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gao_GAO-13-150 | gao_GAO-13-150_0 | The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) consolidated federal safety regulatory activity relating to consumer products within CPSC. As a result, in addition to its responsibilities for protecting against product hazards in general, CPSC administers the following laws that authorize various performance standards for specific consumer products: the Flammable Fabrics Act, which among other things, authorizes CPSC to prescribe flammability standards for clothing, upholstery, and other fabrics;the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, which establishes the framework for the regulation of substances that are toxic, corrosive, combustible, or otherwise hazardous;the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, which authorizes CPSC to prescribe special packaging requirements to protect children from injury resulting from handling, using, or ingesting certain drugs and other household substances; the Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956, which mandates CPSC to prescribe safety standards for household refrigerators to ensure that the doors can be opened easily from the inside; the Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa Safety Act of 2007, which establishes mandatory safety standards for swimming pool and spa drain covers, as well as a grant program to provide states with incentives to adopt pool and spa safety standards; and the Children’s Gasoline Burn Prevention Act of 2008, which establishes safety standards for child-resistant closures on all portable gasoline containers.the Child Safety Protection Act of 1994, which requires the banning or labeling of toys that pose a choking risk to small children and the reporting of certain choking incidents to the CPSC. New hazards can be associated with either a new or existing product. Finally, CPSC has another effort under way to improve its surveillance of imported products, which could prevent violative products from entering the U.S. markets. CPSC Uses Various Means to Stay Informed about New Product Risks
CPSC uses multiple mechanisms to stay informed about new and emerging risks from consumer products, especially new products entering the market. These visits may be announced or unannounced. In contrast to this difficulty in completing agreements with foreign counterparts, CPSC has on occasion been able to share information it has gathered with U.S. state and local agencies. This inability to establish information-sharing agreements may hinder CPSC’s ability to respond to a potential hazard in a timely manner because of the delay that might occur between when a foreign counterpart decides to take action in response to a product hazard and when that action becomes public. CPSC Faces Challenges in Identifying Risks Associated with New Products, but Is Taking Steps to Improve Data Systems
CPSC uses information from a number of sources to identify specific risks associated with both new and existing products. To address these challenges, CPSC is currently implementing upgrades to CPSRMS, its data management system, as required by CPSIA. 1). According to CPSC, the upgraded system is designed to enhance CPSC’s efficiency and effectiveness, enable a more rapid dissemination of information, and allow consumers to search the database through a publicly available portal. CPSC officials expect the system upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2013 and fully operational in fiscal year 2014. CPSC Is Taking Actions to Improve Its Ability to Identify Unsafe Imported Products before They Enter the Marketplace
As we have previously reported, CPSC has had limited ability to identify unsafe products at the ports. 2. In response to CPSIA, CPSC has developed and is pilot testing an approach for identifying and targeting unsafe consumer products at U.S. ports. CPSC’s initial activities are focused on import compliance, such as screening children’s imported products for lead content. Timeliness of CPSC’s Actions to Assess and Address New Risks Depends on the Specific Product or Hazard
CPSC assesses product risks on a case-by-case basis using information it collects from various sources. 2). However, because testing methods are still being developed, conducting its risk assessment of such products will take longer. CPSC Uses Various Approaches to Address Product Hazards, but Faces Challenges in Addressing New Product Risks
To address product-related hazards, CPSC uses various approaches designed to reduce injuries and deaths. Public Education—notifying the public of safety hazards and educating them about safe practices. An incident may include more than one death or injury. Moreover, CPSC may not have prior experience with the potential hazard from a new consumer product and may need to take a number of actions to address a specific hazard, which can take years. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To better enable CPSC to target unsafe consumer products, Congress may wish to amend section 29(f) of CPSA to allow CPSC greater ability to enter into information-sharing agreements with its foreign counterparts that permit reciprocal terms on disclosure of nonpublic information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Consolidated Appropriations Act requires GAO to analyze the potential safety risks associated with new and emerging consumer products, including chemicals and other materials used in their manufacture, taking into account the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) ability and authority to identify, assess, and address the risks of new and emerging consumer products in a timely manner and to keep abreast of the effects of these products on public health and safety. Our objectives were to evaluate the authority and ability of CPSC to (1) stay generally informed about new risks associated with consumer products and use available information to identify product hazards, and (2) assess and address new risks posed by consumer products in a timely manner. In addition, we reviewed data on CPSC corrective actions. We also interviewed national consumer and industry organizations and legal professionals and toured CPSC’s National Product Testing and Evaluation Center. | Why GAO Did This Study
Growing numbers of consumer product recalls in 2007 and 2008, particularly of imported toys and children's products, focused increased attention on CPSC. In the 2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress directed GAO to analyze the potential safety risks associated with new and emerging consumer products. CPSC's approach focuses on new hazards, which could be risks associated with both new and existing products. Therefore, this report evaluates the authority and ability of CPSC to (1) stay generally informed about new risks associated with consumer products and use available information to identify product hazards, and (2) assess and address new risks posed by consumer products in a timely manner.
GAO reviewed CPSC's statutory and regulatory authorities to respond to product hazards; reviewed agency documents on risk assessment; reviewed CPSC corrective actions; and met with agency officials and representatives from national consumer, industry, and legal organizations with expertise in consumer product safety and risk assessment. GAO observed CPSC's testing facility and demonstrations of its information system upgrades.
What GAO Found
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has broad authority to identify, assess, and address product risks, but faces some challenges in identifying and responding to new risks in a timely manner. CPSC uses various means to stay informed about risks that may be associated with new or existing products. These methods include (1) market surveillance activities for imported products, retail stores, and Internet sales; and (2) formal agreements and various activities with other agencies. However, certain legal restrictions may hamper CPSC's ability to stay informed about new product hazards to public health and safety. Specifically, because of certain restrictions in the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), CPSC cannot agree to allow foreign agencies to disclose nonpublic information they receive from CPSC. While the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) allows CPSC greater freedom to disclose information to U.S. courts, Congress, and state and local agencies, CPSC has been unable to complete information-sharing agreements with foreign counterparts as envisioned because it cannot offer its counterparts reciprocal terms on disclosure of nonpublic information. Due to the growing number of imported consumer products, this restriction on sharing information may hinder CPSC's ability to identify risks from new products in a timely manner, possibly leading to injury and death if unsafe products enter the U.S. market. CPSC also faces challenges in collecting and analyzing large quantities of data in order to identify potential product risks. Some sources CPSC uses to identify injuries or death are dated--for example, death certificates can be 2 or more years old--or contain limited information about the product involved in the incident. To respond to these challenges, the agency has key efforts under way. First, CPSC is upgrading its data management system. According to CPSC, the upgrades are designed to enhance CPSC's efficiency and effectiveness, enable a more rapid dissemination of information, and allow consumers to search the database through a publicly available Internet portal. CPSC officials expect the upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2013 and fully operational in fiscal year 2014. Second, in response to a CPSIA requirement, CPSC is working with Customs and Border Protection to test a new approach for identifying unsafe consumer products at the ports. CPSC port investigators have found this approach to be effective and have prevented hundreds of consumer products that were in violation of U.S. safety rules or found to be hazardous from entering commerce.
Timeliness of CPSC's actions to assess and address new risks depends on the specific product or hazard. For example, the simplest assessments may only take a few days, such as testing a product for lead content. More complex assessments can take years to complete, such as tracking potential chronic hazards from certain chemicals and nanotechnology (which involves the ability to control matter at the scale of one billionth of a meter) because no standard method for measuring toxicity associated with nanotechnology currently exists. CPSC uses various approaches to address product hazards, including conducting compliance activities, developing mandatory safety standards, and educating the public about safety hazards and safe practices. CPSC can take action to address a product hazard more quickly if it is addressing a known hazard. However, addressing a new or emerging risk can take CPSC years because it may need to develop new standards or approaches.
What GAO Recommends
To better enable CPSC to target unsafe consumer products, Congress may wish to amend section 29(f) of CPSA to allow CPSC greater ability to enter into information-sharing agreements with its foreign counterparts that permit reciprocal terms on disclosure of nonpublic information. CPSC supported this matter. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-277 | gao_T-AIMD-98-277_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. However, unless agency progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. For example, (1) Illinois’ Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely affect state government operations, (2) Vermont’s Office of Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail, (3) Texas’ Office of the State Auditor reported that many state entities had not finished their embedded systems inventories and, therefore, it is not likely that they will complete their embedded systems repairs before the year 2000, and (4) Florida’s Auditor General has issued several reports detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various district school boards and community colleges. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 computer system risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems' compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_GAO-08-932T | gao_GAO-08-932T_0 | In December 2001, Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, stipulating that the “Defense Emergency Response Fund” could be used by the Secretary of Defense to reimburse coalition partners like Pakistan for their logistical and military support of U.S. military operations. This funding became known as Coalition Support Funds. Defense Did Not Consistently Apply Its Existing Guidance, and Additional Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Accountability over CSF to Pakistan
We found that Defense did not consistently apply existing CSF guidance and that certain deficiencies existed in their oversight procedures. Comptroller generally performed four broad analytical reviews as called for in its guidance. Defense guidance developed by the Comptroller also calls for obtaining sufficient information to validate Pakistani claims to determine that costs were incurred, reasonable, and appropriate. For example, Defense reimbursed Pakistan over $2 billion for claims from January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining detailed documentation that would allow a third party to recalculate the costs. As a result, Defense may have paid costs that were (1) not incremental, (2) not based on actual activity, or (3) potentially duplicative. We also found that additional oversight controls were needed. Defense reimbursed Pakistan more than $2.2 billion, or 76 percent, of Pakistani army claims from January 2004 through June 2007, without obtaining sufficient information to support how the costs were calculated. Defense Paid Costs That May Not Have Been Incremental
Comptroller guidance states that reimbursement claims must clearly indicate the incremental nature of the logistical and military support provided—i.e., that claimed costs are above and beyond the partner country’s normal operating costs. ODRP Began Playing a Larger Role in the CSF Oversight Process in Late 2006; However, ODRP’s Continued Oversight Is Not Assured
Defense’s 2003 guidance did not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have direct access to Pakistani officials and information. Because of this, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistani CSF claims until September 2006, when, without any formal guidance or directive to do so, ODRP began an effort to verify that Pakistani military support was provided and costs were actually incurred as claimed in the military’s requests for reimbursement. The amount disallowed or deferred for March through June 2007 represents a significant increase in CSF oversight by Defense. For example, from January 2004 through August 2006, Defense disallowed or deferred an average of a little more than 2 percent of each monthly Pakistani reimbursement claim, for a total of $59.4 million over a 32-month period. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent or $33.3 million over a 6-month period and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent, or $81.2 million in a four month period. No Guidance to Ensure Continued Oversight by ODRP
Despite ODRP’s increased oversight activity, the continuity of this oversight is not assured. Defense has never provided ODRP with guidance on how, and to what extent, it should verify that Pakistan actually provided military support and that expenses were actually incurred. Our assessment found that while CSF played a key role in Pakistan’s support for the war on terror, Defense has not followed its existing guidance and has provided little oversight of the effort at the embassy in Pakistan. Prior to 2004, it appears there was even less evidence to support Pakistan’s claims. Additionally we recognize that Defense may not be able to fully verify all Pakistani claims without having the ability to access the Pakistani government’s records and make site visits or conduct spot checks. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has reimbursed Pakistan, a key ally in the global war on terror, about $5.56 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for its efforts to combat terrorism along its border with Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides CSF for costs incurred in direct support of U.S. military operations. Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF, receiving 81 percent of CSF reimbursements. This testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which Defense has consistently applied its guidance to validate the reimbursements claimed by Pakistan and (2) how the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan's (ODRP) role has changed over time. This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds, GAO-08-806 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008).
What GAO Found
Defense Comptroller issued new guidance in 2003 to enhance CSF oversight. The guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e., above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated. While Defense generally conducted macro-level analytical reviews called for in its guidance, such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the same service, for a large number of reimbursement claims Defense did not obtain detailed documentation to verify that claimed costs were valid, actually incurred, or correctly calculated. GAO found that Defense did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2 billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining sufficient information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs. Furthermore, Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not incremental, (2) were not based on actual activity, or (3) were potentially duplicative. GAO also found that additional oversight controls were needed. For example, there is no guidance for Defense to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if performed would enhance Defense's ability to monitor for potential overbillings. Defense's guidance does not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have access to Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistan CSF claims from January 2004 through August 2006. Beginning in September 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from U.S. Central Command or the Defense Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort on the part of ODRP contributed to an increase in the amount of Pakistani government CSF claims disallowed and deferred. Prior to ODRP's increased verification efforts, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for January 2004 through August 2006 was a little over 2 percent. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent. However, ODRP's continued oversight activity is not assured, as Defense had not developed formal guidance delineating how and to what degree ODRP should attempt to verify Pakistani claims for reimbursement. GAO recognizes that Defense may not be able to fully verify every Pakistani claim without the ability to access Pakistani records or do onsite monitoring. However, such ability would enhance CSF oversight. |
gao_GAO-07-547T | gao_GAO-07-547T_0 | The first recommendation suggests targets for near-term oversight; the second proposes policies and programs in need of fundamental reform and re-engineering; the third lists governing issues. We plan to establish a presence in Iraq beginning later this fiscal year to provide additional oversight of issues deemed important to the Congress; subject to approval by the U.S. Department of State and adequate funding. In January of this year, we also issued our High-Risk Series: An Update, which identifies federal areas and programs at risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and those in need of broad-based transformations. Indeed, as the Congress considers those fiscal pressures, it will be grappling with tough choices about what government does, how it does business, and who will do the government’s business. Performance, Results, and Plans
We anticipate that the funds requested for fiscal year 2008 will support efforts similar to those just completed in fiscal year 2006. Outcomes of Our Work and the Road Ahead
During fiscal year 2006, we used 16 annual performance measures that capture the results of our work; the assistance we provided to the Congress; our ability to attract, retain, develop, and lead a highly professional workforce; and how well our internal administrative services help employees get their jobs done and improve their work life (see table 3). Of this amount, about $27 billion resulted from changes to laws or regulations, $10 billion resulted from agency actions based on our recommendations to improve services to the public, and $14 billion resulted from improvements to core business processes. Helped to ensure that certain U.S. During fiscal year 2006, we recorded a total of 1,342 nonfinancial benefits. During fiscal year 2006, experts from our staff testified at 240 congressional hearings covering a wide range of complex issues (seetable 4). GAO’s Fiscal Year 2008 Request to Support the Congress
Our fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks the resources necessary to allow GAO to rebuild and enhance its workforce, knowledge capacity, employee programs, and infrastructure. In the years ahead, our support to the Congress will likely prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation’s current and projected budget deficit and growing long-term fiscal imbalance. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request includes funds to regain the momentum needed to achieve these goals. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow GAO to address supply and demand imbalances in responding to congressional requests for studies in areas such as health care, disaster assistance, homeland security, the global “war on terrorism,” energy and natural resources, and forensic auditing; address our increasing bid protest workload; be more competitive in the labor markets where GAO competes for talent; address critical human capital components, such as knowledge capacity building, succession planning, and staff skills and competencies; enhance employee recruitment, retention, and development programs; restore program funding levels and regain our purchasing power; undertake critical initiatives necessary to continuously re-engineer processes geared to increasing our productivity and effectiveness and addressing identified management challenges; and pursue critical structural and infrastructure maintenance and improvements. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request represents an increase of $41.7 million (or 8.5 percent) over our fiscal year 2007 funding level and includes about $523 million in direct appropriations and authority to use about $7.5 million in offsetting collections as illustrated in table 5. However, in order to manage within expected funding levels in fiscal year 2007, we will significantly curtail hiring by about 50 percent below the previous year, resulting in a projected FTE utilization of 3,159—well below our planned level. We have also seen an increase in the number of bid protest filings. GAO, however, is unable to extend this increased benefit to staff. In fiscal year 2008, we would like to have sufficient funding to take action to protect our current investments and continue to be a model agency and lead by example. We also plan to request legislation that will assist GAO in performing its mission work and enhance our human capital policies, including addressing certain compensation and benefits issues of interest to our employees. We are grateful for the Congress’s continued support of our mutual effort to improve government and for providing the resources that allow us to be a world- class professional services organization. We are proud of our record performance and the positive impact we have been able to effect in government over the past year and believe an investment in GAO will continue to yield substantial returns for the Congress and the American people. GAO’s expertise and involvement in virtually every facet of government positions us to provide the Congress with the timely, objective, and reliable information it needs to discharge its constitutional responsibilities. Appendix I: Serving the Congress—GAO’s Strategic Plan Framework
GAO exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. | Why GAO Did This Study
We would like to thank Congress for its past support of GAO. We are especially appreciative of Congressional efforts to help us avoid a furlough of our staff during fiscal year 2007. Had we not received additional funds this year and not taken other cost minimization actions, GAO would have likely been forced to furlough most staff for up to 5 days without pay. At the same time, due to funding shortfalls, we were not able to make pay adjustments retroactive to January 7, 2007. It is through the efforts of our dedicated and capable staff that we were able to provide the Congress with the professional, objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced information it needs to meet the full range of its constitutional responsibilities. We are extremely pleased and proud to say that we helped the federal government achieve a total of $51 billion in financial benefits in fiscal year 2006--a record high that represents a return on investment of $105 for every dollar the Congress invested in us. As a result of our work, we also documented 1,342 nonfinancial benefits that helped to improve service to the public, change laws, and transform government operations. The funding we received in fiscal year 2006 allowed us to conduct work that addressed many difficult issues confronting the nation, including U.S. border security, Iraq and Hurricane Katrina activities, the tax gap and tax reform, and issues affecting the health and pay of military service members. Our client-focused performance measures indicate that the Congress valued and was very pleased with our work overall.
What GAO Found
There is a need for fundamental and dramatic reform to address what the government does, how it does business, and who will do the government's business. Our support to the Congress will likely prove even more critical because of the pressures created by our nation's current and projected budget deficit and growing long-term fiscal imbalance. Also, as we face current and projected supply and demand imbalance issues and a growing workload over the coming years across a wide spectrum of issues, GAO will be unable to respond to congressional demands without a significant investment in our future. We have exhausted the results that we can achieve based on prior investments. Our ability to continue to produce record results and assist the Congress in discharging its Constitutional responsibilities relating to authorization, appropriations, oversight, and other matters will be adversely impacted unless we take action now. Therefore, our fiscal year 2008 budget request is designed to restore GAO's funding to more reasonable operating levels. Specifically, we are requesting fiscal year 2008 budget authority of $530 million, an 8.5 percent increase over our fiscal year 2007 funding level. The additional funds provided in fiscal year 2007 have helped reduce our requested increase for fiscal year 2008 from 9.4 percent to 8.5 percent. This funding level also represents a reduction below the request we submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in January as a result of targeted adjustments to our planned fiscal year 2008 hiring plan. Our fiscal year 2008 budget request will allow us to achieve our performance goals to support the Congress as outlined in our strategic plan1 and rebuild our workforce capacity to allow us to better respond to supply and demand imbalances in responding to congressional requests. This funding will also help us address our caseload for bid protest filings, which have increased by more than 10 percent from fiscal years 2002 through 2006. Our workload for the first quarter of fiscal year 2007 suggests a continuation of this upward trend in bid protest fillings. We will be seeking Congressional commitment and support to provide the funding needed to increase GAO's staffing level to 3,750 over the next 6 years in order to address critical needs including supply and demand imbalances, high-risk areas, 21st Century Challenges questions, technology assessments, and other areas in need of fundamental reform. In addition, as we get closer to when GAO may be able to render our opinion on the consolidated financial statements of the U. S. government and the Department of Defense's financial and related systems, we will need to increase our workforce capacity. We will be providing the Congress additional information on the basis for and nature of this target later this year. Importantly, as noted last year, we also plan to request legislation that will assist GAO in performing its mission work, and enhance our human capital policies, including addressing certain compensation and benefits issues of interest to our employees. We plan to submit our proposal to our Senate and House authorization and oversight committees in the near future. |
gao_GAO-02-517T | gao_GAO-02-517T_0 | Over the same time period, pipeline mileage increased 1.6 percent annually from 1.9 to 2.2 million miles of pipelines. OPS Has Made Progress in Implementing Integrity Management Programs and Other Initiatives
Partly on the basis of OPS’ experience with the Risk Management Demonstration Program, the agency has moved forward with a new regulatory approach that requires pipeline operators to comprehensively identify and address risks to the segments of their pipelines that are located in “high consequence areas” where a leak or rupture would have the greatest impact. According to the Safety Board and industry groups, OPS’ initiatives address the underlying data problems and will enable OPS to better understand the causes of incidents so the agency can focus its efforts to improve safety. States Are Taking a Greater Role in Overseeing Interstate Pipeline Safety Activities
OPS is allowing more states to help oversee a broader range of interstate pipeline safety activities. OPS Has Not Implemented Significant Safety Board Recommendations and Statutory Requirements
OPS is taking action on open recommendations from the Safety Board and statutory requirements, but has still not implemented important recommendations and requirements. Some of these recommendations were more than a decade old. As of February 2002, OPS had not implemented 42 recommendations, several of which date from the late 1980s and deal with issues considered critical to pipeline safety, such as requiring operators to inspect their pipelines. These issues include (1) performance measures for the integrity management approach, (2) sufficient resources and expertise to oversee operators’ integrity management programs, (3) consistent and effective enforcement of integrity management program requirements, and (4) requirements for integrity management programs for operators of gas transmission pipelines. OPS has taken steps to improve its data, but it may be several years before the agency can accumulate sufficient data to evaluate trends in the pipeline industry. | What GAO Found
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) oversees 2.2 million miles of pipelines that transport potentially dangerous materials, such as oil and natural gas. OPS has been slow to improve its oversight of the pipeline industry and implement critical pipeline safety improvements. As a result, OPS has the lowest rate of any transportation agency for implementing the recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board. In recent years, OPS has taken several steps to improve its oversight of the pipeline industry, including requiring "integrity management" programs for individual operators to assess their pipelines for risks, take action to mitigate the risks, and develop program performance measures. OPS has also (1) revised forms and procedures to collect more complete and accurate data, which will enable OPS to better assess the causes of incidents and focus on the greatest risks to pipelines; (2) allowed more states to oversee a broader range of interstate pipeline safety activities; and (3) increased the use of fines. OPS has made progress in responding to recommendations from the Safety Board and statutory requirements, but some key open recommendations and requirements, such as requiring pipeline operators to periodically inspect their pipelines, are now more than a decade old. OPS faces challenges that include (1) developing performance measures for the integrity management approach, (2) ensuring sufficient resources and expertise to oversee operators' integrity management programs, (3) providing consistent and effective enforcement of integrity management program requirements, and (4) issuing requirements for integrity management programs for operators of gas transmission pipelines. |
gao_GAO-07-389T | gao_GAO-07-389T_0 | For example, the unified budget deficit provides information on borrowing needs and current cash flow. Meeting the Long- Term Fiscal Challenge Requires Action on the Spending and Tax Sides of the Budget-- Cooperation and Compromise Will Be Necessary
There is no easy way out of the challenge we face. As I noted, we need to start with real changes in existing entitlement programs to change the path of those programs. Reprioritization and constraint will be necessary in other spending programs. Finally, we will need more revenues—hopefully through a reformed tax system. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | What GAO Found
The Comptroller General testified before Congress for a hearing entitled "Why Deficits Matter." The presentation touched on several points. First, the current financial condition in the United States is worse than is widely understood. Second, the current fiscal path is both imprudent and unsustainable. Third, improvements in information and processes are needed and can help. And finally, meeting the long-term fiscal challenge will require (1) significant entitlement reform to change the path of those programs; (2) reprioritizing, restructuring and constraining other spending programs; and (3) more revenues--hopefully through a reformed tax system. This will take bipartisan cooperation and compromise. |
gao_NSIAD-97-37 | gao_NSIAD-97-37_0 | Factors Contributing to Contract Payment Process Errors and Cost
We identified three key factors that contribute significantly to problems in DOD’s payment process. These three factors are: nonintegrated computer systems that require data to be entered manually and often with information that is erroneous or incomplete, multiple documents that must be matched before contractors are paid, and payment information that is allocated among numerous accounting categories. 2). Moreover, the organizations we visited reported that payment productivity increased. DOD Is Addressing Its Payment Problems, but It Can Do More
DOD is aware of the seriousness of its payment problems and is taking steps to address them, including testing and adopting some commercial best practices. According to DOD, it has not yet made a decision on how to avoid transferring erroneous data to the new system, but it believes that other initiatives may help minimize errors. DFAS still matches multiple documents before making a payment. Conclusions and Recommendations
It is imperative that DOD achieve cost-effective control over its payment process. Otherwise, it continues to risk hundreds of millions of dollars in potential overpayments and other financial management and accounting control problems. Further, improving the efficiency of the payment process could save additional millions of dollars annually in reduced processing costs. Improving DOD’s payment system will not be an easy or quick undertaking. It will require continued top management attention and support for many years to come. However, when and to what degree these actions will correct its problems remains to be seen. DOD might also benefit from further examining best practices of organizations that have reengineered their contract payments process. Scope and Methodology
To determine the factors contributing to payment process errors and cost, and DOD’s efforts to improve its payment process, we interviewed officials and reviewed supporting documentation from the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, Washington, D.C.;
Defense Finance and Accounting Service Headquarters, Navy Finance and Accounting Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, Department of the Navy’s Office of Research Development and Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia;
Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia;
Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
Air Force Materiel Command, Dayton, Ohio;
Army Aviation and Troop Command, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, St. Louis, Missouri; and
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Columbus Center, Columbus, Ohio. They focused on a long-term effort of continual improvements with contract payments viewed as an integral part of the acquisition process. In general, these organizations combined technological improvements with streamlined processes to improve service and reduce costs. 2. 3. 4. 5. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve its contract payment practices, focusing on: (1) the factors contributing to payment errors and increased costs; (2) DOD's efforts to improve its payment system; and (3) payment practices of commercial companies that DOD might adopt.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is imperative that DOD achieve cost-effective control over its payment process; (2) otherwise, it continues to risk hundreds of millions of dollars in potential overpayments and other financial management and accounting control problems; (3) further, improving the efficiency of the payment process would save additional millions of dollars annually in reduced processing costs; (4) the following factors contribute significantly to problems and increased costs in DOD's payment process: (a) nonintegrated computer systems that require manual entry of data that are erroneous or incomplete; (b) multiple documents that must be matched before contractors are paid; and (c) payments that require allocation among numerous accounting categories; (5) improving DOD's payment system will not be an easy or quick undertaking; (6) it will require continued top management attention and support for many years to come; (7) while DOD is taking some steps to address its payment problems, when and to what degree they will effectively correct its problems remains to be seen; (8) further, DOD's actions do not go far enough in addressing the factors GAO identified as contributing to payment problems; (9) for example, DOD has yet to decide on how to minimize transferring existing erroneous data to the new automated system; (10) moreover, it also plans to continue to match multiple documents and allocate payments across numerous accounting categories; (11) GAO's review indicated that DOD might benefit from further examining best practices of commercial organizations that have reengineered their contract payments process; (12) the organizations GAO visited have focused on a long-term effort of continual improvements with contract payments viewed as an integral part of the acquisition process; and (13) in general, these organizations have combined technological improvements with streamlined processes to improve service and reduce costs. |
gao_T-GGD-98-115 | gao_T-GGD-98-115_0 | As requested, I will discuss three topics today: (1) the need for and advantages of more frequent updating of the CPI expenditure weights, (2) the nature of the work we are currently doing with regard to the CPI, and (3) BLS’ coverage of CPI improvement efforts in its strategic plan and fiscal year 1999 annual performance plan. My comments on the need for and advantages of more frequent updating of the CPI expenditure weights are based largely on our October report and will provide information on (1) the views of individuals knowledgeable about the CPI on the issue of updating the expenditure weights between major revisions to the CPI, (2) the updating practices of other industrial countries, (3) the cost to update the expenditure weights, (4) the possible effect on the federal budget of more frequent updates, and (5) BLS’ response to our recommendation that it should update the expenditure weights more frequently. for improving CPI quality or how BLS will ensure that information it uses to assess actual performance against CPI improvement goals is accurate, complete, and consistent. However, BLS’ performance plan does not fully portray how BLS’ strategies and resources will help achieve the BLS performance goals. Overall, we found linkages between BLS’ performance goals and indicators relating to improving the CPI and three Boskin commission recommendations (see app. BLS told us that both it and the Department of Labor question the usefulness of discussing recommendations contained in particular reports, such as the Boskin commission report, in long-range planning documents, including BLS’ strategic plan and fiscal year 1999 annual performance plan. However, given the high degree of interest that Members of Congress, the Federal Reserve, and others who are concerned about the accuracy of the CPI have shown in the Boskin commission’s report and recommendations, we believe that a discussion of the relationship of the goals in BLS’ performance plan for fiscal year 2000 to the Boskin commission recommendations, or an explanation of the absence of such relationship, would add to the plan’s credibility and usefulness to CPI stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed whether the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) accurately reflects consumer spending, focusing on the: (1) need for and advantages of more frequent updating of the CPI expenditure weights; (2) nature of the work GAO is doing with regard to the CPI; and (3) BLS' coverage of CPI improvement efforts in its strategic plan and fiscal year (FY) 1999 annual performance plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) BLS uses expenditure weights to aggregate market basket items into the overall index number; (2) the preponderance of evidence GAO obtained pointed to the need for and advantages of more frequent updates; (3) this evidence included the: (a) views of professionals knowledgeable about the CPI; (b) practices of other countries; (c) results of research that show that the age of expenditure weights affects the CPI; and (d) the sizable effect more frequent updates could have on the federal budget in comparison to the relatively small costs associated with updates; (4) BLS has said it agrees with GAO's recommendation for more frequent updates and is considering the appropriate update frequency; (5) in examining BLS' FY 1999 performance plan, GAO found that it was partially successful in providing a picture of BLS' intended performance to improve the CPI's quality; (6) further, the plan did not fully portray how BLS' strategies and resources would help achieve the performance goals for improving CPI quality or how BLS would ensure that the data it uses to assess its performance are credible; (7) GAO found linkages between some, but not all, of the commission's recommendations and the plan's performance goals and indicators; (8) neither BLS' strategic plan nor its FY 1999 performance plan discusses such linkages or the lack of them; (9) BLS and the Department of Labor question the usefulness of discussing recommendations contained in particular reports, such as the Boskin commission report, in long-range planning documents; and (10) however, GAO believes such a discussion would enhance the plans' usefulness and credibility to CPI stakeholders given the great interest shown in the Boskin commission recommendations by Congress and others. |
gao_GAO-14-439 | gao_GAO-14-439_0 | All three functional combatant commands’ number of authorized positions grew. However, the functional combatant commands also increased the number of military personnel to support the headquarters. Specifically, total authorized military and civilian positions for the service component commands increased from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815 in fiscal year 2013. Costs to Support Headquarters Operations Have Grown for Combatant and Service Component Commands
Total costs to support headquarters operations at the three functional combatant commands we reviewed increased substantially from fiscal years 2001 to 2013. Our analysis of data provided by the commands shows that the costs to support headquarters operations—including costs for civilian pay, contract services, travel, and equipment —increased more than fourfold in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, from about $296 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013. Total costs in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars to support headquarters operations increased slightly at the service component commands we reviewed, from about $614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $657 million in fiscal year 2013.component commands saw the greatest increase in costs to support headquarters operations, primarily due to the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command, which first reported costs in fiscal year 2010. DOD’s Headquarters Reductions Do Not Include All Command Resources, Thus Affecting DOD’s Ability to Achieve Significant Cost Savings
In 2013, the Secretary of Defense set a target for reducing management headquarters budgets by 20 percent, but we found that DOD did not have an accurate accounting of the budgets and personnel associated with management headquarters to use as a starting point for reductions. Our work also found that management headquarters include about a quarter of the personnel at the commands—of the 10,500 authorized positions at the functional combatant commands, about 2,500 are considered to be management headquarters. In July 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced in a memorandum that the Secretary of Defense had directed reductions to DOD headquarters, to include the functional combatant commands, in an effort to streamline DOD’s management and eliminate lower-priority activities. DOD officials reported that each of the combatant commands developed different approaches for identifying the population of resources on which to base reductions. On the basis of our analysis of data on authorized positions at the functional combatant commands and their service component commands, we found that the commands designate less than a quarter of the total authorized positions as part of their management headquarters functions. However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data. If DOD’s headquarters reductions do not have a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to target savings—and reductions are only focused on what the commands have self-reported as management headquarters activities— then the department may not be able to track its savings to management headquarters or assure that reductions are achieved as intended. We further noted that any consolidation initiatives must be grounded in accurate and reliable data. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management headquarters, to include the combatant commands, by June 2014.plan is to include a description of the planned changes or reductions in staffing and services and the estimated cumulative savings to be achieved from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. 3. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure the department’s efforts ultimately result in meaningful savings. DOD concurred with the second and third recommendations that the Secretary of Defense: set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. This report (1) identifies any trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 to meet their assigned missions and responsibilities, and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) directed reductions to headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting service component commands, could result in cost savings for the department. SOCOM’s Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013
SOCOM’s Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013
5% Theater Special Operations Command (23)
15% Joint Special Operations Command (71)
80% SOCOM Headquarters (373)
SOCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013
SOCOM’s Service Component Commands’ Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013
34% Air Force Special Operations Command (710)
12% Air Force Special Operations Command (29.4)
7% Marine Corps Special Operations Command (16.2) 14% Naval Special Warfare Command (33.2)
67% Army Special Operations Command (159.7)
14% Marine Corps Special Operations Command (304)
Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters Directorates
Subordinate Unified Command Total Direct Reporting Units
U.S. Special Operations Command Grand Total
Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command Service Component Commands
Service Component Command Grand Total
Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. Strategic Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 6)
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (STRATCOM)
Mission: STRATCOM conducts global operations in coordination with other combatant commands, military services, and appropriate U.S. government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States and its allies. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD operates three functional combatant commands, which provide special operations, strategic forces, and transportation. GAO was mandated to review personnel and resources of these commands in light of plans announced by DOD to reduce headquarters. This report (1) identifies the trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD's reductions to headquarters could result in cost savings.
GAO analyzed data for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 on authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations for the functional combatant commands and their service component commands. GAO also obtained documentation such as guidance and budget documents and interviewed officials regarding the commands' approach for implementing reductions to headquarters.
What GAO Found
GAO analysis of the resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) functional combatant commands shows substantial increases in authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations. Specifically, the number of authorized positions across the commands grew from 5,731 in fiscal year 2004 to 10,515 in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD officials, recent and emerging missions have driven up demands at all three functional combatant commands and driven the growth in authorized personnel. In addition, costs to support headquarters operations also increased substantially at the functional combatant commands. Data, in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, show that the combined costs to support headquarters operations for the commands increased from about $296 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than $1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013. Authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands supporting the functional combatant commands also increased. Specifically, authorized positions grew from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815 in fiscal year 2013, and costs to support headquarters operations increased from about $614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $657 million in fiscal year 2013.
DOD's directed reductions to headquarters do not include all resources at the commands, which may affect DOD's ability to achieve significant savings in headquarters operations. In 2013, DOD directed reductions to management headquarters resources in an effort to streamline the department's management. However, GAO found that the department did not have a clear or accurate accounting of the resources being devoted to management headquarters to use as a starting point to track reductions. Officials noted that DOD relied on data self-reported by the commands, and GAO found that these data were potentially inconsistent and did not include the totality of headquarters resources. Specifically, GAO found that less than a quarter of the positions at the functional combatant commands are considered to be management headquarters even though many positions appear to be performing management headquarters functions such as planning, budgeting, and developing policies. As such, more than three quarters of the headquarters positions at the functional combatant commands are potentially excluded from DOD's directed reductions. However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data. GAO has also concluded that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear goals and consolidation initiatives grounded in accurate and reliable data. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management headquarters by June 2014. Unless DOD reevaluates its decision to focus reductions to management headquarters and establishes a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to base reductions, the department will be unable to track and reliably report its headquarters reductions and ultimately may not realize significant savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure meaningful savings, (2) set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and (3) track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation, questioning, in part, the recommendation's scope, and concurred with the second and third recommendations. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-903T | gao_GAO-05-903T_0 | Deployed Military Services Use Varying Approaches to Collect OEHS Data and Have Not Submitted All OEHS Reports for OIF
The deployed military services generally have collected and reported OEHS data for OIF, as required by DOD policy. To increase data collection uniformity, the Joint Environmental Surveillance Working Group has made some progress in devising cross-service standards and practices for some OEHS activities. However, CHPPM officials said that they could not measure the magnitude of noncompliance because they have not received all of the required quarterly consolidated lists of OEHS reports that have been completed. For example, although one water monitoring standard has been adopted by all military services, the services have different standards for both air and soil monitoring. Deployed Military Services Have Not Submitted All Required OEHS Reports for OIF, and the Magnitude of Noncompliance Is Unknown
The deployed military services have not submitted all the OEHS reports that the preventive medicine units completed during OIF to CHPPM for archiving, according to CHPPM officials. Progress Made in Using OEHS Reports to Address Immediate Health Risks, Though Limitations Remain for Addressing Both Immediate and Long- term Health Issues
DOD has made progress in using OEHS reports to address immediate health risks during OIF, but limitations remain in employing these reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues. During OIF, OEHS reports have been used as part of operational risk management activities intended to assess, mitigate, and communicate to servicemembers any potential hazards at a location. In addition, DOD’s centralized archive of OEHS reports for OIF is limited in its ability to provide information on the potential long-term health effects related to occupational and environmental exposures for several reasons, including limited access to most OEHS reports because of their security classification, incomplete data on servicemembers’ deployment locations, and the lack of a comprehensive federal research plan incorporating the use of archived OEHS reports. DOD Has Made Progress in Using Deployment OEHS Data and Reports in Risk Management but Does Not Monitor Implementation of These Efforts
To identify and reduce the risk of immediate health hazards in OIF, all of the military services have used preventive medicine units’ OEHS data and reports in an operational risk management process. Difficulties Exist in Linking Archived OEHS Reports to Individual Servicemembers, but Some Efforts Are Under Way to Include Information in Medical Records
Linking OEHS reports from the archive to individual servicemembers will be difficult because DOD’s centralized tracking database for recording servicemembers’ deployment locations currently does not contain complete or comparable data. During OIF, some efforts have been made to include information about specific incidents of potential and actual exposure to occupational or environmental health hazards in the medical records of servicemembers who may have been affected. In addition, the military services have taken some steps to include summaries of potential exposures to occupational and environmental health hazards in the medical records of servicemembers deployed to specific locations. No Federal Research Plan Exists for Using OEHS Reports to Follow the Health of OIF Servicemembers over Time
According to DOD and VA officials, no federal research plan that includes the use of archived OEHS reports has been developed to evaluate the long- term health of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF, including the effects of potential exposure to occupational or environmental hazards. Consequently, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense ensure that cross-service guidance is created to implement DOD’s policy, once that policy has been revised, to improve the collection and reporting of OEHS data during deployments and the linking of OEHS reports to servicemembers. However, efforts by a joint DOD and VA working group to develop a federal research plan for OIF that would include examining the effects of potential exposure to occupational and environmental health hazards have just begun, despite similarities in deployment location to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation, and VA concurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, research and investigations into the causes of servicemembers' unexplained illnesses were hampered by a lack of servicemember health and deployment data, including inadequate occupational and environmental exposure data. In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) developed a militarywide health surveillance framework that includes occupational and environmental health surveillance (OEHS)--the regular collection and reporting of occupational and environmental health hazard data by the military services. This testimony is based on GAO's report, entitled Defense Health Care: Improvements Needed in Occupational and Environmental Health Surveillance during Deployment to Address Immediate and Long-term Heath Issues (GAO-05-632). The testimony presents findings about how the deployed military services have implemented DOD's policies for collecting and reporting OEHS data for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the efforts under way to use OEHS reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF.
What GAO Found
Although OEHS data generally have been collected and reported for OIF, as required by DOD policy, the deployed military services have used different data collection methods and have not submitted all of the OEHS reports that have been completed. Data collection methods for air and soil surveillance have varied across the services, for example, although they have been using the same monitoring standard for water surveillance. For some OEHS activities, a cross-service working group has been developing standards and practices to increase uniformity of data collection among the services. In addition, while the deployed military services have been conducting OEHS activities, they have not submitted all of the OEHS reports that have been completed during OIF. Moreover, DOD officials could not identify the reports they had not received to determine the extent of noncompliance. DOD has made progress in using OEHS reports to address immediate health risks during OIF, but limitations remain in employing these reports to address both immediate and long-term health issues. OEHS reports have been used consistently during OIF as part of operational risk management activities intended to identify and address immediate health risks and to make servicemembers aware of the risks of potential exposures. While these efforts may help in reducing health risks, DOD has not systematically evaluated their implementation during OIF. DOD's centralized archive of OEHS reports for OIF has several limitations for addressing potential long-term health effects related to occupational and environmental exposures. First, access to the centralized archive has been limited due to the security classification of most OEHS reports. Second, it will be difficult to link most OEHS reports to individual servicemembers' records because not all data on servicemembers' deployment locations have been submitted to DOD's centralized tracking database. To address problems with linking OEHS reports to individual servicemembers, the deployed military services have tried to include OEHS monitoring summaries in the medical records of some servicemembers for either specific incidents of potential exposure or for specific locations within OIF. Additionally, according to DOD and Veterans Affairs (VA) officials, no federal research plan has been developed to evaluate the long-term health of servicemembers deployed in support of OIF, including the effects of potential exposures to occupational or environmental hazards. GAO's report made several recommendations, including that the Secretary of Defense improve deployment OEHS data collection and reporting and evaluate OEHS risk management activities and that the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs jointly develop a federal research plan to address long-term health effects of OIF deployment. DOD plans to take steps to meet the intent of our first recommendation and partially concurred with the other recommendations. VA concurred with our recommendation for a joint federal research plan. |
gao_GAO-09-494 | gao_GAO-09-494_0 | FCC has primary responsibility for regulating broadband. The Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is the President’s principal telecommunications and information adviser and works with other executive branch agencies to develop the administration’s telecommunications policies. A 2008 NTIA report reaffirmed President Bush’s vision of universal broadband access by noting, “rom its first days, the Administration has implemented a comprehensive and integrated package of technology, regulatory, and fiscal policies designed to lower barriers and create an environment in which broadband innovation and competition can flourish.”
The Broadband Data Improvement Act of 2008 was enacted to “improve the quality of Federal and State data regarding the availability and quality of broadband services and to promote the deployment of affordable broadband services to all parts of the Nation.”
