives will be achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge progress, and resources (e.g., funding and personnel) needed to achieve these goals and objectives. GAO’s prior work on strategic planning has shown that organizations need a well-developed strategic plan to identify and achieve their goals Table 1, below, lists the key and objectives effectively and efficiently.elements of a strategic plan and indicates those that are and are not included in DOD’s draft strategic plan for the Defense Forensic Enterprise. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that after the strategic plan is issued, their office plans to issue guidance that will task the DOD components to develop individual implementation plans that include milestones. Nonetheless, the lack of an approved strategic plan, and associated implementation plans, limits DOD’s ability to effectively and efficiently prioritize its efforts to develop an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by the end of 2014. OUSD(AT&L) Has Not Reviewed and Evaluated the Adequacy of Expeditionary Forensic Budget Estimates for Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018
OUSD(AT&L) has not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the DOD components’ expeditionary forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 2013 through 2018. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that they had not reviewed and evaluated DOD components’ forensic budget estimates because, among other things, OUSD(AT&L) was waiting for the DOD components to finalize their proposed budget estimates for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and waiting for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to validate their forensic requirements. Regardless of not having validated forensic requirements, reviewing and evaluating the DOD components’ proposed budget estimates allows OUSD(AT&L) to advise the DOD components on their resource allocation decisions with respect to expeditionary forensic capabilities and ascertain whether the proposed funding is adequate to meet the department’s overarching requirements and objectives. Moreover, DOD officials have noted the need to establish base funding for expeditionary forensic capabilities in advance of expected reductions in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. OUSD(AT&L) officials cited several factors that also affected their ability to review and evaluate the DOD components’ forensic budget data, including expeditionary forensics. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agencies should provide policy and guidance to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including the use of resources needed to achieve their goals. Without collection and reporting guidance, OUSD(AT&L) will continue to experience challenges with reviewing and evaluating the costs associated with DOD’s expeditionary forensic capabilities. However, the strategic plan has been in draft for 2 years with no publication date set—and by extension, no publication date has been set for the proposed implementation plans. Recommendations for Executive Action
As DOD establishes an enduring expeditionary forensic capability prior to the projected drawdown of operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following four actions: Incorporate key elements in its forensic strategic plan, implementation plans, and other associated guidance that are currently absent including approaches for achieving goals and objectives, milestones and metrics to gauge the department’s progress, and resources needed to meet its goals and objectives. Issue guidance on how DOD components are to collect and report their forensic budget data—including expeditionary forensic budget data. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD used expeditionary forensics for collecting fingerprints and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to identify, target, and disrupt terrorists and enemy combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The increased incidence of improvised explosive devices and other asymmetric threats has increased demand for expeditionary forensic capabilities. Many of DOD's expeditionary forensic activities are resourced through DOD's Overseas Contingency Operations funds. DOD estimates that it cost between $800 million and $1 billion of these funds from 2005 through 2012 to support expeditionary forensics activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as military operations are projected to draw down in Afghanistan, this funding is expected to substantially decline by the end of 2014. Consequently, DOD is taking steps to establish expeditionary forensics as an enduring capability in DOD's base budget. GAO was asked to examine DOD's expeditionary forensic capability. This report assessed the extent to which DOD has taken steps to establish an enduring expeditionary forensic capability. To address this objective, GAO reviewed relevant policy, plans, and budget estimates, and interviewed cognizant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some important steps to establish an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by issuing a concept of operations in 2008, followed by a directive in 2011 to establish policy and assign responsibilities. As required by the directive, DOD has drafted a strategic plan to guide the activities of the Defense Forensic Enterprise, including expeditionary forensics. Although the plan includes a mission statement, and goals and objectives--two of the five key elements identified by GAO as integral to a well-developed strategic plan--it does not identify approaches for how goals and objectives will be achieved, milestones and metrics to gauge progress, and resources needed to achieve goals and objectives. GAO's prior work has shown that organizations need a well-developed strategic plan to identify and achieve their goals and objectives effectively and efficiently. Officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) said that they decided to create a concise, high-level strategic plan and that they plan to issue guidance tasking the DOD components to develop individual implementation plans that include milestones. However, approaches, metrics, and resources needed to accomplish its goals and objectives were absent from the draft guidance. GAO discussed this omission with OUSD(AT&L), and in response, this office plans to revise its draft guidance. Also, the forensic strategic plan has been in draft for 2 years having undergone multiple revisions, and is still undergoing DOD internal review with no publication date set, and by extension, a publication date has not been set for the proposed DOD component implementation plans. The lack of an approved strategic plan and associated implementation plans limits DOD's ability to prioritize its efforts to develop an enduring expeditionary forensic capability by the end of 2014.
Moreover, OUSD(AT&L) has not reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of DOD components' expeditionary forensic budget estimates for fiscal years 2013 through 2018, as required by DOD's directive. OUSD(AT&L) officials said that they were waiting for the DOD components to finalize their budget estimates for fiscal years 2013 through 2018, and waiting for the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System to validate their forensic requirements. Regardless, reviewing and evaluating the DOD components' proposed budget estimates allows OUSD(AT&L) to advise the DOD components on their resource allocation decisions with respect to expeditionary forensic capabilities. OUSD(AT&L) officials cited several factors that also affected their ability to review and evaluate the DOD components' forensic budget data, such as aggregation of components' forensic budget estimates with other costs. Moreover, these officials said the directive does not provide guidance to DOD components on how to collect and report forensic budget data. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that agencies should provide policy and guidance to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. Until OUSD(AT&L) reviews and evaluates the adequacy of DOD components' forensic budget estimates, and guidance is in place to inform forensic budget collection and reporting, OUSD(AT&L) will continue to experience challenges with identifying the costs associated with DOD's expeditionary forensic capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including incorporating key elements in its strategic plan, periodically reviewing and evaluating DOD components' proposed forensic budget estimates--including expeditionary forensics, and issuing guidance on collecting and reporting forensic budget data. DOD concurred with all four recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-771 | gao_GAO-01-771_0 | We have identified inventory management as a high-risk area since 1990. As such, the Navy has efforts under way to better define its aviation spare parts requirements. The aviation systems that we reviewed are vital to the Navy’s achievement of its missions but have had significant parts shortages problems. Parts Shortages Adversely Affect Navy Operations, Maintenance, and Military Personnel
The shortages of spare parts for the two aircraft systems reviewed not only have affected readiness but also have created inefficiencies in maintenance processes and procedures and have adversely affected the retention of military personnel. Multiple Reasons for Parts Shortages
The primary reasons for shortages of the 50 spare parts for the EA-6B and F-14 aircraft that we reviewed were (1) greater demands than anticipated for the parts, (2) delays in awarding contracts for the purchase and repair of parts, (3) contractors’ delivery delays, (4) delays in repairs at military facilities, and (5) other problems. III for a more detailed list of the reasons for the parts shortages discussed in this report.) 11) resulted in spare parts shortages. Overall Initiatives Exist to Address Problems
The Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency have initiatives under way or planned that may improve the availability of parts, including the use of best commercial inventory practices. The initiatives are intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the logistics system and generally address the specific reasons for the shortages identified by our review. To identify initiatives that the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency have under way or planned to address spare parts shortages for all aircraft, we interviewed Navy and Marine Corps headquarters officials and examined relevant documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The military's ability to carry out its mission depends on having adequate supplies of spare parts on hand for equipment maintenance. Shortages are a key indicator of whether the billions of dollars spent on these parts each year are used effectively, efficiently, and economically. The Navy has acknowledged in recent years that its aviation systems have significant readiness and supply problems. Since 1990, GAO has included Defense Department (DOD) inventory management, including spare parts, on its list of government functions at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This report reviews (1) the impact of shortages of spare parts for two selected aircraft--the EA-6B Prowler and F-14 Tomcat, (2) the reasons for the shortages, and (3) the initiatives that the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency have in place or planned to address overall spare part shortage issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that spare parts shortages for the two aircraft have harmed Navy's readiness and the economy and efficiency of maintenance activities. Spare parts shortages have contributed to problems retaining military personnel. Navy managers attributed the spare parts shortages to the fact that more parts were required than the Navy originally anticipated and that problems arose in identifying, quantifying, or contracting with a private company to produce or repair the parts. The Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency have many logistics initiatives planned or under way to improve the logistic system and alleviate shortages of spare parts. The initiatives include best commercial inventory practices and generally address the causes GAO identified regarding spare parts shortages. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-102 | gao_T-AIMD-98-102_0 | As part of its goal of maintaining safety and soundness, OTS is responsible for examining and monitoring thrifts’ efforts to adequately mitigate the risks associated with the century date change. The letter, which included a statement from the interagency Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, described the Year 2000 problem and highlighted concerns about the industry’s Year 2000 readiness. In May 1997, OTS, along with the other regulators, issued a more detailed awareness letter that described the five-phase approach to planning and managing an effective highlighted external issues requiring management attention, such as reliance on vendors, risks posed by exchanging data with external parties, and the potential effect of Year 2000 noncompliance on corporate borrowers; discussed operational issues that should be considered in Year 2000 planning, such as whether to replace or repair systems; related its plans to facilitate Year 2000 evaluations by using uniform examination guidance and procedures; and directed thrifts to (1) inventory core computer functions and set priorities for Year 2000 goals by September 30, 1997, and (2) to complete programming changes and to have testing of mission-critical systems underway by December 31, 1998. In conducting this assessment, OTS performed off-site examinations of the thrifts that addressed whether (1) their systems were ready to handle Year 2000 processing, (2) they had established a structured process for correcting Year 2000 problems, (3) they prioritized systems for correction, (4) they had determined the Year 2000 impact on other internal systems’ important to day-to-day operations, such as vaults, security and alarm systems, elevators, and telephones, (5) they had estimated Year 2000 project costs and targeted sufficient resources, (6) their milestones for renovating and testing mission-critical systems were consistent with those recommended by FFIEC, and (7) they had been closely tracking the progress of service bureau and vendor Year 2000 remediation efforts. First, like the other regulators, OTS is behind in assessing individual institution’s readiness. As with NCUA and FDIC, OTS got off to a late start assessing the readiness of the institutions it oversees and, consequently, was late in completing assessment phase activities. In their May 1997 letter to thrifts, banks, and credit unions, the financial regulators recommended that institutions begin (1) developing contingency plans to mitigate the risk that Year 2000-related problems will disrupt operations and (2) ensuring that their data processing services, software vendors, and large corporate customers are making adequate Year 2000 progress. Third, although OTS has been working hard to assess industrywide compliance, it has yet to determine the level of technical resources needed to adequately evaluate the Year 2000 conversion efforts of the thrifts and vendors who service them. That is, how many institutions are at high risk of not being ready for the millennium and require immediate attention and which service providers are likely to be problematic. We also found that OTS was making substantial progress in remediating its systems. For example, 13 of OTS’ 15 mission-critical systems have already been renovated, tested, and implemented. It was still developing these plans to ensure continuity of operations in the event its remediated systems fail or the two systems being renovated are not fixed in time. However, OTS did not develop a single plan providing a clear understanding of the interrelationships and dependencies among the automated systems that support its business operations, such as thrift supervision, office equipment, payroll, and facilities. This increases the risk that systems will not operate as intended in the year 2000 and beyond. Additionally, a combination of factors—including starting the thrift assessment process late and issuing more specific guidance to thrifts at a relatively late date—are hindering OTS’ and the other regulators’ ability to develop more positive assurance that their institutions will be ready for the year 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the progress being made by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in ensuring that the more than 1,200 thrifts it oversees have adequately mitigated the risks associated with the year 2000 date change.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the year 2000 problem poses a serious dilemma for thrifts due to their heavy reliance on information systems; (2) regulators have a monumental task in making sure that financial institutions have adequate guidance in preparing for the year 2000 and in providing a level of assurance that such guidance is being followed; (3) further, regulators will likely face some tough decisions on the readiness of individual institutions as the millennium approaches; (4) GAO found that OTS is taking the problem very seriously and is devoting considerable effort and resources to ensure the thrifts it oversees mitigate the year 2000 risks; (5) despite aggressive efforts, OTS still faces significant challenges in providing a high level of assurance that individual thrifts will be ready; (6) in fact, the problems GAO found at OTS are generally the same as those found at the other regulators reviewed; (7) OTS was late in addressing the problem and consequently, is behind the year 2000 schedule recommended by both GAO and the Office of Management and Budget; (8) in addition, key guidance--being developed under the auspices of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)--needed by thrifts and other financial institutions to complete their own preparations is also late which, in turn, could potentially hurt individual institutions' abilities to address year 2000 issues; (9) OTS needs to better assess whether it has an adequate level of technical resources to evaluate the industry's year 2000 efforts; (10) these problems hinder the regulators' ability to develop more positive assurance that institutions will be ready for the century date change; (11) consequently, the challenge for them at this point is how can they use their resources from here to the millennium to ensure that thrifts, banks, and credit unions mitigate year 2000 risks; (12) OTS has done much to mitigate the risk to its mission-critical internal systems and has already renovated, tested, and implemented 13 of its 15 mission-critical systems; (13) however, it has not yet completed contingency plans necessary to ensure business continuity in case system renovations or replacements are not completed in time or do not work as intended; (14) compounding this problem is the fact that OTS has not developed a comprehensive year 2000 conversion program plan providing a clear understanding of the interrelationships and dependencies among the automated systems that support, for example, its supervisory functions, office equipment, and facilities; and (15) such a plan provides added assurance that all systems are assessed. |
gao_GAO-07-285 | gao_GAO-07-285_0 | The key scientific assessments we reviewed generally found that warmer temperatures are expected to alter the frequency or severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing, magnitude, and duration of these changes are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperature on weather events is expected in the near future. Nevertheless, research suggests that the potential effects of climate change on damaging weather- related events could be significant. The earth warmed by roughly 0.74 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years, and is projected to continue warming for the foreseeable future. Several key assessments of the state of this science have addressed the large body of work on this topic. Insured Weather- Related Losses Have Been Sizeable, and Federal Insurers’ Exposure Has Grown Significantly
Taken together, insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims for weather- related losses between 1980 and 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year—largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts—but generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas, and consequent real estate development and increasing real estate values, have generally increased insurers’ exposure to weather-related events and help to explain their increased losses. Nonetheless, major private and federal insurers are responding to this prospect differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating some elements of near-term climate change into their risk management practices. Major Federal Insurers Have Taken Little Action to Prospectively Assess Potential Increases in Catastrophic Risk Associated with Climate Change
The goals of the major federal insurance programs are fundamentally different from those of private insurers. NFIP and FCIC are two major federal programs which, as a consequence of both future climate change and substantial growth in exposure, may see their losses grow by many billions of dollars in coming decades. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness to analyze the potential long-term implications of climate change for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the National Flood Insurance Program, respectively, and report their findings to the Congress. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We were asked us to (1) describe what is known about how climate change might affect insured and uninsured losses, (2) determine insured losses incurred by major federal agencies and private insurers and reinsurers resulting from weather-related events, and (3) determine what major federal agencies and private insurers and reinsurers are doing to assess and manage the potential risk of increased losses due to changes in the frequency and severity of weather-related events associated with climate change. PCS obtains its insured loss data from information reported by insurers. Until 1980, the federal crop insurance program was limited to major crops in the nation’s primary production areas. GAO Comments
1. High-Risk Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Weather-related events have cost the nation billions of dollars in damages over the past decade. Many of these losses are borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs--the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. GAO was asked to (1) describe how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) determine past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determine what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. In response, among other things, GAO reviewed key scientific assessments; analyzed insured loss data; and contacted private insurers, NFIP, and FCIC.
What GAO Found
Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased by 0.74 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years and climate models predict additional, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature. The key assessments GAO reviewed generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future, including a highly anticipated assessment of the state of climate science this year. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure quadrupled, nearing $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by assessing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. The two major federal insurance programs, however, have done little to develop comparable information. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic analysis of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing fiscal imbalance. |
gao_GAO-03-861 | gao_GAO-03-861_0 | To help the laboratories and test centers with these problems, the Congress enacted legislation in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 establishing pilot programs for laboratories and test centers to propose innovative partnerships, business-like practices, and human capital initiatives. In fiscal year 2003, the Congress authorized another 3-year pilot program and extended the 1999 and 2000 pilot programs until 2005. Many Initiatives Were Proposed but Few Were Implemented under Pilot Programs
Since the inception of the pilot programs in 1999, 178 initiatives have been proposed, but only 4—or 2 percent—have been implemented under the pilot programs. Participating laboratories and test centers proposed initiatives covering a variety of areas, including business-like practices, partnerships with industry and academia, and human capital innovations. First, DOD did not develop an effective process for implementing the pilot programs. Second, DOD determined that proposed human capital initiatives—for example, requests for the authority to hire directly or offer voluntary retirement incentives—were in conflict with statutory provisions. Lack of an Effective Implementation Process
DOD did not provide standardized guidance on proposal requirements or feedback for improving proposals; coordinate or prioritize proposals; or clarify decision-making authority for proposal review and approval. The lack of a strong focal point exacerbated other process gaps. Unclear Decision-Making Authority
DOD did not clarify decision-making authority for proposal review and approval. No Strong Focal Point
DOD did not designate a strong focal point to coordinate the pilot programs, advocate process improvements, and provide assistance and advice to participants. The 2003 Pilot Program Faces Implementation Challenges
The 2003 pilot program faces several implementation challenges. First, as of May 2003, DOD had not addressed implementation problems. Finally, laboratories and test centers may be reluctant to participate in the new pilot program. Many participants in the earlier pilots told us they were discouraged by their experience and consequently unwilling to repeat it. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2003, the Congress authorized pilot programs to help the Department of Defense (DOD) laboratories and test centers explore innovative business partnerships and human capital strategies. Congressional concerns about DOD's implementation of the pilot programs have been growing. The Congress mandated that GAO review pilot program implementation. GAO (1) identified the pilot initiatives proposed and their current status, (2) examined factors that affected implementation, and (3) assessed implementation challenges the 2003 pilot program faces.
