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gao_GAO-05-457 | gao_GAO-05-457_0 | Today, TSA security activities at airports are overseen by FSDs. TSA has also implemented leadership and technical training programs for Screening Supervisors. FSDs reported that insufficient staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some training facilities have made it difficult to fully utilize these programs and to meet training requirements. TSA has acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent screener training delivery and is taking steps to address these challenges, including factoring training requirements into workforce planning efforts and distributing training through written materials and CD-ROMs until full Internet/intranet connectivity is achieved. In December 2003, TSA issued a directive requiring screeners to receive 3 hours of recurrent training per week averaged over a quarter year. First, TSA policy does not clearly define responsibility for ensuring that screeners have completed all required training. However, TSA headquarters officials stated that they have no formal policy for monitoring screeners’ completion of basic training. Because of the unclear policies and procedures for recording completion of remedial training, TSA does not have adequate assurance that screeners are receiving legislatively mandated remedial training. For example, TSA has increased the amount of covert testing it performs at airports. However, TSA is taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and checked baggage screening performance data, including working toward implementing TIP for checked baggage screening and developing an image recognition module for checked baggage screener recertification. Although TSA has not yet established performance targets for each of the component indicators, TSA plans to finalize performance targets for the indicators by the end of fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses and vulnerabilities were identified at airports of all sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and airports with private-sector screeners. TSA Has Identified and Implemented Efforts to Enhance Screener Performance, but These Efforts Primarily Focused on Passenger Screeners
TSA has implemented a number of improvements designed to enhance screener performance, based on concerns it identified in a July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study and recommendations from OIAPR. TSA Has Established Screening Performance Measures and Indexes but Has Not Established Key Performance Targets
TSA has established performance measures, indexes, and targets for the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, but has not established targets for the various components of the screening indexes. Conclusions
It has been over 2 years since TSA assumed responsibility for passenger and checked baggage screening operations at the nation’s commercial airports. Additionally, history demonstrates that U.S. commercial aircraft have long been a target for terrorist attacks through the use of explosives carried in checked baggage, and covert testing conducted by TSA and DHS OIG have identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, including the ability of screeners to detect threat objects. While covert test results provide an indicator of screening performance, they cannot solely be used as a comprehensive measure of any airport’s screening performance or any individual screener’s performance, or in determining the overall performance of federal versus private-sector screening. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that all screeners have timely and complete access to screener training available in the Online Learning Center and to help provide TSA management with reasonable assurance that all screeners are receiving required passenger and checked baggage screener training, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to take the following two actions: develop a plan that prioritizes and schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all TSA’s airport training facilities to help facilitate the delivery of screener training and the documentation of training completion, and develop internal controls, such as specific directives, clearly defining responsibilities for monitoring and documenting the completion of required training, and clearly communicate these responsibilities throughout the agency. (3) What is the status of TSA’s efforts to assess and enhance screener performance in detecting threat objects? | Why GAO Did This Study
The screening of airport passengers and their checked baggage is a critical component in securing our nation's commercial aviation system. Since May 2003, GAO has issued six products related to screener training and performance. This report updates the information presented in the prior products and incorporates results from GAO's survey of 155 Federal Security Directors--the ranking Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's commercial airports. Specifically, this report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to enhance training for passenger and checked baggage screeners and screening supervisors, (2) how TSA ensures that screeners complete required training, and (3) actions TSA has taken to measure and enhance screener performance in detecting threat objects.
What GAO Found
TSA has initiated a number of actions designed to enhance screener training, such as updating the basic screener training course. TSA also established a recurrent training requirement and introduced the Online Learning Center, which makes self-guided training courses available over TSA's intranet and the Internet. Even with these efforts, Federal Security Directors reported that insufficient screener staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some training facilities have made it difficult to fully utilize training programs and to meet the recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a quarter year, within regular duty hours. TSA acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent training delivery and is taking steps to address these challenges, including factoring training into workforce planning efforts and distributing training through written materials and CD-ROMs. However, TSA has not established a plan prioritizing the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all airport training facilities to facilitate screener access to training materials. TSA lacks adequate internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that screeners receive legislatively mandated basic and remedial training, and to monitor its recurrent training program. Specifically, TSA policy does not clearly specify the responsibility for ensuring that screeners have completed all required training. In addition, TSA officials have no formal policies or methods for monitoring the completion of required training and were unable to provide documentation identifying the completion of remedial training. TSA has implemented and strengthened efforts to measure and enhance screener performance. For example, TSA has increased the number of covert tests it conducts at airports, which test screeners' ability to detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on baggage, and in checked baggage. These tests identified that overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in passenger and checked baggage screening systems at airports of all sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and at airports with private-sector screeners. While these test results are an indicator of performance, they cannot solely be used as a comprehensive measure of any airport's screening performance or any individual screener's performance. We also found that TSA's efforts to measure and enhance screener performance have primarily focused on passenger screening, not checked baggage screening. For example, TSA only uses threat image software on passenger screening X-ray machines, and the recertification testing program does not include an image recognition module for checked baggage screeners. TSA is taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and checked baggage screening performance data. TSA also established performance indexes for the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, to identify an overall desired level of performance. However, TSA has not established performance targets for each of the component indicators that make up the performance indexes, including performance targets for covert testing. TSA plans to finalize these targets by the end of fiscal year 2005. |
gao_GAO-12-421 | gao_GAO-12-421_0 | Navy Report Addressed Four of the Five Elements Specified in the House Report
The Navy report addressed four of the five elements specified in the House report, while partially addressing one of the five elements. Include a recommendation regarding the potential establishment of improved boat corrosion control and prevention as a key performance parameter for sustainment: The report did not recommend improved boat corrosion control and prevention as a key performance parameter for sustainment. The Navy report partially addressed the following element: Include an evaluation and business case analysis of the impact of advanced boat lifts for potential improvements to small boat acquisition costs and life-cycle sustainment: The report’s business case analysis evaluated potential improvements to life-cycle sustainment, focusing on potential maintenance cost savings associated with boat lifts. However, this business case analysis did not evaluate the impact of the use of advanced boat lifts on potential improvements to small boat acquisition costs. Navy officials told us that the use of advanced boat lifts would not significantly contribute to extending the service life of the boats or produce any other additional benefits that would lead to reduced small boat acquisition costs. This is primarily because a critical feature of current procurement strategies is to select, specify, or design boats that are made from corrosion-resistant materials and use components that are corrosion resistant. Nonetheless, the Navy did not include this justification in the report or analyze the potential effects of the use of boat lifts on small boat acquisition costs in the report’s business case analysis. Navy Would Benefit from More Comprehensive Information in Future Analyses
While the Navy completed a business case analysis of the impact of reduced maintenance and repair costs for the Navy’s small boat fleet through the use of advanced boat lifts, we found several areas in which more complete information could have been included to better support the findings of the Navy study. The guidebook provides standards for the DOD business case analysis process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks. We identified several areas in which more comprehensive information, consistent with the DOD guidebook, could have been included in the business case analysis. The Navy did not include comprehensive data from Navy installations that are using 72 recently acquired boat lifts on (1) actual lift installation and maintenance cost data or (2) qualitative data on other potential costs and benefits associated with the use of boat lifts. The DOD guidebook indicates that authoritative data sources— those used to conduct the financial and nonfinancial analysis for a business case analysis—should be comprehensive and accurate. Navy officials responsible for conducting the business case analysis were unaware of the DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook, but acknowledged its applicability to their analysis. Navy officials recognized that more comprehensive information would have been useful, but noted that they were unable to systematically survey all current boat lift users within the few months they had to complete their business case analysis. The Navy noted in its report that a significant number of boat lifts have recently entered service in the fleet and that the Navy will monitor service experience, data that may provide a basis for future decisions regarding the use of boat lifts. Without more complete information, the Navy may not be fully informed when it considers making future investments in boat lifts or other storage and harboring techniques at individual locations. While these boats vary widely in the missions they perform and the approaches for maintaining them, fiscal challenges require DOD to maximize its investment in small boats by reducing maintenance and repair costs where appropriate. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enable the Navy to make informed decisions when it considers making future investments in boat lifts or other storage and harboring techniques, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to collect and include more complete information when evaluating investment decisions at individual locations, for example, by using discounting and conducting comprehensive surveys of boat lift users to obtain all potential costs and benefits associated with implementing boat lifts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Navy’s report addressed the House Armed Services Committee’s direction, we analyzed House Report 112- 78 to identify each element of the committee’s direction for the Navy report. To determine the extent to which the findings in the Navy’s study are supported by the data and information examined, we reviewed the study and obtained information on the objectives, scope, and methodology officials used to conduct it. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy has noted that successful execution of its maritime strategy requires the acquisition of not only surface combatants, but also small boats. The Navy reported that it received about $135 million in fiscal year 2010-2012 base procurement funding for small boats. These small boats vary widely in the missions they perform, their sizes, and the approaches for their maintenance. The House Armed Services Committee directed the Navy in House Report 112-78 to conduct a study on strategies to reduce maintenance and repair costs associated with small boat storage and harboring and to submit a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on its findings by October 31, 2011. The committee directed GAO to assess the Navys report for completeness, including the methodology used in the Navys analysis. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) the Navy's report addressed the committees direction and (2) the findings in the Navy's study are supported by the data and information examined. GAO analyzed study documents and the business case analysis, obtained and analyzed key documents, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Navy report addressed four of the five elements specified in House Report 112-78, while partially addressing one of the five elements. The Navy report addressed the potential for reducing maintenance and repair costs for the Navys small boat fleet by using advanced boat lifts, and it addressed recommendations regarding the potential establishment of improved boat corrosion control and prevention as key performance parameters. The Navy report partially addressed the committees direction to include an evaluation and business case analysis of the impact of advanced boat lifts for potential improvements to small boat acquisition costs and life-cycle sustainment. The reports business case analysis evaluated potential improvements to life-cycle sustainment, focusing on potential maintenance cost savings associated with boat lifts. However, this business case analysis did not evaluate the impact of the use of advanced boat lifts on potential improvements to small boat acquisition costs. Navy officials told GAO that the use of advanced boat lifts would not significantly contribute to extending the service life of the boats or produce any other additional benefits that would lead to reduced small boat acquisition costs. This is primarily because a critical feature of current procurement strategies is to select, specify, or design boats that are made from corrosion-resistant materials and use components that are corrosion resistant. Nonetheless, the Navy did not include this justification in the report or analyze the potential effects of the use of boat lifts on small boat acquisition costs in the reports business case analysis.
While the Navy completed a business case analysis of the impact of reduced maintenance and repair costs for the Navys small boat fleet through the use of advanced boat lifts, GAO found several areas in which more complete information could have been included to better support the findings of the Navy study. The April 2011 DOD Product Support Business Case Analysis Guidebook provides standards for the DOD business case analysis process used to conduct analyses of costs, benefits, and risks. GAO identified several areas in which more comprehensive information, consistent with the DOD guidebook, could have been included in the Navys business case analysis. For example, the Navy did not include (1) actual lift installation and maintenance cost data or (2) qualitative data on other potential costs and benefits associated with the use of boat lifts, particularly location- and mission-specific benefits, from Navy installations that are using 72 recently acquired boat lifts. The DOD guidebook indicates that authoritative data sourcesthose used to conduct the financial and nonfinancial analysis for a business case analysisshould be comprehensive and accurate. Navy officials recognized that more comprehensive information would have been useful, but noted that they were unable to systematically survey all current boat lift users within the few months they had to complete their business case analysis. The Navy noted in its report that a significant number of boat lifts have recently entered service in the fleet and that the Navy will monitor service experience, data that may provide a basis for future decisions regarding the use of boat lifts. Without more complete information, the Navy may not be fully informed when it considers making future investments in boat lifts or other storage and harboring techniques at individual locations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy collect and include more complete information when evaluating future investment decisions at individual locations. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-695 | gao_GAO-12-695_0 | However, we consider them to remain open. As discussed previously, we are reporting our recommendations resulting from the information security control deficiencies identified in our annual audits of IRS’s financial statements separately because of the sensitive nature of many of these control deficiencies. Open Recommendations Grouped by Internal Control Activity
Linking the open recommendations from our financial audits, and the control deficiencies that gave rise to them, to internal control activities that are central to IRS’s tax administration responsibilities provides insight regarding their significance to accomplishing IRS’s mission. The following long term recommendation in table 9 is designed to assist IRS in evaluating its operations and determining which activities are the most beneficial. IRS has made substantial progress in improving its financial management and internal control since its first financial audit, as evidenced by unqualified audit opinions on its financial statements for the past 12 years, resolution of several material internal control weaknesses, significant deficiencies, and other control deficiencies, and actions taken resulting in the closure of hundreds of financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work by many individuals throughout IRS and sustained commitment of IRS leadership. Nonetheless, more needs to be done to fully address the agency’s continuing financial management challenges—resolving material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in internal control; developing outcome-oriented performance metrics that can facilitate managing operations for outcomes; and correcting numerous other control deficiencies. Effective implementation of the recommendations we have made through our financial audits and related work could greatly assist IRS in improving its ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, the IRS Commissioner expressed his appreciation for our acknowledgment of the agency’s progress in addressing its financial management challenges as evidenced by our closure of 38 open financial management recommendations from prior GAO reports. The IRS Commissioner also stated that the agency is committed to implementing appropriate improvements to ensure that it maintains sound financial management practices. Appendix I: Status of GAO Recommendations from Internal Revenue Service Financial Audits and Related Management Reports
This appendix presents a summary of (1) the 77 previous GAO recommendations that were open as of the beginning of our fiscal year 2011 financial audit, (2) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported status and corrective actions taken or planned for such recommendations as of March 2012, and (3) our analysis of whether the control deficiencies that gave rise to the recommendations have been effectively addressed. It also includes a summary of the status of the 30 new recommendations identified as part of our fiscal year 2011 financial statement audit. Those recommendations are reported separately and are not included in this report primarily because of the sensitive nature of some of the issues. In our audit of IRS’s fiscal year 2011 financial statements, we reported a significant deficiency in IRS’s internal control over tax refund disbursements that resulted from (1) IRS not having effectively addressed the deficiencies in internal control over manual tax refunds that we have reported in previous years, (2) additional deficiencies in internal control over manual tax refunds we identified during our fiscal year 2011 audit, and (3) continued deficiencies in IRS’s internal control over processing of claims for the First-time Homebuyer Credit (FTHBC). Each year, we continue to identify control deficiencies related to IRS’s safeguarding of taxpayer receipts and information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its role as the nations tax collector, IRS has a demanding responsibility to annually collect trillions of dollars in taxes, process hundreds of millions of tax and information returns, and enforce the nations tax laws.
Each year, as part of the annual audit of IRSs financial statements, GAO makes recommendations to address control deficiencies identified during the audit and follows up on the status of IRSs efforts to address the control deficiencies GAO identified in previous years audits. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide an overview of the financial management challenges still facing IRS, (2) provide the status of financial auditrelated recommendations and the actions needed to address them, and (3) highlight the relationship between GAOs recommendations and internal control activities central to IRSs mission and goals.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has made significant progress in improving its internal controls and financial management since its first financial statement audit in 1992, as evidenced by 12 consecutive years of clean audit opinions on its financial statements, the resolution of several material control deficiencies, and actions resulting in the closure of over 300 financial management recommendations. This progress has been the result of hard work throughout IRS and sustained commitment at the top levels of the agency. However, IRS still faces significant financial management challenges in (1) resolving its remaining material weaknesses and significant deficiency in internal control, (2) developing outcome-oriented performance metrics, and (3) correcting numerous other control deficiencies, especially those relating to safeguarding tax receipts and taxpayer information. At the beginning of GAOs audit of IRSs fiscal year 2011 financial statements, 77 recommendations from prior audits remained open because IRS had not fully addressed the underlying issues. During the fiscal year 2011 financial audit, IRS took actions that GAO considered sufficient to close 38 recommendations. At the same time, GAO identified additional control deficiencies resulting in 30 new recommendations. In total, 69 recommendations remain open. GAO has also identified numerous control deficiencies and made recommendations related to information security that have been reported separately and are not included in this report because of the sensitive nature of many of those control deficiencies.
To assist IRS in evaluating and improving internal controls, GAO categorized the 69 open recommendations by various internal control activities, which, in turn, were grouped into three broad control categories. The continued existence of control deficiencies that gave rise to these recommendations represents a serious challenge for IRS. Effective implementation of GAOs recommendations could greatly assist IRS in improving its internal controls and achieving sound financial management, which are integral to effectively carrying out its tax administration responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, the IRS Commissioner stated that the agency is committed to implementing appropriate improvements to maintain sound financial management practices. |
gao_GAO-13-209 | gao_GAO-13-209_0 | 2). DOD Uses a Coordinated Approach to Plan Its Combat Casualty Care Research and Development, but Not All of Its Organizations Share Information Early
DOD’s biomedical research organizations use a coordinated approach to plan for combat casualty care research and development in a manner that is consistent with key collaboration practices. DOD has also taken steps to coordinate with other federal agencies that are involved in combat casualty care research. These key practices include agreeing on roles and responsibilities and establishing a means to operate across organizational boundaries. First, Health Affairs and the Army MRMC—the two organizations that fund most combat casualty care research and development—have outlined their roles in an Interagency Support Agreement, which designates the Army MRMC as the organization responsible for managing the day-to-day use of Health Affairs funding for medical research, including research to improve combat casualty care. Other DOD Research Organizations Do Not Always Coordinate Early in the Research Process, Which Can Result in Inefficiencies
DOD organizations that typically do not conduct biomedical research are generally not involved in DOD’s efforts to coordinate combat casualty care research. When these nonmedical research organizations conduct research relevant to combat casualty care, they do not always share relevant information with appropriate officials early in the research process. DOD officials recently stated that DOD and the other two agencies are working together to address these concerns. DOD Monitors the Progress of Combat Casualty Care Research Projects, but Not Whether the Research Fills Gaps or Achieves Other Goals
Health Affairs and Army MRMC monitor and assess the progress of combat casualty care research and development projects, but they have not assessed the extent to which this research fills gaps in DOD’s capability to provide combat casualty care or achieves other goals for this research, including those related to improving DOD’s ability to control bleeding, which is the primary cause of death on the battlefield. Internal control standards for the federal government state that agencies should monitor and assess their performance over time to help ensure that they meet the agency’s missions, goals, and objectives. For example, Health Affairs and Army MRMC monitor and assess cost, schedule, and performance metrics for individual research projects to determine whether to continue funding, make necessary corrections to, or terminate these projects. Senior leadership in these organizations reviews projects annually to determine whether they are meeting established cost, schedule, and performance baselines. However, these officials have not developed an assessment that comprehensively identifies each of the goals for the portfolio and includes information about the extent to which each goal has been met. Following a review and analysis of the combat casualty care research portfolio in September 2012, Health Affairs and Army MRMC officials reported to us that they intended to complete an overarching strategic roadmap for the portfolio by March 2013. Moreover, while DOD assesses the progress of combat casualty care research projects, it is also important that DOD monitor and assess the extent to which the results of its combat casualty care research fill the gaps in DOD’s capability to provide combat casualty care and achieve other goals that it established for the research. However, without a plan for monitoring and assessment, DOD runs the risk that it may not be producing results that most effectively improve combat casualty care to save lives on the battlefield. To ensure that nonmedical DOD research organizations coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs early in the research process to understand medical research requirements and avoid inefficiencies that may lead to duplicative work, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to communicate to DOD’s nonmedical research organizations the importance of coordination with the JPC-6 chair on combat casualty care issues, and require this coordination early in the research process when these organizations conduct research with implications for combat casualty care. 2. To improve DOD’s ability to assess the overall performance of its combat casualty care research portfolio, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to develop and implement a plan to assess the extent to which combat casualty care research and development fills gaps in DOD’s capability to provide combat casualty care and achieves DOD’s other goals for this portfolio of research. Therefore, we included a recommendation in our draft report that DOD issue the final charter. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD estimates that about 24 percent of servicemembers who die in combat could have survived if improved and more timely medical care could be made available. Because multiple DOD organizations conduct research to develop medical products and processes to improve combat casualty care, it is critical that these organizations coordinate their work. It is also important that agencies monitor and assess their performance to help achieve organizational goals, which for DOD include addressing gaps in its capability to provide combat casualty care. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to review DODs combat casualty care research and development programs. This report assesses whether DOD (1) uses a coordinated approach to plan this research; and (2) monitors and assesses this research to determine the extent to which it fills capability gaps and achieves other goals. GAO reviewed DODs policies and documentation; interviewed officials from DOD and other federal agencies; and analyzed metrics DOD used to gauge the progress of its research.
What GAO Found
The biomedical research organizations of the Department of Defense (DOD) use a coordinated approach to plan combat casualty care research and development, but not all of DOD's nonmedical research organizations share information early in the research process. GAO has previously reported that federal agencies can enhance and sustain collaboration of efforts by using key practices, such as agreeing on roles and responsibilities and establishing the means to operate across organizational boundaries. In 2010, DOD established a planning committee to coordinate the efforts of organizations conducting combat casualty care research. The committee developed a draft charter in 2010 identifying members respective roles and responsibilities. DOD issued the final charter in early January 2013, while GAO was conducting its review. DOD also facilitated operation across organizational boundaries by colocating most of the organizations conducting combat casualty care research. However, DOD organizations that typically do not conduct biomedical research, such as the Army Research Laboratory, are not involved in DOD's efforts to coordinate this research. When these organizations conduct research relevant to combat casualty care they do not always share information with appropriate officials early in the research process, as they are not aware of the need to coordinate early and may not fully understand medical research requirements. As a result, some researchers have had to repeat some work to adhere to these requirements. DOD has also taken steps to coordinate with other federal agencies that are involved in this research.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (Health Affairs) and the Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) assess the progress of combat casualty care research and development projects, but they have not assessed the extent to which this research fills gaps in DOD's capability to provide this care or achieves other DOD goals. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should assess their performance to ensure they meet the agency's objectives. Health Affairs and Army MRMC--the two organizations that fund most combat casualty care research and development--monitor research projects to determine whether to continue funding, make necessary corrections, or terminate these projects. However, in 2008 DOD identified gaps in its capability to provide combat casualty care, and although Health Affairs and Army MRMC have completed 44 research projects since then designed to address these gaps, they have not assessed whether the results of this research fill the gaps identified in 2008. In addition, Health Affairs and Army MRMC established other goals for this research portfolio to improve combat casualty care. For example, in 2010, Health Affairs set goals to improve DOD's ability to control bleeding. However, neither organization has developed an assessment that comprehensively identifies each of the goals for the portfolio and includes information about the extent to which each goal has been met. Health Affairs and Army MRMC officials stated that they intend to complete a strategic roadmap for the portfolio, but GAO was unable to determine if the roadmap will include a plan for a comprehensive assessment of this portfolio. Without such a plan for a comprehensive assessment, these organizations cannot be sure the research they are conducting is producing results that most effectively improve combat casualty care to save lives on the battlefield.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) communicate the importance of early coordination among DOD's nonmedical organizations and (2) develop and implement a plan to determine the extent to which research fills gaps and achieves other goals. DOD concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-669T | gao_GAO-08-669T_0 | Reset is the repair, replacement, and modernization of equipment that has been damaged or lost as a result of combat operations. Total Costs to Fully Equip the Army Are Uncertain
The total cost to restructure and rebuild the Army is uncertain but this effort will likely require many billions of dollars and take at least several more years to complete. Our analysis of Army cost estimates and cost data indicate that it is likely to cost at least $190 billion dollars to equip modular units, expand the force, reset equipment, and replace prepositioned equipment from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. However, these estimates have limitations and could change. For example, the Army is likely to continue to have shortfalls of some key equipment beyond then and believes it will require additional funding to equip modular units through fiscal year 2017. Information on Army Equipping-Related Costs for Key Initiatives Is Available but Some Estimates Are Incomplete or May Change
Although the Army has not identified a total aggregate cost for its key equipping initiatives, it has previously reported some cost estimates and cost data for equipping modular units, expanding the Army, resetting equipment, and restoring pre-positioned stocks. Based on our analysis of various sources of Army cost data, it appears that the cost of these initiatives will exceed $190 billion dollars between fiscal years 2004-2013 (see table 1). These figures do not include data on Army longer term transformation efforts such as the Army’s Future Combat System. As shown in table 2, most of these funds—$43.6 billion—were designated for equipment purchases. In addition, the Army’s original plan for equipping modular units also did not fully consider the equipping implications associated with the Army National Guard’s changing role in supporting military operations. Equipment Costs to Expand the Force Are Significant
DOD’s plan to expand the size of the Army by over 74,000 personnel will also add to the Army’s equipment needs. Given the magnitude of the Army’s funding plan and potential changes to the plan, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with a revised funding plan for expanding the force and adhere to a high quality cost estimating methodology. Given the substantial amount of equipment deployed overseas, the uncertain length of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the lack of transparency and accountability, it is unclear how much funding the Army will need to reset its equipment. The Army Lacks a Strategic Approach That Promotes Transparency and Ensures That Equipment Investments Are Based on Sound Plans
A common theme in our work has been the need for DOD and the Army to take a more strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with measurable, realistic goals and time frames, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. A lack of linkage between overall Army equipment requirements and funding plans impedes oversight by DOD and congressional decision-makers because it does not provide a means to measure the Army’s progress toward meeting long-term Army equipment goals or to inform decisions that must be made today. Our work on modular restructuring has shown that the Army has substantially revised its timeline for fully equipping units from an original date of 2011 to 2019 but has not provided evidence of its overall equipment requirements or specific plans, milestones, or resources required to fully equip the modular force. Oversight of the Army’s key equipment initiatives has been complicated by multiple funding requests. Actions Needed to Improve Management Controls and Improve Transparency of Army Equipping Efforts
We have recommended a number of actions intended to improve management controls and enhance transparency of funding requests associated with modular restructuring, force expansion, equipment reset, and prepositioning of equipment stock. However, many of these recommendations have not been adopted because the Army has not developed concrete plans to address the recommendations and in some cases, disagreed with our recommendations. As a result, senior DOD leaders and Congress may not have sufficient information to assess progress and fully evaluate the Army’s funding requests. Until these steps are taken, decision makers will lack key information needed to gauge interim progress and make informed choices aimed at balancing the need to restore near-term readiness while positioning the Army for the future. GAO-08-354R. Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army’s Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for Results. Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The high pace of overseas operations is taking a heavy toll on Army equipment. Harsh combat and environmental conditions over sustained periods of time have exacerbated equipment repair, replacement, and recapitalization problems. The Army has also taken steps to restructure its forces before implementing its longer term transformation to the Future Combat System. To support ongoing operations and prepare for the future, the Army has embarked on four key initiatives: (1) restructuring from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force, (2) expanding the Army by adding about 74,000 people and creating new units, (3) repairing, replacing, and recapitalizing new equipment through its reset program, and (4) replacing equipment borrowed from its pre-positioned equipment sets around the world. Since 2004, Congress has provided billions of dollars to support the Army's equipping needs. GAO has issued many reports on the Army's efforts to equip modular units, expand the Army, reset equipment, and manage and replace prepositioned equipment. This statement, which draws largely on these reports, will address (1) the equipment-related cost of these initiatives, and (2) the management challenges facing the Army and the actions needed to improve its implementation of these initiatives. GAO is issuing a separate statement today on the Future Combat System (GAO-08- 638T).
What GAO Found
Restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete; however, the total cost is uncertain. Based on GAO's analysis of Army cost estimates and cost data, it appears that the Army's plans to equip modular units, expand the force, reset equipment, and replace prepositioned equipment are likely to cost at least $190 billion dollars through fiscal year 2013. However, these estimates have some limitations and could change. Further, the Army has stated it plans to request additional funds to address equipment shortfalls in modular units through fiscal year 2017. Several factors are contributing to the uncertainties about future costs. First, the Army's $43.6 funding plan for equipping modular units was based on preliminary modular unit designs and did not fully consider the needs of National Guard units. Second, the Army expects to need $18.5 billion for equipment to expand the force but has not clearly documented this estimate. Third, costs to reset equipment may total at least $118 billion from fiscal years 2004-2013 but may change because they are dependent on how much equipment is lost, damaged, or worn beyond repair during continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and how long these operations continue. Fourth, the Army believes it will need at least $10.6 billion to replace pre-positioned equipment that was taken out of storage to support ongoing operations, but this amount is an estimate and DOD's overall strategy for prepositioned equipment has not yet been issued Given the magnitude of these initiatives and potential for costs to change, DOD will need to carefully monitor the projected costs of these initiatives so that it can consider tradeoffs and allocate funding to balance the Army's equipping needs for the next decade and longer term transformation goals. A common theme in GAO's work has been the need for DOD and the Army to take a more strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with measurable, realistic goals and time frames, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. GAO's work on modular restructuring has shown a lack of linkage between the Army's funding requests and equipment requirements. This lack of linkage impedes oversight by DOD and Congress because it does not provide a means to measure the Army's progress in meeting modular force equipment requirements or inform budget decisions. Oversight of Army initiatives has also been complicated by multiple funding requests that makes it difficult for decision makers to understand the Army's full funding needs. GAO has recommended a number of actions to improve management controls and enhance transparency of the Army's plans for equipping modular units, expanding the force, resetting equipment, and replacing prepositioned equipment. However, many of these recommendations have not been fully implemented or adopted. For example, until the Army provides a comprehensive plan for its modular restructuring and expansion initiatives, which identifying progress and total costs, decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess progress and allocate defense resources among competing priorities. |
gao_NSIAD-95-4 | gao_NSIAD-95-4_0 | Applying Management Lessons May Reduce Costs and Avoid Schedule Delays
By incorporating management lessons into the NSSN program, the Navy may avoid repeating many of the problems that caused Seawolf detail design and lead ship construction cost increases and schedule delays. However, because of the absence of a DOD approved acquisition strategy, the extent to which the NSSN acquisition strategy will include these lessons cannot be assessed now. It also caused a 1-year delay in the SSN-21’s delivery. Moreover, according to the NSSN project manager, the NSSN, to the extent possible, will incorporate existing systems and components from prior submarine programs and off-the-shelf, commercially available technology. The Navy estimates that NSSN savings from all approved lessons could range from $90 million to $100 million. Recommendation
To allow an assessment of how the Navy will avoid a repetition of past problems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the formal NSSN acquisition strategy explicitly documents how the Navy is to address and incorporate the management and technical lessons from prior submarine programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's plans to incorporate lessons learned from prior submarine programs into the design and construction of the NSSN, a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by incorporating management lessons from prior submarine construction programs, the Navy could reduce its costs and avoid the schedule delays that it has experienced in the Seawolf SSN-21 program; (2) the NSSN project manager intends to incorporate lessons learned from the Seawolf SSN-21 program into the NSSN program acquisition strategy, but the extent to which these lessons will be applied cannot be assessed until the Department of Defense (DOD) approves the strategy and makes it available to the public for evaluation; (3) the Navy estimates that NSSN cost savings could range from $90 million to $100 million; and (4) the DOD acquisition strategy should explicitly address how the Navy will avoid repeating the problems of prior construction programs. |
gao_GAO-04-370 | gao_GAO-04-370_0 | NNSA and University’s Actions Taken to Address Mission Support Problems Identified in 2001 Have Not Been Fully Implemented
NNSA and the University have taken a number of steps to address the major mission support problems that were known when NNSA extended the University’s contracts in 2001, but all actions will not be complete until mid-2005. When NNSA decided to extend the contracts for the two laboratories, concerns had emerged in three areas: project management, facilities management, and nuclear safety. This revised rule strengthened NNSA’s ability to hold contractors accountable for the safety of nuclear facilities In addition to incorporating new agencywide requirements into the two contracts, NNSA established new contract mechanisms and performance measures to help ensure that the laboratories put in place management improvements for mission support activities. New problems in business operations, such as controls over purchase cards and property, emerged at the Los Alamos laboratory in 2002, while developing an emergency management program that complied with NNSA requirements continued to be a problem at the Lawrence Livermore laboratory. The laboratory plans on having these additional measures in place by the end of 2005. Although the laboratory submitted the first draft of the plan on time early in the fiscal year, the quality of the plan did not meet NNSA expectations, and the laboratory received a marginal rating on this measure for fiscal year 2002. NNSA now estimates that the laboratory will have an emergency management program that is in substantial compliance with DOE orders by the end of fiscal year 2004. Challenges Remain for Sustaining Mission Support Improvements at the Laboratories
NNSA and the University face three main challenges to sustaining improvements over the long term in mission support activities at the two laboratories. Ensuring that actions taken to address mission support problems translate into effective performance of mission support requires establishing and maintaining an effective system of management control. The University’s Vice President for Laboratory Management said that outside partners with strong management and business experience could strengthen its performance in the areas of business operations and other mission support areas. The laboratories will also need to ensure that improvement efforts are sustained and effective. In the past, however, oversight of the laboratories’ mission support activities has been inadequate. Neither the University nor NNSA was influential in ensuring that the laboratory followed best practices in managing the business system improvement initiative, even after the department had issued guidance on managing improvement initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to ensure through contract and other management mechanisms that the University of California and any future contractor managing Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories provide leadership, resources, and oversight to ensure effective mission support activities, including evaluating the impact of improvement actions on performance; ensure that NNSA performance assessments at the laboratories include evaluations of the adequacy of leadership, resources, and internal controls associated with mission support activities; ensure that as NNSA implements its proposed oversight and contractor assurance policy at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, NNSA retains sufficient independent federal oversight of mission support activities to fulfill its responsibilities associated with protecting public resources and safety; and include in its contract with the University of California and any future contractor at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories a requirement that major improvement initiatives be managed consistent with the best practices of high-performing organizations, as defined in DOE Notice 125.1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The University of California (University) operates the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The two research laboratories, with a combined fiscal year 2003 budget of $2.3 billion, have had problems in such mission support areas as managing projects, conducting business operations, and ensuring safe nuclear operations. GAO was asked to describe the actions taken to address mission support problems identified in 2001, as well as problems that have since emerged, and to assess the main challenges to sustaining mission support improvements.
What GAO Found
For the three mission support areas with problems as of 2001--managing construction and other major projects, maintaining and managing existing facilities, and ensuring safe operations of nuclear facilities--actions are basically complete in the first two areas but not in the third. For all three areas, NNSA incorporated new requirements into the contracts, developed new performance measures, and increased its oversight. The University of California has strengthened oversight of the laboratories by, among other things, establishing a new position of vice president for laboratory management. The laboratories will not fully comply with new requirements for providing a safety analysis of each nuclear facility until mid-2005. The actions taken by NNSA and the University to correct problems in project, facilities, and nuclear safety management were not systemic enough to keep problems from developing in other mission support areas after 2001. At the Los Alamos laboratory, emerging problems centered on business operations, including inadequate controls over procurement, purchase cards, and property management. The laboratory now has extensive corrective actions underway and expects to have most of the new measures in place by the end of 2005. At the Lawrence Livermore laboratory, the problems centered on emergency planning and preparedness, in that the laboratory had made little progress in developing an emergency management program that complied with NNSA requirements. The laboratory has taken steps over the past 2 years to improve in this area, and NNSA now estimates that the laboratory will have an approved emergency management program by the end of fiscal year 2004. NNSA and the University face three main challenges to sustaining improvements in mission support performance over the long term. The first challenge is for the laboratories to ensure that actions taken to address mission support problems translate into effective performance of mission support activities. A past lack of emphasis on mission support activities was a major factor when problems surfaced, particularly at the Los Alamos laboratory. Ensuring that mission support activities are effective will require sustained leadership, resources, and effective internal controls. The second challenge is ensuring appropriate and effective oversight of mission support activities, which has been inadequate in the past. In particular, a draft NNSA policy that calls for relying primarily on contractors' management controls raises concerns about the future adequacy of NNSA oversight. The third challenge is ensuring that the laboratories follow best practices in developing any future improvement initiatives. In its efforts to improve business systems, the Los Alamos laboratory did not follow best business practices for managing such improvements. Not doing so lessens the laboratory's ability to ensure that the efforts will achieve the desired results. |
gao_GAO-14-567T | gao_GAO-14-567T_0 | Specifically, 8 of the 11 agencies did not consistently meet annual spending requirements for SBIR. Additional data on each agency’s spending on the programs is included in our 2013 report. SBIR and STTR program managers identified reasons why spending the required amount in a given fiscal year could be difficult, which we described in our 2013 report. For example, in that report, we found that delays in receiving final appropriations can delay agencies’ awarding of contracts for SBIR or STTR projects. As we found in our 2013 report, when appropriations were received late in the year, agencies used differing methodologies to calculate their spending requirements, making it difficult to determine whether agencies’ calculations were correct. Although SBA provided guidance in policy directives on calculating their spending requirements, we found that the policy directives did not provide guidance to agencies on how to calculate such spending requirements when agency appropriations are delayed. We found that, without such guidance, that agencies would likely continue to calculate spending requirements in differing ways. Agencies and SBA Did Not Consistently Comply with Certain Reporting Requirements
We also found in 2013 that agencies participating in the SBIR and STTR programs did not consistently comply with requirements in the Small Business Act to annually report a description of their methodologies for calculating their extramural R&D budgets to SBA and that SBA did not consistently comply with the act’s requirements for annually reporting to Congress. With the exception of NASA in certain years, agencies did not submit their methodology reports to SBA within the time frame required by the Small Business Act for fiscal years 2006 through 2011 for the SBIR and STTR programs. More significantly, we found in 2013 that the majority of the agencies did not include an itemization of each R&D program excluded from the calculation of the agency’s extramural budget and a brief explanation of why it was excluded, as required. We also found in 2013 that SBA had not consistently complied with the requirement to report its analysis of the agencies’ methodologies in its annual report to Congress, as required by the Small Business Act. We found that these reports contained limited analyses of the agencies’ methodologies, and some of the analyses were inaccurate. In our 2013 report, we found that, without more comprehensive analysis and accurate information on participating agencies in SBA’s annual report, Congress did not have information on the extent to which agencies are reporting what is required by law. SBA is in the process of taking steps to address this recommendation. Changing the Calculation Methodology Could Increase Spending Requirements and Participation
In 2013, we also found that changing the methodology to calculate the SBIR and STTR spending requirements based on each agency’s total R&D budget instead of each agency’s extramural R&D budget would increase the amount of each agency’s spending requirement for the programs, some much more than others, depending on how the change was implemented. Also, such a change would increase the number of agencies that would be required to participate in the programs if the threshold for participating in the programs remained the same. For STTR, three additional agencies—Commerce, USDA, and VA—would also have been required to participate in the program for fiscal year 2011 if total R&D budgets had been the criteria because these agencies reported total R&D budgets in excess of $1 billion. Administrative Costs Could Not Be Determined Because the Agencies Did Not Identify or Track All Costs
We found in 2013 that the participating agencies’ cost of administering the SBIR and STTR programs could not be determined because the agencies neither collected that information nor had the systems to do so. Estimates agencies provided for our report indicated that the greatest amounts of administrative costs in fiscal year 2011 were for salaries and expenses, contract processing, outreach programs, technical assistance programs, support contracts, and other purposes. With the implementation in 2013 of a pilot program allowing agencies under certain conditions to use up to 3 percent of SBIR program funds for certain administrative costs, SBA expected to require agencies in the pilot program to track and report the spending of that 3 percent but not all of their administrative costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies have awarded more than 156,000 contracts and grants, totaling nearly $40 billion through the SBIR and STTR programs to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. The Small Business Act mandates that agencies, with extramural R&D budgets that meet the thresholds for participation, must spend a percentage of these annual budgets on the two programs. The agencies are to report to SBA and SBA is to report to Congress.
This testimony is based on a report GAO issued in September 2013 and addresses for fiscal years 2006 through 2011, (1) the extent to which participating agencies complied with program spending requirements, (2) the extent to which participating agencies and SBA complied with certain reporting requirements, (3) the potential effects of basing the spending requirements for the SBIR and STTR programs on agencies' total R&D budgets instead of their extramural R&D budgets, and (4) what is known about the amounts participating agencies spent for administering the programs. For that report, GAO reviewed agency calculations of spending requirements and required reports, and interviewed SBA and participating agency officials.
What GAO Found
Using data agencies had reported to the Small Business Administration (SBA), GAO found in its 2013 report that 8 of the 11 agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and 4 of the 5 agencies participating in the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program did not consistently comply with spending requirements for fiscal years 2006 to 2011. SBA, which oversees the programs, provided guidance in policy directives for agencies on calculating these requirements, but the directives did not provide guidance on calculating the requirements when appropriations are late and spending is delayed. Some SBIR and STTR program managers told GAO that it can be difficult to spend the required amount because delays in receiving final appropriations can delay agencies' awarding of contracts. As GAO found in its 2013 report, when appropriations were received late in the year agencies used differing methodologies to calculate their spending requirements, which made it difficult to determine whether agencies' calculations were correct. GAO found that, without further SBA guidance, agencies would likely continue calculating spending requirements in differing ways.
GAO also found in 2013 that the participating agencies and SBA had not consistently complied with certain program reporting requirements. For example, participating agencies did not itemize each program excluded from the calculation of their extramural research or research and development (R&D) budgets and explain why the program was excluded, as required. (Extramural R&D is generally conducted by nonfederal employees outside of federal facilities.) Also, SBA's annual reports to Congress that were available at the time of GAO's review contained limited analysis of the agencies' methodologies, often not including information on particular agencies. By providing more analysis of the agencies' reports, as GAO recommended in its 2013 report, SBA can provide information to Congress on the extent to which agencies were reporting what is required.
In 2013, GAO found that the potential effects of basing each participating agency's spending requirement on its total R&D budget instead of its extramural R&D budget would increase the amount of the spending requirement—for some agencies more than others, depending on how the change was implemented. Also, if the thresholds of the spending requirements for participation in the programs did not change, changing the base to an agency's total R&D budget would increase the number of agencies required to participate.
In addition, GAO found in 2013 that the agencies' cost of administering the programs could not be determined because the agencies had not consistently tracked costs as they were not required to do so by the authorizing legislation of the programs. Estimates agencies provided to GAO indicated that the greatest amounts of administrative costs in fiscal year 2011 were for salaries and expenses, contract processing, outreach programs, technical assistance programs, support contracts, and other purposes. With the start of a pilot program allowing agencies to use up to 3 percent of SBIR program funds for administrative costs in fiscal year 2013, SBA planned to require participating agencies to track and report administrative costs paid from program funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations, but made several to SBA in GAO's 2013 report on this topic. SBA agreed with those recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. |
gao_NSIAD-97-3 | gao_NSIAD-97-3_0 | Government and industry officials stated, however, that it will probably take well over a year after the December 1, 1995, implementation of FASA in governmentwide regulations for significant effects of these changes to be apparent. Regarding the use of the results of market research in the contracts reviewed, we found evidence that such research was used in 13 of the 21 contracts to obtain commercial items and NDI and in 5 of the 21 contracts to obtain government-unique items or services. For example, post-FASA efforts to implement the new market research requirements have included (1) the Defense Acquisition University’s development of a governmentwide satellite training program, for the acquisition workforce, that included modules on market research; (2) the Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s (OFPP) efforts to compile a list of available commercial training courses for market research; (3) the Federal Acquisition Institute’s revisions and development of online training materials relating to market research; (4) GSA’s compilation of commercial terms and conditions used by 100 of the top Fortune 500 companies; and (5) DOD’s issuance of its 1996 5000.1 and 5000.2 acquisition guidance, incorporating FASA’s market research changes. Although these officials acknowledged that the regulation writers may have intended for note 26 to be used as a final check on the government’s market research, some DOD and GSA officials objected to an across-the-board use of the note as such a check. Both the DOD and GSA officials stated that they would take actions to exempt these types of contracts from the note 26 requirement. Broad Consensus Against a Government- maintained Database, but Other Ideas Might Be Helpful
Government and industry officials have provided varied opinions on the possibility of creating a governmentwide database for storing, retrieving, and analyzing market data. They said such a database is feasible but would be difficult to maintain and would be costly. For example, OFPP officials and others pointed out that powerful “search engines” are becoming available on the Internet that will facilitate market research of private sector and government electronic catalogs. In light of these Internet initiatives and the strong consensus against the database, we do not believe that federal agencies should be required, at this time, to create a comprehensive, governmentwide, and government-maintained database to store, retrieve, and analyze market data. This does not include services that are sold based on hourly rates without an established catalog or market price for a specific service performed; (g) “Any item, combination of items, or service referred to in paragraphs (a) through (f), notwithstanding the fact that the item, combination of items, or service is transferred between or among separate divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of a contractor; or (h) “A nondevelopmental item, if the procuring agency determines the item was developed exclusively at private expense and sold in substantial quantities, on a competitive basis, to multiple State and local governments.” (a) “Any previously developed item of supply used exclusively for governmental purposes by a Federal agency, a State or local government, or a foreign government with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement; (b) “Any item described in paragraph (a) of this definition that requires only minor modification or modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial market place in order to meet the requirements of the procuring department or agency; or (c) “Any item of supply being produced that does not meet the requirements of paragraph (a) or (b) solely because the item is not yet in use.”
Market Research Efforts and Results for the 21 Contracts Reviewed
Table II.1 shows the market research efforts in developing requirements and increasing competition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the government's use of market research, focusing on: (1) existing federal government market research efforts, both before and after implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), regarding commercial items and nondevelopmental items (NDI); and (2) the feasibility of creating a governmentwide database for storing, retrieving, and analyzing market data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) GAO's review of 21 selected contracts and discussions with the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agency officials showed that the government's market research efforts varied widely, but the variances appeared to be appropriate; (2) the type and extent of market research varied for the 21 contracts reviewed; (3) overall, the agencies: (a) obtained commercial items or NDI in 16 of the 21 contracts, although for 3 of the 16, market research was, for legitimate reasons, not performed; and (b) used market research to obtain government unique items or services in 5 of the 21 contracts; (4) at the time of GAO's review, implementation of FASA's market research requirements was underway, but government and industry officials said it would take well over a year after the December 1, 1995, implementation date before the impact of the changes could be realized; (5) for example, in GAO's review of Commerce Business Daily notices published from October 1995 to May 1996, GAO found that the final check on the government's market research, which the federal acquisition regulation (FAR) required, generally was not being used; (6) although officials at most of the activities GAO contacted said they were not aware of the requirement and would send out policy letters to increase compliance, the Director of Defense Procurement and the General Services Administration's Associate Administrator for Acquisition Policy took issue with an across-the-board application of the requirement, stating that they would take actions to amend the FAR to exempt certain contracts from this requirement; (7) there is strong opposition to creating a governmentwide, government-maintained database for storing, analyzing, and retrieving market data; (8) most government and industry officials said that: (a) such a database would be too costly to maintain, be hard to keep current, and provide few benefits; and (b) using the tools available on the Internet appears to be a more practical alternative; (9) for example, some officials stated that powerful search engines are becoming available on the Internet that will likely facilitate market research of private sector and government electronic catalogs; (10) in addition, interactive forums have been placed on the Internet, such as DOD's newly developed Commercial Advocates Forum, that provide useful market research tools and information; and (11) based on GAO's discussions with government and industry officials, and in light of new developments on the Internet, GAO does not believe that federal agencies should be required, at this time, to create a government-maintained database to store, retrieve, and analyze market data. |
gao_GAO-16-669 | gao_GAO-16-669_0 | The Clean Energy Ministerial is focused on improving energy efficiency worldwide, enhancing clean energy supply, and expanding clean energy access. Agencies Obligated About $97 Million in Total for Clean Energy Cooperation with China for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2015
U.S. agencies obligated about $97 million for clean energy cooperation with China over the 8-year period of fiscal years 2008 through 2015. More than 90 percent of this money was obligated by three agencies: DOE, USTDA, and State. The work through fiscal year 2015 was separated into three tracks focused on clean coal, clean vehicles, and energy efficiency in buildings. Export promotion: Activities to promote U.S. exports received about 13 percent of the funding, all of which was from USTDA and included feasibility studies, trade missions, and some technical assistance. For example, CERC projects had led to the launch of 15 products by the end of 2015, including software for enhancing energy efficiency in buildings. The Three Key Programs Have Yielded Some Results
Our analysis of the measures and documents used by the three programs to track performance at the program and lower levels shows that all of the programs have yielded some results, such as the number of products launched as a result of CERC, the dollar value of exports generated by USTDA’s projects, and the number of people trained on global climate change by CCWG initiatives. Although the Three Programs Monitor Performance, They Generally Lack Targets, Making It Unclear How Results Compare with Intended Performance
All three programs monitor progress toward their goals through a variety of tools, such as performance reports and program reviews. To help manage program performance, linking goals to performance measures that are tracked against established targets is a leading practice for federal programs. DOE Has Taken Steps to Manage IP Risks CERC Participants May Face, but Participants Are Reluctant to Share IP
DOE officials identified potential sharing of background IP—IP generated outside the scope of a research and development collaboration—and participants not having a clear plan for managing IP as risks to U.S. companies and researchers participating in CERC. According to agency officials, this has not been the case in previous science and technology agreements between the United States and other countries. CERC Participants Reported No Significant Issues with DOE’s Approach to IP, but Participants Are Reluctant to Share IP
CERC participants we interviewed did not report any significant issues with steps DOE has taken to address IP risks. DOE officials acknowledged that companies participating in CERC face a tradeoff between the risks of sharing background IP and the potential benefits, such as valuable research and development outcomes and gaining a market advantage through demonstrating projects in China. These officials also stated that it is appropriate for companies to assess risks for themselves and not share their most valuable IP if the related risk is determined to be too great. Conclusions
Both the United States and China have committed to efforts to address climate change, including doubling their research and development investments on clean energy. CERC and CCWG officials are in the process of planning the next phases of those programs, and USTDA describes itself as an agency that values the role of data in making program decisions. In their written comments reproduced in appendices IV, V, and VI, DOE, State, and USTDA, respectively, agreed with our recommendations and noted plans to take action to address them. This report examines (1) how much funding U.S. agencies have obligated to clean energy cooperation with China; (2) what is known about the results of key U.S.-China cooperation programs and the extent to which these programs follow leading practices in performance monitoring; and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages risks that may face U.S. participants in the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC). | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and China lead the world in energy consumption, and both are investing in renewable resources and efforts to increase the efficiency of traditional fossil fuel sources in part to address climate change. In 2014, a congressional commission raised questions about bilateral cooperation between the United States and China on clean energy, including potential IP risks to U.S. participants involved in collaborative research projects.
GAO was asked to review government-led U.S.-China collaborative initiatives on clean energy. This report examines (1) how much funding U.S. agencies obligated for clean energy cooperation with China, (2) what is known about the results of key programs and the extent to which they follow leading practices in performance monitoring, and (3) the extent to which DOE managed risks that CERC participants may face. GAO analyzed funding data, reviewed documents and compiled reported results, interviewed agency officials and participants of key programs, and conducted site visits.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2008–2015, U.S. agencies obligated a total of about $97 million for clean energy cooperation with China. Two-thirds of this money was obligated for three key programs (projects of which are depicted from left to right below):
Department of Energy (DOE) program, the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), that has focused on research and development in clean coal, clean vehicles, and energy efficiency in buildings;
U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) program focused on export promotion through projects such as feasibility studies and trade missions; and
Department of State (State) program that includes information sharing and technology demonstration projects across various clean energy technologies.
The key programs have yielded some results and have performance monitoring tools but generally lack targets for their performance, making the significance of their progress unclear. Examples of the programs' results include: for CERC, as of the end of 2015, the launch of 15 products, such as software for enhancing energy efficiency of buildings; and for the USTDA program, through fiscal year 2015, about $230 million in U.S. exports from its clean energy projects. Based on performance monitoring principles in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, it is a leading practice for federal programs to link goals to performance measures with established targets. Without targets, it is unclear how results compare with intended performance and what improvements may be needed; this is particularly important as DOE and State officials are planning the next phases of their programs and USTDA emphasizes the role of data in program decisions.
DOE identified intellectual property (IP) risks CERC participants may face, such as participants not having a clear plan for protecting IP, and took steps to manage them. These steps included requiring agreements clarifying IP rights and providing training, in part to encourage participants to share IP created outside of CERC projects. DOE officials said this IP sharing is important for valuable research and development collaboration. CERC participants GAO spoke with reported no significant issues with DOE's management of IP risks but, nonetheless, have been reluctant to share IP. DOE officials acknowledged that participants face a tradeoff between the risks and benefits of sharing IP with Chinese participants and that it is appropriate for companies to assess risks for themselves.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to enhance performance monitoring, including that DOE, USTDA, and State each develop targets for program-level performance and track progress against them for the key programs GAO reviewed. The agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and plan to take actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-792 | gao_GAO-16-792_0 | Background
Under PPACA, health-care marketplaces were intended to provide a single point of access for individuals to enroll in private health plans, apply for income-based subsidies to offset the cost of these plans— which, as noted, are not paid directly to enrollees, but instead are paid to health-insurance issuers—and, as applicable, obtain an eligibility determination or assessment of eligibility for other health-coverage programs. These other programs include Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Marketplaces are required by PPACA to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for the income-based subsidies or Medicaid. These verification steps include validating an applicant’s Social Security number, if one is provided; verifying citizenship, status as a U.S. national, or lawful presence by comparison with Social Security Administration or Department of Homeland Security records; and verifying household income and family size by comparison with tax-return data from the Internal Revenue Service, as well as data on Social Security benefits from the Social Security Administration. Results of Undercover Attempts to Obtain Qualified Health-Plan Coverage from the Federal Marketplace and Selected State Marketplaces
Our undercover testing for the 2015 coverage year found that the health- care marketplace eligibility determination and enrollment process for qualified health plans remains vulnerable to fraud. As shown in figure 1, the federal Marketplace or selected state marketplaces approved each of our 10 fictitious applications for subsidized qualified health plans. We proceeded to phone the marketplaces and our applications were subsequently approved. For the four fictitious applicants who claimed their employer did not provide minimum essential coverage, the marketplace did not contact our fictitious employer to confirm the applicant’s account that the company offers only substandard coverage. In August 2015, we briefed CMS, California, and Kentucky officials on the results of our undercover testing, to obtain their views. According to these officials, the marketplaces only inspect for documents that have obviously been altered. Thus, if the documentation submitted does not appear to have any obvious alterations, it would not be questioned for authenticity. In addition, according to Kentucky officials, in the case of the impossible Social Security number, the identity-proofing process functioned correctly, but a marketplace worker bypassed identity-proofing steps that would have required a manual verification of the fictitious Social Security card we submitted. Results of Undercover Attempts to Obtain Medicaid Coverage through the Federal Marketplace and Selected State Marketplaces
For our additional eight fictitious applications for Medicaid coverage in 2015, we were approved for subsidized health-care coverage in seven of the eight applications. As shown in figure 2, for three of the eight applications, we were approved for Medicaid, as originally sought. Details of Medicaid Applications through the Federal Marketplace
For the four fictitious Medicaid applications submitted to the federal Marketplace for 2015, we were told that we may be eligible for Medicaid but that the respective Medicaid state offices might require more information. CMS officials said that, instead, they accept the applicant’s attestation that the applicant was denied Medicaid coverage. For our North Dakota Medicaid application in which we did not provide a Social Security number but did provide an impossible immigration document number, we called the North Dakota Medicaid agency to determine the status of our application. As part of our 2015 testing and in response to such requests, we provided counterfeit follow-up documentation, such as a fake immigration card with an impossible numbering scheme, for these applicants. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report, which concludes work we initially presented in a testimony in October 2015, are to describe for the 2015 coverage year (1) results of undercover attempts to obtain qualified health-plan coverage from the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) and selected state marketplaces under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), for the act’s second open-enrollment period, for 2015 coverage; and (2) results of undercover attempts to obtain Medicaid coverage through the federal Marketplace and selected state marketplaces. The undercover results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees. For all 18 fictitious applications, we used publicly available information to construct our scenarios. We chose these two states because they had expanded Medicaid eligibility and also delegated their Medicaid eligibility determinations to the federal Marketplace at the time of our testing. We made 4 of these 10 applications online and the other 6 applications by phone. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces where consumers can, among other things, select private health-insurance plans or apply for Medicaid. The act requires verification of applicant information to determine enrollment or subsidy eligibility. In addition, PPACA provided for the expansion of the Medicaid program. GAO was asked to examine enrollment and verification controls for the marketplaces.