Officials at OSTP, FCC, and NTIA during the Bush Administration told us that the current federal broadband policy was market-based; OSTP told us that the Bush Administration had implemented fiscal, technology, and regulatory policies based on the recognition that a competitive marketplace provides the best environment for achieving the United States’ broadband goals, and competitive markets should be deregulated; an official at FCC characterized FCC’s broadband policy in recent years as one that reduced barriers to entry, lessened regulation of broadband, and encouraged investment; and NTIA told us that federal broadband policies of the past few years flow from an early speech made by President Bush that emphasized the deployment of broadband, and that NTIA has executed initiatives to remove economic disincentives. Furthermore, according to these officials, the role of the government in carrying out this policy was to create market incentives and remove barriers to competition; the role of the private sector was to fund the deployment of broadband. Under this market-based policy, broadband infrastructure has been extensively deployed in the United States. However, gaps remain, primarily in rural areas, because the market does not support private broadband infrastructure investment in low-density areas. For example, officials from several states said that rural areas in their states often lack broadband service. Multiple Federal Programs Support Telecommunications Infrastructure Deployment, Primarily in Rural Areas, with Two Programs Specifically Funding Broadband
Eleven federal programs administered by six federal agencies help fund telecommunications infrastructure deployment, but just 2 of these programs—Rural Broadband Access Loans and Loan Guarantees program and the Community Connect Grant program—focus specifically on broadband infrastructure deployment. Both programs are administered by the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development, Utilities Program (RDUP). III provides information on these other federal programs.) Stakeholders Credit Federal Programs with Advancing Broadband Deployment, but Said More Investment Is Required to Reach Goal of Universal Availability
Industry stakeholders credit federal programs with helping to increase the deployment of broadband infrastructure throughout the United States. The Broadband Policies of a Number of Other OECD Nations with Higher Broadband Subscribership Are More Detailed Than U.S. Market-Based Policy
A number of the OECD nations that lead the United States in subscribership have broadband policies that are more detailed than the U.S. policy and often include timelines, action plans, and some performance metrics. States Vary in Their Approaches to Increasing Broadband Deployment
Officials from 48 states and the District of Columbia reported wide variation in their approaches to increasing the level of broadband deployment in their states. To address these gaps, CIOs said they were considering or had taken a variety of actions, including mapping, planning, and allocating funds. Mapping broadband deployment. In addition to these existing plans, CIOs from 6 states said they are in the process of developing broadband deployment plans. Fourteen state CIOs told us their states had provided some type of financial support to local providers, state cooperatives, or state agencies for broadband deployment, ranging from bonds to grants to appropriations from state budgets. The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment Act establishes universal access to broadband as a goal and provides federal funding to RDUP and NTIA for grants and loans, to NTIA for mapping broadband infrastructure, and to FCC for developing a national plan for broadband deployment. Figure 1 compares broadband rankings for the United States and other OECD countries. We selected these items because the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) emphasizes these elements as important for the effective and efficient management of government programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States ranks 15th among the 30 democratic nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on one measure of broadband (i.e., high-speed Internet) subscribership. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has regulatory authority over broadband, and several federal programs fund broadband deployment. This congressionally requested report discusses (1) the federal broadband deployment policy, principal federal programs, and stakeholders' views of those programs; (2) how the policies of OECD nations with higher subscribership rates compare with U.S. policy; and (3) actions the states have taken to encourage broadband deployment. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed the broadband policies of the United States and other OECD nations, reviewed federal program documentation and budgetary information, and interviewed federal and state officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
According to federal officials, the federal approach to broadband deployment is focused on advancing universal access. Federal officials said that historically the role of the government in carrying out a market-driven policy has been to create market incentives and remove barriers to competition, and the role of the private sector has been to fund broadband deployment. Under this policy, broadband infrastructure has been deployed extensively in the United States. However, gaps remain, primarily in rural areas, because of limited profit potential. Eleven federal programs help fund telecommunications infrastructure deployment, particularly in rural areas, and two of these programs, administered by the Department of Agriculture's Rural Development Utilities Program (RDUP), focus specifically on broadband infrastructure deployment. Industry stakeholders credit federal programs with helping to increase broadband deployment, particularly in rural areas, but told GAO that because of the high cost and low profit potential of providing broadband services in rural areas, the federal government will likely need to provide additional funding to achieve universal access. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides more than $7 billion to the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), FCC, and RDUP, to map broadband infrastructure in the United States, develop a plan for broadband deployment, and issue loans and grants to fund broadband access and availability in rural areas. This funding will greatly increase the potential for achieving universal access, but overlap in responsibilities for these new broadband initiatives makes coordination among the agencies important to avoid fragmentation and duplication. Current administration officials said they are still formulating their telecommunication agenda. In comparison to the policies of several other OECD countries with higher broadband subscribership rates per 100 inhabitants, the U.S. policy lacks elements identified by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as essential to achieving effective and efficient policy outcomes. Specifically, according to officials of these countries' governments, several of the OECD nations with higher rankings have written broadband policies, action plans, goals, and performance measures. A number of these other countries also have provided financial support, created financial incentives, or taken other steps to promote broadband. In interviews with state officials, GAO learned that states vary in their actions to encourage deployment. Officials in more than half the states cited gaps in broadband deployment and said their states were considering or had taken actions to address these gaps. Officials in 12 states said they had mapped their states and 13 more said they had plans to map; officials in 12 states said they have broadband deployment plans; and officials in 14 states said they have provided some type of financial support for broadband deployment. |
gao_GAO-02-124 | gao_GAO-02-124_0 | The contractors explained in a report issued 60 days after the June 1997 test that the test achieved its primary objectives, but that some sensor abnormalities were noted. The project office also relied on Boeing to oversee the performance of its subcontractor, TRW. Distinguishable Differences in Objects Deployed in Space
Boeing and TRW reported that post-flight testing and analysis of data collected during Integrated Flight Test 1A showed that deployed target objects displayed distinguishable features when observed by an infrared sensor. Decoy Reduction in Later Tests
National Missile Defense program officials said that after considerable debate among themselves and contractors, the program manager reduced the number of decoys planned for intercept flight tests in response to a recommendation by an independent panel, known as the Welch Panel.The panel, established to reduce risk in ballistic missile defense flight test programs, viewed a successful hit-to-kill engagement as a difficult task that should not be further complicated in early tests by the addition of decoys. Evaluation of TRW’s Discrimination Software
The Phase One Engineering Team was tasked by the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office to assess the performance of TRW’s software and to complete the assessment within 2 months using available data. The team reported that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. Based on its analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded contracts to three companies in 1990 to develop and test exoatmospheric kill vehicles. One of the contractors--Boeing North American--subcontracted with TRW to develop software for the kill vehicle. In 1998, Boeing became the Lead System Integrator for the National Missile Defense Program, and chose Raytheon as the primary kill vehicle developer. Boeing and TRW reported that the June 1997 flight test achieved its primary objectives, but that some sensor abnormalities were detected. The project office relied on Boeing to oversee the performance of TRW. Boeing and TRW reported that deployed target objects displayed distinguishable features when being observed by an infrared sensor. After considerable debate, the program manager reduced the number of decoys planned for intercept flight tests in response to a recommendation by an independent panel. The Phase One Engineering Team, which was responsible for completing an assessment of TRW's software performance within two months using available data, found that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. On the basis of that analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected. |
gao_GAO-02-1124T | gao_GAO-02-1124T_0 | Direct Farm Loan Application National Processing Times Were Longer for Hispanic Farmers than for Non-Hispanic Farmers but Were Shorter in Most States with Large Numbers of Hispanic Borrowers
During fiscal year 2000 and 2001, the national average processing time for direct loans for Hispanic farmers was 20 days—4 days longer than for non- Hispanic farmers—but well within FSA’s 60-day requirement. However, the loan approval rate for Hispanic farmers was lower than for non-Hispanic farmers during this 2-year period: 83 and 90 percent, respectively. When an individual files an administrative discrimination complaint with OCR, FSA’s policy is to automatically issue a stay of adverse action—including foreclosure–until the complaint has been resolved. Office of Civil Rights’ Problems with Processing Discrimination Complaints Persist
OCR has adopted many recommendations made in the past by USDA’s Inspector General and agency task forces. Specifically, USDA directs OCR to complete its investigative reports within 180 days after accepting a discrimination complaint. However, during fiscal years 2000 and 2001, OCR took on average 365 days and 315 days, respectively, to complete its investigative reports. In fact, when all phases of the complaint resolution are accounted for, OCR took an average of 772 and 676 days in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, respectively, to completely process complaints through the entire complaint cycle and issue the final agency decision. In the case of class action lawsuits, USDA has been charged with treating different minority groups inequitably because it grants stays of foreclosures to some groups but not to others. | What GAO Found
For years, some minority and women farmers have alleged that the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) discriminates against them, treating them differently from other farmers during the loan approval or foreclosure process. During fiscal years 2000 and 2001, FSA took, on average, four days longer to process loan applications from Hispanic farmers than it did for non-Hispanic farmers: 20 days versus 16 days. The FSA's direct loan approval rate was somewhat lower for Hispanic farmers than for non-Hispanic farmers nationwide: 83 and 90 percent, respectively. USDA's policies for staying foreclosures when discrimination has been alleged depend on the method used to lodge complaints. When an individual's discrimination complaint is accepted by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), FSA's policy is to automatically issue a stay of adverse action, such as foreclosure, until the complaint has been resolved. OCR has made modest progress in the length of time it takes to process discrimination complaints. USDA requires OCR to complete the investigative phase of processing a complaint within 180 days of accepting it. In fiscal year 2000, OCR took an average of 365 days to complete just the investigative phase. Although OCR slightly improved this average to 315 days in fiscal year 2001, this continues to exceed the department's internal 180-day requirement. |
gao_GAO-07-400T | gao_GAO-07-400T_0 | HHS Has Initiated Actions to Identify Solutions for Protecting Personal Health Information but Has Not Defined an Overall Approach for Addressing Privacy
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting health information. Specifically, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for developing solutions that comply with federal privacy and security requirements, consulted with the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) to develop recommendations regarding privacy and confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network, and formed the American Health Information Community (AHIC) Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security Workgroup to frame privacy and security policy issues and identify viable options or processes to address these issues. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT intends to use the results of these activities to identify technology and policy solutions for protecting personal health information as part of its continuing efforts to complete a national strategy to guide the nationwide implementation of health IT. However, HHS is in the early stages of identifying solutions for protecting personal health information and has not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and for addressing key privacy principles. In summer 2006, the privacy and security solutions contractor selected 34 states and territories as locations in which to perform assessments of organization-level privacy- and security-related policies and practices that affect interoperable electronic health information exchange and their bases, including laws and regulations. The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics Made Recommendations for Addressing Privacy and Security within a Nationwide Health Information Network
In June 2006, NCVHS, a key national health information advisory committee, presented to the Secretary of HHS a report recommending actions regarding privacy and confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network. These two work areas address the security principle. HHS stated that the department is committed to ensuring that health information is protected as part of its efforts to achieve nationwide health information exchange. In summary, concerns about the protection of personal health information exchanged electronically within a nationwide health information network have increased as the use of health IT and the exchange of electronic health information have also increased. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2004, President Bush called for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement a strategic plan to guide the nationwide implementation of health IT. The plan is to recommend methods to ensure the privacy of electronic health information. GAO was asked to summarize its report that is being released today. The report describes the steps HHS is taking to ensure privacy protection as part of its national health IT strategy and identifies challenges associated with protecting electronic health information exchanged within a nationwide health information network.
What GAO Found
HHS and its Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT have initiated actions to identify solutions for protecting personal health information through several contracts and with two health information advisory committees. For example, in late 2005, HHS awarded several health IT contracts that include requirements for addressing the privacy of personal health information exchanged within a nationwide health information exchange network. Its privacy and security solutions contractor is to assess the organization-level privacy- and security-related policies, practices, laws, and regulations that affect interoperable health information exchange. Additionally, in June 2006, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics made recommendations to the Secretary of HHS on protecting the privacy of personal health information within a nationwide health information network and in August 2006, the American Health Information Community convened a work group to address privacy and security policy issues for nationwide health information exchange. While these activities are intended to address aspects of key principles for protecting the privacy of health information, HHS is in the early stages of its efforts and has therefore not yet defined an overall approach for integrating its various privacy-related initiatives and addressing key privacy principles, nor has it defined milestones for integrating the results of these activities. GAO identified key challenges associated with protecting electronic personal health information in four areas. |
gao_NSIAD-99-66 | gao_NSIAD-99-66_0 | FYDP Shows Partial Costs and Savings Estimates From BRAC and Competitive Sourcing
DOD expects savings from individual DRIs but has not incorporated specific savings from these initiatives in the FYDP, except in the areas of potential BRAC and competitive sourcing. Both have significant up-front investment costs that can limit net savings in the short term. While personnel reductions are programmed in the 1999-2003 FYDP and are expected to represent a portion of savings from DRIs, DOD has not required the services to link specific personnel reductions to individual initiatives. Projected Competitive Sourcing Savings Are Significant but Do Not Fully Account for Investment Costs
DOD’s 1999-2003 FYDP projected $6.2 billion in savings from competitive sourcing between fiscal year 1997 and 2003. Competitive Sourcing Savings Were Projected Using Historic Experience But Were Not Linked to Specific Study Plans
Savings from ongoing and future competitive sourcing studies as projected in the 1999 FYDP were the result of broad-based estimates drawn from previous experience. When the FYDP was being prepared, the projections were not linked to specific functions then under study or planned for future study. Our previous work has already shown that there are important limitations to using historical savings estimates because they may not provide an accurate indication of likely future savings. Actual savings data has not been captured. Specific Study Plans Continue to Evolve
Study plans of most Defense components linking the number of positions to be studied with specific functions and locations are still evolving, and estimated savings will not be known until the studies are completed. Consequently, it is not feasible to identify the current costs of functions to be studied and their potential savings rates. 2461 requirements for congressional notification. Other than specific cases brought to our attention, procurement and commercial activities data systems do not identify the extent to which Defense components may be outsourcing functions without complying with these procedures or requirements. Conclusions
The costs and savings associated with Defense Reform Initiatives incorporated in DOD’s 1999-2003 FYDP include partial costs and savings from competitive sourcing and additional BRAC initiatives. There is no systematic way to identify whether components outsource functions without following the requirements of OMB Circular A-76 or the procedures of 10 U.S.C. Such cases can be identified only when they are specifically raised. To determine whether Defense components outsourced inherently governmental functions without allowing civilian employees to compete or did not meet the requirements of 10 U.S.C. The A-76 Process
In general, the A-76 process consists of six key activities: (1) developing a performance work statement and quality assurance surveillance plan; (2) conducting a management study to determine the government's most efficient organization (MEO); (3) developing an in-house government cost estimate for the MEO; (4) issuing a Request for Proposals or Invitation for Bids; (5) evaluating the proposals or bids and comparing the in-house estimate with a private-sector offer or interservice support agreement and selecting the winner of the cost comparison; and (6) addressing any appeals submitted under the administrative appeals process, which is designed to ensure that all costs are fair, accurate, and calculated in the manner prescribed by the A-76 handbook. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), focusing on: (1) whether savings in DOD's fiscal year (FY) 1999-2003 FYDP were the result of DOD's Defense Reform Initiatives (DRI); (2) the extent to which savings and personnel reductions from competitive sourcing in the 1999-2003 FYDP were based on ongoing or planned studies of functions specifically identified under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, and what percentage of the current costs of performing those functions were included from the projected savings from these studies; and (3) whether DOD components outsourced activities that included inherently governmental functions, without allowing civilian employees to compete under Circular A-76 procedures, or without following the study and notification requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2461.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD expects savings from individual DRIs, but has not incorporated specific savings in the 1999-2003 FYDP from these initiatives, except in the areas of competitive sourcing and estimates relating to future base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions; (2) DOD's 1999-2003 FYDP incorporated $6.2 billion of estimated savings from competitive sourcing between FY 1997 and 2003, but these estimated savings do not fully account for up-front investment costs, which could reduce the amount of actual savings in the short term; (3) the FYDP does provide a fuller estimate of the impact of investment costs associated with BRACs; (4) while DOD has requested additional BRAC rounds, Congress has not authorized them; (5) the Office of the Secretary of Defense expects DRIs to reduce personnel requirements but has not required the services to link specific reductions with individual initiatives; (6) savings from competitive sourcing reflected in the 1999 FYDP were not linked to specific functions under study or targeted for future studies; (7) in addition, DOD does not yet have the systems in place that can provide reliable cost information needed to precisely identify savings; (8) consequently, it is not feasible to accurately identify the current costs of functions to be studied or the potential savings as a percentage of these costs; (9) according to DOD, savings estimates incorporated in the FYDP represented broad projections based on the numbers of positions expected to be studied and historic savings data; (10) GAO's work has shown that historic savings estimates may have important limitations and may not accurately indicate likely current and future savings; (11) study plans of most DOD components have evolved over time, but in many cases they have not linked positions to be studied to specific functions and locations; (12) firm savings estimates probably will not be possible until individual studies are completed; (13) even then, these estimates would be subject to change; (14) procurement and commercial activities data systems do not identify the extent to which DOD components may be outsourcing functions without complying with Circular A-76 procedures or 10 U.S.C. 2461 congressional reporting requirements; and (15) such cases can be identified only when they are specifically raised by affected parties. |
gao_GAO-04-510T | gao_GAO-04-510T_0 | EPA has awarded these grants primarily to nonprofit organizations, universities, and government entities. EPA Faces Four Key Grants Management Challenges, Despite Past Efforts to Address Them
We identified four key challenges that EPA continues to face in managing its grants. These challenges are (1) selecting the most qualified grant applicants, (2) effectively overseeing grantees, (3) measuring the results of grants, and (4) effectively managing grant staff and resources. In the past, EPA has taken a series of actions to address these challenges by, among other things, issuing policies on competition and oversight, conducting training for project officers and nonprofit organizations, and developing a new data system for grants management. However, these actions had mixed results because of the complexity of the problems, weaknesses in design and implementation, and insufficient management attention. EPA has not selected the most qualified applicants despite issuing a competition policy. New Policies and Plan Show Promise but Require Strengthening, Enhanced Accountability, and Sustained Commitment to Succeed
EPA’s recently issued policies on competition and oversight and a 5-year grants management plan to address its long-standing grants management problems are promising and focus on the major management challenges, but these policies and plan require strengthening, enhanced accountability, and sustained commitment to succeed. EPA’s competition policy shows promise but requires a major cultural shift. These activities will require significant planning and take more time than awarding grants noncompetitively. EPA’s December 2002 policy makes important improvements in oversight, but it still does not enable EPA to identify systemic problems in grants management. For the first time, EPA plans a coordinated, integrated approach to improving grants management. In implementing this plan, however, EPA faces challenges to enhancing accountability. While EPA’s new 5-year grants management plan shows promise, given EPA’s historically uneven performance in addressing its grants management challenges, congressional oversight is important to ensure that the Administrator of EPA, managers, and staff implement the plan in a sustained, coordinated fashion to meet the plan’s ambitious targets and time frames. To ensure that EPA’s recent efforts to address its grants management challenges are successful, in our August 2003 report, we recommended that the Administrator of EPA provide sufficient resources and commitment to meeting the agency’s grants management plan’s goals, objectives, and performance targets within the specified timeframes. Furthermore, to strengthen EPA’s efforts we recommended incorporating appropriate statistical techniques in selecting grantees for in-depth reviews; requiring EPA staff to use a standard reporting format for in-depth reviews so that the results can be entered into the grant databases and analyzed agencywide; developing a plan, including modifications to the grantee compliance database, to use data from its various oversight efforts—in-depth reviews, significant actions, corrective actions taken, and other compliance information—to fully identify systemic problems, inform grants management officials of areas that need to be addressed, and take corrective action as needed; modifying its in-depth review protocols to include questions on the status of grantees’ progress in measuring and achieving environmental outcomes; incorporating accountability for grants management responsibilities through performance standards that address grants management for all managers and staff in headquarters and the regions responsible for grants management and holding managers and staff accountable for meeting these standards; and evaluating the promising practices identified in the report and implementing those that could potentially improve EPA grants management. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has long faced problems managing its grants, which constitute over one-half of the agency's annual budget, or about $4 billion. EPA uses grants to implement its programs to protect human health and the environment and awards grants to thousands of recipients, including state and local governments, tribes, universities, and nonprofit organizations. EPA's ability to efficiently and effectively accomplish its mission largely depends on how well it manages its grants resources. This testimony, based on GAO's August 2003 report Grants Management: EPA Needs to Strengthen Efforts to Address Persistent Challenges, GAO-03-846 , focuses on the (1) major challenges EPA faces in managing its grants and how it has addressed these challenges in the past, and (2) extent to which EPA's recently issued policies and grants management plan address these challenges.
What GAO Found
EPA continues to face four key grants management challenges, despite past efforts to address them. These challenges are (1) selecting the most qualified grants applicants, (2) effectively overseeing grantees, (3) measuring the results of grants, and (4) effectively managing grant staff and resources. In the past, EPA has taken a series of actions to address these challenges by, among other things, issuing policies on competition and oversight, conducting training for project officers and nonprofit organizations, and developing a new data system for grants management. However, these actions had mixed results because of the complexity of the problems, weaknesses in design and implementation, and insufficient management attention. EPA's recently issued policies and a 5-year grants management plan to address longstanding management problems show promise, but these policies and plan require strengthening, enhanced accountability, and sustained commitment to succeed. EPA's September 2002 competition policy should improve EPA's ability to select the most qualified applicants by requiring competition for more grants. However, effective implementation of the policy will require a major cultural shift for EPA managers and staff because the competitive process will require significant planning and take more time than awarding grants noncompetitively. EPA's December 2002 oversight policy makes important improvements in oversight, but it does not enable EPA to identify systemic problems in grants management. For example, the policy does not incorporate a statistical approach to selecting grantees for review so that EPA can project the results of the reviews to all EPA grantees. Issued in April 2003, EPA's 5-year grants management plan does offer, for the first time, a comprehensive road map with objectives, goals, and milestones for addressing grants management challenges. However, in implementing the plan, EPA faces challenges in holding all managers and staff accountable for successfully fulfilling their grants management responsibilities. Without this accountability, EPA cannot ensure the sustained commitment needed for the plan's success. While EPA has begun implementing actions in the plan, GAO believes that, given EPA's historically uneven performance in addressing its grants challenges, congressional oversight is important to ensure that EPA's Administrator, managers, and staff implement the plan in a sustained, coordinated fashion to meet the plan's ambitious targets and time frames. |
gao_GAO-04-963T | gao_GAO-04-963T_0 | Several technical factors specifically limit interoperability of public safety wireless communications systems. Nature and Scope of Interoperable Communication Problems Nationwide Are Unknown
The current status of wireless interoperable communications across the nation—including the current interoperable communications capabilities of first responders and the scope and severity of the problems that may exist—has not been determined. SAFECOM officials said development of a national architecture will take time because SAFECOM must first assist state and local governments to establish their communications architectures. Converting SAFECOM’s Functions To A Long-Term Program
In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established SAFECOM to unify the federal government’s efforts to help coordinate work at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels in order to provide reliable public safety communications and achieve national wireless communications interoperability. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of various federal agencies within and outside DHS involved in communications interoperability have not been fully defined, and SAFECOM’s authority to oversee and coordinate federal and state efforts has been limited in part because it has been dependent upon other federal agencies for cooperation and funding and has operated without signed memorandums of understanding negotiated with various agencies. DHS, where SAFECOM now resides, announced in May 2004 that it had created an Office for Interoperability and Compatibility within the Science and Technology Directorate, to coordinate the federal response to the problems of wireless and other functional interoperability and compatibility. As of June 2004, the exact structure and funding for the office, including SAFECOM’s role within the office, were still being developed. State and Local Governments Can Play a Central Role
States, with broad input from local governments, can serve as focal points for statewide planning to improve interoperable communications. The FCC has recognized the important role of states. In its rules and procedures, the FCC concluded that because states play a central role in managing emergency communications and are usually in control at large scale-events and disasters, states should administer the interoperability channels within the 700 MHz band of communications spectrum. However, states are not required to establish a statewide management structure or to develop interoperability plans, and there is no clear guidance on what should be included in such plans. However, the federal funding assistance programs to state and local governments do not fully support regional planning for communications interoperability. Conclusions
A fundamental barrier to successfully addressing interoperable communications problems for public safety has been the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning. No one first responder agency, jurisdiction, or level of government can “fix” the nation’s interoperability problems, which vary across the nation and often cross first responder agency and jurisdictional boundaries. We recommend that the Secretary of DHS: in coordination with the FCC and National Telecommunications and Information Administration, continue to develop a nationwide database of public safety frequency channels and a standard nationwide nomenclature for these channels, with clear target dates for completing both efforts; establish requirements for interoperable communications and assist states in assessing interoperability in their states against those requirements; through DHS grant guidance encourage states to establish a single, statewide body to assess interoperability and develop a comprehensive statewide interoperability plan for federal, state, and local communications systems in all frequency bands; and at the appropriate time, require through DHS grant guidance that federal grant funding for communications equipment shall be approved only upon certification by the statewide body responsible for interoperable communications that grant applications for equipment purchases conform with statewide interoperability plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Lives of first responders and those whom they are trying to assist can be lost when first responders cannot communicate effectively as needed. This report addresses issues of determining the status of interoperable wireless communications across the nation, and the potential roles that federal state, local governments can play in improving these communications.
What GAO Found
In a November 6, 2003, testimony, GAO said that no one group or level of government could "fix" the nation's interoperable communications problems. Success would require effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary and intergovernmental planning. The present extent and scope nationwide of public safety wireless communication systems' ability to talk among themselves as necessary and authorized has not been determined. Data on current conditions compared to needs are necessary to develop plans for improvement and measure progress over time. However, the nationwide data needed to do this are not currently available. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intends to obtain this information by the year 2005 by means of a nationwide survey. However, at the time of our review, DHS had not yet developed its detailed plans for conducting this survey and reporting its results. The federal government can take a leadership role in support of efforts to improve interoperability by developing national requirements and a national architecture, developing nationwide databases, and providing technical and financial support for state and local efforts to improve interoperability. In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established the federal government's Wireless Public Safety Interoperable Communications Program, SAFECOM, to unify efforts to achieve national wireless communications interoperability. However, SAFECOM's authority and ability to oversee and coordinate federal and state efforts has been limited by its dependence upon other agencies for funding and their willingness to cooperate. OMB is currently examining alternative methods to implement SAFECOM's mission. In addition, DHS, where SAFECOM now resides, has recently announced it is establishing an Office for Interoperability and Compatibility to coordinate the federal response to the problems of interoperability in several functions, including wireless communications. The exact structure and funding for this office, which will include SAFECOM, are still being developed. State and local governments can play a large role in developing and implementing plans to improve public safety agencies' interoperable communications. State and local governments own most of the physical infrastructure of public safety communications systems, and states play a central role in managing emergency communications. The Federal Communications Commission recognized the central role of states in concluding that states should manage the public safety interoperability channels in the 700 MHz communications spectrum. States, with broad input from local governments, are a logical choice to serve as a foundation for interoperability planning because incidents of any level of severity originate at the local level with states as the primary source of support. However, states are not required to develop interoperability plans, and there is no clear guidance on what should be included in such plans. |
gao_GAO-09-656 | gao_GAO-09-656_0 | EPA had identified 528 parties responsible for contamination at this site. While site-specific characteristics generally influence how Superfund liability is resolved, we identified some key considerations that the parties routinely take into account: (1) site cleanup costs, (2) the strength of EPA’s evidence, (3) the number and type of other responsible parties, and (4) other considerations that agency officials and Superfund experts cited less frequently as affecting negotiations. Superfund Litigation Decreased Due to a Number of Factors, According to Experts
Superfund litigation—as measured by the number, duration, and complexity of CERCLA cases—decreased from fiscal years 1994 through 2007, the period for which reliable data were available. EPA’s expenditures for litigation, which decreased by 50 percent, from more than $50 million in fiscal year 1999 to $25 million in fiscal year 2007, provide further evidence of this trend. Changes to EPA’s Enforcement Process Have Led to Less Litigation
Litigation also decreased because, through its Superfund administrative reforms and other changes to its enforcement process, EPA further promoted settlements with responsible parties, especially settlements negotiated prior to filing a case in court. Differences in the Types of Sites on the NPL and Other Factors Make It Difficult to Assess the Status of Superfund Site Cleanups and Program Costs
While the number of sites added to the NPL each year has declined significantly since the Superfund program’s early years, the types of sites added in recent years are more costly to clean up, and may not have viable responsible parties to perform or pay for the work. However, EPA does not provide the Congress with sufficient information to make decisions about future funding needs of the Superfund program. The Number and Types of Sites Added to the NPL Have Changed Over Time, but Trends in Sites without Viable Responsible Parties Are Unclear
We identified three factors that could affect EPA’s ability to fund and conduct site cleanups: (1) the number of sites on the NPL has declined over time; (2) the types of sites added to the NPL may require greater EPA expenditures for cleanup; and (3) fewer sites may have responsible parties who can contribute to cleanup, although EPA data do not clearly indicate the number of sites without viable responsible parties or the value of the orphan shares at sites. Other cleanup programs have been used to clean up sites. Mining sites. Within this category, two types of sites were listed in greater numbers. Furthermore, the sites that are not construction complete may require more complex or costly cleanup activities. Remedial Actions Have Been Implemented or Are Underway at Most NPL Sites, but the Amount of Work Remaining Is Unclear
Remedial actions to address site contamination have been completed or begun at most of the sites listed on the NPL since the beginning of the Superfund program, according to EPA’s data. As of fiscal year 2007, approximately 70 percent of the 1,397 nonfederal NPL sites had reached EPA’s construction complete milestone. Conclusions
EPA’s Superfund enforcement actions have generally resulted in agreements with responsible parties that provided significant value to the program, particularly in terms of responsible parties’ commitments to conduct site work. However, EPA’s ability to continue to recover its costs may be affected by the extent to which responsible parties are able to pay for site cleanups. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist the Congress in making decisions about funding the Superfund program, we are recommending that the Administrator, EPA, assess the comprehensiveness and reliability of the data the agency collects and, where necessary, improve the data for the purpose of providing aggregated information on the following issues: the status and cost of cleanups at individual sites, particularly complex and expensive sites; the extent to which there are viable responsible parties at NPL sites; and the potential financial impacts from EPA’s inability to obtain reimbursement for agency cleanup costs from nonviable responsible parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to examine the (1) outcomes of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) enforcement actions, and the factors considered by federal and private parties in reaching these outcomes; (2) trends, if any, in litigation to resolve Superfund liability; and (3) status and implementation costs of the Superfund program. As a result of our monthly searches of the PACER system, as well as data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and district court officials, we compiled a database of 2,281 cases filed under a CERCLA cause of action in U.S. district courts from fiscal years 1994 through 2007. Cases that included previously negotiated settlements were substantially shorter, on average, than other cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Superfund program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) places the most seriously contaminated sites on the National Priorities List (NPL). EPA may compel site cleanups by parties responsible for contamination, or conduct cleanups itself and have these parties reimburse its costs. The program is funded by a trust fund, which is largely supported by general fund appropriations. GAO was asked to examine (1) EPA's enforcement action outcomes and the factors parties consider in reaching these outcomes; (2) any trends in litigation to resolve Superfund liability; and (3) the program's status and costs. GAO obtained and analyzed Superfund program data from EPA, as well as data on Superfund litigation from cases filed in U.S. district courts. GAO also interviewed EPA officials and other Superfund experts
What GAO Found
Through fiscal year 2007, 80 percent of EPA's completed enforcement actions resulted in agreements with responsible parties, and these actions yielded an estimated $29.9 billion in recovered costs, work commitments, and other results. While most of this value came from work commitments, responsible parties more often agreed to reimburse EPA for its cleanup costs than to conduct site work. EPA, the Department of Justice, and responsible parties make settlement decisions on the basis of site-specific characteristics, but generally also take into account (1) site cleanup costs, (2) the strength of the evidence of a party's liability for site contamination, and (3) the number and types of responsible parties identified, among other considerations. Superfund litigation--as measured by the number, duration, and complexity of cases--decreased from fiscal years 1994 through 2007, the period for which data were available. Over this period, the number of Superfund cases filed annually in U.S. district courts decreased by almost 50 percent. Also, litigation in federally-initiated cases decreased as settlements prior to filing cases in court were reached more often, shortening court time. Furthermore, cases became less complex as fewer defendants were involved. Litigation costs can be substantial, according to experts, and such costs may have decreased as a result of these trends. Litigation decreased because (1) fewer sites were listed on the NPL, and, as cleanups progressed, fewer sites required cleanup and parties had less reason to go to court; (2) EPA promoted settlements with responsible parties; and (3) the courts clarified several legal uncertainties. As of fiscal year 2007, EPA or responsible parties completed construction of remedial actions at about 70 percent of the nonfederal NPL sites, with program appropriations averaging about $1.2 billion annually. However, GAO identified Superfund program trends that make it difficult to predict future program costs. The number of sites added to the NPL each year has declined; EPA added over 400 sites in fiscal year 1983, but only 20 sites a year, on average, for fiscal years 1998 through 2007. The types of sites have also changed, as mining sites--among the most expensive sites to clean up--have been added to the NPL in greater numbers. At the same time, because of limitations in EPA's data, the extent to which NPL sites do not have viable parties to assist with cleanups and how this may impact EPA's cost recovery efforts are unclear. Further, while remedial actions have been completed or are underway at most NPL sites, data limitations make it difficult to quantify the amount of work remaining. Also, NPL sites that have not yet been cleaned up may be more complex and expensive. Finally, program appropriations and expenditures are declining, while EPA's costs for individual sites are increasing. However, EPA does not provide the Congress with sufficient information to make program funding decisions. For example, EPA does not provide aggregated information on the status and cost of work at sites not yet cleaned up or the extent to which it cannot identify viable parties. As a result, it is unclear how much funding for future cleanup activities will have to come from trust fund appropriations rather than from responsible parties. |
gao_GAO-05-80 | gao_GAO-05-80_0 | Accordingly, in the 2001 report, we made 14 recommendations to Justice to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its criminal debt collection processes. We interviewed appropriate officials from Justice’s EOUSA and the responsible FLUs concerning actions taken to collect the debt, obstacles to collection, and prospects for future collections. This was done to ensure sufficient privacy of those involved in our selected cases, and in consideration of Justice’s concern that the release of information on open cases could hinder the department’s efforts to collect the debts. Restitution Amounts Far Exceed Likely Collections for the Crime Victims
The court-ordered restitution amounts assessed the offenders for the five selected criminal debt cases far exceed likely collections for the crime victims. We found that the FLUs, which typically become involved in criminal debt collection after the debt is established at judgment, performed certain debt collection activities; however, they were not able to reduce the restitution debts significantly by identifying and liquidating additional assets of the offenders to pay the victims. Most of the Court-Ordered Restitution Has Not Been Collected
As previously mentioned, the offenders’ restitution amounts for the selected cases totaled about $568 million. Court records show that each of the offenders, who pled guilty to engaging in criminal activity, had been high-ranking officials of companies and lending institutions or operated their own business. As noted earlier, only about $40 million, or about 7 percent of the total restitution for the selected cases had been paid as of June 2004, which was from about 4 to 8 years after the courts sentenced each of the offenders. Prospects Are Not Good for Collecting Additional Restitution to Fully Compensate the Crime Victims
For the selected cases, based on information available to us, the FLUs are not likely to collect sufficient additional restitution amounts from the offenders to compensate their victims to the extent initially ordered by the courts. At some point prior to the judgments establishing the restitution debts, each of the offenders either reported having wealth or significant financial resources to the courts or to Justice, or there were indicators of such. There were minimal, if any, apparent negative consequences to the offenders for not paying restitution to their victims as initially ordered by the courts. Long Intervals between the Offenders’ Criminal Activities and Their Judgments Create Major Debt Collection Challenges for the FLUs
For the selected cases, according to records provided by the courts, at least 5 to 13 years passed between when the offenders began to engage in the criminal activities for which they were sentenced and the date of their judgments. We identified and the FLUs acknowledged that by the time the courts rendered the judgments establishing the restitution debts, certain of the offenders’ assets were, among other things, transferred through legal or potentially fraudulent means to a family member or others, involved in forfeiture actions, subject to bankruptcy, or moved to a foreign account. In addition, one of our selected cases involved an offender who was jointly and severally liable for the debt with another offender who had been deported. Bankruptcy
According to Justice, bankruptcy can impair the FLU’s ability to collect criminal restitution debt. However, very recently, the Congress directed the Attorney General to develop a strategic plan with certain other federal agencies to improve criminal debt collection. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the wake of a recent wave of corporate scandals, Senator Byron L. Dorgan noted that the American taxpayers have a right to expect that those who have committed corporate fraud and other criminal wrongdoing will be punished, and that the federal government will make every effort to recover assets held by the offenders. Recognizing that GAO previously reported on deficiencies in the Department of Justice's (Justice) criminal debt collection processes (GAO-01-664), Senator Dorgan asked GAO to review selected criminal white-collar financial fraud cases for which large restitution debts have been established but little has been collected. Specifically, GAO was asked to determine (1) the status of Justice's efforts to collect on the outstanding debt, (2) the prospects for future collections, and (3) whether specific problems have affected Justice's ability to collect the debt.
What GAO Found
The court-ordered restitution for the five selected white-collar financial fraud criminal debt cases GAO reviewed far exceeded amounts likely to be collected and paid to the victims. These offenders, who had either been high-ranking officials of companies or operated their own business, pled guilty to crimes for which the courts ordered restitution totaling about $568 million to victims. As of the completion of GAO's fieldwork, which was up to 8 years after the offenders' sentencing, court records showed that amounts collected for the victims in these cases totaled only about $40 million, or about 7 percent of the ordered restitution. At some point prior to the judgments establishing the restitution debts, each of the five offenders either reported having wealth or significant financial resources to the courts or to Justice, or there were indicators of such. However, following the judgments, the offenders claimed that they were not financially able to pay full restitution to their victims. Justice's Financial Litigation Units (FLU) that were responsible for collection performed certain activities to collect the debts after the judgments, but the debts had not been significantly reduced as a result of the FLUs' identification and liquidation of additional assets of the offenders. The FLUs' prospects are not good for collecting additional restitution amounts on these cases. A major problem hindering the FLUs' ability to collect restitution debt in the selected cases was the long time intervals between the criminal offense and the judgment. Court records show that 5 to 13 years passed between when the offenders began to engage in the criminal activity for which they were sentenced and the date of their judgments. For each of the selected cases, by the time the court rendered the judgment establishing the restitution debt, certain of the offenders' assets had been, among other things, transferred to family members or others, involved in forfeiture actions, subject to bankruptcy, or moved to a foreign account. In addition, one of the selected cases involved an offender who was jointly and severally liable for the debt with another offender who had been deported. Justice acknowledged that such dispositions or circumstances are not uncommon and create major debt collection challenges for the FLUs. Moreover, there were minimal, if any, apparent negative consequences to these offenders for not paying their restitution debts. Recently, to further implementation of a related recommendation made in 2001 by GAO, the Congress directed the Attorney General to develop a strategic plan with certain other federal agencies to improve criminal debt collection. Given the significant upward trend in outstanding criminal debt and the difficulty experienced by Justice in collecting criminal restitution debt, it is important that Justice include in such a plan legislative initiatives, operational initiatives, or both to enhance the federal government's capacity to collect restitution for victims of financial crimes. |
gao_GAO-04-767 | gao_GAO-04-767_0 | VA, DOD, HHS, and other federal agencies initiated research and investigations into these health concerns and the consequences of possible hazardous exposures. 2.) Most Federally Funded Gulf War Illnesses Research Projects and Investigations Are Complete, but VA Has Not Collectively Analyzed Research Findings to Determine the Status of Key Research Questions
More than 80 percent of the 240 federally funded Gulf War illnesses research projects have been completed. In recent years, funding for this research has decreased, federal research priorities have expanded to incorporate the long-term health effects of all hazardous deployments, and interagency coordination of Gulf War illnesses research has waned. In a separate but related effort, as of April 2003, all of DOD’s Gulf War investigations were complete. DOD has provided the most funding for Gulf War illnesses research, funding about 74 percent of all federal Gulf War illnesses research within this time frame. 1.) Additionally, VA has not reassessed the extent to which the collective findings of completed Gulf War illnesses research projects have addressed the 21 key research questions developed by the RWG. The only assessment of progress in answering these research questions was published in 2001, when findings from only about half of all funded Gulf War illnesses research were available. Moreover, the summary did not identify whether there were gaps in existing Gulf War illnesses research or promising areas for future research. In 2000, we reported that without such an assessment, many underlying questions about causes, course of development, and treatments for Gulf War illnesses may remain unanswered. Generally, these reports concluded that there were limited exposures by troops to some hazards and limited or no short- or long-term adverse effects expected from these exposures. Some Efforts Are Under Way to Monitor Cancer Incidence among Gulf War Veterans, but Research Limitations May Impede Reliability of Results
As of April 2004, federal agencies had funded seven research projects related to cancer incidence among Gulf War veterans, four of which have been completed. Few Research Projects Related to Cancer Incidence in Gulf War Veterans Have Been Funded
Of the 240 federally funded research projects on Gulf War illnesses, VA officials stated that only 7 were related to cancer incidence in Gulf War veterans—accounting for about 3 percent of the entire research portfolio. Research related to cancer incidence in Gulf War veterans may also be hampered by incomplete federal data on the health characteristics of Gulf War veterans. However, VA and RAC are exploring ways to improve information sharing, including VA’s hiring of a senior scientist who would both guide the agency’s Gulf War illnesses research and serve as the agency’s liaison to provide routine updates to RAC. RAC Officials Cite VA’s Poor Information Sharing and Limited Collaboration as Impediments in Meeting Its Mission
According to RAC officials, VA senior administrators’ poor information sharing and limited collaboration with the committee about Gulf War illnesses research initiatives and program planning may have hindered RAC’s ability to achieve its mission of providing research advice to the Secretary of VA. RAC is required by its charter to provide advice and make recommendations to the Secretary of VA on proposed research studies, research plans, and research strategies relating to the health consequences of service during the Gulf War. However, most of these changes had not been formalized at the time of our review. Appendix III: Charter for VA’s Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs | Why GAO Did This Study
More than a decade after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, there is continued interest in the federal response to the health concerns of Gulf War veterans. Gulf War veterans' reports of unexplained illnesses and possible exposures to various health hazards have prompted numerous federal research projects on Gulf War illnesses. This research has been funded primarily by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Health and Human Services. GAO is reporting on (1) the status of research and investigations on Gulf War illnesses, (2) the efforts that have been made by VA and DOD to monitor cancer incidence among Gulf War veterans, and (3) VA's communication and collaboration with the Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses (RAC).
What GAO Found
Most federally funded Gulf War illnesses research projects and investigations are complete, but VA--the agency with lead responsibility for coordination of Gulf War illnesses issues--has not yet analyzed the latest research findings to identify whether there are gaps in current research or to identify promising areas for future research. As of September 2003, about 80 percent of the 240 federally funded medical research projects for Gulf War illnesses had been completed. In recent years, VA and DOD funding for this research has decreased, federal research priorities have changed, and interagency coordination of Gulf War illnesses research has waned. In addition, VA has not reassessed the extent to which the collective findings of completed Gulf War illnesses research projects have addressed key research questions. The only assessment of progress in answering these research questions was published in 2001, when findings from only about half of all federally funded Gulf War illnesses research were available. Moreover, it did not identify whether there were gaps in existing Gulf War illnesses research or promising areas for future research. This lack of comprehensive analysis leaves VA at greater risk of failing to answer unresolved questions about causes, course of development, and treatments for Gulf War illnesses. In a separate effort, DOD has conducted 50 investigations since 1996 on potential hazardous exposures during the Gulf War. Generally, these investigations concluded that there were limited exposures by troops to some hazards and, at most, limited short- or long-term adverse effects expected from these exposures. As of April 2003, all investigations were complete. Federal agencies have funded seven research projects related to cancer incidence among Gulf War veterans. However, several limitations exist that affect research related to cancer incidence. For example, some cancers may take many years to develop and be detected. In addition, some research projects studying cancer incidence have not studied enough Gulf War veterans to reliably assess cancer incidence. Research may also be impeded by incomplete federal data on the health characteristics of Gulf War veterans. RAC's efforts to provide advice and make recommendations on Gulf War illnesses research to the Secretary of VA may have been hampered by VA senior administrators' incomplete or unclear information sharing and limited collaboration on research initiatives and program planning. VA and RAC are exploring ways to improve collaboration, including VA's hiring of a senior scientist who would both guide VA's Gulf War illnesses research and serve as the agency's liaison for routine updates to the advisory committee. However, most of these changes had not been finalized at the time of our review. |
gao_GAO-12-642T | gao_GAO-12-642T_0 | For fiscal year 2011, of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act), DOD was the only agency to receive a disclaimer of opinion on all of its financial statements.Inspector General (IG) reported that the department’s fiscal year 2011 financial statements would not substantially conform to generally accepted accounting principles;
DOD’s financial management and feeder systems were unable to adequately support material amounts on the financial statements; and long-standing material internal control weaknesses identified in prior audits continued to exist, including material weaknesses in areas such as financial management systems, Fund Balance with Treasury, Accounts Receivable, and General Property, Plant, and Equipment. Challenges in Achieving Audit Readiness
GAO’s recent work highlights the types of challenges facing DOD as it strives to attain audit readiness and reengineer its business processes and systems. The urgency in addressing these challenges has been increased by the recent efforts to accelerate audit readiness time frames, in particular attaining audit readiness for the department’s SBR by fiscal year 2014. DOD has generally agreed with these recommendations and is taking corrective actions in response. Reported DOD Progress toward Audit Readiness for the Statement of Budgetary Resources
The Secretary of Defense’s direction to achieve audit readiness for the SBR by the end of 2014 necessitated that DOD’s components revise some of their plans and put more focus on short-term efforts to develop accurate data for the SBR in order to achieve this new accelerated goal. Further, in a February 2012 briefing on its accelerated plans, DOD indicated that 7 of 24 material general fund Defense Agencies and Other Defense Organizations are either already sustaining SBR audits or are ready to have their SBRs audited. These accomplishments represent important positive steps. Our recent reports highlight some of the difficulties that the components have experienced recently related to achieving an auditable SBR, including the Army’s inability to locate and provide supporting documentation for its military pay; the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ inability to reconcile their Fund Balance with Treasury accounts; and the Marine Corps’ inability to provide sufficient documentation to auditors of its SBR. GAO has made prior recommendations to address these issues. The Marine Corps received disclaimers of opinion from its auditors on its fiscal year 2010 and 2011 SBRs because it could not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner, and support for transactions was missing or incomplete. The plan also provided interim milestones for DOD components such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Logistics Agency, and other defense agencies. For example, the May 2011 FIAR Plan Status Report indicated that the Air Force had planned to validate its audit readiness for many SBR-related assessable units in fiscal year 2016 and that its full SBR would not be ready for audit until 2017. However, the February 2012 briefing on the accelerated plans indicated that most of the Air Force’s SBR assessable units will be audit-ready in fiscal years 2013 or 2014. DOD considers the successful implementation of these ERP systems critical to transforming its business operations and addressing long-standing weaknesses in areas such as financial and supply-chain management and business systems modernization. DOD officials have also stated that these systems are critical to ensuring the department meets its mandated September 30, 2017, goal to have auditable departmentwide financial statements. However, DFAS users of these systems told us that they were having difficulties using the systems to perform their daily operations. Challenges in Developing and Implementing DOD’s Business Enterprise Architecture and Investment Control Processes
Improving the department’s business environment through efforts such as DOD’s business enterprise architecture and improved business systems management is an important part of helping DOD achieve auditability. In June 2011, we reported that DOD had continued to make progress in implementing a comprehensive business enterprise architecture, transition plan, and improved investment control processes. The act further states that these efforts should ensure that (1) the business process to be supported by the defense business system modernization will be as streamlined and efficient as practicable and (2) the need to tailor commercial-off-the-shelf systems to meet unique requirements or incorporate unique interfaces has been eliminated or reduced to the maximum extent practicable.investments we reviewed, DOD and the military departments used DOD’s Business Process Reengineering Guidance (dated April 2011) to assess In June 2011, we reported that, for those whether the investments complied with the business-process reengineering requirement. We also reported in June 2011 that while DOD and the military departments largely followed DOD’s guidance, they did not perform the key step of validating the results of these reengineering assessments to ensure that they, among other things, accurately assessed process weaknesses and identified opportunities to streamline and improve affected processes. We have work underway to evaluate DOD’s efforts to improve its business system investment process, including its efforts to address the act’s business process reengineering requirement. DOD faces considerable implementation challenges and has much work to do if it is to meet the goals of an auditable SBR by fiscal year 2014 and a complete set of auditable financial statements by fiscal year 2017. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated several efforts intended to improve its financial management operations and ultimately achieve an unqualified (clean) opinion on its financial statements. These efforts have fallen short of sustained improvement in financial management and financial statement auditability.