What GAO Found
The 1999 and 2000 pilot programs have not worked as intended. Since their inception, 178 initiatives have been proposed by the participating laboratories and test centers but only 4--or 2 percent--were implemented under the pilot programs. Participants proposed initiatives covering a variety of areas, including business-like practices, partnerships, and human capital innovations. The pilot programs were not effective because DOD lacked an effective implementation process and proposed human capital initiatives were not consistent with statutory provisions. First, DOD did not provide standardized guidance on proposal requirements, coordinate proposals, or clarify decision-making authority for proposal review and approval. Furthermore, DOD did not designate a strong focal point to provide assistance and advice to participants and advocate process improvements. The lack of a strong focal point exacerbated other process gaps. Second, DOD attorneys advised that the pilot programs did not provide authority to make most of the proposed human capital changes. Implementation of the new 2003 pilot program faces several challenges. First, DOD has not addressed implementation problems. For example, clear guidance is still lacking and decision-making authority is still unclear. Second, the 2003 pilot program provides no change in authority concerning human capital initiatives. Finally, laboratories and test centers may be reluctant to participate. Many participants in the earlier pilots told us they were discouraged by their experience and consequently unwilling to repeat it. |
gao_GAO-03-628T | gao_GAO-03-628T_0 | EPA has had persistent problems in managing its grants. In 2002, the Inspector General and the Office of Management and Budget recommended that EPA, once again, designate grants management as a material weakness. EPA Continues to Face Problems in Managing Its Grants in Four Key Areas
EPA faces four major, persistent problems in managing its grants. It must resolve these problems in order to improve its grants management. EPA Has Not Always Awarded Grants Competitively and Ensured Widespread Solicitations
Until September 2002, EPA did not have a policy for competing the discretionary grants that might be eligible for competition—about $719 million of its total $4.2 billion in grant funding in fiscal year 2002. Instead, EPA’s management of the program focused on the procedures and processes of awarding grants. In fact, for almost half of the 42 grants reviewed, EPA did not even attempt to measure the projects’ outcomes. EPA Has Not Effectively Managed Its Grant Resources
Both EPA’s internal management reviews and its Inspector General reports have noted several problems in how effectively and efficiently EPA manages its grants staff and other resources. EPA’s Past Actions Have Targeted Some of the Key Problems but Have Not Been Consistently Successful
In recent years, EPA has taken a series of actions to address two of its key problem areas: grantee oversight and resource management. It has issued several oversight policies, conducted training, and developed a new data system for grants management. However, EPA’s corrective actions have not been consistently successful because of weaknesses in their implementation and insufficient management emphasis. EPA Has Taken Actions to Improve Oversight of Grantees and Resource Management
Between 1998 and 2002, EPA issued three policies to improve its oversight of its grant recipients. EPA Has Recently Issued New Policies and Developed a Plan to Address Its Grants Management Problems
EPA has recently issued new policies to address two of the key problems we have identified—competition and oversight—and developed a 5-year plan to address its long-standing grants management problems. In September 2002, EPA issued a policy to promote competition in awarding grants by requiring that certain grants be competed. In April 2003, EPA issued a 5-year Grants Management Plan. Specifically, EPA’s plan: Recognizes the need for greater involvement of senior officials in ensuring effective grants management throughout the agency. Although these actions appear promising, EPA has a long history of undertaking initiatives to improve grants management that have not solved its problems. If the future is to be different from the past, EPA must work aggressively to implement its new policies and its ambitious plan through a sustained, coordinated effort. It will be particularly important for all agency officials involved in managing grants to be committed to and held accountable for achieving the plan’s goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, EPA has had persistent problems in managing its grants. Grants constituted one-half of the agency's annual budget, or about $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2002. EPA uses grants to implement its programs to protect human health and the environment and awards them to over 3,300 recipients, including state and local governments, tribes, universities, and nonprofit organizations. EPA's ability to efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission largely depends on how well it manages its grant resources and builds in accountability. Since 1996, GAO and EPA's Office of Inspector General have repeatedly reported on EPA's problems in managing its grants. Because these problems have persisted, in January 2003, GAO cited grants management as a major management challenge for EPA. GAO is currently reviewing EPA's efforts to improve grants management at the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Representative Anne Northup. For this testimony GAO is reporting on results of its previously issued reports and on the grants problems EPA faces, past actions to address these problems, and recently issued EPA policies and a 5-year grants management plan to address its long-standing grants management problems.
What GAO Found
EPA faces four key problems in managing its grants: (1) selecting the most qualified grant recipients from a large applicant pool, (2) effectively overseeing grantees throughout the life of the grant, (3) measuring the results of the grantees' work, and (4) effectively managing its grants staff and resources. EPA must resolve these problems in order to improve its management of grants. In recent years, EPA has taken a series of actions to address two of its key problem areas: grantee oversight and resource management. EPA actions include issuing several oversight policies, conducting training, and developing a new data system for grants management. However, these past actions were not consistently successful in resolving grants management problems because of weaknesses in implementation and insufficient management emphasis. For example, between 1998 and 2002, EPA issued three policies designed to improve oversight of grantees, but EPA staff did not consistently carry them out. Late in 2002, EPA launched new efforts to address some of its grants management problems. In September 2002, EPA, for the first time, issued a policy to promote competition in awarding grants. In December 2002, it issued a new policy designed to better ensure effective grant oversight. Finally, in April 2003, EPA issued a 5-year grants management plan to address its long-standing grants management problems. GAO is still reviewing these new efforts. Although EPA's recent actions seem promising, the agency has a long history of undertaking initiatives to improve grants management that have not solved its problems. If the future is to be different from the past, EPA must work to aggressively implement its new policies and its ambitious 5-year plan through a sustained, coordinated effort. It will be particularly important for all agency officials involved in managing grants to be committed to and held accountable for achieving the plan's goals and objectives. |
gao_HEHS-96-24 | gao_HEHS-96-24_0 | Malpractice Claims Made Against VA Are Increasing
The number of malpractice claims filed annually against VA has increased from 678 in fiscal year 1990 to 978 in fiscal year 1994. VA recognizes this and in June 1992 entered into an agreement with AFIP to analyze and assess trends in VA malpractice claims. This report contains an analysis of the 801 medical malpractice claims filed against VA in fiscal year 1993 and is intended to provide VA management with some general characteristics of VA malpractice claims in order to help VA managers identify possible opportunities for improving VA health care delivery. This information assists the center’s risk management and quality assurance personnel in analyzing and assessing trends in malpractice data. AFIP can provide VAMCs with the number of malpractice cases at the facility, the status of a case, the amount of payment, the results of peer review, a determination about whether the patient injury was related to a component of care, and the types of risk management issues that should be addressed. Comparisons can, however, be made of the types of problems that are resulting in malpractice claims against each of these entities. Table 3 shows the areas into which most malpractice claims fall. But, even if the number of malpractice claims filed against VA and the military services could be compared, the numerical data may not be an accurate representation of the extent to which malpractice in fact occurs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) malpractice claims, focusing on the: (1) total number of malpractice claims filed against VA between fiscal years (FY) 1990 and 1994; (2) way VA manages its malpractice claims; (3) extent to which malpractice experiences are used in VA quality assurance activities; and (4) volume of non-VA health care malpractice claims.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between FY 1990 and 1994, malpractice claims against VA medical centers (VAMC) increased from 678 to 978 annually and claimants received over $205 million in payments; (2) in 1992, VA entered into an agreement with the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) to analyze malpractice claims on a systemwide basis to identify malpractice trends and risk management issues, but VA is not using the information requested from AFIP to address risk management or quality assurance issues; (3) although Department of Defense (DOD) malpractice data can not easily be compared to VA data due to the lack of a standard data collection format, comparisons can be made of the types of problems resulting in malpractice claims against each agency; and (4) DOD malpractice data may help VA identify areas in which malpractice claims are being generated, such as surgery-related incidents. |
gao_GAO-04-242 | gao_GAO-04-242_0 | Expediting Background Checks and Training Enabled the Service to Meet the Deputy Secretary’s Deployment Deadline
To expedite the deployment of thousands of air marshals, the Service obtained preliminary background checks and provided abbreviated training before deploying air marshal candidates on flights. DHS said that TSA’s Credentialing Office had taken steps since June 2003 to ensure that every active air marshal was operating under a top-secret clearance; and as of October 2003, about 3 percent of the active air marshals were operating under interim security clearances. As a result, some potential employees received their top-secret clearances ahead of other candidates who were being trained or deployed on flights. Changes to the Training Curriculum Helped Expedite Deployment
To deploy the requisite number of air marshals by the Deputy Secretary’s July 2002 deadline, the Service revised and abbreviated its training program. Management Information, Policies, and Procedures Have Not Kept Pace with Expanded Operations
As the Service grew from a small, centralized organization to an organization with 21 field offices and thousands of employees, its need for information, policies, and procedures to manage its expanded workforce and operations also grew. Management Information Is Not Sufficiently Detailed or Comprehensive for Effective Monitoring and Oversight
The Service collects information on air marshals’ work schedules and other issues, including potential security incidents documented in reports filed by air marshals after completing their missions, allegations of misconduct by air marshals, and reasons provided by air marshals for leaving the Service. Policy on Transfers Was Not Implemented until May 2003
Before its expansion, the Service was a centralized organization with one office and fewer than 50 air marshals. Key Practices and Implementation Steps Can Help Address Merger Implementation Challenges
The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting from its mergers into DHS in March 2003 and into ICE in November 2003. While changes in the size of its workforce could eventually occur in light of the many recent improvements to aviation security and federal budget constraints, the plans announced to date point to changes in the roles, responsibilities, and training of ICE’s workforces; the Service’s coordination with TSA and other organizations; and administrative matters. The Service is also likely to face coordination challenges following its transfer from TSA to ICE. Conclusions
The rapid expansion of the Service’s mission and workforce posed significant challenges, many of which the Service has begun to address. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security to support the Service’s continued commitment to developing into a high-performing organization by taking the following actions to improve management information and to implement key practices that contribute to successful mergers and organizational transformations: Develop an automated method to compare actual hours worked with scheduled hours so that the Service can monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls and support its planned long-term study of the effects of flying on air marshals and their aviation security mission. To compare the background check procedures for the newly hired air marshals with those used before September 2001, we obtained and reviewed Service documents that described the process and procedures used to apply for a top-secret clearance, as well as for an interim secret clearance waiver. The spreadsheets included cases reported between October 2001 and July 2003. Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress. Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership for the transformation. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help strengthen aviation security after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Congress expanded the size and mission of the Federal Air Marshal Service (the Service) and located the Service within the newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Between November 2001 and July 1, 2002, the Service grew from fewer than 50 air marshals to thousands, and its mission expanded to include the protection of domestic as well as international flights. In March 2003, the Service, with TSA, merged into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and in November 2003, it was transferred from TSA and merged into DHS's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GAO looked at operational and management control issues that emerged during the rapid expansion of the Service, specifically addressing its (1) background check procedures and training; (2) management information, policies, and procedures; and (3) challenges likely to result from its mergers into DHS and ICE.
What GAO Found
To deploy its expanded workforce by July 1, 2002, a deadline set by the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Service used expedited procedures to obtain interim secret security clearances for air marshal candidates and provided abbreviated training for them. These procedures allowed candidates with interim clearances to work until they received their final top-secret clearances. Because of a governmentwide demand for clearances, nearly a quarter of the active air marshals had not received their top-secret clearances as of July 2003; but by October 2003, only about 3 percent were awaiting their top-secret clearances. To train its expanded workforce before the Deputy Secretary's deployment deadline, the Service incrementally revised and abbreviated its curriculum. The Service has begun to develop management information, policies, and procedures to support its expanded workforce and mission, but it has not yet completed this major effort. For example, it replaced a manual system for scheduling flight duty with an automated system, but it has not yet developed an automated means to monitor the effectiveness of its scheduling controls designed to prevent air marshals' fatigue. In addition, it has gathered and used information on potential security incidents and on air marshals' reasons for separation from the Service to improve its operations and workforce management. However, some of this information is not clear or detailed enough to facilitate follow-up. Finally, the Service has implemented policies needed to support its expansion. The Service is likely to face challenges in implementing changes resulting from its mergers into DHS and ICE, including changes to its roles, responsibilities, and training and to its procedures for coordinating with TSA's security organizations, as well as administrative changes. GAO's recent work on mergers and organizational transformations proposes several key practices--set implementation goals, establish a communication strategy, and involve employees to obtain their ideas--and associated implementation steps that could help the Service implement such changes. |
gao_GAO-04-759 | gao_GAO-04-759_0 | Background
SBR represents the first time that DOD has taken the lead on developing a major national security space capability with the intelligence community as a partner. DOD’s warfighting community is particularly interested in tracking targets moving over land or sea as well as other objects of interest. A key advantage of radar in space is having the ability to “see” through clouds and sand storms and any type of weather, day or night. With the ability to perform these functions almost simultaneously, SBR is expected to help analysts gain a better understanding of what is occurring in specific locations. Our reports have shown that these problems, common among many weapon acquisitions, are largely rooted in a failure to match the customer’s requirements (desired capabilities) with the developer’s resources (technical knowledge, timing, and funding) when starting an acquisition program. This best practices model enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures during development and helps them make informed investment decisions. This makes it difficult for DOD as a whole to make corporate-level and trade-off decisions— which will likely be needed when DOD begins the SBR acquisition because (1) costs are significantly increasing for other critical space systems such as the Space-Based Infrared System High, the Transformational Satellite, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle and (2) DOD is planning to undertake additional new programs, such as the Space-Based Space Surveillance system and a new version of the Global Positioning System. DOD Moving Forward on Acquiring Critical Knowledge but Gaps Remain in Approval for SBR Requirements
DOD has bolstered the SBR acquisition program by increasing senior leader and stakeholder involvement in setting requirements. Figure 2 shows how these groups work with SBR’s joint program office and requirements review boards for DOD and the intelligence community. Moreover, it is unclear how disagreements that may occur after initial approval will be resolved. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the concept of operations, provided comments, but did not approve it. DOD Taking Proactive Steps to Gain Knowledge about Resources, but Critical Gaps May Remain at Product Development
DOD is also taking positive steps to attain the knowledge needed to understand what resources will be needed to develop SBR’s capabilities and to mitigate risks. These include: relying on systems engineering to translate requirements into specific, achievable capabilities and to close gaps between requirements and resources; adopting a more comprehensive cost estimating technique to identify SBR’s life-cycle costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if TCA—the infrastructure that DOD is depending on to transmit SBR’s data—incurs schedule slips; and asking two concept development contractors to each propose at least two different operations concepts for SBR with and without TCA. Specifically, one of TCA’s primary components, the Transformational Satellite, may not be ready in time to support SBR. DOD has undertaken an analysis to weigh the merits of space-based radar. DOD officials told us that when SBR initiates product development in 2006, it would know whether TCA will be available to support SBR or whether to pursue a TCA alternative. Technologies Will Not Be Mature at Product Development Start
DOD officials have said that SBR will likely be the most technically challenging, software-intensive, and complex space system ever built by DOD. Table 2 shows the current TRL for each of SBR’s critical technologies and the expected TRL at product development start in 2006. In November 2003, the Air Force completed an analysis of alternatives (AOA) for SBR, which was supposed to evaluate whether space- or air-based radar platforms (such as manned and unmanned aircraft with radar capabilities) or a combination of both are better suited for tracking moving targets on land or at sea and analyze the capabilities and costs of each suitable option. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that DOD and its intelligence community partners obtain the additional knowledge they need to determine whether and when to begin the SBR acquisition program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to: Direct the SBR Executive Steering Group to ensure that outcomes from the requirements management process are formally approved and documented as the program proceeds through product development before an investment is made beyond technology and concept development for the SBR program. If the Under Secretary determines that the program should go forward with less mature technologies, then we recommend that the Under Secretary (1) undertake an assessment of the backup technologies that may lessen capability and add cost to the program and the additional time and money that may be required to meet SBR’s performance objectives to address those risks, (2) undertake an assessment of trade-offs that may need to be made with other space programs to assure SBR’s successful outcome, and (3) secure formal commitments from DOD to provide funding for total estimated costs as well as costs estimated to address potential technical risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Missing among the Department of Defense's (DOD) portfolio of systems is a capability to track stationary and moving enemy vehicles on land or at sea in any type of weather, day or night, from space. To meet this need, DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating on the ambitious Space-Based Radar (SBR) program. By leveraging the newest generation of radar technologies, the SBR concept promises to deliver high-quality data to a wide array of users. DOD intends to start product development in 2006 and to field SBR satellites as quickly as possible so that warfighters, the intelligence community, and national decision makers can gain a better understanding of what adversaries are doing in specific locations around the world. GAO reviewed the SBR program to assess DOD's progress in attaining the knowledge it needs by 2006 in terms of customer needs (or requirements) and resources.
