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gao_GAO-15-656 | gao_GAO-15-656_0 | The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 required USDA to update federal requirements for school lunches, breakfasts, and to establish standards for competitive foods—foods sold to children in schools other than through the school meals programs. 1.) USDA regulations also phase in requirements for sodium reductions in lunches. 2.) 3.) The participation rate, which measures the proportion of all students in schools that take part in the National School Lunch Program who ate school lunches, also declined during this period, falling from 62 percent in school year 2010-2011 to 58 percent in school year 2013-2014. 4.) According to officials from four states, another factor that may have led to lower participation among students paying full price for lunch is the federally-required increase in the prices of paid lunches in certain districts—also known as paid lunch equity. According to our analysis of USDA data, participation in the School Breakfast Program grew by 1.4 million students (or 12 percent) from school year 2010-2011 through school year 2013-2014, to a total of 13.5 million students. According to USDA data, the increases in School Breakfast Program participation can be explained, in part, by program expansion. SFAs Continue to Report Challenges with New School Meals Requirements and Expressed Concern about Future Sodium Restrictions
Some Challenges We Reported on Previously Have Persisted
SFAs and states reported that some of the challenges they have experienced meeting the new school meals requirements have persisted since school year 2012-2013, such as increased plate waste. Our lunch observations suggest that plate waste may be beginning to decrease as students adjust to school meals that meet the new requirements. Although there has been some progress, poor student acceptance of certain foods is another longstanding challenge that SFAs continued to report. Representatives from four of the eight food companies we interviewed said they anticipated problems with developing foods that would meet future targets. An additional effort that may assist SFAs struggling with the sodium reductions in the future is USDA’s training and peer-to-peer mentoring program called “Team Up For School Nutrition Success,” which aims to leverage successes from some SFAs by sharing best practices with others that are struggling with specific aspects of implementing the new nutrition requirements. SFAs and Schools Made Changes to Comply with the New Federal Competitive Food Standards and Faced Challenges with Procurement, Revenue, and Oversight
SFAs and School Groups Had to Make Product Changes and Had Procurement Challenges
While many states and school districts had pre-existing policies on nutrition standards for competitive food sales when the new federal requirements were established, SFAs and school groups in seven of the eight districts we reviewed reported that they had to make changes to the competitive foods they offered for sale in school year 2014-2015 to comply. However, at the same time, three of eight SFAs expressed concerns that not all school groups were in compliance with the new requirements and the consequences for noncompliance were unclear. The expansion of state oversight responsibility to include reviews of competitive foods could help ensure compliance with the nutrition standards, though some states reported that initial oversight of this area has been challenging. USDA’s Assistance Has Included a Substantial Amount of Guidance and Other Efforts
Officials from several states and SFAs that we interviewed during school year 2014-2015 indicated that USDA’s assistance on the new school meals and competitive food requirements was helpful or has recently improved; at the same time, some found the amount of USDA guidance to be overwhelming. In addition, two SFAs reported that USDA guidance on the changes has improved over time; however, a state official also told us that USDA has issued too much guidance, and it has overwhelmed SFAs. With the bulk of the changes to school meals and competitive foods nutrition standards already required to be implemented, the need for USDA to issue additional guidance on these changes should diminish in future years, according to officials. In recognition of the challenges SFAs have faced while implementing the new requirements, USDA has provided other types of assistance intended to help clarify the regulations and guidance. In addition, the initiative offers monthly webinars for states and SFAs on a wide variety of topics—including menu planning and sodium, which are also made available online for later viewing. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Participation Data
To assess trends in school lunch and breakfast participation, we analyzed USDA’s national data on meals served in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs from school year 2000-2001 through school year 2013-2014. Site Visits
To gather information from the local level on implementation of the new nutrition requirements for school meals and competitive foods, we contacted the same eight school districts across the country that we had visited as part of our prior study of implementation of the new school lunch requirements in school year 2012-2013. We selected these school districts because they provided variation across geographic location, district size, and certain characteristics of the student population and district food services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 required USDA to update nutrition standards for school lunches and breakfasts and add standards for other food sold in schools, known as competitive foods. In response, USDA set new nutrition requirements, including limits on calories, sodium, and fats. Previously, GAO reported on the implementation of changes to school lunches in school year 2012-2013. Since then, additional requirements for lunches have taken effect, as well as new requirements for breakfasts and competitive foods. GAO was asked to review implementation of the nutrition changes to school food.
GAO reviewed (1) recent trends in school meals participation, (2) challenges SFAs faced in implementing the new requirements for school meals, (3) challenges SFAs and districts faced in implementing new requirements for competitive foods, and (4) USDA assistance in implementing the changes.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed federal school meals participation data from school years 2000-2001 through 2013-2014; reviewed implementation in the same eight school districts visited for the report on school year 2012-2013 lunch changes, selected to provide variation in geographic location and certain district and food service characteristics; and interviewed USDA and state officials, as well as food industry and stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
Nationwide, participation in the National School Lunch Program declined by 1.4 million children (or 4.5 percent) from school year 2010-2011 through school year 2013-2014, to 30.4 million children. The participation rate of enrolled students also declined, from 62 to 58 percent. Seven of eight states that GAO interviewed reported that challenges with student acceptance of changes made to comply with new federal nutrition requirements contributed to the decrease. Also, four of eight states noted that recent required increases in the price of lunch may have decreased participation among some students. At the same time, nationwide participation in the breakfast program continued its trend of steady increases, which can be explained, in part, by program expansion into more schools.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), states, and the eight School Food Authorities (SFAs) GAO reviewed, which administer meal programs in school districts, reported some ongoing challenges with meal requirements; however some SFAs noted success in certain areas. For example, five of eight SFAs, described continuing challenges with plate waste, that is, students taking required foods and then not eating them. However, officials in the other three, as well as GAO's mealtime observations across the two school years, suggest that plate waste may be decreasing in some SFAs. Also, five of the SFAs reported difficulty serving certain required food items in ways that appeal to students, though others reported some success. Regarding sodium, SFA, state, and food company officials expressed concerns about meeting future targets, which USDA plans to phase in over the next 8 years. To address these concerns, USDA is gathering information from SFAs and the food industry on progress toward reducing sodium levels in school meals.
New requirements for competitive foods—foods sold to students in schools other than through the school meals programs—also challenged SFAs and schools during school year 2014-2015. Six of eight SFAs reported difficulty procuring items that met the new requirements, particularly at the beginning of the school year. Also, four SFAs and two school groups selling competitive foods in the eight districts GAO reviewed reported decreased revenues due to lower student demand for products that comply with the requirements. In addition, SFA and state officials reported issues with ensuring compliance and providing oversight of these sales. To identify and help address such issues, USDA recently required states to begin including competitive foods in their periodic reviews of SFAs.
Officials from five states and four SFAs reported that USDA's assistance in implementing these changes has been helpful or improving over time; however, some SFAs noted problems with the amount or clarity of the guidance. USDA has initiated efforts to assist SFAs, such as by conducting webinars on a variety of topics, including menu planning. At the same time, officials from three of eight SFAs said USDA guidance on the new requirements—comprising nearly 4,700 pages issued from January 2012 through April 2015—has been challenging to keep up with. However, according to USDA, the substantial changes to nutrition standards have already occurred, and therefore, the need for additional guidance should decrease in future years. Moreover, USDA has provided other types of assistance that help clarify the guidance, including initiatives that facilitate the sharing of best practices and provide peer mentoring.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-254 | gao_GAO-10-254_0 | The service components depend on military recruiters to meet their annual recruiting missions. Recruiters reported, however, that while they have seen an increase in the number of individuals interested in military service, many of them do not meet the military’s qualification requirements. Substantiated Cases of Irregularities Represent a Small Percentage of Accessions, and Actions Have Been Taken against the Recruiters Responsible
Substantiated Cases of Recruiter Irregularities across the Service Components Comprise a Small Percentage of Overall Accessions
From fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2008, the total number of substantiated cases of recruiter irregularities across the service components comprised a small percentage of overall accessions. For example, as can be seen in table 7, in fiscal year 2008, the most common type of action taken by the Army involved adverse administrative action, such as placing a letter of reprimand in the recruiter’s permanent personnel file, while the most common type of action taken in the Marine Corps involved removal from recruiting. The Service Components Have Developed Guidance and Procedures to Address Recruiter Irregularities, but Not All Service Components Share Recruiter Irregularity Data throughout All Levels of Command
The Service Components Have Developed Guidance to Address Recruiter Irregularities
All of the service components have developed guidance on recruiter irregularities and have instituted procedures for reporting allegations of recruiter irregularities, conducting an investigation, and adjudicating cases. The Service Components Have Taken Steps to Identify and Prevent Recruiter Irregularities
The service components have instituted a number of quality control checks to help identify recruiter irregularities, including the use of a hotline for individuals to report recruiter irregularities, periodic inspections of recruiting stations, and opportunities for recruits to reveal any potential recruiter irregularities committed by their recruiter during the enlistment process. The Service Components’ Oversight and Data Sharing Have Improved, but Not All Service Components Share Data throughout All Levels of Command
Since we reported in our prior work that the service components’ recruiting commands did not have oversight over recruiter irregularities, the service components have improved oversight. Although the reporting process is generally similar across the service components, some differences exist, as shown in figure 4. Further, commanders may not be able to seize opportunities to learn from their peers about shared experiences on handling recruiter irregularities. OSD Implemented Recruiter Irregularity Reporting Requirements, but Lacks Complete Oversight over Irregularities
OSD Has Implemented Recruiter Irregularity Reporting Requirements, Sponsored Research, and Provided Information- Sharing Opportunities on Recruiter Irregularity Issues
In December 2006, OSD issued the memorandum regarding the tracking and reporting of recruiter irregularities by the service components. on However, other service components may not be approaching this situati in the same manner. Recommendations Executive Action
mend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 1. direct the Secretaries of the Army and Navy to identify mechanisms the regular sharing of the levels of command, and recruiter irregularity data throughout all irect the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to: complete and issue the instruction on tracking and reporting data recruiter irregularities to clarify the requirements for the types of recruiter irregularities to be reported and the placement of rec irregularity cases and actions taken into reporting categories; direct the relevant offices within the National Guard Bureau to adjust their reporting procedures in ways that will provide transpa data reported to OSD and any limitations on the data; and include the appropriate disclosures concerning data limitations in th recruiter irregularity reports that OSD produces on the basis of the National Guard data for the Congress and others. To conduct our work, we examined relevant guidance issued by OSD, the service components, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard; reviewed and analyzed data on recruiter irregularities reported by the service components to OSD from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2009; and reviewed reports issued by GAO and the Department of Defense (DOD) related to recruiting and recruiter irregularities, including surveys conducted by DOD on recruiters’ quality of life across the service components. To assess the extent to which OSD maintains oversight of recruiter irregularities occurring across the service components, we reviewed the December 2006 memorandum issued by OSD that requires each service component to submit a semiannual report to OSD on recruiter irregularities. | Why GAO Did This Study
To sustain a viable military force, the Department of Defense (DOD) depends on recruiting several hundred thousand qualified individuals into the military each year. The service components rely on their recruiters to act with the utmost integrity because even a single incident of wrongdoing on the part of a recruiter--a recruiter irregularity--can adversely affect the service components' ability to recruit qualified individuals. GAO was asked to (1) analyze data on reported cases of recruiter irregularities across the service components, (2) review the extent to which the service components have guidance and procedures to address recruiter irregularities, and (3) review the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has oversight over recruiter irregularities. GAO analyzed the data on recruiter irregularities reported to OSD by the service components; reviewed the service components' recruiter irregularity case files; examined relevant guidance and procedures from the service components; and interviewed service components' recruiting command personnel, recruiters, and OSD officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2006 through 2008, the total number of substantiated cases of recruiter irregularities across the service components represented a small percentage of overall accessions (i.e., number of individuals entering military service), and the service components have taken various actions against the recruiters responsible for these irregularities. Specifically, the number of substantiated cases of recruiter irregularities as a percentage of overall accessions was 0.26 percent in fiscal year 2006, 0.22 percent in fiscal year 2007, and 0.18 percent in fiscal year 2008. The most common types of recruiter irregularity reported involved concealment or falsification of documents or information, sexual misconduct, and quality control measures (e.g., valid parental signatures). The action most commonly applied against recruiters who committed irregularities varied by service component. Removal from recruiting was the most commonly applied action in the Marine Corps while adverse administrative action (e.g., a letter of reprimand in the recruiter's personnel file) was most commonly applied in the Army. All service components have guidance and procedures on addressing recruiter irregularities and have improved oversight over them, but the manner in which data on recruiter irregularities are shared within the service components varied. Although some differences exist, the service components are similar in how they identify, investigate, and adjudicate recruiter irregularities. In addition, the service components have taken steps to identify and prevent recruiter irregularities, including establishing quality control checks to help identify recruiter irregularities and providing training for recruiters to help prevent recruiter irregularities. However, in most service components, not all levels of command have regular access to information on recruiter irregularities that occur. Without regular access to information, commanders may not be able to take full advantage of servicewide recruiter irregularity data and opportunities to learn from their peers. Although OSD has implemented requirements for the service components to regularly report on recruiter irregularities, it does not have complete oversight over the recruiter irregularities that occur. In December 2006, OSD issued a memorandum for the service components on tracking and reporting recruiter irregularities, and the service components have been providing recruiter irregularity data to OSD. However, because some of the reporting requirements lack clarity, the service components do not interpret the reporting requirements in the same way. Further, the data provided to OSD by the National Guard are incomplete and the relevant offices within the National Guard Bureau do not provide appropriate caveats regarding these data, such as including information on the States and Territories that did not submit recruiter irregularity data. Unless OSD clarifies the reporting requirements in its memorandum and directs the service components to provide transparency in the data they report, it will be unable to maintain complete oversight over the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring and make determinations on whether corrective action is needed. |
gao_GAO-08-947T | gao_GAO-08-947T_0 | On February 6, 2007, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a new geographic combatant command to consolidate the responsibility for DOD activities in Africa that have been shared by U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command. DOD Has Focused on Transferring Existing Activities from Other Commands to AFRICOM
Since the President announced the establishment of AFRICOM, DOD has focused on building the capabilities necessary for AFRICOM to systematically assume responsibility for all existing military missions, activities, programs, and exercises in the area of responsibility it is inheriting from the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific commands. DOD has approved 1,304 positions (military and DOD civilian) for the command’s headquarters, of which about 270 military positions are being transferred from other commands. By September 30, 2008, DOD plans to have filled 75 percent, or 980 of these positions. In addition, DOD plans to have 13 command positions filled by representatives from non-DOD agencies. For example, although DOD has not fully estimated the additional costs of establishing and operating the command, AFRICOM officials said that as the command is further developed and decisions are made on its permanent headquarters, it will need to construct both enduring facilities and meet other operational support requirements. In addition to DOD’s efforts to establish the combatant command, the military services and Special Operations Command are also working to establish component commands that will be subordinate to AFRICOM. According to AFRICOM, strategic success in Africa depends on a whole-of-government approach to stability and security. By bringing knowledge of their home agencies, personnel from other agencies, such as the USAID and the departments of Treasury and Commerce, are expected to improve the planning and execution of AFRICOM’s plans, programs, and activities and to stimulate collaboration among U.S. government agencies. Even with a reduction in the number of interagency positions, according to DOD officials, some civilian agencies have limited personnel resources and incompatible personnel systems that have not easily accommodated DOD's intent to place interagency personnel in the command. With relatively few interagency personnel on the AFRICOM staff, such coordination mechanisms could be critical for the command to achieve its vision. Stakeholder Concerns Regarding the Command’s Mission
DOD’s second challenge to achieving its vision for AFRICOM is in overcoming stakeholder concerns of the command’s mission. This could limit its ability to develop key partnerships. Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, State Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all U.S. government activities in Africa, even though the U.S. embassy leads decision-making on U.S. government non-combat activities conducted in that country. One factor contributing to persistent concerns among U.S. government agencies, non governmental organizations, and African partners is the evolution of how DOD has characterized AFRICOM’s unique mission and goals. Uncertainty about DOD Presence in Africa
DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of AFRICOM’s presence in Africa. DOD, however, has faced difficulty reaching agreement with the State Department on AFRICOM’s future presence on the continent. Therefore, AFRICOM will be based in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future and plans to focus on increasing its representatives in embassies until decisions on the structure and location of AFRICOM’s presence are made. Having such a command will likely help DOD focus military efforts on the African continent, but the extent to which an integrated approach is feasible remains unclear. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2007, the President announced the U. S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a Department of Defense (DOD) geographic combatant command with a focus on strengthening U.S. security cooperation with Africa, creating opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, and enhancing peace and security efforts on the continent through activities such as military training and support to other U.S. government agencies' efforts. DOD officials have emphasized that AFRICOM is designed to integrate DOD and non-DOD personnel into the command to stimulate greater coordination among U.S. government agencies to achieve a more whole-of-government approach. This testimony is based on the preliminary results of work GAO is conducting for the Subcommittee on the establishment of AFRICOM. GAO analyzed relevant documentation and obtained perspectives from the combatant commands, military services, Joint Staff, Department of State, USAID and non-governmental organizations. GAO plans to provide the Subcommittee with a report later this year that will include recommendations as appropriate. This testimony addresses (1) the status of DOD's efforts to establish and fund AFRICOM and (2) challenges that may hinder the command's ability to achieve interagency participation and a more integrated, whole-of-government approach to DOD activities in Africa.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense has made progress in transferring activities, staffing the command, and establishing an interim headquarters for AFRICOM, but has not yet fully estimated the additional costs of establishing and operating the command. To date, AFRICOM's primary focus has been on assuming responsibility for existing DOD activities such as military exercises and humanitarian assistance programs, and DOD plans to have most of these activities transferred by October 1, 2008. DOD has approved 1,304 positions for the command's headquarters, and by October 1, 2008, plans to have filled about 75 percent, or 980 positions. Also, DOD plans to have 13 other positions filled by representatives from non-DOD organizations, such as the State Department. DOD is renovating facilities in Stuttgart, Germany, for interim headquarters and plans to use these facilities for the foreseeable future until decisions are made regarding the permanent AFRICOM headquarters location. The initial concept for AFRICOM, designed and developed by DOD, met resistance from within the U.S. government and African countries and contributed to several implementation challenges. First, DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, which is critical to synchronizing DOD efforts with other U. S. government agencies. DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in the command. According to DOD, other agencies have limited resources and personnel systems which have not easily accommodated DOD's intent to place interagency personnel in the command. Second, DOD has encountered concerns from civilian agencies and other stakeholders over the command's mission and goals. For example, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development officials have expressed concerns that AFRICOM will become the lead for all U.S. efforts in Africa, rather than just DOD activities. If not addressed, these concerns could limit the command's ability to develop key partnerships. Third, DOD has not yet reached agreement with the State Department and potential host nations on the structure and location of the command's presence in Africa. Uncertainties related to AFRICOM's presence hinder DOD's ability to estimate future funding requirements for AFRICOM and raises questions about whether DOD's concept for developing enduring relationships on the continent can be achieved. |
gao_GAO-07-231 | gao_GAO-07-231_0 | According to data from 2002 through 2005, elimination periods can range from 0 to at least 730 days. Partnership Policies Must Include Certain Benefits Not Required of Traditional Policies, and Insurance Companies Cannot Charge Higher Premiums for Asset Protection in Partnership Policies
The four states with Partnership programs require that Partnership policies include certain benefits—such as inflation protection and minimum daily benefit amounts—while traditional long-term care insurance policies may include these benefits but are not generally required to do so. We found that from 2002 through 2005, a higher percentage of Partnership policyholders purchased policies with more extensive coverage compared with policyholders who purchased traditional long-term care insurance nationally. Insurance Companies Cannot Charge Partnership Policyholders Higher Premiums for Asset Protection, and Premiums for Partnership Policies Must Be Equivalent to Premiums of Traditional Policies That Have Comparable Benefits
According to state officials, the four states with Partnership programs require Partnership and traditional long-term care insurance policies to have equivalent premiums if the benefits offered—except for asset protection—are otherwise comparable. Long-Term Care Insurance Policyholders Are Generally Wealthier than Those Without Such Insurance, and Partnership Policyholders Are Typically Younger than Traditional Long- Term Care Insurance Policyholders
Long-term care insurance policyholders—that is, both Partnership policyholders and traditional long-term care insurance policyholders—are more likely to have higher incomes and more assets than people without long-term care insurance. However, our scenarios suggest that an individual could self-finance care and delay Medicaid eligibility for about the same amount of time as he or she would have with a Partnership policy, although we identify some circumstances that could delay or accelerate the time to Medicaid eligibility. Based on surveys of Partnership policyholders conducted by state Partnership programs in California, Connecticut, and Indiana, we estimate that, in the absence of a Partnership program in their state, 80 percent of Partnership policyholders would have purchased traditional long-term care insurance policies instead, while the other 20 percent would have self-financed their care. To assess the impact Partnership programs may have on Medicaid savings in the four states with Partnership programs, we explored, under three different illustrative financing scenarios and using certain assumptions, how long it would take before an individual using a Partnership policy would become eligible for Medicaid and how long—in the absence of a Partnership program—it would take for the same individual to become eligible for Medicaid using the other two financing options depicted in the scenarios. However, the number of policyholders that this applies to is unlikely to be large enough to offset the number of Partnership policyholders who represent a potential source of increased Medicaid spending. While we do not have information about the amount of assets that Partnership policyholders have at the time they use their benefits, survey data from California and Connecticut indicate that when Partnership policyholders purchased their policies, they tended to purchase policies that were equal to or lower than the value of their household assets. This could result in some savings to Medicaid for those individuals who purchase Partnership policies instead of transferring assets. Few Partnership Policyholders Are Likely to Become Eligible for Medicaid, Limiting the Impact on Medicaid Expenditures
Although our survey data and scenarios show that about 80 percent of Partnership policyholders who become eligible for Medicaid are likely to do so sooner than they otherwise would have without a Partnership program, we also expect that few Partnership policyholders will actually become eligible for Medicaid and turn to the program to finance their long- term care. We do not know why some of the 292 individuals who exhausted their long-term care insurance benefits did not access Medicaid. Based on our scenario comparison and survey data, we anticipate that Partnership programs in California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York are unlikely to result in savings for their state Medicaid programs and could result in increased Medicaid expenditures. HHS commented that the results of our study should not be considered conclusive because the results do not adequately account for the effect of estate planning efforts such as asset transfers. However, our scenarios suggest that the savings associated with asset transfers are likely to offset the potential costs associated with policyholders who would have purchased traditional long-term care insurance in the absence of the Partnership programs. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, congressional committees, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Partnership programs allow individuals who purchase Partnership long-term care insurance policies to exempt at least some of their personal assets from Medicaid eligibility requirements. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined (1) the benefits and premium requirements of Partnership policies as compared with those of traditional long-term care insurance policies; (2) the demographics of Partnership policyholders, traditional long-term care insurance policyholders, and people without long-term care insurance; and (3) whether the Partnership programs are likely to result in savings for Medicaid. To examine benefits, premiums, and demographics, GAO used 2002 through 2005 data from the four states with Partnership programs--California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York--and other data sources. To assess the likely impact on Medicaid savings, GAO (1) used data from surveys of Partnership policyholders to estimate how they would have financed their long-term care without the Partnership program, (2) constructed three scenarios illustrative of the options for financing long-term care to compare how long it would take for an individual to spend his or her assets on long-term care and become eligible for Medicaid, and (3) estimated the likelihood that Partnership policyholders would become eligible for Medicaid based on their wealth and insurance benefits.
What GAO Found
California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York require Partnership programs to include certain benefits, such as inflation protection and minimum daily benefit amounts. Traditional long-term care insurance policies are generally not required to include these benefits. From 2002 through 2005, Partnership policyholders purchased policies with more extensive coverage than traditional policyholders. According to state officials, insurance companies must charge traditional and Partnership policyholders the same premiums for comparable benefits, and they are not permitted to charge policyholders higher premiums for asset protection. Partnership and traditional long-term care insurance policyholders tend to have higher incomes and more assets at the time they purchase their insurance, compared with those without insurance. In two of the four states, more than half of Partnership policyholders over 55 have a monthly income of at least $5,000 and more than half of all households have assets of at least $350,000 at the time they purchase a Partnership policy. Available survey data and illustrative financing scenarios suggest that the Partnership programs are unlikely to result in savings for Medicaid, and may increase spending. The impact, however, is likely to be small. About 80 percent of surveyed Partnership policyholders would have purchased traditional long-term care insurance policies if Partnership policies were not available, representing a potential cost to Medicaid. About 20 percent of surveyed Partnership policyholders indicate they would have self-financed their care in the absence of the Partnership program, and data are not yet available to directly measure when or if those individuals will access Medicaid had they not purchased a Partnership policy. However, illustrative financing scenarios suggest that an individual could self-finance care--delaying Medicaid eligibility--for about the same amount of time as he or she would have using a Partnership policy, although GAO identified some circumstances that could delay or accelerate Medicaid eligibility. While the majority of policyholders have the potential to increase spending, the impact on Medicaid is likely to be small because few policyholders are likely to exhaust their benefits and become eligible for Medicaid due to their wealth and having policies that will cover most of their long-term care needs. Information from the four states may prove useful to other states considering Partnership programs. States may want to consider the benefits to policyholders, the likely impact on Medicaid expenditures, and the income and assets of those likely to afford long-term care insurance. The Department of Health and Human Services commented on a draft of the report that our study results should not be considered conclusive because they do not adequately account for the effect of estate planning efforts such as asset transfers. While some Medicaid savings could result from people who purchase Partnership policies instead of transferring assets, they are unlikely to offset the costs associated with those who would have otherwise purchased traditional policies. |
gao_GAO-02-369T | gao_GAO-02-369T_0 | In an area of growing importance, VA has taken key steps in laying the groundwork for an integrated, departmentwide enterprise architecture—a blueprint for evolving its information systems and developing new systems that optimize their mission value. Crucial executive support has been established and the department has put in place a strategy to define products and processes that are critical to its development. VA is also currently recruiting a chief architect to assist in implementing and managing the enterprise architecture. Information security management is another area in which VA has taken important steps to strengthen its department-level program, including mandating information security performance standards and, thus, greater management accountability for senior executives. It has also updated security policies, procedures, and standards to guide the implementation of critical security measures. However, VA continues to report pervasive and serious information security weaknesses. Conversely, the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) managers and clinicians have made good progress in expanding their use of the decision support system (DSS) to facilitate clinical and financial decisionmaking. The use of DSS data for the fiscal year 2002 resource allocation process and a requirement that veteran integrated service network directors better account for their use of this system have both raised awareness of and promoted its utility among VHA facilities. Lastly, VA has achieved limited progress in its joint efforts with the Department of Defense and Indian Health Service to create an interface for sharing data in their health information systems, as part of the government computer-based patient record initiative. Strategies for implementing the project continue to be revised, its scope has been substantially narrowed, and it continues to operate without clear lines of authority or comprehensive, coordinated plans. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has laid the groundwork for an integrated, departmentwide enterprise architecture--a blueprint for evolving its information systems and developing new systems to optimize their mission value. Crucial executive support is in place and the department has a strategy to define products and processes critical to its development. VA is now recruiting a chief architect to help implement and manage the enterprise architecture. VA has tried to strengthen its information security management program by mandating information security performance standards and greater management accountability for senior executives. It has also updated security policies, procedures, and standards to implement critical security measures. Despite these efforts, VA continues to report pervasive and serious information security weaknesses. The Veterans Benefits Administration is still far from launching a modernized system to replace its aging benefits delivery network. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has made good progress in expanding the use of its decision support system (DSS) for clinical and financial decision making. The use of DSS data for the fiscal year 2002 resource allocation process, and a requirement that veteran integrated service network directors better account for their use of this system, have raised awareness of, and promoted its use, among VHA facilities. VA has made little progress in sharing data with the Department of Defense and Indian Health Service as part of a computer-based patient record initiative. Implementation strategies continue to be revised, the scope of the initiative has been substantially narrowed, and it continues to operate without clear lines of authority or comprehensive, coordinated plans. |
gao_GAO-02-604 | gao_GAO-02-604_0 | It completed a Final Interim Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Statement for the project in 1992. Most Environmental Concerns Have Been Addressed, but Several Related Issues Remain Unresolved
The Corps has largely addressed the likely environmental effects of the project’s dredging operations and dredge material disposal to the satisfaction of federal and state environmental agencies; however, several issues are not yet resolved. As of May 2002, the State of Delaware was still considering the permit application. Also, the Corps has not yet obtained a special use permit from the U.S. These involved several miscalculations, invalid assumptions, and reliance on outdated information. Consequently, we believe that the Corps’ current project analysis does not provide a reliable basis for deciding whether to proceed with the project. In addition, there are a number of uncertainties about the project that could increase or decrease both benefits and costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
Considering the significant problems we identified with the Corps’ economic justification for the Delaware River project, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Corps of Engineers to prepare a new and comprehensive economic analysis of the project’s benefits and costs, which includes all aspects of the analysis and corrects for the miscalculations, erroneous assumptions, and outdated information contained in the current analysis; obtain the information, where possible, that is needed to address the uncertainties—such as changing commodity movements over the last decade and alternative dredging techniques—that could significantly affect project benefits and costs; engage an external independent party to review the revised economic analysis to ensure that it accurately and fairly represents the expected benefits and costs of the proposed project; and submit the revised analysis, including the external independent review, to the Congress for its use in considering future appropriation requests for the project. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' February 1992 Final Interim Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Statement reported that deepening the Delaware River ship channel from 40 to 45 feet was economically justified and environmentally feasible.
What GAO Found
However, GAO found that it does not provide a reliable basis for deciding whether to proceed with the project. GAO identified several miscalculations, invalid assumptions, and the use of significantly outdated information on the Corps' benefits estimate. In addition, several unresolved issues and uncertainties were not factored into the Corps' economic analysis, the outcome of which could either increase or decrease the benefits and costs of the project. Because of these shortcomings, the actual economic merits of the project will be unclear until the Corps reanalyzes it. The Corps of Engineers has largely addressed the environmental concerns of federal and state environmental agencies. However, several unresolved issues remain, including the issuance of a permit from the state of Delaware governing construction projects that affect state waters. |
gao_GAO-06-868T | gao_GAO-06-868T_0 | Background
Congress established FHA in 1934 under the National Housing Act (P.L. FHA determines the expected cost of its insurance program, known as the credit subsidy cost, by estimating the program’s future performance. Two major trends in the conventional mortgage market have significantly affected FHA. The proposal, among other things, would authorize FHA to change the way it sets insurance premiums, insure larger loans, and reduce down-payment requirements. The Way FHA Developed and Uses TOTAL Limits the Scorecard’s Effectiveness in Assessing the Default Risk of Borrowers
If Congress authorizes the reforms HUD has proposed, FHA’s ability to assess the default risk of borrowers will take on increased importance because FHA would be adjusting insurance premiums based on its assessments of the credit risk of borrowers and insure potentially larger and riskier mortgages with low or no down payments. To improve how FHA benefits from TOTAL, we recommended that the agency explore additional uses for the scorecard, including using it to implement risk-based pricing of mortgage insurance and to develop new products. However, as we reported in September 2005, with the exception of the 1992 reestimate, FHA’s subsidy reestimates have been less favorable than the original estimates. In particular, FHA’s $7 billion reestimate for fiscal year 2003 was more than twice the size of any other reestimate from fiscal years 2000 through 2004. FHA has utilized pilots or demonstrations when making changes to its single-family mortgage insurance but generally has done so in response to legislative requirement rather than on its own initiative. FHA Has Not Implemented Sufficient Standards and Controls to Manage Risks Associated with the Growing Proportion of Loans with Down- Payment Assistance
HUD’s legislative proposal would represent a significant change to the agency’s single-family mortgage insurance program and presents new risk management challenges. Stricter Standards and Additional Controls Could Help FHA Manage the Risks Posed by Loans with Down-Payment Assistance
FHA has implemented some standards and internal controls to manage the risks associated with loans with down-payment assistance, but stricter standards and additional controls could help FHA better manage risks posed by these loans while meeting its mission of expanding homeownership opportunities. Observations
The risks FHA faces in today’s mortgage market are growing. For example, the agency has seen increased competition from conventional mortgage and insurance providers, many of which offer low- and no-down-payment products and that may be better able than FHA to identify and approve relatively low-risk borrowers. Additionally, FHA is insuring a greater proportion of loans with down-payment assistance. To effectively manage the risks posed by FHA’s existing products, we have concluded from our prior work that the agency must significantly improve its risk management and cost estimation practices. However, FHA needs to take additional steps, such as establishing policies and procedures for updating TOTAL scorecard on a regular basis, more fully considering the risks posed by down-payment assistance when underwriting loans, developing a framework for introducing new products in a way that mitigates risk, and studying and reporting on the impact of variables found to influence credit risk that are not currently in the agency’s loan performance models. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has faced several challenges in recent years, including rising default rates, higher-than-expected program costs, and a sharp decline in program participation. To help FHA adapt to market changes, HUD has proposed a number of changes to the National Housing Act that would raise FHA's mortgage limits, allow greater flexibility in setting insurance premiums, and reduce down-payment requirements. Implementing the proposed reforms would require FHA to manage new risks and estimate the costs of program changes. To assist Congress in considering issues faced by FHA, this testimony provides information from recent reports GAO has issued that address FHA's risk management and cost estimates. Specifically, this testimony looks at (1) FHA's development and use of its mortgage scorecard, (2) FHA's consistent underestimation of program costs, (3) instructive practices for managing risks of new mortgage products, and (4) weaknesses in FHA's management of risks related to loans with down-payment assistance.
What GAO Found
Recent trends in mortgage lending have significantly affected FHA, including increased use of automated tools (e.g., mortgage scoring) to underwrite loans, increased competition from lenders offering low-and no-down-payment products, and a growing proportion of FHA-insured loans with down-payment assistance. Although FHA has taken steps to improve its risk management, in a series of recent reports, GAO identified a number of weaknesses in FHA's ability to manage risk and estimate program costs during this period of change. The way that FHA developed and uses its mortgage scorecard, while generally reasonable, limits how effectively it assesses the default risk of borrowers. With one exception, FHA's reestimates of program costs have been less favorable than originally estimated, including a $7 billion reestimate for fiscal year 2003. FHA has not consistently implemented practices used by other mortgage institutions to help manage the risks associated with new mortgage products. FHA has not developed sufficient standards and controls to manage risks associated with insuring a growing proportion of loans with down-payment assistance. GAO made several recommendations in its recent reports, including that FHA (1) incorporate the risks posed by down-payment assistance into its mortgage scorecard, (2) study and report on the impact of variables not in its loan performance models that have been found to influence credit risk, and (3) consider piloting new mortgage products. FHA has taken actions in response to GAO's recommendations, but additional improvements in managing risk and estimating program costs will be important if FHA is to successfully implement its proposed program changes. |
gao_NSIAD-00-42 | gao_NSIAD-00-42_0 | Aviation and Safety Requirements for the Runway Protection Zone at Fallon NAS
Fallon NAS is governed by aviation safety and operational standards established by DOD for runway protection zones. Fallon NAS Limited Its Detailed Consideration to Three Alternatives
In arriving at the land management strategy for Fallon NAS, the Navy considered three alternatives in detail. As many as 11 different land management strategies were identified by Fallon NAS officials at the outset. These strategies were eliminated because the officials believed that they would be environmentally or economically unacceptable or would cause unacceptable operational or safety impairments. They also felt that the strategies would be expensive to maintain and would not provide a “soft” landing for any aircraft accident. Of the eight land management strategies, five were eliminated because Fallon NAS officials believed those strategies did not meet the evaluation criteria. Fallon NAS officials selected the first strategy: conventional farming with water conservation practices. At the time, these officials believed that the advantages of this strategy were the very high probability that it would satisfy the safety goals for the greenbelt for the long term and provide moderate water savings. Land Management Strategies Varied at Military Facilities and Commercial Airports Visited
The land management strategies varied at the seven other military facilities and commercial airports we visited. All were located in environments similar to Fallon NAS'. Two military facilities used greenbelts, while the other five did not. DOD also stated that the report did not mention the value of the Navy's use of irrigation water to the local community for agriculture and to enhancement of the safety of the Navy's operations. 2.) 3.) Land Use
The China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station operates its airstrips in desert terrain. 4.) 5.) 6.) 7.) 8.) Land use surrounding the airport varies. After follow-up discussions with Navy officials and with Senator Reid's office, we undertook this review to provide information on (1) the aviation safety and operational requirements for the runway protection zone at Fallon NAS, (2) the alternative land use strategies Fallon NAS identified in response to congressional direction and how it evaluated them, and (3) the current land use strategies at five military facilities and two commercial airports that operate in similar environments. To determine the land use strategies Fallon NAS identified and how it evaluated them in selecting the greenbelt approach, we obtained Fallon NAS' Natural Resources Management Plan, its Environmental Assessment for Management of the Greenbelt Area, and a study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service, “Plant Materials Trials on Revegetation of Abandoned Farmland.” We interviewed Fallon NAS and Conservation Service officials on the results of these studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on alternative land uses that could save water at Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, focusing on: (1) the aviation safety and operational requirements for the runway protection zone at Fallon Naval Air Station (NAS); (2) the alternative land use strategies Fallon NAS identified in response to congressional direction and how it evaluated them; and (3) the land use strategies at five military facilities and two commercial airports that operate in similar environments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Fallon NAS must comply with the Department of Defense's (DOD) aviation safety and operational requirements for runway protection zones; (2) these requirements specify the maximum safe heights for buildings, towers, poles, and other possible obstructions to air navigation; (3) under these requirements, where possible, areas immediately beyond the ends of runways and along primary flight paths should be developed sparsely, if at all, to limit the risk from a possible aircraft accident; (4) at Fallon NAS, the agricultural and other low-density land uses are compatible with air operations; (5) the land surrounding the airfield is owned by the Navy and leased to farmers for agricultural use, which is permitted by DOD; (6) Fallon NAS gave detailed consideration to three land management strategies in developing its approach to managing land in the runway protection zone in the early 1990s; (7) each of these strategies involved irrigating the greenbelt; (8) as many as 11 different land management strategies were identified at the outset, but three of them were eliminated before an initial screening because Fallon NAS officials believed they would be environmentally or economically unacceptable or would cause unacceptable operational or safety impairments; (9) Fallon NAS officials eliminated five of the remaining eight strategies prior to a detailed analysis because they believed the strategies did not meet the Navy's evaluation criteria, which were based on provisions of the law; (10) the criteria Fallon NAS used in evaluating these land management strategies were based on the officials' assessment of whether the strategies would minimize dust, bird strikes, fire and other hazards, would enhance air safety, and, to a lesser extent, would reduce the amount of irrigation water used; (11) after a detailed analysis and the application of these criteria, Fallon NAS officials selected the strategy that involves conventional farming combined with water conservation practices because they believed it would have a very high probability of satisfying the safety goals while providing moderate water savings compared with the air station's historical usage; (12) at the seven other military facilities and commercial airports GAO visited, the land management strategies varied--two used strategies involving greenbelts, while five did not; and (13) the military facilities and commercial airports operating in desert-like conditions similar to Fallon NAS' have employed land management strategies that have resulted in water savings. |
gao_GAO-14-249 | gao_GAO-14-249_0 | As shown in figure 7, monthly domestic crude oil production has increased by over 55 percent through September 2013 compared with average production in 2008. The rapid growth in U.S. and Canadian crude oil production has lowered the cost of crude oil for some domestic refiners that have the access and ability to process these crude oils. Two Key Regulations Have Likely Contributed to Declining Fuel Consumption and Compliance with One Has Increased Some Refiners’ Costs
According to stakeholders and the information we reviewed, two recently strengthened key environmental regulations—the coordinated CAFE and GHG vehicle emission standards, and the RFS—have likely affected the refining industry by reducing the consumption of petroleum fuels, and compliance with the RFS has recently increased costs for some refiners, as well as other challenges. RFS Has Had Three Main Effects Stakeholders we contacted and information we reviewed identified three main ways the RFS has affected U.S. petroleum refiners: (1) compliance has recently increased costs for some refiners, (2) required blending of renewable fuels has contributed to declining domestic consumption of petroleum-based transportation fuels, and (3) EPA’s delays in issuing annual RFS standards may have contributed to investment uncertainty for some refiners. Several stakeholders told us this increase in credit prices was primarily due to RFS requirements exceeding the capability of the transportation fuel infrastructure to distribute and the fleet of vehicles to use renewable fuels, referred to as the “blend wall.” A refiner we spoke with also attributed the decline in credit prices in the second half of 2013 to EPA’s statements expressing its desire to address the blend wall. As a result, refiners and other industry participants have blended increasing amounts of renewable fuels. Third, the RFS has contributed to investment uncertainty for refiners according to several stakeholders because EPA has not issued annual RFS standards on time since 2009. Without such analyses and a plan to address the underlying causes of the delays, EPA risks repeating them. Industry Outlook Depends on a Number of Factors
Stakeholders we contacted and information we reviewed generally suggest that the outlook of the U.S. refining industry depends on a number of factors, in particular: (1) future domestic consumption of petroleum products; (2) the extent to which key environmental regulations raise costs for domestic refiners; and (3) the extent to which domestic refiners will be able to export and compete in international markets. As discussed above, domestic petroleum product consumption declined by 11 percent from 2005 through 2012, and forecasts we reviewed project consumption of three major petroleum products—gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel—will be stable to slightly increasing through 2020, but not returning to high levels of the past. Key regulations. In general, increasing costs for refiners may be absorbed by refiners themselves (i.e., by reducing their profits), be passed on to consumers through higher product prices, or both. Extent to Which Refiners Can Export and Compete in Foreign Markets
While the domestic refining industry has increasingly relied on export markets, stakeholders and forecasts we reviewed indicate that the industry’s future competitiveness is uncertain and that foreign markets present both challenges and opportunities for U.S. refiners. Exports of petroleum products represented 7 percent of refinery production in 2007 but increased to 17 percent in 2012. Stakeholders and information we reviewed suggest that various factors may affect the U.S. refining industry’s future competitiveness, including: (1) the balance between global refining capacity and global demand for petroleum products, (2) costs associated with environmental regulations, (3) exports to nations with stringent fuel standards, and (4) increasing domestic and Canadian crude oil production. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve EPA’s ability to meet the annual statutory deadline for issuing annual RFS standards, we recommend that the Administrator of the EPA take the following two actions:
Assess past experience to identify the underlying causes of delays in issuing annual RFS standards. To provide information on major changes that have affected the domestic petroleum refining industry and the future of the industry, we reviewed information including the following: studies by federal agencies and consultants, company financial regulatory filings, and proposed and final regulations and regulatory impact analyses. We also asked agency officials and other stakeholders we contacted to recommend studies. Based on our research and information from stakeholders, we identified five key regulations that were recently strengthened or proposed: (1) the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Renewable Fuels Standard regulations, (2) the Department of Transportation’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy and EPA’s greenhouse gas vehicle emission standards; (3) EPA’s Tier 3 Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards; (4) EPA’s stationary source greenhouse gas requirements; and (5) the state of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard. Stakeholders included representatives from refining companies, environmental organizations, consultants, and officials from federal and state agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. petroleum refining industry—the largest refining industry in the world—experienced a period of high product prices and industry profits from the early 2000s through about 2007. Since the recession of 2007 to 2009, the industry has been in transition.
Federal and state agencies regulate petroleum refining and the use of petroleum products to protect human health and the environment, as well as for other purposes. EPA, DOT, and California recently proposed or strengthened five key regulations, including EPA and DOT's coordinated fuel economy and GHG vehicle emission standards, and EPA's RFS, which has required that refiners and others ensure transportation fuels include increasing amounts of renewable fuels such as ethanol produced from corn.
GAO was asked to provide information on the domestic petroleum refining industry. This report examines: (1) major changes that have recently affected the industry and (2) the future of the industry. GAO reviewed information including studies by agencies and consultants and company financial filings; interviewed stakeholders, including agency officials and representatives of refiners and environmental organizations; and reviewed forecasts by the Energy Information Administration and others.
What GAO Found
Stakeholders GAO contacted and information reviewed by GAO identified the following three major changes that have recently affected the domestic petroleum refining industry:
Increased production. U.S. and Canadian crude oil production have increased, leading to lower costs of crude oil for some refiners. After generally declining for decades, monthly U.S. crude oil production increased over 55 percent compared with average production in 2008.
Declining consumption. Domestic consumption of petroleum products declined by 11 percent from 2005 through 2012, resulting in a smaller domestic market for refiners.
Key regulations. Two key regulations—the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and Department of Transportation's (DOT) coordinated fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) vehicle emission standards, as well as EPA's Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—have contributed to declining petroleum-based fuel consumption. For some refiners, compliance with the RFS increased costs in the first half of 2013, though costs have since declined to some degree from their peak. According to some stakeholders GAO contacted, this was primarily due to RFS requirements exceeding the capability of the transportation fuel infrastructure to distribute and the fleet of vehicles to use renewable fuels. Moreover, EPA has missed the statutory deadline to issue regulations establishing annual RFS blending standards since 2009. EPA has not systematically identified the underlying causes of these delays or changed its approach in order to avoid them. A late RFS contributes to industry uncertainty, which can increase costs because industry cannot plan and budget effectively, according to some stakeholders.
Stakeholders GAO contacted and information reviewed generally suggested that the U.S. refining industry's outlook depends on the following factors:
Domestic consumption. Future consumption of petroleum products is uncertain, with projections ranging from stable to slightly increasing through 2020 but not returning to consumption levels of the past. Forecasts GAO reviewed suggest higher future refinery production in scenarios with higher domestic consumption.
Costs of key regulations . The extent to which requirements in the key regulations increase costs for refiners will affect the industry's outlook. For example, future costs to comply with RFS may depend on the annual renewable fuel volumes EPA sets and whether EPA issues annual RFS standards on time. In general, increasing costs may be absorbed by refiners (i.e., by reducing their profits), be passed on to consumers through higher prices, or both.
Foreign markets. The U.S. refining industry has increasingly relied on foreign markets. Exports grew from 7 percent of production in 2007 to 17 percent in 2012. The extent to which domestic refiners export their products will depend on the competitiveness of U.S. refiners. Factors that may affect competitiveness include domestic environmental regulations, levels of U.S. and Canadian crude oil production, and the balance between global refining capacity and demand for petroleum products.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA identify the underlying causes of delays in issuing RFS standards and implement a plan to issue RFS standards on time. EPA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-631 | gao_GAO-01-631_0 | In short, DLA’s goal is “to do business as business does business.”
According to BSM program documents, DLA’s transformation from its current to its future role requires modernization of the IT systems that now support DLA’s materiel management business function, subfunctions, and processes. Thus, the first release will be deployed to all three Defense Supply Centers at once. DLA’s Approach to Developing an Architecture Is Not Enterprise Focused
BSM officials, including the BSM program manager and chief architect, have acknowledged that DLA does not have an enterprise architecture. To date, DLA has treated the entire BSM program as one investment decision, justified by a single economic analysis, because this approach was consistent with DOD policy for major system acquisitions that were in effect until January 2001. DLA Has Not Yet Made Investment Decisions Incrementally
Although DLA plans to acquire and implement its BSM system solution in four increments, it has not so far managed BSM investments incrementally. They also stated that they would follow this approach to investing in later releases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether DLA is using an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain its investment in its Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program and (2) whether DLA is investing in BSM in an incremental manner. 4. Notwithstanding DLA’s recent commitments to incrementally invest in BSM, DLA has so far treated BSM as a single investment decision. 28. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) plays a critical role in supporting America's military forces worldwide. DLA employs about 28,000 civilian and military workers at about 500 sites in all 50 states and 28 countries; in round numbers, it manages 4 million supply items and processes 30 million annual supply distribution actions. This report reviews DLA's efficiency and effectiveness in managing it is Business Systems Modernization (BSM) acquisition program. Specifically GAO determines (1) whether DLA is using an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain its investment in (BSM) and (2) whether DLA is investing in BSM in an incremental manner.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DLA does not have an enterprise architecture to guide its investment in BSM. DLA plans call for creating an architecture as a byproduct of BSM's implementation. In addition, GAO found that DLA has not been managing its investment in this program in an incremental manner; that is, DLA has not treated the first of its four planned incremental releases of BSM as a separate investment decision. Instead, DLA has thus far treated the entire BSM program as a single investment decision, according to BSM officials. DLA now plans to take an incremental approach to future releases. This change would ensure that DLA's investment decisions are consistent with statutory requirements and federal guidance. |
gao_GAO-01-749 | gao_GAO-01-749_0 | Coverage of screening and necessary treatment for children is one of these requirements. Limited Available Data Indicate Many Children Do Not Receive EPSDT Services
Despite statutory reporting requirements, reliable national data are not available on the extent to which children in Medicaid are receiving EPSDT services. Some Studies Show Screening Rates Are Low
While HCFA’s data cannot present a reliable and comprehensive picture of the extent to which children in Medicaid receive EPSDT services, other studies indicate that many of these children are not receiving such services. Several advocacy groups we interviewed echoed concerns that states and managed care plans do not adequately inform beneficiaries about the broad scope of EPSDT services or about beneficiary appeal rights. Ensuring Service Delivery
States have also put into action a number of initiatives to help ensure that managed care plans and health providers deliver screening and treatment services to children enrolled in Medicaid. For example, to encourage Medicaid beneficiaries, including those in managed care, to take advantage of preventive care, Florida mails reminder letters to families when their children are due for EPSDT screens. They have also identified needed actions to improve children’s access to EPSDT care. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the federal role in ensuring the delivery of EPSDT services and to bring greater visibility to ways that states can better serve children in Medicaid, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS: work with states to develop criteria and time frames for consistently assessing and improving EPSDT reporting and the provision of services, including requiring that states develop improvement plans as appropriate for achieving the EPSDT goal of providing health services to children in Medicaid; and develop a mechanism for sharing information among states on successful state, plan, and provider practices for reaching children in Medicaid. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) Program calls for states to provide children and adolescents under age 21 with access to comprehensive, periodic evaluations of health, development, and nutritional status, as well as vision, hearing, and dental services. There is concern that state Medicaid programs are not doing an adequate job of screening children for medical conditions or providing treatment for the children who need it. There is also concern about how these services are faring under managed care plans. This report examines (1) the extent to which children in Medicaid are receiving EPSDT services, (2) efforts that selected states are taking to improve delivery of EPSDT services, particularly within managed care, and (3) federal government efforts to ensure that state Medicaid programs provide covered EPSDT services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the extent to which children in Medicaid are receiving EPSDT services are not fully known, but the available evidence indicates that many are not receiving these services. A Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General study found that less than one-half of enrolled children in their sample received any EPSDT screens. GAO found that states are taking actions to improve delivery of EPSDT services, particularly within managed care. These actions include linking several state databases, publishing statistics that compare performance, contracting with local health departments to coordinate care for children, and mailing reminder letters to parents. Federal efforts to ensure that children are receiving services have largely focused on changing the state reports so that they can collect reliable information about the extent of the EPSDT screening. |
gao_GAO-17-99 | gao_GAO-17-99_0 | Also, in 2008, Congress mandated that DOD implement a centralized, case-level database for the collection and maintenance of information regarding sexual assault involving a member of the armed forces. DOD Has Implemented DSAID across the Military Services and Taken Steps to Standardize Its Use and Monitor Data Quality
DOD Has Implemented DSAID across the Military Services
As of October 2013, DOD had implemented DSAID across the military services, and the military services were using it to track and collect data on sexual assault cases. Data are input into DSAID through both manual and automated data entry processes, and include, as applicable, victim and referral support information; investigative and incident information; and case outcome data. DOD Has Taken Steps to Standardize the Use of DSAID across the Military Services Development of Policies, Processes, and Procedures
Since 2012, DOD has taken several steps to standardize the use of DSAID throughout the department, including the development of (1) policies, processes, and procedures for use of the system; (2) training for system users; and (3) processes for monitoring the completeness of data. Further, DOD has instituted formal processes to facilitate changes to DSAID. Users Have Identified Technical Challenges with DSAID and DOD Plans to Implement Modifications to Alleviate Challenges
DSAID users have identified a variety of technical challenges with the system and DOD officials told us they have plans to spend approximately $8.5 million to address most of these issues in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Some of the key technical challenges users have reported experiencing with the system are related to DSAID’s system speed and ease of use; interfaces with MCIO databases; utility as a case management tool; and users’ ability to query data and generate reports. DOD has plans in place to implement modifications to DSAID that are expected to alleviate these challenges; however, officials stated that they will not get approval to fund these modifications until after having conducted an analysis of alternatives in line with DOD’s acquisition policy framework. This framework, and the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide outline key elements that should be included in this analysis, such as relative lifecycle costs and benefits; the methods and rationale for quantifying the lifecycle costs and benefits; the effect and value of cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs; the sensitivity to changes in assumptions; and risk factors for any proposed modifications. Conducting a comparative analysis of alternatives, including identifying and quantifying lifecycle costs and benefits and weighing the cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs, is key to ensuring that DOD appropriately manages its modifications to DSAID. In 2010, we found that DOD had failed to demonstrate adherence to these key elements in the initial development and implementation of DSAID. DOD projected it will have spent a total of approximately $31.5 million as of November 2016 on implementing and maintaining DSAID through fiscal year 2018. This is approximately $13 million more than the revised 2012 estimate. DOD’s plan to conduct an analysis of alternatives that adheres to the department’s acquisition framework and adequately considers key elements identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, as DOD officials have stated that their analysis will do, should position DOD to more accurately assess whether planned modifications to DSAID can be implemented within budget and with the desired outcome. DOD’s Process for Managing Changes to DSAID Substantially Aligns with Key Elements of Industry Standards
DOD manages modifications to DSAID through its change management process, which we found, based on our review of DOD documentation, substantially align with the elements described in the project management and information technology industry standards that we reviewed. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Change Requests Prioritized for Implementation in Fiscal Year 2017
Table 3 describes change requests to the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID) that the Department of Defense (DOD) has prioritized for implementation in fiscal year 2017. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported that DOD has not collected uniform data on sexual assaults involving members of the armed forces. In 2008, Congress required DOD to implement a centralized, case-level database for the collection and maintenance of these data. In 2012, DSAID reached initial operational capability to capture sexual assault data. House Report 112-479 included a provision for GAO to review DSAID no sooner than 1 year after it was certified compliant with DOD standards by the Secretary of Defense.
This report (1) describes the current status of DOD's implementation of DSAID and steps DOD has taken to help standardize DSAID's use, (2) assesses any technical challenges DSAID's users have identified and any DOD plans to address those challenges, and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD's change management process for modifying DSAID aligns with information technology and project management industry standards.
GAO reviewed DOD documents, and interviewed DOD program officials as well as DSAID users. Specifically, GAO conducted site visits to 9 military installations and met with 42 DSAID users. Views obtained are nongeneralizable. Installations were selected based on their use of DSAID, number of users, geographic diversity, and other factors.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
As of October 2013, the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID) was fully implemented and in use across the military services, and DOD had taken several steps to standardize DSAID's use throughout the department. Sexual assault incident data are input into DSAID through both manual and automated data entry processes and include, as applicable, victim and referral support information, investigative and incident information, and case outcome data for certain incidents of sexual assault that involve a servicemember. Additionally, in some instances DSAID includes sexual assault cases involving a servicemember spouse, an adult family member, and DOD civilians and contractors. Further, DOD has taken several steps to standardize DSAID's use through the development of (1) policies, processes, and procedures for using the system; (2) training for system users; and (3) processes for monitoring the completeness of data.
DSAID users have identified technical challenges with the system and DOD officials stated that they have plans to spend approximately $8.5 million to implement modifications to DSAID that address most of these challenges in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. Some of the key technical challenges users have identified experiencing with the system relate to DSAID's system speed and ease of use; interfaces with other external DOD databases; and users' ability to query data and generate reports. DOD has plans in place to implement modifications to DSAID that are expected to alleviate these challenges; however, officials stated that they will not be approved to fund these modifications until they have conducted an analysis of alternatives that is in line with DOD's acquisition policy framework. This framework, as well as the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide , outline key elements of this analysis, such as relative lifecycle costs and benefits and the effect and value of cost and schedule, among others. Conducting an analysis of alternatives including these elements is key to ensuring that DOD appropriately manages its modifications to DSAID. In 2010, GAO found that DOD had failed to demonstrate adherence to these key elements in the initial development and implementation of DSAID, and, DOD projects it will have spent a total of approximately $31.5 million on implementing and maintaining DSAID through fiscal year 2018. This is approximately $13 million more than the 2012 estimate. DOD's plan to conduct an analysis of alternatives that adequately considers key elements should position DOD to more accurately assess whether planned modifications to DSAID can be implemented within budget and result in the desired outcome.
DOD manages modifications to DSAID through its change management process, which GAO found substantially aligns with key applicable elements established in the industry standards that GAO reviewed. Specifically, DOD has established processes for managing change requests, such as developing a process to evaluate requested changes to the database and establishing a board that approves, tracks, and controls changes to the database. DOD has also established processes for configuration management, including a process to track, communicate, and deliver changes to the database. |
gao_GAO-10-59 | gao_GAO-10-59_0 | In fact, scheduling and planning are so important that the Bureau has already established a high-level schedule for planning the 2020 Census. As we have previously reported, the Bureau had initially planned to carry out major field data collection activities using hand held computing devices. However, the Bureau does not link within its schedule estimates of resource requirements—such as labor hours and materials—to respective activities. Bureau Plans to Deliver Two Key Systems on a Tight Schedule
The automated control system that the Bureau plans to use to help manage the data collection operations of the decennial census still faces significant development and testing milestones, some of which are scheduled to be completed just before the system needs to be deployed before respective field operations begin. Further, software developers may not have the required information to meet the Bureau’s needs. Quality Control Matching and Coding Software for Nonreponse Follow-up and Update/Enumerate Faces Testing Delays and Revisions to Requirements
The Bureau has experienced delays in the development and testing of software that will play a key role along with PBOCS in controlling and managing field data collection activity for the quality assurance programs of NRFU and Update/Enumerate. The compressed testing schedule leaves little time for additional delays in writing software or conducting tests. Conclusions
Our review of the Bureau’s master schedule for conducting the 2010 Census and the processes the Bureau uses to manage it suggests that it is doing a commendable job conducting such a large and complex undertaking consistent with leading scheduling practices. Yet, the Bureau’s generally well-defined and integrated schedule provides an essential road map for the systematic execution of the census and the means by which to gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau to take the following three actions: To improve the Bureau’s use of its master schedule to manage the 2020 decennial census: Include estimates of the resources, such as labor, materials, and overhead costs, in the 2020 integrated schedule for each activity as the schedule is built, and prepare to carry out other steps as necessary to conduct systematic schedule risk analyses on the 2020 schedule. To improve the Bureau’s ability to manage paper-based field operations in the 2010 Decennial Census, finalize and prioritize detailed requirements and implement reliable progress reporting on the development of the paper-based operations control system, including estimates of effort needed to complete remaining development. | Why GAO Did This Study
To carry out the decennial census, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) conducts a sequence of thousands of activities and numerous operations. As requested, The Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined (1) the Bureau's use of scheduling tools to maintain and monitor progress and (2) the status of two systems key to field data collection: the control system the Bureau will use to manage the work flow for paper-based operations, including nonresponse follow-up, and the system used to manage quality control of two major field operations. GAO applied schedule analysis tools; reviewed Bureau evaluations, planning documents, and other documents on work flow management; and interviewed Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's master schedule provides a useful tool to gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability as the Bureau carries out the census. GAO found that the Bureau's use of its master schedule generally follows leading scheduling practices that enable such high-level oversight. However, errors GAO found in the Bureau's schedule hinder the Bureau's ability to identify the effects of activity delays and to plan for the unexpected. The Bureau has recently begun taking systematic steps to identify and correct remaining errors. However, within its schedule, the Bureau does not identify the resources needed to complete activities, making it difficult for the Bureau to evaluate the costs of schedule changes or the resource constraints that may occur at peak levels of activity. Leveraging the 2010 scheduling experience and including resource needs in the 2020 schedule should facilitate planning for the 2020 Census, already underway. The automated control system that the Bureau plans to use to help manage major field data collection operations has significant development and testing milestones remaining, with some scheduled to finish shortly before the system needs to be deployed. This aggressive schedule leaves little time for resolving problems that may arise, and without prioritized and final software specifications and reliable progress measures, the Bureau may not get what it needs from the system to conduct the operations. Additionally, development of quality control software for two major field operations faces delays, although detailed specifications and test plans are final. |
gao_GAO-05-821 | gao_GAO-05-821_0 | Differences in How States Define Work Activities Result in Inconsistent Measurement of Work Participation across States and over Time
We found that differences in how states define the 12 categories of federal work activities result in some states counting hours recipients spend in activities that other states do not consider allowable activities for meeting federal work participation requirements. Also, some states have made changes in their definitions of some categories of federal work activities, making what is measured by those states’ work participation rates inconsistent from year to year. Some States Do Not Have Internal Controls Needed for Reporting Data in Accordance with HHS Guidance, while Other States Do
Some of the states we reviewed did not have internal controls to help ensure that reported hours of participation in work activities are in accordance with HHS guidance. Insufficient monitoring to verify that hours were reported correctly. Some States Have Systematic Approaches for Verifying Reported Data
While some of the states we reviewed lacked internal controls, other states have implemented systematic practices to help ensure that reported data are in accordance with HHS guidance. HHS Has Provided Minimal Oversight of States’ Definitions of Work Activities
Under PRWORA, HHS has authority to regulate states’ definitions of work activities. However, HHS has chosen not to issue regulations for this purpose in order to promote the flexibility PRWORA provided states and in response to calls from states for as much flexibility as possible in designing their TANF programs, according to HHS officials. HHS Has Provided Limited Guidance to States on the Appropriate Hours to Report
Although HHS has provided states with general guidance on reporting actual hours of work participation, the guidance lacks specific criteria for determining the appropriate hours to report. Because of the differences among states in the activities that they count in calculating the work participation rate and in the internal controls over the data used in the calculation, states are being measured by different standards, and the work participation rates cannot be used to compare the performance of states. Appendix I: Elements of the Work Participation Requirement and How the Work Participation Rate Is Calculated
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) work participation requirement is composed of (1) a requirement for a minimum number of hours recipients must participate in order to be counted as engaged in work activities and (2) a requirement for the percentage of TANF families with an adult (or minor head of household) a state must have engaged in work activities. Welfare to Work: JOBS Participation Rate Data Unreliable for Assessing States’ Performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The debate over reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant has focused on work requirements and brought attention to the measure of TANF work participation. The measure is used to assess states' performance and determine whether a state is subject to penalty for not meeting TANF work requirements. The 2003 work participation rates ranged from 9 to 88 percent for the 50 states based on data they submit to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). To help Congress understand these rates, GAO looked at (1) how selected states are defining the categories of work activities, (2) whether selected states have implemented internal controls over the work participation data, and (3) what guidance and oversight HHS has provided states.