In this statement, GAO provides its assessment of DODs progress toward: (1) producing an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) by fiscal year 2014 and a complete set of auditable financial statements by fiscal year 2017, including the development of interim milestones for both aforementioned audit readiness goals; (2) acquiring and implementing new enterprise resource programs and other critical financial management systems; (3) reengineering business processes and instituting needed controls; and (4) implementing a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan, and improved investment control processes.
This statement is primarily based on GAOs prior work related to the departments efforts to achieve audit readiness, implement modern business systems, and reengineer its business processes. GAO also obtained and compared key milestones in a February 2012 DOD briefing on its updated plans to accelerate achieving SBR auditability with the May 2011 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plan but did not independently verify the updated information in the February 2012 briefing.
What GAO Found
GAOs recent work highlights the types of challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) as it strives to attain audit readiness and reengineer its business processes and systems. The urgency in addressing these challenges has been increased by the goals of an auditable DOD Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) by the end of fiscal year 2014 and a complete set of auditable financial statements by the end of fiscal year 2017. For example, GAOs 2011 reporting highlights difficulties the DOD components experienced in attempting to achieve an auditable SBR. These include:
tthe Navys and the Air Forces premature assertions of audit readiness and missed interim milestones;
the Armys inability to locate and provide supporting documentation for its military pay;
the Navys and Marine Corps inability to reconcile their Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT) accounts; and
the Marine Corps inability to receive an opinion on both its fiscal years 2010 and 2011 SBRs because it could not provide supporting documentation in a timely manner, and support for transactions was missing or incomplete.
In a February 2012 briefing on its updated plans, DOD accelerated milestones for its components in some cases, significantlyto accomplish the 2014 SBR goal. For example, the Air Force had planned to validate its audit readiness for many SBR-related items in fiscal year 2016; however, the departments February 2012 accelerated plans show that most of the Air Forces SBR line items will be audit-ready in fiscal years 2013 or 2014. Also, in its February 2012 update DOD shows that 7 of 24 material general fund Defense Agencies and Other Defense Organizations have either already had SBR audits or are ready to have their SBRs audited, which represent important positive steps.
DOD has stated it considers the successful implementation of its enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems critical to transforming its business operations, addressing long-standing weaknesses, and ensuring the department meets its mandated September 30, 2017 auditability goals. However, in 2011, GAO reported that independent assessments of two of these systemsthe Armys and Air Forces new general ledger systemsidentified operational problems, gaps in capabilities that required manual workarounds, and training that was not focused on system operation. Moreover, users of these systems had difficulties using these systems to perform daily operations. GAO also reported in 2011 on numerous weaknesses in DODs enterprise architecture and business processes that affect DODs auditability. For example, while DOD continued to update its corporate enterprise architecture, it had not yet augmented its corporate architecture with complete, coherent subsidiary architectures for DOD components such as the military departments. Also, while DOD and the military departments largely followed DODs Business Process Reengineering Guidance to assess business system investments, they had not yet performed the key step of validating assessment results.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made prior recommendations to address these issues. DOD has generally agreed with these recommendations and is taking corrective actions in response. GAO has work underway to evaluate DODs continuing efforts in these areas. |
gao_GAO-10-720 | gao_GAO-10-720_0 | Army’s and Marine Corps’ Major Training Facilities Require Few Adjustments to Support Force Increase in Afghanistan
The Army and Marine Corps have shifted their operational priority from Iraq to Afghanistan; however, few adjustments were required at the Army’s major training facilities for a number of reasons, including the similarities in the Army’s training requirements for both operations. Because of the similarities in requirements, the Army has had to make few adjustments at its major training facilities to support the increase in forces deploying to Afghanistan. These major training facilities also use the same training ranges, mock towns and villages, and instrumentation to train for both operations. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, however, the Marine Corps has shifted its focus to missions in Afghanistan; as of the summer of 2009, the Marine Corps was conducting limited training for missions in Iraq at its CTC at Twentynine Palms. Like the Army, the Marine Corps, because of similarities in training requirements, had to make few adjustments at Twentynine Palms to support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. For example, the Marine Corps uses the same training ranges, trainers, and mock towns and villages as it did when training forces for Iraq. The Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges in Adjusting Training Capacity to Meet Their Identified Future Requirements
The Army and Marine Corps face challenges as they look to broaden the scope and size of their training rotations in the future. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its maneuver CTCs to meet its identified future requirements to train brigade combat teams for both continuing operations and a broader range of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Further, the Army has not developed a plan to use its existing training capacity to meet these full-spectrum training requirements for its smaller reserve-component units. To support this process, the Army has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 brigade combat team rotations annually. The Army currently is projecting that its National Training Center–Exportable Training Capability will reach its initial operating capability in fiscal year 2012 and full operating capability in fiscal year 2013. As the Army plans to meet its future requirements, its plans call for continuing to train its smaller reserve-component forces at its seven mobilization training centers. The six alternatives for land acquisition range in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting its future brigade combat team requirements or the risks associated with not conducting the desired number of training rotations. In addition, while the Army has identified its training requirements and locations for its smaller reserve-component units that will be deploying for ongoing operations, it has not finalized the training requirements for its smaller reserve-component units that will serve as contingency forces, including where or when these contingency forces should be trained. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage existing capacities to meet future reserve- component training requirements, or whether any excess reserve- component training capacity exists. Specifically, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to address the challenges associated with training its brigade combat teams for both ongoing operations and a fuller range of missions by developing and implementing a plan to evaluate the full range of available options for training its brigade combat teams; assessing the risks of not conducting the desired number of training rotations; and determining how, if necessary, risks will be mitigated. DOD further noted that the Army agrees a risk and mitigation plan is required to address CTC capacity shortfalls. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps training policies and guidance, such as Army regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, the Army’s Combat Training Center Master Plan, and the Marine Corps’ OIF/OEF Predeployment Training Continuum, and Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. We interviewed officials with the Department of the Army, the Combat Training Center Directorate, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army’s three maneuver CTCs, and the Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center regarding the likelihood of this capability meeting its current timelines and milestones and the availability of risk assessments or plans to assist the Army in conducting its desired number of training rotations in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's and Marine Corps' major training facilities--Army and Marine Corps combat training centers and Army mobilization training centers--have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense faces as it adjusts training capacities. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (1) made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future requirements. GAO analyzed service training guidance, future training requirements, and related plans, and interviewed headquarters officials and personnel from the services' major training facilities.
What GAO Found
Due to similarities in training requirements, the Army and Marine Corps did not need to make significant adjustments at their major training facilities to support the shift in operational priority from Iraq to Afghanistan. While the Army had to adapt training scenarios to more closely resemble the operating environment in Afghanistan, it did not have to adjust trainers, training ranges, and mock towns and villages as these are the same regardless of whether forces are preparing for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the summer of 2009, the Marine Corps had withdrawn most of its forces from Iraq and shifted the focus of training at its combat training center to exclusively train forces for missions in Afghanistan. Like the Army, the Marine Corps noted that, because of similarities in training requirements, it had to make few adjustments beyond changing some cultural role players and signs in mock towns and villages to support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Army and Marine Corps face several challenges as they plan to broaden the scope and size of training rotations to meet future training requirements. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its combat training centers as it seeks to train brigade combat teams to meet future requirements for both ongoing operations and full-spectrum operations--offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The Army has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 annual training rotations for its brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2011; the centers can currently conduct 28 rotations a year. The Army is developing an exportable capability, expected to increase its capacity by 6 rotations each year when it reaches full operational capability in 2013. However, this will not be sufficient to meet the total projected requirements. To address the gap, the Army plans to give priority to deploying units. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting future brigade combat team training requirements, or the risks associated with not conducting the desired number of training rotations. The Army's force generation model calls for smaller reserve-component units to train for both ongoing and full-spectrum operations, but the Army has not finalized its training strategy for these reserve-component forces. The Army has identified training requirements and locations where deploying forces will train for ongoing operations, but it has not determined where or when it will train its reserve-component contingency forces for full spectrum operations. The Army has the capacity to train 86,000 reserve-component personnel at its seven mobilization training centers each year. It is also conducting enhanced training at other locations, which could expand capacity. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage existing resources to meet future training requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training capacity exists. In the future, the Marine Corps plans to expand training to allow larger numbers of forces to train together, but it lacks sufficient space at its combat training center. It is considering alternatives for acquiring land, ranging in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres, and expects to reach a decision by fiscal year 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Army develop a risk-assessment and mitigation plan to address gaps in training capacity, and assess how it can maximize existing resources to conduct reserve-component training called for under its force generation model. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-699T | gao_GAO-10-699T_0 | While the Number of FDA Overseas Inspections Has Fluctuated, the Agency Has Opened Overseas Offices, and Has Piloted PREDICT
In 2008, FDA inspected 153 foreign food facilities out of an estimated 189,000 such facilities registered with FDA and estimated that it would conduct 200 inspections in 2009 and 600 in 2010. In 2007, FDA inspected 95 facilities. In addition to having overseas offices assist FDA’s oversight of imported food, the agency is developing PREDICT. PREDICT is intended to assist FDA’s oversight of imported food and uses FDA-developed criteria to estimate the risk of imported food shipments. PREDICT generates a numerical risk score for all FDA-regulated products. A 2007 pilot test of PREDICT in Los Angeles for seafood products indicated that the system could enhance FDA’s risk-based import screening efforts. FDA and Other Agencies Face Gaps in Enforcement That Undermine Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported Food
We identified specific gaps in enforcement that could allow violative food products to enter U.S. commerce: (1) FDA’s limited authority to assess civil penalties on certain violators; (2) lack of unique identifiers for firms exporting FDA-regulated products; (3) lack of information-sharing between agencies’ computer systems and (4) FDA’s not sharing product distribution information during a recall. Information Is Not Shared between Computer Systems
When we issued our report in September 2009, we reported that CBP’s computer system did not notify FDA’s or FSIS’s systems when imported food shipments arrive at U.S. ports, which increases the risk that potentially unsafe food may enter U.S. commerce, particularly at truck ports. FDA Does Not Always Share Product Distribution Information During a Recall
One key issue of concern, according to officials we spoke with from several states, is that FDA does not always share with states certain distribution-related information, such as a recalling firm’s product distribution lists, which impedes the states’ efforts to quickly remove contaminated products from grocery stores and warehouses. Statutory Authorities We Identified Could Help FDA Oversee Food Safety
In our past work, we have pointed out that mandatory recall—the authority to require a food company to recall a contaminated product— would help ensure that unsafe food does not remain in the food supply. We have noted that limitations in the FDA’s food recall authorities heighten the risk that unsafe food will remain in the food supply and have proposed that Congress consider giving FDA similar authorities. FDA Has Limited Oversight of Food Ingredients Determined to be Generally Recognized as Safe
We have reported that FDA should strengthen its oversight of food ingredients determined to be generally recognized as safe (GRAS) for their intended use. Currently, companies may conclude a substance is GRAS without FDA’s approval or knowledge. We also recommended that, if FDA determines that it does not have the authority to implement one or more of our recommendations, the agency should seek the authority from Congress. For example, we noted that FDA has identified a need for explicit authority from Congress to issue regulations requiring preventive controls (risk-based safety regulations) by firms producing foods that have been associated with repeated instances of serious health problems or death. FDA already has preventive regulations for seafood and juice, which require firms to analyze safety hazards and implement plans to address those hazards. FDA agreed with this recommendation and has sought authority to issue additional preventive controls for high-risk foods. In conclusion, food imports from around the world constitute a substantial and increasing volume of imported foods. Additional statutory authorities, such as mandatory recall authority, could also help FDA oversee food safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
Food imported from around the world constitutes a substantial and increasing percentage of the U.S. food supply. Ensuring the safety of imported food challenges the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to better target its resources on the foods posing the greatest risks to public health and to coordinate efforts with the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) so that unsafe food does not enter U.S. commerce. This testimony focuses on (1) FDA's overseas inspections, (2) identified gaps in agencies' enforcement efforts to ensure the safety of imported food, and (3) statutory authorities that GAO has identified that could help FDA's oversight of food safety. This testimony is principally based on GAO's September 2009 report, Food Safety: Agencies Need to Address Gaps in Enforcement and Collaboration to Enhance Safety of Imported Food (GAO-09-873) and has been updated with information from FDA.
What GAO Found
While the number of FDA overseas inspections has fluctuated, FDA has opened up several overseas offices to address the safety of imported food at the point of origin, and is testing a computer-based system to target high-risk imports for additional inspection when they arrive at ports of entry. Specifically, in 2008, FDA inspected 153 foreign food facilities out of an estimated 189,000 such facilities registered with FDA; in 2007, FDA inspected 95 facilities. FDA estimated that it would conduct 200 inspections in 2009 and 600 in 2010. In addition, FDA opened offices in China, Costa Rica, and India and expects to open offices in Mexico and Chile and to post staff at European Union agencies. Furthermore, FDA's testing of a new computer screening system--the Predictive Risk-Based Evaluation for Dynamic Import Compliance Targeting (PREDICT)--indicates that the system could enhance FDA's risk-based screening efforts at ports of entry, but the system is not yet fully operational. PREDICT is to generate a numerical risk score for all FDA-regulated products by analyzing importers' shipment information using sets of FDA-developed risk criteria and to target for inspection products that have a high risk score. GAO previously identified several gaps in enforcement that could allow food products that violate safety laws to enter U.S. commerce. For example, FDA has limited authority to assess penalties on importers who introduce such food products, and the lack of a unique identifier for firms exporting food products may allow contaminated food to evade FDA's review. In addition, FDA's and CBP's computer systems do not share information. FDA does not always share certain distribution-related information, such as a recalling firm's product distribution lists with states, which impedes states' efforts to quickly remove contaminated products from grocery stores and warehouses. GAO identified certain statutory authorities that could help FDA in its oversight of food safety. Specifically, GAO previously reported that FDA currently lacks mandatory recall authority for companies that do not voluntarily recall food products identified as unsafe. Limitations in FDA's food recall authorities heighten the risk that unsafe food will remain in the food supply. In addition, under current FDA regulations, companies may conclude a food ingredient is generally recognized as safe without FDA's approval or knowledge. GAO recommended that if FDA determines that it does not have the authority to implement one or more recommendations, the agency should seek the authority from Congress. Finally, GAO reported that FDA has identified a need for explicit authority from Congress to issue regulations requiring preventive controls by firms producing foods that have been associated with repeated instances of serious health problems or death. FDA already has preventive regulations for seafood and juice, which require firms to analyze safety hazards and implement plans to address those hazards. |
gao_GAO-02-940T | gao_GAO-02-940T_0 | Governmentwide, agencies need to place increased emphasis on holding senior executives accountable for organizational goals. The American people expect and deserve this linkage as well. At the same time, GAO’s work over the years, most prominently in our High- Risk and Performance and Accountability Series, has amply documented that many agencies suffer from a range of long-standing management challenges and a lack of attention to basic stewardship responsibilities, requiring concerted action and sustained top-level attention if they are to be addressed. We also must carefully examine the composition of the SES. GAO’s Constructive Efforts to Help Agencies Address Their Human Capital Challenges
As the federal government’s leading accountability organization, we have made a concerted effort to identify and encourage the implementation of human capital practices that improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of the federal government. We also understand that we have a responsibility to “lead by example” and “practice what we preach” in all key management areas, including strategic human capital management. By managing our workforce strategically and focusing on results, we are helping to maximize our own performance and ensure our own accountability. The most prominent change in human capital management that we implemented as a result of the GAO Personnel Act of 1980 was a broadbanded pay-for-performance system. | What GAO Found
Strategic human capital management is critical to maximizing government's performance and ensuring its accountability for the benefit of the American people. The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition being driven by several key trends, including global interdependence; diverse, diffuse, and asymmetrical security threats; rapidly evolving science and technology; dramatic shifts in age and composition of the population; important quality of life issues; the changing nature of the economy; and evolving governmental structures and concepts. GAO designated strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area because of a long-standing lack of a consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed for government to deliver on its promises. Three broad human capital reform opportunities are instrumental to agency transformation efforts: aligning individual and organizational performance, implementing results-oriented pay reform, and sustaining agency transformation efforts. |
gao_GAO-12-236T | gao_GAO-12-236T_0 | EPA Has Not Fully Addressed Findings of Evaluations on Long- standing Planning, Coordination, or Leadership Issues
EPA has taken some actions but has not fully addressed the findings and recommendations of five independent evaluations over the past 20 years regarding long-standing planning, coordination, and leadership issues that hamper the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of its science activities, including its laboratory operations. First, EPA has yet to fully address planning and coordination issues identified by a 1992 independent, expert panel evaluation that recommended that EPA develop and implement an overarching issue- based planning process that integrates and coordinates scientific efforts throughout the agency, including the important work of its 37 laboratories. That evaluation found that EPA’s science was of uneven quality and that the agency lacked a coherent science agenda and operational plan to guide scientific efforts throughout the agency. Because EPA did not implement the evaluation’s recommendation, EPA’s programs, regional officials, and ORD continue to independently plan and coordinate the activities of their respective laboratories based on their own offices’ priorities and needs. MITRE Corporation, Center for Environment, Resources, and Space, Assessment of the Scientific and Technical Laboratories and Facilities of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (McLean, Va., May 1994). Regarding program office laboratory consolidations, the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air did not physically consolidate its laboratories but did administratively and physically consolidate its Las Vegas laboratory with ORD’s Las Vegas radiation laboratory, and the Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances colocated three of four laboratories with the region 3 laboratory. technical activities. EPA Has Not Taken an Agencywide, Coordinated Approach to Manage Its Laboratory Physical Infrastructure
On the basis of our analysis of EPA’s facility master planning process, we found that EPA manages its laboratory facilities on a site-by-site basis and does not evaluate each site in the context of all the agency’s real property holdings—as recommended by the National Research Council report in 2004. EPA’s facility master plans are intended to be the basis for justifying its building and facilities spending, which was $29.9 million in fiscal year 2010, and allocating those funds to specific repair and improvement projects. Master plans should contain, among other things, information on mission capabilities, use of space, and condition of individual laboratory sites. In addition, we found that most facility master plans were out of date. EPA’s real property asset management plan states that facility master plans are supposed to be updated every 5 years to reflect changes in facility condition and mission, but we found that 11 of 20 master plans were out of date and 2 of 20 had not been created yet. Since 2003, when GAO first designated federal real property management as an area of high risk, agencies have come under increasing pressure to manage their real property assets more effectively. According to EPA officials, they do not use benchmarks because the work of the laboratories varies. EPA Does Not Use a Comprehensive Workforce Planning Process for Its Laboratories
EPA does not use a comprehensive planning process for managing its laboratories’ workforce. For example, we found that not all of the regional and program offices with laboratories prepared workforce plans as part of an agencywide planning effort in 2007, and for those that did, most did not specifically address their laboratories’ workforce. In fact, some regional management and human resource officials we spoke with were unaware of the requirement to submit workforce plans to the Office of Human Resources. Some of these managers told us the program and regional workforce plans were a paperwork exercise, irrelevant to the way the workforce is actually managed. Managers in program and regional offices said that workforce planning for their respective laboratories is fundamentally driven by the annual budgets of program and regional offices and ceilings for full-time equivalents (FTE). We believe that such information is essential for EPA to prepare a comprehensive laboratory workforce plan to achieve the agency’s mission with limited resources. The agency asked its National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and Technology to help address scientific and technical competencies as it develops a new agencywide workforce plan. Finally, in our July 2011 report on EPA’s laboratory enterprise we recommended, among other things, that EPA develop a coordinated planning process for its scientific activities and appoint a top-level official with authority over all the laboratories, improve physical and real property planning decisions, and develop a workforce planning process for all laboratories that reflects current and future needs of laboratory facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the research and development activities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the findings of our recent report on the agency's laboratory enterprise. EPA was established in 1970 to consolidate a variety of federal research, monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement activities into one agency for ensuring the joint protection of environmental quality and human health. Scientific research, knowledge, and technical information are fundamental to EPA's mission and inform its standard-setting, regulatory, compliance, and enforcement functions. The agency's scientific performance is particularly important as complex environmental issues emerge and evolve, and controversy continues to surround many of the agency's areas of responsibility. Unlike other primarily science-focused federal agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health or the National Science Foundation, EPA's scientific research, technical support, and analytical services underpin the policies and regulations the agency implements. Therefore, the agency operates its own laboratory enterprise. This enterprise is made up of 37 laboratories that are housed in about 170 buildings and facilities located in 30 cities across the nation. Specifically, EPA's Office of Research and Development (ORD) operates 18 laboratories with primary responsibility for research and development. Four of EPA's five national program offices operate nine laboratories with primary responsibility for supporting regulatory implementation, compliance, enforcement, and emergency response. Each of EPA's 10 regional offices operates a laboratory with responsibilities for a variety of applied sciences; analytical services; technical support to federal, state, and local laboratories; monitoring; compliance and enforcement; and emergency response. Over the past 20 years, independent evaluations by the National Research Council and others have addressed planning, coordination, or leadership issues associated with EPA's science activities. The scope of these evaluations varied, but collectively they recognized the need for EPA to improve long-term planning, priority setting, and coordination of laboratory activities; establish leadership for agencywide scientific oversight and decision making; and better manage the laboratories' workforce and infrastructure. When it was established in 1970, EPA inherited 42 laboratories from programs in various federal departments. According to EPA's historian, EPA closed or consolidated some laboratories it inherited and created additional laboratories to support its mission. Nevertheless, EPA's historian reported that the location of most of EPA's present laboratories is largely the same as the location of its original laboratories in part because of political objections to closing facilities and conflicting organizational philosophies, such as operating centralized laboratories for efficiency versus operating decentralized laboratories for flexibility and responsiveness. Other federal agencies face similar challenges with excess and underused property. Because of these challenges, GAO has designated federal real property as an area of high risk. This statement summarizes the findings of our report issued in July of this year that examines the extent to which EPA (1) has addressed the findings of independent evaluations performed by the National Research Council and others regarding long-term planning, coordination, and leadership issues; (2) uses an agencywide, coordinated approach for managing its laboratory physical infrastructure; and (3) uses a comprehensive planning process to manage its laboratory workforce.
What GAO Found
EPA has taken some actions but has not fully addressed the findings and recommendations of five independent evaluations over the past 20 years regarding long-standing planning, coordination, and leadership issues that hamper the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of its science activities, including its laboratory operations. First, EPA has yet to fully address planning and coordination issues identified by a 1992 independent, expert panel evaluation that recommended that EPA develop and implement an overarching issue-based planning process that integrates and coordinates scientific efforts throughout the agency, including the important work of its 37 laboratories. Second, EPA has also not fully addressed recommendations from a 1994 independent evaluation by the MITRE Corporation to consolidate and realign its laboratory facilities and workforce--even though this evaluation found that the geographic separation of laboratories hampered their efficiency and technical operations and that consolidation and realignment could improve planning and coordination issues that have hampered its science and technical community for decades. Third, EPA has not fully addressed recommendations from the independent evaluations regarding leadership of its research and laboratory operations. On the basis of our analysis of EPA's facility master planning process, we found that EPA manages its laboratory facilities on a site-by-site basis and does not evaluate each site in the context of all the agency's real property holdings--as recommended by the National Research Council report in 2004. EPA's facility master plans are intended to be the basis for justifying its building and facilities spending, which was $29.9 million in fiscal year 2010, and allocating those funds to specific repair and improvement projects. Master plans should contain, among other things, information on mission capabilities, use of space, and condition of individual laboratory sites. In addition, we found that most facility master plans were out of date. EPA's real property asset management plan states that facility master plans are supposed to be updated every 5 years to reflect changes in facility condition and mission, but we found that 11 of 20 master plans were out of date and 2 of 20 had not been created yet. EPA does not use a comprehensive planning process for managing its laboratories' workforce. For example, we found that not all of the regional and program offices with laboratories prepared workforce plans as part of an agencywide planning effort in 2007, and for those that did, most did not specifically address their laboratories' workforce. In fact, some regional management and human resource officials we spoke with were unaware of the requirement to submit workforce plans to the Office of Human Resources. Some of these managers told us the program and regional workforce plans were a paperwork exercise, irrelevant to the way the workforce is actually managed. Managers in program and regional offices said that workforce planning for their respective laboratories is fundamentally driven by the annual budgets of program and regional offices and ceilings for full-time equivalents (FTE). |
gao_GAO-08-611T | gao_GAO-08-611T_0 | Background
When the Congress enacted FACA in 1972, one of the principal concerns it was responding to was that certain special interests had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. While GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA guidance to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies and procedures for following FACA requirements. OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to follow in complying with statutory conflict-of-interest provisions that apply to all federal employees, including special government employees serving on federal advisory committees. Findings and Conclusions from Our 2004 Report on the Independence and Balance of Committees
In 2004, we concluded that additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the independence of federal advisory committee members and the balance of federal advisory committees. We found that OGE guidance to federal agencies had shortcomings and did not adequately ensure that agencies appropriately appoint individuals selected to provide advice on behalf of the government as special government employees. We found that some agencies were inappropriately appointing members as representatives who, as a result, were not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews. In addition, GSA guidance to federal agencies, and agency-specific policies and procedures, needed to be improved to better ensure that agencies elicit from potential committee members information that could be helpful in determining their viewpoints regarding the subject matters being considered—information that could help ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. That is, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture had appointed most or all members to their federal advisory committees as representatives—even in cases where the members were called upon to provide advice on behalf of the government and thus would be more appropriately appointed as special government employees. We identified several promising practices for forming and managing federal advisory committees that could better ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being, independent and balanced. In addition, we identified selected measures that could promote greater transparency in the federal advisory committee process and improve the public’s ability to evaluate whether agencies have complied with conflict- of-interest requirements and FACA requirements for balance, such as providing information on how the members of the committees are identified and screened and indicating whether the committee members are providing independent or stakeholder advice. Our 2004 Recommendations to GSA and OGE and Their Responses
Because the effectiveness of competent federal advisory committees can be undermined if the members are, or are perceived as, lacking in independence or if committees as a whole do not appear to be properly balanced, we made 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide additional guidance to federal agencies under three broad categories: (1) the appropriate use of representative appointments; (2) information that could help ensure committees are, in fact and in perception, balanced; and (3) practices that could better ensure independent and balanced committees and increase transparency in the federal advisory process. GSA and OGE have taken steps to implement many, but not all, of the recommendations we made in 2004. GSA quickly implemented this recommendation and now has data on appointments beginning in 2005. Potential Changes to FACA That Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence, Balance, and Transparency
You asked us to provide recommendations for improving the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Clarifying appointment issues in the act could resolve questions about or challenges to GSA’s authorities and thereby better support agency compliance with GSA and OGE guidance on this critical issue. In consideration of the above, the Subcommittee may want to consider amendments to FACA that could help prevent the inappropriate use of representative appointments and better ensure the independence of committee members by clarifying the nature of advice to be provided by special government employees versus representative members of advisory committees and require that all committee members, not just special government employees, be provided ethics training. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because advisory committees provide input to federal decision makers on significant national issues, it is essential that their membership be, and be perceived as being, free from conflicts of interest and balanced as a whole. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) was enacted in 1972, in part, because of concerns that special interests had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. The General Services Administration (GSA) develops guidance on establishing and managing FACA committees. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) develops regulations and guidance for statutory conflict-of- interest provisions that apply to some advisory committee members. As requested, this testimony discusses key findings and conclusions in our 2004 report, Federal Advisory Committees: Additional Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance; GAO's recommendations to GSA and OGE and their responses; and potential changes to FACA that could better ensure the independence and balance of advisory committees. For our 2004 work, we reviewed policies and procedures issued by GSA, OGE, and nine federal agencies that sponsor many committees. For this testimony, we obtained information from GSA and OGE on actions they have taken to implement our recommendations; we also reviewed data in GSA's FACA data base on advisory committee appointments.
What GAO Found
In 2004, GAO concluded that additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the independence of federal advisory committee members and the balance of federal advisory committees. For example, OGE guidance to federal agencies did not adequately ensure that agencies appoint individuals selected to provide advice on behalf of the government as "special government employees" subject to conflict-of-interest regulations. Further, GAO found that some agencies were inappropriately appointing most or all members as "representatives"--expected to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews--even when the agencies call upon the members to provide advice on behalf of the government and thus should have been appointed as special government employees. In addition, GSA guidance to federal agencies and agency-specific policies and procedures needed to be improved to better ensure that agencies collect and evaluate information, such as previous or ongoing research, that could be helpful in determining the viewpoints of potential committee members regarding the subject matters being considered and in ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. GAO also identified several promising practices for forming and managing federal advisory committees that could better ensure that committees are independent and balanced as a whole, such as providing information on how the members of the committee are identified and screened and indicating whether the committee members are providing independent or stakeholder advice. To help improve the effectiveness of federal advisory committees so that members are, and are perceived as being, independent and committees as a whole are properly balanced, GAO made 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide additional guidance to federal agencies under three broad categories: (1) the appropriate use of representative appointments; (2) information that could help ensure committees are, in fact, and in perception, balanced; and (3) practices that could better ensure independence and balanced committees and increase transparency in the federal advisory process. GSA and OGE implemented our recommendations to clarify the use of representative appointments. However, current data on appointments indicate that some agencies may continue to inappropriately use representatives rather than special government employees on some committees. Further, GSA said it agrees with GAO's other recommendations, including those relating to committee balance and measures that would promote greater transparency in the federal advisory committee process, but has not issued guidance in these areas as recommended, because of limitations in its authority to require agencies to comply with its guidance. In light of indications that some agencies may continue to use representative appointments inappropriately and GSA's support for including GAO's 2004 recommendations in FACA--including those aimed at enhancing balance and transparency--the Subcommittee may wish to incorporate the substance of GAO's recommendations into FACA as it considers amendments to the act. |
gao_GAO-07-556T | gao_GAO-07-556T_0 | Sustained Leadership Is Essential to Successful Transformations
Leadership in agencies across the federal government is essential to providing the accountable, committed, consistent, and sustained attention needed to address human capital and related organization transformation issues. OPM’s 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) results showed that the government needs to establish a more effective leadership corps. For example, slightly less than half of employees responding to the survey reported a high level of respect for their senior leaders or are satisfied with the information they receive from management on what is going on in the organization. Similarly, only 38 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that leaders in their organization generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce. OPM plays a key role in fostering and guiding improvements in all areas of strategic human capital management in the executive branch. However, in leading governmentwide human capital reform, OPM has itself faced challenges in its capacity to assist, guide, and certify agencies’ readiness to implement reforms. We recently reported that OPM has made commendable efforts in transforming itself from less a rulemaker, enforcer, and independent agent to more a consultant, toolmaker and strategic partner in leading and supporting executive agencies’ human capital management systems. Strategic Human Capital Planning Is Critical to Agencies’ Transformation
Strategic human capital planning is the centerpiece of federal agencies’ efforts to transform their organizations to meet the governance challenges of the 21st century. The long-term fiscal outlook and challenges to governance in the 21st century are prompting fundamental reexaminations of what government does, how it does it, and who does it. Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader organizational strategic planning is critical to ensuring agencies have the talent they need for future challenges. An agency’s strategic human capital plan should address the demographic trends that the agency faces with its workforce, especially pending retirements. Acquiring, Developing, and Retaining Talent Remains a Federal Workforce Challenge
Faced with a workforce that is becoming more retirement-eligible and finding gaps in talent because of changes in the knowledge, skills, and competencies in occupations needed to meet their missions, agencies need to strengthen their efforts and use of available flexibilities to acquire, develop, motivate, and retain talent. This is a positive step on OPM’s part as we continue to believe that more needs to be done to provide information to help agencies meet these human capital needs. An effective performance management system is critical to achieving this vital cultural transformation. Moreover, leading public sector organizations both in the United States and abroad create a clear linkage—line of sight—between individual performance and organizational success and, thus, transform their cultures to be more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative in nature. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is facing new and more complex challenges in the 21st century because of long-term fiscal constraints, changing demographics, evolving governance models, and other factors. Strategic human capital management, which remains on GAO's high-risk list, must be the centerpiece of any serious change management and transformation effort to meet these challenges. However, federal agencies do not consistently have the modern, effective, economical, and efficient human capital programs, policies, and procedures needed to succeed in their transformation efforts. In addition, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) must have the capacity to successfully guide human capital transformations. This testimony, based on a large body of GAO work over many years, focuses on strategic human capital management challenges that many federal agencies continue to face.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies continue to face strategic human capital challenges in several areas. Leadership--Top leadership in agencies across the federal government must provide committed and inspired attention needed to address human capital and related organizational transformation issues. However, slightly less than half of respondents to the 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey reported a high level of respect for senior leaders while only 38 percent agreed or strongly agreed that leaders in their organizations generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce. Strategic Human Capital Planning--Strategic human capital planning that is integrated with broader organizational strategic planning is critical to ensuring agencies have the talent they need for future challenges, especially as the federal government faces a retirement wave. Too often, agencies do not have the components of strategic human capital planning needed to address their current and emerging human capital challenges. Acquiring, Developing, and Retaining Talent--Faced with a workforce that is becoming more retirement eligible and finding gaps in talent, agencies need to strengthen their efforts and use of available flexibilities to acquire, develop, motivate, and retain talent. Agencies are not uniformly using available flexibilities to recruit and hire top talent and to address the current and emerging demographic challenges facing the government. (4) Results-Oriented Organizational Culture--Leading organizations create a clear linkage--"line of sight"--between individual performance and organizational success and, thus, transform their cultures to be more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative. However, in many cases, the federal government does not have these linkages and has not transformed how it classifies, compensates, develops, and motivates its employees to achieve maximum results within available resources and existing authorities. Agencies are facing strategic human capital challenges in a period of likely sustained budget constraints. Budget constraints will require agencies to plan their transformations more strategically, prioritize their needs, evaluate results, allocate their resources more carefully, and react to workforce challenges more expeditiously in order to achieve their missions economically, efficiently, and effectively. OPM will continue to play a key role in fostering and guiding strategic human capital management improvements in the executive branch and in helping agencies meet transformation challenges. Although making commendable efforts in transforming itself to more a consultant, toolmaker, and strategic partner in leading and supporting agencies' human capital management systems, OPM has itself faced challenges in its capacity to assist, guide, and certify agencies' readiness to implement reforms. |
gao_GAO-02-44 | gao_GAO-02-44_0 | Homeownership Centers Use Numerous Systems to Support Their Operations
While more than 20 different information systems support single-family operations, the homeownership centers currently rely on 7 major information systems to oversee lenders and contractors and provide customer service. In addition to these major systems, the centers have developed specialized databases to help them fulfill their missions. Therefore, these systems do not adequately support the centers’ efforts to oversee lenders and contractors and provide customer service. HUD’s Plans to Improve Its Single- Family Information Systems Are in the Early Stages
To better ensure that FHA’s single-family information systems support the homeownership centers’ operations, HUD’s Office of the Chief Information Officer is developing an enterprise architecture, and its Office of Single Family Housing is planning improvements to specific information systems. As part of its efforts to develop an enterprise architecture for the Department as a whole, the Office of the Chief Information Officer plans to complete its definition of FHA’s baseline architecture by the fall of 2001. By January 2002, it expects to define some aspects of the Department’s target architecture. We reviewed documents describing FHA’s single-family information systems and telephone systems. | What GAO Found
The Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) homeownership centers use more than 20 different information systems implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) headquarters, including seven major systems, databases developed by the centers, and various different telephone systems. Some of these technologies were implemented before FHA formed the centers and transferred some responsibilities to lenders and contractors. Others were implemented later, to help FHA staff oversee lenders and contractors and provide customer service. Although homeownership center staff have developed specialized databases to help them better meet their responsibilities, neither FHA's single-family information systems nor its telephone systems adequately support the centers' efforts. To better ensure that FHA's single-family information systems support current center operations, HUD is developing a systems blueprint, or enterprise architecture. HUD's Office of the Chief Information Officer plans to finish defining the current capabilities of FHA's information systems by the fall of 2001 and to have partially defined the desired capabilities of all the Department's information systems by January 2002. |
gao_GAO-04-593T | gao_GAO-04-593T_0 | Each area can receive funding through the Park Service’s budget—generally limited to not more than $1 million a year for 10 or 15 years. No Systematic Process Exists for Identifying and Designating National Heritage Areas
No systematic process is in place to identify qualified candidate sites and designate them as national heritage areas. Furthermore, of the 14 areas that were designated after a full evaluation, the Congress designated 8 consistent with the Park Service’s recommendations, 5 without the agency’s advice, and 1 after the agency had recommended that action be deferred. A suitability/feasibility study, should examine a proposed area using the following criteria: The area has natural, historic, or cultural resources that represent distinctive aspects of American heritage worthy of recognition, conservation, interpretation, and continuing use, and are best managed through partnerships among public and private entities, and by combining diverse and sometimes noncontiguous resources and active communities; The area’s traditions, customs, beliefs, and folk life are a valuable part of the national story; The area provides outstanding opportunities to conserve natural, cultural, historic, and/or scenic features; The area provides outstanding recreational and educational opportunities; Resources that are important to the identified themes of the area retain a degree of integrity capable of supporting interpretation; Residents, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and governments within the area that are involved in the planning have developed a conceptual financial plan that outlines the roles for all participants, including the federal government, and have demonstrated support for designation of the area; The proposed management entity and units of government supporting the designation are willing to commit to working in partnership to develop the area; The proposal is consistent with continued economic activity in the area; A conceptual boundary map is supported by the public; and The management entity proposed to plan and implement the project is described. National Heritage Areas Annually Receive Millions in Federal Funding
According to data from 22 of the 24 heritage areas, about half of their total funding of $310 million in fiscal years 1997 through 2002 came from the federal government and the other half from state and local governments and private sources. However, in each case, the sunset date was extended and the heritage area continued to receive funding from the Congress. Finally, the areas’ designating legislation typically requires the heritage areas to match the amount of federal funds they receive with a specified percentage of funds from nonfederal sources. The Park Service Lacks an Effective Process for Ensuring that National Heritage Areas Are Accountable for Their Use of Federal Funds
In the absence of a formal program, the Park Service oversees heritage areas’ activities by monitoring the implementation of the terms set forth in the cooperative agreements. According to Park Service officials, the agency has not taken actions to improve oversight because, without a formal program, it does not have the direction or funding it needs to effectively administer its national heritage area activities. National Heritage Areas Do Not Appear to Have Affected Individual Property Rights
National heritage areas do not appear to have affected private property rights, although private property rights advocates have raised a number of concerns about the potential effects of heritage areas on property owners’ rights and land use. However, most of the management plans state that local governments’ participation will be crucial to the success of the heritage area and encourage local governments to implement land use policies that are consistent with the plan. Property rights advocates are concerned that such provisions give heritage areas an opportunity to indirectly influence zoning and land use planning, which could restrict owners’ use of their property. Despite concerns about private property rights, officials at the 24 heritage areas, Park Service headquarters and regional staff working with these areas, and representatives of six national property rights groups that we contacted were unable to provide us with a single example of a heritage area directly affecting—positively or negatively—private property values or use. These actions should include developing well-defined, consistent standards and processes for regional staff to use in reviewing and approving heritage areas’ management plans; requiring regional heritage area managers to regularly and consistently review heritage areas’ annual financial audit reports to ensure that the agency has a full accounting of their use of funds from all federal sources, and developing results-oriented performance goals and measures for the agency’s heritage area activities, and requiring, in the cooperative agreements, heritage areas to adopt such a results-oriented management approach as well. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress has established, or "designated," 24 national heritage areas to recognize the value of their local traditions, history, and resources to the nation's heritage. These areas, including public and private lands, receive funds and assistance through cooperative agreements with the National Park Service, which has no formal program for them. They also receive funds from other agencies and nonfederal sources, and are managed by local entities. Growing interest in new areas has raised concerns about rising federal costs and the risk of limits on private land use. GAO was asked to review the (1) process for designating heritage areas, (2) amount of federal funding to these areas, (3) process for overseeing areas' activities and use of federal funds, and (4) effects, if any, they have on private property rights.
What GAO Found
No systematic process currently exists for identifying qualified sites and designating them as national heritage areas. While the Congress generally has designated heritage areas with the Park Service's advice, it designated 10 of the 24 areas without a thorough agency review; in 6 of these 10 cases, the agency recommended deferring action. Even when the agency fully studied sites, it found few that were unsuitable. The agency's criteria are very general. For example, one criterion states that a proposed area should reflect "traditions, customs, beliefs, and folk life that are a valuable part of the national story." These criteria are open to interpretation and, using them, the agency has eliminated few sites as prospective heritage areas. According to data from 22 of the 24 heritage areas, in fiscal years 1997 through 2002, the areas received about $310 million in total funding. Of this total, about $154 million came from state and local governments and private sources and another $156 million came from the federal government. Over $50 million was dedicated heritage area funds provided through the Park Service, with another $44 million coming from other Park Service programs and about $61 million from 11 other federal sources. Generally, each area's designating legislation imposes matching requirements and sunset provisions to limit the federal funds. However, since 1984, five areas that reached their sunset dates had their funding extended. The Park Service oversees heritage areas' activities by monitoring their implementation of the terms set forth in the cooperative agreements. These terms, however, do not include several key management controls. That is, the agency has not (1) always reviewed areas' financial audit reports, (2) developed consistent standards for reviewing areas' management plans, and (3) developed results-oriented goals and measures for the agency's heritage area activities, or required the areas to adopt a similar approach. Park Service officials said that the agency has not taken these actions because, without a program, it lacks adequate direction and funding. Heritage areas do not appear to have affected property owners' rights. In fact, the designating legislation of 13 areas and the management plans of at least 6 provide assurances that such rights will be protected. However, property rights advocates fear the effects of provisions in some management plans. These provisions encourage local governments to implement land use policies that are consistent with the heritage areas' plans, which may allow the heritage areas to indirectly influence zoning and land use planning in ways that could restrict owners' use of their property. Nevertheless, heritage area officials, Park Service headquarters and regional staff, and representatives of national property rights groups that we contacted were unable to provide us with any examples of a heritage area directly affecting--positively or negatively--private property values or use. |
gao_GAO-05-542T | gao_GAO-05-542T_0 | Background
Before commercialization, air navigation services under government control faced increasing strain. With commercialization, the government typically retains full or partial ownership of the air navigation system and continues to regulate operational safety, but an independent ANSP is responsible for operating the system. The independent ANSP is subject to corporate financial and accounting rules and, in line with today’s current management theories, is generally designed as a performance-based organization—that is, an organization that develops strategies, goals, and measures and gathers and reports data to demonstrate its performance. For this statement, we will use “commercialization.”