What GAO Found
Although SBR is 2 years away from product development, the program already faces major challenges. DOD officials say SBR will likely be the most expensive and technically challenging space system ever built by DOD. The acquisition time frame is much shorter than what has been achieved in the past for other complex satellite systems. Finally, DOD is setting precedence by taking the lead on developing SBR with the intelligence community as a partner. Most DOD space programs that GAO has reviewed in the past several decades were hampered by schedule and cost growth and performance shortfalls. Problems were largely rooted in a failure to match requirements with resources when starting product development. Commitments were made without knowing whether technologies being pursued would work as intended. To avoid these problems, leading commercial firms have adopted a knowledge-based model that enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures and helps them make informed investment decisions. Although DOD has taken positive steps to strengthen the involvement of senior leaders within DOD and the intelligence community in setting requirements, SBR's concept of operations has not been approved and signed by requirements boards for either of the two partners. Without documentation and formal approval, it is unclear who will be held accountable for setting requirements or how disagreements among SBR's partners will be resolved when DOD moves SBR into ensuing phases of acquisition. DOD has adopted noteworthy practices to gain knowledge about SBR's resources. These include maximizing the use of systems engineering to close gaps between requirements and resources; estimating all of SBR's costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA)--the communications infrastructure that is expected to relay SBR data across a network of users--incurs schedule and performance shortfalls; and asking contractors to propose multiple operations concepts for SBR with or without TCA. Despite these accomplishments, DOD is at risk of knowledge gaps. SBR's critical technologies will not be mature when product development starts, as called for by best practices. One of TCA's primary components may not be ready in time to support SBR data. These knowledge gaps make it harder for DOD to reliably estimate how much time and money are needed to complete SBR's development. If TCA is delayed, DOD's alternatives may involve reducing SBR's capabilities or significantly increasing program cost. Without sufficient knowledge, DOD may not be able to determine by the time SBR's product development starts in 2006 whether space-based radar is best suited to tracking moving targets on land or at sea or whether air-based radar would provide enough capabilities at far less cost. More specific analyses would help DOD weigh the merits of various alternatives and assess how much to invest in the SBR acquisition program versus air platforms with similar capabilities. |
gao_GAO-13-172 | gao_GAO-13-172_0 | Many of BBG’s Language Services Overlap with Another BBG Service, but Annual Review Does Not Systematically Consider Overlap’s Cost or Impact
Nearly two-thirds of the BBG language services—that is, offices that produce content for particular languages and regions—overlap with another BBG service by providing programs to the same countries in the same languages. Nearly Two-Thirds of BBG’s Language Services Overlap with Another BBG Service
We identified 23 instances of overlap, involving 43 of BBG’s 69 language services (62 percent), where two services provide programming to the same countries in the same languages. For example, in 8 instances involving 16 services, a VOA service and an RFA service overlapped. In almost all countries, the overlapping entities BBG officials noted some benefits of its overlapping language services, such as the availability of news from various sources in countries of strategic interest to the United States. However, these officials acknowledged that overlap among its language services reduces the funding available for other BBG broadcasts, including those that may have greater impact. associated with maintaining the 43 overlapping language services is about $149 million, or nearly 20 percent of BBG’s total appropriations for fiscal year 2011. Specifically, we found that U.S. commercial broadcasters transmit in 7 of the 59 BBG languages and target different audiences, and other democratic nations’ government-supported broadcasters transmit in over half of BBG languages, but each represents the unique perspectives and interests of its respective country. More Than Half of BBG Languages Are Used by Other International Broadcasters, Although Their Objectives Differ
BBG and the other international broadcasters we reviewed broadcast in many of the same languages, although their objectives differ. BBG’s Annual Language Service Review Does Not Systematically Consider Activities of Other International Broadcasters
The International Broadcasting Act contains 18 standards and principles for U.S. international broadcasting, including that U.S. international broadcasting shall not duplicate the activities of private U.S. broadcasters or of other democratic nations’ government-supported broadcasting entities. BBG’s annual language service review generally considers the broadcast alternatives available to targeted audiences by identifying the most significant broadcasters in each market BBG serves. However, the language service review process does not systematically identify the languages used, and the countries served, by other major democratic nations’ international broadcasters and U.S. commercial broadcasters. Further, it does not assess the extent to which these broadcasters provide similar or complementary alternatives to BBG broadcasts. However, without regularly reviewing and documenting the activities of other international broadcasters, BBG risks missing opportunities to better allocate its resources. Conclusions
U.S. public diplomacy efforts rely on U.S. international broadcasting to communicate directly with audiences in countries with limited journalism alternatives. However, by not systematically considering the cost and impact of overlap in its annual language service reviews—BBG’s primary method of prioritizing broadcast languages and planning resource allocations—the agency risks missing opportunities to reduce overlap as appropriate, strengthen impact, and improve coordination among its entities. In addition, BBG noted that its strategic plan for 2012-2016 recognized the existence of overlapping language services and that it had introduced proposals to reduce unnecessary overlap. Other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which (1) Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) language services overlap with one another, and (2) BBG broadcasts in the same languages as other international broadcasters. In particular, we reviewed the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, as amended, and other laws relevant to the five BBG entities—federal entities the Voice of America (VOA) and Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), and nonprofit grantees Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. international broadcasting is intended to communicate directly with audiences in countries with limited journalism alternatives and to inform, engage, and connect people around the world. BBG oversees two U.S. government entities--Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting-- and three nonprofit grantees that act as surrogates for local media--Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.; Radio Free Asia; and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In 2003, GAO found overlap among BBG's language services. In its strategic plan for 2012- 2016, BBG recognizes the need to reduce language service overlap.
GAO was asked to review issues related to international broadcasting. This report examines the extent to which (1) BBG language services overlap with one another and (2) BBG broadcasts in the same languages as other international broadcasters. GAO reviewed laws, reports, and other documents related to U.S. international broadcasting; analyzed information on the BBG entities; and interviewed representatives of the five BBG entities and international broadcasters.
What GAO Found
Nearly two-thirds of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) language services--offices that produce content for particular languages and regions-- overlap with another BBG service by providing programs to the same countries in the same languages. GAO identified 23 instances of overlap involving 43 of BBG's 69 services. For example, in 8 instances involving 16 services, a Voice of America service and a Radio Free Asia service overlapped. Almost all overlapping services also broadcast on the same platform (i.e., radio or television). BBG officials noted that some overlap may be helpful in providing news from various sources in countries of strategic interest to the United States; however, they acknowledged that overlap reduces the funding available for broadcasts that may have greater impact. BBG budget information indicates that BBG spent approximately $149 million in fiscal year 2011 to maintain language services broadcasting in the same countries and languages--nearly 20 percent of its total appropriations. However, BBG has not estimated the potential savings and efficiencies from reducing unnecessary overlap. Further, BBG's annual language service review--its primary means of prioritizing broadcast languages and planning resource allocations--does not systematically consider the cost and impact of overlap. As a result, BBG may be missing opportunities to reduce overlap as appropriate, strengthen impact, and improve BBG entity coordination.
More than half of BBG's broadcast languages are used by other international broadcasters--U.S. commercial international broadcasters and other major democratic nations' government-supported international broadcasters--although these broadcasters' objectives differ from BBG's. The U.S. commercial broadcasters that GAO identified transmit in seven of the BBG languages and target different audiences, with for-profit aims. Other democratic nations' broadcasters, including Germany's Deutsche Welle and the United Kingdom's BBC, transmit in 35 of the 59 BBG languages, although each broadcaster represents the unique perspectives and interests of its respective country. BBG's annual language service review generally considers the broadcast alternatives available to targeted audiences by identifying the most significant broadcasters in each market BBG serves. However, the review process does not systematically identify the languages used and the countries served by other international broadcasters, and it does not assess the extent to which these broadcasters provide similar or complementary alternatives to BBG broadcasts. As a result, BBG risks missing additional opportunities to better allocate its resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BBG systematically consider in its annual language service reviews (1) the cost and impact of overlap among BBG entities' language services and (2) the activities of other international broadcasters. BBG agreed with GAO's recommendations and reported taking initial steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-550T | gao_GAO-06-550T_0 | The Yucca Mountain project is currently focused on preparing an application for a license from NRC to construct a repository. DOE Has a Long History of Quality Assurance Problems at Yucca Mountain
DOE has had a long history of quality assurance problems at the Yucca Mountain project. In the project’s early stages, DOE had problems assuring NRC that it had developed adequate quality assurance plans and procedures. As DOE prepares to submit the Yucca Mountain project license application to NRC, it is relying on costly and time-consuming rework to ensure that the documents supporting its license application are accurate and complete. DOE Cannot Be Certain Its Efforts to Improve Quality Assurance Have Been Effective Because of Weaknesses in Tracking Progress and Identifying Problems
DOE’s management tools for the Yucca Mountain project have not enabled it to effectively identify and track progress in addressing significant and recurring quality assurance problems. In April 2004, DOE told us it expected that the progress achieved with its Initiatives for improving quality assurance would continue and that its performance indicators would enable it to assess further progress and direct management attention as needed. Another shortcoming of the panel was that frequent changes to the indicators hindered the ability to identify problems for management attention and track progress in resolving them. It was not created for December 2004 through February 2005, and it has not been created since August 2005. According to DOE, a second management tool, the project’s quarterly trend evaluation reports, captured some aspects of the Initiatives’ areas of concern and their associated effectiveness indicators that were not represented in the performance indicators. DOE’s New Path Forward to Submitting a License Application Faces Substantial Quality Assurance and Other Challenges
In pursuing its new path forward, DOE faces significant quality assurance and other challenges, including (1) determining the extent of problems and restoring confidence in the documents supporting the license application after the discovery of e-mails raising the potential of falsified records, (2) settling the design issues and the associated problems with requirements management, and (3) replacing key personnel and managing the transition of new managers and other organizational challenges. The early 2005 discovery of USGS e-mails suggesting possible noncompliance with the project’s quality assurance requirements has left lingering concerns about the adequacy of USGS’s scientific work related to the infiltration or flow of water into the repository and whether other work on the project has similar quality assurance problems. In addition, DOE is conducting an extensive review of approximately 14 million e-mails to determine whether they raise additional quality assurance concerns. Finally, DOE continues to be challenged to effectively manage a changing and complex program and organization. The significant project changes initiated under the new path forward create the potential for confusion over accountability as roles and responsibilities change—a situation DOE found to contribute to quality assurance problems during an earlier transition period. Unless these quality assurance problems are addressed, further delays on the project are likely. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to obtain a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The project, which began in the 1980s, has been beset by delays. In 2004, GAO raised concerns that persistent quality assurance problems could further delay the project. Then, in 2005, DOE announced discovery of employee e-mails suggesting quality assurance problems. Quality assurance, which establishes requirements for work to be performed under controlled conditions that ensure quality, is critical to making sure the project meets standards for protecting public health and the environment. This testimony, which summarizes GAO's March 2006 report (GAO-06-313), provides information on (1) the history of the project's quality assurance problems, (2) DOE's tracking of these problems and efforts to address them since GAO's 2004 report, and (3) challenges facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the project.
What GAO Found
DOE has had a long history of quality assurance problems at the Yucca Mountain project. In the 1980s and 1990s, DOE had problems assuring NRC that it had developed adequate plans and procedures related to quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to submit a license application for the repository to NRC, DOE has been relying on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance problems uncovered during audits and after-the-fact evaluations. DOE announced, in 2004, that it was making a commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that would enable it to assess progress and direct management attention as needed. However, GAO found that the project's performance indicators and other key management tools were not effective for this purpose. For example, the management tools did not target existing areas of concern and did not track progress in addressing them. The tools also had weaknesses in detecting and highlighting significant problems for management attention. DOE continues to face quality assurance and other challenges. First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents because of the quality assurance problems suggested in the discovered e-mails between project employees, and it has about 14 million more project e-mails to review. Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving design control problems associated with its requirements management process--the process for ensuring that high-level plans and regulatory requirements are incorporated into specific engineering details. Problems with the process led to the December 2005 suspension of certain project work. Third, DOE continues to be challenged to manage a complex program and organization. Significant personnel and project changes initiated in October 2005 create the potential for earlier problem areas, such as confusion over roles and responsibilities, to reoccur. |
gao_AIMD-99-19 | gao_AIMD-99-19_0 | We discussed with DOD, DFAS, and Navy officials limitations on the Navy’s ability to research and correct problem in-transits, which resulted in the request for the policy change, and reviewed Navy and DFAS records on disbursements and collections not yet recorded in the Navy’s accounting system, including in-transit transactions recorded in DFAS’ problem disbursement database, and the Navy’s cuff records—separately prepared spreadsheets that are not reflected in the Navy’s accounting system. In addition, these problems have a major effect on the accuracy and reliability of the Navy’s financial reporting, including its annual financial statements required under the CFO Act. Funds Control Implications
We found evidence that as of September 30, 1997, the Navy may have overobligated 29 canceled and expired appropriations totaling $290 million. We reviewed Navy journal vouchers (documentation of transactions) used to record these obligations. The Navy uses these cuff records to track obligations that it concludes are necessary to resolve problem disbursements. However, if the obligations shown in the cuff records were recorded in the Navy’s accounting system, the obligation records for these 20 expired appropriations, like the records for the 9 canceled appropriations, would show that these appropriations also may have obligations in excess of available budget authority. As of the completion of our review, the Navy had not initiated an Antideficiency Act investigation of any of these 29 appropriations. Until transactions are recorded accurately and in a timely manner and reflected in these financial statements, the Navy and DOD will remain unable to achieve the goal of producing reliable financial statements. We also recommend that the Navy’s Assistant Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller) in concert with DFAS record obligations in the Navy’s official accounting and funds control records for the 20 expired appropriations identified in the Navy’s cuff records, immediately investigate any of the 9 canceled appropriations and the 20 expired appropriations that are potentially overobligated, and report any overobligations to the Congress and the President pursuant to the Antideficiency Act and implementing guidance in OMB Circular A-34. 4. 6. 7. Current policies and procedures permit the Navy to delay for about 5 years (1) the recording of obligations needed to support payments already made, (2) avoid the initiation of Antideficiency Act investigations of any potential violations, and (3) any resulting reports of violations to the Congress and the President. During this time, the Navy’s appropriation balances are unreliable, leaving DOD and the Congress without assurance that the Navy has not incurred obligations in excess of available budget authority. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the effects of in-transit disbursements on the Navy's funds control and financial reporting.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have not established adequate funds control as required by the Antideficiency Act; (2) current policies and procedures permit the Navy to delay for about 5 years: (a) the recording of obligations in excess of available budget authority; (b) the initiation of required Antideficiency Act investigations; and (c) any resulting reports of violations to Congress and the President; (3) during this time, the Navy's appropriation balances are unreliable, leaving DOD and Congress without assurance that budget authority has not been exceeded; (4) according to Navy records, as of September 30, 1997, obligations for 9 cancelled and 20 expired appropriations may have exceeded available budget authority by a total of $290 million; (5) in accordance with DOD policy, obligations have been recorded in the nine appropriations that have cancelled; (6) at the time of GAO's review, the Navy's records indicated that these obligations may have exceeded budget authority; (7) although the Navy maintained cuff records (separately prepared spreadsheets used to track obligations) that it also would need to record to resolve problem in-transit disbursements in the 20 expired appropriations, these obligations were not recorded in the Navy's accounting system; (8) if these obligations had been recorded, the obligation records for the 20 expired appropriations would have shown that these appropriations also may have obligations that exceed available budget authority; (9) Navy officials stated that an investigation of these appropriations would show that they are not overobligated; (10) at the time of GAO's review, the Navy had not initiated an Antideficiency Act investigation of any of the 29 appropriations, although DOD policy requires investigations of the 9 cancelled appropriations with recorded obligations in excess of available budget authority; (11) in addition to the lack of control over funds, these problems have a major effect on the accuracy and reliability of the Navy's financial reporting, including its annual financial statements required under the Chief Financial Officers Act; and (12) until transactions are recorded accurately and in a timely manner, and reflected in these financial statements, the Navy and DOD will remain unable to achieve the goal of producing reliable financial statements. |
gao_GAO-03-897 | gao_GAO-03-897_0 | About 13 percent of students in federally supported programs, or about 6.5 million children, receive special education services under IDEA. SEA and LEA officials also identified a number of issues related to the IEP that caused disagreements between parents and school districts. Available Data Indicate That Dispute Resolution Activity Was Generally Low; Due Process Hearings Were Concentrated in a Few Locations
While national data on disputes are limited and inexact, the reported available information indicates that formal dispute resolution activity, as measured by the number of due process hearings, state complaints, and mediations, was generally low. In April 2002, NASDSE reported that, over the 5-year period, requests for hearings steadily increased from 7,532 to 11,068. NASDSE reported that the number of due process hearings held was low and had decreased from 3,555 to 3,020.’ We calculated that due process hearings occurred at a low rate of about 5 per 10,000 students with disabilities in 2000. Nearly 80 percent of all hearings were held in 5 states—California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania—and the District of Columbia. The rates of due process hearings per 10,000 students in these states ranged from 3 in California to 24 in New York; in the District of Columbia the rate was 336 due process hearings per 10,000. Rates of Mediations and State Complaints Were Also Low
According to limited national data available from three studies, the rates of mediations and complaints per 10,000 students with disabilities were generally low, but somewhat higher than the rates of due process hearings. States We Visited Were Emphasizing Mediation, and Some Locations Used Additional Strategies
In the 4 states in our review, and in Iowa, where we examined alternative dispute resolution strategies, officials told us they emphasized mediation in resolving disputes, and some locations had developed additional strategies for early resolution of disagreements between families and school districts. The problems they encountered had little impact on the timeliness of the complaint process; state and local education officials appeared to be working together to overcome them. In addition, we met with representatives of other professional organizations, including the National Association of State Directors of Special Education and the Consortium for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in Special Education. To identify what kinds of issues resulted in formal disputes between parents and school districts, we interviewed state and local education officials, parent resource and advocacy groups, and obtained data during our site visits to California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas. This study, funded by the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), is collecting data over a 5-year period by means of mailed surveys at the state, district, and school levels, and through case studies of the implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in selected school districts on selected topics. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 2001-02 school year, about 6.5 million children aged 3 through 21 received special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). On occasion, parents and schools disagree about what kinds of special services, if any, are needed for children and how they should be provided. Conflicts between school officials and families sometimes become costly, both financially and in terms of the harm done to relationships. As requested, GAO determined the kinds of issues that result in formal disputes, the extent to which the three formal mechanisms (due process hearings, mediations, and state complaints) are employed for resolution, the role of mediation and other alternative dispute resolution strategies in selected locations, and whether local education agencies received adequate and timely complaint notifications from states. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed available national data and conducted site visits to state and local education agencies in four states--California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas.