This report, which follows earlier testimony, provides final results of GAO testing and describes (1) undercover attempts to obtain health-plan coverage from the federal Marketplace and selected state marketplaces for 2015, and (2) undercover attempts to obtain Medicaid coverage through the federal Marketplace and the selected state marketplaces. GAO submitted, or attempted to submit, 18 fictitious applications by telephone and online. Ten applications tested controls related to obtaining subsidized coverage available through the federal Marketplace in New Jersey and North Dakota, and through state marketplaces in California and Kentucky. GAO chose these states based partly on range of population and whether the state had expanded Medicaid eligibility under PPACA. The other 8 applications tested controls for determining Medicaid eligibility. The results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized. GAO discussed results with CMS and state officials to obtain their views. The states identified several actions being taken in response to GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), health-insurance marketplaces are required to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and, if applicable, determine eligibility for income-based subsidies or Medicaid. Verification steps include reviewing and validating an applicant's Social Security number, if one is provided; citizenship, status as a U.S. national, or lawful presence; and household income and family size.
GAO's undercover testing for the 2015 coverage year found that the health-care marketplace eligibility determination and enrollment process for qualified health plans—that is, coverage obtained from private insurers—remains vulnerable to fraud. The federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) or selected state marketplaces approved each of 10 fictitious applications GAO made for subsidized health plans. Although 8 of these 10 fictitious applications failed the initial online identity-checking process, all 10 were subsequently approved. Four applications used Social Security numbers that, according to the Social Security Administration, have never been issued, such as numbers starting with “000.” Other applicants obtained duplicate enrollment or obtained coverage by claiming that their employer did not provide insurance that met minimum essential coverage.
For eight additional fictitious applications, initially made for Medicaid coverage, GAO was approved for subsidized health-care coverage in seven of the eight cases, through the federal Marketplace and the two selected state marketplaces.
Three of GAO's applications were approved for Medicaid, which was the health-care program for which GAO originally sought approval. In each case, GAO provided identity information that would not have matched Social Security Administration records. For two applications, the marketplace or state Medicaid agency directed the fictitious applicants to submit supporting documents, which GAO did (such as a fake immigration card), and the applications were approved. For the third, the marketplace did not seek supporting documentation, and the application was approved by phone.
For four, GAO was unable to obtain approval for Medicaid but was subsequently able to gain approval of subsidized health-plan coverage. In one case, GAO falsely claimed that it was denied Medicaid and was able to obtain the subsidized health plan when in fact no Medicaid determination had been made at that time.
For one, GAO was unable to enroll into Medicaid, in California, because GAO declined to provide a Social Security number. According to California officials, the state marketplace requires a Social Security number or taxpayer-identification number to process applications.
For both sets of testing, GAO submitted fictitious documentation as part of the application and enrollment process. According to officials from the Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services (CMS), California, Kentucky, and North Dakota, the marketplace or Medicaid office only inspect for supporting documentation that has obviously been altered. Thus, if the documentation submitted does not show such signs, it would not be questioned for authenticity. |
gao_GAO-15-297 | gao_GAO-15-297_0 | In carrying out its mission, IRS annually collects over $2 trillion in taxes from millions of individual taxpayers and numerous other types of taxpayers and manages the distribution of more than $300 billion in refunds. IRS’s fiscal year 2014 budget was $11.3 billion. Of this amount, IRS expected to spend about $2.4 billion on IT investments. IRS Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Prior Recommendations to Improve Reliability and Reporting of Cost, Schedule, and Scope Information
IRS has made limited progress in improving the reliability and reporting of cost, schedule, and scope performance information: it has partially implemented two of our five related recommendations and not yet addressed the remaining three. IRS’s implementation of these recommendations is critical in ensuring that Congress receives the reliable information it needs for effective oversight and decision making. Table 2 identifies the status of IRS’s efforts to address the recommendations. It is important to note that the cost and schedule information was not updated for two investments however, IRS did not consistently indicate so in its reports to Congress. IRS also reported “green” ratings for investments instead of their previous “yellow” ratings for Chief Technology Officer summary-level risk assessments. However, IRS does not provide these ratings for the six investments for which it provides detailed information in the quarterly reports to Congress. Providing summary-level risk ratings for all major investments would improve the visibility into changes in investment risk, and provide Congress with the information to more easily determine the investments requiring greater attention. Most Investments Were Reportedly Within Cost and Schedule Goals
According to IRS, 11 of 17 IT investments were within 10 percent of cost estimates between October 2013 and September 2014, and 13 of 17 investments were within 10 percent of schedule estimates between October 2013 and September 2014. While the detailed information on the 6 investments is consistent with congressional reporting requirements, supplementing it with Chief Technology Officer summary-level risk assessment ratings would improve the visibility into risks faced by these investments, and provide Congress with the information to more easily determine the investments requiring greater attention. Variances from Selected Investments’ Initial Cost, Schedule, and Scope Goals Have Not Been Transparent and Reporting of ACA Testing Status Is Not Comprehensive
Selected investments experienced variances from initial cost, schedule, and scope goals that were not transparent in congressional reporting because IRS has yet to address our prior recommendations for reporting at the investment level and on progress in delivering scope. Specifically, RRP has so far exceeded planned costs by $86.5 million and has yet to deliver functionality that was scheduled for September 2012, in large part due to the need to implement new technology and a lack of adequate resources, including contracting expertise and staff; a key phase of CADE 2 was developed 10 months late and at $183.6 million more than planned; and the IRDM Case Management project was cancelled. In addition, the reports on the status of testing for the ACA investment are not comprehensive, making it difficult to determine whether all required testing is being performed. Accordingly, we believe our recommendation is still warranted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate IRS’s efforts to address our recommendations for improving the reliability and reporting of cost, schedule, and scope information; (2) summarize the reported cost, schedule, and performance of IRS’s major IT investments; and (3) assess the status and plans of selected investments. We assessed a recommendation as being fully addressed if IRS provided evidence that it fully addressed our recommendation; partially addressed if IRS provided evidence that it addressed our recommendation to some extent; and not addressed if IRS did not provide any evidence that it addressed our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS relies extensively on IT systems to annually collect more than $2 trillion in taxes, distribute more than $300 billion in refunds, and carry out its mission of providing service to America's taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. For fiscal year 2014, IRS expected to spend about $2.4 billion on IT. Given the size and significance of IRS's IT investments and the challenges inherent in successfully delivering these complex IT systems, it is important that Congress be provided reliable cost, schedule, and scope information to assist with its oversight responsibilities.
Accordingly, GAO's objectives were to (1) evaluate IRS's efforts to address prior GAO recommendations for improving the reliability and reporting of cost, schedule, and scope information; (2) summarize the reported cost, schedule, and performance of IRS's major IT investments; and (3) assess the status and plans of selected investments.
To do so, GAO analyzed quarterly reports and reviewed information on cost and schedule from October 2013 to September 2014, interviewed program officials, and analyzed documentation for selected investments.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has made limited progress in improving the reliability and reporting of cost, schedule, and scope performance information–the agency has partially implemented two of GAO's five prior recommendations, but not yet addressed the remaining three (see table). IRS's implementation of these recommendations is critical in ensuring that Congress receives the reliable information it needs for effective oversight and decision making.
Key: ● Fully—the agency provided evidence that it fully addressed the recommendation. ◐ Partially—the agency provided evidence that it has addressed the recommendation to some extent. ◌ Not addressed—the agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed the recommendation.
Most of IRS's major information technology (IT) investments were reported as meeting cost and schedule goals. Specifically, 11 of 17 investments were reportedly within 10 percent of cost estimates, and 13 were within 10 percent of schedule estimates between October 2013 and September 2014. In addition, the agency reported “green” ratings for investments instead of their previous “yellow” ratings for Chief Technology Officer summary-level risk assessments. It is important to note that these ratings are not provided for 6 investments for which IRS provides detailed reporting to Congress. Providing summary-level risk ratings for all major investments would improve the visibility into changes in investment risk, and provide Congress with the information to more easily determine the investments requiring greater attention.
Selected investments experienced variances from initial cost, schedule, and scope plans that were not transparent in congressional reporting because IRS has yet to address GAO's prior recommendations. Specifically, the Return Review Program has so far exceeded planned costs by $86.5 million and has yet to deliver functionality that was scheduled for September 2012, and a key phase of Customer Account Data Engine 2 was developed 10 months late and at $183.6 million more than planned. However, none of these variances were clearly identified in congressional reporting. In addition, the consolidated reports on the status of testing for the Affordable Care Act Administration investment are not comprehensive, making it difficult to determine whether all required testing is being performed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to improve the reliability and reporting of investment performance information and management of selected investments. IRS agreed with two recommendations but disagreed with the third related to the reporting of test results. GAO continues to believe it is still warranted. |
gao_GAO-07-828 | gao_GAO-07-828_0 | In addition, mobilized reservists are eligible for full health care benefits for themselves and their dependents. Cost to Compensate Guard and Reserve Personnel Has Increased Significantly Since Fiscal Year 2000
The total cost to the federal government to compensate both part-time and full-time National Guard and reserve personnel increased significantly, about 47 percent, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2006. The cost increased from about $13.9 billion in fiscal year 2000 to about $20.5 billion in fiscal year 2006, as shown in figure 2. This cost includes (1) cash compensation, such as basic pay and other allowances; (2) noncash compensation, such as education assistance and health care; and (3) deferred compensation, that is, benefits that promise future compensation like retirement pay and health care. In addition to part-time reservists, about 9 percent of reservists work full- time, and their per capita cost to the federal government also increased, as shown in figure 4, from about $90,100 in fiscal year 2000 to about $115,200 in fiscal year 2006, about 28 percent. This increase is similar to the trends in active duty per capita compensation cost (see app. DOD Does Not Know the Extent to Which Its Mix of Compensation Is Meeting Its Human Capital Goals
DOD does not know the extent to which its mix of cash, noncash, and deferred compensation is meeting its human capital goals of recruiting and retaining personnel. However, these efforts have been done in a piecemeal fashion that has shifted the mix of reserve compensation toward more deferred benefits, even though this may not be the most efficient allocation of compensation to enable DOD to meet its recruiting and retention human capital goals. Figure 6 shows an increase in deferred compensation from 12 percent of total reserve compensation in fiscal year 2000 to 28 percent in fiscal year 2006. This preference for cash compensation has a profound impact on the efficiency of DOD’s compensation system, especially considering that fewer than one in four part-time reservists will receive these costly deferred benefits. More specifically, about 24 percent of those who join the guard and reserve will ultimately earn nondisability retirement pay and health care for life. Moreover, these changes may not be sustainable over the long term. DOD Does Not Have an Established Compensation Strategy and Performance Measures to Gauge the Efficiency of Reserve Compensation
DOD is unable to gauge the efficiency of the mix of reserve compensation and its compensation tools because it has not established a compensation strategy or performance measures. DOD Does Not Have Transparency over Total Costs of Reserve Compensation
Decision makers in Congress and DOD do not have adequate transparency over total costs for providing reserve compensation—including the allocation of costs to cash, noncash, and deferred compensation—and the cost of mobilized reservists. Good business practices require adequate transparency over investments of resources, especially in times of fiscal constraint. Until total costs for reserve compensation are compiled in a transparent and easily accessible manner, decision makers will be unable to determine the affordability and efficiency of the reserve compensation system. Knowing these costs is especially important given the growing fiscal challenges the country faces. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the appropriateness of the reserve compensation system and to gain transparency over total reserve compensation costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: Establish a clear compensation strategy that includes performance measures to evaluate the efficiency of compensation in meeting recruiting and retention goals, and use the performance measures to monitor the performance of compensation and assess what mix of compensation will be most efficient in the future. Compile the total costs to provide reserve compensation for part-time, full-time, and mobilized reservists and communicate these costs as well as the allocation of these costs among cash, noncash, and deferred compensation to decision makers within the administration and Congress—perhaps as an annual exhibit as part of the President’s budget submission to Congress. We interviewed DOD recruiting and retention officials to determine the extent to which compensation is used to attract and retain reserve personnel. 10. 19. 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly relied on reserve personnel to carry out its military operations. Congress and DOD have taken steps to enhance reserve compensation, such as improving health care benefits. Concerns exist, however, that rising compensation costs may not be sustainable in the future, especially given the nation's large and growing long-range fiscal imbalance. Under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to conduct work on his own initiative, GAO (1) reviewed how much it has cost the federal government to compensate reserve personnel since fiscal year 2000; (2) assessed the extent to which DOD's mix of cash, noncash, and deferred compensation has helped DOD meet its human capital goals; and (3) evaluated the extent to which DOD's approach to reserve compensation provides transparency over total cost to the federal government. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed budget data and relevant legislation and also interviewed appropriate officials. GAO focused this review on part-time reservists and full-time, active guard and reserve.
What GAO Found
Using fiscal year (FY) 2006 constant dollars, the federal government's total cost to compensate part-time and full-time reserve personnel has increased 47 percent since FY 2000, rising from about $13.9 billion in FY 2000 to about $20.5 billion in FY 2006. Most reservists are part-time, and their per capita compensation costs nearly doubled from about $10,100 in FY 2000 to about $19,100 in FY 2006. Additionally, a small percentage of reservists work full-time, and their per capita costs increased about 28 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2006. Cash compensation, which servicemembers see in their "paycheck," has increased about 19 percent. However, much of the total growth in compensation is driven by the costs for deferred compensation. These costs tripled over this period, primarily attributed to enhanced health care benefits. Moreover, DOD officials anticipate significant continued growth in health care costs because of the expansion of health care coverage to reserve personnel in FY 2007. DOD does not know the extent to which its mix of pay and benefits meets its human capital goals in part because it lacks an established compensation strategy to identify the appropriate mix of reserve compensation to maintain its force. DOD and Congress have added pay and benefits using a piecemeal approach that has not been based on an established strategy and that has not adequately considered the appropriateness, affordability, and sustainability of the related costs. These additions have contributed to a shift in the mix of compensation toward more deferred benefits--that is, future compensation such as retirement pay and health care for life. Deferred benefits increased from 12 percent of total reserve compensation in FY 2000 to 28 percent of total compensation in FY 2006. This increase in deferred compensation may not be the most efficient allocation given that fewer than one in four of those who join the reserve will ultimately earn nondisability retirement pay and health care for life. Moreover, DOD does not know the efficiency and effectiveness of these changes in meeting its recruiting and retention goals because it does not have performance measures. Without performance measures, DOD cannot determine the return on its compensation investment or make fact-based choices on how its compensation resources should be allocated. DOD's approach to reserve compensation does not provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with adequate transparency over total cost for reservists--including the allocation of costs to cash, noncash, and deferred compensation, as well as the cost for mobilized reservists. Despite the fact that sound business practices require adequate transparency over investments of resources, currently costs are found in multiple budgets within three federal departments. Until total reserve compensation costs are compiled in a transparent manner--and decisions are based on established compensation strategies--decision makers will be unable to determine the affordability, cost effectiveness, and ultimately the sustainability of the reserve compensation system. Increased transparency is especially important given the growing fiscal challenges the country faces. |
gao_GAO-04-1100T | gao_GAO-04-1100T_0 | Influenza and pneumonia rank as the fifth leading cause of death among persons aged 65 and older. Currently, two manufacturers—one in the United States and one in the United Kingdom— produce over 95 percent of the vaccine used in the United States. Production for the 2003-04 flu season was based on the previous year’s demand and was about 87 million doses. HHS also has a role in planning to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. Planning is key to being prepared for and mitigating the negative effects of the next influenza pandemic, including major illness, death, economic loss, and social disruption. Challenges Exist in Ensuring an Adequate and Timely Flu Vaccine Supply
Ensuring an adequate and timely supply of vaccine is a difficult task. For the 2003-04 flu season, shortages of vaccine have been attributed to an earlier than expected and more severe flu season and to higher than normal demand, likely resulting from media coverage of pediatric deaths associated with influenza. According to CDC officials, this increased demand occurred in a year in which manufacturers had produced about the same number of doses as in the previous season and that supply was not adequate to meet the demand. This happened in the 2000-01 season, and it could happen again. When vaccine supply is limited relative to public demand for flu shots, distributors and others who have supplies of the vaccine have the ability—and the economic incentive—to sell their supplies to the highest bidders rather than filling lower-priced orders they had already received. Our work has also found that there is no mechanism in place to ensure distribution of flu vaccine to high-risk individuals before others when the vaccine is in short supply. Including the flu vaccine in the Vaccines for Children (VFC) stockpile to help improve flu vaccine supply. HHS’s Draft Pandemic Influenza Plan Defines Roles and Responsibilities but Leaves Some Important Issues Unresolved
HHS’s draft pandemic influenza plan describes federal roles and responsibilities in responding to an influenza pandemic and provides planning guidance to state and local health departments and the health care system. In addition, the draft plan does not make recommendations for how population groups should be prioritized to receive vaccines in a pandemic. The draft plan also provides technical background information on preparedness and response activities such as vaccine development and production. Draft Plan Leaves Many Important Issues Unresolved, Making It Difficult for States to Plan
Although HHS’s draft pandemic influenza plan is comprehensive in scope, it leaves many important decisions about the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines unresolved. These decisions include determining the public- versus the private-sector roles in the purchase and distribution of vaccines; the division of responsibility between the federal government and the states for vaccine distribution; and how population groups will be prioritized and targeted to receive limited supplies of vaccines. Only two manufacturers currently produce flu vaccine for seniors and others at high risk for flu-related complications, and manufacturing problems experienced in recent years illustrate the fragility of the current methods of production. Despite efforts by CDC and others, there remains no system to ensure that persons at high risk for complications receive flu vaccine first when vaccine is in short supply. Agency Comments
Officials from CDC provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Related GAO Products
SARS Outbreak: Improvements to Public Health Capacity Are Needed for Responding to Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases. Influenza Pandemic: Plan Needed for Federal and State Response. | Why GAO Did This Study
Influenza is associated with an average of 36,000 deaths and more than 200,000 hospitalizations each year in the United States. Persons aged 65 and older are involved in more than 9 of 10 deaths and 1 of 2 hospitalizations related to influenza. The best way to prevent influenza is to be vaccinated each fall. In the 2000-01 flu season, and again in the 2003-04 flu season, this country experienced periods when the demand for flu vaccine exceeded the supply, and there is concern about the availability of vaccines for this and future flu seasons. There is also concern about the prospect of a worldwide influenza epidemic, or pandemic, which many experts believe to be inevitable. Three influenza pandemics occurred in the twentieth century. Experts estimate that the next pandemic could kill up to 207,000 people in the United States and cause major social disruption. Public health experts have raised concerns about the ability of the nation's public health system to respond to an influenza pandemic. GAO was asked to discuss issues related to supply, demand, and distribution of vaccine for a regular flu season and assess the federal plan to respond to an influenza pandemic. GAO based this testimony on products it has issued since October 2000, as well as work it conducted to update key information.
What GAO Found
Challenges persist in ensuring an adequate and timely flu vaccine supply. The number of producers remains limited, and the potential for manufacturing problems such as those experienced in recent years is still present. If a manufacturer's production is affected, those providers who ordered vaccine from that manufacturer could experience shortages, while providers who received supplies from another manufacturer might have all the vaccine they need. This potential for imbalance is what creates situations in which some providers might not have enough vaccine for persons at highest risk, while other providers might have enough supply to hold mass-immunization clinics even for persons at lower risk for flu-related complications. To help limit the potential for such situations, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and others have taken such steps as adding flu vaccine to federal stockpiles and more aggressively monitoring the projected supply of vaccine. However, there is no system in place to ensure that seniors and others at high risk for complications receive flu vaccinations first when vaccine is in short supply. The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) draft "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan" provides a blueprint for the government's role but leaves some important decisions about the government's response unresolved. In addition to describing the federal role, responsibilities, and actions in collaboration with the states in responding to an influenza pandemic, the plan also provides planning guidance to state and local health departments and the health care system. The draft plan is comprehensive in scope, but it leaves decisions about the purchase, distribution, and administration of vaccines open for public comment and for the states to decide individually. In addition, the draft plan does not make recommendations for how population groups should be prioritized to receive vaccines in a pandemic. Difficulties encountered during the annual flu season in the purchase, distribution, and administration of flu vaccine highlight the importance of resolving these issues for pandemic preparedness. Officials from CDC provided technical comments on this testimony that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-202 | gao_GAO-12-202_0 | Coast Guard Did Not Meet the Required Deadline for Establishing IOCs, but Has Made Progress
The Coast Guard did not meet the October 2009 deadline enacted in the SAFE Port Act to establish IOCs; however, the Coast Guard is establishing IOCs at all 35 of its sectors, although none of them have achieved full operating capability. Coast Guard Did Not Meet the SAFE Port Act IOC Deadline, and Its Definition of an IOC Has Evolved
The Coast Guard did not meet the SAFE Port Act’s deadline to establish IOCs at high-risk ports within 3 years of enactment, in part because it was not appropriated funds to establish the IOCs until fiscal year 2008—14 months after enactment of the law, and because the definition of a fully operational IOC was evolving during this period. DHS Has Recently Begun to Support Port-Partner Participation and Further IOC Implementation
According to the Coast Guard’s Chief of IOC Implementation and its Information Sharing Executive Agent, continued support is needed from DHS to increase port-partner participation and the success of the IOC initiative. According to Coast Guard officials, once DHS delegated responsibility for the development of IOCs to the Coast Guard, the department did not provide any support or guidance on how to implement IOCs. However, it is too early to determine how successful these efforts will be in facilitating the IOC’s role in sharing critical information among port partners. WatchKeeper Is Not Being Used by Majority of Port Partners; Monitoring Participation and Soliciting Input Could Help Improve System
The Coast Guard has granted WatchKeeper access to port partners at 11 of the 12 sectors where it has been installed, but the majority of those port partners with access were not using the system frequently, with more than 80 percent of port partners not logging on to the system from July through September 2011. Without a means to determine to what extent (1) sectors are providing port partners WatchKeeper access and (2) port partners are using WatchKeeper, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to determine whether WatchKeeper is facilitating the IOC initiative in meeting its goals of improving information sharing and coordination of joint operations. Additionally, in May 2011, the Coast Guard and CBP—a port- According to the Coast Guard, it consulted with CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) when developing the initial requirements for WatchKeeper. Without a process to obtain and incorporate port-partner input into the development of future WatchKeeper requirements, the Coast Guard does not have reasonable assurance that WatchKeeper will satisfy port partners’ needs, and facilitate mission-based information sharing to achieve the goals of the IOC project. Coast Guard Has Not Adhered to Established Guidance in Defining WatchKeeper Requirements, Cost, and Schedule
The Coast Guard has not adhered to established guidance in defining WatchKeeper requirements, cost, and schedule, which are fundamental to delivering a system on time and within budget. In particular, the Coast Guard has not (1) effectively developed and managed WatchKeeper requirements, (2) developed a reliable cost estimate to guide and inform the WatchKeeper investment, and (3) developed a reliable project schedule to develop and deploy WatchKeeper. Moreover, the Coast Guard does not have any documentation that outlines the activities that need to be completed by its development organization. Additionally, the cost estimate identifies costs associated with the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of the IOC project as well as contractor-related costs, but it does not include all government costs, such as those related to systems engineering and program management. Project officials attributed the limitations in the cost estimate to a lack of project resources and competing priorities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure effective implementation of WatchKeeper and maximize its use among port partners, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the IOC Project Manager to take the following two actions: collect data to determine the extent to which (1) sectors are providing port partners WatchKeeper access and (2) port partners are using WatchKeeper; and develop, document, and implement a process to obtain and incorporate port-partner input into the development of future WatchKeeper requirements. To address the risks facing the Coast Guard in its acquisition and deployment of WatchKeeper, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard direct the IOC Project Manager to take the following three actions: implement key requirements-development and management practices to include (1) defining and documenting requirements, including eliciting user needs from all relevant port partners, before initiating key design activities, (2) prioritizing remaining requirements to ensure critical port-partner needs are addressed, and (3) tracing bi-directionally between higher-level operational requirements and lower-level system requirements; revise the IOC project life-cycle cost estimate for delivering WatchKeeper capabilities to reflect the four characteristics of a reliable estimate discussed in this report; and develop an integrated master schedule for delivering WatchKeeper that addresses, at a minimum, the key schedule-estimating practices discussed in this report. DHS stated that it will continue to evaluate acquisition priorities in the context of, among other things, Coast Guard mission needs. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guarda component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)is responsible for establishing Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) in response to provisions of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. IOCs are designed to, among other things, share maritime information with the Coast Guards port partners (other agencies and organizations it coordinates with). To facilitate IOCs, the Coast Guard is implementing an information-management and sharing system called WatchKeeper. GAO was asked to assess IOC and WatchKeeper implementation. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS and the Coast Guard have implemented IOCs, (2) port partners use WatchKeeper and the Coast Guard has facilitated its use to enhance IOC capabilities, and (3) the Coast Guard has adhered to established guidance in defining WatchKeeper requirements and its associated cost and schedule. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as implementation plans, and interviewed Coast Guard and port-partner officials at the first four sectors (field locations) where WatchKeeper was implemented. The results of the four sector visits are not generalizable, but provide insights.
What GAO Found
DHS's and the Coast Guard did not meet the SAFE Port Act's requirement that IOCs be established at high-priority ports by October 2009, in part because the Coast Guard was not appropriated funds to establish the IOCs until 14 months after enactment of the law, and the definition of an IOC was evolving during this period. However, the Coast Guard plans to establish IOCs at all 35 of its sectors. According to the Coast Guard's analysis of sector status reports, none of its sectors have achieved IOCs with full operating capability. According to the Coast Guards Chief of IOC Implementation, as well as its Information Sharing Executive Agent, continued support is needed from DHS to increase port-partner participation and the success of the IOC initiative. DHS has recently begun to support efforts to increase port-partner participation and further IOC implementation, such as facilitating the review of an IOC management directive. It is too early to determine, though, if and when IOCs will achieve their intended goal of sharing information and coordinating operations with port partners.
The Coast Guard has granted WatchKeeper access to port partners at 11 of the 12 sectors where it has been installed, but more than 80 percent of those port partners did not log on from July through September 2011. As of October 2011, the Coast Guard no longer collects data on port partners access and use of WatchKeeper. Without such data, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to determine whether WatchKeeper is facilitating the IOC program in meeting its goals of improving information sharing and coordination of joint operations. GAO interviewed 22 port partners who were not using WatchKeeper. Of those 22, the most frequently cited reason (by 7 port partners) is that it does not help them perform their missions. The Coast Guard primarily consulted with Customs and Border Protection when developing WatchKeeper, but did not solicit input from all port partners. Without developing, documenting, and implementing a process on how it will incorporate port partners feedback into future WatchKeeper requirements, the Coast Guard does not have reasonable assurance that WatchKeeper will satisfy the needs of port partners and facilitate IOC goals.
The Coast Guard has not defined WatchKeeper requirements, cost, and schedule in accordance with established guidance. For example, the Coast Guard designed and developed the initial WatchKeeper segment without first defining the specific functions that the system is to perform. Further, the Coast Guard has not developed a reliable cost estimate to guide and inform the WatchKeeper investment. For example, the estimate does not include all government costs, such as related program-management costs. Also, WatchKeeper development and deployment has not been guided by a reliable schedule of the work needed to be performed and the key activities that need to occur. In particular, the schedule does not link all activities so that the project office can determine how a slip in a particular task may affect other related tasks, or the overall schedule. Project officials attributed these limitations to an aggressive IOC development schedule, limited resources, and competing priorities. As a result, these limitations increase the risk that WatchKeeper capabilities will not meet mission needs and will not be delivered on time and within budget.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard collect data on port partners access and use of WatchKeeper; develop, document, and implement a process on how to incorporate port-partner input; implement requirements-development practices; and revise the cost estimate and the integrated master schedule. DHS concurred subject to the availability of funds. |
gao_GAO-05-911T | gao_GAO-05-911T_0 | The schedules program provides advantages to both federal agencies and vendors. In administering the multiple award schedules program, GSA is responsible for ensuring that negotiated prices reflect the government’s aggregate buying power. GSA contracting officials seek discounts from a vendor’s price list that are equal to or greater than the vendor’s most favored customer’s discounts. In the mid-1990s, GSA had about 5,200 schedules contracts. By fiscal year 2004, this number had increased to over 16,000 contracts. Historically, GSA Has Not Consistently Made Good Use of Pre-award and Postaward Audits
GSA’s use of pre-award audits and postaward audits of pre-award information has been sporadic—a finding we have reported for more than 25 years. We found that sales and discount information submitted on 6 of 15 contract proposals was not accurate, complete, and current. In 1979, we again reported that price information submitted by some vendors was unreliable. Moreover, of the 11 audits (1 pre-award and 10 postaward) that had been done during fiscal years 1977 and 1978, all but 2 found inaccurate sales information had been reported by vendors or the availability of better discounts had not been disclosed. Pricing problems continued throughout the 1980s, and GSA’s use of pre- award audits and postaward audits of pre-award information was limited. These pre-award audits resulted in nearly $480 million in negotiated cost savings for GSA’s customers. Additionally, from fiscal years 1990 through fiscal year 1994, the GSA Inspector General reported that it recovered an average of $18 million each year in vendor overcharges. Despite Skyrocketing Sales, Pricing Problems and the Overall Decline in the Use of Pre-award Audits Have Continued
In August 1997, GSA revised its acquisition regulations to expand access to commercial products and services and implement greater use of commercial buying practices. The Inspector General projected that over the contract’s term, GSA customers would pay nearly $40 million more for these products than they should. In February 2005, we completed our most recent review of the multiple awards schedules program and found that contract pricing continues to be a problem. GSA management officials agreed with our recommendations, and stated that GSA would continue to work with the Inspector General to increase and improve the number of pre-award audits, publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register to request comments on the role of postaward audit reviews in the acquisition process, and evaluate the results of the fiscal year 2004 contract file review and that this evaluation would involve a discussion and identification of the underlying reasons for any weaknesses. Historically, pre-award and postaward audits have proven their value in deterring overpricing and recovering vendor overcharges. Until GSA takes steps to ensure the appropriate use of available pricing and negotiation tools, it will continue to miss opportunities to save the government hundreds of millions of dollars in the procurement of goods and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, federal agencies spend billions of dollars to buy commercial products and services through the General Service Administration's (GSA) Multiple Award Schedules program. The program has grown significantly over the past several years. Currently, federal agencies can directly purchase, through more than 16,000 schedule contracts, over 8 million products from more than 10,000 commercial vendors. In fiscal year 2004, purchases from these contracts totaled more than $32 billion. The multiple award schedules program is designed to take advantage of the government's significant buying power. To maximize savings, GSA negotiates discounts that are equal to or greater than those given to the vendor's most favored customers. This testimony focuses on GSA's historic use of two proven negotiation tools to improve the pricing of schedules contracts--pre-award audits and postaward audits of pre-award information. Pre-award audits allow GSA to avoid potential overpricing by verifying vendor pricing information before contracts are awarded. Postaward audits allow GSA to identify overpricing of awarded contracts and recover overcharges.
What GAO Found
Historically, GSA has used pre-award and postaward audits sporadically, thereby minimizing its ability to avoid excessive pricing and recover overcharges and potentially save millions of federal dollars. For more than 25 years, GAO has reported on GSA's multiple award schedules program pricing problems. In March 1977, we reported that pre-award information on 6 of 15 contract proposals was not accurate, complete, or current. In 1979, we again reported that pricing information submitted by some vendors was unreliable. Moreover, only 1 pre-award audit and 10 postaward audits had been conducted during fiscal years 1977 and 1978 of which 9 found inaccurate sales information had been reported by vendors or the availability of better discounts had not been disclosed. These problems continued throughout the 1980s. In the early 1990s, GSA made good use of pre-award and postaward audits, negotiating nearly $480 million in cost savings and recovering about $90 million in vendor overcharges over 5 years. However, in August 1997, GSA revised its acquisition regulations and effectively eliminated the use of postaward audits. While GSA expected pre-award audits to increase, this increase never materialized. In August 2001, the GSA Inspector General reported that GSA was not consistently negotiating most favored customer pricing. For just one contract, the Inspector General projected that over the contract's term, GSA customers would pay nearly $40 million more than they should have. In February 2005, we completed our most recent review of the multiple award schedules program and found that pricing problems persist and that the number of pre-award audits continued to decline. We concluded that GSA was continuing to miss opportunities to save hundreds of millions of dollars. |
gao_GAO-02-890 | gao_GAO-02-890_0 | Background
In 1985, Congress required the Department of the Defense to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical agents and munitions and to establish an organization within the Army to manage the agent destruction program. The Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Product was added in 1993 to destroy any chemical weapons or materiel not included in the stockpile disposal program. Lessons Learned Program Has Made Positive Contributions but Needs Improvement
The Lessons Learned Program has made valuable contributions in support of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project’s efforts to safely destroy the chemical stockpile. It has generally operated consistently with knowledge management principles and lessons sharing best practices and has successfully captured and shared thousands of lessons. However, the program does not apply or incorporate all knowledge management principles and lessons sharing best practices. For example, the program does not provide needed guidance for senior managers; it does not have formal a validation procedure to determine whether a problem has been fixed; and the database of lessons learned needs improvement. The Lessons Learned Program remained primarily focused on the five incineration sites. The Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project does have access to the Lessons Learned Program’s database, and it plans to develop its own separate database that it will share with the Lessons Learned Program only at “key milestones.” The project’s information, however, could be very valuable to other components of the Chem- Demil Program, especially the Assembled Chemical Weapons Program, which also researches alternative technologies. As a result, fragmented or duplicative efforts continue today, and the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program in particular lacks access to important data maintained by the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project and the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness and usefulness of the Chemical Demilitarization Program’s Lessons Learned Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop guidance to assist managers in their decision making when making exceptions to lessons learned, develop procedures to validate, monitor, and prioritize the lessons learned to ensure corrective actions fully address deficiencies identified as the most significant, and improve the organizational structure of the database so that users may easily find information and develop criteria to prioritize lessons in the database. The incineration process and the releases and construction incidents are described below. | What GAO Found
The Army has been tasked to destroy 31,500 tons of highly toxic chemical agents by April 2007, the deadline set by an international treaty for the elimination of all chemical weapon stockpiles. To destroy the weapons, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the Army Chemical Demilitarization Program. The Army has destroyed over one-quarter of the U.S. stockpile as of March 2002. Originally, the Chem-Demil Program consisted only of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project, which was initiated in 1988 to incinerate chemical weapons at nine storage sites. In response to public concern about incineration, in 1994 Congress established the Alternative Technologies and Approaches Project to investigate alternatives to the baseline incineration process. The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project operates a Programmatic Lessons Learned Program whose aim is to enhance safety, reduce or avoid unnecessary costs, and maintain the incineration schedule. This program has successfully supported the incineration project's primary goal to safely destroy chemical weapons and has captured and shared many lessons from past experiences and incidents. However, the Lessons Learned Program does not fully apply generally accepted knowledge management principles and lessons sharing best practices, thereby limiting its effectiveness. The program's management plan does not provide policy guidance for senior managers to help them in decision-making or daily operations. In addition, it does not have formal procedures to test or validate whether a corrective action has been effective in resolving its deficiency. Finally, the lessons learned database is difficult to search and does not prioritize lessons. The Lessons Learned Program has been effective in sharing knowledge among the different stakeholders within the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Project. However, as new components were created to destroy the stockpile, the scope of the Lessons Learned Program remained primarily limited to the incineration project. As a result, some components that could greatly benefit from timely and full sharing of lessons learned with the incineration project are not doing so. |
gao_GGD-96-120 | gao_GGD-96-120_0 | Introduction
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)(referred to in this report jointly as the enterprises) are government-sponsored enterprises that play important roles in federal support of home ownership and America’s housing finance system. They earn profits primarily from two sources. Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae operated differently. (See table 1.5.) On the other hand, if the markets’ perception about the implied guarantee does not change, or changes very little, the effect of privatization on the enterprises’ costs would be limited largely to expenses related to SEC registration requirements and state and local corporate income taxes. Privatization Would Eliminate Direct Benefits
Privatization would eliminate the direct benefits conveyed by the enterprises’ federal charters. However, using the Federal Reserve could make enterprise securities more liquid and convenient investments than they would be otherwise. We have concluded, however, that if the enterprises were fully privatized and the perceived guarantee were reduced or eliminated, their funding costs would increase for both MBS and debt. 2). In addition, their cost advantages may have sheltered them from potential competitors in the secondary market. They did not, however, predict the potential impact of reduced liquidity on mortgage interest rates. Freddie Mac officials said that mortgage rates would increase by more than 15 to 35 basis points; in fact, they predicted an increase of 55 to 86 basis points. 3). Transition Issues and Alternative Policy Options
Privatization of the enterprises would clearly be a major policy change. Generally, the larger the new enterprises are, the greater the risks that investors would continue to perceive an implicit federal guarantee, because the enterprises could be considered too big to fail and there would be increased potential cost to taxpayers if the enterprises were rescued by the government; and the enterprises, because of their size and the possible remaining perception of an implicit federal guarantee, would exercise market power in business activities outside of the secondary mortgage market for conventional, conforming residential mortgages. User fees on the enterprises could help level the playing field between the enterprises and private-label conduits and motivate these conduits to securitize conforming mortgages, because the cost of funds differential would be reduced. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO examined the potential effects of privatizing the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would have a major impact on both the secondary and primary mortgage markets; (2) if the two government-sponsored enterprises lost the benefits of their federal charter, their costs would increase because they would be responsible for paying Securities and Exchange Commission registration fees on their securities or state and local taxes; (3) by eliminating or reducing the implied federal guarantee on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and debt, the enterprises' borrowing costs would increase from 30 to 106 basis points if the perceived federal guarantee were completely eliminated; (4) these increased costs would be passed to the homebuyer and the average mortgage interest rate would increase by 15 to 35 basis points; (5) eliminating the cost advantages of federal sponsorship could spur more competition and retain liquidity in the secondary market because firms would find it profitable to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages; (6) privatization could stabilize the securities market and prevent it from experiencing regional disparity; (7) privatization would pose an adverse threat to the enterprises' financial performance because they would be more dependent on their strategic business decisions and total quality management; (8) low and moderate-income borrowers would be most impacted by the enterprises' privatization because the federal programs providing credit to these groups would be eliminated; and (9) alternative initiatives should be studied to limit the risk to taxpayers. |
gao_GAO-05-701 | gao_GAO-05-701_0 | To address this issue, some states have employed domestic violence specialists. Each of these states reported that they make some effort to screen clients for domestic violence, refer clients to domestic violence services, and offer waivers of certain TANF program requirements. Such tools vary in detail and depth of inquiry. For example, 20 states screen when a client fails to meet the conditions of cash assistance. Five states that have adopted the Family Violence Option or a comparable policy reported that they do not actively screen TANF clients for domestic violence. Although HHS has funded research on state TANF program approaches to domestic violence screening, HHS officials also told us that the agency has not provided state TANF programs with specific advice in the form of policy guidance or memoranda regarding best practices in domestic violence screening. To Address the Needs of Victims of Domestic Violence, Most States Use Waivers and Refer Clients to Local Service Providers
State TANF programs play an important role by offering victims of domestic violence waivers from TANF program requirements and helping them obtain needed services. Although most states will waive certain TANF requirements, the provisions of these waivers vary from state to state. Most States Waive Requirements for Work, Time Limits, and Child Support
Of the 48 states that adopted the Family Violence Option or an equivalent policy, the majority will waive the requirement that TANF clients work or engage in work-related activities, the 5-year federal lifetime limit on TANF benefits, and cooperation with the child support authorities to collect child support, as shown in table 1. Limited Data Indicates That a Small Portion of the TANF Population Use Domestic Violence Waivers
Reliable national data on the number of domestic violence waivers issued by the states does not exist, according to an HHS official responsible for tracking state data reporting. Most States Used Federal TANF Funds for Marriage or Responsible Fatherhood Programs, but Take Differing Approaches to Addressing Domestic Violence
Thirty-one states reported using federal TANF funds for marriage or responsible fatherhood programs, and limited research indicates that such programs generally do not specifically address domestic violence. Specifically, 15 states reported funding marriage programs, and 28 states reported funding responsible fatherhood programs from 2002 to 2004. Generally, Marriage and Fatherhood Programs Do Not Explicitly Address Domestic Violence
According to research and practitioners in the field of marriage and responsible fatherhood, domestic violence is generally not explicitly included as a component of marriage and responsible fatherhood programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what states are doing to identify victims of domestic violence among Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients, (2) what states are doing to address domestic violence among TANF recipients once they have been identified, and (3) the extent to which states are spending TANF funds on marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, and how, if at all, these programs are addressing domestic violence. In addition, we asked officials about marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, how these programs were implemented, and the sources of funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program introduced specific work requirements and benefit time limits. However, the Family Violence Option (FVO) requires states that adopt the FVO to screen TANF clients for domestic violence and grant waivers from program requirements for clients in domestic violence situations. TANF also allows the use of TANF funds for marriage and responsible fatherhood programs. Given states' broad discretion in implementing the TANF program, including most aspects of the FVO and marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, this report examines (1) how states identify victims of domestic violence among TANF recipients, (2) how states address domestic violence among TANF recipients once they are identified, and (3) the extent to which states spend TANF funds on marriage and responsible fatherhood programs, and how, if at all, these programs are addressing domestic violence.
What GAO Found
Forty-eight states have adopted the FVO or a comparable state policy. Most of these states actively screened clients by directly questioning them about domestic violence, whereas five states simply notified clients of domestic violence waivers without making a direct inquiry. Most states provide staff with a screening tool, but the detail and depth of these tools vary. State officials said that staff in local TANF offices often have limited skills in dealing with domestic violence issues, and policies regarding staff training vary. To address this issue, some state TANF offices employ domestic violence specialists. Although HHS has compiled and disseminated information about domestic violence screening, HHS has not issued guidance regarding best practices in domestic violence screening. State TANF programs help clients address domestic violence issues by granting waivers that exempt victims from TANF requirements, and by referring clients for domestic violence services. Most states will waive the TANF program's federal requirements pertaining to work, the 5-year lifetime limit on cash assistance, and the child support requirements. However, the conditions of these waivers vary from state to state. For example, 27 states required that clients participate in domestic violence services. Limited data on the number of domestic violence waivers indicates that a comparatively small portion of TANF recipients obtain such waivers. Most states have used TANF funds for marriage or responsible fatherhood programs or both. Specifically, 15 states reported funding marriage programs and 28 reported funding responsible fatherhood programs. States that provided usable data reported spending about 5 percent or less of their federal TANF budget on these programs. In addition, some states funded these programs through other funding sources or had programs in development. According to research and practitioners in the field, these programs generally do not explicitly address domestic violence, and HHS has stated that all future Healthy Marriage projects should include domestic violence protections. |
gao_GAO-04-870 | gao_GAO-04-870_0 | Taking a strategic approach involves a range of activities from developing a better picture of what the company is spending on procurement to taking an enterprisewide approach to procuring goods and services and developing new ways of doing business. Conducting a spend analysis to obtain improved knowledge on procurement spending is a critical component of an effective strategic approach. Each agency is beginning to use spend analysis to obtain knowledge and to plan and carry out changes in agencywide procurement processes intended to leverage buying power, eliminate redundant and duplicative acquisition activity, and reduce purchasing costs for goods and services. The departments of Justice and Transportation have not begun to collect the data needed for using spend analysis nor taken steps that would be part of a strategic approach to procurement. For several years, Veterans Affairs has had significant success using spend analysis on an ongoing basis to take a more strategic approach to pharmaceutical procurement. In 2003, Agriculture’s procurement management division began to use this spend analysis, competitively awarding an agencywide discount agreement with a national office supply vendor that yielded savings of $1.8 million to the agency’s purchase card holders—a price 10 percent less then the vendor’s Federal Supply Schedule contract prices. In the future, Agriculture plans to provide automated and repeatable spend analysis, data-mining, and reporting capabilities that identify opportunities for savings through negotiated volume discounts. Agencies Have Not Adopted Full Range of Spend Analysis Best Practices and Lack Some Supporting Structure, Processes, and Roles
Veterans Affairs, HHS, and Agriculture have made good progress using spend analysis to improve their procurements, and they have adopted some elements of a strategic approach. The audit recommended increasing efforts to pursue aggressively more national contracts that, if implemented, could achieve about $82 million per year in savings. Federal agencies such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs, HHS, and Agriculture can achieve significant benefits using spend analysis best practices to support a more strategic approach to buying goods and services. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the varying spend analysis efforts by Veterans Affairs, HHS, and Agriculture go further in emulating the best practices of leading companies and that these agencies have the supporting structure, processes, and roles in place to effectively use the results of spend analysis, we are making the following three recommendations: To identify, track, and evaluate what clinical care and support services are being purchased by veterans’ medical facilities, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct procurement headquarters officials to expand the planned development by 2006 of an automated medical supplies and equipment spend analysis system also to capture spending data on services. Once an initial spend analysis can be completed to arm the agencies with the knowledge of such opportunities, Justice and Transportation should assess whether their current procurement structure, processes, and roles are adequate to support a more strategic approach to acquiring goods and services, for example whether cross-functional commodity teams would provide more effective, coordinated management of high-dollar, high- volume categories of goods, services, and suppliers on an ongoing basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
"Spend analysis" is a tool that provides knowledge about who are the buyers, who are the suppliers, how much is being spent for what goods and services, and where are the opportunities to leverage buying power. Private sector companies are using spend analysis as a foundation for employing a strategic approach to procurement. Recognizing the potential in government purchasing, GAO examined if the departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs are using spend analysis to take a strategic approach. GAO assessed (1) if agencies use spend analysis to obtain knowledge to improve procurement of goods and services and (2) how agencies' practices compare to leading companies best practices.
What GAO Found
Taking a strategic approach to procurement involves a range of activities--from using spend analysis to taking an enterprisewide approach to buying goods and services. Three of the five surveyed agencies have begun to use spend analysis to obtain knowledge and improve their spending for goods and services. Veterans Affairs' success in using spend analysis and a strategic approach to pharmaceutical procurement helped save $394 million in 2003. Currently, agency teams are organizing medical-equipment and supplies purchase data to develop national contracts to save an estimated $82 million a year. Spend analysis is being used by HHS to support strategic sourcing of office-related equipment and supplies through discount agreements with major vendors that could save an estimated $9.5 million per year. Agriculture used a 2001 spend analysis to negotiate a discount agreement for office supplies that yielded savings of $1.8 million to date and is identifying more such opportunities. Agriculture is also modernizing its acquisition system to develop automated data-mining, spend analysis, and reporting capabilities to support future opportunities. The departments of Justice and Transportation have not yet used spend analyses to support a more strategic approach to procurement. Veterans Affairs, HHS, and Agriculture have made good progress using spend analysis to improve their procurements, and they have adopted some elements of a strategic approach. Implementing spend analysis is challenging and can take time, and the agencies have not yet adopted the full range of private sector best practices. Fully adopting the supporting structure, process, and role changes that companies institute would enable these agencies to move away from a fragmented procurement process and determine how effective they are in using spend analysis to achieve significant savings. |
gao_GAO-09-567 | gao_GAO-09-567_0 | IRS Does Not Comprehensively Evaluate the Administration of Tax Penalties or Their Impact on Voluntary Compliance, but a Plan Could Help It Do So
Although IRS policies state that IRS should collect information to evaluate the administration of penalties and their impact on voluntary compliance, and IRS is collecting some relevant information, OSP is not comprehensively evaluating penalty administration or penalties’ impact on voluntary compliance. According to IRS policies, OSP is to do the following: Administer the penalty statutes in a manner that is fair and impartial to both the government and the taxpayer, is consistent across taxpayers, and ensures the accuracy of the penalty computation. Collect statistical and demographic information to evaluate penalties and penalty administration and to determine the effectiveness of penalties in promoting voluntary compliance. These policies are consistent with positions expressed in the 1989 IRS Task Force report and by Congress when reforming penalties in 1989 and with more recent views expressed by the National Taxpayer Advocate. However, OSP generally does not fulfill the responsibilities specified in IRS policy or as envisioned by the 1989 IRS Task Force report, Congress, or the National Taxpayer Advocate. Rather, OSP analysts focus most of their efforts on addressing short-term issues, such as sudden spikes in assessments or abatements. OSP officials said that they have not done more to evaluate the administration of penalties and their effect on voluntary compliance primarily because of resource constraints both within OSP and IRS’s various research units, methodological barriers that impede their ability to research the effect of penalties on voluntary compliance, and limitations in available databases. A Plan Could Help Identify Needed Resources and Support Resource Requests
OSP does not have a plan for fulfilling its responsibilities. Thus, by focusing on what it is attempting to accomplish by developing a plan, OSP would be better positioned to determine what resources within IRS are available to assist it. Thus, analyses that determine whether penalties are being consistently applied across IRS so that similarly situated taxpayers receive the same penalties could provide pertinent information. Data Limitations Could Be Addressed in a Plan
Finally, in developing a plan, OSP could assess options for overcoming the limitations in available data that officials say impede its ability to both assess the effect of penalties on voluntary compliance and perform more sophisticated reviews of IRS’s administration of penalties. The Enforcement Revenue Information System (ERIS) contains substantial data on all IRS enforcement activities, including penalties. For example, ERIS does not include readily usable information related to taxpayer income or practitioner representation that could be used to determine equitable treatment, develop employee training, or provide taxpayer education outreach. Reportable Transaction Guidance Was Timely Issued, but Could Be More Useful to Affected Parties
IRS issued guidance to implement a new penalty for taxpayers that fail to disclose a reportable transaction in a timely manner and began assessing penalties after audits had been conducted. Officials in the Office of Chief Counsel told us that their criterion for issuing guidance successfully is whether it was released in time to meet their customers’ needs. The practitioners we spoke with from two leading practitioner organizations said that issuing the interim guidance in only 3 months was quick and the guidance included the information they needed to understand how IRS would implement the penalty. IRS officials recognize the need to further raise awareness with taxpayers. According to IRS officials, as of January 2009, IRS had assessed 98 of the penalties for $13.7 million and collected $2.7 million. In addition, 1,188 returns had been assigned to field groups and 50 returns were being reviewed by IRS’s Appeals Division. IRS issued guidance for the reportable transaction penalty in a timely manner following its passage in 2004. In addition, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should use IRS’s standard, low-cost methods of outreach to again alert as many tax return preparers and taxpayers as possible about the need to properly report loss transactions to avoid penalties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Civil tax penalties are an important tool for encouraging compliance with tax laws. It is important that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administers penalties properly and determines the effectiveness of penalties in encouraging compliance. In response to a congressional request, GAO determined (1) whether IRS is evaluating penalties in a manner that supports sound penalty administration and voluntary compliance and, if not, how IRS may be able to do so, and (2) whether IRS's guidance for a new penalty for failure to disclose reportable transactions was issued in a timely manner and was useful to affected parties, and whether and how IRS has assessed the penalty. GAO reviewed IRS documents and guidance, and interviewed IRS officials and tax practitioners.