What GAO Found
Differences in how states define the 12 categories of work that count toward meeting TANF work participation requirements have resulted in some states counting activities that other states do not count and, therefore, in an inconsistent measurement of work participation across states. For example, 5 of the 10 states we reviewed considered caring for a disabled household or family member to count toward the federal work participation requirement, while 5 did not consider hours spent in this activity to be countable. We also found that some states made significant changes in their definitions of the categories of work. As a result, the work participation rates for these states cannot be compared from year to year. Some of the states in our review have implemented internal controls to help report work participation hours in accordance with HHS guidance, while other states lack such internal controls. Some states have not issued guidance on how to verify that reported hours were actually worked, nor do they monitor data reported by their staff to help ensure that hours are reported correctly. In contrast, a few states have systematic approaches for verifying that hours reported were worked. HHS has provided limited oversight and guidance to states on appropriately defining work activities and reporting hours of work participation. According to HHS officials, HHS has the authority to regulate states' definitions of work activities. However, to promote state flexibility, HHS chose not to issue regulations for this purpose. Further, HHS's guidance lacks specific criteria for determining the appropriate hours to report. Given that HHS has not exercised oversight of states' definitions and internal controls, states are making different decisions about what to measure. Therefore, there is no standard basis for interpreting states' rates, and the rates cannot effectively be used to assess and compare states' performance. |
gao_GAO-16-562T | gao_GAO-16-562T_0 | Problems Newly Enrolled Veterans Faced in Accessing Primary Care and Obtaining Timely Access to Care
Our review of medical records for a sample of newly enrolled veterans at six VA medical centers found several problems in medical centers’ processing of veterans’ requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments, and thus not all newly enrolled veterans were able to access primary care. VA medical center staff did not follow VHA scheduling policy. For the 120 newly enrolled veterans across the six VA medical centers in our review who requested care and were seen by primary care providers, we found the average number of days between newly enrolled veterans’ initial requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments and the dates the veterans were seen by primary care providers ranged from 22 days to 71 days. Appointments were not always available when veterans wanted to be seen, which contributed to delays in receiving care. VHA’s Oversight of Veterans’ Access to Primary Care Is Hindered in Part by Data Weaknesses
VHA’s oversight of veterans’ access to primary care is hindered, in part, by data weaknesses and the lack of a comprehensive scheduling policy, both of which are inconsistent with federal internal control standards. These standards call for agencies to have reliable data and effective policies to achieve their objectives, and for information to be recorded and communicated to the entity’s management and others who need it to carry out their responsibilities. For newly enrolled veterans, VHA calculates primary care appointment wait times starting from veterans’ preferred dates, rather than the dates veterans initially requested that VA contact them to schedule appointments. Therefore, these data do not capture the time veterans wait prior to being contacted by schedulers, making it difficult for officials to identify and remedy scheduling problems that may arise prior to making contact with veterans. Further, ongoing scheduling errors, such as incorrectly revising preferred dates when rescheduling appointments, understated the amount of time veterans waited to see providers. Officials attributed these errors to confusion by schedulers resulting from the lack of an updated standardized scheduling directive, which VHA rescinded and replaced with an interim directive in July 2014. As in our previous work, we continue to find scheduling errors that affect the reliability of wait-time data used for oversight, which make it difficult to effectively oversee newly enrolled veterans’ access to primary care. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2016 report, entitled VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Improve Newly Enrolled Veterans' Access to Primary Care , GAO-16-328 .
What GAO Found
GAO found that not all newly enrolled veterans were able to access primary care from the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and others experienced wide variation in the amount of time they waited for care. Sixty of the 180 newly enrolled veterans in GAO's review had not been seen by providers at the time of the review; nearly half were unable to access primary care because VA medical center staff did not schedule appointments for these veterans in accordance with VHA policy. The 120 newly enrolled veterans in GAO's review who were seen by providers waited from 22 days to 71 days from their requests that VA contact them to schedule appointments to when they were seen, according to GAO's analysis. These time frames were impacted by limited appointment availability and weaknesses in medical center scheduling practices, which contributed to unnecessary delays.
VHA's oversight of veterans' access to primary care is hindered, in part, by data weaknesses and the lack of a comprehensive scheduling policy. This is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to have reliable data and effective policies to achieve their objectives. For newly enrolled veterans, VHA calculates primary care appointment wait times starting from the veterans' preferred dates (the dates veterans want to be seen), rather than the dates veterans initially requested VA contact them to schedule appointments. Therefore, these data do not capture the time these veterans wait prior to being contacted by schedulers, making it difficult for officials to identify and remedy scheduling problems that arise prior to making contact with veterans. Further, ongoing scheduling errors, such as incorrectly revising preferred dates when rescheduling appointments, understated the amount of time veterans waited to see providers. Officials attributed these errors to confusion by schedulers, resulting from the lack of an updated standardized scheduling policy. These errors continue to affect the reliability of wait-time data used for oversight, which makes it more difficult to effectively oversee newly enrolled veterans' access to primary care. |
gao_GAO-07-660 | gao_GAO-07-660_0 | Currently, TSA conducts compliance inspections of domestic and foreign passenger carriers transporting cargo into the United States, but does not perform such inspections of all air carriers transporting inbound air cargo. For instance, TSA has completed a strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security and has identified the primary threats associated with inbound air cargo. Also within DHS, CBP has recently initiated efforts to mitigate the threat of a WMD entering the United States by targeting inbound air cargo transported on passenger and all-cargo aircraft that may pose a security risk and inspecting such cargo once it arrives in the United States. Finally, TSA and CBP have taken steps to coordinate their responsibilities to safeguard air cargo transported into the United States, but the two agencies do not have a systematic process in place to share information that could be used to strengthen their efforts to secure inbound air cargo. TSA officials acknowledged that it is important to partner with CBP, foreign governments, and international air cargo stakeholders in developing a strategy for securing inbound air cargo. The final rule also acknowledges that TSA amended its security directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. However, TSA has not developed a similar inspection plan for international aviation security. However, working with foreign governments to achieve harmonization may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary. In addition, some foreign governments do not share DHS’s view regarding the threats and risk associated with air cargo. To help strengthen the Transportation Security Administration’s inbound air cargo security efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following four actions: (3) establish a methodology and time frame for completing assessments of inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets, and use these assessments as a basis for prioritizing the actions necessary to enhance the security of inbound air cargo; (4) establish a time frame for completing the assessment of whether existing inspection exemptions for inbound air cargo pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the security of air cargo, and take steps, if necessary, to address identified vulnerabilities; (5) develop and implement an inspection plan that includes performance goals and measures to evaluate foreign and domestic air carrier compliance with inbound air cargo security requirements; and (6) in collaboration with foreign governments and the U.S. air cargo industry, systematically compile and analyze information on air cargo security practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the department’s overall air cargo security program, including assessing whether the benefits that these practices could provide in strengthening the security of the U.S. and inbound air cargo supply chain are cost- effective, without impeding the flow of commerce. While CBP’s and TSA’s efforts to collaborate on their air cargo security activities are worthwhile, it is also important that TSA and CBP develop a system to share information—such as the results of TSA inspections of air carrier compliance with TSA inbound air cargo security requirements and TSA assessments of foreign airports’ compliance with international air cargo security standards—that could be used to strengthen the department’s efforts to secure inbound air cargo. (2) What practices have the air cargo industry and select foreign countries adopted that could potentially be used to enhance DHS’s efforts to strengthen air cargo security, and to what extent have the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) worked with foreign government stakeholders to enhance its air cargo security efforts? To determine what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened, we reviewed TSA’s domestic air cargo strategic plan, proposed and final air cargo security rules, air cargo-related security directives and emergency amendments, aircraft operator security programs, and related guidance to determine the requirements placed on air carriers for ensuring inbound air cargo security. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for securing air cargo transported into the United States from another country, referred to as inbound air cargo, and preventing implements of terrorism from entering the country. GAO examined (1) what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened; and (2) what practices the air cargo industry and foreign governments have adopted that could enhance DHS's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and to what extent DHS has worked with foreign governments to enhance their air cargo security efforts. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed relevant DHS documents, interviewed DHS officials, and conducted site visits to seven countries in Europe and Asia.
What GAO Found
Within DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have taken a number of actions designed to secure inbound air cargo, but these efforts are still largely in the early stages and could be strengthened. For instance, TSA completed a risk-based strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security, but has not developed a similar strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security, including how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. In addition, while TSA has identified the primary threats to inbound air cargo, it has not yet assessed inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. Moreover, TSA's air cargo security rule incorporated a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of inbound air cargo. This final rule also acknowledges that TSA amended its security directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. However, TSA continues to exempt certain types of inbound air cargo transported on passenger air carriers from inspection. Further, TSA inspects domestic and foreign passenger air carriers with service to the United States to assess whether they are complying with air cargo security requirements, but currently does not conduct compliance inspections of all air carriers transporting inbound air cargo. Moreover, TSA has not developed performance goals and measures to determine to what extent air carriers are complying with security requirements. In addition, CBP recently began targeting inbound air cargo transported on passenger and all-cargo aircraft that may pose a security risk and inspecting such cargo once it arrives in the United States. TSA and CBP, however, do not have a systematic process in place to share information that could be used to strengthen the department's efforts in securing inbound air cargo, such as the results of TSA air carrier compliance inspections and foreign airport assessments. The air cargo industry and foreign governments have implemented various security practices that could provide opportunities for strengthening DHS's overall air cargo security program. TSA officials acknowledged that compiling and analyzing security practices implemented by foreign air cargo stakeholders and foreign governments may provide opportunities to enhance U.S. air cargo security, and have begun an initial review of practices in select foreign countries. TSA has also begun working with foreign governments to coordinate security practices to enhance security and improve oversight, referred to as harmonization, but these efforts may be challenging to implement. For example, some foreign countries do not share the United States' view regarding air cargo security threats and risks, which may make the harmonization of air cargo security practices difficult to achieve. |
gao_GAO-13-356 | gao_GAO-13-356_0 | Agencies Have Elevated Performance Management Roles, but Performance Staff Competency Assessment and Training Are Needed
Designation of Senior- Level Officials to Key Performance Management Roles Has Helped to Elevate Accountability for Agency Performance
The 24 CFO Act agencies have all assigned senior-level officials to the key performance management roles—chief operating officer, performance improvement officer, and goal leader—required under GPRAMA, according to OMB and the results of our PIO survey. Performance improvement officer. According to officials at HHS and NSF, responsibilities of deputy PIOs at these agencies included, among other things, coordinating with priority goal leaders, preparing for agency quarterly performance reviews, and attending PIC meetings, as appropriate. PIOs generally reported that their staff had the competencies identified by OPM to a large extent, although they reported that the competencies below were not as widespread as others:
Performance measurement: the knowledge of the principles and methods for evaluating program or organizational performance using financial and nonfinancial measures. In addition, OPM worked with the PIC’s Capability Building working group to develop position descriptions for performance management staff. According to OPM, the 15 core competencies for performance management staff are moderately to highly trainable, and OPM has taken steps to work with agencies to incorporate the competencies into training programs for relevant staff. PIOs and Selected Agencies Found the PIC Useful, but Additional Planning and Performance Assessment Are Needed
PIOs Reported that the Most Helpful Aspects of the PIC Were Sharing of Best Practices and Development of Tips and Tools
PIOs we surveyed generally found the PIC’s work to be helpful to their agencies. However, the PIC has not done this on a regular basis, or gathered member feedback about its overall performance. Through our PIO survey, we found that officials with responsibilities under GPRAMA were greatly involved in central, key aspects of performance management. These officials were supported by performance management staff, and PIOs reported that they were generally satisfied with their staff skills. OPM could also use this information to ensure that its work with agencies to incorporate competencies into training for agency staff, as required by GPRAMA, is effective. Both GPRAMA and related OMB guidance described the PIC’s functions, but the PIC has not regularly collected member feedback on its own performance, and has not updated its strategic plan since GPRAMA was enacted in January 2011. To ensure that the PIC has a clear plan for accomplishing its goals and evaluating its progress, we recommend that the Director of OMB work with the PIC to take the following two actions:
Conduct formal feedback on the performance of the PIC from member agencies, on an ongoing basis. OPM agreed with our recommendation that it identify competency areas needing improvement in agencies, and use this information to identify and share information about training that focuses on needed performance management competencies. Appendix I: Agencies Subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires GAO to review the act’s implementation, and this report is part of a series of reviews planned around the requirement. The objectives of this report are to (1) examine the status of federal agency implementation of the performance management leadership roles under GPRAMA; and (2) evaluate the role of the PIC in facilitating the exchange of best practices and improving program management and performance. To address both objectives, we conducted a survey of PIOs at the 24 CFO Act agencies. In addition, in order to understand GPRAMA implementation in more detail and put survey results in context for both objectives, we conducted in-depth studies of two agencies’ implementation of performance management leadership roles under GPRAMA and participation in the PIC—the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Science Foundation (NSF). We also interviewed OPM officials about their work with the PIC. The PIC is an interagency council made up of agency PIOs that is charged with assisting OMB with topics related to GPRAMA and facilitating the exchange of useful practices among agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The performance of federal agencies is central to delivering meaningful results to the American public. GPRAMA, along with related guidance, assigned responsibilities for managing performance to key officials. It also provided a statutory basis for the existing PIC, a council made up of agency PIOs that is tasked with assisting OMB with topics related to GPRAMA. GPRAMA directed GAO to report on the act's implementation. This report, one of a series under that mandate, (1) examines the status of federal agencies' implementation of the performance management leadership roles under GPRAMA and (2) evaluates the role of the PIC in facilitating the exchange of best practices and improving agency program management and performance.
To address both objectives, GAO conducted a survey of PIOs at all 24 CFO Act federal agencies, as well as in-depth case studies of HHS and NSF, which were selected because they have differing characteristics such as size. GAO also interviewed and obtained documents from OMB staff and OPM officials.
What GAO Found
The designation of senior-level officials to key performance management roles with responsibilities under the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) has helped elevate accountability for performance management within federal agencies and ensure high-level involvement, according to officials GAO interviewed. The 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies have all assigned officials to the key management roles--chief operating officer, performance improvement officer (PIO), and goal leader--required under GPRAMA, according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the results of GAO's PIO survey. PIOs GAO surveyed reported that most key officials were greatly involved in central aspects of performance management, such as agency quarterly performance reviews. PIOs GAO surveyed, and priority goal leaders GAO interviewed at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), reported they were supported in their responsibilities by their deputies and other staff. PIOs generally reported that their staff had competencies identified as relevant by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), such as reasoning, to a large extent, although PIOs reported that the competencies were not as widespread among their staff as the other competencies.
OPM has taken steps to work with agencies to incorporate performance management staff competencies into training. For example, OPM is working with the Performance Improvement Council (PIC) to develop a website that will include such training. However, at this time, it does not plan to assess competency gaps among agency performance management staff to inform its work. Without this information, it will be difficult for OPM, working with the PIC, to focus on the most-needed resources and facilitate their use by other agencies.
PIOs generally found that sharing of best practices and development of tips and tools are the most helpful aspects of the PIC, and reported strong agency attendance at meetings and participation in working groups. However, the PIC has not regularly collected member feedback about its performance. Additionally, although the PIC has a strategic plan in place, it has not updated it since GPRAMA was enacted. Routine member feedback and an updated strategic plan that reflects changes required by GPRAMA could help increase the PIC's effectiveness. Without these assessment tools, the PIC lacks an important basis and means for directing and evaluating its performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OPM work with the PIC to identify competency gaps for agency performance management staff and use this information to identify and share relevant agency training. GAO also recommends that the Director of OMB work with the PIC to gather regular feedback from members on its performance and update its strategic plan. OPM and OMB staff agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-686 | gao_GAO-12-686_0 | Entities that provide services in more than one fee category—such as a company that offers wireline and wireless services— must pay regulatory fees for each fee category commensurate with the service provided. FCC’s Assessment of Regulatory Fees Is Based on Obsolete Data and Lacks Transparency
FCC’s Regulatory Fee Assessments
From fiscal year 1998 through its most recent assessment for fiscal year 2011, FCC has based its division of regulatory fees among industry sectors and fee categories on its fiscal year 1998 division of FTEs among fee categories. The Communications Act requires FCC to develop accounting systems necessary for the agency to determine whether and how the fee schedule should be adjusted to comply with the statute’s requirement that FCC base its regulatory fees on the number of FTEs performing regulatory tasks, among other things. FCC officials stated that while the statute requires FCC to amend its regulatory fees if FCC determines such amendment is necessary to comply with the FTE-based requirement, among other things, the statute does not prescribe a specific time at which FCC must make such a determination. Changes in the Telecommunications Industry since 1998
The major changes that have occurred in the telecommunications industry over the past 14 years dramatically increase the likelihood that FCC’s current division of fees among fee categories has become obsolete. FCC did not comprehensively reform its process as a result of this FNPRM. FCC’s inaction in updating its FTE analysis is inconsistent with federal guidance on user fees. Moreover, by not periodically analyzing FTEs by fee category and adjusting its division of regulatory fees based on this analysis, FCC may have put itself into a situation where, in order to adjust regulatory fees based on an updated FTE analysis, FCC may have to figure out how to handle large swings in fees for some fee categories. FCC Has Collected $66 Million in Excess Fees That Is Unavailable without Further Congressional Action
FCC’s Regulatory Fee Collections
On average, FCC collected 2 percent more each year in regulatory fees than it was required to collect in its annual appropriations acts over the past 10 fiscal years. As explained earlier, since 2008, FCC’s annual appropriations have prohibited the use of any excess fees from the current year or previous years without an appropriation by Congress. Prior to fiscal year 2008, FCC’s annual appropriations stated that any excess regulatory fees remained available until expended. FCC has collected on average $6.7 million in excess fees annually from fiscal year 2006 to 2011, and so the account has steadily increased. Congress has not provided for the disposition of the funds. However, FCC has not been fully transparent with regard to informing industry stakeholders or others about these excess fees. We identified these alternative approaches through examining the regulatory fee processes of five other regulatory fee-funded agencies in the U.S. and Canada: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Farm Credit Administration (FCA), Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). According to officials at NRC, CRTC, and FERC, each agency aligns its assessment of annual fees by industry sector with an annually or biennially updated analysis of costs by industry sector. In contrast, officials at all five agencies we met with told us their agency has a form of annual adjustment or “true-up” mechanism such that any excess fees collected are either applied as an adjustment to the next year’s fees or are refunded. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Chairman of the FCC, as part of FCC’s effort to reform its regulatory fee process, take the following three actions:
Determine whether and how the current fee schedule should be revised—including an overall analysis of the appropriate number of categories and bases for calculating rates—to reflect the current telecommunications industry and FCC’s regulatory activities, and in consideration of the processes of other regulatory fee-funded agencies that may be instructive, including, if appropriate, proposing to Congress any needed changes to its current statutory authority. FCC agreed with our recommendations and stated that an NPRM on regulatory fee reform, released on July 17, 2012, addressed them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
In response to your request to review FCC’s regulatory fee process, we examined (1) FCC’s process for assessing regulatory fees among industry sectors and the results of this process, (2) FCC’s regulatory fee collections over the past 10 years compared to the amount it was directed to collect by Congress, and (3) alternative approaches to assessing and collecting regulatory fees that could be instructive for FCC as it considers reforms to its process. Specifically, among others, we reviewed the following documents:
Statute establishing FCC’s regulatory fee-collecting authority (Section 9 of the Communications Act of 1934)
FCC’s appropriations acts, fiscal years 1994 to 2011
Conference Report to Accompany the Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1991, Sept. 17, 1991
Hearing transcript, House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology Hearing on President Obama’s Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal for the Federal Communications Commission, February 16, 2012
FCC Notices of Proposed Rulemakings, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and Reports and Orders related to FCC’s collection of regulatory fees, fiscal years 1994 through 2012
FCC budget justifications, fiscal years 2005 to 2013
FCC internal documentation of its regulatory fee methodology
FCC internal documentation related to its core financial system,
FCC strategic plans, 2009 to 2014 and 2012 to 2016
FCC annual financial reports, fiscal years 2010 and 2011
Prior GAO work on FCC, regulatory agencies, and user fees
Federal guidance on user fees and cost accounting, including the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular No. | Why GAO Did This Study
FCC must by law assess annual regulatory fees on telecommunications entities to recover its entire appropriationabout $336 million in fiscal year 2011. The entities from which FCC collects fees fall into one of five main industry sectors (broadcast, cable, wireline, wireless, and international) and are assigned to one of 86 fee categories, such as paging services. Recently, FCC stated that it was planning to consider reforms to its regulatory fee process. GAO was asked to examine (1) FCCs process for assessing regulatory fees among industry sectors, (2) FCCs regulatory fee collections over the past 10 years, and (3) alternative approaches to assessing regulatory fees. GAO reviewed FCC data and documents, interviewed officials from FCC and the telecommunications industry, and, to identify alternative approaches to assessing regulatory fees, met with five fee-funded U.S. and Canadian regulatory agencies.
What GAO Found
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) assesses regulatory fees among industry sectors and fee categories based on obsolete data, with limited transparency. The Communications Act requires FCC to base its regulatory fees on the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) that perform regulatory tasks in certain bureaus, among other things. FCC based its fiscal year 2011 regulatory fee assessments on its fiscal year 1998 division of FTEs among fee categories. It has not updated the FTE analysis on which it bases its regulatory fees, in part to avoid fluctuations in fees from year to year. FCC officials stated that the agency has complied with its statutory authority by dividing fees among fee categories based on FTE dataalthough the data is from fiscal year 1998since the statute does not prescribe a specific time for FCC to update its FTE analysis. As a result, after 13 years in a rapidly changing industry, FCC has not validated the extent to which its fees correlate to its workload. Major changes in the telecommunications industry include the increasing use of wireless and broadband services and a convergence of telecommunications industries. Moreover, FCCs practice is inconsistent with federal guidance on user fees. As a result of FCCs use of obsolete data in assessing regulatory fees, companies in some fee categories may be subsidizing companies in others. FCC officials said it has become more challenging to align current FTEs to the 86 fee categories given the increasingly cross-cutting nature of FCCs work, raising the potential that FCCs fee categories may also be out of date. FCCs regulatory fee process also lacks transparency because of the limited nature of the information FCC has published on it. This has made it difficult for industry and other stakeholders to understand and provide input on fee assessments. On July 17, 2012, FCC released a regulatory fee reform Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing changes to FCCs regulatory fee program related to many issues raised in this report.
On average over the past 10 years, FCC collected 2 percent more in regulatory fees than it was required to collect. Prior to fiscal year 2008, FCCs annual appropriations stated that any excess regulatory fees remained available until expended; since 2008, FCCs annual appropriations have prohibited the use of any excess fees from the current year or previous years without an appropriation by Congress. As a result, $66 million in excess fees currently resides in an account at the Department of Treasury that cannot be used without congressional action. The account has increased by an average of $6.7 million per year for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Congress has not provided for the disposition of these accumulating excess funds.
Approaches of other fee-funded regulatory agencies could be instructive as FCC considers reforms. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission assess fees based on an annually or biennially updated analysis of costs by industry sector. Regarding excess fees, officials at five other fee-funded regulatory agencies stated that their agencies either apply excess fees as an adjustment to the subsequent years fees or refund them.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider whether FCCs excess fees should be appropriated for FCCs use or, if not, what their disposition should be. FCC should perform an updated FTE analysis and require at least biennial updates going forward; determine whether and how to revise the current fee schedule, including the number of fee categories; increase the transparency of its regulatory fee process; and consider the approaches of other fee-funded regulatory agencies. FCC agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-143 | gao_GAO-14-143_0 | Background
Medicare Part D was established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.beneficiaries have been able to obtain prescription drug coverage through prescription drug plans offered by Part D plan sponsors that contract with CMS. Under these plans, monthly premiums and cost-sharing arrangements can vary. 2). In addition to the website, customer service representatives for 1-800-MEDICARE—a nationwide toll-free telephone help line that beneficiaries and their advisers can call to ask questions about Medicare—also use a version of Plan Finder to provide information on Part D plan options and to enroll beneficiaries over the phone. CMS Oversight of the Part D Program
CMS is responsible for overseeing plan sponsors’ compliance with their Part D contracts. CMS collects performance data on Part D plans covered under each individual contract for 18 quality measures—including a measure for Plan Finder drug pricing accuracy. CMS Uses Data Checks and Quality Measures to Oversee Plan Finder’s Drug Pricing Accuracy and Has Taken Compliance Actions against Plan Sponsors
To assess the accuracy of pricing information on Plan Finder, CMS performs computerized data checks on pricing information before it is displayed on Plan Finder and has taken compliance actions against certain Part D plan sponsors for submitting inaccurate and incomplete pricing information. CMS requires Part D plan sponsors to submit drug pricing information for their plans on a biweekly basis—which Plan Finder uses to estimate beneficiaries’ cost-sharing amounts and expected drug costs. If CMS’s data checks identify potentially inaccurate plan pricing information, CMS notifies the sponsor of the plan and gives the sponsor an opportunity to attest to the accuracy of the data, or correct it. If the sponsor does not verify or correct the pricing information, CMS will “suppress” the plan from Plan Finder for two weeks, or longer if the sponsor does not provide accurate pricing information for the next biweekly data update. When a Part D plan is suppressed from Plan Finder, its pricing information is removed and beneficiaries cannot enroll in the plan through the website. In 2012, 18 percent of Part D contracts had one or more plans that were suppressed from Plan Finder at least once, and, from January 1, 2013, through July 31, 2013, 25 percent of contracts had one or more plans that were suppressed at least once (see table 1). noncompliance and 67 warning letters for inaccurate or incomplete drug pricing information. CMS’s processes for overseeing the accuracy of drug pricing information in Plan Finder are consistent with internal control standards for the federal government. CMS Uses Quality Measures to Evaluate Pricing Accuracy
CMS’s Star Ratings, which provide beneficiaries with information on plan quality, assigns scores to each Part D contract on the accuracy of pricing information on Plan Finder. To determine the annual quality ratings for drug pricing accuracy, CMS compares Plan Finder drug prices with beneficiaries’ point-of-sale drug costs and assigns scores based on the extent to which the point-of-sale costs were higher than prices posted on Plan Finder. For the 2013 Star Ratings, 6 percent of contracts had point-of-sale prices that were greater than Plan Finder prices by an average of 4 percent or more. CMS Has Obtained Feedback on Plan Finder from a Variety of Sources and Has Taken Steps to Improve Usability
CMS has assessed the usability of Plan Finder by obtaining feedback from a variety of sources and has implemented updates to the website to improve usability. CMS has conducted user tests on the usability of Plan Finder with beneficiaries, beneficiary advisers, and SHIP counselors. A website survey. Website user data. CMS has implemented updates to the website on a quarterly basis and, according to CMS officials, has used feedback on Plan Finder to address identified issues and improve the website’s usability. For example, CMS developed and added a “frequently asked questions” webpage to the website in 2013 to help beneficiaries with frequently encountered issues. In addition, CMS has added filters to help beneficiaries compare Part D plans and select plans that meet their needs. Officials from the beneficiary assistance organizations we spoke with generally told us that Plan Finder helps beneficiaries compare Part D plans and that the website’s usability has improved over time. Agency Comments
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare prescription drug program, known as Medicare Part D, provides a voluntary outpatient prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries. Beneficiaries may choose Part D plans from among multiple plans offered by private companies--plan sponsors--that contract with CMS. Plans may differ in their premiums and cost-sharing arrangements, the drugs they cover, and the pharmacies they contract with to fill prescriptions. CMS developed the Medicare Plan Finder interactive website in 2005 as a tool to help beneficiaries compare Part D plans and identify plans that meet their needs. For Plan Finder to serve its intended purpose, beneficiaries and their advisers need to be able to obtain accurate drug cost information, understand plan options, and navigate the website effectively.
GAO was asked to review CMS's efforts to ensure that beneficiaries can use Plan Finder effectively. This report examines (1) how CMS oversees the accuracy of drug pricing information in Plan Finder; and (2) how CMS assesses the usability of Plan Finder and any steps CMS has taken to improve it. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation detailing CMS's processes for overseeing Plan Finder pricing accuracy and obtained data on agency compliance actions. GAO also interviewed CMS officials and organizations that help Medicare beneficiaries navigate Plan Finder to learn about CMS's processes for obtaining feedback on Plan Finder's usability and steps the agency has taken to improve the website.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare, uses data checks and quality measures to oversee the accuracy of Part D plan pricing information on the Plan Finder interactive website. Part D sponsors may have multiple contracts with CMS to provide drug coverage, with each contract covering one or more distinct Part D plans, and CMS is responsible for overseeing plan sponsors' compliance with their Part D contracts. CMS requires Part D plan sponsors to submit drug pricing information for their plans, which Plan Finder uses to estimate beneficiaries' cost-sharing amounts and expected annual drug costs. To ensure the accuracy of this information,
CMS performs computerized data checks on the pricing information for each plan to identify incomplete and potentially inaccurate data before information is displayed on Plan Finder. If CMS's data checks identify potentially inaccurate plan pricing information, CMS gives the plan's sponsor an opportunity to attest to the accuracy of the data, or correct it. If the plan's sponsor does not verify or correct potential inaccuracies identified by these checks, CMS will "suppress" the plan from Plan Finder, which means that the plan's pricing information is removed and that beneficiaries cannot enroll in the plan through the website. In the first seven months of 2013, 25 percent of Part D contracts had one or more plans suppressed from Plan Finder at least once. CMS has taken compliance actions against plan sponsors for repeated suppressions--between January 1, 2009, and July 31, 2013, CMS issued 89 notices of noncompliance and 67 warning letters.
CMS uses quality measures to evaluate the accuracy of pricing information on Plan Finder. As part of its Part D Star Ratings, which provide beneficiaries with information on plan quality, CMS collects performance data on Part D plans covered under each individual contract. CMS assigns scores to each contract based on the extent to which beneficiaries' point-of-sale costs were higher than prices posted on Plan Finder. For the 2013 Star Ratings, 6 percent of contracts had point-of-sale prices that were greater than Plan Finder prices by an average of 4 percent or more.
CMS has assessed the usability of Plan Finder by obtaining feedback from a variety of sources, including beneficiary assistance organizations, user testing, a website survey, and website user data. CMS has used feedback on Plan Finder to update the website and improve usability. For example, CMS developed and added a "frequently asked questions" webpage to the website. Officials from the beneficiary organizations GAO spoke with generally said that Plan Finder helps beneficiaries compare Part D plans and that its usability has improved over time. |
gao_GAO-07-1130 | gao_GAO-07-1130_0 | USDA’s Lending and Conservation Assistance for Beginning Farmers Has Increased
USDA’s lending and conservation assistance to beginning farmers has been substantial and is growing. From fiscal year 2000 through 2006, FSA increased its lending to beginning farmers from $716 million to $1.1 billion annually, for a total of more than $6 billion during the period. Also, from fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (the most recent years for which data are available), NRCS’s assistance to beginning farmers through two key conservation programs nearly doubled, from over $47 million to about $92 million. However, it is unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of its assistance to this group because (1) it does not have a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal to guide its beginning farmer efforts and because (2) it has only recently begun to develop information on the characteristics of beginning farmers, which will supplement its existing research on the age of farmers and changes in the number of farms. USDA Lacks a Crosscutting, Departmental Strategic Goal for Its Beginning Farmer Efforts
Although many reasons exist for helping beginning farmers, USDA has not transformed these reasons into a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal that demonstrates the outcomes it expects its beginning farmer efforts to achieve. Stakeholders cite additional reasons for beginning farmer assistance, such as promoting social change by increasing the number of immigrant and minority farmers and changes to the structure of agriculture by increasing the number of small and middle-sized farms. In 2006, USDA incorporated beginning farmers into its small farms policy to better recognize the importance of assisting beginning farmers. However, the policy does not provide a management and accountability focus for USDA’s efforts. While USDA has not established a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal for beginning farmers, two USDA agencies—FSA and RMA—have each developed their own beginning farmer performance goals. These goals set targets for the volume of their beginning farmer activities—the number of farmers assisted and the dollars they receive—rather than outcomes. Among other things, recently developed analysis of existing data shows that beginning farmers are younger than established farmers (about 7 in 10 beginning farmers are under 55 years of age), operate smaller farms, and are slightly more ethnically diverse and female than other farmers. For example, ERS economists found that roughly one- third of beginning farms in 2005 had no agricultural output and were likely operated by individuals interested in a rural residential lifestyle. Additional baseline data about beginning farmer characteristics that provide insight into who beginning farmers are, which ones USDA assists, and how beginning farmer operations in agriculture change over time should (1) help USDA track the changes within this group, (2) provide a basis for more in-depth analyses about the effects of existing programs on beginning farmers, and (3) help identify the need for new forms of assistance. Our objectives were to (1) identify the key steps USDA has taken to help beginning farmers and (2) assess USDA’s actions to measure the effectiveness of these steps. We focused on departmental efforts to assist beginning farmers, as well as efforts by individual agencies such as the Farm Service Agency (FSA) and Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). has not operated a farm or ranch or has operated a farm or ranch for not more than 10 years has not operated a farm or ranch, or who has operated a farm or ranch for not more than 10 consecutive years will materially and substantially will materially and substantially participate in the operation of the farm or ranch participate in the operation of the farm or ranch meets the loan eligibility requirements of the program to which he/she is applying agrees to participate in such loan assessment, borrower training, and financial management programs as the Secretary requires demonstrates insufficient resources to continue farming or ranching on a viable scale does not own a farm greater than 30 percent of the average size farm in the county (farm ownership loans only)
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Agriculture
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Staff Acknowledgments
In addition to the individual named above, Charles Adams, Assistant Director; Kevin Bray; Barbara El Osta; Paige Gilbreath; Lynn Musser; Carol Herrnstadt Shulman; and Tracy Williams made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs have long supported beginning farmers. USDA generally defines a beginning farmer or rancher as one who has operated a farm or ranch for 10 years or less--without regard for age--and who materially and substantially participates in its operation. USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) makes and guarantees loans for farmers who cannot obtain commercial credit, including beginning farmers. FSA also reserves funds for beginning farmers within its loan programs. USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) provides higher conservation payments for beginning farmers through two of its conservation programs. GAO reviewed the key steps USDA has taken to help beginning farmers and assessed the department's actions to measure the effectiveness of these steps..
What GAO Found
USDA's lending and conservation assistance to beginning farmers has been substantial and is growing. USDA supports beginning farmers primarily through its lending assistance. From fiscal years 2000 through 2006, FSA's lending to beginning farmers rose from $716 million to $1.1 billion annually--totaling more than $6 billion. In addition, from fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the most recent years for which data are available, NRCS's annual financial assistance for beginning farmers through two key conservation programs nearly doubled from over $47 million to nearly $92 million, for a total of $233 million. However, USDA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its support for beginning farmers, because it has not developed a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal for its beginning farmer efforts and has only recently begun to analyze the characteristics of this group. Specifically, USDA has not developed a crosscutting, departmental strategic beginning farmer goal that demonstrates the outcomes it expects its beginning farmer efforts to achieve. Such a goal might address, for example, promoting demographic change, such as by decreasing the average age of farmers or changes to the structure of agriculture, such as by increasing the number of small and middle-sized farms. USDA has incorporated beginning farmers into its existing policy for maintaining the viability of small farms. Although this provides added recognition of the need to assist beginning farmers, USDA's policy does not establish a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal that provides a management and accountability focus for the department's several efforts. Furthermore, USDA tracks the numbers of farmers it assists and the dollars they receive, rather than its progress toward achieving a particular beginning farmer outcome. Having a crosscutting, departmental strategic goal could provide better insight into the desired outcomes and impact of USDA's beginning farmer efforts. USDA is just beginning to develop data about the characteristics of beginning farmers to supplement its existing analyses about the age of farmers and changes in the number of farms. For example, one recent analysis shows that beginning farmers are younger than established farmers, operate smaller farms, and are slightly more ethnically diverse and female than other farmers. Another indicates that roughly one-third of beginning farms in 2005 had no agricultural output and were likely operated by individuals interested in a rural residential lifestyle. Continued analysis of such characteristics and trends could provide better insight into who beginning farmers are, which ones USDA assists, and how beginning farmer operations change over time. |
gao_GGD-96-4 | gao_GGD-96-4_0 | Fiscal year 1995 appropriated funds for the Community Policing Act totaled $1.3 billion. About 92 percent of jurisdictions that applied for a COPS grant received initial award approval. The Higher the Crime Rate, the More Likely a Jurisdiction Was to Apply for a COPS Grant
We estimated that about 42 percent of all law enforcement jurisdictions applied for a COPS FAST or COPS AHEAD grant. From our telephone survey, we estimated that 62 percent (plus or minus 11 percent) of the nonapplicant jurisdictions did not apply for a COPS FAST or COPS AHEAD grant due to cost-related factors. The estimated 62 percent included about 40 percent (plus or minus 12 percent) of nonapplicants who said uncertainty about the jurisdiction’s ability to meet the requirement for continued officer funding after the 3-year grant period was the most important reason for not applying. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with the Committee and Subcommittee, our objectives were to review various aspects of the COPS programs and describe the grant application, selection, and monitoring processes for COPS: Phase I, COPS FAST, and COPS AHEAD. The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services provided written comments on a draft of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various aspects of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, focusing on the reasons some jurisdictions did not apply for federal community policing grants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) jurisdictions with higher crime rates were more likely to apply for COPS grants; (2) nearly 92 percent of the jurisdictions applying for grants received initial approval; (3) some jurisdictions were uncertain about being able to continue officer funding after their grant expired and about their ability to provide the required 25 percent match; (4) the jurisdictions that did not apply for COPS grants cited cost-related factors as their major concern; and (5) the most frequent crimes reported by COPS Funding Accelerated for Smaller Towns (FAST) applicants were property crime and domestic violence. |
gao_GAO-17-174 | gao_GAO-17-174_0 | Background
This section describes the public’s longstanding opposition to siting nuclear waste repositories, DOE’s efforts to develop a repository under the NWPA and its amendments, and DOE’s efforts since terminating the Yucca Mountain repository to develop other strategies to manage and store nuclear waste. In 2010, DOE terminated its licensing efforts at Yucca Mountain. In Recommending a Separate Defense High-Level Waste Repository, DOE Did Not Quantify Cited Benefits or Show How Certain Benefits Would Be Achieved or the Effect If Not Realized
In the information DOE provided to the President, DOE cited benefits of a separate defense HLW repository but did not quantify the benefits when possible, nor did it provide detailed support demonstrating that the benefits it cited could be achieved or show the risks if certain benefits could not be realized as planned. How the Department of Energy Evaluated the Six Factors under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) The Department of Energy (DOE) reported that in evaluating the six factors required under the NWPA, it included (1) a summary of the 1985 evaluation conclusions; (2) a discussion of post-1985 changes and new information bearing on the cost efficiency factor; and (3) conclusions as to whether each factor supports a finding that a defense high-level radioactive waste repository is required. Cost Efficiency. Public acceptability. Regulation. DOE did not show that the national security benefits it cited could be achieved. Health and safety. DOE’s Estimates for the Projected Costs and Schedule to Site, License, and Construct a Defense High-Level Waste Repository Are Not Reliable
The preliminary cost and schedule estimates DOE provided to the President for a defense HLW repository are not reliable. According to DOE officials, they did not develop reliable estimates to reflect all likely costs and schedule activities because their plan was still at the conceptual stage, and DOE officials did not have enough information to generate cost and schedule estimates that met best practices; however, industry best practices documented by GAO state that it is possible to generate reliable estimates of cost and schedule even when information is limited. We shared with DOE officials the results of our assessment of DOE’s cost estimates that DOE provided to the President. Waste transportation. Also, DOE’s estimates exclude site selection and site characterization, which could add decades to the time frames, based on past DOE experience and plans. Moreover, DOE is planning to develop a consent-based siting process before it has addressed certain prerequisites—such as the possible need for EPA to update health and safety regulations—which are necessary to solicit public comment on its consent-based siting process, screen potential sites for a repository, and engage in site selection discussions with local communities. These experts and stakeholders added that it would be premature for DOE to site a defense HLW or a subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository until health and safety regulations are revised. The information DOE provided to the President in 2015—concluding that a strong basis exists to find that a defense HLW repository is required—served as the basis for the decision that started the nation down the path of developing two repositories. DOE faces significant public opposition in developing a consent-based siting process and engaging in site selection discussions with local communities, in part because DOE has not yet addressed certain prerequisites that are needed for the site selection process, such as the possible need to revise health and safety regulations. 1. The Secretary of Energy should direct the Office of Nuclear Energy to conduct a comprehensive assessment, which adheres to OMB guidance and best practices, of the benefits, costs, and schedules of the options it reviewed and provided to the President in 2015, and, in light of the new information and results of its assessment, revise—if needed—the report’s conclusion that a strong basis exists to find that a defense HLW repository is required. 2. However, as we stated in our report, the public cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process without having key information that is a precondition for discussion and which could influence public input. Therefore, we believe that DOE should reassess its decision to simultaneously pursue such activities until key prerequisites have been addressed. Appendix I: Methodology
To assess the benefits that DOE cited in its recommendation to the President about the need for a separate defense HLW repository, we reviewed DOE’s March 2015 report and additional planning and cost documents supporting that report. Furthermore, the guidance states that benefits and cost estimates involve some degree of uncertainty and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. We also reviewed DOE’s project management orders regarding “pre-conceptual” planning activities and similar DOE documents indicating the importance of front-end planning. If the nation develops separate repositories, these costs would be spent again for each separate repository. The President found that a separate repository for defense HLW and SNF was required. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE had long planned to store defense and commercial nuclear waste in a single repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, funded largely from commercial power fees. In 2010, DOE terminated this plan, and then considered developing separate defense and commercial repositories. This approach requires a Presidential finding under the NWPA. In 2015, DOE provided information to the President supporting separate repositories and cited several benefits, including cost efficiencies. On the basis of this information, the President in 2015 reversed a 1985 presidential finding and determined that a separate repository for defense waste was required, setting DOE down the path of developing separate repositories. Taxpayers would likely fund a defense waste repository rather than industry fees. GAO reviewed DOE's efforts to develop a separate defense waste repository. This report assesses (1) the information on benefits DOE provided to the President; (2) the reliability of DOE's cost and schedule estimates; and (3) DOE's efforts to site a defense HLW repository. GAO reviewed DOE documents and interviewed more than 50 experts.
What GAO Found
The information that the Department of Energy (DOE) provided to the President about whether a separate defense waste repository was required did not quantify cited benefits, when possible, show how these benefits could be achieved, or show the risks if certain benefits could not be realized as planned. In the information provided to the President, DOE stated that separate repositories for defense high-level waste (HLW) and commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) would produce certain benefits. DOE cited benefits in each area required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)—cost efficiency, public acceptability, regulation, transportation, national security, and health and safety—in concluding that there is a strong basis for a defense HLW repository. Federal guidance states that benefits must be quantified when possible, and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. DOE officials said their plan was still conceptual and the guidance did not yet apply. Nevertheless, DOE did not show that benefits outweighed costs in recommending to the President that the nation should depart from its longstanding nuclear waste strategy.
DOE's preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the two-repository approach that it provided to the President are not reliable because the estimates do not meet industry best practices. DOE's cost estimates excluded major costs, such as site selection and site characterization costs that could add tens of billions of dollars. Regarding its schedule estimates, DOE did not provide information on how its schedules would be achieved. GAO found that DOE's estimates leave little time for major activities and that DOE's schedule appears optimistic, given its past repository siting experiences. Without reliable estimates that reflect best practices, DOE provided information to the President that supported a decision that could commit the nation to expending undisclosed but significant future resources and to a time frame that appears optimistic.
DOE is planning to develop a process to obtain consent for an eventual repository site; however, DOE faces significant public opposition and certain prerequisites have not yet been established. These prerequisites include updated health and safety regulations, which are necessary for the public to consider as part of a consent-based siting process. Without updated health and safety regulations, which establish radiation exposure limits, the public cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process and local communities cannot effectively be engaged in hosting potential repository sites. DOE officials acknowledge that health and safety regulations—which were developed in the 1980s—need to be updated and revised for any future defense HLW or mostly commercial SNF repository. Revising such regulations is the responsibility of other federal agencies. Experts and stakeholders told GAO that updated health and safety regulations are a precondition for having discussions with the public and for screening potential sites. An internal project management requirement directs DOE to perform key “preconceptual” planning activities to enhance front-end planning. In proceeding with siting activities without ensuring key prerequisites have been established, DOE runs the risk of increasing public opposition and potentially wasting resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess benefits, costs, and schedule estimates, and (2) reassess its decision to conduct site selection activities. DOE agreed on the need for a more thorough assessment, but disagreed on the need to reassess site selection activities, citing benefits of its approach. GAO continues to believe its recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-317 | gao_GAO-09-317_0 | While several U.S. corridors exhibit characteristics that suggest potential economic viability, decision makers have faced difficulties in ascertaining whether any specific proposed line will be viable due to uncertainties in how accurately project sponsors forecast riders and estimate costs, and to the lack of agreement and standards regarding how a project’s public benefits should be valued and assessed. High speed rail also has more potential to attract riders in corridors experiencing heavy travel on existing modes of transportation (i.e., conventional rail, air, and highways—including automobile and bus) and where there is, or is projected to be, congestion and constraints on the capacity of existing transportation systems. Traffic safety: Benefits from increased traffic safety include reduction in traffic accidents, to the extent that the rail service reduces congestion on highways. In addition, sustaining public and political support for project development will also be a challenge. Federal funding that has historically been made available for high speed rail has been derived from general revenues, rather than a dedicated funding source. Consequently, high speed rail projects must compete with other nontransportation demands on federal funds, such as national defense, education, or health care, as opposed to being compared with other alternative transportation investments or policies in a corridor. In the countries we visited, the central government generally funds the majority of up-front costs of their country’s respective high speed rail projects, and they do so without the expectation that their investment will be recouped through ticket revenues. Sustaining public support over this length of time can be difficult and can have significant impacts on a project. The recently enacted PRIIA, in addition to authorizing funding, provides numerous other opportunities for a greater federal role in high speed rail development, as follows: the act requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish and carry out a rail cooperative research program that will address, among other things, new high speed wheel on rail systems; the FRA Administrator is tasked with the development of a long-range national rail plan consistent with approved state rail plans and the rail needs of the nation; the FRA Administrator is required to support high speed rail development, including high speed rail planning; the act explicitly provides a framework for the establishment of a High Speed Rail Corridor Development Program, which permits the Secretary to make grants to states, groups of states, and others to finance capital projects in high speed rail corridors; the act requires the Secretary to issue a request for proposals for the financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance of high speed intercity passenger rail systems operating within high speed rail corridors; and the Secretary is to study high speed rail routes and establish a process for states or groups of states to redesignate or modify designated high speed rail corridors. Incorporate performance and accountability for results into funding decisions. To date, there has been little consideration at a national policy level of how high speed rail could or should fit into the national transportation system and what high speed rail development goals should be. Project selection criteria encourage a project sponsor to evaluate public benefits. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To better understand the potential viability of high speed rail service in the United States, we reviewed (1) the factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail projects—that is, whether a project’s total social benefits offset or justify the total social costs—and difficulties in determining the economic viability of proposed projects; (2) the challenges that U.S. project sponsors experience in developing and financing high speed rail projects; and (3) the federal role in the potential development of high speed rail systems. Rather, this study identifies characteristics of corridors and service and other factors that contribute to a proposed project’s benefits and costs and the challenges in developing and financing such projects. We requested and reviewed any available data on ridership forecasts and evaluations, project cost estimates and evaluations, as well as the costs to construct and maintain high speed rail service in these countries. This included analyzing selected high speed rail legislation from 1965 to 2008, including the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal and other decision makers have had a renewed interest in how high speed rail might fit into the national transportation system and address increasing mobility constraints on highways and at airports due to congestion. GAO was asked to review (1) the factors affecting the economic viability--meaning whether total social benefits offset or justify total social costs--of high speed rail projects, including difficulties in determining the economic viability of proposed projects; (2) the challenges in developing and financing high speed rail systems; and (3) the federal role in the potential development of U.S. high speed rail systems. GAO reviewed federal legislation; interviewed federal, state, local, and private sector officials, as well as U.S. project sponsors; and reviewed high speed rail development in France, Japan, and Spain.
What GAO Found
Factors affecting the economic viability of high speed rail lines include the level of expected riders, costs, and public benefits (i.e., benefits to non-riders and the nation as a whole from such things as reduced congestion), which are influenced by a line's corridor and service characteristics. High speed rail tends to attract riders in dense, highly populated corridors, especially where there is congestion on existing transportation modes. Costs largely hinge on the availability of rail right-of-way and on a corridor's terrain. To stay within financial or other constraints, project sponsors typically make trade-offs between cost and service characteristics. While some U.S. corridors have characteristics that suggest economic viability, uncertainty associated with rider and cost estimates and the valuation of public benefits makes it difficult to make such determinations on individual proposals. Research on rider and cost forecasts has shown they are often optimistic, and the extent that U.S. sponsors quantify and value public benefits varies. Once projects are deemed economically viable, project sponsors face the challenging tasks of securing the up-front investment for construction costs and sustaining public and political support and stakeholder consensus. In the three countries GAO visited, the central government generally funded the majority of the up-front costs of high speed rail lines. By contrast, federal funding for high speed rail has been derived from general revenues, not from trust funds or other dedicated funding sources. Consequently, high speed rail projects must compete with other nontransportation demands on federal funds (e.g., national defense or health care) as opposed to being compared with other alternative transportation investments in a corridor. Available federal loan programs can support only a fraction of potential high speed rail project costs. Without substantial public sector commitment, private sector participation is difficult to secure. The challenge of sustaining public support and stakeholder consensus is compounded by long project lead times, by numerous stakeholders, and by the absence of an established institutional framework. The recently enacted Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 will likely increase the federal role in the development of high speed rail, as will the newly enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In the United States, federal involvement with high speed rail to date has been limited. The national rail plan required by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 is an opportunity to identify the vision and goals for U.S. high speed rail and how it fits into the national transportation system, an exercise that has largely remained incomplete. Accountability can be enhanced by tying the specific, measurable goals required by the act to performance and accountability measures. In developing analytical tools to apply to the act's project selection criteria, it will be important to address optimistic rider and cost forecasts and varied public benefits analyses. |
gao_GAO-05-928T | gao_GAO-05-928T_0 | NORAD also conducts air patrols in U.S. airspace. Violations of Restricted Airspace
Our review of an FAA database found about 3,400 reported violations of restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were committed by general aviation pilots. According to FAA, violations occur because (1) pilots may divert from their planned flight path to avoid bad weather, or may make navigational errors and consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) FAA may establish airspace restrictions with little warning, and pilots already in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions; or (3) pilots may not check for notices of new restrictions as required by FAA and may consequently enter restricted airspace without authorization. In addition, terrorists might deliberately enter restricted airspace to observe the government’s response or to carry out an attack. The agencies have established the National Capital Region Coordination Center to enhance the effectiveness of air security and air defense operations in the national capital region. However, it is important to recognize that it may not be possible to prevent all restricted airspace violations or to deter all attacks. Consequently, the interagency management of the response to airspace violations could benefit from filling gaps in policies and procedures. We also identified gaps in TSA’s risk assessment of the aviation sector. As a result, TSA lacks assurance that some airport managers have taken reasonable steps to enhance security. TSA has reviewed some general aviation airports for vulnerabilities and developed risk assessment tools to enable managers to conduct self-assessments. Specifically, the agencies do not have: an organization in charge, interagency policies and procedures, protocols for information sharing, and common definitions of restricted airspace violations. Because the interagency process to manage the response to restricted airspace violations is a time- critical operation, the implications of not having well-developed policies, procedures, information sharing protocols, and common definitions are serious. To identify the actions taken individually or in coordinated fashion to secure U.S. airspace and aviation and to mitigate the threat since September 11, 2001, we interviewed officials at the National Capital Region Coordination Center; the headquarters of NORAD and its Continental U.S. NORAD Region and the three continental U.S. based air defense sectors, TSA, FAA, and Air Combat Command; and the Air and Marine Operations Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing and defending U.S. airspace is an interagency mission that depends on close interagency coordination and information sharing. GAO was asked to review (1) the threat assessment for U.S. aviation, (2) violations of restricted airspace since September 11, 2001, (3) agencies' individual or coordinated steps to secure U.S. aviation, and (4) interagency policies and procedures to manage the response to restricted airspace violations. GAO will issue a classified report responding to this request later this year. To keep this testimony unclassified, GAO focused on the latter three questions.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration reported about 3,400 violations of restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur because (1) pilots may divert from their flight plan to avoid bad weather, (2) the Administration may establish newly restricted airspace with little warning, and pilots in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions, or (3) pilots do not check for notices of restrictions, as required. Also, terrorists may deliberately enter restricted airspace to test the government's response or carry out an attack. Federal agencies have acted individually or have coordinated to enhance aviation security. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established a national operations center that disseminates operational- and intelligence-related information, and has enhanced passenger and checked baggage screening, secured cockpit doors, and assessed the risk to some, but not all, commercial airports. Also, few general aviation airport owners have conducted risk assessments. The North American Aerospace Defense Command's mission was expanded to include monitoring domestic air traffic and conducting air patrols. Collectively, the agencies are operating the National Capital Region Coordination Center to secure the National Capital Region. GAO identified gaps in the simultaneous, time-critical, multi-agency response to airspace violations. While it may not be possible to prevent all violations or deter all attacks, GAO identified some gaps in policies and procedures. Specifically, the agencies were operating without (1) an organization in the lead, (2) fully developed interagency policies and procedures for the airspace violations response teleconferencing system, (3) information sharing protocols and procedures, or (4) accepted definitions of a violation. As a result, opportunities may be missed to enhance the security of U.S. aviation. |
gao_GAO-01-1103 | gao_GAO-01-1103_0 | Treasury Requested and OPM Approved Customs’ Authority Based on Impracticability to Examine
Treasury requested, on August 6, 1998, that OPM amend Customs’ Schedule A authority to include 10 positions for oversight policy and direction of sensitive law enforcement activities. The justification for including the additional 10 positions under a Schedule A authority was that “due to the sensitive nature of the operations, these positions require a unique blend of special characteristics, skills and abilities that cannot be announced to the general public, and for which it is not practicable to examine.”
OPM approved the authority for the 10 positions on August 21, 1998. The OPM official who reviewed the request and recommended its approval said that her determination that it was impracticable to examine for such positions was based primarily on Customs’ assertion that the positions were sensitive in nature and involved law enforcement activities. Circumstances of Some Appointments Give the Appearance of Inconsistent Application of the Authority or Political Favoritism
Customs appointed nine individuals to Schedule A positions using the amended authority granted by OPM between the time of OPM’s approval on August 21, 1998, and the most recent appointment on January 14, 2001. The surveys primarily consisted of OPM’s requesting that Treasury justify the continuing need for each of its appointment authorities. As discussed previously, at Treasury’s request, OPM reviewed the use of Customs’ Schedule A authority for two of the nine appointments made. Appendix II: Comments From the Office of Personnel Management | Why GAO Did This Study
The Treasury Department, on behalf of the Customs Service, requested Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approval for Schedule A appointment authority for 10 positions for oversight policy and direction of sensitive law enforcement activities. Treasury's request stated that "due to the sensitive nature of the operations, these positions require a unique blend of special characteristics, skills and abilities that cannot be announced to the general public, and for which it is not practical to examine." According to OPM officials, no detailed criteria are applied when OPM considers such requests. OPM approved the request primarily because Treasury argued that the positions were sensitive in nature, involved law enforcement activities, and were impracticable to advertise and examine for. In using the Schedule A authority between September 1998 and January 2001, Customs made nine appointments to various positions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that circumstances surrounding five of the nine appointments can give the appearance of inconsistency in the application of the Schedule A appointment authority or possible favoritism toward former political employees. OPM reviews agencies' use of appointment authorities, including Schedule A and other excepted appointments, every four to five years. The most recent review of Customs was for appointments made in 1999. OPM also conducts occasional surveys that require agencies to justify the continuing need for each of its appointment authorities. |
gao_GGD-00-45 | gao_GGD-00-45_0 | To obtain information on broker selection policies and guidance used by federal agencies, we asked DOJ to identify other federal agencies that handled structured settlement claims. Federal Policies for Selecting Structured Settlement Brokers Lacked Adequate Internal Control
Although DOJ had established policies and guidance for the selection of structured settlement brokers, the policies and guidance did not include an internal control requiring attorneys to document their reasons for selecting a specific broker. Similarly, although the six agencies we reviewed said they generally followed DOJ’s policy guidance for selecting a structured settlement broker, they were not required to document their reasons for selecting a particular broker. None of these agencies documented the reasons why they selected particular brokers. DOJ Did Not Document Reasons for Selecting Brokers
DOJ had established policies and guidance governing the selection of structured settlement brokers, but it did not require that the reasons for selecting a specific broker be documented. DOJ Selected a Few Brokers to Handle Most Settlements Claims
DOJ has selected several structured settlement brokerage companies to handle most of the structured settlement claims. Between May 1, 1997, and May 1, 1999, DOJ used 27 different structured settlement brokerage companies to settle 242 claims for $236 million. Of the 242 claims awarded, 70 percent (169 cases) were awarded to 4 brokerage companies. The remaining 23 companies were awarded 30 percent of the total number of cases. According to DOJ, the companies frequently have multiple offices and brokers that compete with each other within the same company. Thus, a simple count of the number of companies could be misleading. However, the policies and guidance lacked an internal control requiring that the reasons for selecting a broker be documented and readily available for examination. Further, without documentation on the reasons settlement brokers were selected, it is more difficult to avoid the appearance of favoritism and preferential treatment in a situation where some brokers get significantly more business than others. According to DOJ, by “treating as a monolith all brokers affiliated with the major companies, the draft report ignores the actual way those businesses are run and runs the risk of significantly understating the actual number of brokers competing to handle DOJ structured settlements.”