What GAO Found
Officials in four states told GAO that disagreements usually arose between parents and school districts over fundamental issues of identifying students' need for special education, developing and implementing their individualized education programs, and determining the appropriate education setting. While national data on disputes are limited and inexact, the available information showed that formal dispute resolution activity, as measured by the number of due process hearings, state complaints, and mediations, was generally low. According to the National Association of State Directors of Special Education, while requests for hearings increased from 7,532 to 11,068 over a 5-year period, the number of due process hearings held decreased from 3,555 to 3,020; much of the 5-year decline occurred in New York. Additionally, most due process hearings were concentrated in five states--California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania--and the District of Columbia. Overall, dispute resolution activity was generally low relative to the number of students with disabilities. About 5 due process hearings were held per 10,000 students with disabilities. National studies also reported no more than an estimated 7 mediations per 10,000 students and about 10 state complaints per 10,000 students. States GAO visited emphasized mediation in resolving disputes and made it more available than federal law required. Some locations had developed additional strategies for early resolution of disagreements between parents and school districts. Finally, school district officials in the four states said they had few problems with state complaint notifications, and problems encountered had little impact on the timeliness of the complaint process: state and local education officials appeared to be working together to overcome them. |
gao_GAO-06-396 | gao_GAO-06-396_0 | Improved decision making, however, can benefit compliance programs, Appeals, and taxpayers. Feedback on Appeals Results Could Be Useful
Based on our case review, for cases closed in fiscal year 2004, we estimate that Appeals did not sustain about 41 percent of compliance cases (about 42,075 of the 102,623) that year. Identifying more specifically which laws or regulations were applied differently by the compliance programs would require an investment to gather and analyze additional data. Because these differing applications span a host of laws and regulations across IRS’s compliance programs, the corrective action that might be taken may only affect a relatively small number of cases. Managers of programs with high appeal rates told us that they would benefit from Appeals feedback information in improving decision making. In addition, the cases that are appealed are generally not fully sustained. Appeals Is Providing Some Feedback Based on Officials’ Initial Judgments of Its Needs
Appeals has taken several steps to launch and expand the feedback project. Appeals plans to implement a revised Appeals case closing system during 2006. However, gaining consensus may not be easy. Specifically, we recommend that the Commissioner direct Appeals in partnership with the compliance programs, to analyze Appeals case- results data, such as the workstream sustention rates, reasons for nonsustention, or staff hours spent per case, to identify areas in which improvements are likely to generate the greatest benefits to the compliance programs, Appeals, and taxpayers; in partnership with the compliance programs, to further investigate the most promising areas and assess whether actions, such as additional guidance or training, are needed to improve the quality of compliance programs’ case decisions; in partnership with the compliance programs, to further develop results- oriented objectives and associated performance measures for the feedback project; and to build upon its current efforts to improve the quality of Appeals information for the feedback project by establishing internal controls to verify, on an ongoing basis, the accuracy of the data entered into Appeals information systems on case results. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) information on Appeals results has the potential to provide useful feedback to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) operating divisions to benefit compliance programs, Appeals, and taxpayers through better case resolution and (2) the feedback project was being effectively managed to maximize its potential to improve IRS’s performance and thereby reduce disputes with taxpayers. Data were not published on the proportion of these cases that were closed with recommended assessments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Taxpayers disagreeing with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) compliance decisions can request an independent review by IRS's Appeals Office (Appeals). In 2004 the Commissioner requested that Appeals establish a feedback program to share the results of Appeals' reviews with the compliance programs. GAO was asked to assess whether (1) information on Appeals results would provide useful feedback to IRS operating divisions to benefit compliance programs, Appeals, and taxpayers through better case resolution and (2) the feedback project is being effectively managed to maximize its potential to improve IRS's performance and thereby reduce disputes with taxpayers.
What GAO Found
Appeals' case result information has the potential to help compliance programs improve taxpayer service, but realizing improvements requires investments in data collection and analysis that must be considered in light of the likely benefits. Based on a review of 153 Appeals cases, GAO estimates that 41 percent of the 102,623 cases closed in fiscal year 2004 were not fully sustained. Of these, about half were not sustained because Appeals applied a law or regulation differently than the programs. Lacking such information, officials could not assess whether actions like additional guidance were needed. However, identifying specific provisions that were interpreted differently would require data gathering and analysis. Because the differences span a host of laws and regulations, corrective action may only affect a small number of cases. Improved decision making, however, can benefit compliance programs, Appeals, and taxpayers. An initial data analysis, such as identifying programs with high nonsustention rates due to differences in applying laws or regulations, would help to target areas most likely to benefit from feedback. Appeals has taken several initial steps to launch the feedback project. During 2005, for example, Appeals and the compliance programs began to identify additional information needs. In addition, Appeals and the compliance programs could refine the feedback project's objectives to target the results-oriented improvements that are logical benefits of information sharing. Obtaining agreement between Appeals and the programs on objectives may not be easy because their perspectives differ on the steps needed to improve operations, but is necessary. Also, Appeals' plans to update its information system to provide additional data on case results will be hindered by inaccurate data. We found that several important data fields had error rates up to 14 percent. Appeals staff cited several reasons for this, including weak data verification procedures. |
gao_HEHS-95-152 | gao_HEHS-95-152_0 | Inappropriate Use of Prescription Drugs Is a Major Health Problem for the Elderly
The inappropriate use of prescription drugs is a problem that is particularly acute for the elderly. Inappropriate Prescription Drug Use Is Widespread Among the Elderly
Based on 1987 data from the National Medical Expenditure Survey, a research study published in July 1994 concluded that almost 25 percent of the noninstitutionalized elderly 65 or older used prescription drugs at least once during the year that are generally considered unsuitable for their age group. Our analysis showed that an estimated 17.5 percent of the almost 30 million senior citizens in the survey used at least one of these drugs in 1992. The Elderly Are Particularly Vulnerable to Inappropriate Prescription Drug Use
The elderly are more likely than other segments of the population to be affected by the inappropriate use of prescription drugs. Elderly patients often lack the ability to eliminate drugs from their systems as efficiently as younger patients do because of decreased liver and kidney function. Since the elderly are more vulnerable to the effects of the inappropriate prescription drug use, they are at greater risk from adverse drug reactions than other segments of the population. 1.) Better Physician Education Can Improve Poor Prescribing Practices
The medical community has only recently started to emphasize the study of geriatrics and elderly clinical pharmacology. Most states have expanded that requirement to mandate drug utilization review of all prescriptions. To determine how physicians, pharmacists, and patients receive information on drug therapies, we identified actions that drug manufacturers and FDA have taken to provide better dosage information for elderly patients as well as changes in how drug manufacturers disseminate information to physicians, pharmacists, and patients. To identify emerging trends in the health care delivery system and their potential effects on the inappropriate use of prescription drugs, we obtained information on how managed care plans develop formularies, train their staff on new drug therapies, and track both patient and physician use of prescription drugs. 2, No. 4 (Apr. 4 (Apr. 2, No. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the elderly's inappropriate use of prescription drugs, focusing on: (1) whether the inappropriate use of prescription drugs by the elderly is widely viewed as a serious health problem; (2) the ways prescription drugs are used inappropriately and why these situations occur; (3) how public knowledge of prescription drugs can be improved; and (4) how emerging trends in health care delivery affect drug prescribing for the elderly.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the inappropriate prescription drug use is a serious health risk for the elderly, since they take more prescription drugs than other age groups, they often take several drugs at once, resulting in adverse drug reactions, and they do not efficiently eliminate drugs from their systems due to decreased body function; (2) the percentage of Medicare recipients over 65 using unsuitable prescription drugs dropped from 25 percent in 1987 to 17.5 percent in 1992; (3) inappropriate prescription drug use results from physicians using outdated prescribing practices, pharmacists not performing drug utilization reviews, and patients not informing their physician and pharmacist of all the drugs they are taking; (4) to address the problem of inappropriate prescription drug use, the government is working to disseminate information on the effect of prescription drugs on the elderly, the medical community is working to increase physicians' knowledge of geriatrics, and patients are increasingly seeking information about their drug therapies; and (5) enrollment in managed care plans has grown rapidly, particularly among senior citizens, allowing for the potential to improve the coordination of drug therapies for newly enrolled elderly patients. |
gao_GAO-01-907T | gao_GAO-01-907T_0 | Circular A-76 requires agencies to maintain annual inventories of commercial activities performed in house. In 1999, DOD began to augment its A-76 program with what it terms strategic sourcing. Strategic sourcing initially does not involve A-76 competitions between the public and the private sectors, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service officials have stressed that strategic sourcing may provide smarter decisions because it determines whether an activity should be performed before deciding who should perform it. DOD’s A-76 Program Has Evolved Over Time
DOD has been the leader among federal agencies in emphasizing A-76 studies. The number of positions planned for study and the time frames for accomplishing those studies have changed over time in response to difficulties in identifying activities to be studied. More recent savings estimates have not yet been made available. Others suggested higher savings than initially identified. Some Issues We Have Raised About DOD’s A-76 Program
In monitoring DOD’s progress in implementing the A-76 program, we have reported on a number of issues that should be considered when expanding emphasis on the A-76 process, either in DOD or at other government agencies. These issues include (1) the time required to complete studies, (2) the costs and other resources needed to conduct and implement studies, (3) the difficulties involved in selecting functions to compete, and (4) the timing of budget reductions in anticipation of projected savings. Studies Have Taken Longer to Complete Than Expected
Individual A-76 studies have taken longer than initially projected. Selecting and Grouping Functions to Compete Can Be Difficult
Selecting and grouping functions and positions to compete can be difficult. The following year it planned to announce 20,000 positions but announced 10,807 (about 54 percent). Among other issues, the Panel will be reviewing the A-76 process and implementation of the FAIR Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76, which establishes federal policy for the performance of recurring commercial activities.
What GAO Found
DOD has been a leader among federal agencies in the use of the A-76 process and at one point planned to use the process to study more than 200,000 positions over several years. However, the number of positions planned for study has changed over time and the Department recently augmented its A-76 program with what it terms strategic sourcing. DOD has saved money through the A-76 process primarily by reducing the number of in-house positions. Yet, GAO has repeatedly found that it is extremely difficult to measure the precise amount of savings because available data has been limited and inconsistent. The lessons learned from DOD's A-76 program include the following: (1) studies have generally taken longer than initially expected, (2) studies have generally required higher costs and resources than initially projected, (3) finding and selecting functions to compete can be difficult, and (4) making premature budget cuts on the assumption of projected savings can be risky. Both government groups and the private sector have expressed concerns about the fairness, adequacy, costs, and timeliness of the A-76 process. |
gao_HEHS-98-197 | gao_HEHS-98-197_0 | Phase II, which is to be undertaken if veterans still have debilitating symptoms that are undiagnosed after phase I, includes additional laboratory tests, medical consultations, and symptom-specific tests. Estimating the Number of Veterans Suffering From Gulf War-Related Illnesses Remains Problematic
While it is widely accepted that almost 700,000 U.S. service members took part in the Gulf War from August 2, 1990, to July 31, 1991, estimating how many of these veterans suffer from illnesses related to their service in the Gulf region is much more problematic. For example, VA reports that over 68,000 Gulf War veterans have participated in its Persian Gulf War Registry program by receiving the Registry examination and being included in the Registry database. Combined, VA and DOD report that over 100,000 Gulf War veterans have requested a Registry examination. VA Not Fully Meeting the Health Care Needs of Gulf War Veterans
Although VA has a program in place to help guide physicians in the diagnosis and treatment of Gulf War veterans, this program has not been fully developed and implemented to effectively meet their health care needs. Specifically, VA’s diagnostic protocol is not being consistently implemented, and VA referral centers are being underutilized. Mandated personal counseling of veterans often does not occur, and form letters that are sent regarding examination results are not always clear and understandable. Some form letters sent to veterans at the completion of the examination generated considerable anger among Gulf War veterans. At the second facility, the Registry physician served as the veterans’ primary care physician. Although each facility’s approach is slightly different, all eight provide links between the diagnostic and treatment phases of care and are focused on the special needs of Gulf War veterans. One half reported that they did not know that VA offered the examination. Based on our survey results, we estimate that about half of the veterans who received the Registry examination in 1996 and 1997 were dissatisfied with that examination. Conclusions
Although VA has made progress in some of its VA locations, it has not fully implemented an integrated diagnostic and treatment program to meet the health care needs of Gulf War veterans. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to uniformly implement a health care process for Gulf War veterans that provides for the coordination of diagnoses of illnesses, treatment of symptoms and illnesses, evaluation of treatment effectiveness, and periodic reevaluation of those veterans whose illnesses remain undiagnosed. Scope and Methodology
Our review consisted primarily of four data collection efforts: (1) reviews of existing databases showing the number of veterans of the Gulf War that VA and DOD report as potentially suffering from related illnesses, (2) work performed at VA’s central office and one Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) office, (3) case studies at six VA medical facilities including discussions with groups of Gulf War veterans, and (4) implementation of a questionnaire sent to a nationwide sample of veterans who received the Persian Gulf Registry health examination. We met with groups of Gulf War veterans served by each of the six VA facilities we visited to collect information on their Gulf War experiences, their past and present health status, and the types of health care services they received from VA. We inquired specifically about their satisfaction with VA’s Persian Gulf Registry examination and the treatment they received for their symptoms. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) provision of health care services to Gulf War veterans, focusing on: (1) the number of veterans VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) report as suffering from Gulf War-related illnesses and the criteria used to identify these illnesses; (2) how VA diagnoses, counsels, treats, and monitors Gulf War veterans for the health problems they report; and (3) Gulf War veterans' satisfaction with the health care they receive from VA.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while the number of Persian Gulf War veterans who participated in the military operations known as Desert Shield and Desert Storm is well established at almost 700,000, the number who actually suffer, or believe they suffer, from illnesses related to their Gulf War service remains uncertain 7 years after the war; (2) the primary difficulty in assessing the impact of such illnesses lies in the fact that the link between the veterans' symptoms and the causes of those symptoms has not yet been identified scientifically; (3) thus, while some data on Gulf War veterans' symptoms have been collected and categorized, it is not yet known whether the symptoms reported are the direct result of the veterans' Gulf War service; (4) combined, VA and DOD report, however, that about 100,000 Gulf War veterans have requested Persian Gulf Registry examinations because of war-related health concerns; (5) in response to a variety of symptoms and illnesses reported by Gulf War veterans, VA implemented a program in 1992 to help them receive VA health care; (6) this free diagnostic and referral process has two stages: (a) an initial medical history and a physical examination with basic laboratory testing; and (b) if needed, further evaluation through specialist consultation and additional symptom-specific testing; (7) 212 VA facilities offer the Registry program to Gulf War veterans; (8) however, VA's guidance regarding the evaluation and diagnosis of Gulf War veterans is not being consistently implemented in some of its medical facilities; (9) while VA records show that thousands of veterans remain undiagnosed, only about 500 veterans have been sent to referral centers for additional evaluations, as recommended by the Registry guidance; (10) mandated personal counseling of veterans often does not occur, and the form letters sent to veterans at the completion of the Registry examination do not always sufficiently explain test results or diagnoses, often leaving veterans frustrated and confused; (11) VA's guidance provides that Registry physicians are responsible for giving veterans medical examinations and necessary treatment; (12) VA has not fully developed and implemented an integrated diagnostic and treatment program to meet the health care needs of Gulf War veterans; (13) VA's diagnostic and treatment implementation problems are reflected by Gulf War veterans' general dissatisfaction with their health care; and (14) based on GAO's nationwide survey, over one half of the veterans who received the Registry examination in 1996 and 1997 were dissatisfied with the examination they received. |
gao_GAO-01-793 | gao_GAO-01-793_0 | Comparison of Commerce’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year’s Report and Plan
Commerce’s FY 2000 Annual Program Performance Report and FY 2002 Performance Plan is a significant improvement over its fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan and addresses the recommendations made in our June 2000 report. Furthermore, the report indicates that Commerce has made progress toward achieving two of the selected key outcomes. However, progress toward achieving the remaining two outcomes is unclear largely because of weaknesses related to measuring performance. Specifically, some of the measures are output-oriented, rather than outcome oriented; some measures have known limitations, which Commerce acknowledges; many of the measures used to assess performance in the past are being discontinued for the future; and Commerce plans to rely on one, narrowly focused measure to demonstrate progress for each performance goal related to these key outcomes. Furthermore, other data exist within ITA that could support additional measures related to its performance goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Commerce's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act to assess Commerce's progress on achieving selected key outcomes.