What GAO Found
The Office of Servicewide Penalties (OSP) does not comprehensively evaluate the administration of civil tax penalties or their impact on voluntary compliance, but a plan could help it do so. OSP has responsibility for administering penalty programs and determining the action necessary to promote voluntary compliance. According to IRS policy, OSP should collect information to evaluate penalties and penalty administration and to determine the effectiveness of penalties in promoting voluntary compliance. This policy is consistent with positions expressed in 1989 by both an IRS Task Force report and by Congress when reforming penalties in 1989, and more recently by the National Taxpayer Advocate. OSP does not fulfill the responsibilities specified in IRS policy. Rather, OSP analysts focus on short-term issues, such as sudden spikes in assessments or abatements. OSP officials said that they have not done more to evaluate the administration of penalties and their effect on voluntary compliance because of resource constraints, methodological barriers, and limitations in available databases. A plan could help IRS focus its efforts and address the constraints to evaluating penalties. In developing a plan, IRS could identify the analyses it should do and the resources needed to do them. OSP could then determine what resources are available to assist it and what additional resources, if any, are needed. A plan also could lay out feasible research for evaluating the effect of penalties on voluntary compliance. For example, fairness is believed to undergird voluntary compliance. Thus, analyses that determine whether penalties are being consistently applied across IRS would provide pertinent information. Data limitations could be addressed in a plan, as well. The Enforcement Revenue Information System (ERIS) contains substantial data on IRS enforcement activities, but does not include all of the information recommended by the 1989 IRS Task Force report. For example, ERIS does not include readily usable information related to taxpayer income that could be used to determine equitable treatment of taxpayers. IRS issued guidance regarding its implementation of a penalty for failure to disclose reportable transactions-- transactions IRS identified as tax avoidance transactions--within 3 months of the provision's passage. IRS officials said that their criterion for issuing timely guidance is whether it was released in time to meet customers' needs. Tax practitioners from two leading practitioner organizations said the guidance was issued timely and included information they needed. However, the practitioners said more targeted outreach about the penalty was needed, specifically regarding reportable loss transactions caused bythe current economic climate in which many taxpayers may experience losses that could trigger the reportable transaction requirements. IRS officials recognize the need to further raise awareness of the penalty, but their planned efforts would reach only a small portion of tax return preparers and taxpayers. As of January 2009, IRS has assessed 98 penalties for $13.7 million.In addition, 1,188 returns had been assigned to field groups. |
gao_HEHS-95-149 | gao_HEHS-95-149_0 | Eligibility and Funding for Space-Available Students
The Secretary of Defense has authority, granted by Public Law 95-561, to allow classes or categories of students, other than space-required students, to enroll in DODDS. However, the July 29, 1985, Conference Report instructed DOD not to include the cost of educating tuition-free, space-available students in its budget requests. Tuition-paying students can be either federally connected, such as dependents of State Department or other U.S. government agency sponsors, or nonfederally connected, including dependents of retired military or foreign national sponsors. Ninety-six percent of tuition-free, space-available students are the dependents of DOD military or civilian sponsors who are not authorized government transportation and housing overseas for their dependents. In Korea, however, the situation is different. In fact, however, DOD does take into account the extra costs for educating space-available, tuition-free students in requesting funds, because it estimates its costs on the basis of the total student population of the previous year, including the space-available, tuition-free students. About 6 percent, or 5,478, of these students were enrolled as space-available. The Panama Region, however, has 22.3 percent space-available enrollment primarily due to a higher number of tuition-free dependents of DOD civilians. Circumstances Contributing to High Space-Available Enrollments
Most DODDS schools—about 75 percent—have space-available enrollments of 5 percent or less. DODDS provided the following explanations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on educating Department of Defense (DOD) dependents overseas, focusing on: (1) legislation that establishes eligibility and authorizes funding for students to enroll in DOD Dependents Schools (DODDS) as space becomes available; (2) the number of space-available students enrolled and their locations; and (3) the circumstances surrounding high space-available enrollments in some schools.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish enrollment eligibility for space-available students and has categorized space-available students as either tuition-paying or tuition-free; (2) tuition-paying students can be either dependents of U.S. government agency sponsors or retired military and foreign national sponsors; (3) tuition-free, space-available students are the dependents of DOD sponsors who are not authorized government transportation and housing overseas for their dependents; (4) DOD is required to only include the cost of educating space-required and tuition-paying students in its budget request, but DODDS has not followed these instructions; (5) although tuition-free, space-available students only represent about 3 percent of the DODDS student population, the percentage is much higher in Korea; (6) in school year 1994-1995, space-available enrollments represented about 6 percent of total DODDS enrollment, almost half of which were tuition-free; and (7) although 75 percent of DODDS schools had space-available enrollments of 5 percent or less, four schools had enrollments of over 65 percent. |
gao_GAO-01-866 | gao_GAO-01-866_0 | Currently, about 70 percent of the milk produced in the United States is regulated under the federal milk marketing order program created in 1937 and administered by USDA. These prices vary by the type of dairy product for which the milk is used; the minimum price for raw milk used for fluid drinking purposes also varies by location. Similarly, Nevada’s dairy commission, established in 1955, sets minimum prices for raw milk sold to processing facilities located within that state. Dairy Compacts
In addition to the federal and state milk marketing order programs that set minimum milk prices, in 1996, the Congress authorized the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact for the six New England states. The Compact supplements the federal milk marketing order and state programs by setting the monthly minimum price to be paid for raw milk used for fluid milk marketed in the six-state area. Retail milk prices increased by as much as 20 cents per gallon immediately following the NEDC’s establishment—which is an amount comparable to the immediate increase in the minimum farm-level price for raw milk to be used for and sold as fluid milk in the six New England states when the NEDC’s price regulations became effective. Another GAO contact and key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX. Specifically, because legislation authorizing the Compact is to expire on September 30, 2001, and the Congress is considering legislative alternatives for reauthorizing the NEDC and authorizing other states to enter into such compact arrangements, Senator Kohl asked us to provide information on the intraregional impacts of the NEDC (that is, within the six NEDC states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) on dairy sector indicators such as (1) retail milk prices, (2) milk producer income, (3) dairy farm structure, (4) milk production, and (5) milk consumption; the impact of the NEDC on the costs to the federal government of its milk price support and nutrition assistance programs; and the interregional impacts of the NEDC, an expanded NEDC, and an expanded NEDC in conjunction with a southern compact (that is, on noncompact milk-producing regions) on selected indicators such as farm- level and wholesale-level indicators such as prices, production, and revenue. 7. | What GAO Found
U.S. dairy farmers produced 167.7 billion pounds of unprocessed, raw milk in 2000. Federal and state dairy programs influence the minimum prices paid to farmers for raw milk. These prices are based on how the raw milk is to be used. Minimum prices set for raw milk to be used for making drinking milk (fluid milk) are higher than those for milk used for manufacturing cheese, butter, and other dairy products. About 70 percent of the raw milk produced in the United States is regulated under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) federal milk marketing order program. The 1996 farm bill established another pricing program -- the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (NEDC) -- which is run by a commission that sets a minimum price for raw milk sold as fluid milk in six New England states. The NEDC works in conjunction with federal and state dairy programs to establish an alternative minimum price for raw milk in the Compact states. When the monthly NEDC minimum price exceeds the federal marketing order or state minimum price, the NEDC price becomes the minimum price. Congress is now considering legislation that would reauthorize and expand the NEDC and establish additional interstate dairy compacts. This report reviews the potential economic impacts of different compact alternatives. |
gao_GAO-16-611 | gao_GAO-16-611_0 | Officials for each of the regulators acknowledged that the 2009 Questions and Answers cite the rescinded FEMA Guidelines but stated that the overall guidance remains in effect. The Biggert-Waters Act requires that regulated lending institutions disclose to a borrower that flood insurance is available from private insurance companies that issue standard flood insurance policies on behalf of NFIP or directly from NFIP; flood insurance that provides the same level of coverage as a standard flood insurance policy under NFIP may be available from a private insurance company that issues policies on behalf of the company; and the borrower is encouraged to compare the flood insurance coverage, deductibles, exclusions, conditions, and premiums associated with flood insurance policies issued on behalf of NFIP and policies issued on behalf of private insurance companies and to direct inquiries on the availability, cost, and comparisons of flood insurance coverage to an insurance agent. Regulatory Uncertainty, Certain NFIP Changes, and Market Challenges Cited as Potentially Inhibiting Use of Private Flood Insurance
Stakeholders cited regulatory uncertainty, such as the lack of final implementing regulations and the scope of the definition of private flood insurance in the Biggert-Waters Act, as some of the potential barriers lenders may face in fulfilling their responsibilities regarding private flood insurance and the mandatory purchase requirement. Finally, a state insurance regulator and federal regulator noted that the lack of final rules has led to uncertainty among lenders about which private policies should be accepted. They also noted the need for regulated lending institutions to retain some discretion when evaluating private flood policies. Lender expertise. Two private insurers told us that in their experience, some lenders find it difficult to compare private policies with NFIP policies. However, FEMA could have taken steps to revise the SFIP to allow for such refunds. Allowing this type of refund would be in line with industry practice to allow for refunds of paid premiums as well as Congress’s interest in transferring some of the federal government’s exposure to flood insurance risk to the private sector. Limited Use of Private Flood Insurance Also Due to Market Challenges
Many stakeholders with whom we spoke said that low private-sector participation in the flood insurance market also was due to certain market challenges that presented barriers to the private sector such as NFIP’s discounted rates, a topic on which we reported previously and also have ongoing work. Conclusions
The Biggert-Waters Act took steps to encourage greater participation by the private sector in flood insurance, but aspects of the act’s provisions on private flood insurance have created some regulatory uncertainty among insurers and lenders. FEMA no longer allows policyholders to cancel their NFIP policy and obtain a refund, on a prorated basis, if they obtained a non-NFIP policy (private flood insurance policy). FEMA officials stated that FEMA can only allow the cancellation of policies and refunds according to the terms and conditions of NFIP’s standard policy, which does not directly address the refunds of premiums when a non-NFIP policy is obtained. Recommendation
To address a potential challenge for consumers who wish to opt for private flood insurance and who must have insurance under the mandatory purchase requirement, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator should consider reinstating the cancellation reason code allowing policyholders to cancel their NFIP policy and be eligible for premium refunds, on a prorated basis, if they obtain a non-NFIP policy after their NFIP policy became effective. This report describes (1) regulated lending institutions’ and federal regulators’ implementation of statutory provisions governing the use of private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement; and (2) views on any regulatory, or other barriers, to the increased use of private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement. The federal regulators involved in implementing the provisions of the flood insurance laws governing the mandatory purchase requirement are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Farm Credit Administration (FCA), and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). Appendix II: Private Flood Insurance Criteria in FEMA’s Guidelines (2007) and the Biggert-Waters Act Definition (2012)
Appendix II: Private Flood Insurance Criteria in FEMA’s Guidelines (2007) and the Biggert- Waters Act Definition (2012)
The following table compares the guidance provided by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 2007 Mandatory Purchase of Flood Insurance Guidelines (rescinded in February 2013) for use of private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement with the statutory definition of private flood insurance in the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act). | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP was created, in part, because private insurers historically have been unwilling to insure against flood damage. The private flood insurance market remains small. The 2012 Biggert-Waters Act took steps to encourage private-sector participation by requiring regulators to direct lenders to accept private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement—a federal requirement to purchase flood insurance on certain properties.
GAO was asked to examine if the regulatory environment posed barriers to private flood insurance. This report describes (1) lender and regulator implementation of provisions on private flood insurance; and (2) views on regulatory, or other, barriers to using private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement. GAO reviewed laws, regulations and guidance and interviewed officials from FEMA, five federal regulators, government-sponsored enterprises, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. GAO interviewed various stakeholders, selected based on their flood insurance experience and size, among other factors: a nongeneralizable sample of eight lenders; 13 organizations; five state insurance regulators; and four private flood insurers.
What GAO Found
Lenders and their regulators have taken some action to implement provisions on private flood insurance in the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act). Specifically, lenders told GAO they send notifications to borrowers that encourage borrowers to compare private and National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policies. Lenders with whom GAO spoke accepted private policies and generally said they used Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidelines and interagency guidance to evaluate private policies. Federal regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Credit Union Administration, and Farm Credit Administration) issued interagency questions and answers on private insurance in 2009, which cite the FEMA guidelines. However, FEMA rescinded its guidelines in 2013, citing a lack of authority to rule on the acceptability of private insurance policies. Federal regulators have issued joint proposed rules to implement the Biggert-Waters Act definition of private flood insurance, but have not yet finalized them. Regulators stated that the information provided in the 2009 Questions and Answers remains in effect until final rules implementing the private flood insurance provisions of the Biggert-Waters Act are adopted.
Stakeholders cited a number of challenges as potentially inhibiting the use of private flood insurance to satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement.
Regulatory uncertainty . Without final regulations implementing the Biggert-Waters Act requirement to accept private flood insurance, there was uncertainty among stakeholders about which private policies would satisfy the mandatory purchase requirement. Many stakeholders, including some lenders, emphasized that lenders needed discretion when evaluating policies and that ensuring policies met the Biggert-Waters Act definition would be challenging for lenders, in part due to their lack of insurance expertise.
Recent NFIP changes . Stakeholders noted that a recent NFIP policy change could discourage consumers' use of private insurance. FEMA recently stopped allowing policyholders to obtain a refund of their unused NFIP premium if they obtained a non-NFIP policy. FEMA officials stated that, based on their recent review of NFIP cancellation policies, this practice was not explicitly permitted in the NFIP standard flood insurance policy terms and conditions. Due to this change, consumers who wish to obtain private coverage would forfeit any unused portion of their premium if they switched after the NFIP policy's effective date. While FEMA's standard policy terms do not specifically address refunds when a non-NFIP policy is obtained, FEMA could revise the standard policy to allow for such refunds. Allowing this type of refund would be in line with industry practice to allow refunds of paid premiums when cancelling insurance policies, as well as Congressional interest in transferring some of the federal government's exposure to flood insurance risk to the private sector.
Market challenges . Many stakeholders noted that low private sector participation in flood insurance was also due to market challenges, some citing the inability to compete with discounted NFIP rates as a primary barrier—a finding that GAO also reported in previous work (GAO-14-127).
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA reconsider allowing policyholders who cancel their NFIP policy to be refunded, on a prorated basis, when obtaining a non-NFIP policy and take any necessary steps to amend the NFIP standard policy to do so. FEMA agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-1068 | gao_GAO-08-1068_0 | DOD Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Plan for Support of BMDS, but Planning to Date Is Incomplete and Complicated by Difficulties in Transitioning Support Responsibilities to the Services
DOD has taken some initial steps to plan for BMDS support, but planning efforts to date are incomplete. While DOD has drafted a proposal for BMDS management that DOD officials have stated is intended, in part, to address this issue, the draft proposal lacks important details. DOD’s Support Planning for BMDS Has Not Followed Key Principles
DOD’s planning to support BMDS over the long term has not followed DOD’s key principles of weapon system life-cycle management. As a result, for five of the seven elements we examined, MDA and the services have been unable to reach agreement on who will be responsible for providing support and how these elements will be supported after 2013, even though MDA officials have stated that most elements are expected to have a useful life of 20 years. Despite Recent Efforts, Operation and Support Cost Estimates for BMDS Elements Have Limitations and Are Not Transparent
DOD’s recent efforts to develop operation and support cost estimates for BMDS elements have limitations and are not transparent for DOD and congressional decision-makers. Although DOD has started to develop operation and support cost estimates for BMDS elements, the estimates are not complete and have limitations. DOD and GAO key principles for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible cost estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions over the short term as well as to assess the long-term affordability of the program. For example, the FYDP, DOD’s 6-year spending plan, does not fully reflect BMDS operation and support costs that are expected to be incurred—and these are likely to be significant since operation and support costs are typically over 70 percent of a system’s total lifetime costs. DOD Has Not Required That Operation and Support Cost Estimates Be Developed
DOD has not yet clearly identified BMDS operation and support costs because the department has not required that these costs be developed, validated, and reviewed, and it has not specified when this should be done or identified who is responsible for doing so. As a result, DOD will have difficulty preparing credible budget requests and estimating long- term costs, which are important in assessing affordability over time. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six actions: To improve planning to support BMDS elements, including planning for the transition of support responsibilities from MDA to the services, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, establish a standard process for long-term support planning that adheres to key principles for life-cycle management, including: establishing timelines for planning that must be completed before each element is fielded, such as naming a lead service, involving services in support and transition planning, and deciding when support responsibilities will be transitioned to the services; requiring active lead service participation in developing long-term support plans and designating what support planning should be completed before elements are fielded; and specifying which organization is responsible for life-cycle management and identifying steps for oversight to identify who is accountable for ensuring these actions are accomplished. To increase transparency and improve fiscal stewardship of DOD resources for BMDS, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to establish a requirement to estimate BMDS operation and support costs including: detailing when credible estimates are to be developed, updated, and reviewed; specifying criteria for prioritizing, allocating, and distributing funds; and clearly identifying who is responsible for oversight of this process; requiring periodic independent validation of operation and support costs for each BMDS element; and using the independently validated estimates to support preparation of complete and credible budget submissions and DOD’s spending plan and to assess the long-term affordability of the integrated system and individual elements for informing key trade-off decisions. Further it is not clear when this draft proposal might be approved and implemented. To assess the extent to which DOD has developed plans for how to support BMDS elements over the long term, we compared the planning that had been done with key principles embodied in DOD and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) policies and guidance for life-cycle management to determine what aspects may be missing or have limited service involvement that could hinder transition of responsibility for support of BMDS elements from MDA to the services and hinder the ability to provide long-term support. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent a total of over $115 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) comprised of land, air, and sea-based elements--such as missiles and radars--working together as an integrated system. Since the cost to operate and support a weapon system usually accounts for most of a system's lifetime costs, the resources needed to fund BMDS could be significant as DOD fields an increasing number of BMDS elements. In 2005, DOD began planning to transition responsibility for supporting BMDS elements from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to the services. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD has (1) planned to support BMDS elements over the long-term, and (2) identified long-term operation and support costs. To do so, GAO analyzed 7 BMDS elements that will be fielded by 2015, compared DOD's plans and cost estimates to DOD and GAO key principles, and assessed the extent to which MDA and the services have agreed on responsibilities for supporting and funding BMDS elements.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken some initial steps to plan for BMDS support, but efforts to date are incomplete, and difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from MDA to the services have complicated long-term planning. DOD key principles for weapon system life-cycle management stress the importance of completing support plans that cover a system's expected useful life before it is fielded. Although MDA has developed some policies and guidance for BMDS support planning, it has not developed support plans for three of the seven elements that GAO examined, and MDA has not completed an overall support plan for the integrated system. DOD's long-term support planning for BMDS is incomplete because it has not established a standard process clearly specifying what support planning should be completed before fielding or how to transition the responsibility for supporting BMDS elements from MDA to the services. For five of the seven elements GAO examined, MDA and the services have been unable to reach agreement on who will be responsible for providing support after 2013. DOD has drafted a proposal for BMDS management that DOD officials have stated is intended, in part, to address these issues. However, the draft proposal lacks important details, and it is not clear when it is expected to be approved and implemented. Without a standardized process for long-term support planning, uncertainty will persist regarding how the elements will be supported over the long term. DOD's recent efforts to develop operation and support cost estimates for BMDS elements have limitations and are not transparent for DOD and congressional decision makers. DOD and GAO key principles for cost estimating state that complete, credible, and independently verified cost estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions over the short term as well as for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. DOD has started to develop operation and support cost estimates for the seven elements GAO examined, but those efforts are not yet complete and have limitations. First, the estimates are likely to change since DOD is still determining key assumptions. Second, DOD does not plan to have the estimates independently verified. Furthermore, the Future Years Defense Program, DOD's 6-year spending plan, does not fully reflect BMDS operation and support costs. DOD has not yet clearly identified BMDS operation and support costs because the department has not required that these costs are to be developed, validated, and reviewed, and it has not specified when this should be done or who is responsible for doing so. Although DOD's draft proposal for managing BMDS contains some funding suggestions, it does not address the operation and support cost limitations GAO identified. Without a requirement to develop and validate BMDS operation and support cost estimates, DOD will have difficulty preparing credible budget requests and assessing the affordability of BMDS over the long term. |
gao_T-RCED-97-223 | gao_T-RCED-97-223_0 | As a result, the Congress has not had an opportunity to accept or revise the statement of policy, as required by RPA. Our report on the Forest Service’s decision-making identifies an organizational culture of indifference toward accountability. The agency’s decentralized management and recently increased flexibility in shifting funds within a simplified budget structure have not been accompanied by sufficient accountability for expenditures and performance. The result is inefficiency and waste. However, the most likely outcomes of the Forest Service’s current decision-making process are indecision and delay. Past efforts by the Forest Service to improve its performance have been stymied by the organization’s highly decentralized management. Agreement Has Not Been Reached on the Forest Service’s Strategic Goals
The Results Act, if implemented successfully, should help break the existing cycle of inefficiency within the Forest Service, strengthen the agency’s accountability for performance and results, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its decision-making. The strategic goals in the Forest Service’s plan form the starting point and foundation for holding the agency accountable for its performance. Hence, these goals are critical to successfully implementing the act within the agency. However, agreement has not been reached on the strategic goals in the Forest Service’s plan, and the agency cannot begin to derive the benefits anticipated from implementing the act. The lack of agreement on the Forest Service’s strategic goals reflects the controversy, both inside and outside the agency, over (1) which uses the agency is to emphasize and (2) which management approach can best ensure the long-term sustainability of legislatively mandated uses on the national forests. However, given both the importance of strategic goals to the successful implementation of the act and the disagreement over the goals in the Forest Service’s plan, we believe that the agency should have taken the opportunity presented by the act to consult with the Congress to better articulate its positions on controversial issues. Specifically, the Forest Service should have set forth (1) its rationale for emphasizing some legislatively mandated uses on the national forests more than other uses, (2) the logic underlying its reliance on ecosystem management, and (3) the likely effects of its policy choices on the types, levels, and mixes of multiple uses on its lands. However, the Forest Service discussed none of these external factors in its draft plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Forest Service's draft strategic plan, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act, focusing on: (1) the need to hold the Forest Service accountable for its performance; (2) the importance of agreed-upon, long-term strategic goals to the successful implementation of the act and the reasons for the current lack of agreement on these goals; and (3) GAO's observations on how the Forest Service can improve critical components, including the strategic goals component, of its draft plan, to make it more informative and useful to the Congress and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its report on the Forest Service's decision-making identifies an organizational culture of indifference toward accountability; (2) the agency's historically decentralized management and recently increased flexibility in fiscal decision-making have not been accompanied by sufficient accountability for expenditures and performance; (3) as a result, inefficiency and waste have cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, and opportunities for both ecological and economic gains have been lost through indecision and delay; (4) past efforts by the Forest Service to change its behavior have not been successful; (5) decision-making within the agency is broken and in need of repair; (6) the Results Act, if implemented successfully, should help break the existing cycle of inefficiency within the Forest Service; (7) the strategic goals in the Forest Service's plan form the starting point and foundation for holding the agency accountable for its performance; (8) hence, these goals are critical to successfully implementing the act within the agency; (9) however, agreement has not been reached on the strategic goals in the Forest Service's plan; (10) this lack of agreement reflects the controversy, both inside and outside the forest Service, over: (a) which uses to emphasize under the agency's broad multiple-use and sustained-yield mandate; and (b) which management approach can best ensure the long-term sustainability of legislatively mandated uses on the national forests; (11) as a result, the agency cannot begin to derive the benefits anticipated from implementing the act; (12) the consultations with the Congress prescribed by the Results Act provide an opportunity for the Forest Service to better explain: (a) its rationale for emphasizing some legislatively mandated uses on the national forests more than other uses; (b) the logic underlying its approach to managing natural resources; and (c) the likely effects of its policy choices on the types, levels and mixes of uses on its lands; and (13) however, the Forest Service's plan is silent on these issues. |
gao_GAO-04-95 | gao_GAO-04-95_0 | DOD and IRS Are Not Collecting Millions in Unpaid Federal Taxes from Contractors
We estimate that DOD, which functions as its own disbursing agent, could have levied payments and collected at least $100 million in unpaid taxes in fiscal year 2002 if it and IRS had worked together to effectively levy contractor payments. However, in the 6 years since the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, DOD has collected only about $687,000. Until DOD begins to fulfill its responsibilities under DCIA by fully assisting IRS in its attempts to levy contractor payments and IRS fully utilizes its authority under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the federal government will continue to miss opportunities to collect on hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid federal taxes owed by DOD contractors. At the completion of our work, DOD had no formal plans or schedule to begin providing payment information from any of its 15 vendor payment systems to FMS for comparison with the TOP database. As mentioned previously, IRS records showed that over 27,100 contractors in DOD’s CCR database owed nearly $3 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2002. Withholding up to 15 percent of these payments is an effective collection method and is authorized by law. DOD Contractors Involved in Abusive or Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System
To determine whether there are instances of abusive or potentially criminal activity by DOD contractors related to the federal tax system, we selected 47 case study businesses and individuals that had unpaid taxes and were receiving DOD contractor payments in fiscal year 2002. However, rather than fulfill their role as “trustees” of this money and forward it to IRS, these DOD contractors diverted the money for other purposes. Table 1 shows a breakdown for our 47 contractor case studies by the type of goods and services provided to DOD. The owner allegedly has now relocated his cars and boat outside the United States. The business transferred its employees to a relative’s business, which also had unpaid federal taxes, and submitted invoices and received payments from DOD on a previous contract through August 2003. In 1996, the owner bought a home and furnishings worth approximately $1 million and borrowed nearly $1 million from the business. The tax problems of this business date back to the mid-1990s. Case # 9 - This family-owned and operated building contractor provided a variety of products and services to DOD, and DOD provided a substantial portion of the contractor’s revenues. Contractors with Unpaid Taxes Are Not Prohibited by Law from Receiving Contracts from the Federal Government
Federal law does not prohibit a contractor with unpaid federal taxes from receiving contracts from the federal government. The Administrator of Federal Procurement Policy provides overall direction for governmentwide procurement policies, regulations, and procedures. To help ensure that the federal government does not award contracts to businesses and individuals that have flagrantly disregarded their federal tax obligations (e.g., failed to remit payroll taxes for several tax periods or broken installment agreements), we recommend that the Director of OMB develop and pursue policy options for prohibiting federal contract awards to contractors in cases in which abuse to the federal tax system has occurred and the tax owed is not contested. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to determine (1) the magnitude of unpaid federal taxes owed by Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, (2) whether indications exist of abuse or criminal activity by DOD contractors related to the federal tax system, (3) whether DOD and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have effective processes and controls in place to use the Treasury Offset Program (TOP) in collecting unpaid federal taxes from DOD contractors, and (4) whether DOD contractors with unpaid federal taxes are prohibited by law from receiving contracts from the federal government.
What GAO Found
DOD and IRS records showed that over 27,000 contractors owed about $3 billion in unpaid taxes as of September 30, 2002. DOD has not fully implemented provisions of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 that would assist IRS in levying up to 15 percent of each contract payment to offset a DOD contractor's federal tax debt. We estimate that DOD could have collected at least $100 million in fiscal year 2002 had it and IRS fully utilized the levy process authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. As of September 2003, DOD had collected only about $687,000 in part because DOD provides contractor payment information from only 1 of its 16 payment systems to TOP. DOD had no formal plans at the completion of our work to provide payment information from its other 15 payment systems to TOP. Furthermore, we found abusive or potentially criminal activity related to the federal tax system through our audit and investigation of 47 DOD contractors. The 47 contractors provided a variety of goods and services, including parts or support for weapons and other sensitive military programs. The businesses in these case studies owed primarily payroll taxes with some dating back to the early 1990s. These payroll taxes included amounts withheld from employee wages for Social Security, Medicare, and individual income taxes. However, rather than fulfill their role as "trustees" and forward these amounts to IRS, these DOD contractors diverted the money for personal gain or to fund the business. For example, owners of two businesses each borrowed nearly $1 million from their companies and, at about the same time, did not remit millions of dollars in payroll taxes. One owner bought a boat, several cars, and a home outside the United States. The other paid over $1 million for a furnished home. Both contractors received DOD payments during fiscal year 2002, but one went out of business in 2003. The business, however, transferred its employees to a relative's company (also with unpaid taxes) and recently received DOD payments on a previous contract. IRS's continuing challenges in collecting unpaid federal taxes also contributed to the problem. In several case studies, IRS was not pursuing DOD contractors due to resource and workload management constraints. For other cases, control breakdowns resulted in IRS freezing collection activity for reasons that were no longer applicable. Federal law does not prohibit contractors with unpaid federal taxes from receiving federal contracts. OMB is responsible for providing overall direction to governmentwide procurement policies, regulations, and procedures, and is in the best position to develop policy options for prohibiting federal government contract awards to businesses and individuals that abuse the tax system. |
gao_RCED-99-148 | gao_RCED-99-148_0 | National Data Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations’ Compliance With Agreements
Data on the activities that nations are undertaking to meet their international environmental obligations are the basis of determining whether each nation is in compliance with the agreement to which it is a party. Historically, such data have had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate. As a result, it has often been difficult to determine whether nations are meeting their obligations. More recently, efforts to improve reporting rates have resulted in more complete data on nations’ compliance activities. However, data quality remains questionable. Data Reporting Requirements Under the Kyoto Protocol Are Minimal
The Kyoto Protocol incorporated the general reporting requirements and supplemental guidelines of the Framework Convention. Parties are required to submit to the secretariat a national inventory of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, a general description of steps taken or to be taken to implement the protocol, and any other information that the party considers relevant. The guidelines were developed to help ensure that the national reports are consistent and comparable; however, they provide considerable flexibility and do not require parties to follow a specific procedure. Monitoring of International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited
Monitoring is necessary to determine whether a nation individually, and all nations collectively, are complying with their international environmental obligations. Monitoring Is Needed to Ensure Compliance
The monitoring done under international environmental agreements includes the review and analysis of reported data and other information that allow assessment of the impact or extent of progress being made in meeting a stated goal or objective, such as implementing an agreement’s provisions. Monitoring can determine both procedural compliance and effectiveness—that is, whether intended outcomes are being achieved. Historically, most monitoring activities have focused on whether nations have implemented processes to transform their international obligations into acceptable rules within their domestic legal systems. International Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced
Enforcement is the final element needed to help ensure that nations comply with their international environmental obligations. Few agreements contain formal provisions for enforcement, however, and the enforcement provisions that do exist are used infrequently or inconsistently. 6-10. 7-15. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the three components needed to ensure compliance with international environmental agreements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) data on the results of nations' activities undertaken to meet their international environmental obligations are the basis of determining whether each nation is in compliance with the agreements to which it is a party; (2) historically, such data have had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate; (3) it has often been difficult to determine whether nations are meeting their obligations; (4) as a result of efforts to improve reporting, more complete data are being reported; (5) however, according to experts, data quality generally remains questionable; (6) the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes contains the same general requirements and supplementary guidelines for data reporting as the Framework Convention itself; (7) the general requirements for the Framework Convention include the requirement to submit annually a national inventory of anthropogenic (manmade) emissions; (8) the details of methodology and the formats to be used to present the data for those inventories--factors that would facilitate analysis, understanding, and comparability of the data reported--are contained in guidelines that provide considerable flexibility and do not require parties to follow a specific procedure; (9) monitoring is the second element necessary to determine whether a nation individually, and all nations collectively, are complying with their international commitments; (10) monitoring includes the review and analysis of data and other information that allow an assessment of the impact or the extent of progress being made in meeting an agreement's stated goal or objective; (11) monitoring can be done to determine both procedural compliance and effectiveness; (12) monitoring activities focused on whether nations implemented processes to transform their international commitments into acceptable rules within their domestic legal systems; (13) however, because enacting domestic laws or implementing policies does not ensure that international commitments will be met, more emphasis is now being placed on mechanisms that monitor effectiveness--that is, whether intended outcomes are being achieved; (14) enforcement is the final element needed to ensure that nations comply with their international environmental obligations; (15) few agreements contain formal provisions for enforcement, however, and the enforcement provisions that do exist are used infrequently or inconsistently; and (16) secretariats and other international organizations are often ineffective at enforcement because they are inadequately funded and are limited in their international jurisdiction. |
gao_GAO-06-955 | gao_GAO-06-955_0 | In an effort to address these problems, the program was restructured in March of this year. However, due to JTRS’ lengthy development path, DOD has had to continue buying other tactical radios— currently estimated to cost $11 billion—to support its communication needs. Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with JTRS
The proposed JTRS restructuring approach appears to address past concerns with the program that GAO and others have documented in recent years. While still meeting the needs of key users such as Future Combat Systems, the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later increments. In addition, through the establishment of the JPEO and other structural changes, JTRS program management has been strengthened and has become more centralized. The centralized management structure should help the program control development costs and improve oversight through the coordination of standards, system engineering, and development of the radios and waveforms. The JPEO must first finalize the details of the restructuring, including completing formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to revise the Concept of Operations so that it effectively describes how JTRS networking capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD’s approval of these activities is needed to ensure the program is executable. Over the longer term, the program faces key management and technical challenges that must be overcome. For example, although the new joint management structure for JTRS is a significant improvement over the previous fragmented program management structure, joint development efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services and other stakeholders. In addition, operating in a networked environment open to a large number of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency. Moreover, integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a long- term challenge and remains so. Interoperability of Networking Waveforms
The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network interoperability have yet to be developed. Recommendations
To enhance the likelihood of success of the JTRS program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: before approving the detailed program plans for each JTRS domain, ensure that they reflect stable and well-defined requirements; knowledge- based acquisition strategies; clear and meaningful test plans that address the need to not only test individual JTRS components but the overall networking capabilities of JTRS as well; and, funding commitments necessary to execute the program; and develop JTRS migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a well- developed concept of operations for using JTRS networking capabilities and effectively balances recent investments in acquiring legacy radios with future needs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether recent actions taken by DOD puts the JTRS program in a better position to succeed, we obtained briefings on restructuring assessments, plans, and decisions, analyzed documents describing Increment 1 requirements, and interviewed program and product officials from the Joint Program Executive Office, San Diego, California. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, a key element of its effort to transform military operations to be network centric. Using emerging software-defined radio technology, the JTRS program plans to develop and procure hundreds of thousands of radios that give warfighters the capability to access maps and other visual data, communicate via voice and video, and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. The JTRS program has encountered a number of problems, resulting in significant delays and cost increases. The program is currently estimated to total about $37 billion. Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD's force transformation, Congress directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program. This report (1) assesses whether a recent restructuring puts the program in a better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the successful fielding of JTRS.
What GAO Found
The proposed JTRS restructuring--a plan DOD approved in March 2006--appears to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others have documented in recent years. While still meeting key requirements, including those related to DOD's network centric transformation effort, the revised approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system before committing to production. JTRS program management has also been strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO). The more centralized management structure should help the program improve oversight and coordination of standards, system engineering, and development of the radios. The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management and technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to develop migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking capabilities will be used. Completing and obtaining DOD's approval of these activities is needed to ensure the JTRS program is executable. There are also a number of longer-term technical challenges that the JTRS program must address. For example, the proposed interim solutions for enabling network interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be developed. In addition, integrating the radio's hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has also been a longstanding challenge that must be overcome. Furthermore, operating in a networked environment open to a large number of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency. At the same time, the program must address the need to obtain and sustain commitments and support from the military services and other stakeholders--a challenge that has often hampered joint development efforts in the past. The extent to which DOD overcomes these challenges will determine the extent to which the program manages cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports JTRS-dependent military operations. |
gao_GAO-12-53 | gao_GAO-12-53_0 | BJA officials reported that the revised measures will strengthen the reliability and improve the usefulness of grantee performance data in making grant-related decisions. BJA Could Enhance Two Key Practices as It Continues to Review and Revise Its Adult Drug Court Performance Measures
BJA’s process to revise its performance measures generally adhered to some of the key practices that we have identified as important to ensuring that measures are relevant and useful to decision-making. Nevertheless, BJA officials have not documented how they will determine if the measures were successful or whether changes would be needed. In addition, BJA officials did not record key methods and assumptions used to guide their revision efforts, such as the feedback stakeholders provided and BJA’s disposition of these comments. As BJA moves forward in assessing the revised measures and implementing additional changes, if it deems necessary, BJA could better ensure that its efforts result in successful and reliable metrics and are transparent by documenting key methods used to guide revision efforts and an assessment of its measures. Drug Courts Were Associated with Lower Recidivism and Relapse Rates for Program Participants Than Criminal Courts
In the evaluations we reviewed, adult drug-court program participation was generally associated with lower recidivism. Our analysis of evaluations reporting recidivism data for 32 programs showed that drug court program participants were generally less likely to be re-arrested than comparison group members drawn from the criminal court system, although the differences in likelihood were reported to be statistically significant in 18 programs. Across studies showing re-arrest differences, the percentages of drug court program participants rearrested were lower than for comparison group members by 6 to 26 percentage points. The MADCE reported a re-arrest rate for drug court participants that was 10 percentage points below that of the comparison group; specifically, 52 percent of drug court participants were re-arrested after the initiation of the drug court program, while 62 percent of the comparison group members were re-arrested. Our analysis of evaluations reporting relapse data for eight programs showed that drug court program participants were less likely than comparison group members to use drugs, based on drug tests or self-reported drug use, although the difference was not always significant. Of these studies, the net benefit ranged from positive $47,852 to negative $7,108 per participant. Recommendation for Execution Action
Recognizing that BJA has recently revised the adult drug-court performance measures and has plans to assess their utility, we recommend that BJA’s Director take the following action to ensure that its revision process is transparent and results in quality and successful metrics to inform management’s key decisions on program operations: Document key methods used to guide future revisions of its adult drug-court program performance measures. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what data DOJ collects on the performance of federally funded adult drug courts and to what extent DOJ has used this data in making grant-related decisions, we analyzed the reporting guidance and requirements that BJA provided in fiscal years 2007 through 2011 to grantees applying for Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program funds; BJA-generated grantee performance data reports from October to December 2010; and BJA’s guides for managing grants and enforcing grantee compliance that were issued in fiscal year 2011. To determine what is known about the effectiveness of adult drug courts in reducing recidivism and substance-abuse relapse rates and what the costs and benefits of adult drug courts are, we conducted a systematic review of evaluations of drug-court program effectiveness issued from February 2004 through March 2011 to identify what is known about the effect of drug court programs on the recidivism of and relapse of drug- involved individuals as well as the costs and benefits of drug courts. | Why GAO Did This Study
A drug court is a specialized court that targets criminal offenders who have drug addiction and dependency problems. These programs provide offenders with intensive court supervision, mandatory drug testing, substance-abuse treatment, and other social services as an alternative to adjudication or incarceration. As of June 2010, there were over 2,500 drug courts operating nationwide, of which about 1,400 target adult offenders. The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administers the Adult Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program, which provides financial and technical assistance to develop and implement adult drug-court programs. DOJ requires grantees that receive funding to provide data that measure their performance. In response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, this report assesses (1) data DOJ collected on the performance of federally funded adult drug courts and to what extent DOJ used these data in making grant- related decisions, and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of drug courts. GAO assessed performance data DOJ collected in fiscal year 2010 and reviewed evaluations of 32 drug- court programs and 11 cost-benefit studies issued from February 2004 through March 2011.
What GAO Found
BJA collects an array of data on adult drug-court grantees, such as drug-court completion rates, and during the course of GAO's review, began expanding its use of this performance data to inform grant-related decisions, such as allocating resources and setting program priorities. For example, during September 2011, BJA assessed a sample of adult drug-court grantees' performance across a range of variables, using a new process it calls GrantStat. BJA developed recommendations following this assessment and is determining their feasibility. In addition, in October 2011, BJA finalized revisions to the performance measures on which grantees report. BJA's process of revising its performance measures generally adhered to key practices, such as obtaining stakeholder involvement; however, BJA could improve upon two practices as it continues to assess and revise measures in the future. First, while BJA plans to assess the reliability of the new measures after the first quarter of grantees' reporting, officials have not documented, as suggested by best practices, how it will determine if the measures were successful or whether changes would be needed. Second, should future changes to the measures be warranted, BJA could improve the way it documents its decisions and incorporates feedback from stakeholders, including grantees, by recording key methods and assumptions used to guide its revision efforts. By better adhering to best practices identified by GAO and academic literature, BJA could better ensure that its future revision efforts result in successful and reliable metrics--and that the revision steps it has taken are transparent. In the evaluations that GAO reviewed, drug-court program participation was generally associated with lower recidivism. GAO's analysis of evaluations reporting recidivism data for 32 programs showed that drug-court program participants were generally less likely to be re-arrested than comparison group members drawn from criminal court, with differences in likelihood reported to be statistically significant for 18 of the programs. Cost-benefit analyses showed mixed results. For example: (1) Across studies showing re-arrest differences, the percentages of drug- court program participants re-arrested were lower than for comparison group members by 6 to 26 percentage points. Drug court participants who completed their program had re-arrest rates 12 to 58 percentage points below those of the comparison group. (2) GAO's analysis of evaluations reporting relapse data for eight programs showed that drug-court program participants were less likely than comparison group members to use drugs, based on drug tests or self- reported drug use, although the difference was not always significant. (3) Of the studies assessing drug-court costs and benefits, the net benefit ranged from positive $47,852 to negative $7,108 per participant.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BJA document key methods used to guide future revisions of its performance measures for the adult drug-court program. DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-505 | gao_GAO-03-505_0 | Training is fundamental, according to a DOD assessment of the mission area, because technological advancements are “meaningless if not supported by training.”
Despite DOD’s Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies Remain
DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems include few opportunities for ground and air forces to train together in a joint environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at troops’ home stations, differences in the training standards for aircraft controllers, and the low priority placed on joint close air support training in the services’ school curriculum and exercises. Figure 2. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically practiced. However, the time devoted to each topic, as well as the specific instructional material presented, varies among the services. Some Services Give Low Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training
One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training needed to adequately prepare U.S. forces to plan and execute the joint close air support missions is the low priority they give to this mission in comparison with other training requirements. The services have not been able to agree on several of them. Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs
The military services have not yet achieved DOD’s goals for ensuring that equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable and cost-effective. In addition, digital transmission systems can transmit more detailed information, thereby improving the “situational awareness” of both ground and air forces. DOD’s Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit several roadblocks—primarily because the services have been unable to agree on joint solutions. Such training is certainly needed to prepare U.S. troops to conduct close air support missions. Congress needs this information to ensure that U.S. forces are adequately prepared to perform the mission and that the department is making cost-effective decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint performance on the battlefield. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have made in providing adequate training for the joint close air support mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and unit-level service representatives both within the United States and overseas. To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we obtained the services’ acquisition strategies for the specific equipment they were procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing air support close to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires timely, well-practiced procedures and communication between ground and air elements. While most close air support operations in Afghanistan were successful, "friendly fire" incidents have resulted from mistakes made while conducting the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide adequate close air support training, as well as efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized close air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations. This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2) home station training is often restricted and thus does not always provide realistic training to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the services use different training standards and certification requirements for personnel responsible for coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual services, joint close air support training is often a lower priority than other missions. While the department recognizes the need to improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on many of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-minute training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield. Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD's goals for interoperability and cost-effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However, the services have acquired equipment that is not able to communicate across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the services are procuring equipment independently to meet individual service needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint service purchases. |
gao_GAO-16-285 | gao_GAO-16-285_0 | TSA Has Generally Addressed TSARA Requirements
TSA Policies and Procedures Address TSARA’s Requirements for Justifying Acquisitions, Establishing Baselines, Managing Inventory, and Consistency with the FAR
Justifying Acquisitions
TSA has policies and procedures that address TSARA’s requirements for justifying acquisitions, including a security-related technology acquisition. TSA had implemented most of these procedures prior to TSARA’s enactment because they were required by existing DHS and TSA policy. One change resulting from TSARA is the requirement that TSA notify Congress at least 30 days preceding contract awards for new security-related technology acquisitions exceeding $30 million, which TSA addressed by developing new procedures. According to TSA officials, TSA has not yet awarded a contract for security-related technology in excess of $30 million since TSARA’s enactment. For example, TSA acquisition policies require that TSA prepare an acquisition program baseline, a risk management plan, and the acquisition program office staffing requirements before obtaining an acquisition. As required by TSARA, TSA established procedures to notify Congress within 30 days of schedule delays, cost overruns, or performance failures constituting a breach against acquisition program baselines. As of December 2015, TSA reported that it had not experienced such breaches in any existing acquisitions since TSARA’s enactment. Managing Inventory
TSA’s policies and procedures address TSARA requirements for managing inventory related to, among other things, (1) using existing units before procuring more equipment; (2) establishing policies and procedures to track the location, use, and quantity of security-related equipment in inventory; and (3) providing for the exception from using just-in-time logistics, a process that involves delivering equipment directly from manufacturers to airports to avoid the need to warehouse equipment. DHS officials further reported that TSA’s actions towards implementation of TSARA requirements is part of DHS’s Acquisition Review Board process and has not led to any duplication or inconsistency with the FAR or AD 102. TSA Developed and Submitted Its Technology Investment Plan and a Small Business Report Generally in Accordance with TSARA
Technology Investment Plan
TSA submitted a Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan (the Plan) to Congress that generally addresses TSARA-mandated elements. For example, the Plan that TSA submitted to Congress identifies capability gaps and security-related technology acquisition needs and procedures. The report submitted by TSA includes an action plan for integrating small business concerns into the acquisition planning procedures and enhancing outreach to disabled, women-owned and HUBZone businesses. However, TSA officials said that they met with the Department of Defense Office of Small Business Programs after they developed the action plan and the agency plans to fully comply with TSARA’s small business requirements in the future. DHS and TSA Officials Report That It Is Too Early to Determine Whether Efforts to Implement TSARA Will Result in Any Efficiencies, Cost Savings, or Delays
DHS and TSA officials reported that to date TSA has not identified any efficiencies, cost savings, or delays from its implementation of TSARA. TSA officials further stated that because many of their current policies and procedures that met the provisions of the law were in place prior to TSARA’s enactment, it was unlikely for TSARA to result in major cost savings, efficiencies, or delays. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS did not provide formal comments but provided technical comments from TSA which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. Appendix I: Status of TSA Efforts to Address TSARA Requirements
In the following tables, we identify the status of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) efforts to address requirements of the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, TSA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for preventing and defending against terrorist and other threats to domestic transportation systems. From fiscal years 2002 through August 2015, TSA obligated $13.4 billion to acquire security-related technologies such as through the Electronic Baggage Screening Program and the Passenger Screening Program. However, GAO and the DHS Office of Inspector General have reported that TSA did not fully follow DHS policies in deploying Advanced Imaging Technology systems to screen passengers and in estimating costs to screen checked baggage, and faced challenges in managing inventory. Enacted in December 2014, TSARA specifies measures that TSA must take to improve transparency and accountability in acquiring security-related technologies.
TSARA contains a provision that GAO report to Congress on TSA's progress in implementing TSARA. This report examines TSA's actions taken toward addressing TSARA. GAO is not fully evaluating the extent to which TSA is implementing the act at this time because TSA has not undertaken an acquisition of security-related technology subject to the requirements of the act since its enactment. Pursuant to TSARA, GAO will report again on TSA's implementation of the act in approximately 3 years. TSA provided technical comments on a draft of this report which GAO incorporated as appropriate. DHS did not provide formal comments.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has policies and procedures that generally address requirements of the December 2014 Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA). Specifically, TSA policy and procedures address TSARA requirements for justifying acquisitions, establishing baselines, managing inventory, and submitting plans, among other requirements.
Justifying Acquisitions
TSA had taken action toward addressing most TSARA requirements related to justifying acquisitions prior to TSARA's enactment because they were required by existing DHS and TSA acquisition policies. Consistent with TSARA, TSA amended its policies to notify Congress within 30 days of awarding contracts exceeding $30 million for the acquisition of security-related technology. According to agency officials, TSA has not made any such new acquisitions since the enactment of TSARA.
Acquisition Baselines
TSA policies require that it prepare an acquisition program baseline, risk management plan, and staffing requirements before acquiring security-related technology. Consistent with TSARA, TSA established policies to notify Congress within 30 days of making a finding of performance failures, schedule delays, or cost overruns constituting a breach against acquisition program baselines. TSA reported that it had not experienced breaches in any existing acquisitions (i.e., those in place prior to December 2014) since the enactment of TSARA.
Managing Inventory
TSA's policies and procedures address TSARA requirements for using existing units before procuring more equipment; tracking the location, use, and quantity of security-related equipment in inventory; and using just-in-time delivery to avoid warehousing equipment.
Submitting Plans
TSA submitted its Technology Investment Plan and Small Business Report to Congress as required by TSARA. The Technology Investment Plan addresses required elements such as identifying security gaps and security-related technology needs and processes. The Small Business Report includes an action plan for integrating the concerns of small businesses into acquisition processes and increasing outreach to targeted small businesses.
DHS and TSA officials said that TSA has not yet identified any efficiencies, cost savings, or delays from its implementation of TSARA. They added that because many of the policies and procedures that meet the provisions of the act were in place prior to the enactment of TSARA, it was unlikely for TSARA to result in major efficiencies, cost savings, or delays. According to TSA officials, TSA has developed mechanisms to monitor various aspects of TSARA, such as tracking progress in implementing planned technology programs. |
gao_GAO-08-1012 | gao_GAO-08-1012_0 | The Response Rate Estimate Lacks Support, Is Not Systematically Reevaluated, and Is Not Clearly Incorporated into Planning Efforts
2010 Census Response Rate Estimate Is Not Fully Supported
The Bureau developed the response rate estimate for the 2010 Census in 2001 but could not demonstrate support for one of the three components underpinning the estimate. The Bureau Does Not Systematically Reevaluate the Response Rate Estimate
Although the Bureau updated the response rate estimate as a result of a major redesign of census operations undertaken in April 2008, the Bureau still lacks procedures for establishing when and how to reevaluate the response rate estimate. From 2001 through April 2008, the Bureau did not reevaluate the estimate to determine whether it should be updated, even though, after establishing the initial estimate in 2001, the Bureau completed several evaluations from Census 2000 and conducted several census tests that could have informed the estimate. The Bureau revised the estimate down to 64 percent after announcing that nonresponse follow-up would be changed from an automated to a paper- based operation. Further, the Bureau could not demonstrate whether or how the short-form-only component and the general decline component of the national estimate were reflected in the life cycle cost model. The Bureau Plans to Incorporate Additional Methods to Increase Mail Response in 2010
Two of Nine Methods Tested to Increase Response Rate Are Planned to Be Included in the 2010 Census
We determined from reviewing Bureau testing documents that through various national and field tests and experiments, the Bureau tested nine methods to increase self-response to the 2010 Census, as shown in table 1. The Bureau currently plans to implement two of these methods—the replacement questionnaire and two-column bilingual form (see fig. Despite its July 2006 decision, the Bureau recently announced that it is considering including the Internet option as part of the 2010 Census design; however, the Bureau has not developed plans for further testing this option. However, Bureau officials did not document the methods that they considered but decided not to test in the 2010 testing cycle or the rationale behind those decisions. Although officials said that they considered cost, complexity of the test, and compatibility of experiments in their decisions, they did not specify how they defined or weighed these factors to select and prioritize the nine methods they chose to test. For example, they said that they attend research conferences to learn about experiences of other organizations that conduct national surveys to identify potential methods to increase response rate. Both Bureau officials and some survey experts noted that methods used to increase response in other surveys may only be indirectly applicable to the decennial census. Nonetheless, testing modifications to methods that the Bureau has previously considered or tested in earlier studies may yield additional opportunities for increasing response. Conclusions
Nonresponse follow-up is the largest field operation, and the Bureau estimates that it will cost more the $2 billion. To control the cost of nonresponse follow-up, it will be important for the Bureau to devise a strategy for getting people to return their census forms. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) assess how the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) develops, supports, and updates the response rate estimate, and the extent to which the Bureau uses the response rate estimate to inform its 2010 planning efforts; (2) describe the methods the Bureau considered for increasing response rates in 2010 and what it did to test these methods; and (3) assess how the Bureau identifies and selects for testing methods to increase response rates, including considering other surveys’ methods for increasing response. Telephone reminder call. Internet. Communications campaign. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that it will spend at least $2 billion to enumerate households that did not return census forms during the 2010 Census. Increasing the response rate would reduce the number of households that Bureau field staff must visit. To address concerns about reducing the cost of enumerating these households, GAO (1) analyzed how the Bureau develops, supports, and updates the response rate estimate, and the extent to which the Bureau uses the estimate to inform its 2010 planning efforts; (2) described the methods the Bureau considered for increasing response in 2010 and how it tested these methods; and (3) assessed how the Bureau identifies and selects for testing methods to increase response rate, including considering other surveys' methods. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed the Bureau's documentation for estimating the response rate and selecting for testing methods to increase response, and interviewed experts from other survey organizations.
What GAO Found
The 2010 Census response rate estimate is not fully supported, systematically reevaluated, or clearly incorporated into the life cycle cost estimate and planning efforts for nonresponse follow-up--where census workers visit households that do not return their census forms. Specifically, the Bureau could not demonstrate support for one component underpinning the estimate--a general decline due to decreasing public participation in surveys--because it did not document its decisions or data sources when developing the estimate. The two other estimate components that affect responses are the short-form-only census and the replacement questionnaire. In 2001, the Bureau estimated the 2010 Census response rate to be 69 percent. However, from 2001 through 2008, the Bureau did not systematically reevaluate the estimate or consider test results from this decade to determine if the estimate should be updated. Although the Bureau revised the estimate to 64 percent after a major redesign of its nonresponse follow-up operation in 2008, the Bureau still lacks procedures for establishing when and how to reevaluate and, if necessary, update the estimate. To estimate costs and plan for nonresponse follow-up, the Bureau relies on response rate estimates for local census office types because these estimates reflect geographic differences. Officials said that the local estimates reflect components of the national estimate. However, only one of the three components from the national estimate--the replacement questionnaire--was clearly reflected in the local census office type estimates. Through various national and field tests and experiments, the Bureau tested nine methods to increase 2010 Census response and currently plans to implement two of these methods--the replacement questionnaire and two-column bilingual form. The Bureau also plans to use a communications campaign to increase response and plans to test campaign messages in 2009. In July 2006, the Bureau decided not to include an Internet response option in the 2010 Census. However, the Bureau recently announced that it is again considering including the Internet option in 2010, although it has not developed further plans for testing it. For 2010, the Bureau established test objectives and research questions to identify methods to test for increasing response. However, Bureau officials did not document the methods that they considered but decided not to test or the rationale behind those decisions. Although officials said that they considered cost, complexity of the test, and compatibility of experiments in their decisions, they did not specify how they weighed these factors to select and prioritize the nine methods they chose to test. Officials said that they consider the experiences of other survey organizations to identify potential methods to increase response, but they, along with some experts, noted that such methods may only be indirectly applicable to the decennial census. Nonetheless, testing modifications to methods the Bureau has previously considered or tested, such as testing a variety of telephone reminder messages, may yield additional opportunities for increasing response. |
gao_GAO-10-493T | gao_GAO-10-493T_0 | Background
Since it started development in 2003, FCS has been at the center of the Army’s efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. 1). In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense proposed a significant restructuring of the FCS program to lower risk and address more near-term combat needs. DOD directed the Army to transition to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a number of integrated acquisition programs, including one to develop ground combat vehicles. Subsequently, the Army has been defining its ground force modernization efforts per the Secretary’s decisions and the June 2009 acquisition decision memorandum. The Army Has Started a Series of Development and Fielding Efforts
The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decisions to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biannually develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions, and preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to define and develop follow-on increments and develop a new GCV. 2). In December 2009, the Army requested and DOD approved, with a number of restrictions, the low- rate initial production of Increment 1 systems that are expected to be fielded in the fiscal year 2011-12 capability package. Recent Army Contract Actions Related to its Post- FCS Efforts
For the time being, the Army is continuing selected development work— primarily that related to Increment 1, Increment 2, and network development—under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has also recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. Acquisition Direction and FCS Lessons Learned Offer Opportunities to Promote Successful Outcomes, But Decision to Proceed with Initial Production is Premature
The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground force modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the right capabilities at the best value. In many ways, DOD and the Army have set modernization efforts on a positive course, and they have an opportunity to reduce risks by adhering to the body of acquisition legislation and policy reforms—which incorporate knowledge-based best practices we identified in our previous work—that have been introduced since FCS started in 2003. The Army did not position the FCS program for success because it did not establish a knowledge-based acquisition approach—a strategy consistent with DOD policy and best acquisition practices—to develop FCS. Army’s Decision to Proceed with Low Rate Initial Production for Increment 1 Increases Risk
In the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army—because they want to support the warfighter quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that systems are immature, are unreliable, and cannot perform as required. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the acquisition program. As a result, the Army is outlining a new approach to ground force modernization. This statement outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS actions and identifies the challenges DOD and the Army must address as they proceed. This testimony is based on GAO's report on the Army's Ground Force Modernization effort scheduled for release March 15, 2010. It emphasizes the December 2009 decision to begin low-rate initial production for Increment 1 of the Brigade Combat Team Modernization.
What GAO Found
The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure the FCS program. It is transitioning from the FCS long-term acquisition orientation to a shorter-term approach that biannually develops and fields new increments of capability within capability packages. It now has an approved acquisition program that will produce and field the initial increment of the FCS spinout equipment, which includes unmanned aerial and ground vehicles as well as unattended sensors and munitions. It has preliminary plans for two other major defense acquisition programs to (1) define and develop follow-on increments and (2) develop a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The individual systems within Increments 1 and 2 are to be integrated with a preliminary version of an information network. Currently, the Army is continuing selected development work--primarily that related to Increments 1 and 2, and the information network--under the existing FCS development contract. The Army has recently released a request for proposals for the technology development phase of the proposed GCV development effort. The Army's projected investment in Increments 1 and 2 and GCV is estimated to be over $24 billion through fiscal year 2015. With these modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the immediate challenge of setting themon the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. DOD and the Army have an opportunity to better position these efforts by utilizing an enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms--which now incorporate many of the knowledge-based practices that GAO has previously identified--as well as lessons learned from the FCS program. Preliminary plans suggest the Army and DOD are strongly considering lessons learned. However, DOD recently approved the first of several planned low-rate initial production lots of Increment 1 despite having acknowledged that the systems and network were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. That decision reflects DOD's emphasis on providing new capabilities quickly to combat units. This decision did not follow knowledge-based acquisition practices and runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored. The Army needs to seize the opportunity of integrating acquisition reforms, knowledge-based acquisition practices, and lessons-learned from FCS into future modernization efforts to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. |
gao_GGD-95-86 | gao_GGD-95-86_0 | Installing this equipment is part of IRS’ Customer Service Vision to improve service to taxpayers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of the continuing decline in taxpayers’ ability to contact an IRS assistor, we reviewed IRS’ telephone assistance program to determine the nature and extent of the accessibility problem, compare IRS’ practices with other organizations that provide telephone assistance to identify practices IRS might use to answer more calls with existing staff resources, and identify reasons why IRS has been unable to answer more taxpayers’ calls. The other sites we visited did not have this information available. It answered 36 million calls. Figure 3.1 shows the number of calls IRS has received and the minimum number of calls the National Office has scheduled the sites to answer since fiscal year 1989. This has been a major barrier to routing calls among its call sites. For fiscal year 1994, Taxpayer Services asked for 649 additional Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) to answer about 4 million more calls in 1994. We see no reason why IRS cannot apply the same management principles to increasing the number of taxpayer calls that IRS answers. Consequently, our recommendations are focused on maximizing service with existing resources. Recommendations
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the Chief, Taxpayer Services, in coordination with other appropriate IRS officials, to lead an aggressive effort to (1) identify and define the appropriate telephone assistance program operating practices for IRS that would allow it to optimize the number of calls it can answer within current budget constraints and (2) work with the leadership of NTEU to reach agreement on implementing those practices on a nationwide basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO examined the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) telephone assistance program, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of taxpayers' accessibility problems; (2) a comparison of IRS practices with those of other organizations providing telephone assistance; and (3) the reasons IRS has been unable to answer more calls.