In response, we have noted that according to DOJ, because structured settlement companies may have multiple offices and brokers, the number of companies could be misleading. Nevertheless, the number and cost of settlements by brokerage company show that DOJ placed the majority of its settlement work with a relatively small number of companies—a situation that still could open it up to charges of favoritism towards these companies. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Justice's (DOJ) policy and guidance for selecting structured settlement brokers, focusing on: (1) the policies and guidance for selecting structured settlement brokers used by DOJ and six selected agencies; and (2) a list of the structured settlement brokerage companies used by DOJ and the number of settlements awarded to each company since May 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1993 and 1997, DOJ issued policies and guidance on the selection of structured settlement brokers to promote fairness and to avoid the appearance of favoritism; (2) DOJ officials told GAO that its policies and guidelines permit some discretion and that when selecting a particular broker, they generally relied on such factors as reputation, past experience, knowledge, and location; (3) however, DOJ officials also told GAO they were unable to specify reasons why attorneys selected particular brokers to settle specific cases, because DOJ did not require documentation of these decisions; (4) without an internal control requiring the reasons for selecting a particular settlement broker be documented and readily available for examination, it is more difficult to verify that selection policies and guidelines were followed and, in turn, to avoid the appearance of favoritism and preferential treatment; (5) overall, the six federal agencies surveyed described policies and guidance in selecting structured settlement brokers that were similar to DOJ's; (6) none of the agencies had internal controls requiring their attorneys to document their reasons for selecting a specific broker; (7) one agency had a written supplemental policy governing the use of structured settlements, but it did not require documentation of decisions; (8) officials at the other five federal agencies said they also generally relied on such factors as reputation, past experience, knowledge, and location for selecting a particular structured settlement broker; (9) however, the reasons why particular brokers were selected for specific cases were not documented; (10) GAO's review of the list of structured settlement brokerage companies used by DOJ and the number of settlements assigned to each company showed that DOJ selected a few companies to handle most of its structured settlement business; (11) according to DOJ, the companies frequently have multiple offices and brokers that compete with each other within the same company; (12) thus, a simple count of the number of companies could be misleading; (13) although DOJ used 27 different structured settlement companies to settle 242 claims for about $236 million between May 1, 1997, and May 1, 1999, 70 percent (169 cases) were awarded to 4 brokerage companies; and (14) of the remaining 23 companies, none were awarded more than 17 cases each. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-1 | gao_T-AIMD-96-1_0 | CFO Act Audits Have Brought Greater Clarity to DOD’s Financial Management Problems
The CFO Act requirements have served as an important catalyst for focusing attention on the financial problems facing the Department. Serious problems in accounting for billions of dollars in annual disbursements. Also, we recently reported that DOD could not rely on its own financial data to detect errors in payments made to contractors. Financial audits have reported that DOD has not properly reported billions of dollars in potential future liabilities. Breakdowns in the Department’s ability to protect its assets from fraud, waste, and abuse. Continuing problems in reliably reporting on the cost of its operations. The following five areas were key elements of that blueprint: (1) consolidate finance and accounting operations, (2) consolidate finance and accounting systems, (3) establish pre-validation for disbursements, (4) reengineer DOD business practices, and (5) strengthen internal controls. DOD has acknowledged that its financial management systems are antiquated and cannot be relied upon to provide DOD management and the Congress with accurate and reliable financial information for use in decision-making. As discussed later, DOD has not yet been able to fully implement this initiative. Strong internal controls are critical to effectively controlling and accounting for the estimated $1 trillion in DOD assets worldwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act, focusing on the: (1) financial problems facing the department; (2) actions DOD plans to take; and (3) issues DOD must address to overcome its problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that DOD: (1) does not have adequate financial management processes or financial data to detect errors in annual disbursements; (2) has not properly reported billions of dollars in potential future liabilities; (3) continues to have problems protecting its assets from fraud, waste, and abuse; (4) has been unable to provide Congress with accurate accounts of its operating costs; (5) needs accurate financial information and appropriate internal controls to effectively manage over $1 trillion in assets, 3 million military and civilian personnel, and a budget of over $250 billion; and (6) has taken several initiatives to consolidate its finance and accounting systems, establish prevalidation procedures for annual disbursements, reengineer DOD business practices, and strengthen internal controls. |
gao_GAO-09-811 | gao_GAO-09-811_0 | Because of the large number and wide variety of stakeholders involved in the recovery from a catastrophic event, collaboration is a critical element of this process. Effective Collaboration Has Facilitated Recovery in Past Disasters
Effective collaboration among recovery stakeholders can play a key role in facilitating disaster recovery. Building on this, we identify two approaches of how stakeholders involved in the recovery process following the Kobe earthquake in Japan and the Grand Forks/Red River flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota, worked collectively to define and articulate common outcomes. In doing so, collaborating groups can bring different levels of resources and capacities to the task at hand. In the wake of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Japanese government created a formal organization through which human capital resources from all levels of the government were leveraged to plan for and implement recovery strategies. To review construction proposals more efficiently, FHWA and CalTrans staff collaborated to review documents, discuss needed changes, and then approve projects together in one location. Under standard contracting procedures, the contracting process could take 26 to 40 weeks to complete. However, this collaborative, co-located process enabled state highway officials to advertise and award construction contracts in just 3 to 5 days. By leveraging the knowledge and resources of state and federal staff in this way, Los Angeles successfully restored its highways within a few months after the Northridge earthquake. Communities can develop such plans either before or after a disaster occurs. Pre-disaster recovery plans that clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders may prove useful in clarifying the specific types of costs federal programs are likely to cover as well as some of the requirements of these programs before a disaster strikes. They enabled policy makers to measure the progress made by various stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, and identify needed changes to existing policies, and learned lessons for future disasters. For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation Hyogo prefecture gained insight into the unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy. FEMA Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Collaboration among Stakeholders, but Could Do More to Share Recovery Experiences
Recovery experiences from past catastrophes—including good collaboration practices—can offer lessons for such events in the future. Through one-on-one exchanges like these, state and local officials involved in recovery can obtain tailored advice from individuals who have addressed similar challenges themselves. Specifically, we have identified a number of practices used during past disasters that can offer insights for effective collaboration: developing and communicating common goals to guide recovery; leveraging resources to facilitate recovery; using recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities; and monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on progress made toward recovery. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the ability of the federal government to capture and disseminate recovery information, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a mechanism for sharing information and best practices focused on disaster recovery, including practices that promote effective collaboration such as those discussed in this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify recovery lessons from past experiences, we selected 5 catastrophic disasters: the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1995 Great Hanshin- Awaji (Kobe) earthquake, and the 1997 Grand Forks/Red River flood to review (see fig. y communities impacted by four of the five disasters in To identify examples of good collaboration among recovery stakeholders, we applied eight key practices we have reported on in prior work that enhance and sustain collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems. Long-term Recove Snapshot
The federal government provided significant funding to the affected areas to facilitate its recovery from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Toward that end, the city established Vision Santa Cruz which helped to facilitate the planning process for the city’s downtown recovery. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, coordination and collaboration challenges created obstacles during the government's response and recovery efforts. Because of the many stakeholders involved in recovery, including all levels of government, it is critical to build collaborative relationships. Building on GAO's September 2008 report which provided several key recovery practices from past catastrophic disasters, this report presents examples of how federal, state, and local governments have effectively collaborated in the past. GAO reviewed five catastrophic disasters--the Loma Prieta earthquake (California, 1989), Hurricane Andrew (Florida, 1992), the Northridge earthquake (California, 1994), the Kobe earthquake (Japan, 1995), and the Grand Forks/Red River flood (North Dakota and Minnesota, 1997)--to identify recovery lessons. GAO interviewed officials involved in the recovery from these disasters and experts on disaster recovery. GAO also reviewed relevant legislation, policies, and the disaster recovery literature.
What GAO Found
Effective collaboration among stakeholders can play a key role in facilitating long-term recovery after a catastrophic event. Toward that end, GAO has identified four collaborative practices that may help communities rebuild from the Gulf Coast hurricanes as well as future catastrophic events: (1) Develop and communicate common goals to guide recovery. Defining common recovery goals can enhance collaboration by helping stakeholders overcome differences in missions and cultures. After the Grand Forks/Red River flood, federally-funded consultants convened various stakeholders to develop recovery goals and priorities for the city of Grand Forks. The city used these goals as a basis to create a detailed recovery action plan that helped it to implement its recovery goals. (2) Leverage resources to facilitate recovery. Collaborating groups bring different resources and capacities to the task at hand. After the Northridge earthquake, officials from the Federal Highway Administration and California's state transportation agency worked together to review highway rebuilding contracts, discuss changes, and then approve projects all in one location. This co-located, collaborative approach enabled the awarding of rebuilding contracts in 3 to 5 days--instead of the 26 to 40 weeks it could take using normal contracting procedures. This helped to restore damaged highways within a few months of the earthquake. (3) Use recovery plans to agree on roles and responsibilities. Organizations can collectively agree on who will do what by identifying roles and responsibilities in recovery plans developed either before or after a disaster takes place. Learning from its experiences from the Loma Prieta earthquake, San Francisco Bay Area officials created a plan that clearly identifies roles for all participants in order to facilitate regional recovery in the event of a future disaster. (4) Monitor, evaluate, and report on progress made toward recovery. After the 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe and the surrounding region established processes to assess and report on recovery progress. These jurisdictions required periodic external reviews over 10 years on the progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result of one of these reviews, the city of Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy. Past recovery experiences--including practices that promote effective collaboration--offer potentially valuable lessons for future catastrophic events. FEMA has taken some steps to facilitate the sharing of such experiences among communities involved in disaster recovery. However, the agency can do more to build on and systematize the sharing of this information so that recovery lessons are better captured and disseminated for use in the future. |
gao_RCED-99-4 | gao_RCED-99-4_0 | This report provides information on (1) the factors that influence the price of fluid milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer, (2) the portion of the average retail price of fluid milk that is received by farmers, cooperatives, wholesalers, and retailers in selected markets nationwide, (3) changes in farm and retail prices and their effect on the farm-to-retail price spread—which is the difference between the retail and farm prices, (4) the way changes in prices at any given level in the milk marketing chain are reflected in changes in prices at the other levels, and (5) different retail pricing relationships that exist in selected markets among the four kinds of milk—whole, reduced-fat (2-percent), low-fat (1-percent), and fat-free (skim). Dairy farmers receive a price for unprocessed milk, and each entity that is involved in the processing and marketing of fluid milk adds value to the product and receives a portion of the difference between the farm and retail price. On the other hand, the amount of fluid milk that consumers want to purchase at the retail level is influenced not only by the price of fluid milk, but also by such factors as the size, age, and income levels of the population in the marketing area, and the prices of substitutes. Our analysis includes information on (1) the portion of the retail price that is received by farmers, cooperatives, wholesalers, and retailers; (2) changes to retail and farm-level prices and their effect on the farm-to-retail price spread; and (3) the way in which changes in prices at any given level in the milk marketing chain are reflected in changes in prices at the other levels. Complete data on prices for all four kinds of milk—whole, 1-percent, fat-free as well as 2-percent—are presented in appendix V.
Portion Received by Farmers, Cooperatives, Wholesalers, and Retailers
From January 1996 through February 1998, for the 31 fluid milk markets that we reviewed, farmers, on average, received 42 percent of the retail price for a gallon of 2-percent milk, cooperatives received 10 percent, wholesalers received 31 percent, and retailers received 17 percent. However, the portion received at any one level in the marketing chain varied substantially among markets. Denver, Colo.
Las Vegas, Nev.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Seattle, Wash.
Sacramento, Calif. (continued)
Salt Lake City, Utah San Diego, Calif.
Changes in Farm and Retail Prices and the Price Spread
From January 1996 through February 1998, retail fluid milk prices remained constant or increased in 27 markets and decreased in 4 markets. In contrast, farm prices decreased in 27 markets and remained constant in 4 markets. As a result of these price changes, the farm-to-retail price spread increased in 27 of the 31 markets over the 26-month period. In contrast, changes in the prices received by farmers less frequently correlated with changes in retail prices than they were with changes in cooperative or wholesale prices. We found that retail pricing relationships among the four kinds of milk varied significantly in the markets we analyzed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues concerning the pricing and marketing of fluid milk, focusing on: (1) the factors that influence the price of fluid milk as it moves from the farm to the consumer; (2) the portion of the average retail price of a gallon of fluid milk that is received by farmers, cooperatives, wholesalers, and retailers in selected markets across the country; (3) changes in farm and retail prices and their effect on the farm-to-retail price spread; (4) the way changes in prices at any given level in the milk marketing chain are reflected in changes in prices at the other levels; and (5) different retail pricing relationships that exist in selected markets among the four kinds of milk.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) at all levels in the fluid milk marketing chain, prices are determined by the interaction of numerous supply and demand factors; (2) the supply available at any given level is influenced by: (a) the costs incurred by the entities involved in the production, processing, and marketing of fluid milk; (b) the government policies that establish minimum prices for unprocessed milk used to produce fluid milk; (c) competitive conditions in the marketplace; (d) the market power acquired by the entities involved; and (e) the price of milk; (3) similarly, the amount demanded at any given level is influenced by the size, age, and income levels of the population in the marketing area, and the prices of fluid milk and substitute goods; (4) furthermore, the prices that retailers receive for fluid milk are influenced not only by their operating costs and return on investment but also by other factors, such as the pricing strategies used by competitors; (5) from January 1996 through February 1998, for the 31 fluid milk markets that GAO reviewed, on average, farmers received 42 percent of the retail price for a gallon of 2-percent milk, cooperatives received 10 percent, wholesalers received 31 percent, and retailers received 17 percent; (6) however, the portion received at any one level in the marketing chain varied substantially among markets; (7) from January 1996 through February 1998, retail prices for a gallon of 2-percent milk remained constant or increased in 27 markets and decreased in 4 market; (8) in contrast, farm prices decreased in 27 markets and remained constant in 4 markets; (9) as a result of these price changes, the farm-to-retail price spread increased in 27 of the 31 markets over the 26-month period GAO reviewed; (10) changes in prices at any given level in the milk marketing chain were most often reflected in changes in prices at the next level, as might be expected; (11) similarly, changes in wholesale prices generally correlated with changes in retail prices; (12) in contrast, changes in prices received by farmers less frequently correlated with changes in retail prices than they did with changes in cooperative or wholesale prices; and (13) retail pricing relationships among the four kinds of milk varied significantly in the markets GAO analyzed. |
gao_GAO-14-114 | gao_GAO-14-114_0 | FMCSA’s Role
FMCSA is responsible for overseeing this large and diverse industry. SMS uses data obtained from federal or state roadside inspections and from crash investigations to identify the highest risk carriers. Carriers potentially receive an SMS score in seven categories based on this information. SMS Carrier Performance
SMS, the measurement system component of CSA, uses the data collected from roadside inspections and crash reports to quantify a carrier’s safety performance relative to other carriers. CSA Program Increases Carrier Interventions, but FMCSA Faces Challenges in Identifying High Risk Carriers
CSA has been successful in raising the profile of safety in the motor carrier industry and providing FMCSA with more tools to increase interventions with carriers. However, FMCSA faces two major challenges in reliably assessing safety risk for the majority of carriers in the industry and prioritizing the riskiest carriers for intervention. First, we found that the majority of regulations used to calculate SMS scores are not violated often enough to strongly associate them with crash risk for individual carriers. From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012, FMCSA increased its number of annual interventions from about 16,000 to about 44,000, largely by sending warning letters to carriers deemed to be above the intervention threshold in one or more BASICs (see table 3). For SMS to be effective in identifying carriers that crash, the violation information that is used to calculate SMS scores should have a relationship with crash risk. (For more information, see app. Most Carriers Lack Sufficient Information to Reliably Compare Safety Performance across Carriers
Most carriers lack sufficient safety performance information to ensure that FMCSA can reliably compare them with other carriers. 4). Strengthened Data Sufficiency Standards Can Improve FMCSA’s Ability to Identify High Risk Carriers
Our analysis shows that FMCSA could improve its ability to identify carriers at higher risk of crashing by applying a more stringent data sufficiency standard. FMCSA’s existing SMS method successfully identified as high risk more than 2,800 carriers whose vehicles were involved in 12,624 crashes. Prioritizing resources to these carriers would limit FMCSA’s ability to reduce the number of overall crashes, resulting in lost opportunities to intervene with the carriers associated with many crashes. In setting a data sufficiency standard, FMCSA needs to consider how precise the scores need to be, and a score’s required precision depends on the purposes for which the scores are used. According to FMCSA, the Safety Fitness Determination rulemaking would seek to allow FMCSA to determine if a motor carrier is not fit to operate based on a carrier’s performance in five of the BASICs, an investigation, or a combination of roadside and investigative information. In addition to using SMS for internal purposes, FMCSA has also stated that SMS provides stakeholders with valuable safety information, which can “empower motor carriers and other stakeholders…to make safety- based business decisions.” publicly released SMS scores stating that the data are intended for agency and law enforcement purposes, and readers should not draw safety conclusions about a carrier’s safety condition based on the SMS score, but rather the carrier’s official safety rating. GAO continues to believe a data-driven, risk-based approach holds promise and can help FMCSA effectively identify carriers exhibiting compliance or safety issues—such as violations or involvement in crashes. Our analysis shows how improving the reliability of SMS scores by strengthening data sufficiency standards could better account for limitations in available safety performance information and help FMCSA better focus intervention resources where they can have the greatest impact on reducing crashes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to take the following two actions: Revise the SMS methodology to better account for limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance information across carriers; in doing so, conduct a formal analysis that specifically identifies: limitations in the data used to calculate SMS scores including variability in the carrier population and the quality and quantity of data available for carrier safety performance assessments, and limitations in the resulting SMS scores including their precision, confidence, and reliability for the purposes for which they are used. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the effectiveness of the Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program in assessing safety risk for motor carriers. Given FMCSA’s use of these scores as quantitative determinations of a carrier’s safety performance, we assessed the reliability of SMS scores as defined by the precision, accuracy, and confidence of these scores when calculated for carriers with varying levels of carrier exposure—measured by FMCSA as either inspections or an adjusted number of vehicles. Using this analysis, we designed an illustrative alternative method that incorporates the following changes: including only carriers with at least 20 observations in the following measures of exposure: driver inspections when calculating scores for the Hours-of- Service Compliance, Driver Fitness, and Controlled Substances BASICs; vehicle related inspections for the Vehicle Maintenance BASIC; vehicle related inspections where placardable quantities of hazardous materials are being transported for Hazardous Materials BASIC; and average power units for the Unsafe Driving and Crash Indicator assigning an SMS score to any carrier meeting these data sufficiency standards (e.g., 20 inspections), even if that carrier does not have any violations, was free of violations for 12 months, or had a clean last inspection; eliminating safety event groups because of the stricter data sufficiency using only the average number of vehicles as the measure of exposure for carrier’s assessed in the Unsafe Driving and Crash Indicator BASICs. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 2009 to 2012, large commercial trucks and buses have averaged about 125,000 crashes per year, with about 78,000 injuries and over 4,100 fatalities. In 2010, FMCSA replaced its tool for identifying the riskiest carriers--SafeStat--with the CSA program. CSA is intended to reduce the number of motor carrier crashes by better targeting the highest risk carriers using information from roadside inspections and crash investigations. CSA includes SMS, a data-driven approach for identifying motor carriers at risk of causing a crash.
GAO was directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 to monitor the implementation of CSA. This report examines the effectiveness of the CSA program in assessing safety risk for motor carriers. GAO spoke with FMCSA officials and stakeholders to understand SMS. Using FMCSA's data, GAO replicated FMCSA's method for calculating SMS scores and assessed the effect of changes--such as stronger data-sufficiency standards--on the scores. GAO also evaluated SMS's ability to predict crashes.
What GAO Found
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program has helped the agency contact or investigate more motor carrier companies that own commercial trucks and buses and has provided a range of safety benefits to safety officials, law enforcement, and the industry than the previous approach, SafeStat. Specifically, from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012, FMCSA more than doubled its number of annual interventions, largely by sending warning letters to riskier carriers.
A key component of CSA--the Safety Measurement System (SMS)--uses carrier performance data collected from roadside inspections or crash investigations to identify high risk carriers for intervention by analyzing relative safety scores in various categories, including Unsafe Driving and Vehicle Maintenance. FMCSA faces at least two challenges in reliably assessing safety risk for the majority of carriers. First, for SMS to be effective in identifying carriers more likely to crash, the violations that FMCSA uses to calculate SMS scores should have a strong predictive relationship with crashes. However, based on GAO's analysis of available information, most regulations used to calculate SMS scores are not violated often enough to strongly associate them with crash risk for individual carriers. Second, most carriers lack sufficient safety performance data to ensure that FMCSA can reliably compare them with other carriers. To produce an SMS score, FMCSA calculates violation rates for each carrier and then compares these rates to other carriers. Most carriers operate few vehicles and are inspected infrequently, providing insufficient information to produce reliable SMS scores. FMCSA acknowledges that violation rates are less precise for carriers with little information, but its methods do not fully address this limitation. For example, FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, GAO found that FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with carriers that were involved in crashes.
FMCSA's methodology is limited because of insufficient information, which reduces the precision of SMS scores. GAO found that by scoring only carriers with more information, FMCSA could better identify high risk carriers likely to be involved in crashes. This illustrative approach involves trade-offs; it would assign SMS scores to fewer carriers, but these scores would generally be more reliable and thus more useful in targeting FMCSA's scarce resources.
In addition to using SMS scores to prioritize carriers for intervention, FMCSA reports these scores publicly and is considering using a carrier's performance information to determine its fitness to operate. Given the limitations with safety performance information, determining the appropriate amount of information needed to assess a carrier requires consideration of how reliable and precise the scores need to be for the purposes for which they are used. Ultimately, the mission of FMCSA is to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities. GAO continues to believe a data-driven, risk-based approach holds promise; however, revising the SMS methodology would help FMCSA better focus intervention resources where they can have the greatest impact on achieving this goal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA revise the SMS methodology to better account for limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance information across carriers. In addition, determination of a carrier's fitness to operate should account for limitations in available performance information. In response to comments from the Department of Transportation (USDOT), GAO clarified one of the recommendations. USDOT agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-430T | gao_GAO-10-430T_0 | More generally, now that the census has moved to the operational phase, it will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule. A time line of key census operations is shown in figure 1. Consequently, as the enumeration progresses, it will be important for the Bureau to closely monitor key performance metrics to ensure that the various operations are on track and quickly address any glitches. Key IT Systems Are Experiencing Significant Performance Issues
Although the Bureau has made progress in testing and deploying IT systems for the 2010 Census, significant performance issues have been identified with both the workflow management system—PBOCS—as well as with the Decennial Applicant Personnel and Payroll System (DAPPS), the automated system the Bureau is using to handle the payroll of the more than 1 million temporary employees that are to work on the census. Bureau officials stated that many of these issues were resolved during the second iteration of testing; however, others remain to be resolved and new issues were identified. In addition, the development and testing of two other releases is needed before the system is ready for other key field operations, such as the enumeration of residents in group quarters, scheduled to begin in March 2010. The Bureau Has Revised Its Cost Estimate for Nonresponse Follow- up, but Needs to Complete Additional Updates as Planned
In 2008, we reported that the Bureau had not carried out the necessary analyses to demonstrate that the then life-cycle cost estimate of about $11.5 billion for the 2010 Census was credible, and we recommended that the Bureau better document and update the estimate, to which it generally agreed. According to the Bureau, two cost drivers—workload, based on the mail response rate, and productivity—are uncertain and could have a significant effect on the ultimate cost of NRFU. However, the Bureau’s analyses of cost are not complete. Those activities include procedures for fingerprinting temporary employees; the Bureau’s efforts to count people residing in nursing homes, dormitories, and other group living arrangements known as “group quarters”; the rollout of key marketing efforts aimed at improving the participation of hard-to-count populations; the Bureau’s plans for a mailing a second, follow-up questionnaire and the removal of late mail returns; and the Bureau’s plans to secure a complete count in the hurricane-affected areas along the Gulf Coast. Bureau Has Taken Steps to Reduce the Number of Unclassifiable Fingerprints of Temporary Workers
The Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce for the first time in the 2010 Census to better conduct background security checks on its workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary census workers. The Bureau has also revised its procedures for refingerprinting employees when both fingerprint cards cannot be read. Under the revised policy, the Bureau plans to digitally capture a third and fourth set of fingerprints if the FBI cannot classify the first two sets. Further, the Bureau targeted the paid advertising messages based on market and attitudinal research. In summary, our analysis suggests that the paid advertising and partnership activities, along with the other components of the Bureau’s communications campaign, are generally more robust than the Bureau’s promotional efforts during the 2000 Census in that the entire effort is more comprehensive, and activities appear to be more data-driven and targeted. Also, the Bureau plans to mail approximately 12 million replacement questionnaires to nonresponding households in other census tracts that had low-to- moderate response rates in 2000 (known as targeted replacement). Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to ensure that local census offices follow these procedures so that households are not unnecessarily visited by an enumerator or inadvertently removed from the follow-up workload and missed in the census count. To ensure a quality count in the hurricane-affected areas, the Bureau will hand-deliver an estimated 1.2 million census questionnaires in these areas through the Update Leave operation, where census workers update addresses and provide a mail-back census questionnaire to each living quarter in their assigned areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings and uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the census, now estimated at around $15 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since made improvements to various IT systems and taken other steps to mitigate the risks of a successful census. However, last year, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained, and much work remained to be completed under very tight time frames. As requested, this testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness for an effective headcount, covering (1) the status of key IT systems; (2) steps the Bureau has taken to revise its cost estimates; and (3) the extent to which critical enumeration activities, particularly those aimed at hard-to-count populations, are on track. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
Overall, the Bureau's readiness for a successful headcount is mixed. On the one hand, ongoing performance issues are affecting key IT systems, especially a workflow management system essential for the Bureau's field operations and a payroll processing system that will be used to pay more than 1 million temporary workers. Indeed, an important performance test the Bureau held in December 2009 revealed significant performance issues with each system. Bureau officials stated that many of these issues were resolved in further testing; however, others remain unresolved, and new defects were identified. The Bureau is going to great lengths to address these issues. However, little time remains before the systems need to become fully operational. In addition, the Bureau revised its cost estimate from $2.7 billion to $2.3 billion for nonresponse follow-up, the largest and most costly field operation where census workers follow up in person with nonresponding households. However, the Bureau's analyses of cost are not complete. According to the Bureau, it continues to reexamine the cost of two other nonresponse follow-up related operations. On the other hand, the rollout of key enumeration activities is generally on track, and the Bureau has taken action to address some previously identified problems. For example, the Bureau has taken several steps to reduce the number of unreadable fingerprint cards of temporary workers, a problem that plagued an earlier field operation. Among other actions, the Bureau plans to digitally capture a third and fourth set of fingerprints if the first two sets cannot be read for background security checks. The Bureau has also developed new procedures for counting those living in group quarters, such as dormitories and prisons. For example, the Bureau is using a single address list containing both group quarters and housing units, rather than separate lists as in the 2000 Census, to reduce the chance of double counting. The Bureau's 2010 Census communications campaign is also more robust than the one used in the 2000 Census. Key differences from the 2000 campaign include increased partnership staffing, targeted paid advertising based on market and attitudinal research, and a contingency fund to address unexpected events. To increase participation rates, the Bureau plans to mail a second, replacement questionnaire to census tracts that had low or moderate response rates in the 2000 Census. To help ensure a complete count of areas along the Gulf Coast, the Bureau plans to hand deliver an estimated 1.2 million census forms in areas devastated by hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. This effort will help ensure that households--even those that were not on the Bureau's address list but appear inhabitable--will be included in the census. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to quickly identify the problems affecting key IT systems and test solutions. Further, given the complexity of the census and the likelihood that other glitches might arise, it will be important for the Bureau to stay on schedule, monitor operations, and have plans and personnel in place to quickly address operational issues. |
gao_GAO-06-250 | gao_GAO-06-250_0 | Key requirements include those set by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, which (1) requires agencies to establish cost, schedule, and measurable performance goals for all major acquisition programs and (2) establishes that agencies should achieve on average 90 percent of those goals; the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which establishes the foundation for budget decision making to achieve strategic goals in order to meet agency mission objectives; and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, which requires agencies to integrate IT security into their strategic and operational planning processes, such as the capital planning and enterprise architecture processes at the agency. Section 300 defines the budget exhibit 300, also called the Capital Asset Plan and Business Case, as a document that agencies submit to OMB to justify resource requests for major IT investments. The types of information included in the exhibit 300 are intended, among other things, to help OMB and the agencies identify and correct poorly planned or performing investments (i.e., investments that are behind schedule, over budget, or not delivering expected results) and real or potential systemic weaknesses in federal information resource management (such as a shortage of sufficiently qualified project managers). Three types of problems were evident. First, all exhibit 300s had documentation weaknesses. Second, agencies did not always demonstrate (for example, in the Security and Privacy and the Project and Funding Plan sections) that they complied with federal requirements or policies with regard to management and reporting processes. Agency officials attributed the absence of adequate support for their exhibit 300s to lack of understanding of the requirements or of how to respond to them. Agency officials mentioned in particular insufficient guidance or training, as well as lack of familiarity with particular requirements, such as the EVM process. If underlying support is inadequate in key areas, OMB and agency executives are depending on unreliable information to monitor the management of major IT projects and to make critical decisions on their funding, thus putting at risk millions of dollars in investments. The investments did not usually demonstrate the basis for the performance measure information provided in the exhibit 300. Only 6 of the 29 investments had documentation to support how agencies initially measured their baseline levels of performance, from which they measured progress toward the agency’s strategic goals. However, in about 72 percent of the exhibit 300s reviewed, either supporting documentation was missing for this cost information, or information in the documentation did not agree with that in the exhibit 300. Overall, the lack of documentation supporting the exhibit 300s raises questions regarding the sufficiency of the business case for the investment and the quality of the projects’ management. At every agency, cost information reported in the 29 exhibit 300s was derived from ad hoc processes rather than from cost-accounting systems with adequate controls to ensure accountability. Although we cannot directly project these examples to the more than one thousand business cases developed each year across the federal government, our results suggest that the issues raised need attention. The kinds of weaknesses displayed and the causes behind them are consistent with the pervasive problems with project and investment management that we have documented in numerous prior reports. In addition, OMB has relied on these exhibits to identify and oversee high-risk projects; thus, our finding that the data being presented to OMB may not be reliable or accurate further complicates its oversight. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to ascertain the extent to which selected agencies have underlying support for the information described in their fiscal year 2006 exhibit 300s as submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in September 2004. To address our objective, we reviewed the supporting documentation for 29 exhibit 300s from agencies and components from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, and the Treasury. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, agencies submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a Capital Asset Plan and Business Case--the exhibit 300--to justify each request for a major information technology (IT) investment. The exhibit's content should reflect controls that agencies have established to ensure good project management, as well as showing that they have defined cost, schedule, and performance goals. It is thus a tool to help OMB and agencies identify and correct poorly planned or performing investments. In its budget and oversight role, OMB relies on the accuracy and completeness of this information. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which selected agencies have underlying support for the information in their fiscal year 2006 exhibit 300s. From five major departments having over $1 billion in IT expenditures in that year, GAO chose for analysis 29 exhibits for projects that supported a cross section of federal activities.
What GAO Found
Underlying support was often inadequate for information provided in the exhibit 300s reviewed. Three general types of weaknesses were evident. All exhibit 300s had documentation weaknesses. Documentation either did not exist or did not fully agree with specific areas of the exhibit 300. For example, both these problems occurred in relation to calculations of financial benefits for most investments. In addition, for 23 of the 29 investments, information on performance goals and measures was not supported by explanations of how agencies had initially measured their baseline levels of performance (from which they determine progress) or how they determined the actual progress reported in the exhibit 300. Agencies did not always demonstrate that they complied with federal or departmental requirements or policies with regard to management and reporting processes. For example, 21 investments were required to use a specific management system as the basis for the cost, schedule, and performance information in the exhibit 300, but only 6 did so following OMB-required standards. Also, none had cost analyses that fully complied with OMB requirements for cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. In contrast, most investments did demonstrate compliance with information security planning and training requirements. In sections that required actual cost data, these data were unreliable because they were not derived from cost-accounting systems with adequate controls. In the absence of such systems, agencies generally derived cost information from ad hoc processes. Officials from the five agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Transportation, and the Treasury) attributed these shortcomings in support to lack of understanding of a requirement or how to respond to it. Agency officials mentioned in particular insufficient guidance or training, as well as lack of familiarity with particular requirements. The weaknesses in the 29 exhibit 300s raise questions regarding the sufficiency of the business cases for these major investments and the quality of the projects' management. Without adequate support in key areas, OMB and agency executives may be depending on unreliable information to make critical decisions on IT projects, thus putting at risk millions of dollars. Further, although the 29 examples cannot be directly projected to the over one thousand business cases developed each year across the federal government, the results suggest that the underlying causes for the weaknesses identified need attention. These weaknesses and their causes are also consistent with problems in project and investment management that are pervasive governmentwide, including at such agencies as the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security, as documented in reports by GAO and others. |
gao_GAO-02-103 | gao_GAO-02-103_0 | The guidance issued by the Department requires the components to pursue the recovery of cleanup costs of $50,000 or more and to include in the annual report to the Congress each site’s name and location, the recovery status, the amount recovered, and the cost of pursuing the recovery. This field includes information such as progress in conducting investigations and contracts awarded for cleanup. The Defense components are required to report both the costs shared with non-DOD parties at the time of cleanup and the costs that they recovered from non-DOD parties after cleanup. Conclusions
The cost recovery data in the Department’s annual environmental cleanup report for fiscal year 1999 are not useful to the Congress or the Department for management or oversight because they are inaccurate, inconsistent, and incomplete. These problems limit the ability of the Congress and the Department to determine the extent to which recoveries may offset environmental cleanup costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Congress and the Department of Defense have accurate, consistent, and complete information on cost recovery efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment to modify existing guidance in areas where it is silent or unclear and provide specific guidance for (1) defining the types of cost sharing arrangements that should be reported, (2) calculating the costs of pursuing recovery, (3) reporting both cumulative and fiscal year data, and (4) capturing and reporting amounts spent by non-DOD parties under cost sharing arrangements. | What GAO Found
The cleanup of contaminated Department of Defense (DOD) sites could cost billions of dollars. Private contractors or lessees that may have contributed to such contamination may also be responsible for cleanup costs. DOD and other responsible parties either agree to a cost sharing arrangement with the responsible parties conducting the cleanup or DOD conducts the cleanup and attempts to recover the other parties' share after the cleanup. On the basis of a GAO study, DOD issued guidance requiring its components to identify, investigate, and pursue cost recoveries and to report on them in the Defense Environmental Restoration Program Annual Report to Congress. The data on cost recoveries from non-Defense parties included in the Department's report for fiscal year 1999 were inaccurate, inconsistent, and incomplete. As a result, neither Congress nor DOD can determine the extent of progress made in recovering costs or the extent to which cost recoveries may offset cleanup costs. Data on cost recoveries included throughout the annual report were also missing from the appendix. Thus, DOD may not know whether all potential cost recoveries have been actively pursued and reported. |
gao_GAO-01-803 | gao_GAO-01-803_0 | For example, the U.S. Conclusions
Although some protection has been provided to internally displaced persons, international organizations have been unable to meet the protection needs of internally displaced persons in most locations, partly because of the danger of operating in conflict zones, the presence of personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations and interventions into their assistance activities, and in the three countries we visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic information about the location of their protection officers and effective approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one forum where these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying political and security factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some State and USAID officials believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a locus of accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although the Department of State is required to provide the Congress with an annual report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited information about the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing information about the internally displaced and their human rights condition that would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced persons would identify what we found to be a significant problem and would provide U.S. government and international and nongovernmental organizations’ officials with country-level data to craft a cohesive program and policy response. | What GAO Found
Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country--are among the most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world. Although some protections have been provided to internally displaced persons, international organizations have been unable to fully meet their needs in most locations, partly because of the danger in operating in conflict zones, the presence of personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations and interventions into their assistance activities. In the three countries GAO visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic information on the location of their protection officers and effective approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one forum in which these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying political and security factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although State is required to provide Congress with an annual report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited information on the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing information on the internally displaced and their human rights conditions which would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced persons would identify a significant problem and would provide the U.S. government and international and nongovernmental organizations' officials with country-level data to craft a cohesive program and policy response. |
gao_RCED-98-208 | gao_RCED-98-208_0 | Overall, DOE’s laboratory supercomputers accounted for about 17 percent of the total supercomputer capacity in the world. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested by the Chairman, House Committee on the Budget, we (1) identified the number and cost of the supercomputers DOE acquired in fiscal years 1994 through 1997 and the number and proposed funding for planned major supercomputer acquisitions in fiscal years 1998 through 2000; (2) determined the stated need for DOE’s supercomputers, the utilization rates for them, and the potential for facilities to share these resources; and (3) identified and described the process DOE and its contractors employ to validate the need for additional supercomputers and compared that process with the technology investment process set forth in the Clinger-Cohen Act. The costs of operating supercomputers are also substantial. Planned Major Supercomputer Acquisitions
DOE expects that its planned major supercomputer acquisitions for fiscal years 1998 through 2000 will cost about $257 million. DOE Has Unused Supercomputer Capacity That Can Be Shared
DOE is underutilizing its supercomputing resources and is missing opportunities to share them. With respect to utilization, we found that DOE’s laboratories are utilizing, on average, only about 59 percent of their available supercomputer capability. Research is under way as part of the ASCI program to address this issue. DOE’s Proposed Changes May Not Improve Oversight of Supercomputers
DOE has not effectively overseen the acquisition and use of supercomputers, and its proposed implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act will not improve its oversight. The Department does not have a process in place to ensure that supercomputer acquisitions are fully justified and represent the best use of funds among competing priorities. As a result, new systems are planned and acquired without DOE oversight, while substantial unused and underutilized capacity already exists within DOE. As envisioned, this approach may allow DOE’s program offices to continue acquiring supercomputers outside the Department’s normal process for implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act. This approach, contrary to what is envisioned in the Clinger-Cohen Act, effectively places the vast majority of DOE’s information technology resources outside the purview of the Department’s chief information officer. However, the program has not been designated as a strategic system. The executive committe and chief information officer oversee major information technology investments, and the chief information officer has the specific responsibility of overseeing the Department’s information technology process. DOE’s Proposed Implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act May Not Follow Its Criteria
In April 1998, the Department decided to implement an investment planning and oversight process for major administrative and scientific information technologies. GAO’s Comments
1. We disagree with DOE’s position on the percent of overall capacity available for sharing, and with the Department’s view that sharing of ASCI supercomputers is difficult. 5. The process DOE is implementing in response to the act would allow the same program office that has a vested interest in acquiring the supercomputer to be the Department’s oversight body for the acquisition of that supercomputer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) acquisition and use of supercomputers, focusing on the: (1) number and cost of the supercomputers DOE acquired in fiscal years (FY) 1994 through 1997 and the number and proposed funding for planned major supercomputer acquisitions in FY 1998 through FY 2000; (2) stated need for DOE's supercomputers, the utilization rates for them, and the potential for facilities to share these resources; and (3) process DOE and its contractors employ to validate the need for additional supercomputers and how that process contrasts with the technology investment process set forth in the Clinger-Cohen Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE has about 17 percent of the world's supercomputing capacity and is planning to almost triple its capacity over the next 3 years; (2) during FY 1998 through FY 2000, the Department plans to acquire five major supercomputers at an estimated cost of $257 million; (3) overall, DOE's national laboratories used only about 59 percent of their available supercomputing capacity in 1997 and are missing opportunities to share these resources; (4) the sharing of supercomputers among DOE's laboratories and with DOE-funded off-site users is not generally considered as a way to better use existing resources and to forgo the need to acquire more supercomputers; (5) DOE has not effectively overseen the acquisition and use of supercomputers; (6) the Department lacks an investment strategy and a defined process to ensure that supercomputer acquisitions are fully justified and represent the best use of funds among competing priorities; (7) instead, the Department's existing management processes separate supercomputer acquisitions from the projects they support, and the Department's chief information officer does not oversee the acquisition or use of supercomputers; (8) as a result, new supercomputers are planned and acquired with little departmental oversight, while underutilized capacity already exists within the Department; (9) DOE's proposed implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act will not improve departmental oversight; (10) in April 1998, the Department outlined its plan to implement a new investment planning and oversight process for information technology in response to the Clinger-Cohen Act; (11) this proposed approach reflects the view of the Department's program offices that supercomputers are research tools rather than information technology investments; (12) this approach may also allow DOE's program offices to continue acquiring supercomputers outside the Department's normal process for complying with the Clinger-Cohen Act; (13) contrary to what is envisioned in the Clinger-Cohen Act, this approach effectively places the vast majority of DOE's information technology resources outside the purview of the Department's chief information officer; (14) in addition, the cost and significance of the supercomputers being developed under the Department's Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) warrants that program's being designated as a strategic system subject to the highest level of departmental oversight; and (15) the ASCI program is estimated to cost about $4 billion from FY 1996 through FY 2010. |
gao_GAO-09-564 | gao_GAO-09-564_0 | However, the program’s approved cost and schedule baseline is not achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program’s cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. Over the past year, selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress. Specifically, three of the five instruments slated for NPP have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at both of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites’ command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance testing. An independent review team, established to assess key program risks, recently reported that the constellation of satellites is extremely fragile and that a single launch failure of DMSP or of the NPP satellite could result in a gap in satellite coverage from 3 to 5 years. Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities
While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the NPOESS program. Specifically, the DOD Executive Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend committee meetings—and sometimes contradicts the Committee’s decisions, the Committee does not aggressively manage risks, and many of the Committee’s decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee is unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS program—and important issues involving cost growth, schedule delays, and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. To address DOD’s requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however, neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing satellite integrator. The first study, conducted in 2007, identified three alternatives to the existing satellite integrator, including (1) re-competing the entire prime contract, (2) obtaining an independent system integrator while having the existing prime contractor continue to develop space and ground components, and (3) having the government take over responsibility for the system integration. The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a final assessment of alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to exercise the option to have the current system integrator produce the next two NPOESS satellites. We also recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to take the following five actions: establish a realistic time frame for revising the program’s cost and develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity; track the Committee’s action items from inception to closure; improve the Committee’s ability to achieve successful outcomes by identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the Committee’s actions, as well as time frames and responsible parties, when new action items are established; and improve the Committee’s efficiency by establishing time frames for escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not linger unresolved at the program executive level. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the status and risks of key National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive Committee’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites. We also interviewed agency officials from the Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the NPOESS program office to determine the status and risks of the key program segments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--that has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. As the often-delayed launch of its demonstration satellite draws closer, these problems continue. GAO was asked to (1) identify the status and risks of key program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
While selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress over the past year, the program is once again over budget and behind schedule. In terms of progress, three of the five instruments slated for a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project--NPP) have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at both of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites' command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance testing. However, the program's approved cost and schedule baseline are not achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program's cost and schedule. Costs could grow by $1 billion over the current $13.95 billion estimate, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays increase the risk of a gap in satellite continuity. An independent review team established to assess key program risks recently reported that the constellation of satellites is extremely fragile, and that there could be a 3 to 5 year gap in satellite coverage if NPP, NPOESS, or other DOD satellites fail on launch. The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for overseeing the program has made improvements over the last several years, but still has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities. Responding to past concerns expressed by GAO and the Department of Commerce's Inspector General, the Committee now meets on a regular basis, and has sought and reacted to advice from external advisors to mitigate specific risks. However, the Committee lacks the membership and leadership needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and direct the program. Specifically, the DOD Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Executive Committee meetings--and sometimes contradicts the Committee's decisions, the Committee does not track its action items to closure, and many of the Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Program officials and external independent reviewers explained that it is extremely difficult for the Committee to navigate three agencies' competing requirements and priorities. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee will remain ineffective. The NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives to using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current contractor. Both studies assessed a variety of alternatives, including re-competing the entire prime contract, obtaining an independent system integrator while having the existing prime contractor continue to develop space and ground components, and having the government take over responsibility for the system's integration. The first study identified strengths and weaknesses and the second study identified high-level costs and benefits. Neither study identified an alternative that is viable. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime contractor. |
gao_GAO-04-377 | gao_GAO-04-377_0 | For fiscal year 2002, OCSE reported over 16 million child support cases and collections of more than $20 billion. One method for collecting child support is intercepting federal tax refunds. Initially the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), an agency within the Department of the Treasury, OCSE, and the state agencies operated the program. Now, all state agencies, OCSE, IRS, and FMS play a role in the program. This delay may not exceed 6 months. State agencies had different interpretations of what comprised undistributed collections and some state agencies reported data that were found to be unreliable throughout this time period. Types of Collections Reported as Undistributed Differed
Although OCSE reported that the amount of undistributed collections for fiscal year 1999 was $545 million and $657 million for fiscal year 2002, OCSE also reported and our survey results indicated that state agencies varied in the types of collections they reported as undistributed. Some State Agencies Reported Inaccurate Amounts of Undistributed Collections
In addition to differences in the types of undistributed collections that state agencies reported, 4 state agencies reported data accuracy problems in 2002 and 2003 that were found to be overestimates. Federal Law, Some State Policies, and Inaccurate, or Missing Information Delayed or Prevented Distribution of Certain Collections
The underlying causes for nearly all undistributed collections were federal law, state policies, as well as inaccurate or missing information. While state agencies are generally required to distribute collections in 2 days, federal law allows state agencies to hold collections from joint tax refunds for up to 180 days. In addition, state agencies had policies on whether or not they held child support collections received before they were due. Many State Agencies Reported Holding More than $1 Million from Joint Tax Refunds and Several Hundred Thousand Dollars in Other Types of Undistributed Collections
In response to our survey, 32 state agencies provided dollar amounts for undistributed collections from joint tax refunds. The median value reported for these collections was $1.8 million. State Agencies Analyzed and Monitored Undistributed Collections
To help reduce their undistributed collections, officials from 5 of 6 state agencies we visited stated that they devoted resources to better understanding these collections. Resolving Missing Information and Invalid Addresses
Officials from all of the state agencies we visited highlighted the importance of dedicating staff to researching collections involving missing information. Automated processes to receive and distributed collections can help reduce undistributed collections. OCSE Has Assisted States’ Efforts to Reduce Undistributed Collections, but the Department of the Treasury Has Not Provided Information That Would Help States Distribute Collections from Some Joint Tax Refunds Sooner
OCSE has provided some assistance to help state agencies reduce their undistributed collections. Conclusion
Receipt of child support is critical for many custodial parents and their children. We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of OCSE to review undistributed collections data from state agencies periodically in conjunction with one of the other routine reviews to help improve the accuracy of the data and work closely with the Department of the Treasury to identify a cost- effective approach for obtaining information on “injured spouse” claims in order to enable collections from some joint tax refunds to reach families sooner. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the child support enforcement program in 1975 to ensure that parents financially supported their children. State agencies administer the program and the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services oversees it. In 2002, state agencies collected over $20 billion in child support, but $657 million in collections from 2002 and previous years were undistributed--funds that were delayed or never reached families. One method used to collect child support, intercepting federal tax refunds, involves all state agencies, OCSE, and two Department of the Treasury agencies--the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Financial Management Service (FMS). GAO was asked to address (1) how the total amount of undistributed collections changed over the years, (2) the causes of undistributed collections, (3) states' efforts to reduce these funds, and (4) OCSE's efforts to assist states. GAO analyzed OCSE data, administered a survey, visited 6 state agencies and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
OCSE reported that the amount of undistributed collections for fiscal year 1999 was $545 million and $657 million for fiscal year 2002; however, these amounts may not be accurate. State agencies had different interpretations of what comprised undistributed collections and data reported by several state agencies were found to be unreliable throughout this time period. OCSE revised the reporting form, but data accuracy concerns remain, in part, because OCSE does not have a process to ensure the accuracy of undistributed collections data. Federal law, some state policies, and inaccurate or missing information were the underlying causes of nearly all types of undistributed collections. State agencies determined how long they held collections from joint tax refunds and if they held collections received before they were due. Federal law allows collections intercepted from joint tax refunds to be held for up to 180 days and in response to GAO's survey, 34 state agencies reported holding them for 180 days. Missing or inaccurate information, such as invalid addresses, also leads to undistributed collections. Based on state agencies' survey responses, GAO determined the median value of the undistributed collections from joint tax refunds was about $1.8 million and the median value of four other types of undistributed collections exceeded $350,000. State agencies GAO visited took steps to better understand and reduce undistributed collections. Of the 6 state agencies visited, 5 had analyzed their undistributed collections cases, 4 adopted performance goals, and officials from all 6 state agencies stressed the importance of researching collections that were missing information. In addition, officials stated that using automated processes to receive and distribute collections helped reduce the number of collections with missing or inaccurate information. OCSE has provided some assistance to help state agencies reduce their undistributed collections. However, the Department of the Treasury has not provided OCSE information that would allow state agencies to distribute collections from joint tax refunds to families sooner. Further, OCSE's efforts to obtain this information have been minimal. |
gao_GAO-08-386SP | gao_GAO-08-386SP_0 | User fees assign part or all of the costs of these programs and activities—the cost of providing a benefit that is above and beyond what is normally available to the general public—to readily identifiable users of those programs and activities. Definition of User Fees
For the purposes of this guide we use the term user fees to include user fees as well as excise taxes with a “user pays” element. The boundaries between fees and taxes are not always clear and the tradeoffs among design elements presented in this guide can be relevant to both. Legislation authorizing a user fee may enact a specified rate or amount to be assessed or may stipulate how the fee is to be calculated, such as a formula; the method and timing of collection; and the authorized uses of the fee collections, which may be broadly or narrowly defined. First, as shown on the left side of figure 2, the extent to which a program provides benefits to the general public versus users should guide the proportion of total program costs that are paid for by general revenues versus user fees. User fees set under the beneficiary-pays principle can also enhance economic efficiency by ensuring that resources are allocated to the most highly valued use, as users make adjustments to their consumption of the service based on their costs and benefits. Although user fees can promote one facet of equity—the beneficiary-pays principle—they may run contrary to another facet—the ability-to-pay principle. For example, in May 2007, U.S. Collecting User Fees: Balancing Compliance with Administrative Costs
The primary challenge in determining when and how to collect a fee is striking a balance between ensuring compliance and minimizing administrative costs (see fig. In some cases, a nonfederal entity such as a state government or private sector enterprise has an existing infrastructure that can collect the fees. While some maintain that the merits of a program, rather than its ability to generate fees, should influence federal funding decisions, dedicating fee collections to the program that generated the fee and giving the agency authority to obligate and expend the fees readily and decide how the collections will be used enhance the agency’s flexibility and ability to respond quickly to changing conditions. Requiring an appropriation increases opportunities for Congressional oversight on a regular basis. To ensure that Congress, stakeholders, and agencies have complete information about changing program costs and whether authorized activities align with program activities, agencies must substantively review and report on their fees on a regular basis. Providing for stakeholder input may affect their support for and acceptance of the fee, and may contribute to improved understanding about how the fees work and what activities they may fund. Any user fee design embodies trade-offs among equity, efficiency, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden. What degree of access will the agency have to collected fees? Will the fees directly support the related program or agency or be deposited to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury? Will agency access to fees be subject to Congressional appropriation? | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government will need to make the most of its resources to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century. As new priorities emerge, policymakers have demonstrated interest in user fees as a means of financing new and existing services. User fees can be designed to reduce the burden on taxpayers to finance the portions of activities that provide benefits to identifiable users above and beyond what is normally provided to the public. By charging the costs of those programs or activities to beneficiaries, user fees can also promote economic efficiency and equity. However, to achieve these goals, user fees must be well designed. GAO was asked to study how user fee design characteristics may influence the effectiveness of user fees. Specifically, GAO examined how the four key design and implementation characteristics of user fees--how fees are set, collected, used, and reviewed--may affect the economic efficiency, equity, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden of cost-based fees. GAO reviewed economic and policy literature on federal and nonfederal user fees, including prior GAO work, and used relevant case examples to illustrate different types of design elements and the impacts they may have.
What GAO Found
Setting user fees according to the beneficiary-pays principle can promote equity and economic efficiency. For cost-based fees, the extent to which a program provides benefits to the general public versus users and the cost of providing those benefits should, theoretically, guide how much of total program costs are paid for by user fees and the amount each user pays (see figure). Although this principle provides a useful guideline for setting fees, strictly following the principle is not always desirable or practical. The primary challenge of determining when and how to collect a fee is striking a balance between ensuring compliance and minimizing administrative costs. In some cases, the collection systems of another agency or a nonfederal entity, such as a private sector enterprise, may be leveraged, as when the airlines collect passenger inspection fees. Determining how fees will be used is a balancing act between Congressional oversight and agency flexibility. Congress gives agencies various degrees of access to collected fees. For example, fees may be dedicated to the related program or may instead be deposited to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and not used specifically for the related program or agency. In addition, fee collections may be subject to appropriation or obligation limits, which increase opportunity for oversight but may limit agencies' ability to quickly respond to changing conditions. Agencies must substantively review their fees on a regular basis to ensure that they, Congress, and stakeholders have complete information. Reviews provide information on whether the fee rates and authorized activities are aligned with actual program costs and activities, may provide opportunities for stakeholder input, and can help promote understanding and acceptance of the fee. |
gao_NSIAD-97-209 | gao_NSIAD-97-209_0 | Consequently, as the executive branch report stated, its analysis of enlargement costs should “be seen as purely illustrative and designed to provide an approximation of the costs of enlargement.” As the basis for its analysis, DOD made the following key assumptions:
Specific nations would be invited to join NATO in the first round of enlargement. Using these assumptions, DOD estimated that the cost of enlarging NATO would range from about $27 billion to $35 billion from 1997 through 2009.The estimate was broken down as follows: about $8 billion to $10 billion for improvements in current NATO members’ regional reinforcement capabilities (e.g., addressing shortfalls in deployable support capabilities), about $10 billion to $13 billion for restructuring and modernizing new members’ militaries (e.g., selectively upgrading self-defense capabilities), and about $9 billion to $12 billion for costs directly attributable to NATO enlargement (e.g., ensuring that current and new members’ forces are interoperable and capable of combined NATO operations and upgrading or constructing facilities for receiving NATO reinforcements). DOD’s Pricing of Cost Elements Could Not Be Verified
Many of DOD’s estimates for specific cost elements could not be verified. DOD officials did not consistently document their analyses. Estimates Include Some Costs That Are Not Directly Related to Enlargement
Substantial portions of DOD’s total estimate consist of costs that are not directly related to enlargement, in contrast to those costs included in the direct enlargement category. DOD’s decision to include $8 billion to $10 billion as the estimated cost to enhance current members’ reinforcement capabilities is questionable. We also question whether all of the $10 billion to $13 billion DOD included for new members’ military modernization and restructuring are enlargement costs. Additional Costs May Be Associated With NATO Enlargement
Various additional costs may be incurred by the United States in connection with NATO enlargement that were not specifically quantified in DOD’s cost study. According to U.S. and NATO officials, the United States, NATO, and other NATO members may increase their Partnership for Peace and related assistance as a consolation to those countries. However, DOD’s cost estimate addressed only a first round of invitations and did not take into account a second or third round of invitations to join NATO. Differences in Estimates Are Due to Various Factors
Several factors account for the differences between DOD’s estimate and the CBO and RAND estimates, even those that employed defense strategies similar to DOD’s. Table 1 illustrates the major results and key assumptions of the three estimates. CBO’s cost estimate is significantly higher than DOD’s, even for a similar defense strategy, for several reasons. RAND’s cost estimate is somewhat higher than DOD’s, although both were based on similar threat assessments. Agency Comments
DOD and the Department of State agreed with our principal conclusion that the uncertainties associated with the military implications of NATO enlargement and DOD’s estimating procedures resulted in cost estimates that were notional and that could differ substantially from actual enlargement costs. We agree that until military requirements for new members are identified through NATO’s defense planning process, it will be difficult to develop more reliable estimates of the cost of enlargement. To determine if there were any additional costs that could affect enlargement costs but were not included in the DOD estimate, we reviewed other analyses of NATO enlargement, including the CBO and RAND cost studies, and interviewed relevant officials and analysts. In comparing the executive branch’s estimate with those of CBO and RAND, we interviewed the analysts at CBO and RAND who conducted the studies and reviewed source information they provided or suggested. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the executive branch's estimate of the cost of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), focusing on: (1) the reasonableness of the study's key assumptions; (2) verifying the pricing of individual cost elements and identifying the basis for the pricing; (3) whether the estimate's major cost categories and elements should be ascribed to NATO enlargement; (4) factors that were not included in the study's cost estimate that could affect enlargement costs; and (5) comparing the executive branch's cost estimate with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Rand Corporation estimates. GAO did not independently estimate the cost of enlarging NATO.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its analysis of the Department of Defense's (DOD) cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that its key assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely consistent with the views of U.S., NATO, and foreign government officials; (2) however, DOD's lack of supporting cost documentation and its decision to include cost elements that were not directly related to enlargement call into question its overall estimate; (3) because of the uncertainties associated with enlargement and DOD's estimating procedures, the actual cost of NATO enlargement could be substantially higher or lower than DOD's estimated cost of about $27 billion to $35 billion; (4) GAO's comparison of DOD's estimate with the RAND and CBO estimates does not indicate that the RAND and CBO costs estimates are more reliable than DOD's; (5) GAO could not verify DOD's pricing of many individual cost elements because DOD officials did not develop sufficient supporting documentation; (6) DOD included two major cost categories that cannot be directly attributed to NATO's enlargement; (7) GAO found no direct link between the cost of remedying current shortfalls in NATO's reinforcement capabilities and enlargement of the alliance; (8) GAO questions whether all of DOD's new member modernization and restructuring costs are attributable to NATO enlargement; (9) DOD's third cost category, direct enlargement, contains elements appropriately attributed to NATO enlargement, based on GAO's analysis; (10) NATO enlargement could entail additional costs beyond those included in the DOD estimate; (11) these costs could include assistance, such as enhanced Partnership for Peace or other bilateral assistance provided as a consolation to countries not invited to join NATO in July 1997; (12) there will also be additional costs associated with subsequent decisions to invite additional countries to join NATO; (13) in addition, the United States may provide assistance to help new members restructure and modernize their forces, which DOD acknowledged but did not include in its estimate of the U.S. cost share; (14) CBO and RAND developed a range of cost estimates for NATO enlargement, including estimates that employ a defense strategy similar to DOD's; and (15) several factors account for the differences between DOD's estimate and the CBO and RAND estimates, including those estimates that employed defense strategies similar to DOD's. |
gao_GAO-09-632T | gao_GAO-09-632T_0 | Sustained Leadership Is Essential to Successful Human Capital Management
Top leadership in agencies across the federal government must provide committed and inspired attention needed to address human capital and related organizational transformation issues. We have reported that OPM has made commendable efforts in transforming itself from less of a rule maker, enforcer, and independent agent to more of a consultant, toolmaker, and strategic partner in leading and supporting executive agencies’ human capital management systems. To help support federal agencies with expanded responsibilities under the Recovery Act, OPM has provided information, tools, and training to federal agencies to help address these new human capital challenges and ensure that agencies acquire the talent they need. For example, in March 2009, OPM held an interagency forum on approaches to meet the Recovery Act’s human capital management support requirements. In 2002, Congress created the chief human capital officer (CHCO) position in 24 agencies to advise and assist the head of the agency and other agency officials in their strategic human capital management efforts. OPM works with the CHCO Council to develop and disseminate human capital guidance and relies upon the council members to communicate OPM policy and other human capital information throughout their agencies. Strategic Human Capital Planning Is Critical to Addressing Workforce Challenges
Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader organizational strategic planning is critical to ensuring that agencies have the talent and skill mix they need to address their current and emerging human capital challenges, especially as the federal government faces a retirement wave. We have found that leading organizations go beyond a succession planning approach that focuses on simply replacing individuals and instead engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity to obtain or develop the knowledge, skills, and abilities they need to carry out their missions. In 2007, we testified that much of the acquisition workforce’s workload and complexity of responsibilities have been increasing without adequate attention to the workforce’s size, skills and knowledge, and succession planning. The challenges agencies are facing with managing acquisitions, including sustaining a capable and accountable acquisition workforce, contributed to GAO’s designation of the management and use of interagency contracting as a governmentwide high-risk area in 2005. Acquiring, Developing, and Retaining Talent Remains a Federal Workforce Challenge
Faced with a workforce that is becoming more retirement eligible and the need for a different mix of knowledge, skills, and competencies, it is important that agencies strengthen their efforts and use of available flexibilities from Congress and OPM to acquire, develop, motivate, and retain talent. In the areas of recruiting and hiring, OPM has, for example, done the following. Individual federal agencies have also taken actions to meet their specific needs for acquiring the necessary talent, while other agencies have faced difficulties. For example, NASA has used a combination of techniques to recruit workers with critical skills, including targeted recruitment activities, educational outreach programs, improved compensation and benefits packages, professional development programs, and streamlined hiring authorities. Recently, we reported on selected federal agencies’ approaches to using older workers to address future critical gaps in leadership, skills, and institutional knowledge. In addition to promoting high performance and accountability to foster results-oriented cultures, leading organizations develop and maintain inclusive and diverse workforces that reflect all segments of society. In helping to ensure diversity in the pipeline for appointments to the SES as well as recruitment at all levels, it is important that agencies have strategies to identify and develop a diverse pool of talent for selecting the agencies’ potential future leaders and to reach out to a diverse pool of talent when recruiting. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2001, GAO identified human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area because federal agencies lacked a strategic approach to human capital management that integrated human capital efforts with their missions and program goals. Progress has been made. However, the area remains high-risk because of a continuing need for a governmentwide framework to advance human capital reform. The importance of a top-notch federal workforce cannot be overstated. The federal government is facing new and growing challenges coupled with a retirement wave and the loss of leadership and institutional knowledge at all levels. The issues facing agencies are complex and require a broad range of technical skills that are also highly sought after by the private sector. This testimony, based on a large body of completed work issued from January 2001 through March 2009, focuses on executive branch agencies' and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) progress in addressing strategic human capital management challenges in four key areas: (1) leadership; (2) strategic human capital planning; (3) acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; and (4) results-oriented organizational culture. In prior reports, GAO has made a range of recommendations to OPM and agencies in the four areas. GAO is reporting on progress in addressing these recommendations and is making no new recommendations.