What GAO Found
Commerce's combined performance report and performance plan is a significant improvement over its fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan and addresses the recommendations made in GAO's June 2000 report. Furthermore, the report indicates that Commerce has made progress toward achieving two of the selected key outcomes. However, progress toward achieving the remaining two outcomes is unclear largely because of weaknesses related to measuring performance. Specifically, some of the measures are output-oriented, rather than outcome oriented; some measures have known limitations, which Commerce acknowledges; many of the measures used to assess performance in the past are being discontinued for the future; and Commerce plans to rely on one, narrowly focused measure to demonstrate progress for each performance goal related to these key outcomes. Furthermore, other data exist within the International Trade Administration (ITA) that could support additional measures related to these performance goals. |
gao_GAO-07-488T | gao_GAO-07-488T_0 | Background
The tax gap is an estimate of the difference between the taxes—including individual income, corporate income, employment, estate, and excise taxes—that should have been paid voluntarily and on time and what was actually paid for a specific year. IRS’s overall approach to reducing the tax gap consists of improving service to taxpayers and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws. Multiple Approaches Are Needed to Reduce the Tax Gap
No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance and therefore multiple approaches are likely to be needed. Simplifying or reforming the tax code, providing IRS more enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement are three major tax gap reduction approaches discussed in more detail below, but providing quality services to taxpayers plays an important role in improving compliance and reducing the tax gap. Considering the costs and burdens. Optimizing resource allocation. For example, if the estimated 83.7 percent voluntary compliance rate that produced a gross tax gap of $345 billion in tax year 2001 had been 85 percent, this tax gap would have been about $28 billion less; if it had been 90 percent, the gap would have been about $133 billion less. Leveraging technology. Reducing the Tax Gap through Tax Simplification or Tax System Reform Depends on Their Design and May Have Effects Beyond Tax Compliance
Tax law simplification and reform both have the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. Despite the potential benefits that simplification may yield, these credits and deductions serve purposes that Congress has judged to be important to advance federal goals. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few tax preferences or complex tax code provisions and if taxable transactions are transparent. Any tax system could be subject to noncompliance, and its design and operation, including the types of tools made available to tax administrators, will affect the size of any corresponding tax gap. Providing IRS with Additional Enforcement Tools Potentially Could Improve Compliance Significantly, but Identifying and Designing Such Tools Can Be Challenging
Changing the tax laws to provide IRS with additional enforcement tools, such as expanded tax withholding and information reporting, could also reduce the tax gap by many billions of dollars, particularly with regard to underreporting—the largest segment of the tax gap. However, designing new withholding or information reporting requirements to address underreporting can be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to at least some form of withholding or information reporting, underreporting exists in varied forms, and the requirements could impose costs and burdens on third parties. We found that requiring brokers to report basis information for securities sales could improve taxpayers’ compliance in reporting their securities gains and losses and help IRS identify noncompliant taxpayers. Withholding and information reporting lead to high levels of compliance. The administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 has 16 legislative proposals on tax gap reduction of which 7 relate to expanded information reporting. Devoting Additional Resources to Enforcement Likely Could Reduce the Tax Gap, but to What Extent Is Difficult to Predict
Devoting more resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, as IRS would be able to expand its enforcement efforts to reach a greater number of potentially noncompliant taxpayers. However, determining the appropriate level of enforcement resources to provide IRS requires taking into account many factors, such as how effectively and efficiently IRS is currently using its resources, how to strike the proper balance between IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement activities, and competing federal funding priorities. If Congress were to provide IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of the tax gap that could be reduced depends in part on the size of any increase in IRS’s budget, how IRS would manage any additional resources, and the indirect increase in taxpayers’ voluntary compliance that would likely result from expanded IRS enforcement. The revenues expected from these initiatives are small compared to the estimated $290 billion net tax gap for tax year 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax gap--the difference between the tax amounts taxpayers pay voluntarily and on time and what they should pay under the law--has been a long-standing problem in spite of many efforts to reduce it. Most recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated a gross tax gap for tax year 2001 of $345 billion and estimated it would recover $55 billion of this gap, resulting in a net tax gap of $290 billion. When some taxpayers fail to comply, the burden of funding the nation's commitments falls more heavily on compliant taxpayers. Reducing the tax gap would help improve the nation's fiscal stability. For example, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield $3 billion annually. GAO was asked to discuss the tax gap, various approaches to reduce it, and what the proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 says about it. This testimony discusses the need for taking multiple approaches and to what extent the tax gap could be reduced through three overall approaches--simplifying or reforming the tax system, providing IRS with additional enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement. This statement is based on prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
Multiple approaches are needed to reduce the tax gap. No single approach is likely to fully and cost-effectively address noncompliance since, for example, it has multiple causes and spans different types of taxes and taxpayers. Simplifying or reforming the tax code, providing IRS more enforcement tools, and devoting additional resources to enforcement are three major approaches. Moreover, providing quality services to taxpayers is a necessary foundation for voluntary compliance. Such steps as periodically measuring noncompliance and its causes, setting tax gap reduction goals, optimizing the allocation of IRS's resources, and leveraging technology to enhance IRS's efficiency would also contribute to tax gap reduction. Simplifying the tax code or fundamental tax reform has the potential to reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. IRS has estimated that errors in claiming tax credits and deductions for tax year 2001 contributed $32 billion to the tax gap. Thus, considerable potential exists. However, these provisions serve purposes Congress has judged to be important and eliminating or consolidating them could be complicated. Fundamental tax reform would most likely result in a smaller tax gap if the new system has few, if any, exceptions (e.g., few tax preferences) and taxable transactions are transparent to tax administrators. These characteristics are difficult to achieve, and any tax system could be subject to noncompliance. Withholding and information reporting are particularly powerful tools to reduce the tax gap. They could help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars, especially if they make underreported income transparent to IRS. These tools have led to high, sustained levels of taxpayer compliance and improved IRS resource allocation by helping IRS identify and prioritize its contacts with noncompliant taxpayers. As GAO previously suggested, reporting the cost, or basis, of securities sales is one option to improve taxpayers' compliance. However, designing additional withholding and information reporting requirements may be challenging given that many types of income are already subject to reporting, underreporting exists in many forms, and withholding and reporting requirements impose costs on third parties. Devoting additional resources to enforcement has the potential to help reduce the tax gap by billions of dollars. However, determining the appropriate level of IRS enforcement resources requires considering such factors as how well IRS uses its resources and the proper balance between taxpayer service and enforcement activities. If Congress provides IRS more enforcement resources, the amount of tax gap reduction would depend on factors such as the size of budget increases and the indirect increase in taxpayers' voluntary compliance resulting from expanded enforcement. The recent budget request for fiscal year 2008 proposes legislation and new initiatives to reduce the tax gap but expected dollar gains are modest. Further reductions likely would require many more such changes. |
gao_GAO-03-179 | gao_GAO-03-179_0 | The physician fee schedule is applicable to procedures conducted in a variety of health care settings, including hospitals, ASCs, and physicians’ offices. Level of Safety of Endoscopy Does Not Appear to Differ by Medical Setting
We found no evidence to suggest that the level of safety of gastroenterological or urological endoscopy conducted on Medicare beneficiaries differs by medical setting. If this occurred, patients in most of the nation would not likely experience access problems for the procedures in our study, given that relatively few procedures are performed in the office setting. They have suggested that the differential provides an incentive to the physician to provide endoscopic procedures in a setting—the physician’s office—that is less safe than another setting, such as a hospital or an ASC. We selected the 12 gastroenterological and 8 urological endoscopic procedures that are ordinarily performed in health care facilities and that we defined as being conducted at least 90 percent of the time in health care facilities and less than 10 percent of the time in offices. Many of these procedures require the use of sedation and entail some risks for patients. To assess whether the practice expense site-of-service payment differential acts as an incentive for physicians to conduct gastroenterological and urological endoscopic procedures in their offices, we analyzed data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) using the Part B Extract and Summary System on the medical settings (office, inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital, and ambulatory surgical center) for relevant procedures for 1996 through 2001. To determine whether access to care by Medicare beneficiaries would be affected if endoscopic procedures in physicians’ offices were no longer reimbursed by Medicare, we analyzed CMS data (using the Part B Extract and Summary System) on office-based endoscopy for the nation as a whole and for the New York City area, which has the highest proportion of office-based procedures in the nation. | What GAO Found
Every year millions of Americans covered by Medicare undergo endoscopic medical procedures in a variety of health care settings ranging from physicians' offices to hospitals. These invasive procedures call for the use of a lighted, flexible instrument and are used for screening and treating disease. Although some of these procedures can be performed while the patient is fully awake, most require some form of sedation and are usually provided in health care facilities such as hospitals or ambulatory surgical centers (ASC). Some physician specialty societies have expressed concern that Medicare's reimbursement policies may offer a financial incentive to physicians to perform endoscopic procedures in their offices and that these procedures may be less safe because physicians' offices are less closely regulated and therefore there is less oversight of the quality of care. For the 20 procedures reviewed, there was no evidence to suggest that there in any difference in the level of safety of gastroenterological and urological endoscopic procedures performed on Medicare beneficiaries in either physicians' offices or health care facilities, such as hospitals and ASC's. There was also no evidence found to suggest that the resource-based site-of-service payment differential has caused physicians to conduct a greater proportion of gastroenterological or urological endoscopic procedures in their offices for Medicare beneficiaries. If Medicare coverage for the office procedures in the study were terminated, few access problems would occur in most of the country because physicians perform the vast majority of the procedures that were studied in health care facilities. |
gao_GAO-15-239 | gao_GAO-15-239_0 | While HHS did approve some expenditure authorities that extended coverage to new populations or for new benefits, HHS also modified existing expenditure authorities in several states to end or limit coverage of low-income adults or premium assistance payments under states’ demonstrations, as new coverage options became available under PPACA. Through expenditure authorities approved in their 1115 demonstrations, the 8 states were allowed to extend full Medicaid coverage to these populations. These five states were collectively approved to spend $9.5 billion in Medicaid funds for these programs during their current demonstration approval periods, Expenditure authorities for some of which ranged from 2.5 to 5 years.these state programs were in place for longer periods, as demonstrations were extended or amended. These state programs include those providing outreach and treatment services for specific health conditions, insurance subsidy programs, and workforce development programs, and were operated or funded by a wide range of different state agencies, such as state departments of mental health, public health, corrections, youth services, developmental disabilities, aging, and state educational institutions. The expenditure authorities approved by HHS during our review period supported a broad range of state program costs that would not otherwise have been eligible for federal Medicaid funding. Workforce training. HHS Approved New or Modified Existing Expenditure Authorities for More Than $26 Billion in New Types of Supplemental Payments to Hospitals through Funding Pools for Uncompensated Care and Incentive Payments for Delivery System Improvements
Another major type of noncoverage-related expenditure authority approved by HHS in eight states during our review period was that which allowed states to make new kinds of supplemental payments—that is, payments in addition to base payments for covered services—to hospitals and other providers. During our review period, HHS approved expenditure authorities for pools of dedicated funds—called funding pools—amounting to more than $26 billion over the course of the current approvals, which ranged from 15 months to over 5 years. HHS’s Criteria and Approval Documents Were Not Always Clear as to How Approved Expenditures Would Further Medicaid Objectives
Although section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides HHS with broad authority to approve expenditure authorities that, in the Secretary’s judgment, are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, HHS has not issued specific criteria for making these determinations. In the absence of clear criteria for approving expenditure authorities and clear documentation of the application of those criteria, the bases for HHS’s decisions—involving tens of billions of Medicaid dollars—are not transparent to Congress, states, or the public. HHS Has Not Issued Specific Criteria for Assessing Whether Expenditure Authorities for State Programs and Funding Pools Promote Medicaid Objectives
While section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides HHS with broad authority in approving expenditure authorities for demonstrations that, in the Secretary’s judgment, are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, HHS officials said the agency has not issued explicit criteria explaining how it assesses whether demonstration expenditures meet this broad statutory requirement. Approval Documents Did Not Always Specify What Expenditures Were for and How They Would Promote Medicaid Objectives
Demonstration approval documents in the states we reviewed with expenditure authorities for state programs or funding pools did not consistently include information indicating what, specifically, the approved expenditures were for and, therefore, how they would likely promote Medicaid objectives. The approvals for the other three states (Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont), authorizing nearly half of the state programs in our review, did not include claiming protocols for most state programs and otherwise lacked clear information on how the state programs would promote Medicaid objectives, such as how they would benefit low-income populations. 2. Ensure the application of these criteria is documented in all HHS’s approvals of section 1115 demonstrations, including those approving new or extending or modifying existing expenditure authorities, to inform internal and external stakeholders, including states, the public, and Congress, of the basis for the agency’s determinations that approved expenditure authorities are likely to promote Medicaid objectives. 3. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We received written comments on a draft of this report from HHS, which are reprinted in appendix VI. In its response, HHS partially concurred with one of the recommendations and concurred with the other two recommendations. In responding to our recommendation that HHS issue criteria for assessing whether section 1115 expenditure authorities are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, HHS said that it partially concurred. Further, we maintain that the general criteria are not sufficiently specific to allow a clear understanding of what HHS considers to be approvable Medicaid purposes. Appendix III: Other Expenditure Authorities Approved for Managed Care Organizations and Various State Activities
In addition to expenditure authorities for state programs and funding pool payments, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) approved expenditure authorities under section 1115 of the Social Security Act that provided federal Medicaid funds for a variety of other non-coverage-related purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, an over $500 billion joint federal-state program, provides health care coverage to low-income individuals. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to waive certain Medicaid requirements and authorize expenditures not otherwise allowed for demonstration projects likely to promote Medicaid objectives. HHS has approved expenditure authorities to allow states to expand Medicaid coverage to populations not otherwise eligible, as well as for other purposes, such as funding for state programs.
GAO was asked to review approved expenditure authorities in recent section 1115 demonstrations. This report examines (1) expenditure authorities approved for purposes of Medicaid coverage, (2) expenditure authorities approved for purposes other than Medicaid coverage, and (3) the criteria HHS uses to determine whether expenditure authorities for purposes other than Medicaid coverage are likely to promote Medicaid's objectives and the documentation of the basis for its approvals. GAO reviewed approval documents for new, extended, or amended section 1115 demonstrations approved by HHS in all 25 states with approvals between June 2012 and October 2013, and interviewed HHS officials.
What GAO Found
Under Medicaid section 1115 demonstrations, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) authorized expenditures not otherwise allowed under Medicaid for a range of coverage-related purposes. HHS approved expenditure authorities to expand coverage to previously uncovered populations in most of the 25 states' demonstrations that GAO reviewed; however, it also modified existing expenditure authorities to end or limit coverage under states' demonstrations as new coverage became available in 2014 under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).
In the 25 reviewed states, HHS approved expenditure authorities for a broad range of purposes beyond Medicaid coverage. Two types of noncoverage-related expenditure authorities were significant in terms of approved spending amounts. In 5 states, HHS approved expenditure authorities allowing the states to spend $9.5 billion in Medicaid funding during their current demonstration approval periods (about 2 to 5 years) to support about 150 state programs that would not otherwise have been eligible for federal Medicaid funding. The state programs included those providing health services, insurance subsidies, and workforce training. They were operated or funded by a wide range of state agencies, such as state departments of mental health, aging, and developmental disabilities that may be receiving non-Medicaid federal grants and funds. HHS also approved expenditure authorities in 8 states allowing states to spend more than $26 billion during their current demonstration approval periods (about 15 months to over 5 years) for new types of supplemental payments to hospitals and other providers through capped funding pools for a range of purposes, which included payments to incentivize delivery system or infrastructure improvements.