What GAO Found
GAO found that IRS: (1) has not kept pace with the increasing number of calls received over fiscal years (FY) 1989 to 1994; (2) answered about the same number of calls each year, about 36 million, even though the telephone answering staff declined; (3) answered about one out of two calls in FY 1989, but only one out of four calls in FY 1994; (4) has improved its ability to route calls among call sites and provide assistors with taxpayers' account information; (5) telephone management practices have not kept pace with those of other organizations; (6) could apply additional telephone management practices to answer more calls with existing resources; (7) provides taxpayer telephone assistance to a much lesser extent than other organizations; (8) and the National Treasury Employment Union have reached an agreement to work together to implement the IRS Customer Service Vision, which is designed to optimize the number of taxpayer calls IRS answers; and (9) could take aggressive actions to better manage its existing resources to answer more calls. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-93 | gao_T-HEHS-99-93_0 | Figure 1 illustrates the federal agencies responsible for federal early childhood funding. The Results Act Helps the Congress and Agencies Oversee Programs and Address Crosscutting Issues
The Results Act is intended to improve the management of federal programs by shifting the focus of decision-making and accountability from the number of grants and inspection made to the results of federal programs. It must include the following six key elements: a comprehensive mission statement covering the major functions and operations of the agency, a description of general goals and objectives for the major functions and operations of the agency, a discussion of how these goals and objectives will be achieved and the resources that will be needed, a description of the relationship between performance goals in the annual performance plan and general goals and objectives in the strategic plan, a discussion of key factors external to the agency that could affect significantly the achievement of the general goals and objectives, and a description of program evaluations used to develop the plan and a schedule for future evaluations. The act’s emphasis on results implies that federal programs contributing to the same or similar outcomes are expected to be closely coordinated, consolidated, or streamlined, as appropriate, to ensure that goals are consistent and that program efforts are mutually reinforcing. Two Agencies’ Plans Address Early Childhood Programs but Lack Important Detail on Coordination
Education and HHS’s ACF—the two agencies that are responsible for the majority of early childhood program funds—addressed early childhood programs in their strategic and 1999 performance plans. Although agencies state that some coordination occurs, they have not yet fully described how they will coordinate their efforts. At the same time, the department still needs to better define its objectives and performance measures for crosscutting issues. Progress in coordinating crosscutting programs is still in its infancy, although agencies are recognizing its importance. The Results Act: Observations on the Department of Education’s Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan (GAO/HEHS-98-172R, June 8, 1998). Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed how Congress can use the Government Performance and Results Act to facilitate agency performance plans to oversee early childhood programs, focusing on: (1) how the Results Act can assist in management and congressional oversight, especially in areas where there are multiple programs; (2) how the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services (HHS)--which together administer more than half of the federal early childhood program funds--addressed early childhood programs in their strategic and fiscal year 1999 and 2000 performance plans and the extent to which recent plans show progress in coordinating early childhood programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Congress can use the Results Act to improve its oversight of crosscutting issues because the act requires agencies to develop strategic and annual performance plans that clearly specify goals, objectives, and measures for their programs; (2) the Office of Management and Budget has issued guidance saying that for crosscutting issues, agencies should describe efforts to coordinate federal programs contributing to the same or similar outcomes so that goals are consistent and program efforts are mutually reinforcing; (3) when GAO looked at the Education and HHS plans, it found that the plans are not living up to their potential as expected from the Results Act; (4) more specifically, while the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 plans to some extent addressed coordination, the departments have not yet described in detail how they will coordinate or consolidate their efforts; and (5) therefore, the potential for addressing fragmentation and duplication has not been realized, and GAO cannot assess whether the agencies are effectively working together on crosscutting issues. |
gao_GAO-08-1002 | gao_GAO-08-1002_0 | TANF was reauthorized under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), and signed into law in February 2006. DRA appropriated $150 million a year for 5 years in discretionary grants for the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative (Initiative). In previous work, we found that HHS has established a rigorous research agenda that regularly evaluates how well its programs are working. HHS shortened its awards process to meet a deadline specified in legislation that allowed 7 months to award grants. However, as part of its awards process, HHS did not fully examine grantees’ programs as described in grantee applications, including the activities they planned to offer, contributing to challenges for some grantees as they were implementing their programs. HHS told us that it received more applications than expected and this was the first time it awarded these grants. Programs Offer a Range of Similar Activities, but Their Focus and Target Populations Differ
While the range of activities offered and populations served by Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood programs’ grantees are similar, their focus and target populations differ. Grantees for both programs reported that they refer domestic violence victims to specialists when appropriate. Additionally, while both programs target such groups as minority and low-income populations, Healthy Marriage grantees are more likely to target high school or teenaged youths, and Responsible Fatherhood grantees are more likely to target incarcerated parents. However, according to our survey, while both programs offer many similar activities, Healthy Marriage programs focus more on those related to marriage and relationship services, whereas Responsible Fatherhood programs are more likely to focus on providing services teaching parenting skills. HHS’s Ability to Target Grantees Not in Compliance with Grant Requirements or Not Meeting Performance Goals Is Hindered by the Lack of an Effective Management Information System
The lack of an effective management information system that captures key information on individual grantees hinders HHS’s ability to appropriately identify which grantees are not in compliance with grant requirements or are not meeting performance goals. HHS told us it is in the process of developing a database that will help it standardize and combine grantee communications and performance information. Conclusions
Marriage and fatherhood programs have emerged as a national strategy for improving the well-being of children. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve monitoring and oversight of Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood grantees, we are recommending that the Secretary of HHS: employ a risk-based approach to monitoring grantees and conducting grantee site visits, using its planned management information system and information from both progress reports and uniform performance indicators to help identify those grantees at risk of not meeting performance goals or not in compliance with grant requirements; and create clear, consistent guidance and policy for monitoring Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood grantees. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To gain insight into how Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood programs are being implemented, we were asked to report on (1) how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded grants and the types of organizations that received funding; (2) the activities and services grantees are providing, including those for domestic violence victims; (3) the manner in which HHS monitors and assesses program implementation and use of funds; and (4) how program impact is measured. | Why GAO Did This Study
Strengthening marriages and relationships in low-income families has emerged as a national strategy for enhancing the well-being of children. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) appropriated $150 million in discretionary grants each year from 2006 through 2010 to implement the Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative. To provide insight into how these programs are being implemented and monitored, GAO is reporting on (1) how the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded grants and the types of organizations that received funding; (2) what activities and services grantees are providing, including those for domestic violence victims; (3) how HHS monitors and assesses program implementation and use of funds; and (4) how program impact is measured. GAO surveyed grantees, interviewed HHS staff, reviewed HHS records and policy, and visited several programs.
What GAO Found
Operating under a deadline that allowed HHS 7 months to award grants, HHS shortened its existing process to award Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood grants to public and private organizations. During this process, HHS did not fully examine grantees' programs as described in their applications, including the activities they planned to offer, and this created challenges and setbacks for grantees later as they implemented their programs. For example, some grantees told us that they were informed that certain activities were not permitted months into program implementation even though HHS had approved these same activities described in their grant applications. The Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood programs provide similar activities, but their focus and target populations differ. Healthy Marriage programs are more likely to provide marriage and relationship activities, while Responsible Fatherhood programs are more likely to provide parenting skills. Additionally, both programs serve low-income and minority groups, but Healthy Marriage grantees are more likely to target teenaged youth, and Responsible Fatherhood grantees are more likely to target incarcerated parents. Both programs' grantees reported that they refer domestic violence victims to specialists in their communities. HHS uses methods that include site visits and progress reports to monitor grantees, but it lacks mechanisms to identify and target grantees that are not in compliance with grant requirements or are not meeting performance goals, and it also lacks clear and consistent guidance for performing site monitoring visits. Moreover, HHS's ability to readily identify which grantees are not in compliance or not meeting goals is hindered because it currently lacks uniform performance indicators and a computerized management information system that would enable HHS to more efficiently track key information on individual grantees. HHS told us that it is in the process of developing a management information system and has submitted uniform performance indicators for review. HHS has established a rigorous research agenda to gauge the long-term impact of healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood activities on diverse, low-income populations. HHS is sponsoring three multiyear impact evaluations of the Healthy Marriage program and one of the Responsible Fatherhood program. |
gao_GAO-17-385 | gao_GAO-17-385_0 | The LD-2s contain information that includes: the name of the lobbyist reporting on quarterly lobbying activities; the name of the client for whom the lobbyist lobbied; a list of individuals who acted as lobbyists on behalf of the client during the reporting period; whether any lobbyists served in covered positions in the executive or legislative branch such as high-ranking agency officials or congressional staff positions, in the previous 20 years; codes describing general issue areas, such as agriculture and education; a description of the specific lobbying issues; houses of Congress and federal agencies lobbied during the reporting reported income (or expenses for organizations with in-house lobbyists) related to lobbying activities during the quarter (rounded to the nearest $10,000). The LDA also requires lobbyists to report certain political contributions semiannually in the LD-203 report. For Most LD-2 Reports, Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Key Elements but Fewer Lobbyists Provided Documentation for Their Income and Expenses
For selected elements of lobbyists’ LD-2 reports that can be generalized to the population of lobbying reports, our findings have been consistent from year to year. For this year’s review, lobbyists for an estimated 83 percent of LD-2 reports provided written documentation for the income and expenses reported for the third and fourth quarters of 2015 and the first and second quarters of 2016. Although the estimated decline from 92 percent in 2015 to 83 percent in 2016 is notable, our analysis does not provide sufficient evidence of a statistically significant decrease in the percentage of lobbyists who have documentation for income and expenses. This year, we estimate that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed 1 or more previously held covered positions as required. As in our other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. Consistent with prior reviews, most lobbying firms reported that they found it “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to comply with reporting requirements. This is consistent with prior reviews. Figures 12 through 16 show what lobbyists reported as their ease of understanding the terms associated with LD-2 reporting requirements from 2012 through 2016. However, it is not always successful. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; to identify challenges and potential improvements to compliance, if any; and to describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (USAO), its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts it has made to improve LDA enforcement. We used the House database for sampling LD- 2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of 2015 and the first and second quarters of 2016, as well as for sampling year-end 2015 and midyear 2016 political contributions (LD-203) reports. 2008 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. 2010 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. 2015 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations on Lobbyists’ Compliance with Disclosure Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also requires that GAO annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 10th report under the mandate.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 78 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2015 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2016. GAO also reviewed 2 random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2015 and midyear 2016. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 46,450 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 22,820 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
For the 2016 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports filed during the third and fourth quarters of 2015 and the first and second quarters of 2016, GAO estimates that
90 percent of lobbyists filed required reports for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement;
83 percent (down from 92 percent in 2015) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and
94 percent filed year-end 2015 LD-203 reports as required.
These findings, with the exception of fewer lobbyists who could produce documentation for income and expenses, are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2015 reporting periods. Although the estimated decline in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable, the decrease is not statistically significant.
As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed 1 or more previously held covered positions. However, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO has found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by prompting them to file reports or applying civil penalties. |
gao_GAO-06-942 | gao_GAO-06-942_0 | The statutes and regulations for each program define administrative costs differently, even though many of the same activities are performed to administer the programs. The laws for each program also include different mechanisms for state and federal participation in funding administrative costs, including specific matching rates, block grants, and spending caps, which can affect state decisions on administrative spending. However, amounts varied widely across the programs and states. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2004, administrative spending increased in five of the seven programs, but generally increased at a lower rate than total program spending. In 2004, Administrative Spending for the Selected Programs Combined Was about 18 Percent of Total Program Spending, but Spending Varied Greatly across Programs and States
In fiscal year 2004, administrative spending, as defined for financial reporting purposes by program statutes and regulations, amounted to about 18 percent—or $21 billion—of the $119 billion in total program spending for the seven programs combined; however, there were large differences in the amounts spent by programs and states. As a percentage of total program spending, administrative spending ranged from 2 percent in CCDF to 58 percent in the Foster Care program, with the exception of CSE in which all program spending is considered administrative. In addition, by helping states facilitate technology enhancements across programs, the federal government can help streamline processes and potentially reduce long- term costs. We acknowledge that all levels of government have attempted to streamline processes across human service programs for the past 20 years. We believe one challenge in particular—the lack of information on the effect streamlining efforts might have on program and administrative costs—is thwarting progress in this area. Simplifying Federal Policies May Save Administrative Costs by Reducing Cumbersome and Duplicative Work
Our current and previous reviews indicate that simplifying policies— especially those related to eligibility determination processes and federal funding structures—could potentially save resources, improve productivity, and help staff focus more time on performing essential program activities, such as providing quality services and accurate benefits to recipients. The costs associated with running human service programs have been a long-standing concern for policy makers interested in maximizing the dollars that go directly to helping vulnerable people. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to provide information on (1) how administrative costs are defined in selected programs and what rules govern federal and state participation in funding these costs; (2) what is known about the amounts of federal and state administrative spending for selected programs and how they have changed over time; and (3) what opportunities exist at the federal level to help states balance cost savings with program effectiveness and integrity. We focused our study on seven key programs: Adoption Assistance, Child Care & Development Fund (CCDF), Child Support Enforcement (CSE), the Food Stamp Program, Foster Care, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Unemployment Insurance (UI). | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost of administering human service programs has been a long-standing concern among policy makers interested in ensuring that federal programs are run in a cost-efficient manner so that federal funds go directly to helping vulnerable people. Little is known about how administrative costs compare among programs, or about opportunities to better manage these costs. GAO looked at (1) how administrative costs are defined and what rules govern federal and state participation in funding these costs; (2) what is known about the amounts of administrative spending and how they have changed over time; and (3) what opportunities exist at the federal level to help states balance cost savings with program effectiveness and integrity. GAO's review included seven programs: Adoption Assistance, Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), Child Support Enforcement (CSE), food stamps, Foster Care, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Unemployment Insurance (UI). To address the questions, GAO reviewed laws, analyzed spending data, and visited five states.
What GAO Found
The statutes and regulations for the seven programs define administrative costs differently, even though many of the same activities are performed to administer the programs. The laws for each program also include different mechanisms for state and federal participation in funding administrative costs, including matching rates, block grants, and spending caps. The seven programs combined spent $21 billion on administration, as defined in law, making up about 18 percent of total program spending in fiscal year 2004. However, amounts varied widely across the programs and states. Administrative spending varied from 2 percent in CCDF to 58 percent in Foster Care, with the exception of CSE in which all program spending is considered administrative. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2004, administrative spending increased in five of the seven programs, generally at a lower rate than total program spending. The federal government may help balance administrative cost savings with program effectiveness and integrity by simplifying policies and facilitating technology improvements. Simplifying policies--especially those related to eligibility determination processes and federal funding structures--could save resources, improve productivity, and help staff focus more time on performing essential program activities. By helping states facilitate technology enhancements across programs, the federal government can help streamline processes and potentially reduce long-term costs. Over the past 20 years, many attempts to streamline processes across programs have had limited success due, in part, to the considerable challenges that streamlining program processes entail. GAO believes one challenge in particular--the lack of information on the effect streamlining efforts might have on program and administrative costs--is thwarting progress in this area. |
gao_GAO-10-675 | gao_GAO-10-675_0 | Using TRLs we developed for these technologies, we found consensus among stakeholders that CCS is less mature than efficiency technologies. While DOE officials reported that individual programs are aware of the maturity of technologies and DOE publishes reports that assess the technical and economic feasibility of advanced coal technologies, we found that the Office of Fossil Energy does not use a standard set of benchmarks or terms to describe or report on the maturity of technologies. The lack of such benchmarks or an assessment of the maturity of key coal technologies and whether they are achieving planned or desired results limits: DOE’s ability to provide a clear picture of the maturity of these technologies to policymakers, utilities officials, and others; congressional and other oversight of the hundreds of millions of dollars DOE is spending on these technologies; and policymakers’ ability to assess the maturity of CCS and the resources that might be needed to achieve commercial deployment. DOE has acknowledged that TRLs can play a key role in assessing the maturity of technologies during the contracting process. Consensus among Key Stakeholders Is That CCS Is Less Mature than Efficiency Technologies
In the absence of an assessment from DOE, we asked stakeholders to gauge the maturity of coal technologies using a scale we developed based on TRLs. for EOR use. However, this plant does not produce electricity. plants have already been demonstrated commercially. Commercial Deployment of Key Coal Technologies Is Possible, but Contingent on Overcoming Economic, Technical, and Legal Challenges
Commercial deployment of CCS within 10 to 15 years is possible according to DOE and other stakeholders, but is contingent on overcoming a variety of economic, technical, and legal challenges. Many technologies to improve plant efficiency have been used and are available for commercial use now, but still face challenges. In addition, some higher efficiency plant designs also face technical challenges in that they require more advanced materials than are currently available. CCS Offers More Potential to Reduce CO
emissions than efficiency improvements alone but could raise electricity costs, increase demand for water, and could affect the ability of individual plants to operate reliably. CCS Could Help Meet Emissions Limits but Raises Key Concerns
According to key reports and stakeholders, the successful deployment of CCS technologies is critical to helping the United States meet potential limits in greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, CCS could allow coal to remain part of the nation’s diverse fuel mix. On the other hand, most stakeholders told us that CCS would increase electricity prices, and key reports raise similar concerns. Specifically, DOE estimated that post-combustion capture technology could almost double water consumption at a coal plant, while pre-combustion capture would increase water use by 73 percent. Plant Efficiency Improvements Offer More Potential for Near-Term Emissions Reductions but Also Raise Concerns
Emission Goals with 21st Century Technologies (Washington, D.C., December 2009). Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of our report to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of EPA for review and comment. To identify stakeholders’ views on these technologies, we conducted initial scoping interviews with power plant operators, technology vendors, and federal officials from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DOE. Following this initial round of interviews, we selected a group of 19 stakeholders with expertise in carbon capture and storage (CCS) or technologies to improve coal plant efficiency and asked them a set of standard questions. Specifically, EPRI developed specific benchmarks to describe TRLs in the context of a commercial scale coal power plant. We based this definition on some of the key reports we reviewed, which used 500 MW as a standard power plant, and stated that such a plant would emit about 3 million tons of CO emissions from a power plant can vary based on a variety of factors, including the amount of time that a power plant is operated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Coal power plants generate about half of the United States' electricity and are expected to remain a key energy source. Coal power plants also account for about one-third of the nation's emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2 ), the primary greenhouse gas that experts believe contributes to climate change. Current regulatory efforts and proposed legislation that seek to reduce CO2 emissions could affect coal power plants. Two key technologies show potential for reducing CO2 emissions: (1) carbon capture and storage (CCS), which involves capturing and storing CO2 in geologic formations, and (2) plant efficiency improvements that allow plants to use less coal. The Department of Energy (DOE) plays a key role in accelerating the commercial availability of these technologies and devoted more than $600 million to them in fiscal year 2009. Congress asked GAO to examine (1) the maturity of these technologies; (2) their potential for commercial use, and any challenges to their use; and (3) possible implications of deploying these technologies. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports and interviewed stakeholders with expertise in coal technologies.
What GAO Found
DOE does not systematically assess the maturity of key coal technologies, but GAO found consensus among stakeholders that CCS is less mature than efficiency technologies. Specifically, DOE does not use a standard set of benchmarks or terms to describe the maturity of technologies, limiting its ability to provide key information to Congress, utilities, and other stakeholders. This lack of information limits congressional oversight of DOE's expenditures on these efforts, and it hampers policymakers' efforts to gauge the maturity of these technologies as they consider climate change policies. In the absence of this information from DOE, GAO interviewed stakeholders with expertise in CCS or efficiency technologies to identify their views on the maturity of these technologies. Stakeholders told GAO that while components of CCS have been used commercially in other industries, their application remains at a small scale in coal power plants, with only one fully integrated CCS project operating at a coal plant. Efficiency technologies, on the other hand, are in wider commercial use. Commercial deployment of CCS is possible within 10 to 15 years while many efficiency technologies have been used and are available for use now. Use of both technologies is, however, contingent on overcoming a variety of economic, technical, and legal challenges. In particular, with respect to CCS, stakeholders highlighted the large costs to install and operate current CCS technologies, the fact that large scale demonstration of CCS is needed in coal plants, and the lack of a national carbon policy to reduce CO2 emissions or a legal framework to govern liability for the permanent storage of large amounts of CO2. With respect to efficiency improvements, stakeholders highlighted the high cost to build or upgrade such coal plants, the fact that some upgrades require highly technical materials, and plant operators' concerns that changes to the existing fleet of coal power plants could trigger additional regulatory requirements. CCS technologies offer more potential to reduce CO2 emissions than efficiency improvements alone, and both could raise electricity costs and have other effects. According to reports and stakeholders, the successful deployment of CCS technologies is critical to meeting the ambitious emissions reductions that are currently being considered in the United States while retaining coal as a fuel source. Most stakeholders told GAO that CCS would increase electricity costs, and some reports estimate that current CCS technologies would increase electricity costs by about 30 to 80 percent at plants using these technologies. DOE has also reported that CCS could increase water consumption at power plants. Efficiency improvements offer more potential for near term reductions in CO2 emissions, but they cannot reduce CO2 emissions from a coal plant to the same extent as CCS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE develop a standard set of benchmarks to gauge and report to Congress on the maturity of key technologies. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-265 | gao_GAO-07-265_0 | The U.S. government’s control over the export of defense and dual-use items is primarily divided between two departments—State and Commerce, respectively (see table 1)—with support for enforcement activities primarily from Commerce, through its Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE); Department of Homeland Security, through its Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and Justice, through the FBI and the U.S. Export Control Enforcement Is Complex, Involving Varying Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities among Multiple Agencies
Enforcing U.S. export control laws and regulations is inherently complex. Multiple agencies are involved in enforcement and carry out various activities, including inspecting shipments, investigating potential export control violations, and taking punitive actions that can be criminal or administrative against violators of export control laws and regulations. Enforcement Authorities Are Granted through Various Laws and Regulations
Authorities for export control enforcement are provided through a complex set of laws and regulations. Agencies have sometimes not agreed on how to proceed on cases, particularly those involving foreign counterintelligence. Agencies Faced with Balancing Multiple Priorities and Leveraging Finite Human Resources
Each enforcement agency’s priorities—and the resources allocated to those priorities—are influenced by the mission of the department in which the agency resides. While Justice and the other enforcement agencies have databases to capture information relating to their own export enforcement activities (see table 3), outcomes of criminal cases are not systematically shared with State and Commerce. State and Commerce officials stated that information on the outcomes of criminal cases, including indictments and convictions, is important to the export licensing process, particularly since indicted or convicted exporters may be denied from participating in the process. Information on criminal export control prosecution outcomes could help inform the export control process by providing a complete picture of the individual or company seeking an export license or trends in illegal export activities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance coordination in the current system, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary for Industry and Security, the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Attorney General direct the Director of the FBI in conjunction with the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the National Security Division to take the following two actions: establish a task force to evaluate options to improve coordination and cooperation among export enforcement investigative agencies, such as creating new or updating existing operating agreements between and among these agencies, identifying and replicating best practices for routinely collaborating on or leading investigations, and establishing a mechanism for clarifying roles and responsibilities for individual export control cases involving foreign counterintelligence, and report the status of task force actions to Congress. Our evidence indicates that coordination is a challenge given that three agencies with differing approaches have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate potential violations of export control laws. To assess whether information on criminal enforcement outcomes is provided to export control agencies, we identified export control enforcement information maintained at the various agencies, such as criminal convictions and indictments for violations of export control laws. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, billions of dollars in dual-use items--items that have both commercial and military applications--as well as defense items are exported from the United States. To protect U.S. interests, the U.S. government controls the export of these items. A key function in the U.S. export control system is enforcement, which aims to prevent or deter the illegal export of controlled items. This report describes the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of export control enforcement agencies, identifies the challenges these agencies face, and determines if information on enforcement outcomes is provided to the export control agencies. GAO's findings are based on an examination of statutes, interagency agreements, and procedures; interviews with enforcement officials at selected field locations and headquarters; and an assessment of enforcement information.
What GAO Found
The enforcement of export control laws and regulations is inherently complex, involving multiple agencies with varying roles, responsibilities, and authorities. The agencies within the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State that are responsible for export control enforcement conduct a variety of activities, including inspecting items to be exported, investigating potential export control violations, and pursuing and imposing appropriate penalties and fines against violators. These agencies' enforcement authorities are granted through a complex set of laws and regulations, which give concurrent jurisdiction to multiple agencies to conduct investigations. Enforcement agencies face several challenges in enforcing export control laws and regulations. For example, agencies have had difficulty coordinating investigations and agreeing on how to proceed on cases. Coordination and cooperation often hinge on the relationships individual investigators across agencies have developed. Other challenges include obtaining timely and complete information to determine whether violations have occurred and enforcement actions should be pursued, and the difficulty in balancing multiple priorities and leveraging finite human resources. Each enforcement agency has a database to capture information on its enforcement activities. However, outcomes of criminal cases are not systematically shared with State and Commerce, the principal export control agencies. State and Commerce may deny license applications or export privileges of indicted or convicted export violators. Without information on the outcomes of criminal cases, export control agencies cannot gain a complete picture of an individual or a company seeking export licenses or discover trends in illegal export activities. This report is a publicly releasable version of a law enforcement sensitive report we issued on November 15, 2006. Therefore, some examples that involved law enforcement techniques or methods and that support our findings have been removed from this version. |
gao_GAO-16-216 | gao_GAO-16-216_0 | DOJ prosecutes fraud cases that affect both federal health programs and private health insurance. In addition, the use of smart card technology could introduce new types of fraud and ways for individuals to illegally access beneficiary information. The majority of the 739 cases (about 68 percent) included more than one scheme; 61 percent of the cases had 2 to 4 schemes, about 7 percent had 5 or more schemes. Schemes related to prescription drugs (including prescription drugs that contained controlled substances), such as fraudulently obtaining or distributing prescription drugs or marketing prescription drugs for non-FDA approved uses in order to commit fraud, were found in about 21 percent of the cases we reviewed. Among the cases in which the beneficiary was complicit, the most common schemes were billing for services that were not medically necessary, billing for services that were not provided, and falsifying records to support the fraud schemes. In about 62 percent of the 739 cases we reviewed, beneficiaries were not complicit in the schemes. Smart Cards Likely Would Not Have Affected the Majority of Cases Reviewed
Among the 739 cases, we found 165 cases (22 percent) in which the entire case (2 percent) or part of the case (20 percent) could have been affected by the use of smart cards. These six schemes were (1) billing for services that were never actually provided and no legitimate services were provided; (2) misusing a provider’s identification information to bill fraudulently (such as using a retired provider’s identification information); (3) misusing a beneficiary’s identification information to bill fraudulently (such as using a deceased beneficiary’s identification information or stealing a beneficiary’s information); (4) billing more than once for the same service (known as duplicate billing) by altering a small portion of the claim, such as the date, and resubmitting it for payment; (5) providing services to ineligible individuals; and (6) falsifying a substantial part of the records to indicate that beneficiaries or providers were present at the point of care. In 18 cases (2.4 percent of all cases resolved in 2010 that we reviewed), the entire case could have been affected because all of the schemes on those cases involved the lack of verification of the beneficiary or provider at the point of care. This case could have been partially affected by the use of smart cards, as the smart card would have verified that the beneficiary was present for only one service in which a duplicate bill was submitted but would not have affected the ability of the provider to bill for services that were not medically necessary. Agency Comments
HHS and DOJ provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we have incorporated as appropriate. To describe types of health care fraud, we reviewed our prior reports, as well as reports from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop a list of schemes and definitions for these schemes, and then reviewed cases resolved in 2010 that we obtained through the course of work for our 2012 report. Using the list of fraud schemes identified, we reviewed court documents for the health care fraud cases resolved in 2010 to determine the prevalence of health care fraud schemes. Appendix II: Additional Details on Health Care Fraud Schemes in Cases GAO Reviewed
Tables 6 through 9 provide detailed information on health care fraud schemes for cases we reviewed, including whether the scheme was the only scheme in the case or used in combination with other schemes, the number of schemes used in cases, the role of the provider, and the role of the beneficiary. | Why GAO Did This Study
While there have been convictions for multimillion dollar schemes that defrauded federal health care programs, there are no reliable estimates of the magnitude of fraud within these programs or across the health care industry. In some fraud cases, individuals have billed federal health care programs or private health insurance by using a beneficiary's or provider's identification information without the beneficiary's or provider's knowledge. One idea to reduce the ability of individuals to commit this type of fraud is to use electronically readable card technology, such as smart cards. Proponents say that these cards could reduce fraud by verifying that the beneficiary and the provider were present at the point of care.
GAO was asked to identify and categorize schemes found in health care fraud cases. This report describes (1) health care fraud schemes and their prevalence among cases resolved in 2010 and (2) the extent to which health care fraud schemes could have been affected by the use of smart card technology. GAO reviewed reports on health care fraud and smart card technology and reviewed court documents for 739 fraud cases resolved in 2010 obtained for a related 2012 GAO report on health care fraud. GAO is not making any recommendations.
The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of 739 health care fraud cases that were resolved in 2010 showed the following:
About 68 percent of the cases included more than one scheme with 61 percent including two to four schemes and 7 percent including five or more schemes.
The most common health care fraud schemes were related to fraudulent billing, such as billing for services that were not provided (about 43 percent of cases) and billing for services that were not medically necessary (about 25 percent).
Other common schemes included falsifying records to support the fraud scheme (about 25 percent), paying kickbacks to participants in the scheme (about 21 percent), and fraudulently obtaining controlled substances or misbranding prescription drugs (about 21 percent).
Providers were complicit in 62 percent of the cases, and beneficiaries were complicit in 14 percent of the cases.
GAO's analysis found that the use of smart cards could have affected about 22 percent (165 cases) of cases GAO reviewed in which the entire or part of the case could have been affected because they included schemes that involved the lack of verification of the beneficiary or provider at the point of care. However, in the majority of cases (78 percent), smart card use likely would not have affected the cases because either beneficiaries or providers were complicit in the schemes, or for other reasons. For example, the use of cards would not have affected cases in which the provider misrepresented the service (as in billing for services not medically necessary), or when the beneficiary and provider were not directly involved in the scheme (as in illegal marketing of prescription drugs). |
gao_NSIAD-96-222 | gao_NSIAD-96-222_0 | As shown in figure 1, DOD has allocated nearly three-quarters of these funds to delivery vehicle and infrastructure dismantlement and destruction and to improving nuclear material controls. The second plan, now in draft, is for 1996. For example, the plan would not reflect the program’s reallocation of $60 million in fiscal year 1996 funds from Russian chemical weapons destruction to strategic delivery vehicle dismantlement work in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; progress made in early 1996 in defining CTR dismantlement projects in Russia; and the U.S. response to Russian requests in March and June 1996 for help in upgrading as many as 50 nuclear weapons storage sites. The CTR program is seeking to address these concerns by helping Russia construct a fissile material storage facility and control its nuclear weapons. The CTR program’s draft 1996 multiyear plan indicates that the program lacks the data and analytical tools needed to assess the extent to which its nuclear security projects are achieving CTR objectives. Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. DOD officials have stated that Russian chemical and nuclear weapon proliferation would pose a major security problem for the United States and that the eventual destruction of Russia’s huge stockpile would significantly reduce the chemical weapon threat. However, DOD officials have also stated that the threat of chemical weapons is less significant and urgent than that of nuclear weapons. By May 1997, CTR officials hope to have a preliminary design of the pilot facility and completed (1) tests on optimizing the Russian destruction technology and (2) a feasibility study to support Russian decisions on the facility’s location. Potential Impact of Chemical Weapon Destruction
CTR program officials plan to assess the effectiveness of their chemical weapons destruction projects only in terms of their success in achieving project milestones. It would not address Russia’s need to construct additional facilities at six more sites in time to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention’s time frames. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense refrain from obligating any CTR funds for constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia until DOD has completed a construction cost estimate based on a one-third completed design and specified the U.S. share of the estimated costs. Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made continued progress in obligating and disbursing funds. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) draft 1996 multiyear Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program plan, focusing on its: (1) estimated costs; and (2) potential impacts on helping control nuclear weapons and materials, and eliminating strategic delivery vehicles.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the draft 1996 CTR multiyear plan does not adequately reflect budgetary uncertainties associated with some projects and cost estimates or important developments that have occurred since 1995; (2) although the CTR program has made progress in helping Russia dismantle and store its nuclear weapons arsenal, DOD has not yet resolved important issues concerning planned Russian nuclear weapons storage and chemical weapons destruction facility projects; (3) the estimated costs for the chemical weapons facility are unknown; (4) the United States has capped its support for the nuclear weapons storage facility that is now under construction, but CTR officials do not plan to cap support for the chemical weapons destruction facility; (5) funding decisions for the chemical weapons destruction facility are compounded by the facility's potential high cost and questions on whether the facility will be effective at reducing the overall Russian chemical weapons threat; (6) DOD officials consider the threat from chemical weapons to be less urgent than the Russian nuclear threat; (7) Russia may not be able to meet the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention unless six more facilities are constructed and other nations resume their funding commitments; (8) CTR officials lack the data needed to independently determine the extent and effect of Russia's controls over nuclear materials; (9) DOD has allocated or requested almost $1.5 billion for chemical weapon destruction, nuclear security, and delivery vehicle destruction projects through 1997; and (10) CTR program costs through 2001 are estimated to be $3.2 billion. |
gao_GAO-04-332 | gao_GAO-04-332_0 | DSS administers the NISP on behalf of DOD and 24 other agencies through its Industrial Security Program. DSS’s Industrial Security Program, which is one of DSS’s three core mission areas, oversees more than 11,000 contractor facilities to assure U.S. government customers that their classified information is protected. Further, while industrial security representatives maintain paper files on the quality of contractor security programs and the types of security violations that result in compromises of classified information, DSS does not analyze this information, and the manner in which it is maintained does not lend itself to such analysis. Nor does DSS evaluate its performance in terms of the frequency of security violations and information compromises occurring at contractor facilities. Further, the manner in which DSS maintains records on facilities’ security programs—geographically dispersed paper-based files— does not lend itself to analysis. DSS Does Not Always Comply with NISP Requirements after a Possible Compromise of Information
Industrial security representatives often failed to determine whether security violations by facilities resulted in the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information or made determinations that were not in accordance with approved criteria. DSS made no determinations in any of the eight cases. In one case, 5 months passed before an industrial security representative was able to notify a government customer that its information was suspected of being compromised. In such instances, the subcontractor may have to work with the prime contractor to identify the government customer to provide the industrial security representative with this information. In one case we reviewed, a subcontractor made repeated attempts over a 5- month period to obtain the affected government customer’s identity from the prime contractor. Such delays limit the government customer’s opportunity to assess the extent of potential damage to national security. Although DSS’s inability to assess its performance as well as evaluate and make changes to its oversight does not necessarily mean that contractors are not fulfilling their responsibilities under the NISP, the effectiveness of DSS’s oversight is diminished and the assurances it provides to government customers regarding the protection of their information cannot be relied on. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enable DSS to evaluate whether its oversight reduces the risk of information compromise, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, Defense Security Service, to take the following three actions: establish results-oriented performance goals and measures that would enable DSS to assess the extent to which it is achieving its industrial security mission, identify the information that needs to be analyzed to detect systemic vulnerabilities and identify trends regarding how contractor facilities protect classified information, and regularly analyze that information to make informed management decisions about the use of resources for its oversight activities and make any needed changes to those activities or procedures to reduce the risk of information compromise. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of DSS to take the following four actions to ensure that appropriate determinations are made regarding possible information compromises and that government customers are notified of such situations in a timely manner: evaluate industrial security representatives and field office chiefs’ understanding of the criteria for making determinations regarding the compromise of classified information and revise training and guidance for representatives and chiefs based on the results of that evaluation, revise Industrial Security Operating Manual requirements to emphasize the need to apply the established determinations regarding the compromise or loss of classified information, explore the effects of establishing specific time-based criteria in the Industrial Security Operating Manual for representatives to make determinations and notify government customers, and establish mechanisms that create accountability for knowing the identity of government customers so that industrial security representatives can readily notify those customers of any loss or compromise. Therefore, DSS cannot provide adequate assurances that its oversight ensures the protection of classified information. To assess adherence to required procedures by DSS after a security violation and possible compromise of classified information, we used a case study approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) contractors perform numerous services that require access to classified information. With access comes the possibility of compromise, particularly as foreign entities increasingly seek U.S. military technologies. To ensure the protection of classified information, the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establishes requirements that contractors must meet. In administering the NISP for DOD and 24 other government agencies, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS) monitors whether 11,000- plus contractor facilities' security programs meet NISP requirements. In response to a Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, GAO assessed DSS's oversight and examined DSS's actions after possible compromises of classified information.
What GAO Found
DSS cannot provide adequate assurances to government agencies that its oversight of contractor facilities reduces the risk of information compromise. DSS is unable to provide this assurance because its performance goals and measures do not relate directly to the protection of classified information. While DSS maintains files on contractor facilities' security programs and their security violations, it does not analyze this information. Further, the manner in which this information is maintained--geographically dispersed paper-based files--does not lend itself to analysis. By not analyzing information on security violations and how well classified information is being protected across all facilities, DSS cannot identify systemic vulnerabilities and make corrective changes to reduce the risk of information compromise. When a contractor facility reports a violation and the possible compromise of classified information, DSS does not always follow established procedures. After receiving a report of a possible information compromise, DSS is required to determine whether compromise occurred and to notify the affected government agency so it can assess any damage and take actions to mitigate the effects of the suspected compromise, compromise, or loss. However, DSS failed to make determinations in many of the 93 violations GAO reviewed and made inappropriate determinations in others. In 39 of the 93 violations, DSS made no determinations regarding compromise. For 30 of the remaining 54 violations, DSS's determinations were not consistent with established criteria. As a result, government agencies are not being kept informed of possible compromises of their information. In addition, weeks or months can pass before government agencies are notified by DSS of possible information compromises because of difficulties in identifying the affected agencies. In 11 out of 16 instances GAO reviewed, it took DSS more than 30 days to notify the affected agency that its information had been lost or compromised. DSS relies on contractor facilities to identify the affected government agencies, but some facilities cannot readily provide DSS with this information because they are subcontractors that have to obtain the identity of the government agency from the prime contractors. In one case, 5 months passed before a subcontractor facility could provide DSS with the identity of the government agency whose information was suspected of being compromised. Such delays limit the government agencies' opportunity to assess and mitigate any damage from loss or compromise. |
gao_GAO-08-230T | gao_GAO-08-230T_0 | Population Measures Are Used in Grant Formulas
Decennial census data play a key role in the allocation of many grant programs. In fiscal year 2004, the federal government administered 1,172 grant programs, with $460.2 billion in combined obligations. In addition to the census count, the Bureau has programs that estimate more current data on population and population characteristics that are derived from the decennial census of population. Because the decennial census provides population counts once every ten years, the Bureau also estimates the population for the years between censuses. Seeking to obtain an accurate count has been a concern since the first census in 1790. Concern about undercounting the population continued through the decades. These measures of coverage are based on demographic analysis, which compares the census count to birth and death certificates and other administrative data (see fig. Modern coverage measurement began with the 1980 Census, when the Bureau compared decennial figures to the results of an independent sample survey of the population. To estimate the accuracy of the 2000 Census, the Bureau conducted the Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation (A.C.E. Population Estimates May Affect Allocation of Federal Funds
The accuracy of state and local population estimates may have an effect, though modest, on the allocation of grant funds among the states. This simulation was done for illustrative purposes only— to demonstrate the sensitivity of government programs to alternative population estimates. While only the actual census numbers should be used for official purposes, our simulation shows the extent to which alternative population counts would affect the distribution of selected federal grant funds and can help inform congressional decision making on the design of future censuses. We selected the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) as part of this simulation because the formula for this block grant program, which is based solely on population, and the resulting funding allocations are particularly sensitive to alternative population estimates. Recalculating these allocations using statistical population estimates from the 2000 A.C.E., only $4.2 million—or 0.25 percent—of $1.7 billion in block grant funds would have shifted. In short, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained $4.2 million and 23 states would have lost a total of $4.2 million. For example, using statistical estimates of the population following the 1990 Census, a total of 0.37 percent of SSBG funds would have shifted among the states in fiscal year 1998. These same data serve as a foundation for the allocation of billions of dollars in federal funds to states and local governments. Though the overall undercount has generally declined since it has been measured, evaluating the accuracy of the census continues to be essential given the importance of the data, the need to know the nature of any errors, and the cost of the census overall. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces critical data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. This testimony discusses (1) the various measures of population used to allocate federal grant funds (2) how the accuracy of the population count and measurement of accuracy have evolved and the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) plan for coverage measurement in 2010; and (3) the potential impact that differences in population estimates can have on the allocation of grant funds. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's issued work in which it evaluated the sensitivity of grant formulas to population estimates.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2000, GAO found that 85 percent of federal government obligations in grants to state and local governments were distributed on the basis of formulas that use data such as state population and personal income. The decennial census is the foundation for measuring the nation's population. It provides a count of the population every 10 years, and is the starting point for estimates of population made in years between the censuses. Obtaining an accurate population count through the decennial census has been a concern since the first census in 1790. Concern that the decennial census undercounted the population has continued since then. To measure accuracy, the Bureau since 1940 has used demographic analysis, in which it compares census counts with information on births, deaths, and other information. With the exception of 1990, the Bureau's demographic analysis shows that the extent to which the census undercounted the population has declined. More recently, the Bureau has used statistical techniques in which it compares the census count with the results of an independent sample survey of the population. For 2010, the Bureau plans to use similar statistical techniques to measure the accuracy and coverage of the census. Evaluating the accuracy of the census is essential given the importance of the data, the need to know the nature of any errors, and the cost of the census overall. GAO's prior work has illustrated that the accuracy of state and local population estimates may have some effect on the allocation of grant funds. Specifically, to show the sensitivity of grant programs to alternative population estimates, GAO simulated how two grant program formulas would allocate federal funds to states if population estimates were substituted for census counts. This simulation was done for illustrative purposes only. While only actual census numbers should be used for official purposes, this simulation showed some shifting of grant funds among the states when estimates were used. For example, recalculating allocations of Social Services Block Grant funds using estimates of population for 2000, rather than the census count, would result in shifting $4.2 million--or 0.25 percent--of $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2004 funds. Specifically, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained $4.2 million and 23 states would have lost a total of $4.2 million. |
gao_AIMD-96-4 | gao_AIMD-96-4_0 | (See table 1.) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) publishes guidance to assist auditors in planning audits under the Single Audit Act of 1984. The Three Key Agents of CMIA Have Made Progress in Achieving the Act’s Purpose
Our review showed that the Department of the Treasury, federal program agencies, and the states have made substantial progress in achieving the act’s purpose of timely transfers of funds. Most state officials acknowledged that CMIA has helped heighten their awareness of cash management, but several expressed concern over what they viewed as added administrative burden. They published final rules and regulations for implementing CMIA; contracted for development of clearance patterns that could be used by states that did not develop their own; developed and issued an Implementation Guide, Federal and State Review Guides, and a Treasury-State Agreement Form Book; negotiated first year TSAs, within the time period specified in the act, with all but two states and second year agreements with all but one state; reviewed the documentation for reimbursement of allowable direct costs over $50,000 submitted by the states; received first-year annual reports from all the states and submitted them to program agencies for review of federal interest liabilities claimed; issued several policy statements intended to clarify regulations; submitted to OMB suggested language on CMIA-related audit objectives and procedures for inclusion in the planned revisions to the Compliance Supplement for Single Audit Act reviews; and developed plans to revise the CMIA regulations to streamline processes to make them more flexible. FMS also plans to eliminate the prohibition on reimbursable funding to provide states with greater flexibility in funding techniques. The first year of implementation of CMIA resulted in a cumulative net state interest liability due to the federal government of approximately $34 million. OMB plans to issue a revised Compliance Supplement during fiscal year 1996 which will address CMIA requirements. Since FMS is not a funding agency, entities would not be required to submit reports to FMS. Conclusions
The Cash Management Improvement Act has heightened awareness of cash management at both the state and federal levels. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Financial Management Service's (FMS), federal agencies', and states' implementation of the Cash Management Improvement Act (CMIA) during 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FMS, federal agencies, and states have complied with CMIA requirements, established processes to implement CMIA, and made progress in achieving the act's goal of timely fund transfers; (2) total state interest liability during the first year of CMIA implementation was about $34 million; (3) states reported that while CMIA has improved their awareness of cash management, they are burdened by added administrative tasks; (4) states have not been able to effectively measure their compliance with CMIA, since the Office of Management and Budget has not published guidance for testing CMIA compliance; (5) FMS is taking action to address instances of state noncompliance in implementing CMIA which resulted in understatements of reported state interest liability; and (6) FMS is planning to revise CMIA regulations to allow states greater flexibility in funding techniques. |
gao_GAO-10-879T | gao_GAO-10-879T_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Transform Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities, but Still Needs a Comprehensive Strategic Plan to Guide Its Efforts
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has taken a number of steps over the past several years to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, including designating Senior Language Authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and other DOD components; developing a governance structure; updating policies; and publishing the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap—the primary document that DOD has used to guide its efforts to date. Using the roadmap as guidance or a complementary document, each military service has developed or is in the process of developing a service- specific strategy for language and regional-proficiency transformation. Our prior work has shown that for a strategic plan to be helpful, it should contain certain key elements, such as measurable performance goals and objectives and funding priorities that are linked to goals. DOD had also not identified the resources required to implement the tasks in the roadmap or linked the roadmap to its funding requests. In the absence of a comprehensive strategic plan that includes measurable performance goals and objectives, funding priorities linked to goals, and accountability for achieving results, we concluded it would be difficult for DOD to guide the military services as they develop and implement their strategies, and supporting programs and activities, and also to ensure these efforts were synchronized and consistent with departmentwide goals. Furthermore, for both the department and Congress, the lack of a comprehensive plan would make it difficult to develop or evaluate funding requests, respectively, and assess progress towards achieving successful transformation of language and regional proficiency capabilities. Therefore, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan with all the key elements I have mentioned. Our latest information from DOD officials, as of this month, is that the plan has been drafted and is undergoing final review and approval. DOD Has Not Fully Developed the Information It Needs to Identify Gaps in Language and Regional Proficiency and Assess Risk
In addition to a comprehensive strategic plan, it is important for DOD to have complete information on the current level of language and regional proficiency within its forces as well as the requirements for these capabilities. With this knowledge, the department can identify gaps and assess risks. At the time of our June 2009 report, DOD had efforts underway to gather inventory data and define requirements, but did not yet have complete information. Because DOD did not have complete information on the regional proficiency capabilities of its military and civilian workforce or a method to evaluate proficiency levels, we concluded it could not determine capability gaps and assess risk effectively. However, DOD has not yet established a mechanism to assess and validate regional proficiency skills. In June 2009, we reported that DOD had developed a process to enable combatant commanders, the military services, and other organizations to submit their language and regional proficiency requirements. Without a validated methodology that was consistently applied by all organizations, DOD did not have a reliable means to identify language and regional proficiency requirements. DOD agreed with this recommendation, noting that it planned to complete two assessments by November 2009 that would identify a validated process to prioritize and refine DOD’s foreign language and regional expertise requirements and produce a standardized methodology to measure risk of identified gaps and shortfalls. As of June 2010, DOD officials told us these assessments were completed and that the results were used to develop a validated methodology for determining language and regional proficiency requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today, and in the foreseeable future, military operations require U.S. personnel to work alongside multinational partners and among local populations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has placed a greater emphasis on transforming language and regional proficiency capabilities, which includes cultural awareness. GAO's prior work has found that integrated strategic plans with measurable goals and funding priorities linked to goals can help guide organizational transformations. Decision makers also require complete information to identify capability gaps and assess risk. This testimony summarizes GAO's prior work and recommendations on DOD's efforts to develop language skills and regional proficiency and the steps DOD has taken to implement our prior recommendations. Specifically, it addresses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a strategic plan to guide its language and regional proficiency transformation efforts and (2) obtained the information it needs to identify capability gaps and assess risk. GAO's statement is based on a June 2009 report and work conducted during May 2010 through June 2010 to update the status of GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken steps to transform its language and regional proficiency capabilities, but it has not yet developed a comprehensive strategic plan to guide its transformation efforts. DOD established Senior Language Authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and other components, developed a governance structure to provide internal oversight over transformation efforts, updated policies, and published a Defense Language Transformation Roadmap with broad goals and objectives. Each military service has also developed or is currently developing strategies using the roadmap as guidance or as a complementary document. However, GAO reported in June 2009 that not all objectives within the 2005 roadmap were measurable and that DOD had not identified the resources required to implement roadmap tasks or linked the roadmap to funding requests. In the absence of a comprehensive plan, GAO concluded it would be difficult for DOD to guide the military services as they develop their strategies and related training programs, and ensure these efforts were consistent with DOD-wide goals. Furthermore, DOD and Congress would lack information needed to assess progress toward a successful transformation and evaluate funding requests. GAO recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan that includes measurable performance goals and objectives and investment priorities. DOD agreed with this recommendation and estimated that a strategic plan would be completed by September 2009. In June 2010, DOD officials informed GAO that the plan is undergoing final review and approval. DOD lacks the information needed to identify gaps in language and regional proficiency and to assess related risks. GAO reported in June 2009 that DOD had developed an inventory of its language capabilities for military personnel, but it did not yet have data on regional proficiency capabilities because DOD lacked an agreed-upon way to assess and validate these skills. GAO concluded that without complete information, DOD could not determine capability gaps and assess risk effectively and recommended that DOD establish a mechanism to assess and validate regional proficiency capabilities. DOD agreed with this recommendation. As of June 2010, DOD had not established such a mechanism. GAO also reported that DOD lacked a standardized methodology to aid DOD components in identifying language and regional proficiency requirements and, as a result, estimates of requirements varied widely. GAO concluded that without such a validated methodology, DOD would not have a reliable way to identify language and regional proficiency requirements. GAO recommended that DOD develop a validated methodology for identifying these requirements for all communities and all proficiency levels. DOD agreed, stating that it had two assessments underway intended to produce a standardized methodology. In June 2010, DOD officials told GAO that, based on the assessments, they had developed a methodology, which is being reviewed by senior DOD leaders. |
gao_GAO-03-417 | gao_GAO-03-417_0 | A major focus of the unit cost reduction objective was to reduce positions as well as streamline operations and develop a more efficient organization. Customers are systematically selected while waiting in checkout lines. Personnel Reductions Have Not Hampered Most Commissaries’ Store Operations or Customer Satisfaction
Despite the workforce reductions, store operations and customer service have been maintained at the same level, and in some cases improved. DeCA has used various measures to eliminate 2,602 full-time positions, or 85 percent of the planned reductions as of December 31, 2002; very few employees have been separated from the agency. However, because DeCA’s strategic plan does not include specific goals for achieving a certain full-time/part-time workforce mix in stores, the planned percentage of part-time positions varies widely by individual store and region. It accomplished this by eliminating 137 vacant positions (114 in headquarters and 23 in the regional offices). The remaining 261 efficiency reductions are planned in fiscal year 2003. 304 positions were eliminated as a result of 15 store closings. In addition, some store directors told us that a greater use of part-time workers has allowed them to increase their store operating hours. Customer Satisfaction Survey Methodology Is Reasonable, but Analysis Could Be Improved
Overall, DeCA’s customer satisfaction survey methodology is a reasonable approach to obtain customer feedback. However, some improvements in the analysis of survey data could be made to provide more precise and complete customer information. Furthermore, the current survey does not collect information on the number of service members who do not shop at a commissary and reasons why they do not. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in consultation with the Chairman, Commissary Operating Board, require the Director, Defense Commissary Agency, to update the strategic plan to include goals that identify the percent of the store workforce that is expected to be full- and part-time to achieve further efficiencies from reshaping the workforce; reassess the management reductions at small stores to ensure managers can balance their workload and maintain store operations; adjust the customer survey results on the basis of sales volume and document the number of survey non-respondents and their reasons for not completing the questionnaire; and examine potential methods and analyses to periodically determine how many and why eligible personnel do not shop at commissaries, to identify ways to improve service and increase the number of potential customers using the commissary benefit. We continue to believe the recommendation is an appropriate one for the Defense Commissary Agency to implement. To determine the status of DeCA’s personnel reduction plan, we obtained data from DeCA headquarters and each regional office on the number of reductions planned by region by store as well as made as of December 31, 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to concerns about the impact of proposed cuts in the Defense Commissary Agency's workforce, the House Armed Services Committee placed in its report on the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 a requirement that we evaluate the effect of the personnel reductions. Specifically, we assessed (1) the status of personnel reductions and how they have affected store operations and customer service, and (2) whether the agency uses a reliable methodology to measure customer satisfaction with its commissaries.
What GAO Found
The Defense Commissary Agency's commissary operations and customer services have been maintained at the same level, and in some cases improved, despite the recent reductions in workforce. As of December 31, 2002, the agency had completed most of its 3,047 planned personnel reductions in full-time positions. It accomplished this primarily by achieving efficiencies or eliminating vacant positions in the stores. Only 122 employees have been separated and 341 retired as a result of the personnel cutbacks. A major focus of DeCA's personnel reductions, as outlined in its strategic plan, was to reshape the workforce and develop a more efficient organization. We found that commissaries are making greater use of part-time employees because of the reductions. This has allowed some stores to increase their operating hours to better meet customer needs. It has also given store managers more flexibility in meeting workload fluctuations. However, DeCA's strategic plan does not include specific goals for achieving a certain full-time/part-time workforce mix in stores. As a result, the planned percentage of part-time positions varies widely by store. A recent customer satisfaction survey showed that commissary patrons expressed high satisfaction with their overall shopping experience, as well as with such key indicators as time waiting in line and convenient hours. However, the managers of the smaller commissaries reported concerns over balancing workload and maintaining store operations. We found that the Commissary Customer Satisfaction Survey methodology is reasonable. However, some improvements in the analysis of survey data could ensure that the findings are more complete and consistent. Such changes could include adjusting survey results for the volume of sales at individual stores or for the number of shoppers who refuse to fill out the questionnaire. Furthermore, the current survey does not collect information on the number of, and reasons why, potential customers do not shop at their local commissaries. |
gao_AIMD-98-136 | gao_AIMD-98-136_0 | Agencies, in undertaking systems modernization efforts, are required by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 to ensure that their information technology investments are effectively managed and significantly contribute to improvements in mission performance. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of SSA’s implementation of IWS/LAN, (2) assess whether SSA and state DDS operations have been disrupted by the installations of IWS/LAN equipment, and (3) assess SSA’s practices for managing its investment in the IWS/LAN initiative. However, the contractor installing IWS/LAN has expressed concerns about the availability of the workstations specified in the contract, raising questions as to whether they can continue to be acquired. According to SSA records, the agency generally met this schedule with the actual installation of 31,261 workstations and 850 LANs by March 15, 1998. During our review, staff in the 11 SSA offices that we visited generally stated that they had not experienced any significant disruptions in their ability to serve the public during the installation and operation of IWS/LAN. Because IWS/LAN is expected to correct Year 2000 deficiencies in some states’ hardware, however, NCDDD cautioned that delaying the installation of IWS/LAN could affect the states’ progress in becoming Year 2000 compliant. SSA Is Not Using Key Performance Measures to Assess the Impact of IWS/LAN on Mission Performance
Although SSA followed certain essential practices for acquiring IWS/LAN, it has not yet implemented performance goals and measures to assess the impact of this investment on productivity and mission performance. Moreover, absent target goals and a defined process for measuring performance, SSA will not be able to determine whether its investment in each phase of IWS/LAN is yielding expected improvements in service to the public. Recommendations
To strengthen SSA’s management of its IWS/LAN investment, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security direct the Deputy Commissioner for Systems to immediately assess the adequacy of workstations specified in the IWS/LAN contract, and based on this assessment, determine (1) the number and capacity of workstations required to support the IWS/LAN initiative and (2) its impact on the IWS/LAN implementation schedule; work closely with state DDSs to promptly identify and resolve network management concerns and establish a strategy for ensuring the compliance of those states relying on IWS/LAN hardware for Year 2000 corrections; establish a formal oversight process for measuring the actual performance of each phase of IWS/LAN, including identifying the impact that each IWS/LAN phase has on mission performance and conducting post-implementation reviews of the IWS/LAN project once it is fully implemented. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) ongoing efforts to implement its intelligent workstation/local area network (IWS/LAN) project, focusing on: (1) determining the status of SSA's implementation of IWS/LAN; (2) assessing whether SSA and state disability determination service (DDS) operations have been disrupted by the installations of IWS/LAN equipment; and (3) assessing SSA's practices for managing its investment in IWS/LAN.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA has moved aggressively in installing intelligent workstations and LANs since initiating IWS/LAN acquisitions in December 1996; (2) as of mid-March 1998, it had completed the installation of about 31,000 workstations and 850 LANs, generally meeting its implementation schedule for phase I of the initiative; (3) the contractor that is installing IWS/LAN has expressed concerns about the future availability of the intelligent workstations that SSA is acquiring; (4) problems encountered in developing software intended to operate on IWS/LAN could affect SSA's planned schedule for proceeding with phase II of this initiative; (5) staff in SSA offices generally reported no significant disruptions in their ability to serve the public during the installation and operation of their IWS/LAN equipment; (6) some state DDSs reported that SSA's decision to manage and control DDS networks remotely and the IWS/LAN contractor's inadequate responses to DDS' service calls have led to disruptions in some of their operations; (7) because IWS/LAN is expected to correct year 2000 deficiencies in some states' hardware, delaying the installation of IWS/LAN could affect states' progress in becoming year 2000 compliant; (8) consistent with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and Office of Management and Budget guidance, SSA has followed some of the essential practices required to effectively manage its IWS/LAN investment; (9) SSA has not established essential practices for measuring IWS/LAN's contribution to improving the agency's mission performance; (10) although the agency has developed baseline data and performance measures that could be used to assess the project's impact on mission performance, it has not defined target performance goals or instituted a process for using the measures to assess the impact of IWS/LAN on mission performance; (11) SSA does not plan to conduct a post-implementation review of IWS/LAN once it is fully implemented; and (12) without targeted goals and a defined process for measuring performance both during and after the implementation of IWS/LAN, SSA cannot be assured of the extent to which this project is improving service to the public or that it is actually yielding the savings anticipated from this investment. |
gao_GAO-08-1026T | gao_GAO-08-1026T_0 | In particular, as shown in figure 1, significantly more federal managers today report having the types of performance measures called for by GPRA and PART than they did 10 years ago. While in general there has been little change in federal managers’ reported use of performance information governmentwide, agency level comparisons between 2000 and 2007 reveal that some agencies have made notable progress. Key Practices for Improving Government through the Use of Performance Information
As our survey results show, despite legislative and administration efforts to focus federal management decisions on the achievement of results and maximize the use of federal funds, changing the way federal managers make decisions is not simply a matter of making program performance information available. Based on our work on management reform efforts as well as analysis of federal managers’ responses to our surveys over the past 10 years, we have identified three key practices that can contribute to greater attention to results when making management decisions. Regardless of the form of future initiatives, the next administration should take steps to ensure that agencies emphasize these practices to make sure that performance information is used in management decision making: 1. demonstrate leadership commitment to results-oriented management; 2. create a clear “line of sight” linking individual performance with 3. build agency capacity to collect and use performance information. 3.). Additionally, we found a significant relationship between federal managers reporting that managers at their level are taking steps to ensure that performance information is useful and appropriate and their reported use of performance information in key management activities. Beyond this, the next administration can better focus its efforts to improve performance by (1) adopting a more strategic and crosscutting approach to overseeing performance; (2) improving the relevance of performance information to Congress; and (3) building agency confidence in assessments for use in decision making. Improve the Relevance of Performance Information to Congress
In order for performance improvement initiatives to hold appeal beyond the executive branch, and to be useful to the Congress for its decision making, garnering congressional buy-in on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. While the last decade has seen the creation of an infrastructure for government performance improvement efforts, and a more results-oriented culture in the federal government, we still see more that can be done to make this transformation more widespread among federal agencies. An online e-supplement GAO-08-1036SP shows the questions asked on the survey with the weighted percentage of managers responding to each item. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 15 years, legislative and executive branch reform efforts have attempted to shift the focus of federal government management from a preoccupation with activities to the results or outcomes of those activities. Based on over a decade of work in this area, GAO has found a transformation in the capacity of the federal government to manage for results, including an infrastructure of outcome-oriented strategic plans, performance measures, and accountability reporting that provides a solid foundation for improving the performance of federal programs. However, agencies have made less progress in getting their managers' to use performance information in their decision making. GAO was asked to testify on the preliminary results of ongoing work looking at (1) trends in federal managers' use of performance information to manage, both governmentwide and at the agency level; (2) how agencies can encourage greater use of performance information to improve results; and (3) lessons learned from prior management reforms for the next administration. Our statement is based on prior GAO reports and surveys we conducted in 1997, 2000, 2003, and 2007. For the results of our 2007 survey, see e-supplement GAO-08-1036SP . GAO will be issuing a report at a later date that will explore the use of performance results in management decision making at selected agencies.