Common Characteristics of Five Commercialized ANSPs
The five commercialized ANSPs that we reviewed have a number of common characteristics: All operate as businesses rather than as government organizations, all focus on safety, and all are largely monopoly providers that are subject to some form of economic review or guidelines for setting prices. ANSPs Make and Execute Their Decisions and Follow Corporate Practices
Each ANSP makes and carries out its own strategic, operating, and financial decisions. Before commercialization, governments funded air traffic control services through annual appropriations from their national government. All five ANSPs collect and manage their own revenues, charging fees for services. All five ANSPs are subject to external safety regulation. Available Data Indicate That Since Commercialization, the Five ANSPs Have Maintained Safety, Controlled Costs, and Achieved Efficiencies
Based on information from each of the ANSPs we reviewed, following commercialization, air navigation safety has not declined, and all five ANSPs have taken steps to control costs. For example, data from Airways Corporation of New Zealand indicate a downward trend in incidents involving loss of separation for the years following commercialization. In New Zealand, as air traffic has increased, some airspace sectors have been subdivided so that controllers are responsible for a smaller piece of airspace. DFS has also integrated operations and consolidated facilities. Focus on Cost Control and Operational Efficiency Has Affected User Charges
Through their cost control initiatives and modernization efforts, some of the ANSPs have been able to lower their unit costs and, in turn, lower their charges to major commercial airlines, which pay the largest proportion of user fees and therefore are the primary users served by the ANSPs. Some governments have subsidized air navigation services at small, remote, general aviation, and regional airports, viewing such services as a public good. Initial Observations on Commercialized ANSPs
Through our research, we made a number of initial observations about the commercialization of air navigation services in the five countries we selected. Having a Contingency Fund Can Help, but May Not Be Sufficient, to Protect Against an Industry Downturn
Following commercialization, two changes—shifting the source of funding from appropriations to user fees and allowing the ANSPs to borrow money on the open market—have generally enabled commercialized ANSPs to cover their operating and capital costs. Since user fees constitute the ANSP’s primary source of revenue, economic monitoring and regulation by an independent third party can protect users and ensure a fair pricing process. ICAO recognizes the need for an independent mechanism to provide economic regulation of air navigation services. Similarly, general aviation operators may be threatened if they are required to pay fees that cover the full costs of the air navigation services they receive. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the past, governments worldwide owned, operated, and regulated air navigation services, viewing air traffic control as a governmental function. But as nations faced increasing financial strains, many governments decided to shift the responsibility to an independent air navigation service provider (ANSP) that operates along commercial lines. As of March 2005, 38 nations worldwide had commercialized their air navigation services, fundamentally shifting the operational and financial responsibility for providing these services from the national government to an independent commercial authority. GAO selected five ANSPs--in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--to examine characteristics and experiences of commercialized air navigation services. These ANSPs used different ownership structures and varied in terms of their size, amount of air traffic handled, and complexity of their airspace. This testimony, which is based on ongoing work, addresses the following questions: (1) What are common characteristics of commercialized ANSPs? (2) What do available data show about how the safety, cost, and efficiency of air navigation services have changed since commercialization? (3) What are some initial observations that can be made about the commercialization of air navigation services?
What GAO Found
The five commercialized ANSPs that GAO selected for review have a number of common characteristics: Each operates as a business, making and carrying out its own strategic, operational, and financial decisions. Each generates and manages its own revenue to cover its costs, charging fees to users and borrowing funds from private markets instead of relying on annual governmental appropriations. Each has also put commercial financial and performance data systems in place. All five ANSPs have retained safety as their primary goal, and each is subject to some external safety regulation. Each ANSP is largely a monopoly provider of air navigation services and undergoes some form of economic review or follows some guidelines for setting prices. The ANSPs report that, since commercialization, each has maintained safety, controlled costs, and improved efficiency. Data from all five indicate that safety has not eroded. For example, data from New Zealand and Canada show fewer incidents involving loss of separation (the required distance between an aircraft and another object). All five ANSPs have taken steps, such as consolidating facilities, to control their operating costs. Finally, all five ANSPs have invested in new technologies that the ANSPs say have lowered their costs by increasing controllers' productivity and produced operating efficiencies, such as fewer or shorter delays. Such measures have generally resulted in lower fees for major carriers, but some smaller, formerly subsidized users now pay new or higher fees and are concerned about future costs and service. GAO's work to date suggests a number of observations about commercialized ANSPs: A contingency fund can help an ANSP cover its costs without greatly increasing user fees during an economic decline; economic regulation by an independent third party can ensure that an ANSP sets prices fairly; providing a forum for stakeholders gives attention to their needs; and special measures may be necessary to reconcile the inability of some users to pay the full costs of services at some small communities and the ANSP's need to recover its costs. |
gao_GAO-13-582 | gao_GAO-13-582_0 | Internal control over financial reporting is further defined in the SEC regulations implementing Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.regulations define internal control over financial reporting as a means of providing reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements, including those policies and procedures that: pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company; provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements. On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act permanently exempted nonaccelerated filers from the auditor attestation requirement. The Percentage of Exempt Companies with Financial Restatements Was Generally Greater Than the Percentage of Nonexempt Companies from 2005 through 2011
Since the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the number and percentage of exempt companies restating their financial statements has generally exceeded the number and percentage of nonexempt companies restating. Exempt and nonexempt companies restated their financial statements for similar reasons, and the majority of these restatements produced a negative effect on the companies’ financial statements. Views on the Costs and Benefits of Auditor Attestation Vary among Companies and Others
Companies and others identified various costs of the auditor attestation requirement. However, determining whether auditor attestation compliance costs outweigh the benefits is difficult because many costs and benefits cannot be readily quantified. Auditor Attestation Costs Can Be Significant, Especially for Small Companies, but Costs Are Declining
A number of studies and surveys show that the estimated costs of obtaining an external auditor attestation on internal control over financial reporting are significant for companies of all sizes. Moreover, in response to a 2010 Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) survey of individual investors, almost two-thirds of investors said they were concerned about exempting companies with annual revenues of under $75 million from the independent auditor attestation requirement, suggesting that the requirement has a positive effect on individual investors’ confidence in the financial information generated by smaller companies. Currently, exempt companies are not required to disclose in their annual reports whether they have voluntarily obtained an auditor attestation on their internal controls. SEC officials said that it is not common for the agency to require a company to disclose compliance status for requirements that are not applicable to the company—which, according to SEC officials, could potentially influence a company’s behavior. Although information on voluntary compliance with the auditor attestation requirement is determinable, having the information explicitly disclosed could benefit investors. Federal securities laws require public companies to disclose relevant information to investors to aid them in their investment decisions. Although information on a company’s exempt status is available to investors, explicit disclosure would increase transparency and investor protection by making investors readily aware of whether a company has obtained an auditor attestation on internal controls. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance transparency and investor protection, we recommend that SEC consider requiring public companies, where applicable, to explicitly disclose whether they obtained an auditor attestation of their internal controls. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses: (1) how the number of financial statement restatements compares between exempt and nonexempt companies; (2) the costs and benefits for nonexempt companies as well as exempt companies that voluntarily comply with the auditor attestation requirement; and (3) what is known about the extent to which investor confidence in the integrity of financial statements is affected by whether or not companies comply with the auditor attestation requirement. We define exempt companies as those with less than $75 million in public float (nonaccelerated filers) and nonexempt companies as those with $75 million or more in public float (accelerated filers). GAO. GAO. GAO. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal Control over Financial Reporting Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a public company to have its independent auditor attest to and report on management's internal control over financial reporting; this is known as the auditor attestation requirement. In July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act exempted companies with less than $75 million in public float from the auditor attestation requirement. The act mandated that GAO examine the impact of the permanent exemption on the quality of financial reporting by small public companies and on investors. This report discusses (1) how the number of financial statement restatements compares between exempt and nonexempt companies (i.e., those with $75 million or more in public float), (2) the costs and benefits of complying with the attestation requirement, and (3) what is known about the extent to which investor confidence is affected by compliance with the auditor attestation requirement. GAO analyzed financial restatements and audit fees data; surveyed 746 public companies with a response rate of 25 percent; interviewed regulatory officials and others; and reviewed laws, surveys, and studies.
What GAO Found
Since the implementation of the auditor attestation requirement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), companies exempt from the requirement have had more financial restatements (a company's revision of publicly reported financial information) than nonexempt companies, and the percentage of exempt companies restating generally has exceeded that of nonexempt companies. Exempt and nonexempt companies restated their financial statements for similar reasons (e.g., revenue recognition and expenses), and the majority of these restatements produced a negative effect on the companies' financial statements.
Views on the costs and benefits of auditor attestation vary among companies and others. Although companies and others reported that the costs associated with compliance can be significant, especially for smaller companies, GAO's and others' analyses show that these costs have declined for companies of all sizes since 2004. Companies and others reported benefits of compliance, such as improved internal controls and reliability of financial reports. However, measuring whether auditor attestation compliance costs outweigh the benefits is difficult and views among companies and others were mixed as to whether the costs exceeded the benefits of compliance.
A majority of empirical studies GAO reviewed suggest that compliance with the auditor attestation requirement has a positive impact on investor confidence in the quality of financial reports. Some interviewees said the independent scrutiny of a company's internal controls is an important investor protection safeguard. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) does not require exempt companies to disclose in their annual report whether they voluntarily obtained an auditor attestation. SEC officials said it is not common for SEC to require a company to disclose voluntary compliance with requirements from which it is exempt. However, federal securities laws require companies to disclose relevant information to investors to aid in their investment decisions. Although information on auditor attestation status is available to investors, requiring a company to explicitly state whether it has obtained an auditor attestation on internal controls could increase transparency and investor protection.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SEC consider requiring public companies, where applicable, to explicitly disclose whether they obtained an auditor attestation of their internal controls. SEC responded that investors could determine attestation status from available information. But without clear disclosure, investors may misinterpret a company's status; therefore, this warrants SEC's further consideration. |
gao_GAO-15-334 | gao_GAO-15-334_0 | NHTSA collects NASS-CDS data through in-depth investigations of a sample of police-reported motor vehicle crashes that occur in the United States. Between 1988 and 2013, NHTSA conducted an average of about 4,700 NASS-CDS investigations each year. According to NHTSA, factors that have contributed to this decline include the budget for NASS-CDS and rising costs. Specific to NASS-CDS, NHTSA’s Data Modernization Project involves the following: redesigning the NASS-CDS sample by reviewing the data elements that comprise the sample and the statistical methodology behind selecting the sample; upgrading the equipment and information technology that supports NASS-CDS to reduce redundancy, improve data quality, and enhance the experience of NASS users; and implementing a new sample to replace NASS-CDS. NHTSA Followed a Reasonable Process for Redesigning NASS-CDS
NHTSA Redesigned NASS-CDS in Accordance with Applicable OMB Standards and Guidelines
We found that the process NHTSA followed to redesign NASS-CDS is consistent with applicable government-wide standards and guidelines issued by OMB that apply to the development of survey concepts, methods, and design. To redesign NASS-CDS, NHTSA awarded a contract to Westat in May 2012 to assist the agency in redesigning the NASS-CDS sample. Consistent with OMB’s recommended practice to include design elements to meet stated objectives, NHTSA tasked Westat with (1) identifying data elements that are responsive to the current and future needs of both NHTSA and the public and (2) developing recommendations for a new sample design that met users’ data needs in an effective and efficient manner while still maintaining national representativeness. Thus, in May 2014, NHTSA announced that it planned to replace NASS-CDS with a new system called the Crash Investigation Sampling System (CISS)—which we discuss in detail in objective 2. Specifically, MAP-21 required NHTSA to conduct a comprehensive review of the data elements collected as part of NASS and report on whether there was a benefit to increasing the size of the NASS sample. For example, the act required NHTSA to provide Congress with information on the types of analyses that can be conducted and the conclusions that can be drawn under the current sample size and an expanded sample size, the number of investigations that NHTSA should conduct as part of the sample that would allow for optimal data analysis, NHTSA’s recommendations for improvements, and the resources necessary to implement NHTSA’s recommendations. The act required NHTSA to report to Congress on the results of its review, including the benefits of a larger sample size, no later than October 1, 2013. NHTSA missed this deadline and issued its report in January 2015, as we were completing our review. In its report, NHTSA stated that meeting the needs of all NASS users is a challenge and that there is no precise answer to what the optimal sample size for NASS-CDS would be. However, NHTSA also noted that increasing the size of the NASS-CDS sample would help meet the evolving needs of NASS-CDS users. The CISS May Not Substantially Increase the Sample Size but May Improve Precision and Data Quality
Although Its Sample Size May Not Substantially Increase, NHTSA Still Expects the CISS to Generate More Precise Crash and Injury Estimates
One means of determining the extent the Data Modernization Project redesign will improve the NASS-CDS sample is to assess the potential for CISS to meet a main technical objective of the Data Modernization Project: achieving similar or greater levels of statistical precision for seven important crash and injury estimates. There are many ways to design a sample to generate more statistically precise estimates. One way NHTSA improved the expected statistical precision of estimates from CISS was by selecting new PSUs that better represent the current population and the number and types of crashes nationwide. Moreover, NHTSA expects the new sample design for CISS to contain more crashes with serious injuries and crashes involving newer vehicles than NASS-CDS currently contains, which also should make estimates of these crashes more statistically precise. NHTSA officials said the new equipment they plan to provide should help reduce the time it currently takes to conduct scene and vehicle inspections. This includes data on the use of crash-avoidance technologies in newer vehicles as well as additional data for older vehicles, as some users had requested. By increasing the size of the CISS sample, NHTSA and others could likely do more to study motor-vehicle traffic crashes in an effort to save lives and reduce the economic costs of crashes. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses (1) the process the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) used to redesign the National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) and (2) the potential for this redesign to improve the NASS-CDS sample. These OMB documents also specify the professional principles and practices that federal agencies should follow and the level of quality and effort expected when initiating a new survey or redesigning an existing survey such as NASS-CDS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, motor vehicle crashes in the United States cost almost 33,000 lives, injured 2.2 million people, and resulted in almost $900 billion in economic costs. As part of its mission to reduce these losses, NHTSA collects and analyzes data on motor vehicle crashes. One NHTSA program that collects crash data is NASS-CDS—a nationally representative sample of police-reported motor-vehicle traffic crashes; however, the NASS-CDS sample was designed in 1988, and subsequent shifts in the population and a declining sample size have necessitated an update of this sample. In 2012, NHTSA started taking steps to redesign NASS-CDS.
Congress mandated GAO to review NHTSA's progress in redesigning NASS-CDS. This report assesses the (1) process NHTSA used to redesign NASS-CDS and (2) the potential for this redesign to improve the NASS-CDS sample. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed relevant information regarding the NASS-CDS redesign and interviewed officials from NHTSA and Westat, the contractor selected to assist NHTSA in redesigning NASS-CDS. Based on comments the public submitted to NHTSA in response to a notice in the Federal Register , GAO also interviewed 21 users of this data and other interested parties regarding the improvements they would like made to NASS-CDS. The Department of Transportation reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) followed a reasonable process for redesigning the National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS), which is a nationally representative sample of police-reported motor-vehicle traffic crashes. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has standards and guidelines that specify the professional principles and practices that agencies should follow and the level of quality and effort expected when redesigning an existing survey, such as NASS-CDS. NHTSA followed a process consistent with applicable OMB standards and guidelines. For example, NHTSA consulted with NASS-CDS users to identify their requirements and expectations in redesigning NASS-CDS and tasked the contractor, Westat, with developing proposals for a new sample design to meet users' data needs in an effective and efficient manner. As of January 2015, NHTSA planned to replace NASS-CDS with a new sample, called the Crash Investigation Sampling System (CISS). However, NHTSA did not meet a congressional deadline to report on the benefits of increasing the size of the NASS-CDS sample. Specifically, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act required NHTSA to report, by October 1, 2013, on whether there would be a benefit to increasing the size of the NASS sample as well as to report on the resources necessary to implement NHTSA's recommended sample size, among other things. NHTSA issued its required report in January 2015 as GAO was completing its review. In its report, NHTSA noted that increasing the size of the NASS-CDS sample would help meet the evolving needs of NASS users, but stated there was no precise answer to what an optimal sample size for NASS-CDS would be.
NHTSA expects the new sample it plans to implement as part of this redesign to generate greater statistical precision for key crash-type and injury-severity estimates than that of NASS-CDS using a similarly sized sample. One way NHTSA was able to generate more precise estimates was by selecting new sites at which to collect data. These sites, or “primary sampling units,” better represent the current population and distribution of motor vehicle crashes nationwide, representation that allows NHTSA and others to generate more precise estimates using the data. NHTSA also expects CISS to sample more crashes involving serious injuries and newer vehicles than NASS-CDS currently allows, as users had requested. NHTSA conducted about 4,700 NASS-CDS investigations annually between 1988 and 2013, and while there is no clear optimal sample size, a larger sample size could allow NHTSA to generate estimates that are even more precise or generate estimates for types of crashes that occur infrequently, estimates that could contribute to research that can affect vehicle safety. However, NHTSA's ability to increase the new CISS sample size is limited by its current and expected budget. Additional planned improvements to NASS-CDS include new technologies that allow for safer and more accurate measurements of accident scenes and vehicles involved in crashes. While NHTSA expects these new technologies to also result in some time savings, NHTSA does not expect them to allow for more investigations due to the time-intensive nature of the CISS data-collection effort. |
gao_GAO-08-764 | gao_GAO-08-764_0 | Background
For nearly 25 years, the United States has provided the Cuban people with alternative sources of news and information. IBB’S Approach for Awarding Selected Radio and Television Broadcasting Contracts Did Not Reflect Sound Business Practices
IBB’s approach for awarding the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca contracts did not reflect sound business practices in certain key aspects. IBB’s approach was predicated on the confluence of several interrelated events—ongoing interagency deliberations, the issuance of a July 2006 report by the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, and concerns about the health of Fidel Castro. In certain respects, however, IBB did not document in its contract files key information or assumptions underlying its decisions to not seek competitive offers, limit the number of potential providers it considered, or the basis used to negotiate the final prices for the services provided. In addition, IBB did not actively involve its contracting office until just prior to contract award. Finally, while justifying the December 2006 award of the two contracts on the basis of urgent and compelling need and the determination that only one source would meet its minimum needs, IBB chose to exercise multiple options on the two contracts to extend their period of performance into 2008 and has only recently taken steps to identify additional providers. OCB’s Practices Provide Limited Visibility into Key Steps When Acquiring Talent Services Contractors
OCB’s practices provide limited visibility into key steps in soliciting, evaluating, and selecting its talent services contractors. In that regard, OCB does not require that managers document instances in which resumes were received from sources other than formal solicitation means nor require that managers document their evaluation of the resumes received. The usefulness of the handbook’s pricing guidance, however, may be limited as the rates in the handbook are neither current nor based on the local Miami market and because OCB, at times, has reduced the rates it pays due to budget constraints. The competition laws and regulations provide agencies considerable flexibility to use noncompetitive procedures, if adequately justified, to meet their needs and permit agencies to use less rigorous procedures for lower dollar acquisitions. With respect to improving IBB’s guidance governing contracts for talent services, we recommend that the Broadcasting Board of Governors direct IBB to take the following two actions: clarify requirements in IBB’s Contracting for Talent and Other Professional Services Handbook on the receipt and evaluation of resumes and ensure that OCB’s practices are consistent with IBB’s guidance, and determine how the pricing guidance in IBB’s handbook could better meet users’ needs as part of its planned revision to the handbook. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate the processes used (1) by the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) to award the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca contracts, and (2) by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) to award its talent services contracts. For the purposes of this review, talent services contracts refer to those contracts awarded by OCB for writers, performers, program hosts, reporters, and technical support required to produce and broadcast radio and TV news and entertainment programming. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has long provided the Cuban people with alternative sources of news and information. As part of this effort, in December 2006 the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) awarded sole-source contracts to two Miami radio and television stations--Radio Mambi and TV Azteca--to provide additional broadcasting options. Additionally, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) annually awards millions of dollars in contracts for talent services--writers, reporters, and technical support--needed to produce and broadcast news and entertainment programming. GAO evaluated the processes used to award (1) the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca broadcasting contracts, and (2) talent services contracts. We reviewed contract files and other documentation and interviewed program managers and contracting officers to determine the process used to award the two broadcasting contracts and a nongeneralizable selection of 37 talent services contracts.
What GAO Found
IBB's approach for awarding the Radio Mambi and TV Azteca contracts did not reflect sound business practices. According to officials from IBB and the Broadcasting Board of Governors--IBB's and OCB's parent organization--the confluence of several interrelated events--ongoing interagency deliberations, the issuance of a July 2006 report by a Cabinet-level commission, and concerns about the health of Fidel Castro--required them to quickly obtain additional broadcasting services to Cuba. Competition laws and regulations provide agencies considerable flexibility to use noncompetitive procedures, if adequately justified, to meet their needs. In certain respects, however, IBB did not fully document in its contract files key information or assumptions underlying its decisions to not seek competitive offers, limit the number of potential providers it considered, or the basis used to negotiate the final prices for the services provided. Additionally, IBB did not actively involve its contracting office until just prior to contract award, though agency regulations and our prior work identify that timely involvement by stakeholders helps promote successful acquisition outcomes. Finally, though it partly justified its awards based on urgency, IBB exercised multiple options on the two contracts to extend their period of performance into 2008. Only recently has it taken steps to identify additional providers. OCB's practices for soliciting, evaluating, and selecting its talent contractors provide limited visibility at key steps. OCB issues quarterly announcements in Federal Business Opportunities, advertises annually in a local newspaper, and posts announcements at OCB's headquarters. OCB does not require, however, that managers document instances in which resumes were received from sources outside these processes, such as when a contractor is recommended by an OCB employee. Further, OCB does not document why other potential providers were not selected as required by IBB's guidance, in part due to questions about how to meet this requirement. Lastly, OCB managers use an IBB handbook to justify how much it pays for talent services, but the usefulness of the handbook's pricing guidance may be limited as the recommended rates are not current or based on the local market. |
gao_GAO-01-289 | gao_GAO-01-289_0 | The next step is for agencies to order services. These advantages—obtaining reliable, high-quality telecommunications services at low cost—increase in importance as the federal government moves to deliver more information and services electronically. Conclusions
Despite progress, the government did not meet its deadlines for transition to FTS2001 and has not yet completed this effort. The deadline was missed for numerous reasons: a lack of sufficient information to effectively oversee and manage this complex transition, slowness in completing all the contract modifications needed to add transition-critical services to the FTS2001 contracts, slowness of some customer agencies to order FTS2001 services, staffing shortfalls and billing problems on the part of FTS2001 contractors, and local exchange carriers’ difficulties providing facilities and services on time. Until GSA addresses the outstanding issues impeding transition and expeditiously completes this transition, it will be unable to fully achieve its basic FTS2001 goals of ensuring the best service and maximizing competition. The Administrator stated, however, that the report did not reflect the success of the FTS2001 transition. | What GAO Found
Telecommunications services are increasingly critical to transforming the way the federal government does business; communicates internally and externally; and interacts with citizens, industry, and state, local, and foreign governments. Electronic government services based on reliable, secure, and cost-effective telecommunications can enable agencies to streamline the way they do business, reduce paperwork and delays, and increase operational efficiencies. It is important that a far-reaching program, such as the FTS2001 program, take full advantage of new services offered by industry; that agencies effectively and efficiently implement these telecommunications services to improve operations; and that the program be successfully implemented to maximize benefits to the taxpayers. Despite progress, the government did not meet its deadlines for transition to FTS2001 and has not yet completed this effort. The government missed its deadline for several reasons, including a lack of sufficient information to effectively oversee and manage this complex transition, slowness in completing all the contract modifications needed to add transition-critical services to the FTS2001 contracts, slowness of some customer agencies to order FTS2001 services, staffing shortfalls and billing problems on the part of FTS2001 contractors, and local exchange carriers' difficulties providing facilities and services on time. Until the General Services Administration addresses the outstanding issues impeding transition and expeditiously completes this transition, it will be unable to fully achieve its basic FTS2001 goals of ensuring the best service and maximizing competition. |
gao_GAO-15-482T | gao_GAO-15-482T_0 | Improper Payments Remain a Government-Wide Challenge
Improper Payment Estimates Increased in Fiscal Year 2014
Government-wide, improper payment estimates totaled $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014, a significant increase of approximately $19 billion from the prior year’s estimate of $105.8 billion. The estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2014 were attributable to 124 programs spread among 22 agencies. When excluding the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Finance and Accounting Service Commercial Pay program, the reported government-wide error rate was 4.5 percent of program outlays in fiscal year 2014, compared to 4.0 percent reported in fiscal year 2013. The increase in the 2014 estimate is attributed primarily to increased error rates in three major programs: the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Medicare Fee-for-Service, HHS’s Medicaid, and the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Earned Income Tax Credit. These three programs accounted for $80.9 billion in improper payment estimates, or approximately 65 percent of the government-wide total for fiscal year 2014. OMB has established guidance for federal agencies on reporting, reducing, and recovering improper payments as required by IPIA, as amended, and on protecting privacy while reducing improper payments with the Do Not Pay initiative. In our report on the Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Report of the United States Government, we identified the issue of improper payments as a material weakness in internal control because the federal government is unable to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them. We found that not all agencies had developed improper payment estimates for all of the programs and activities they identified as susceptible to significant improper payments. We recommended that the Department of Energy In addition to the challenges that we and the IGs reported, some agencies reported in their fiscal year 2014 performance and accountability reports or agency financial reports that program design issues could hinder efforts to estimate or recapture improper payments. While agencies continue to face challenges, there are a number of strategies that can help agencies in reducing improper payments, including analyzing the root causes of improper payments to identify and implement effective preventive and detective controls. Detective controls are critical for identifying improper payments that have already been made, but strong preventive controls can serve as the frontline defense against improper payments. One example of preventive controls is up-front eligibility verification through data sharing, which allows entities that make payments to compare information from different sources to help ensure that payments are appropriate. Use of Death Information Can Help Prevent Improper Payments, but Agencies Face Challenges in Obtaining Accurate and More Complete Data
Programs Can Use Death Information to Help Prevent Improper Payments
Because of its mission, SSA is uniquely positioned to collect and manage death data at the federal level, and these data can be helpful in preventing improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use deceased individuals’ identities. The Social Security Act requires that SSA share its full death file, to the extent feasible, with agencies that provide federally funded benefits, provided that the arrangement meets statutory requirements. However, SSA may not include death data received from states in the DMF.reported on the value of using SSA’s death data―the full death file, if possible, or the DMF―to guard against improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use deceased individuals’ identities. For example, we have reported on payments to deceased individuals that could have been prevented by using SSA’s death data in the following areas. Disaster assistance. Farm programs. Rural housing. Challenges Exist in Maintaining and Sharing Death Information
While verifying eligibility using SSA’s death data can be an effective tool to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals, SSA faces challenges in maintaining accurate death data, and other federal agencies face challenges in accessing these data. An agency that does not access SSA’s full death file can instead access the publicly available DMF. While we appreciate that agencies may request the full death file for a variety of intended uses, and we support SSA’s efforts to ensure compliance with all applicable legal requirements, we continue to believe that developing this guidance could help to ensure consistency in SSA’s future decision making, as well as enhance agencies’ ability to obtain the data in a timely and efficient manner Further, in November 2013, we found that SSA’s projected reimbursement amounts for the reasonable cost of sharing death data varied for different agencies, sometimes because of legal requirements, but SSA did not share with agencies how these amounts were determined. Improper Payments: DOE’s Risk Assessments Should Be Strengthened. Social Security Death Data: Additional Action Needed to Address Data Errors and Federal Agency Access. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the steward of taxpayer dollars, the federal government is accountable for how it spends hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars annually. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended, requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements. In general, reported improper payment estimates include payments that should not have been made, were made in the incorrect amount, or were not supported by sufficient documentation.
Implementing strong preventive controls can serve as the frontline defense against improper payments. One example of a preventive control is verifying eligibility through data sharing, which can allow agencies that make payments to compare information―such as death data― from different sources to help ensure that payments are appropriate before they are made.
This testimony addresses (1) issues related to government-wide improper payments and (2) use of death data to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals. This testimony is primarily based on GAO's body of work related to improper payments and SSA's death data, as well as information obtained from agency financial reports.
What GAO Found
Government-wide, improper payment estimates totaled $124.7 billion in fiscal year 2014, a significant increase of approximately $19 billion from the prior year's estimate of $105.8 billion. The estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2014 were attributable to 124 programs spread among 22 agencies. The reported government-wide error rate was 4.5 percent of program outlays in fiscal year 2014 compared to 4.0 percent reported in fiscal year 2013. The increase in the 2014 estimate is attributed primarily to increased error rates in three major programs: the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Medicare Fee-for-Service and Medicaid programs, and the Department of the Treasury's Earned Income Tax Credit program. These three programs accounted for $80.9 billion in improper payment estimates, or approximately 65 percent of the government-wide total for fiscal year 2014.
Agencies continue to face challenges in reducing improper payments. In GAO's report on the Fiscal Year 2014 Financial Report of the United States Government , GAO identified the federal government's inability to determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them as a material weakness in internal control. Some agencies reported in their fiscal year 2014 agency financial reports that program design issues hindered efforts to estimate or recover improper payments. For example, HHS reported that statutory limitations prevent the agency from requiring states to estimate improper payments for its Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. Further, inspectors general at 10 agencies identified noncompliance with improper payment requirements in fiscal year 2013. GAO has reported that strategies for reducing improper payments include analyzing the root causes of improper payments and developing strong preventive and detective controls. Recent laws and guidance support some of these strategies, including the Do Not Pay initiative, a web-based, centralized data-matching service that could help prevent certain improper payments.
Sharing death data can help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use deceased individuals' identities, but the Social Security Administration (SSA) faces challenges in maintaining these data, and other agencies face challenges in obtaining them. The Social Security Act requires that SSA share its full death file, to the extent possible, with agencies that provide federally funded benefits, provided that the arrangement meets statutory requirements. An agency that does not access SSA's full death file can instead access the publicly available Death Master File, a subset of the full death file that does not include state-reported death data. GAO has reported on payments to deceased individuals that could have been prevented by using SSA's death data in programs related to disaster assistance, farming, and rural housing. While verifying eligibility using SSA's death data can be an effective tool to help prevent improper payments to deceased individuals or those who use their identities, agencies may not be obtaining accurate data because of weaknesses in how these data are received and managed by SSA. In November 2013, GAO reported that SSA needed to take action to address data errors and agency access issues, including assessing the risks that errors in death data pose. GAO also recommended that SSA ensure appropriate agency access by developing written guidance on eligibility requirements for access to the full death file. |
gao_GAO-06-379 | gao_GAO-06-379_0 | In addition, OSHA is required to submit to the President an annual report on the status of federal employees’ occupational safety and health. Drawing from our prior work, a review of the literature, and OSHA’s requirements, we identified six components often found in sound safety programs: (1) management commitment, (2) employee involvement, (3) education and training, (4) identification of hazards, (5) following up and correcting hazards, and (6) medical management. However, agency officials we surveyed and interviewed reported they face a number of implementation challenges that cut across the components, particularly in using automated systems, holding managers accountable for maintaining an effective safety program, and making the best use of their limited resources. Most Agencies Reported Having at Least One Activity for Each Safety Program Component
All of the 57 agencies surveyed reported that their safety programs incorporate activities for the management commitment component. Approximately a quarter of the agencies surveyed reported that they did not have automated systems for tracking safety training completed by their employees. In addition, a potential consequence of operating with limited resources is the use of collateral duty safety officers—employees whose primary responsibilities do not involve safety. OSHA Provides Inadequate Oversight of Federal Agencies Because It Does Not Use Its Enforcement and Compliance Assistance Resources Strategically
OSHA’s oversight of federal agencies’ safety programs is not as effective as it could be because it does not use its enforcement and compliance assistance resources in a strategic manner. First, OSHA does not routinely conduct inspections that target federal worksites with high injury and illness rates. Finally, while OSHA has a range of promising programs for assisting agencies in complying with its regulations and improving worker safety, not all of these programs are being fully utilized. Recommendations for Executive Action
The Secretary of Labor should direct OSHA to develop a targeted inspection program for federal worksites based on the new worker injury and illness data federal agencies are required to collect by requiring that relevant portions or summaries of that data be included in agencies’ annual reports to OSHA or by obtaining the data from agencies or worksites through periodic, selected surveys; track violations disputed by federal agencies to their resolution and ensure that unresolved disputes are reported to the President; conduct evaluations of the largest and most hazardous federal agencies use evaluations, inspection data, and annual reports submitted by federal agencies to assess the effectiveness of their safety programs, and include, in OSHA’s annual report to the President, an assessment of each agency’s worker safety program and recommendations for improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal workers' compensation costs exceeded $1.5 billion in 2004, with approximately 148,000 new claims filed that year. Because of concerns for the safety of federal workers, as well as the costs associated with unsafe workplaces, GAO described the characteristics of federal agencies' safety programs and the implementation challenges they face, and assessed how well the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) oversees and assists federal agencies' efforts to develop and administer their safety programs.
What GAO Found
Based on a survey of 57 agencies, GAO found that most agencies reported having at least one activity for each of the six components generally associated with a sound safety program--(1) management commitment, (2) employee involvement, (3) education and training, (4) identification of hazards, (5) correction of hazards, and (6) medical management (which includes having a return-to-work program for injured employees). However, agencies faced implementation challenges that cut across the components in the areas of data management, accountability, and safety resources. The survey results indicated that many agencies do not have automated systems for tracking elements of their safety programs, such as training. In addition, several of the agencies did not demonstrate that their managers are held accountable for maintaining effective safety programs. Finally, many agency officials stated that, due to limited resources, they often must depend on safety officers with limited professional safety experience. OSHA's oversight of federal agencies' safety programs is not as effective as it could be because the agency does not use its enforcement and compliance assistance resources in a strategic manner. Although inspections are one of OSHA's primary enforcement tools, it does not conduct many inspections of federal worksites or have a national strategy for targeting worksites with high injury and illness rates for inspection. Furthermore, although OSHA is responsible for tracking violations that agencies dispute and reporting any unresolved disputes to the President, OSHA does not track these disputed violations or their resolution. In addition, although OSHA is required to review agencies' safety programs annually and submit a report on them to the President each year, as of January 2006, the last report submitted was for fiscal year 2000. Finally, while OSHA has a range of compliance assistance programs designed to help agencies comply with its regulations and improve safety, these programs are not being fully utilized. |
gao_GAO-07-1265T | gao_GAO-07-1265T_0 | VA Has Expanded GPD Program Capacity to Help Meet Homeless Veterans’ Needs, but Demand Still Exceeds Supply
Since fiscal year 2000, VA has quadrupled the number of available beds and significantly increased the number of admissions of homeless veterans to the GPD program in order to address some of the needs identified through the its annual survey of homeless veterans. In fiscal year 2006, VA estimated that on a given night, about 196,000 veterans were homeless and an additional 11,100 transitional beds were needed to meet homeless veterans’ needs. An increasing number of homeless women veterans and veterans with dependents are in need of transitional housing according to VA officials and GPD providers we visited. The grant documents must also specify how providers will deliver services to meet the program’s three goals—residential stability, increased skill level or income, and greater self-determination. The GPD providers we visited often collaborated with VA, local service organizations, and other state and federal programs to offer the broad array of services needed to help veterans achieve the three goals of the GPD program. Despite GPD providers’ efforts to collaborate and leverage resources, GPD providers and VA staff noted gaps in key services and resources, particularly affordable permanent housing for veterans ready to leave the GPD program. In response to our recommendation that VA take steps to ensure that its policies are understood by the staff and providers with responsibility for implementing them, VA took several steps in 2007 to improve communications with VA liaisons and GPD providers, such as calling new providers to explain policies and summarizing their regular quarterly conference calls on a new Web site, along with new or updated manuals. VA Data Show Many Veterans Have Housing and Jobs on Leaving the Program and Plans Are Under Way for Follow-up
VA assesses performance in two ways—the outcomes for veterans at the time they leave the program and the performance of individual GPD providers. During 2006, over half of veterans obtained independent housing when they left the GPD program, and another quarter were in transitional housing programs, halfway houses, hospitals, nursing homes, or similar forms of secured housing. Nearly one-third of veterans had jobs, mostly on a full-time basis, when they left the GPD program. Significant percentages also demonstrated progress in handling alcohol, drug, mental health, or medical problems and overcoming deficits in social or vocational skills. We recommended that VA explore feasible and cost-effective ways to obtain information on how veterans are faring after they leave the program. While following up at 1 month is a step in the right direction, additional information at a later point would yield a better indication of longer-term success. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs asked GAO to discuss its recent work on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Homeless Providers Grant and Per Diem (GPD) program. GAO reported on this subject in September 2006, focusing on (1) VA's estimates of the number of homeless veterans and transitional housing beds, (2) the extent of collaboration involved in the provision of GPD and related services, and (3) VA's assessment of program performance.
What GAO Found
VA estimates that about 196,000 veterans nationwide were homeless on a given night in 2006, based on its annual survey, and that the number of transitional beds available through VA and other organizations was not sufficient to meet the needs of eligible veterans. The GPD program has quadrupled its capacity to provide transitional housing for homeless veterans since 2000, and additional growth is planned. As the GPD program continues to grow, VA and its providers are also grappling with how to accommodate the needs of the changing homeless veteran population that will include increasing numbers of women and veterans with dependents. The GPD providers we visited collaborated with VA, local service organizations, and other state and federal programs to offer a broad array of services designed to help veterans achieve the three goals of the GPD program--residential stability, increased skills or income, and greater self-determination. However, most GPD providers noted key service and communication gaps that included difficulties obtaining affordable permanent housing and knowing with certainty which veterans were eligible for the program, how long they could stay, and when exceptions were possible. VA data showed that many veterans leaving the GPD program were better off in several ways--over half had successfully arranged independent housing, nearly one-third had jobs, one-quarter were receiving benefits, and significant percentages showed progress with substance abuse, mental health or medical problems or demonstrated greater self-determination in other ways. Some information on how veterans fare after they leave the program was available from a onetime follow-up study of 520 program participants, but such data are not routinely collected. We recommended that VA take steps to ensure that GPD policies and procedures are consistently understood and to explore feasible means of obtaining information about the circumstances of veterans after they leave the GPD program. VA concurred and, following our review, has taken several steps to improve communications and to develop a process to track veterans' progress shortly after they leave the program. However following up at a later point might yield a better indication of success. |
gao_GAO-16-85 | gao_GAO-16-85_0 | Oversight and Monitoring of Child Welfare Programs
HHS provides oversight and monitoring of states in a variety of ways to ensure their child welfare programs are in compliance with federal law, regulations, and relevant approved state plans. HHS conducts statewide periodic assessments known as the Child and Family Services Reviews (CFSR) that involve case-file reviews and stakeholder interviews to ensure conformity with federal requirements for child welfare services. According to the most recent data available, nationally, 14 percent of children in foster care were in congregate care placements at the end of fiscal year 2013, although the rates of congregate care use varied among the states (see fig. Eight Selected States Reduced the Use of Congregate Care Substantially Using Multiple Approaches, but the Rates of Use Varied Widely
The Eight Selected States Averaged a 47 Percent Reduction in Congregate Care Use, Although the Current Rates of Use Still Varied among These States
From September 30, 2004, to September 30, 2013, the share of all foster care children in congregate care in the eight states we reviewed declined 47 percent on average, with reductions ranging from 7 to 78 percent, according to the most recent data available from HHS. However, the states’ percentages of congregate care placements ranged from approximately 5 percent in Washington to 34 percent in Colorado (see fig. In addition, caseworkers may also recruit or train foster families to serve as treatment or therapeutic foster families. The goals of the “Place Matters” initiative include: (1) providing more in-home support to help maintain children with their families; (2) placing children in family settings (either with relatives or family-based care); and (3) reducing the length of stay in foster care and increasing the number of reunified families. HHS Has Recently Taken Steps to Encourage States to Examine Their Use of Congregate Care, but Could Enhance Its Support to States
HHS’s Administration for Children and Families (ACF) recently took steps to examine how states were using congregate care and as previously mentioned issued a report in May 2015 to help inform states and policymakers about the use of congregate care for foster children. For example, consistent with the challenges we identified, states could benefit from HHS’s assistance in the areas of increasing capacity for specialized foster family placements and working with congregate care providers to diversify their services. HHS has taken an important first step by issuing its report on congregate care and recognizing that additional information is needed on how states use congregate care and what changes are appropriate. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that HHS take steps to enhance its support of state actions to reduce the use of congregate care as appropriate. These steps could include: collecting additional information on states’ efforts to reduce their use of congregate care; and identifying and sharing best practices with the states and providing technical assistance that states could use to address challenges in the areas of building capacity for family placements, addressing shortages of needed services, improving assessments, and retaining sufficient numbers of congregate care providers, or other areas as needed. HHS also noted that to assist states in reducing their use of congregate care, the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget request includes a proposal to amend title IV-E to provide support and funding to promote family based care for children with behavioral and mental health needs as well as provide oversight of congregate care placements, as we noted in the report. These homes have no more than 16 beds. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 14 percent of the more than 400,000 children in foster care nationwide lived in congregate care at the end of fiscal year 2013, according to HHS data. Given the importance of family-based care to foster children's well-being, GAO was asked to review state use of congregate care.
This report examines (1) how selected states have reduced their use of congregate care; and (2) some challenges with reducing congregate care placements, and efforts HHS has taken to help states reduce congregate care. GAO analyzed child welfare data from HHS; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and documents; and interviewed state child welfare officials in eight states--Connecticut, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington. In four of these states, GAO also visited and spoke with local child welfare officials and congregate care providers. The selected states varied in their use of congregate care and geographic location, but cannot be generalized nationwide. GAO also spoke with child welfare experts.
What GAO Found
Eight states GAO reviewed had a variety of efforts under way to help ensure they placed foster children in family-based settings rather than in group homes or institutions, also known as congregate care. Federal law requires that foster children have a case plan designed to achieve placement in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available, consistent with their needs. States' efforts to ensure appropriate placements included more oversight of decisions to place children in congregate care and the length of stay; enhanced recruiting and training for specialized foster families to care for children with serious emotional, behavioral, or medical problems; and increased supports for families in crisis. Officials in the eight states generally credited these efforts with declines in their use of congregate care—on average a 47 percent decline from fiscal years 2004 through 2013, based on the most recent available data from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, these states' percentages of foster children in congregate care still ranged from 5 percent to 34 percent, mirroring the variation nationwide in fiscal year 2013.