Although section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides HHS with broad authority to approve expenditure authorities that, in the Secretary's judgment, are likely to promote Medicaid objectives, HHS has not issued specific criteria for making these determinations. Further, HHS's approval documents are not always clear as to what, precisely, approved expenditures are for and how they will promote Medicaid objectives. For example, HHS's approvals in three states authorizing the use of federal Medicaid funds for more than half of the state programs GAO reviewed lacked clear information on how the programs would promote Medicaid objectives, such as how they would benefit low-income populations. In addition, HHS's approvals authorizing funding pools for incentive payments did not always provide clear explanations of how payments to hospitals would promote Medicaid objectives. Finally, approval documentation for some but not all approvals provided assurances that Medicaid funds would not be used for purposes addressed by other federal funding streams. Without clear criteria for assessing how proposed expenditure authorities states are seeking will promote Medicaid objectives, and without clear documentation of the application of those criteria, the bases for HHS's decisions involving tens of billions of Medicaid dollars are not transparent to Congress, states, or the public.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS partially concurred with the recommendation on issuing criteria, listing the general criteria it uses. But GAO maintains that more-specific, written guidance is needed. HHS concurred with the recommendation on documentation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS issue criteria for assessing whether expenditure authorities are likely to promote Medicaid objectives and document the use of these criteria in HHS's approvals of demonstrations. |
gao_RCED-99-30 | gao_RCED-99-30_0 | Overall Participation Remains Low for Small-Volume Customer Choice Programs
As of July 31, 1998, 43 gas utilities in 16 states had customer choice programs under way for residential and/or small commercial natural gas users. In addition, gas utilities in 11 other states and the District of Columbia were beginning or considering customer choice programs for residential or small commercial gas users. In general, the customer choice programs under way are relatively new, as most of these programs are less than 3 years old and several are less than 1 year old. According to our survey of gas utilities, roughly 553,000 residential gas users, about 4 percent of the customers eligible to participate in customer choice programs, are participating in them. The figures for national participation in small commercial programs could not be determined because data were unavailable. Customer participation rates are determined by a variety of factors, such as the potential to save money through the purchase of gas from a gas marketer rather than through a gas utility. Table 1 provides information, by state, on the 34 residential customer choice programs. Many Factors Affect Gas Marketers’ Participation
State regulators, gas utilities, and gas marketers told us that gas marketers’ participation in customer choice programs is influenced by the potential for the gas marketers to earn a profit on their gas sales. Several gas utilities in our survey reported that program participants achieved savings and greater service options with no apparent reduction in service reliability. Most gas utilities in our survey did not provide an estimate of customer savings, in part because their programs were in their initial stages of operation and information on savings were unavailable from gas marketers. Savings estimates ranged from 1 to 15 percent on total gas bills and were estimated to come from lower transportation and storage costs, the lower cost of gas, and savings on state and local taxes. Most gas utilities in our survey have set up independent marketing arms, called affiliates, to sell gas as a separate service to residential and small commercial gas users. For several of the customer choice programs that we surveyed, these marketing affiliates have large market shares, raising concerns about how competitive these programs are and thus their potential to reduce prices to customers. While some gas utilities reported few reliability problems with gas marketers’ deliveries, some utilities and state regulators noted that customer choice programs are less than 3 years old and the reliability of gas marketers’ deliveries has yet to be tested. Observations
Competition for residential and small commercial natural gas users is gradually emerging in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) initial participation in natural gas customer choice programs; and (2) the effect of these recent customer choice initiatives on residential and small commercial customers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) 43 gas utilities in 16 states have customer choice programs for either or both residential and small commercial natural gas customers; (2) gas utilities in 11 other states and the District of Columbia are beginning or considering customer choice programs; (3) as of July 31, 1998, roughly 553,000 residential gas users were participating in customer choice programs in the United States, representing only about 4 percent of the residential customers eligible to participate in these programs; (4) national figures for participation in small commercial programs could not be determined because data were unavailable; (5) while overall participation in residential customer choice programs is generally low, participation rates vary dramatically among programs; (6) customer participation rates are determined by a variety of factors, such as the customers' potential to save money by purchasing gas from a marketer rather than a gas utility; (7) gas marketers told GAO that their participation in customer choice programs is influenced by their potential to earn a profit on their gas sales; (8) customer choice programs for residential and small commercial customers are relatively new, with most being less than 3 years old and several less than 1 year old; (9) as a result, information on these programs' impacts on customers is limited; (10) gas utilities that responded to GAO's survey reported that customers achieved savings and greater service options with no apparent reduction in reliability; (11) while gas utilities reported few problems with the reliability of gas marketers' deliveries, some noted that since customer choice programs are less than 3 years old, the reliability of gas marketers' deliveries has yet to be tested; (12) most gas utilities did not provide an estimate of customer savings because their programs were in their initial stages of operation and information on savings was unavailable from gas marketers; (13) savings estimates GAO did receive ranged from 1 to 15 percent on total gas bills and were estimated to come from lower transportation and storage costs, lower gas costs, and savings on state and local taxes; (14) most gas utilities in GAO's survey have set up independent gas marketers, called marketing affiliates, to sell gas as a separate service to residential and small commercial gas users; and (15) these marketing affiliates have large market shares, raising concerns among some state regulators about how competitive these programs can be and, thus, their potential to reduce prices. |
gao_GAO-07-566T | gao_GAO-07-566T_0 | In December 2005, DOD issued a report on the study of its mobility capabilities. The MCS determined that the projected mobility capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk during the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2013; that is, the current U.S. inventory of aircraft, ships, prepositioned assets, and other capabilities are sufficient, in conjunction with host nation support. In September 2006, we reported that DOD’s conclusions were based, in some instances, on incomplete data and inadequate modeling and metrics that did not fully measure stress on the transportation system, and that, in some cases, MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence. It is not clear how the analyses done for the study supported DOD’s conclusions, and we suggested that decision makers exercise caution in using the results of this study to make programmatic decisions. Relevant generally accepted research standards require that conclusions be supported by analyses. The MCS report also made recommendations to conduct further studies, develop plans and strategies, and improve data collection and mobility models. Contrary to mandatory Air Force implementing guidance, however, the Air Force proposal for a replacement refueling aircraft, the KC-X tanker, included a passenger and cargo capability without analyses identifying an associated gap, shortfall, or redundant capability. Without sound analyses, the Air Force may be at risk of spending several billion dollars unnecessarily for a capability that may not be needed to meet a gap or shortfall. Considering the requirement for analyses that separate needs from wants and the risk of unnecessary expenditures in this multi-year multi-billion dollar acquisition program, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that the analyses required by mandatory guidance are necessary to inform the decision that begins the acquisition. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense require that future studies and analyses of replacement airlift and tanker aircraft consider accomplishing the missions with a dual-use aircraft. Success for acquisitions requires sound decisions to ensure that program investments are getting promised returns—on time deliveries to the field, predictable costs, and sufficient capability. Outcomes of Certain Airlift Programs
We assessed four airlift programs as part of our annual assessment of DOD’s major acquisition programs and each has experienced cost growth and schedule delays. DOD estimates it will need over $12 billion between 2007 and 2013 to develop, modify, or procure these aircraft. The Air Force’s C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP) is intended to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and availability of the C-5 through engine replacements and modifications to subsystems such as the electrical and fuel subsystems. The airlift systems we reviewed were not immune to this condition and have experienced unnecessary cost growth and schedule delays as a result. Some of the causes to problems encountered include Failing to fully analyze the resources needed to integrate proven commercial technologies and subsystems into a military system before initiating development. Not achieving a stable design before beginning system demonstration phase resulting in costly design changes and rework. Failing to demonstrate the aircraft would work as required before making large production investments. Even today, 4 years after production was initiated, performance concerns remain with the C-5 AMP. Program officials plan to address the deficiencies as part of a C-130J modernization effort. Success over the long term will depend on following knowledge-based acquisition practices as well as DOD leadership’s commitment to improving outcomes. GAO-06-391. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has continuing efforts to modernize its airlift and tanker fleets by investing billions of dollars to modify legacy airlift systems, such as the C-5 and C-130, and procure new aircraft, such as a tanker replacement. Acquisition has been on GAO's list as a high risk area since 1990. GAO has reported that elements contributing to a sound business case for an acquisition are missing or incomplete as DOD and the services attempt to acquire new capabilities. Those elements include firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding. Acquisition problems that include failure to limit cost growth, schedule delays, and quantity reductions persist, but fiscal realities will not allow budgets to accommodate these problems any longer. Today's testimony addresses (1) the analyses supporting the Department of Defense's (DOD) mobility capabilities and requirements and (2) actions that are needed to improve the outcomes of weapon system acquisitions. For this testimony, GAO drew from issued reports, containing statements of the scope and methodology used, as well as recently completed work not yet reported. GAO's work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
Past GAO reports, including two recently issued, raise concerns about the quality of analyses underpinning the programmatic decision-making surrounding DOD's airlift requirements. In September 2006, GAO issued our report (GAO-06-938) on DOD's Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS). The MCS determined that the projected mobility capabilities are adequate to achieve U.S. objectives with an acceptable level of risk during the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2013; that is, the current U.S. inventory of aircraft, ships, prepositioned assets, and other capabilities are sufficient, in conjunction with host nation support. GAO's report stated that conclusions of the MCS were based on incomplete data and inadequate modeling and metrics that did not fully measure stress on the transportation system. GAO further observed that the MCS results were incomplete, unclear, or contingent on further study, making it difficult to identify findings and evaluate evidence. It was not clear how the analyses done for the study support DOD's conclusions and GAO suggested that decision makers exercise caution in using the results of this study to make programmatic decisions. In March 2007, GAO reported (GAO-07-367R) on the lack of mandatory analyses to support a passenger and cargo capability for the new replacement refueling aircraft, the KC-X tanker. Contrary to mandatory Air Force implementing guidance, the Air Force proposed a capability without analyses identifying an associated gap, shortfall, or redundancy. GAO believes that without sound analyses, the Air Force may be at risk of spending several billion dollars unnecessarily for a capability that may not be needed to meet a gap or shortfall and made recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that included conducting the requiring analyses necessary to establish capabilities. Successful acquisition programs make sound decisions based on critical product knowledge to ensure that program investments are getting promised returns--on time delivery, within estimated costs, and with expected capabilities. However, GAO has shown in its work that DOD practices diverge from best development practices intended to produce good outcomes and, as a result, have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays. DOD expects to invest over $12 billion in new and improved capabilities in four airlift programs discussed in this testimony between now and 2013--C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program, C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, and the C-130J acquisition program. GAO found that all four programs failed at basic systems engineering practices to 1) fully analyze the resources needed to integrate proven commercial technologies, 2) achieve a stable design before beginning system demonstration, and 3) demonstrate the aircraft would work as required before making large production investments. |
gao_GAO-01-800 | gao_GAO-01-800_0 | The program’s goals include preserving the affordability and the availability of low-income rental housing while reducing the long-term costs of Section 8 project-based assistance, resolving the problems affecting financially and physically troubled projects, and correcting management and ownership deficiencies. Conclusions
If the legislative authority for the mark-to-market program provided for in Subtitle A of the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 is allowed to expire on September 30, 2001, HUD estimates it will have to reduce the rents to market levels of well over 1,000 properties without having the tools needed to mitigate the potential effects of such reductions. If the reduced rents do not provide sufficient revenues to cover the properties’ operating expenses, mortgage payments, and repair needs, owners may be forced to reduce expenditures for maintenance or other operating expenses or may default on their mortgages. Such action could result in deteriorating property conditions and substantial claims against the FHA insurance fund, which, in turn, could adversely affect property residents and lead to a decrease in the supply of affordable housing. Transferring authority for the mark-to-market program to HUD’s Office of Housing could potentially help facilitate the handling of some mark-to- market related functions that have required coordination between OMHAR and the Office of Housing. While the mark-to-market program has brought about successful restructurings resulting in Section 8 savings at a number of properties, at other properties the requirement that rents be reduced to market has increased the risk of physical and financial problems. | What GAO Found
The Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring (OMHAR) administers the mark-to-market program, which was created to preserve the affordability of low-income rental housing while reducing the long-term costs of Section 8 project-based assistance. Legislative authorization for both the mark-to-market program and OMHAR is scheduled to terminate on September 30, 2001. If the legislative authority for the mark-to-market program provided for in Subtitle A of the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 is allowed to expire, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) estimates it will have to reduce the rents to market levels of well over 1,000 properties without having the tools to mitigate the potential effects of such reductions. If the reduced rents do not provide sufficient revenues to cover the properties' operating expenses, mortgage payments, and repair needs, owners may be forced to reduce expenditures for maintenance or other operating expenses or may default on their mortgages. Such action could result in deteriorating property conditions and substantial claims against the Federal Housing Administration insurance fund, which, in turn, could adversely affect property residents and lead to a decrease in the supply of affordable housing. Transferring authority for the mark-to-market program to HUD's Office of Housing could potentially help facilitate the handling of some mark-to-market related functions that have required coordination between OMHAR and the Office of Housing. While the mark-to-market program has brought about successful and restructurings resulting in Section 8 savings at a number of properties, the requirement that rents be reduced to market has increased the risk of physical and financial problems at other properties. |
gao_RCED-97-43 | gao_RCED-97-43_0 | Through fiscal year 1995, the latest period for which EPA has data, EPA had selected incineration as a Superfund cleanup remedy 43 times, or in about 6 percent of the decisions on remedies it had reached through that date.At the time of our review, three incinerators were operating at Superfund sites—the Bayou Bonfouca site in Louisiana, the Times Beach site in Missouri, and the Baird and McGuire site in Massachusetts. 1.) These methods are (1) setting site-specific standards for emissions and operations, (2) incorporating safety features into an incinerator’s emergency systems, (3) monitoring emissions at the incinerator’s stack and along the site’s perimeter, and (4) providing 24-hour on-site oversight. On-Site Observation of Incinerators’ Operations Occurred
Although 24-hour oversight is not required by regulations or formal EPA policy, Corps of Engineers or state officials continuously observed the operations of the incinerator at each of the sites we visited. EPA Has Not Implemented Two Planned Methods for Promoting the Safe Operation of Incinerators
In addition to the safeguards discussed above, EPA planned two additional methods to promote the safe operation of Superfund incinerators but never fully implemented them. First, EPA issued a directive requiring inspectors from its hazardous waste incinerator inspection program to periodically evaluate Superfund incinerators. Second, EPA has not carried out its intention to systematically ensure that the lessons learned about an incinerator’s operations in one incineration project are applied to subsequent projects. Only one of the three incinerators we visited had received such an inspection. EPA regional staff we talked to were unaware of the directive and guidance on these inspections. EPA headquarters personnel told us that they were unaware that the inspections were not taking place but confirmed with the regions that only one region was inspecting Superfund incinerators. Also, they encourage site managers to visit other incineration sites to learn from the experiences there; however, they do not currently intend to revive their plans for preparing fact sheets. Second, EPA’s attempts to systematically share the lessons learned from site to site were never fully implemented. Recommendations to the Administrator, EPA
To provide further assurance that incinerators at Superfund sites are being operated safely, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, implement the agency’s guidance for having RCRA hazardous waste incinerator inspectors evaluate Superfund incinerators, including the development of a single document specifying site-specific operating requirements and procedures for these incinerators, and document the lessons learned about safe operation from the experiences of each Superfund site where incineration is used and institute a systematic process to share this information at other sites where incinerators are used. At these sites, we spoke with EPA, state government, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and contractor officials to determine how the incinerators operate, what safety measures they employ to ensure safe operation, and what oversight activities occur. A brief description of the incineration project at each site follows. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) use of incineration at Superfund sites, focusing on: (1) what safeguards EPA uses to promote the safe operation of incinerators at these sites; and (2) whether EPA has fully implemented its planned system of safeguards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA relies upon four main methods to promote the safe operation of incinerators used at Superfund sites; (2) these methods are: (a) required site-specific standards for an incinerator's emissions and performance; (b) engineering safety features built into the incinerator's systems; (c) air monitoring to measure the incinerator's emissions; and (d) on-site observation of the incinerator's operations; (3) EPA sets standards after it studies each site's characteristics; (4) each incinerator is designed with safety features intended to stop its operation if it fails to meet the specified operating conditions; (5) air monitors are placed in the incinerator's stack and around the site's perimeter to measure the incinerator's emissions; (6) at the three Superfund sites with ongoing incineration projects at the time of GAO's review, EPA had arranged for 24-hour, on-site oversight from either the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or a state government to ensure that the incinerator was operating properly; (7) in addition to the four methods discussed above, EPA managers intended to use two other techniques, inspections and applications of lessons learned, to encourage safe operations, but neither was fully implemented; (8) EPA has not used inspectors from its hazardous waste incinerator inspection program to evaluate the operations of all Superfund incinerators as it required in a 1991 directive; (9) only one of the three incinerators GAO visited had received such an inspection; (10) EPA regional staff responsible for hazardous waste incinerator inspections were unaware that the Superfund incinerators were supposed to be inspected, and EPA headquarters officials were unaware that the inspections were not occurring; (11) EPA managers did not follow through on their intention to systematically apply the lessons learned from incineration at one site to other sites; (12) they had intended to prepare documents describing problems and solutions at each incineration project for use in designing and operating other projects and to hold periodic conference calls with the managers from incineration sites to discuss issues of common interest; (13) both of these methods of transferring information were dropped for various reasons; (14) GAO found that the lessons learned from the problems experienced at the sites GAO visited could benefit other sites; and (15) EPA headquarters officials told GAO that they encouraged Superfund project managers to share their experiences with incineration but had not facilitated this exchange in a structured way. |
gao_NSIAD-99-73 | gao_NSIAD-99-73_0 | After the wing is deactivated, the remaining 158 military personnel and 433 civilian personnel will be reassigned to existing or new organizations, located principally at Tinker and Keesler AFBs. As a result of the deactivation and restructuring, 1,752, or 75 percent, of the unit’s 2,343 positions would be eliminated, while 591 would be reassigned elsewhere. Applicability of OMB Circular A-76 and 10 U.S.C. According to the Air Force, A-76 does not apply to its plan because the deactivation of the 38th EIW does not constitute a conversion of the performance of an activity by civilian DOD employees as envisioned under the circular. The Air Force plan to deactivate the 38th EIW and transfer its E&I activities to other organizations within the Air Force or to the ANG is a comprehensive change to the missions and responsibilities of the 38th EIW. 2461. The study also found that another $5 million will be saved due to the cancellation of building construction projects at Tinker AFB. Similarly, the planned action is not a change of the kind contemplated by 10 U.S.C. 2461. Accordingly, the Air Force was not required to perform the cost study and provide congressional notification under that provision. At the same time, the Air Force’s business case analysis supports the cost-effectiveness of the proposed action, with the reduction of a significant number of personnel. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the planned action was subject to the requirements of OMB Circular A-76, we reviewed the Air Force’s programming and implementation plans and reviewed and analyzed Circular A-76. To determine whether the Air Force action was subject to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on whether the Air Force complied with relevant policy and congressional notification requirements in reaching a decision to deactivate the 38th Engineering Installation Wing (EIW) at Tinker Air Force Base (AFB), Oklahoma, focusing on: (1) the scope of the Air Force's planned action; (2) whether it is subject to the requirements of Office and Management Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and 10 U.S.C. 2461; and (3) whether an analysis was completed to examine the cost-effectiveness of the planned action.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force plans to deactivate the 38th EIW, headquartered at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, and transfer its wartime mission to the Air National Guard without increasing the Guard's authorized end-strength; (2) about 75 percent, or 1,752, of the unit's authorized positions will be eliminated, while 591 positions will be reassigned to existing or new organizations to assume responsibilities previously assigned to the 38th EIW; (3) these changes are expected to result in one-time savings of $33 million and annual recurring savings of $28 million; (4) the proposed action is a comprehensive restructuring of an active component unit, largely transferring its wartime mission to the National Guard; (5) it is not the type of action historically associated with OMB Circular A-76 and is not a conversion as envisioned under the circular; (6) accordingly, a cost comparison under that circular is not required; (7) likewise, the planned action is not a change in the performance from civilian personnel to contractor employees of the kind subject to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2461; (8) accordingly, the Air Force was not required to perform the cost study and provide congressional notification under that provision; and (9) at the same time, the Air Force's business case analysis supports the cost-effectiveness of the proposed action, with the reduction of a significant number of personnel. |
gao_GAO-10-325T | gao_GAO-10-325T_0 | Assistance provided under this program is in addition to the assistance provided by FRBNY. The Federal Response to the Current Financial Crisis Builds on Responses to Past Crises but Faces Unique Challenges
The government has a long history of intervening in markets during times of crisis. Looking at the government’s role in providing assistance to large companies dating back to the 1970s, we have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for large-scale federal financial assistance efforts and that still apply today. These principles are identifying and defining the problem, determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that reflect them, and protecting the government’s interests. These actions have been important in previous financial crises, but the shear size and scope of the current crisis has presented some unique challenges that affected the government’s actions. In addition to these principles, we have also reported on important considerations for Treasury in monitoring and selling its ownership interest in Chrysler and GM, which may also serve as useful guidelines for its investments in AIG and Citi as well. Four Core Principles Guide Treasury’s Management of Its Ownership Interest
Recognizing the challenges associated with the federal government having an ownership interest in the private market, the administration developed several guiding principles for managing its TARP investments. In exceptional cases, the government may determine that ongoing assistance is necessary but will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability, and encourage growth. After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner. As a common shareholder, the government will vote on only core governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors and major corporate events or transactions. Specifically, the agreements with the companies impose certain reporting requirements and include provisions such as restrictions on dividends and repurchases, lobbying expenses, and executive compensation. While all four institutions were subject to internal control requirements, as set forth in the credit and other agreements that outline Treasury’s and the companies’ roles and responsibilities, Chrysler and GM have agreed to (1) produce a portion of their vehicles in the United States; (2) report to Treasury on events related to their pension plans; and (3) report to Treasury monthly and quarterly financial, managerial, and operating information. Treasury has stated that it plans to manage its equity interests in Chrysler and GM in a hands-off manner and does not plan to manage its interests to achieve social policy goals. Treasury Monitors a Number of Performance Benchmarks as Part of Its Oversight Effort
One of the principles guiding the government’s management of its investments in the companies includes monitoring and communicating information from company, industry, and economic indicators. Treasury has hired an outside asset management firm to monitor its investment in Citigroup. The valuation process includes tracking market conditions on a daily basis and collecting data on indicators such as credit spreads, bond and equity prices, liquidity, and capital adequacy. To monitor its investment in AIG, Treasury also coordinates with FRBNY in tracking liquidity, weekly cash forecasts and daily cash reports, among other indicators. Our Ongoing Work Suggests That Different Management Strategies for Investments Have Advantages and Disadvantages and That Divestment Strategies Are Evolving
As part of our ongoing work with SIGTARP, we are reviewing the extent of government involvement in the corporate governance and operations of companies that have received exceptional assistance, Treasury’s mechanisms for ensuring that companies are complying with key covenants, and the government’s management of the investment and its divestiture strategies. OFS uses this strategy to manage its investment in Citi, Chrysler, and GM, and the independent trustees of the AIG trust manage the government’s common equity interest in AIG. According to officials we interviewed, each structure—managing the investment directly or through a trust—has advantages and disadvantages. First, it affords the government the greatest amount of control over the investment. For example, having the government both regulate and hold an ownership interest in an institution or company could create a conflict of interest and potentially expose the government to external pressures. Conversely, a trust structure largely removes control of the investment from the government. Although Treasury has stated that it intends to sell the federal government’s ownership interest as soon as doing so is practical, it has yet to develop exit strategies for unwinding most of these investments. For Citi, Chrysler, and GM, Treasury will decide when and how to divest its common shares. Given the complexity and importance of this decision, we recently recommended that Treasury develop criteria for evaluating the optimal method and timing for divesting its equity stake. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent financial crisis resulted in a wide-ranging federal response that included infusing capital into several major corporations. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) has been the primary vehicle for most of these actions. As a result of actions and others, the government is a shareholder in the American International Group (AIG), Citigroup Inc. (Citi), Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler), and General Motors Company (GM), among others. As market conditions have become less volatile, the government has been considering how best to manage these investments and ultimately divest them. This testimony discusses (1) the government's approach to past crisis and challenges unique to the current crisis; (2) the principles guiding the Department of the Treasury's implementation of its authorities and mechanisms for managing its investments; and (3) preliminary views from GAO's ongoing work with the Special Inspector General for TARP on the federal government's monitoring and management of its investments. This statement builds on GAO's work since the 1970s on providing government assistance to large corporations and more recent work on oversight of the assistance and investments provided under TARP. In its November 2009 report, GAO recommended that Treasury ensure it has expertise needed to monitor its investment in Chrysler and GM and that it has a plan for evaluating the optimal method and timing for divesting this equity.