What GAO Found
According to GAO surveys, since 1997 significantly more federal managers report having performance measures for the programs they manage. However, despite having more performance measures available, federal managers' reported use of performance information in management decision making has not changed significantly. For the collection of performance information to be considered more than meaningless paperwork exercises, it must be useful to and used by federal decision makers at all levels--including Congress. To reach this state, GAO believes that the next administration should promote three key practices that we have identified in our work over the last 10 years: (1) demonstrate leadership commitment to results-oriented management; (2) develop a clear "line of sight" linking individual performance with organizational results; and (3) build agency capacity to collect and use performance information. In addition to encouraging agencies to employ these practices, the next administration should: (1) adopt a more strategic and crosscutting approach to overseeing governmentwide performance; (2) improve the relevance of performance information to Congress; and (3) build agency confidence in assessments for use in decision making. |
gao_GAO-07-428T | gao_GAO-07-428T_0 | According to NNSA’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to spend almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. However, we highlighted the need for NNSA to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of headquarters and field staff and to establish clear lines of authority between NNSA and its contractors, among other things. Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA’s reorganization had addressed some past problems by better delineating lines of authority and improving communication. Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA’s Security Program
Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we found that the results of internal and independent security oversight assessments have identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. The following factors have contributed to this situation: Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security activities. Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office security staff. Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate as a Separately Organized Agency within DOE
While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. Second, DOE’s January 2000 implementation plan, which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. Specifically, as our report documents, NNSA and DOE counterintelligence officials have disagreed over (1) the scope and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to jointly direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program offices, (3) the allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4) counterintelligence policymaking and (5) their roles and responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence matters—in particular with regard to the department’s handling of the well-publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified NNSA computer system and removal of the names and social security numbers of 1,502 individuals working for NNSA. Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Become Fully Effective
In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA’s relationship to DOE, we identified the following four other management areas where additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear weapons complex if it took further action. NNSA has made progress in developing a human capital strategy. Project management. Recognizing the important role of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions, such as developing a program management policy. However, NNSA has yet to identify all of its program managers or train them to a certified level of competency. Financial management. However, the Administrator does not have an independent group to review program proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze alternatives. While NNSA has taken some action in this direction, it is not clear when such a group will be established. As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we do not believe that such drastic change is necessary to produce an organization that can provide effective oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear Security Administration in Implementing Title 32, GAO-01-602T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.
What GAO Found
While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved communication through a reorganization and has made progress in establishing critical management systems, especially in the development of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, important weaknesses remain with respect to security; the Administration's relationship with DOE; and project, program and financial management. Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. Four factors have contributed to these problems: (1) lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for security; (2) security personnel staffing shortages at NNSA site offices; (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office security staff; and (4) incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's security program. While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with agreeing on how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as a separate agency, GAO does not believe that such drastic change is necessary to provide effective oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define their working relationships and determine how conflicts will be resolved. Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not (1) implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; (2) identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level of competency; and (3) established an independent analysis unit to review program budget proposals and analyze budget alternatives. In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight program; (2) clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program management, and the Administration's planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. NNSA generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. NNSA considered the agency a success but acknowledged there was considerable work yet to be accomplished. |
gao_GAO-08-912T | gao_GAO-08-912T_0 | The Long-Term Fiscal Outlook Remains Unsustainable
The unified budget deficit declined between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, but this did not change the long-term path: it remains unsustainable. Moreover, while the recent past shows some progress in the annual unified deficit figures, any assessment of the federal government’s long- term fiscal outlook also needs to recognize the fact that the Social Security cash surplus has been used to offset spending in the rest of government for many years. Figure 1 shows GAO’s simulation of the deficit path based on recent trends and policy preferences. Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem; they are a problem for other levels of government and other sectors. As shown in figure 3, GAO’s fiscal model demonstrates that state and local governments—absent policy changes—will also face large and growing fiscal challenges beginning within the next few years. As is true for the federal budget, growth in health-related spending—Medicaid and health insurance for state and local employees and retirees—is the primary driver of the long-term fiscal challenges facing the state and local governments. The Federal Government’s Long- Term Fiscal Outlook Is Driven Primarily by Health Care
The large fiscal gap is primarily the result of spending on Medicare and Medicaid, which continue to consume ever-larger shares of both the federal budget and the economy. While growth in public spending strains government budgets, growth in private sector health care costs erodes employers’ ability to provide coverage to their workers and undercuts their ability to compete internationally. Systemwide Growth in Health Care Spending Is Driven by Certain Key Factors
Public and private health care spending continues to rise because of several key factors, including the following: Medical technology. However, without reliable comparative information on medical outcomes, quality of care, and cost, consumers are less able to determine the best value. Obesity, smoking, and other population risk factors can lead to expensive chronic conditions, such as diabetes and heart disease. The increased prevalence of such conditions drives spending as the utilization of health care resources rises. Addressing these drivers will be a major societal challenge. The Window of Opportunity Is Narrowing
Here in the first half of 2008, the long-term fiscal challenge is not in the distant future. The longer action on reforming heath care and Social Security is delayed, the more painful and difficult the choices will become. Simply put, the federal budget is on an unsustainable long- term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage of time. Attention should be focused not only on the spending side of the budget but also on the revenue side. Meeting the nation’s long-term fiscal challenge will require a multipronged approach bringing people together to tackle health care, Social Security, and the tax system as well as strengthening oversight of programs and activities, including creating approaches to better facilitate the discussion of integrated solutions to cross-cutting issues; and reengineering and reprioritizing the federal government’s existing programs, policies, and activities to address 21st century challenges and capitalize on related opportunities. Demographics are a smaller component than rapid health care cost growth, but the two interact, and aging is not a trivial contributor to the federal government’s long-term fiscal condition. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to provide its views on the long-term fiscal outlook. This statement addresses four key points: (1) the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook is a matter of utmost concern; (2) this challenge is driven primarily by health care cost growth; (3) reform of health care is essential but other areas also need attention which requires a multipronged solution; and (4) the federal government faces increasing pressures yet a shrinking window of opportunity for phasing in needed adjustments. GAO's simulations of the federal government's long-term fiscal outlook were updated with the Trustees 2008 intermediate projections and continue to indicate that the long-term outlook is unsustainable. This update combined with GAO's analysis of the fiscal outlook of state and local governments demonstrates that the fiscal challenges facing all levels of government are linked and should be considered in a strategic and integrated manner. Since 1992, GAO has published long-term fiscal simulations of what might happen to federal deficits and debt levels under varying policy assumptions. GAO developed its long-term model in response to a bipartisan request from Members of Congress who were concerned about the longterm effects of fiscal policy. Information about GAO's model and assumptions can be found at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/longterm/ .
What GAO Found
Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and others all show that despite a decline in the federal government's unified budget deficit between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, it still faces large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Simply put, the federal government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Although Social Security is important because of its size, over the long term health care spending is the principal driver--Medicare and Medicaid are both large and projected to continue growing rapidly in the future. Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem. Growth in health-related spending is the primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing state and local governments as well. Unsustainable growth in health care spending also threatens to erode the ability of employers to provide coverage to their workers and undercuts their ability to compete in a global marketplace. Public and private health care spending continues to rise because of several key factors: (1) increased utilization of new and existing medical technology; (2) lack of reliable comparative information on medical outcomes, quality of care, and cost; and (3) increased prevalence of risk factors such as obesity that can lead to expensive chronic conditions. Addressing health care costs and demographics--and their interaction--will be a major societal challenge. The longer action on reforming heath care and Social Security is delayed, the more painful and difficult the choices will become. The federal government faces increasing pressures yet a shrinking window of opportunity for phasing in adjustments. In fact, the oldest members of the baby-boom generation are now eligible for Social Security retirement benefits and will be eligible for Medicare benefits in less than 3 years. Additionally, in addressing this fiscal challenge it will be important to review other programs and activities on both the spending and revenue sides of the budget. |
gao_RCED-97-82 | gao_RCED-97-82_0 | The telecommunications loan portfolio had no delinquencies. RUS’ records show that a total principal of $7.4 billion was owed by such borrowers at the end of fiscal year 1996. Electricity Loans
According to RUS’ reports, about $8 billion, or almost 25 percent of the $32.3 billion in outstanding principal on electricity loans as of September 30, 1996, was owed by 12 borrowers that are delinquent or in financial distress. These 12 borrowers made up less than 2 percent of the total number of RUS’ electricity loan borrowers. Water and Waste Disposal Loans
According to RUS’ reports, less than 1 percent of the outstanding principal on water and waste disposal loans was owed by borrowers that were delinquent. Specifically, the outstanding principal on water and waste disposal loans totaled slightly more than $5 billion as of September 30, 1996; direct loans accounted for all but about $8 million of this amount. These 70 borrowers made up less than 1 percent of the total number of water and waste disposal direct loan borrowers. While the overwhelming majority of borrowers had positive equity at the end of 1995, 13 borrowers, or about 1 percent, had negative equity. The electricity loans of the eighth borrower were settled on September 13, 1996, when the borrower made a partial payment and RUS wrote off the remaining debt. However, four borrowers, or 7.8 percent, did not have a profit in 1995. About 96 percent of the distribution borrowers and about 92 percent of the power supply borrowers had 1995 income that equaled or exceeded their 1995 interest expenses. These three borrowers owed $5.4 million on their outstanding telecommunications loans as of September 30, 1996. Twenty-nine percent of the borrowers made more than $1 million in profit in 1995; these borrowers accounted for 92.5 percent of the total profit. Electricity loans. Telecommunications loans. RUS also employs about 35 field accountants who conduct financial reviews of electricity and telecommunications loan borrowers. For example, table II.1 shows that the amount of outstanding principal owed on electricity loans declined by about $2.1 billion, or 6.2 percent, from the end of fiscal year 1992 to the end of fiscal year 1996. Table II.3: Amount of Outstanding Principal Owed on Water and Waste Disposal Loans Made or Guaranteed by RUS, and Portion Owed by Delinquent Borrowers, September 30, 1992, Through September 30, 1996
Financial Information on Borrowers With Electricity and Telecommunications Loans
This appendix contains information on the financial characteristics of borrowers that had RUS’ electricity and telecommunications loans and that reported financial information to RUS as of the end of calendar years 1992 through 1995. Subsequently, on October 17, 1996, the Chairman of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, wrote to us expressing his concern about the financial risks associated with RUS’ lending and asking that we report to him on the (1) financial condition of the electricity, telecommunications, and water and waste disposal loan portfolios and (2) financial characteristics of borrowers having electricity and telecommunications loans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the financial condition of the Rural Utilities Service's electricity, telecommunications, and waste disposal loan portfolios and the financial characteristics of borrowers having electricity and telecommunications loans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) at the end of fiscal year 1996, over $8 billion of the total $42.5 billion in outstanding principal on the Rural Utilities Service's electricity, telecommunications, and water and waste disposal loans was owed by borrowers that were experiencing financial problems; (2) almost all of this amount was owed by 12 electricity loan borrowers, representing less than 2 percent of the total number of electricity loan borrowers; (3) these 12 borrowers owed almost 25 percent of the outstanding electricity loan portfolio; (4) of the $5.2 billion in outstanding principal on the telecommunications loans, none was owed by borrowers experiencing similar financial distress; (5) of the slightly more than $5 billion in outstanding principal on water and waste disposal loans, $43 million was owed by 70 delinquent borrowers that made up less than 1 percent of total borrowers and that owed less than 1 percent of the outstanding portfolio; (6) most electricity and telecommunications loan borrowers had favorable financial characteristics at the end of calender year 1995; (7) for example, year-end reports to the Rural Utilities Service showed that more than 98 percent of the electricity loan borrowers and more than 99 percent of the telecommunications loan borrowers had positive equity at the end of 1995; (8) about 95 percent, or a total of 1,610 borrowers, had equity of $1 million or more; (9) similarly, the year-end reports showed that about 96 percent of the electricity loan borrowers and about 98 percent of the telecommunications loan borrowers made a profit in 1995; (10) about 92 percent, or a total of 1,565 borrowers, made a profit of $100,000 or more; (11) however, 10 electricity and 3 telecommunications loan borrowers had negative equity at the end of 1995; (12) nine of these electricity loan borrowers owed about $6.2 billion as of September 30, 1996 and the loans of the 10th borrower were resolved prior to that date when the borrower made a partial payment and the agency wrote off the remaining debt; (13) the three telecommunications loan borrowers owed about $5.4 million as of September 30, 1996; (14) also, 38 electricity and 14 telecommunications loan borrowers did not make a profit in 1995; and (15) these borrowers owed about $1.2 billion and about $103 million, respectively, as of September 30, 1996. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-262 | gao_T-AIMD-98-262_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. Unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. For example, (1) Illinois’ Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely affect state government operations, (2) Vermont’s Office of Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail, (3) New York’s Office of the State Comptroller found a real risk that services provided to the public will be disrupted unless much more effort and resources are devoted to address the Year 2000 problem, and (4) Florida’s Auditor General has issued several reports detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various district school boards and community colleges. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_NSIAD-95-40 | gao_NSIAD-95-40_0 | Cost allowability is governed by the contract and by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A-21, “Cost Principles for Educational Institutions.”
In our first report to the Committee, we discussed JPL’s fixed fee, selected cost controls, scope of work, food and beverage charges, and tuition payments for dependents. The key is the “auditability” of JPL’s cost submission and the supporting documentation. The NASA Administrator responded that the tuition benefit is part of Caltech’s general compensation and benefit plan and that it would be reviewed as part of a comprehensive JPL compensation review that NASA would conduct during fiscal year 1994. JPL’s dependent tuition assistance program was specifically targeted for review. NASA Oversight Resources
The flexibility in the JPL contract places increased importance on oversight by the NASA Management Office. Improved coordination of audit resources could complement that oversight. Two of these maintain offices at JPL—the NASA Office of the Inspector General and DCAA. To analyze how NASA handled contractual and oversight concerns, we compared its current contract with Caltech to the previous one and to NASA’s Request for Proposal for the current contract. As requested, we did not obtain agency comments on a draft of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the contract between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) and the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) for the operation of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and analyzed modifications to it.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA has improved the JPL contract in several areas including award fee, selected cost controls, scope of work, and number of contract deviations; (2) although NASA has not yet reviewed the reasonableness of paying the college tuition of JPL employees' dependents, it requested that the Defense Contract Audit Agency perform a comprehensive review of the JPL compensation package and the dependent tuition assistance benefit; (3) the success of the contractual and oversight changes at JPL will depend on effective implementation; and (4) NASA needs to better coordinate its audit resources to meet the demands of its oversight responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-05-929 | gao_GAO-05-929_0 | Characteristics of Concierge Care
Concierge care is practiced by a small number of physicians, located primarily in urban areas on the East and West Coasts. Although nearly all of the concierge physicians who responded to our survey reported practicing primary care, they differed in many of the characteristics of practice design, including the annual membership fee charged, number of patients treated, features offered, whether they billed health insurance, and their relationship to the Medicare program. Amount of Annual Membership Fee
The annual membership fee for an individual to join a concierge practice ranged from $60 to $15,000 among the physicians responding to our survey. The most frequently reported features were same- or next-day appointments for nonurgent care, 24-hour telephone access, and periodic preventive-care physical examinations. Eighty-five, approximately three-fourths, of respondents reported that they billed patient health insurance for covered services. Aspects of Concierge Care of Interest to Medicare and Its Beneficiaries
Two principal aspects of concierge care are of interest to the Medicare program and its beneficiaries: its compliance with Medicare requirements and its effect on beneficiary access to physician services. The small number of concierge physicians makes it unlikely that the approach has contributed to widespread access problems. The memorandum states that physicians may enter into retainer agreements with their patients as long as these agreements do not violate any Medicare requirements. For example, concierge care membership fees may constitute prohibited additional charges if they are for Medicare- covered items or services. In March 2004, HHS OIG issued an alert “to remind Medicare participating physicians of the potential liabilities posed by billing Medicare patients for services that are already covered by Medicare.” The alert stated that “charging extra fees for already covered services abuses the trust of Medicare patients by making them pay again for services already paid for by Medicare.” As an example, the alert referred to a Minnesota physician who paid a settlement and agreed to stop offering personal health care contracts to patients for annual fees of $600. The small number of concierge physicians at the time of our review, along with information from available measures of access to services, suggests that concierge care does not present a systemic access problem for Medicare beneficiaries at this time. In its comments, HHS agreed that concierge care has had a minimal impact on beneficiary access to physician services at this time. HHS noted, however, that the agency is interested in developments in concierge care and will continue to follow this area and to evaluate whether any further steps are indicated. We identified concierge physicians through a variety of methods, including a nationwide literature search, telephone interviews, and referrals from other concierge physicians. To assess what is known about how concierge care might affect Medicare beneficiary access to physician services, we reviewed national surveys and reports on overall Medicare beneficiary access. GAO. Results from the 2003 Targeted Beneficiary Survey on Access to Physician Services among Medicare Beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concierge care is an approach to medical practice in which physicians charge their patients a membership fee in return for enhanced services or amenities. The recent emergence of concierge care has prompted federal concern about how the approach might affect beneficiaries of Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the aged and some disabled individuals. Concerns include the potential that membership fees may constitute additional charges for services that Medicare already pays physicians for and that concierge care may affect Medicare beneficiaries' access to physician services. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 directed GAO to study concierge care and its relationship to Medicare. Using a variety of methods, including a nationwide literature search and telephone interviews, GAO identified 146 concierge physicians and surveyed concierge physicians in fall 2004. GAO analyzed responses from 112 concierge physicians. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, policies, and available data on access to physician services and interviewed officials at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of Medicare beneficiary advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
Concierge care is practiced by a small number of physicians located mainly on the East and West Coasts. Nearly all of the 112 concierge physicians responding to GAO's survey reported practicing primary care. Annual patient membership fees ranged from $60 to $15,000 a year, with about half of respondents reporting fees of $1,500 to $1,999. The most often reported features included same- or next-day appointments for nonurgent care, 24-hour telephone access, and periodic preventive care examinations. About three-fourths of respondents reported billing patient health insurance for covered services and, among those, almost all reported billing Medicare for covered services. Two principal aspects of concierge care are of interest to the Medicare program and its beneficiaries: compliance with Medicare requirements and its effect on beneficiary access to physician services. HHS has determined that concierge care arrangements are allowed as long as they do not violate any Medicare requirements; for example, the membership fee must not result in additional charges for items or services that Medicare already reimburses. Some concierge physicians reported to GAO that they would like more HHS guidance. The small number of concierge physicians makes it unlikely that the approach has contributed to widespread access problems. GAO's review of available information on beneficiaries' overall access to physician services suggests that concierge care does not present a systemic access problem among Medicare beneficiaries at this time. In comments on a draft version of this report, HHS agreed with GAO's finding on concierge care's impact on beneficiary access to physician services and indicated it will continue to follow developments in this area. |
gao_GAO-06-289 | gao_GAO-06-289_0 | There are several different types of DAPs: IFQs allow eligible entities, such as vessel owners or fishermen, to catch a specified portion of the total catch allowed. Current Stakeholder Participation Practices Do Not Fully Adhere to Core Participation Principles
Our review of the participation literature and policies from leading federal agencies in stakeholder participation identified the following core principles for effective stakeholder participation, some of which may overlap when put into practice: using an open and clearly defined decision-making process; making key information readily available and understandable; actively conducting outreach and soliciting stakeholder input; involving stakeholders early and throughout the decision-making fostering responsive, interactive communication between stakeholders using formal and informal participation methods; and including all stakeholder interests. While all the councils we reviewed make key information on DAP program development readily available to stakeholders, this technical information is not always presented in an easily understandable way. According to participation experts, serial testimony is not an effective way to communicate, because it does not lead to a dialogue between stakeholders and decision makers. NMFS is not legally required to develop a formal policy on stakeholder participation or provide the councils with guidance and training on how to develop and implement a participation framework, and it has not done so. Moreover, the councils themselves have not developed strategic approaches that define their specific participation goals or include participation plans, and therefore may be missing opportunities to make stakeholder participation in the DAP process more effective. These methods generally fall into five categories: (1) providing education and outreach, (2) holding meetings in different ways, (3) streamlining the DAP program development process, (4) diversifying interests represented in the council process, and (5) sharing decision-making authority. While strategic use of these methods can result in more effective participation, they can also have disadvantages, such as increased costs. Stakeholders identified the Marine Resource Education Project (MREP), which is sponsored by a group of universities in New England, as an example of a good training program. MREP provides stakeholders with intensive training on fisheries management and science to help them better understand the council process and DAP issues, teaches the importance of being involved early and throughout the process, and provides diverse stakeholders with the opportunity to exchange information in informal settings. However, such training can be costly and may reach relatively few stakeholders. Hold meetings at different times or locations. Streamlining the DAP program development process. Stakeholders have suggested that NMFS streamline the process for developing fishery management plans, such as DAP programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance stakeholder participation in the development of DAP programs, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to direct the Director of NMFS to: establish a formal policy for stakeholder participation, including adopting a set of core principles to guide stakeholder participation activities; provide guidance to the councils and train NMFS staff, council members, and council staff on developing and using a strategic approach to stakeholder participation; and ensure that the councils develop and implement a framework for stakeholder participation that includes core principles and a strategic approach. For this report, we reviewed the development of domestic DAP programs to determine (1) the extent to which the regional fishery management councils are using a framework for effective stakeholder participation and (2) the methods stakeholders and participation experts suggest for enhancing stakeholder participation in the development of DAP programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dedicated access privilege (DAP) programs are one tool the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) uses to help end overfishing and promote conservation. Under a DAP program, NMFS sets an allowable catch in a fishery and allocates the privilege to harvest a portion of the total to eligible entities, such as fishermen. Because DAP programs can have significant impacts on fishermen and their communities, many believe that effective participation by fishermen and other stakeholders in the development of these programs is critical. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which the regional fishery management councils are using a framework for effective participation and (2) the methods stakeholders and participation experts suggest for enhancing stakeholder participation in developing DAP programs.
What GAO Found
The fishery management councils that GAO reviewed lack key elements of an effective stakeholder participation framework and therefore may be missing opportunities for all stakeholders to participate in the DAP program development process. Based on GAO's review of the literature and the experience of leading federal agencies in stakeholder participation, such a framework should include a strategic implementation approach that embodies a set of core principles, such as making key information readily available and understandable and fostering responsive, interactive communication between stakeholders and decision makers. However, fisheries stakeholders identified several areas where council practices do not fully adhere to the core principles GAO identified. For example, while the councils make DAP-related information available to stakeholders, this information is not always presented in an easily understandable way. Also, while stakeholders can testify at council meetings, according to participation experts, this one-way communication is not an effective way to share information because it does not lead to a dialogue between stakeholders and decision makers. Unlike other federal agencies, NMFS has neither developed a formal stakeholder participation policy nor provided the councils with guidance or training on how to develop and use a strategic approach to enhance stakeholder participation. While not legally required to do so, if NMFS adopted such an approach it could help ensure, among other things, that all relevant stakeholders are identified, specific participation goals are defined, and participation plans are implemented by the councils developing DAP programs. Methods suggested by stakeholders and participation experts that could enhance stakeholder participation in the DAP program development process principally fall into five categories: (1) providing education and outreach; (2) holding meetings using different times, locations, and formats; (3) streamlining the DAP program development process; (4) diversifying interests represented in the council process; and (5) sharing decision-making authority. While using these methods can result in more effective participation, particularly when they are employed as part of a participation plan, these methods can also have certain disadvantages, such as increased costs. For example, the Marine Resource Education Project (MREP), which is sponsored by a group of universities in New England, offers several examples of promising practices. MREP provides stakeholders with training on fisheries management and science to help them better understand the council process and DAP issues, teaches the importance of being involved early and throughout the process, and provides diverse stakeholders with the opportunity to exchange information in informal settings. However, such training can be costly and may reach relatively few stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-12-534 | gao_GAO-12-534_0 | Most U.S. funding made available for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011 provided training and equipment to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. DOD and State funds constituted about 97 percent of the U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent of U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. Funds Made Available for U.S. Foreign Police Assistance Rose and Then Fell during Fiscal Years 2009 through 2011
On the basis of data provided by DOD, State, DOE, USAID, Treasury, and DOJ, we estimate that the U.S. government made available $3.5 billion in foreign police assistance in fiscal year 2009, $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2010, and $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2011 (see fig. DOD and State Are Taking Steps to Address Limitations in Their Procedures for Assessing and Evaluating Foreign Police Assistance Activities
DOD and State/INL have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are taking steps to address them. Recognizing the need to conduct such evaluations, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that is consistent with State’s February 2012 Evaluation Policy and implementing its June 2010 guidelines that recommended including evaluation as a part of its budget and planning documents for programs in Iraq and Mexico. DOD Assesses the Performance of Police Forces It Trained and Equipped in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan
DOD assesses the performance of the national police forces it has trained and equipped for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan—countries that were the three largest recipients of DOD’s foreign police assistance funds during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. DOD Reported It Lacks Data on Civil Policing Effectiveness for Afghanistan, but Plans to Expand Its Assessment Process to Include Such Data
Although DOD is assessing ANP’s operational performance, the department recently reported it lacked data to assess civil policing effectiveness. Agencies Coordinate Foreign Police Assistance Activities, but Some Areas for Improvement Exist
U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance activities. Such mechanisms include (1) interagency policy committees chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) that coordinate policies at a high level; (2) headquarters working groups established to coordinate specific issues, such as antiterrorism and nonproliferation; (3) various working groups at the overseas posts; and (4) special positions to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. However, we noted some areas for improvement, including lack of defined agency roles and responsibilities and inconsistent information sharing. Though State requested official copies of these assessments, DOD did not provide them. According to a former DOD civilian police adviser, DOD destroyed the database that contained the assessments of the Iraqi police forces during the transition, because it had completed its mission to train the Iraqi police. To ensure that information is available for future U.S. foreign police assistance efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. NSC did not comment on the report’s recommendations. This includes work to better define agency roles and responsibilities, as appropriate. To identify the amount of U.S. government funding made available for foreign police training and equipment activities, we examined past GAO reports; congressional budget submissions, including the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ (State/INL) program and budget guides for fiscal year 2011; the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund fiscal year 2012 congressional budget justification; and the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2012 congressional budget justification and other budget documents. We also interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy (DOE); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID; and the Departments of the Treasury, Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security (DHS). GAO Recommendations Not applicable. However, we did not believe this report sufficiently addressed our recommendation. State partially concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2011, we reported that the United States provided an estimated $3.5 billion for foreign police assistance to 107 countries during fiscal year 2009. We agreed to follow up that report with a review of the extent to which U.S. agencies evaluated and coordinated their foreign police assistance activities.
As such, this report (1) updates our analysis of the funding U.S. agencies provided for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, (2) examines the extent to which DOD and State/INL assess or evaluate their activities for countries with the largest programs, and (3) examines the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. GAO focused on DOD and State because they have the largest foreign police assistance programs.
GAO analyzed program and budget documents and interviewed officials from DOD, State, Energy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security.
What GAO Found
The United States provided an estimated $13.9 billion for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Funds provided by U.S. agencies rose and then fell between fiscal years 2009 and 2011. During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, the United States provided the greatest amount of its foreign police assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Colombia, Mexico, and the Palestinian Territories. Department of Defense (DOD) and State (State) funds constituted about 97 percent of U.S. funds for police assistance in fiscal year 2009 and 98 percent in fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
DOD and States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) have acknowledged limitations in their procedures to assess and evaluate their foreign police assistance activities and are taking steps to address them. DOD assesses the performance of the police forces it trains and equips in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. However, the assessment process for Afghanistan does not provide data on civil policing effectiveness. DOD plans to expand its assessments to obtain data to assess the ability of these forces to conduct civil policing operations. In addition, recognizing that it had conducted only one evaluation of its foreign police assistance activities because it lacked guidelines, State/INL is developing an evaluation plan that is consistent with States February 2012 Evaluation Policy. This evaluation plan includes conducting evaluations for its largest programs in Iraq and Mexico.
U.S. agencies have implemented various mechanisms to coordinate their foreign police assistance activities as part of wider foreign assistance activities, such as the National Security Councils (NSC)-led interagency policy committees that coordinate policies at a high level and various working groups at the overseas posts. However, GAO noted some areas for improvement. Specifically, NSC has not defined agencies roles and responsibilities for assisting foreign police. Further, DOD and State do not consistently share and document information. For example, DOD did not provide copies of its capability assessments of the Iraqi police to State, which is now responsible for police development in Iraq, because it destroyed the database containing the assessments at the end of its mission to train the police. Further, some U.S. embassies, including the one in Bogotá, Colombia, do not publish agendas or minutes of their proceedings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) NSC complete its efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities, and (2) the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. NSC provided technical comments, but did not comment on our recommendation. DOD concurred and State partially concurred, noting the importance of interagency collaboration. |
gao_GAO-16-487 | gao_GAO-16-487_0 | Otherwise, DOD can finance projects through agreements with private developers and pay back the costs of the projects over time—referred to as alternative financing mechanisms. DOD Emphasized Working with Private Developers to Develop Larger Renewable Energy Projects but Builds Some Projects Using Up-Front Appropriated Funds
According to DOD officials and documents, in recent years, DOD’s approach emphasized developing larger projects and working with private developers to develop renewable energy projects with a generating capacity of greater than 1 megawatt on DOD installations in the United States. However, the project documentation DOD developed for the officials responsible for approving these projects did not always clearly identify the value of land used for the projects and in turn the compensation the department received for the land. In addition, the guidance does not direct project documentation to include a comparison of the value of the land used and the compensation DOD receives for it. Our 2009 cost-estimating guide states that one basic characteristic of a credible cost estimate is the recognition of excluded costs, so that any excluded costs should be disclosed and given a rationale. Some Selected Projects Advanced DOD’s Energy Goals and Security Objective, but Documentation of Project Contributions Was Not Always Clear and Consistent Some of the Selected Projects Advanced DOD’s Energy Goals, but Project Documentation about Contributions toward the Goals Was Not Always Clear
Some of the 17 projects we reviewed advanced DOD’s energy goals and energy security objective, but project documentation was not always clear about how each project was expected to (1) contribute to the department’s production and consumption goals or (2) advance the department’s energy security objective or estimate the value of energy security provided. Thus approving officials did not have access to all relevant information about the project and its contributions toward the energy goals. However, this view was not consistently reflected in the documentation for the 17 projects in our sample. However, we found that only 2 of these projects had the capability to provide electricity to the installation in the event of an outage of the commercial grid without additional steps. The other 5 projects would require additional steps and investments, such as the installation of batteries or other energy storage equipment and the integration of improvements to the electricity delivery and control systems on the installation before they would be able to deliver electricity during a grid outage. Under federal standards for internal control, information should be recorded and communicated to management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. Without specifying this information, project documentation did not convey a full understanding of the projects’ potential costs and benefits specific to energy security to approving officials. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to take the following eight actions: To improve DOD’s analyses of the financial costs and benefits of renewable energy projects, modify guidance for presenting land values in project documentation to apply to the range of alternative financing mechanisms DOD has used and clarify the guidance to direct all project documentation for alternatively financed projects involving land use agreements to include the value of the land, the compensation DOD would receive for it, and how the value of the land compared with the value of the compensation. To improve DOD’s analyses of the financial costs and benefits of renewable energy projects involving long-term PPAs on its land, revise guidance to develop consistent sources for assumptions for escalation; clarify how to describe sensitivity analyses in project documentation; and clarify how project documentation should present information on all costs of a project, including the value of the land and compensation received for it and in turn how that value and compensation would affect the estimated costs and benefits of purchasing electricity from the project (e.g., whether compensation could be used to reduce electricity costs for the project when estimating cost-effectiveness). To improve the information available to approving officials on projects’ contributions to DOD’s renewable energy goals and energy security objective and to help ensure the consistency and completeness of project documentation, develop guidance to clarify that projects should specify their contribution to DOD’s energy production and consumption goals; clarify the type of energy security benefit that projects will provide and state whether any such benefit is immediately available or would require additional investments and, for projects that would require additional investment, provide a detailed estimate of those investments; and clarify that a consistent approach is to be taken to estimate the value of the energy security benefit of providing assured access to power during a grid outage and that a description of this approach is provided in project documentation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) the Department of Defense’s (DOD) approach for developing renewable energy projects with a generating capacity greater than 1 megawatt (2) DOD’s approach for analyzing the financial costs and benefits of selected renewable energy projects contracted for or funded from 2010 through 2015 and (3) the extent to which selected projects addressed DOD’s renewable energy goals and energy security objective. We selected projects that reflected a range of military departments and services, funding mechanisms, and renewable energy technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
By law and executive order, DOD is to pursue goals for the production and consumption of renewable energy. Also, DOD policy calls for investing in cost-effective renewable energy and improving energy security—addressing risks such as disruption of electricity grids serving military installations.
The Joint Explanatory Statement for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to examine how DOD determines the costs and benefits of a sample of renewable energy projects. This report examines (1) DOD's approach for developing renewable energy projects with a generating capacity greater than 1 megawatt, (2) DOD's approach for analyzing the financial costs and benefits of selected projects, and (3) the extent to which these projects addressed DOD's renewable energy goals and energy security objective. GAO examined a nongeneralizable sample of 17 projects that reflect a mix of military departments and services, funding mechanisms, and technologies. GAO also examined legal authorities, project documentation, and DOD guidance, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized working with private developers using a variety of alternative financing mechanisms—that is, agreements with private developers to pay back the costs of the projects over time—to develop renewable energy projects greater than 1 megawatt. According to DOD officials, DOD works with private developers because doing so gives DOD several advantages. For example, private developers have access to tax incentives that can significantly lower the overall costs of developing projects compared to what those costs would be if DOD developed the projects on its own.
DOD used various approaches to analyze the financial costs and benefits of the 17 renewable energy projects GAO examined, but project documentation was not always clear or complete. In particular, project documentation did not always clearly identify the value of land used and compare that to any compensation DOD received. Specifically, for 8 projects, DOD received little or no financial compensation for the use of its land, but the documentation did not clearly compare the value for granting use of DOD land to the value of what DOD received for it. As a result, DOD contributed potentially valuable land—in some cases, over 100 acres—for the development of a project without including this as a cost in project documentation. GAO's 2009 cost-estimating guide states that one basic characteristic of a credible cost estimate is the recognition of excluded costs, so any excluded costs should be disclosed and a rationale provided. However, DOD guidance does not specify that project documentation should include a comparison of the value of land and any compensation received. By clarifying its guidance to call for project documentation to include a comparison of land values and any compensation it would receive, DOD would have greater assurance that its officials have credible information about projects' financial costs and benefits before approving them.
Some of the 17 projects GAO reviewed advanced DOD's renewable energy goals and energy security objective (e.g., for access to reliable supplies of energy during an outage of the commercial grid), but project documentation was not always clear about how projects did so. For example, officials told GAO they believe that all the projects contributed to DOD's energy security objective, but this view was not reflected in the documentation for the 17 projects. GAO found that only 2 projects would immediately be able to provide electricity to an installation in the event of a grid outage. Five other projects would require additional investment, such as the installation of batteries or other energy storage, before they would be able to deliver electricity during an outage, and project documentation did not always reflect this information. Under federal standards for internal control, agencies are to record and communicate information to management and others who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. Without clarifying its guidance to call for project documentation to include information about projects' contributions to DOD's energy security objective and any additional investment needed to do so, DOD officials may not have a full understanding of all relevant information when approving renewable energy projects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations, including that DOD should clarify guidance to call for project documentation to include (1) a comparison of the value of the land used and the compensation DOD is to receive for it and (2) information on projects' contributions toward DOD's energy security objective. DOD fully concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-299 | gao_GAO-03-299_0 | It Is Not Known Whether Contract Provisions Could Contribute to Improper Handling of Taxpayer Receipts
We found nothing inherent in the new 2002 lockbox bank contractual agreements or the prior agreements that would necessarily contribute to mishandling of taxpayer receipts. Although a desire to avoid negative consequences, such as financial penalties or contract termination, could cause lockbox bank employees to make poor decisions, penalty and termination provisions are necessary to help the federal government address inadequate contractor performance. Cause of the 2001 Incident Remains Under Investigation
The exact cause of the 2001 incident involving the loss and destruction of taxpayer data and receipts at the Pittsburgh lockbox site has yet to be officially reported. However, we found that the oversight of lockbox banks was not fully effective in protecting the government’s interests due to (1) a lack of clear directives and documented policies and procedures for various oversight functions, (2) key oversight functions not being performed, and (3) conflicting roles and responsibilities for IRS lockbox coordinators. Nevertheless, during our recent visits to all nine lockbox locations, we found internal control deficiencies in the areas of (1) physical security, (2) processing controls, (3) courier security, and (4) employment screening. A Comprehensive Study Evaluating Costs for IRS Processing Versus Using Lockbox Banks for All Types of Tax Receipts Has Not Been Performed
IRS and FMS have not performed a comprehensive study evaluating the full range of costs and benefits of IRS processing tax receipts versus the lockbox banks processing the receipts for all types of tax receipts processed by the banks. Having adopted this perspective in accordance with Treasury regulations, IRS and FMS did not consider some costs, such as opportunity costs, or the results from alternative uses of the money spent to achieve speedier deposits. These types of studies would include different costs and benefits from those included in the 1999 study. If IRS and FMS had done a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness study, the resulting conclusions may have differed. Conclusions
Approximately $268 billion in tax receipts IRS collected in fiscal year 2002 were processed through lockbox banks. Additionally, numerous internal control weaknesses need to be corrected and certain provisions of the lockbox processing guidelines need to be revised. To improve the effectiveness of government oversight of lockbox banks, we recommend that the Commissioner of FMS and the Acting Commissioner of IRS document IRS’s and FMS’s oversight roles and responsibilities in agency policy and procedure manuals and determine the appropriate level of IRS and FMS oversight of lockbox sites throughout the year, particularly during peak processing periods; establish and document guidelines and procedures in IRS and FMS policy and procedure manuals for implementing the new penalty provision for lockbox banks to reimburse the government for direct costs incurred in correcting errors made by lockbox banks; finalize and document the recently developed waiver process in IRS and FMS policy and procedure manuals and ensure that decisions on requests for waivers are formally and promptly communicated to lockbox management; and establish and document a process in IRS and FMS policy and procedure manuals to ensure that lockbox bank management formally responds to IRS and FMS oversight findings and recommendations promptly and that corrective actions taken by lockbox bank management are appropriate. In addition, the report will be made available to others at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Lockbox banks are commercial banks that process certain taxpayer receipts on behalf of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Following an incident at a lockbox site during 2001, which involved the loss and destruction of about 78,000 tax receipts totaling more than $1.2 billion, the Senate Committee on Finance asked GAO to examine whether (1) provisions of the contracts under which lockbox banks operate address previously identified problems or might contribute to mishandling of tax receipts, (2) oversight of lockbox banks is adequate, (3) internal controls are sufficient, and (4) IRS and Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) had considered the costs and benefits of contracting out the functions performed by lockbox banks.
What GAO Found
FMS has contractual agreements with four lockbox banks, which operate 11 lockbox sites at nine locations on IRS's behalf. Of the more than $2 trillion in tax receipts that IRS collected in fiscal year 2002, lockbox banks processed approximately $268 billion. The findings of GAO's study include the following: (1)Nothing inherent in the lockbox contractual agreements would necessarily contribute to mishandling of tax receipts. Although a desire to avoid negative consequences, such as financial or other penalties allowed for by the agreements, could motivate bank employees to make poor decisions, penalty provisions are necessary to help the government address inadequate performance. The results of an ongoing investigation of the 2001 incident may help IRS and FMS determine whether new provisions or modifications to existing provisions are needed. (2) Although IRS and FMS have significantly increased their presence at lockbox sites, oversight of lockbox banks during fiscal year 2002 was not fully effective to ensure that taxpayer data and receipts were adequately safeguarded and properly processed. Inadequate oversight resulted mainly from a lack of clear oversight directives and policies; failure to perform key oversight functions; and conflicting roles and responsibilities of IRS personnel responsible for day-to-day oversight of lockbox banks. (3) Internal controls, including physical security controls, need to be strengthened at IRS lockbox locations. In addition, the processing guidelines under which IRS lockbox banks operate need to be revised to improve receipt-processing controls, employment screening, and courier security. (4) IRS and FMS have not performed a comprehensive study of the costs and benefits of using lockbox banks. The most recent study, in 1999, omitted some costs that may have affected the result. For example, the study did not consider opportunity costs--benefits foregone that might have resulted from alternative uses of the money. Because of these omissions and several changes that have affected costs and benefits, a new study will be needed before lockbox contracts expire in 2007. |
gao_GAO-15-675T | gao_GAO-15-675T_0 | We have previously testified that the federal government has spent billions of dollars on failed IT investments, such as the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Expeditionary Combat Support System, which was canceled in December 2012, after spending more than a billion dollars and failing to deploy within 5 years of initially obligating funds; the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative Network program, which was ended in January 2011, after the department obligated more than $1 billion to the program, because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards; the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program, which was intended to be delivered by 2014 at a total estimated cost of $609 million, but was terminated in October 2011 due to challenges in managing the program; the Office of Personnel Management’s Retirement Systems Modernization program, which was canceled in February 2011, after spending approximately $231 million on the agency’s third attempt to automate the processing of federal employee retirement claims; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s National Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, which was a tri- agency weather satellite program that the White House Office of Science and Technology stopped in February 2010 after the program spent 16 years and almost $5 billion; and the VA Scheduling Replacement Project, which was terminated in September 2009 after spending an estimated $127 million over 9 years. These and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations
Although the executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage the more than $80 billion that is annually invested in IT, federal IT investments too frequently fail or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. The recent IT reform legislation holds promise for improving agencies’ acquisition of IT, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is developing guidance for agencies to implement its provisions. Implementing these provisions, along with our outstanding recommendations, is necessary for agencies to demonstrate progress in addressing this high-risk area. However, these reviews accounted for less than 20 percent of medium- or high-risk investments government-wide. As of August 2012, there were 162 such at-risk investments across the government. Further, we reviewed four selected agencies and found they had held TechStats on 28 investments. In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months. However, we recently reported that less than half of selected investments at five major agencies planned to deliver capabilities in 12-month cycles. To help the government achieve such transparency, in June 2009, OMB established a public website (referred to as the IT Dashboard) that provides detailed information on major IT investments at 27 federal agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets.information is intended to allow OMB; other oversight bodies, including Congress; and the general public to hold agencies accountable for results and performance. The public dissemination of this As of May 2015, according to the IT Dashboard, 178 of the federal government’s 738 major IT investments—totaling $8.7 billion—were in need of management attention (rated “yellow” to indicate the need for attention or “red” to indicate significant concerns). Further reducing transparency, OMB does not update the public version of the Dashboard as it and the agencies work to assist in the formulation of the President’s annual budget request. Among other things, we made recommendations to OMB aimed at improving the reporting of achieved savings. The new IT acquisition reform requirements codified in the law, when fully implemented, should help address key issue areas identified in our high- risk report related to the management of IT investments. Finally, OMB’s proposed guidance also includes requirements to help support agency implementation of the roles and responsibilities for CIOs and other senior agency officials (i.e., the common baseline). As noted in that report, from October 2009 through December 2014, we made 737 recommendations to improve agencies’ management of their IT acquisitions; however, as of January 2015, only about 23 percent of these had been fully implemented. Also in our high-risk report, we stated that OMB and agencies should demonstrate measurable government-wide progress in the following key areas:
OMB and agencies should, within 4 years, implement at least 80 percent of GAO’s recommendations related to the management of IT acquisitions and operations. In summary, with the recent passage of IT reform legislation, the federal government has an opportunity to improve the transparency and management of IT acquisition and operations, and strengthen the authority of CIOs to provide needed direction and oversight. Data Center Consolidation: Reporting Can be Improved to Reflect Substantial Planned Savings. November 6, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government invests more than $80 billion annually in IT. However, these investments frequently fail, incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contribute little to mission-related outcomes. This underperformance of federal IT projects can be traced to a lack of disciplined and effective management and inadequate executive-level oversight. Accordingly, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list—a list of agencies and program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation.
GAO was asked to testify on its designation of the management of IT acquisitions and operations as a federal high-risk area and the impact of recent legislation on IT acquisition reform. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in these areas.
What GAO Found
Federal investments in information technology (IT) have often resulted in multimillion dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays, with questionable mission-related achievements. Further, the implementation of initiatives to improve IT acquisitions has been inconsistent. For example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a process for holding face-to-face investment performance reviews between agencies and OMB (referred to as “TechStats”). However, as of 2013 less than 20 percent of at-risk investments across the government had undergone such reviews, even though GAO has identified a number of ongoing IT investments with significant issues that require attention. OMB also requires investments to deliver capabilities every 6 months, but as GAO reported in 2014, less than half of selected investments at five major agencies planned to deliver capabilities in 12-month cycles.
To facilitate transparency across the government in acquiring and managing IT investments, OMB established a public website—the IT Dashboard—to provide detailed information on major investments at federal agencies. As of May 2015, the Dashboard showed that 178 of the government's 738 major investments—totaling $8.7 billion—were in need of management attention due to their risk. Moreover, OMB does not update the public version of the Dashboard while the President's budget request is being formulated, most recently for more than 6 months. GAO has made multiple recommendations to improve the Dashboard.
Further opportunities for savings and efficiency exist in agencies' spending on “commodity” IT (e.g., IT infrastructure, enterprise systems such as e-mail, and systems that perform administrative functions) and the consolidation of federal data centers. The table below shows savings realized or planned from the consolidation of federal data centers.
However, limitations exist in how agencies report savings in these areas: better tracking them would provide for greater transparency and oversight.
Recognizing the importance of these issues, a law was recently enacted aimed at reforming federal IT acquisition. This legislation should help address the key issue areas identified in GAO's high-risk designation. OMB has released proposed guidance for agencies to implement provisions of this law, to include implementing roles and responsibilities for senior agency officials. To improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations, it is also critical for agencies to implement GAO's prior recommendations and demonstrate measurable government-wide progress in key areas such as delivering IT systems incrementally and realizing planned data center savings.
What GAO Recommends
From October 2009 through December 2014, GAO made 737 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the management and oversight of IT. As of January 2015, only about 23 percent of these had been fully implemented. |
gao_AIMD-98-131 | gao_AIMD-98-131_0 | Because of this, the department wasted millions of dollars each year paying for unnecessary or unused telecommunications services and equipment, and services billed but never provided. USDA agreed that it has to do a significantly better job managing its telecommunications investments. By implementing improvements such as reengineering telecommunications management, the department reported in November 1997 that its telecommunications costs could be reduced as much as $30 million annually. However, to date, USDA has not fully implemented the revised and improved management practices. In December 1997, the CIO issued a plan of action for resolving the department’s long-standing problems managing information technology. Further, USDA has not established an overall plan or strategy for directing and integrating these separate improvement efforts and for ensuring that critical corrective actions are cost-effectively and promptly implemented throughout the department. A major factor contributing to this situation is that no one at USDA has been given overall responsibility, authority, and accountability for doing so. USDA also stated that the department has made real progress in telecommunications management and has achieved significant savings, but did not disagree that USDA continues to miss savings opportunities and cannot ensure that telecommunications resources are cost-effectively managed across the department. To address our objective, we reviewed studies, reports, plans, and other documentation describing USDA’s actions to address our recommendations for (1) correcting telecommunications management weaknesses, (2) identifying and acting on opportunities to consolidate and optimize FTS 2000 telecommunications services, (3) planning networks in support of information and resource sharing needs, and (4) resolving telephone abuse and fraud. We also reviewed USDA’s information systems technology architecture and discussed it with CIO officials to determine the extent to which the architecture defines information sharing needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to improve its management of telecommunications resources and act on opportunities to achieve savings.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USDA has taken positive steps to begin correcting its telecommunications management weaknesses--improvements that the department says could reduce its $200 million-plus reported annual investment in telecommunications by as much as $70 million each year; (2) for example, USDA conducted a departmentwide reengineering study and is beginning to test a redesigned approach for managing telecommunications resources; (3) USDA has also taken action to eliminate some redundant services and reduce costs; (4) however, USDA has not achieved significant cost savings or management improvements because many of the department's corrective actions are incomplete or inadequate; (5) specifically, USDA has not: (a) established the sound management practices necessary for ensuring that telecommunications resources are cost-effectively managed and payments for unused, unnecessary, or uneconomical services are stopped; (b) consolidated and optimized telecommunications to achieve savings where opportunities exist to do so; (c) adequately planned integrated networks in support of information sharing needs; and (d) determined the extent to which the department is at risk for telephone abuse and fraud and acted to mitigate those risks nationwide; (6) further, it is unclear how and when these needed corrective actions will be implemented because the department has not established an effective action plan or strategy for addressing GAO's recommendations with timeframes, milestones, and resources for making improvements; and (7) a major factor contributing to this situation is that no one at USDA has been given overall responsibility, authority, and accountability for fixing USDA's long-standing telecommunications management problems. |
gao_HEHS-99-59 | gao_HEHS-99-59_0 | 3. 5. 6. 7. Hospitals Are Implementing Compliance Programs
According to the results of two hospital surveys, our interviews with observers in the health care field, and our study of 25 hospitals, it is apparent that many hospitals are implementing formal compliance programs. However, the actual prevalence of such programs is difficult to determine precisely. Also, a recent survey of 4,300 hospitals by AHA found that 96 percent of the 1,902 respondents indicated that they have a formal compliance program in place or plan to implement one within the coming year. When asked why they felt the need to develop more rigorous compliance programs, these hospital officials mentioned the heightened enforcement environment, HHS-OIG guides and workplans showing a continued enforcement focus on hospital billing, and expectations that HCFA and accrediting bodies would soon require compliance programs. Hospitals Report Compliance Program Costs Are Considerable
According to the hospitals in our study, the implementation and operation of compliance programs entail a considerable commitment of time and money. However, among hospitals that could provide us with direct compliance program cost data, only one appears to spend more than 1 percent of total patient care revenues. All of the hospitals in our study identified direct cost components, such as salaries and fringe benefits for compliance officers and staff, consulting and legal fees, and outside audit services; but determining the costs of these and other components of compliance programs was difficult for our hospital providers. The lack of a compliance budget was the main reason for this difficulty; the hospitals could not always distinguish the costs attributable to their compliance programs from those of their normal operations. Hospital officials pointed out that their compliance programs also generate indirect costs, which are more difficult to measure and may be greater than the direct costs. Foremost among these was employee and physician time spent away from regular duties while attending compliance-related training. Early Evidence of Compliance Program Effectiveness Is Inconclusive
The principal objective of compliance programs, and hence the most direct measure of their effectiveness, is their performance in preventing improper Medicare payments. Self-disclosures of potential misconduct by providers have been reported by HHS-OIG, Justice, and hospital officials, although the number of self-disclosures reported is small. Others we spoke with cautioned that a variety of factors could contribute to an increase in refunds of provider-identified overpayments—not just the effectiveness of compliance programs. One of the other two contractors we spoke with also reported that it had received refunds of overpayments, reportedly due to compliance programs. The voluntary compliance of hospitals and other Medicare providers is crucial to reducing the improper payments that continue to plague the program. The evidence available to date does not show that compliance programs have reduced improper Medicare payments. Comments From the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General
Organizations at Which GAO Conducted Interviews
Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, New Orleans, La. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the compliance programs established by health care providers to reduce improper payments by Medicare, focusing on the: (1) prevalence of compliance programs among hospitals and other Medicare providers; (2) costs involved with compliance programs; and (3) effectiveness of the programs, to the extent that could be measured.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although there is no comprehensive data on the number of providers with compliance programs, many hospitals are implementing them; (2) two recent hospital surveys, one focusing on academic health centers and the other including a broad range of hospital types, found that most hospitals responding either had or planned to soon implement a compliance program; (3) the hospitals in GAO's study said they felt compelled to implement a compliance program for a variety of reasons, including the heightened enforcement environment, suggestions from the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of the Inspector General, and expectations that the Health Care Financing Administration and accrediting bodies would soon require compliance programs; (4) although compliance programs are apparently becoming widely accepted, most of the hospitals in GAO's study have only recently begun implementation; (5) hospitals report that compliance programs require an investment of considerable time and money; (6) however, measuring the cost of compliance programs is difficult; (7) hospitals could not always distinguish costs attributable to their compliance programs from those of their normal operations, in part because the hospitals often had existing compliance-oriented activities that were subsumed by the compliance program; (8) hospitals reported a variety of significant direct costs, such as salaries for compliance staff and professional fees for consultants and attorneys; (9) according to the information GAO was able to obtain, direct compliance program costs appear to account for a very small percentage of total patient revenues--less than 1 percent in all but one of the hospitals studied; (10) the hospitals also reported indirect costs, such as time spent by employees in compliance-related training and away from their regular duties; (11) these indirect costs are more difficult to measure and may be larger than the direct costs reported; (12) the principal measure of a compliance program's effectiveness is its ability to prevent improper Medicare payments; (13) it is difficult to measure effectiveness in this way because of the lack of comprehensive baseline data and the existence of many other factors that could affect measurement results; (14) other measures have been suggested as a proxy for measuring compliance program effectiveness; (15) Medicare contractors reported that they have received refunds of provider overpayments with more frequency; (16) GAO has also noted an increase in formal provider self-disclosures during the last few years; and (17) however, this preliminary evidence does not demonstrate that compliance programs have reduced improper Medicare payments. |
gao_GAO-01-1016 | gao_GAO-01-1016_0 | Under incoming assignments, employees from nonfederal organizations come to work for the federal government. NSF Has Been a Major User of the IPA Program
According to OPM data, NSF has been one of the most active users of the IPA program among those federal agencies sending employees on temporary assignments to universities, state and local governments, or other nonfederal organizations. Nearly two-thirds (29) of the 45 participants were temporarily assigned to universities, 1 to a local government, and the other 15 to other nonfederal organizations, including research institutions and professional associations. These assignments were also designed to allow employees to share their NSF expertise. In 41 of the 45 assignments, the partnering institution made at least some contribution to the costs of the assignments. NSF spent about $7.2 million on 45 IPA assignments that were ongoing from January 1995 through December 2000. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Concerning the external Intergovernmental Personnel Act’s (IPA) mobility program, we were asked to provide information on (1) the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) use of the program, (2) the NSF program’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations, (3) the program’s costs to NSF and its partnering institutions, and (4) the benefits that NSF has identified from participating in the program. | What GAO Found
The Intergovernmental Personnel Act's (IPA) mobility program authorizes the temporary assignment of employees between federal agencies and state and local governments, universities, Indian tribal governments, and other nonfederal groups. These assignments, which may last up to four years, are intended to increase cooperation between the federal government and the non-federal entity. The National Science Foundation (NSF) temporarily assigned 45 of its employees to nonfederal organizations between 1995 and 2000, making NSF one of the most active users of the IPA program among federal agencies. NSF assigned 29 participants to universities, one to a local government, and 15 to other nonfederal organizations, such as research institutions or professional associations. NSF's implementation of the IPA program conformed to applicable laws and regulations. Although the partnering institutions nearly always made some financial contribution to these assignments, NSF paid about 78 percent of the total costs associated with the 45 assignments that GAO reviewed. The estimated total cost of these assignments to NSF was about $7.2 million for the six-year period GAO covered. NSF's external IPA assignments benefit not only the assignees but also the partnering institutions and NSF, according to NSF officials. |
gao_GAO-05-1016T | gao_GAO-05-1016T_0 | Background
The Social Security Act of 1935 authorized the Social Security Administration (SSA) to establish a record-keeping system to manage the Social Security program, which resulted in the creation of the SSN. In 1998, Congress made identity theft a federal crime when it enacted the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (Identity Theft Act). Public Sector Entities Use SSNs, and Some Agencies Limit Their Display
As required by a number of federal laws and regulations, agencies at all levels of government frequently collect and use SSNs to administer their programs, to link data for verifying applicants’ eligibility for services and benefits, and to conduct program evaluations. Government agencies use SSNs for a variety of reasons. In addition, SSNs are sometimes used for statistics, research, and evaluation. SSNs Are Widely Available in Public Records Held by States, Local Jurisdictions, and Courts, but Many of These Agencies Are Taking Steps to Limit Display
SSNs are publicly available throughout the United States, primarily at the state and local levels of government. Certain Private Sector Entities Routinely Obtain and Use SSNs
Private sector entities such as information resellers, credit reporting agencies, and health care organizations routinely obtain and use SSNs. Because the SSN is a unique identifier, we found that these entities use SSNs for various purposes, such as building tools to aid in verifying an individual’s identity or matching existing data. Private Sector Entities Obtain SSNs from Public and Private Sources
Private sector entities such as information resellers, CRAs, and health care organizations generally obtain SSNs from various public and private sources. In addition to these federal laws, many states have enacted their own legislation to restrict the use and display of SSNs, focusing on public display restrictions, such as the display of SSNs on identification cards, SSN solicitation, and customer notifications when SSNs are compromised. In the last year, Congress has also introduced consumer privacy legislation similar to enacted state legislation, which in some cases includes SSN restrictions. Federal and State Laws Limit the Use and Disclosure of Personal Information, Including SSNs
Certain federal and state laws have placed restrictions on entities’ use and disclosure of consumers’ personal information, including SSNs. Notably, in 2001, California enacted a law to restrict the use and display of SSNs. For example, New York law makes identity theft a crime. Furthermore, some states have also included identity theft victim assistance provisions in their laws. The increased availability and aggregation of personal information in public and private sector databases and via the Internet has provided new opportunities for individuals to engage in fraudulent activities. State legislatures have also placed restrictions on SSNs by enacting laws that restrict the use and display of SSNs and prohibit the theft of individuals' personal information. Financial institutions are permitted to disclose consumers’ nonpublic personal information without offering them an opt-out right in some of the following circumstances: to effect a transaction requested by the consumer in connection with a financial product or service requested by the consumer; maintaining or servicing the consumer’s account with the financial institution or another entity as part of a private label credit card program or other extension of credit; or a proposed or actual securitization, secondary market sale, or similar transaction; to protect the confidentiality or security of the consumer’s records; to prevent actual or potential fraud, for required institutional risk control or for resolving customer disputes or inquiries, to persons holding a legal or beneficial interest relating to the consumer, or to the consumer’s fiduciary; to the extent specifically permitted or required under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, to law enforcement agencies, self-regulatory organizations, or for an investigation on a matter related to public safety; to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act or from a consumer report reported by a consumer reporting agency; to comply with federal, state, or local laws; an investigation or subpoena; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1936, the Social Security Administration established the Social Security number (SSN) to track worker's earnings for Social Security benefit purposes. Despite its narrowly intended purpose, the SSN is now used for a myriad of non-Social Security purposes. Today, SSNs are used, in part, as identity verification tools for services such as child support collections, law enforcement enhancements, and issuing credit to individuals. Although these uses can be beneficial to the public, the SSN is now a key piece of information in creating false identities. The aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases and the increased availability of information via the Internet may provide criminals the opportunities to commit identity theft. Although Congress and the states have enacted a number of laws to protect consumers' privacy, the public and private sectors' continued use of and reliance on SSNs, and the potential for misuse, underscore the importance of strengthening protections where possible. Accordingly, this testimony focuses on describing (1) the public use of SSNs, (2) the use of SSNs by certain private sector entities, and (3) certain federal and state laws regulating the use of SSNs and identity theft.