Selected stakeholders (state officials, service providers, and experts) cited challenges to more appropriate use of congregate care, such as providing specialized training to foster families, addressing shortages in mental health and other community services, and working with congregate care providers to focus more on providing services in family settings. In a May 2015 report, HHS said that states' progress in reducing congregate care was inconsistent and recognized that additional information was needed. HHS also proposed some relevant legislative changes. Stakeholders identified other HHS actions, such as additional data analysis and sharing of best practices that would help states facing challenges to transform their use of congregate care. HHS currently does not have plans to take further actions to support states.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS take steps to enhance its support of state actions to reduce use of congregate care as appropriate, by, for example, collecting additional information on state efforts and sharing best practices. HHS concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-95-114 | gao_NSIAD-95-114_0 | Defense Expenditures
Since the World War II drawdown, defense spending has experienced three peaks associated with the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Reagan administration military buildup. As shown in table 1, the current decline is only 2 percentage points greater than the Vietnam War drawdown, which was spread over an 8-year period, whereas the post-Cold War drawdown is currently projected over a 10-year period. However, unlike the Vietnam War drawdown, defense contractors view the current decline as permanent, not cyclical. We compared the peak sales by these business units during the mid-to-late 1980s with their sales in 1993 and the latest year projected.Measured from their peak sales years, we found that the business units’ sales decreases ranged from 21 percent to 54 percent through 1993 and that the units were estimating decreases ranging from 50 percent to 73 percent through the latest year projected. Through 1993, the units’ workforce reductions ranged from 30 percent to 76 percent. Through the latest projected year, the units’ estimated reductions ranged between 44 percent to 79 percent. Table 3 compares projected employment with the 1976 and 1980 levels. Declines in IR&D/B&P Expenditures
Similar to the reductions in employment levels, the six business units had made substantial cuts in their IR&D/B&P expenditures. Between their peak spending years and 1993, these units had reduced IR&D/B&P expenditures ranging from 31 percent to 71 percent and projected reductions ranging from 41 percent to 84 percent through the latest year projected. The units projected a weighted average reduction of 76 percent in their capital expenditures. Reductions in Facilities
Measured from their peak years, five of the business units had reduced their total square footage by as much as 34 percent through 1993, and five units projected reductions ranging from 6 percent to 43 percent, or an average of 26 percent, through the latest projected year. We focused our work on these five elements because we believed they were most representative of the impact of reduced defense spending on defense contractor business units. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the impact of the recent decline in defense expenditures on individual business units of major defense contractors, focusing on a comparison of defense expenditures over a number of years and changes in the business units': (1) sales and employment levels; and (2) spending on independent research and development and bid and proposal (IR&D/B&P) preparation, capital improvements, and facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) measured from their peak years, the six business units GAO visited had experienced sales decreases ranging from 21 percent to 54 percent through 1993 and estimated declines ranging from 50 percent to 73 percent through the latest year projected; (2) the resulting employment reductions ranged from 30 percent to 76 percent through 1993 and planned reductions ranging from 44 percent to 79 percent through the latest year projected; (3) from their peak year spending levels through 1993, the six units had reduced IR&D/B&P spending ranging from 31 percent to 71 percent and projected reductions ranging from 41 percent to 84 percent through the latest year projected; (4) the six units had also reduced expenditures for capital improvements by an average of 80 percent through 1993 and, through the latest year projected, estimated an average reduction of 76 percent in these expenditures; (5) although these business units have significantly reduced spending in these areas, projections by some of the units are still higher than their: (a) 1976 levels, the lowest peacetime defense spending level since the Korean War buildup; and (b) 1980 levels, the year before the Reagan administration military buildup; (6) the defense industry has adjusted to previous spending reductions; (7) the current post-Cold War reduction is only 2 percentage points greater than the reduction after the Vietnam War and is taking place over a period that is 2 years longer; and (8) however, unlike other drawdowns, defense contractors view the current decline as permanent and have developed a variety of strategies to deal with reduced defense spending. |
gao_HEHS-99-100 | gao_HEHS-99-100_0 | Background
Title I of HIPAA established standards for health coverage access, portability, and renewability that apply to employer-sponsored plans in the group market and, to a more limited extent, to the individual market.Group market provisions include limitations on preexisting condition exclusion periods; a requirement that previous coverage be credited to reduce or eliminate a new employee’s preexisting condition exclusion period; restrictions against excluding an employee from the health plan on the basis of his or her health status; and special enrollment opportunities for certain employees, such as those who did not enroll because they were previously covered under a spouse’s health plan. With respect to guaranteed coverage for small employers, quantitative evidence about the effects of the provision does not yet exist, but early evidence suggests that experiences vary considerably among states, in large part on the basis of the extent of pre-HIPAA state reforms. This was probably the case because many large employer plans had already incorporated portability protections similar to those of HIPAA. HIPAA Has Improved Access, but Not Price, for Certain Individuals Losing Group Coverage
HIPAA’s group-to-individual portability provision ensures that people who are losing group coverage are guaranteed access to at least two individual market products, although these individuals, if in poor health, will probably pay more than the standard rate. The amount of the premium increase varies considerably. HIPAA-Eligibles With Health Problems Generally Pay Higher-Than-Standard Premiums
HIPAA does not limit the premium price carriers may charge eligible individuals for coverage. All 22 states using their high-risk pool as an alternative mechanism impose a premium cap for coverage in the pool of 200 percent of the standard rate or less, and about half cap premiums at 150 percent of the standard rate or less. Few People Rely on HIPAA’s Group-to-Individual Portability Provision
The number of people that rely on HIPAA’s group-to-individual portability provision to obtain coverage is difficult to quantify, particularly in states using the federal rules and states using an alternative mechanism other than a high-risk pool. Limited Consumer Awareness and Understanding of HIPAA May Constrain Benefit to Consumers
Consumer awareness and understanding of HIPAA remain limited, and those who have heard of the law often believe it provides broader access and protections than it does. Consequently, federal agencies and other entities have undertaken educational efforts that target specific populations—such as those changing jobs or losing group coverage—in an attempt to reach those who are most likely to benefit from HIPAA’s protections. Over 1 year later, most consumers are still largely unfamiliar with the law, according to agents, carriers, and state regulators. States have also undertaken a variety of efforts to better educate consumers about HIPAA, although the extent of these efforts varies among states. HIPAA Established New Federal Regulatory Responsibilities
HIPAA established a complex regulatory framework in which oversight and enforcement of the law are shared among multiple federal agencies and state regulators. Nonetheless, some concerns persist. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996: Early Implementation Concerns (GAO/HEHS-97-200R, Sept. 2, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the implementation status of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provisions in the group insurance market; (2) the price of coverage for certain individuals losing group insurance; (3) the extent of consumer understanding of HIPAA as well as federal, state, and private efforts undertaken to educate consumers about the law's protections; and (4) federal efforts undertaken to ensure HIPAA compliance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) implementation of HIPAA's insurance standards in the group market has proceeded relatively smoothly--particularly among larger group plans--although carriers and employers continue to express some concerns about certain administrative and interpretive aspects of HIPAA; (2) this ease of transition has occurred partly because many of these group plans had already provided key HIPAA protections before the law was enacted; (3) concerns exist about the extent to which some smaller employers are performing certain required tasks; (4) with respect to HIPAA's requirement that carriers guarantee access to coverage for certain smaller employers, early evidence suggests experiences vary considerably among states, largely depending on the extent of state-level reforms that preceded HIPAA; (5) HIPAA's group-to-individual portability provision ensures that certain consumers who lose group coverage are guaranteed access to at least two individual market insurance products; (6) the so-called HIPAA-eligible individuals who have certain health conditions often pay a higher-than-standard premium for individual coverage, although the amount of the premium increase varies considerably; (7) all but 3 of the 41 carriers GAO surveyed in states using HIPAA standards would charge a HIPAA-eligible with a specified health condition a higher-than-standard rate, and nearly half of these would charge 300 to 464 percent of the standard rate; (8) the average premium for individual coverage for HIPAA-eligibles with a specified health condition that would be charged by the 41 carriers was $381 per month; (9) the 22 states that use a high-risk pool as an alternative to the federal portability standards limit premiums to 200 percent or less of the standard rate, or an average subsidized rate of $221 per month; (10) the exact number of individuals who rely on HIPAA's group-to-individual portability provision to obtain coverage is difficult to determine but appears small according to carrier estimates and risk-pool enrollment figures; (11) consumers' understanding of HIPAA remains limited, and many are largely unfamiliar with the law; (12) federal agencies and others have targeted educational efforts to specific populations in an attempt to reach those most likely to benefit from HIPAA; and (13) HIPAA established a complex regulatory framework in which oversight and enforcement of the law are shared among multiple federal agencies and state regulators. |
gao_GAO-14-768 | gao_GAO-14-768_0 | Some Drawdown Progress Has Been Made, but Key Uncertainties Could Affect Future Progress
DOD has made some progress in its drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan, but ongoing uncertainties about the future force in Afghanistan could affect future progress of the drawdown. Future progress toward drawdown goals will depend on equipment turn-in rates which, in turn, depend on having more information about the post- 2014 force level and mission. This is because some vehicles that had been forecast for turn-in were instead redistributed to other units in Afghanistan. A senior DOD official stated that units have retained equipment because of uncertainty regarding future operational needs in Afghanistan. Once the post-2014 force level and mission are announced, these vehicle turn-in rates may increase. Equipment Drawdown Has Progressed as DOD’s Drawdown Goals Have Changed over Time
From October 2012 to October 2013, DOD returned from Afghanistan or destroyed 14,664 vehicles, or an average of 1,128 vehicles per month. From March 2013 to October 2013, the number of vehicles turned in by units for the drawdown averaged 55 percent of what had been forecasted. Steps Have Been Taken to Reduce Transportation Costs, but Improved Controls Could Mitigate Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures
DOD has taken some steps to improve efficiencies and manage costs in its Afghanistan drawdown processes. For example, CENTCOM amended its drawdown instruction to allow for aggregation of equipment at U.S. ports. According to DOD officials, this will allow for shipment of equipment via rail, resulting in potential savings when compared with trucking costs. However, as a result of ineffective internal controls, the Army and Marine Corps may be incurring unnecessary costs by returning equipment that potentially exceeds service needs or that is not economical to return and repair. DOD guidance on supply chain materiel management indicates that equipment exceeding certain service-approved quantities should not be retained unless economic or contingency reasons support its retention. We found that in a 12-month period the Army and Marine Corps returned more than 1,000 vehicles that exceeded their service-approved quantities, thereby incurring possible transportation costs of up to $107,400 per vehicle, depending on the type of vehicle, for equipment that might no longer be needed. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps documented and reviewed justifications for returning these potentially unneeded items, although federal internal control standards state that documentation and review should be part of an organization’s management to provide reasonable assurance that operations are effective and efficient. DOD guidance also states that all costs associated with materiel management, including transportation costs, shall be considered in making best-value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. While the services considered repair costs, they did not consider transportation costs in determining whether vehicles were economical to return and repair. their decision-making process, the services are at risk of allowing the return and repair of uneconomical-to-return-and-repair equipment. Conclusions
DOD officials have taken some positive steps to reduce costs and create efficiencies in the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan. However, by returning items without documentation and review of justifications and by not including all costs in the decision-making process, the Army and the Marine Corps are at risk of making unnecessary expenditures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To reduce the risk of unnecessary expenditure of resources, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two actions: 1. ensure that justifications for returning items that exceed their approved acquisition objectives are documented and receive management review; and 2. ensure that transportation and all other relevant costs are included in disposition decision making. To examine the status of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to reduce equipment in Afghanistan, we identified drawdown goals and key sources of documentation. To analyze the steps DOD has taken to create efficiencies and consider costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan, we obtained and analyzed standard operating procedures and other guidance used to return equipment from Afghanistan and interviewed officials familiar with the transportation of equipment out of Afghanistan. To determine the results of each service’s equipment disposition decisions, we obtained and reviewed data containing approximately 10,000 disposition decisions made by the Army and Marine Corps over a 12-month period. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD anticipates that the drawdown from Afghanistan will be more difficult than that from Iraq due to logistical challenges and the costs of transporting equipment out of landlocked Afghanistan. As of summer 2013, the Army and Marine Corps had substantial amounts of equipment in Afghanistan. The efficiency and effectiveness of equipment disposition decision making can directly affect the total cost of the drawdown.
GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to execute the drawdown in a cost-effective and efficient manner. GAO examined: (1) the status of DOD's efforts to draw down equipment from Afghanistan and (2) the extent to which DOD has taken steps to create efficiencies and consider costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan. To evaluate these efforts, GAO reviewed documents and data containing approximately 10,000 disposition decisions made over a 12-month period, in addition to interviewing DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has made some progress in its drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan, but ongoing uncertainties about the future force in Afghanistan could affect progress of the drawdown. Specifically, from October 2012 to October 2013, DOD returned from Afghanistan or destroyed 14,664 vehicles, an average of 1,128 vehicles per month. Future progress toward drawdown goals will depend on equipment turn-in rates, which, in turn, depend on having more information about the post-2014 force level and mission. In addition, over the course of the last 8 months of the above period, the number of vehicles turned in by units for the drawdown averaged 55 percent of what had been forecast. This is because some vehicles that had been forecast for turn-in were instead redistributed to other units in Afghanistan. A senior DOD official stated that units have retained equipment because of uncertainty regarding future operational needs in Afghanistan. Once the post-2014 force level and mission are announced, these vehicle turn-in rates may increase.
DOD has taken some steps to improve efficiencies and manage costs in its Afghanistan drawdown processes. For example, U.S. Central Command amended its drawdown instruction to allow for aggregation of equipment at U.S. ports. According to DOD officials, this will allow for shipment of equipment via rail, resulting in potential savings when compared with trucking costs. However, due to ineffective internal controls, the Army and Marine Corps may be incurring unnecessary costs by returning equipment that potentially exceeds service needs or is not economical to return and repair. Specifically, GAO found the following:
In a 12-month period, the Army and Marine Corps returned more than 1,000 potentially unneeded vehicles, thereby incurring estimated transportation costs of up to $107,400 per vehicle, depending on the type of vehicle. DOD guidance indicates that equipment exceeding certain service-approved quantities should not be retained unless economic or contingency reasons support its retention. However, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps documented and reviewed justifications for returning items exceeding these approved quantities. Federal internal control standards state that documentation and review should be part of an organization's management to provide reasonable assurance that operations are effective and efficient.
The Army and Marine Corps may have returned vehicles that were uneconomical to return and repair because they did not consider transportation costs in making equipment-disposition decisions. DOD guidance states that all costs associated with materiel management, including transportation costs, shall be considered in making best-value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. When all costs are not included in the decision-making process, there is risk of allowing the return and repair of uneconomical-to-return-and-repair equipment.
This is a public version of a For Official Use Only (FOUO) report GAO issued previously, which omits FOUO information and data such as the schedule of drawdown efforts, numbers of vehicles returned, overall drawdown goals, and some cost information that DOD deemed FOUO.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD ensure that the Army and Marine Corps document and review justifications for the return of potentially unneeded items and that transportation costs and other relevant costs be included in disposition decision making. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-73 | gao_GAO-08-73_0 | The accidents have included radiation exposures, inhalation of toxic vapors, electrical shocks, and injuries during construction projects or maintenance activities. Fortunately, no one has been killed, but many of these accidents have resulted in serious worker injuries or facility damage. At both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore laboratories, such persistent safety problems (combined with concerns about security at Los Alamos) ultimately resulted in the temporary closure, or stand-down, of certain of the laboratories’ facilities. Long-standing Management Weaknesses Leave Sites Vulnerable to Continued Safety Problems
In our review of nearly 100 safety studies—including accident investigations and independent assessments by the Safety Board and others since 2000—we found that factors contributing to safety problems stemmed largely from weaknesses in how NNSA manages safety at the weapons laboratories. These contributing factors generally fall into three key areas: A relatively lax attitude toward safety procedures. Weaknesses in identifying safety problems and taking appropriate corrective actions. Inadequate oversight by NNSA site offices. Steps Taken at the Laboratories Include Efforts in Three Key Areas
NNSA and its contractors have been taking steps intended to address weaknesses in three key areas: safety culture, systems for identifying and correcting safety problems, and federal oversight: Safety culture. The effort was intended to raise safety awareness and provide a formal process for employees to integrate safety into work activities by requiring employees to (1) define the scope of work, (2) analyze the hazards associated with that scope of work, (3) develop and implement hazard controls to address possible safety issues, (4) perform work within those controls, and (5) provide a feedback system for continuing to improve safety. NNSA site office oversight. Many of these efforts are still under way, however, and their effect on safety performance is not clear. NNSA Faces Fundamental Challenges to Effective Management and Oversight of Safety at Weapons Laboratories
NNSA faces two principal challenges in its continuing efforts to improve safety at the nation’s weapons laboratories. First, the agency has no way to determine the effectiveness of its safety improvement efforts, in part because those efforts rarely incorporate outcome-based performance measures. We have found that NNSA and its contractors have not consistently managed safety improvement efforts using a disciplined approach incorporating substantive outcome measures and a system to evaluate its efforts’ effectiveness. Nevertheless, we found little indication that either NNSA or the contractors have been using the systematic approach specified by the October 2003 directive, and the approach in the directive has not been incorporated into the laboratory contracts. Weaknesses in Federal Oversight Raise Concerns about NNSA’s Decision to Rely More Heavily on Contractors’ Management Controls
NNSA has revised its laboratory contractor oversight policy to rely more on the contractors’ own systems of management controls to identify and correct safety problems. Given the perennial safety problems at the laboratories, coupled with NNSA’s and contractors’ continued inability to clearly demonstrate progress in remedying weaknesses, it is unclear how this revised system will enable NNSA to maintain an appropriate level of oversight of safety performance at the weapons laboratories. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the safety problems that have occurred at the weapons laboratories and contributing factors, we reviewed documents, including federal laws and regulations describing safety requirements for nuclear safety and for worker safety and health, Department of Energy (DOE) policies and procedures regarding safety management, and about 100 relevant reports issued since 2000 evaluating safety issues at the three weapons laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national laboratories. National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal officials, Congress, and the public have long voiced concerns about safety at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia. The laboratories are overseen by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), while contractors carry out the majority of the work. A recent change to oversight policy would result in NNSA's relying more on contractors' own management controls, including those for assuring safety. This report discusses (1) the recent history of safety problems at the laboratories and contributing factors, (2) steps taken to improve safety, and (3) challenges that remain to effective management and oversight of safety. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed almost 100 reports and investigations and interviewed key federal and laboratory officials.
What GAO Found
The nuclear weapons laboratories have experienced persistent safety problems, stemming largely from long-standing management weaknesses. Since 2000, nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses have occurred, including worker exposure to radiation, inhalation of toxic vapors, and electrical shocks. Although no one was killed, many of the accidents caused serious harm to workers or damage to facilities. Accidents and nuclear safety violations also contributed to the temporary shutdown of facilities at both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore in 2004 and 2005. Yet safety problems persist. GAO's review of nearly 100 reports issued since 2000 found that the contributing factors to these safety problems generally fall into three key areas: relatively lax laboratory attitudes toward safety procedures, laboratory inadequacies in identifying and addressing safety problems with appropriate corrective actions, and inadequate oversight by NNSA site offices. NNSA and its contractors have been taking some steps to address safety weaknesses at the laboratories. Partly in response to continuing safety concerns, NNSA has begun taking steps to reinvigorate a key safety effort--integrated safety management--originally started in 1996. This initiative was intended to raise safety awareness and provide a formal process for employees to integrate safety into every work activity by identifying potential safety hazards and taking appropriate steps to mitigate these hazards. NNSA and its contractors have also begun taking steps to develop or improve systems for identifying and tracking safety problems and the corrective actions taken in response. Finally, NNSA has initiated efforts to strengthen federal oversight at the laboratories by improving hiring and training of federal site office personnel. NNSA has also taken steps to strengthen contractor accountability through new contract mechanisms. Many of these efforts are still under way, however, and their effect on safety performance is not clear. NNSA faces two principal challenges in its continuing efforts to improve safety at the weapons laboratories. First, the agency has no way to determine the effectiveness of its safety improvement efforts, in part because those efforts rarely incorporate outcome-based performance measures. The department issued a directive in 2003 requiring use of a disciplined approach for managing improvement initiatives, often used by high-performing organizations, including results-oriented outcome measures and a system to evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative. Yet GAO found little indication that NNSA or its contractors have been managing safety improvement efforts using this approach. Second, in light of the long-standing safety problems at the laboratories, GAO and others have expressed concerns about the recent shift in NNSA's oversight approach to rely more heavily on contractors' own safety management controls. Continuing safety problems, coupled with the inability to clearly demonstrate progress in remedying weaknesses, make it unclear how this revised system will enable NNSA to maintain an appropriate level of oversight of safety performance at the weapons laboratories. |
gao_GAO-11-260T | gao_GAO-11-260T_0 | FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Measuring Preparedness by Assessing Capabilities and Addressing Long- Standing Challenges
DHS Developed Plans for Assessing Capabilities, but Did Not Fully Implement Them
In July 2005, we reported that DHS had established a draft Target Capabilities List that provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that FEMA would expect federal, state, local, and tribal first responders to develop and maintain. In addition, this information could be used to measure the readiness of federal civil response assets and the use of federal assistance at the state and local level and to provide a means of assessing how federal assistance programs are supporting national preparedness. In implementing this plan, DHS intended to collect preparedness data on the capabilities of the federal government, states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector to provide information about the baseline status of national preparedness. DHS’s efforts to implement these plans were interrupted by the 2005 hurricane season. Hurricane Katrina and the following Hurricanes Rita and Wilma— also among the most powerful hurricanes in the nation’s history— graphically illustrated the limitations at that time of the nation’s readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic disaster, that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local first responders and require outside action and support from the federal government and other entities. In October 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Act that required FEMA, in developing guidelines to define target capabilities, ensure that such guidelines are specific, flexible, and measurable. In addition, the Post-Katrina Act calls for FEMA to ensure that each component of the national preparedness system, which includes the target capabilities, is developed, revised, and updated with clear and quantifiable performance metrics, measures, and outcomes. FEMA Issued the Target Capabilities List in September 2007 but Has Made Limited Progress in Developing Preparedness Measures and Addressing Long-standing Challenges in Assessing Capabilities
In September 2007, FEMA issued the Target Capabilities List to provide a common perspective to conduct assessments to determine levels of readiness to perform critical tasks and to identify and address any gaps or deficiencies. According to FEMA, policymakers need regular reports on the status of capabilities for which they have responsibility to help them make better resource and investment decisions and to establish priorities. At the time of our review, FEMA was in the process of refining the target capabilities to make them more measurable and to provide state and local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the levels of capability they need. We reported in July 2005 that DHS had identified potential challenges in gathering the information needed to assess capabilities, including determining how to aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments and others and integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches. We recommended that FEMA enhance its project management plan to include milestone dates, among other things, a recommendation to which DHS concurred. In October 2010, we reported that FEMA had enhanced its project management plan. Nonetheless, the challenges we reported in July 2005 and April 2009 faced by DHS and FEMA, respectively, in their efforts to measure preparedness and establish a system of metrics to assess national capabilities have proved to be difficult for them to overcome. For example, FEMA’s Deputy Director for Preparedness testified in October 2009 that the “Cost-to-Capabilities” (C2C) initiative developed by FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate (at that time already underway for 18 months) had a goal as a multiyear effort to manage homeland security grant programs and prioritize capability-based investments. We reported in October 2010, that as a result of FEMA’s difficulties in establishing metrics to measure enhancements in preparedness capabilities, officials discontinued the C2C program. We reported in October 2010 that FEMA officials said they had an ongoing effort to develop measures for target capabilities—as planning guidance to assist in state and local assessments —rather than as requirements for measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities; FEMA officials had not yet determined how they plan to revise the list and said they are awaiting the completed revision of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which is to address national preparedness. As a result, FEMA has not yet developed national preparedness capability requirements based on established metrics to provide a framework for national preparedness assessments. Until such a framework is in place, FEMA will not have a basis to operationalize and implement its conceptual approach for assessing federal, state, and local preparedness capabilities against capability requirements to identify capability gaps for prioritizing investments in national preparedness. Appendix I: National Preparedness Guidelines and Critical Practices for Performance Measurement
This appendix presents additional information on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Preparedness Guidelines as well as key steps and critical practices for measuring performance and results. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--to measure and assess national capabilities to respond to a major disaster. According to the Congressional Research Service, from fiscal years 2002 through 2010, Congress appropriated over $34 billion for homeland security preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters. Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) to address shortcomings in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina that, among other things, gave FEMA responsibility for leading the nation in developing a national preparedness system. The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities--capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters--to determine the nation's preparedness capability levels and the resources needed to achieve desired levels of capability. Federal, state, and local resources provide capabilities for different levels of "incident effect" (i.e., the extent of damage caused by a natural or manmade disaster). FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate within its Protection and National Preparedness organization is responsible for developing and implementing a system for measuring and assessing national preparedness capabilities. The need to define measurable national preparedness capabilities is a well-established and recognized issue. For example, in December 2003, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities noted that preparedness (for combating terrorism) requires measurable demonstrated capacity by communities, states, and private sector entities throughout the United States to respond to threats with well-planned, well-coordinated, and effective efforts. This is consistent with our April 2002 testimony on national preparedness, in which we identified the need for goals and performance indicators to guide the nation's preparedness efforts and help to objectively assess the results of federal investments. We reported that FEMA had not yet defined the outcomes of where the nation should be in terms of domestic preparedness. Thus, identifying measurable performance indicators could help FEMA (1) track progress toward established goals, (2) provide policy makers with the information they need to make rational resource allocations, and (3) provide program managers with the data needed to effect continual improvements, measure progress, and to enforce accountability. In September 2007, DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness as a systematic effort that includes sequential steps to first determine capability requirements and then assess current capability levels. According to the Guidelines, the results of this analysis provide a basis to identify, analyze, and choose options to address capability gaps and deficiencies, allocate funds, and assess and report the results. This proposed framework reflects critical practices we have identified for government performance and results. This statement is based on our prior work issued from July 2005 through October 2010 on DHS's and FEMA's efforts to develop and implement a national framework for assessing preparedness capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as DHS's and FEMA's efforts to develop and use metrics to define capability levels, identify capability gaps, and prioritize national preparedness investments to fill the most critical capability gaps. As requested, this testimony focuses on the extent to which DHS and FEMA have made progress in measuring national preparedness by assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges.
What GAO Found
In summary, DHS and FEMA have implemented a number of efforts with the goal of measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges, but success has been limited. DHS first developed plans to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities, but did not fully implement those plans. FEMA then issued the target capabilities list in September 2007 but has made limited progress in developing preparedness measures and addressing long-standing challenges in assessing capabilities, such as determining how to aggregate data from federal, state, local, and tribal governments. At the time of our review of FEMA's efforts in 2008 and in 2009, FEMA was in the process of refining the target capabilities to make them more measurable and to provide state and local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the levels of capability they need. We recommended in our April 2009 report that FEMA enhance its project management plan with, among other things, milestones to help it implement its capability assessment efforts; FEMA agreed with our recommendation. We reported in October 2010 that FEMA had enhanced its plan with milestones in response to our prior recommendation and that officials said they had an ongoing effort to develop measures for target capabilities--as planning guidance to assist in state and local assessments--rather than as requirements for measuring preparedness by assessing capabilities; FEMA officials had not yet determined how they plan to revise the list. |
gao_GAO-05-686 | gao_GAO-05-686_0 | Background
In 1988, the Congress enacted the Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act, which authorized the President to investigate the impact of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies on national security and to suspend or prohibit acquisitions that might threaten national security. The President delegated this investigative authority to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The Committee is an interagency group that was established by executive order in 1975 to monitor the impact of and coordinate U.S. policy on foreign investment in the United States. The Committee’s Implementation of Exon-Florio May Limit Its Effectiveness
The manner in which the Committee implements Exon-Florio may limit its effectiveness because (1) Treasury, in its role as Chair, has narrowly defined what constitutes a threat to national security and (2) the Committee is reluctant to initiate a 45-day investigation because of a perceived negative impact on foreign investment and a conflict with the U.S. open investment policy. However, when companies that have already completed the acquisition are allowed to withdraw, there is a substantially longer time before they refile, and in some cases they never do, leaving unresolved any outstanding concerns. While these vulnerabilities may not pose an immediate threat to national security, they may create the potential for longer-term harm to U.S. national security interests by reducing U.S. technological leadership in defense systems. According to Treasury Department officials, the Committee reviews foreign acquisitions with a view to protecting national security while maintaining U.S. open investment policy, which provides for equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Provisions for Monitoring Compliance Have Improved
In our 2002 report, we identified several weaknesses in the agreements that agencies negotiated with companies under the Exon-Florio Amendment. The Department of Homeland Security has taken the lead on monitoring compliance for those agreements that it has signed under Exon-Florio. Exon-Florio provides the latitude for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to address these threats. Those time constraints, together with the Committee’s reluctance to initiate investigations, can result in the Committee permitting companies to withdraw their notifications. In addition, in view of the need to ensure that national security is protected during the period that withdrawal is allowed for companies that have completed or plan to complete an acquisition prior to the Committee completing its work, the Congress should require that the Secretary of the Treasury, as Committee Chair, establish (1) interim protections where specific concerns have been raised, (2) specific time frames for refiling, and (3) a process for tracking any actions being taken during the withdrawal period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1988 Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that may harm national security, an action the President has taken only once. Implementing Exon-Florio can pose a significant challenge because of the need to weigh security concerns against U.S. open investment policy--which requires equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Exon-Florio's investigative authority was delegated to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States--an interagency committee established in 1975 to monitor U.S. policy on foreign investments. In September 2002, GAO reported on the implementation of Exon-Florio. This report further examines that implementation.
What GAO Found
Foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies can pose a significant challenge for the U. S. government in implementing the Exon-Florio amendment because while foreign investment can provide substantial economic benefits, these benefits must be weighed against the potential for harm to national security. Exon-Florio's effectiveness in protecting U.S. national security may be limited because the Department of the Treasury--as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States--and others narrowly defines what constitutes a threat to national security and, along with some other member agencies, is reluctant to initiate investigations to determine whether national security concerns require a recommendation for possible presidential action. Some Committee members have argued that this narrow definition is not sufficiently flexible to protect critical infrastructure, secure defense supply, and preserve technological superiority in the defense arena. The Committee's reluctance to initiate an investigation--due in part to concerns about potential negative effects on the U.S. open investment policy--limits the time available for member agencies to analyze national security concerns. To provide additional time, while avoiding an investigation, the Committee has encouraged companies to withdraw their notification of a pending or completed acquisition and to refile at a later date. However, for companies that have completed the acquisition, there is a substantially longer time before they refile to complete the Committee's process; in some cases they never do, leaving unresolved any outstanding concerns. In our 2002 report, GAO recommended improvements in provisions to assist agencies in monitoring actions companies have agreed to take to address national security concerns. The Committee has improved provisions on monitoring compliance, and the Department of Homeland Security is actively involved in monitoring company actions. |
gao_GAO-17-756 | gao_GAO-17-756_0 | Under this authority, in April 2011, DOT issued “Consumer Rule 2” which included several provisions related to increasing the transparency of airfares and optional service fees for consumers. This rule—which became completely in effect in January 2012—requires, among other things, that certain U.S. and foreign air carriers disclose information about their optional service fees on their websites and refund passengers’ baggage fees if their bags are lost. Selected Airlines Have Continued to Introduce New Fees for Optional Services since 2010, while Increasing the Price of Some Existing Fees
Since 2010, U.S. airlines have introduced a variety of new optional- service fees and bundled products and increased the price of some existing fees. U.S. Airlines Have Introduced New Fees and Products for Optional Services since 2010
Several U.S. airlines have introduced new fees since 2010 for services that used to be included in the ticket price, notably “preferred” seats within the economy cabin. From 2010 to 2017, U.S. airlines introduced other new fees such as fees for carry-on bags, beverages, wireless internet access, and priority boarding. Total Revenue from Fees Increased as the Number of Passengers Also Increased
According to airline financial data submitted to BTS, U.S. airline revenues from baggage fees and reservation change and cancellation fees—the only fees for which revenues are separately reported—increased from a total of $6.3 billion in 2010 to $7.1 billion in 2016 in constant 2016 dollars. Selected Airlines Consider Competition and Customer Demand Among other Factors When Making Decisions About Optional Services
Airlines Said That They Charge Separately for Optional Services to Compete with Other Airlines and Respond to Customer Demand
Airline officials said that airlines charge separately for optional services to better compete with other airlines. As a result, customers who paid for checked bags paid more on average for the combined airfare and bag fee than when the airfare and bag fee were bundled together. According to officials from 9 of the 10 selected airlines we interviewed, unbundling allows passengers to customize their flights by paying for only the services that they value—a benefit that one official cited as the overriding impetus for unbundling. Customers’ willingness to pay varies. Competitors’ prices for similar services: Officials from 8 of the 10 airlines that we interviewed said that they consider competitors’ pricing for similar services when they set fees for optional services, to ensure that their own product is priced competitively. DOT Has Made Progress in Increasing Transparency of Optional Service Fees, but Consumer and Industry Groups Raised Some Challenges
DOT Has Monitored and Enforced Compliance with Transparency Regulations, Collected Consumer Complaints, and Provided Guidance and Information to Airlines and Consumers
DOT has taken a range of actions to improve transparency of U.S. airline fees for optional services since 2010, as described below. We requested and reviewed a selection of 2016 complaints related to optional service fees and found that complaints included concerns that fees for changing or cancelling reservations, transporting bags, and selecting seats were too high or that information about these fees was not transparent or fully disclosed to the customer. Educating Airlines and Consumers
DOT has taken several actions to educate airlines and consumers about existing regulations and consumer rights related to optional service fees, for example: In 2011, after the issuance of Consumer Rule 2, DOT conducted informational sessions with the airlines about the requirements of the new regulations. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT officials provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. There are some differences between the U.S. and foreign laws. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to describe: (1) how selected U.S. airlines have modified their offering and pricing of optional services since 2010, (2) the factors that selected U.S. airlines consider when determining whether and how much to charge for optional services, and (3) the actions the Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken since 2010 to improve the transparency of optional service fees and views of selected aviation stakeholders about these actions. We requested interviews with representatives from all 11 selected airlines but one airline declined to be interviewed. To identify the factors that airlines consider when setting optional service fees, we interviewed officials from the 10 selected U.S. airlines that agreed to speak with us about the factors airlines consider when deciding whether to separate optional service fees from the base fare price and determining how much to charge for a given optional service. We also conducted an economic literature search for studies that have examined the effect of baggage fees on base ticket prices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2008, U.S passenger airlines have increasingly charged fees for optional services that were previously included in the price of a ticket, such as checked baggage or seat selection. Consumer advocates have raised questions about the transparency of these fees and their associated rules. In April 2011, DOT issued a final rule requiring, among other things, that certain U.S. and foreign airlines disclose information about optional service fees on their websites.
GAO was asked to review issues related to optional service fees in the U.S. aviation industry. This report describes: (1) how selected U.S. airlines have modified their offering and pricing of optional services since 2010, (2) the factors that selected U.S. airlines consider when determining whether and how much to charge for optional services, and (3) actions DOT has taken since 2010 to improve the transparency of optional service fees and views of selected aviation stakeholders about these actions.
GAO reviewed 2010 and 2017 airline data on optional services fees charged by the 11 largest U.S. passenger airlines; analyzed airline financial data from 2010 to 2016 reported to DOT; reviewed economic studies examining the effects of bag fees on fares; and reviewed applicable laws. GAO requested interviews with representatives of all the 11 selected U.S. airlines; 10 agreed to be interviewed and one airline declined. GAO also interviewed DOT officials, consumer advocates, and other aviation industry stakeholders. DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since 2010, selected U.S. airlines have introduced a variety of new fees for optional services and increased some existing fees. For example, each of the 11 U.S. airlines that GAO examined introduced fees for “preferred” seating, which may include additional legroom or a seat closer to the front of the economy cabin. Some of these airlines have also introduced new fees for other optional services, such as fees for carry-on baggage and priority boarding. Since 2010, many of the selected airlines have also increased existing fees for some optional services, including fees for checked baggage and for changing or cancelling a reservation. From 2010 to 2016, U.S. airlines' revenues from these two fees—the only optional service fees for which revenues are separately reported to the Department of Transportation (DOT)—increased from $6.3 billion in 2010 to $7.1 billion in 2016 (in constant 2016 dollars).
Airline officials cited competition from other airlines and customer demand, among other things, as factors they consider when deciding whether and how much to charge for optional services. According to officials from 9 of the 10 selected airlines GAO interviewed, the process of “unbundling” allows passengers to customize their flight by paying for only the services that they value. Airline officials said that charging fees for optional services allows the airlines to offer lower base airfares to customers. For customers traveling with bags, however, GAO's review of airline-related economic literature showed that on average customers who paid for at least one checked bag paid more in total for the airfare and bag fees than they did when airfares included checked baggage. Officials from the 10 airlines said they also consider customer demand and willingness to pay when setting prices for optional services, and officials from 8 of these airlines noted that competitors' prices for similar services are another factor used in determining the amount of fees.
Since 2010, DOT has taken or has proposed a range of actions to improve the transparency of airlines' fees for optional services. These actions include: (1) monitoring and enforcing airlines' compliance with existing transparency regulations; (2) collecting, reviewing, and responding to consumers' complaints; (3) collecting additional data on revenue generated from fees; and (4) educating airlines and consumers about existing regulations and consumer rights related to optional service fees. Consumer and industry stakeholders, such as online travel agents' representatives, told GAO that DOT's regulations requiring certain airlines to disclose optional service fees on their websites have improved consumer transparency. However, these stakeholders also told GAO that there are additional transparency challenges, such as when consumers search for and book flights through online travel agents. Because optional services are not always available for purchase and because fees for such services are not always disclosed through online travel agents, these stakeholders argue that consumers are not always able to determine the full cost of their travel and compare costs across airlines before they purchase their tickets. While transparency challenges still exist, DOT has ongoing regulatory proceedings, some in response to prior GAO recommendations that may resolve some of these issues. |
gao_GAO-01-758 | gao_GAO-01-758_0 | NSF’s mission is to promote the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and to secure the national defense. NSF is in the process of developing a 5-year strategic plan on its workforce needs that must be submitted to OMB by July 20, 2001. Comparison of NSF’s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan With the Prior Year’s Report and Plan for Selected Key Outcomes
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in NSF’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. Last year, we also reported that the strategies for achieving the goals were not clearly discussed. The 2002 performance plan still does not do so. Regarding strategic human capital management, we found that NSF’s performance plan generally did not have goals and measures related to strategic human capital management, and NSF’s performance report did not explain its progress in resolving strategic human capital management challenges. While NSF’s performance report did not explain its progress in resolving information security challenges, it did indicate that NSF has internal management controls that continually monitor data security. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the National Science Foundation's (NSF) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance report plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
Specifically, GAO discusses NSF's progress in addressing several key outcomes that are important to NSF's mission. NSF reported that it made substantial progress in achieving its key outcomes. Although the planned strategies for achieving these key outcomes generally are clear and reasonable, some are vague and do not identify the specific steps for achieving the goals. NSF's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan reflect continued improvement compared with the prior year's report and plan. Although the 2002 performance plan does not substantially address NSF's human capital management, NSF is developing a five-year workforce strategic plan to address strategic human capital management issues that must be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget by July 20, 2001. NSF's performance report did not explain its progress in resolving information security challenges, but NSF indicated that it has internal management controls that continually monitor data security. |
gao_NSIAD-96-59 | gao_NSIAD-96-59_0 | Some of the more serious problems have been resolved. Users of the M198 Report Recurring Maintenance Problems
In 1994, a joint Marine Corps and Army team of experts visited five major active duty Marine Corps and Army artillery units to identify and quantify the problems with the M198 howitzer, as reported by using units. However, the weapons manager has not been provided funds to buy them. The availability rate reported by Army users from January 1989 through August 1995 averaged about 93 percent. The Marine Corps’ weapons manager does not believe that the M198s can be sustained indefinitely but said that recent initiatives to repair major problems have improved the availability of the howitzer. The Army and Marine Corps Are Developing a Lighter-Weight Howitzer
According to users, Marine Corps doctrine, and systems development officials, poor mobility of the M198 is the main reason requiring its replacement. However, a howitzer weighing 9,000 pounds may not be capable of firing munitions any farther than the M198. The XM982, an extended-range rocket-assisted projectile currently being developed under a separate program and expected to be usable in the new howitzer, may achieve the desired 40-kilometer range. The Marine Corps has assumed that its new medium-lift aircraft now in engineering and manufacturing development, the MV-22 Osprey, will be able to lift the new light-weight howitzer. Light-Weight Howitzer May Not Fire Any Farther Than the M198
The Army and Marine Corps have been testing two light-weight howitzer prototypes, and a third is expected to be available for a shoot-off in fiscal year 1996. DOD disagreed on two counts with our conclusion that even with the remaining problems the M198 availability rate remains high. Our objectives were to determine whether maintenance problems with the M-198 justify accelerating the development of a replacement and to describe the current light-weight howitzer development program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether the Marine Corps' and Army's reported maintenance problems with the M198 howitzer justify the rapid development of a replacement weapon.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by themselves, the maintenance problems with the M198 howitzer do not justify accelerating the development of a replacement; (2) although Army and Marine Corps users of the M198 have experienced recurring maintenance problems with the howitzer, some of these problems have been resolved, and solutions to most of the remaining problems have been identified but not funded; (3) even with these problems, availability of the M198 reported by Army and Marine Corps units over the last 6 years averaged about 93 percent and 89 percent respectively; (4) the Marine Corps believes that the poor mobility of the M198 is a more important reason than maintenance for replacing it with a lighter-weight weapon; (5) however, the anticipated air mobility improvements are dependent on the ability of the MV-22 medium-lift aircraft, now in engineering and manufacturing development, to lift a 9,000-pound howitzer; (6) so far, the developmental aircraft has not shown that it can lift that weight; (7) current light-weight howitzer candidates will fire projectiles to 30 kilometers, the same range as the M198; (8) to achieve the objective firing range of 40 kilometers, the weight of the new howitzer would have to be increased, but an increase in weight could negate mobility improvements; (9) a new munition, the XM982, currently being developed by the Army independent of the light-weight howitzer development program and scheduled to become available in fiscal year 1998, is expected to achieve the desired 40-kilometer range; and (10) however, it has not yet been tested in the competing light-weight howitzer prototypes. |
gao_GAO-03-155 | gao_GAO-03-155_0 | 1.) Such shifts show that even relatively short periods of increased security activity can affect other missions. Nonetheless, the district is continuing to use one of its patrol boats for homeland security patrols on inshore waters and along the border. Funding Increases Proposed in Fiscal Year 2003 Budget May Not Have a Major Effect on Nonsecurity Missions
Most of the proposed funding increase for new mission-related initiatives in the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2003 budget request is directed at security activities and, according to Coast Guard officials, would likely have a limited impact on nonsecurity missions. Many of these measures are already reported in some context or another. Conclusions
The Coast Guard’s adjustment to its new post–September 11th environment is still largely in process. Sorting out how traditional missions will be fully carried out alongside new security responsibilities will likely take several years. After September 11th, the Coast Guard’s attention understandably turned to assimilating added security responsibilities, and beyond its short-term plans for fiscal year 2003 it has not indicated the levels of effort its various missions are likely to receive. It is also important for the Coast Guard to develop and share with the Congress a longer-term strategy that identifies, at least in general terms, the levels of effort the Coast Guard projects for its various missions, along with a time frame for achieving these planned levels. The Coast Guard currently collects and disseminates a wide variety of information about its nonsecurity missions and activities, but this information is in disparate forms and documents. Recommendations
To provide the Congress with a useful framework for reviewing and monitoring Coast Guard activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to: Develop a longer-term strategy that outlines how the Coast Guard sees its resources—cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel—being distributed across its various missions, as well as a time frame for achieving this desired balance among missions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Coast Guard has restored its nonsecurity missions following the September 11th terrorist attacks, we reviewed the Coast Guard’s Abstract of Operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for balancing resource levels among its many missions.