What GAO Found
Looking at the government's role in providing assistance to large companies dating back to the 1970s, we have identified principles that serve as a framework for such assistance; including identifying and defining the problem, setting clear goals and objectives that reflect the national interests, and protecting the government's interests. These actions have been important in the past, but the current financial crisis has unique challenges, including the sheer size and scope of the crisis, that have affected the government's actions. As a result, the government's response has involved actions on the national and international levels and oversight and monitoring activities tailored to specific institutions and companies. We have also reported on considerations important for Treasury's approach to monitoring its investments in the companies that received assistance. The administration developed several guiding principles for managing its ownership interest in AIG, Citigroup, Chrysler, and GM. It does not intend to own equity stakes in companies on a long-term basis and plans to exit from them as soon as possible. It reserves the right to set up-front conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability, and encourage growth. It intends to manage its ownership stake in institutions and companies in a hands-off, commercial manner and to vote only on core governance issues, such as the selection of a company's board of directors. Treasury has also required companies and institutions that receive assistance to report on their use of funds and has imposed restrictions on dividends and repurchases, lobbying expenses, and executive compensation, among other things. As part of its oversight efforts, it also monitors a number of performance benchmarks. Chrysler and GM will submit detailed financial and operational reports to Treasury, while an asset management firm will monitor the data on Citi, including credit spreads, liquidity and capital adequacy. To monitor its investment in AIG, Treasury coordinates with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in tracking liquidity and cash reports, among other indicators. Treasury directly manages its investment in Citi, Chrysler, and GM, but the common equity investment in AIG, obtained with the assistance of the Federal Reserve, is managed through a trust arrangement. Each of these management strategies has advantages and disadvantages. Directly managing the investment affords the government the greatest amount of control but could create a conflict of interest if the government both regulates and has an ownership share in the institutions and could expose the government to external pressures. A trust structure, which places the government's interest with a third party, could mitigate any potential conflict-of-interest risk and reduce external pressures. But a trust structure would largely remove accountability from the government for managing the investment. GAO is reviewing Treasury's plans for managing and divesting itself of its investments, but the plans are still evolving, and, except for Citi, Treasury has yet to develop exit strategies for unwinding the investments. |
gao_GAO-14-294 | gao_GAO-14-294_0 | 1). Army’s Modular Report Generally Met Legislative Requirements
The Army’s annual report on its modular force generally met legislative requirements by providing information that either fully or partially addressed each of the requirements. Our analysis showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report fully addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The fully addressed requirements included information related to the status of key enabler personnel and equipment, an assessment of the modular force capabilities, and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among others. The partially addressed requirements included risks associated with shortfalls; mitigation strategies for shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment; itemizing information by active-duty and reserve components; and comments by the National Guard and Army Reserve regarding key enabler personnel and equipment. By fully or partially addressing the requirements, the Army’s 2013 report provided more thorough information to congressional decision makers on the Army’s progress in its modular force transformation than previous reports. The Army generally agreed with 18 of those recommendations, but it has so far implemented only 3 of them. Army Has Made Some Progress Creating a Results-Oriented Plan, Including Taking Initial Steps in Ongoing Restructuring
Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Creating a Results-Oriented Plan
In order to improve the Army’s focus on the relationship between key enabler investments and results and the completeness of the information that the Army provides Congress, between 2005 and 2008 we made four recommendations regarding creating a results-oriented plan. GAO’s Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Have Adequate Plans to Staff and Equip Modular Forces
Our work since 2005 found that the Army began its modular transition without creating a results-oriented plan with clear milestones to provide units with specially trained personnel and specialized equipment. By creating a results-oriented plan for the inactivations and reorganizations, the Army has established a baseline against which to measure performance. If the Army follows through its initial steps to create a results-oriented plan for changes to the modular force design, it would help to provide senior officials and Congress the ability to identify and mitigate any potential problems that may arise. Army Did Not Develop Realistic Cost Estimates Associated with Its Modular Force Transformation, and Costs and Savings of Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Clear
Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Developing Realistic Cost Estimates
In order to improve information available to decision makers on the cost of the Army’s plan for its modular force transformation, between 2005 and 2008 we made 10 recommendations regarding creating a realistic cost estimate. GAO’s Prior Work Found That Modularity Costs Increased Dramatically from Initial Estimates, but Were Never Clearly Reported
From 2005 through 2013, the Army did not create realistic cost estimates for implementing its modular force transformation. We continue to believe that realistic cost estimates would enhance DOD decision makers’ ability to weigh competing priorities in a fiscally constrained environment and provide Congress with the information needed to evaluate funding requests. Army Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Assessment Plan to Monitor Performance of Its Modular Force Transformation, and Assessments for Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Formalized
Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Planning Comprehensive Assessments
In order to assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure in terms of the goals of modular restructuring, from 2005 through 2008 we made six recommendations regarding creating comprehensive assessment plans. GAO’s Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Provide Comprehensive Assessments of Modular Restructuring
Since 2004, the Army has made many refinements to its modular design based on lessons learned and limited assessments of specific capabilities, but it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan to measure the extent that its modular force transformation is meeting performance goals. The Army has developed some plans to conduct assessments and capture lessons learned as it changes its modular force design, but it has not formalized these plans with a detailed methodology, data-collection procedures, or outcome-based metrics. If the Army created a comprehensive assessment plan, it could help enable the Army to clearly measure the extent to which it is achieving desired benefits in the design of its modular force. Agency Comments
We are not making new recommendations in this report. However, this report’s analysis provides additional support for past recommendations to develop realistic cost estimates and to create a comprehensive assessment plan to measure achievement of desired benefits. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. To determine how the Army is addressing these challenges, we reviewed whether the Army implemented the recommendations in our prior GAO reports that evaluated the Army’s modular force structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army considers its modular force transformation, which began in 2004, to be its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army expanded the number of deployable units and incorporated advanced equipment and specialized personnel, but removed a maneuver battalion from its brigades. Throughout the transformation, GAO reported, testified, and made recommendations on associated challenges the Army faced. In 2013, the Army stated it had completed its transformation and submitted its last required report to Congress on its modular progress. It also announced plans to restore a maneuver battalion to most brigades.
Congress mandated that GAO report annually on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO (1) evaluates whether the Army addressed the legislative requirements in its modular force report and (2) provides an overview of any challenges that the Army faced in its modular force transformation and describes how the Army is addressing these challenges as it implements further changes in its force structure. GAO analyzed the Army's report against the legislative requirements, reviewed key Army reports, and spoke to Army officials.
What GAO Found
The Army's annual report on its modular force either fully or partially addressed all of the requirements mandated by law. GAO's analysis showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report fully addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The requirements that were fully addressed included an assessment of the modular force capabilities and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among others. Some of the requirements that were partially addressed included information related to risks and mitigation strategies associated with shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment; and itemizing information by active-duty and reserve components. The 2013 report provided more thorough information to congressional decision makers on the Army's progress in its modular force transformation than previous reports.
GAO's body of work since 2005 on the Army's modular restructuring found that the Army faced challenges in creating a results-oriented plan, developing realistic cost estimates, and planning comprehensive assessments. GAO made 20 recommendations from 2005 through 2008 to help address these challenges; the Army generally agreed with 18 of the recommendations but so far has implemented only 3. As the Army plans to restructure its modular force it has made some progress in creating a results-oriented plan, but more work remains in developing realistic cost estimates and planning comprehensive assessments.
Creating a results-oriented plan. As the Army plans further changes to its modular force design, it has taken initial steps to create a results-oriented plan by developing a timeline with associated tasks and milestones. When the Army began its modular force transformation it did not create a plan with clear milestones to guide its efforts to fully staff and equip the modular force. By incorporating lessons identified in GAO's prior work as it makes further changes, the Army has established a baseline against which to measure performance and may provide decision makers the ability to mitigate any potential problems that may arise.
Developing realistic cost estimates . From 2005 through 2013, the Army did not create realistic cost estimates or provide a reliable accounting of past spending or future funding needs for implementing its modular force transformation. As the Army plans further changes to its modular force design, it has not developed cost estimates for military construction, personnel relocation, or training for the reorganized units. GAO continues to believe that realistic cost estimates would better position the Army to weigh competing priorities in a fiscally constrained environment and provide Congress with the information needed to evaluate funding requests.
Planning comprehensive assessments. Since 2004, the Army has made many changes to its modular design based on limited assessments, but it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan to measure the extent that its modular force transformation is meeting performance goals. As the Army continues to make changes to its modular design, the Army plans to conduct assessments but has not identified outcome-oriented metrics to measure progress. If the Army created a comprehensive assessment plan, it could help decision makers identify capability gaps and mitigate risks.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations, but this analysis provides additional support for past recommendations to develop realistic cost estimates and to create a comprehensive assessment plan to measure achievement of desired benefits. In oral comments on a draft of this report, the Army concurred with the report. |
gao_NSIAD-97-175 | gao_NSIAD-97-175_0 | DOD Has Improved Oversight of Category I Missiles
DOD has taken actions to correct the deficiencies cited in our September 1994 report. Weaknesses Still Exist in DOD’s Oversight of Category I Missiles
Although the services established a baseline inventory count of category I missiles as of December 31, 1994, updates to the baseline continue to be made as additional missiles are located or errors are discovered. Also, DOD has not fully complied with physical security regulations at all of its sites. All containers had a missile, but the serial number on one container did not match the one on the missile. Oversight Weaknesses Also Exist for Category I Rockets
The services have different procedures and requirements for maintaining oversight of AT4 and LAW rockets. Although we found no missing rockets in our physical count, three AT4 rockets that were sent to the Persian Gulf for Operation Desert Storm are missing from the Marine Corps’ inventory. The investigations were closed on these three missing rockets, but no conclusions were reached by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service on whether the rockets were missing, lost, or stolen. In accordance with the CFO Act of 1990, each agency is to establish an integrated financial management system. Establishing an integrated, general ledger controller system, which ties together DOD’s accounting systems with its logistics and other key management systems, is critical if DOD is to effectively ensure oversight and control over its sensitive materials. Audit reports have repeatedly pointed out, however, that DOD’s existing accounting and related systems, including its logistics systems, are not integrated and lack a general ledger. No Evidence of Thefts From U.S. Military Arsenals by Terrorists or Extremists
We did not find any documentation that terrorists or other extremists had stolen category I handheld missiles or rockets or category II grenades, mines, and explosives from DOD arsenals. There have been thefts of category II munitions and explosives by uniformed and DOD civilian employees that involved quantities of items such as grenades, C-4 explosives, and TNT. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a cost-effective procedure for periodically revalidating the category I inventory baseline by, for example, matching item managers’ records with site records annually at a representative sample of storage sites; develop a cost-effective procedure for opening containers of missiles and rockets, for example, by selecting a representative sample of pallets, rather than individual missiles and rockets, to inspect; manage category I rockets by serial number so that the item managers will have total visibility over the numbers and locations of rockets; establish procedures for ensuring that serial numbers are not changed during upgrades and modifications of category I missiles and rockets; and continue to emphasize compliance with physical security requirements. II). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to correct weaknesses cited in GAO's September 1994 report on the military services' most sensitive category I missiles and to determine if problems still remained. GAO also reviewed DOD's oversight of category I rockets and the vulnerability of category I missiles and rockets and category II grenades, mines, and explosives to theft from U.S. military arsenals by terrorists or extremists.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD has taken actions to improve the oversight of category I handheld missiles; (2) it conducted a worldwide inventory of handheld missiles; established a new baseline inventory count as of December 31, 1994; and implemented procedures to track changes to the baseline; (3) DOD also established procedures to check containers to ensure that each had a missile and verify serial numbers; (4) DOD reemphasized physical security procedures to be followed at its facilities; (5) despite DOD's progress toward better oversight of handheld missiles, some weaknesses remain; (6) adjustments continue to be made to the baseline as additional missiles are located and errors are discovered; (7) discrepancies still exist between records of the number of missiles and GAO's physical count; (8) the missiles may be vulnerable to insider theft because DOD is not always selecting a representative sample of containers to be opened during maintenance checks; (9) some facilities are not fully complying with DOD physical security requirements; (10) although GAO was able to match the physical count of AT4 and light antitank weapon (LAW) rockets at each site visited with the item manager's records, GAO also found oversight weaknesses with the category I rockets; (11) the Marine Corps reported three AT4 rockets missing from shipments returning from the Persian Gulf after Operation Desert Storm; (12) the Naval Criminal Investigative Service reached no conclusions on whether the rockets were missing, lost, or stolen, and the investigations were closed; (13) the services have different procedures and requirements for maintaining oversight of the rockets; (14) DOD's accounting and related systems, including its logistics systems, are not integrated; (15) in accordance with the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act of 1990, each agency is to establish an integrated financial management system; (16) establishing an integrated, general ledger controller system, which ties together DOD's accounting systems with its logistics and other key management systems, is critical if DOD is to effectively ensure oversight and control over its sensitive material; (17) GAO did not find any documentation that terrorists or other extremists had stolen any category I handheld missiles or rockets or category II munitions or explosives from DOD arsenals; (18) some weapons continue to be vulnerable to insider theft as quantities of various category II items have been stolen by uniformed or DOD civilians; and (19) DOD and intelligence sources did not have any indication that the stolen items were intended for terrorists. |
gao_GAO-17-309 | gao_GAO-17-309_0 | One of the purposes of this type of prototyping can be to further disruptive innovation. Major Acquisition Programs Selected Prototyping Approaches That Addressed Key Risks
The programs we reviewed used prototyping primarily to reduce technical risks, investigate integration challenges, validate designs, and mature technologies. Of the 22 MDAPs we reviewed, 17 used some form of prototyping during technology development and 5 did not prototype. Prototyping provided programs with information on technology maturity, the feasibility of the design concepts, potential costs, and the achievability of planned performance requirements, which helped inject realism into their business cases. For example, prototyping helped programs improve system performance. DOD Has Established New Initiatives to Increase Prototyping and Innovation, but Does Not Have a Strategy to Guide Its Investments
To help ensure U.S. military capabilities outpace those of potential adversaries, DOD has expanded prototyping efforts focused on innovation, including disruptive innovation, and has started several new initiatives outside of major acquisition programs to address gaps in its innovation portfolio. However, these initiatives face barriers, such as limited funding and competing priorities. Literature on private sector innovation, including the use of prototyping, identifies key enablers for these types of efforts, such as developing a strategy for innovation, identifying relative levels of investments that align with innovation goals, and protecting funding for technology investments that have higher risk, but perhaps more reward across the enterprise. DOD has taken steps that are consistent with a few of these enablers, but lacks others, such as an innovation strategy that could also address the role of prototyping. The distribution of resources among different buckets is dictated by the organization’s strategy. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision that could provide more information about funding for select prototyping initiatives outside of acquisition programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure DOD takes a strategic approach for its prototyping and innovation initiatives and overcomes funding and cultural barriers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to take the following four actions:
Develop a high-level DOD-wide strategy, in collaboration with the military services and other appropriate DOD components, to communicate strategic goals and priorities and delineate roles and responsibilities among DOD’s prototyping and innovation initiatives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) how the Department of Defense (DOD) has used prototyping prior to system development on major defense acquisition programs, and (2) what steps DOD has taken to increase innovation through prototyping activities conducted outside of major defense acquisition programs. DOD’s Use of Prototyping on Major Programs Prior to System Development
To address our first objective, we examined 22 major defense acquisition programs that had a Milestone B decision, which approves entry into system development, between December 2009 and February 2016, or anticipated receiving Milestone B approval by February 2016 when we began our selection process. This increase is driven by new projects as well as testing and development efforts on existing projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD invests roughly $70 billion annually in weapon system research, development, test, and evaluation, including prototyping activities. Prototyping can help reduce risk in weapon system acquisition programs by improving understanding of technologies, requirements, and proposed solutions. It can also contribute to innovation by demonstrating the value of new technologies or systems.