What GAO Found
The public and private sector use of SSNs is widespread. Agencies at all levels of government frequently collect and use SSNs to administer their programs, verify applicants' eligibility for services and benefits, and conduct research and evaluations of their programs. Although some government agencies are taking steps to limit the use and display of SSNs, these numbers are still widely available in a variety of public records held by states, local jurisdictions, and courts. In addition, certain private sector entities that we have reviewed, such as information resellers, credit reporting agencies (CRAs), and health care organizations, also routinely obtain and use SSNs. These entities often obtain SSNs from various public sources or their clients and use SSNs for various purposes, such as building tools that aid in verifying an individual's identity or matching records from various sources. Given the extent to which government and private sector entities use SSNs, Congress has enacted federal laws to restrict the use and disclosure of consumers' personal information, including SSNs. Many states have also enacted their own legislation to restrict the use and display of SSNs, focusing on public display restrictions, SSN solicitation, and customer notifications when SSNs are compromised. Furthermore, Congress has recently introduced consumer privacy legislation similar to enacted state legislation, which in some cases includes SSN restrictions. Although there is some consistency in the various proposed and enacted federal and state laws, gaps remain in protecting individuals' personal information from fraud and identity theft. Some federal agencies are beginning to collect statistics on identity theft crime, which appears to be growing. For example, recent statistics show that identity theft is increasing in New York. In 2004, Federal Trade Commission (FTC) statistics indicated that over 17,600 New Yorkers reported being a victim of identity theft, which is up from roughly 7,000 in 2001. |
gao_HEHS-95-121 | gao_HEHS-95-121_0 | All physicians and dentists employed by VA are subject to privileging procedures. However, VA guidance does not explicitly state the extent to which (1) discussions with a practitioner should be documented or (2) the reasons for no action being taken should be justified. This suggests that the standard of care is often unclear to reviewers. Practice guidelines are being developed with increasing frequency in both VA and the medical community as a whole. Physician Perceptions of the Peer Review Process in VA Are Mixed
The degree to which the concept of peer review is accepted or embraced by physicians depends to a great extent on how the results of peer review are utilized by medical center management. However, the effect is that physicians who may have performance problems are not reported to the Data Bank. Conclusions
Although physician peer review is performed at the VA medical centers that we visited and cases of questionable quality of care are identified, actions taken by service chiefs as the result of peer review findings are seldom made a matter of record in peer review files. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to require service chiefs to fully document all discussions held with practitioners involved in cases that peer reviewers conclude that most experienced, competent practitioners might or would have handled differently, and revise the criteria now being used by medical centers to report VA practitioners to the National Practitioner Data Bank so that they are more consistent with the reporting practices now used in the private sector. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the relationship between problem identification and problem resolution in the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) physician peer review process, focusing on: (1) how the results of VA peer review are being used in disciplining physicians with performance problems; (2) the impediments to effective peer review; and (3) whether VA is taking action against physicians who are not performing in accordance with professional standards.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) actions taken by VA to address quality of care problems are often limited to undocumented discussions with the physicians involved; (2) there is generally no record of the extent to which quality of care problems are addressed or the actions taken to deal with the problems identified; (3) VA is developing practice guidelines and using peer review to help reduce heavy reliance on professional judgment in peer review; and (4) VA medical centers are not reporting many actions taken against physicians to the National Practitioner Data Bank because of their restrictive reporting procedures. |
gao_GAO-15-470 | gao_GAO-15-470_0 | Ultimately, these resources were reduced by about 7 percent, or $37.2 billion, as a result of sequestration (see fig. Sequestration Reduced DOD’s Nonexempt Discretionary Resources, Including Unobligated Balances, and the Military Services’ Accounts Absorbed Most of the Reductions
In response to the President’s sequestration order and OMB’s implementing report, DOD’s nonexempt discretionary resources were reduced, including those within the operation and maintenance, procurement, RDT&E, and military construction appropriation accounts.DOD’s use of prior year unobligated balances to meet sequestration reductions varied by appropriation. In contrast, within their operation and maintenance accounts, the military services had the flexibility to allocate sequestration reductions to specific functions and activities. DOD Took Near-Term Actions While Implementing Sequestration Reductions to Preserve Key Programs and Functions
DOD and the military services provided guidance to their subordinate commands and components identifying near-term actions to help plan for and implement sequestration, and the components took a variety of actions in response to this guidance. Similarly, the Air Force cancelled or reduced participation in 32 of 48 of its large-scale planned exercises, including two of its key multinational training events. The following are examples of sequestration-related effects identified by DOD officials across our case studies:
The Navy cancelled or delayed some planned ship deployments in fiscal year 2013, which resulted in a 10 percent decrease in its deployed forces worldwide. DOD Used Available Means to Mitigate the Effects of Sequestration, but Has Not Consistently Documented and Shared Best Practices or Lessons Learned
DOD and the military services generally relied on previously existing processes and funding flexibilities, such as the ability to reprogram and transfer funds, to mitigate the effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequestration. Our review identified some limited efforts to document decisions or lessons learned from implementing the fiscal year 2013 sequestration, but DOD and the military services did not comprehensively document, assess, or share best practices or lessons learned from their experiences. Without documenting, assessing, and sharing DOD’s and the services’ best practices and lessons learned from implementing sequestration, including, for example, strategies for evaluating the interdependence of various funding sources subject to budgetary reductions, DOD is missing an opportunity to gain valuable institutional knowledge that would help facilitate future decision making about budgetary reductions should sequestration occur again. However, without documenting, assessing, and sharing information on lessons learned and best practices in implementing the 2013 sequestration reductions across the department and leveraging existing mechanisms to share this information, decision makers at the program, DOD component, and department-wide levels may not benefit from such insights. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Johana R. Ayers at (202) 512-5741 or [email protected], or Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. As a result of actions taken to reduce spending for lower priority areas in fiscal year 2013, service component officials identified negative effects, which based on our analysis are related to increased costs in fiscal year 2013 or a subsequent fiscal year; cancelled or reduced training activities and delayed time frames to restore readiness; and a decreased availability of forces or equipment to support operations and training. Some of the effects identified were interrelated, while others were difficult to quantify. The use of transfers and reprogrammings gave the services some flexibility to manage reductions, but did not allow them to restore some actions taken in response to the fiscal year 2013 sequestration. Reductions Resulted in Effects Related to Costs and Spending, Delayed Time Frames, and Reduced Equipment Availability
Based on our review of DOD’s budget execution data, internal maintenance records, service guidance, and interviews with maintenance officials, we found that the service components took steps during the fiscal year 2013 sequestration to preserve funding for maintenance activities most directly associated with equipment readiness for those units deploying or next-to-deploy in support of ongoing operations, and reduced spending on equipment maintenance for later-deploying units, in response to a DOD memorandum. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The joint explanatory statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that we review the effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequestration. This report examines (1) how DOD, including the military services, allocated fiscal year 2013 sequestration reductions, (2) what effects, if any, DOD has identified from the fiscal year 2013 sequestration on selected DOD programs, services, and military readiness, and (3) the extent to which DOD took actions to mitigate the effects of the fiscal year 2013 sequestration. Case Study Selection
We selected a non-probability sample of five case studies of expenses or investments within DOD to review in detail. To further our understanding of DOD’s allocation of fiscal year 2013 sequestration reductions and the extent to which those reductions affected selected case study areas or were mitigated by DOD efforts, we interviewed officials, or where appropriate, obtained documentation at the organizations listed below: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer
Manpower and Personnel Directorate
Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program Department of the Air Force
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations,
Air Force Civil Engineer Center
Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs (A8)
Headquarters Air Force, Studies and Analyses, Assessment, and Lessons Learned (A9)
Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, Operations (A3O)
Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Security Forces (A47S)
Headquarters Air Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Logistics (A4L)
Air Combat Command
Air Education and Training Command
Air Force Materiel Command
Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Life Cycle Management
Air Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems Center
Air Force Reserve Command
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Army Budget
Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Operations and Plans
Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-4 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army Installation Management Command
U.S. Army Forces Command
U.S. Army Materiel Command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned
U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Life Cycle
U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Readiness and Logistics), Fleet Readiness Division (N43)
Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Warfare Systems (N9)
U.S. Fleet Forces Command
Naval Air Systems Command
Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Supply Systems Command
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Commander, Navy Installations Command
Navy Warfare Development Command
Office of the Chief of Navy Reserve
Navy Reserve Forces Command
Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources
Headquarters Marine Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations
Headquarters Marine Corps, Installations and Logistics, Logistics
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command
U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Command
U.S. Marine Corps Installations Command
U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Marine Corps
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve We conducted this performance audit from April 2014 to May 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2013, the President ordered across-the-board spending reductions, known as sequestration, for all federal agencies and departments. As a result, DOD's discretionary resources were reduced by about $37.2 billion over the remainder of FY 2013. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation and effects of the FY 2013 sequestration. This report examines, for the FY 2013 sequestration, (1) how DOD allocated reductions, (2) what effects DOD has identified on selected DOD programs, services, and military readiness, and (3) the extent to which DOD took actions to mitigate the effects of sequestration.
GAO analyzed DOD's FY 2013 budget and execution data and reviewed a nongeneralizeable sample of five types of expenses or investments—such as maintenance, and a selection of weapon systems and military construction projects—based on the magnitude of reductions and possible relation to readiness. For each area, GAO reviewed data on planned versus actual spending and reports on actions taken and interviewed DOD and service officials.
What GAO Found
To implement sequestration in fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Defense's (DOD) discretionary resources were reduced in approximate proportion to the size of its appropriation accounts, with the largest reductions to DOD's largest accounts, operation and maintenance. The military services' accounts absorbed about 76 percent of DOD's reduction relative to other defense accounts. In contrast to other accounts, such as procurement, DOD and the services had some flexibility to allocate varying reductions to functions and activities funded by the operation and maintenance accounts.
To implement sequestration reductions, DOD took near-term actions to preserve key programs and functions and reduced spending on lower priorities. Many effects that DOD officials attributed to the reductions were interdependent, with some difficult to quantify and assess. Effects DOD identified generally related to:
Costs and spending : Some actions increased costs or deferred spending to subsequent years (e.g., procurement delays to the Navy's P-8A aircraft program resulted in an estimated $56.7 million life-cycle cost increase).
Time frames or cancellations : Delayed or cancelled activities affected some plans to improve military readiness (e.g., the Air Force cancelled or reduced participation in most of its planned large-scale FY 2013 training events, and expects delayed achievement of longer-term readiness goals).
Availability of forces and equipment : Some actions decreased the forces and equipment ready for contingencies (e.g., the Navy cancelled or delayed some planned ship deployments, which resulted in a 10 percent decrease in its deployed forces worldwide).
DOD and the services relied on existing processes and flexibilities to mitigate the effect of sequestration in FY 2013, but did not comprehensively document or assess best practices or lessons learned from their experiences. For example, the services used authorities to reprogram and transfer funds, which allowed them to reverse some initial actions taken to reduce spending. GAO identified some DOD efforts to document lessons learned or best practices related to the implementation of the FY 2013 sequestration, but found them to be limited in scope and not widely shared. Without documenting and assessing lessons learned and best practices, such as strategies for evaluating interdependence of funding sources and programs, and leveraging existing mechanisms to share this information, DOD is missing an opportunity to gain institutional knowledge that would facilitate future decision making about budgetary reductions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD document and assess lessons learned and best practices from implementing sequestration, as well as leverage existing mechanisms to share these lessons within the services and across the department. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.
; or Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected] . |
gao_GAO-06-117 | gao_GAO-06-117_0 | Its primary oversight tools are statutorily required federal monitoring surveys conducted annually in at least 5 percent of the state- surveyed Medicare and Medicaid nursing homes in each state and annual state performance reviews. Available Data Show Significant Overall Decrease in Serious Quality Problems but Indicate Continued Inconsistency and Understatement in State Findings
CMS’s nursing home survey data show a significant decrease in serious quality problems in recent years, but other information indicates that this trend masks two important and continuing issues: inconsistency in how states conduct surveys and understatement of serious quality problems. Moreover, although federal comparative surveys conducted from October 1998 through December 2004 showed a decline in the proportion of serious deficiencies that were not identified by state surveys, this overall trend masks a more recent increase from 2002 through 2004 in federally identified understatement of serious deficiencies. In five large states we examined with a significant decline in the proportion of homes found to have harmed residents, federal comparative surveys found that a significant proportion of state surveys had missed serious deficiencies, that is, state surveyors either failed to cite the deficiencies altogether or cited them at too low a level of scope and severity. From January 1999 through January 2005, the proportion of nursing homes nationwide with actual harm or immediate jeopardy deficiencies declined from about 29 percent to about 16 percent. CMS Has Addressed Many Shortcomings in Survey and Oversight Activities, but Work Continues on Some Key Initiatives
CMS has addressed many shortcomings in nursing home survey and oversight activities both in response to our recommendations and as a result of its own assessment of needed improvements, but it is still working on key initiatives that have not yet been implemented. Examples of CMS’s initiatives to address shortcomings include (1) revising the survey methodology, (2) issuing states additional guidance to strengthen complaint investigations, (3) implementing immediate sanctions for homes cited for repeat serious violations, and (4) strengthening oversight by conducting assessments of state survey activities. CMS also has published information on its Web site about nursing home quality and has engaged independent quality organizations to work with nursing homes to improve quality. Despite CMS’s initiatives in four distinct areas—surveys, complaints, enforcement, and oversight—some initiatives either have not effectively targeted the problems we identified or have shortcomings that impair their effectiveness. An independent evaluation is planned. In response to recommendations in our November 1999 and July 2004 reports, CMS has (1) significantly increased the number of federal comparative surveys both for quality of care and fire safety and (2) decreased the time between the end of the state survey and the start of the federal survey for quality-of-care comparative surveys, allowing CMS to better distinguish between serious problems missed by state surveyors and changes in a home that occurred after the state survey. However, CMS continues to address ongoing problems with the accuracy and reliability of the underlying data, such as the MDS, quality indicators, and nurse staffing levels. Resource and Workload Issues Pose Key Challenges to Further Improving Nursing Home Quality and Safety
CMS, states, and nursing homes face a number of key challenges in their efforts to further improve nursing home quality and safety, including (1) the cost of retrofitting older nursing homes with automatic sprinklers, a potentially costly requirement that has a demonstrated ability to prevent deaths in the event of a fire; (2) continuing problems in hiring and retaining qualified surveyors, a factor that states indicated can contribute to variability in the citation of serious deficiencies; and (3) an increasing federal and state survey workload due to increased oversight, the identification over time of additional initiatives, and growth in the number of Medicare and Medicaid providers that must be surveyed, including expected growth in nursing homes. For example, CMS sought input from experts in developing investigative protocols for surveyors. Even with CMS’s increased efforts to improve nursing home quality, the agency’s continued attention and commitment to these efforts is essential in order to maintain and build upon the momentum of its accomplishments to date. California Nursing Homes: Care Problems Persist Despite Federal and State Oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, GAO has issued numerous reports on nursing home quality and safety that identified significant weaknesses in federal and state oversight. Under contract with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), states conduct annual nursing home inspections, known as surveys, to assess compliance with federal quality and safety requirements. States also investigate complaints filed by family members or others in between annual surveys. When state surveys find serious deficiencies, CMS may impose sanctions to encourage compliance with federal requirements. GAO was asked to assess CMS's progress since 1998 in addressing oversight weaknesses. GAO (1) reviewed the trends in nursing home quality from 1999 through January 2005, (2) evaluated the extent to which CMS's initiatives have addressed survey and oversight problems identified by GAO and CMS, and (3) identified key challenges to continued progress in ensuring resident health and safety. GAO reviewed federal data on the results of state nursing home surveys and federal surveys assessing state performance; conducted additional analyses in five states with large numbers of nursing homes; reviewed the status of its prior recommendations; and identified key workforce and workload issues confronting CMS and states.
What GAO Found
CMS's nursing home survey data show a significant decline in the proportion of nursing homes with serious quality problems since 1999, but this trend masks two important and continuing issues: inconsistency in how states conduct surveys and understatement of serious quality problems. Inconsistency in states' surveys is demonstrated by wide interstate variability in the proportion of homes found to have serious deficiencies--for example, about 6 percent in one state and about 54 percent in another. Continued understatement of serious deficiencies is shown by the increase in discrepancies between federal and state surveys of the same homes from 2002 through 2004, despite an overall decline in such discrepancies from October 1998 through December 2004. In five large states that had a significant decline in serious deficiencies, federal surveyors concluded that from 8 percent to 33 percent of the comparative surveys identified serious deficiencies that state surveyors had missed. This finding is consistent with earlier GAO work showing that state surveyors missed serious care problems. These two issues underscore the importance of CMS initiatives to improve the consistency and rigor of nursing home surveys. CMS has addressed many survey and oversight shortcomings, but it is still developing or has not yet implemented several key initiatives, particularly those intended to improve the consistency of the survey process. Key steps CMS has taken include (1) revising the survey methodology, (2) issuing states additional guidance to strengthen complaint investigations, (3) implementing immediate sanctions for homes cited for repeat serious violations, and (4) strengthening oversight by conducting assessments of state survey activities. Some CMS initiatives, however, either have shortcomings impairing their effectiveness or have not effectively targeted problems GAO and CMS identified. For example, CMS has not fully addressed issues with the accuracy and reliability of the data underlying consumer information published on its Web site. The key challenges CMS, states, and nursing homes face in their efforts to further improve nursing home quality and safety include (1) the cost to older homes to be retrofit with automatic sprinklers to help reduce the loss of life in the event of a fire, (2) continuing problems with hiring and retaining qualified surveyors, and (3) an expanded workload due to increased oversight, identification of additional initiatives that compete for staff and financial resources, and growth in the number of Medicare and Medicaid providers. Despite CMS's increased nursing home oversight, its continued attention and commitment are warranted in order to maintain the momentum of its efforts to date and to better ensure high-quality care and safety for nursing home residents. CMS generally concurred with the report's findings. CMS noted several areas of progress in nursing home quality and identified remaining challenges to conducting nursing home survey and oversight activities. |
gao_GAO-06-76 | gao_GAO-06-76_0 | In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of cargo was shipped within the United States by air. A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. TSA Has Developed a Risk-Based Strategic Plan but Has Not Completed Assessments of the Risks Posed by Terrorists to the Air Cargo System
TSA has taken initial steps toward applying a risk-based management approach to address air cargo security but not yet completed risk assessments for air cargo security. However, TSA officials stated that they decided not to fund this effort because of its cost. TSA Has Implemented Actions Intended to Strengthen Air Cargo Security, but Factors Exist That May Limit Their Effectiveness
TSA has implemented a variety of actions intended to strengthen the security of air cargo as it works to fully implement a risk management approach for securing air cargo. More recently, TSA has focused on increasing the number of air cargo inspections. Specifically, TSA is developing a system to target elevated risk air cargo for inspection that would minimize the agency's reliance on random inspections. However, as we have previously noted, there are problems with the information contained in the TSA Known Shipper database and how TSA uses this information to identify shippers who may pose a risk. Table 3 describes TSA's proposed measures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Transportation Security Administration has a comprehensive risk-based approach for securing the domestic air cargo transportation system, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following six actions: (1) develop a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets, as well as defining, gathering, and analyzing information on air cargo security breaches, and use the information resulting from these assessments as a basis for prioritizing the steps necessary to enhance the security of the nation's air cargo transportation system; (2) reexamine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any needed adjustments to the exemptions; (3) develop measures to gauge air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements to assess and address potential security weaknesses and vulnerabilities; (4) develop a plan for systematically analyzing the results of air cargo compliance inspections and use the results to target future inspections and identify systemwide corrective actions; (5) assess the effectiveness of enforcement actions, including the use of civil penalties, in ensuring air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements; and (6) ensure that the data to be used in the Freight Assessment System to identify elevated risk cargo are complete, accurate, and current. (2) What actions has TSA taken to ensure the security of air cargo, and what factors may limit their effectiveness? To determine the extent to which TSA has used a risk management approach to guide decisions on securing air cargo, we compared a synthesis of government requirements and best practices that represents GAO's risk management approach with TSA's efforts to implement such an approach. To identify TSA's plans for enhancing air cargo security and the financial, operational, and other challenges TSA and industry stakeholders face in implementing air cargo security plans, we interviewed TSA and air cargo industry stakeholders. Last, the Department of Transportation has responsibility for, among other things, ensuring the security of hazardous materials being transported on air carriers. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, an estimated 23 billion pounds of air cargo was transported within the United States, about a quarter of which was transported on passenger aircraft. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for ensuring the security of commercial aviation, including the transportation of cargo by air. To evaluate the status of TSA's efforts to secure domestic air cargo, GAO examined (1) the extent to which TSA used a risk management approach to guide decisions on securing air cargo, (2) the actions TSA has taken to ensure the security of air cargo and the factors that may limit their effectiveness, and (3) TSA's plans for enhancing air cargo security and the challenges TSA and industry stakeholders face in implementing these plans.
What GAO Found
TSA has taken initial steps toward applying a risk-based management approach to address air cargo security. A risk-based management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives and assessing risk through the identification and evaluation of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical assets. In November 2003, TSA completed an air cargo strategic plan that outlined a threat-based, risk management approach to secure the air cargo system by, among other things, targeting elevated risk cargo for inspection. TSA also completed an updated threat assessment in April 2005. However, TSA has not yet established a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets--two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs. TSA has taken a number of actions intended to strengthen air cargo security, but factors exist that may limit their effectiveness. For example, TSA established a centralized database on people and businesses that routinely ship air cargo to improve information on known shippers. However, we identified problems with the reliability of the information in the database, and how TSA is using the information to identify shippers who may pose a risk. TSA has also established requirements for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but has exempted some cargo from inspection, potentially creating security weaknesses. Further, TSA conducts audits of air carriers and indirect air carriers to ensure that they are complying with existing air cargo security requirements. However, TSA has not developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier and indirect air carrier compliance, systematically analyzed these audit results to target future inspections, or assessed the effectiveness of its enforcement actions to ensure compliance with air cargo security requirements. TSA's plans for enhancing air cargo security focus on implementing a system for targeting and inspecting elevated risk cargo, and requiring air carriers to conduct security threat assessments on thousands of cargo workers, among other efforts. However, these plans may pose financial, operational, and technological challenges to the agency and air cargo industry stakeholders. For example, stakeholders are concerned, and our analysis identified, that TSA may have underestimated the cost of its proposed measures. |
gao_GAO-11-640 | gao_GAO-11-640_0 | It requires CSBs to include the appropriate service acquisition executive as chair and include representatives from USD (AT&L), the Chief of Staff for the armed forces, representatives from other armed forces as appropriate, the Joint Staff, the comptroller of the military department, the military deputy to the service acquisition executive, the program executive officer for the program concerned, and others as appropriate; prevent unnecessary changes to programs that could have an adverse impact on program cost or schedule, mitigate adverse cost and schedule effects of changes that may be required, and ensure that each program delivers as much planned capability as possible at or below the planned cost and schedule; review and approve or disapprove any proposed changes to program requirements or system configuration with the potential to adversely affect cost and schedule; and review and recommend proposals that could reduce requirements and improve cost and schedule. The Air Force and Navy did not fully comply with the requirement to hold annual CSB meetings for all major defense acquisition programs in 2010; the Army did comply. In total, the military departments held an annual CSB meeting for 74 of 96 major defense acquisition programs they managed in 2010. According to our survey results, when the military departments held CSB meetings, 19 programs endorsed requirements or configuration changes. In most of these cases, strategies were developed to mitigate any effect on a program’s cost and schedule—a key provision in the statute and DOD policy. However, key acquisition and requirements personnel were often absent from Air Force and Navy CSB meetings when these issues were discussed. Two Major Defense Acquisition Programs Are Not Covered By The CSB Statute
Two major defense acquisition programs—the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and the Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives programs, which are managed by DOD components rather than military departments—are not subject to the CSB provisions in statute because the statute only applies to major defense acquisition programs overseen by the military departments. CSB Meetings Had Some Positive Effects on Programs’ Efforts to Control Requirements and Costs
Individual programs varied in the extent to which they utilized CSBs to control requirements and mitigate cost and schedule risks. According to our survey results, the majority of CSB meetings neither reviewed requirement changes nor discussed options to reduce requirements or the scope of programs. We found a number of instances in which CSB meetings were effective in mitigating the effect of necessary changes, rejecting other changes, facilitating discussion of requirements, and endorsing descoping options with the potential to improve or preserve cost or schedule. In an effort to increase descoping proposals, the Army and Air Force have issued additional descoping guidance and set savings or budget targets. To further increase effectiveness and efficiency of CSBs, some of the military departments have taken steps to coordinate CSB meetings among programs that provide similar capabilities and align CSB meetings with other significant reviews. Program managers may be reluctant to recommend descoping options to moderate requirements during a CSB meeting because of cultural biases about the role of a program manager, a preference not to elevate decisions to higher levels of review, and concerns that future funding will be cut. CSBs’ Effects Differ for Programs in Development and Production
The types of discussions for which CSBs were useful changed based on whether programs were in development or production. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven actions directing: the Navy to amend its policy on CSBs to ensure that all statutorily required participants, particularly the Joint Staff, are included; the MDA to amend its policy to ensure that all statutorily required participants for military department CSBs are included in MDA’s Program Change Board, particularly the Joint Staff, if it is to serve as an equivalent review; USD (AT&L) to amend its acquisition instruction to: ensure that all statutorily required participants, in particular the comptroller, are included on CSBs; require CSB meetings for major defense acquisition programs in production as well as development but also coordinate with the military departments and the Congress to evaluate the effectiveness of CSB meetings for programs well into production; and develop the means to better track CSBs and ensure compliance with the requirement that CSBs hold a meeting at least once each year; USD (AT&L) to work with DOD components to determine whether paper CSBs are as effective as in-person meetings and, if not, amend the acquisition instruction accordingly; and DOD components to amend their policies to encourage alignment between CSB meetings and other complementary reviews whenever possible. In its comments, DOD concurred or partially concurred with all seven of our recommendations and agreed to take action to address six of them. This report presents information on all of these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reported that requirements changes are factors in poor cost and schedule outcomes on Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. In 2007, DOD introduced Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) to review requirement and configuration changes that could adversely affect programs. In 2008, Congress made annual CSB meetings a requirement for all of the military departments' major defense acquisition programs. In response to the Senate report accompanying the bill for the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD has complied with the statutory requirements for CSBs, and (2) the extent to which CSBs have been effective in controlling requirements and mitigating cost and schedule risks. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed DOD's major defense acquisition programs, reviewed CSB documentation, and interviewed relevant military service and program officials.
What GAO Found
The military departments varied in their compliance with the CSB requirements in statute. The Air Force and Navy did not fully comply with the requirement to hold annual CSB meetings for all major defense acquisition programs in 2010, while the Army did. In total, the military departments held an annual CSB meeting for 74 of 96 major defense acquisition programs they managed in 2010. According to GAO's survey results, when the military departments held CSB meetings, 19 programs endorsed requirements or configuration changes. In most of these cases, strategies were developed to mitigate the effects of these changes--a key provision in the statute and DOD policy. However, key acquisition and requirements personnel were often absent from Air Force and Navy CSB meetings when these issues were discussed. Two major defense acquisition programs--the Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives programs--are not subject to the CSB provisions in statute because the statute only applies to programs overseen by military departments; the programs are managed by other DOD components. These programs are subject to DOD's CSB policy, which differs from the statute in that it only requires major defense acquisition programs that are in development to hold annual CSB reviews. Individual programs varied in the extent to which they utilized CSBs to control requirements and mitigate cost and schedule risks. According to GAO's survey results, the majority of CSB meetings neither reviewed requirement changes nor discussed options to moderate requirements or reduce the scope of programs. There were a number of specific instances where CSB meetings were effective in mitigating the effect of necessary changes, rejecting other changes, facilitating discussion of requirements, and endorsing "descoping" options with the potential to improve or preserve cost or schedule. However, in response to a survey, program officials cast some doubts about the effectiveness of CSBs, and in interviews, acquisition officials indicated that program managers may be reluctant to recommend descoping options due to cultural biases that encourage meeting warfighters' stated needs rather than achieving cost savings, a preference not to elevate decisions to higher levels of review, and concerns that future funding may be cut if potential savings are identified. In response, the Army and Air Force have issued additional descoping guidance and set savings or budget targets. The types of discussions for which CSBs were useful changed based on whether programs were in development or production. Development programs found them more useful to consider requirements changes and descoping options, and production programs found CSBs more useful to prevent changes. In an effort to further increase effectiveness and efficiency of CSBs, some of the military departments have taken steps to coordinate CSB meetings among programs that provide similar capabilities and align CSB meetings with other significant reviews. Among GAO's recommendations for DOD components are that they amend their CSB policies to be consistent with statute and align CSBs with other reviews when possible. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with all seven of GAO's recommendations and agreed to take action to address six of them. |
gao_GAO-12-647 | gao_GAO-12-647_0 | Background
Transportation-disadvantaged populations, including those that cannot provide their own transportation due to age, disability, or income constraints, may face challenges in accessing transportation, such as lack of access to public transportation or a private vehicle. DOT and HHS formed the Coordinating Council on Human Services Transportation (Coordinating Council) in 1986 to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of human service transportation by coordinating related programs at the federal level and promoting the maximum feasible coordination at the state and local levels. 1). Thirty- one of these programs are administered by HHS. Transportation is not the primary mission for the vast majority of the programs we identified. Except for the 7 DOT programs, where all funds are used to support public transportation, the remaining 73 programs we identified primarily provide a variety of human services, such as job training, employment, education, medical care, or other services, which incorporate transportation as an eligible program expense to ensure participants can access a service. Federal Spending
Total spending on transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged remains unknown because, in many cases, federal departments do not separately track spending for these services. However, total expenditures and obligations for the 28 programs that do track or estimate transportation spending were at least $11.8 billion in fiscal year 2010 (see table 1). Federal Coordination Efforts Are Led by an Interagency Council, but Key Challenges Remain
Coordinating Council
The interagency Coordinating Council, chaired by DOT, has been charged with leading governmentwide transportation coordination efforts since 2003. The Coordinating Council undertook a number of activities through its United We Ride initiative, largely between 2003 and 2007. However, according to DOT officials, more recent Coordinating identifies agency roles and responsibilities, measurable outcomes, or required follow-up. We have previously reported that defining and articulating a common outcome, agreeing on agency roles and responsibilities, and reinforcing agency accountability through agency plans and reports are important elements for agencies to enhance and sustain collaborative efforts. State and Local Efforts Include Transportation Planning and Service Coordination, but Challenges Continue
State and Local Transportation Coordination Efforts
State and local officials in the five states we selected used a variety of coordinated planning and service efforts to serve the transportation disadvantaged. State coordinating bodies can help to facilitate collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies by providing a venue for agencies to discuss and resolve transportation issues to better coordinate transportation activities related to the provision of human services and enhance services for transportation- disadvantaged populations. In addition to state coordinating councils, efforts include regional and local planning, one-call centers, mobility managers, and vehicle sharing (see table 3). Challenges to State and Local Efforts
State and local entities’ efforts to coordinate services for the transportation disadvantaged are not without challenges. According to officials, challenges include insufficient federal leadership, changes to state legislation and policies, and limited financial resources in the face of growing unmet needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote and enhance federal, state, and local coordination activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, as the chair of the Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility, and the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and Veterans Affairs, as member agencies of the Coordinating Council, should meet and take the following actions:
Complete and publish a strategic plan for the Coordinating Council, which should, among other things, clearly outline agency roles and responsibilities and articulate a strategy to help strengthen interagency collaboration and communication. Report on the progress of Coordinating Council recommendations made as part of its 2005 Report to the President on Implementation of Executive Order 13330 and develop a plan to address any outstanding recommendations, including the development of a cost- sharing policy endorsed by the Coordinating Council and the actions taken by member agencies to increase federal program grantee participation in locally developed, coordinated planning processes. In commenting on a draft of this report, Education and VA generally agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. HHS, HUD, and DOT neither agreed nor disagreed with the report and provided technical comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify federal programs that provide funding for transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged, we examined prior GAO work on the topic, conducted an online search of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, and requested program information from federal agency officials for the programs identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans are unable to provide their own transportation or have difficulty accessing public transportation. Such transportation-disadvantaged individuals may include those who are elderly, have disabilities, or have low incomes. The Departments of Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), Transportation (DOT), Veterans Affairs (VA), and other federal agencies may provide funds to state and local entities to help these individuals access human service programs. As requested, GAO examined (1) federal programs that may fund transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged; (2) federal coordination efforts undertaken since 2003; and (3) coordination at the state and local levels. GAO analyzed information from the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; interviewed federal officials; and interviewed state and local officials in five states, chosen based on a variety of characteristics, including geographic diversity.
What GAO Found
Eighty federal programs are authorized to fund transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged, but transportation is not the primary mission of most of the programs GAO identified. Of these, the Department of Transportation administers 7 programs that support public transportation. The remaining 73 programs are administered by 7 other federal agencies and provide a variety of human services, such as job training, education, or medical care, which incorporate transportation as an eligible expense in support of program goals. Total federal spending on transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged remains unknown because, in many cases, federal departments do not separately track spending for these services. However, total funding for the 28 programs that do track or estimate transportation spending, including obligations and expenditures, was at least $11.8 billion in fiscal year 2010.
The interagency Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility, which the Secretary of Transportation chairs, has led governmentwide transportation coordination efforts since 2003. The Coordinating Council has undertaken a number of activities through its United We Ride initiative aimed at improving coordination at the federal level and providing assistance for state and local coordination. For example, its 2005 Report to the President on Human Service Transportation Coordination outlined collective and individual department actions and recommendations to decrease duplication, enhance efficiencies, and simplify access for consumers. Key challenges to federal interagency coordination efforts include a lack of activity at the leadership level of the Coordinating Council in recent yearsthe Coordinating Council leadership has not met since 2008and the absence of key guidance documents for furthering agency coordination efforts. For example, the Coordinating Council lacks a strategic plan that contains agency roles and responsibilities, measurable outcomes, or required follow-up. GAO has previously reported that defining and articulating a common outcome and reinforcing agency accountability through agency plans and reports are important elements for agencies to enhance and sustain collaborative efforts.
State and local officials GAO interviewed use a variety of planning and service coordination efforts to serve the transportation disadvantaged. Efforts include state coordinating councils, regional and local planning, one-call centers, mobility managers, and vehicle sharing. For example, state coordinating councils provide a forum for federal, state, and local agencies to discuss and resolve problems related to the provision of transportation services to the transportation disadvantaged. In other examples, one-call centers can provide clients with transportation program information and referrals for appropriate service providers and mobility managers may serve many functionsas policy coordinators, operations service brokers, and customer travel navigators. However, state and local governments face several challenges in coordinating these servicesincluding insufficient federal leadership, changes to state legislation and policies that may hamper coordination efforts, and limited financial resources in the face of growing disadvantaged populations.
What GAO Recommends
To promote and enhance federal, state, and local coordination activities, the Secretary of Transportation and the Coordinating Council should meet to (1) complete and publish a strategic plan; and (2) report on progress of recommendations made by the Council in its 2005 Report to the President and develop a plan to address outstanding recommendations. Education and VA agreed with GAOs recommendations. HHS, DOL, DOT, and other federal agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the report. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-899 | gao_GAO-03-899_0 | Charter schools are public schools established under contracts that grant them greater levels of autonomy from school regulations in exchange for agreeing to certain student performance goals. Facilities, Funding, and, to a Lesser Extent, Expertise Pose Challenges for New Charter Schools, but Some Assistance Is Available
New charter school founders across the country share common challenges: securing adequate facilities, obtaining start-up funding, and, to a lesser extent, acquiring the expertise necessary to run a charter school, although various forms of assistance are available to help with the start-up process. Charter schools also report facing difficulties obtaining funding during the application and early implementation periods, although the federal government and a small number of states provide funding for charter school start-up grants. In addition to providing charter schools with funding for facilities, states may provide charter schools with other forms of facilities assistance. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that allow charter schools access to vacant public buildings. The extent to which these laws enable charter schools to gain access to public buildings varies considerably both in terms of how proactive the states are in providing access and in terms of the cost of this access to charter schools. Under the Public Charter Schools Program, the federal government is also authorized to provide grants to states to establish or enhance per-pupil facilities aid programs; however, as of July 2003, this program has never received funding. Charter schools incur many start-up expenses during the planning and early implementation stages, such as hiring lawyers and business consultants to review charter plans and applications, buying curriculum programs and instructional materials, purchasing school furniture and supplies, hiring key staff, purchasing insurance, and placing down payments on facilities. District Charter Schools Have Additional Resources to Address Facilities Problem, but Real Estate Costs in the District Continue to Limit Options
According to D.C. charter school founders and other knowledgeable sources with whom we spoke, securing appropriate facilities is the greatest challenge to opening a charter school in the District. Until fiscal year 2003, charter schools were not eligible for public funds prior to receiving preliminary approval. The District Charter School Resource Center’s Closing Has Diminished Access to Start-Up Knowledge, although Some Local Resources Are Available
New charter school founders in the District are similar to charter school founders across the country in that they must have expertise in a wide range of areas to successfully open and operate a charter school. In our discussions, some D.C. charter school experts said that one of the challenges that many charter school founders encounter is acquiring the business and legal knowledge necessary to run a school. We also provided a draft of this report to officials at both of the D.C. charter school authorizing bodies - the D.C. Board of Education and the D.C. Public Charter School Board. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To obtain information about the challenges faced by charter school start- ups across the country and the resources available, we analyzed federal and state charter school laws. We interviewed officials from the District of Columbia Board of Education Public Charter Schools Oversight Office, the District of Columbia Public Charter School Board, the District of Columbia Public Schools, and several other D.C. government offices, including the Executive Office of the Mayor, the Department of Banking and Financial Institutions, and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. State has a “stimulus fund” which provides financial support for start-up costs and costs associated with facilities’ renovations or remodeling. Charter schools are offered a preference to use surplus school buildings. Charter Schools: Limited Access to Facility Financing. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of the 2002-2003 school year, nearly 2,700 charter schools operated in 36 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Charter schools are public schools that are exempt from certain state and local regulations in exchange for agreeing to certain student performance goals. To increase their understanding of problems faced during the start-up process, Congress included a provision in the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-7), which required GAO to report on charter school start-ups, including a comparison with charter schools in the District of Columbia. This report examines (1) the challenges faced by charter school start-ups across the nation and the resources available in various states to address these challenges and (2) how the District of Columbia compares in terms of charter school challenges and resources. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed federal, state, and D.C. charter school laws and interviewed Education and District officials, including representatives of the D.C. charter school authorizing boards, the D.C. public school system, and various city offices. GAO also conducted a discussion group consisting of District charter school experts and D.C. charter school founders.
What GAO Found
Securing a facility, obtaining start-up funding, and, to a lesser extent, acquiring the expertise necessary to run a charter school are the three greatest challenges facing new charter school founders nationwide, although the extent of the challenges varied from state to state. Charter school advocates report that charter schools need buildings that allow them to grow as their enrollment grows and that they have limited access to financing for facilities--both of which make securing facilities one of the most difficult aspects of opening a new charter school. Additionally, charter schools report that obtaining start-up money, particularly early in the charter application and planning periods, is difficult. In gaining approval for charters, they may incur significant expenses, such as hiring experts to review charters, purchasing curriculum programs, and placing down payments on facilities, before becoming eligible to receive most forms of public funding. Another challenge facing new charter school founders is acquiring the expertise--business, legal, managerial--necessary to open and run a charter school. Several federal, state, and local programs are available to help charter schools address these challenges across the country and in the District of Columbia. At the federal level, the Public Charter Schools Program has awarded about $1 billion in grants since 1994 to charter schools to help offset their start up costs. The program has also provided additional funding for a limited number of grants to organizations to increase charter schools' access to facilities financing. Some states also provide assistance to charter schools to address these challenges. The challenges facing D.C. charter schools are similar to those around the country; however, obtaining facilities is particularly difficult in D.C. due to the cost of real estate and poor condition of available buildings. To offset this challenge, the District provides charter schools with various forms of assistance, including a limited preference to buy or lease surplus public school buildings and a per-pupil allotment for the cost of facilities. To address challenges associated with start-up funding, the District provides charter schools with some funding prior to schools' opening. Although the District chartering authorities provide some guidance to charter applicants, they do not provide them with general technical assistance. |
gao_GAO-11-298 | gao_GAO-11-298_0 | TSA, part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary agency responsible for civil aviation security, which includes general aviation operations. Security Measures and Potential Vulnerabilities Identified at Selected Airports
The 13 airports we visited had multiple security measures in place to protect against unauthorized access. These 3 airports are required to follow TSA regulations because of their commercial flights. However, we identified potential vulnerabilities at the 10 general aviation airports that could allow unauthorized access to aircraft or airport grounds, facilities, or equipment. Of the 10 general aviation airports, nearly all had in place or partially in place the following security measures: perimeter fencing or natural barriers, lighting around hangars, aircraft and hangars locked and secured, and CCTV cameras in areas related to unauthorized access. None of the 10 general aviation airports had perimeter lighting in place, and only 1 of the general aviation airports had an intrusion detection system, as discussed below. Although 12 of the 13 airports had full or partial perimeter fencing, or other barriers in place, the fencing at 6 airports was partially bordered by bushes or trees, partially obstructed from view, or located next to a parking lot. According to TSA’s suggested security guidelines, such incidents have occurred. All 13 airports we visited had lighting around their hangars, and all but 3 airports had lighting at designated access points. Perimeter lighting provides both a real and psychological deterrent, and allows security personnel to maintain visual-assessment capability during darkness. Most of the airports we visited (9 of 13) lacked an intrusion detection system, which may consist of building alarms, CCTV monitoring, or both. TSA guidance states that such systems can replace the need for physical security personnel to patrol an entire facility or perimeter. Incidents of Unauthorized Access
According to airport officials, several incidents of unauthorized access have occurred within approximately the past 10 years at three of the airports we visited. One airport provided documentation detailing two incidents. The airport also did not implement any corrective actions in response to the incident in which a stolen aircraft was flown to Mexico. In written comments on our report, DHS generally concurred with the overall content and results of our report and indicated that TSA will work in partnership with the general aviation community to support their efforts to address the issues we identified. In addition, DHS stated that while most airports would readily implement the security measures recommended by TSA, they are unable to put additional security measures in place primarily because of a lack of funding. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what physical security measures selected airports with general aviation operations have to prevent unauthorized access, we performed on-site assessments at a nonrepresentative selection of 13 airports that exhibit at least two of the following characteristics that potentially affect an airport’s security posture under TSA guidelines: (1) airport is a public use airport, (2) airport location is within 30 nautical miles of a mass population center of at least 1 million people, (3) based aircraft over 12,500 pounds are located at the airport, (4) airport has at least one runway with a length of at least 5,000 feet, and (5) over 50,000 annual aircraft operations—takeoffs and landings—occur at the airport. Since TSA does not require the implementation of security measures for airports with only general aviation operations, our assessments are not meant to imply that any of the general aviation airports we visited have failed to implement required security measures. The results of our assessments cannot be projected to all general aviation airports nationwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
General aviation accounts for three-quarters of U.S. air traffic, from small propeller planes to large jets, operating among nearly 19,000 airports. While most security operations are left to private airport operators, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), provides guidance on threats and vulnerabilities. In 2004, TSA issued suggested security enhancements that airports could implement voluntarily. Unlike commercial airports, in most cases general aviation airports are not required to implement specific security measures. GAO was asked to perform onsite assessments at selected airports with general aviation operations to determine what physical security measures they have to prevent unauthorized access. With advance notice, GAO investigators overtly visited a nonrepresentative selection of 13 airports, based on TSA-determined risk factors. Three of the airports also serve commercial aviation and are therefore subject to TSA security regulations. Using TSA's voluntary recommendations and GAO investigators' security expertise, GAO determined whether certain security measures were in place. GAO also requested documentation of incidents of unauthorized access. Results of GAO's assessments cannot be projected to all general aviation airports and are not meant to imply that the airports failed to implement required security measures..
What GAO Found
The 13 airports GAO visited had multiple security measures in place to protect against unauthorized access, although the specific measures and potential vulnerabilities varied across the airports. The 3 airports also supporting commercial aviation had generally implemented all the security measures GAO assessed, whereas GAO identified potential vulnerabilities at most of the 10 general aviation airports that could allow unauthorized access to aircraft or airport grounds, facilities, or equipment. For example, 12 of the 13 airports had perimeter fencing or natural barriers as suggested by TSA; but at 6 of the airports fencing was partially bordered by bushes or trees or located next to a parking lot, which can obstruct surveillance or allow someone to scale or topple the fence. GAO found that none of the 10 general aviation airports had lighting along their perimeters. Perimeter lighting provides both a real and psychological deterrent, and allows security personnel to maintain visual assessment during darkness. However, officials at several airports stated that neighborhood street lights provided perimeter lighting, and all 13 airports had lighting around their hangars. The 10 general aviation airports' use of intrusion monitoring varied, with closed-circuit TV (CCTV) cameras and onsite law enforcement being more prevalent than an intrusion detection system, which can consist of multiple monitors including building alarms and CCTV. TSA guidance states that such systems can reduce or replace the need for physical security personnel to patrol an entire facility or perimeter. According to airport officials, several incidents of unauthorized access have occurred within approximately the past 10 years at three of the airports, though they were unable to provide documentation in all cases. Three incidents did not involve access to aircraft, but rather to airport grounds. In separate incidents, two airplanes were stolen or taken from one airport but later recovered. Airport officials informed GAO that they took corrective actions in response to these incidents as appropriate. DHS generally concurred with GAO's findings and indicated that TSA will work in partnership with the general aviation community to address vulnerabilities. DHS also noted that a lack of funding will be a challenge for most airports. GAO shared its findings with officials at the 13 airports it visited and incorporated their comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-09-715 | gao_GAO-09-715_0 | About one-half of all U.S. workers participate in some form of employer- sponsored retirement plan. Only under certain circumstances do federal regulations allow 401(k) plan sponsors to provide participants with access to their tax-deferred retirement savings before retirement. In addition, when separating from their employer, participants may elect to receive a lump- sum distribution of their account balance, or “cash out,” rather than to preserve the tax-deferred status of their accounts by rolling over their account into another qualified plan or IRA. Leakage Has Remained Relatively Steady, with Cashouts Having the Greatest Impact on Retirement Savings
Leakage Has Remained Relatively Steady, Even in the Poor Economy
Our estimates—based on SIPP data collected in 1998, 2003, and 2006— found no statistically significant differences in the overall incidence of leakage from 401(k) accounts in the data from the three SIPP panels that we analyzed, with approximately 15 percent of participants between ages 15 and 60 initiating at least one form of leakage. The overall incidence and amounts of leakage from loans and hardship withdrawals also remained steady through 2008, according to data that we obtained from selected major 401(k) administrators. Cashouts Can Have the Greatest Impact on Retirement Savings
Cashouts at job separation can have the greatest impact of the principal forms of leakage on an individual participant’s savings, according to the results of our analysis. However, few plans that we contacted had tools on their Web sites for participants to project the potential impact of cashouts, hardship withdrawals, and loans on their future retirement savings. Most Plans Informed Participants about the Short-term Costs of Leakage, but Few Informed Participants about the Long-term Implications
Almost all of the plans contacted told us that they sent a termination package to participants at job separation that outlined the available options for their account balance, but that these documents did not contain information on the long-term implications of choosing to take a cashout. Experts said that the provision requiring participants in 401(k) plans to exhaust their plan’s loan provisions before taking a hardship withdrawal had likely reduced leakage by promoting the use of loans that are generally repaid and returned to the plan. Experts Said That the Provision Requiring Suspension of Contributions May Exacerbate the Long-term Effects of Leakage
Experts noted that the statutory provision requiring a 6-month suspension of participant contributions following a hardship withdrawal may increase the amount of leakage by prohibiting those participants who can contribute to their 401(k) accounts from doing so. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to identify (1) the incidence, amount, and relative significance of the different forms of 401(k) leakage; (2) how 401(k) plans inform participants about hardship withdrawal provisions, loan provisions, and options at job separation, including the short-term and long-term costs associated with each; and (3) what is known about how various policies may affect the incidence of 401(k) leakage. To determine the recent prevalence of leakage, we analyzed summary data on the incidence and amount of hardship withdrawals and loans from 2005 through 2008 that we obtained from major 401(k) plan administrators, which represented about 22 million 401(k) participants and over $1 trillion in 401(k) plan assets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under federal regulations, 401(k) participants may tap into their accrued retirement savings before retirement under certain circumstances, including hardship. This "leakage" from 401(k) accounts can result in a permanent loss of retirement savings. GAO was asked to analyze (1) the incidence, amount, and relative significance of the different forms of 401(k) leakage; (2) how plans inform participants about hardship withdrawal provisions, loan provisions, and options at job separation, including the short- and long-term costs of each; and (3) how various policies may affect the incidence of leakage. To address these matters, GAO analyzed federal and 401(k) industry data and interviewed federal officials, pension experts, and plan administrators responsi- ble for managing the majority of 401(k) participants and assets.