What GAO Found
As the Coast Guard adjusts to its new post-September 11th environment, it will likely take several years to determine how best to balance carrying out nonsecurity missions alongside new security responsibilities. In recent months the Coast Guard has increased its level of effort in nonsecurity activities such as drug interdiction and fisheries patrols, but some of these activities remain below earlier levels. For example, patrol boats formerly used for drug interdiction are still being used for harbor security patrols. Substantial increases in nonsecurity activities are also unlikely in the near future, because the mission-related initiatives proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget are directed primarily at security missions. Most notably, most of the proposed 1,330 new staff would replace reserve staff activated after September 11th. The Coast Guard has not yet developed a strategy for showing, even in general terms, the levels of effort it plans for its various missions in future years. Understandably, the Coast Guard's attention has been focused on assimilating added security responsibilities. However, developing a more comprehensive strategy is now important, as a way to inform the Congress about the extent to which the Coast Guard's use of its resources--cutters, boats, aircraft, and personnel--will allow it to continue meeting its many responsibilities. Also important is designing a way to keep the Congress informed about its progress in achieving this balance. The Coast Guard has considerable data from which to develop progress reports, but this information is currently in disparate forms and documents. |
gao_NSIAD-96-5 | gao_NSIAD-96-5_0 | We have issued a series of reports on private sector practices that could be applied to DOD’s expendable inventories. Similarities Between Air Force and Commercial Airline Logistics Operations
Although not as large as the Air Force, commercial airlines’ operations resemble the Air Force’s in several ways. Time also has a significant impact on cost. This report focuses on (1) best management practices used in the commercial airline industry to streamline logistics operations and improve customer service, (2) Air Force reengineering efforts to improve the responsiveness of its logistics system and reduce costs, and (3) barriers that may stop the Air Force from achieving the full benefits of its reengineering efforts. 2.3). 2.4). Air Force Reengineering Efforts Can Be Expanded, but Obstacles Must Be Overcome
In recognition of increasing budgetary pressures, the changing global threat, and the need for radical improvements to its logistics system, the Air Force has begun a reengineering program aimed at redesigning its logistics operations. This support will be needed if the full range of changes is to be carried out. The following principles for effective reengineering, reflecting panel members’ views, emerged from the symposium:
Top management must be supportive of and engaged in reengineering efforts to remove barriers and drive success. Without these logistics system improvements, the Air Force will continue to operate a logistics system that results in billions of dollars of wasted resources. Recommendations
To build on the existing Air Force reengineering efforts and achieve major logistics system improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense commit and engage top-level DOD managers to support and lead Air Force reengineering efforts to ensure its success. Specific concepts that have been proven to be successful and should be considered, but have not been incorporated in the current Air Force program include installing information systems that are commercially available to track inventory amounts, location, condition, and requirements; counting existing inventory once new systems are in place to ensure accuracy of the data; establishing closer relationships with suppliers; encouraging suppliers to establish local distribution centers near major repair depots for quick shipment of parts; using integrated supplier programs to shift to suppliers the responsibility for managing certain types of inventory; using third-party logistics services to manage the storage and distribution of reparable parts and minimize DOD information technology requirements; reorganizing workshops, using the cellular concept where appropriate, to reduce the time it takes to repair parts; and integrating successful reengineered processes and flexible, team-oriented employees in new facilities (like the green field sites) to maximize productivity improvements, as new facilities are warranted to meet changes in the types and quantities of aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's management of its reparable parts inventory, focusing on: (1) commercial airline industry practices to streamline logistics operations and improve customer service; (2) Air Force reengineering efforts to improve its logistics system and reduce costs; and (3) barriers to the Air Force's reengineering efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the commercial airline industry, including certain manufacturers, suppliers, and airlines, are using leading-edge practices to improve logistics operations and reduce costs; (2) in recognition of increasing budgetary pressures, the changing global threat, and the need for radical improvements in its logistics system, the Air Force has begun a reengineering program aimed at redesigning its logistics operations; (3) GAO has urged these changes and supports them, and has identified additional private-sector practices that may result in even greater savings; (4) there are several major barriers to bringing about change that must be addressed and resolved if the Air Force is to reengineer its logistics system and save billions of dollars; (5) the Air Force reengineering effort addresses inherent problems with its logistics system, but additional steps can be taken to maximize potential improvements; (6) additional steps GAO identified that could enhance this program include establishing a top-level DOD champion of change to support the Air Force initiatives, greater use of third-party logistics services, closer partnerships with suppliers, encouraging suppliers to use local distribution centers, centralizing repair functions, and modifying repair facilities to accommodate these new practices; (7) the success of the Air Force in achieving a quantum leap in system improvements hinges on its ability to address and overcome certain barriers, such as inherent organizational resistance to change; (8) top-level DOD officials must be supportive of and engaged in Air Force reengineering efforts to remove these barriers and drive success; (9) information systems do not always provide Air Force managers and employees with accurate, real-time data on the cost, amount, location, condition, and usage of inventory; and (10) without the support of top-level DOD management and accurate, real-time inventory information, the expansion of the Air Force's reengineering efforts could be seriously impaired. |
gao_GAO-11-163 | gao_GAO-11-163_0 | Theater Commanders Continually Assess Medical Personnel Requirements, but DOD’s Directive on Routine Medical Care for DOD Deployed Civilians Is Not Consistent with In-theater Guidance
Medical officials in theater continually assess the number and the types of military medical personnel they need to support ongoing contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to congressional interest about deployed civilians, the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress in April 2010 that with each new mission, the need for new civilian skills have resulted in an increase in the number of deployed civilians and that these civilians are not immune to the dangers associated with contingency operations. This ongoing assessment takes place in theater and allows theater officials to identify new medical personnel requirements and regularly reevaluate existing medical personnel requirements. The Level of Care That Deployed DOD Civilian Employees Can Expect in Theater is Unclear
Although DOD primarily provides both emergency life-saving medical care as well as routine medical care to U.S. military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unclear what level of routine medical care deployed DOD civilian employees can expect in theater. Also, the organizational design of these medical units used in theater, which indicates the number and mix of skilled medical personnel these units should have, has not been updated to reflect current practice in theater. In fact, studies show that for those severely injured or wounded, 90 percent do not survive if advanced medical care is not provided within 60 minutes of injury, thus creating urgency for rapid access to the wounded. Specifically, officials with the Task Force 1st Medical Brigade told us these specialized personnel documents allow for more up-to-date establishment of personnel requirements to address gaps caused by splitting medical units. However, the process is difficult and it came about because current doctrine and organizational design were not sufficient to address the capabilities needed for splitting medical units such as combat support hospitals and area support medical companies. According to an Army regulation, the Army maintains a lessons learned program to, among other things, systematically update Army doctrine to enhance the Army’s preparedness to conduct current and future operations. By updating Army doctrine and organizational documents for the design of medical units that could be used in other theaters, the Army could benefit from incorporating its lessons learned, where appropriate, and be better assured the current practice of splitting medical units to quickly provide advanced life-saving emergency medical care to those severely injured or wounded does not lead to unnecessary staffing challenges. According to medical officials in theater, when these gaps occur, Army commanders have used two approaches to fill these gaps: backfilling and cross-leveling. The Army’s 90-day rotation policy— while intended to ease the financial burden of deploying reserve medical personnel and help retain them—has presented some challenges for the Army in quickly filling these gaps when a medical provider is not able to deploy. Although we found examples of the 915th Forward Surgical Team not having all of its medical personnel before the end of each 90-day rotation, Army data show the magnitude of these unfilled gaps or late arrivals for the reserve components ranged from about 3 percent to 7 percent from January 2008 to July 2010. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments provided in response to a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with our findings and recommendations. DOD fully concurred with our first recommendation that the department clarify the level of care that deployed DOD civilian employees can expect in theater. Specifically, we evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed its need for military medical personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, (2) the Army has adapted the composition and use of its medical units to provide advanced medical care, and (3) the Army fills medical personnel gaps that arise in theater. For the second objective—to evaluate the extent to which the Army has adapted the composition and use of its medical units to provide advanced medical care in Iraq and Afghanistan—we reviewed reports from the medical task forces in theater, Army documentation of the composition of medical units in Iraq and Afghanistan, theater-level publications regarding medical care in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army medical doctrine, and Army field manuals for medical units. | Why GAO Did This Study
For ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, military medical personnel are among the first to arrive and the last to leave. Sustained U.S. involvement in these operations has placed stresses on the Department of Defense's (DOD) medical personnel. As the U.S. military role in Iraq and Afghanistan changes, the Army must adapt the number and mix of medical personnel it deploys. In response to Congress' continued interest in the services' medical personnel requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed its need for medical personnel in theater to support ongoing operations, (2) the Army has adapted the composition and use of medical units to provide advanced medical care, and (3) the Army fills medical personnel gaps that arise in theater. To do so, GAO analyzed DOD policies and procedures on identifying personnel requirements, deploying medical personnel, and filling medical personnel gaps in Iraq and Afghanistan, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Medical officials in theater continually assess the number and the types of military medical personnel they need to support contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and analyze the risks if gaps occur. Given congressional interest about deployed civilians, DOD reported to Congress in April 2010 that with each new mission, the need for new civilian skills has resulted in an increase in deployed civilians and that these civilians are not immune to the dangers associated with contingency operations. Although GAO did not learn of any DOD deployed civilians turned away for care in theater during this review, it is unclear the extent they can expect routine medical care in theater given that a DOD directive and theater guidance differ with regard to their eligibility for routine care. By clarifying these documents, DOD could reduce uncertainty about the level of routine care deployed DOD civilians can expect in theater and provide more informed insights into the military medical personnel requirements planning process. Army theater commanders have been reconfiguring or splitting medical units to cover more geographical areas in theater to better provide advanced emergency life-saving care quicker, but Army doctrine and the organizational design of these units, including needed staff, have not been fully updated to reflect these changes. Studies show that for those severely injured or wounded, 90 percent do not survive if advanced medical care is not provided within 60 minutes of injury. Officials in theater told GAO they are using specialized personnel documents to staff these medical units with more up-to- date personnel requirements to address gaps caused by splitting medical units, and that current doctrine and organizational design were not sufficient to address the capability needed for splitting medical units. According to an Army regulation, it maintains its lessons learned program to systematically update Army doctrine and enhance the Army's preparedness to conduct current and future operations. By updating Army doctrine and organizational documents for the design of medical units that could be used in other theaters, the Army could benefit from incorporating its lessons learned, where appropriate, and be better assured the current practice of splitting medical units to quickly provide advanced life-saving emergency medical care to those severely injured or wounded does not lead to unnecessary staffing challenges. Army commanders have used two approaches--cross-leveling and backfilling--to fill medical personnel gaps that arise in theater due to reasons such as illnesses, emergency leave, and resignations of medical personnel. When these gaps in needed medical personnel occur, the Army's 90-day rotation policy--while intended to ease the financial burden of deploying reserve medical personnel and help retain them--has presented some challenges in quickly filling these gaps in theater with reserve medical personnel when a medical provider is not able to deploy. However, Army data show the magnitude of these unfilled gaps or late arrivals for the reserve component medical providers ranged from about 3 percent to 7 percent from January 2008 to July 2010.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) DOD clarify the level of routine medical care that deployed DOD civilian employees can expect in theater and (2) the Army update its doctrine and the organizational design of split medical units. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-399 | gao_GAO-07-399_0 | These capabilities include having backup operating sites that have staff capable of performing the organizations’ critical tasks and that are geographically distant from their primary operating locations. In addition, two organizations have increased their recovery capabilities by establishing sites hundreds of miles from the primary site that are capable of monitoring and operating critical networks at the primary location. Although Some Challenges Remain, Organizations also Have Acted to Reduce Physical Security and Information Security Vulnerabilities
The seven critical market organizations have continued to implement physical security measures to reduce the potential for physical attacks on their facilities. Broker-Dealers and Banks Have Reduced Risk of Disruption in Clearing Activities and Continue to Address Risks to Trading Activities
Since our 2004 report, the banks and broker-dealers that are key participants in the U.S. securities markets have made considerable progress in improving their resiliency, but certain wide-scale disasters could significantly disrupt their ability to conduct trading activities. In response to expectations by financial regulators, since the 2001 attacks these broker-dealers and banks have improved the resiliency of their clearing and settling operations by increasing the geographic distance between the primary and backup sites that conduct such operations. Financial regulators also have been promoting regional coalitions to improve information sharing and response during disasters. SEC staff also plan to do more focused reviews of broker-dealer trading readiness. SEC also has taken actions to improve the ARP program that it uses to oversee systems operations issues at the markets and clearing organizations, including increasing staffing levels and expertise and preparing a rule mandating compliance with the ARP program’s tenets for which it expects to seek approval during 2007. Regulators Are Actively Addressing Pandemic Planning, but Additional Actions Could Improve Readiness
Banking and securities regulators have been working to assist market participants’ pandemic planning efforts, but have not taken other actions that could better assure that market participants adequately prepare for a pandemic. Regulators Have Worked to Ensure That Trading Activities Will Resume After a Disaster, and Plan to Examine Broker-Dealer Readiness More Fully
Although broker-dealers are not required to be able to resume operations after disasters, securities regulators have issued some guidance and conducted some assessments of firms’ readiness to trade. Recommendation for Executive Action
To increase the likelihood that the securities markets will be able to function during a pandemic, we recommend that the Chairman, Federal Reserve; the Comptroller of the Currency; and the Chairman, SEC, consider taking additional actions to ensure that market participants adequately prepare for an outbreak, including issuing formal expectations that business continuity plans for a pandemic should include measures likely to be effective even during severe outbreaks, and setting a date by which market participants should have such plans. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this report is to describe the progress that financial markets participants and regulators have made since our 2004 report in ensuring the security and resiliency of our securities markets. Specifically, we assessed (1) actions critical securities market organizations and key market participants have taken to improve their business continuity capabilities for recovering from physical or electronic attacks and the security measures they use to reduce their vulnerabilities to such events; (2) actions taken by financial market participants, telecommunications industry organizations, and others to improve the ability of participants to respond to future disasters and increase the resiliency of the telecommunications on which the markets depend; and (3) financial regulators’ efforts to ensure the resiliency of the financial markets, including SEC’s progress in improving its securities market organization oversight program. | Why GAO Did This Study
This is GAO's third report since the September 11 terrorist attacks that assesses progress that market participants and regulators have made to ensure the security and resiliency of our securities markets. This report examined (1) actions taken to improve the markets' capabilities to prevent and recover from attacks; (2) actions taken to improve disaster response and increase telecommunications resiliency; and (3) financial regulators' efforts to ensure market resiliency. GAO inspected physical and electronic security measures and business continuity capabilities using regulatory, government, and industry-established criteria and discussed improvement efforts with broker dealers, banks, regulators, telecommunications carriers, and trade associations.
What GAO Found
The critical securities markets organizations GAO reviewed have acted to significantly reduce the likelihood of physical disasters disrupting the functioning of U.S. securities markets. As of January 2007, the seven critical exchanges, markets, clearing organizations, and payment processors GAO reviewed have the capability of performing their critical functions at sites that are geographically dispersed from their primary sites. These organizations were also preparing plans to reduce the likelihood that a disease pandemic will disrupt their critical operations, although not all had fully completed such efforts. They also improved their physical and information security measures, including by taking actions that GAO identified during this review. Although key securities trading staff remain concentrated in single locations, the broker-dealers and clearing services banks that account for significant trading volumes and that GAO reviewed have increased the distances between their sites for primary and backup operations for clearance and settlement activities and established dispersed backup trading locations. Various private and public sector groups continued to enhance the preparedness of the financial sector, although resolving vulnerabilities in the telecommunications infrastructure remains a challenge. Securities industry organizations have continued to conduct annual industrywide tests of financial market participants' backup site operating capabilities, and key trading and clearing organizations are increasingly using communications networks that are less vulnerable to disruption to transmit information. After attempts to assist individual financial market participants to determine whether their own telecommunications lines were routed through single paths or switches proved difficult, regulators are assisting efforts to develop automated systems for identifying circuit paths. In response to concerns over whether the telecommunications infrastructure can absorb the increased demand likely to result from large numbers of organizations and individuals seeking to telecommute during a pandemic, financial regulators and market participants are assisting government efforts to model such events and develop potential solutions. To improve market resiliency, financial regulators established goals for prompt recovery of critical clearing activities after disasters and have been conducting examinations to ensure market participants' compliance. Securities regulators also set goals and are examining securities markets' readiness to resume trading and plan to do more focused reviews of individual broker-dealer capabilities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also has improved its program for overseeing operations issues at market and clearing organizations, including increasing its staffing levels and expertise. Securities and banking regulators have been actively addressing pandemic issues, but could better ensure that market participants prepare complete plans and have sufficient time to train employees and test these plans, by providing formal expectations that plans address even severe outbreaks and set dates for completing such plans. |
gao_GAO-04-338 | gao_GAO-04-338_0 | Scope and Methodology
To provide detailed information on the amount and growth of criminal debt, including specific amounts related to white-collar financial fraud, we obtained information from Justice on the amount of (1) outstanding criminal debt as of the end of fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002 and (2) related collections for each of these 3 fiscal years. Criminal Debt Has Increased Markedly, but Collections Have Decreased Slightly
Justice reported an unaudited amount of total outstanding criminal debt of about $25 billion as of September 30, 2002, almost double when compared to Justice’s unaudited amount from 3 years earlier. Given MVRA’s requirement that restitution be assessed regardless of the criminal’s ability to pay, the significant increase in the balance of reported uncollected criminal debt was not unexpected. According to Justice’s unaudited records, collections relative to outstanding criminal debt averaged about 7 percent for fiscal years 1995 through 1999 and decreased to an average of about 4 percent for fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002. Justice’s unaudited records showed that nonfederal restitution accounted for about 70 percent of total reported criminal debt as of September 30, 2002. This proportion is generally consistent with what we found for fiscal year 1999, which we reported in our 2001 report. According to Justice’s unaudited records, collections of outstanding debt did not increase, and in fact fell slightly, over this 3-year period. As shown in figure 2, a major component of criminal debt was debt related to white-collar financial fraud, which, according to Justice’s unaudited records, totaled about $11 billion, $13 billion, and $17 billion as of September 30, 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, or about two-thirds or more of overall outstanding criminal debt at the end of each of these years. Prompt Action Has Not Been Taken to Address the Majority of Recommendations
Justice has not taken timely action to address all of the recommendations we made to it in July 2001, which were designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Justice’s criminal debt collection processes. In addition, since July 2001, Justice has completed action on only 7 of the 13 interim recommendations that were made to stem the growth of reported uncollected criminal debt while Justice and certain other agencies worked to develop the strategic plan. Actions to address 4 of these 7 recommendations were completed about 2 years after we made the recommendations, and actions to address the remaining 6 interim recommendations are still in process. Until Justice takes actions to fully implement our previous recommendations to it to improve criminal debt collection efforts, including forming a joint task force with AOUSC, OMB, and Treasury and developing a strategic plan to improve the criminal debt collection processes, the effectiveness of criminal fines and restitution as a punitive tool may be diminished, and Justice’s management processes and procedures will not provide adequate assurance that offenders are not afforded their ill-gotten gains and that innocent victims are compensated for their losses to the fullest extent possible. Most important, from the standpoint of resolving key jurisdictional issues and functional responsibilities, Justice has not taken action along with certain other agencies to develop a strategic plan for criminal debt collection. We noted that the strategic plan should address managing, accounting for, and reporting of criminal debt. Since these interim recommendations largely focused on policies and procedures, it is important that they be effectively implemented once they are established, and it will likely take some time for collection results to be realized from full implementation. We will also provide copies to the Attorney General, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of the Treasury. For this report, we were requested to examine the extent to which Justice has acted on the recommendations we made in our 2001 report to improve criminal debt collection. That report resulted in numerous recommendations to Justice and AOUSC to improve debt collection. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2001, GAO reported that outstanding criminal debt, as reported in Department of Justice (Justice) statistical reports, had increased from about $6 billion as of September 30, 1995, to more than $13 billion as of September 30, 1999. Although some of the key factors that contributed to this increase were beyond Justice's control, GAO concluded--after accounting for such factors--that Justice's criminal debt collection processes were inadequate. Accordingly, in the 2001 report, GAO made 14 recommendations to Justice to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its criminal debt collection processes. To follow up on the 2001 report, GAO was asked to (1) provide information on the amount and growth of criminal debt for fiscal years 2000 through 2002, (2) examine the extent to which Justice has acted on GAO's previous recommendations, and (3) review Justice's collection efforts for selected criminal debt cases related to white-collar financial fraud. This report addresses the first two objectives; GAO will report separately on its ongoing work to address the third.
What GAO Found
Justice reported an unaudited amount of total outstanding criminal debt of about $25 billion as of September 30, 2002, almost double when compared to Justice's unaudited amount from 3 years earlier. This increase, which was not unexpected, continued a trend that began in fiscal year 1996. A primary factor contributing to the increase is a mandate that requires restitution to be assessed regardless of the ability of the offender to pay. As we reported in 2001, collections as a percentage of outstanding criminal debt averaged about 7 percent for fiscal years 1995 through 1999. As indicated in Justice's unaudited records, because collections decreased slightly while debt increased, collections as a percentage of outstanding debt declined to an average of about 4 percent for fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002. For each of these 3 fiscal years, according to Justice's unaudited records, about two-thirds or more of criminal debt was related to white-collar financial fraud. Justice has made progress responding to GAO's 2001 recommendations related to criminal debt collection, but not to the degree that had been expected. A key recommendation in 2001 was for Justice, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of the Treasury to work as a joint task force to develop a strategic plan that addresses managing, accounting for, and reporting criminal debt. As of mid-December 2003, Justice had not yet worked with these other agencies to develop this plan. We also made 13 interim recommendations to Justice to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal debt collection while the strategic plan was being developed. Since July 2001, Justice has completed action on 7 of these recommendations; actions to address 4 of the 7 were completed about 2 years after GAO made them. Actions to address the remaining 6 interim recommendations are in process. According to Justice, GAO did not fully recognize its progress in improving the criminal debt collection process. GAO said that it had given Justice full credit for its efforts to implement the 2001 recommendations, as well as for some related efforts outside the scope of those recommendations. GAO noted, however, that Justice had not yet led efforts to resolve key jurisdictional issues and functional responsibilities. While acknowledging that Justice was laying the foundation for improved collections by establishing policies and procedures in response to certain of the interim recommendations, GAO noted that it is important that the new policies and procedures be effectively implemented and that it will likely take some time for collection results to be realized from full implementation. Until Justice takes action to fully implement these recommendations, Justice's management processes and procedures will not provide adequate assurance that offenders are not afforded their ill-gotten gains and that innocent victims are compensated for their losses to the fullest extent possible. |
gao_GGD-00-23 | gao_GGD-00-23_0 | Our Analysis Raises Concerns About Impact of Compliance Assessments on Importer Compliance
In the absence of a Customs evaluation of the impact that compliance assessments have on importers’ compliance with U.S. laws and regulations, we analyzed compliance rates for all 59 importers that had compliance assessments completed by September 30, 1997, and had received compliance measurement exams in both fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 1998. According to the NASC Director, the delay was due to lack of staff resources and to staff turnover. We analyzed two of six Customs actions designed to address noncompliance within the informed and enforced compliance framework—the Multi-port Approach to Raise Compliance by the year 2000 (MARC 2000) and the Company Enforced Compliance Process (CECP)—and found that Customs’ efforts to raise overall compliance rates for importers in selected industries had mixed results. Fiscal year 1998 compliance rates for these industries were all below the prior year’s (fiscal year 1997) compliance rates (see table 5). Although Customs has monitored and evaluated certain aspects of the initiatives and actions, it has not evaluated, nor does it have a plan to evaluate, the impact on compliance of the overall informed compliance strategy. This seems especially important since Customs may not be able to reach its goals in terms of coverage for the compliance assessment and account management initiatives. We stated that “While Customs has monitored and evaluated certain aspects of the initiatives and actions, it has not evaluated nor does it have a plan to evaluate the impact on compliance of the overall informed compliance strategy.” We agree with and support Customs’ ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and enhancement efforts of its many programs, including those related to informed compliance activities. If, after such an evaluation, Customs determines that one or more of the initiatives are not making substantial contributions to the overall goal of raising importers’ compliance rates, then either part or all of the informed compliance strategy should be reexamined at that time. Scope and Methodology
To review the status of Customs’ implementation of the informed compliance strategy developed in response to the Mod Act and to determine the extent to which trade compliance under the new program had improved, we concentrated on five key initiatives. The Customs Service’s Director of the Office of Planning provided written comments that are discussed at the end of the letter and are reprinted in appendix IV. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Custom Service's Modernization efforts, focusing on: (1) the status of Customs' implementation of the informed compliance strategy; and (2) whether trade compliance under the new program had improved.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) compliance data suggest the key initiatives and actions that make up Customs' informed compliance strategy have not yet produced the benefits that were expected; (2) among the reasons for these results may be that Customs has not implemented three of the key initiatives and actions to the extent or at the pace that it had expected; (3) two of the five are fully operational; (4) three have been implemented but have not yet reached many of the intended importers; (5) in responding to noncompliant importers, Customs has had limited success in increasing compliance; (6) its efforts to raise compliance rates in selected industries led to an initial increase in the rates, followed by a decrease, and ended with the fiscal year 1998 compliance rates falling below Customs' goal; (7) Customs cited the lack of sufficient staff resources as a major reason for shortfalls in implementing the compliance assessment and account management programs to the extent or at the pace intended; (8) Customs also noted that as it implemented the compliance measurement system and introduced new analytical tools, staff have become more astute at finding noncompliance; (9) although Customs has monitored and evaluated certain aspects of the key initiatives and actions, it has not evaluated, nor does it have a plan to evaluate, the impact on compliance of the overall informed compliance strategy; (10) however, such an evaluation seems appropriate to address the concerns raised by GAO's analysis of the impact of the compliance assessment initiative on the compliance rates for 59 importers; (11) the overall improvement in these importers' compliance rates after compliance assessment was less than Customs expected; and (12) the limited extent or pace of implementation of some aspects of the strategy and GAO's findings concerning compliance rates for the 59 importers raise fundamental questions about informed compliance strategy. |
gao_GAO-17-293 | gao_GAO-17-293_0 | They perform the inspections, in part, by using a checklist derived from regulated safety and environmental requirements. In December 2015, BSEE issued its Fiscal Year 2016–2019 Strategic Plan. BSEE Leadership Has Started Several Initiatives to Improve the Bureau’s Safety and Environmental Oversight Capabilities but Its Actions Have Hindered Progress
BSEE leadership has started several initiatives to improve its safety and environmental oversight capabilities but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. Limited Efforts to Obtain and Incorporate Input from Regional Personnel Hindered the Development and Implementation of Risk-Based Inspection Initiative
Since it was established as a separate bureau in 2011, BSEE leadership has continued an initiative begun by its predecessor to transition the bureau’s inspection program to a risk-based approach. In 2012, BSEE leadership started a new initiative that included the development of a risk model and an approach for inspecting production facilities based on the risk they pose. By going against BSEE’s inspection planning methodology, BSEE leadership appears to have excluded the input of regional personnel, undercutting the pilot effort and raising questions about whether the bureau’s leadership has the commitment necessary to enable the successful implementation of its risk-based program. Inspection Protocol. However, according to officials, BSEE did not provide the operator of the first pilot facility with a report of its findings. Limited Efforts to Obtain and Incorporate Input Hindered BSEE’s Ability to Identify and Remediate Deficiencies in Its Risk-Based Inspection Program
In July 2003, we found that when implementing large-scale management initiatives, a key practice is involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership by incorporating employee feedback into new policies and procedures. Without higher level oversight within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau and any external parties, such as Argonne, that can affect the bureau’s ability to achieve its objectives, BSEE’s Environmental Stewardship efforts are likely to experience continued implementation and efficacy problems. BSEE Leadership Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Strategic Initiatives to Improve Its Internal Management
Since 2013, BSEE began four strategic initiatives to improve its internal management, but their successful implementation has been hindered by limited leadership commitment and not addressing factors contributing to trust concerns. 2. However, BSEE terminated the contract in January 2015 because, according to BSEE officials, leadership determined that the bureau needed to complete its ongoing internal organizational restructuring prior to developing programmatic performance measures. BSEE headquarters officials told us that the bureau did not implement the consultant-developed measures, but rather that those measures are informing BSEE’s third effort to develop performance measures. BSEE initially planned to finalize its internally-developed list of performance measures in February 2016, but did not meet this deadline. As of August 2016, BSEE had developed 17 draft performance measures, but bureau leadership has repeatedly missed deadlines to review them. BSEE headquarters officials told us that, subsequent to leadership approval, the bureau plans to pilot these measures and develop others in upcoming years. Interior agreed that additional reforms—such as documented policies and procedures—are needed to address offshore oil and gas oversight deficiencies, but Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. In our 2013 High-Risk update, because progress had been made in one of the three segments we identified in Interior’s Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources on our 2011 High-Risk List—reorganization of its oversight of offshore oil and gas activities—we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area to focus on the remaining two segments (revenue collection and human capital). However, BSEE leadership has not demonstrated continuing oversight and accountability for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress implementing key strategic initiatives as well as its inability to address long-standing oversight deficiencies. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE—including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives (e.g., ERM and performance measure initiatives)—in a timely manner, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing internal management initiatives, including its key strategic initiatives for ERM and performance measures, in a timely manner. Without a higher-level organization within Interior addressing leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives (e.g., ERM and performance measure initiatives) in a timely manner, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing internal management initiatives, including its key strategic initiatives for ERM and performance measures, in a timely manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
In this report, we are making four recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. The incident raised questions about Interior's oversight of offshore oil and gas activities. In response, in May 2010, Interior reorganized its offshore oil and gas management activities, and in October 2011, created BSEE to among other things, develop regulations, conduct inspections, and take enforcement actions. In February 2011, GAO added the management of federal oil and gas resources to its High-Risk List. In December 2015, BSEE issued a strategic plan outlining initiatives to improve offshore safety and environmental oversight as well as its internal management.
This report examines what efforts BSEE leadership has made in implementing key strategic initiatives to improve its (1) offshore safety and environmental oversight and (2) internal management. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and other documents related to the development of BSEE's strategic initiatives. GAO also interviewed BSEE officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its offshore safety and environmental oversight, but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. For example, to supplement its mandatory annual regulatory compliance inspections, in 2012, BSEE leadership began developing a risk-based inspection initiative to identify high-risk production facilities and assess their safety systems and management controls. During pilot testing in 2016, several deficiencies—including the usefulness of its facility risk-assessment model and unclear inspection protocols—caused BSEE to halt the pilot. According to bureau officials, during the development of the initiative, BSEE headquarters did not effectively obtain and incorporate input from regional personnel with long-standing experience in previous risk-based inspection efforts, who could have identified deficiencies earlier in the process. GAO previously found that when implementing large-scale management initiatives a key practice is involving employees to obtain their ideas by incorporating their feedback into new policies and procedures. Instead, BSEE leadership appears to have excluded the input of regional personnel by, for example, not incorporating input beyond the risk-assessment tool when selecting the first pilot facility, even though it was prescribed to do so in the bureau's inspection planning methodology. This undercut the pilot effort, raising questions about whether the bureau's leadership has the commitment necessary to successfully implement its risk-based program. Without higher level leadership within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau, BSEE's risk-based inspection initiative could face continued delays.
Similarly, since 2013, BSEE leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its internal management, but none have been successfully implemented, in part, because of limited leadership commitment. For example, BSEE's leadership identified the importance of developing performance measures in its 2012-2015 strategic plan. BSEE began one of three attempts to develop performance measures in July 2014 by hiring a contractor to develop measures, but the bureau terminated this contract in January 2015 after determining a need to complete its internal reorganization before developing such measures. A second effort to develop performance measures started in December 2015, using the same consultant, and yielded 12 performance measures in March 2016, but BSEE did not implement them, in part, because data did not exist to use the measures. By the time BSEE received this consultant's report, it had already begun a third effort to internally develop performance measures; as of November 2016 had identified 17 draft performance measures, but BSEE leadership missed repeated deadlines to review them. BSEE officials told GAO that after leadership approval, the bureau plans to pilot these measures and develop others. BSEE leadership has not demonstrated continuing oversight and accountability for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress implementing key strategic initiatives. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing internal management initiatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that higher-level leadership within Interior (1) establish a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from bureau personnel that can affect the bureau's ability to achieve its objectives and (2) address leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives in a timely manner. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-455 | gao_GAO-11-455_0 | Under the plan, the ISE would consist of five “communities of interest”—homeland security, law enforcement, foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence. Program Manager and Agencies Have Advanced Key Information Sharing Activities but Have Not Yet Developed a Comprehensive Road Map to Effectively Implement the ISE
Since we issued our 2008 report, the Program Manager and agencies have established a discrete set of goals and undertaken activities to guide development and implementation of the ISE, but these actions do not fully address our recommendations or provide the comprehensive road map that we called for in our report. For example, the Program Manager and agencies have not yet fully defined what the ISE is expected to achieve and contain, identified the incremental costs necessary to implement the ISE, or fully developed procedures to show what work remains and related milestones to provide accountability for results. The administration has taken steps to strengthen the ISE governance structure to help guide the development and implementation of the ISE, but it is too early to gauge the structure’s effectiveness. Consistent with the Intelligence Reform Act, the ISE is intended to provide the means for sharing terrorism information across the five communities in a manner that, among other things, builds upon existing systems and leverages ongoing efforts. To date, the ISE has primarily focused on the homeland security and law enforcement communities and related sharing between the federal government and state and local partners, in part to align with information sharing priorities. However, it does not describe business activities and information flows for the remaining 21 current business processes, such as the business process that supports responding to a terrorism-related threat. However, the Office of the Program Manager’s approach to managing ISE architecture-related activities does not fully satisfy the core elements described in our EAMMF for establishing institutional commitment and creating the EA management foundation. In addition, officials from the key ISE implementing agencies indicated that the lack of detailed and implementable ISE guidance was one limiting factor in developing agency information sharing segment architectures. The Program Manager added that this approach is based on (1) OMB decisions to establish a standardized EA framework that departments and agencies that own their respective information systems and architectures could use to develop, modify, and integrate those systems into the ISE; (2) the Office of the Program Manager’s interpretation of the Intelligence Reform Act; and (3) the Office of the Program Manager’s understanding that a full EA must be organization based and tied to budget authority. Conclusions
The ISE is to fulfill a critical purpose in a time when acts of terrorism on U.S. soil have recently been attempted or planned. Establishing an improved EA management foundation, including well- defined EA guidance for the ISE, would better position the government to realize significant benefits, such as better planning for implementation, improved decision making, and ultimately more effective sharing of critical terrorism-related information among all ISE agencies. To support future progress in developing and implementing the ISE, we recommend that after the end state is defined, the Program Manager in consultation with the ISA IPC and key ISE agencies, determine to what extent relevant agency initiatives across all five communities could be better leveraged by the ISE so that their benefits can be realized governmentwide and in coordination with the ISA IPC and OMB, task the key ISE agencies to define, to the extent possible, the incremental costs needed to help ensure successful implementation of the ISE and prioritize investments. To better define ISE EA guidance and effectively manage EA activities to support ISE implementation efforts, we recommend that the Program Manager, in consultation with the ISA IPC and key ISE agencies, establish an ISE EA program management plan that (1) reflects ISE EA program work activities, events, and time frames for improving ISE EA management practices and addressing missing architecture content and (2) defines accountability mechanisms to help ensure that this program management plan is implemented. To determine the extent to which the Program Manager and stakeholder agencies have made progress in developing and implementing the ISE, we reviewed key statutes and policies, including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. To determine to what extent the Program Manager for the ISE and key stakeholder agencies have defined an EA to support ISE implementation efforts, we examined the extent to which (1) key current, or “as-is,” and future, or “to-be,” EA content and a plan for transitioning from the current to the future environment have been established; (2) the Office of the Program Manager has established a structure for effectively managing ISE architecture development and implementation; and (3) key federal agencies have defined their information sharing segment architectures (ISSA) to support ISE implementation. An EA should also include a sequencing plan for transitioning from the current environment to the future environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent planned and attempted acts of terrorism on U.S. soil underscore the importance of the government's continued need to ensure that terrorism-related information is shared in an effective and timely manner. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, mandated the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which is described as an approach for sharing terrorism-related information that may include any method determined necessary and appropriate. GAO was asked to assess to what extent the Program Manager for the ISE and agencies have (1) made progress in developing and implementing the ISE and (2) defined an enterprise architecture (EA) to support ISE implementation efforts. In general, an EA provides a modernization blueprint to guide an entity's transition to its future operational and technological environment. To do this work, GAO (1) reviewed key statutes, policies, and guidance; ISE annual reports; and EA and other best practices and (2) interviewed relevant agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since GAO last reported on the ISE in June 2008, the Program Manager for the ISE and agencies have made progress in implementing a discrete set of goals and activities and are working to establish an "end state vision" that could help better define what the ISE is intended to achieve and include. However, these actions have not yet resulted in a fully functioning ISE. Consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), the ISE is to provide the means for sharing terrorism-related information across five communities--homeland security, law enforcement, defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence--in a manner that, among other things, leverages ongoing efforts. To date, the ISE has primarily focused on the homeland security and law enforcement communities and related sharing between the federal government and state and local partners, to align with priorities the White House established for the ISE. It will be important that all relevant agency initiatives--such as those involving the foreign affairs and intelligence communities--are leveraged by the ISE to enhance information sharing governmentwide. The Program Manager and agencies also have not yet identified the incremental costs necessary to implement the ISE--which would allow decision makers to plan for and prioritize future investments--or addressed GAO's 2008 recommendation to develop procedures for determining what work remains. Completing these activities would help to provide a road map for the ISE moving forward. The administration has taken steps to strengthen the ISE governance structure, but it is too early to gauge the structure's effectiveness. The Program Manager and ISE agencies have developed architecture guidance and products to support ISE implementation, such as the "ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework," which is intended to enable long-term business and technology standardization and information systems planning, investing, and integration. However, the architecture guidance and products do not fully describe the current and future information sharing environment or include a plan for transitioning to the future ISE. For example, the EA framework describes information flows for only 3 of the 24 current business processes. In addition, the Program Manager's approach to managing its ISE EA program does not fully satisfy the core elements described in EA management best practices. For example, an EA program management plan for the ISE does not exist. The Program Manager stated that his office's approach to developing ISE architecture guidance is based on, among other things, the office's interpretation of the Intelligence Reform Act. Nevertheless, the act calls for the Program Manager to, among other things, plan for and oversee the implementation of the ISE, and officials from the key agencies said that the lack of detailed and implementable ISE guidance was one limiting factor in developing agency information sharing architectures. Without establishing an improved EA management foundation, including an ISE EA program management plan, the federal government risks limiting the ability of ISE agencies to effectively plan for and implement the ISE and more effectively share critical terrorism-related information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that in defining a road map for the ISE, the Program Manager ensure that relevant initiatives are leveraged, incremental costs are defined, and an EA program management plan is established that defines how EA management practices and content will be addressed. The Program Manager generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1013T | gao_GAO-08-1013T_0 | DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s Programs to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Assault
DOD has taken positive steps to respond to congressional direction by establishing policies and a program to prevent, respond to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers, and the Coast Guard, on its own initiative, has taken similar steps. However, we also found that several factors hinder implementation of the programs, including (1) guidance that may not adequately address how to implement DOD’s program in certain environments, (2) inconsistent support for the programs, (3) limited effectiveness of some program coordinators, (4) training that is not consistently effective, and (5) limited access to mental health services. Specific steps that DOD has taken include establishing a standardized departmentwide definition of sexual establishing a confidential option to report sexual assault incidents, known as restricted reporting; establishing a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to serve as the single point of accountability for sexual assault prevention and response; requiring the military services to develop and implement their own policies and programs, based on DOD’s policy, to prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents; establishing training requirements for all servicemembers on preventing and responding to sexual assault; and reporting data on sexual assault incidents to Congress annually. DOD’s guidance may not adequately address some important issues. While most commanders support the programs, some do not. Program coordinators’ effectiveness can be hampered when program management is a collateral duty. Visibility over Reports of Sexual Assault
We found, based on responses to our nongeneralizeable survey and a 2006 DOD survey, the most recent available, that occurrences of sexual assault may be exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD and the Coast Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of these occurrences. At the 14 installations where we administered our survey, 103 servicemembers indicated that they had been sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months. Of these, 52 servicemembers indicated that they did not report the sexual assault incident. Commonly cited reasons by survey respondents at the installations we visited included: (1) the belief that nothing would be done; (2) fear of ostracism, harassment, or ridicule by peers; and (3) the belief that their peers would gossip about the incident. For example, a junior enlisted female observed that the military is going to great lengths to improve the ways that sexual assault can be reported and commented that “in my opinion, people will be more likely to report an incident anonymously.” Similarly, a female senior officer commented that “giving the victim a choice of making a restricted or unrestricted report is a positive change and allows that person the level of privacy they require.”
DOD and the Coast Guard’s Oversight over Reports of Sexual Assault
DOD and the Coast Guard have established some mechanisms for overseeing reports of sexual assault involving servicemembers. In reviewing DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s programs, we found that neither has established an oversight framework because they have not established a comprehensive plan that includes such things as clear objectives, milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress, nor established evaluative performance measures with clearly defined data elements with which to analyze sexual assault incident data. Because DOD’s and the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response programs lack an oversight framework, their respective programs, as currently implemented, do not provide decision makers with the information they need to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs or to determine the extent to which the programs are helping to prevent sexual assault from occurring and to ensure that servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault receive the care they need. Without an oversight framework to guide program implementation, DOD and the Coast Guard also risk not collecting all of the information needed to provide insight into the effectiveness of their programs. However, DOD does not include these data in its annual report, and the Coast Guard does not provide these incident data to Congress because neither is required to do so. Congressionally Directed Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services Has Not Yet Begun Its Review
To provide further oversight of DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response programs, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required that the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services conduct an examination of matters relating to sexual assault in cases in which members of the Armed Forces are either victims or offenders. However, as of July 2008, this task force has yet to begin its review. We expect to make a number or recommendations in our final report to improve implementation and oversight of sexual assault prevention and response programs in both DOD and the Coast Guard. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a comprehensive policy to prevent and respond to sexual assaults involving servicemembers. Though not required to do so, the Coast Guard has established a similar program. This statement addresses the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard (1) have developed and implemented policies and programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers; (2) have visibility over reports of sexual assault; and (3) exercise oversight over reports of sexual assault. This statement draws on GAO's preliminary observations from an ongoing engagement examining DOD's and the Coast Guard's programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault. In conducting its ongoing work GAO reviewed legislative requirements and DOD and Coast Guard guidance, analyzed sexual assault incident data, and obtained through surveys and interviews the perspective on sexual assault matters of more than 3,900 servicemembers stationed in the United States and overseas. The results of GAO's survey and interviews provide insight into the implementation of the programs but are nongeneralizable. GAO expects to issue its final report in August 2008 and to make a number of recommendations to improve implementation of sexual assault prevention and response programs and improve oversight of the programs in both DOD and the Coast Guard.