What GAO Found
Congress, executive branch agencies, and OPM have taken action to reform federal human capital management, but federal agencies are facing new challenges. The recent need to quickly hire staff to carry out and oversee the Troubled Asset Relief Program and expanded agency responsibilities under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 point to the need for sustained attention to help ensure that agencies have the right people with the right skills to meet new challenges. Top leadership in agencies across the federal government must provide committed and inspired attention needed to address human capital and related organizational transformation issues. OPM has made strides in transforming itself as a strategic partner to help lead human capital reform efforts. For example, at the agency level, OPM works with the Chief Human Capital Officers council to develop and disseminate human capital guidance and relies upon the council members to communicate OPM policy and other human capital information throughout their agencies. Integrating succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening both current and future organizational capacity to obtain or develop the knowledge, skills, and abilities agencies need to meet their missions continues to be important. For example, GAO has reported on a challenge in the acquisition workforce where the workload and complexity of responsibilities have been increasing without adequate attention to the workforce's size, skills and knowledge, and succession planning. Faced with a workforce that is becoming more retirement eligible and the need for a different mix of knowledge, skills, and competencies, it is important that agencies strengthen their efforts and use available flexibilities. Agencies have developed strategies to recruit needed talent, including turning to older experienced workers to fill knowledge and skills gaps. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has used a combination of techniques to recruit workers with critical skills, including targeted recruitment activities, educational outreach programs, improved compensation and benefits packages, and streamlined hiring authorities. In addition to promoting high performance and accountability to foster results-oriented cultures, it is important for agencies to develop and maintain inclusive and diverse workforces that reflect all segments of society. Agencies can benefit from strategies that offer a diverse pool of talent for selecting the agencies' future leaders and recruiting new employees so that agencies can get a wider variety of perspectives and approaches. |
gao_GAO-17-78 | gao_GAO-17-78_0 | Under CMS regulations, a consumer may qualify for an SEP due to a specific triggering event, and generally would have up to 60 days after the event to select and enroll in a qualified health plan. While PPACA requires marketplaces to verify application information to determine eligibility for enrollment and income-based subsidies—such as verifying U.S. citizenship, nationality, or lawful presence—there is no specific legal requirement to verify the events that trigger an SEP. The February 2016 report included eight recommendations, which are discussed below, to strengthen CMS oversight of the Marketplace. In our February 2016 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Acting Administrator of CMS to: (1) conduct a feasibility study and create a written plan on actions that CMS can take to monitor and analyze the extent to which data hub queries provide requested or relevant applicant verification information; (2) track the value of enrollee subsidies that are terminated or adjusted for failure to resolve application inconsistencies, and use this information to inform assessments of program risks; (3) regarding cost-sharing subsidies that are terminated or adjusted for failure to resolve application inconsistencies, consider and document whether it would be feasible to create a mechanism to recapture those costs; (4) identify and implement procedures to resolve Social Security number inconsistencies where the Marketplace is unable to verify Social Security numbers or applicants do not provide them; (5) reevaluate CMS’s use of certain incarceration status data and determine to either use these data or accept applicant attestation on status in all cases; (6) create a written plan and schedule for providing Marketplace call center representatives with access to information on the current status of eligibility documents submitted to CMS’s documents processing contractor; (7) conduct a fraud-risk assessment, consistent with best practices described in GAO’s framework for managing fraud risks in federal programs, of the potential for fraud in the process of applying for qualified health plans through the federal Marketplace; and (8) fully document prior to implementation, and have readily available for inspection thereafter, any significant decision on qualified health-plan enrollment and eligibility matters, with such documentation to include details such as policy objectives, supporting analysis, scope, and expected costs and effects. In formal comments on a draft of the report, HHS concurred with our recommendations and outlined a number of steps it plans to take to implement them. In an April 2016 letter, HHS described a number of specific actions it had taken in response to our eight recommendations, such as creating an integrated project team to perform the Marketplace fraud-risk assessment. Consequently, we consider all eight recommendations to remain open as of November 2016, pending corroborating information. We will continue to monitor HHS’s progress in implementing them. Implementing these recommendations as intended, such as performing the fraud-risk assessment, could help address some of the control vulnerabilities we identified during our SEP tests as well. Results of Undercover Attempts to Obtain Subsidized Qualified Health-Plan Coverage from the Federal Marketplace and Selected State-Based Marketplaces during an SEP
The federal or selected state-based marketplaces approved coverage and subsidies for 9 of our 12 fictitious applicants who initially applied online or by telephone seeking coverage during an SEP, as of October 2016. The 6 remaining fictitious applicants were not instructed to provide supporting documentation related to the SEP triggering event. Figure 2 summarizes document submissions and outcomes for the 12 fictitious applications for subsidized qualified health-plan coverage during an SEP.
Officials from the marketplaces explained that they do not require applicants to submit documentation to support certain SEP triggering events. For other SEP triggering events, CMS officials explained that the standard operating procedure in the federal marketplace is to enroll applicants first, and verify documentation to support the SEP triggering event after enrollment. However, relying on self-attestation without verifying documents submitted to support a SEP triggering event could allow actual applicants to obtain subsidized coverage they would otherwise not qualify for. The remaining four of our six fictitious applicants to the selected state- based marketplaces were not instructed by the state marketplace to provide supporting documentation to prove eligibility to enroll through the SEP. Two of these four fictitious applicants were able to obtain and maintain subsidized health insurance through the marketplace without providing supporting documentation related to the SEP and are currently enrolled in a qualified health plan. However, according to federal and state officials, all applicants that apply for enrollment during an SEP must attest under penalty of perjury that they meet the conditions of eligibility for the SEP.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to HHS, Covered California, and the District of Columbia (DC) Health Benefit Exchange Authority. In their written comments, in terms of overall context, these agencies reiterated that they are not required to verify the events that trigger an SEP and instead rely on self-attestation and the associated penalties, which we acknowledge and state in this report. As mentioned above, prudent stewardship and good management practices suggest that fraud risks be understood and managed to protect public funds. Specifically, our 12 fictitious applicants claimed to have experienced one of the following selected events that may indicate eligibility, under certain circumstances, to enroll in health coverage under an SEP: (1) loss of minimum essential health coverage; (2) gained access to new qualified health plans as a result of a permanent move to another state; (3) gained a dependent through marriage; (4) experienced an exceptional circumstance, such as a serious medical condition that prevented the consumer from enrolling during the annual open enrollment period; (5) nonenrollment during the annual open enrollment period was unintentional and the result of misinformation or misrepresentation by a non-exchange entity providing enrollment assistance or conducting enrollment activities; and (6) Medicaid application filed during the annual open enrollment period was denied after the open enrollment period had closed. We tested the six selected triggering events in the federal marketplace. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under PPACA, consumers can enroll in health insurance coverage, or change from one qualified health plan to another, through the federal and state marketplaces either (1) during the annual open enrollment period or (2) outside of the open enrollment period, if they qualify for an SEP. A consumer may qualify for an SEP due to specific triggering events, such as a nonvoluntary loss of health-care coverage. CMS reported that 1.6 million individuals made a plan selection through an SEP in 2015.
GAO was asked to test marketplace enrollment and verification controls for applicants attempting to obtain coverage during an SEP.
This report describes the results of GAO attempts to obtain subsidized qualified health-plan coverage during the 2016 SEP in the federal marketplace and two selected state-based marketplaces—California and the District of Columbia.
To perform the undercover testing of enrollment verification, GAO submitted 12 new fictitious applications for subsidized health-insurance coverage outside of the open enrollment period in 2016. GAO's applications tested verifications related to a variety of SEP triggering events. The results cannot be generalized to all enrollees.
GAO provided a draft of this report to CMS and the selected state agencies. In their written comments, CMS and the states reiterated that they are not required to verify an SEP event and instead rely on self-attestation. However, prudent stewardship and good management practices suggest that fraud risks be understood and managed to protect public funds.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires that federal and state-based marketplaces verify application information—such as citizenship or immigration status—to determine eligibility for enrollment in a health plan, potentially including a subsidy. However, there is no specific legal requirement to verify the events that trigger a Special Enrollment Period (SEP), which is an opportunity period to allow an individual to apply for health coverage after events such as losing minimum essential coverage or getting married. Prior to the start of GAO's enrollment tests, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which maintains the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace), implemented a policy to request that federal Marketplace applicants provide supporting documentation for certain SEP triggering events. According to CMS, ensuring that only qualified applicants enroll during an SEP is intended to prevent people from misusing the system to enroll in coverage only when they become sick. However, relying on self-attestation without verifying documents submitted to support an SEP triggering event, such as those mentioned above, could allow actual applicants to obtain subsidized coverage they would otherwise not qualify for.
The federal and selected state-based marketplaces approved health-insurance coverage and subsidies for 9 of 12 of GAO's fictitious applications made during a 2016 SEP. The remaining 3 fictitious applicants were denied. The marketplaces instructed 6 of 12 applicants to provide supporting documentation, such as a copy of a recent marriage certificate, related to the SEP triggering event; the remaining 6 of 12 were not instructed to do so. For 5 applicants, GAO provided no documents to support the SEP triggering event, but coverage was approved anyway. Officials from the marketplaces explained that they do not require applicants to submit documentation to support certain SEP triggering events. For other SEP triggering events, CMS officials explained that the standard operating procedure in the federal Marketplace is to enroll applicants first, and verify documentation to support the SEP triggering event after enrollment. The officials also noted that all applicants must attest to their eligibility for enrollment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in this report. However, GAO made eight recommendations to strengthen PPACA enrollment controls in a February 2016 report; these recommendations included conducting a fraud-risk assessment of the federal marketplace, consistent with the leading practices described in GAO's framework for managing fraud risks in federal programs. In formal comments on a draft of the February report, HHS concurred with the recommendations and outlined a number of steps it planned to take to implement them. In an April 2016 follow-up letter to GAO, HHS described a number of specific actions it had taken in response to the eight recommendations, such as creating an integrated project team to perform the Marketplace fraud-risk assessment. As of November 2016, GAO considers all eight recommendations to be still open, pending corroborating information, and will continue to monitor CMS's progress in implementing them. Implementing these recommendations by actions such as performing the fraud-risk assessment could help address the control vulnerabilities GAO identified during its most recent SEP tests. |
gao_GAO-15-33 | gao_GAO-15-33_0 | The Highway Trust Fund primarily supports surface transportation programs administered by four DOT operating administrations—FHWA, FTA, FMCSA, and NHTSA. FTA also collects data on the activities that are funded with Highway Trust Fund obligations each year, while NHTSA and FMCSA collect and report data on obligations from the Highway Trust Fund by grant programs. FHWA, NHTSA, and FMCSA also receive funding from the Highway Trust Fund for administrative expenses. FHWA Collects Some Information on Funded Highway Activities but Does Not Collect Some Project Data
In fiscal year 2013, FHWA obligated about $41 billion from the Highway Trust Fund, most of which (about $39 billion) was apportioned to states for activities to improve the nation’s roadway and bridge infrastructure through the federal-aid highway program. While FHWA collects information in FMIS on the type of activities funded with Highway Trust Fund monies, it does not currently collect and report aggregate spending data at the project level for the majority of projects on a routine basis.individual project segments or contracts, but not for an entire project. DOT Administrations Supported a Range of Administrative Expenses with Highway Trust Fund Monies
Within DOT, FHWA, FMCSA, and NHTSA receive Highway Trust Fund monies for administrative expenses such as personnel salaries and benefits and rent. In fiscal year 2013, FHWA obligated $22 million for these programs. Conclusions
Motor fuel taxes that support the Highway Trust Fund are eroding, resulting in fewer resources to fund surface transportation projects and requiring, in recent years, infusions of funding from general revenues. In recent years, FHWA has taken some positive steps to collect and report aggregate spending data for its “major” projects, but does not currently collect and report aggregate spending data for other projects, which represented nearly 88 percent of all fiscal year 2013 federal-aid highway obligations. FHWA could collect and report aggregate spending data for all projects in FMIS since the database already has two existing data fields that could be used to collect this information. According to FHWA officials, collecting this data in FMIS could result in some increased costs to states; however, FHWA does not have an estimate of what the associated costs for tracking this information would be to states. FHWA is currently in the process of modernizing its FMIS database system, which could provide FHWA with an opportunity to explore options for further refining FMIS to collect consistent aggregate spending data for all projects or other options for collecting this information. Improving FMIS to allow states to provide project-level data could aid FHWA in its risk-based oversight of federal- aid highway programs by allowing FHWA to more easily draw consistent data for its compliance assessment reviews. In addition, collecting project-level data could assist FHWA in tracking and reporting information to Congress and the public about how the majority of federal funds from the Highway Trust Fund are being used. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve transparency and provide Congress and the public greater visibility into the types of highway activities funded with Highway Trust Fund monies, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to explore the costs, feasibility, and options for collecting and publicly reporting consistent aggregate project-level spending data. DOT agreed with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report was to examine what is known about the types of projects, activities, and federal administrative functions and expenses supported by the Department of Transportation (DOT) using Highway Trust Fund monies in fiscal year 2013. To identify the types of projects, activities, and administrative expenses that have been undertaken using Highway Trust Fund monies in fiscal year 2013, we obtained and analyzed data from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) of fiscal year 2013 obligations for all programs and administrative expenses funded with Highway Trust Fund monies. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, dedicated revenues to the Highway Trust Fund have been eroding, resulting in fewer resources to fund surface transportation projects and requiring, between 2008 and 2014, transfers of over $50 billion in general revenues. Four operating administrations within DOT—FHWA, FTA, NHTSA, and FMCSA—receive funding from the Highway Trust Fund for programs administered by these agencies, and FHWA receives the largest share (81 percent of the agency's authorizations in fiscal year 2013).
GAO was asked to review how Highway Trust Fund monies are being used to help ensure that sound choices and investment decisions about future funding are made. This report examines what is known about the types of projects, activities, and federal administrative functions and expenses supported by DOT using Highway Trust Fund monies in fiscal year 2013. To address this request, GAO obtained and analyzed fiscal year 2013 federal obligation data from DOT's operating administrations, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed FHWA, FTA, FMCSA, NHTSA, and DOT officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2013, operating administrations within the Department of Transportation (DOT) collected and reported some information on the types of activities and administrative expenses funded from the Highway Trust Fund, but did so with varying levels of detail. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) obligated about $41 billion in fiscal year 2013, most of which ($39 billion) was apportioned to states through the federal-aid highway program. FHWA tracks federal-aid highway program obligations in its Fiscal Management Information System (FMIS), for individual project segments or contracts. This process allows FHWA to collect and report information on the types of activities (such as obligations for the construction of new roads or bridges) funded with Highway Trust Fund monies.
However, FHWA does not collect and report aggregate project-level data for the majority of projects on a routine basis. Aggregate project-level data would allow FHWA to track and report the total overall obligations of an entire project. While FHWA tracks and reports aggregate obligations for its “major projects” (projects with a total cost of $500 million or more), it does not collect and report aggregate obligations for other projects, which represented nearly 88 percent of all fiscal year 2013 spending. FHWA could collect and report aggregate obligations for all projects in FMIS, and FMIS has two existing data fields that could be used to collect this information. But according to FHWA officials, doing so would result in increased costs to FHWA and states. FHWA officials attributed increased costs to, among other things, programming costs to make changes to FMIS to track these data; however, FHWA has not completed a cost analysis to estimate what the associated costs would be. FHWA is currently in the process of modernizing its FMIS database system. Exploring the costs, feasibility, and options for collecting and reporting consistent aggregate project-level obligations could aid FHWA in its oversight efforts, including its ability to more easily draw consistent data for its compliance reviews and to report information to Congress and the public about how the majority of federal funds from the Highway Trust Fund are being used.
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration (FMCSA) also collect some information on activities funded with Highway Trust Fund monies. For example, FTA collects data on activities, such as obligations for bus and rail purchases, funded with Highway Trust Fund monies each year, and NHTSA and FMCSA collect and report data by grant program. In addition, within DOT, the FHWA, FMCSA, and NHTSA used Highway Trust Fund monies for a range of administrative expenses, such as personnel salaries and benefits and rent. FTA does not receive Highway Trust Fund monies for administrative expenses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to explore the costs, feasibility, and options for collecting and publicly reporting consistent aggregate project-level spending data. DOT agreed with our recommendation. DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-66 | gao_GAO-13-66_0 | HFAs receive tax credit allocations. Developers apply to the states for tax credits. HFAs award tax credits to selected housing projects. Investors receive tax benefits. IRS Revised Guidance and States Modified Qualified Allocation Plans to Implement the HERA Changes
Because the LIHTC program is jointly administered by federal and state governments, agencies at both levels played roles in implementing HERA’s changes to the program. At the state level, HFAs modified their QAPs for allocating tax credits. IRS and Treasury Have Issued Guidance and Are Considering and Acting on Implementation Issues
HERA made changes to the LIHTC program that affected various parties, including taxpayers, HFAs, and project owners, and IRS and Treasury provided guidance and took other actions into 2012 to implement these changes. Program stakeholders we spoke with, including HFAs, industry associations, syndicators, and developers, generally said that IRS’s actions to implement the HERA changes were sufficient, and that they were satisfied with the agency’s efforts. HUD’s LIHTC Database, the largest source of federal information on the LIHTC program, aggregates project-level data that are voluntarily submitted by HFAs. It does not maintain the information needed to assess a housing production program, such as the types of tenants targeted and whether projects are in urban or rural areas. For example, HUD’s database showed that one state had between 23 and 49 projects placed in service each year from 2006 through 2009, but only 2 projects in 2010. When we followed up with the HFA in this state, HFA officials provided us with documentation showing that they had reported 37 projects for 2010. An official from this state’s HFA told us that the actual number for 2008 was 96 properties. Even when HUD did receive project data, much of it was incomplete, omitting information on project characteristics such as the type of location, construction, and tenants targeted. For example, the proportion of missing information on the types of tenants targeted increased from 5 percent in 2006 to 28 percent in 2010. A HUD official noted that the HERA provision requiring HFAs to collect data on the characteristics of tenants in LIHTC projects had made it more challenging for HFAs to also report the project data with existing resources. Without more complete data on the number, location, and characteristics of LIHTC projects, the federal government’s ability to continue evaluating program outcomes and overall federal efforts to provide affordable housing is limited. Available Data Provide Limited Insight into Trends in the Number and Characteristics of LIHTC Projects
According to HUD data as of July 2012, the 42 HFAs that submitted information for each year from 2006 through 2010 reported that more than 5,300 LIHTC projects were placed in service over the 5-year period (see table 4). Stakeholders Said HERA Provisions Helped the Financial Feasibility of Some LIHTC Projects
State and industry officials we spoke with said that isolating the effect of the HERA changes on the overall LIHTC market was difficult because of other program changes (e.g., creation of the Exchange Program) and economic developments (e.g., the recession and financial crisis) that occurred around the same time. In particular, they cited the temporary increase in per capita credit allocations, the temporary 9 percent floor, and the HERA basis boost as three provisions that helped the financial feasibility of some projects and likely prevented even further decreases in LIHTC projects after 2008. Some state officials we spoke with said that they allocated the additional credits to projects already under development and to new projects. Through HERA, Congress made a number of changes to the program and sought analysis of credit allocations made before and after the act’s implementation. Without improvements in the database, the federal government’s ability to evaluate basic program outcomes—such as how much housing was produced—and other aspects of federal housing policy may suffer. Recommendation for Executive Action
HUD has taken steps to improve its data collection process and faces resource constraints. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (1) evaluate options for improving the completeness of HUD’s LIHTC Database, including following up on data anomalies and enhancing the role of HUD’s contractor in data collection and quality control; and (2) based on this evaluation, take additional steps to improve the data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses (1) how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and selected housing finance agencies (HFA) implemented the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) changes to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, (2) what the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) data on LIHTC projects show about the number and characteristics of projects completed from 2006 through 2010 and any data limitations, and (3) the views of program stakeholders about the effects of the HERA changes on these projects. We also interviewed IRS and Department of the Treasury officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS and state HFAs administer the LIHTC program, the largest source of federal assistance for developing affordable rental housing. HFAs are allocated tax credits on a per capita basis and award them to developers. By acquiring project equity from developers, investors may become eligible for the credits, which offset federal tax liabilities. As part of HERA, Congress made changes to the program that included increasing credits allocated to states, setting a temporary floor on the most common LIHTC rate (the portion of eligible project costs for which a developer can receive credits), and giving HFAs more discretion in "enhancing" (i.e., increasing) awards. HERA also required GAO to study the changes, including the distribution of credit allocations before and after HERA. This report discusses (1) how IRS and selected HFAs implemented the HERA changes, (2) what HUD's data show about the number and characteristics of projects completed from 2006 through 2010 and any data limitations, and (3) stakeholders' views on the effects of the HERA changes on LIHTC projects. GAO reviewed IRS and state guidelines, analyzed HUD data on LIHTC projects, and spoke with federal, state, and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Federal and state agencies implemented changes made in 2008 to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program by revising program guidance and modifying plans for allocating tax credits. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implemented the changes made by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) by, among other things, issuing notices and revenue procedures. Program stakeholders that GAO contacted said that IRS's actions were generally sufficient. But as of October 2012, IRS and the Department of the Treasury were still working on implementation issues, such as developing guidance on the provision designed to ease restrictions on using tax credits to acquire existing federally or state-assisted buildings. At the state level, housing finance agencies (HFA) implemented the HERA changes by modifying their tax credit allocation plans, which provide criteria for awarding credits. For example, in their plans, some HFAs cited financial need as the only criterion for awarding HERA-created enhanced credits. Others planned to target specific types of projects, such as those using "green building" practices.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) voluntarily compiles the largest public database on LIHTC projects, but the data it collects from HFAs are incomplete. Despite HUD efforts to improve its data collection process, the database may undercount projects, in part because HUD did not follow up on potentially incomplete information. For example, HUD's database showed that one state had between 23 and 49 completed projects each year from 2006 through 2009, but only 2 projects in 2010. However, officials from this state's HFA provided GAO with documentation showing that they had reported 37 projects for 2010. Further, much of the project data that HUD has received does not include characteristics such as the type of location, construction, and tenants targeted. A HUD official noted that a HERA provision requiring states to collect tenant-level data (e.g., race and income) had made collecting project data more challenging because HUD did not receive additional resources and available resources had to be divided between tenant and project data collection. Without more complete data on the LIHTC program, the federal government's ability to evaluate basic program outcomes--such as how much housing was produced--and overall federal efforts to provide affordable housing may suffer. Data from 42 HFAs that reported each year from 2006 through 2010 provide limited insight into the actual number and characteristics of LIHTC projects. The number of reported projects completed exceeded 5,300, and most were in metropolitan areas and were new construction. However, missing data prevented analysis of trends over the 5-year period. For example, the proportion of missing information on the types of tenants targeted increased from 5 percent in 2006 to 28 percent in 2010.
Program stakeholders told GAO that the broad effects of the HERA provisions on the LIHTC market were difficult to determine but noted that certain provisions enhanced the financial feasibility of some individual projects. For example, stakeholders said the temporary increase in per capita credit allocations, temporary credit rate floor, and discretion to use enhanced credits improved the financial viability of some projects by allowing states to award more credits per project. Some state officials also said that the larger awards especially benefited projects in rural areas that can be difficult to finance because they tend to have lower rents and are less attractive to investors than projects in urban areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD evaluate and implement additional steps to improve its LIHTC Database. HUD agreed with the recommendation but said the report could better describe the agencys efforts to improve data collection despite resource constraints. In response, GAO added further information on HUDs changes to its collection process. |
gao_GAO-08-1141T | gao_GAO-08-1141T_0 | Background
CBP’s SBI program is responsible for deploying SBInet (e.g., sensors, cameras, radars, communications systems, and mounted laptop computers for agent vehicles), and tactical infrastructure (e.g., pedestrian and vehicle fencing, roads, and lighting) that are intended to enable CBP agents and officers to gain effective control of U.S. borders. SBInet Deployment Delays Are Ongoing and Border Patrol Agents Continue to Use Existing Technology to Secure Borders
SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays and, as a result, Border Patrol agents have to rely upon existing limited technological capabilities to help achieve effective control of the border. In February 2008, we reported that the first planned deployment of technology would occur in two geographic areas within the Tucson sector—known as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1—by the end of calendar year 2008, with the remainder of deployments to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2011. In July 2008, SBI program office officials reported that SBInet technology deployments to Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 would be completed sometime in 2009. SBInet program uncertainties contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments. The need to obtain environmental permits is also contributing to the initial Tucson deployment delays. We previously reported that Project 28 encountered performance shortfalls and delays. Further delays of SBInet technology deployments may hinder the Border Patrol’s efforts to secure the border. Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Continues, but Costs Are Increasing, the Life-Cycle Cost Is Not Yet Known, and Land Acquisition Issues Pose a Challenge to Completion of the Timeline
The deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border is ongoing, but costs are increasing, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, and land acquisition issues pose challenges to DHS in meeting the goal it set, as required by law, to complete 670 miles of fencing—370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, by December 31, 2008. Although SBI program office and USACE officials stated that they plan to meet the December deadline, factors such as a short supply of labor and materials, and the compressed timeline affect costs. According to USACE officials, as of August 28, 2008, fencing costs average $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. The SBI Program Management Office Is Reevaluating Its Staffing Goal and Has Continued to Take Steps to Implement Its Human Capital Plan
As of September 2008, the SBI program office was reevaluating its staffing goal, and the SBI program office continued to take steps to implement the December 2007 Human Capital Plan. In February 2008, we reported that the SBI program office had established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008. As of August 1, 2008, the SBI program office reported having 129 government staff and 164 contractor support staff for a total of 293 employees (see table 5). SBI program office officials stated that a reorganization of the SBI program office and project delays have resulted in a need for fewer staff during fiscal year 2008. The officials further noted they plan to continue to evaluate the expected staffing needs through the end of fiscal year 2009. For example, the SBI program office held a meeting on September 2, 2008, to develop SBI’s mission, visionary goals and objectives, and core values, and the office has recruitment efforts under way to fill open positions. However, in other areas, the SBI program office is in the process of drafting or has drafted documents, such as the SBI Value Statement, the SBI Awards and Recognition Plan, and the Succession Management Plan, which have yet to be approved and acted upon. Furthermore, tactical infrastructure costs are increasing and the SBI program office has not yet determined a life-cycle cost for fencing because maintenance costs are unknown and the SBI program office has not identified the locations for fencing construction projects beyond December 31, 2008; therefore, the total cost for building and maintaining fences along the southwest border is not yet known. Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight Needed to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet Program Implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of surveillance and communication technologies known as SBInet (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones), and tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing). The House Committee on Homeland Security and its Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology deployment; (2) infrastructure deployment; and (3) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on prior and new work, including analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, and status reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS and Department of the Interior officials and contractors, and visits to sites on the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from March to September 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
SBInet technology deployments continue to experience delays and, as a result, Border Patrol agents have to rely upon existing limited technological capabilities to help achieve control of the border. SBI program officials had originally planned to deploy SBInet technology across the southwest border by the end of 2008, but in February 2008 this date had slipped to 2011. In July 2008, officials reported that two initial projects that had been scheduled to be completed by the end of calendar year 2008 would be finished sometime in 2009. SBInet program uncertainties, such as not fully defined program expectations, changes to timelines, and confusion over the need to obtain environmental permits contribute to ongoing delays of SBInet technology deployments. Due to the delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that predates SBInet, and in the Tucson, Arizona, area they are using capabilities from SBInet's prototype system despite previously reported performance shortfalls. Further delays of SBInet technology deployments may hinder the Border Patrol's efforts to secure the border. The deployment of fencing is ongoing, but costs are increasing, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, and meeting DHS's statutorily required goal to have 670 miles of fencing in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging. As of August 22, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed a total of 341 miles of fencing, and program officials stated that they plan to meet the December 2008 deadline. However, project costs are increasing and various factors pose challenges to meeting this deadline, such as a short supply of labor and land acquisition issues. According to program officials, as of August 2008, fencing costs averaged $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian fencing and $2.8 million per mile for vehicle fencing, up from estimates in February 2008 of $4 million and $2 million per mile, respectively. Furthermore, the life-cycle cost is not yet known, in part because of increasing construction costs and because the program office has yet to determine maintenance costs and locations for fencing projects beyond December 2008. In addition, land acquisition issues present a challenge to completing fence construction. As of September 2008, the SBI program office was reevaluating its staffing goal and continued to take actions to implement its human capital plan. In February 2008, we reported that the SBI program office had established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008. As of August 1, 2008, the SBI program office reported having 129 government staff and 164 contractor support staff for a total of 293 employees. Program officials stated that a reorganization of the SBI program office and SBInet project delays have resulted in fewer staffing needs and that they plan to continue to evaluate these needs. The SBI program office also continued to take steps to implement its human capital plan. For example, recruitment efforts are under way to fill open positions. However, the SBI program office is in the process of drafting or has drafted documents, such as the Succession Management Plan, that have yet to be approved or put into action. |
gao_GAO-01-72T | gao_GAO-01-72T_0 | These three basic goals focus on meeting callers’ needs for timely and accurate information. OWCP Lacked Valid Information to Measure Progress in Achieving Goals
Often, OWCP did not collect credible performance data to gauge progress in attaining its goals. OWCP did do customer satisfaction surveys of injured workers. Scope and Methodology
To determine how OWCP communicates with injured federal workers, agencies who employed these workers, and medical and other service providers who are involved in their treatment, we performed the following audit steps. We placed 2,400 telephone calls to OWCP’s 12 district offices (200 per office), to assess the accessibility of telephone representatives at each of the 12 OWCP district offices and whether each office’s automated integrated voice response (IVR) system’s data was consistent with the national office’s claim data. To compare OWCP’s goals and practices for telephone communication with those of leading organizations, we also surveyed three agencies that have won awards for their telephone communication practices: the Social Security Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs’ Bureau of Benefits Administration, and state of Ohio’s Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP). GAO reviewed how OWCP communicates with injured federal workers, agencies who employ these persons, and medical and other service providers who treat them. To evaluate OWCP's system, GAO used criteria suggested by the National Partnership for Reinventing Government (NPR). This report summarizes GAO's findings on NPR's study of private sector practices for providing telephone customer service, which included: (1) setting challenging goals for meeting callers' needs for timely and accurate information; (2) collecting credible performance data to measure progress in attaining those goals; and (3) improving telephone service by using the performance data and results to periodic surveys of customers and stakeholders to determine levels of satisfaction.
What GAO Found
GAO found that OWCP provided consistent customer service regardless of where injured workers live. GAO made 2,400 telephone calls to OWCP's 12 district offices. To compare OWCP's goals and practices for telephone communication with those of model organizations, GAO surveyed three agencies that have won awards for their telephone communication practices: the Social Security Administration, the Department of Veterans Affairs' Benefits Administration, and Ohio's Bureau of Workers' Compensation. |
gao_GAO-02-1090T | gao_GAO-02-1090T_0 | Federal Approach to Financing the Marine Transportation System as Compared with the Aviation and Highway Systems
Unlike the funding approach used for the aviation and highway transportation systems, which are primarily funded by collections from users of the systems, the commercial marine transportation system relies heavily on general tax revenue. During fiscal years 1999 through 2001, customs duties on imported goods shipped through the transportation systems averaged $15.2 billion each year for the marine transportation system, $3.7 billion for the aviation system, and $928 million for the highway system. However, unlike transportation excise taxes, customs duties are taxes on the value of imported goods paid by importers and ultimately their consumers—not on the users of the system—and have traditionally been viewed as revenues to be used for the support of the general activities of the federal government. Systematic Framework Could Help Guide Decisions When Making Investment Choices for the Marine Transportation System
Some maritime industry stakeholders have suggested that substantial new investments in the maritime infrastructure by federal, state, and local governments and by the private sector may be required because of an aging infrastructure, changes in the shipping industry, and increased concerns about security. These growing and varied demands for increased investments in the maritime transportation system heighten the need for a clear understanding about the federal government’s purpose and role in providing funding for the system and for a sound investment approach to guide federal participation. In examining federal investment approaches across many national activities, we have found that issues such as these are best addressed through a systematic framework. Chairmen, the projected increases in freight tonnage will likely place pressures on the nation’s surface transportation systems. Therefore, there is a need to view various transportation modes from an integrated standpoint, particularly for the purposes of developing and implementing a federal investment strategy and alternative funding approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses challenges in defining the federal role with respect to freight transportation issues.
What GAO Found
There are concerns that the projected increases in freight tonnage for all transportation modes will place pressures on the marine, aviation, and highway transportation systems. As a result, there is growing awareness of the need to view various transportation modes, and freight movement in particular, from an integrated standpoint, particularly for the purposes of developing and implementing a federal investment strategy and considering alternative funding approaches. The federal approach for funding the marine transportation system relies heavily on general revenues, although the approach for funding the aviation and highway systems relies almost exclusively on collections from users of the systems. During fiscal years 1999 through 2001, customs duties on imported goods transported through the transportation systems averaged $15 billion each year for the marine transportation system, $4 billion each year for the aviation system, and $900 million each year for the highway system. Customs duties are taxes on the value of imported goods and have traditionally been viewed as revenues to be used for the support of the general activities of the federal government. Diverse industry stakeholders believe that substantial new investments in the maritime infrastructure may be required from public and private sources because of an aging infrastructure, changes in the shipping industry, and increased concerns about security. A systematic framework would be helpful to decision makers as they consider the federal government's purpose and role in providing funding for the system and as they develop a sound investment approach to guide federal participation. In examining federal investment approaches across many national activities, GAO has identified four key components of such a framework--establishing national goals, defining the federal role, determining appropriate funding tools, and evaluating performance--which could potentially be applied to all transportation systems. |
gao_GAO-06-648 | gao_GAO-06-648_0 | Selected Physician Files at Medical Facilities Demonstrated Compliance with Four VA Credentialing and Four Privileging Requirements; a Fifth Privileging Requirement Was Problematic
The physician files we reviewed at the seven VA medical facilities demonstrated compliance with the four credentialing requirements we selected for review and four of five VA privileging requirements. VA has not provided guidance to help facilities find alternative ways to efficiently collect performance information, outside of a facility’s quality assurance program, that could be used in privileging decisions. At the seventh medical facility, officials did not use performance information to renew clinical privileges, as required. However, the performance information cannot be collected as part of a medical facility’s quality assurance program. Officials at six medical facilities told us that they used quality assurance information to support the granting of clinical privileges requested by their physicians, but collected all or most of this information through facility quality assurance programs. However, according to both VA headquarters legal counsel and the director of VA’s credentialing and privileging program, coding quality assurance information in this manner and using it to renew clinical privileges could make this information available for other purposes, including litigation, and therefore does not comply with VA policy. VA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure the Accuracy of Medical Facilities’ Privileging Information
VA has not required its medical facilities to establish internal controls to help ensure that privileging information managed by medical staff specialists is accurate. One facility we visited did not identify 106 physicians whose privileging process had not been completed by facility officials for at least 2 years because of inaccurate information provided by the facility’s medical staff specialist. As a result, these physicians were practicing at the facility without current clinical privileges. Without accurate information on the privileges that have been granted to physicians and the dates for renewing those privileges, VA medical facility officials will not know if they have failed to renew clinical privileges for any of their physicians in accordance with VA policy. VA medical facilities we visited complied with the four VA credentialing requirements we reviewed and all but one of five privileging requirements—to use information on a physician’s performance when renewing clinical privileges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that VA physicians are qualified to deliver care safely to veterans, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following three actions: provide guidance to medical facilities on how to collect individual physician performance information in accordance with VA’s credentialing and privileging policy to use in medical facilities’ privileging processes, enforce the requirement that medical facilities submit information on paid VA medical malpractice claims to VA’s Office of Medical-Legal Affairs within 60 days after being notified that the claim is paid, and instruct medical facilities to establish internal controls to ensure the accuracy of their privileging information. The four credentialing requirements are 1. verify that all state medical licenses held by physicians are valid; 2. query the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) database to determine whether physicians had disciplinary action taken against any of their licenses, including expired licenses; 3. verify information provided by physicians on their involvement in medical malpractice claims at a VA or non-VA medical facility; and 4. query the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to determine whether a physician was reported to this data bank because of involvement in VA or non-VA paid medical malpractice claims, display of professional incompetence, or engagement in professional misconduct. In collecting information on the credentialing and privileging requirements from physician files at each facility, we employed standard data collection techniques to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data used in this report, such as interviewing medical facility officials about the accuracy and timeliness of the information contained in the physician files we reviewed and taking steps to have a consistent interpretation of VA’s credentialing and privileging requirements for the physician files we reviewed at each medical facility. We interviewed officials at this office to obtain information about VA’s process and requirements for determining if substandard care was delivered. VA Health Care: Improved Screening of Practitioners Would Reduce Risk to Veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for determining that over 36,000 physicians working in its facilities have the appropriate professional credentials and qualifications to deliver health care to veterans. To do this, VA credentials and privileges physicians providing care at its medical facilities. In this report, GAO determined the extent to which selected VA facilities complied with (1) four VA credentialing requirements and five VA privileging requirements and (2) a requirement to submit information on paid malpractice claims. GAO also determined (3) whether VA has internal controls to help ensure the accuracy of information used to renew clinical privileges. GAO reviewed VA's policies, interviewed VA officials, and randomly sampled 17 physician files at each of seven VA medical facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the files reviewed at seven VA medical facilities complied with four of VA's credentialing requirements selected for review, and all but one of five privileging requirements. Credentialing is the process of verifying that a physician's professional credentials, such as state medical licenses, are valid and meet VA's requirements for employment. Privileging is the process for determining which health care services a physician is allowed to provide to veterans. For the files GAO reviewed, compliance with the fifth privileging requirement was problematic at six facilities because officials used performance information when renewing clinical privileges but collected all or most of this information through their facility's quality assurance program. This is prohibited under VA policy. In general, VA quality assurance information is confidential, according to federal law and VA policy. According to VA officials, if quality assurance information is used outside of a facility's quality assurance program, it could be used for other purposes, including litigation. The information is protected to encourage physicians to participate in quality assurance programs by reporting and discussing adverse events to help prevent such events from occurring in the future. VA has not provided guidance to help medical facilities find ways to efficiently collect performance information outside of a facility's quality assurance program. At the seventh medical facility, officials did not use performance information to renew clinical privileges, as required. Three of the seven medical facilities did not meet VA's requirement to submit, within 60 days after being notified that the claim was paid, any information on paid VA medical malpractice claims involving facility practitioners, including physicians, to VA's Office of Medical-Legal Affairs. This office reviews the information and determines whether practitioners involved in the claims delivered substandard care, displayed professional incompetence, or engaged in professional misconduct. The office informs facilities of its determinations. When facilities do not submit all relevant VA malpractice information in a timely manner, VA medical facility officials lack complete information that would allow them to make informed decisions about the clinical privileges that their physicians should be granted. VA has not required its medical facilities to establish internal controls to help ensure that privileging information managed by medical staff specialists--who are responsible for obtaining and verifying the information used in the credentialing and privileging processes--is accurate. One facility GAO visited did not identify 106 physicians whose privileging process had not been completed by facility officials for at least 2 years because of inaccurate information provided by the facility's medical staff specialist. As a result, these physicians were practicing at the facility without current clinical privileges. Without accurate information on the privileges that have been granted to physicians and the dates for renewing those privileges, VA medical facility officials will not know if they have failed to renew clinical privileges for any of their physicians in accordance with VA policy. |
gao_GAO-03-292 | gao_GAO-03-292_0 | As discussed in the next section of this report on tests of key controls, 52 of the 152 transactions in our Lackland AFB sample were for Wilford Hall purchase card activity, and required supporting documentation was not available for 23 of these 52 transactions. Some Approving Officials’ Span of Control over Purchase Card Accounts Exceeds DOD Guidelines
In response to concerns about approving official span of control raised during our initial Navy purchase card work, the Director of DOD’s Purchase Card Joint Program Management Office issued a memorandum on July 5, 2001, that called for no more than five to seven cardholders per approving official. For example, of the five key control activities we tested, we found that all four Air Force locations had significant control breakdowns in at least three of them. Based on our statistical testing, we estimated that the failure rate for independent documentation of receipt and acceptance—receiving of goods and services by someone other than the cardholder—ranged from 53 percent to 68 percent at the four Air Force locations we tested. In these instances, cardholders and approving officials were unable to tell us the types of items purchased or the purpose of the transactions. Our analysis of documentation related to the potentially fraudulent transactions that were not disputed disclosed the following facts. Split purchases in which the cardholder circumvents the micropurchase limit or other transaction limits. In response to our DOD audits, the Congress has recently enacted amendments in section 1007(a) of DOD’s fiscal year 2003 authorization act that address requirements for (1) periodic reviews to be performed to determine whether each purchase card holder has a need for the purchase card, (2) periodic inspector general audits to identify potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive uses of purchase cards, (3) appropriate training for cardholders and oversight officials, and (4) specific policies regarding the number of purchase cards issued by various organizations, authorized credit limits, and categories of employees eligible to be issued purchase cards. However, the problems we identified with missing receipts, lack of cardholder reconciliations and approving official review, and failure to follow requirements in laws, regulations, and DOD and Air Force policies and procedures resulted in control environment weaknesses that leave the Air Force vulnerable to fraud and improper use of the purchase card, as well as abuse and wasteful spending. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the overall control environment and improve internal control over the Air Force purchase card program, we recommend that the following actions be taken. Alternative Air Force actions relate to our recommendations that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting (1) review organizational use of the purchase card and revoke purchase cards issued to organizations that do not have authority to participate in the governmentwide purchase card program and (2) establish appropriate, consistent Air Force-wide policy as a guide for taking disciplinary actions with respect to cardholders and approving officials who make or approve fraudulent, improper, or abusive purchase card transactions. We used a case study approach to evaluate the local purchase card program, and our work consisted of three major segments—(1) an assessment of the overall control environment, including the adequacy of the Air Force’s policies and procedures, (2) an evaluation of the effectiveness of key internal control activities, and (3) a determination of whether evidence existed of potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable transactions. Finally, we assessed management actions taken in fiscal year 2002 to improve purchase card controls. Approving official review is a recognized control activity at all levels of the purchase card program, and the approving official review process has been described as the first line of defense against misuse of the card. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2001 and March 2002, GAO testified on significant breakdowns in internal controls over purchase card transactions at two Navy sites that resulted in fraud, waste, and abuse. As a result, the Congress asked GAO to audit purchase card controls at DOD. This report focuses on Air Force purchase card controls and addresses whether the overall management control environment and key internal controls were effective in preventing potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchase card transactions.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in the overall control environment and breakdowns in key controls relied on to manage the purchase card program leave the Air Force vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Major contributors to the weak control environment included excessive numbers of purchase cards, with about one purchase card for every seven employees, approving official span of control that far exceeded DOD guidelines, and credit limits that were 12 to 20 times higher than actual spending. Of the five key control activities tested, the Air Force had significant control breakdowns in at least three of them (1) receiving of goods and services by someone other than the card holder, (2) cardholder reconciliation, and (3) approving official review of the cardholder's reconciled statements. The highest failure rates--69 to 87 percent--at the four locations tested related to approving official review--viewed by DOD as the first line of defense against misuse of the purchase card. The control breakdowns resulted in purchases that were potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive or questionable. GAO also identified potentially fraudulent transactions for which supporting documentation was not available to show the quantity and type of items purchased. Air Force officials could not recall the purpose of these transactions. In addition, GAO identified (1) improper transactions related to weaknesses in controls relied on to prevent splitting purchases into multiple transactions to circumvent micropurchase and cardholder transaction limits and (2) the failure to use mandated sources of supply. Finally, GAO found that cardholders who abused or improperly used the purchase card were not subject to strong disciplinary action or consequences. The Air Force has taken a number of steps to improve control over the purchase card program. For example, it implemented automated controls during fiscal year 2002 to help monitor approving official span of control, credit limits, and cardholder reconciliation and approving official review of monthly statements. If effectively implemented, these controls should help strengthen the overall Air Force purchase card control environment as well as controls over statement reconciliation and approval. |
gao_GAO-11-714T | gao_GAO-11-714T_0 | This assistance is provided through a decentralized system of primarily 18 different federal programs that help ensure that millions of low-income individuals have consistent, dependable access to enough food for an active, healthy life. The Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security as well as multiple state and local government and nonprofit organizations work together to administer a complex network of programs and providers, ranging from agricultural commodities to prepared meals to vouchers or other targeted benefits used in commercial food retail locations. However, some of these programs provide comparable benefits to similar or overlapping populations. For example, individuals eligible for groceries through USDA’s Commodity Supplemental Food Program are also generally eligible for groceries through USDA’s Emergency Food Assistance Program and for targeted benefits that are redeemed in authorized stores through the largest program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as the Food Stamp Program), which is also administered by USDA. Information on Colocation, Administrative Consolidation, and Performance Could Improve Efficiency of Federal Employment and Training Programs
Federally funded employment and training programs play an important role in helping job seekers obtain employment. In fiscal year 2009, 47 programs spent about $18 billion to provide services, such as job search and job counseling, to program participants. Most of these programs are administered by the Departments of Labor, Education, and HHS. However, 44 of the 47 federal employment and training programs GAO identified, including those with broader missions such as multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. In some cases, these programs may have meaningful differences in their eligibility criteria or objectives, or they may provide similar types of services in different ways. Better Coordination of Federal Homelessness Programs May Minimize Overlap and Fragmentation As Well As Improve Usefulness of Program Data Collected
Several federal agencies provide a range of programs that offer not only housing assistance but also supportive services to those experiencing homelessness and to those at risk of becoming homeless, yet coordination of these programs varies by program and agency. We previously reported that in 2009, federal agencies spent about $2.9 billion on over 20 programs targeted to address the various needs of persons experiencing homelessness. A number of federal programs are specifically targeted to address issues related to homelessness while other mainstream programs that are generally designed to help low-income individuals by providing housing assistance and services such as health care, job training, and food assistance may also serve those experiencing homelessness or at risk of becoming homeless. We found the potential for overlap because in some cases, different agencies may be offering similar types of services to similar populations. Moreover, additional programs have since developed incrementally over time to address the specific needs of certain segments of the population. Greater Coordination Needed to Minimize Fragmentation, Enhance Services, and Improve Information about Federal Programs for Transportation- Disadvantaged Persons
Federal agencies fund transportation services to millions of Americans who are unable to provide their own transportation—frequently because they are elderly, have disabilities, or have low incomes—through programs that provide similar services to similar client groups. The variety of federal programs providing funding for transportation services to the transportation disadvantaged has resulted in fragmented services that can be difficult for clients to navigate and narrowly focused programs that may result in service gaps. GAO previously identified 80 existing federal programs across eight departments that provided funding for transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged in fiscal year 2010 (see app. These programs may provide funding to service providers for bus tokens, transit passes, taxi vouchers, or mileage reimbursement, for example, to transportation-disadvantaged persons for trips to access government services (such as job-training programs), the grocery store, medical appointments, or for other purposes. We have previously reported on the challenges federal grantees face in navigating differences among programs across agencies. As part of current planning for our future annual reports, we are continuing to look at additional federal programs and activities to identify further instances of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation as well as other opportunities to reduce the cost of government operations and increase revenues to the government. Careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address many of the issues discussed in our March report, particularly those involving potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal programs and activities. Appendix I: Duplication, Overlap, or Fragmentation Areas Identified
DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Two bureaus within the Department of State (State)
Appendix II: Federal Agencies and Programs Where Cost-Saving or Revenue-Enhancement Opportunities May Exist
Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Appendix III: Federal Programs Cited in This Review
Domestic Food Assistance Programs
The federal government spent more than $62.5 billion on the following 18 domestic food nutrition and assistance programs in fiscal year 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our first annual report to Congress responding to the statutory requirement that GAO identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives--either within departments or governmentwide--that have duplicative goals or activities. This work can help inform government policymakers as they address the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our national government. Our simulations of the federal government's fiscal outlook show continually increasing levels of debt that are unsustainable over time, absent changes in the federal government's current fiscal policies. Since the end of the recent recession, the gross domestic product has grown slowly, and unemployment has remained at a high level. While the economy is still recovering and in need of careful attention, widespread agreement exists on the need to look not only at the near term but also at steps that begin to change the long-term fiscal path as soon as possible without slowing the recovery. With the passage of time, the window to address the fiscal challenge narrows and the magnitude of the required changes grows. This testimony today is based on our March 2011 report, which provided an overview of federal programs or functional areas where unnecessary duplication, overlap, or fragmentation exists and where there are other opportunities for potential cost savings or enhanced revenues. In that report, we identified 81 areas for consideration--34 areas of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation and 47 additional areas describing other opportunities for agencies or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury. The 81 areas we identified span a range of federal government missions such as agriculture, defense, economic development, energy, general government, health, homeland security, international affairs, and social services. Within and across these missions, the report touches on hundreds of federal programs, affecting virtually all major federal departments and agencies. My testimony today highlights some key examples of overlap and duplication from our March report on the federal government's management of programs providing services in the areas of (1) domestic food assistance, (2) employment and training, (3) homelessness, and (4) transportation for disadvantaged populations. For each area, this statement will discuss some of the challenges related to overlap and duplication, as well as examples of how better information about each program could help policymakers in determining how to address this overlap and duplication.
What GAO Found
The federal government spent more than $90 billion on domestic food and nutrition assistance programs in fiscal year 2010. This assistance is provided through a decentralized system of primarily 18 different federal programs that help ensure that millions of low-income individuals have consistent, dependable access to enough food for an active, healthy life. The Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security as well as multiple state and local government and nonprofit organizations work together to administer a complex network of programs and providers, ranging from agricultural commodities to prepared meals to vouchers or other targeted benefits used in commercial food retail locations. However, some of these programs provide comparable benefits to similar or overlapping populations. For example, individuals eligible for groceries through USDA's Commodity Supplemental Food Program are also generally eligible for groceries through USDA's Emergency Food Assistance Program and for targeted benefits that are redeemed in authorized stores through the largest program, USDA's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Federally funded employment and training programs play an important role in helping job seekers obtain employment. In fiscal year 2009, 47 programs spent about $18 billion to provide services, such as job search and job counseling, to program participants. Most of these programs are administered by the Departments of Labor, Education, and HHS. However, 44 of the 47 federal employment and training programs GAO identified, including those with broader missions such as multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. In some cases, these programs may have meaningful differences in their eligibility criteria or objectives, or they may provide similar types of services in different ways. Several federal agencies provide a range of programs that offer not only housing assistance but also supportive services to those experiencing homelessness and to those at risk of becoming homeless, yet coordination of these programs varies by program and agency. We previously reported that in 2009, federal agencies spent about $2.9 billion on over 20 programs targeted to address the various needs of persons experiencing homelessness. A number of federal programs are specifically targeted to address issues related to homelessness while other mainstream programs that are generally designed to help low-income individuals by providing housing assistance and services such as health care, job training, and food assistance may also serve those experiencing homelessness or at risk of becoming homeless. We found the potential for overlap because in some cases, different agencies may be offering similar types of services to similar populations. Federal agencies fund transportation services to millions of Americans who are unable to provide their own transportation--frequently because they are elderly, have disabilities, or have low incomes--through programs that provide similar services to similar client groups. The variety of federal programs providing funding for transportation services to the transportation disadvantaged has resulted in fragmented services that can be difficult for clients to navigate and narrowly focused programs that may result in service gaps. GAO previously identified 80 existing federal programs across eight departments that provided funding for transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged in fiscal year 2010. These programs may provide funding to service providers for bus tokens, transit passes, taxi vouchers, or mileage reimbursement, for example, to transportation-disadvantaged persons for trips to access government services (such as job-training programs), the grocery store, medical appointments, or for other purposes. |
gao_GAO-09-969 | gao_GAO-09-969_0 | Sector-Specific Agencies Have Yet to Update Their Respective Sector- Specific Plans to Fully Address Key Cyber Security Criteria as Called for by DHS Guidance
Although DHS reported many efforts under way and planned to improve the cyber content of sector-specific plans, sector-specific agencies have yet to update their respective sector-specific plans to fully address key DHS cyber security criteria. For example, of the 17 sector-specific plans, only 9 have been updated. Of these 9 updates, just 3 addressed missing cyber criteria, and those 3 involved only a relatively small number (3 or fewer) of the criteria in question. The continuing lack of plans that fully address key cyber criteria has reduced the effectiveness of the existing sector planning approach and thus increases the risk that the nation’s cyber assets have not been adequately identified, prioritized, and protected. Sector Plans and Related Reports Do Not Fully Provide For Effective Implementation
Most sector-specific agencies developed and identified in their 2007 sector plans those actions—referred to by DHS as implementation actions— essential to carrying out the plans; however, since then, most agencies have not updated the actions and reported progress in implementing them as called for by DHS guidance. The lack of complete updates and progress reports are further evidence that the sector planning process has not been effective and thus leaves the nation in the position of not knowing precisely where we stand in securing cyber-critical infrastructures. Subsequently, in examining these initial plans to determine the extent to which they addressed cyber security, we reported in October 2007, that none of the plans fully addressed all 30 cyber security-related criteria we identified in DHS guidance (in performing that work, we (1) analyzed DHS guidance provided to the critical infrastructure sectors that stated how the sectors should address cyber topics in their sector-specific plans, (2) identified 30 cyber-related criteria, and (3) shared them with responsible DHS officials who largely agreed that these were the correct criteria to use), and recommended that DHS request that by September 2008 the sector-specific agencies’ plans address the cyber-related criteria that were only partially addressed or not addressed at all. Specifically, in response to 2006 guidance that called for agencies in developing implementation actions to address three key elements (e.g., action descriptions, completion milestones), most sectors initially developed implementation actions that fully addressed the key elements; however, while 2008 guidance called for implementation actions to be updated and for sector reports to include progress reporting against implementation action milestone commitments, only five sectors updated their plans and reported on progress against implementation actions. DHS attributed this in part to the department not following up and working to ensure that all sector plans are fully developed and implemented in accordance with department guidance. Not following up to address these conditions also shows DHS is not making sector planning a priority. Further, the recent studies by the President’s working group and expert commission also identified shortfalls in the effectiveness of the current public- private partnership approach and related sector planning and offered options for improving the process. Given this, it is essential that DHS determine whether the current process should continue to be the national approach and thus worthy of further investment Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, consistent with any direction from the Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator, to assess whether the existing sector-specific planning processes should continue to be the nation’s approach to securing cyber and other critical infrastructure. However, until these plans are issued, it is not clear whether they fully address cyber requirements. It also recommended streamlining existing sector and others organizations involved in the partnerships to optimize their capacity to identify priorities and develop response plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's critical infrastructure sectors (e.g., energy, banking) rely extensively on information technology systems. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued guidance in 2006 that instructed lead federal agencies, referred to as sector-specific agencies, to develop plans for protecting the sector's critical cyber and other (physical) infrastructure. These agencies issued plans in 2007, but GAO found that none fully addressed all 30 cyber security-related criteria identified in DHS's guidance and recommended that the plans be updated to address it by September 2008. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which sector plans have been updated to fully address DHS's cyber security requirements and assess whether these plans and related reports provide for effective implementation. To do this, GAO analyzed documentation, interviewed officials, and compared sector plans and reports with DHS cyber criteria.
What GAO Found
Although DHS reported many efforts under way and planned to improve the cyber content of sector-specific plans, sector-specific agencies have yet to update their respective sector-specific plans to fully address key DHS cyber security criteria. For example, of the 17 sector-specific plans, only 9 have been updated. Of these 9 updates, just 3 addressed missing cyber criteria, and those 3 involved only a relatively small number (3 or fewer) of the criteria in question. Recently DHS issued guidance specifically requesting that the sectors address cyber criteria shortfalls in their 2010 sector-specific plan updates. Until the plans are issued, it is not clear whether they will fully address cyber requirements. Accordingly, the continuing lack of plans that fully address key cyber criteria has reduced the effectiveness of the existing sector planning approach and thus increases the risk that the nation's cyber assets have not been adequately identified, prioritized, and protected. Most sector-specific agencies developed and identified in their 2007 sector plans those actions--referred to by DHS as implementation actions--essential to carrying out the plans; however, since then, most agencies have not updated the actions and reported progress in implementing them as called for by DHS guidance. Specifically, in response to 2006 guidance that called for agencies to address three key implementation elements (action descriptions, completion milestones, and parties responsible), most sectors initially developed implementation actions that fully addressed the key elements. However, while 2008 guidance called for implementation actions to be updated and for sector reports to include progress reporting against implementation action milestone commitments, only five sectors updated their plans and reported on progress against implementation actions. DHS attributed this in part to the department not following up and working to ensure that all sector plans are fully developed and implemented in accordance with department guidance. The lack of complete updates and progress reports are further evidence that the sector planning process has not been effective and thus leaves the nation in the position of not knowing precisely where it stands in securing cyber critical infrastructures. Not following up to address these conditions also shows DHS is not making sector planning a priority. Further, recent studies by a presidential working group--which resulted in the President establishing the White House Office of Cybersecurity Coordinator--and an expert commission also identified shortfalls in the effectiveness of the current public-private partnership approach and related sector planning and offered options for improving the process. Such options include (1) prioritizing sectors to focus planning efforts on those with the most important cyber assets and (2) streamlining existing sectors to optimize their capacity to identify priorities and develop plans. Given this, it is essential that DHS and the to-be-appointed Cybersecurity Coordinator determine whether the current process as implemented should continue to be the national approach and thus worthy of further investment. |
gao_GAO-01-1054T | gao_GAO-01-1054T_0 | Background
To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress enacted BRAC legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. Most Communities Are Recovering From the Economic Impacts of Base Closures
While the loss of jobs for DOD civilians and other adverse effects are in the short term inescapable byproducts of base closures, such effects can continue for some time. Several factors affect the economic recovery of communities near base realignments and closures. Economic data related to unemployment rates and average annual real per capita income growth suggest that the majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well economically in relation to the U.S. rates and show some improvement since base realignments and closures began with the 1988 BRAC round. BRAC Actions Are Essentially Completed, but Transfer of Unneeded Base Property Is Only Partially Complete
As of August 20, 2001, DOD reported that it has essentially implemented all of the BRAC Commissions’ 451 recommendations. In most of the transfers, DOD has continued the cleanup activities, but in some cases the new property owner is cleaning up the property. Environmental Cleanup Is Progressing but Will Require Many Years to Fully Complete
While DOD has made progress and has established numerous initiatives to expedite environmental cleanups, many cleanup activities remain. The Air Force’s base closure environmental activities account for 52 percent of the total estimated costs after fiscal year 2001. The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure, Department of Defense, April 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony reviews the progress of the Department of Defense's (DOD) base realignments and closures (BRAC) in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 and the implementation of the BRAC Commissions' recommendations.