What GAO Found
The incidence and amount of the principal forms of leakage from 401(k) plans--that is, cashouts of account balances at job separation that are not rolled over into another retirement account, hardship withdrawals, and loans--have remained relatively steady, with cashouts having the greatest ultimate impact on participants' retirement preparedness. Approximately 15 percent of participants initiated some form of leakage from their retirement plans, according to an analysis of U.S. Census Bureau survey data collected in 1998, 2003, and 2006. In addition, the incidence and amount of hardship withdrawals and loans changed little through 2008, according to data GAO received from selected major 401(k) plan administrators. Cashouts of 401(k) accounts at job separation can result in the largest amounts of leakage and the greatest proportional loss in retirement savings. Most plans that GAO contacted used plan documents, call centers, and Web sites to inform participants of the short-term costs associated with the various forms of leakage, such as the tax and associated penalties. However, few plans provided them with information on the long-term negative implications that leakage can have on their retirement savings, such as the loss of compounded interest and earnings on the withdrawn amount over the course of a participant's career. Experts that GAO contacted said that certain provisions had all likely reduced the overall incidence and amount of leakage, including those that imposed a 10 percent tax penalty on most withdrawals taken before age 59?, required participants to exhaust their plan's loan provisions before taking a hardship withdrawal, and required plan sponsors to preserve the tax-deferred status of accounts with balances of more than $1,000 at job separation. However, experts noted that a provision requiring plans to suspend contributions to participant accounts for 6 months following a hardship withdrawal may exac-erbate the long-term effect of leakage by barring otherwise able participants from contributing to their accounts. GAO also found that some plans are not following current hardship rules, which may result in unnecessary leakage. |
gao_HEHS-97-63 | gao_HEHS-97-63_0 | Likewise, long delays in processing exclusion referrals allow unacceptable providers to continue to provide services in federal health care programs. While these referrals remained unresolved, some providers received thousands of dollars from Medicare. These providers had withdrawn from Medicaid for serious quality-of-care problems. Thus, a provider could enroll in a state’s Medicaid program, after being excluded nationwide by the OIG, and not be detected. State Medicaid agencies, for instance, sometimes have difficulty determining whether OIG-excluded providers are enrolled or have attempted to enroll in their programs because identifying information about the providers on the exclusion list may be incomplete or different from the identifiers used in state data systems. The OIG believes that this action will substantially reduce the number of excluded licensed providers that continue to indirectly participate in federal health care programs in hospitals. One of these tools is a system of unique health identifiers for all health care providers, which the act requires HHS to establish. Moreover, certain factors could limit the data bank’s effectiveness. The OIG Is Taking Actions to Strengthen the Excluded Provider Process
OIG officials attributed many of the problems we found to resource cuts over the last several years. Headquarters officials plan to use some of this money to hire additional field office staff to process exclusion cases, they said. The process for excluding providers can and has operated successfully, with thousands of unacceptable providers excluded from Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs over the years. Interim actions are needed. Training that has been provided to current staff should help reduce inconsistencies among field offices and improve the quality of processing, and plans to hire additional staff should improve the timeliness of exclusion processing. Recommendations to the HHS Inspector General
We recommend that the HHS Inspector General improve oversight of key state agencies that refer cases to the OIG, such as the state Medicaid agency and MFCU, to ensure that states understand and comply with the statutory reporting requirements for state-removed providers; clarify to states that settlements and provider withdrawals to avoid formal sanctions should be reported to the OIG, in accordance with its regulations (42 C.F.R. We also interviewed officials at OIG headquarters and HCFA to determine their plans to establish an Adverse Action Data Bank and develop a unique health care identifier, as required by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Legal Basis for Excluding Providers Under the Social Security Act
1128(a)(1)1128(a)(2)
Conviction for patient abuse or neglect 1128(a)(3)
Felony conviction related to health care fraud 1128(a)(4)
Felony conviction related to controlled substances 1128(b)(1)
Misdemeanor conviction related to health care fraud 1128(b)(2)
Conviction for obstructing an investigation 1128(b)(3)
Misdemeanor conviction related to controlled substances 1128(b)(4) 1128(b)(5)
Suspension or exclusion under a federal or state health care program 1128(b)(6)
Excessive claims or furnishing of unnecessary or substandard items and services 1128(b)(7)
Fraud, kickbacks, and related activities 1128(b)(8)
Entities owned or controlled by a sanctioned individual 1128(b)(9)
Failure to disclose required information 1128(b)(10)
Failure to supply requested information on subcontractors and suppliers 1128(b)(11)
Failure to provide payment information 1128(b)(12)
Failure to grant immediate access 1128(b)(13)
Failure to take corrective action 1128(b)(14)
Default on health education loan or scholarship obligations 1128(b)(15)
Individuals controlling an excluded entity 1128A(a)
Imposition of a civil money penalty or assessment 1156(b)
Mandatory exclusion provisions. OIG Process: Problems With State Exclusion Referrals
Several examples of (1) cases for which the OIG had no record of state exclusion referrals when we initially inquired and (2) delays in OIG processing of state exclusion referrals (discussed on pp. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General's (OIG) process for excluding providers from federal health care programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the years, the OIG, working with state agencies, has excluded thousands of providers from participating in federal health care programs because of health care fraud, abuse, or quality-of-care problems, thus helping to protect the financial integrity of those programs and decreasing the likelihood that program beneficiaries receive substandard care; (2) several weaknesses in this exclusion process allow many unacceptable providers to remain on the rolls of federal health programs; (3) the weaknesses GAO identified include: (a) lack of controls at OIG field offices to ensure that all state referrals received are reviewed and acted on promptly; (b) inconsistencies among OIG field offices as to the criteria for excluding providers; (c) lack of oversight to ensure that states make appropriate exclusion referrals to the OIG; and (d) problems states experience in attempting to identify and remove from their programs providers that appear on the OIG's exclusion list; (4) these weaknesses place the health and safety of beneficiaries at risk and compromise the financial integrity of Medicaid; (5) moreover, difficulties states experienced in using OIG exclusion data allowed some providers to continue to be enrolled in a state Medicaid program after they had been excluded nationwide by the OIG; (6) OIG officials attributed many of these problems to repeated cutbacks in resources occurring in the past several years; (7) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, however, addresses this concern by providing the OIG with extra funding, specifically for dealing with health care fraud; (8) some of this funding, officials said, will be used to hire additional staff to process exclusion referrals; (9) the act also includes tools and resources to facilitate identifying unacceptable providers; (10) these tools include a system of unique billing numbers for health care providers, to be developed to reduce the potential for inappropriate payments, and an adverse action data bank, to be established to record information on any adverse action taken against a health care provider; (11) when implemented, these tools should help to limit the number of providers excluded from one program that continue to participate in others; (12) in the interim, the HHS Inspector General has initiated actions to improve the effectiveness of the exclusion process; and (13) while these efforts are significant, GAO believes further refinements are necessary to improve the exclusion process. |
gao_GAO-08-53 | gao_GAO-08-53_0 | IT Investment Management Is Critical to Achieving Successful Systems Modernization
A corporate approach to IT investment management is characteristic of successful public and private organizations. Department of the Navy Has Not Yet Established the Management Structures Needed to Effectively Manage Business System Investments and Has Not Fully Defined Many of the Related Policies and Procedures
Although DOD relies on its components to execute investment management policies and procedures, the Department of the Navy has not yet established the management structures needed to effectively manage its business system investments or fully developed many of the related policies and procedures outlined in our ITIM framework. Relative to its business system investments, the department has implemented two of the nine key practices that call for project-level management structures, policies, and procedures and none of the five key practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. Department officials stated that they are currently working on guidance to address these weaknesses. Until the department establishes the necessary management structure and fully defines policies and procedures for both individual projects and the portfolios of projects, it risks not being able to select and control these business system investments in a consistent and complete manner, which in turn reduces the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most effective manner. ITIM Stage 2 critical processes include (1) defining investment board operations, (2) identifying the business needs for each investment, (3) developing a basic process for selecting new proposals and reselecting ongoing investments, (4) developing project-level investment control processes, and (5) collecting information about existing investments to inform investment management decisions. According to department officials, they are aware of the absence of documented policies and procedures in certain areas of project-level management, and plan to issue new policies and procedures addressing these areas by March 2008. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the Department of the Navy’s business system investment management capability and address the weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that well-defined and disciplined business system investment management policies and procedures are developed and issued. Analyzing, selecting, and maintaining business system investment portfolios. Our analysis was based on the best practices contained in GAO’s Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) framework and the framework’s associated evaluation methodology, and focused on the department’s establishment of policies and procedures for business system investments needed to assist organizations in complying with the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Stages 2 and 3). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high-risk," and continues to do so today. In 2004, Congress passed legislation reflecting prior GAO recommendations that DOD adopt a corporate approach to information technology (IT) business systems investment management, including tiered accountability for business systems at the department and component levels. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's efforts, GAO assessed whether the investment management approach of one of DOD's components--the Department of the Navy--is consistent with leading investment management best practices. In doing so, GAO applied its IT Investment Management (ITIM) framework and associated methodology, focusing on the stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Navy has yet to establish the management structures needed to effectively manage its business systems investments or to fully develop many of the related policies and procedures outlined in GAO's ITIM framework. The department has implemented two of the nine key practices that call for project-level management structures, policies, and procedures, and none of the five practices that call for portfolio-level policies and procedures. Specifically, it has developed procedures for identifying and collecting information about its business systems to support investment selection and control, and assigned responsibility for ensuring that the information collected during project identification meets the needs of the investment management process. However, the department has not established the management structures needed to support effective investment oversight. It also has not fully documented business system investment policies and procedures for directing Investment Review Board operations, selecting new investments, reselecting ongoing investments, integrating the investment funding and investment selection processes, and developing and maintaining complete business system investment portfolio(s). Department officials stated that they are aware of the lack of an Investment Review Board and the absence of documented policies and procedures in certain areas of project and portfolio-level management, and are currently working on new guidance to address these areas. According to these officials, the new policies and procedures are expected to be approved by March 2008. However, until the department assigns responsibility for overseeing project-level management and portfolio management to a departmentwide review board and fully defines policies and procedures for both individual projects and portfolios of projects, it risks selecting and controlling these business system investments in a way that is inconsistent, incomplete, and ad hoc, which in turn reduces the chances that these investments will meet mission needs in the most effective manner. |
gao_GAO-04-221T | gao_GAO-04-221T_0 | Johnston Atoll has missed its schedule milestone for shutting down the facility (closure phase). Table 1 shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss 2001 schedule milestones. Environmental permitting. Funding. As of October 2003, according to preliminary estimates from FEMA, unfunded CSEPP requirements for all sites are expected to amount to $39.4 million and $49.0 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, respectively. The Chem-Demil Program has faced continued delays with the program largely because DOD and the Army have not yet developed a risk management approach to proactively anticipate and address potential problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. As a result, DOD’s total program cost estimate grew from $15 billion to $24 billion between 1998 and 2001. Program officials told us that they estimate new costs had increased by $1.4 billion as of October 2003, and this estimate is likely to rise further as additional factors are considered. Since reaching the 2002 deadline to destroy 20 percent of the stockpile in July 2001, the Chem-Demil Program has been able to destroy only an additional 3 percent of the stockpile. In order to meet the April 2004 CWC deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile, the program would have to eliminate an additional 22 percent of the stockpile within the next 6 months. According to current destruction schedules, the United States will not meet the 2007 deadline to eliminate 100 percent of the stockpile. As a result, the United States will likely have to ask for an extension of the 2007 deadline to complete the destruction of the entire stockpile. Unless the program fixes the problems that are causing schedule delays, the United States also risks not meeting this deadline, if extended to 2012. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program’s complex structure, with many lines of authority, has left roles and responsibilities unclear. Finally, the program lacks an overarching, comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and monitor performance. Program Lacks Strategy and Implementation Plan
While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide the program and monitor its progress. Emergency Preparedness Program Is Improving, but Costs Are Rising
Since our 2001 report, the Army and FEMA have assisted state and local communities to become better prepared to respond to chemical emergencies. In our August 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA (1) provide technical assistance, guidance, and leadership to the three states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) with long-standing emergency preparedness issues to resolve their concerns; (2) provide all states and their communities with training and assistance in preparing budget and life-cycle cost estimates and provide guidance and plans on reentry; and (3) establish specific measures of compliance with the benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its inception in 1985,the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil) Program has been charged with destroying the nation's large chemical weapons stockpile. After years of planning and building new facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. As of October 2003, the program had destroyed 26 percent of the 31,500-ton agent stockpile, and its total estimated cost to destroy the entire stockpile is more than $25 billion. This testimony summarizes GAO's September 2003 report and addresses the following issues: (1) the status of schedule milestones and cost estimates, (2) the impact of the current schedule on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated with managing the program, and (4) the status of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
What GAO Found
The Chem-Demil Program faces schedule delays and higher costs, but it has improved emergency preparedness in communities near the sites. In 2001, the Chem-Demil Program extended its schedule milestones and increased its cost estimates from $15 billion to about $24 billion. Since then nearly all sites have experienced delays,stemming from problems such as: plant safety issues,environmental requirements, approving emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. The program needs a risk management plan to mitigate problems affecting program schedules, costs, and safety. Program officials say the delays have raised the cost estimates by an additional $1.4 billion, to more than $25 billion as of September 2003. Based on current schedule slippages, GAO believes that costs will grow higher and further delays will occur. Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC's April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile and it risks not meeting the original 2007 deadline to complete destruction of the entire stockpile. Unless the program fixes the problems causing delays,the United States also risks not meeting CWC's deadline of 2012, if extended. The program has suffered from several long-standing management and organizational issues. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program's complex structure, with multiple lines of authority, has left roles and responsibilities unclear. It does not have an overarching, comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and monitor its performance. The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have helped state and local communities become better prepared to respond to chemical emergencies. Despite these gains, CSEPP costs are rising because some states have expanded their preparedness requests beyond the approved budgets. These requests amount to $88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. |
gao_GAO-12-279T | gao_GAO-12-279T_0 | Summary of Science- Related Recovery Act Funding
Of the four agencies that received over $40 billion in funding for science- related activities under the Recovery Act, DOE received the largest amount of funds. The LGP, which guarantees loans for energy projects that (1) use either new or significantly improved technologies as compared with commercial technologies already in use in the United States and (2) avoid, reduce, or sequester emissions of air pollutants or man-made greenhouse gases. The Weatherization Assistance Program, which enables low-income families to reduce their utility bills by making long-term energy- efficiency improvements to their homes by, for example, installing insulation, sealing leaks, and modernizing heating or air conditioning equipment. Table 3 shows Recovery Act funding, obligations, and expenditures for these DOE programs as of September 30, 2011. According to our analysis of DOE data, as of September 30, 2011, DOE’s LGP had obligated about 78 percent of the remaining $2.5 billion in Recovery Act funds, leaving $552 million unobligated. Consequently, we reported that DOE’s program management could improve its ability to evaluate and implement the LGP by implementing the following four recommendations: (1) develop relevant performance goals that reflect the full range of policy goals and activities for the program, and to the extent necessary, revise the performance measures to align with these goals; (2) revise the process for issuing loan guarantees to clearly establish what circumstances warrant disparate treatment of applicants; (3) develop an administrative appeal process for applicants who believe their applications were rejected in error and document the basis for conclusions regarding appeals; and (4) develop a mechanism to systematically obtain and address feedback from program applicants and, in so doing, ensure that applicants’ anonymity can be maintained. we found that although weatherizing multifamily In our May 2010 report, we made eight recommendations to DOE to clarify its weatherization guidance and production targets. DOE has issued several guidance documents addressing multi-family buildings that, among other things, provide guidance on conducting energy audits on multi-family units. In response to our recommendation, DOE issued guidance that clarified the definition of income and strengthened income eligibility requirements. We expect to issue a report on the use of Recovery Act funds for the Weatherization Assistance Program and the extent to which program recipients are meeting Recovery Act and program goals, such as job creation and energy and cost savings, as well as the status of DOE’s response to our May 2010 recommendations by early 2012. Commerce
Of the over $1.4 billion Commerce received under the Recovery Act for science-related projects and activities, Commerce reported that it had obligated nearly all of it (98 percent) and spent $894 million (62 percent) as of September 30, 2011. As part of our February 2010 report,Recovery Act grants from Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology had to delay or recast certain scheduled engineering or construction-related activities to fully understand, assess, and comply with the Recovery Act reporting and other requirements. we found that some recipients of Of the $1 billion NASA received under the Recovery Act for science- related projects and activities, NASA reported that it had obligated nearly $1 billion (100 percent) and spent $948 million (95 percent) as of September 30, 2011. In a March 2009 report, we found that NASA large-scale projects had experienced significant cost and schedule growth, but the agency had undertaken an array of initiatives aimed at improving program management, cost estimating, and contractor oversight. In our most recent update of that report, we found that, although cost and schedule growth remained an issue, Recovery Act funding enabled NASA to mitigate the impact of cost increases being experienced on some projects and to address problems being experienced by other projects. we reviewed NASA’s, as well as other Of the $3 billion it received under the Recovery Act for projects and activities, NSF reported that it had obligated nearly all of the $3 billion (almost 100 percent) and spent $1.4 billion (46 percent) as of September 30, 2011. This program, along with 24 new programs and 20 existing programs, was funded to increase federal investment in basic scientific research and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education in the United States. We also found that NSF was taking steps to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of their funded projects. GAO-11-804. GAO-11-239SP. GAO-10-627. Recovery Act: States’ and Localities’ Uses of Funds and Actions Needed to Address Implementation Challenges and Bolster Accountability. GAO-10-604. GAO-10-383. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: GAO’s Role in Helping to Ensure Accountability and Transparency for Science Funding. GAO-09-515T. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) is intended to preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery, among other things. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2011 that the Recovery Act would cost $840 billion, including more than $40 billion in science-related activities at the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). These activities support fundamental research, demonstrate and deploy advanced energy technologies, purchase scientific instrumentation and equipment, and construct or modernize research facilities. The Recovery Act assigned GAO with a range of responsibilities, such as bimonthly reviews of how selected states and localities used funds, including for science-related activities. This statement updates the status of science-related Recovery Act funding for DOE, Commerce, NASA, and NSF and provides the status of prior recommendations from GAO's Recovery Act reports. This testimony is based on prior GAO work updated with agency data as of September 30, 2011.
What GAO Found
As of September 30, 2011, DOE, Commerce, NSF, and NASA had obligated about 98 percent of the more than $40 billion appropriated for science-related activities identified at those agencies. They had spent $22 billion, or 54 percent of appropriated funds. DOE received the majority of this funding, and the four agencies vary in the amount of Recovery Act funds they have obligated and spent for their programs, as well as the challenges they have faced in implementing the Recovery Act. For example: 1) Loan Guarantee Program for Innovative Technologies. As of September 30, 2011, DOE had obligated about 78 percent of the nearly $2.5 billion provided for this program, which among other things guarantees loans for projects using new or significantly improved technologies as compared with commercial technologies already in use in the United States and reported spending about 15 percent of those funds. In a July 2010 report (GAO-10-627), GAO made four recommendations for DOE to improve its evaluation and implementation of the program. DOE has begun to take steps to address our recommendations but has not fully addressed them, and GAO continues to believe DOE needs to make improvements to the program. 2) Weatherization Assistance Program. As of September 30, 2011, DOE had obligated the full $5 billion of Recovery Act funding provided for the Weatherization Assistance Program, which enables low-income families to reduce their utility bills by making long-term energy-efficiency improvements to their homes, and reported spending about 72 percent of those funds. In a May 2010 report (GAO-10-604), GAO made eight recommendations to DOE to clarify guidance and production targets. To date, DOE has implemented two of those recommendations: (1) it issued guidance on multi-family buildings and (2) clarified the definition of income and strengthened income eligibility requirements. 3) Commerce, NASA, and NSF. As of September 30, 2011, Commerce, NASA, and NSF each had obligated nearly all of their science-related Recovery Act funding. Commerce spent about 62 percent, NASA spent about 95 percent, and NSF spent about 46 percent of this funding. GAO has reported several times on the use of these funds and the challenges agencies faced. In a February 2010 report (GAO-10-383), GAO found that some recipients of Commerce's Recovery Act grants faced challenges complying with Recovery Act reporting and other federal requirements and had to delay or recast certain scheduled activities as a result. In a March 2009 report (GAO-09-306SP), GAO found that NASA's large-scale projects, including those that received Recovery Act funds, had experienced significant cost and schedule delays. In a March 2011 report, (GAO-11-239SP), GAO found that Recovery Act funds allowed NASA to reduce the impact of cost increases on some projects and to address problems being experienced by others. In GAO's October 2010 report (GAO-11-127R), it found that NSF's program to increase investment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education took steps to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of its projects and developed goals and metrics for that evaluation. |
gao_GAO-10-509T | gao_GAO-10-509T_0 | Background
Section 861 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008) directed the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lack of Information on Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements and Associated Personnel Can Hinder Agencies’ Management and Oversight
DOD, State, and USAID’s significant reliance on contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and their associated personnel makes it critical that agency officials have accurate and reliable information to inform decision making and properly oversee work being performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have reported extensively on the management and oversight challenges of using contracts and grants to help agencies carry out their missions during contingency operations. As our prior work has shown, the agencies’ lack of complete and accurate information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk: Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively agencies rely on them to support operations and carry out missions. For example, we reported in November 2009 that without insight into services provided by contractors as part of the drawdown in Iraq, DOD planners may lack information necessary to efficiently allocate contracted services to support the remaining U.S. forces as the drawdown progresses. We determined this impaired USAID’s ability to make informed decisions on resource allocations for the strategy. In particular, by not having a centralized, interagency database of all ongoing projects in Afghanistan, the U.S. government may not be in a position to fully leverage the resources available and risks duplicating reconstruction efforts. These officials indicated SPOT has the potential to bring some of this dispersed information together so it can be used to better manage and oversee contractors. SPOT may offer the same potential for managing grants and cooperative agreements since data on them and their associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan are similarly dispersed. Though SPOT Implementation Continues, Challenges Remain in Tracking Personnel and Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements
DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing SPOT, but as we reported in October 2009, the agencies’ ongoing implementation of SPOT falls short of providing information that would help facilitate oversight and inform decision making as well as fulfill statutory requirements. Specifically, we found the criteria for deciding which contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan are entered into the system varied and as a result, not all required personnel have been entered. Because of SPOT’s limitations, the agencies have relied on other sources, such as periodic surveys, for information on contractor personnel, including those that were killed or wounded, but we have found these sources to be unreliable as well. Although our prior findings are specific to tracking contracts they point to challenges the agencies may face as they use SPOT to track similar information on grants, cooperative agreements, and the personnel working on them. Specifically, DOD, State, and USAID officials stated the primary factor, particularly in Iraq, for deciding which contractor personnel were entered into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-generated letter of authorization (LOA). As the three agencies continue to implement SPOT for personnel working on grants and cooperative agreements, our ongoing work to date indicates that they will experience challenges similar to those with contractor personnel, such as ensuring consistent criteria for whom to enter and accounting for local nationals. Tracking Information on Contracts, Grants and Cooperative Agreements with Performance in Iraq and Afghanistan
Although the agencies are entering information on contracts into SPOT, the system continues to lack the capability to accurately import and track the contract data elements as agreed to in the MOU. Therefore, the agencies will need to determine how the information from multiple databases is to be entered or linked to SPOT. Specifically, we recommended ensuring the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008 and with the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel; revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information needs; and establishing uniform requirements on how to enter contract numbers into SPOT so contract information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU. DOD, State, and USAID agreed that coordination among the three agencies is important, but DOD and State disagreed that they needed a plan to address the issues we identified. In developing this plan, each agency should further consider its respective information needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement recipients to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This reliance increases the importance of agencies having reliable data to inform decision-making and oversee the work performed. To help increase oversight of activities supporting DOD, State, and USAID's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended, required the agencies to identify common databases of information on their contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel. In their July 2008 memorandum of understanding (MOU), the three agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required information. GAO's testimony addresses (1) how a lack of information hinders agencies' management and oversight of contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel, (2) the status of the agencies' continued efforts to implement SPOT, and (3) GAO's prior recommendation to improve SPOT's implementation. It is drawn primarily from GAO's prior work on contracting in contingency operations.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported extensively on the need for agencies to have reliable information to manage and oversee work being performed to address challenges related to using contracts and grants. The lack of such information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk. For example, GAO reported last year that by not having insight into contractor provided services, DOD may lack needed information to efficiently allocate contracted services to support remaining U.S. forces in Iraq. GAO also previously determined that by not considering contractor and grantee resources in developing an Afghan assistance strategy, USAID's ability to make resource allocation decisions was impaired. Many of GAO's prior recommendations on contractors supporting contingency operations focused on increasing agencies' ability to track contracts and contractor personnel. Agency officials have indicated that SPOT has the potential of consolidating dispersed information to help them better manage and oversee contractors. SPOT may offer the same potential for grants and cooperative agreements as information on them and their personnel are similarly dispersed. Although the agencies have made progress in implementing SPOT, the database falls short of providing information to facilitate oversight and fulfill statutory requirements. GAO reported in October 2009 that the criteria used to determine which personnel are entered into SPOT varied and not all personnel were being entered as required. In particular, the agencies cited the need for a SPOT-generated letter of authorization as the primary factor for deciding whether personnel were entered, but not all personnel, particularly local nationals, need this authorization. As a result, officials from the three agencies acknowledge that SPOT data are incomplete, with some questioning the need for detailed data on all contractors. Because of SPOT's limitations, the agencies have relied on other sources, such as periodic surveys, for data on contractor personnel, but we have found these sources to be unreliable. Although contract information is being entered into SPOT, the system continues to lack the capability to accurately import information from other sources as agreed to in the MOU. For example, because SPOT does not require users to enter contract information in a standardized manner, our work has shown that there will be challenges in identifying which contracts' dollar values and competition information should be imported. While our prior findings are specific to contracts and their personnel, together with our ongoing work they point to challenges the agencies will face in using SPOT to track similar data on grants, cooperative agreements, and their personnel. Last year GAO recommended that the agencies develop a plan for addressing the shortcomings identified in SPOT's implementation. While the agencies agreed coordination is important, they disagreed with the need for a plan. GAO continues to believe that a plan with timeframes that provides consistent criteria and standards is necessary for ensuring that SPOT meets statutory requirements and helping the agencies identify their information needs to manage and oversee contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. |
gao_RCED-98-9 | gao_RCED-98-9_0 | Another update of the guide is forthcoming. In contrast to the current guide, which relied heavily on an empirical approach to derive its design equations, the NCHRP contract to update the guide by 2002 calls for the use of an approach that would more realistically characterize existing highway pavement usage and improve the reliability of designs. An Existing Pavement Design and Analysis Method Has the Potential to Improve Highways and Is Being Used by Others
An existing method called nonlinear 3D-FEM has the potential to significantly improve the design and analysis of highway pavement structures. Nonlinear 3D-FEM is considered by many experts to be superior to current design and analysis methods because values of stresses, strains, and pavement deflections can be calculated accurately from a variety of traffic loads—static, impact, vibratory, and moving mixes of traffic loads, including multiaxle truck/trailer loads both within and outside legal weight limits. A chief engineer of the Ohio Transportation Department further told us that the state was pleased with Battelle’s efforts to predict pavement response using the nonlinear method. Conclusions
The pavement design guide developed and updated by AASHTO over the years for designing and analyzing highway pavement structures is outdated. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to (1) describe the roles of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and others in developing and updating the pavement design guide and (2) examine the use and potential of a computer analysis method known as the nonlinear 3 Dimensional-Finite Element Method (3D-FEM) for improving the design and analysis of highway pavements. To accomplish these objectives, we first reviewed the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) highway pavement guide, which is being used by many state departments of transportation as an aid in designing and analyzing pavement structures, federally funded and otherwise. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the: (1) roles of the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) and others in developing and updating the pavement design guide; and (2) use and potential of a computer analysis method known as nonlinear 3 Dimensional-Finite Element Method (3D-FEM) for improving the design and analysis of highway pavement structures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FHwA has worked cooperatively with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) in developing and updating the pavement design guide; (2) the current guide is slated to be updated by the year 2002 to better reflect the changing priority of rehabilitating the nation's highways rather than building new ones; (3) in contrast to the current guide, that many transportation experts believe is outdated, the new guide is expected to incorporate the use of analytical methods to predict pavement performance under various loading and climatic conditions; (4) sponsors believe that a new design approach will more realistically characterize existing highway pavements and improve the reliability of designs; (5) a promising analytical method to accurately predict pavement response is the nonlinear 3D-FEM; (6) only with accurate response data can one reliably predict pavement performance; (7) the use of this method has the potential to improve the design of highway pavements, which encompasses highway safety, durability, and cost-effectiveness, because values of stresses, strains, and deflections (pavement response) can be calculated accurately from a variety of static, impact, vibratory, and moving mixes in traffic loads; (8) several state departments of transportation, academicians, and scientists have pioneered the use of the nonlinear 3D-FEM and are using it to solve a variety of complex structural engineering problems, including the design and analysis of highway pavement structures; and (9) while this is a promising method for improving highway pavement design and analysis, GAO could find no evidence that it is being considered for inclusion in the current design guide update. |
gao_HEHS-96-20 | gao_HEHS-96-20_0 | Currently, the Medicare program reimburses only for care provided in health maintenance organizations (HMO) and by the fee-for-service sector. Concerned about ensuring quality in managed care plans that have not participated in Medicare, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means requested that GAO (1) discuss the present and future strategies of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), which administers the Medicare program, to ensure that Medicare providers furnish quality health care, in both fee-for-service and HMO arrangements and (2) obtain experts’ views on desirable attributes of a quality assurance strategy if more managed care options are made available to Medicare beneficiaries. Encourage continuous quality improvement. Make information about providers available to beneficiaries and others in a useful and understandable way. HCFA plans to modify its quality assurance strategies to emphasize outcomes and improvement in the quality of care. Ultimately, the agency has the authority to suspend Medicare payment to substandard providers. Until recently, these strategies were based on a regulatory approach—setting minimum standards for health care organizations and implementing systems to identify and discipline substandard providers. The Medicare Provider Certification Program, in existence since Medicare’s inception in 1965, is directed at ensuring that fee-for-service institutional health care providers serving Medicare beneficiaries meet minimum health and safety requirements. This program was established to ensure that HMOs with contracts to serve Medicare beneficiaries meet minimum financial and structural standards. Inadequate Enforcement of Medicare HMO Quality Assurance Requirements
We have criticized HCFA for failing to aggressively enforce Medicare quality assurance requirements for HMOs. The Medicare Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program
HCFA’s medical record review strategy, implemented through the Medicare PRO program, was designed to identify providers whose care does not meet recognized medical standards. HCFA’s new strategy, called the Health Care Quality Improvement Program, is founded on the premise that HCFA should try to buy the best care possible for Medicare beneficiaries and is generally consistent with many of the elements of appropriate quality assurance strategies cited by the health care experts we interviewed. The strategy should use many measures to evaluate care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) efforts to enhance the quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries, focusing on: (1) the strategies to ensure that Medicare providers furnish quality health care, in both fee-for-service providers and health maintenance organizations (HMO); and (2) experts' views on desirable attributes of a quality assurance strategy if more managed care options are made available to Medicare beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) HCFA monitors the quality of care in the Medicare program and has the authority to require corrective action or withhold Medicare payments from substandard providers; (2) Medicare's quality assurance strategies include setting minimum standards for health care organizations and implementing systems to identify and discipline substandard fee-for-service providers and HMO; (3) the Medicare Provider Certification Program ensures that fee-for-service institutional health care providers serving Medicare beneficiaries meet minimum health and safety standards; (4) the Medicare HMO Qualification Program ensures that HMO with contracts to serve Medicare beneficiaries meet minimum financial and structural standards; (5) HCFA has failed to enforce Medicare quality assurance requirements for HMO; (6) the HCFA medical record review strategy, implemented through the Medicare Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program, identifies providers whose care does not meet recognized medical standards; (7) the new HCFA quality assurance strategy, called the Health Care Quality Improvement Program, tries to buy the best care possible for Medicare beneficiaries and reflects state-of-the-art quality assurance practices; (8) experts believe that programs designed to ensure quality care provided to Medicare beneficiaries through a variety of managed care arrangements should build on existing efforts, use many measures to evaluate care, encourage continuous quality improvement, and make information about providers available; and (9) the dubious nature of previous quality assurance implementation efforts raises concern about its ability to implement its new quality assurance strategy. |
gao_GAO-16-424 | gao_GAO-16-424_0 | In 1990, the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act amended the Housing Act of 1959 and created separate programs: (1) the Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly program to support affordable housing for very low-income elderly persons and (2) the Section 811 program for very low-income persons with disabilities. Section 202 and Section 811 sponsors are not required to repay the capital advance as long as they continue to make supportive housing affordable to eligible households for 40 years. Although Congress continues to appropriate funds for rental assistance for existing Section 202 and Section 811 units, these appropriations also declined from 2011 to 2013. HUD Allocated Capital Advances to Its Regional Offices Based on Relative Regional Housing Needs
Until fiscal year 2012, when funding for new units ceased, HUD used a two-phase process to allocate and award Section 202 and Section 811 capital advances (see fig. First, HUD headquarters allocated the total amount of appropriated funds for capital advances to each of the 18 Hubs (which in this report we refer to as regional offices) based on a funding formula, which accounted for regional housing needs and cost characteristics. Second, applicants submitted applications online and staff from the applicable regional office evaluated applications using a technical review and a point system and awarded capital advances to the highest-scoring applicants. While our discussion of funding below analyzes the number of capital advances and the amount by state, award determinations were based on applications received in each regional office. According to HUD officials, in fiscal year 2010, HUD implemented changes in the way it distributed capital advances among the regional offices to better target resources for the Section 202 program. At that time, each local program office received a minimum set-aside for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. However, in the combined fiscal year 2010/2011 capital advance competition, HUD did not subdivide the funds to local offices and discontinued the minimum set-aside of 20 units in metropolitan and 5 units in nonmetropolitan areas in order to fund properties at a higher level. HUD Regional Offices Scored Applicants for Section 202 and Section 811 Capital Advances in a Competitive Process
Both Section 202 and Section 811 followed a similar competitive process for awarding capital advances. Most but Not All States Had Applicants That Received Capital Advances during Fiscal Years 2008 through 2011
From fiscal years 2008 through 2011, most states had at least one Section 202 applicant that received capital advance award dollars. Total capital advance amounts awarded varied across states for the Section 202 program (see fig. From fiscal years 2008 through 2011, three states received total capital advances of $75 million or more. Since applications were only maintained for 3 years, HUD officials were not able to tell us why a specific application did not receive funding, but they identified possible reasons why applicants may not have received funding during this period. Specifically, HUD officials noted that applications that were submitted may have been ineligible; applications may have failed to meet the minimum point threshold for selection; or higher-scoring applications from other states may have been selected instead. HUD officials said that sponsors in these states did not receive capital advances for reasons similar to those for the Section 202 program. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a copy of this report to HUD for its review. Appendix I: Number and Amount of Section 202 and Section 811 Capital Advance Awards, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2011
Tables 4 through 7 show the number of Section 202 and Section 811 capital advance awards and the total dollar amounts by state (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) from fiscal years 2008 through 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 151,000 very low-income elderly and disabled households rely on the Section 202 and the Section 811 programs to provide affordable rents and housing with supportive services. Before fiscal year 2012, nonprofit organizations interested in developing units for these populations could apply to HUD for grants known as capital advances, which did not have to be repaid as long as the property continued to serve these populations for 40 years. Since fiscal year 2012, Congress has not appropriated any funding for capital advances for either program, although it has continued to fund rental assistance for existing developments.
The House report accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to provide information on HUD capital advances for the Section 202 and Section 811 programs from 2008–2013.
This report examines (1) how HUD determined the capital advance amounts awarded to sponsors for Section 202 and Section 811 and (2) the number of capital advance awards and amounts by state from fiscal years 2008–2011 and any changes in the distribution of capital advances over that period. GAO reviewed budget documents and funding announcements and interviewed agency officials.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft to HUD for its review and received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Until program funding for new development ceased in fiscal year 2012, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) used a two-phase process to allocate and award capital advances for Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly (Section 202) and Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities (Section 811). First, HUD headquarters allocated the amount of appropriated funds for capital advances to each of the 18 regional offices using a funding formula, which accounted for regional housing needs and cost characteristics. Funding was further divided among 52 local offices using a set-aside formula and was also split between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas for Section 202. In 2010, HUD eliminated the set-aside which had guaranteed a minimum amount of funding for each local field office. The process for making capital advance awards did not change, but HUD was better able fund properties at a higher level. Second, applicants submitted applications to the applicable HUD regional office, and staff from these offices evaluated and scored applications based on various criteria, including capacity to provide housing and ability to secure funding from other sources. Applicants in each regional office were ranked highest to lowest and funded in that order. Any residual funds that were not sufficient to fund the next project in rank order were pooled nationwide and HUD headquarters used a national ranking to fund additional projects.
Most but not all states (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) had applicants that received capital advances for Section 202 and Section 811 in fiscal years 2008 through 2011. GAO found that some states had applicants that received capital advances in each of the years reviewed, while other states did not. In the period reviewed, four states had no applicants that received Section 202 capital advance awards, and eight states had no applicants that received Section 811 capital advance awards. HUD officials cited several reasons applicants from some states may not have received funding during this period, including applications that were submitted may have been ineligible or higher-scoring applications from other states may have been selected instead. The capital advance amounts varied. For Section 202, total capital advance amounts for fiscal years 2008-2011 for states that received at least one award ranged from less than $24 million to more than $75 million. For Section 811, total capital advance amounts for fiscal years 2008-2011 for states that received at least one capital advance award ranged from less than $4 million to more than $15 million. |
gao_NSIAD-98-47 | gao_NSIAD-98-47_0 | DOD Continues to Use Inefficient and Ineffective Management Techniques for Hardware Items
DOD continues to use outdated and inefficient business practices to manage its hardware inventory. For example, DOD buys inventory years in advance of when the items are actually used. Based on our analyses of DLA records, 62 percent of DLA’s hardware items did not have a demand from September 1995 to August 1996 (see fig. 1). We found an additional 21 percent of DLA’s hardware items had enough inventory on hand to last for more than 2 years based on demands during the same period. These items accounted for about $4.4 billion, or 77 percent, of DLA’s $5.7 billion hardware inventory. Despite this large investment in inventory, DOD’s supply system frequently does not meet the needs of its customers. When hardware items are not immediately available to mechanics, the repair of weapon systems and their components is delayed, which increases repair times. For example, the Navy calculates that the lack of parts increases the repair time for aviation parts by as much as 74 percent. In general, these concepts provide inventory users with a capability to order supplies as they are needed and then receive those items within hours after an order is placed. Ordering supplies only as they are needed, combined with quick logistics response times, enable companies to reduce or eliminate the possibility of inventory spoilage or obsolescence and reduce overall supply system costs. DOD Could Build on Efforts to Use Best Practices for Hardware Items
To its credit, DLA has tried new inventory practices for managing hardware items. To achieve greater inventory reductions, infrastructure savings, and improved customer service that we have seen in the private sector, we believe DOD needs to expand its use of private sector inventory practices, such as prime vendors and integrated suppliers, and use the full range of services offered under these programs. 5). DOD Has Applied a Limited Form of the Prime Vendor Concept to Hardware Items
In fiscal year 1997, DOD began using a prime vendor concept, called the Virtual Prime Vendor program, for hardware supplies on a limited basis. We estimate that DOD’s programs, when implemented, will apply to about 2 percent of DLA’s $3.1 billion annual sales of hardware items. DOD personnel still order, receive, store, and distribute material to the end users. Recommendations
To encourage DLA and the services to more aggressively apply best practices to its operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: Identify a “Champion of Change” within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that would be responsible for coordinating and overseeing improvement initiatives throughout DOD’s operations and ensuring the prime vendor and integrated supplier concepts (1) encompass a broader part of DOD’s operations, (2) fully use the services offered in the private sector, and (3) are used by all military services whenever it is cost effective to do so. GAO Comment
1. Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress in Using Best Practices to Achieve Substantial Savings (GAO/NSIAD-95-142, Aug. 4, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in adopting inventory management practices for hardware items, focusing on: (1) DOD and private-sector practices for managing hardware items; (2) whether DOD has adopted best practices for these items; and (3) opportunities that DOD can take advantage of to improve its management of hardware items.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while DOD has implemented some innovative management practices, more opportunities exist to better manage its reported $5.7-billion hardware inventory and achieve substantial savings; (2) DOD continues to manage its hardware inventory using outdated and inefficient business practices that create unnecessary inventory levels, provide poor customer service, generate excess and obsolete inventory, and cost approximately $1 billion per year to manage and distribute; (3) DOD buys hardware inventory years in advance of when the items are actually used; (4) for example, based on GAO's analysis of DOD records, 62 percent of DOD's hardware items did not have a demand from September 1995 to August 1996, and an additional 21 percent of the items had enough inventory to last for more than 2 years; (5) these items account for about $4.4 billion, or 77 percent, of DOD's $5.7-billion hardware inventory; (6) despite DOD's substantial investment in inventory, in many cases, hardware inventory is not available when needed by DOD customers; (7) when this happens, the repair of weapon systems and components is often delayed; (8) the Navy has estimated that the lack of parts increases the repair time for aviation parts by as much as 74 percent; (9) DOD's overall progress in adopting best management practices for hardware items has been limited; (10) in February 1997, DOD began testing, on a limited basis, the prime vendor concept for hardware items--one of the concepts GAO recommended; (11) these tests will potentially affect about 2 percent of DOD's $3.1-billion annual sales of these items; (12) these tests do not, however, fully optimize the services available in the private sector, such as ordering, storing, and distributing supplies to the customer; (13) the business practices GAO recommended in its past reports have, for the most part, been used in the private sector to provide customers with a capability to order supplies as they are needed; (14) ordering supplies as they are needed, combined with quick logistics response times, reduces overall supply system costs, eliminates large inventories, and enables companies to reduce or eliminate the possibility of ordering supplies that may not be needed or become obsolete; and (15) to achieve similar inventory reductions, infrastructure savings, and improved customer service, DOD could expand its prime vendor programs to include tasks such as ordering, storing, and distributing supplies to the customer, and fully use the services offered under these programs. |
gao_PEMD-95-10 | gao_PEMD-95-10_0 | 1395u) of the Social Security Act, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) contracts with 32 insurance carriers to process and issue benefit payments on claims submitted under Medicare Part B coverage. Carrier Denial Rates for 1992 and 1993 Were Stable for Most Services
The denial rates for at least two thirds of each carrier’s services did not significantly change between 1992 and 1993. Factors That Contributed to Intercarrier Variation in Denial Rates
The significant differences in denial rates for medical necessity across carriers give rise to the following question: What accounts for the variations in denial rates? Carriers Differed in How They Implemented Prepayment Screens
The Medicare program has since its inception acknowledged the existence of regional variations in medical practice standards and has sought to accommodate these differences in adjudicating claims. Medical necessity denial rates for 74 services across six carriers varied substantially. To a lesser degree, the varying interpretation of certain national coverage standards across carriers, differences in the way carriers treated claims with missing information, and reporting inconsistencies helped explain variation in carrier denial rates. No allowed services were found for this code. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare Part B claims processing, focusing on the: (1) differences in carriers' denial rates for lack of medical necessity; and (2) factors that contribute to intercarrier variations in denial rates.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in 1992 and 1993, denial rates for lack of medical necessity for 74 expensive or heavily utilized services were generally low, but the six carriers reviewed varied significantly in their denial rates; (2) denial rates for the 74 services varied from zero to over 100 per 1,000 services allowed; (3) in general, the carriers' denial rates remained stable for two-thirds of their services in 1992 and 1993; (4) the Medicare program has traditionally allowed carriers to include regional variations in medical practice standards in their criteria for determining allowable claims; (5) the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has developed initiatives to promote consistency in medical policy across carriers; and (6) variations in carrier denial rates stemmed from carriers' differing prepayment screens, varying interpretations of certain national coverage standards, carriers' differing treatment of incomplete claims, and reporting inconsistencies. |
gao_HEHS-95-28 | gao_HEHS-95-28_0 | In addition, states are required to provide AFDC recipients with necessary support services, such as child care and transportation. In addition, although JOBS has made progress in serving those at risk of long-term dependence, some AFDC recipients who have barriers to employment have not been widely served. FSA expanded the base of AFDC recipients required to participate. JOBS Programs Report Unmet Service Needs Among Current Participants
While JOBS programs serve only a portion of the AFDC caseload, many program administrators reported that they could not always provide those participating with the services they need. These counties generally placed less than 1 percent of their JOBS participants in these activities. State JOBS Programs Are Held Accountable for Participation, Not Employment
The performance measurement system for JOBS provides little incentive for states to focus on moving clients into jobs. These may include the lack of available jobs in some locations, the volatility of the low-wage labor market, the lack of strong financial incentives to seek and keep employment, and a lack of health care coverage, child care, or transportation. The issues include the small portion of the AFDC caseload currently served under JOBS and the current limits on programs’ ability to provide needed services; the unknown number of AFDC recipients who have multiple barriers to employment, are at risk of long welfare stays, and may not be widely served under the current program; JOBS’ underutilization of the tools available to link participants to employers and the lack of a basic foundation for building subsidized work programs; and JOBS’ lack of a performance measurement system that encourages states to focus on employment as the ultimate program goal. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology of Ongoing Work
Our objectives for this report were to assess the progress that states and HHS have made in (1) serving more AFDC recipients in JOBS and (2) using JOBS to help AFDC recipients get jobs and end dependence. (2) What are the constraints and barriers to expanding the JOBS program? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the progress the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program has made in: (1) serving a larger portion of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients; and (2) ensuring that JOBS participants obtain employment and leave AFDC.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) about 11 percent of AFDC recipients participate in JOBS, and this percentage has not increased despite attempts to expand the base of AFDC recipients required to participate in JOBS; (2) many JOBS program administrators have reported that they could not always provide participants with the services they needed, such as basic education and job skills training, transportation, and child care; (3) although states have generally met federal requirements to target AFDC recipients at risk of long-term welfare dependence, many JOBS programs have not adequately served the difficult and complex needs of teen parents, alcohol or drug abusers, and others who are at risk for long-term welfare dependence; (4) JOBS program administrators have expressed concern about their capacity to increase program size and serve participants' varying needs; (5) JOBS program administrators have not fully used available resources to help AFDC participants obtain employment; (6) the JOBS performance measurement system, which focuses on participation rather than employment, provides little incentive for states to move clients into jobs; and (7) some factors affecting welfare dependence are outside the control of JOBS, including the low-wage labor market and a lack of financial incentives, health care coverage, child care, and transportation. |
gao_GAO-06-592 | gao_GAO-06-592_0 | DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability
DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process for Considering and Testing Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability
Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish a clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and biological survivability. The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability during the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in how each service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans to conduct operations in a contaminated environment. Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown
DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this database is unknown. It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be submitted to DTIC. Further, there is no established process for submitting chemical and biological information to DTIC. As a result, individual personnel and organizations submit information to DTIC through ad hoc actions, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information is submitted to DTIC as required. The absence of an internal control for ensuring that research and test results are submitted to DTIC and entered in DTIC's database could result in unnecessary expenditures on duplicative work. Without DOD establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition and establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of chemical and biological survivability into major weapons system acquisition is likely to remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, military planners and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, availability, and interoperability issues. Finally, the absence of a clearly defined DOD-level process for overseeing military service and program office actions limits DOD's ability to ensure that appropriate weapon system survivability decisions are being made. This policy or guidance should establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should be considered and tested; require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding how weapon system chemical and biological survivability is considered and tested; and establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for monitoring weapon system program office decisions; modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive. This modified policy should state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to be submitted to DTIC; clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical information to DTIC; and designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to DTIC. We also conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon systems. We selected programs for this non probability sample based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value, (2) whether the weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. | Why GAO Did This Study
The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon system to be able to survive such attacks. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense submit a plan to address weapon system chemical and biological survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to include developing a centralized database with information about the effects of chemical and biological agents on materials used in weapon systems. DOD did not submit its plan as mandated. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and biological survivability research and test data for weapon system design and development.
What GAO Found
The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered in the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied. Although DOD strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of an adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons for over a decade, DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies are inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability. To assess the extent DOD addresses chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, GAO conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon systems based on high dollar value, whether the system was a joint program, and risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Because DOD and joint acquisition policies do not require that survivability be specifically addressed, the military services have developed their own varying and unique policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO reviewed, the program offices involved made individual survivability decisions, resulting in inconsistent survivability consideration and testing. In the absence of DOD requirements, program offices also inconsistently document their decisions regarding how they consider and test chemical and biological survivability. Furthermore, DOD policies do not establish a clear process for responsibility, authority, and oversight for monitoring program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability. Without establishing consistent policies requiring that chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition, and a clear process for doing so, military planners and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, availability, and interoperability issues. These could negatively affect system availability in a contaminated environment and limit DOD's ability to identify risk and ensure that appropriate decisions are made. DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains a centralized database for science and technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of this database is unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is unlikely that the DTIC database contains fully comprehensive information about this for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether this information is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be submitted to DTIC. Second, there is no established process for submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted to DTIC through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information is being submitted to DTIC. Third, no office or organization in DOD has been given clear oversight responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database with comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological survivability creates the risk of unnecessary expenditures on duplicative testing. |
gao_GAO-03-748 | gao_GAO-03-748_0 | MPDC Operates CCTV on a Limited Basis
MPDC’s CCTV system is generally intended to help manage public resources (such as police officers) during major public events and demonstrations and to coordinate traffic control on an as-needed basis. MPDC can obtain real-time video images from other D.C. agencies, including the District of Columbia Public Schools. According to the Chief, the United States Park Police initially planned to wait until its policy was complete to resume the operation of its CCTV system; however, they used the cameras during large-scale demonstrations on the National Mall and when the Department of Homeland Security increased the national threat level to high alert (code orange). According to an Interior official, the United States Park Police is not required to obtain public comment on its proposed CCTV policy; however, it is considering providing the public an opportunity to comment. MPDC and the United States Park Police CCTV Management Controls Address Proper Use of CCTV Systems
MPDC and United States Park Police officials have in place or are putting in place, respectively, management controls for operating their CCTV systems and handling CCTV images. Specifically, MPDC’s regulations and the United States Park Police’s draft policy address the need for appropriate supervision to protect against inappropriate use of their systems and establish procedures for appropriate access to and handling of CCTV images. United States Park Police officials also said that it has been difficult to find measures of effectiveness for such things as crime prevention related to CCTV use. Experiences of Other CCTV Users in the United States and UK Reveal Best Practices for Other Interested Locations
Officials in the selected U.S. cities and in the UK shared with us practices that they considered beneficial to help ensure proper and effective use of CCTV systems. Clear Goals and Purpose Help Ensure Appropriate Use and Alleviate Concerns Raised
To help ensure that CCTV systems are used effectively, some CCTV users in the UK indicated that it is important to have a plan prior to the implementation of the CCTV system that should include clear, realistic, and measurable goals for the CCTV system, as well as how CCTV might address the goals. CCTV users in selected U.S. cities also found audits to be helpful. Civil liberties advocates have raised concerns about the protection of privacy and the proper use of CCTV systems. The experiences of CCTV users in the United States and the UK can help guide other jurisdictions that are considering the use of this law enforcement tool with regard to openness and community involvement; uniform standards and management controls; and the establishment of realistic, clear, and measurable performance goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Law enforcement use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) as a tool to fight crime and terrorism has become more prevalent over time. Civil liberties advocates have raised privacy concerns about its use. This report describes (1) the Metropolitan Police Department's and the United States Park Police's implementation of CCTV to monitor public spaces in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area such as the National Mall and (2) the management controls they established to address privacy concerns. GAO also identified experiences of selected CCTV users that provide insights to help ensure the proper CCTV use.
What GAO Found
The Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia's CCTV system was implemented, among other things, to facilitate crowd management during large demonstrations; however, officials indicated that the system could also be used to help combat terrorism. The system is used on an as-needed basis for such things as crowd control and when the national terrorism threat level is set to high alert (code orange). The Metropolitan Police Department obtained public comments on its implementation of CCTV. In contrast, the United States Park Police uses CCTV, among other purposes, primarily to combat terrorism and operates its CCTV system on a continuous basis. The United States Park Police has not obtained public input on its implementation of CCTV, but it is considering providing the public an opportunity to provide input. The Metropolitan Police developed regulations and the United States Park Police developed draft policies for operating their CCTV systems. Both include management controls that address the protection of privacy and the proper use of CCTV such as the need for supervision to protect against improper use and the establishment of procedures to control access to CCTV images. The experiences of CCTV users in the United Kingdom (UK) and selected U.S. cities revealed best practices for the implementation and use of CCTV. For example, UK and U.S. officials considered providing training and audits helpful to ensuring proper use of CCTV. Officials in the UK and others shared their best practices that include (1) operating CCTV systems in an open environment helps to alleviate privacy concerns; (2) having uniform standards helps to reassure the public that safeguards are in place when utilizing CCTV and provides CCTV operators guidance for proper use; and (3) establishing realistic, clear, and measurable goals helps make CCTV systems more effective and can also reassure the public about its use. |
gao_HEHS-95-190 | gao_HEHS-95-190_0 | In 1994, an appeal took over 24 months to process, a 50-percent increase in 4 years. The Board makes its decision. Officials Cite the Act and Court Decisions as Key Factors in Increased Board Workload
VA officials stated that increased responsibilities imposed on VA by the 1988 act and Court decisions have contributed directly to the substantial increase in claims and appeals processing times as well as to the increased number of remanded decisions. Again, a legislative change is needed before VA can implement this recommendation. Decisionmakers will have to weigh the benefits of providing individual veterans with unlimited access to the system against the impact that access has on the system as a whole and all veterans seeking benefits from VA.
Interaction Among VA Organizations Needed to Ensure Effective Service to Veterans
Since 1990, at least four studies have made recommendations aimed at ensuring that VA organizations work together to improve claims and appeals processing to better serve veterans and their families. 3.1.) Its legal authority does not include setting policy or issuing rules for VA claims adjudication. Figure 3.2 depicts the complex framework of the adjudication process. Some suggested that a broader organizational restructuring may be needed. Doing so is critical to fair and efficient claims adjudication. Additionally, a clear understanding of VA’s responsibilities is necessary for a meaningful analysis of the resources needed to meet those responsibilities and, in turn, for developing solutions to overcome problems, including resource constraints. There are many procedural and interpretive areas in which multiple VA organizations are involved. Recommendation
The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should designate a Department-level official to monitor actions by the Board, VBA, and VHA to identify and resolve intra-agency impediments to efficient claims and appeals processing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the need for organizations within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that are involved in processing claims to increase cooperation and coordination so that impediments to processing appeals can be identified and resolved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) legislation and Court of Veterans Appeals' rulings have forced VA to integrate new adjudication responsibilities into its already unwieldy adjudication process; (2) since 1991, the number of appeals awaiting Board of Veterans Appeals' action has increased by over 175 percent and the average processing time has increased by over 50 percent; (3) the VA legal and organizational framework makes effective interaction among autonomous VA claims adjudication organizations essential to fair and efficient claims processing; (4) although VA believes it has implemented efficient problem solving mechanisms, problems are going unidentified and unresolved; (5) unless consistent Board interpretations are developed, VA decisions will continue to be remanded, delaying benefits for some veterans and increasing VA workloads; and (6) unless VA clearly defines its adjudication responsibilities, it can not determine whether it has adequate resources to meet those responsibilities and whether new solutions may be needed. |
gao_GAO-05-639 | gao_GAO-05-639_0 | CCMs are to develop and forward grant proposals to the Global Fund, monitor grant implementation, and advise the Global Fund on the viability of grants for continued funding after 2 years. According to secretariat officials, grant managers use four sources of information to determine whether to disburse additional funds to grant recipients. Recipient progress reports. Recipient expenditure data. Several Factors Affected Grant Performance
According to Global Fund officials and other knowledgeable entities, recipient countries’ capacity to implement grants was an underlying factor in grant performance. In addition, principal recipients for the 38 grants as well as Global Fund and development partner officials frequently cited four factors associated with challenges or successes in grant performance: (1) guidance, (2) coordination, (3) planning, and (4) contracting and procurement. For example, recipients in three countries reported that they could not meet their targets because they had not received approved national treatment guidelines. However, several grant recipients reported that, under certain circumstances, Global Fund guidance allowed them to quickly redirect funds to meet existing targets. In addition, although the Global Fund’s stated policy is to disburse funds based on performance and to operate in a transparent and accountable manner, we found that the secretariat did not document its reasons for periodic disbursement decisions during phase 1. Some reports do not explain why recipients missed targets, and the limited monitoring and evaluation capabilities of many recipients raise questions about the accuracy of their reporting. Further, the Global Fund secretariat does not systematically track denied disbursement requests or publicly document denials. Global Fund Is Taking Several Steps to Refine Grant Management and Performance
The Global Fund’s secretariat is launching a range of initiatives to address challenges to grant performance and improve the overall management of grants. Systemwide, the secretariat is (1) reorganizing and strengthening its units, (2) developing a risk assessment mechanism and early warning system, (3) streamlining reporting and funding procedures, (4) working with partners to strengthen recipient capacity, and (5) clarifying guidance for CCMs. However, the board has not clearly defined the CCMs’ role in overseeing grant implementation. Recipients we met with in Thailand confirmed that they had received the toolkit. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In May 2003, the President signed a law directing the Comptroller General to monitor and evaluate projects supported by the Global Fund. In this report, we (1) describe the Global Fund’s process for managing grants and disbursing funds, (2) identify factors that have affected grant performance, (3) review the basis for, and documentation of, the Global Fund’s performance-based funding, and (4) describe the Global Fund’s recent refinements for managing grants and improving their performance. Methodology for Describing the Global Fund’s Process for Managing Grants and Disbursing Funds
To describe the Global Fund’s process for managing grants and disbursing funds, we reviewed Global Fund documents, including The Global Fund Operational Policy Manual and related guidance documents; A Force for Change: The Global Fund at 30 Months; The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: Annual Report 2002/2003; and Investing in the Future: The Global Fund at Three Years. 3). Methodology for Reviewing the Basis for, and Documentation of, the Global Fund’s Performance- Based Funding
To review the basis for, and documentation of, the Global Fund’s performance-based funding, we examined Global Fund documents— including The Global Fund Operational Policy Manual and related guidance documents, the dossiers for the 38 grants that had a first disbursement on or before December 31, 2003, and documents supporting Global Fund decisions to continue or discontinue funding 25 of 28 grants that had reached their phase-2 renewal point and been reviewed by the secretariat as of March 31, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria--established as a private foundation in January 2002--is intended to rapidly disburse grants to recipients, including governments and nongovernmental organizations. The Global Fund has signed over 270 grant agreements and disbursed more than $1 billion. Governments provide most of its funding; the United States has provided almost one-third of the $3.7 billion the Global Fund has received. In May 2003, the President signed legislation directing the Comptroller General to monitor and evaluate Global Fund-supported projects. GAO reviewed grants that the Global Fund began disbursing before January 2004. This report (1) describes the Global Fund's process for managing grants and disbursing funds, (2) identifies factors that have affected grant performance, (3) reviews the basis and documentation of performance-based funding, and (4) notes recent refinements of Global Fund processes.