What GAO Found
DOD and the Coast Guard have established policies and programs to prevent, respond to, and resolve reported sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers; however, implementation of the programs is hindered by several factors. GAO found that (1) DOD's guidance may not adequately address some important issues, such as how to implement its program in deployed and joint environments; (2) most, but not all, commanders support the programs; (3) program coordinators' effectiveness can be hampered when program management is a collateral duty; (4) required sexual assault prevention and response training is not consistently effective; and (5) factors such as a DOD-reported shortage of mental health care providers affect whether servicemembers who are victims of sexual assault can or do access mental health services. Left unchecked, these challenges can discourage or prevent some servicemembers from using the programs when needed. GAO found, based on responses to its nongeneralizeable survey administered to 3,750 servicemembers and a 2006 DOD survey, the most recent available, that occurrences of sexual assault may be exceeding the rates being reported, suggesting that DOD and the Coast Guard have only limited visibility over the incidence of these occurrences. At the 14 installations where GAO administered its survey, 103 servicemembers indicated that they had been sexually assaulted within the preceding 12 months. Of these, 52 servicemembers indicated that they did not report the sexual assault. GAO also found that factors that discourage servicemembers from reporting a sexual assault include the belief that nothing would be done; fear of ostracism, harassment, or ridicule; and concern that peers would gossip. Although DOD and the Coast Guard have established some mechanisms for overseeing reports of sexual assault, neither has developed an oversight framework--including clear objectives, milestones, performance measures, and criteria for measuring progress--to guide their efforts. In compliance with statutory requirements, DOD reports data on sexual assault incidents involving servicemembers to Congress annually. However, DOD's report does not include some data that would aid congressional oversight, such as why some sexual assaults could not be substantiated following an investigation. Further, the military services have not provided sufficient data to facilitate oversight and enable DOD to conduct trend analyses. While the Coast Guard voluntarily provides data to DOD for inclusion in its report, this information is not provided to Congress because there is no requirement to do so. To provide further oversight of DOD's programs, Congress, in 2004, directed DOD to form a task force to undertake an examination of matters relating to sexual assault in which members of the Armed Forces are either victims or offenders. However, as of July 2008, the task force has not yet begun its review. Without an oversight framework, as well as more complete data, decision makers in DOD, the Coast Guard, and Congress lack information they need to evaluate the effectiveness of the programs. |
gao_GAO-01-328 | gao_GAO-01-328_0 | Conclusions
Approximately one million taxpayers per year, as well as IRS, incur costs to abate tax assessments created due to exemption errors. Avoiding the errors, or correcting them earlier, could reduce the burden on taxpayers of complying with tax laws. IRS has taken one step intended to help taxpayers avoid these errors— revising instructions for claiming exemptions. In another step, aimed at correcting some exemption errors that continue to be made, IRS decided to do checks of name and SSN errors for spousal exemption claims during returns processing. In addition, IRS is considering implementing earlier—during returns processing—checks for dependent exemption errors and taxpayer contacts if the checks do not correct exemption errors. Considering doing such checks and contacts earlier is worthwhile. However, IRS did not provide us with any details or documentation about how or when decisions would be made. Little is known about how to reduce nonexemption errors that lead to assessments being abated. Because over one million taxpayers were burdened by such assessments, research to reduce the errors is worth considering. | What GAO Found
About one million taxpayers per year, as well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), incur costs to abate tax assessments created due to tax exemption errors. Avoiding the errors, or correcting them earlier, could reduce the burden on taxpayers of complying with tax laws. IRS has taken one step intended to help taxpayers avoid these errors--revising instructions for claiming exemptions. In another step, aimed at correcting some exemption errors that continue to be made, IRS decided to check name and social security number errors for spousal exemption claims during returns processing. In addition, IRS is considering implementing earlier--during returns processing--checks for dependent exemption errors and taxpayer contacts if the checks do not correct exemption errors. Doing such checks and contacts earlier is worthwhile. Although the cost savings to IRS are unknown, many taxpayers would benefit. However, IRS did not provide GAO with any details or documentation about how or when decisions would be made. Little is known about how to reduce nonexemption errors that lead to assessments being abated. Because more than one million taxpayers were burdened by such assessments, research to reduce the errors is worth considering. |
gao_GAO-14-509T | gao_GAO-14-509T_0 | Background
When providers at VAMCs determine that a veteran needs outpatient specialty care, they request and manage consults using VHA’s clinical consult process. In response to task force recommendations, in May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative to standardize aspects of the consult process, with the goal of developing consistent and reliable information on consults across all VAMCs. This initiative requires VAMCs to complete four specific tasks between July 1, 2013, and May 1, 2014:
Review and properly assign codes to consistently record consult requests in the consult system;
Assign distinct identifiers in the electronic consult system to differentiate between clinical and administrative consults;
Develop and implement strategies for requesting and managing requests for consults that are not needed within 90 days—known as “future care” consults; and
Conduct a clinical review as warranted, and as appropriate, close all unresolved consults—those open more than 90 days. VHA established this goal based on its performance reported in previous years. Officials at VHA’s central office, VISNs, and VAMCs all have oversight responsibilities for the implementation of VHA’s scheduling policy. GAO’s Ongoing Work Identified Examples of Delays in Specialty Care, and Limitations in VHA’s Implementation of Its Business Rules Impede Its Ability to Assess Delays
Our ongoing work identified examples of delays in veterans receiving requested outpatient specialty care at the five VAMCs we reviewed. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no- shows and cancelled appointments, among the factors that hinder their ability to meet VHA’s guideline for completing consults within 90 days. For 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults we reviewed for one VAMC, we found that between 108 and 152 days elapsed, with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. In 1 of these cases, several months passed before the veteran was referred to non-VA care, and he was seen 252 days after the initial consult request. Our ongoing work also identified variation in how the five VAMCs we reviewed have implemented key aspects of VHA’s business rules, which limits the usefulness of the data in monitoring and overseeing consults systemwide. For example, VAMCs have developed different strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. These consults would not appear in VHA’s systemwide data once they have been discontinued. In addition, oversight of the implementation of VHA’s business rules has been limited and has not included independent verification of VAMC actions. If the patient fails to do so within this time frame, the specialty care provider may discontinue the consult. Reliability of Reported Outpatient Medical Appointment Wait Times and Scheduling Oversight Need Improvement, and VA Has Initiated Actions to Address Related GAO Recommendations
In December 2012, we reported that VHA’s reported outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable and that inconsistent implementation of VHA’s scheduling policy may have resulted in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely outpatient medical appointments. Since, at the time of our review, VHA measured medical appointment wait times as the number of days elapsed from the desired date, the reliability of reported wait time performance was dependent on the consistency with which VAMC schedulers recorded the desired date in the VistA scheduling system. However, VHA’s scheduling policy and training documents were unclear and did not ensure consistent use of the desired date. For example, we found the electronic wait list was not always used to track new patients that needed medical appointments as required by VHA scheduling policy, putting these patients at risk for delays in care. VA concurred with the four recommendations included in our December 2012 report and reported continuing actions to address them. First, we recommended that the Secretary of VA direct the Under Secretary for Health to take actions to improve the reliability of its outpatient medical appointment wait time measures. In response, VHA officials stated that the department is in the process of revising the VHA scheduling policy to include changes, such as the new methodology for measuring wait times, and improvements and standardization of the use of the electronic wait list. Although VA has initiated actions to address our recommendations, we believe that continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA’s ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if access is delayed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring that veterans obtain needed medical care. Over the past few years there have been numerous reports of VAMCs failing to provide timely care to patients, including specialty care, and in some cases, these delays have resulted in harm to patients.
In December 2012, GAO reported that improvements were needed in the reliability of VHA's reported medical appointment wait times, as well as oversight of the appointment scheduling process. Also in 2012, VHA found that systemwide consult data could not be adequately used to determine the extent to which veterans experienced delays in receiving outpatient specialty care. In May 2013, VHA launched the Consult Management Business Rules Initiative with the aim of standardizing aspects of the consults process.
This testimony highlights (1) preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to VHA's management of outpatient specialty care consults, and (2) concerns GAO raised in its December 2012 report regarding VHA's outpatient medical appointment scheduling, and progress made implementing GAO's recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from VHA's central office. Additionally, GAO interviewed officials from five VAMCs for the consults work and four VAMCs for the scheduling work that varied based on size, complexity, and location. GAO shared the information it used to prepare this statement with VA and incorporated its comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work examining VHA's management of outpatient specialty care consults identified examples of delays in veterans receiving outpatient specialty care, as well as limitations in the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA), Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) implementation of new consult business rules designed to standardize aspects of the clinical consult process. For example, for 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults GAO reviewed for one VAMC, between 108 and 152 days elapsed with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. For 1 of these consults, several months passed before the veteran was referred for care to a non-VA health care facility. VA medical center (VAMC) officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments among the factors that lead to delays and hinder their ability to meet VHA's guideline of completing consults within 90 days of being requested. GAO's ongoing work also identified variation in how the five VAMCs reviewed have implemented key aspects of VHA's business rules, such as strategies for managing future care consults—requests for specialty care appointments that are not clinically needed for more than 90 days. Such variation may limit the usefulness of VHA's data in monitoring and overseeing consults systemwide. Furthermore, oversight of the implementation of the business rules has been limited and did not include independent verification of VAMC actions. Because this work is ongoing, we are not making recommendations on VHA's consult process at this time.
In December 2012, GAO reported that VHA's outpatient medical appointment wait times were unreliable. The reliability of reported wait time performance measures was dependent in part on the consistency with which schedulers recorded desired date—defined as the date on which the patient or health care provider wants the patient to be seen—in the scheduling system. However, VHA's scheduling policy and training documents were unclear and did not ensure consistent use of the desired date. GAO also reported that inconsistent implementation of VHA's scheduling policy may have resulted in increased wait times or delays in scheduling timely medical appointments. For example, GAO identified clinics that did not use the electronic wait list to track new patients in need of medical appointments as required by VHA policy, putting these patients at risk for not receiving timely care. VA concurred with the four recommendations included in the report and, in April 2014, reported continued actions to address them. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation for VA to take actions to improve the reliability of its medical appointment wait time measures, officials stated the department has implemented new patient wait time measures that no longer rely on desired date recorded by a scheduler. VHA officials stated that the department also is continuing to address GAO's three additional recommendations. Although VA has initiated actions to address GAO's recommendations, continued work is needed to ensure these actions are fully implemented in a timely fashion. Ultimately, VHA's ability to ensure and accurately monitor access to timely medical appointments is critical to ensuring quality health care to veterans, who may have medical conditions that worsen if access is delayed. |
gao_GAO-16-391T | gao_GAO-16-391T_0 | Indian Affairs Does Not Have Complete and Accurate Information on School Safety and Health
We found that Indian Affairs does not have complete and accurate information on safety and health conditions at all BIE schools because of key weaknesses in its inspection program. We found that 69 out of 180 BIE school locations were not inspected in fiscal year 2015, an increase from 55 locations in fiscal year 2012 (see fig. Without conducting annual inspections at all school locations, Indian Affairs does not have complete information on the frequency and severity of safety and health deficiencies at all BIE school locations and cannot ensure these facilities are safe for students and staff and currently meet safety and health requirements. Concerned about the lack of completeness of the inspection, school officials said they arranged with the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services to inspect their facilities. To support the collection of complete and accurate safety and health information on the condition of BIE school facilities nationally, we recommended that Interior (1) ensure all BIE schools are annually inspected for safety and health, as required by its policy, and that inspection information is complete and accurate and (2) revise its inspection guidance and tools, require that regional safety inspectors use them, and monitor safety inspectors’ use of procedures and tools across regions to ensure they are consistently adopted. For example, we reviewed inspection documents for two schools and found numerous examples of serious “repeat” deficiencies—those that were identified in the prior year’s inspection and should have been corrected soon afterward but were not. One school’s report identified 12 repeat deficiencies that were assigned Interior’s highest risk assessment category, which represents an immediate threat to students’ and staff safety and health and require correction within a day. For example, at one school, 7 of the school’s 11 boilers failed inspection in 2015 due to various high-risk deficiencies, including elevated levels of carbon monoxide and a natural gas leak (see fig. Indian Affairs and school officials could not provide an explanation for why repairs took significantly longer than Indian Affairs’ required time frames. Additionally, Indian Affairs has not taken needed steps to build the capacity of school staff to abate safety and health deficiencies, such as by offering basic training for staff in how to maintain and conduct repairs to school facilities. Several officials at Indian Affairs’ safety office and BIA regional offices acknowledged they do not have a plan to build schools’ capacity to address safety and health deficiencies. Absent such a plan, schools will continue to face difficulties in addressing unsafe and unhealthy conditions in school buildings. As a result, Indian Affairs cannot effectively determine the magnitude and severity of safety and health deficiencies at schools and is thus unable to prioritize deficiencies that pose the greatest danger to students and staff. Further, Indian Affairs has not developed a plan to build schools’ capacity to promptly address deficiencies or consistently monitored whether schools have established required safety committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2016 report, entitled Indian Affairs: Key Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Health at Indian School Facilities , GAO-16-313 .
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs) lacks sound information on safety and health conditions of all Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) school facilities. Specifically, GAO found that Indian Affairs' national information on safety and health deficiencies at schools is not complete and accurate because of key weaknesses in its inspection program, which prevented GAO from conducting a broader analysis of schools' safety and health conditions. Indian Affairs' policy requires its regional safety inspectors to conduct inspections of all BIE schools annually to identify facility deficiencies that may pose a threat to the safety and health of students and staff. However, GAO found that 69 out of 180 BIE school locations were not inspected in fiscal year 2015, an increase from 55 locations in fiscal year 2012. Agency officials told GAO that vacancies among regional staff contributed to this trend. As a result, Indian Affairs lacks complete information on the frequency and severity of health and safety deficiencies at BIE schools nationwide and cannot be certain all school facilities are currently meeting safety requirements.
Number of Bureau of Indian Education School Locations That Were Inspected for Safety and Health, Fiscal Years 2012-2015
Indian Affairs is responsible for assisting schools on safety issues, but it is not taking needed steps to support schools in addressing safety and health deficiencies. While national information is not available, officials at several schools GAO visited said they faced significant difficulties addressing deficiencies identified in annual safety and health and boiler inspections. Inspection documents for two schools GAO visited showed numerous high-risk safety and health deficiencies—such as missing fire extinguishers—that were identified in the prior year's inspection report, but had not been addressed. At another school, four aging boilers in a dormitory failed inspection due to elevated levels of carbon monoxide, which can cause poisoning where there is exposure, and a natural gas leak, which can pose an explosion hazard. Interior's policy in this case calls for action within days of the inspection to protect students and staff, but the school continued to use the dormitory, and repairs were not made for about 8 months. Indian Affairs and school officials across several regions said that limited staff capacity, among other factors, impedes schools' ability to address safety deficiencies. Interior issued an order in 2014 that emphasizes building tribes' capacity to operate schools. However, it has not developed a plan to build BIE school staff capacity to promptly address deficiencies. Without Indian Affairs' support of BIE schools to address these deficiencies, unsafe conditions at schools will persist and may endanger students and staff. |
gao_GAO-09-883 | gao_GAO-09-883_0 | Saudi Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, 2003- 2005
Although the Saudi government took actions to combat terrorists following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Al Qaeda’s attacks against Saudi and U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 marked a turning point in the Saudi government’s efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing, as the Saudi government came to see Al Qaeda as a threat to the Saudi regime. The U.S. Mission Has Established Targets to Measure the Effectiveness of Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Its Financing; Some Performance Targets Related to Terrorism Financing Were Removed from the MSP
The MSP for Saudi Arabia contains goals, performance indicators, and performance targets for counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, a target related to implementation of cash courier regulations was part of the MSP in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but was removed in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Agencies and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Combating Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Challenges Persist, Particularly in Preventing Alleged Funding for Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia
U.S. agencies and Saudi officials report progress countering terrorism and terrorism financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly those related to preventing the flow of alleged financial support to extremists outside Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, the U.S. embassy assessed progress towards its goal of building an active antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia as “on target.” With regard to counterterrorism efforts, U.S. and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorists, and assess that these efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda’s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. While citing progress, U.S. and Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia’s neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Preventing Financial Support to Extremists, but Concerns Remain about Individuals’ and Multilateral Charitable Organizations’ Ability to Support Terrorism and Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia
U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in preventing financial support to extremists, citing improved Saudi regulation and enforcement capacity. Since 2007, U.S. and Saudi officials report that the government of Saudi Arabia has arrested and prosecuted a number of individuals suspected of financing terrorism. At that time, we will send copies to the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
In this report, we were asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies’ assessment of and the Saudi government’s views on progress toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We also interviewed subject matter experts from a variety of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations to obtain their assessments of progress. United States and Saudi Arabia establish diplomatic relations. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
An Arabic version of this product is available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-190 . The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies' assessment of and the Saudi government's views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia on counterterrorism utilizes existing diplomatic and security-related efforts to create an active antiterrorism coalition by enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists and prevent financial support to extremists. These objectives are contained in Department of State's (State) Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, and also reflected in a January 2008 report from State to the Congress on its strategy for Saudi Arabia. The MSPs include performance targets to measure progress on efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, such as providing security training to the Saudi government, strengthening Saudi financial institutions, and implementation of relevant Saudi regulations. U.S. and Saudi officials report progress on countering terrorism and its financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly in preventing alleged funding for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, State assessed progress related to its goal of building an active U.S.-Saudi antiterrorist coalition as "on target." U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists, and note the Saudi government's efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda's terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. However, these officials noted Saudi Arabia's neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists, citing, for example, the Saudi government's regulations on sending charitable contributions overseas, and the arrest and prosecution of individuals providing support for terrorism. However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and charitable organizations to support terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia, and noted limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorists' use of cash couriers as challenges. Despite these concerns, some performance targets related to countering terrorism financing were removed from State's current MSP. According to State officials, these changes were made either because a specific target was no longer considered feasible or because progress was made toward the target. |
gao_GGD-98-103 | gao_GGD-98-103_0 | Why Take the Census? Census Data Have Other Important Uses
While apportionment is the most widely known use of census data, the data are also used for congressional redistricting, managing federal agencies, and allocating federal funds, and are disseminated to state and local governments, academia, and the private sector as well. 3. For the 2000 Census, the Bureau is planning to rely on a Master Address File (MAF), which is to be developed, in part, from the Bureau’s 1990 Census address list and the most recent Postal Service address list (referred to as the delivery sequence files). Under a reengineering plan approved in September 1997, the Bureau also plans to conduct a 100-percent canvass of all census blocks in early 1999 and will request the Postal Service to validate the city-style addresses prior to the delivery of 2000 Census questionnaires. Instead, the Bureau is planning for enumerators to deliver the questionnaires and ask that they be mailed back. In 2000, the Bureau will focus its efforts to count the homeless on the places where many of them come for services, such as shelters and soup kitchens, as well as targeted outdoor locations. However, because the Bureau had little control over when or where the Advertising Council disseminated the Bureau’s message, it has decided to use a paid advertising campaign in 2000 to complement its continuing efforts with its organizational partners. In order to improve the mail response rate in 2000, the Bureau is planning to use a new, multiple mail contact strategy. For 2000, the Bureau is researching the use of questionnaires in additional languages. Sampling and Statistical Estimation in the 2000 Census
The Bureau plans to use two new sampling procedures in the 2000 Census. One is designed to reduce the time required for and expense of following up on the projected 40 million housing units that may not respond in 2000 to the questionnaires. The other, referred to as Integrated Coverage Measurement (ICM), is designed to adjust the population counts obtained from census questionnaires and nonresponse follow-up procedures to eliminate the endemic differential undercount. Rising Census Costs
The cost of the census has steadily increased over the course of 200 years. The rate of increase will continue to escalate with the 2000 Census, which is projected to cost $4 billion. The 2000 Census will rely on computer technology to a greater extent than ever before, but most improvements are not primarily aimed at cost reduction. Several thousand full-time employees from Bureau headquarters are expected to work on the 2000 Decennial Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on historical census issues and reviewed the Census Bureau's plans for the 2000 census. GAO did not evaluate the potential for success, or make recommendations, regarding the 2000 census.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the framers of the Constitution established a requirement for the national government to undertake the census, and described, in general terms, how it should be accomplished; (2) while apportionment is the most widely known use of census data, the data are also used for congressional redistricting, managing federal agencies, and allocating federal funds, and are disseminated to state and local governments, academia, and the private sector as well; (3) for the 2000 Census, the Bureau is planning to rely on a Master Address File, which is to be developed, in part, from the Bureau's 1990 Census address list and the most recent Postal Service address list; (4) the Bureau plans to conduct a 100-percent canvass of all census blocks in early 1999 and will request the Postal Service to validate the city-style addresses prior to the delivery of 2000 Census questionnaires; (5) the Bureau is planning for enumerators to deliver the questionnaires and ask that they be mailed back; (6) the Bureau will focus its efforts to count the homeless in the places where many of them come for services, such as shelters and soup kitchens, as well as targeted outdoor locations; (7) the Bureau has decided to use a paid advertising campaign in 2000 to complement its continuing efforts with its organizational partners; (8) the Bureau is researching the use of questionnaires in additional languages; (9) in order to improve mail response rate, the Bureau is planning to use a new, multiple mail contact strategy; (10) the Bureau plans to use two new sampling procedures in the 2000 census designed to: (a) reduce the time required for and expense of following up on the projected 40 million housing units that may not respond in 2000 to the questionnaires; and (b) adjust the population counts obtained from census questionnaires and nonresponsive follow-up procedures to eliminate the endemic differential undercount; (11) the cost of the census has steadily increased over 200 years, and the rate of increase will continue to escalate with the 2000 Census; (12) the 2000 Census will rely on computer technology to a greater extent than ever before; and (13) several thousand full-time employees from Bureau headquarters are expected to work on the 2000 Decennial Census. |
gao_GAO-08-216T | gao_GAO-08-216T_0 | Jet Aircraft Operations, Land Uses, and Aircraft Flight Paths Are Key Factors That Affect Communities’ Level of Noise Exposure
Noise is one of the most significant environmental impacts of aviation. Changes in aircraft flight paths can also affect communities’ exposure to aviation noise, redirecting air traffic over some communities that were not previously exposed and diverting it from others. As technologies for reducing aviation noise have advanced (see our discussion of some of these advances in the next section of this testimony), regulatory standards for jet aircraft noise have become more stringent. Incompatible Land Use Exposes Communities to Aviation Noise and Erodes Gains in Noise Control Achieved through More Stringent Standards and Advances in Technology
Decisions that allow communities to expand near airports may expose residences, schools, hospitals, and other uses to aviation noise. For example research sponsored by FAA and NASA shows that for 92 commercial airports, between 1990 and 2000, “the effectiveness of existing federal land-use guidelines on reducing total noise exposure and deterring residential development inside the DNL 65 dB contours is mixed.” Moreover, according to the research, “land-use planning has done little to address the increasing population aggregation on lands near existing noise footprints.”
Furthermore, according to FAA, incompatible land use is emerging as a problem around reliever airports, which predominantly service general aviation traffic that would otherwise go to nearby busy airports. This contention could raise concerns about environmental justice. A Number of Efforts Are Underway or Planned to Reduce the Impact of Aviation Noise
To reduce the impact of aviation noise, FAA, in conjunction with NASA, aircraft and aircraft engine manufacturers, airlines, airports, and communities, follows what the International Civil Aviation Organization refers to as its “balanced approach.” This approach recognizes that short- term opportunities to mitigate the impact of aviation noise on communities should be combined with longer-term efforts to reduce aviation noise. Efforts include reducing noise at the source through more stringent standards; implementing noise abatement programs in communities near airports; supporting research and development programs for new technologies to make aircraft quieter, developing and implementing NextGen technologies and procedures, and restricting aircraft operations . 3). Planning for NextGen Includes an Environmental Focus, and Technologies and Procedures Are Being Developed to Reduce Noise as well as Improve Efficiency
Part of the planning for NextGen includes reducing the environmental impact of aviation because concerns about aviation noise and emissions, which will increase with the expected growth in air traffic, are strong constraints on system capacity. FAA implements a national program for reviewing airport noise and access restrictions, known as Part 161. Airports Are Using Additional Studies, Supplemental Noise Metrics, and Community Outreach to Address Community Concerns about Aviation Noise
According to FAA, communities are increasingly aware of efforts to plan for and mitigate aviation noise, and complaints about noise are coming increasingly from outside the DNL contours, along with demands for action to address noise in areas outside significant noise contours. One of these representatives noted that early and continuous open communication between the airport, local governments, and the affected communities is a key to gaining support for projects to increase airport capacity. Reducing the Impact of Aviation Noise Poses Challenges Involving Technology, Funding, and Cooperation on Land- use Issues
Reducing aviation noise requires technological advances, substantial funding from government and the aviation industry, and cooperation among stakeholders and communities on land-use issues. Providing Funding for Research and Development and for Equipping the Fleet with NextGen Technologies Poses Challenges for Government and Industry
Funding noise reduction research and development programs poses a challenge for federal agencies. Currently, most of the federal funding for reducing aviation noise goes to soundproofing programs. Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways and Actions to Address Them. Aviation and the Environment: Results from a Survey of the Nation’s 50 Busiest Commercial Service Airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
To address projected increases in air traffic and current problems with aviation congestion and delays, the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), an interagency organization within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is working to plan and implement a new air traffic management system, known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). This effort involves implementing new technologies and air traffic control procedures, airspace redesign, and infrastructure developments, including new or expanded runways and airports. Community opposition is, however, a major challenge, largely because of concerns about aviation noise. As a result, according to JPDO, aviation noise will be a primary constraint on NextGen unless its effects can be managed and mitigated. GAO's requested testimony addresses (1) the key factors that affect communities' level of exposure to aviation noise, (2) the status of efforts to address the impact of aviation noise, and (3) major challenges and next steps for reducing and mitigating the effects of aviation noise. The testimony is based on prior GAO work (including a 2000 survey of the nation's 50 largest airports), updated with reviews of recent literature, FAA data and forecasts, and interviews with officials from FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), industry and community representatives, and aviation experts.
What GAO Found
Key factors affecting the level of aviation noise that communities are exposed to include jet aircraft operations, land uses around airports, and aircraft flight paths. With more stringent regulatory standards for aviation noise, enabled by advances in technology, aircraft operations have become quieter, but aviation noise is still a problem when communities allow incompatible land uses, such as residences, schools, and hospitals, near airports. Aircraft flight paths also expose communities to aviation noise, and airspace redesign efforts, which are intended to improve aviation system safety and efficiency, may expose some previously unaffected communities to noise, raising concerns in those communities about higher noise levels. A number of efforts are underway or planned to address the impact of aviation noise on communities. More stringent noise standards for aircraft have been implemented, billions of federal dollars have been spent to soundproof buildings around airports, federal and private funding for research and development has advanced technologies to reduce aviation noise, NextGen technologies and procedures are being planned and will contribute to reducing communities' exposure to noise, some airports have imposed restrictions on the operation of certain aircraft, and airports are reaching out to communities to address their concerns about aviation noise and gain support for projects to increase airports' safety and efficiency. Major challenges for reducing or mitigating the effects of aviation noise include continuing to make technological advances; obtaining substantial funding--from the federal government for NextGen in particular and from industry for equipping aircraft with new technologies--and cooperating on land-use issues. Next steps could include state and local actions to limit incompatible development, FAA's issuance of guidance related to the disposal of land acquired with federal funding for noise mitigation purposes, and the passage of legislative proposals that would address environmental issues, including the reduction of aviation noise. FAA and NASA officials generally agreed with the information presented in this testimony and provided technical clarifications that GAO incorporated. |
gao_T-RCED-99-177 | gao_T-RCED-99-177_0 | Background
In October 1998, the EPA Administrator announced plans to create an office with responsibility for information management, policy, and technology. Such concerns involve the accuracy and completeness of EPA’s environmental data, the fragmentation of the data across many incompatible databases, and the need for improved measures of program outcomes and environmental quality. Nonetheless, EPA has not yet developed an information plan that identifies the office’s goals, objectives, and outcomes. While EPA has made progress in determining the organizational structure of the office, final decisions have not been made and EPA has not yet identified the employees and the resources that will be needed. Information Plan Is Needed
Although EPA has articulated both a vision as well as key goals for its new information office, it has not yet developed an information plan to show how the agency intends to achieve its vision and goals. Needed Resources Are Still Unknown
Even though EPA has not yet determined which staff will be moved to the central information office, the transition team’s director told us that it is expected that the office will have about 350 employees. She added that staffing decisions will be completed by July 1999 and the office will begin functioning sometime in August 1999. On the basis of our prior and ongoing work, we believe that the agency must address these challenges for the reorganization to significantly improve EPA’s information management activities. Among the most important of these challenges are (1) obtaining sufficient resources and expertise to address the complex information management issues facing the agency; (2) overcoming problems associated with EPA’s decentralized organizational structure, such as the lack of agencywide information dissemination policies; (3) balancing the demand for more data with calls from the states and regulated industries to reduce reporting burdens; and (4) working effectively with EPA’s counterparts in state government. They likewise recognize that the reorganization will raise a variety of complex information policy and technology issues. Senior EPA officials responsible for creating the new office anticipate that the information office will need “purse strings control” over the agency’s resources for information management expenditures in order to implement its policies, data standards, procedures, and other decisions agencywide. Overcoming Problems Associated With EPA’s Decentralized Organizational Structure
EPA will need to provide the new office with sufficient authority to overcome organizational obstacles to adopt agencywide information policies and procedures. Given that EPA depends on state regulatory agencies to collect much of the data it needs and to help ensure the quality of that data, EPA recognizes the need to work in a close partnership with the states on a wide variety of information management activities, including the creation of its new information office. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) information management initiatives, focusing on the: (1) status of EPA's efforts to create a central office responsible for information management, policy, and technology issues; and (2) major challenges that the new office needs to address in order to achieve success in collecting, using, and disseminating environmental information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA estimates that its central information office will be operational by the end of August 1999 and will have a staff of about 350 employees; (2) the office will address a broad range of information policy and technology issues, such as improving the accuracy of EPA's data, protecting the security of information that EPA disseminates over the Internet, developing better measures to assess environmental conditions, and reducing information collection and reporting burdens; (3) EPA recognizes the importance of developing an information plan showing the goals of the new office and the means by which they will be achieved but has not yet established milestones or target dates for completing such a plan; (4) although EPA has made progress in determining the organizational structure for the new office, it has not yet finalized decisions on the office's authorities, responsibilities, and budgetary needs; (5) the agency has not performed an analysis to determine the types and the skills of employees that will be needed to carry out the office's functions; (6) EPA officials told GAO that decisions on the office's authorities, responsibilities, budget, and staff will be made before the office is established in August 1999; (7) on the basis of GAO's prior and ongoing reviews of EPA's information management problems, GAO believes that the success of the new office depends on the agency's addressing several key challenges as it develops an information plan, budget, and organizational structure for that office; and (8) most importantly, EPA needs to: (a) provide the office with the resources and the expertise necessary to solve the complex information management, policy, and technology problems facing the agency; (b) empower the office to overcome organizational challenges to adopting agencywide information policies and procedures; (c) balance the agency's need for data on health, the environment, and program outcomes with the call from the states and regulated industries to reduce their reporting burdens; and (d) work closely with its state partners to design and implement improved information management systems. |
gao_GAO-16-557 | gao_GAO-16-557_0 | DOD Sole-Source 8(a) Contract Awards over $20 Million Have Declined While the Number of Competitive 8(a) Awards Has Increased in Recent Years
From fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the number of sole-source 8(a) contract awards over $20 million at DOD started to decline in 2011 and remained low through 2015, while the number of competitive contract awards over $20 million increased in recent years. We found that DOD awarded two sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million with a total value of over $87 million in fiscal year 2015, one of which did not complete the 8(a) justification as required. In one case, a Marine Corps contracting officer awarded a $24 million sole-source 8(a) contract for vehicle maintenance and repair to the incumbent contractor. She further noted that there will not be a follow-on contract for this particular requirement, as the service is no longer needed. In addition, since 2011, tribal 8(a) firms have consistently won higher value awards than other 8(a) firms for competitive 8(a) contracts over $20 million. Five of the 9 sole- source 8(a) contracts we reviewed were competed in the follow-on contracts, and, for most of the remaining 4 contracts with follow-on sole- source contracts, officials stated that they plan to competitively award future procurements or are already in the process of doing so. In addition, DOD officials from almost half of the offices noted that a decline in their budgets or a decline in the size of their requirements rendered the 8(a) justification not applicable because most of their contracts fall below the $20 million threshold. See figure 2. The Army competitively awarded a 4-year $140 million contract for base operations support, which was previously met by a 10-year $397 million sole-source 8(a) contract. The follow-on award went to an 8(a) firm owned by the same tribal entity as the incumbent firm. The current contracting officer did not know why the previous contracting officer awarded separate contracts for this requirement. The contracting officer told us that he intends to competitively award future follow-on contracts. DOD Officials’ Opinions Varied on Whether the 8(a) Justification Will Affect Future Awards of Sole- Source 8(a) Contracts over $20 Million
DOD contracting and small business officials had differing views about whether the 8(a) justification was a deterrent to awarding sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million. Agency Comments
The Department of Defense had no comments on a draft of this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) trends among Department of Defense (DOD) sole-source and competitive 8(a) awards over $20 million from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2015; and (2) the factors to which DOD officials attribute these trends. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 contained a provision for us to assess the impact of the justification and approval for sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million, which we refer to as 8(a) justification. These contracts were identified in our past work on this topic. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's 8(a) program is one of the federal government's primary vehicles for developing small businesses. Tribal 8(a) firms, such as firms owned by Alaska Native Corporations, can win sole-source contracts for any dollar amount in the 8(a) program, while other 8(a) firms generally must compete for contracts valued above certain dollar thresholds.
In March 2011, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was amended to include a new requirement for a written justification for sole-source 8(a) awards over $20 million, where previously no justification was required. GAO has previously reported on tribal 8(a) contracting and recommended improved oversight.
The Appropriations Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to assess the impact of the 8(a) justification at DOD. This report addresses: (1) trends among DOD sole-source and competitive 8(a) awards from fiscal years 2006 through 2015; and (2) the factors to which DOD officials attribute these trends. GAO analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, reviewed 14 sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million—9 of which had been followed by additional contracts for the same requirement, and spoke with contracting officials. GAO judgmentally selected most of the 14 contracts from offices that had awarded numerous sole-source 8(a) contracts in the past.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense had no comments on a draft of this report.
What GAO Found
The number of sole-source contracts over $20 million that the Department of Defense (DOD) awards to small businesses under the 8(a) program has been steadily declining since 2011 when the new requirement for a written justification for these contracts went into effect. In contrast, the number of competitive 8(a) contracts over $20 million has increased in recent years (see figure).
Between GAO's last report on this topic in September 2014 and the end of fiscal year 2015, DOD awarded two sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million—one for vehicle maintenance and repair and one for engineering services. The contracting officer for the vehicle repair contract told GAO that the service will not be needed in the future, while the contracting officer for engineering services stated that he intends to competitively award the next contract for these services. Tribal 8(a) firms eligible for sole-source contracts over $20 million have won a growing number of competed 8(a) contracts since the justification went into effect in 2011.
DOD contracting officials GAO spoke to overwhelmingly cited an agency-wide emphasis on using competition to obtain benefits, such as better pricing, as a reason for the decline in the use of sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million. Further, officials from almost half of the offices also noted that a decline in their budgets or the amount of goods and services needed rendered the 8(a) justification not applicable because most of their contracts fall below the $20 million threshold. Of the 9 sole-source 8(a) contracts GAO reviewed with subsequently awarded contracts, over half were ultimately competed. For example, the Army competitively awarded a 4-year $140 million contract for base operations support, a service that had been previously met by a 10-year $397 million sole-source 8(a) contract. |
gao_GAO-15-775 | gao_GAO-15-775_0 | Deployment May Occur over the Next Few Decades
DOT and Various Stakeholders Are Developing and Testing V2I Technologies through Small Test Deployments
DOT, state and local transportation agencies, academic researchers, and private sector stakeholders are engaged in a number of efforts to develop and test V2I technologies and applications, as well as to develop the technology and systems that enable V2I applications. State and local transportation agencies, which will ultimately be deploying V2I technologies on their roads, have also pursued efforts to test V2I technologies in real-world settings. The Connected Vehicle Pilot Deployment Program: Over the next 5 years, DOT plans to provide up to $100 million in funding for a number of pilot projects that are to design and deploy connected vehicle environments (comprised of various V2I and V2V technologies and applications) to address specific local needs related to safety, mobility, and the environment. DOT and Stakeholders Are Collaborating and Developing V2I Guidance for State and Local Agencies
DOT and other stakeholders have worked to provide guidance to help state and local agencies pursue V2I deployments, since it will be up to state and local transportation agencies to voluntarily deploy V2I technologies. A Variety of Challenges, Including Potential Spectrum Sharing, May Affect the Deployment of V2I
According to experts and industry stakeholders we interviewed, there are a variety of challenges that may affect the deployment of V2I technologies including: (1) ensuring that possible sharing with other wireless users of the radiofrequency spectrum used by V2I communications will not adversely affect V2I technologies’ performance; (2) addressing states’ lack of resources to deploy and maintain V2I technologies; (3) developing technical standards to ensure interoperability between devices and infrastructure; (4) developing and managing a data security system and addressing public perceptions related to privacy; (5) ensuring that drivers respond appropriately to V2I warnings; and (6) addressing the uncertainties related to potential liability issues posed by V2I. DOT is collaborating with the automotive industry and state transportation officials, among others, to identify potential solutions to these challenges. Extent of Benefits and Costs Are Likely to Remain Unclear until Further Deployment of V2I Technology
Experts Identified Potential Safety, Mobility, Operational, and Environmental Benefits to V2I Technologies, but Extent of Benefits Is Not Yet Clear
DOT officials, stakeholders representing state officials and private sector entities, and experts we interviewed stated that the deployment of V2I technologies and applications is expected to result in a variety of benefits to users. This result, in turn, could provide safety or other benefits to drivers. However, DOT has commissioned or conducted some studies to estimate potential V2I benefits, particularly with respect to safety and the environment. According to AASHTO, there are two primary, non-recurring cost categories associated with V2I deployments: Infrastructure deployment costs include the costs for planning, acquiring, and installing the V2I roadside equipment. Second, V2I will also require recurring costs—the costs required to operate and maintain the infrastructure. Estimating equipment costs is difficult at this time because the technology is still developing, according to NCHRP. We incorporated these comments as appropriate. FCC did not provide comments. We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and appropriate congressional committees. We primarily selected stakeholders based on recommendations from DOT and industry associations. Appendix II: Expert Ratings of Potential Challenges Facing Deployment of Vehicle- to-Infrastructure Technologies
As part of our review, we conducted 21 structured interviews with individuals identified by the National Academy of Sciences and based on other factors discussed in our scope and methodology to be experts on vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) technologies (see table 2 in app. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades, automobile crash-related fatality and injury rates have declined over 34 and 40 percent respectively, due in part to improvements in automobile safety. To further improve traffic safety and provide other transportation benefits, DOT is promoting the development of V2I technologies. Among other things, V2I technologies would allow roadside devices and vehicles to communicate and alert drivers of potential safety issues, such as if they are about to run a red light. GAO was asked to review V2I deployment.
This report addresses: (1) the status of V2I technologies; (2) challenges that could affect the deployment of V2I technologies, and DOT efforts to address these challenges; and (3) what is known about the potential benefits and costs of V2I technologies.
GAO reviewed documentation on V2I from DOT, automobile manufacturers, industry associations, and state and local agencies. In addition, GAO interviewed DOT, Federal Communication Commission (FCC), and National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) officials. GAO also conducted structured interviews with 21 experts from a variety of subject areas related to V2I. The experts were chosen based on recommendations from the National Academy of Sciences and other factors.
DOT, NTIA, and the FCC reviewed a draft of this report. DOT and NTIA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. FCC did not provide comments.
What GAO Found
Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) technologies allow roadside devices to communicate with vehicles and warn drivers of safety issues; however, these technologies are still developing. According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), extensive deployment may occur over the next few decades. DOT, state, and local-transportation agencies; researchers; and private-sector stakeholders are developing and testing V2I technologies through test beds and pilot deployments. Over the next 5 years, DOT plans to provide up to $100 million through its Connected Vehicle pilot program for projects that will deploy V2I technologies in real-world settings. DOT and other stakeholders have also provided guidance to help state and local agencies pursue V2I deployments, since it will be up to these agencies to voluntarily deploy V2I technologies.
According to experts and industry stakeholders GAO interviewed, there are a variety of challenges that may affect the deployment of V2I technologies including: (1) ensuring that possible sharing with other wireless users of the radio-frequency spectrum used by V2I communications will not adversely affect V2I technologies' performance; (2) addressing states and local agencies' lack of resources to deploy and maintain V2I technologies; (3) developing technical standards to ensure interoperability; (4) developing and managing data security and addressing public perceptions related to privacy; (5) ensuring that drivers respond appropriately to V2I warnings; and (6) addressing the uncertainties related to potential liability issues posed by V2I. DOT is collaborating with the automotive industry and state transportation officials, among others, to identify potential solutions to these challenges.
The full extent of V2I technologies' benefits and costs is unclear because test deployments have been limited thus far; however, DOT has supported initial research into the potential benefits and costs. Experts GAO spoke to and research GAO reviewed indicate that V2I technologies could provide safety, mobility, environmental, and operational benefits, for example by: (1) alerting drivers to potential dangers, (2) allowing agencies to monitor and address congestion, and (3) providing driving and route advice. V2I costs will include the initial non-recurring costs to deploy the infrastructure and the recurring costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure. While some organizations have estimated the potential average costs for V2I deployments, actual costs will depend on a variety of factors, including where the technology is installed, and how much additional infrastructure is needed to support the V2I equipment. |
gao_NSIAD-96-170 | gao_NSIAD-96-170_0 | Since the Bottom-Up Review, DOD has conducted various studies to examine the two-MRC requirement. Nimble Dancer Promoted Interaction Within DOD and Identified Critical Issues
Nimble Dancer served as a means to promote interaction among DOD organizations and identify critical issues related to the two-MRC requirement. Such issues included the sufficiency of strategic mobility, timeliness of national level decision-making, sufficiency of combat and support forces to meet desired conflict end mitigation of the impact of chemical and biological warfare, impact of extracting forces from peace operations, effectiveness of intelligence capabilities, availability of Bottom-Up Review force enhancements, planning to optimize the apportionment of forces and lift assets for two mitigation of the impact of mine warfare threats, and mitigation of the impact of ballistic missile threats. Nimble Dancer Testing of Key Assumptions Was Limited
During Nimble Dancer, DOD used many key assumptions in modeling the two MRCs that were identical or similar to assumptions in the May 1994 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which implemented the Bottom-Up Review. These limitations precluded DOD from analyzing the robustness of U.S. forces to execute the two-MRC strategy under more adverse circumstances. However, DOD did not conduct these sensitivity analyses. For example, DOD’s analyses on chemical warfare and the extraction of forces from peace operations were limited in scope and did not fully assess the impact of these issues on the MRCs. Furthermore, DOD’s analysis of other critical issues, such as the sufficiency of support forces, effectiveness of intelligence capabilities, and the use of the Army National Guard enhanced brigades primarily consisted of discussions, and in some cases, DOD deferred detailed analysis to other studies. Because of its limited analysis, DOD lost opportunities to acquire additional information on the impact of some critical issues on U.S. capabilities. DOD relied on military judgment—an integral part of any war game—throughout Nimble Dancer. DOD officials told us that in reaching the overall conclusion that the war game tested and validated Bottom-Up Review assumptions and showed that U.S. forces can fight and win two MRCs, participants applied their judgment based on extensive military experience when assessing the implications of modeling and other analytical results. In some cases where analytical results were not available, military judgment was the sole basis for reaching conclusions. We continue to believe that Nimble Dancer did not fully examine certain critical issues to the level implied in DOD’s public comments that the game involved rigorous and robust analyses. Our scope was limited to reviewing the Nimble Dancer war game. Assumption appears favorable. Sensitivity analysis was considered by the Joint Staff but was not done. Limited sensitivity analysis done on key assumptions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the the Department of Defense's (DOD) Nimble Dancer war game, a simulation designed to assess U.S. forces' ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), focusing on whether the methodology, scope, and results were reasonable.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD statements that Nimble Dancer tested basic Bottom-Up Review assumptions through intensive and extensive war-gaming suggest a more rigorous level of analysis than occurred during the exercise; (2) Nimble Dancer was a useful forum for promoting interaction among DOD organizations and in identifying critical issues in fulfilling the two-MRC requirement; (3) however, Nimble Dancer used many of the same favorable assumptions contained in DOD guidance implementing the Bottom-Up Review; (4) although DOD originally considered examining the sensitivity of certain key assumptions, this type of analysis in some cases was not done, and in other cases its scope was limited; (5) furthermore, DOD did not fully examine the impact of certain critical issues; (6) for example, DOD's analyses of chemical warfare and the extraction of forces from peace operations were limited in scope and did not fully identify the impact of these issues on MRCs; (7) also, DOD deferred detailed analyses of the sufficiency of support forces and intelligence capabilities to other studies; (8) the limited sensitivity analysis of certain key assumptions and limited analysis of some critical issues precluded DOD from analyzing the robustness of the programmed Bottom-Up Review force to meet the two-MRC requirement under more adverse circumstances; (9) in addition, DOD lost opportunities to acquire additional information about the impact of specific critical issues on U.S. capabilities; (10) military judgment is an integral part of any DOD war game or analysis; (11) during Nimble Dancer, DOD relied on the professional military judgment of participants to reach its conclusions, especially where modeling and other analytical results were not available; and (12) all of these factors--favorable assumptions, limited sensitivity analysis, the lack of full analysis of certain critical issues, and heavy reliance on military judgment in some cases where analysis was lacking--should be considered in evaluating DOD's conclusions that Nimble Dancer tested and validated Bottom-Up Review assumptions. |
gao_GAO-08-407 | gao_GAO-08-407_0 | Requirements to Comply with Environmental Laws Have Affected Some Training Activities, but Readiness Data Do Not Confirm that These Laws Hamper Military Readiness
The requirement to comply with environmental laws has affected some training activities and how they are conducted, but our review of DOD’s readiness data does not confirm that compliance with these laws hampers overall military readiness. However, DOD officials responsible for planning and facilitating training events may implement adjustments to training events, referred to as “workarounds,” to ensure training requirements are still accomplished. 1). For example, Fort Stewart, Fort Lewis, and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton officials said trainers instruct units to pretend restricted training areas are holy grounds, mine fields, or any other restricted area in theatre and advise them to avoid these areas. DOD’s Use of Exemptions Has Allowed Some Training Activities to Continue and Enabled Others to Avoid Potential Delays
DOD has used the exemptions from the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act to continue to conduct training activities that might otherwise have been prohibited, delayed, or canceled, and the Endangered Species Act exemptions have enabled DOD to avoid potential training delays by providing it greater autonomy in managing its training lands. The Navy has twice invoked exemptions from the Marine Mammal Protection Act to continue using mid-frequency active sonar in its training exercises that would otherwise have been prevented. DOD’s exemption to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act eliminated the possibility of having to cancel military training exercises, such as Navy live-fire training exercises at the Farallon de Medinilla Target Range in the Pacific Ocean. Endangered Species and Migratory Bird Act Exemptions Have Not Adversely Affected the Environment, and the Effect of the Marine Mammal Protection Act Exemption Has Not Been Determined
On the basis of meetings with officials within and outside DOD and visits to 17 training ranges, we found no instances where DOD’s use of exemptions from the Endangered Species Act or Migratory Bird Treaty Act has adversely affected the environment; however, the impact of the Marine Mammal Protection Act exemption has not yet been determined. However, NGO officials we spoke with were concerned that DOD’s use of its integrated natural resources management plans in lieu of critical habitat designations may weaken oversight of endangered species found on military lands. Moreover, the services employ a variety of measures and conservation activities to mitigate the effects of their training activities on endangered species populations on their lands. In order to advise decision makers on a proposed project, policy or program, best practices and our prior work recommend that agencies develop a business case whereby they can assess and demonstrate the viability of proposed initiatives. Congress Lacks a Sound Basis for Assessing the Need to Enact the Three Proposed Exemptions
Because DOD has not provided any specific examples to support assertions that its training activities have been hindered by the requirements of the Clean Air Act, RCRA, or CERCLA, Congress lacks a sound basis for assessing the need to enact these three remaining exemptions. Without a sound business case that demonstrates the benefits and adverse effects on training and readiness, costs, and risk associated with the proposed exemptions, DOD will have little on which to base any further requests, and Congress will have difficulty determining whether additional exemptions from environmental laws are warranted. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the effects, if any, of environmental laws and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of exemptions to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Acton training activities and military readiness, we judgmentally selected and visited 17 military training locations throughout the continental United States, which included training sites from each military service component, to directly observe the effects of environmental laws and DOD’s use of exemptions on training activities, military readiness, and the environment. We also met with officials from other federal regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. To assess the extent to which DOD has demonstrated that proposed statutory exemptions from the Clean Air Act; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act would help the department to achieve its training and readiness goals, we reviewed the department’s most recent annual sustainable range reports, its Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative, and other documents for elements of a sound business case. | Why GAO Did This Study
A fundamental principle of military readiness is that the military must train as it intends to fight, and military training ranges allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to accomplish this goal. According to DOD officials, heightened focus on the application of environmental statutes has affected the use of its training areas. Since 2003, DOD has obtained exemptions from three environmental laws and has sought exemptions from three others. This report discusses the impact, if any, of (1) environmental laws on DOD's training activities and military readiness, (2) DOD's use of statutory exemptions from environmental laws on training activities, (3) DOD's use of statutory exemptions on the environment, and (4) the extent to which DOD has demonstrated the need for additional exemptions. To address these objectives, GAO visited 17 training locations; analyzed environmental impact and readiness reports; and met with officials at service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, federal regulatory agencies, and nongovernmental environmental groups.