What GAO Found
Although some communities surrounding closed base areas are faring better than others, most are recovering from the initial economic impact of base closures. The short-term impact can be very traumatic for BRAC-affected communities, but the long-term economic recovery of communities depends on several factors, including the strength of the national and regional economies and successful redevelopment of base property. Key economic indicators show that the majority of communities surrounding closed bases are faring well economically in relation to U.S. unemployment rates and show some improvement since the time closures began in 1988. Implementation of BRAC recommendations is essentially completed, but title to only 41 percent of unneeded base property has been transferred. As of August 20, 2001, DOD reported that it has essentially implemented all of the BRAC Commission's 451 recommendations. Although DOD has made progress and established numerous initiatives to expedite cleanup, many cleanup activities remain. Cleaning up environmental contamination on BRAC-affected installations has proven to be costly and challenging for DOD and can delay the transfer of the title of property to other users. DOD expects to continue its environmental efforts well beyond fiscal year 2001, the final year of the base closure implementation authority. |
gao_AIMD-95-188 | gao_AIMD-95-188_0 | As shown in figure 1, after 8 years and three software development contractors, FDA still does not have a fully functional automated import system. FDA decided to maintain and refine OASIS in the Seattle District. The results of this study are expected in February 1996. In addition, FDA has made little progress in implementing basic systems development procedures, including conducting user acceptance testing and a risk assessment. Recent developments include the completion of a system design review which concluded that OASIS was not ready for national implementation and recommended an immediate reengineering effort. Cost and Performance Information Are Needed
We found that FDA has not been effective in controlling costs or monitoring the progress of OASIS. In February 1995, the current contractor was tasked with conducting a cost-benefit analysis, which was completed in June 1995. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget and the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration to ensure that continuous top management oversight and systems expertise are provided to FDA as it proceeds with its import automation effort;
FDA develops and maintains reliable cost and performance information;
FDA follows sound systems development practices, including validating systems software, conducting user acceptance testing, developing a security plan, and conducting a cost-benefit analysis that includes an assessment of alternative systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) progress in implementing its Operational and Administrative System for Import Support (OASIS), focusing on systems development areas that need improvement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although some improvements have been made to import operations, FDA has not completed OASIS after 8 years and about $14 million in system development costs, mainly due to inadequate management oversight; (2) in 1994, FDA determined that OASIS was at a high risk for failure and it should suspend development until it completed a comprehensive system review; (3) FDA has taken an inadequate approach in developing OASIS, resulting in the potential for unsafe products entering the country; (4) FDA completed the comprehensive review of OASIS in June 1995 and determined that OASIS was not ready for national implementation and recommended an immediate reengineering effort; and (5) FDA success in improving OASIS depends on better planning and top management involvement in system design, development, and deployment. |
gao_GAO-02-1017 | gao_GAO-02-1017_0 | Researchers and patient safety advocates have suggested certain measures to reduce the risk of medication errors, and VA and DOD have incorporated many of these measures as features of their health care systems. Inpatient medications are ordered using the host facility’s formulary guidelines and filled through the inpatient pharmacy. Shared Patients Experience Gaps in Medication Safety Measures
VA’s and DOD’s separate, uncoordinated information and formulary systems result in gaps in medication safeguards for shared inpatients and outpatients. VA and DOD providers and pharmacists have ready access to health records of their own beneficiaries, largely through CPRS and CHCS, respectively. Thus, these patients are subjected to the risks associated with handwritten prescriptions, such as illegible orders and transcription errors. All joint venture sites have taken steps to increase access to patient information. For instance, pharmacies at two sites stock drugs commonly prescribed for the other agency’s patients, but neither host agency’s P&T committee has representatives from both agencies. Recommendations For Executive Action
To better protect shared patients at the joint ventures, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health and that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to develop the capability for VA and DOD providers to access patient medical information relevant to medication decision making, regardless of whether that information resides in VA’s or DOD’s information system and provide training to physicians and pharmacists who need to use this access; develop the capability to perform a comprehensive, automatic drug interaction check that uses medication information from all VA and DOD facilities and mail order operations and DOD’s network pharmacies, and evaluate the potential for DOD’s PDTS to be used for this purpose; require providers to use computerized order entry of medications for shared patients where it is available and implement system modifications that will enable providers to electronically order medications to be dispensed at the other agency’s pharmacies; and establish a joint VA and DOD pharmacy and therapeutics committee, or similar working group, at each joint venture site to determine how best to safely meet the medication needs of VA and DOD shared patients and to overcome obstacles associated with separate formularies. | What GAO Found
Medication errors and adverse drug reactions are a significant concern for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) because their large beneficiary populations receive many prescriptions. Each agency has taken steps to reduce the risk of medication errors, such as making patients' medical records more accessible to providers and performing checks for drug interactions. Although each agency has designed safeguards to protect its own patients, some VA and DOD patients receive medication from both agencies. Shared patients face a higher risk of medication error. Joint (DOD and VA) venture sites with inpatient facilities provide services to shared inpatients in the same manner as they do for their own beneficiaries; that is, medications are ordered using the facility's guidelines and filled through the inpatient pharmacy at that facility. Gaps in safeguards result primarily from VA's and DOD's separate, uncoordinated information and formulary systems. Joint venture sites have tried to address some of these safety gaps. For instance, all sites have made patient information more accessible by providing additional, although incomplete, access to the other agency's patient information system. |
gao_GAO-10-142 | gao_GAO-10-142_0 | For example, tenant agencies fund FPS’s security equipment countermeasure recommendations that they approve through SWAs. Building Security Operations—interfaces with FPS and monitors the services FPS provides to GSA and tenant agencies. We have identified a set of key facility protection practices from the collective practices of federal agencies and the private sector to provide a framework for guiding agencies’ protection efforts and addressing challenges. FPS’s Risk Management Approach Is Inadequate, but Improvements Are in Development
FPS is limited in its ability to influence the allocation of resources using risk management because security funding decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies. Moreover, FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool, a subjective approach, and a time-consuming process to conduct BSAs. GSA and tenant agencies have concerns about the quality and timeliness of FPS’s risk assessment services and in some cases, are assuming these responsibilities. FPS’s Ability to Influence Resource Allocation Based on Risk is Limited
FPS’s ability to influence the allocation of resources based on the results of its risk assessments is constrained because GSA and tenant agencies must agree to fund recommended countermeasures, and we found that tenant agencies were sometimes unwilling to fund recommended security equipment. It is critical that FPS—which is responsible for assessing risk for nearly 9,000 GSA buildings and properties that GSA may lease—replace its outdated, subjective, and time- consuming risk assessment tool and approach with the new program it has been developing since fiscal year 2007, especially as the results of its risk analyses lay the foundation for FPS, GSA, and tenant agencies’ security efforts. Although FPS is developing a program for technology acquisition, its implementation has been delayed and it does not include an evaluative component to ensure cost- effectiveness. Additionally, FPS does not provide inspectors with specialized guidance and standards for cost-effectively selecting technology. Consequently, tenant agency representatives would have to investigate the cost and risk implications of these options on their own to make an informed resource allocation decision. FPS and GSA Disagree Over Sharing Informatio from the BSA
While FPS and GSA acknowledge that the two organizations are partners in protecting and securing GSA buildings, FPS and GSA fundamentally disagree over how much of the information in the BSA should be shared Per the MOA, FPS is required to share the BSA executive summary with GSA and FPS believes that this document contains sufficient information for GSA to make decisions about purchasing and implementing FPS’s recommended countermeasures. As a result, communication among these entities is limited. FPS officials at one location told us that their radios are not interoperable with those of the local police department. Reach consensus with GSA on what information contained in the BSA is needed for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to the protection of federal buildings and occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees to use in deciding what information to protect with SBU designations; provisions for training on making designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this information sharing process is working, with results reported to the Secretary regularly on a mutually agreed-to schedule. Until the cost-analysis component of RAMP is implemented, it will be important for inspectors to have guidance they can use to make cost-effective countermeasure recommendations so that GSA and tenant agencies can be assured that their investments in FPS-recommended technologies and other countermeasures are cost- effective, consistent across buildings, and the best available alternatives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report was to determine whether the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) approach to security for buildings under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA) reflects key facility protection practices. We used the following key practices as criteria: allocating resources using risk management; leveraging technology; and information sharing and coordination. | Why GAO Did This Study
There is ongoing concern about the security of federal buildings and their occupants. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing law enforcement and related security services for nearly 9,000 federal buildings under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices from the collective practices of federal agencies and the private sector that included: allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, and information sharing and coordination. As requested, GAO determined whether FPS's security efforts for GSA buildings reflected key practices. To meet this objective, GAO used its key practices as criteria, visited five sites to gain firsthand knowledge, analyzed pertinent DHS and GSA documents, and interviewed DHS, GSA, and tenant agency officials.
What GAO Found
FPS's approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects of key protection practices, and FPS has several improvements underway such as a new risk assessment program and a countermeasure acquisition program. While FPS's protection activities exhibit some aspects of the key practices, GAO found limitations in each of the areas. FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies; however, FPS's ability to influence the allocation of resources using risk management is limited because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies, which may be unwilling to fund FPS's countermeasure recommendations. Moreover, FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool and a subjective, time-consuming process. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies are uncertain whether risks are being mitigated. Concerned with the quality and timeliness of FPS's risk assessment services, GSA and tenant agencies are pursuing some of these activities on their own. Although FPS is developing a new risk management program, full implementation is not planned until the end of fiscal year 2011 and has already experienced delays. With regard to leveraging technology, FPS inspectors have considerable latitude for selecting technologies and countermeasures that tenant agencies fund, but FPS provides inspectors with little training and guidance for making cost-effective choices. Additionally, FPS does not provide tenant agencies with an analysis of alternative technologies, their cost, and associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance that the recommendations inspectors make are the best available alternatives and tenant agencies must make resource allocation decisions without key information. Although FPS is developing a program to standardize security equipment and contracting, the program has run behind schedule and lacks an evaluative component for assessing the cost-effectiveness of competing technologies and countermeasures. FPS has developed information sharing and coordination mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there is inconsistency in the type of information shared and the frequency of coordination. Lack of coordination through regular contact can lead to communication breakdowns. For example, during a construction project at one location, the surveillance equipment that FPS was responsible for maintaining was removed from the site during 2007. FPS and tenant agency representatives disagree over whether FPS was notified of this action. Furthermore, FPS and GSA disagree over what building risk assessment information can be shared. FPS maintains that the sensitive information contained in the assessments is not needed for GSA to carry out its mission. However, GSA maintains that restricted access to the risk assessments constrains its ability to protect buildings and occupants. |
gao_GAO-08-1023T | gao_GAO-08-1023T_0 | Background
Regulation B imposes a general prohibition on collecting data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants. Studies Suggest That Discrimination May Play a Role in Certain Types of Nonmortgage Lending, but Data Limitations Complicate Efforts to Better Understand the Issue
The limited number of studies on nonmortgage lending that met our criteria for selection in our June report focused primarily on the small business sector, and suggested that certain minority-owned businesses may be denied loans more often or be offered higher interest rates than similar white-owned businesses. However, the key data source for most of these studies, FRB’s SSBF, has certain limitations compared with HMDA data, and this may limit the data’s usefulness as an analytical tool. While studies using SSBF data have provided important insights into possible discrimination in small business lending, researchers and FRB officials also pointed out a number of limitations: SSBF data are collected from individual small business borrowers rather than lenders, which limit their analytical value. These studies showed the strength of the SCF as a data source (e.g., the ability to consider data on personal characteristics and loan underwriting factors), as well as its limitations (e.g., the data are collected from borrowers rather than lenders). We found that in the absence of similar race, gender, and other data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants, examiners may rely on time-consuming and possibly unreliable techniques to assess lenders’ compliance with fair lending laws. For example, examination guidance allows examiners, after consulting with their agency’s supervisory staff, to assume that an applicant is Hispanic based on the last name, female based on the first name, or likely to be an African-American based on the census tract of the address. Researchers and Others Had Mixed Views on FRB’s Conclusion That Voluntary Data Collection Could Create Some Risk for Discrimination in Nonmortgage Lending
Some researchers, staff from a bank regulatory agency, and representatives from banking and business trade groups we contacted generally agreed with FRB that permitting voluntary data collection on personal characteristics could create a risk that the information would be used for discriminatory purposes. Similarly, all lenders that chose to collect and use such data for discriminatory purposes would face the risk of public disclosure of such practices through litigation. FRB established such procedures for federally regulated lenders that choose to conduct a self-test. Many Researchers and Others Agreed That Voluntarily Collected Data May Not Be Reliable or Useful in Helping to Better Identify Possible Discrimination in Nonmortgage Lending
Even so, many researchers, regulatory staff, and representatives from consumer groups and banking trade groups agreed with FRB’s conclusion that the reliability of voluntarily collected data may be limited in identifying possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending. Moreover, the establishment of such data collection standards might also have further diminished lender interest in a voluntary program, which researchers, FRB officials, and others said was already limited due to the potential for increased regulatory and public scrutiny of their lending practices. A Data Collection and Reporting Requirement Could Further Efforts to Better Understand Possible Discrimination in Nonmortgage Lending but Would also Involve Complexities and Costs That Would Require Consideration
In concept, a requirement that lenders collect and publicly report data on the personal characteristics of nonmortgage loan applicants, similar to HMDA requirements, could help address some of the existing data limitations that complicate efforts by researchers, federal bank regulators, and others to identify possible discrimination. For this reason, they reiterated that a data collection and reporting requirement would involve additional system integration and employee training costs, among others. Limiting a Data Collection and Reporting Requirement to Specific Types of Nonmortgage Loans Would Also Have Benefits and Costs
One potential option to mitigate the costs associated with a requirement that regulated lenders collect and report data on the personal characteristics of those seeking nonmortgage loans would be to limit the requirement to certain types of loans, such as small business and/or automobile loans. One option to potentially enhance federal oversight of the fair lending laws, while mitigating lender cost concerns, would be to require lenders to collect data on personal characteristics for small business loan applicants, and perhaps other types of nonmortgage lending like automobile lending, and make the data available to regulators but not require public reporting of such data or any other information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) Regulation B, which implements the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA), generally prohibits lenders from collecting certain data from loan applicants, such as their race or gender, for nonmortgage loans (e.g., small business loans). FRB has stated that this provision of Regulation B minimizes the chances that lenders would use such data in an unlawful and discriminatory manner. However, others argue that the prohibition limits the capacity of researchers and regulators to identify possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending. This testimony is based on the GAO report, Fair Lending: Race and Gender Data Are Limited for Nonmortgage Lending ( GAO-08-698 , June 27, 2008). Specifically, GAO analyzes (1) studies on possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending and the data used in them, (2) FRB's 2003 decision to retain the prohibition of voluntary data collection, and (3) the benefits and costs of a data collection and reporting requirement. For this work, GAO conducted a literature review; reviewed FRB documents; analyzed issues involving the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which requires lenders to collect and publicly report data on personal characteristics for mortgage loan applicants; and interviewed FRB and others. FRB did not take a position on this report's analysis. In addition to restating its rationale for retaining the prohibition of voluntary data collection, FRB summarized GAO's findings, including the potential benefits and costs of additional data for fair lending enforcement.
What GAO Found
GAO's June 2008 report found that most research suggests that discrimination may play a role in certain types of nonmortgage lending, but data limitations complicate efforts by researchers and regulators to better understand this issue. For example, available studies indicate that African-American owned small businesses are denied loans more often or pay higher interest rates than white-owned businesses with similar risk characteristics. While the primary data source for these studies, a periodic FRB small business survey, provides important insights into possible discrimination, it also has limits compared to HMDA data. For example, the FRB survey data are collected from borrowers rather than lenders, which limit their usefulness as a means to assess lending practices. In addition, federal bank regulators that enforce ECOA said that HMDA data facilitates the identification of lenders that may be engaging in discriminatory mortgage lending. In the absence of such data for nonmortgage loans, regulators may rely on time-consuming and less reliable approaches to identify possible discrimination, such as assuming a loan applicant is Hispanic based on his or her last name. While testimony from researchers and other information GAO collected did not fully agree with all aspects of FRB's 2003 rationale for retaining the prohibition of voluntary data collection, there was general agreement that such voluntary data would have limited benefits. FRB did not adopt a proposal that would have allowed lenders to collect data, without any standards, because it said the proposal would have (1) created an opportunity for lenders to use the data for discriminatory purposes and (2) such data would not be useful since lenders may use different collection approaches. While some researchers and others agreed with FRB's first rationale, others said that data collection alone would not necessarily create the risk for discrimination because, in some cases (e.g., small business lending), lenders may already be aware of applicants' personal characteristics as such lending is often done on a face-to-face basis. Even so, a range of researchers, regulatory staff, and others agreed that voluntarily collected data would not likely materially benefit efforts to better understand possible discrimination because the data would be collected on an inconsistent basis or few lenders would participate out of concern for additional regulatory scrutiny of their nonmortgage lending practices and the potential for litigation. Requiring lenders to collect and publicly report data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants could help address current data limitations that complicate efforts to better assess possible discrimination. However, such a requirement would impose additional costs on lenders that could be partially passed on to borrowers. These potential costs include those associated with information system integration, software development, data storage and verification, and employee training. Limiting a requirement to certain types of loans could help mitigate such costs but may also involve complexities that would need to be carefully considered. For example, to the extent that small business lending is more complicated than other types of lending, lenders may need to collect and report additional information on a range of underwriting standards in addition to data on personal characteristics so that informed judgments can be made about their lending practices. |
gao_GAO-11-346 | gao_GAO-11-346_0 | Figure 1 illustrates the different pathways by which pharmaceuticals may enter drinking water supplies. Under SDWA, EPA is authorized to regulate contaminants, including pharmaceuticals, meeting certain criteria in public drinking water systems. National and regional studies have generally detected pharmaceuticals in source water, treated drinking water, and treated wastewater; but the full extent of occurrence is unknown. The concentrations detected were measured most frequently in parts per trillion. Research Has Not Determined the Human Health Effects of Pharmaceuticals in Drinking Water, but Some Research Raises Concerns
Research has not determined the human health effects of exposure to pharmaceuticals in drinking water. However, some research has demonstrated the potential impact to human health from exposure to some pharmaceuticals found in drinking water, such as EDCs and antibiotics. The United States and Other Countries Are Engaged in Take-Back Programs to Help Prevent Pharmaceuticals from Reaching Drinking Water
Some states and local governments, as well as DEA, have taken actions to reduce the extent to which pharmaceuticals occur in drinking water— primarily through take-back programs to properly dispose of pharmaceuticals. II provides federal guidelines on the proper disposal of pharmaceuticals). Encouraging initial prescriptions in smaller amounts. This practice may reduce the amount of pharmaceuticals that are disposed of when patients switch to different pharmaceuticals. EPA is collaborating with other agencies on research to help obtain these data for use in developing future candidate lists, but these efforts are largely informal and EPA has not established a formal mechanism to sustain these collaborative efforts. According to EPA officials, there is no formal mechanism, such as a long- term strategy or formal agreement, to manage and sustain these collaborative efforts. Three of these practices may help clarify how EPA and other agencies could coordinate their research efforts. We have previously reported on key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration efforts, such as (1) establishing roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led; (2) identifying the expertise and other resources that each agency can bring to bear on the issue, and (3) establishing a process for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting to the public the results of the collaborative research efforts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To collect the pharmaceutical occurrence and health effects data necessary to better implement SDWA, and to address the broader issue of pharmaceuticals and their relationship to other contaminants in the nation’s waterways, we are making the following recommendation to the Administrator of EPA: Establish a workgroup or other formal mechanism that includes the relevant federal agencies to collaborate and coordinate research on pharmaceuticals and, as appropriate, other contaminants in drinking water that present the greatest public health concern. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) provide information on the extent to which pharmaceuticals occur in drinking water and the effects, if any, that their occurrence has on human health; (2) describe the approaches taken in the United States and in other countries to reduce the extent to which pharmaceuticals occur in drinking water; and (3) identify challenges, if any, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces in determining whether any pharmaceuticals should be regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), actions EPA is taking to address these challenges, and options for addressing such challenges in the future. To identify the effects, if any, that the occurrence of pharmaceuticals in drinking water has on human health, we also reviewed federal and peer- reviewed reports, including articles in peer-reviewed journals by federal scientists and others; and the PiE workgroup’s draft report. We selected a nonprobability sample of five programs to represent the three categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drinking water in some metropolitan areas contains concentrations of pharmaceuticals, raising concerns about their potential impact on human health. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate contaminants, including pharmaceuticals, in public drinking water systems if they may adversely affect human health among other criteria. Pharmaceuticals may enter drinking water supplies from several pathways, including discharge from wastewater facilities. GAO was asked to provide information on the (1) extent to which pharmaceuticals occur in drinking water and their effects, if any, on human health; (2) U.S. and other countries' approaches to reducing their occurrence; and (3) challenges, if any, that EPA faces in determining whether to regulate pharmaceuticals. GAO reviewed federal and peer-reviewed reports, and surveyed a nonprobability sample of five U.S. programs designed to properly dispose of pharmaceuticals. We selected these programs based on geographic diversity and program characteristics. We also researched such programs in two countries, and interviewed scientists and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Research has detected pharmaceuticals in the nation's drinking water. National and regional studies by the U.S. Geological Survey, EPA, and others have detected pharmaceuticals in source water, treated drinking water, and treated wastewater; but the full extent of occurrence is unknown. The concentrations detected for any one pharmaceutical were measured most frequently in parts per trillion. Research has not determined the human health effects of exposure to these concentrations of pharmaceuticals in drinking water. However, federal research has demonstrated the potential impact to human health from exposure to some pharmaceuticals found in drinking water, such as antibiotics and those that interfere with the functioning and development of hormones in humans. Some states and local governments as well as the Drug Enforcement Administration have taken actions that could reduce the extent to which pharmaceuticals occur in drinking water. These efforts have primarily been through drug take-back programs to encourage proper control and disposal of pharmaceuticals. Additional efforts have been adopted in Europe following the European Union's directive in 2004 requiring member states to have appropriate collection systems for unused or expired medicinal products. In addition to collection systems, Sweden also encourages actions such as writing small initial prescriptions to reduce the amount of pharmaceuticals that are disposed of if patients switch to a different pharmaceutical course. EPA faces challenges in obtaining sufficient occurrence and health effects data on pharmaceuticals and other contaminants in drinking water to support analyses and decisions to identify which, if any, pharmaceuticals should be regulated under SDWA. EPA is collaborating with the Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Geological Survey on research to help obtain such data but these efforts are largely informal. EPA officials said there is no formal mechanism, such as a long-term strategy or formal agreement, to manage and sustain these collaborative efforts. A recently expired interagency workgroup, which EPA co-chaired, initiated work on a research strategy to identify opportunities that will enhance collaborative federal efforts on pharmaceuticals in the environment, but its draft report did not contain key details about how the agencies will coordinate such collaborative efforts. GAO previously identified key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal agencies, some of which may help clarify such coordination, such as establishing the roles and responsibilities of collaborating agencies; leveraging their resources; and establishing a process for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting to the public the results of the collaborative research efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of EPA establish a workgroup or other formal mechanism to coordinate research on pharmaceuticals and other contaminants in drinking water. EPA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-138 | gao_GAO-11-138_0 | Since 2002, the U.S. government—led primarily by USAID and DOD—has implemented a wide range of water projects throughout Afghanistan and, while some preceded the ANDS and the U.S. interagency water strategies, implemented projects generally addressed the needs and goals of the Afghan water sector. U.S. Government Plans to Accelerate Water-Sector Development Efforts in Afghanistan from Fiscal Year 2010 through Fiscal Year 2014
According to documents provided to us by USAID and our discussions with agency officials involved in development work in Afghanistan, the U.S. government plans to accelerate water-sector development efforts in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. United States Has Taken Steps to Better Coordinate Afghan Water-Sector Projects, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and several U.S. strategic documents concerning operations in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of interagency coordination in Afghanistan. Moreover, we have previously reported on the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration when multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. counterterrorism-related efforts. For example, U.S. agencies generally do not meet on a regular basis with all the relevant ministries in the Afghan government, and they do not have complete data concerning other donor projects in order to best leverage resources and maximize investments. Agencies did not meet on a regular basis to discuss ongoing projects. However, the interagency implementation plan has not been completed. Lacks a Centralized Database for U.S.-Funded Water Projects in Afghanistan
We previously reported that DOD and USAID relied on separate data systems to track and manage development projects in Afghanistan, and recommended the agencies take steps to develop a centralized database to ensure that adequate information exists to manage and make decisions. Gaps Exist in U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Manage and Monitor Performance for Afghan Water Projects
USAID has established performance management and monitoring procedures, including for implementers of water sector projects. USAID’s Automated Directives System documents the agency’s performance management and monitoring procedures. For example, while USAID collected quarterly progress reports from its implementing partners for five of the six water projects included in our review, agency staff did not analyze and interpret this information. In October 2008, USAID adopted new guidance endorsing several alternative monitoring methods in high threat environments. As table 5 shows, four out of six implementers established performance indicators, though some did not always establish targets for the indicators as required. U.S. Government Has Included a Focus on Building Sustainability into U.S.-Funded Water Projects
Sustainability is one of the U.S. government’s key principles for development and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, and recent U.S. strategies have emphasized the importance of project sustainability. Based on our review of the U.S. Government Inter- Agency Water Strategy and discussions with agency staff, the U.S. government has identified two key elements to help ensure water project sustainability: (1) enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions with water sector responsibilities, and (2) ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. DOD and CERP guidance also emphasizes sustainability. The strategy also outlines several goals that will enhance water project sustainability. DOD officials have acknowledged the difficulty of sustaining CERP projects in Afghanistan. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the coordination of U.S.-funded water projects, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID, in conjunction with the Secretaries of DOD and other relevant agencies take the following actions: Develop an interagency implementation plan, as called for in the 2010 U.S.
Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy that (1) establishes agreement on roles and responsibilities of the various U.S. agencies with respect to the short, medium, and long-term goals identified in the strategy; (2) identifies and address the leveraging of U.S. resources; and (3) outlines means to operate effectively across agency boundaries. DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop an interagency implementation plan. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) U.S. water projects in Afghanistan since 2002 and the extent to which U.S. goals for Afghan water-sector development assistance align with the goals of the Afghan government; (2) U.S. agencies’ coordination of water-sector efforts among themselves and with the Afghan government and the donor community; (3) U.S. agencies’ performance management efforts for water-sector projects; and (4) U.S. agencies’ efforts to build sustainability into their water-sector projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Water is critical to the stability of Afghanistan and is an essential part of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have awarded $250 million for water projects. This report examines (1) the alignment of U.S. water goals and projects with Afghan water-sector development goals; (2) U.S. agencies' coordination of water-sector efforts among themselves, with the Afghan government and the donor community; (3) U.S. efforts to manage and monitor these water projects; and (4) U.S. efforts to build sustainability into water-sector projects. GAO reviewed and analyzed planning, funding, and performance documents from U.S. agencies and implementing partners, and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and U.S., Afghan, and donor officials in Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The goals outlined in the U.S. government's 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy generally align with Afghan government strategic goals for the water sector. The Strategy identifies short, medium, and long-term goals to be achieved between 2010 and 2014. Additionally, since 2002, the U.S. government has implemented a wide range of water projects throughout Afghanistan to improve access to safe drinking water and sanitation, agriculture irrigation, and water-sector management. These projects generally align with Afghan water-sector goals. The United States expects to accelerate development efforts in the water sector and estimates that an additional $2.1 billion will be needed to fund these efforts from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. The Government Performance and Results Act and several U.S. strategic documents concerning operations in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of interagency coordination. GAO has reported on the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration when multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. counterterrorism-related efforts. GAO's review showed that the United States has taken steps to better coordinate water-sector development projects but that additional efforts are needed. For example, the U.S. government has developed an Infrastructure Working Group, an Inter-Agency Water Strategy, and has started to meet on a regular basis. However, an interagency implementation plan called for in the strategy has not been completed. Also, USAID and DOD have not developed a centralized database to enhance coordination, which GAO previously recommended. Moreover, U.S. agencies generally do not meet on a regular basis with all the relevant ministries in the Afghan government, and they lack complete data concerning other donor projects to maximize the U.S. investment in development projects. USAID's Automated Directives System outlines USAID's performance management and monitoring procedures. GAO found that gaps existed in USAID's performance management and monitoring efforts for water sector projects in Afghanistan. For example, while 4 of the 6 implementers of projects GAO reviewed established performance indicators, some did not always establish targets for the indicators as required. In addition, although USAID collected quarterly progress reports from 5 of the 6 water project implementers for the projects GAO reviewed, it did not analyze and interpret this information as required. Finally, though USAID has identified several alternative monitoring procedures staff can use to help mitigate monitoring challenges in high threat environments, USAID has not effectively ensured that such guidance was disseminated to staff in Afghanistan. The U.S. government has included a focus on building sustainability into U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. Recent U.S. strategies have emphasized the importance of project sustainability. GAO has identified two key elements to ensuring water project sustainability: enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions with water-sector responsibilities, and ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. Ongoing USAID water projects included in this review have incorporated sustainability initiatives. DOD guidance also emphasizes sustainability. However, DOD officials have acknowledged the difficulties of sustaining water projects in Afghanistan.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes several recommendations to the USAID Administrator, in conjunction with DOD and other relevant agencies, to improve planning, coordination, and management of U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. This includes developing an interagency plan and designating a centralized database. GAO also recommends steps the USAID Administrator needs to take to improve performance management. USAID and DOD generally concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-192 | gao_HEHS-98-192_0 | Schools’ Use of NSLDS’ On-Line and Batch Processing Functions Is Limited
Our survey results indicate that a significant proportion—42 percent—of the schools participating in federal student financial aid programs were not using NSLDS’ on-line and batch processing functions, which first became available in November 1994. In addition, of the schools that were using these functions, most were not routinely using them for many of the tasks they were capable of performing. 2.) As shown in figure 3, more than half of the schools rarely or never performed 7 of the 10 tasks using NSLDS. 4.) However, some schools did experience problems with some aspects of the system. 5.) The Department depends on guaranty agencies, loan servicers, and other entities to provide many of these data and has initiated efforts to address these problems. About 80 percent of schools that use the system responded that they requested assistance or information from the NSLDS Customer Service Center. Schools Had Mixed Views About Whether NSLDS Improved Student Financial Aid Administration
Schools using NSLDS’ on-line and batch processing functions had mixed views about whether these capabilities led to improvements in their ability to administer federal student financial aid programs. However, most had no plans to obtain access to NSLDS, had plans to obtain access but did not know when, or were unsure whether they would ever obtain access. While the schools that did not use NSLDS’ on-line and batch processing functions—either because they chose not to (19 percent) or did not have the ability to (23 percent)—had a variety of reasons for not using or having NSLDS, these reasons generally fell into one of three categories: use of alternative methods, such as the Clearinghouse, for obtaining and processing SSCR information; limitations in resources, personnel, or skills, such as lack of training; and lack of confidence in data reliability. 8.) The Department Has Taken Steps to Promote Greater School Use of NSLDS
The Department has efforts under way to increase schools’ use of NSLDS. While a small percentage of schools have not complied with requirements for SSCR processing and on-line access, the Department recognizes that to encourage schools to use NSLDS beyond these requirements, it must promote the system and ensure the accuracy of the system’s data. Therefore, the Department plans to provide additional NSLDS training to users at sites throughout the country and review and correct any inaccurate data in NSLDS. The Department gave the major data providers detailed technical instructions that specify their responsibilities and the data they are required to provide. To further demonstrate its commitment to improving the reliability of data on its financial aid programs, the Department has addressed the issue of data integrity in its long-range strategic and annual performance plans prepared in response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. National Student Loan Data System
The National Student Loan Data System performs prescreening of student financial aid program applications, performs student status confirmation reporting, and tracks borrowers. 1. The Department said all schools use NSLDS, and that we were incorrect in reporting that almost half of the schools do not use NSLDS at all. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed schools' use of the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), focusing on: (1) the extent to and purposes for which schools are using NSLDS; (2) problems these schools are having and the benefits they are getting from using the system; (3) why some schools are not using NSLDS; and (4) the extent to which the Department of Education is taking or plans to take steps to ensure that schools are fully using NSLDS.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) postsecondary schools participating in federal student financial aid programs are making limited use of NSLDS' online and batch processing functions; (2) GAO estimated that almost half of the schools are not using these system capabilities at all--3 years after they first became available; (3) those that are using these functions are not routinely using them for many of the tasks they are capable of performing; (4) the one use made by the majority of schools is to provide and update student financial data on the student status confirmation report, which the Department now requires all schools to perform; (5) GAO estimated that over half of the schools rarely or never performed 7 of the 10 tasks that GAO identified for its survey using NSLDS' online and batch processing functions; (6) in general, schools' experiences using NSLDS have been relatively problem free; however, some schools did experience problems with some aspects of the system; (7) schools using NSLDS' online and batch processing functions had mixed views on whether they led to improvements in their program administration; (8) schools that did not use NSLDS' online and batch processing functions cited a variety of reasons for not doing so; (9) the most frequent reasons cited by these schools included relying on alternative methods to obtain or submit data needed to administer student aid programs; (10) of the schools that did not use the systems' online and batch processing functions, many did not have plans to obtain access to NSLDS, had plans to obtain access to the system but did not know when, or were unsure when they would obtain access to the system in the future; (11) in an effort to increase schools' use of NSLDS, the Department has provided training assistance to schools and has worked to ensure the accuracy of the system's data; (12) the Department recently expanded its NSLDS customer service center and will offer NSLDS training to users at its 11 regional training centers; (13) in addition, to demonstrate its commitment to improving the reliability of data on its postsecondary education programs, the Department has addressed the issue of data integrity in its long-range strategic and annual performance plans prepared in response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; (14) as part of this commitment, the Department has initiated efforts to identify and correct inaccurate data in NSLDS, and to strengthen its working relationships with other data providers, such as guaranty agencies. |
gao_GAO-12-482 | gao_GAO-12-482_0 | DOD’s goal is for the components to share UII data across each of their individual IT systems, and DOD-wide, between components. The task force issued a report with recommendations in June 2010 that estimated financial costs of IUID implementation, as well as financial and nonfinancial benefits. DOD Has Taken Some Steps toward Developing a Framework for Management of IUID Implementation, but Has Not Yet Incorporated Several Key Elements of a Comprehensive Management Approach
DOD has taken some steps to improve its approach to managing and implementing IUID technology, but has yet to incorporate some key elements of best management practices into its evolving framework for management of IUID implementation. These include internal controls and analysis of return on investment. For example, DOD lacks such key information as quantitatively defined goals for marking legacy items; performance measures, such as reliable schedules for predicting when its Enterprise Resource Planning systems will have the capability to manage items using UII data; and a full estimate of IUID’s cost and benefits. Moreover, according to the report, implementing IUID into property-accountability processes on the enterprise level could enable DOD to track equipment assets throughout their life cycle. DOD and Contractors Have Made Some Progress Marking Items with IUID, but DOD Faces Challenges in Assessing Progress toward Goals and Ensuring That Items Are Sufficiently Marked
DOD components and contractors have been marking items with IUID, but due to several challenges, it is difficult for DOD to assess its progress in marking items or ensuring that contractors are sufficiently marking items. But, DOD does not have complete information on the total number of legacy items that its components have marked and must mark in the future. With respect to newly-acquired items and pieces of government-furnished property, DOD reports that as of January 2012, more than 2,500 contractors had delivered newly-acquired items to DOD and had registered over 11.5 million such items and pieces of government- furnished property in DOD’s IUID Registry. As a result, DOD may be unable to ensure that contractors are marking all newly-acquired items and pieces of government-furnished property that require IUID labels, and DOD cannot know the extent to which contractors are supplying IUID data matrices that the components need to track items with IUID technology. As of October 2011, the components reported marking more than 2 million legacy items. However, DOD does not have complete information on the total number of items to be marked and that have been marked; DOD has not quantifiably defined its marking goals according to DOD’s IUID marking criteria; DOD has not set interim milestones to determine the components’ progress in marking items; and DOD’s components do not use consistent criteria to track progress in legacy item marking. To Achieve Key Benefits, DOD Plans to Use IUID Technology in Enterprisewide Logistics Processes by the End of Fiscal Year 2015
It is DOD’s goal for its components to share UII data departmentwide, and the components are to use these data for unique item tracking. First, DOD is in the process of modifying its supply chain management policy and guidance to incorporate use of IUID technology and UII data across DOD. However, these systems have limited capabilities to manage or use UII data. Without fully defined requirements; resolving the challenges posed by the Air Force and the Navy not actively integrating IUID with their Enterprise Resource Planning systems; and an integrated master schedule that includes IUID integration at the component level and at the DOD-wide level, DOD cannot reliably predict whether it will meet its goal to use these systems to manage items through intensive item management and product life cycle management by the end of fiscal year 2015, or predict when these systems will have this capability. Also, DOD has not fully developed the schedules needed to integrate IUID with existing IT systems, so that DOD can share UII data enterprisewide. Because of this, we continue to believe that the agency cannot ensure that the items it inspects have IUID labels with sufficient data matrices, and that it should continue to develop policies and procedures that provide for systematic assessment of the sufficiency of contractor- marked items’ data matrices. DOD concurred with our recommendation for the components to examine and report to the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy on all types of contracts that should include the acquired-items and government-property clauses. DOD concurred with our recommendation to define the requirements for using UII data across DOD and within the components’ Enterprise Resource Planning systems. Moreover, DOD has estimated that implementing IUID technology could save $3 billion to $5 billion per year. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a comprehensive management approach for its implementation of item unique identification (IUID), we reviewed previously published DOD and GAO work to identify best practices; the IUID implementation framework documentation provided by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration (ODASD); the DOD IUID task force’s analysis of the potential costs and benefits of IUID implementation; and the components’ estimates of historical spending and fiscal year 2012 budget requests for IUID implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
IUID technology allows DOD to assign a unique number to an item and use that number to manage that item in a variety of logistics processes. In 2003, DOD began implementation of IUID and has estimated that it could improve the accountability and maintenance of its property and equipment and save from $3 billion to $5 billion per year. Also, integrating and sharing UII data across DODs enterprise information systems could enable DOD to track equipment as it moves between its components. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has (1) incorporated key elements of best management practices into its framework for IUID implementation, (2) marked items with IUID labels, and (3) developed the capability to share UII data across DOD in its enterprise information systems. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed cognizant officials, and reviewed DOD and GAO key practices for its analysis.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken some steps to improve its approach to managing and implementing Item Unique Identification (IUID) technology, but has yet to incorporate some key elements of best management practices into its evolving framework for management of IUID implementation. These include internal controls and analysis of return on investment. DOD has included certain internal controls, such as defining key areas of authority for IUID implementation, and it is revising policy to incorporate IUID. However, DOD does not have performance measures, such as reliable schedules for predicting when its enterprise information systems will be able to manage items using IUID data, or a full estimate of IUIDs cost and benefits. Without a management framework that includes such key practices, DOD has faced challenges in implementing IUID technology and may not be well positioned to achieve potential financial and nonfinancial benefits.
DODs data on the number of items already in its inventorylegacy itemsmarked with IUID labels to date is incomplete and DOD lacks assurance that contractors are sufficiently marking newly-acquired items and government-furnished property. The military services mark legacy items and have reported marking more than 2 million items. However, DOD does not have complete information on the total number of legacy items its components have marked and must mark in the future; does not have a full set of quantifiable goals or interim milestones corresponding to its IUID marking criteriasuch as certain items that cost $5,000 or moreand does not use consistent criteria among its components to track progress. Without the components reporting complete and comparable data, DODs ability to assess progress in marking legacy items will remain limited. Also, DOD does not have assurance that contractors are sufficiently marking newly-acquired items and government-furnished property. DOD reported that as of January 2012, over 2,500 contractors had marked or registered over 11 million items. However, DOD does not require the components to examine and report on all types of contracts that should include IUID marking clauses, nor does it have policies and procedures that provide for systematic assessment of the sufficiency of data contained in these items labels. Hence, DOD cannot know the full extent to which contractors are supplying IUID labels with the data needed to track items.
DODs ability to track and share unique item identifier (UII) data across components is hampered by the lack of full integration of data into components enterprise information systems. DOD has made some progress but faces challenges as it proceeds with its integration plans. DOD is revising its supply chain management policy and guidance to include IUID use, but has not fully defined requirements for using UII data, nor developed complete, integrated master schedules for integrating IUID, DOD-wide and within components systems. Such schedules enable agencies to predict the cost and timelines of their systems development. Without such requirements and schedules, DOD cannot adequately predict when the systems will be able to use UII data, or whether DOD will meet its fiscal year 2015 goal for using UII data to manage items throughout their life cycle.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making nine recommendations for enhancing DODs implementation of IUID. They include actions to improve DODs management of IUID implementation through best practices; enable the components to report complete data for marking items with IUID labels; and enable the components to share UII data across DOD enterprise information systems. DOD concurred with eight recommendations and partially concurred with one related to updating estimated financial costs and benefits of IUID implementation. DOD stated it will continue to identify such costs, but GAO continues to believe that updating benefits is also important, as discussed more fully in the report. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-96 | gao_T-AIMD-98-96_0 | In fiscal year 1998 alone, USDA plans to spend about $1.2 billion on information technology and related information resources management (IRM) activities. Strong Leadership Essential to Overcoming Long-Standing Problems Managing Information Technology Investments
As we testified before this Subcommittee last spring, USDA has a long history of problems in managing its substantial investments in IT. While many factors have contributed to these problems, a major cause was the lack of strong IRM leadership, accountability, and oversight of the acquisition and use of departmental IT investments. Consequently, over time, the department has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in hundreds of systems that are not interoperable with others in the agency and that actually inhibit the use and sharing of information. After more than a decade of poor IT planning and program management by federal agencies, as just described for USDA, the Congress enacted the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which, in part, seeks to strengthen executive leadership in information management and institute sound capital investment decision-making to maximize the return on information systems investments. Together, Clinger-Cohen and these other laws provide a powerful framework under which federal agencies such as USDA have the best opportunity to improve their management and acquisition of IT. The Chief Information Officer
A central element of Clinger-Cohen was the requirement that the head of each executive agency designate a CIO. 3280 presents requirements to clarify and enhance the authorities of the department’s CIO; these requirements are discussed in five major sections. The first addresses the CIO’s relationship to the Secretary and the department’s Executive Information Technology Investment Review Board. The next three present requirements as they relate to developing an information technology architecture, providing funding for the CIO’s office, and establishing control over IT staff across the department. The last provision discusses an annual Comptroller General report on compliance. The Secretary of Agriculture established the CIO position on August 8, 1996. We see the thrust of this bill as, for the most part, consistent with the goals of Clinger-Cohen and other legislation designed to strengthen executive leadership in information management. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the problems and challenges the Department of Agriculture (USDA) has faced in managing the more than $1 billion it spends annually on information technology (IT) investments, as well as recent IT reform legislation that established the Chief Information Officer (CIO) position in federal agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in fiscal year 1998 alone, USDA plans to spend about $1.2 billion on information technology and related information resources management (IRM) activities; (2) USDA has a long history of problems in managing its substantial investments in IT; (3) while many factors have contributed to these problems, a major cause was the lack of strong IRM leadership, accountability, and oversight of the acquisition and use of departmental IT investments; (4) consequently, over time, the department has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in hundreds of systems that are not interoperable with others in the agency and that actually inhibit the use and sharing of information; (5) after more than a decade of poor IT planning and program management by federal agencies, Congress enacted the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 which, in part, seeks to strengthen executive leadership in information management and institute sound capital investment decision-making to maximize the return on information systems investments; (6) other reform legislation includes the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, and the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act; (7) together, Clinger-Cohen and these other laws provide a powerful framework under which federal agencies such as USDA have the best opportunity to improve their management and acquisition of IT; (8) a central element of Clinger-Cohen was the requirement that the head of each executive agency designate a CIO; (9) H.R. 3280 presents requirements to clarify and enhance the authorities of the department's CIO; (10) these requirements are discussed in five major sections; (11) the first addresses the CIO's relationship to the Secretary and the department's Executive Information Technology Investment Review Board; (12) the next three present requirements as they relate to developing and information technology architecture, providing funding for the CIO's office, and establishing control over IT staff across the department; (13) the last provision discusses an annual Comptroller General report on compliance; and (14) GAO sees the thrust of H.R. 3280 as, for the most part, consistent with the goals of Clinger-Cohen and other legislation designed to strengthen executive leadership in information management. |
gao_GAO-16-245 | gao_GAO-16-245_0 | In May 2013, BSEE management determined that other regulatory changes were higher priorities. In recognition of continued risks to the effectiveness of its oversight of offshore oil and gas development, BSEE initiated an organizational restructuring in October 2013 that encompasses its investigations, environmental compliance, and enforcement capabilities. BSEE’s Investigative Policies and Procedures Have Not Changed Since the Deepwater Horizon Incident, and the Bureau Does Not Have the Capability to Analyze Incident Data
BSEE has not completed a policy identifying investigative responsibilities under the October 2013 restructuring or updated its existing policies or procedures for investigating incidents that occur on the OCS since the Deepwater Horizon incident. Developing policies and procedures are among the goals of BSEE’s restructuring, according to restructuring planning documents, and consistent with federal standards for internal control. The use of outdated investigative policies and procedures is a long- standing deficiency in the bureau’s investigative capabilities. For example, following the Deepwater Horizon incident, Interior’s IG and OCS Safety Oversight Board reports identified flaws in Interior’s investigation guidance documents—specifically, that the guidance documents did not include detailed requirements for planning investigations, gathering and documenting evidence, and ensuring quality control. Without updating its existing, pre-Deepwater Horizon investigative policies and procedures, BSEE continues to face risks to the effectiveness of its investigative capabilities. BSEE’s Ongoing Restructuring Risks Weakening Its Environmental Compliance Capabilities
BSEE’s ongoing restructuring of its environmental compliance program reverses actions taken to address post-Deepwater Horizon concerns, weakening its oversight of operator compliance with environmental standards. The predecessor division was established as a national program in 2011 in response to the findings of the post-Deepwater Horizon incident investigations. Specifically, in September 2010, the OCS Safety Oversight Board reported that the focus of BOEMRE—BSEE’s predecessor bureau—on oil and gas development might have been at the expense of protecting the environment. Based on the recommendations of this report and the OCS Safety Oversight Board, BSEE established an Environmental Enforcement Division with region-based environmental staff reporting directly to the headquarters-based division chief instead of regional management, as had been done prior to the establishment of the Environmental Enforcement Division, to ensure that the environmental component of BSEE operated under a separate reporting structure from the regional BSEE offshore operations. BSEE Has Made Limited Progress Developing and Updating Its Environmental Compliance Policy and Procedures
BSEE has not completed an environmental compliance policy or developed procedures for environmental compliance—which are among the goals of BSEE’s restructuring effort, according to restructuring planning documents, and consistent with federal standards for internal control. BSEE’s Ongoing Restructuring Has Made Limited Progress Addressing Long-Standing Deficiencies in Its Enforcement Capabilities
BSEE’s restructuring of its enforcement capabilities has made limited progress addressing long-standing deficiencies in its effectiveness. BSEE Has Not Developed Procedures, Including Criteria for Using Its Enforcement Tools
BSEE has not completed an enforcement policy or developed procedures consistent with federal standards for internal control—including criteria for enforcement actions against operators that violate safety and environmental regulations—which are among the goals of BSEE’s restructuring effort, for all its enforcement tools, according to restructuring planning documents. The absence of enforcement criteria is a long-standing deficiency in the bureau’s enforcement capabilities. For example, in 2010, IG and OCS Safety Oversight Board investigations following the Deepwater Horizon incident recommended that BSEE—then BOEMRE—assess its enforcement tools and how to employ them to deter safety and environmental violations. These documents also state that the current lack of criteria results in inconsistent enforcement actions and creates uncertainty for operators regarding BSEE’s oversight approach and expectations. Without completing policies and procedures for these capabilities, BSEE continues to face risks to their effectiveness. However, BSEE reverted to a region-based reporting structure without conducting and documenting a risk analysis, including actions to mitigate any risk and, thus, it is not clear that BSEE will have reasonable assurance that environmental issues are receiving the appropriate weight and consideration as called for by the OCS Safety Oversight Board report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the extent to which the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement’s (BSEE) ongoing restructuring has enhanced its capabilities for (1) investigations, (2) environmental compliance, and (3) enforcement, we reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance related to BSEE’s authority regarding these capabilities, as well as its activities in implementing them since the bureau’s inception in 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico resulting in 11 deaths, serious injuries, and the largest marine oil spill in U.S. history. In response, in May 2010, Interior reorganized offshore oil and gas management activities—energy development, revenue collection, and regulatory oversight—into separate bureaus. In October 2011, Interior created BSEE to manage regulatory oversight. Since then, BSEE has undertaken reform efforts but has not fully addressed deficiencies in its investigative, environmental compliance, and enforcement capabilities identified by investigations after the Deepwater Horizon incident. In October 2013, BSEE initiated an organizational restructuring to address continuing oversight deficiencies. GAO was asked to review BSEE's efforts to enhance its oversight capabilities.
This report examines the extent to which BSEE's ongoing restructuring has enhanced its capabilities for (1) investigations, (2) environmental compliance, and (3) enforcement. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies, related to BSEE's restructuring and oversight activities. GAO also interviewed BSEE officials and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement's (BSEE) ongoing restructuring has made limited progress in enhancing the bureau's investigative capabilities. BSEE continues to rely on pre- Deepwater Horizon incident policies and procedures. Specifically, BSEE has not completed a policy outlining investigative responsibilities or updated procedures for investigating incidents—among the goals of BSEE's restructuring, according to restructuring planning documents, and consistent with federal standards for internal control. The use of outdated investigative policies and procedures is a long-standing deficiency. Post- Deepwater Horizon incident investigations found that Interior's policies and procedures did not include requirements for planning investigations, gathering and documenting evidence, and ensuring quality control and determined that their continued use posed a risk to the effectiveness of bureau investigations. Without completing and updating its investigative policies and procedures, BSEE continues to face this risk.
BSEE's ongoing restructuring of its environmental compliance program reverses actions taken to address post- Deepwater Horizon incident concerns, and risks weakening the bureau's environmental compliance oversight capabilities. In 2011, in response to two post- Deepwater Horizon incident investigations that found that BSEE's predecessor's focus on oil and gas development might have been at the expense of protecting the environment, BSEE created an environmental oversight division with region-based staff reporting directly to the headquarters-based division chief instead of regional management. This reporting structure was to help ensure that environmental issues received appropriate weight and consideration within the bureau. Under the restructuring, since February 2015, field-based environmental compliance staff again report to their regional director. BSEE's rationale for this action is unclear, as it was not included in the bureau's restructuring planning documentation or analysis as part of restructuring planning. Under federal standards for internal control, management is to assess the risks faced from external and internal sources and decide what actions to take to mitigate them. Without assessing the risk of reversing this reporting structure, it is not clear that BSEE will have reasonable assurance that environmental issues are receiving the appropriate weight and consideration as called for by post- Deepwater Horizon incident investigations.
BSEE's ongoing restructuring has made limited progress in enhancing its enforcement capabilities. In particular, BSEE has not developed procedures with criteria to guide the use of its enforcement tools—such as warnings and fines—which are among the goals of BSEE's restructuring, according to planning documents, and consistent with federal standards for internal control. BSEE restructuring plans state that the current lack of criteria results in inconsistent actions and creates uncertainty for operators regarding BSEE's oversight approach and expectations. The absence of enforcement criteria is a long-standing deficiency. For example, post- Deepwater Horizon incident investigations recommended an assessment of enforcement tools and how to employ them to deter safety and environmental violations. Without developing procedures with defined criteria for taking enforcement actions, BSEE continues to face risks to the effectiveness of its enforcement capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that BSEE (1) complete and update its investigative policies and procedures, (2) conduct and document a risk analysis of the regional-based reporting structure, and (3) develop procedures for enforcement actions. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-775 | gao_GAO-03-775_0 | Operational–improved mission capabilities through interoperability with allied systems. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides DOD the authority to enter into cooperative programs with U.S. allies. The United States benefits from financial contributions, increased potential for international sales of JSF aircraft, and access to partner industry. JSF International Program Relationships Are Complex
The JSF program is made up of a complex set of relationships involving both government and industry from the United States and eight other countries—the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Australia (see fig. In return for their contributions, partner countries have representatives in the program office with access to program data and technology; membership on the management decision-making bodies; aircraft delivery priority over future foreign military sales participants; guaranteed or potential waiver of nonrecurring aircraft costs; potential levies on future foreign military sales aircraft sold; and improved relationships for their industry with U.S. aerospace companies through JSF subcontracting opportunities. Future cost increases, should they arise in the program, may fall almost entirely on the United States because there are no provisions in the negotiated agreements requiring partners to share these increases. According to program officials and documents, partners have not been required to share any of these costs because the changes were DOD directed and unrelated to partner actions or requirements. JSF Technology Transfer Presents Challenges for Program Execution, International Suppliers, and Disclosure Policy
The transfer of technology on the JSF program presents a number of challenges related to program execution, international suppliers, and disclosure policy. Further, the transfer of technologies necessary to achieve aircraft commonality goals is expected to far exceed past transfers of advanced military technology and will push the boundaries of U.S. disclosure policy. Export authorizations for critical suppliers need to be planned for, prepared, and resolved in a timely fashion, to help avoid schedule delays in the program. The JSF support concept is currently being developed, with input from the U.S. military services and international partners. But, if Lockheed Martin’s efforts to meet partner return-on-investment expectations come into conflict with program cost, schedule, and performance goals, this could have a negative effect as well. Therefore, the JSF Program Office will ultimately have to make decisions to balance partner expectations and program execution. To support this approach, Lockheed Martin has taken the following steps to manage partner return-on-investment expectations, identify opportunities for qualified bidders to compete for JSF contracts, and provide visibility into the subcontracting process for the program: To manage partner return-on-investment expectations, Lockheed Martin sent teams of engineers and business development personnel to partner countries and assessed suppliers’ ability to compete for JSF contracts. International participation in the program, while providing benefits, makes managing these challenges more difficult and places additional risk on DOD and the prime contractor. Specifically, we identified international relationships and the benefits they are expected to provide and assessed how DOD is managing cost sharing, technology transfer, and partner expectations for industrial return. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a cooperative program between the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. allies for developing and producing next generation fighter aircraft to replace aging inventories. As currently planned, the JSF program is DOD's most expensive aircraft program to date, costing an estimated $200 billion to procure about 2,600 aircraft and related support equipment. Many in DOD consider JSF to be a model for future cooperative programs. To determine the implications of the JSF international program structure, GAO identified JSF program relationships and expected benefits and assessed how DOD is managing cost sharing, technology transfer, and partner expectations for industrial return.
What GAO Found
The JSF international program structure is based on a complex set of relationships involving both government and industry from the United States and eight partner countries. The program is expected to benefit the United States by reducing its share of program costs, giving it access to foreign industrial capabilities, and improving interoperability with allied militaries. Partner governments expect to benefit from defined influence over aircraft requirements, improved relationships with U.S. aerospace companies, and access to JSF program data. Yet international participation also presents a number of challenges. For example, while international partners can choose to share any future program cost increases, they are not required to do so under the terms of negotiated agreements. Therefore, the burden of any future increases may fall almost entirely on the United States. Technology transfer also presents challenges. The large number of export authorizations needed to share project information, solicit bids from partner suppliers, and execute contracts must be submitted and resolved in a timely manner to ensure that partner industry has the opportunity to compete for subcontracts and key contracts can be executed on schedule. Transfers of sensitive U.S. military technologies--which are needed to achieve aircraft commonality goals--will push the boundaries of U.S. disclosure policy. While actions have been taken in an attempt to address these challenges, additional actions are needed to control costs and manage technology transfer. Finally, if partners' return-on-investment expectations are not met, support within their countries could deteriorate. To realize this return-on-investment, partners expect their industry to win JSF contracts through competition--a departure from other cooperative programs, which directly link contract awards to financial contributions. If the prime contractor's efforts to meet these expectations come into conflict with program cost, schedule, and performance goals, the program office will have to make decisions that balance these potentially competing interests. |
gao_GAO-17-747T | gao_GAO-17-747T_0 | The Coast Guard Develops Annual 5- year CIPs but Needs to Complete Long- Term Planning Document
Previous 5-year CIPs’ Funding Projections Have Not Matched Annual Budget Requests
Since 2012, the Coast Guard has been legislatively required to submit a CIP annually to certain Congressional committees, alongside its budget proposal, that includes, among other things, projected funding for capital assets in such areas as acquisition, construction, and improvements needed for the upcoming 5 fiscal years. Furthering the affordability concern, the Offshore Patrol Cutter procurement, for which planned acquisition costs are estimated at $12.1 billion through final delivery in 2034—making it the most expensive Coast Guard acquisition program in its recapitalization effort—will create additional strain on the Coast Guard’s acquisition budget. According to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Offshore Patrol Cutter is its top priority. Beginning in September 2018, the Offshore Patrol Cutter will absorb roughly one half to about two-thirds of the Coast Guard’s annual acquisition funding requests until 2032 if historic funding request levels over the past 4 years continue to remain about the same. The Coast Guard is Developing a Long-Term Acquisition Planning Document, but Its Completion Date and Contents are Unknown
In 2014, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that would identify all acquisitions necessary for maintaining at least its current level of service and the fiscal resources necessary to build these assets. DHS concurred with this recommendation and the Coast Guard is in the process of developing this document to guide and manage the affordability of its acquisition portfolio. Coast Guard officials report an ongoing effort to produce a 20-year plan—which the Coast Guard refers to as a 20-year CIP—but has not articulated a timeframe for when this plan will be completed or what information it will include. Potential Risks Exist in the Coast Guard’s Accelerated Acquisition Schedule for Heavy Icebreakers and Coast Guard Plans to Mitigate Potential Icebreaking Capability Gap
Coast Guard Has Initiated a New Acquisition for Heavy Icebreakers, but Accelerated Acquisition Schedule Poses Potential Risk
The Coast Guard initiated the acquisition of a new fleet of heavy polar icebreakers in 2013, but now faces potential schedule and cost risks in implementing an accelerated acquisition approach. In June 2016, we reported that the Coast Guard’s heavy icebreaking fleet had been operating at a reduced capacity after one of its ships, the Polar Sea, suffered a catastrophic engine failure in 2010, rendering it inactive. As a result, the Coast Guard reports that it has not been able to provide year- round access to both the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Further, the Navy and Coast Guard have established a preliminary cost estimate of $1.15 billion for the lead heavy polar icebreaker, though they are working to reduce this estimate. To meet its accelerated schedule, the program will need to be fully funded in fiscal year 2019. This is an issue we will pursue in our ongoing work on the acquisition of the polar icebreaker. Instead, Coast Guard officials stated they are planning to conduct a limited service life extension of the Polar Star to address key components and keep it operational until fiscal year 2025, when a second new heavy polar icebreaker is expected to be delivered. According to officials, the Coast Guard is currently conducting an assessment of the Polar Star to determine what systems would need to be overhauled and replaced to meet this goal. An official cost estimate for this effort has not been completed yet, but the fiscal year 2017 CIP includes a total of roughly $75 million towards this effort in fiscal years 2019 through 2021. In conclusion, as the Coast Guard continues its recapitalization effort, it is important that it plans for the affordability of its future portfolio so that it can minimize the capability gaps that can occur when legacy assets reach the end of their service lives before new assets become operational. | Why GAO Did This Study
In order to meet its missions of maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship, the Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs a variety of assets, several of which are approaching the end of their intended service lives. As part of its efforts to modernize its surface and air assets (known as recapitalization), the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels and air assets. Concerns surrounding the affordability of this effort remain as the Coast Guard continues to pursue new acquisitions such as the polar icebreaker, while also acquiring the Offshore Patrol Cutter—which is estimated to cost $12.1 billion through 2032.