What GAO Found
Global Fund policy is to manage grants in a transparent and accountable manner, disbursing funds to recipients based on their demonstrated performance as measured against agreed-on targets. In implementing this performance-based funding system, Global Fund officials are to periodically assess whether the grant's principal recipient has made sufficient progress to warrant its next disbursement. After 2 years, the Global Fund is to determine whether to continue funding the grant for an additional 3 years. In making an assessment, officials consider several information sources, including the recipient's reports on its performance and expenditures and an independent agent's verification of the recipient's reports. Recipient countries' capacity to implement grants has been an underlying factor in grant performance, according to Global Fund and other knowledgeable officials. These officials, as well as principal recipients, also cited guidance, coordination, planning, and contracting and procurement as factors associated with challenges or successes in grant performance. For example, recipients in three countries reported that they could not meet their targets because they had not received national treatment guidelines. However, several grant recipients reported that, under certain circumstances, Global Fund guidance allowed them to quickly redirect funds, thereby enabling them to meet their targets. GAO found problems associated with the information sources that the Global Fund uses in making performance-based funding decisions. For example, the limited monitoring and evaluation capabilities of many recipients raise questions about the accuracy of their reporting. Moreover, the Global Fund has not consistently documented its determinations that recipients' performance warranted additional funding. For instance, the Global Fund's documentation did not explain its decisions to disburse funds to some recipients who reported that they had met few targets. Further, the Global Fund does not track or publicly document denied disbursement requests. The Global Fund is taking steps to address challenges to grant performance and improve the overall management of grants, including (1) reorganizing and strengthening its staff; (2) developing a risk assessment mechanism and early warning system to identify poorly performing grants; (3) streamlining reporting and funding procedures; (4) working with partners to strengthen recipient capacity; and (5) clarifying certain guidance for the country coordinating mechanism--the entity in each country responsible for developing grant proposals, nominating grant recipients, monitoring grant implementation, and advising the Global Fund on the viability of grants for continued funding. However, the Global Fund has not clearly defined the role of these entities in overseeing grant implementation. |
gao_GAO-15-799 | gao_GAO-15-799_0 | DOE Achieved Its Goals for Two of Four Key Activities
DOE achieved its goals for the initiative for the key activities of removing or disposing of HEU and plutonium and downblending HEU; however, it did not achieve its goals for upgrading the physical protection of HEU and plutonium at vulnerable sites or for converting reactors and associated facilities that use HEU to LEU. According to GTRI records, over the course of the initiative (April 2009 through December 2013), GTRI removed 1,581 kilograms of HEU and plutonium, exceeding its goal of 1,201 kilograms as reported in DOE’s fiscal year 2010 budget request. Downblending HEU: DOE’s MPC&A exceeded its goal for downblending 2,700 kilograms of HEU. More specifically, DOE has developed the following goals since the initiative ended in 2013: Removing or disposing of HEU and plutonium: According to DOE planning documents and information that department officials provided to us, GTRI’s goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to December 2019. Converting reactors: DOE’s fiscal year 2015 budget request states that GTRI’s goal is to convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. Challenges May Hamper Agencies in Four Key Ways
We identified four challenges that may hamper DOE and other agencies’ abilities to meet their goals and maintain progress to secure HEU and plutonium going forward: (1) access to some countries and sites may continue to be a challenge, (2) DOE and other U.S. agencies have not completed an inventory of U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas, (3) DOE has not prioritized its inventory list of HEU at foreign locations for removal or disposition, and (4) DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites in more than 20 years to determine whether U.S.-origin material on-site is adequately protected. DOE and Other U.S. DOE, NRC, and State did not agree with this recommendation, but they have taken actions to partially implement it. However, as of May 2015, GTRI had neither provided GAO with a detailed or specific prioritized list of nuclear materials for return as noted in July 2014 and reaffirmed in January 2015, nor provided a time frame for doing so. DOE and Other Agencies Have Not Visited Key Sites in More Than 20 Years to Determine Whether U.S.-Origin Material On-Site Is Adequately Protected
The fourth challenge that may hamper future progress is that DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites to ascertain whether U.S.-origin nuclear material is protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines. As we recommended in September 2011, we continue to believe that U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of all U.S.- obligated plutonium overseas to determine whether these nuclear materials are vulnerable, as well as to determine the amounts and locations of additional quantities of U.S.-obligated plutonium at worldwide sites that could be addressed in future DOE efforts. DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology to select and prioritize physical protection visits, as we had recommended in our September 2011 report. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making two recommendations to ensure that the global initiative to remove and secure vulnerable nuclear materials achieves its stated goals of securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials and ensure that U.S. agencies are able to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible:
To ensure that the most vulnerable nuclear materials are given priority for removal or disposition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy complete the prioritization for removal or disposition of inventories of identified nuclear materials at foreign locations, including recently identified stocks of U.S.-origin HEU at foreign locations, to determine priorities for efforts going forward. To ensure that Category I and Category II U.S.-origin nuclear material is protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy work with U.S. agencies by requesting and, where feasible, undertaking physical protection visits at partner country sites that hold Category I and Category II quantities of U.S.-obligated nuclear material that have not been visited in more than 5 years—particularly those that have not been visited in 20 or more years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report: (1) assesses the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) achieved its goals associated with the 2009 initiative’s four key activities of removing, downblending, and upgrading the physical protection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and converting facilities that use HEU, and (2) examines DOE’s goals since the end of the initiative associated with the four key activities and identifies and assesses challenges, if any, that may limit DOE’s ability to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible. We interviewed officials from DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of State (State) and discussed these issues with NSC officials to determine the extent to which these agencies contributed to the initiative and their plans going forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2009, President Obama announced an initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials—such as those that could be stolen by terrorists and used to construct a nuclear device—within 4 years. DOE is primarily responsible for activities under this initiative, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and the National Security Council (NSC) also have roles. GAO was asked to examine actions taken under this initiative.
This report (1) assesses the extent to which DOE achieved its goals for four key activities under the initiative and (2) examines DOE's goals going forward and assesses challenges that may limit its ability to secure additional vulnerable nuclear materials. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, DOD, and State, as well as discussed these issues with officials from NSC and selected foreign government agencies. This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2015.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) achieved goals for two of its four key activities under the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years. Specifically, from April 2009 through December 2013, GAO's analysis of DOE's records found that DOE exceeded its goal for removing or disposing of 1,201 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium by more than 400 kilograms, and it exceeded its goal of downblending (i.e., mixing HEU with either depleted or natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU), to produce a new product that has a lower concentration of uranium-235) 2,700 kilograms of HEU by an additional 2,200 kilograms. However, it missed its goal for providing physical protection upgrades at 43 buildings by 11 buildings and missed its goal of converting 34 foreign reactors to more proliferation-resistant LEU by 11 reactors. DOE officials said that political challenges, including access to key sites, and technical concerns such as delays in the development of LEU replacement fuels for certain high-performing nuclear reactors, complicated its efforts to achieve these goals.
DOE has developed new goals since the end of the 2009 initiative for efforts related to the initiative's four key activities. For example, DOE's goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to December 2019, and convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. However, GAO identified several challenges that may hamper future progress. For example, DOE and other U.S. agencies have not completed an inventory of U.S plutonium overseas as GAO previously recommended in September 2011. DOE and the other agencies did not agree with this recommendation, citing such an effort was impractical and unwarranted. Without such an inventory, the U.S. government is not able to identify where vulnerable weapons-usable materials such as plutonium reside. In addition, DOE has neither completed a prioritization of nuclear materials, including recently identified U.S.-origin HEU, at foreign locations for return or disposition to identify the most vulnerable material stocks to focus efforts on, nor established a time frame for doing so. Another challenge GAO identified is that DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites to determine whether U.S. nuclear material on-site is protected according to international physical security guidelines. Specifically, GAO identified 11 key sites that hold more than 3,500 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU that DOE and other agencies have not visited in more than 20 years to determine whether they are protected according to international physical security guidelines. DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology for selecting and prioritizing physical protection visits but has not yet provided GAO with a time frame for prioritizing and conducting such visits. Without an assessment of the physical security conditions of U.S.-origin nuclear materials at sites containing key quantities of such material, it may be difficult to ensure that such materials are being adequately protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines, and that DOE and U.S. agencies are removing or disposing of the most vulnerable nuclear materials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to believe that DOE and other U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of U.S. plutonium at worldwide sites as GAO recommended in September 2011. In this report, GAO recommends that DOE complete its prioritization of nuclear materials at foreign locations. GAO also recommends that DOE and other agencies visit sites containing key quantities of U.S nuclear materials that have not been visited in at least 5 years. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-473T | gao_GAO-02-473T_0 | To develop this essential national strategy, the federal role needs to be considered in relation to other levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and the most appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and the private sector to achieve these goals. More than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to terrorism, and more than 20 federal entities in bioterrorism alone. Concerns about coordination and fragmentation in federal preparedness efforts are well founded. The first of these is a lack of a cohesive effort from within the federal government. As state and local officials have noted, the multiplicity of programs can lead to confusion at the state and local levels and can expend precious federal resources unnecessarily or make it difficult for them to identify available federal preparedness resources. The design of federal policy will play a vital role in determining success and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to achieve critical national goals. Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today - a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools— is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist attacks. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is intergovernmental, national policymakers need a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges when formulating antiterrorism strategies. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO's has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and duplication of programs. This situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the government's ability to (1) target areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals. |
gao_GAO-08-374 | gao_GAO-08-374_0 | Different Organizational Cultures, Funding Arrangements, and Requirements Processes Present a Challenging Environment in Which to Coordinate DOD and National Intelligence Activities
The complex context of different organizational cultures, funding arrangements, requirements processes, and diverse missions of other members of the intelligence community that DOD supports presents a challenge for DOD in integrating its ISR enterprise, as highlighted by previous efforts to achieve greater ISR integration within DOD. For example, Congress found in the past that DOD and the national intelligence community may not be well- positioned to coordinate their intelligence activities and programs, including ISR investments, in order to ensure unity of effort and avoid duplication of effort, and a congressionally chartered commission that reviewed the management and organization of national security space activities—known as the Space Commission—noted that understanding the different organizational cultures of the defense and national space communities is important for achieving long-term integration. However, DOD also coordinates with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which uses separate budgeting and requirements identification processes to manage the national intelligence budget. For example, the Mission Requirements Board did not approve a proposal for a new ISR capability to ensure that the proposal incorporated certain changes, even though DOD had already given its approval to the proposal through the JCIDS process. DOD Has Initiatives to Improve the Integration of Its Future ISR Investments, but the Initiatives Do Not Provide Key Management Tools Needed to Effectively Guide ISR Investments
To improve the integration of its ISR investments, DOD has developed two initiatives—the ISR Integration Roadmap and a test case for managing ISR investments as part of a departmentwide portfolio of capabilities. The ISR Roadmap Does Not Provide a Clear Vision of a Future ISR Enterprise That Lays Out What Capabilities Are Required to Achieve DOD’s Strategic Goals
Based on our review and analysis, DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap does not yet provide (1) a clear vision of a future integrated ISR enterprise that identifies what ISR capabilities are needed to achieve DOD’s strategic goals, or (2) a framework for evaluating tradeoffs between competing ISR capability needs and assessing how ISR capability investments contribute toward achieving those goals. The Roadmap states that the department will conduct a study to define DOD’s complete requirements for achieving global persistent surveillance. For example, such a framework would allow ISR decision makers to identify areas where ISR collection capabilities are sufficiently robust or even saturated—areas where further investment may not be warranted given priority needs in other less robust collection areas. Specifically, our review of 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities that sponsors submitted to the BA FCB since 2003 showed that 12 sponsors did not complete the capabilities-based assessment of current and planned ISR systems called for by Joint Staff policy in order to identify possible solutions to meet warfighters’ needs. We also found that, for the 7 sponsors who did conduct these assessments, the assessments varied in completeness and rigor. The BA FCB did not implement these activities because it lacks a readily available source of information that identifies all ISR capabilities that would serve as a tool for reviewing the efficiency of sponsors’ assessments, and because the BA FCB does not have a monitoring mechanism, which could ensure that key oversight activities are fully implemented, as described in Joint Staff policy. In addition, BA FCB officials said that they lack adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early coordination with the sponsors and review the sponsors’ capabilities-based assessments. To this end, managers should use both ongoing monitoring activities as well as separate evaluations to identify gaps, if any, in performance. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive source of information on existing and developmental ISR capabilities. We also obtained information from and discussed DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap and DOD ISR integration efforts and challenges with senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va.; the Joint Staff, Arlington, Va.; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Arlington, Va.; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Arlington, Va.; the National Security Space Office, Fairfax, Va.; U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for ISR, Washington, D.C.; the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to ensure that proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to filling warfighters’ needs based on a thorough analysis of existing capabilities, we identified 19 ISR capability proposals, described in table 1, that were submitted to the Joint Staff since the implementation of JCIDS in 2003 and for which the Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board was designated the lead Functional Capabilities Board. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities-such as satellites and unmanned aircraft systems-are crucial to military operations, and demand for ISR capabilities has increased. For example, DOD plans to invest $28 billion over the next 7 years in 20 airborne ISR systems alone. Congress directed DOD to fully integrate its ISR capabilities, also known as the ISR enterprise, as it works to meet current and future ISR needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the challenges, if any, that DOD faces in integrating its ISR enterprise, (2) assess DOD's management approach for improving integration of its future ISR investments, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD has implemented key activities to ensure proposed new ISR capabilities fill gaps, are not duplicative, and use a joint approach to meeting warfighters' needs. GAO assessed DOD's integration initiatives and 19 proposals for new ISR capabilities. We supplemented this analysis with discussions with DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DOD faces a complex and challenging environment in supporting defense requirements for ISR capabilities as well as national intelligence efforts. Past efforts to improve integration across DOD and national intelligence agencies have been hampered by the diverse missions and different institutional cultures of the many intelligence agencies that DOD supports. For example, DOD had difficulty obtaining complete information on national ISR assets that could support military operations because of security classifications of other agency documents. Further, different funding arrangements for defense and national intelligence activities complicate integration of interagency activities. While DOD develops the defense intelligence budget, some DOD activities also receive funding through the national intelligence budget to provide support for national intelligence efforts. Disagreements about equitable funding from each budget have led to program delays. Separate military and intelligence requirements identification processes also complicate efforts to integrate future ISR investments. DOD does not have a clearly defined vision of a future ISR enterprise to guide its ISR investments. DOD has taken a significant step toward integrating its ISR activities by developing an ISR Integration Roadmap that includes existing and currently planned ISR systems. However, the Roadmap does not provide a long-term view of what capabilities are required to achieve strategic goals or provide detailed information that would make it useful as a basis for deciding among alternative investments. Without a clear vision of the desired ISR end state and sufficient detail on existing and planned systems, DOD decision makers lack a basis for determining where additional capabilities are required, prioritizing investments, or assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, as well as identifying areas where further investment may not be warranted. DOD policy calls for the services and agencies that sponsor proposals for new ISR capabilities to conduct comprehensive assessments of current and planned ISR systems, but GAO's review of 19 proposals showed that 12 sponsors did not complete assessments, and the completeness of the remaining 7 sponsors' assessments varied. GAO found that the DOD board charged with reviewing ISR proposals did not consistently coordinate with sponsors to ensure the quality of the assessments supporting their proposals or review the completed assessments. There were three key reasons for this. First, the board did not have a comprehensive, readily available source of information about existing and developmental ISR capabilities that could help identify alternatives to new systems. Second, the board has no monitoring mechanism to ensure that key activities are fully implemented. Third, DOD board officials said that the board lacks adequate numbers of dedicated, skilled personnel to engage in early coordination with sponsors and to review sponsors' assessments. Without more complete information on alternatives and a monitoring mechanism to ensure these key activities are fully implemented, DOD is not in the best position to ensure that investment decisions are consistent with departmentwide priorities. |
gao_GAO-03-501 | gao_GAO-03-501_0 | Because of the nature of radio transmission, the amount of radiofrequency spectrum allocated by FCC for mobile phone service, and the challenge of building the infrastructure to meet a rapidly growing consumer base, consumers are not always able to complete their phone calls or to hear them clearly. FCC has acted to implement this regulatory framework and is relying on consumer choice in a competitive marketplace to determine the level of call quality, rather than setting a minimum standard for the industry to meet. However, FCC has not included call quality, beyond a discussion of the number of carriers providing service, in its annual analysis of whether or not there is effective competition in mobile phone services. Fully assessing the extent of call quality problems would likely require network performance data from the carriers as well as information on the extent to which consumers are satisfied or dissatisfied with the call quality of their mobile phone service. Our Survey on Call Quality Yielded Mixed Results
To obtain information about the extent to which consumers are concerned about various aspects of mobile phone call quality, we included questions on call quality in a national telephone survey of adults conducted in November 2002. As shown in the last column of table 2, we estimate that about one-fifth of customers were not able to get through on 10 percent or more of their calls because the cell from which they were calling was at capacity, and about one-third of customers could not complete 10 percent or more of their calls because they were in a cell where their carrier did not provide service. Interested Parties Have Suggested Actions for Improving Call Quality
Interested parties, such as state officials and consumer advocates, who have raised concerns about mobile phone call quality have also suggested actions—such as local number portability or mandating that certain information be provided to consumers—that might lead indirectly to changes in call quality by making the market more competitive or providing consumers with better information. This would likely raise costs for these carriers. Carriers Say They Are Taking Actions to Improve Call Quality
The national carriers we spoke with said that they recognize that call quality is important to consumers and that they are taking actions to improve call quality. Conclusions
As Americans have come to rely more on mobile phones to meet their business and personal needs, it is important that FCC evaluate whether competition is adequate to ensure that mobile phone consumers are receiving the level of call quality they desire and expect. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, Americans have come to rely increasingly on mobile phones to meet their business and personal needs. However, because of the nature of radio transmission and other constraints, consumers are not always able to complete calls or to hear their calls clearly. As reliance on mobile phones has increased, state officials, consumer groups, the media, and others have raised concerns about the extent of call quality problems. With regard to call quality, GAO agreed to describe the regulatory framework; determine the extent to which consumers are experiencing problems; and discuss actions for improving call quality suggested by interested parties.
What GAO Found
In establishing a regulatory framework for mobile phone services, the Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to encourage competition among carriers. FCC believes that competition enables consumers to choose carriers that offer a desired level of call quality and that regulatory action establishing a minimum level of call quality would not be beneficial in a competitive environment. The Congress requires FCC to report annually on whether or not there is effective competition in mobile phone services. While call quality has been identified as a factor that affects consumers' choices of a carrier, FCC does not discuss call quality in this report. To assess the extent to which consumers are experiencing call quality problems--such as blocked or dropped calls, insufficient capacity, dead spots, or lack of coverage--we included questions on a national survey of adult consumers, conducted in November 2002. Our survey indicated that about four-fifths of adult mobile phone users were satisfied with their service, about one-tenth were dissatisfied, and the remainder indifferent. However, we also found that consumers are experiencing some call quality problems. For example, we estimate that about one-fifth of users were unable to successfully complete 10 percent or more of their calls, because their mobile phone network dropped the calls. Only limited information on call quality problems is available to the public or FCC. Interested parties have proposed actions that could provide consumers with better information to help them choose a carrier that matches their needs or would set industry-wide call quality standards for all consumers. However, some of the suggested actions could drive up the price of service, limit the entry of new carriers, or lead to a reduction of service in regions that are technically difficult or costly to serve. The carriers themselves say that they are taking actions to improve call quality and further regulation is not needed. |
gao_GAO-05-173 | gao_GAO-05-173_0 | Background
Federal funding for highways is provided to the states mostly through a series of formula grant programs collectively known as the federal-aid highway program. For example, in 1997, we reported that the overall amount of and reasons for cost increases on highway and bridge projects could not be determined because data were not readily available from FHWA or the states. FHWA Established Some Oversight Goals and Measures but Has Not Effectively Implemented Them
FHWA established measurable, outcome-oriented goals and measures related to cost and schedule performance for the first time in its 2004 performance plan, but FHWA has not effectively implemented these goals and measures in order to improve oversight. Activities undertaken in response to prior concerns included increasing the use of project oversight managers, issuing guidance to states for improving cost estimates throughout the life of projects, developing some information on cost growth of major and other large projects, incorporating more risk assessments into its reviews of state management processes, and attempting to address congressional- committee direction to develop a multidisciplinary approach to its oversight. FHWA’s activities in these areas have promising elements and limitations. FHWA Established Competencies for Project Oversight Managers but Did Not Establish Roles or Consistent Performance Expectations
FHWA has taken some positive steps in its use of project oversight managers for major projects, but it has not yet defined the role of project oversight managers or established agency wide performance expectations for them. In spite of this progress, FHWA still does not have the capability to measure the extent of and reasons for cost growth on projects. These challenges also stem from FHWA’s decentralized organization, human capital challenges that mirror those faced throughout government, and FHWA’s perception that it has received conflicting signals on its oversight role over the years. Because these challenges are in large part rooted in FHWA’s organization and culture, and in the structure of the program it administers, they may be difficult to surmount. The absence of such a link may make it more difficult for FHWA to define its role, the purpose of its oversight, and what its oversight is designed to accomplish. For FHWA, this government wide challenge manifests itself in a number of ways, including the need to transform its workforce and culture to meet its evolving mission. Having measurable goals gives managers the means to objectively and quantifiably assess progress toward achieving certain outcomes. A comprehensive approach would avail itself of best practices and would include (1) goals and outcome measures with activities and performance expectations set for its staff that are linked to these goals and measures; (2) an overall plan for FHWA’s oversight initiatives and activities that responds to past concerns raised about its program and is tied to its goals and measures; (3) workforce planning efforts that support the goals, measures, and overall plan; (4) centrally defined roles and responsibilities for key staff, such as oversight managers for major projects; and (5) the capability to track and measure costs over the life of projects in order to identify problems, help target resources, and transfer lessons learned. Given the limitations present today, questions exist about the ability of FHWA to effectively absorb these new responsibilities and to improve its oversight of the federal-aid highway program in the years ahead. Recommendations
In order to establish a comprehensive approach to project oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, FHWA, to take the following four actions: link FHWA’s day-to-day activities and the performance expectations set for its staff to its goals and outcome measures; develop an overall plan for its oversight initiatives that is tied to its goals and measures, along with priorities and time frames, and that includes workforce planning efforts that support these goals and measures; improve the use and performance of project oversight managers by centrally defining their role and responsibilities; and develop the capability to track and measure costs over the life of projects to help identify the extent of and reasons for problems, target resources, and transfer lessons learned. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) approach to improving its federal-aid highway project oversight efforts since 2002, including (1) FHWA’s oversight-related performance goals and measures, (2) FHWA’s oversight improvement activities, (3) challenges FHWA faces in improving project oversight, and (4) best practices for project oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal-aid highway program provides over $25 billion a year to states for highway and bridge projects, often paying 80 percent of these projects' costs. The federal government provides funding for and oversees this program, while states largely choose and manage the projects. Ensuring that states effectively control the cost and schedule performance of these projects is essential to ensuring that federal funds are used efficiently. We reviewed the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) approach to improving its federal-aid highway project oversight efforts since we last reported on it in 2002, including (1) FHWA's oversight-related goals and performance measures, (2) FHWA's oversight improvement activities, (3) challenges FHWA faces in improving project oversight, and (4) best practices for project oversight.
What GAO Found
FHWA has made progress in improving its oversight efforts since 2002, but it lacks a comprehensive approach, including goals and measures that guide its activities; workforce plans that support these goals and measures; and data collection and analysis efforts that help identify problems and transfer lessons learned. FHWA's 2004 performance plan established, for the first time, performance goals and outcome measures to limit cost growth and schedule slippage on projects, but these goals and measures have not been effectively implemented because FHWA has not linked its day-to-day activities or the expectations set for its staff to them, nor is FHWA fully using them to identify problems and target its oversight. FHWA undertook activities in response to concerns raised about the adequacy of its oversight efforts that have both promising elements and limitations. For example, while FHWA now assigns a project oversight manager to each major project (generally projects costing $1 billion or more) and identified skills these managers should possess, it has not yet defined the role of these managers or established agencywide performance expectations for them. While FHWA issued guidance to improve cost estimating and began collecting information on cost increases, it still does not have the capability to track and measure cost growth on projects. Finally, although FHWA received direction to develop a more multidisciplinary workforce to conduct oversight, it has not fully incorporated this direction into its recruiting and training efforts. FHWA faces challenges to improving its oversight that are in large part rooted in the structure of the federal-aid highway program and in FHWA's organization and culture. As such, they may be difficult to surmount. For example, because the program does not link funding to states with the accomplishment of performance goals and outcome measures, it may be difficult for FHWA to define the role and purpose of its oversight. Also, FHWA's decentralized organization makes it difficult to achieve a consistent organizational vision. Human capital challenges affecting much of the federal government have affected FHWA, particularly in its need to transform its workforce to meet its evolving oversight mission. FHWA faces an increased oversight workload in the years ahead as the number of major projects grows and if provisions Congress is considering to increase FHWA's responsibilities become law. Questions exist about FHWA's ability to effectively absorb these new responsibilities, overcome underlying challenges, and improve its oversight. We identified selected best practices that could help FHWA develop a framework for a comprehensive approach to project oversight. These include establishing measurable goals to objectively and quantifiably assess progress, making oversight managers accountable for the effective implementation of these goals, providing professional training, and collecting and transferring lessons learned. |
gao_GAO-13-730T | gao_GAO-13-730T_0 | FECA benefits are adjusted annually for cost-of-living and are neither subject to age restrictions nor taxed. FECA and Retirement under FERS
FECA beneficiaries receive different benefits past retirement age than workers who retire under a federal retirement system. In addition, Social Security benefits attributable to federal service are offset by FECA. Proposed FECA Revisions Would Reduce Median Wage Replacement Rates and Increase the Difference between Total-Disability Beneficiaries With and Without a Dependent
Our simulations of the effects of compensating non-USPS and USPS total-disability beneficiaries at the single rate (regardless of the presence of dependents) of either 66-2/3 or 70 percent of wages at injury, reduced the median wage replacement rates. Median wage replacement rates overall, and within the subgroups we examined, were generally lower under the 66-2/3 percent compensation proposal. Proposed Single Rates Would Reduce Wage Replacement Rates
Compared to the current FECA program, both proposals reduced 2010 median wage replacement rates for total-disability non-USPS and USPS beneficiaries, as shown in figure 1. The decreases in the overall median wage replacement rates were due to the greater proportion of beneficiaries who had a dependent—73 percent of non-USPS beneficiaries and 71 percent of USPS beneficiaries. Years of Service Play a Key Role in the Comparison between FECA and FERS Benefits
Current Median FECA Benefit Packages Exceed 2010 FERS Benefit Packages
According to our retirement simulation comparing current FECA benefits to FERS benefits, we found that the overall median FECA benefit package (FECA benefits and TSP annuity) for both USPS and non-USPS FECA beneficiaries was greater than the current median FERS retirement benefit package (FERS annuity, TSP annuity, and Social Security). Proposals would Roughly Equalize FECA and FERS Benefit Packages for 2010 Annuitants
Based on our simulation, we found that reducing FECA benefits once beneficiaries reach retirement age to 50 percent of wages at the time of injury would result in an overall median for the reduced FECA benefit package (reduced FECA plus the TSP) that was about 6 percent less than the median FERS benefit package for non-USPS annuitants. As a result, we conducted a simulation of a “mature” FERS that was coupled with the assumption that individuals have 30-year federal careers. Effects of Proposed FECA Revisions on Partial-disability Beneficiaries Depend on Post-Injury Earning Capacity and Employment Over Time We found partial-disability beneficiaries to be fundamentally different from total-disability beneficiaries, as they receive reduced benefits based on their potential to be re-employed and have work earnings. Effects of Proposals to Reduce FECA at Retirement Age Depend on Whether Partial-Disability Beneficiaries Remain on FECA or Elect OPM Retirement Benefits
We have also found that the proposals to reduce FECA benefits at retirement age would primarily affect those partial-disability beneficiaries who continue to receive FECA benefits past retirement age. Since those beneficiaries who elect FERS retirement would not be affected by the proposed revisions to FECA compensation at retirement age, the overall effects of the proposals on partial-disability beneficiaries should be considered in the larger context of retirement options. The beneficiaries in case studies 1, 3, and 7 had potential FERS benefit packages that were lower than their FECA benefits under current policy and the proposed revision—they would likely face a reduction in FECA benefits in retirement under the proposed revision. In table 2, beneficiaries with: low earning capacities post-injury (case studies 1, 3, and 5) had FECA benefits that were more favorable than FERS benefits; high earning capacities post-injury (case studies 2 and 4) had FECA benefits that were less favorable than FERS benefits; and mid-range earning capacities post-injury (case studies 6 and 7) had FECA benefits whose favorability depended on their total years of federal service. The proposed reduction may serve as a long- term incentive for partial-disability beneficiaries to return to work,particularly because their initial FECA benefits are lower than those of total-disability beneficiaries. More specifically, we assessed the proposed changes by simulating the level of take-home pay or retirement benefits FECA beneficiaries would have received if they had not been injured, which provides a realistic basis for assessing how beneficiaries may be affected. While our analyses focused on how the median FECA beneficiary might be affected by proposed changes, it also highlighted how potential effects may vary for different subpopulations of beneficiaries, which can assist policymakers as they consider such changes to the FECA program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, the FECA program provided more than $2.1 billion in wage-loss compensation to federal workers who sustained injuries or illnesses while performing federal duties. Total-disability beneficiaries with an eligible dependent are compensated at 75 percent of gross wages at the time of injury and those without are compensated at 66-2/3 percent. Benefits are adjusted for inflation and are not taxed nor subject to age restrictions. Some policymakers have raised questions about the level of FECA benefits, especially compared to federal retirement benefits. Proposals to revise FECA for future total- and partial- disability beneficiaries include: setting initial FECA benefits at a single rate (66-2/3 or 70 percent of applicable wages at time of injury), regardless of whether the beneficiary has eligible dependents; and converting FECA benefits to 50 percent of applicable wages at time of injuryadjusted for inflationonce beneficiaries reach full Social Security retirement age.
This testimony presents results of GAOs four recent reports on FECA issues. It summarizes (1) potential effects of the proposals to compensate total-disability FECA beneficiaries at a single rate; (2) potential effects of the proposal to reduce FECA benefits to 50 percent of applicable wages at full Social Security retirement age for total-disability beneficiaries; and (3) how partial disability beneficiaries might fare under the proposed changes. To do this work, GAO conducted simulations comparing FECA benefits to income (take-home pay or retirement benefits) a beneficiary would have had absent an injury, and conducted seven case studies of partial disability beneficiaries.
What GAO Found
GAO's simulation found that under the current Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program, the median wage replacement rate--the percentage of take-home pay replaced by FECA--for total-disability beneficiaries was 88 percent for U.S. Postal Service (USPS) beneficiaries and 80 percent for non-USPS beneficiaries in 2010. GAO also found that proposals to set initial FECA benefits at a single compensation rate would reduce these replacement rates by 3 to 4 percentage points under the 70-percent option and 7 to 8 percentage points under the 66-2/3 percent option. Beneficiaries with dependents would receive reduced FECA benefits under both options. The decreases in wage replacement rates were due to the greater proportion of beneficiaries who had a dependent--over 70 percent of both USPS and non-USPS beneficiaries.
In GAO's simulation comparing FECA benefits to retirement benefits, GAO found that under the current FECA program, the median FECA benefit package for total-disability retirement-age beneficiaries was 37 and 32 percent greater than the median 2010 retirement benefit package for USPS and non-USPS beneficiaries, respectively. This analysis focused on individuals covered under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), which generally covers employees first hired in 1984 or later, and covered about 85 percent of the federal workforce in 2009. GAO also found that the proposal to reduce FECA benefits at the full Social Security retirement age would result in a median FECA package roughly equal to the median FERS retirement package in 2010. However, the median years of service for the FERS annuitants GAO analyzed was about 16 to 18 years, so these simulations did not capture a fully mature retirement system and likely understated the future FERS benefit level. Consequently, GAO also simulated a mature FERS system--intended to reflect future benefits of workers with 30-year careers--and found that the median FECA benefit package under the proposed change would be from 22 to 35 percent less than the median FERS retirement package.
Partial-disability beneficiaries are fundamentally different from total-disability beneficiaries, as they receive reduced FECA benefits based on a determination of their earning capacity. GAO's seven case studies of partial-disability beneficiaries showed that how they might fare under the proposed FECA changes can vary considerably based on their individual circumstances, such as their earning capacity and actual levels of earnings. For example, among GAO's case studies, those beneficiaries with high earning capacities may elect to retire under FERS and would likely not be affected by the proposed FECA reduction at retirement age because their potential retirement benefits were substantially higher than their current or proposed reduced FECA benefit levels. In contrast, those beneficiaries with low earning capacities had potential retirement benefits that were lower than their current FECA benefits and the proposed FECA reduction at retirement age would reduce their FECA benefits. |
gao_GGD-96-105 | gao_GGD-96-105_0 | Financial institutions have also adopted so-called “know your customer” policies to help them identify customers engaged in known or suspected financial crimes. These European countries require recording large currency transactions; however, with the exception of Italy, they do not require routinely reporting such transactions that the United States has relied on under BSA. In countries with laws that serve to prohibit U.S. regulators from entering to examine U.S. branches, U.S. regulators must rely on other means besides on-site examinations for obtaining information on U.S. overseas branches’ anti-money-laundering controls, according to FRB and OCC officials. Some European Officials Are Concerned About Coordination With U.S. Law Enforcement
European law enforcement officials we spoke with acknowledged the important role that U.S. law enforcement agencies play in investigating overseas money-laundering cases. International Arrangements to Combat Overseas Money Laundering
The United States works with other countries through multilateral and bilateral treaties and arrangements to establish global anti-money-laundering policies, enhance cooperation, and facilitate the exchange of information on money-laundering investigations. Countries That Have Signed Bilateral Agreements With the United States to Share Information on Criminal, Currency, and Customs Matters
The United States has entered into various bilateral treaties and agreements with other countries to facilitate its efforts in combating international money-laundering activities. Aruba, Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K., the United States, and Venezuela Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Antilles, Pakistan, Paraguay, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, and the United Arab Emirates Antigua, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, the Channel Islands, Chile, China, Cyprus, France, Gibraltar, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Macau, Madeira/Azores, Malaysia, Montserrat, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, St. Vincent, and Taiwan Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Nepal, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, and Vanuatu (continued)
Synopsis of the 40 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommended that each member country take these actions: 1. implement the 1988 Vienna Convention, which includes criminalizing drug money laundering and cooperating with other countries on money-laundering investigations; 2. prevent financial institution secrecy laws from inhibiting the recommendations; 3. increase multilateral cooperation in money-laundering investigations; 4. make money laundering a crime; 5. extend money-laundering offenses beyond narcotic trafficking into other crimes, such as bank and insurance fraud, arms trafficking, and other serious crimes; 6. apply anti-money-laundering measures to individuals who knew or should have known that the money they received came from a criminal activity; 7. subject corporations, not only their employees, to criminal liability if they are found guilty of money laundering; 8. enable authorities to confiscate the proceeds or property obtained from criminal activity; 9. apply recommendations to nonbank financial institutions, such as exchange houses, money transmitters, brokerage houses, and check-cashing services; 10. take steps to ensure that the recommendations are implemented to cover not only banks, but also nonbank financial institutions; and 11. consider developing a list of nonbank financial institutions dealing with cash so that members can make them subject to these recommendations. 2. GAO’s Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on U.S. efforts to combat international money laundering, focusing on: (1) U.S. money-laundering controls; (2) how U.S. law enforcement agencies coordinate their anti-money-laundering activities with European officials; and (3) U.S. participation in international money-laundering agreements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the United States relies on financial institutions to report suspect transactions to regulatory and law enforcement authorities; (2) some financial institutions rely on a "know your customer" policy to identify suspected money launderers; (3) European countries model their anti-money-laundering activities after 1991 European Union directives and U.S. financial institutions; (4) European countries require their financial institutions to record but not report large currency transactions; (5) European law enforcement officials believe that the United States should establish a single liaison office to coordinate money-laundering cases; (6) the United States participates in bilateral and multilateral agreements to establish global anti-money-laundering policies, enhance cooperation, and facilitate the exchange of information; (7) U.S. multilateral efforts are coordinated through the Financial Action Task Force, which encourages both member and nonmember countries to adopt money-laundering legislation and controls; and (8) the United States has entered into several bilateral agreements to facilitate the flow of information concerning criminal matters. |
gao_GAO-05-861T | gao_GAO-05-861T_0 | SBIR Program Has Generally Met Its Goals
Between July 1985 and June 1999, we reviewed, reported, and testified on the SBIR program many times at the request of the Congress. While our work focused on many different aspects of the program, we generally found that SBIR is achieving its goals to enhance the role of small businesses in federal R&D, stimulate commercialization of research results, and support the participation of small businesses owned by women and/or disadvantaged persons. Participating agencies and companies that we surveyed during the course of our reviews generally rated the program highly. Improvements Made to the SBIR Program Over Time
We have also identified areas of weaknesses and made recommendations that, if addressed, could strengthen the program further. Many of our recommendations for program improvement have been either fully or partially addressed by the Congress in various reauthorizations of the program or by the agencies themselves. In 1995, we identified duplicate funding for similar, or even identical, research projects by more than one agency. Geographical concentration of awards. Assessing the Performance of the SBIR Program Remains a Challenge
One issue that continues to remain somewhat unresolved after almost two decades of program implementation is how to assess the performance of the SBIR program. As the program has matured, the Congress has emphasized the potential for commercialization as an important criterion in awarding funds and the commercialization of a product as a measure of success for the program. However, in 1999, we reported that the program’s other goals also remain important to the agencies. By itself, according to some program managers, limited commercialization may not signal “failure” because a company may have achieved other goals, such as innovation or responsiveness to an agency’s research needs. We identified a variety of reasons why assessing the performance of the SBIR program has remained a challenge. First, because the authorizing legislation and SBA’s policy directives do not define the role of the company’s commercialization record in determining commercial potential and the relative importance of the program’s goals, different approaches have emerged in agencies’ evaluations of proposals. Second, we found that it has been difficult to find practical ways to define and measure the SBIR program’s goals in order to evaluate proposals. For example, the authorizing legislation lacks a clear definition of “commercialization,” and agencies sometimes differed on its meaning. Finally, we reported that as the emphasis on commercialization had grown, so had concerns that noncommercial successes may not be adequately recognized. For example, program managers identified various projects that met special military or medical equipment needs but that had limited sales potential. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since it was established in 1982, GAO has consistently reported on the success of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in benefiting small, innovative companies, strengthening their role in federal research and development (R&D), and helping federal agencies achieve their R&D goals. However, through these reviews GAO has also identified areas where action by participating agencies or the Congress could build on the program's successes and improve its operations. This statement for the record summarizes the program's successes and improvements over time, as well as the continuing challenge of assessing the long term results of the program.
What GAO Found
Between July 1985 and June 1999, GAO reviewed, reported, and testified on the SBIR program many times at the request of the Congress. While GAO's work focused on many different aspects of the program, it generally found that SBIR is achieving its goals to enhance the role of small businesses in federal R&D, stimulate commercialization of research results, and support the participation of small businesses owned by women and/or disadvantaged persons. Participating agencies and companies that GAO surveyed during the course of its reviews generally rated the program highly. GAO also identified areas of weaknesses and made recommendations that, if addressed, could strengthen the program further. Some of these concerns related to (1) duplicate funding for similar, or even identical, research projects by more than one agency, (2) inconsistent interpretations of extramural research budgets by participating agencies, (3) geographical concentration of awards in a small number of states, and (4) lack of clarification on the emphasis that agencies should give to a company's commercialization record when assessing its proposals. Most of GAO's recommendations for program improvement have been either fully or partially addressed by the Congress in various reauthorizations of the program or by the agencies themselves. One issue that continues to remain somewhat unresolved after almost two decades of program implementation is how to assess the performance of the SBIR program. As the program has matured, the Congress has emphasized the potential for commercialization as an important criterion in awarding funds and the commercialization of a product as a measure of success for the program. However, in 1999, GAO reported that the program's other goals also remain important to the agencies. By itself, according to some program managers, limited commercialization may not signal "failure" because a company may have achieved other goals, such as innovation or responsiveness to an agency's research needs. GAO identified a variety of reasons why assessing the performance of the SBIR program has remained a challenge. First, because the authorizing legislation and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) policy directives do not define the role of the company's commercialization record in determining commercial potential and the relative importance of the program's goals, different approaches have emerged in agencies' evaluations of proposals. Second, GAO found that it has been difficult to find practical ways to define and measure the SBIR program's goals in order to evaluate proposals. For example, the authorizing legislation lacks a clear definition of "commercialization," and agencies sometimes differed on its meaning. Finally, GAO reported that as the emphasis on commercialization had grown, so had concerns that noncommercial successes may not be adequately recognized. For example, program managers identified various projects that met special military or medical equipment needs but that had limited sales potential. |
gao_GAO-07-342T | gao_GAO-07-342T_0 | However, the fundamental drivers of our long- term challenge are largely the same. Meeting the Long- Term Fiscal Challenge Requires Cooperation and Compromise— and Action Should Not Be Delayed
The government can help ease future fiscal burdens through spending reductions, revenue actions, or both that reduce debt held by the public and enhance the pool of economic resources available for private investment and long-term growth. The specific policy choices made to address this fiscal challenge are the purview of elected officials. The policy debate will reflect differing views of the role of government and differing priorities for our country. What the FWUT can do—and what I will continue to do—is lay out the facts, debunk various myths and prepare the way for tough choices by elected officials. If the American people understand that there is no magic bullet— if they understand that we cannot grow our way out this problem; eliminating earmarks will not solve the problem; wiping out fraud, waste and abuse will not solve the problem; ending the war or cutting way back on defense will not solve the problem; and letting the recent tax cuts expire will not solve this problem. Then they can engage with you in a discussion about what government should do and how. The time for action is now. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony, given by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States before the Senate Committee on the Budget, addresses the nation's long-term fiscal outlook and the challenge it presents. However, the outlook is not good. Continuing down this current fiscal path would gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, out economy, our standard of living, and ultimately even our domestic tranquility and national security. The five major points of the testimony are: (1) The current fiscal condition is worse than advertised, (2) the long-term fiscal outlook is both imprudent and unsustainable, (3) improvements in information and processes are needed and can help, (4) meeting out long-term fiscal challenge will require tough choices, bi-partisan cooperation, and compromise, and lastly (5) the time for action is now.
What GAO Found
The specific policy choices made to address this fiscal challenge are the purview of elected officials, and the policy debate will reflect differing views on the role of government and differing priorities for this country. What can be done is laying out the facts, debunking various myths and preparing the way for tough choices by elected officials. If the American people can understand that (1) we cannot grow out way out of this problem, (2) eliminating earmarks will not solve the problem, (3) wiping out fraud, waste, and abuse will not solve the problem, (4) ending the way or cutting way back on defense will not solve the problem, and (5) letting the recent tax cuts expire will not solve this problem, they they can engage with the elected officials in a discussion about what the government should do and how. |
gao_GAO-07-1014 | gao_GAO-07-1014_0 | Background
Sole proprietors own unincorporated businesses by themselves. Most Sole Proprietors Underreported Business Income, but a Small Proportion Accounted for the Bulk of Unpaid Taxes
The significant amount of sole proprietor noncompliance reported in IRS’s tax gap estimates is caused by underreporting of net business income, including the misreporting of both gross business income and expenses. These NRP results showed that an estimated 61 percent of Schedule C filers underreported their net income and 9 percent overreported. After these adjustments, IRS estimates that sole proprietors misreported 57 percent of their net business income in 2001 and that the tax gap caused by this misreporting of sole proprietor net business income in 2001 was $68 billion. Taxpayers misreport income and expenses for a variety of reasons. The taxpayer should not have filed a Schedule C.
Although a Small Proportion of Sole Proprietors, More Than 1 Million Accounted for the Majority of Understated Taxes
Understated taxes are spread unevenly among the population of sole proprietors, and slightly more than 1 million sole proprietors accounted for most of the understatements. Enforcement Programs Have Limited Reach over Sole Proprietors but Still Make Billions of Dollars in Recommended Assessments
IRS’s two main programs for addressing sole proprietor reporting compliance— AUR and Examination—have limited reach over noncompliant sole proprietors, although they annually contact hundreds of thousands of taxpayers and recommend billions of dollars in assessments. AUR Is Limited by a Lack of Resources, Expense Matching, and Examination Authority
Because of resource constraints, IRS officials said they do not contact taxpayers in all cases where AUR finds a mismatch between what was reported on an information return and what was reported on a tax return. Second, third-party information generally is not required on sole proprietor expenses. In fiscal year 2006, IRS examined about 3 percent of the Schedule C categorized returns. Current Treasury Tax Gap Strategy Discusses Neither Sole Proprietor Noncompliance nor the Many Options That Could Address It
The tax gap strategy issued by Treasury in September 2006 does not discuss sole proprietor noncompliance or specific options to address it. IRS’s annual budget requests include specific compliance program proposals. IRS has other compliance objectives in addition to sole proprietor compliance. For example, information reporting invariably imposes some costs on the third parties required to report, but no objective criteria exist for assessing when third- party costs are excessive. Judgments would have to be made based on qualitative information. Because underreporting is spread among more than 12 million sole proprietors, much of it in small amounts, because the underreporting is for both gross income and expenses, and because IRS’s enforcement programs are limited and costly, the sole proprietor tax gap cannot be closed by IRS enforcement alone. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the nature and extent of the noncompliance associated with sole proprietors, we analyzed the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) National Research Program (NRP) results, tax gap estimates, and Statistics of Income (SOI) data, and interviewed IRS officials. 2. 3. 6. 10. This option envisions new information reporting by organizations but also by consumers. 18. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that $68 billion of the annual $345 billion gross tax gap for 2001 was due to sole proprietors, who own unincorporated businesses by themselves, underreporting their net income by 57 percent. A key reason for this underreporting is well known. Unlike wage and some investment income, sole proprietors' income is not subject to withholding and only a portion is subject to information reporting to IRS by third parties. GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of sole proprietor noncompliance, (2) how IRS's enforcement programs address it, and (3) options for reducing it. GAO analyzed IRS's recent random sample study of reporting compliance by individual taxpayers, including sole proprietors.
What GAO Found
Based on what IRS examiners could find, most sole proprietors, at least an estimated 61 percent, underreported net business income, but a small proportion of them accounted for the bulk of understated taxes. Both gross income and expenses were misreported. Most of the resulting understated taxes were in relatively small amounts. Half the understatements that IRS examiners could find were less than $903. However, 10 percent of the tax understatements, made by over 1 million sole proprietors, were above $6,200. In this top group, the mean understatement of tax was $18,000. IRS's two main sole proprietor enforcement programs--the Automated Underreporter Program, which computer matches information on a tax return with information submitted to IRS by third parties, and examinations (audits)--have limited reach. The two programs each annually contact less than 3 percent of estimated noncompliant sole proprietors. The limited reach exists for a variety of reasons. In 2001, about 25 percent of sole proprietor gross income was reported on information returns by third parties; expenses generally are not subject to such reporting. Even when required, various barriers make information reporting inconvenient. Examinations of sole proprietors yield less in additional tax assessed and cost more to conduct than examinations for other taxpayers. However, because of the extent of sole proprietor noncompliance, any effect that examinations have on voluntary compliance by other sole proprietors could result in significant revenue. The Treasury Department's recently released tax gap strategy discusses neither sole proprietor noncompliance specifically nor the many options that could address it. GAO has reported on the need for such a detailed strategy for years. Specific options that address issues including sole proprietor recordkeeping, underreporting of gross income, overreporting of expenses, information reporting, and IRS's enforcement programs are listed in appendix II. |
gao_GAO-11-656 | gao_GAO-11-656_0 | TILA was designed to provide consumers with accurate information about the cost of credit. The Dodd-Frank Act expands the definition of high-cost loans to include mortgages for purchasing a home; reduces the APR and points and fees triggers; and requires mandatory preloan counseling for borrowers of high-cost mortgages, among other things. The Dodd-Frank Act requires securitizers of RMBS to retain no less than 5 percent of the credit risk of any residential mortgage they securitize that does not meet specified criteria. The report noted that the effects of a final set of risk retention requirements could not be analyzed because implementing regulations were still being developed. Although Most Recent Mortgages Would Likely Have Met Certain Qualified Mortgage Criteria, the Criteria Could Limit Mortgage Options for Some Borrowers
Our analysis of the QM criteria specified in the Dodd-Frank Act generally indicated that, for each year from 2001 through 2010, most mortgages would likely have met the individual criteria for which relevant data were available. The extent to which mortgages met individual criteria varied by mortgage category and origination year, reflecting changes in the mortgage market over the 10-year period. The Federal Reserve Board issued proposed QM rules in April 2011, and is accepting public comments through July 22, 2011. Consumer and Industry Groups Cited Consumer Protection Benefits of the Qualified Mortgage Criteria but also Raised Some Concerns
Representatives from some consumer groups and the mortgage industry we spoke with stated that they were generally supportive of certain QM criteria in the Dodd-Frank Act because the criteria were associated with a borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage. Many industry stakeholders and consumer groups noted that the implications of such a requirement would depend on a variety of regulatory decisions and potential changes in the mortgage market. These include decisions on the characteristics of QRMs that would be exempt from the risk retention requirement, the forms of risk retention that would be allowed, the percentage that securitizers would be required to hold, and risk-sharing arrangements between securitizers and lenders. These factors could affect the availability and cost of mortgage credit and the future viability of the private-label RMBS market. Some market participants and the rulemaking agencies noted that risk retention may complement other securitization and mortgage reforms, such as those that promote greater transparency and enforcement of loan underwriting standards. Rulemaking agencies are accepting public comments on proposed risk retention regulations through August 1, 2011. Findings from the limited research available on housing counseling are mixed, with some studies suggesting that some types of counseling can improve mortgage outcomes and others finding no effect. HUD Is Creating a New Office for Its Housing Counseling Activities, but Funding Is Uncertain
To enhance consumer protections for homebuyers and tenants, the Dodd-Frank Act requires HUD to establish an Office of Housing Counseling. Because of the associated penalties and liabilities, lenders have generally avoided making high-cost loans, and the secondary market for these loans has been negligible. Additional information would be needed to assess the extent to which the new definition would affect mortgages currently available to consumers. In its written comments, NCUA indicated, as we do, that the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act would depend on regulatory decisions that had yet to be made. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the proportions of mortgages originated from 2001 through 2010 that would have met selected qualified mortgage (QM) criteria specified in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank Act) and describes the views of mortgage industry stakeholders on the potential effects of the QM criteria on the mortgage market, (2) discuss relevant information and the views of mortgage industry stakeholder on the potential impact of a risk retention requirement on the mortgage market and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a uniform risk retention requirement, and (3) describe what research and the views of mortgage industry stakeholders suggest about the potential impact of provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act regarding homeownership counseling and changes to the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). Abt Associates for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act) is intended, among other things, to reform residential mortgage lending and securitization practices that contributed to the recent financial crisis. The act provides some liability protection for lenders originating mortgages that meet nine specified criteria, as applicable, associated with a borrower's ability to repay ("qualified mortgages"). The act also requires securitizers of mortgages not meeting separate criteria associated with lower default risk to retain at least 5 percent of the credit risk, though federal rulemaking agencies may vary this amount. The act directed GAO to assess the effect of mortgage-related provisions on the availability and affordability of mortgage credit and to issue a report by July 2011, but federal agencies are still developing implementing regulations. This report discusses the potential impact of the act's (1) qualified mortgage criteria, (2) credit risk retention requirement, and (3) provisions concerning homeownership counseling and regulation of high-cost loans.
What GAO Found
GAO examined five of the nine qualified mortgage criteria specified in the Dodd- Frank Act for which sufficient data were available and generally found that, for each year from 2001 through 2010, most mortgages would likely have met the individual criteria. The five criteria address payment of loan principal, length of the mortgage term, scheduled lump-sum payments, documentation of borrower resources, and borrower debt burden. The extent to which mortgages met the individual criteria varied by year of origination, reflecting changes in the mortgage market over the 10-year period. However, the impact of the full set of qualified mortgage criteria is uncertain, partly because data limitations make analysis of the other four criteria difficult and partly because federal agencies could establish different criteria as they develop final regulations. Consumer and industry groups indicated that the criteria specified in the act would likely encourage sound underwriting but could also restrict the availability of and raise the cost of mortgage credit for some homebuyers. Provisions in the act and proposed regulations attempt to address some of these issues, in part by providing exemptions for certain loan products in certain locales, such as rural areas. The public comment period for these proposed regulations ends on July 22, 2011. Mortgage industry stakeholders GAO spoke with indicated that the implications of a risk retention requirement would depend on a variety of regulatory decisions and potential changes in the mortgage market. Rulemaking agencies are accepting public comments on proposed risk retention regulations through August 1, 2011. Key decisions that have yet to be made concern the characteristics of mortgages that would be exempt from risk retention, the forms of risk retention that would be allowed, the percentage that securitizers would be required to hold, and risk-sharing arrangements between lenders and securitizers. These factors could affect the availability and cost of mortgage credit and the viability of a private mortgage securitization market. Additionally, risk retention could complement other securitization and mortgage reforms, such as those that promote greater transparency and enforcement of loan underwriting standards. Other provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act concerning homeownership counseling and regulation of high-cost loans could enhance consumer protections and improve mortgage outcomes for some borrowers, but their specific impacts are difficult to assess at this time. The act authorized a new Office of Housing Counseling within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but the office is still in the planning stage. Findings from the limited research on housing counseling for mortgage borrowers are mixed, with some studies suggesting that some types of counseling can improve mortgage outcomes and others finding no effect. The act also expands the definition of "high-cost loans," which have disclosures and restrictions designed to protect consumers. Although lenders have generally avoided making these loans, additional information on mortgage costs would be needed to assess the extent to which the new definition would affect mortgages that may be made in the future. To do this work, GAO analyzed a proprietary database of residential mortgages, reviewed relevant housing and mortgage market research, and interviewed key mortgage industry stakeholders. GAO provided a draft of this report to eight agencies. In a letter, the National Credit Union Administration said, as noted in the report, that the act's impact would depend on regulatory decisions that had yet to be made. Six other agencies provided technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate. |
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