House Conference Report 114-102 accompanying a bill for the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review how DOD's research and development funds are used and whether this approach effectively supports activities such as prototyping. This report assesses (1) how DOD has used prototyping prior to system development on major defense acquisition programs, and (2) what steps DOD has taken to increase innovation through prototyping activities outside of major defense acquisition programs. GAO examined prototyping activities for 22 MDAPs that planned to enter system development between December 2009 and February 2016 and 7 prototyping-focused initiatives with the stated purpose of promoting innovation.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has used prototyping on its major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) primarily to reduce technical risk, investigate integration challenges, validate designs, mature technologies, and refine performance requirements. Of the 22 programs GAO reviewed, 17 used prototyping before starting system development. For many of those programs, prototyping provided information that helped introduce realism into their business cases by providing information on technology maturity, the feasibility of the design concepts, potential costs, and the achievability of planned performance requirements.
DOD has developed new initiatives that are outside of major defense acquisition programs to increase prototyping and further innovation. However, these initiatives face barriers, such as limited funding, a risk averse culture, and competing priorities. Literature on private sector innovation identifies key enablers for these types of efforts, such as developing an innovation strategy, aligning investments with innovation goals, and protecting funding for riskier projects. DOD has taken steps that are consistent with a few, but not all, of these enablers. For example, DOD does not have a department-wide strategy that communicates strategic goals and priorities and delineates roles and responsibilities to guide the prototyping initiatives. This could lead to unproductive or poorly coordinated investments later. DOD's initiatives also face competition for funding, particularly with acquisition programs. One strategy to address funding issues called “strategic buckets” involves allocating resources to different types of projects based on an organization's strategy (see figure). DOD has not set strategic funding targets for its initiatives. Failing to do so could prevent them from gaining traction and puts their long-term success at risk.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD develop a department-wide innovation strategy that includes prototyping and adopt a more strategic approach for funding prototyping efforts across DOD. DOD concurred with the recommendations and is currently working on this strategy. |
gao_GAO-04-947T | gao_GAO-04-947T_0 | The health care industry has recognized that IT can improve the quality of care, promote patient safety, reduce costs of both care and administrative functions, and expedite response to public health emergencies. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has previously acknowledged several IT limitations in the public health infrastructure. Information Technology Can Provide Benefits for Delivery of Care
IT can provide significant benefits in providing clinical health care and in the administrative functions associated with health care delivery. Specific examples included:
A teaching hospital reported that it realized about $8.6 million in annual savings by replacing paper medical charts with EMRs for outpatients. It also reported saving over $2.8 million annually by replacing its manual process for handling medical records with electronic access to laboratory results and reports. Health care organizations also told us that EMRs could also improve the delivery of care because, among other reasons, more complete medical documentation was available to support the provider’s diagnosis. In addition, EMRs greatly facilitate the reporting of public health information associated with the early detection of and response to disease outbreaks. The lessons learned that were reported to us by health care organizations that have successfully implemented IT may prove useful for other organizations as they implement solutions—such as recognizing the importance of reengineering business processes, gaining users’ acceptance, providing adequate training, and making systems available and secure. Many IT Initiatives Address the Public Health Infrastructure, Although Standards Implementation Challenges Remain
In May 2003, we reported that six federal agencies involved in bioterrorism preparedness and response had a large number of existing and planned information systems associated with supporting a public health emergency. Specifically, these agencies identified 72 information systems and supporting technologies. Of the 72 systems, 34 are surveillance systems, 18 are supporting technologies, 10 are communications systems, and 10 are detection systems. In spite of these many initiatives, the key ones that are intended to facilitate greater information sharing are still being developed and implemented. For example, CDC is currently implementing its Public Health Information Network, which consists of a number of disease surveillance and communications systems, including the Health Alert Network. This network is an early warning and response system intended to provide federal, state, and local agencies with better communications during public health emergencies. Most recently, in May 2003, we again reported that the identification and implementation of health care data, communications, and security standards—which are necessary to support the compatibility and interoperability of agencies’ various IT systems—remains incomplete across the health care industry. To address the challenges of coordinating the many IT initiatives and implementing a consistent set of standards, we recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), in coordination with other key stakeholders, establish a national IT strategy for public health preparedness and response, including specific steps toward improving the nation’s ability to use IT in support of the public health infrastructure. Specifically, we recommended, among other things, that the Secretary set priorities for information systems, supporting technologies, and other IT initiatives; define activities for ensuring that the various standards-setting organizations coordinate their efforts and reach further consensus on the definition and use of standards; establish milestones for defining and implementing all standards; create a mechanism—consistent with HIPAA requirements—to monitor the implementation of standards throughout the health care industry. In addition, in April of this year, the President issued an Executive Order, which calls for the establishment of a National Health Information Technology Coordinator and the issuance of a broader strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health care information systems. As health IT initiatives are pursued, it will be essential to have continued leadership, clear direction, measurable goals, and mechanisms to monitor progress. However, much more work remains to more fully utilize IT for the delivery of care and to identify and respond to public health emergencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health care is an information-intensive industry that remains highly fragmented and inefficient. Hence, the uses of information technology (IT)--in delivering clinical care, performing administrative functions, and supporting the public health infrastructure--have the potential to yield both cost savings and improvements in the care itself. In 2003, GAO reported on benefits to health care that could result from using IT--both cost savings and measurable improvements in the delivery and quality of care. GAO also reported on federal agencies' existing and planned information systems intended to support our nation's preparedness for and ability to respond to public health emergencies and the status of health care standards setting initiatives. Congress has asked GAO to summarize our work on reported benefits of the use of IT for health care delivery and on IT initiatives supporting public health preparedness and response.
What GAO Found
The use of IT can yield benefits in clinical care and associated administrative functions as well as in public health. Health care organizations reported that electronic medical records (EMR) improved the delivery of care because, among other reasons, more complete medical documentation was available to support the provider's diagnosis. In addition, EMRs could greatly facilitate the reporting of public health information associated with the early detection of and response to disease outbreaks. One hospital replaced outpatients' paper medical charts with EMRs, realizing about $8.6 million in annual savings. This hospital also established electronic access to laboratory results and reports, replacing its manual process for handling medical records and saving another $2.8 million a year. In addition, the lessons learned that were reported to us by health care organizations that have successfully implemented solutions could be used by other organizations to accelerate the adoption of health IT. These lessons recognize the importance of reengineering business processes, gaining users' acceptance of IT, providing adequate training, and making systems secure. Regarding public health, federal agencies identified 72 existing and planned information systems--34 surveillance systems, 18 supporting technologies, 10 communications systems, and 10 detection systems. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is currently implementing its Public Health Information Network comprised of a number of disease surveillance and communications systems, including the Health Alert Network. This network is an early warning and response system that is intended to facilitate communication among federal, state, and local agencies during public health emergencies. GAO also reported that identification and implementation of health care data, communications, and security standards--which are necessary to support compatibility and interoperability of agencies' various IT systems--remained incomplete across the health care sector. To address the challenges of coordinating the many IT initiatives and implementing a consistent set of standards, GAO recommended last year that the Secretary of Health and Human Services develop a strategy for public health preparedness and response, to include setting priorities for IT initiatives and establishing mechanisms to monitor the implementation of standards throughout the health care industry. Since that time, progress has been made in identifying standards. The Office of Management and Budget's e-government initiative, the Consolidated Health Informatics initiative, has identified a number of standards to be applied to new federal development efforts and modifications of existing systems. This initiative is intended to promote the interoperability of information systems. However, implementing these standards across the federal government is still a work in progress. Until these standards are implemented, information-sharing challenges will remain. In April of this year, Executive Order 13335 established a National Health IT Coordinator and called for a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of interoperable health IT. As this plan moves forward, it will be essential to have continued leadership, clear direction, measurable goals, and mechanisms to monitor progress. |
gao_HEHS-00-182 | gao_HEHS-00-182_0 | The Number of Beneficiaries Using Hospice Has Grown as Average Days Used Have Declined
From 1992 to 1998, the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolling in hospice more than doubled, with growth in all population subgroups and in all states. The Number of Medicare Hospice Users More Than Doubled in 7 Years
Our analysis of Medicare claims data indicates substantial growth in hospice use. 1.) The most dramatic growth in use was among individuals with other terminal conditions, such as heart disease, lung disease, stroke, or Alzheimer’s disease. 2.) In 1998, 28 percent of all beneficiaries using hospice care did so for 1 week or less. While these beneficiaries historically had many more days of care than cancer patients, the average number of days used declined 38 percent between 1992 and 1998. Multiple Factors Influence the Use of the Hospice Benefit
Several factors influence beneficiary choice about whether and when to use hospice care. In addition, recent federal oversight of compliance with patient eligibility requirements may have affected certain beneficiaries’ use of the hospice benefit. Patient Choice and Circumstances
The use of hospice services by Medicare beneficiaries requires not just awareness of the benefit and a physician’s certification of prognosis but also acceptance that death is the outcome of their illness and the choice by beneficiaries to give up a portion of their standard Medicare benefits in order to receive hospice care. Public and Professional Awareness
Public and professional awareness also influences the use of the Medicare hospice benefit. Hospice Care Is More Widely Available, but Providers Report Cost Concerns
Sustained growth in the number of hospice providers participating in Medicare and in their distribution throughout the country suggests that hospice services are now more widely available to program beneficiaries. While all sectors of the hospice industry have grown over the past decade, recent growth has been particularly strong in the for-profit sector and among large hospice programs. At the same time, hospice industry officials report growing cost pressures from shorter patient stays and changes in the practice of palliative care. From 1992 to 1999, the rate of growth was greatest among for-profit providers and those in rural areas. Even with certificate-of-need (CON) requirements that apply to hospice providers in 14 states, the number and size of Medicare hospice providers increased in almost every state from 1992 to 1998.Among states with large Medicare enrollment and no CON requirements, the most dramatic growth was in Texas, where the supply of hospice providers relative to the size of the Medicare population nearly doubled. Industry Reports Increased Cost Pressures but the Effect on Providers Is Uncertain
Even as the hospice industry has grown, changes in the use of the hospice benefit and the delivery of hospice care have raised concerns about cost among providers. However, because reliable data on provider costs are not available, it is not clear how these factors may effect hospices’ financial status or their ability to serve Medicare beneficiaries. We calculated the period of enrollment by summing the number of days covered by each claim, even if they covered discontinuous periods of service, and excluded duplicate claims.Because records of hospice use are not complete for beneficiaries who entered hospice during the later years of our study period, we adjusted the claimed days of hospice service for 1996 to 1998 to better account for beneficiaries with very long stays.Our adjustment factor was calculated from 1992-95 data on the proportion of total beneficiary claim days accounted for within the first 2 calendar years of hospice use. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Medicare hospice benefit, focusing on: (1) the patterns and trends in hospice use by Medicare beneficiaries; (2) factors that affect the use of the hospice benefit; and (3) the availability of hospice providers to serve the needs of Medicare beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the number of Medicare beneficiaries choosing hospice services has increased substantially; (2) in 1998, nearly 360,000 Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a hospice program, more than twice the number who elected hospice in 1992; (3) of Medicare beneficiaries who died in 1998, about one in five used the hospice benefit, but use varies considerably across the states; (4) although cancer patients account for more than half of Medicare hospice patients, growth in use has been particularly strong among individuals with other common diagnoses such as heart disease, lung disease, stroke, and Alzheimer's disease; (5) although more beneficiaries are choosing hospice, many are doing so closer to the time of death; (6) the average period of hospice use declined from 74 days in 1992 to 59 days in 1998; (7) half of Medicare hospice users now receive care for 19 or fewer days, and care for 1 week or less is common; (8) many factors influence the use of the Medicare hospice benefit; (9) decisions about whether and when to use hospice depend on physician preferences and practices, patient choice and circumstances, and public and professional awareness of the benefit; (10) along with these factors, increases in federal scrutiny of compliance with program eligibility requirements may have contributed to a decline in the average number of days of hospice care that beneficiaries use; (11) the growth in the number of Medicare hospice providers in both urban and rural areas and in almost every state suggests that hospice services are more widely available to program beneficiaries than in the past; (12) between 1992 and 1999, the number of hospices participating in Medicare increased 82 percent, with large providers and those in the for-profit sector accounting for a greater proportion of the services delivered; (13) at the same time, hospice industry officials report cost pressures from declining patient enrollment periods and increased use of more expensive forms of palliative care; (14) because reliable data on provider costs are not available, however, the effect of these reported cost pressures on the overall financial condition of hospice providers is uncertain; and (15) as required by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the Health Care Financing Administration began collecting information in 1999 from hospice providers about their costs to allow a reevaluation of the Medicare hospice payment rate. |
gao_AIMD-98-157 | gao_AIMD-98-157_0 | Under the joint direction of the Attorney General and the HHS Secretary (acting through the HHS/OIG), HCFAC is to achieve the following: coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts to control fraud and abuse associated with health plans; conduct investigations, audits, and other studies of the delivery and payment for health care in the United States; facilitate the enforcement of the civil, criminal, and administrative statutes applicable to health care; provide guidance to the health care industry, including the issuance of advisory opinions, safe harbor notices, and special fraud alerts; and establish a national database of adverse actions against health care providers. HIPAA also requires amounts equal to the following types of collections to be deposited in the trust fund: criminal fines recovered in cases involving a federal health care offense, including collections pursuant to section 1347 of Title 18, United States Code, civil monetary penalties and assessments imposed in health care fraud amounts resulting from the forfeiture of property by reason of a federal health care offense, including collections under section 982(a)(6) of Title 18, United States Code, and penalties and damages obtained and otherwise creditable to miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury’s general fund obtained under the False Claims Act (sections 3729 through 3733 of Title 31, United States Code), in cases involving claims related to the provision of health care items and services (other than funds awarded to a relator, for restitution or otherwise authorized by law). To satisfy our second objective of identifying amounts appropriated from the trust fund in fiscal year 1997 for the HCFAC program and the reported justification for expenditures of such amounts, as well as our third objective of identifying expenditures from the trust fund for HCFAC activities not related to Medicare, we reviewed the joint report. To identify any savings to the trust fund, as well as any other savings, resulting from expenditures from the trust fund for the HCFAC program, which was our fourth objective, we reviewed the joint report. Amounts Deposited to the Trust Fund
HHS and DOJ reported total deposits of $130.7 million to the trust fund in fiscal year 1997 pursuant to HIPAA. In addition, nothing came to our attention to suggest that HHS and DOJ did not accurately classify HIPAA deposits in their fiscal year 1997 joint HCFAC report, except for a $5 million overstatement of criminal fines that they noted in the joint report. We found no material weaknesses in HHS’ and DOJ’s process for allocating the HCFAC appropriation for fraud and abuse control purposes. The Department of Justice was allocated a total of $22.2 million primarily to increase efforts to litigate health care fraud cases and provide fraud training courses. The HCFA Customer Information System is designed to identify potential targets for Medicare fraud and abuse investigations. HRSA was allocated $2 million to design and implement the adverse action database, referred to as the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (which is discussed later in this report). We found that (1) the expenditures and obligations we tested related to HHS and DOJ funding decisions and the proposals approved for HCFAC funds and (2) the transactions appeared justified for fraud and abuse activities. Non-Medicare Expenditures
We were not able to identify HCFAC program expenditures from the trust fund not related to Medicare because the HHS/OIG and DOJ do not separately account for or monitor such expenditures. HIPAA restricts the HHS/OIG’s use of HCFAC funds to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Savings to the Trust Fund
In this first year of the HCFAC program, we were unable to quantify the savings to the trust fund, or any other savings, resulting from expenditures from the trust fund due to the nature of health care anti-fraud and -abuse activities. GAO’s Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the first joint report issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on the fiscal year (FY) 1997 deposits to the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the allocation of the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program (HCFAC) appropriation, focusing on: (1) the amounts deposited to the trust fund and the sources of such amounts; (2) the amounts appropriated from the trust fund for the HCFAC program and the justification for the expenditure of such amounts; (3) expenditures from the trust fund for HCFAC activities not related to Medicare; and (4) any savings to the trust fund, as well as any other savings, resulting from the trust fund for the HCFAC program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the HHS and DOJ joint report for FY 1997 reported that $130.7 million was deposited to the trust fund pursuant to the Health Insurance Portablity and Accountability Act (HIPAA); (2) the sources of these deposits were primarily penalties and damages and criminal fines resulting from health care fraud audits, evaluations, investigations, and litigation activities initiated prior to implementation of the HCFAC program; (3) the joint report also stated that $104 million was appropriated from the trust fund for the HCFAC program in FY 1997; (4) of the $104 million, HHS and DOJ allocated the maximum--$70 million--to thhe HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to increase its Medicare and Medicaid fraud activities; (5) the remaining $34 million was allocated to: (a) DOJ, which received $22.2 million primarily to increase litigative efforts and to provide fraud training; (b) the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which received $5.3 million for various initiatives related to health care fraud and abuse, including the development of a new information system to identify potential targets for fraud investigations; and (c) other federal and state agencies, which received the remaining $6.5 million for a variety of activities, including increased litigation; development of a new adverse action data bank; and outreach, education and training; (6) GAO found no material weaknesses in HHS' and DOJ's processes for accumulating this information, and nothing came to GAO's attention to lead it to believe that the amounts related to HIPAA deposits and the allocation of the HCFAC appropriation reported by HHS and DOJ in their joint report were inaccurate or unsupported; (7) GAO could not identify expenditures from the trust fund for HCFAC activities not related to Medicare because neither HHS OIG nor DOJ separately account for or monitor those expenditures; (8) HIPAA restricts HHS OIG's use of HCFAC funds to Medicare and Medicaid activities; (9) furthermore, health care fraud cases often involve more than one health care program; (10) thus, it is difficult to identify non-Medicare related expenditures; (11) GAO also could not determine the magnitude of savings to the trust fund, or other savings, resulting from trust fund expenditures for the HCFAC program during FY 1997; and (12) finally, the implementation of the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank, which is to be an important tool to keep unscrupulous providers from having access to Medicare and other health care programs, has been delayed. |
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