This statement addresses the (1) extent that the Coast Guard develops planning tools to guide its acquisition portfolio, and (2) potential risks the Coast Guard faces in its polar icebreaker acquisition. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of published and ongoing work examining the Coast Guard's acquisition efforts over several years.
What GAO Found
In June 2014, GAO found that the Coast Guard lacked long-term planning to guide the affordability of its acquisition portfolio and recommended the development of a 20-year fleet modernization plan to identify all acquisitions necessary for maintaining at least its current level of service and the fiscal resources necessary to build and modernize its planned surface and aviation assets. Coast Guard officials stated that they are developing a 20-year Capital Investment Plan (CIP), but the timeframe for completion is unknown. The Coast Guard does, however, submit a 5-year CIP annually to Congress that projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years. GAO found the CIPs do not match budget realities in that tradeoffs are not included. In the 20-year CIP, GAO would expect to see all acquisitions needed to maintain current service levels and the fiscal resources to build the identified assets as well as tradeoffs in light of funding constraints.
As GAO reported in June 2016, the Coast Guard's heavy icebreaker fleet was operating at a reduced capacity with only one heavy polar icebreaker in service, resulting in limited access to both the Arctic and Antarctic regions year-round. The Coast Guard's only active heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star , is approaching the end of its expected service life, and the Coast Guard plans to implement a limited service life extension to keep it operational until the new icebreaker is available. An official cost estimate has not been completed, but the Coast Guard estimates this extension will cost roughly $75 million.
Consequently, the Coast Guard expedited its acquisition of new heavy icebreakers with delivery of the first polar icebreaker scheduled in 2023. This delivery schedule poses potential risk as the required acquisition documents may not be completed in time to award the contract in 2019, as currently scheduled. Further, in order to meet this accelerated schedule, the first polar icebreaker would need to be fully funded in fiscal year 2019 with a preliminary cost estimate of $1.15 billion, alongside the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition. The Coast Guard has not articulated how it will prioritize its acquisition needs given its Offshore Patrol Cutter is expected to absorb half to two-thirds of its annual acquisition funding requests—based on recent funding history—starting in 2018.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past regarding recapitalization, including that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them. DHS agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_PEMD-96-2 | gao_PEMD-96-2_0 | Although the median review time showed a decline in 1994 (152 days), it remained higher than that of the initial 3 years. Of all the applications submitted to FDA to market new devices during the period under review, a little over 90 percent were for 510(k)s. Between 1989 and 1994, the number of 510(k) applications remained relatively stable, ranging from a high of 7,023 in 1989 to a low of 5,774 in 1991. In 1994, 6,446 applications were submitted. For applications determined to be substantially equivalent, non-FDA time—the amount of time FDA placed the application on hold while waiting for additional information—comprised almost 20 percent of the total elapsed time. Premarket Approvals (PMAs)
The trends in review time differed for original PMAs and PMA supplements. In 1993 and 1994, the median declined to 242 and 193 days, respectively. This trend was reflected in the mean review time that peaked at 336 days in 1992. Investigational Device Exemptions (IDEs)
For IDEs, the mean review time between submission and FDA action was 30 days, and it has not changed substantially over time. The following tables present information on review time for PMA applications for fiscal years 1989 through 1995. Original PMA applications are distinguished from PMA supplements. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) review of medical devices, focusing on how FDA review time has changed from fiscal year 1989 to May 18, 1995.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FDA review times for medical device applications remained stable from 1989 to 1991, increased sharply in 1992 and 1993, and dropped in 1994; (2) in 1994, the median review time for 510(k) applications was 152 days, which was higher than the median review time during 1989 through 1991; (3) the review time trend for original premarket approval (PMA) applications was unclear because many applications remained open; (4) the median review time for original PMA applications peaked at 984 days in 1992; (5) the review time trend for supplementary PMA applications fluctuated slightly in the first 3 years, peaked in 1992, and declined to 193 days in 1994; (6) in many instances, FDA placed 501(k) applications on hold while waiting for additional information, which comprised almost 20 percent of its total elapsed review time; and (7) the mean review time for investigational device exemptions was 30 days. |
gao_GAO-01-759 | gao_GAO-01-759_0 | Health of Federally Managed Land, Water, and Renewable Resources
Interior’s progress in maintaining the health of federally managed land, water, and renewable resources cannot be judged. We cannot judge progress because, as we reported last year, the goals associated with this outcome do not foster a broad or departmentwide approach to measuring progress. This action could identify other strategies to achieve Interior’s goals. Availability, Accessibility, Diversity, and Quality of National Park Facilities and Services
The Park Service reported that it achieved the outcome of safely satisfying the expectations of visitors in national parks and educating these visitors on the relevance and importance of the park units they visit. The agency’s strategies for continuing to meet and exceed its visitor satisfaction and visitor education goals appear clear and reasonable, although the plan does not provide information on the human capital aspects of the strategies. Responsibilities to Protect and Preserve Indian Trust Lands and Trust Resources
We cannot judge whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is making progress in protecting and preserving Indian trust lands and resources because the annual goals and performance measures it has established that relate to this outcome are output-related and therefore these measures do not assess progress toward the outcome. It also discusses the degree to which Interior’s fiscal year 2000 reports and fiscal year 2002 plans address concerns and recommendations by the Congress, GAO, the Inspector General, and others. Interior’s fiscal year 2002 performance plans provided goals and performance measures for most of its management challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of the Interior's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance report plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
Specifically, GAO discusses Interior's progress in achieving the following four outcomes: (1) maintaining the health of federally managed land, water, and renewable resources; (2) ensuring visitors' satisfaction with the availability, accessibility, diversity, and quality of national parks; (3) meeting the federal government's responsibility to preserve and protect Indian trust lands and resources; and (4) ensuring the safe and environmentally sound development of mineral resources. GAO could not judge the agency's progress in promoting the health of federally managed land, water, and renewable resources because the goals Interior has reported do not foster a broad or departmentwide approach to measuring progress. Although the Park Service's strategies for continuing to meet and exceed its visitor satisfaction and visitor education goals appear clear and reasonable, the agency's fiscal year 2002 performance plan lacks information on the strategic human capital management strategies to achieve this outcome. GAO cannot judge the Bureau of Indian Affairs' progress in protecting Indian trust lands and resources because the annual goals it has established are output-related and do not assess progress toward the outcome. The Minerals Management Service has had mixed results in meetings its mineral development goals. Its goals for meeting its fiscal year 2002 goals seem reasonable. |
gao_GAO-05-115 | gao_GAO-05-115_0 | Today, even young children need a SSN to obtain medical coverage, be claimed on their parents’ income tax return, or establish eligibility for other government or financial benefits. In fiscal year 2004, SSA issued approximately 5.5 million original SSNs and 12.4 million replacement cards, of which roughly 4.2 million originals and 2.3 million replacements were for U.S.-born children under age 18, as shown in table 1. SSA also has specific policies for issuing replacement cards to children. Majority of SSNs Are Issued to Children through SSA’s Enumeration at Birth Process
In 2004, SSA issued roughly 90 percent of SSNs to children through its EAB program. For those parents choosing to participate in the program, SSA guidance states that hospital representatives should provide parents with a receipt as proof of their SSN request. Once SSA receives the data, its automated system ensures that the EAB data are complete and scans for keying errors. To apply for the SSN, parents complete a SSN application and submit at least two documents as evidence of their child’s age, identity, and citizenship as well as evidence of their own identity. In addition to processing original SSNs, SSA field offices also issue replacement SSN cards if a card is lost or stolen. SSA requires that the applicant provide only proof of identity for both the parent and the child. Several Weaknesses Could Affect the Integrity and Efficiency of SSA’s Enumeration Processes
Despite SSA’s efforts in recent years to improve its enumeration processes, several weaknesses persist, including a lack of EAB program oversight and outreach, inefficient birth verification procedures, and other vulnerabilities that could adversely affect the integrity and efficiency of SSA’s processes. SSA Lacks a Nationwide Capability to Perform Birth Verifications
SSA currently lacks a nationwide capability to quickly and efficiently perform required birth verifications for children whose parents apply for a SSN through an SSA field office, although a prior SSA pilot project proved successful in providing enhanced verification capabilities. This act gave SSA 1 year to implement regulations for independently verifying the birth documents of all SSN applicants except for EAB and limited the issuance of SSN replacement cards to 3 annually and 10 over an individual’s lifetime. Because SSA does not conduct comprehensive integrity reviews of vital statistics agencies or require that these agencies conduct similar reviews of hospitals, SSA lacks information to assess its potential exposure to error or fraud, identify aspects of the birth registration process that are most problematic, and develop safeguards to ensure the integrity of the data it relies on to enumerate millions of children. Finally, as our audit work and previous engagements show, SSA’s processes for verifying the birth records of children under age 1 and its policies for issuing replacement cards expose the agency to fraud. The recently passed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 includes specific requirements to address these weaknesses. Establish a mechanism to better coordinate with external audit agencies that periodically conduct reviews of states’ birth registration and certification processes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance asked us to document the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) current processes and internal controls for issuing Social Security numbers (SSN) and replacement cards to U.S.-born children under the age of 18 and identify any weaknesses that may affect SSA’s ability to ensure the integrity of the SSN and the efficiency of enumeration processes. We identified two processes—Enumeration at Birth (EAB), a program set up to let parents request their child’s SSN through hospitals and vital statistics agencies, and another that requires application through SSA field offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued about 4.2 million original Social Security numbers (SSN) and 2 million SSN replacement cards to U.S.-born children. Despite its narrowly intended purpose, today, young children need a SSN to be claimed on their parent's income tax return or to apply for certain government benefits. Because children's SSNs, like all SSNs, are vulnerable to theft and misuse, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance requested that GAO (1) document SSA's current processes and internal controls for issuing SSNs to U.S.-born children under the age of 18 and (2) identify any weaknesses that may affect SSA's ability to ensure the integrity of the SSN and the efficiency of enumeration processes.
What GAO Found
SSA has two processes for issuing SSNs to U.S.-born children--one that allows parents to request SSNs through a hospital during birth registration and one that permits them to apply through SSA field offices--both of which include various internal control mechanisms. Today, SSA issues the majority of SSNs to children through its Enumeration at Birth (EAB) program. Participating hospitals forward the SSN request and other birth registration data to vital statistics agencies, which then send it to SSA. SSA's automated system ensures that the data are complete and mails the SSN to the parent. Parents may also request SSNs through SSA field offices by mail or in person. This process requires parents to present proof of the child's age, identity, and citizenship as well as proof of their own identity. As fraud prevention measures, SSA also interviews children 12 and older and verifies documents with a third party for those over age 1. If a child's SSN card is lost or stolen, parents may also apply for a replacement card. SSA requires proof of identification for both the parent and the child to obtain such cards. Despite SSA's efforts to improve its enumeration processes, weaknesses persist in EAB program oversight and outreach, manual birth verification procedures, and other vulnerabilities that could adversely affect the integrity of SSA's processes. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should assess and mitigate risk to their programs. However, SSA does not conduct comprehensive integrity reviews, or coordinate with external auditing agencies to ensure that vital statistics agencies and hospitals are properly collecting and protecting enumeration data for children. In addition, SSA lacks a nationwide capability to efficiently verify birth certificates for children whose parents apply through SSA field offices, although a prior SSA pilot proved successful in providing such verifications. Further, SSA lacks a policy for securing and tracking birth certificates once manual verifications are complete, making these documents vulnerable to misuse. Finally, SSA's policies for verifying birth certificates of children under age 1 and for issuing replacement SSN cards, which allow for up to 52 cards annually, remain weak and could expose the program to fraud. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 will assist SSA in protecting the integrity of the SSN by requiring the agency to verify birth documents for all SSN applicants, except for EAB purposes, and limit the issuance of SSN replacement cards. |
gao_GAO-14-29 | gao_GAO-14-29_0 | The Director for Joint Force Development retains responsibility to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint warfighter through joint force development, in order to advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint force. DOD’s Study Was Intended to Identify Leader Attributes, Career-Long Education Goals, and Educational Gaps
The purpose of DOD’s issued study of the JPME program was to identify desired leader attributes by defining what is needed from the JPME career-long learning experience to support DOD’s strategic vision, as well as any gaps in the current educational program to facilitate the development of the leaders needed to achieve that vision. In addition to retaining the existing institutional structure for providing JPME education, however, in its report the MECC also emphasized the importance of self-directed, career-long learning and development. These include changes to teaching methodologies, assessment mechanisms, and other areas in support of the newly-identified desired leader attributes. Study’s Methodology Generally Included Leading Practices, but DOD Has Not Yet Fully Planned for Follow-on Actions and Engaged All Stakeholders, or Considered Potential Implementation Costs
The methodology DOD used for its study of JPME generally included leading practices for evaluating strategic training and other programs, such as reviewing existing literature, using available data, and assessing skills gaps. Further, the department has not yet fully evaluated the potential costs associated with the implementation of the MECC’s recommendations to provide decision makers with more complete information and assurance that the recommendations will be cost-effective. DOD’s study also focused on the ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, and critical thinking in joint operations. In turn, this gap analysis helped inform the MECC’s 21 recommendations. According to the July 16, 2012 memorandum that directed the MECC study, the March 1, 2013 deadline for the results of the study was intended to help shape the fall 2013 academic year. The MECC completed its report on June 24, 2013, and provided us with a copy of the final report on July 1, 2013. For nine of the recommendations, the document identifies potential target dates for completion, one of which is to be completed later in 2013, and eight of which are to be completed not later than September 2014. We have previously concluded that leading practices such as accounting for program resources enables managers to better manage existing resources and plan for future programmatic needs. However, by not assessing the cost of the MECC’s recommendations, as well as any efficiencies that may be achieved through their implementation, DOD may not be in a position to know if it has the resources to implement them or whether efficiencies will be achieved, and, without plans to assess cost in the near term as part of continued efforts to implement the results of the JPME study, decision makers may not know if implementing their recommendations will be cost effective. For instance, without establishing milestones and timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, and involving necessary stakeholders and developing an implementation approach that provides for accountability, the department may not be assured that the study’s findings and recommendations will be incorporated into the JPME program at institutions across the department and the services in a timely manner. Additionally, without reliable information on the costs of implementing the study’s recommendations, decision makers could be hindered in determining the most efficient allocation of departmental resources for JPME. Recommendations for Executive Action
To guide the implementation of actions DOD identified in its study on JPME, we recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Director for Joint Force Development to take the following two actions: establish well-defined timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, coordinate with all stakeholders, and identify key officials responsible for implementing the study’s recommendations to help ensure the usefulness, timeliness, and implementation of any actions DOD takes in response to the findings and recommendations contained in its study, and assess the costs of implementing recommendations made and efficiencies to be derived from the recommendations in order to implement DOD’s recommendations in a cost-effective manner. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the purpose of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) study of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance and other documents related to the study, including the final report dated June 24, 2013, and met with knowledgeable officials. To assess the methodology DOD used to conduct the joint professional military education study and its planning for follow-on actions, we reviewed the MECC’s final report and supporting documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
To facilitate unified operations across the services, DOD has provided JPME programs at departmental and service academic institutions for almost 30 years. In July 2012, the Director for Joint Force Development, who reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tasked the MECC to review DOD's joint education objectives and institutions to help ensure that outcomes match requirements for the strategic environment projected for Joint Force 2020. Subsequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to report to Congress on the analytical approach used by the MECC not later than 90 days after the Director submitted the MECC's report to GAO, which the Director did on July 1, 2013. In this report, GAO (1) identifies the purpose of DOD's study of the JPME program, and (2) assesses DOD's methodology used to conduct the Joint Professional Military Education study and its planning for follow-on actions. GAO analyzed the MECC's final report and relevant planning documents, interviewed DOD officials who conducted portions of the study, and reviewed leading practices for evaluating programs by GAO and other entities.
What GAO Found
The purpose of the Department of Defense's (DOD) study of its Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program was to identify (1) desired leader attributes as part of the JPME career-long learning experience needed to support DOD's strategic vision and (2) any gaps in the current educational program to facilitate the development of the leaders needed to achieve that vision. Specifically, a Military Education Coordination Council (MECC)--following direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director for Joint Force Development--proposed six desired leader attributes, including, for example, the ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, and concluded that the existing institutional structure for providing JPME should be retained. The MECC's gap analysis, however, indicated that in order to support the development of these attributes, a greater emphasis on career-long self-directed learning is also needed, among other things. In line with its findings, the MECC made 21 recommendations to improve the JPME program that address increased accessibility of educational programs, changes to teaching methodologies and assessment mechanisms, and enhanced use of technology.
DOD's methodology generally included leading practices for assessing training programs, but DOD has not yet fully planned for follow-on actions and engaged all stakeholders, nor has it assessed the costs of the MECC's recommendations to provide decision makers with more timely and complete information and help ensure that the study's results are implemented. Specifically, the MECC reviewed other related studies, conducted a gap analysis to identify gaps based on existing and future needs, used the best available data and acknowledged limitations--all practices identified by GAO and other government agencies and research institutions as leading practices for successful evaluations of training and other programs. By contrast, DOD documents state that the results of the study were intended to inform and shape the fall 2013 academic year, but the MECC did not complete its study until June 24, 2013 and provided its report to GAO on July 1, 2013. Further, DOD has not yet identified milestones and timeframes for implementing all of its recommendations. Subsequently, the department developed an update to inform actions for moving forward on its recommendations. DOD identified target dates for completion not later than September 2014 for 9 recommendations, but did not include interim milestones, and has not yet developed target dates for 12 recommendations. In addition, the MECC did not formalize plans to achieve the buy-in of all stakeholders for recommendation implementation. Without this information, it may be difficult for DOD to ensure that stakeholders agree on and are accountable for implementing the recommendations in a timely manner. Finally, the MECC did not analyze the costs or efficiencies associated with implementing its recommendations, but it identified 5 recommendations that could incur additional costs because they require further study. Leading practices such as accounting for program resources enable managers to better manage existing resources and plan for future programmatic needs. Without cost data on the study's recommendations or plans to assess cost in the near term as part of continued efforts to implement the results of the JPME study, decision makers could be hindered in determining the most efficient allocation of departmental resources for JPME.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish well-defined timeframes for conducting any follow-on actions and include stakeholders necessary for implementation, and assess the costs of implementing recommendations made in the MECCs recent study of joint professional military education. DOD concurred with both of GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-528 | gao_GAO-04-528_0 | However, the USDA leads the nation’s nutrition education efforts, providing nutrition education through the EFNEP program and through four of its major nutrition assistance programs. On the basis of this work, program officials should take these actions during program design, service delivery, and program monitoring and evaluation. Key Actions in Nutrition Education Can Increase the Likelihood of Success
We identified several key actions presented in general nutrition education research, prior GAO reports, and other documents on performance-based management that program officials should take during any nutrition education program. However, if seriously addressed, these actions will increase the likelihood that the nutrition education will achieve its goals. These actions occur at three separate stages in a nutrition education program: program design, service delivery, and program monitoring and evaluation. Identifying the target population can help program officials focus their goals and planning efforts appropriately. Programs Incorporated the Service Delivery Actions in Different Ways and to Varying Extents but Faced Similar Challenges to Incorporating Them
We found that the USDA programs incorporated the service delivery actions likely to contribute to successful nutrition education in different ways and to varying extents, but they faced similar challenges that affected their ability to fully incorporate these actions. The children received tailored interventions, based on the assessments, with goals such as increasing fruit intake at lunch and increasing physical activity throughout the school day. In addition, other program requirements restricted the time and resources available for nutrition education. For example, WIC providers were required by law to provide services unrelated to nutrition education, such as voter registration and drug and alcohol counseling. Programs Generally Did Not Incorporate Key Nutrition Education Evaluation Actions, Leaving Officials with Limited Information about Program Results
The programs we reviewed generally did not fully incorporate the monitoring and evaluation actions that are key to performance-based management and likely to contribute to successful nutrition education. Most of the programs—with the exception of EFNEP—did not systematically collect data at the federal level on the types of nutrition education services provided, who received these services, and the outcomes of the services. Available Research Provides Little Information about whether the Programs Have Met Their Nutrition Education Goals
Despite the lack of regular nationwide evaluations, USDA and others have conducted some limited or smaller-scale evaluations and studies of the nutrition education efforts. Conclusions
Over the past few decades, the negative health consequences of poor nutrition have grown dramatically in the United States. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help overcome the challenges associated with USDA’s nutrition education efforts and to help programs incorporate the key actions related to successful nutrition education, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture ensure that the department develop a unifying strategy that, at a minimum: Identifies ways to improve coordination efforts and strengthen the linkages among the nutrition education efforts, which would include examining options ranging from more systematically sharing nutrition education resources across programs to identifying and promoting approaches for federal, state, and local officials to implement cross- program strategies to more efficiently use existing resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently reported that poor nutrition and lack of physical activity are catching up to tobacco use as the leading cause of death in the United States. In addition to having negative health outcomes, children with poor nutrition may have a harder time succeeding in school than other children. To help improve nutrition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides nutrition education through five of its programs. The department spent $472 million on these efforts in fiscal year 2002. GAO was asked: (1) What key actions can officials take to increase the likelihood of success in nutrition education? (2) Do USDA and state and local officials take these actions during program design, service delivery, and program monitoring and evaluation?
What GAO Found
GAO identified several key actions, based on research and performance-based management principles, that increase the likelihood that programs providing nutrition education will achieve their goals. Examples of these actions include identifying program goals, tailoring services to meet the needs of participants, and collecting data on program results. The actions can be taken during program design, service delivery, and program monitoring and evaluation. USDA programs providing nutrition education that we reviewed--the Food Stamps Program; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the National School Lunch Program; the Child and Adult Care Food Program; and the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program--generally incorporated the key program design actions likely to contribute to success. For example, the USDA programs identified nutrition education goals and target populations. However, the programs' administrative structures hinder coordination among the USDA nutrition education efforts. We found that the USDA programs incorporated the service delivery actions likely to contribute to successful nutrition education in different ways and to varying extents, but they faced similar challenges that affected their ability to fully incorporate these actions. The challenges included limited resources and systems for providing nutrition education and competing program requirements that took time or resources away from nutrition education. For example, WIC officials said they had limited time for nutrition education because of competing requirements, such as providing information on drug and alcohol counseling. USDA's nutrition education efforts did not fully incorporate the monitoring and evaluation actions that contribute to success, such as collecting data on the types of nutrition education provided and the outcomes of the efforts. As a result, little is known about what nutrition education is provided and whether these programs have met their nutrition education goals. |
gao_GAO-16-294 | gao_GAO-16-294_0 | In addition, although DHS established a variety of NCPS-related metrics, none provide insight into the value derived from the functions of the system. NCPS Has Limited Ability to Detect Intrusions within Observed Network Traffic
NCPS’s intrusion detection capability is intended to provide DHS with the ability to scan network traffic for signs of potentially malicious activity. By employing only signature-based intrusion detection, NCPS is unable to detect intrusions for which it does not have a valid or active signature deployed. However, NCPS is not currently evaluating all types of network traffic. This is accomplished by monitoring network traffic to and from a customer agency’s network and taking some action to stop traffic (e.g., blocking an e-mail) that has characteristics matching pre-defined indicators of malicious traffic. Specifically, DHS has enhancements planned through fiscal year 2018. As a result, DHS has yet to develop a majority of planned functionality for the information-sharing capability of NCPS. As a result no substantive actions have yet been taken to develop this capability. Additionally, DHS did not always solicit, and agencies did not always provide, feedback on the notifications. One reason DHS and agencies do not agree about whether notifications were received may be that DHS does not always explicitly ask for feedback or confirmation of receipt of the notification. DHS Identified Future NCPS Needs, but Has Developed Limited Requirements
While DHS developed an executive road map for the intrusion detection, prevention, analytics, and information sharing objectives that describes future NCPS capabilities to be developed through fiscal year 2018, it has not defined requirements, as called for by OMB guidance and best practice, for two intrusion detection capabilities to be provided in fiscal year 2016. In addition, although DHS officials stated that they do consider threat information as part of the required risk-based approach for determining future capabilities to protect federal information systems, they do not consider specific vulnerabilities affecting agencies’ networks and systems, as information on these is not currently available. Agencies have had mixed results in adopting NCPS capabilities. However, NSD documents indicated that only 5 of the 23 agencies were receiving intrusion prevention services. Further, four of the five selected agencies in our review reported that not all of their traffic was being sent to NCPS intrusion detection sensors. This agency will also not be able to implement the e-mail intrusion prevention capability. This occurred in part because NSD did not provide guidance to customer agencies on how to securely route their information to the Internet service providers. The system’s intrusion prevention capability is less fully developed, with limited deployment across different types of network traffic, such as content from websites, limiting its ability to prevent malicious code from penetrating agencies’ networks. While the adoption of the intrusion detection capabilities is widespread among the 23 agencies required to use NCPS, the implementation of intrusion prevention capabilities is more limited due to policy and implementation challenges that DHS is working to overcome. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct:
NSD to determine the feasibility of enhancing NCPS’s current intrusion detection approach to include functionality that would detect deviations from normal network behavior baselines;
NSD to determine the feasibility of developing enhancements to current intrusion detection capabilities to facilitate the scanning of traffic not currently scanned by NCPS;
US-CERT to update the tool it uses to manage and deploy intrusion detection signatures to include the ability to more clearly link signatures to publicly available, open-source data repositories;
US-CERT to consider the viability of using vulnerability information, such as data from the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program as it becomes available, as an input into the development and management of intrusion detection signatures;
US-CERT to develop a timetable for finalizing the incident notification process, to ensure that customer agencies are being sent notifications of potential incidents, which clearly solicit feedback on the usefulness and timeliness of the notification;
The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications to develop metrics that clearly measure the effectiveness of NCPS’s efforts, including the quality, efficiency, and accuracy of supporting actions related to detecting and preventing intrusions, providing analytic services, and sharing cyber-related information;
The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications to develop clearly defined requirements for detecting threats on agency internal networks and at cloud service providers to help better ensure effective support of information security activities;
NSD to develop processes and procedures for using vulnerability information, such as data from the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program as it becomes available, to help ensure DHS is using a risk-based approach for the selection/development of future NCPS intrusion prevention capabilities; and
NSD to work with their customer agencies and the Internet service providers to document secure routing requirements in order to better ensure the complete, safe, and effective routing of information to NCPS sensors. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) meets stated objectives, (2) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has designed requirements for future stages of the system, and (3) federal agencies have adopted the system. To determine the extent to which DHS has designed requirements for future stages of the system, we reviewed NCPS program planning documentation and interviewed program officials in order to identify how future capabilities are planned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber-based attacks on federal systems continue to increase. GAO has designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997. This was expanded to include the protection of critical cyber infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. NCPS is intended to provide DHS with capabilities to detect malicious traffic traversing federal agencies' computer networks, prevent intrusions, and support data analytics and information sharing.
Senate and House reports accompanying the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act included provisions for GAO to review the implementation of NCPS. GAO determined the extent to which (1) the system meets stated objectives, (2) DHS has designed requirements for future stages of the system, and (3) federal agencies have adopted the system. To do this, GAO compared NCPS capabilities to leading practices, examined documentation, and interviewed officials at DHS and five selected agencies. This is a public version of a report that GAO issued in November 2015 with limited distribution. Certain information on technical issues has been omitted from this version.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) is partially, but not fully, meeting its stated system objectives:
Intrusion detection: NCPS provides DHS with a limited ability to detect potentially malicious activity entering and exiting computer networks at federal agencies. Specifically, NCPS compares network traffic to known patterns of malicious data, or “signatures,” but does not detect deviations from predefined baselines of normal network behavior. In addition, NCPS does not monitor several types of network traffic and its “signatures” do not address threats that exploit many common security vulnerabilities and thus may be less effective.
Intrusion prevention: The capability of NCPS to prevent intrusions (e.g., blocking an e-mail determined to be malicious) is limited to the types of network traffic that it monitors. For example, the intrusion prevention function monitors and blocks e-mail. However, it does not address malicious content within web traffic, although DHS plans to deliver this capability in 2016.
Analytics: NCPS supports a variety of data analytical tools, including a centralized platform for aggregating data and a capability for analyzing the characteristics of malicious code. In addition, DHS has further enhancements to this capability planned through 2018.
Information sharing: DHS has yet to develop most of the planned functionality for NCPS's information-sharing capability, and requirements were only recently approved. Moreover, agencies and DHS did not always agree about whether notifications of potentially malicious activity had been sent or received, and agencies had mixed views about the usefulness of these notifications. Further, DHS did not always solicit—and agencies did not always provide—feedback on them.
In addition, while DHS has developed metrics for measuring the performance of NCPS, they do not gauge the quality, accuracy, or effectiveness of the system's intrusion detection and prevention capabilities. As a result, DHS is unable to describe the value provided by NCPS.
Regarding future stages of the system, DHS has identified needs for selected capabilities. However, it had not defined requirements for two capabilities: to detect (1) malware on customer agency internal networks or (2) threats entering and exiting cloud service providers. DHS also has not considered specific vulnerability information for agency information systems in making risk-based decisions about future intrusion prevention capabilities.
Federal agencies have adopted NCPS to varying degrees. The 23 agencies required to implement the intrusion detection capabilities had routed some traffic to NCPS intrusion detection sensors. However, only 5 of the 23 agencies were receiving intrusion prevention services, but DHS was working to overcome policy and implementation challenges. Further, agencies have not taken all the technical steps needed to implement the system, such as ensuring that all network traffic is being routed through NCPS sensors. This occurred in part because DHS has not provided network routing guidance to agencies. As a result, DHS has limited assurance regarding the effectiveness of the system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS take nine actions to enhance NCPS's capabilities for meeting its objectives, better define requirements for future capabilities, and develop network routing guidance. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-493 | gao_GAO-01-493_0 | Mine Countermeasures
Sea mines threaten the Navy’s ability to conduct amphibious landings and logistical support operations. The Navy’s current forces of specialized ships, helicopters, and other assets that have been developed for and dedicated to detecting and neutralizing enemy sea mines are not effectively capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water near the shore. This capability is required to assure access to beach- landing sites by combat and support forces. The Navy has made some progress in these areas. 1). Antisubmarine Warfare
Although the Navy is making some progress in overcoming shortfalls identified in the 1997 Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment, a lack of resources and priorities among competing programs is still prevalent. Antiship Cruise Missile Defense
The Navy’s ship defense capabilities against currently deployed cruise missiles are marginal, and none of the acquisitions that the Navy is currently pursuing will provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons. Consequently, surface ships will be at risk when operating within the range of these weapons. Naval Surface Fire Support
The Marine Corps will not have the ship-based fire support it needs for at least another decade. Figure 4 illustrates the Marine Corps’ naval surface fire support requirements. Additional progress in overcoming shortfalls identified in the Navy’s 1997 Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment may be limited by a lack of funding and the Navy’s failure to establish priorities among competing antisubmarine warfare acquisition programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Navy, the primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project power from the sea to influence events ashore. To be successful, naval forces must be able to gain access to, and operate in the coastal areas of potential adversaries. Consequently, they must be able to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines and other antiship weapons. Finally, they must be able to launch and support offensive operations against enemy forces ashore. This report assesses the Navy's (1) existing mine countermeasures, (2) antisubmarine warfare, (3) ship self-defense, (4) surface fire support capabilities, and (5) progress in the acquisition programs the Navy is pursuing to address shortfalls in these areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Navy's current force of specialized ships, helicopters, and other assets developed to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines lack several key warfighting capabilities it needs for shoreline operations. Although the Navy is making some progress in overcoming shortfalls in antisubmarine warfare, a lack of resources and priorities among competing programs persists. The Navy's ship defense capabilities against cruise missiles are marginal, and surface ships will be at risk when operating within the range of these weapons. The Navy will not meet the Marine Corps' naval surface fire support requirements for at least another decade. The Navy has shown limited progress in overcoming shortfalls in the acquisition programs it is pursuing. |
gao_GAO-16-15 | gao_GAO-16-15_0 | While these contracting options have been informally referred to as bridge contracts by some in the acquisition community, no formal definition of bridge contracts exists nor is there a requirement to track them in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The J&A must include sufficient facts and rationale to justify the use of a sole-source contract and include, among other things, the following information:
The nature or description of the action being approved;
A description of the supplies or services required to meet the agency’s need, including the estimated value of the contract;
The statutory authority being cited to justify a noncompetitive contract—for example urgency, only one-source available, etc;
A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited; and
A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the government will be fair and reasonable. Selected Agencies Have Little to No Insight into Their Use of Bridge Contracts but Two Components Have Instituted Policies
The agencies we reviewed had limited or no insights into their use of bridge contracts. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should identify, analyze, and monitor risks associated with achieving objectives, and that information needs to be recorded and communicated to management so as to achieve agency objectives. One common procurement objective at federal agencies is to maximize competition. However, without a definition for bridge contracts, and strategies for tracking and managing their use, agencies are not able to fully identify and monitor the risks related to these contracts, and therefore may be missing opportunities to increase competition. Staff from OMB’s OFPP, one of the entities responsible for initiating revisions to the FAR, acknowledged that the use of bridge contracts may introduce risks related to a lack of competition, such as the risk of higher contract prices. However, even after lengthy bridge contracts, we found that competition occurred in most cases. Bridge Contracts Are Awarded for a Variety of Services
DOD, DOJ, and HHS awarded bridge contracts for a wide range of services. Almost All Follow-On Contracts Were Competed, and in Some Cases Savings Could Be Quantified
Follow-on contracts were competitively awarded for 23 of 26 contracts included in our in-depth review. The 3 remaining follow-on contracts were awarded on a sole-source basis. Late Completion of Acquisition Planning Documentation Most Frequently Identified Reason for Bridge Contracts
Based on our reviews of contract documentation and information provided by agency officials, we found that the most commonly cited reasons for the use of a bridge contract across the 73 contracts were related to acquisition planning issues—in particular the late completion of key acquisition planning documentation, such as statements of work, that are needed to begin a solicitation. Conclusions
While bridge contracts can be a useful tool in certain circumstances to avoid a gap in services, they are typically envisioned to be used for short periods of time. As an interim measure, until the FAR is amended, provide guidance to a definition of bridge contracts, with consideration of contract extensions as well as stand-alone bridge contracts; and suggestions for agencies to track and manage their use of these contracts, such as identifying a contract as a bridge in a J&A when it meets the definition, and listing the history of previous extensions and stand-alone bridge contracts back to the predecessor contract in the J&A. Since bridge contracts are not defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), we, in consultation with our general counsel, developed a definition for bridge contracts based on our prior reviews and knowledge of bridge contracts and the Institute for Defense Analyses report on competition for service contracts—which defined bridge contracts. Using the results of the customized methodology, we selected three agencies (the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Justice (DOJ)) and eight components within those agencies for review. Because of its role in providing direction for government-wide procurement policies, regulations and procedures, and to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in government acquisitions, we also interviewed staff at the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to discuss their views on the benefits and challenges on the use of bridge contracts. To identify key characteristics of selected bridge contracts and assess the reasons why bridge contracts are being used, we selected 73 bridge contracts across the eight components to be included in our high level review, and a subset of 29 of those contracts to be included in our more in-depth review. | Why GAO Did This Study
When an existing contract is set to expire but the follow-on contract is not ready to be awarded, the government can extend the existing contract or award a short-term sole-source contract to avoid a gap in service. These have been referred to as “bridge contracts.” While bridge contracts can be necessary tools, they are awarded without competition, which puts the government at risk of paying too much. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' use of bridge contracts. This report examines (1) insights selected agencies have into their use of bridge contracts; (2) key characteristics of bridge contracts; and (3) the reasons bridge contracts are used.
Because bridge contracts are not defined in the FAR, GAO constructed a definition based on its prior work and that of other federal agencies. GAO reviewed policies and procedures at three agencies that were among those with the highest number of potential bridge contracts. GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 73 contracts for services, based on a customized search of the federal procurement data system and contract information provided by agencies. For a more in-depth review, GAO selected a subset of 29 contracts based on contract value and other factors.
What GAO Found
The agencies included in GAO's review—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services, and Justice—had limited or no insight into their use of bridge contracts, as bridge contracts were not defined or addressed in department-level guidance or in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). However, GAO found that two DOD components, the Navy and Defense Logistics Agency, have instituted definitions, policies, and procedures to manage and track their use. The components took these steps due to concerns that bridge contracts were being used too frequently and reducing competition. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should identify, analyze, and monitor risks associated with achieving objectives, such as maximizing competition. Staff from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), which provides direction for government-wide procurement policies so as to promote efficiency and effectiveness in government acquisitions, acknowledge that the use of bridge contracts may introduce risks related to a lack of competition. Without a definition of bridge contracts and guidance for tracking and managing their use, agencies are not able to fully identify and monitor these risks and increase opportunities for competition.
The 73 bridge contracts GAO analyzed varied widely in characteristics such as the type of service and length of contract. Almost half of the contracts were used to procure either professional management services or information technology services. Although bridge contracts are typically envisioned as short-term, GAO found that some bridge contracts spanned multiple years, potentially undetected by approving officials. For example, of the 29 contracts GAO reviewed in-depth, 6 were longer than 3 years. As the figure below illustrates, an Army bridge contract for computer support services was initially planned as a 12-month bridge, but because of subsequent bridges, ultimately spanned 42 months.
Even after lengthy bridge contract scenarios, most follow-on contracts were awarded competitively. Of the 26 cases in GAO's review where follow-on contracts were awarded, 23 were awarded competitively, in some instances leading to savings. The fact that competition occurred in almost all cases, which can save the government money, highlights the importance of better management controls over use of bridge contracts.
Acquisition planning delays, such as revisions to statements of work and delays in source selection, as well as an inexperienced and overwhelmed acquisition workforce, bid protests, and budget uncertainties contributed to the use of bridge contracts in the cases GAO studied. Often, more than one of these factors led to the use of a bridge contract.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OFPP take steps to amend the FAR to incorporate a definition of bridge contracts, and, in the interim, provide guidance for agencies to track and manage their use. OFPP agreed with the recommendation to provide guidance to agencies and plans to explore the value of adding a definition to the FAR. |
gao_GAO-05-333SP | gao_GAO-05-333SP_0 | Panelists Identified Cultural and Technical Factors That Have Affected ATC Modernization and Suggested Short-term Steps to Address Them
The panelists attributed many of the ATC modernization program’s chronic problems to cultural and technical factors. In particular, they cited resistance to change at all levels within the agency and insufficient technical expertise as key factors impeding modernization. They identified multiple, currently available options for addressing these factors. Panelists Suggested Steps That the ATO Could Take in the Short Term to Address Cultural Impediments to Modernization
what is expected of them, how they fit into the strategy, and what the vision is for their organization. Panelists Said FAA Personnel Lack Technical Expertise Needed to Develop Complex Systems and Oversee Contractors Effectively
Technical as well as cultural factors have impeded ATC modernization, according to several of the panelists. They think that meetings are products.” good job, but who certainly have a different motivation from FAA. This panelist described how a foreign air traffic services organization develops new ATC systems in-house and seldom uses contractors. He also noted that FAA plans to train or hire people with needed skills to address shortfalls in technical expertise. For example, the ATO established collaborative teams of technical experts and ATC system reorganized air traffic services and the research and acquisition organization along functional lines of business to bring stakeholders together and integrate goals, as well as reward cooperation by linking investments to operations; reduced layers of management from 11 to 7 to help address the hierarchical nature of the organization; and conducted an organizationwide activity value analysis to determine the full range of activities that ATO headquarters is engaged in, the value customers place on those activities, and the potential for conducting any of those activities more effectively and efficiently. In their view, the most immediate issue is a critical shortage of funds to meet the current modernization program’s plans and users’ demands. Additionally, they said, the federal budget process is slow, inflexible, and influenced by the political process; annual appropriations are uncertain and discourage planning; and the budget fails to show investment priorities and relationships between FAA’s capital and operating budgets. Funding Air Traffic Services through the Budget Process Is Slow and Inflexible, Some Panelists Said
Several panelists maintained that the federal budget cycle is too long and inflexible to meet the needs of an ATC system. Such a “dramatic,” “dynamic” system requires “more managerial freedom, much more day-to-day, week-to-week, month-to-month decision- making,” he said. By the time the acquisitions are fully deployed, panelists said, they may be out of date. Panelists Identified Short- term Steps within the Budget Process and Other Steps That the ATO Could Take under Its Existing Authorities to Address Budget Constraints
While recognizing the magnitude of the ATO’s projected funding shortfall over the next few years, the panelists identified a number of steps that the ATO could take to address its current financial situation. These steps included accepting the budget process as it is and reducing spending to match revenues, developing strategies for presenting the ATO’s budget request more clearly to Congress, implementing regulatory and procedural changes to allow the use of existing cost-saving technologies, contracting with the private sector to provide certain air traffic services, and obtaining information on other countries’ ATC technologies and on international technical standards. This panelist also said that FAA needs a customer-oriented business strategy and a business plan. financial management systems it has been putting in place. The following is additional information from the ATO’s COO and from previous GAO reports and work in progress that indicates how FAA is addressing some of the structural changes that panelists proposed to improve the ATO’s success over time: In addition to the business plan that the ATO is developing to guide and improve its operations and financial management, FAA has worked to develop three longer term planning documents. Instead, taking a two-pronged approach— telling people “what’s to be done now to get results” and telling them “that they have an obligation to build for the future”—would be the best way, in the view of most panelists, for the ATO to meet its immediate and longer term challenges. National Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to Improve Performance of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System. Budgetary Factors
FAA Budget Policies and Practices. Structural Issues
Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges for Transforming Into a High-Performing Organization. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a program to modernize the national airspace system and a primary component, the air traffic control (ATC) system. The ATC component of this program, which is designed to replace aging equipment and accommodate predicted growth in air traffic, has had difficulty for more than two decades in meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets. The performance-based Air Traffic Organization (ATO) was created in February 2004 to improve the management of the modernization effort. On October 7, 2004, GAO hosted a panel to discuss attempts to address the ATC modernization program's persistent problems. Participants discussed the factors that they believed have affected FAA's ability to acquire new ATC systems. Participants also identified steps that FAA's ATO could take in the short term to address these factors, as well as longer term steps that could be taken to improve the modernization program's chances of success and help the ATO achieve its mission. The participants included domestic and foreign aviation experts from industry, government, private think tanks, and academia. They are recognized for their expertise in aviation safety, economics, and engineering; transportation research and policy; and government and private-sector management.
What GAO Found
What Participants Said: Overall, the participants identified cultural, technical, and budgetary factors that, in their view, have affected the progress of ATC modernization. To address these factors, they proposed what one participant termed a "two-pronged" approach--simultaneously taking care of "the here and now" and building a "viable future" for the ATO. Cultural and Technical Factors Have Impeded ATC Modernization: According to participants, the key cultural factor impeding modernization has been resistance to change. Such resistance is a characteristic of FAA personnel at all levels, participants said, and management, in the experience of some, is more resistant than employees who may fear that new technologies will threaten their jobs. The key technical factor affecting modernization, participants said, has been a shortfall in the technical expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air traffic systems. Without the technical proficiency to "scrub" project proposals for potential problems early and to oversee the contractors who implement its modernization projects, they said, FAA has to rely on the contractors, whose interests differ from its own. Budgetary Factors Have Constrained ATC Modernization: The most immediate budgetary constraint, participants said, is the multibillion-dollar shortfall that FAA is projecting between available revenues and modernization needs over the next 4 years. Participants also identified features of the federal budget process as constraints, noting, for example, that the federal budget cycle is too long and inflexible to meet the needs of a dynamic ATC system that requires much more managerial freedom and short-term decision making. They further noted that the budget process is influenced by the political process, and that the funding for capital projects is sometimes spread out over so many years that technologies are out of date by the time they are deployed. Annual funding uncertainties discourage strategic and capital planning, they said, and the budget fails to show priorities and relationships among proposed investments. Short-term and Longer Term Changes Could Promote Success: Participants suggested that the ATO could facilitate cultural transformation by creating a vision and strategy that would unite stakeholders and by assembling project teams with different skills and interests whose members could forge common organizational interests by working together to solve common technology development problems. To help offset technical inadequacies, the participants suggested that the ATO could consult an advisory board, identify and consider purchasing needed technologies that other countries have developed, and hire more skilled engineers to provide in-house expertise. To address budgetary constraints, participants suggested, among other short-term steps, reducing spending to match revenues and developing strategies for presenting FAA's budget request more clearly to Congress. Longer term suggestions included giving the ATO the predictable funding and decision-making authority it needs to carry out a "sensible" capital investment plan. |
gao_GAO-13-602T | gao_GAO-13-602T_0 | DHS Continually Reviews Potential Overstay Records, but Unmatched Arrival Records Remain
DHS Reviewed a Backlog of 1.6 Million Potential Overstay Records
DHS has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records we previously identified in April 2011. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records because either (1) the individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an overstay or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in ADIS that do not have corresponding departure records—remain open and indicate that those individuals are potential in-country overstays. Since completing this review of the backlog of potential overstay records in the summer of 2011, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records through national security and law enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether the subjects of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action. DHS Has More than 1 Million Unmatched Arrival Records
As of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of departure or status change). For example, our preliminary analysis shows that 44 percent of the unmatched arrival records are nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent are also tourists but were admitted under the Visa Waiver Program. DHS Has Actions Completed and Under Way to Improve Data, but the Effect of These Changes Is Not Yet Known
DHS Has Begun Collecting Additional Data and Improved Sharing of Data among Its Databases to Help Identify Potential Overstays
Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on potential overstays. Since that time, DHS has taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern land ports of entry. These changes have resulted in efficiencies in reviewing records for determining possible overstay leads; however, they do not address some of the underlying data quality issues we previously identified, such as incomplete data on departures through land ports of entry. Furthermore, because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS’s overstay data. DHS Continues to Face Challenges in Reporting Reliable Overstay Rates, and Recent Changes Have Not Yet Been Fully Implemented
DHS has not reported overstay rates because of concerns about the reliability of its data on overstays. Since 1994, DHS or its predecessors have not reported annual overstay rates regularly because of its concerns about the reliability of the department’s overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in overstay data, such as missing data for land departures, that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay rates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute. Although the new departure data DHS is collecting as part of the Beyond the Border initiative may allow DHS to close out more potential overstay records in the future, these data are limited to land departure at northern border ports of entry, and as the initiative has not yet been fully implemented, it is too early to assess its effect on helping strengthen the reliability of DHS’s overstay data for reporting purposes. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. As of April 2013, DHS was working to determine how it plans to calculate and report these overstay rates. DHS Faces Challenges Planning for a Biometric Exit System at Air and Sea Ports of Entry
Developing a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. DHS has generally concurred with our recommendations and has reported taking action to address them. As of April 2013, the department’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS officials. However, in October 2010, DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit solution: (1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports. We plan to report on the results of our analysis in July 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection is tasked with inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS's actions to identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to address them. Since April 2011, DHS has reported taking further actions to strengthen its processes for addressing overstays.
This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations on DHS's efforts since April 2011 to (1) review potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns, (2) improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, and (3) plan for a biometric exit system. This statement is based on preliminary analyses from GAO's ongoing review of overstay enforcement for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data related to overstays and interviewed relevant DHS officials. GAO expects to issue a final report on this work in July 2013. DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since GAO reported on overstays in April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records by reviewing such records to identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched arrival records remain in DHS's system. In April 2011, GAO reported that, as of January 2011, DHS's Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) contained a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records--those that do not have corresponding departure records--remain open and indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In the summer of 2011, DHS reviewed the 1.6 million potential overstay records. As a result, DHS closed about 863,000 records and removed them from the backlog. Since that time, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns. However, as of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS. GAO's preliminary analysis identified nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa constitute 44 percent of unmatched arrival records, while tourists admitted under a visa waiver constitute 43 percent. The remaining records include various types of other nonimmigrants, such as those traveling on temporary worker visas.
DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, but the impact of these changes is not yet known. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify potential overstays, among other things. Although these actions have resulted in efficiencies in processing data, they do not address underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Further, because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS's overstay data. DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessors have not regularly done so since 1994. In September 2008, GAO reported on limitations in overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data and that, as a result, DHS could not reliably report overstay rates. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013.
DHS faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and sea ports of entry. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. As of April 2013, DHS's planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution at sea ports. However, in October 2010, DHS identified key challenges as to why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit capability, including challenges in determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information.
GAO is assessing DHS's plans and efforts in these areas and plans to report on its results in July 2013. |
gao_NSIAD-96-115 | gao_NSIAD-96-115_0 | DOD reports the incremental costs of its participation in contingency operations. In addition to incremental costs, DOD incurs costs to maintain a standing military force. Table 1.1 provides detail on the reported incremental costs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a request from the Chairmen of the House Committees on International Relations and National Security, we reviewed (1) the accuracy of DOD’s reported incremental costs for contingency operations and (2) the adequacy of DOD guidance and accounting systems to ensure accurate cost reporting. A material weakness raises questions about the reliability of reported costs. We identified about $104 million in overstated costs and about $171 million in understated costs between fiscal years 1994 and 1995. We also found instances where the accuracy of some reported costs could not be determined. Costs Are Overstated Because They Are Not Adjusted to Reflect Offsets
The services do not have financial management systems that capture actual incremental costs. We did not determine the amount of this overstatement. Services Report Estimated Incremental Personnel Costs
Military personnel deployed to contingency operations become eligible for several types of special pays and allowances. Guidance for Reporting Incremental Costs Is Vague and Accounting Systems Are Unreliable
The DOD Comptroller and the service secretaries have not developed sufficiently specific guidance for identifying contingency operation costs and the methodology for calculating them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the reliability of the Department of Defense's (DOD) reported costs for contingency operations, focusing on the: (1) accuracy of reported incremental costs; and (2) adequacy of DOD guidance and accounting systems to ensure accurate cost reporting.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD overstated about $104 million in incremental costs and understated or failed to report about $171 million in incremental costs; (2) DOD overstated costs primarily because the services failed to adjust reported incremental costs for normal costs they did not incur; (3) DOD understated costs primarily because the services failed to report certain incremental personnel and munitions costs; (4) it could not determine the accuracy of some reported costs because the services could not readily identify special pay and allowances related to contingency operations; (5) DOD revised its guidance for developing and reporting incremental costs, but the guidance generally remains vague and incomplete; (6) the financial management systems DOD uses to develop incremental cost data are deficient, unreliable, and a high-risk area; and (7) the problems in DOD reporting of incremental cost are indicative of a material weakness in DOD accounting systems. |
gao_GAO-09-178 | gao_GAO-09-178_0 | The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza recommends that organizations plan for a 40 percent absenteeism rate at the height of a pandemic. The Federal Government Lacks a Comprehensive Understanding of the Sufficiency of Its Veterinarian Workforce
Four of the five key agencies that employ veterinarians—APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and Army—regularly assess the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforces for routine program activities, and all four identified existing or potential shortages. FDA does not perform such assessments. Finally, there is no governmentwide assessment of the veterinarian workforce. Departments Have Done Little to Assess the Sufficiency of Their Veterinarian Workforces across Their Component Agencies
Even though their component agencies identified concerns about their veterinarian workforces, officials from both USDA and HHS told us that they have not undertaken a departmentwide assessment of these workforces to gain a broader perspective on trends and shared issues. In contrast, DOD has a process for such an assessment. These current challenges are likely to worsen because a large number of federal veterinarians are eligible to retire in the near future. Efforts to Identify the Veterinarian Workforce Needed during a Pandemic and Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak Are Insufficient
Four of the five key agencies we reviewed—APHIS, FSIS, ARS, and FDA— have plans intended to detail how essential functions and services, including those that veterinarians perform, would continue during a pandemic that has the potential to severely reduce the workforce. However, the plans lack crucial details, such as how the laboratories will continue operations if absenteeism reaches 40 percent. For example, it does not identify which essential functions—whether they be the responsibility of the veterinarian or others—must be performed on-site and which can be performed remotely. According to the project leader, as well as USDA and DHS officials, control and eradication strategies would be greatly complicated if wildlife became infected and could require more veterinarians and different expertise. Federal and State Agencies Are Missing Important Opportunities to Ensure Efficient Use of Veterinarians During Disease Outbreaks
During four recent zoonotic disease outbreaks, the veterinarian workforce challenge cited most often by federal and state officials was having too few veterinarians to control the outbreak while also adequately carrying out other routine activities. Federal and state agency officials reported several consequences of this insufficient veterinarian capacity. First, 10 of the 17 agencies have not assessed how well their own veterinarian workforces responded to individual outbreaks. To help ensure the federal veterinarian workforce is sufficient to meet the critical responsibilities it carries out on a routine basis, we recommend that 1. the Secretary of Agriculture direct FSIS to periodically assess whether its level of inspection resources dedicated to food safety and humane slaughter activities is sufficient, and 2. the Secretary of Agriculture conduct a departmentwide assessment of USDA’s veterinarian workforce—based, for example, on workforce assessments by its component agencies—to identify current and future workforce needs (including training and employee development) and departmentwide solutions to problems shared by its agencies. 3. DHS recommended that the federal government enhance efforts to identify the veterinarian workforce needed during catastrophic events. The number of veterinarians listed for the Department of Health and Human Services does not include those United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps veterinarians working at the FSIS and the Environmental Protection Agency because they are counted as employees of those agencies. Within these three departments, we further focused our review on five component agencies—the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), FSIS, Army, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—to determine the extent to which they assessed the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce. To determine the extent to which federal and state agencies encountered veterinarian workforce challenges during four recent zoonotic outbreaks, we conducted semistructured interviews with 17 federal and state agencies involved in these outbreaks. 3. As our report notes, the United States has used this “stamping out” method in the past for eradicating smaller outbreaks of foreign animal diseases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterinarians are essential for controlling zoonotic diseases--which spread between animals and humans--such as avian influenza. Most federal veterinarians work in the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). However, there is a growing national shortage of veterinarians. GAO determined the extent to which (1) the federal government has assessed the sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce for routine activities, (2) the federal government has identified the veterinarian workforce needed during a catastrophic event, and (3) federal and state agencies encountered veterinarian workforce challenges during four recent zoonotic outbreaks. GAO surveyed 24 federal entities about their veterinarian workforce; analyzed agency workforce, pandemic, and other plans; and interviewed federal and state officials that responded to four recent zoonotic outbreaks.
What GAO Found
The federal government lacks a comprehensive understanding of the sufficiency of its veterinarian workforce. More specifically, four of five component agencies GAO reviewed have assessed the sufficiency of their veterinarian workforce to perform routine activities and have identified current or future concerns. This includes USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS), Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and Agricultural Research Service (ARS); and DOD's Army. Current and future shortages, as well as noncompetitive salaries, were among the concerns identified by these agencies. HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not perform such assessments and did not identify any concerns. In addition, at the department level, USDA and HHS have not assessed their veterinarian workforces across their component agencies, but DOD has a process for doing so. Moreover, there is no governmentwide effort to search for shared solutions, even though 16 of the 24 federal entities that employ veterinarians raised concerns about the sufficiency of this workforce. Further exacerbating these concerns is the number of veterinarians eligible to retire in the near future. GAO's analysis revealed that 27 percent of the veterinarians at APHIS, FSIS, ARS, Army, and FDA will be eligible to retire within 3 years. Efforts to identify the veterinarian workforce needed for a catastrophic event are insufficient. Specifically, agencies' plans lack important elements necessary for continuing essential veterinarian functions during a pandemic, such as identifying which functions must be performed on-site and how they will be carried out if absenteeism reaches 40 percent--the rate predicted at the height of the pandemic and used for planning purposes. In addition, one federal effort to prepare for the intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease is based on the unrealistic assumption that all affected animals will be slaughtered, as the United States has done for smaller outbreaks, making the resulting veterinarian workforce estimates irrelevant. A second effort lacks crucial data, including data on how the disease would spread in wildlife. If wildlife became infected, as they have in the past, response would be greatly complicated and could require more veterinarians and different expertise. Officials from federal and state agencies involved in four recent zoonotic disease outbreaks commonly cited insufficient veterinarian capacity as a workforce challenge. However, 10 of the 17 agencies that GAO interviewed have not assessed their own veterinarian workforce's response to individual outbreaks and are thus missing opportunities to improve future responses. Moreover, none of the entities GAO reviewed has looked across outbreaks to identify common workforce challenges and possible solutions. |
gao_GAO-03-337 | gao_GAO-03-337_0 | Furthermore, retirement income data needs keep changing, in part, as a result of trends in the pension industry and the labor force. Much of the data needed to assess retirement income and wealth are subject to federal laws protecting the confidentiality of information reported to the federal government. Experts Cited Need for Better Data and Better Data Set Linkage
Experts we consulted cited priorities for improving retirement data that fit into two broad categories: (1) obtaining better data from employers on employee benefits and (2) obtaining better data from individual and household surveys by linking them with administrative data. The kinds of information concerning employers and employer-sponsored benefit plans that analysts sought included the features of their pension plans, such as minimum and maximum allowable contributions, or formulas for calculating benefits from defined benefit pension plans. As a result, analysis of pension offerings by demographic groups is limited. Our expert panelists made several suggestions for linking individual and household survey data with administrative data sources to help improve the analysis of retirement income and projections of the effects of policy changes on future retirement income. Many Factors Limit Needed Retirement Income and Wealth Data
Experts we consulted believed that data needed for the study of retirement income are not collected or made available because of factors that include the fragmentation of data collection responsibility, the burden of data collection on respondents, and confidentiality considerations that restrict access. Fragmentation stems from no single agency having a statutory mandate to collect and analyze all the data needed to support a more comprehensive study of retirement income and wealth. Some information is no longer collected out of concern that it was an unnecessary burden on the firms having to submit it and because it was only being used to a limited extent by the government. For example, Labor has the authority to obtain existing documents describing the features of private pension plans. Similar efforts have been undertaken with other surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Study of Mature Women. HRS investigators have compared employee responses about retirement income to employer provided data and Social Security records and found wide discrepancies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Future demographic trends include a doubling of the nation's retiree population and only modest labor force growth, leading to concerns about retirement income adequacy for future generations. Credible projections of the effects of policy proposals on federal spending and future retirees' income are necessary. Because adequate data is critical to the analysis of retirement income and wealth, GAO was asked to identify data improvements that experts say are a priority for the study of retirement income and wealth, as well as factors limiting efforts to obtain the needed information.
What GAO Found
Experts consulted by GAO cited priorities for improving retirement data that fit into two broad categories: (1) obtaining better data from employers on employee benefits and (2) obtaining better data by linking more individual and household surveys with administrative data (such as employer records, and Social Security earnings history records). Information from employers, such as documents describing the features of their pension plans, would enable analysts to forecast future retirement income of pension holders, based on the specific features of their pension plans and the likely distribution of pension income and wealth for different segments of the population. Linking individual and household surveys with administrative data creates new information, such as the demographic characteristics of employees whose pensions are affected by the formulas that employers use to calculate contributions or pension payments. Analysts attribute the shortcomings in retirement income data primarily to fragmentation of the responsibility for data collection and analysis, the burden of data collection on respondents, and confidentiality considerations that restrict access to these data. Fragmentation of responsibility occurs, in their view, because no single agency has a statutory mandate to collect or to analyze all the data needed to support a more comprehensive study of retirement income and wealth. With regard to respondent burden, some information on pension plans is no longer collected, in part, out of concern that it was an unnecessary burden on the firms having to submit it. Finally, certain kinds of data needed to make projections are not widely available to all analysts because of the confidentiality laws that authorize their collection. |
gao_GAO-06-795 | gao_GAO-06-795_0 | Results
TSA obligated almost $470 million from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005 for EDS and ETD maintenance, according to TSA budget documents. TSA was not able to provide us with data on the maintenance cost per machine before fiscal year 2005 because, according to TSA officials, TSA’s previous contract with Boeing to maintain EDS and ETD machines was not structured to capture these data. In response to the DHS OIG, TSA agreed to recover any excessive award fees paid to Boeing, if TSA determined that such fees were not warranted. Lastly, life-cycle cost estimates were not developed for the Boeing, Siemens, L-3, and GE InVision contracts before the maintenance contracts were executed, and, as a result, TSA did not have a sound estimate of maintenance costs for all the years the machines are expected to be in operation. In commenting on our draft report in July 2006, DHS stated that the TSA contractor estimated completing a prototype life-cycle cost model by September 2006. TSA officials told us that they perform such reviews, but do not document their activities since there are no TSA policies or procedures requiring them to do so. Further, TSA officials provided no evidence that they ensure that contractors are performing scheduled preventative maintenance. Without stronger oversight, TSA will not have reasonable assurance that contractors are performing as required and that full payment is justified based on meeting mean downtime requirements. Recommendations
To help improve TSA’s management of EDS and ETD maintenance costs and strengthen oversight of contract performance, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to take the following three actions: establish a timeline to complete its evaluation and close out the Boeing contract and report to congressional appropriations committees on its actions, including any necessary analysis, to address the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General’s recommendation to recover any excessive fees awarded to Boeing Service Company; establish a timeline for completing life-cycle cost models for EDS, which TSA recently began; and revise policies and procedures to require documentation of the monitoring of EDS and ETD maintenance contracts to provide reasonable assurance that contractor maintenance cost data and performance data are recorded and reported in accordance with TSA contractual requirements and self-reported contractor mean downtime data are valid, reliable, and justify the full payment of the contract amount. Regarding our recommendation that TSA establish a timeline to close out the Boeing contact and report to congressional committees on its actions to recover any excessive fees, DHS stated that TSA has conducted a contract reconciliation process to ensure that no fees would be paid on costs that exceeded the target due to poor contractor performance and that Boeing and TSA have reached an agreement in principle on this matter and the documentation is in the approval process with closure anticipated in July 2006. In fiscal year 2006, TSA estimates it will spend $199 million and has projected it will spend $234 million in fiscal year 2007. Background
TSA was mandated to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003.1 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristics of explosives. Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines use chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors or residues. In March 2005, TSA signed firm fixed price contracts for EDS and ETD maintenance. Factors That Played a Role in EDS and ETD
Factors That Played a Role in Maintenance Costs and Could Impact Future Costs
Different factors have played a role in costs to date and will influence future maintenance costs for EDS According to a September 2004 DHS OIG report, TSA did not follow sound contracting practices in administering the Boeing contract, which was primarily for the installation and maintenance of EDS and ETD machines. Among other things, the DHS OIG found that TSA had paid provisional award fees totaling $44 million through December 2003 without any evaluation of Boeing’s performance. MDT is calculated by the number of hours a machine is out of service in a month divided by the number of times that machine is out of service per month. Without such a time frame, TSA may not be identifying cost efficiencies and making informed procurement decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mandated to screen all checked baggage by using explosive detection systems at airports by December 31, 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed two types of screening equipment: explosive detection systems (EDS), which use computer-aided tomography X-rays to recognize explosives, and explosive trace detection (ETD) systems, which use chemical analysis to detect explosive residues. This report discusses (1) EDS and ETD maintenance costs, (2) factors that played a role in these costs, and (3) the extent to which TSA conducts oversight of maintenance contracts. GAO reviewed TSA's contract files and processes for reviewing contractor cost and performance data.
What GAO Found
TSA obligated almost $470 million from fiscal years 2002 through 2005 for EDS and ETD maintenance, according to TSA budget documents. In fiscal year 2006, TSA estimates it will spend $199 million and has projected it will spend $234 million in fiscal year 2007. TSA was not able to provide GAO with data on the maintenance cost per machine before fiscal year 2005 because, according to TSA officials, its previous contract with Boeing to install and maintain EDS and ETD machines was not structured to capture these data. Several factors have played a role in EDS and ETD maintenance costs. According to a September 2004 Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General report, TSA did not follow sound contracting practices in administering the contract with Boeing, and TSA paid provisional award fees totaling $44 million through December 2003 without any evaluation of Boeing's performance. TSA agreed to recover any excessive award fees paid to Boeing if TSA determined that such fees were not warranted. In responding to our draft report, DHS told us that TSA and Boeing had reached an agreement in principle on this matter and that documentation was in the approval process with closure anticipated in July 2006. Moreover, TSA did not develop life-cycle cost models before any of the maintenance contracts were executed and, as a result, TSA does not have a sound estimate of maintenance costs for all the years the machines are expected to be in operation. DHS also stated in its comments on our draft report that a TSA contractor expected to complete a prototype life-cycle cost model by September 2006 and that TSA anticipated that the EDS model would be completed 12 months after the prototype was approved. Without such an analysis, TSA may not be identifying cost efficiencies and making informed procurement decisions on future purchases of EDS and ETD machines and maintenance contracts. TSA has taken actions to control costs, such as entering into firm-fixed-price contracts for maintenance starting in March 2005, which have advantages to the government because price certainty is guaranteed. Further, TSA incorporated standard performance requirements in the contracts including metrics related to machine reliability and monthly performance reviews. For EDS contractors, TSA has specified that the full agreed price would be paid only if mean downtime (i.e., the number of hours a machine is out of service in a month divided by the number of times that machine is out of service per month) requirements are met. Although TSA has policies for monitoring contracts, TSA officials provided no evidence that they are reviewing required contractor-submitted performance data, such as mean downtime data. TSA officials told GAO that they perform such reviews, but do not document their activities because there are no TSA policies and procedures requiring them to do so. As a result, without adequate documentation, TSA does not have reasonable assurance that contractors are performing as required and that full payment is justified based on meeting mean downtime requirements. |
gao_GAO-17-221T | gao_GAO-17-221T_0 | To inform these design decisions, the Bureau held several major operational tests, including the 2014 Census test, which was conducted in the Maryland and Washington, D.C., areas to evaluate new methods for conducting self- response and non-response follow-up; the 2015 Census test in Arizona, which evaluated, among other things, (1) the use of a field operations management system to automate data collection operations and provide real-time data, (2) the ability to reduce the non-response follow-up workload using information previously provided to the government, and (3) the use of personally owned mobile devices by the field-based enumerators who go door to door to collect census data; the 2015 Optimizing Self-Response test in Savannah, Georgia, and the surrounding area, which was intended to explore methods of encouraging households to respond using the Internet, such as by using advertising and outreach to motivate respondents, and enabling households to respond without a Bureau-issued identification number; and the 2016 Census tests in Harris County, Texas and Los Angeles, California, which evaluated, among other things, the efficiency of non- response follow-up using contractor-provided mobile devices. This project is called the Enterprise Censuses and Surveys Enabling (ECASE) initiative. The Bureau Lacks Processes for Effectively Managing Interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs
In August 2016, we reported that the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs were intended to be on parallel implementation tracks and had major interdependencies; however, the interdependencies between these two programs had not always been effectively managed. Nevertheless, while both programs had taken a number of steps to coordinate, such as holding weekly schedule coordination meetings and participating in each other’s risk review board meetings, they lacked processes for effectively integrating their schedule dependencies, integrating the management of interrelated risks, and managing requirements. The Bureau agreed with this recommendation and indicated it would be taking actions to address it. The Bureau agreed with these recommendations and reported that it planned to take actions to address them. Census Bureau Faces Several Information Security Challenges in Implementing the 2020 Census
While the Bureau plans to extensively use IT systems to support the 2020 Census redesign in an effort to realize potentially significant efficiency gains and cost savings, we reported that this redesign introduces critical information security challenges related to the following: minimizing the threat of phishing aimed at stealing personal information, which could target 2020 Census respondents, as well as Census employees and contractors; ensuring that individuals gain only limited and appropriate access to adequately protecting approximately 300,000 mobile devices; ensuring adequate control of security performance requirements in a cloud environment, such as those related to data reliability, preservation, privacy, and access rights; adequately considering information security when making decisions about the IT solutions and infrastructure supporting the 2020 Census; making certain that key IT positions are filled and have appropriate information security knowledge and expertise; ensuring that contingency and incident response plans are in place that encompass all of the IT systems to be used to support the 2020 Census; adequately training Bureau employees, including its massive temporary workforce, in information security awareness; making certain that security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level; and properly configuring and patching systems supporting the 2020 Census. For example, the introduction of an option for households to respond using the Internet puts respondents more at risk for phishing attacks. More details on each of these challenges can be found in our recently issued report. Uncertainty about the Bureau’s Readiness for the 2018 Test Remains
Looking forward, there is uncertainty as to whether the Census Bureau will be ready for the 2018 end-to-end test. We have ongoing work for this committee that is evaluating the significant challenges the Bureau faces in developing, testing, and integrating systems prior to the 2018 test. For example, as of October 2016, only 3 of the 50 systems (6 percent) had been delivered. The Bureau is relying on contractor support in many key areas, including the technical integration of all of the key systems and infrastructure, and the development of many of the data collection systems. Additionally, while the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, it also introduces many information security challenges, including educating the public to offset inevitable phishing scams. Continued focus on these considerable security challenges will be important as the Bureau begins to develop and/or acquire systems and implement the 2020 Census design. In our ongoing work for this committee, we plan to address key questions about the Bureau’s ability to develop, integrate, test, and secure the IT systems and infrastructure in time for the end–to-end test. Given the short window of time before the test begins, it is important that the Bureau continue to focus its attention on implementing and securing the systems that will collect and store the personal information of millions of American people. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Census Bureau (a component of the Department of Commerce) plans to significantly change the methods and technology it uses to count the population with the 2020 Decennial Census, such as by offering an option for households to respond to the survey via the Internet. The Bureau's redesign of the Census program relies on the acquisition and development of many new and modified systems. Several of the key systems are to be provided by an enterprise-wide initiative called CEDCAP.
This statement summarizes the report GAO issued in August 2016 on the challenges the Bureau faces in managing the interdependencies between the 2020 Census and CEDCAP programs, as well as challenges it faces in ensuring the security and integrity of Bureau systems and data. GAO also updated key information based on its ongoing work for this committee by, among other things, reviewing the updated 2020 Operational Plan and systems lists provided by the Bureau, and by interviewing agency officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) 2020 Decennial Census program is heavily dependent upon the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) program to deliver the key systems needed to support the 2020 redesign. CEDCAP is a complex modernization program intended to deliver a system-of-systems for the Bureau's survey data collection and processing functions. In August 2016, GAO reported that while the two programs had taken steps to coordinate their schedules, risks, and requirements, they lacked effective processes for managing interdependencies. Officials acknowledged weaknesses in managing interdependencies and reported that they were taking steps to address them. Until these interdependencies are managed more effectively, the Bureau will be limited in its ability to meet milestones, mitigate major risks, and ensure that requirements are appropriately identified.
While the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. For example, the introduction of an option for households to respond using the Internet puts respondents more at risk for phishing attacks (requests for information from authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails and websites). The Bureau had begun efforts to address a number of these challenges; as it begins implementing this decennial census' design, continued focus on these considerable security challenges will be critical.
Looking forward, there is uncertainty as to whether the Census Bureau will be ready for the 2018 end-to-end test, set to begin in August 2017. GAO has ongoing work for this committee that is evaluating the significant challenges the Bureau faces in developing, testing, integrating, and securing systems prior to the 2018 test. For example, of the 50 systems to be included in the end-to-end test, half of them are to be delivered after the start of the test or lack a firm delivery date (see figure). In addition, key dates for the integration of the systems have not yet been defined. Given the short window of time before the test is to begin, it is important that the Bureau continue to focus its attention on implementing and securing the data collection systems that are to collect and store the personal information of millions of American people.
What GAO Recommends
In its August report, GAO made eight recommendations to the Department of Commerce. The recommendations addressed, among other things, deficiencies in the Bureau's management of interdependencies related to schedule, risk, and requirements. The department agreed with all eight recommendations and indicated that it would be taking actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-399 | gao_GAO-16-399_0 | Responsibilities for Oversight of Imported Food Products
FDA’s responsibilities for overseeing the safety of imported food products are divided among its product centers and program offices. PREDICT Uses Data and Analyzes the Data by Applying Rules That Contribute to Risk-Based Scores, but FDA Does Not Have a Documented Process for Obtaining Some Data
PREDICT uses a variety of data and FDA-created rules—conditional statements that tell PREDICT how to react when encountering particular information—to analyze these data and to identify high-risk imported food shipments. Some of the domestic and foreign sources are open sources—that is, publicly available. PREDICT Uses a Variety of Data, but FDA Does Not Have a Documented Process for Obtaining Open Source Data
PREDICT uses a variety of data to estimate the risk of imported food. Many of the data PREDICT uses come from sources within FDA. Data from Non-FDA Domestic Sources
According to FDA officials, PREDICT also uses data from sources outside of FDA, including domestic sources, such as databases from states and other federal agencies. Instead, FDA relies on ORA officials to informally communicate and obtain information from officials in other FDA offices and from other federal agencies on an ad hoc basis. The Implementation of FSMA Will Provide PREDICT with Additional Data on Imported Food
FSMA, which was enacted in 2011, contains provisions that will provide PREDICT with additional data to analyze (i.e., from additional sources) when estimating the risk of imported food. Of these five, the first three are as follows:
Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP): The FSVP rule requires importers to verify that their foreign suppliers use processes and procedures that provide the same level of public health protection as the hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls and other applicable requirements of FDCA. Because some of these FSMA-related programs are still new and not yet fully implemented, the details of how certain data generated by these programs will be integrated into PREDICT are not finalized, but according to FDA officials, PREDICT will use data produced by these programs and authorities in a variety of ways. Implementation of FSVP, for example, will identify importers that are not in compliance, and PREDICT would use that information in assigning risk scores to products from those importers. FDA Assessed the Effectiveness of PREDICT in 2013, but Some Recommended Improvements Have Yet to Be Implemented
FDA has assessed the effectiveness of PREDICT by ongoing monitoring of key program data and by conducting an evaluation of the tool in 2013, and it has implemented many, but not all, of the 2013 evaluation’s recommendations to improve PREDICT. Data provided by FDA from fiscal years 2012 to 2014 confirmed that in general, PREDICT is fulfilling this role. FDA Conducted an Internal Evaluation of PREDICT and Developed 24 Recommendations to Improve the Tool
In May 2013, FDA completed an internal evaluation of PREDICT’s effectiveness that examined five processes: work planning, examinations and sampling, entry review, rules management, and communication. According to agency officials, the agency has implemented 15, partially implemented another 6, and not implemented 3 (see fig. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies are to ensure that the findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. To that end, agencies are to complete, within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management’s attention. Establishing a practical timeline for implementing the remaining recommendations as resources become available would provide FDA with reasonable assurance that the improvements are made and that PREDICT remains an effective tool for screening imports. FDA physically examines about 1 percent of food shipment entry lines annually. Recommendations for Executive Action
To further enhance FDA’s PREDICT tool and its ability to ensure the safety of imported food, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to take the following two actions: document the process for identifying the type of open source data to collect, obtaining such data, and determining how PREDICT is to use the data and establish a timeline for implementing, as resources become available, the remaining recommendations from FDA’s 2013 evaluation of PREDICT. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
You asked us to examine how the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is using Predictive Risk-based Evaluation for Dynamic Import Compliance Targeting (PREDICT) to protect the safety of the U.S. food supply. Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) the data used by PREDICT and how PREDICT analyzes these data to identify high-risk food shipments for examination; (2) how implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) will affect PREDICT; and (3) the extent to which FDA has assessed the effectiveness of PREDICT and used the results of those assessments to improve the tool. We also reviewed how the agency identifies, obtains, and uses open source information and compared this process to criteria for documentation found in the federal standards for internal control. | Why GAO Did This Study
Imported food makes up a substantial and growing portion of the U.S. food supply. FDA is responsible for oversight of more than 80 percent of the U.S. food supply. However, because the volume of imported food is so high, FDA physically examines only about 1 percent of imported food annually. In 2011, FDA implemented PREDICT, a computerized tool intended to improve FDA's targeting of imports for examination by estimating the risk of imported products.
GAO was asked to review how FDA is using PREDICT to protect the U.S. food supply. This report examines (1) the data used by PREDICT and how PREDICT analyzes these data to identify high-risk food shipments for examination, (2) how implementation of FSMA will affect PREDICT, and (3) the extent to which FDA has assessed the effectiveness of PREDICT and used the assessments to improve the tool. To address these issues, GAO analyzed FDA documents, interviewed FDA officials, and analyzed data from fiscal years 2012 through 2014.
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Predictive Risk-based Evaluation for Dynamic Import Compliance Targeting (PREDICT) tool uses a variety of data and analyzes data by applying rules—conditional statements that tell PREDICT how to react when encountering particular information—to generate risk scores for imported food. Many of the data used by PREDICT come from internal FDA sources, such as FDA databases. PREDICT also uses data from sources outside of FDA, such as other federal agencies, states, and foreign governments. Some of the data are open source data—information that is publicly available, such as information from newspapers and websites. FDA's Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) relies on other FDA offices and federal agencies to provide open source data for PREDICT, but ORA does not have a documented process for identifying, obtaining, and using the data, relying instead on an ad hoc process. Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to document internal controls. Without a documented process for identifying, obtaining, and using open source data, FDA does not have reasonable assurance that ORA will consistently identify, obtain, and use such data for PREDICT.
The implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), enacted in 2011, will provide PREDICT with additional data for estimating the risk of imported food. FDA identified FSMA provisions likely to generate data, including the Foreign Supplier Verification Program (FSVP), which requires importers to verify that their foreign suppliers use processes and procedures that provide the same public health protection as applicable U.S. requirements. Because FSVP and other FSMA-related programs are still new and not yet fully implemented, the details of how PREDICT will use the data have not been worked out. However, according to FDA officials, the data will be useful. For example, FSVP data will identify suppliers that are not in compliance with standards, and PREDICT will use those data in assigning risk scores to imports from those suppliers.
FDA has assessed the effectiveness of PREDICT by monitoring of key data and by conducting an internal evaluation of the system, and it has implemented many, but not all, of its recommendations from the evaluation. GAO's analysis of FDA data from fiscal year 2012 through 2014 shows that in general, PREDICT is working as intended: imported food with higher-risk scores is more likely to be physically examined and to be found in violation of food safety standards or labeling requirements. In May 2013, FDA completed an evaluation of PREDICT that examined five key processes. As a result of the evaluation, FDA developed 24 recommendations for improving PREDICT and prioritized these recommendations based on feasibility and impact. According to FDA, the agency has fully implemented 15, partially implemented 6, and not implemented 3 of the recommendations. FDA officials said that the agency has not fully implemented all recommendations because of a lack of resources. However, federal standards for internal control specify that agencies are to ensure that the findings of reviews are promptly resolved. To that end, agencies are to complete, within established time frames, all actions that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management's attention. Establishing a timeline for implementing the remaining recommendations as resources become available would help ensure that PREDICT continues to remain an effective tool for screening imported food.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA take two actions to improve the effectiveness of PREDICT: (1) document the process by which FDA is to identify, obtain, and use open source data and (2) establish a timeline for implementing the remaining recommendations from FDA's 2013 evaluation of PREDICT. FDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-211 | gao_GAO-17-211_0 | As shown in the figure, the ceiling price represents the government’s maximum liability under the contract. We elaborate below on the picture over the past 10 years. These factors constrain the Navy’s ability to award shipbuilding contracts competitively. The Navy Prefers FPI Contracts but Did Not Always Document Its Rationale for Determining Contract Type and Elements
According to Navy contracting officials, the Navy prefers FPI contracts for shipbuilding programs over other contract types because cost risk can be shared between the Navy and the shipbuilder more equitably. A required contract document that is intended to convey the rationale for selecting an FPI contract was not present in half of the six contract files we reviewed. These contract terms remained consistent throughout negotiations. An important factor in determining FPI contract elements for the Navy and shipbuilder is whether the contract will be a multi-year or block buy contract. Under such negotiations, the shipbuilder and Navy need to make assumptions regarding the shipbuilder’s efficiencies, learning, and suppliers far into the future. Specifically, we found that: (1) for two of the six selected contracts, uncertainties at the time of contract award made establishing a realistic target cost challenging and (2) for most of the six contracts, share lines or ceiling prices were not in line with what guidance suggests as a point of departure. Majority of Contracts Included Additional Incentives That Provided the Potential for Shipbuilders to Earn Profit Outside of the Share Line
Although the cost incentive on the share line is intended to be the primary incentive for the shipbuilder to control costs, in 5 of the 6 contracts we selected for review, the Navy included additional incentives, which have the effect of increasing the shipbuilder’s potential to earn profit or cushion its potential loss in the event of cost growth. Costs Grew above Target on the Majority of FPI Contracts We Reviewed
Of the 11 ships on the contracts we reviewed that had been delivered to the Navy as of December 2015, 8 experienced cost growth, defined as actual costs exceeding the target cost. The LPD 17 program accounted for $551.77 million of the $711.40 million over the past 10 years, including an additional $45.10 million for the LPD 27 in the Navy’s fiscal year 2017 budget request, primarily to cover the government’s portion of the shipbuilding contract overrun. However, it is unclear whether these incentives resulted in the outcomes that the Navy desired since, according to a senior Navy official, the Navy has not assessed the effectiveness of these incentives across its shipbuilding portfolio. One way is to ensure that contracting officers document the rationale for using an FPI contract, and that the basis for FPI contract elements be clearly set forth in contract documents—in particular, determination and findings documents and the pre- and post-negotiation business clearance memorandums. Regulation, while not prescriptive, highlights the benefits of measuring the effectiveness of such incentives. Conduct a portfolio-wide assessment of the Navy’s use of additional incentives on FPI contracts across its shipbuilding programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review assessed: (1) the extent to which the Navy has entered into fixed-price incentive (FPI) contracts over the last 10 years and what influences the Navy’s contracting approach when awarding FPI contracts for ship construction, (2) how the Navy apportions risk between the government and the shipbuilder for these contracts, and (3) the extent to which the FPI contract type led to desired outcomes. As a result, this public version of the original report does not contain certain information deemed to be sensitive but unclassified by DOD, including specific share lines, ceiling prices, and target costs of the Navy ships we assessed, our assessment of the share of cost risk between the Navy and shipbuilder on the 40 ships reviewed, specific dollar amounts of added incentives on ships we assessed, and Navy and shipbuilder cost outcomes on six delivered ships with significant cost growth. This report uses data from December 2015 to be consistent with the report issued in November 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD encourages the use of FPI contracts because they allow for equitable sharing of costs savings and risk with the shipbuilder. Under FPI contracts, the shipbuilder's ability to earn a profit or a fee is tied to performance. After costs reach the agreed upon target cost, the shipbuilder's profit decreases in relation to the increasing costs. A ceiling price fixes the government's maximum liability.
A House Report on the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to examine the Navy's use of FPI contracts for shipbuilding. This report examines (1) the extent to which the Navy has entered into FPI contracts over the past 10 years, (2) how FPI contracts apportion risk between the Navy and the shipbuilder, and (3) the extent to which FPI contracts led to desired cost outcomes. GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of six contracts (for 40 ships) awarded during the past 10 years, analyzed Navy contract documents, and interviewed program, contract, and shipbuilding officials. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in November 2016.
What GAO Found
Over 80 percent of the Navy's shipbuilding contracts awarded over the past 10 years were fixed-price incentive (FPI). However, GAO found that half of the six selected contracts it reviewed did not document the Navy's justification for selecting this contract type. Moreover, key documents that should describe the rationale for selecting contract elements varied across these contracts. Given the Navy's plans to invest billions of dollars in shipbuilding programs in the future, without adequate documentation on the rationale for use of an FPI contract and key decisions made about FPI contract elements, contracting officers will not have the information they need to make sound decisions at the negotiation table.
Department of Defense (DOD) regulation suggests, as a point of departure for contract negotiations, that the government and shipbuilders share the cost risk equally and set a ceiling price 20 percent higher than the negotiated target cost. GAO found that, for most of the 40 ships on the contracts reviewed, these contract terms resulted in the Navy absorbing more cost risk, as shown below.
Many factors inform the Navy's and shipbuilder's negotiation positions, including the stability of the supplier base and extent of competition. That said, guidance states that the FPI contract elements should be the primary incentive for motivating the shipbuilder to control costs. But GAO found that in five of the six contracts, the Navy added over $700 million in incentives.
Of the 11 ships delivered as of December 2015 under the six contracts, 8 experienced cost growth. In one case, costs grew nearly 45 percent higher than the negotiated target cost. Further, it is unclear whether the additional incentives achieved intended cost and schedule outcomes, as GAO found a mixed picture among the contracts reviewed. Regulation, while not prescriptive, highlights the benefits of measuring the effectiveness of incentives. According to a senior Navy contracting official, the Navy has not measured incentive outcomes for its shipbuilding portfolio. Without assessing whether adding incentives is effective in improving shipbuilder performance, the Navy is missing an opportunity to better inform decisions about whether to include additional incentives in future awards.
What GAO Recommends
For shipbuilding contract awards, the Navy should (1) document in the contract file its rationale for selecting an FPI contract and the basis for contract elements and (2) conduct a portfolio-wide assessment of its use of additional incentives on FPI contracts across its shipbuilding programs. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that actions will be taken in 2017 to address them. |
gao_GAO-04-56 | gao_GAO-04-56_0 | To assist USO, the Congress, beginning in fiscal year 2000, provided a total of $23.8 million in O&M funds in the form of grants for USO. USO used these funds as seed money for the endowment. DOD Provided Substantial Appropriated and Nonappropriated Support to USO, but Total Amount Cannot Be Determined
During fiscal years 2000 through 2002, DOD provided substantial appropriated and nonappropriated support, but the total amount cannot be determined because of limitations in DOD’s and USO’s record-keeping systems. DOD also provided other appropriated support such as lodging, transportation, and use of some facilities. However, we could not identify the total monetary value of DOD’s support derived from appropriated funds because neither DOD nor USO has record-keeping systems to aggregate or report the needed information. While DOD also provides nonappropriated support, largely in the form of in-kind goods (e.g., food and refreshments), services (e.g., Internet and telephone access), and infrastructure support (some performance facilities), to help sustain USO’s overseas operations, the same limitations precluded us from determining the total monetary value for this support. We identified at least $34.7 million in appropriated funds that DOD provided to support USO’s activities during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. As of September 2003, in fiscal years 2000 through 2002, DOD had provided a total of $20.8 million in grants to USO as seed money to fund the Spirit of Hope Endowment Fund, which is intended to ensure the continued existence of USO’s programs and services. Contracts
AFEO provided USO with about $12.1 million in contract reimbursements during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. Direct Payments
AFEO and the Air Mobility Command used appropriated O&M funds to pay directly for USO tour-related expenses, such as commercial airfares, visas and passports, and military airlift services. Sufficient Financial and Management Controls Did Not Exist to Assure Appropriate Use of Appropriated Funds
DOD and USO did not have sufficient financial and management controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that all appropriated funds were used appropriately. DOD properly awarded grant funds to USO, and USO appropriately administered these funds. However, USO did not require its independent auditor to fully test internal controls over grant funds or funds reimbursed by DOD, as required under grant and contractual agreements with DOD. For support provided through contract reimbursements and direct payments, AFEO lacked clearly written supplemental guidance regarding allowable expenses, effective management oversight in reviewing USO invoices, and adequate procedures for capturing reimbursable expenses. In some cases, these weaknesses resulted in inappropriate expenditures of funds. Specifically, we found problems with expenditures totaling about $433,000, including approximately $86,000 in improper expenditures, $3,000 in questionable expenditures, and $344,000 for unsupported expenditures. As a result of our audit, AFEO officials told us they have initiated several actions to improve financial and management controls and to recover funds from USO. Improved oversight of expenses reimbursed to USO for overseas tours. Additionally, as of September 2003, AFEO had recovered about $19,000 in improper and questionable payments it made to support USO overseas tours. Had USO’s independent auditor fully tested internal controls, the problems we identified might have surfaced. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Armed Forces Entertainment Program and its partnership with the United Services Organization (USO) in providing U.S. armed forces with celebrity entertainment overseas. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than 60 years, the United Services Organization (USO), in partnership with the Department of Defense (DOD), has provided support and entertainment to U.S. armed forces, relying heavily on private contributions and on funds, goods, and services from DOD. To assist USO, Congress, beginning in fiscal year 2000, provided a total of $23.8 million in grants to be awarded through DOD as seed money for an endowment fund. The availability of these funds to USO, along with DOD's ongoing support funded in its regular annual appropriations, represents a substantial financial commitment. GAO determined (1) the source and amount of DOD's support to USO in fiscal years 2000-2002 and (2) the sufficiency of internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that federal funds are used in an appropriate manner. GAO focused its audit on USO World Headquarters' activities and audited a limited selection of USO transactions for the 3 fiscal years.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2000 through 2002, DOD provided USO with substantial appropriated and nonappropriated support, but the total amount cannot be determined because of limitations in DOD's and USO's record-keeping systems. GAO identified at least $34.7 million in appropriated funds that DOD provided to support USO during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. Of this amount, $20.8 million was in congressionally appropriated grants to help USO establish the Spirit of Hope Endowment Fund to ensure the continuation of USO's programs and services. Another $12.1 million was for reimbursements to USO, and at least $1.8 million was paid directly by DOD for tour-related expenses such as commercial airfares, visas, and passports. DOD also provided other appropriated support, such as lodging and transportation. However, GAO could not determine the total monetary value of DOD's support from appropriated funds because neither DOD nor USO has record-keeping systems that aggregate the needed information. DOD also provides USO with nonappropriated support, largely in the form of in-kind goods (e.g., food), services (e.g., Internet access), and infrastructure support (e.g., performance facilities), to help sustain USO's overseas tours, but the same limitations precluded GAO from determining the total monetary value. DOD and USO did not have sufficient financial and management controls to reasonably ensure that all appropriated funds were used appropriately. DOD properly awarded grant funds to USO, and USO properly administered these funds. However, USO did not require its independent auditor to fully test internal controls over grants or funds reimbursed to USO by DOD, as required by its agreements with DOD. In terms of reimbursements to USO and direct payments by DOD, DOD lacked clearly written supplemental guidance regarding allowable expenses, management oversight in reviewing USO's invoices, and procedures for capturing reimbursable expenses. In some cases, these weaknesses resulted in inappropriate expenditures of funds. Based on limited testing, GAO found problems with payments totaling about $433,000, including about $86,000 in improper expenditures, $3,000 in questionable expenditures, and $344,000 for unsupported expenditures. Had USO's independent auditor tested internal controls, the problems GAO identified might have surfaced. As a result of GAO's audit, DOD stated it has initiated several actions to improve financial and management controls and to recover funds from USO. As of September 2003, DOD had recovered about $19,000 from USO in improper payments for overseas tour expenses. |
gao_GAO-07-865 | gao_GAO-07-865_0 | While Treasury has established many of the capabilities needed to select, control, and evaluate its IT investments, the department has significant weaknesses that hamper its ability to effectively manage its investments. Specifically, the department has executed 19 of the 38 key practices that the ITIM requires to build a foundation for IT investment management (Stage 2), including practices needed to ensure that projects support business needs and that a disciplined process exists for capturing investment information. In addition, the department has executed 11 of the 27 key practices required to manage investments as a portfolio (Stage 3), including documenting policies and procedures for conducting postimplementation reviews. However, Treasury does not have an executive investment review board— a group of executives from IT and business units that is intended to be the final decision-making authority—that is actively engaged in the investment management process. In addition, the department does not have any processes in place for managing its nonmajor investments, although they represent about 70 percent of the total number of investments. Until the department addresses these weaknesses, it will not have the investment management structure needed to effectively assess and manage the risks associated with its multibillion-dollar portfolio. Treasury Does Not Have a Comprehensive Plan to Guide Its Improvement Efforts
We have previously reported that to effectively implement IT investments management processes, organizations need to be guided by a plan that (1) is based on an assessment of strengths and weaknesses; (2) specifies measurable goals, objectives, and milestones; (3) specifies needed resources; (4) assigns clear responsibility and accountability for accomplishing tasks; and (5) is approved by senior-level management. Such a plan is instrumental in helping agencies coordinate and guide improvement efforts. Treasury has initiated efforts to improve its investment management process. Until Treasury develops this plan, the department risks not being able to put in place an effective management process that will provide appropriate executive-level oversight for minimizing risks and maximizing returns. (2) Develop and implement policies and procedures to manage nonmajor investments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) assess the Department of the Treasury’s capabilities for managing its IT investments, (2) determine any plans Treasury might have for improving those capabilities, and (3) evaluate the CIO’s role in managing the department’s IT investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Treasury relies extensively on information technology (IT) to carry out its mission. For fiscal year 2007, Treasury requested about $2.8 billion--the third largest planned IT expenditure among civilian agencies. GAO's objectives included (1) assessing Treasury's capabilities for managing its IT investments and (2) determining any plans the agency has for improving its capabilities. GAO used its IT investment management framework (ITIM) and associated methodology to address these objectives, focusing on the framework's stages related to the investment management provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.
What GAO Found
While Treasury has established many of the capabilities needed to select, control, and evaluate its IT investments, the department has significant weaknesses that hamper its ability to effectively manage its investments. Specifically, the department has executed 19 of the 38 key practices that the ITIM requires to build a foundation for IT investment management (Stage 2), including practices needed to ensure that projects support business needs and that a disciplined process exists for capturing investment information. In addition, the department has executed 11 of the 27 key practices required to manage investments as a portfolio (Stage 3), including documenting policies and procedures for conducting postimplementation reviews. However, Treasury does not have an executive investment review board--a group of executives from IT and business units that is intended to be the final decision-making authority--that is actively engaged in the investment management process. In addition, the department does not have any policies and procedures for managing its nonmajor investments, although they represent almost 70 percent of the total number of investments. Until the department addresses these weaknesses, it will not have the investment management structure needed to effectively assess and manage the risks associated with its multibillion-dollar portfolio. To its credit, Treasury has initiated efforts to improve its investment management process. For example, it has recently implemented a process for identifying major projects that should receive additional oversight. However, the department has not developed a comprehensive improvement plan that (1) is based on an assessment of strengths and weaknesses; (2) specifies measurable goals, objectives, and milestones; (3) specifies needed resources; (4) assigns clear responsibility and accountability for accomplishing tasks; and (5) is approved by senior-level management. GAO has previously reported that such a plan is instrumental in helping agencies coordinate and guide improvement efforts. Until Treasury develops this plan and the controls for implementing it, the department risks not being able to put in place an effective management process that will provide appropriate executive-level oversight for minimizing risks and maximizing returns. |
gao_GAO-04-119T | gao_GAO-04-119T_0 | The Federal Government Has Many Assets it Does Not Need
Despite significant changes in the size and mission needs of the federal government in recent years, the federal portfolio of real property assets in many ways still largely reflects the business model and technological environment of the 1950s and faces serious security challenges. The state of deterioration is alarming because of the magnitude of the repair backlog— current estimates show that tens of billions of dollars will be needed to restore these assets and make them fully functional. These factors include competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions; various legal and budget- related disincentives to businesslike outcomes; the need for improved capital planning; and the lack of a strategic, governmentwide focus on federal real property issues. Resolving the long-standing problems will require high-level attention and effective leadership by Congress and the administration and a governmentwide, strategic focus on real property issues. Real property problems related to unneeded property and the need for realignment, deteriorating conditions, unreliable data, costly space, and security concerns have multibillion-dollar cost implications and can seriously jeopardize mission accomplishment. Because of the breadth and complexity of the issues involved, the long-standing nature of the problems, and the intense debate about potential solutions that will likely ensue, current structures and processes may not be adequate to address the problems. Given this, we concluded in our high-risk report that a comprehensive and integrated transformation strategy for federal real property is needed, and an independent commission or governmentwide task force may be needed to develop this strategy. Such a strategy, based on input from agencies, the private sector, and other interested groups, could comprehensively address these long-standing problems with specific proposals on how best to realign the federal infrastructure and dispose of unneeded property, taking into account mission requirements, changes in technology, security needs, costs, and how the government conducts business in the 21st century; address the significant repair and restoration needs of the federal ensure that reliable governmentwide and agency-specific real property data—both financial and program related—are available for informed decisionmaking; resolve the problem of heavy reliance on costly leasing; and consider the impact that the threat of terrorism will have on real property needs and challenges, including how to balance public access with safety. Congress and the administration could work together to develop and enact reform legislation to give real property-holding agencies the tools they need to achieve better outcomes, foster a more businesslike real property environment, and provide for greater accountability for real property stewardship. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces longstanding problems with excess and underutilized real property, deteriorating facilities, unreliable real property data, and costly space. These problems have multibillion-dollar cost implications and can seriously jeopardize agencies' missions. In addition, federal agencies face many challenges securing real property due to the threat of terrorism. This testimony discusses long-standing, complex problems in the federal real property area and what actions are needed to address them.
What GAO Found
Government data show that over 30 agencies control hundreds of thousands of real property assets worldwide, including facilities and land, which are worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Unfortunately, much of this vast, valuable portfolio reflects an infrastructure based on the business model and technological environment of the 1950s. Many of the assets are no longer effectively aligned with, or responsive to, agencies' changing missions and are therefore no longer needed. Further, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration; agencies have estimated that restoration and repair needs are in the tens of billions of dollars. Compounding these problems are the lack of reliable governmentwide data for strategic asset management, a heavy reliance on costly leasing instead of ownership to meet new space needs, and the cost and challenge of protecting these assets against potential terrorism. Given the persistence of these problems and related obstacles, we designated federal real property as a new high-risk area in January 2003. Resolving these problems will require high-level attention and effective leadership by both Congress and the administration. Also, current structures and processes may not be adequate to address the problems. Thus, as we have reported, there is a need for a comprehensive, integrated transformation strategy for real property that will focus on some of the underlying causes that contribute to these problems, such as competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions, various legal and budget-related disincentives to businesslike outcomes, inadequate capital planning, and the lack of governmentwide focus on real property issues. It is equally important that Congress and the administration work together to develop and enact needed reform legislation to give real property-holding agencies incentives and tools they need to achieve better outcomes. This would also foster a more businesslike real property environment and provide for greater accountability. |
gao_GAO-04-124 | gao_GAO-04-124_0 | National Physician Supply Grew at Twice the Rate of the U.S. Population
The number of physicians in the United States increased about 26 percent, from about 541,000 to about 681,000 from 1991 to 2001. Physician growth was twice that of national population growth during this period. The national physician workforce maintained approximately a one-third generalist to two-thirds specialist composition between 1991 and 2001. In 1991, 8 metropolitan areas and 27 statewide nonmetropolitan areas had fewer than 100 physicians per 100,000 people. See appendix III for information on physician supply by state metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas in 1991 and 2001. Physician Supply Per 100,000 People Increased in Most Areas but Geographic Disparities Persisted
All 48 statewide nonmetropolitan areas experienced an increase in the number of physicians per 100,000 people from 1991 to 2001 and 301 of 318 metropolitan areas experienced an increase in physicians per 100,000 people. Overall, the nonmetropolitan areas had higher proportional growth in physicians per 100,000 people than the metropolitan areas, but the disparity in the supply of physicians per 100,000 people between the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas persisted. Rates of growth in the number of physicians per 100,000 people, the supply of physicians per 100,000 people, and the mix of generalists and specialists among categories of metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties varied. The disparity in the supply of physicians per 100,000 people between nonmetropolitan and metropolitan areas persisted because physicians continued to disproportionately locate in metropolitan areas. While nonmetropolitan counties with a large town (10,000 to 49,999 residents) had the biggest percentage increase in physicians per 100,000 people of all county categories, their supplies per 100,000 people were still less than large and small metropolitan counties’ supplies in 1991 and 2001. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HRSA for comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through a variety of programs, the federal government supports the training of physicians and encourages physicians to work in underserved areas or pursue primary care specialties. GAO was asked to provide information on the physician supply and the generalist and specialist mix of that supply in the United States and the changes in and geographic distribution of physician supply in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data on physician supply and geographic distribution from 1991 and 2001.
What GAO Found
The U.S. physician population increased 26 percent, which was twice the rate of total population growth, between 1991 and 2001. During this period the average number of physicians per 100,000 people increased from 214 to 239 and the mix of generalists and specialists in the national physician workforce remained about one-third generalists and two-thirds specialists. Growth in physician supply per 100,000 people between 1991 and 2001 was seen in historically high-supply metropolitan areas as well as low-supply statewide nonmetropolitan areas. Between 1991 and 2001, all statewide nonmetropolitan areas and 301 out of the 318 metropolitan areas gained physicians per 100,000 people. Of those 17 metropolitan areas that experienced declines in the number of physicians per 100,000 people, only 2 had fewer total physicians in 2001 than 1991. Overall, nonmetropolitan areas experienced higher proportional growth in physicians per 100,000 people than metropolitan areas, but the disparity in the supply of physicians per 100,000 people between nonmetropolitan and metropolitan areas persisted. Nonmetropolitan counties with a large town (10,000 to 49,999 residents) had the biggest increase in physicians per 100,000 people of all county categories but their supplies per 100,000 people were still less than large and small metropolitan counties' supplies in 1991 and 2001. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Health Resources and Services Administration agreed with GAO findings of persisting disparities between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. |
gao_GAO-05-198 | gao_GAO-05-198_0 | Mantis Processing Times Have Declined
Mantis processing times and the number of cases pending more than 60 days have declined significantly. In February 2004, we reported that the average length of time it took to process Mantis checks in Washington and for State to notify posts was 67 days for Mantis cases initiated from April— June 2003. State reported that the average Mantis processing time in October 2003 was 75 days. Although this plan remained a draft and was not fully implemented, State and other agencies acted on many of the steps called for in the plan and undertook other efforts to address difficulties that students and scholars face in obtaining visas. These actions included establishing a stand-alone Mantis team; providing additional guidance to consular officers; creating an electronic tracking system for Mantis cases; clarifying the roles and responsibilities of agencies involved in the Mantis process; reiterating a policy to give students and scholars priority interviews; and extending the validity period for Mantis clearances. Several agencies that participate in the Mantis process are not fully connected electronically to State’s tracking system. In order to facilitate travel, State Department officials proposed to extend visa validities for students and scholars on a reciprocal basis. Students and Scholars from China Are Limited to 6- Month, Two-Entry Visas
China has one of the strictest visa reciprocity schedules for students and scholars. As we reported in 2004, the use of the cabling system to transmit Mantis cases can lead to unnecessary delays in the process. Provide more opportunities for consular officers at key Mantis consular posts to receive guidance and feedback on the Visas Mantis program through direct interaction with agency officials knowledgeable about the program. To identify and assess actions taken to implement our recommendation to improve the Visas Mantis program, we obtained documentation from key U.S. agencies, primarily the State Department, interviewed officials from these agencies, and observed training classes for new consular officers at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2004, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the time taken to adjudicate visas for science students and scholars. Specifically, a primary tool used to screen these applicants for visas (the Visas Mantis program) was operating inefficiently. We found that it took an average of 67 days to process Mantis checks, and many cases were pending for 60 days or more. GAO also found that the way in which information was shared among agencies prevented cases from being resolved expeditiously. Finally, consular officers lacked sufficient program guidance. This report discusses the time to process Mantis checks and assesses actions taken and timeframes for improving the Mantis program.
What GAO Found
Mantis processing times have declined significantly. In November 2004, the average time to process a Mantis check was about 15 days, far lower than the average of 67 days we reported previously. The number of Mantis cases pending more than 60 days has also dropped significantly. Although an action plan that the State Department (State) drafted was not fully implemented, State and other agencies took several actions in response to our recommendations to improve Visas Mantis and to facilitate travel by foreign students and scholars. These actions included (1) adding staff to process Mantis cases, (2) providing additional guidance to consular officers, (3) developing an electronic tracking system, (4) clarifying roles and responsibilities of agencies involved in the Mantis program, (5) reiterating State's policy of giving students and scholars priority interviews, and (6) extending the validity of Mantis clearances. Nonetheless, some issues remain unresolved. Consular officers at posts we visited continue to need guidance on the Mantis program, particularly through direct interaction with State officials knowledgeable about the program. Several agencies that receive Mantis cases are not fully connected to State's electronic tracking system. This can lead to unnecessary delays in the process. Finally, students and scholars from China are limited to 6-month, two-entry visas. The Chinese government has rejected a proposal by the United States to extend visa validities, on a reciprocal basis, for students and scholars. |
gao_RCED-98-42 | gao_RCED-98-42_0 | All electricity loans on which RUS has provided repayment guarantees in recent years have been made by the Treasury’s Federal Financing Bank (FFB). Opportunities Exist to Make the Loan Programs More Effective and Less Costly
RUS’ electricity and telecommunications loans are intended to assist in the development of the nation’s rural areas. First, lending practices could be modified to ensure that the loans benefit areas with low populations, thereby more effectively using the agency’s limited loan funds. Currently, borrowers serving areas that are heavily populated sometimes receive loans. Second, RUS’ subsidized direct loans could be focused on borrowers that are not capable of using their own resources or of obtaining loans from the private sector to fund their utility projects. Targeting subsidized direct loans to borrowers in need of federal assistance could result in the more effective use of the loan funds.Currently, financially healthy borrowers sometimes receive these subsidized loans. As a result, RUS’ loans are sometimes made to financially healthy borrowers that may not need federal assistance to fund their utility projects. Modifying certain aspects of both loan programs could reduce the agency’s vulnerability to losses on new loans. First, loan and indebtedness limits could be imposed. Currently, the loan programs generally lack limits, and, as a result, some borrowers have obtained large-dollar loans and accumulated large levels of debt. Second, the repayment guarantee that RUS places on loans made by other lenders could be reduced so that the lenders participating in RUS’ programs would share in the risk of the loans they make. Currently, RUS guarantees 100 percent of other lenders’ loans. While RUS did not make or guarantee loans to such borrowers during the period covered by our review, there are no policies to prevent loans to such borrowers from being made in the future. However, because all guaranteed loans in recent years have been made by the FFB, the risk to the federal government as a whole would not be reduced if the FFB continues to be the sole source of loan funds. Commercial Lending for Rural Electricity and Telecommunications Purposes
RUS is not the only provider of credit to rural utilities. These two commercial lenders had a combined total of $13.1 billion in outstanding principal on loans for rural electricity and telecommunications purposes as of June 30, 1997. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. They also requested that we compile loan information on commercial lenders that have a significant level of lending for rural electricity and telecommunications purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Rural Utilities Service's electricity and telecommunication loan programs, focusing on: (1) ways to make the loan programs more effective and less costly for the government; (2) ways to decrease the Rural Utilities Service's vulnerability to loan losses; and (3) loan information on commercial lenders that have a significant level of lending for rural electricity and telecommunication purposes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because loan programs are intended to assist in the development of the nation's rural areas, targeting loans to borrowers that provide services to areas with low populations could result in the more effective use of the agency's limited loan funds; (2) current lending practices sometimes result in loans to borrowers serving areas that are heavily populated; (3) targeting subsidized direct loans to borrowers that need the agency's assistance to fund their utility projects could result in the more effective use of the loan funds and reduce the level of subsidized loans and program costs; (4) the agency sometimes makes its subsidized direct loans to borrowers capable of using their own resources or of obtaining loans from the private sector to fund their utility projects; (5) graduating the agency's financially viable borrowers from direct loans to commercial credit could also reduce program costs; (6) opportunities also exist to decrease the Rural Utilities Service's vulnerability to losses; (7) the agency's vulnerability could be lessened if loan and indebtedness limits were established; (8) borrowers have been able to obtain large-dollar loans and accumulate large amounts of debt because such limits are generally lacking; (9) the repayment guarantee that the agency places on loans made by other lenders could be reduced so that lenders holding the guaranteed loans bear some portion of the financial risk; (10) the agency guarantees the repayment of loans made by other lenders at 100 percent; (11) because all guaranteed loans in recent years have been made by the Treasury's Federal Financing Bank, the risk to the federal government as a whole would not be reduced if the Federal Financing Bank continues to be the sole source of loan funds; (12) although the agency did not make or guarantee loans to such borrowers during the period covered by GAO's review, there are no policies prohibiting additional loans to such borrowers; (13) the Rural Utilities Service is not the only provider of credit to rural utilities; (14) two commercial lenders are actively involved in lending to rural electricity and telecommunications providers; and (15) these two lenders had approximately $13.1 billion in outstanding principal on loans for rural electricity and telecommunication purposes. |
gao_HEHS-97-36 | gao_HEHS-97-36_0 | CCRCs Encourage Exercise, Proper Nutrition, and Social Involvement
Many of the CCRCs we visited promote good health for their residents by encouraging exercise, proper nutrition, and social involvement. They also said that the physical layout of CCRCs fosters social interaction and is an integral part of the CCRC model. These activities are carried out by nurses, social workers and physicians who may be either affiliated with or independent of the CCRC. Most of the CCRCs we visited encourage early detection of health problems through periodic medical exams and other health assessments. CCRCs Use a Multidisciplinary, Coordinated Approach to Manage Chronic Conditions
CCRCs we visited use a multidisciplinary, coordinated approach to manage care for their residents with chronic conditions such as hypertension and heart disease. Essential elements of this approach include a wide range of on-site services, coordination of services to ensure residents receive them in an appropriate and timely manner, and active monitoring of residents with chronic conditions. CCRC staff coordinate various services provided by both CCRC staff and other providers whether on site or off. Teams meet regularly to reassess needs and services. CCRC Practices May Provide Health Benefits but Effect on Costs Is Largely Undemonstrated
Many of the practices we identified in CCRCs for health promotion, disease prevention, and early detection of health problems are credited by experts and the literature with reducing the risk of disease and disability and improving health and functioning among the elderly. Education and counseling to encourage exercise and proper nutrition are also recommended. Experts told us that because care for older people with chronic conditions may involve many modes of treatment and disciplines, it needs to be organized, coordinated, and managed. While evidence exists for the effectiveness of many of the practices we found in these CCRCs, their effect on health care costs and use of health services has not been conclusively demonstrated. Scope and Methodology
We focused our work on practices that 11 continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs) use to maintain or improve the health and functioning of their elderly residents and to manage the use of health and other services by residents with chronic conditions. To address our study objectives, we (1) visited 11 CCRCs to examine care management practices, (2) reviewed the literature on CCRCs and on health and cost effects of CCRCs’ practices, and (3) interviewed experts on CCRCs and geriatric medicine as well as officials from HCFA’s Office of Managed Care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the processes of managed care in continuing care retirement communities (CCRC), focusing on: (1) CCRC practices for promoting wellness; (2) practices for managing care for elderly people with chronic conditions; and (3) evidence regarding the possible effect of these practices on health status and costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) to serve their elderly residents, CCRCs GAO examined manage care to meet the needs of both healthy individuals and those who have chronic conditions; (2) they use active strategies to promote health, prevent disease, and detect health problems early by encouraging exercise, proper nutrition, social contacts, immunizations, and periodic medical exams and assessments for all residents; (3) many of these CCRCs also have multidisciplinary teams of nurses, social workers, rehabilitation specialists, physicians, dieticians, or others to plan and manage residents' care; (4) these teams meet periodically to discuss residents' health and functional status, determine whether services are needed, and decide on the types of treatment, services, and supports that will be provided; (5) CCRC staff coordinate a wide range of health and other services, whether provided on or off site, to enhance their benefit to the individual resident; (6) active monitoring of the health and functioning of residents who have chronic conditions, such as arthritis, hypertension, and heart disease, is an integral part of this coordinated, multidisciplinary approach to managing care; (7) many of these CCRCs' practices are considered to be effective in improving the health and functioning of the elderly, although their effect on health care costs is largely undemonstrated; (8) regular medical exams and health assessments, immunizations, and counseling to encourage exercise, proper nutrition, and social interaction are all recommended by experts and the literature as effective health promotion and disease prevention strategies for the elderly; (9) in addition, geriatric experts recommend a coordinated and multidisciplinary approach to manage chronic conditions among the elderly because their care may involve many modes of treatment and disciplines; and (10) while the health benefit of these practices has been demonstrated, little evidence exists to demonstrate health cost savings from either the CCRC package of services or most of the practices individually. |
gao_NSIAD-98-169 | gao_NSIAD-98-169_0 | Consequently, the Congress enacted base realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. Funding Opportunities to Offset the 1999 BRAC Budget Request
Our analysis of the base closure account and the fiscal year 1999 BRAC budget request raises questions about the need for $131.1 million included in the request. Funds Allocated to BRAC 1991 Environmental Projects Could Be Used to Offset the Request
During March and April 1998, the military services allocated $8.5 million from the 1990 base closure account for BRAC 1991 environmental requirements that no longer existed (see table 5). Although the $26 million was put in a holding account for potential reprogramming for other higher priority programs, the money was never used for these programs. Conclusions
DOD and the military services have reduced the previous high unobligated balance in the 1990 base closure account. Our questions center on the potential (1) use of unreported proceeds from BRAC actions, unused funds allocated to the BRAC 1991 round, and withheld BRAC appropriations from fiscal year 1998 to offset equivalent amounts of funding included in the 1999 budget request and (2) need for funding requested for two MILCON projects, where the requirements for one project have not been determined and the other has already been funded. DOD’s fiscal year 1999 budget request did not reflect $35.7 million in proceeds that was collected but not included in the request. Also, the 1999 budget request contains $40.6 million for two MILCON projects that are no longer needed. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) base closure accounts and its budget request for base closure activities, focusing on opportunities for offsetting the budget request for fiscal year (FY) 1999, including the validity of two proposed military construction (MILCON) projects included in that request.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD and the military services have reduced the previous high unobligated balances in the 1990 base closure account; (2) however, there are opportunities to offset the 1999 budget request; (3) GAO's analysis of the 1990 account and the FY 1999 base realignment and closure (BRAC) budget request raises questions about the need for $131.1 million included in the request; and (4) specifically: (a) from the 1990 base closure account, $35.7 million in proceeds generated by BRAC activities that has not been reported to Congress; $12.5 million previously allocated but not needed for BRAC 1991 MILCON projects; $7.8 million allocated but not needed for BRAC 1991 operation and maintenance activities; and $8.5 million previously allocated but not needed for BRAC 1991 environmental projects; (b) from the FY 1998 BRAC appropriations, $26 million previously withheld but ultimately was not needed for other higher priority programs; and (c) from 1999 BRAC budget request, $40.6 million requested for two separate MILCON projects may no longer be needed because the requirements for one project have not been determined and the other has already been funded. |
gao_GAO-11-545 | gao_GAO-11-545_0 | DOD Has Made Limited Progress in Delivering Improved Capabilities to Address SSA Shortfalls and Delivery of New Capabilities Expected within the Next 5 Years Faces Challenges
DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost, schedule, and performance challenges which are rooted in systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, both face challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. Space Situational Awareness Faces Significant Governmentwide Management and Oversight Challenges
There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of organizations and assets involved in the mission, and the fact that, while the new National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. However, actions are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. Additionally, the recently issued National Space Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, and among other things, directs the determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the need to develop specific measures for improving SSA capabilities, is also a positive step. Lastly, though the commercial sector and the international community are to play pivotal roles in the SSA mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD’s efforts to expand and make permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities. National SSA architecture. National Security Space Strategy. Therefore, while it is too early to determine the extent to which these new capabilities will address existing shortfalls, it is essential that new SSA system acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure capabilities from these systems are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. We have consistently made recommendations for establishing reliable acquisition business cases, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements, and DOD has already embraced these for its newest major space acquisition—the Global Positioning System IIIA program. For SSA in particular, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take the following two actions: Assure—as part of the approval for the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development—that all critical technologies are identified and matured to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic or operational environment, and that other key program risks have been fully assessed to help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals will be met (for JMS in particular, implementing this recommendation may require dividing the program into separate increments). If a determination is made that the effort should move forward into product development with less mature technologies, then conduct an assessment of available backup technologies that may lessen capability and add cost to the programs and the additional time, money, and effort that may be required to meet performance objectives. We continue to believe an assessment of utilizing backup technologies should occur prior to the start of system development, as the results of such an assessment could provide knowledge needed to determine whether the acquisition program is still worth pursuing or what tradeoffs would need to be made with other investments should additional resources be required. To review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, we examined Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition efforts that are expected to deliver large gains in SSA capabilities during fiscal years 2010 through 2015, including Space Surveillance Network sensor upgrade and life-extension efforts aimed to avoid gaps in operational capabilities; development of new sensors, such as the Space Based Space Surveillance, Space Fence, and Space Surveillance Telescope efforts; and the development of the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System to integrate data and provide real-time information for SSA and command and control of space forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States' growing dependence on space systems makes them vulnerable to a range of threats. DOD has undertaken a variety of initiatives to provide space situational awareness (SSA)--the knowledge and characterization of space objects and the environment on which space operations depend. GAO was asked to (1) review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, and their progress meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) determine how much an integrated approach is being used to manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities. To achieve this, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed key officials on major SSA development efforts and oversight and management of SSA. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2011.
What GAO Found
DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost, schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, two critical acquisition efforts that are scheduled to begin development within the next 2 years--Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS)--face development challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. It is essential that these acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure their capabilities are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. GAO has consistently recommended that reliable acquisition business cases be established, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements in order to reduce program risks. For efforts that move forward with less mature technologies, assessments of the cost, schedule, and performance implications of utilizing backup technologies, if they exist, could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether the efforts are worth pursuing or the investment trade-offs that may need to be made. DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years, but it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will address capability shortfalls. There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and assets involved in the mission. Additionally, while the recently issued National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. However, actions, such as development of a national SSA architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other positive steps, such as the determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the development of options for new measures for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently-issued National Security Space Strategy could help guide the implementation of the new space policy. GAO has recommended since 2003 that such a strategy be issued. Finally, though the commercial sector and the international community are to play a pivotal role in the SSA mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD's efforts to expand and make permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD assure--in approving the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development--that all critical technologies are identified and matured, and that other key risks have been fully assessed. If DOD determines that the programs should move forward with less mature technologies, DOD should assess available backup technologies and additional resources required to meet performance objectives. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe DOD should assess required resources earlier than its stated intent. |
gao_GAO-12-548 | gao_GAO-12-548_0 | State Partnership Program Stakeholders Cited Benefits but Program Oversight Is Hindered by Lack of Clear Goals, Objectives, and Progress Measures
State Partnership Program stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits of the program, but the program lacks clear goals, objectives, and performance metrics. Without a comprehensive oversight framework for defining and measuring progress, DOD cannot fully assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources. We have previously reported that achieving results in government requires a comprehensive oversight framework that includes clear goals, measurable objectives, and metrics for assessing progress.Officials stated that they recognize the need to update program goals and objectives to more accurately reflect the current environment and the focus on military-to-military activities, and reported that they have initiated such efforts and expect the new goals and objectives to be finalized by July 2012. Complete Information about Activities and Funding Is Unavailable
We cannot provide complete information on the types and frequency of State Partnership Program activities or the total funding amounts for these activities for fiscal years 2007 to 2011 because activity data are incomplete as well as inconsistent and funding data are incomplete. The National Guard Bureau uses its own system to track State Partnership Program events that it funds. However, the terminology used to identify activity types varied both across the combatant commands and between the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. In addition, although State Partnership Program activities that are funded by both a combatant command and the National Guard Bureau should be entered into each entity’s database for its respective funded amount, four combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau reported that there is no standard method for all the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau to ensure the separate entries can be easily compiled in order to see all data maintained on a particular activity, including the total funding amount of the activity. We found that funding data from the National Guard Bureau and some of the combatant commands were incomplete. Challenges in Funding Activities and Incorporating U.S. and Foreign Partner Civilians Require Additional Guidance and Training
State Partnership Program stakeholders that we contacted, including combatant commands, State Partnership Program Coordinators, and Bilateral Affairs Officers, cited several types of challenges in funding State Partnership Program activities and in incorporating U.S. and foreign partner civilians into events. Although guidance and training exist on funding for the program, stakeholders expressed confusion in response to our questions. The most prominent challenge cited by State Partnership Program stakeholders involved concerns about conducting and funding activities that include civilian participants. These included activities such as subject matter expert exchanges with members of the state’s fire department and the host nation on military support to civil authorities; a familiarization on 911 system operations between U.S. and host country civilians; and a subject matter expert exchange with U.S. and foreign partner law enforcement officials on maritime border security issues. National Guard Bureau officials told us that since the issuance of the Directive Type Memorandum, states have become cautious about conducting events with civilians, and many have chosen to not conduct any events with civilians due to a concern about violating DOD guidance. The draft DOD instruction is still undergoing review and is intended to provide clarifying information on the use of funds appropriated to DOD prior to the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Without further guidance and training in this area, the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands may miss additional opportunities to use the program to fulfill their missions. To enable oversight and improve the completeness and consistency of data needed to manage the State Partnership Program, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Joint Staff, in coordination with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the combatant commands, and the embassy country teams, to develop guidance for all stakeholders that includes agreed-upon definitions for data fields and rules for maintaining data until the global data system is fully implemented. To determine the extent to which State Partnership Program activities are meeting the goals and objectives of the program, we gathered documentation; interviewed National Guard Bureau officials about the development of goals, objectives, and performance metrics for the program; and assessed their efforts based on criteria from our previous work. To determine the completeness and consistency of activity and funding data for the program, we collected and analyzed data on State Partnership Program activities from fiscal years 2007 through 2011— including types of activities, funding sources, and funding amounts— obtained from the National Guard Bureau and the six U.S. geographic combatant commands. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Guards State Partnership Program is a DOD security cooperation program that matches state National Guards with foreign countries to conduct joint activitiesincluding visits between senior military leaders and knowledge sharing in areas such as disaster managementthat further U.S. national security goals. The program has partnerships between 52 U.S. state and territory National Guards and 69 countries. In fiscal year 2011, program expenditures were at least $13.2 million. The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study the program. GAO determined (1) the extent to which State Partnership Program activities are meeting program goals and objectives; (2) the types and frequency of activities and funding levels of the program; and (3) any challenges DOD faces in the programs implementation. GAO collected written responses to questions from State Partnership Program Coordinators at the state level, Bilateral Affairs Officers at the U.S. embassies in the partner nations, and officials at the combatant commands, reviewed documents, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Many State Partnership Program stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program, but the program lacks a comprehensive oversight framework that includes clear program goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress against those goals, which limits the Department of Defenses (DOD) and Congress ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources. The benefits described by all stakeholders focused on the programs contributions to meeting their specific missions, such as building security relationships, providing experience to guardsmen, and supporting combatant commands missions. Goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress are necessary for management oversight, and National Guard Bureau officials told GAO that they recognize the need to update the programs goals and develop metrics and have initiated efforts in these areas. Officials expect completion of these efforts in summer 2012. Until program goals and metrics are implemented, DOD cannot fully assess or adequately oversee the program.
State Partnership Program activity data are incomplete as well as inconsistent and funding data are incomplete for fiscal years 2007 through 2011; therefore GAO cannot provide complete information on the types and frequency of activities or total funding amounts for those years. GAO found that the multiple data systems used to track program activities and funding are not interoperable and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs. The terminology used to identify activity types is inconsistent across the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. Further, funding data from the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands were incomplete, and while the National Guard Bureau provided its total spending on the program since 2007, it could not provide information on the cost of individual activities. Although the National Guard Bureau has initiated efforts to improve the accuracy of its own State Partnership Program data, without common agreement with the combatant commands on what types of data need to be tracked and how to define activities, the data cannot be easily reconciled across databases.
The most prominent challenge cited by State Partnership Program stakeholders involved how to fund activities that include U.S. and foreign partner civilian participants. Activities involving civilians, for example, have included subject-matter expert exchanges on military support to civil authorities and maritime border security. Although DOD guidance does not prohibit civilian involvement in activities, many stakeholders have the impression that the U.S. military is not permitted to engage civilians in State Partnership Program activities and some states may have chosen not to conduct any events with civilians due to the perception that it may violate DOD guidance. DOD and the National Guard Bureau are working on developing additional guidance and training in this area. Until these efforts are completed, confusion may continue to exist and hinder the programs full potential to fulfill National Guard and combatant command missions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD complete its comprehensive oversight framework for the State Partnership Program, develop guidance to achieve reliable data on the program, and issue guidance and conduct additional training on the appropriate use of funding for program activities, including those involving civilians. DOD concurred with all recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-260 | gao_T-AIMD-00-260_0 | SBA had made progress in establishing an investment review board and is beginning to define an investment selection process. However, it had not yet established IT investment management policies and procedures to help identify and select projects that will provide mission-focused benefits and maximum risk-adjusted returns. Likewise, SBA had not yet defined processes for investment control and evaluation to ensure that selected IT projects will be developed on time, within budget, and according to requirements, and that these projects will generate expected benefits. The agency had performed only limited reviews of major IT investments, and these reviews were ad-hoc since little data had been captured for analyzing benefits and returns on investment. SBA had made progress with its target IT architecture by describing its core business processes, analyzing information used in its business processes, describing data maintenance and data usage, identifying standards that support information transfer and processing, and establishing guidelines for migrating current applications to the planned environment. However, procedures did not exist for change management to ensure that new systems installations and software changes would be compatible with other systems and SBA’s planned operating environment. SBA lacked policies for software development and acquisition to help produce information systems within the cost, budget, and schedule goals set during the investment management process that at the same time comply with the guidance and standards of its IT architecture. An existing systems development methodology was being adopted, however, to replace outdated guidelines that lacked key processes for software development. Our review of the selected software projects indicated that SBA’s practices were typically ad hoc for project planning, project tracking and oversight, quality assurance, and configuration management. SBA had not conducted periodic risk assessments for its mission-critical systems; the agency had only recently conducted a security workload assessment and a risk assessment for one system. Training and education had not been provided to promote security awareness and responsibilities of employees and contract staff. SBA had not established policies and procedures to identify and address its short- and long-term requirements for IT knowledge and skills. Further, SBA had not evaluated its progress in improving IT human capital capabilities or used data to continuously improve human capital strategies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Small Business Administration's (SBA) management of information technology (IT), focusing on five key areas: (1) investment management; (2) architecture; (3) software development and acquisition; (4) information security; and (5) human capital management.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SBA had made progress in establishing an investment review board and is beginning to define an investment selection process; (2) however, it had not yet established IT investment management policies and procedures to help identify and select projects that will provide mission-focused benefits and maximum risk-adjusted returns; (3) likewise, SBA had not yet defined processes for investment control and evaluation to ensure that selected IT projects will be developed on time, within budget, and according to requirements, and that these projects will generate expected benefits; (4) the agency had performed only limited reviews of major IT investments, and these reviews were ad-hoc since little data had been captured for analyzing benefits and returns on investment; (5) SBA had made progress with its target IT architecture by describing its core business processes, analyzing information used in its business processes, describing data maintenance and data usage, identifying standards that support information transfer and processing, and establishing guidelines for migrating current applications to the planned environment; (6) however, procedures did not exist for change management to ensure that new systems installations and software changes would be compatible with other systems and SBA's planned operating environment; (7) SBA lacked policies for software development and acquisition to help produce information systems within the cost, budget, and schedule goals set during the investment management process that at the same time comply with the guidance and standards of its IT architecture; (8) an existing systems development methodology was being adopted to replace outdated guidelines that lacked key processes for software development; (9) GAO's review of the selected software projects indicated that SBA's practices were typically ad-hoc for project planning, project tracking and oversight, quality assurance, and configuration management; (10) SBA had not conducted periodic risk assessments for its mission-critical systems; (11) the agency had only recently conducted a security workload assessment and a risk assessment for one system; (12) training and education had not been provided to promote security awareness and responsibilities of employees and contract staff; (13) SBA had not established policies and procedures to identify and address its short- and long-term requirements for IT knowledge and skills; and (14) further, SBA had not evaluated its progress in improving IT human capital capabilities or used data to continuously improve human capital strategies. |
gao_NSIAD-95-211 | gao_NSIAD-95-211_0 | This number increased to about 4,700 during the same period in 1994. As the flow of rafters increased, President Clinton announced on August 19, 1994, that the Coast Guard would no longer bring interdicted Cubans to the United States but would hold them at Guantanamo Bay. The President and the Attorney General indicated at that time that those Cubans taken to Guantanamo Bay would have no opportunity for eventual entry into the United States. This announcement reversed a 3-decade policy of welcoming Cubans seeking refuge into the United States. The U.S. The United States later began granting parole to certain categories of Cubans in the safe haven camps at Guantanamo Bay. These four categories became known as the “four protocols.”
On May 2, 1995, the White House Press Secretary announced that Cubans interdicted at sea would no longer be taken to safe haven at Guantanamo Bay but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply for entry into the United States through legal channels at the U.S. She also announced at that time that remaining Cubans at Guantanamo Bay—about 18,500 as of June 7, 1995—would be considered for parole into the United States, excluding those found to be ineligible for parole due to criminal activity in Cuba, in the United States, or while in safe haven and those with certain serious medical conditions. The U.S. Since May 2, 1995, most Cubans interdicted at sea have been returned by the Coast Guard to Cuba. Other organizations are also involved in Cuban migration operations at Guantanamo Bay. Costs Associated With Cuban Migration
We estimate that the total cost of the U.S. response to the Cuban exodus from August 1994 through fiscal year 1995 will exceed $497 million (see table 2). As of June 9, 1995, the Interests Section had approved 16,305 for entry into the United States. Sixty Cuban rafters had been interdicted and repatriated to Cuba as of that date, pursuant to the May 2 announcement that such individuals would be returned to Cuba. Conditions at the Guantanamo Bay Camps
While detention in safe haven camps is undoubtedly difficult, our review at the Guantanamo Bay camps indicated that living conditions were adequate. While we found no internationally accepted criteria for minimal refugee living standards, we noted that the U.S. Atlantic Command had developed standards for safe haven conditions based on inspection guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and standard military regulations and manuals’ requirements. 1 through 3.) 4). Travel From Cuba to the United States Is Being Delayed
Although by September 1995 the Interests Section will likely have processed for U.S. entry the 20,000 Cubans called for in the September 9, 1994, agreement as well as the 6,700 on the noncurrent immigrant visa preference list, it is unlikely that this number will travel to the United States by that date. The U.S. government repeatedly voiced its concern to the Cuban government about the exorbitant airfare. Scope and Methodology
We identified U.S. policies toward Cubans seeking U.S. entry through discussions with State, INS, and CRS officials and reviewing documentation such as agreements with the Cuban government, joint communiques, administration announcements of parole and safe haven positions, and pertinent legislation. To determine the processing capabilities of the Interests Section, we interviewed INS officials in Washington, D.C., and visited the Interests Section in Havana. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. government's actions to address the 1994 Cuban migration crisis, focusing on: (1) how U.S. policy has toward those seeking to leave Cuba has changed since that time; (2) the agencies involved with and costs to the government associated with the exodus of Cubans; (3) the capabilities of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to process applicants seeking legal entry into the United States; and (4) the adequacy of living conditions at the Cuban safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) for over 30 years, fleeing Cubans had been welcomed to the United States; however, the U.S. government reversed this policy on August 19, 1994, when President Clinton announced that Cuban rafters interdicted at sea would no longer be brought to the United States and would be taken to safe haven camps at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with no opportunity for eventual entry into the United States other than by returning to Havana to apply for entry through legal channels at the U.S. Interests Section; (2) on September 9, 1994, the U.S. and Cuban governments agreed that the United States would allow at least 20,000 Cubans to enter annually in exchange for Cuba's pledge to prevent further unlawful departures by rafters; (3) on May 2, 1995, a White House announcement was released stating that: Cubans interdicted at sea would not be taken to a safe haven but would be returned to Cuba where they could apply for entry into the United States at the Interest Section in Havana, eligible Cubans in the safe haven camps would be paroled into the United States, and those found to be ineligible for parole would be returned to Cuba; (4) several U.S. agencies have been involved in implementing the U.S. policy regarding Cubans wishing to leave their country including the: (a) Department of Defense which will spend about $434 million from August 1994 through September 1995 operating the safe haven camps, (b) U.S. Coast Guard which spent about $7.8 million interdicting Cubans at sea from August 1994 to the present, (c) Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service and Community Relations Service which together will spend about $48.6 million for the Cuban migration crisis from August 1994 through September 1995, and (d) Department of State which will spend an estimated $7.1 million during this same period; (5) the U.S. Interests Section in Havana has been able to meet the workload of processing applicants seeking legal entry into the United States; (6) as of June 9, 1995, it had approved 16,305 Cubans for U.S. entry; however, not all those approved will leave Cuba by September 1995, the anniversary of the September 1994 agreement; (7) the Cubans' living conditions at the Guantanamo Bay safe haven camps are difficult but adequate based on GAO's observations at the camps; and (8) conditions in all camps generally exceeded U.N. inspection guidelines for minimal shelter, food, and water, but found no internationally accepted standards of what the living conditions should be at refugee camps. |
gao_GAO-15-156 | gao_GAO-15-156_0 | Discipline. Attorneys. Furthermore, the Deputy Counsel reported that changes to OPR’s intake process have reduced the amount of time it takes OPR to initially assess the merit of a complaint from up to 90 days to approximately 7 days. DOJ Does Not Ensure Discipline Is Implemented or Consistent and Some Attorneys Found to Have Engaged in Misconduct Receive Performance Awards
Ensuring Discipline Is Implemented
DOJ does not require components to demonstrate that attorneys found to have engaged in professional misconduct serve the discipline imposed upon them. Consistent and Timely Discipline Decisions
DOJ has plans to help ensure consistent and timely decisions about discipline for attorneys who OPR finds to have engaged in professional misconduct, but has not yet implemented these plans.DOJ did not provide GAO with reasons for why it has not yet taken action to implement these changes. Supervisors Use Managerial Discretion as well as DOJ Guidance and Other Support when Assigning Work to, and Overseeing, Attorneys
Supervisors of attorneys accused of, or found to have engaged, in professional misconduct use managerial discretion when determining what work responsibilities they will assign to these attorneys and ensuring that these attorneys are complying with professional standards. These respondents reported that they assign work to attorneys on a case-by-case basis but based on a variety of factors, including the following:
The nature of the alleged misconduct. For example, they may not assign work responsibilities to attorneys accused of professional misconduct any differently than other attorneys until they consult with EOUSA’s General Counsel’s Office or component management. DOJ’s Policy Is Not to Provide Counsel for Its Attorneys for OPR Proceedings, but DOJ Paid $3.66 Million over 6 Years for Private Counsel Representation in Related Legal Proceedings
Under departmental policy, DOJ is not to authorize legal representation for purposes of defending attorneys in proceedings that OPR conducts because it is generally not in the interests of the United States to provide federal employees with legal representation in internal agency This policy also precludes legal administrative investigations.representation to assist employees in preparing submissions to support their defense in internal disciplinary investigations, or to represent employees in agency disciplinary proceedings, including those that OPR conducts. For example, according to DOJ, assuming that an attorney’s request for representation meets the criteria set forth in DOJ’s policy statement, DOJ could provide representation for a DOJ attorney who is the subject of a state bar proceeding while that attorney is also the subject of an OPR investigation related to the same conduct. However, representation would be limited to the state bar proceeding, not for defense in the OPR investigation. We determined that DOJ expended $3.66 million from fiscal years 2008 through 2013 for private counsel representation for 38 DOJ attorneys, in headquarters or in an USAO, involved in 18 legal proceedings where there were also related OPR investigations. Furthermore, by requiring that DOJ establish near-term milestones for expanding PMRU’s jurisdiction to all department attorneys, DOJ can better ensure that it is addressing violations of professional misconduct for all department attorneys in a timely and consistent manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help provide Congress and the public with reasonable assurance that attorneys found to have engaged in professional misconduct are disciplined, and prevent delays in implementing this discipline, we recommend that the Attorney General take the following two actions: require components that impose discipline to demonstrate that they actually implemented the discipline—similar to EOUSA’s requirement, and establish near-term milestones that will hold the department accountable for completing its goal to expand PMRU’s jurisdiction to all department attorneys found by OPR to have engaged in professional misconduct. 2. How do supervisors determine work responsibilities for attorneys accused of, or who have been found to have engaged in, professional misconduct? We also reviewed previous GAO and DOJ Inspector General reports on DOJ’s processes for managing professional misconduct and disciplining attorneys. We reviewed OPR complaint data from fiscal years 2008 through 2013 in order to describe what, if any, changes occurred in the number of complaints and the length of time to complete inquiries and investigations since DOJ’s process for managing complaints of professional misconduct changed in 2011.We reviewed OPR complaint data from fiscal years 2008 through 2013 in order to describe what, if any, changes occurred in the number of complaints and the length of time to complete inquiries and investigations since DOJ’s process for managing complaints of professional misconduct changed in 2011. We also interviewed senior-level DOJ officials within OPR, PMRU, the Criminal Division, the Executive Office for U.S. To address our second objective, we sent a questionnaire to 20 selected U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) and 28 litigating sections within selected DOJ components to collect information on the various types of policies and procedures put in place to manage the work activities of attorneys accused of or found to have engaged in professional misconduct. | Why GAO Did This Study
Instances of professional misconduct—such as a violation of an attorney’s responsibilities to be honest—among DOJ attorneys have called into question DOJ’s efforts to oversee attorney behavior, including its processes for investigating and disciplining misconduct complaints.
Congress mandated GAO to review DOJ's performance in disciplining attorneys. This report addresses (1) DOJ's processes to manage misconduct complaints; (2) how supervisors determine work responsibilities for attorneys accused of, or found to have engaged in, misconduct; and (3) DOJ's policies for paying for representation for attorneys investigated for misconduct. GAO reviewed DOJ regulatory obligations and policies, and legal representation costs from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. GAO also analyzed survey responses on assigning work responsibilities from 48 selected litigating sections. Responses are not generalizable, but provided helpful insights. GAO also interviewed DOJ officials who manage misconduct complaints.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has made changes to improve its processes for managing complaints of attorney professional misconduct since 2011 but has not implemented plans to improve processes for demonstrating that discipline is implemented, or achieving timely and consistent discipline decisions. For example, GAO found that changes to the Office of Professional Responsibility's (OPR) processes for assessing the merits of misconduct complaints reduced assessment time that took up to 90 days in 2008 to about 7 days in 2014. However, GAO found that DOJ does not require its components to demonstrate that attorneys have served the discipline imposed on them for misconduct. Ensuring that discipline is implemented helps hold attorneys accountable for violating professional standards and provides the public reasonable assurance that misconduct is being addressed. DOJ also has not implemented a change called for in a January 2011 memorandum from the Attorney General that would expand the purview of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit (PMRU)--the unit that proposes and decides discipline for attorneys with findings of misconduct by OPR. With this change, PMRU would go from deciding discipline for attorneys with professional misconduct findings in U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) and the Criminal Division to all components. According to the Attorney General, this change could help reduce delays in implementing discipline and ensure consistent decisions about discipline. DOJ did not provide GAO with reasons for not making this change.
DOJ policy provides that supervisors of attorneys accused of, or found to have engaged in, professional misconduct can use discretion to determine what work to assign to these attorneys. DOJ also provides agency-wide guidance to supervisors, such as administrative directives and the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, that identify steps supervisors may take when dealing with attorneys accused of misconduct. Representatives for 12 of the 20 USAOs and 20 of the 28 litigating sections we surveyed reported that supervisors assign work on a case-by-case basis but consider factors, such as the nature of the alleged misconduct, in doing so. A smaller number of respondents reported that supervisors may assign work to such attorneys no differently than to other attorneys until the supervisors determine allegations have merit or professional misconduct is confirmed.
Under departmental policy, DOJ is not to authorize legal representation for attorneys in OPR proceedings, including representation to assist such attorneys in preparing submissions to support their defense. However, DOJ attorneys, like all federal employees, may be provided legal representation by DOJ for carrying out their duties, under certain circumstances. For example, DOJ may provide representation for an attorney whose conduct is the subject of a state bar proceeding while the attorney is also the subject of an OPR investigation related to the same conduct. The representation would cover defense for the state bar but not the OPR proceeding. As a result, from fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DOJ expended $3.66 million for private counsel representation for 38 DOJ attorneys involved in 18 legal proceedings where there were also related OPR investigations. DOJ found 12 attorneys within these investigations to have engaged in professional misconduct.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ (1) require components to demonstrate that they have implemented discipline for misconduct and (2) establish near-term milestones for expanding PMRU's jurisdiction to decide discipline for all attorneys with findings of misconduct.DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-682 | gao_GAO-15-682_0 | OPA authorizes use of the Fund, subject to limitations on the amount and types of costs, to pay specified damage claims above a responsible party’s liability limit, to pay damage claims or removal costs when a responsible party does not pay or cannot be identified, and to pursue reimbursement from the responsible party for oil removal and damage claims paid by the Fund. The Fund’s primary revenue source is an 8-cent per-barrel tax on both domestically produced and imported petroleum products. These included missing invoice certifications, missing supporting cost documentation, and high visibility spills not identified. NPFC’s Design and Implementation of Internal Controls for Its Damage Claim Disbursements Provide Reasonable Assurance That Expenses Are Appropriately Disbursed from the Fund
Our testing of the 27 selected high dollar damage claim disbursements, which accounted for 93 percent of the total damage claim disbursements for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, found that the design and implementation of relevant key controls provide reasonable assurance that damage claim expenses are appropriately disbursed. NPFC Controls Provide Reasonable Assurance That Responsible Parties Were Designated and Billed for Damage Claim and Oil Removal Disbursements over $500,000
NPFC has established a system of internal controls over designation and billing of responsible parties for damage claim and oil removal disbursements that are over $500,000. We determined that the internal controls provided reasonable assurance that the responsible parties were designated and billed, as appropriate, for the oil removal disbursements that are over $500,000. The Fund Has Received Limited Reimbursement for Damage Claim and Oil Removal Disbursements, and Certain Revenue Sources for the Fund Are Set to Expire
NPFC disbursed in total over $360 million from the Fund for damage claim and oil removal costs in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. We found that NPFC was unable to bill for a large percentage of high dollar claim disbursements because either the responsible parties had reached their limit of liability or the spills were classified as mystery spills. Amounts Billed to and Collected from Responsible Parties in Fiscal Years 2011 through 2013
As shown in table 3, NPFC sent bills to responsible parties totaling $272 million and collected $39 million in total for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 for both damage claim and oil removal disbursements. During fiscal year 2014, NPFC reported 408 oil spills; the Coast Guard and EPA responded to 324 of these. The average amount of the Fund’s revenue from the per-barrel tax was 60 percent of the total revenue for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Although the Fund’s balance was about $4.6 billion as of September 30, 2014, the potential for large spills exists, and if a responsible party is unwilling, unable, or not required to pay, the Fund will be needed to pay for the cleanup, including removal costs and damage claims. Because the Fund has disbursed more funding than it has been able to recover, its primary source of funding has been the per-barrel oil tax. However, the per-barrel oil tax is set to expire in 2017, creating uncertainty with regard to future funding. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider the options for sustaining the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund as well as the optimal level of funding to be maintained in the Fund, in light of the expiration of the Fund’s per-barrel tax funding source in 2017. Develop and implement policies and procedures related to identifying available vendor discounts. In written comments, reprinted in appendix IV, the Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendations and described actions taken or planned to address each recommendation. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 included a provision for GAO to conduct an audit of Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund) disbursements. This report examines the extent to which (1) the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) has designed and implemented internal controls over damage claim and oil removal disbursements to reasonably assure that amounts are appropriately disbursed from the Fund; (2) NPFC has designed and implemented internal controls to reasonably assure that responsible parties are designated and billed, as appropriate, for disbursements from the Fund that are over $500,000; and (3) the Fund was reimbursed for damage claim and oil removal costs in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. To determine whether the design of existing internal controls over the damage claim and oil removal processes assure that amounts are appropriately disbursed from the Fund, we (1) reviewed OPA and other federal laws and regulations to obtain an understanding of allowed costs, (2) reviewed Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and evaluated the policies and procedures NPFC has in place for damage claim and oil removal disbursements, (3) evaluated potential risks and the effectiveness of NPFC’s controls to mitigate those risks (4) interviewed NPFC officials and staff, and (5) performed walk-throughs of the damage claim and oil removal processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 included a provision for GAO to examine NPFC. This report addresses the extent to which (1) NPFC has designed and implemented internal controls over damage claim and oil removal disbursements to reasonably assure that amounts are appropriately disbursed from the Fund; (2) NPFC has designed and implemented internal controls to reasonably assure that responsible parties are designated and billed, as appropriate, for disbursements from the Fund that are over $500,000; and (3) the Fund was reimbursed for damage claim and oil removal costs in fiscal years 2011 through 2013. GAO also reviewed the Fund's primary source of revenues.
GAO obtained and analyzed data on damage claim and oil removal disbursements from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. GAO also obtained and analyzed data on billings and collections for fiscal years 2011 through August 2014 in order to determine which disbursements had been billed and paid. GAO reviewed relevant policies and procedures and interviewed officials and staff at the Coast Guard and EPA.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Coast Guard's National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) has responsibility for disbursements from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund).The Fund enables the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to respond to oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) authorizes the Fund to pay for certain damage claims and oil removal costs. The federal government may subsequently seek reimbursement of these costs from responsible parties.
Damage claims. GAO found that for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, internal controls were designed and implemented to reasonably assure that damage claim expenses were appropriately disbursed from the Fund.
Oil removal. GAO identified several internal control deficiencies, which demonstrated that NPFC was unable to reasonably assure that oil removal disbursements were appropriately disbursed from the Fund. GAO's statistical tests of oil removal disbursements less than or equal to $500,000 identified design and implementation control deficiencies involving invoices that lacked required certifications, high visibility spills that were not identified, and missing supporting documentation for some costs. Also, GAO identified other issues, including that NPFC lacked policies and procedures for tracking and reconciling cash advances to EPA.
NPFC has established a system of internal controls for the designation and billing, as appropriate, of responsible parties. For fiscal years 2011 through 2013, GAO determined for the amounts over $500,000 that NPFC designed and implemented internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that responsible parties were designated and billed, as appropriate, for damage claim and oil removal disbursements.
For fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the Fund disbursed over $360 million, not including disbursements related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During the period, not including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, NPFC billed $272 million to responsible parties and collected $39 million. GAO found that NPFC was unable to bill for a large percentage of the damage claim and oil removal disbursements over $500,000 because the responsible party had reached its limit of liability, not all elements of liability were established, or the source of the spill could not be identified.
OPA authorizes using the Fund for immediate response costs and when responsible parties cannot be identified or pay. GAO analyzed the Fund's sources of income and found the 8-cent per-barrel tax on petroleum products is relied on as the primary, consistent source of funding because the Fund has disbursed more funding than it has been able to recover. This is because the Fund is not reimbursed for certain damage claim and oil removal costs, as noted above. The average amount of the Fund's revenue from the per-barrel tax was 60 percent of the total revenue for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. The per-barrel tax is set to expire at the end of 2017, creating uncertainty with regard to future revenue sources for the Fund. As of September 30, 2014, the Fund's balance was about $4.6 billion, which reflects approximately $1.3 billion in fines from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. However, these fines are not a consistent funding source.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider options for sustaining the Fund, as well as the optimal level of funding, to address uncertainty regarding future funding. In addition, GAO is making several recommendations to improve the U.S. Coast Guard's internal controls for oil removal disbursements from the Fund. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with the recommendations and described actions taken or planned for each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-662T | gao_GAO-09-662T_0 | The act provides $500 million from the stimulus package for data center expenses, of which $350 million is slated for the building infrastructure and part of the remaining funding for IT-related upgrades. These requirements are intended to ensure, among other things, that ● funds are awarded and distributed in a prompt, fair, and reasonable ● the recipients and uses of all funds are transparent to the public, and the public benefits of these funds are reported clearly, accurately, and in a timely manner; ● funds are used for authorized purposes and instances of fraud, waste, error, and abuse are mitigated; ● projects funded under the act avoid unnecessary delays and cost ● program goals are achieved, including specific program outcomes and improved results on broader economic indicators. Attention to Key IT Management Areas Will Help SSA in Its Data Center Initiative
An effort as central to SSA’s ability to carry out its mission as its planned new data center requires effective IT management. These capabilities include, but are not limited to ● strategic planning to describe an organization’s goals, the strategies it will use to achieve desired results, and performance measures; ● developing and using an agencywide enterprise architecture, or modernization blueprint, to guide and constrain IT investments; ● establishing and following a portfolio-based approach to investment implementing information security management that ensures the integrity and availability of information. For example, a strategic plan that identifies interdependencies within and across modernization projects helps ensure that these are understood and managed, so that projects—and thus system solutions—are effectively integrated. Given that the new data center is to form the backbone of SSA’s automated operations, it is important that the agency identify goals, resources, and dependencies in the context of its strategic vision. An enterprise architecture consists of models that describe (in both business and technology terms) how an entity operates today and how it intends to operate in the future; it also includes a plan for transitioning to this future state. It provides these perspectives both for the enterprise’s current environment and for its target environment, as well as a transition plan for moving from one to the other. In short, it is a blueprint for organizational change. Like an IT strategic plan (with which an enterprise architecture should be closely aligned), an enterprise architecture is an important tool to help SSA ensure that its data center initiative is successful. Using an enterprise architecture will help the agency ensure that the planning and implementation of the initiative take full account of the business and technology environment in which the data center and its systems are to operate. An agency should establish and follow a portfolio-based approach to investment management in which IT investments are selected, controlled, and monitored from an agencywide perspective. For example, SSA had not applied its investment management process to a major portion of its IT budget. Robust investment management controls are important tools for achieving these goals. For example, developing accurate cost estimates—an important aspect of investment management— helps an agency evaluate resource requirements and increases the probability of program success. We have issued a cost estimating guide that provides best practices that agencies can use for developing and managing program cost estimates that are comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible, and that provide management with a sound basis for establishing a baseline to formulate budgets and measure program performance. Finally, the Recovery Act emphasizes the importance of energy efficiency and green building projects. For any organization that depends on information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or business, information security is a critical consideration. It is especially important for government agencies like SSA, where maintaining the public’s trust is essential. Further, because a data center is the backbone of an organization’s operations and service delivery, continuity of operations is a key concern. Data centers need to be designed with the ability to efficiently provide consistent processing of operations. Data centers are vulnerable to a variety of service disruptions, including accidental file deletions, network failures, systems malfunctions, and disasters. An agency needs to articulate, in a well defined plan, how it will process, retrieve, and protect electronically maintained information in the event of minor interruptions or a full- blown disaster. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provides resources to the Social Security Administration (SSA) to help replace its National Computer Center. This data center, which is 30 years old, houses the backbone of the agency's automated operations, which are critical to providing benefits to nearly 55 million people, issuing Social Security cards, and maintaining earnings records. The act makes $500 million available to SSA for the replacement of its National Computer Center and associated information technology (IT) costs. In this testimony, GAO was asked to comment on key IT management capabilities that will be important to the success of SSA's data center initiative. To do so, GAO relied on previously published products, including frameworks that it has developed for analyzing IT management areas. GAO has not performed a detailed examination of SSA's plans for this initiative, so it is not commenting on the agency's progress or making recommendations.
What GAO Found
For an effort as central to SSA's mission as its planned new data center, effective practices in key IT management areas are essential. For example: (1) Effective strategic planning helps an agency set priorities and decide how best to coordinate activities to achieve its goals. For example, a strategic plan identifying interdependencies among modernization project activities helps ensure that these are understood and managed, so that projects--and thus system solutions--are effectively integrated. Given that the new data center is to form the backbone of SSA's automated operations, it is important that the agency identify goals, resources, and dependencies in the context of its strategic vision. (2) An agency's enterprise architecture describes both its operations and the technology used to carry them out. A blueprint for organizational change, an architecture is defined in models that describe (in business and technology terms) an entity's current operation and planned future operation, as well as a plan for transitioning from one to the other. An enterprise architecture can help optimize SSA's data center initiative by ensuring that its planning and implementation take full account of the business and technology environment. (3) For IT investment management, an agency should follow a portfoliobased approach in which investments are selected, controlled, and monitored from an agencywide perspective. By helping to allocate resources effectively, robust investment management processes can help SSA meet the accountability requirements and align with the goals of the Recovery Act. For example, projects funded under the act are to avoid unnecessary delays and cost overruns and are to achieve specific program outcomes. Investment management is aimed at precisely such goals: for example, accurate cost estimating (an important aspect of investment management) provides a sound basis for establishing a baseline to formulate budgets and measure program performance. Further, the act emphasizes energy efficiency--also a major concern for data centers, which have high power and cooling requirements. Investment management tools are important for evaluating the most cost-effective approaches to energy efficiency. (4) Finally, information security should be considered throughout the planning, development, and implementation of the data center. Security is vital for any organization that depends on information systems and networks to carry out its mission--especially for government agencies like SSA, where maintaining the public's trust is essential. One part of information security management is contingency and continuity of operations planning--vital for a data center that is to be the backbone of SSA's operations and service delivery. Data centers are vulnerable to a variety of service disruptions, including accidental file deletions, network failures, systems malfunctions, and disasters. Accordingly, it is necessary to define plans governing how information will be processed, retrieved, and protected in the event of minor interruptions or a full-blown disaster. These capabilities will be important in helping to ensure that SSA's data center effort is successful and effectively uses Recovery Act funds. |
gao_GAO-13-21 | gao_GAO-13-21_0 | CRA defines a “major” rule as one that, among other things, has resulted in or is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. OIRA also provides guidance to agencies on regulatory requirements. Agencies Issued about 35 Percent of Major Rules and about 44 Percent of Nonmajor Rules without an NPRM from 2003 to 2010
During calendar years 2003 through 2010, agencies published 568 major rules and about 30,000 nonmajor rules. Agencies Most Often Invoked the Good Cause Exception When Publishing Rules without an NPRM
Good Cause Exception Commonly Used
The agencies that published rules in our sample claimed the good cause exception in 77 (plus or minus 11) percent of major rules and 61 (plus or minus 10) percent of nonmajor rules without an NPRM, as shown in figure 5 below. In examining these 92 rules we identified five primary categories of explanations (more than one category sometimes applies to a given rule): a law imposed a deadline either requiring the agency to issue a rule or requiring a program to be implemented by a date that agencies claimed would provide insufficient time to provide prior notice and comment—36 rules; a law prescribed the content of the rule issued—31 rules; the agency said it was responding to an emergency—19 rules; the rule implemented technical changes—5 rules; and all other explanations (for example, an agency issued a final rule without an NPRM in response to a court decision)—14 rules. Specifically, we found that in 84 of the 123 major rules without an NPRM in our sample, agencies described circumstances in which a statute: (1) required or authorized them to issue the rule without an NPRM, (2) prescribed the content of the rule, or (3) set a deadline for a rule or program which the agency stated did not allow sufficient time to issue an NPRM. When Agencies Publish Major Rules without an NPRM, They Often Provide Information on Economic Effects and Request Comments, But Do Not Always Respond to Comments
Agencies Provided Information on Economic Effects of Most Major Rules without an NPRM
Of the 123 major rules without an NPRM that we reviewed, 113 provided some estimates of economic effects, such as on the potential costs or benefits. Although Not Required, Agencies Often Requested Comments on Major Final Rules Issued without an NPRM, but Did Not Always Respond to Comments Received
Of the 123 major rules without an NPRM in our sample, we found that agencies requested comments for 77 rules where they had discretion over at least part of the regulation’s content. Agencies sometimes solicit public comments through the Federal Register on such rules, though not required to do so. Typically, agency responses to comments received from the public are published in the Federal Register when a follow-up rule is issued. Each of these 26 rules has significant economic effects, with some of these rules having an impact of a billion dollars a year or more. These rules also cover important issues ranging from national health care policies to manufacturing incentive programs. For example, in one of the 26 rules, an agency defined a pre- existing condition to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and sought public comment. The agency received 4,627 comments, but has not published a response to them. The public does not know whether the agency considered the comments, accepted or rejected the views or evidence presented, or if the agency intends to finalize and potentially change the rule. We found that when agencies did respond to public comments they often made changes to the rules. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better balance the benefits of expedited rulemaking procedures with the benefits of public comments that are typically part of regular notice- and-comment rulemakings, and improve the quality and transparency of rulemaking records, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Chairman of ACUS, issue guidance to encourage agencies to respond to comments on final major rules, for which the agency has discretion, that are issued without a prior notice of proposed rulemaking. OMB disagreed with our recommendation to issue guidance to encourage agencies to respond to comments on final major rules, for which the agency has discretion, that are issued without a prior notice of prior rulemaking. When it is unclear whether agencies considered comments, rulemaking is less transparent to the public, and, as courts have recognized, the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the public. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For final rules published during calendar years 2003 through 2010, the objectives of this report were to: 1. 2. Identify which exceptions agencies used when issuing final rules without an NPRM. 3. Our sample contained rules by 52 different agencies, including every cabinet-level agency issuing regulations and every agency that published a major rule during the 8-year period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies publish thousands of rules each year, with significant benefits and costs. Before issuing a final rule, agencies are generally required to publish an NPRM in the Federal Register. Agencies must then respond to public comments when issuing final rules. Agencies may use exceptions in certain circumstances to forgo this NPRM process to expedite rulemaking. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has authority to provide guidance on regulatory issues. GAO was asked to provide information on the rulemaking process. This report addresses (1) how often agencies issued final rules without an NPRM; (2) which exceptions agencies used to do this; and (3) whether agencies took certain actions when issuing major rules without an NPRM, including voluntarily requesting and responding to public comments. GAO reviewed a generalizable random sample of 1,338 final rules published during calendar years 2003 through 2010. The sample contained rules by 52 agencies, including all cabinet departments issuing regulations. GAO completed more detailed analyses of 123 major rules without an NPRM, including every such rule published from 2007 through 2010, to obtain additional information to answer the objectives.
What GAO Found
Agencies did not publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), enabling the public to comment on a proposed rule, for about 35 percent of major rules and about 44 percent of nonmajor rules published during 2003 through 2010. A major rule has significant economic impact and may, for example, have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more. Agencies published a total of 568 major rules from 2003 through 2010. Agencies also published about 30,000 nonmajor rules during this period, which have less economic significance and can involve routine administrative issues.
Agencies frequently cited the "good cause" exception and other statutory exceptions for publishing final rules without an NPRM. Agencies in GAO's sample used the "good cause" exception for 77 percent of major rules and 61 percent of nonmajor rules published without an NPRM. Agencies may use the good cause exception when they find that notice and comment procedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." In practice, agencies may find an NPRM "impracticable" when the rule must be issued by a statutory deadline, "unnecessary" when the rule pertains to technical corrections, and "contrary to the public interest" in an emergency situation. To a lesser extent, agencies also used other statutory exceptions to issue a rule without an NPRM. For example, in 84 of the 123 major rules that GAO analyzed, agencies described circumstances in which a statute: (1) either required or authorized them to issue the rule without an NPRM, (2) prescribed the content of the rule, or (3) set a deadline for a rule or program which the agency stated did not allow sufficient time to issue an NPRM.
GAO found that agencies, though not required, often requested comments on major final rules issued without an NPRM, but they did not always respond to the comments received. Agencies may solicit comments through the Federal Register when publishing a final rule without an NPRM, but the public does not have an opportunity to comment before the rule's issuance, nor is the agency obligated to respond to comments it has received. For example, agencies requested comments on 77 of the 123 major rules issued without an NPRM in GAO's sample. The agencies did not issue a follow-up rule or respond to comments on 26 of these 77 rules. This is a missed opportunity, because GAO found that when agencies did respond to public comments they often made changes to improve the rules. In addition, each of these 26 rules is economically significant and some of these rules have an impact of a billion dollars a year or more. These rules also cover important issues ranging from national health care policies to manufacturing incentive programs. For example, in one of the 26 rules, an agency defined a pre-existing condition to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and sought public comment. The agency received 4,627 comments, but has not published a response to them. When agencies do not respond to comments requested, the public does not know whether the agency considered their comments, or if it intends to change the rule. As the courts have recognized, the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to significant points raised by the public.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB issue guidance to encourage agencies to respond to comments on final major rules, for which the agency has discretion, that are issued without a prior NPRM. OMB disagreed that guidance would offer substantial benefits. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid, as further discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-16-200T | gao_GAO-16-200T_0 | Company Filings in 2014 Indicate That Company Inquiries and Due Diligence Provided Limited Insights Regarding Country of Origin of Conflict Minerals Used, Citing Difficulty Obtaining Information from Suppliers
The SEC conflict minerals disclosure rule outlines a three-step process for companies to follow, as applicable, to comply with the rule. Of the 1,321 companies that filed conflict minerals disclosures in 2014, the sample of filings that we reviewed indicates that almost all of the companies conducted an RCOI and a majority of them exercised due diligence, but most reported that they were unable to determine the country of origin of conflict minerals they had used in 2013. According to our analysis, an estimated
67 percent reported that they were unable to determine the
4 percent reported that conflict minerals came from Covered
24 percent reported that conflict minerals did not originate in
2 percent reported that conflict minerals came from scrap or
3 percent did not provide a clear determination. Our analysis shows that the exercise of due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals yielded little or no additional information, beyond the RCOI, regarding the country of origin of conflict minerals or whether the conflict minerals that companies used in 2013 in their products benefited or financed armed groups in the Covered Countries. The estimated 4 percent of the companies who determined that the necessary conflict minerals used in their products originated from Covered Countries could not determine whether such conflict minerals financed or benefitted armed groups during the reporting period, even though they disclosed that they conducted due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals they used. State and USAID Actions to Implement the U.S. Conflict Minerals Strategy Have Yielded Some Results, but Conditions Remain Difficult
State and USAID Are Taking Action to Implement Strategy Objectives
State and USAID officials reported that they are implementing the U.S. conflict minerals strategy they submitted to Congress in 2011 through specific actions that address the strategy’s five key objectives. First, the mining areas in eastern DRC continue to be plagued by insecurity because of the presence and activities of illegal armed groups and some corrupt members of the national military. As we reported in 2010, U.S. government officials and others indicated that weak governance and lack of state authority in eastern DRC constitute a significant challenge. According to USAID officials, USAID is working to introduce a pilot traceability system to increase transparency, accountability, and competition in the legal artisanal mining sector. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate Most Companies Were Unable to Determine the Source of Their Conflict Minerals. GAO-15-561. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take Further Action to Contribute to the Effective Regulation and Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's August 2015 report, entitled SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate Most Companies Were Unable to Determine the Source of Their Conflict Minerals , (GAO-15-561) .
What GAO Found
According to a generalizable sample GAO reviewed, company disclosures filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the first time in 2014 in response to the SEC conflict minerals disclosure rule indicated that most companies were unable to determine the source of their conflict minerals. Companies that filed disclosures used one or more of the four “conflict minerals”—tantalum, tin, tungsten, and gold—determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or adjoining countries. Most companies were based in the United States (87 percent). Almost all of the companies (99 percent) reported performing country-of-origin inquiries for conflict minerals used. Companies GAO spoke to cited difficulty obtaining necessary information from suppliers because of delays and other challenges in communication. Most of the companies (94 percent) reported exercising due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict minerals used. However, most (67 percent) were unable to determine whether those minerals came from the DRC or adjoining countries (Covered Countries), and none could determine whether the minerals financed or benefited armed groups in those countries. Companies that disclosed that conflict minerals in their products came from covered countries (4 percent) indicated that they are or will be taking action to address the risks associated with the use and source of conflict minerals in their supply chains. For example, one company indicated that it would notify suppliers that it intends to cease doing business with suppliers who continue to source conflict minerals from smelters that are not certified as conflict-free.
a Covered Countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials reported taking actions to implement the U.S. conflict minerals strategy, but a difficult operating environment complicates this implementation. The agencies reported supporting a range of initiatives including validation of conflict-free mine sites and strengthening traceability mechanisms that minimize the risk that minerals that have been exploited by illegal armed groups will enter the supply chain. As a result, according to the agencies, 140 mine sites have been validated and competition within conflict-free traceability systems has benefited artisanal miners and exporters. Implementation of the U.S conflict minerals strategy faces multiple obstacles outside the control of the U.S. government. For example, eastern DRC is plagued by insecurity because of the presence of illegal armed groups and some corrupt members of the national military, weak governance, and poor infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-13-60 | gao_GAO-13-60_0 | DOD Employment Assistance Programs and Other Efforts to Help Military Spouses
Recognizing the challenges that military spouses face in beginning or maintaining a career, DOD has historically had efforts to help military spouses obtain employment. DOD Has Initiated Programs and Is Developing Guidance for Collaboration
Since 2009, DOD has established three programs targeted to military spouses to help them obtain employment: (1) the Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) tuition assistance program; (2) the Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP), which connects military spouses with employers; and (3) the Military Spouse Career Center, consisting of a call center and a website through which spouses can obtain counseling and information. DOD has two goals for its SECO programs: (1) reduce unemployment among military spouses and (2) close their wage gap with civilian spouses. However, DOD does not currently have guidance describing its overall strategy and how its various programs should coordinate to help spouses obtain employment. Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. DOD Currently Cannot Measure the Effectiveness of Its Programs, but Efforts Are Underway
DOD is not yet able to measure the overall effectiveness of its spouse employment programs in achieving the goals of reducing unemployment among military spouses and the wage gap with civilian spouses. To assess effectiveness of the three SECO programs, DOD is planning on contracting with a research organization to conduct a long-term evaluation. DOD officials would like the research organization to examine whether the programs have affected spouses’ unemployment rates and their wage gap with civilian spouses, as well as determine whether the programs have had an effect on servicemembers’ retention in the military and the families’ financial well-being. Second, DOD tracks the percentage of courses funded by MyCAA tuition assistance that spouses complete with a passing grade. DOD’s performance monitoring is limited for several reasons. First, DOD has no performance measures for the Career Center. Second, DOD’s data on the MSEP program are of questionable reliability because they derive from an informal, nonstandardized process. Finally, DOD’s performance measure for MyCAA—showing that more than 80 percent of courses funded with MyCAA tuition assistance were completed with passing grades in fiscal year 2011—may be a useful interim measure for monitoring how the funds are being used. DOD recognizes the need to improve its performance monitoring for its spouse employment programs and is taking steps to improve the data it collects on its individual programs:
For the Career Center, DOD is planning to ask the contractor who runs the call center to follow up with spouses who use the center’s services and ask them about their employment situation. Two Hiring Mechanisms Can Provide Advantages to Military Spouses Seeking Federal Employment
The federal government has two hiring mechanisms targeted specifically to military spouses seeking federal jobs. These two mechanisms can increase a military spouse’s chances of obtaining federal employment, but they do not guarantee that spouses will obtain the jobs they apply for. The noncompetitive authority, which became effective in late fiscal year 2009, allows any federal agency the option of hiring qualified military spouses into the competitive service without going through the competitive examination process. The approximately 1,200 military spouses hired in fiscal year 2011 represented about 0.5 percent of all federal hires that year. For context, spouses of active duty servicemembers represented 0.4 percent of the working-age population in 2010. DOD’s Military Spouse Preference (MSP) program provides military spouses priority in selection for DOD positions. This number includes both new hires and conversions of DOD employees. With regard to its performance monitoring, DOD has taken steps in the right direction by exploring options to collect outcome data and planning for a long-term evaluation. consider incorporating key attributes of successful performance measures when developing and finalizing performance measures, such as ensuring reliability of the data used in the measures and covering key program activities. What efforts has DOD recently made to help military spouses prepare for and obtain employment? What hiring mechanisms exist to help military spouses obtain federal jobs? The information we obtained from these installations is not generalizable. Objective 3: Identifying Federal Hiring Mechanisms
We identified the hiring mechanisms intended to help military spouses obtain federal employment by interviewing officials at OPM and DOD and reviewing relevant federal laws, regulations, executive orders, and guidance. On the other hiring mechanism that we examined, the Military Spouse Preference (MSP) program, DOD’s civilian personnel office provided us with data on the number of spouses placed into civil service positions, including both hires and conversions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The approximately 725,000 spouses of active duty servicemembers face challenges to maintaining a career, including having to move frequently. Their employment is often important to the financial well-being of their families. For these reasons, DOD has taken steps in recent years to help military spouses obtain employment. Moreover, the federal government has hiring mechanisms to help military spouses obtain federal jobs.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires GAO to report on the programs that help military spouses obtain jobs. This report examines: (1) DOD's recent efforts to help military spouses obtain employment, (2) DOD's steps to assess effectiveness of these efforts, and (3) the hiring mechanisms to help military spouses obtain federal jobs. GAO conducted interviews with DOD, the Office of Personnel Management, and two advocacy groups; conducted site visits; analyzed relevant data; and reviewed relevant documents, laws, and regulations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has recently created three new programs to help military spouses obtain employment: (1) the Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts (MyCAA) tuition assistance program, (2) the Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP), which connects military spouses with employers, (3) and the Military Spouse Career Center, consisting of a call center and a website for military spouses to obtain counseling and information. DOD's goals for these programs are to reduce unemployment among military spouses and close their wage gap with civilian spouses. Aside from these new programs, military spouses can also use employment assistance programs that the military services have long operated on DOD installations. However, GAO's site visits and interviews indicate that there may be gaps in coordination across the various programs that result in confusion for military spouses. Currently, DOD does not have guidance describing its overall strategy and how all of its programs should coordinate to help military spouses obtain employment, but DOD is in the process of developing such guidance.
DOD is not yet able to measure the overall effectiveness of its military spouse employment programs and its performance monitoring is limited, but DOD is taking steps to improve its monitoring and evaluation. To determine whether its programs have been effective in reducing unemployment among military spouses and closing their wage gap with civilian spouses, DOD is planning to contract with a research organization for a long-term evaluation. With regard to its performance monitoring for these programs, DOD has performance measures for MSEP and MyCAA, but has no measures for the Career Center. In addition, reliability of the data is questionable on the MSEP performance measure because DOD's data are derived from an informal and inconsistent process. DOD's other measure--the percentage of courses funded by MyCAA tuition assistance that military spouses complete with a passing grade--is a useful interim measure for monitoring how the funds are being used, but it does not provide information on whether the funds help military spouses obtain employment. DOD has efforts underway to improve its performance monitoring, including identifying additional measures it would like to track and collecting additional data on participants' employment and educational outcomes.
The federal government has two hiring mechanisms that can provide military spouses who meet the eligibility criteria with some advantages in the federal hiring process. The first mechanism--a non-competitive authority--allows federal agencies the option of hiring qualified military spouses without going through the competitive process. The second mechanism--DOD's Military Spouse Preference program--provides military spouses priority in selection for certain DOD jobs. These hiring mechanisms can increase a military spouse's chances of obtaining federal employment, but they do not guarantee that military spouses will obtain the job they apply for. In fiscal year 2011, agencies used the noncompetitive authority to hire about 1,200 military spouses, which represented approximately 0.5 percent of all federal hires that year. Military spouses represented 0.4 percent of the working-age population in 2010. With regard to the Military Spouse Preference program, DOD has placed about 12,500 military spouses into civil service jobs in the past 10 years, which includes both new hires and conversions of DOD employees.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD consider incorporating (1) key collaboration practices as it develops its spouse employment guidance, and (2) key attributes of successful performance measures as it develops and finalizes its performance measures. |
gao_GAO-03-662 | gao_GAO-03-662_0 | In 2002, about 5.5 million people with disabilities received SSI benefits. SSA has estimated that it will need a total of about $4 billion to process its projected CDR workload over the next 5 years. If another large CDR backlog is generated, SSA is at risk of foregoing cost-savings, thereby compromising the integrity of its disability programs as a result of paying benefits to disability beneficiaries who are no longer eligible to receive them. SSA officials attributed the delay in obtaining a fiscal year 2003 budget as the main factor in hampering their ability to conduct all of the planned CDRs for the fiscal year. As a result, most of the backlog that is expected to reemerge by the end of fiscal year 2003 will likely consist of SSI CDRs and, according to SSA officials, this makes the backlog less problematic than if the backlog consisted of mostly DI cases. Decisions on Timing of CDRs Are Not Based on Systematic Analysis of Available Information
While DDS personnel review available information on beneficiaries to establish a diary date indicating when beneficiaries should undergo a CDR, they do not conduct a systematic analysis of this information. SSA’s Process for Determining CDR Method Not Always Based on Best Information Available
SSA’s process for determining what method to use for a CDR is not always based on the best information available. This is the case even when the profile score indicates that improvement is unlikely. SSA Has Not Fully Studied and Pursued the Use of Medical Treatment Data from Medicare and Medicaid
SSA has not fully studied and pursued the use of medical treatment data on beneficiaries available from the Medicare and Medicaid programs despite the potential of these data to improve SSA’s decisions regarding whether to use a mailer or full medical review to complete a CDR. Missing or Incomplete Case Folders May Result in Fewer Benefit Cessations
SSA continues to be hampered in its CDR decisions by missing or incomplete information on beneficiaries’ case history, which may prevent SSA from ceasing benefits for some individuals who no longer qualify for benefits. However, our analysis of SSA data indicates that the vast majority of MIE beneficiaries in the DI and SSI programs—about 94 percent—are not found to have medically improved upon completion of a CDR. Delaying services to some disability beneficiaries, therefore, undermines SSA’s recent efforts to increase its emphasis on helping these beneficiaries return to work. For example, SSA could develop a better means of identifying beneficiaries who are expected to medically improve. In addition, SSA would still be able to achieve the cost savings that are derived from CDRs for beneficiaries that it considers most likely to medically improve. While SSA has taken a number of steps to improve the CDR process, it has not taken advantage of other opportunities that could further improve the cost-effectiveness of this process and its ability to stay current. Finally, SSA’s initial assessments of which beneficiaries are most likely to improve are not very accurate and, therefore, may not be the most appropriate criteria to use for delaying beneficiary access to a ticket for return-to-work services. SSA has the challenge of developing a policy that will make return-to-work assistance available to beneficiaries at the appropriate time while providing adequate mechanisms for ensuring program integrity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has had difficulty in conducting timely reviews of beneficiaries' cases to ensure they are still eligible for disability benefits. SSA has been taking steps to improve the cost-effectiveness of its review process. SSA has linked the review process to eligibility for a new benefit that provides return-to-work services. This report looks at SSA's ability to stay current with future reviews, identifies potential improvements to the review process, and assesses the review process--return-to-work link.
What GAO Found
SSA will likely face a backlog of about 200,000 continuing disability review (CDR) cases by the end of fiscal year 2003. SSA officials attribute the pending backlog to its decision to reduce the number of cases reviewed as a result of the delay in obtaining fiscal year 2003 funding. In addition, the pending backlog resulted from putting more emphasis on initial applications over CDRs. To ensure CDRs receive adequate attention, SSA has requested some fiscal year 2004 funds be "earmarked" for these reviews. Given SSA's ability to eliminate its previous CDR backlog using targeted funds, this maneuver could help SSA. Over the next 5 years, SSA has estimated that 8.5 million CDRs, costing about $4 billion, are needed to stay current. If SSA generates another backlog, cost savings and program integrity may be compromised by paying benefits to disability beneficiaries who are no longer eligible to receive them. SSA is not making the best use of available information when conducting its CDRs, leaving opportunities for improvement. First, SSA's decisions on the timing of CDRs are not based on systematic analysis of available information. Second, SSA's process for determining which CDR method to use is not always based on the best available information. For example, SSA requires an in-depth review for all beneficiaries who, upon entering the program, are expected to medically improve even if current information on certain of those beneficiaries indicates that improvement is unlikely and that the review would be better handled through a shorter, less expensive method. Third, SSA has not fully pursued medical treatment data available from the Medicare and Medicaid programs despite their potential to improve SSA's decisions regarding which review method to use. Fourth, SSA's CDRs continue to be hampered by missing or incomplete information on beneficiaries' case history. SSA delays the provision of new return-to-work benefits to beneficiaries expected to medically improve based on the assumption that such beneficiaries are least likely to need them. However, according to SSA data, about 94 percent of such beneficiaries are not found to have medically improved upon completion of a disability review. As a result, some individuals who might benefit from return-to-work services are initially denied access to them. SSA is reviewing this policy and while doing so, will need to consider how to best balance its financial stewardship and return-to-work goals. |
gao_GGD-98-151 | gao_GGD-98-151_0 | However, neither FPI’s legislation nor the FAR defines current market price or specifies how such a price is to be established. Responding to this pricing dispute, the Board of Arbitration for Prison Industries issued a decision in February 1931 that prison industries did not have to set its price at the lowest bid price in order to comply with the current market price requirement. In this opinion, Justice found that the mandatory preference granted FPI is an exception to the rules that normally govern the way products are procured by federal agencies, and therefore, procurements from FPI are not covered by the FAR’s standard provisions. Nor did the procedures specify how many prices should be checked to constitute a market or how frequently prices should be checked. In addition, FPI’s policy did not require the product divisions to document the market surveys or other methods they used when setting prices for FPI’s products. We discussed FPI’s pricing policy and procedures with FPI officials and told them that we were concerned that the policy and procedures in effect at the time of our review had not implemented our 1985 recommendations to define current market price and provide pricing methods that the product divisions could use to help ensure that FPI’s products were priced within current market prices. The only limit the law imposes on FPI’s price is that it may not exceed the upper end of the current market price range. Our comparison of FPI’s prices for 20 products with private vendors’ catalogue or actual prices for the same or comparable products showed that for 16 of the products, FPI’s prices were not the highest. Although FPI’s prices for 16 of the products reviewed did not exceed current market prices, prices for 5 of these products were at the high end of the range of prices offered by private vendors. In summary, for the 20 products we reviewed, FPI’s prices for 17 products were not the highest offered to the government, and therefore we concluded that the prices were within the current market price ranges; FPI’s prices for 2 products may have been within the current market ranges; and for 1 product, it was not clear whether FPI’s price was within the current market range. However, FPI generally did not offer federal agencies the lowest prices for products that they purchased. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the laws and regulations governing how Federal Prison Industries (FPI) is to price its products, (2) describe the policies and procedures FPI uses to ensure that its products are priced in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, (3) determine whether FPI followed these policies and procedures when it set prices for selected products, and (4) compare FPI’s prices with those charged by private vendors for selected products. We compared the pricing policy and procedures that were in effect when we began our review with the revised policy and procedures that FPI issued in February 1998 to determine what changes had been made. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Prison Industries' (FPI) product pricing, focusing on: (1) the laws and regulations governing how FPI is to price its products; (2) the policies and procedures FPI uses to ensure that its products are priced in accordance with the laws and regulations; (3) whether FPI followed these policies and procedures when it set prices for selected products; and (4) a comparison of FPI's prices with those charged by private vendors for selected products.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal agencies are required by law to purchase FPI products if they are available, meet the agencies' requirements, and do not exceed current market prices; (2) however, neither the law nor the Federal Acquisition Regulation defines current market price or provides guidance on how such a price is to be determined; (3) a 1931 Comptroller General Decision cited a decision by the Board of Arbitration for Prison Industries, which stipulated that FPI is not required to set its prices at the lowest bid price to comply with the current market price requirement; (4) on the basis of these decisions, GAO concluded that the only limitation on FPI's price is that it may not exceed the upper end of the current market price range; (5) a 1993 legal opinion issued by the Department of Justice found that the mandatory preference granted FPI is an exception to the rules that normally govern the way federal agencies procure products; (6) FPI's May 1995 policy and procedures that were in effect when GAO began its review in July 1997 recognized that FPI products were to be sold at prices that did not exceed current market prices; (7) however,the policy and procedures did not specifically define current market price; (8) FPI's procedures did not specify how many prices had to be checked to constitute a market or how frequently prices should be checked; (9) further, FPI policy did not require the product divisions to document the market surveys or other methods that they used when setting prices for FPI's products; (10) however, on February 18, 1998, FPI issued its revised pricing policy and procedures; (11) GAO's analysis of how FPI established prices for 20 selected products showed that for 13 of the products, the divisions followed FPI's pricing policy and procedures that were in effect when GAO began its review; (12) GAO's comparison of FPI's catalogue or actual prices for 20 products with private vendors' prices for the same or comparable products showed that FPI's prices for 16 of the products were not the highest; and (13) however, FPI's prices for 5 of these 16 products were at the higher end of the price range offered by private vendors. |
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