What GAO Found
Compliance with environmental laws has caused some training activities to be cancelled, postponed, or modified, and DOD has used adjustments to training events, referred to as "workarounds," to accomplish some training objectives while meeting environmental requirements. Some DOD trainers instruct units to pretend restricted training areas are holy grounds, mine fields, or other restricted areas in theater, simulating the need to avoid specific areas and locations when deployed. GAO's review of readiness data for active duty combat units did not confirm that compliance with environmental laws hampers overall military readiness. Since 2006, the Navy has twice invoked the Marine Mammal Protection Act exemption to continue using mid-frequency active sonar in training exercises that would otherwise have been prevented. DOD's exemption from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, authorizing the taking of migratory birds, eliminated the possibility of having to delay or cancel military training exercises, such as Navy live-fire training at the Farallon de Medinilla Target Range. The exemption to the Endangered Species Act, which precludes critical habitat designation on DOD lands, enables DOD to avoid potential training delays by providing greater autonomy in managing its training lands. On the basis of meetings with officials within and outside DOD and visits to 17 training ranges, GAO found no instances where DOD's use of exemptions from the Endangered Species Act or Migratory Bird Treaty Act has adversely affected the environment, but the impact of the Marine Mammal Protection Act exemption has not yet been determined. The services employ a variety of measures and conservation activities to mitigate the effects of training activities on the natural resources located on DOD lands. Additionally, regulatory officials GAO spoke to said DOD has done an effective job protecting and preserving endangered species and habitats on its installations. However, some nongovernmental organizations have expressed concern that the Endangered Species Act exemption allowing DOD to avoid critical habitat designations may weaken oversight from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. DOD has not presented a sound business case demonstrating the need for the proposed exemptions from the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. Best practices and prior GAO work recommend that agencies develop a business case that includes, among other things, expected benefits, costs, and risks associated with a proposal's implementation. However, DOD has not provided any specific examples showing that training and readiness have been hampered by requirements of these laws. Meanwhile some federal, state, and nongovernmental organizations have expressed concern that the proposed exemptions, if granted, could harm the environment. Until DOD develops a business case demonstrating the need for these exemptions, Congress will lack a sound basis for assessing whether to enact requested exemptions. |
gao_GAO-01-812 | gao_GAO-01-812_0 | EPA also maintains 10 regional offices to implement federal environmental statutes and to provide oversight of related state activities. EPA's staff or full time equivalents (FTEs) grew by about 18 percent from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1999 (see fig. EPA's Human Capital Strategy Is a Promising First Step but Lacks Key Elements
EPA's human capital strategy is a promising initial effort to develop a framework for managing the agency's workforce. EPA and federal agencies in general have not given adequate attention to human capital management in the past. OECA's Workforce Deployment Does Not Ensure the Consistent Enforcement of Environmental Requirements Across Regions
Managing EPA's enforcement workforce is particularly challenging because enforcement activities pervade the agency's programs and regions. OECA provides overall direction on enforcement policies to the regions, which carry out enforcement actions and oversee the enforcement activities of states that EPA has authorized to enforce federal environmental regulations. Furthermore, as EPA implements its human capital strategy over the next few years, we recommend that the Administrator better align the strategy with those of high-performing organizations by working toward developing a system for workforce allocation and deployment that is explicitly linked to the agency's strategic and program planning efforts and that is based on systematic efforts of each major program office to accurately identify the size of its workforce, the deployment of staff geographically and organizationally, and the skills needed to support its strategic goals; designing succession plans to maintain a sustained commitment and continuity of leadership within the agency based on (1) a review of current and emerging leadership needs and (2) identified sources of executive talent within and outside the agency; targeting recruitment and hiring practices to fill the agency's short- and long-term human capital needs and, specifically, to fill gaps identified through EPA's workforce planning system; and implementing training practices that include (1) education, training, and other developmental opportunities to help the agency's employees build the competencies that are needed to achieve EPA's shared vision, and (2) an explicit link between the training curricula and the competencies needed for mission accomplishment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to determine (1) the extent that EPA's strategy to improve its human capital management includes the key elements associated with successful human capital strategies, (2) the major human capital challenges facing EPA in successfully implementing its strategy, and (3) the extent to which EPA's deployment of its enforcement workforce ensures that federal environmental requirements are consistently enforced across regions. EPA may also take appropriate enforcement action against violators. EPA administers its environmental enforcement responsibilities through its headquarters Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA). | Why GAO Did This Study
During the last decade, as most federal agencies downsized, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) workforce grew by about 18 percent. Much of this growth occurred in EPA's 10 regional offices, which carry out most of the agency's efforts to encourage industry compliance with environmental regulations. Currently, EPA's workforce of 17,000 individuals includes scientists, engineers, lawyers, environmental protection specialists, and mission-support staff. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether EPA is giving enough attention to managing this large and diverse workforce. The workforce management practices of EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA)--which takes direct action against violators of environmental statutes and oversees the environmental enforcement activities of states--have come under particular scrutiny because its enforcement activities span all of EPA's programs and regions. Although EPA has began several initiatives during the last decade to better organize and manage its workforce, it has not received the resources and senior-level management attention needed to realize them. This report reviews (1) the extent to which EPA's strategy includes the key elements associated with successful human capital strategies, (2) the major human capital challenges EPA faces in the successful implementation of its strategy, and (3) how OECA deploys the enforcement workforce among EPA's 10 regions to ensure that federal environmental requirements are consistently enforced across regions either by OECA or by states with enforcement programs that OECA oversees.
What GAO Found
GAO found that EPA's November 2000 human capital strategy is a promising first step towards improving the agency's management of its workforce, but it lacks some of the key elements that are commonly found in the human capital strategies of high-performing organizations. EPA's major challenges in human capital management involve assessing the work requirements for its employees, ensuring continuity of leadership within the agency, and hiring and developing skilled staff. OECA does not systematically deploy its workforce to ensure the consistent enforcement of federal regulations throughout all EPA regions and bases deployment decisions on outdated and incomplete information on key regional workload factors. |
gao_GAO-12-871 | gao_GAO-12-871_0 | Many low-income Medicare beneficiaries receive assistance from Medicaid to pay Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements. MIPPA included several new requirements aimed at eliminating barriers to MSP enrollment. Specifically, MIPPA required SSA to, beginning January 1, 2010, transfer data from LIS applications, at the option of applicants, to state Medicaid agencies, and it required state Medicaid agencies to use the transferred information to initiate an MSP application. SSA was also required to make information on MSPs available to those potentially eligible for LIS, coordinate outreach for LIS and MSPs, and train staff on MSPs.included a number of other provisions related to MSPs. SSA Transferred over 1.9 Million Applications to States, Made Information on MSPs Available to Potentially Eligible Individuals, and Trained Staff
As required by MIPPA, SSA began transferring applications in January 2010, and SSA reported transferring over 1.9 million applications to states between January 4, 2010, and May 31, 2012. SSA Spent about $12 Million in the First 3 Years and Reported That Implementing the Requirements Did Not Significantly Affect SSA’s Workload
In fiscal years 2009 through 2011, SSA spent about $12 million to implement the MIPPA requirements. Of the $24.1 million appropriated by MIPPA for the initial costs of implementing the requirements, SSA spent $9.2 million combined for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 ($4.5 million and $4.7 million respectively). In fiscal year 2011, SSA spent about $2.5 million of the $3 million appropriated under MIPPA for the ongoing administrative costs of carrying out the requirements. Estimated MSP Enrollment Increased from 2007 through 2011 with the Largest Increases Occurring after the Requirements Took Effect
Using CMS data, we estimated that MSP enrollment increased each year from 2007 through 2011. The largest increases in MSP enrollment occurred in 2010 and 2011 (5.2 percent and 5.1 percent respectively), the first 2 years that the MIPPA requirements were in effect. A number of factors may have contributed to the higher levels of growth in MSP enrollment in 2010 and 2011, including SSA application transfers and outreach, other MIPPA provisions and related changes to state policies, and the economic downturn. In response to our survey of state Medicaid officials about the effects of the application transfers on MSP enrollment, officials from 28 states reported that MSP enrollment has increased as a result of the application transfers. While there are no nationwide data that demonstrate the effects of the SSA application transfers on MSP enrollment, 3 of the 6 states we contacted to supplement our survey tracked some information on the outcomes of applications transferred by SSA.application transfers from SSA in 2011, Arizona reported enrolling about 800 of 16,000 applicants; Louisiana reported enrolling about As a result of the 3,300 of about 21,800 applicants; and Pennsylvania officials reported enrolling about 16,000 of 37,500 applicants. For example, these enrollees may have instead enrolled by applying directly through the state. The extent to which the SSA application transfers required system changes or affected workload may have depended on whether the state treated the transferred information as verified. Though CMS policy allows states to treat the information in the transferred applications as verified, in response to our survey, officials from 35 states reported requiring applicants to reverify some or all of the information before the state would determine eligibility for MSPs. Specifically, of the three states that we contacted that accepted SSA’s verification of the application information, two states reported being able to enroll some of the transferred applicants with little to no work required of caseworkers. This verification process included multiple steps by states and applicants. Differences in how SSA and states count income and assets for LIS versus MSPs may have driven states’ choices to require further verification of information in the transferred applications. The guidance reminded states that they have the option to align their definition with SSA’s, and noted that doing so would expand eligibility for MSPs to more people and reduce states’ administrative burden in processing the applications transferred by SSA. Aligning the methods for determining income and assets for MSPs with those of LIS is an option currently available to states, and some states have used that flexibility. SSA stated, in an e-mail, that the report accurately describes its implementation of the requirements. Appendix I: GAO Methodology for Estimating Change in Medicare Savings Program Enrollment
To describe the change in Medicare Savings Program (MSP) enrollment from 2007 through 2011, we used data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to estimate annual enrollment and the change in annual enrollment over that period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established four MSPs and the LIS program to help low-income beneficiaries pay for some or all of Medicares cost-sharing requirements. Historically low enrollment in MSPs has been attributed to lack of awareness about the programs and cumbersome enrollment processes through state Medicaid programs. MIPPA included requirements for SSA and state Medicaid agencies aimed at eliminating barriers to MSP enrollment. Most notably, MIPPA created a new pathway to MSP enrollment by requiring SSA, beginning January 1, 2010, to transfer the information from a LIS application to the relevant state Medicaid agency, and the state must initiate an application for MSP enrollment. MIPPA also required GAO to study the effect of these requirements. This report describes (1) SSAs implementation of the requirements; (2) how MSP enrollment levels have changed from 2007 through 2011 and the factors that may have contributed to those changes; and (3) the effects of the MIPPA requirements on states administration of MSPs.
GAO reviewed documents and data on SSAs efforts to transfer applications and implement other MIPPA requirements, analyzed MSP enrollment data from CMS, surveyed Medicaid officials from the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and contacted officials from 6 states selected, in part, because they accounted for over 20 percent of MSP enrollment.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) took a number of steps to implement the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) requirements aimed at eliminating barriers to Medicare Savings Program (MSP) enrollment and spent about $12 million in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 to do so. SSA reported transferring over 1.9 million Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) program applications to state Medicaid agencies between January 4, 2010 and May 31, 2012. SSA also took steps to make information available to potentially eligible individuals, conduct outreach, and train SSA staff on MSPs. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, SSA spent $9.2 million of the $24.1 million appropriated by MIPPA for initial implementation costs, and in fiscal year 2011, SSA spent about $2.5 million of the $3 million appropriated by MIPPA for ongoing administrative costs. SSA officials told GAO that implementing the MIPPA requirements has not significantly affected its overall workload and that SSA expects funding provided under the law to be sufficient to carry out the requirements.
Using data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), GAO estimates that MSP enrollment increased each year from 2007 through 2011. The largest increases occurred in 2010 and 2011 (5.2 percent and 5.1 percent respectively), the first 2 years that the MIPPA requirements were in effect. Several factors may have contributed to the higher levels of growth in MSP enrollment during these 2 years, including SSA application transfers and outreach, other MIPPA provisions related to MSPs, and the economic downturn. For example, while there are no nationwide data demonstrating the effects of the SSA application transfers, officials from 28 states reported that MSP enrollment had increased as a result of the transfers.
Officials from most of the six states GAO contacted to supplement its survey reported that the SSA application transfers led to changes in eligibility systems and had increased the state's workload, that is, the time spent processing MSP applications. The extent to which the application transfers resulted in system or workload changes may have depended on whether states accepted SSA's verification of the information transferred, as allowed under CMS policy. In response to GAO's survey, officials from 35 states reported that the state required the applicant to reverify at least some of the information. GAO found from interviews with officials from selected states that requiring reverification from applicants included multiple steps by the state and applicant. In contrast, officials from two states that accepted SSA's verification of the information told GAO that the state was able to enroll some of the applicants transferred by SSA with little to no work required by caseworkers. Differences in how SSA and states count income and assets when determining eligibility for LIS versus MSPs may have driven states' decisions to require verification from applicants. States have the flexibility under federal law to align methods for counting income and assets for MSPs with those for LIS and doing so may reduce the administrative burden of processing the transferred applications. However, doing so would likely increase enrollment and, therefore, increase state Medicaid costs. SSA, in an e-mail, agreed with GAO's description of its implementation of MIPPA requirements. |
gao_T-NSIAD-97-187 | gao_T-NSIAD-97-187_0 | Significant Opportunities Exist to Improve Support Infrastructure and Business Practices
There is a need to improve the economy and efficiency of DOD’s business practices and further reduce its support infrastructure. Expenditures on wasteful or inefficient activities divert defense funds from other defense needs such as the modernization of weapon systems. Despite spending reductions that have occurred already, our review of DOD’s future years funding plans through fiscal year 2001 indicates that overall support infrastructure funding as a percentage of the budget is projected to remain relatively constant. DOD’s inability to effectively address the underlying causes of the high-risk areas has resulted in billions of dollars being wasted and places billions of dollars in future spending at similar risk. We concluded that effectively addressing the high-risk areas will require congressional support and a commitment by senior-level DOD mangers to a strategy that is based on the framework provided by the Government Performance and Results Act and other recent legislation. The six high-risk areas are financial management, information technology, weapon systems acquisition, contract management, infrastructure, and inventory management. Observations on the Defense Reform Act of 1997
As requested, our observations are focused on the titles of the bill relating to defense personnel reforms, defense business practice reforms, and miscellaneous additional defense reforms. Therefore, as DOD develops its personnel reduction plan required by this section, it is important that it considers restructuring of headquarters’ organizations and support activities. In February 1996, we reported that the U.S. Transportation Command retained an outdated and inefficient modally oriented organizational structure. Our work shows that opportunities exist to improve the business practices addressed in this title. We have questions about the section removing the Defense Automation and Printing Service’s surcharge and suggest the Committee may want to reconsider the section. Section 407: Coordination of the Department of Defense criminal investigations and audits. Section 407 may be inconsistent with this concept authorizing the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) to participate in jurisdictional decisions among the service auditors and to resolve jurisdictional disputes. This role raises questions regarding the independence of service audit organizations. 10, 1997). 8, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the titles within the Defense Reform Act of 1997 (H.R. 1778) dealing with defense personnel, business practices, and miscellaneous reforms.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO strongly supports the need to improve the Department of Defense's (DOD) business practices and further reduce its support infrastructure; (2) despite spending reductions that have occurred, GAO's review of DOD's future years funding plans through fiscal year (FY) 2001 indicates that overall support infrastructure funding as a percentage of the budget is projected to remain relatively constant in the range of 57-58 percent; (3) DOD needs to achieve significant savings in its support infrastructure to help increase funding for weapon system modernization and meet its aim of increasing procurement funding from $44.1 billion to $68.3 billion between FY 1997 and 2002; (4) opportunities to improve defense business practices are illustrated by GAO's February 1997 high-risk series of reports that include six areas (financial management, information technology, weapon systems acquisition, contract management, infrastructure, and inventory management) within DOD; (5) DOD's inability to effectively address weaknesses in high-risk areas has resulted in billions of dollars being wasted and places billions of dollars in future spending at similar risk; (6) in order to effectively address the underlying causes of the high-risk areas, GAO believes that senior-level defense managers need to develop a strategic plan; (7) legislative initiatives such as H.R. 1778, and the Government Performance and Results Act, are important to stimulating long-term changes needed in DOD; (8) there are opportunities to achieve savings by reducing personnel overhead in various DOD headquarters and support areas identified in the bill; (9) GAO's work shows that there are inefficiencies in various defense activities addressed in the bill such as the U.S. Transportation Command, and that there are significant opportunities to change business practices in defense agencies as suggested by this title; (10) the requirement to remove the Defense Automation and Printing Service's surcharge billed to its military customers would be inconsistent with working capital fund cost accounting principles; (11) GAO questions part of the provision creating a board to coordinate audits because it would authorize the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) to participate in jurisdictional decisions among the service auditors and to resolve jurisdictional disputes; and (12) this role raises questions regarding the independence of service audit organizations. |
gao_GAO-15-142 | gao_GAO-15-142_0 | Vaccines Covered by the Program and on the Vaccine Injury Table
VICP includes a vaccine injury table that lists the vaccines covered by the program and the injuries associated with each those vaccines. HHS, as the respondent in the process, receives a copy of the petition, including medical records, and other documentation filed with the USCFC. Negotiated settlement. Most Claims Filed Since Fiscal Year 1999 Have Taken Multiple Years to Adjudicate
VICP claims filed since fiscal year 1999 took an average of about 5 and a half years to adjudicate, according to USCFC data for the nearly 8,800 claims filed since fiscal year 1999 that were adjudicated as of March 31, 2014. More than 1,000 (11 percent) of the claims filed since fiscal year 1999 were still in process (pending) as of March 31, 2014; most of these had been pending for 2 years or less (see fig. For claims filed since fiscal year 2009, a greater percentage of claims were resolved within 1 or 2 years. HHS has reported the program has met its annual target of 1,300 days (about 3.5 years) for the average time to adjudicate non-autism claims in all but 1 year since fiscal year 2009. Six Vaccines Have Been Added to the Vaccine Injury Table since Fiscal Year 1999 without Covered Injuries; HHS Is Considering Additional Changes
Since fiscal year 1999, HHS has added six vaccines to the vaccine injury table (but has not added covered injuries associated with these vaccines to the table). This means that while individuals may file VICP claims for those vaccines, each petitioner must demonstrate that the vaccine that was administered caused the alleged injury. Trust Fund Balance Has Increased since 2009, As Has Petitioner and Attorney Compensation and Other VICP-Related Spending
The Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund balance increased to more than $3 billion in fiscal year 2013 despite increased spending by HRSA, DOJ, and USCFC on petitioner compensation, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other VICP-related expenses. From Fiscal Year 2009 to 2013 the Trust Fund Balance Gradually Increased to More than $3 Billion
The balance in the trust fund increased from $2.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2009 to nearly $3.3 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013. As required by applicable law pertaining to the management of trust funds, Treasury oversees the investment of part of the net revenue from vaccine excise taxes. Petitioners’ compensation paid by HRSA using appropriations from the trust fund increased to over $254 million in fiscal year 2013. For example, HRSA reported obligating about $9.6 million for medical experts to review petitioner claims and provide expert testimony during adjudication proceedings for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. In that time, the program has awarded more than $2.8 billion to thousands of petitioners. Several aspects of the program have changed over the years. HHS and USCFC agreed with our findings and provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendixes IV and V, respectively. HHS, USCFC, DOJ, and Treasury also provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Vaccine Injury Table, September 2014
Vaccine Vaccines against tetanus (e.g., DTaP, DTP, DT, Td, or TT)
Vaccines against pertussis (e.g., DTP, DTaP, P, DTP-Hib)
Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock Encephalopathy (or encephalitis)
Vaccines against measles, mumps, rubella in any combination (e.g., MMR, MR, M, R)
Encephalopathy (or encephalitis)
Vaccines against measles (e.g., MMR, MR, M)
Vaccines against rubella (e.g., MMR, MR, R)
Vaccines against polio (polio live virus-containing (OPV))
Vaccines against polio (polio inactivated virus-containing (IPV))
Vaccines against hemophilus influenzae type b (Hib conjugate vaccine)
Vaccines against varicella Vaccines against rotavirus Vaccines against pneumococcal disease (pneumococcal conjugate vaccine) Vaccines against influenza (trivalent vaccine) Vaccines against meningococcal disease Vaccines against human papillomavirus (HPV)
Appendix II: Covered Vaccines and Injuries on the Vaccine Injury Table, Fiscal Years 1999-2014
Vaccine Vaccines and Injuries Added to the Table before Fiscal Year 1999 Tetanus- containing
Human Papillomavirus Vaccines and Injuries Added and Removed from the Table since Fiscal Year 1999 Hib polysaccharide (unconjugated)
Appendix III: Compensation to Petitioners and Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Fiscal Years 1999-2013
This appendix shows the total amount paid in compensation to petitioners under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the number of compensated claims in fiscal years 1999-2013 (see table 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Vaccines save lives by preventing disease in the people who receive them. In some instances, however, a vaccine can have severe side effects, including death or an injury requiring lifetime medical care. VICP provides compensation to people for injuries and deaths associated with certain vaccines for medical and other costs. The program includes an injury table that lists the injuries that are presumed to be caused by vaccines covered by the program. The program may also compensate individuals for injuries not on the table; however, in those cases causation is not presumed. In both cases, medical and other records are required. VICP pays claims from a trust fund. Since the program began in 1988, it has awarded more than $2.8 billion in compensation.
GAO was asked to review the program. GAO examined (1) how long it has taken to adjudicate claims and how claims have been adjudicated, (2) the changes to the vaccine injury table, and (3) how the balance of and spending from the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund have changed, among other objectives.
GAO examined data and interviewed officials from HHS, DOJ, and USCFC, including data on claims filed since fiscal year 1999 and their status as of March 31, 2014; reviewed laws and agency documents; and reviewed Treasury data and agency data on compensation and obligations for other VICP-related expenses for fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
HHS and USCFC agreed with GAO's findings, and HHS, USCFC, DOJ, and Treasury provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Most of more than 9,800 claims filed with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) since fiscal year 1999 have taken multiple years to adjudicate (see fig.). More than 1,000 (11 percent) of claims filed since fiscal year 1999 were still in process (pending) as of March 31, 2014; most of these were pending for 2 years or less. A greater percentage of the claims filed since fiscal year 2009 were resolved within 1 or 2 years. In all but 1 year since fiscal year 2009, the program has met the target for the average time to adjudicate claims (about 3.5 years) tracked by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers the program. Officials from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (USCFC), where VICP claims are adjudicated, report that delays may occur while petitioners gather evidence for their claims. Since 2006, about 80 percent of compensated claims have been resolved through a negotiated settlement.
Since fiscal year 1999, HHS has added six vaccines to the vaccine injury table, but it has not added covered injuries associated with these vaccines to the table. This means that while individuals may file VICP claims for these vaccines, each petitioner must demonstrate that the vaccine that was administered caused the alleged injury. HHS is considering adding covered injuries associated with these vaccines; but as of September 2014, it had not published any final rules to do so.
The balance of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, managed by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) increased from $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2009 to nearly $3.3 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013 as the trust fund's income (from net revenues from vaccine excise taxes and interest on investments) outpaced its disbursements to HHS, USCFC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which represents HHS in VICP proceedings. VICP compensation, funded by the trust fund, increased from less than $126 million in each of fiscal years 1999 to 2009 to over $254 million in fiscal year 2013. |
gao_RCED-95-269 | gao_RCED-95-269_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the financial condition of the crop insurance program, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry asked us to examine whether USDA (1) set insurance rates to achieve the legislative requirement of collecting premiums sufficient to cover 91 percent of the claims paid—termed “91-percent adequacy” in this report; (2) reduced the losses caused by high-risk farmers; (3) based claims payments on farmers’ normal production levels; and (4) set deadlines for farmers to purchase crop insurance before planting begins. As a result, the rates for both coverage and production levels are not aligned with risk. At the same time, because of concerns that farmers would stop purchasing crop insurance, USDA has failed to raise the basic rates promptly to ensure achievement of 91-percent adequacy. The dates are set for a several-state area rather than for local growing conditions. However, by not routinely setting these deadlines by crop-growing regions, USDA enables some farmers to better evaluate growing conditions and increases the likelihood that they will purchase crop insurance when growing conditions are poor. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined whether the Department of Agriculture (USDA): (1) set insurance rates to achieve the legislative requirement of 91-percent adequacy; (2) reduced the losses caused by high-risk farmers; (3) based payments to farmers for claimed losses on their actual production history; and (4) set deadlines for farmers to purchase crop insurance before planting their crops.
What GAO Found
GAO found that USDA: (1) has improved the overall financial condition of the crop insurance program by raising the premium rates, but the basic rates still do not meet the requirement of 91-percent adequacy set by Congress; (2) sets higher rates for high-risk farmers to help reduce the government's losses; (3) has made changes to more accurately calculate farmers' production levels based on their historical experience; and (4) generally sets the same deadline for an area covering several states rather than considering the local growing conditions, and as a result some farmers are able to more precisely evaluate growing conditions at planting time and are more likely to purchase crop insurance when growing conditions are poor. |
gao_GAO-10-29 | gao_GAO-10-29_0 | Participants Said Using Federal Income Tax Data and Revising the FAFSA Could Reduce Applicants’ Burden
Obtaining IRS Tax Data Could Decrease the Burden on Applicants
Many study group participants said using federal income tax data the government already collects on annual income tax forms could shorten the application process, making it easier on students and their families. Specifically, these participants proposed that relevant federal income tax data be directly transferred to the appropriate answer fields on each applicant’s online FAFSA. Changes to the Design and Contents of the Form Could Streamline the Application
Many study group participants proposed changes to the design and contents of the FAFSA that could help streamline the form and make the application process less daunting for prospective students. Although Education has worked to clarify the online and paper FAFSA instructions in recent years, some participants said the length and complexity of the instructions continue to confuse applicants and should be further reduced and clarified. Participants Said Reducing the Financial Information Required by the Need Analysis Formula Could Ease Applicants’ Burden, but Some Aid Redistribution Is Likely
Using Less Financial Information to Determine Eligibility Could Reduce Burden on Applicants
Many study group participants supported changing the need analysis formula to require less financial information from federal student aid applicants. In particular, participants discussed the merits of relying solely on a family’s income— as measured by adjusted gross income (AGI) on federal income tax forms—and the number of tax exemptions to determine aid eligibility. Reducing the Amount of Financial Information Collected Could Result in Redistribution of Federal and State Aid
Many participants said that although it would make the application process easier on prospective students, reducing the amount of financial information collected would likely result in some change in the distribution of federal, state, and institutional aid, and would create new winners and losers among the pool of aid applicants. Education’s recent proposal to limit the federal formula to financial information available through federal income tax forms would eliminate 26 financial questions—including those on assets—while retaining up to 20 financial questions that could all be answered with federal income tax data. Participants Said Technology and Public Outreach Are Central to Implementing Changes, but Several Challenges Must Be Addressed
Using IRS Tax Data to Populate the Electronic Form Is Feasible, but Presents Challenges
While many study group participants noted the potential benefits of using IRS data to populate the online FAFSA, some raised questions about the feasibility and limitations of this approach. Acknowledging these limitations, Education officials said making the electronic transfer of IRS tax data to the FAFSA feasible for fall college applicants would likely require the use of income data that would be one year older than the information Education currently uses to determine financial aid eligibility. As of July 1, 2010, the Higher Education Opportunity Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to allow such older data to be used in calculating applicants’ aid eligibility. For example, applicants may request professional judgment if they think their financial aid award does not match their current economic need. In addition, some participants expressed concern about the possible effects of using prior-prior year data on applicants who are not required to file income taxes. Currently, New York residents who submit the online FAFSA are immediately provided a link to the New York state aid Web site. Beginning in January 2010, Education plans to offer this type of connection to all states, but the costs to states—and whether Education will provide financial assistance to states to facilitate this change—are not yet known. In addition to technological improvements, participants suggested that efforts to simplify the application should be accompanied by a strategy to increase public outreach efforts. Our study group participants proposed various options for mitigating some of the complexity in the application process, and Education has proceeded with the early phases of its new plan for simplification, which includes a public outreach component. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Education, Department of Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service for review and comment. Appendix I: Expert Panel Agenda
Simplifying the Federal Student Aid Application Process A Government Accountability Office Expert Panel Breakfast available in the room Approaches to shortening the form and changing the application process What are some approaches to shorten the Free Application for Federal Student Aid or otherwise make it less time-consuming to complete? Break Approaches to changing the statutory need analysis formula How could the statutory need analysis formula be changed to reduce the amount of financial information collected, without causing significant redistribution of federal grants and subsidized loans? | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal student aid is intended to play an integral part in fulfilling the promise of greater academic access and success for less affluent students. However, many experts have expressed concern about the length and complexity of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and the statutory need analysis formula used to determine aid eligibility. The Higher Education Opportunity Act required GAO to form a study group to examine options and implications in simplifying the financial aid process. The study group focused on (1) identifying ways to shorten the FAFSA and make it less burdensome to complete, (2) identifying changes to the statutory need analysis formula that would reduce the amount of financial information required by the FAFSA without causing significant redistribution of federal and state student aid, and (3) determining how any changes to the FAFSA and the statutory need analysis formula could be implemented. To address these questions we convened an expert panel on May 7, 2009, and conducted additional interviews with experts. This summary captures the ideas and themes that emerged at the panel and during interviews. It does not necessarily represent the views of GAO or of the organizations whose representatives participated in the study group.
What GAO Found
Study group participants said using federal income tax data that the government already collects and revising the form could shorten the application process, making it easier on students and their families. Many participants proposed that relevant federal income tax data be directly transferred to the appropriate answer fields on each applicant's online FAFSA, an approach that the Department of Education (Education) plans to pilot for some applicants in January 2010. Such a change could decrease the amount and complexity of some of the financial questions on the application. In addition, many participants proposed changes to the design and contents of the form to clarify and streamline the application. Education has recently taken steps to shorten and reorganize the online form and has plans for further improvements. Participants said changing the federal formula to reduce required financial information would ease applicants' burden, but such a shift would likely result in some change in the distribution of aid. Many study group participants supported changing the need analysis formula to rely solely on a family's income and number of tax exemptions to determine aid eligibility. These changes would greatly reduce the number of complicated financial questions on the FAFSA. However, reducing the amount of financial information collected could change the distribution of federal, state, and institutional aid, prompting some concern about this approach. Education's recent legislative proposal to limit the formula to financial information available through tax forms would eliminate 26 financial questions, including those on assets. Participants said technology and public outreach efforts could improve the federal student aid application process, but successful implementation of changes hinges on the ability of federal and state agencies to address several challenges. While it is feasible to electronically transfer tax data directly from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the FAFSA by using income data one year older than what is currently required, participants expressed some concern about the potential implications of such a change. Specifically, using older tax data might result in increased aid eligibility for some applicants whose data may not reflect their current economic needs. In addition, it may be more difficult for applicants who do not file taxes to provide sufficient documentation of their income from two years earlier. Education and the IRS have begun developing a plan to allow some applicants to electronically access their tax data when they apply for aid online. However, because taxpayers can submit their data as late as April 15, these data will not be available in time to accommodate most aid applicants. Many participants also called for linking state aid Web sites to the online federal application to mitigate the potential effects of federal formula changes on state aid. Education plans to offer this option to states in January 2010. In addition, participants said that efforts to simplify the application process should be accompanied by a public outreach strategy aimed at increasing knowledge of the availability of federal student aid. Education plans to undertake a public outreach campaign beginning in fall 2009. |
gao_GAO-14-272T | gao_GAO-14-272T_0 | The Composition and Work Patterns of American Households and the U.S. Retirement System Have Changed Over Time
Over the last 50 years, the composition of the American household has changed dramatically. 1). From 1960 to 2010, the percentage of single-parent families also rose. The decline in marriage and rise in single parenthood over this period were more pronounced among low-income, less-educated individuals, and some minorities. 2). Trends in Labor Force Participation
Over the same period, the labor force participation rate of married women increased (see fig. Since then, the differences in labor force participation rates for these four groups have narrowed, with labor force participation among married and single women within 3 percentage points in 2010. Specifically, over the last two decades employers have increasingly shifted away from offering their employees traditional DB to DC plans, and roughly half of U.S. workers do not participate in any employer-sponsored pension plan. DB plans typically offer retirement benefits to a retiree in the form of an annuity that provides a monthly payment for life, including a lifetime annuity to the surviving spouse, unless the couple chooses otherwise. Trends in Marriage, Work and Pensions May Leave Some Americans Vulnerable
Social Security Benefits
Taken together, the trends in marriage and workforce participation have implications for the receipt of Social Security retirement benefits, especially for women. The decline in the proportion of women with marriages that qualify them for spousal benefits—coupled with the rise in the percentage of women receiving benefits based on their own work record—has resulted in fewer women today receiving Social Security spousal and survivor benefits than in the past.been more dramatic. Households with DC plans have greater responsibility to save and manage their retirement savings so that they have sufficient income throughout retirement. Single parents, in particular, tend to have fewer resources available to save for retirement during their working years and are less likely to participate in DC plans. Lastly, the transition from DB to DC plans has increased the vulnerability of some spouses due to differences in the federal requirements for spousal protections between these two types of retirement plans. Despite the role Social Security has played in reducing poverty among seniors, poverty remains high among certain groups (see fig. These groups include older women, especially those who are unmarried or over age 80, and nonwhites. Prior GAO work has shown that long- term unemployment can reduce an older worker’s future retirement income in numerous ways, including reducing the number of years the worker can accumulate savings, prompting workers to claim Social Security retirement benefits before they reach their full retirement age, Similarly, our and leading workers to draw down their retirement assets.past work has shown that divorce and widowhood in the years leading up to and during retirement have detrimental effects on an individual’s assets and income, and that these effects were more pronounced for women. As a result of the trends described above, these vulnerable populations may face increasing income insecurity in old age and be in greater need of assistance. L. No. Concluding Observations
Our findings underscore how retirement security can be affected by changing circumstances in the American household and the economy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 50 years, poverty rates among older Americans have declined dramatically, in large part due to the availability and expansion of Social Security benefits. Social Security is now the most common type of income for retirees. Social Security retirement benefits are available not only to those who qualify based on their own work history, but also to spouses, widows/widowers, and in some cases former spouses of workers who qualify. However, in recent decades, marriage has become less common, women have entered the workforce in greater numbers, and many employers have shifted from offering DB to DC plans.
In light of these trends, GAO is reporting on: (1) the trends in marriage and labor force participation in the American household and in the U.S. retirement system, (2) the effect of those trends on the receipt of retirement benefits and savings, and (3) the implications for vulnerable elderly populations and current challenges in assisting them. This statement draws from previously issued GAO work and a recently issued report, which was based on an analysis of nationally representative survey data including the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and the Current Population Survey (CPS); and a broad literature review. GAO also interviewed agency officials and a range of experts in the area of retirement security.
GAO is making no recommendations.
What GAO Found
The decline in marriage, rise in women's labor force participation, and transition away from defined benefit (DB) plans to defined contribution (DC) plans have resulted in changes in the types of retirement benefits households receive and increased vulnerabilities for some. Since the 1960s, the percentage of unmarried and single-parent families has risen dramatically, especially among low-income, less-educated individuals, and some minorities. At the same time, the percentage of married women entering the labor force has increased. The decline in marriage and rise in women's labor force participation have affected the types of Social Security benefits households receive, with fewer women receiving spousal benefits today than in the past. In addition, the shift away from DB to DC plans has increased financial vulnerabilities for some due to the fact that DC plans typically offer fewer spousal protections. DC plans also place greater responsibility on households to make decisions and manage their pension and financial assets so they have income throughout retirement. As shown in the figure below, despite Social Security's role in reducing poverty among seniors, poverty remains high among certain groups of seniors, such as minorities and unmarried women. These vulnerable populations are more likely to be adversely affected by these trends and may need assistance in old age.
Note: The category “White” refers to people who are white only, non-Hispanic. “Black” refers to people who are black only, non-Hispanic. “Asian” refers to people who are either Asian only, Pacific Islander only or Asian and Pacific Islander, and are non-Hispanic. Hispanic people may be any race. Percentage estimates for poverty rates have margins of error ranging from 0.6 to 8.6 percentage points. See the hearing statement for more information on confidence levels and the data. |
gao_HEHS-97-38 | gao_HEHS-97-38_0 | Background
The Official Poverty Measure
Researchers have defined poverty in a variety of ways. Issues in Assessing a Family’s Economic Well-Being
In developing, as well as evaluating, a poverty measure, certain assumptions and choices must be made as one addresses two fundamental decisions: first, how to define a family’s resources and, second, how to select a threshold, or standard, to represent a “minimally adequate standard of living.” While the two decisions are distinct, the two definitions must be consonant with each other so that the eventual comparison of a family’s resources with a standard is considered fair. Although many technical choices must be made in developing a valid and practical measure of family economic well-being for the purposes of determining poverty status, we identified three key choices to be made: whether to directly measure a family’s spending on basic necessities or to use income and other economic resources as a proxy for its ability to buy those necessities, which economic resources should be considered available for meeting a family’s basic needs, and whether existing data sources are adequate or should be modified to improve the reliability of poverty estimates. We found disagreement among the experts, however, about how far to go in making these adjustments to cash income. Part of the argument for using expenditures rather than income to measure a family’s economic well-being is the claim that many apparently low-income households underreport their income. II provides more detail on these surveys.) Developments Since the NRC Report
OMB has not yet acted on the panel’s recommendations to revise the poverty measure but has discussed forming an interagency working group with BLS, the Bureau of the Census, and other interested agencies to explore general issues in measuring income and poverty and consider alternative measures to be developed and tested. Although many technical choices will need to be made in developing thresholds, we highlight four key choices: on what basis to set the level of a poverty threshold, whether to accommodate changes over time in standards of living as well how to quantify the difference in need among families of different size and whether and how to accommodate geographical differences in the cost of living. Conclusions
Some of the issues involved in updating the poverty measure seem to be fairly well resolved in the scientific community. But additional discussion and research may be needed for experts to reach consensus on other issues, such as how to incorporate government medical assistance in a measure of disposable income and how to accommodate geographical differences—and changes—in the cost of living. Recommendation 1.4
The Statistical Policy Office of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget should institute a regular review, on a 10-year cycle, of all aspects of the poverty measure: reassessing the procedure for updating the thresholds, the family resource definition, etc. Recommendation 4.2
The definition of family resources for comparison with the appropriate poverty threshold should be disposable money and near-money income. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various issues involved in updating the federal government's measure of poverty, focusing on: (1) the issues associated with measuring a family's economic well-being and setting a standard below which families are considered poor; (2) the suggestions experts have for addressing these issues; and (3) recent developments on these issues since the National Research Council (NRC) Panel on Poverty and Family Assistance issued its report in 1995.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the choices or issues to address in developing a routinely available, reliable measure of a family's economic resources include: (a) whether to directly measure a family's spending on basic necessities or use income and other economic resources as a proxy for their ability to buy these necessities; (b) which economic resources should be considered available for meeting a family's basic needs; and (c) whether existing data sources are adequate (for whichever resource definition is selected) or should be modified to improve the reliability of poverty estimates; (2) some issues in updating the family resource measure seem to be fairly well resolved in the scientific community, while additional discussion and research may be needed to reach consensus on some of the practical details; (3) although assessing a family's expenditures might provide a more direct picture of its economic well-being than income, measuring income is considered to be more feasible for obtaining routinely available poverty statistics; (4) the panel recommended that the official poverty measure should define a family's economic resources to include disposable money income and near-money government benefits, although experts differ on how to make some of the adjustments to cash income; (5) issues to address in developing a contemporary set of poverty thresholds to represent a "minimally adequate standard of living" for families in different circumstances include: (a) what basis should be used to set the level of the thresholds; (b) whether to accommodate changes over time in standards of living as well as in prices; (c) how to quantify the differences in needs between families of different size and composition; and (d) whether and how to accommodate geographical differences in the cost of living; (6) in contrast to defining family resources, additional research may lead to consensus on some issues in selecting a set of poverty thresholds, but other issues will require policy judgment; (7) the panel proposed a statistical formula derived from the literature to develop thresholds for different family sizes, but lacking an objective way to measure the difference in needs between families, left setting the formula's exact terms to policy judgment; and (8) the Office of Management and Budget has not yet begun a formal review of the poverty measure as the NRC panel recommended, but it plans to create a working group soon with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of the Census, and other interested agencies to explore general issues in measuring income and poverty and consider alternative measures to be developed and tested. |
gao_GAO-08-167 | gao_GAO-08-167_0 | Opinion on Internal Control
Because of the material weakness and significant deficiencies in internal control discussed below, SEC did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2007, and thus did not have reasonable assurance that misstatements material in relation to the financial statements would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Although certain compliance controls should be improved, SEC maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over compliance with laws and regulations as of September 30, 2007, that provided reasonable assurance that noncompliance with laws and regulations that could have a direct and material effect on the financial statements would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. In our prior year audit, we reported on weaknesses we identified in the areas of SEC’s (1) recording and reporting of disgorgements and penalties, (2) information systems controls, and (3) property and equipment controls. During fiscal year 2007, SEC improved its controls over the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the disgorgement and penalty data and used a much improved database for the initial recording and tracking of these data. However, the processing of these data for financial reporting purposes is still done through a manual process that is prone to error. We found that the internal controls that compensated for the manual processing of the related accounts receivable balances in fiscal year 2006 were not effective in fiscal year 2007. This issue is included in the material weakness in SEC’s financial reporting process for fiscal year 2007. Therefore, we consider information security to be a significant deficiency as of September 30, 2007. In addition, we continued to identify the same weaknesses in controls over property and equipment during this year’s audit, and therefore, we considered this area to be a significant deficiency as of September 30, 2007. Although SEC had one material weakness and three significant control deficiencies in internal control, SEC’s financial statements were fairly stated in all material respects for fiscal years 2007 and 2006. Material Weakness
Financial Reporting Process
During this year’s audit, we found control deficiencies in SEC’s period-end financial reporting process, in its calculation of accounts receivable for disgorgements and penalties, in its accounting for transaction fee revenue, and in preparing its financial statement disclosures. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements; assessed the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by evaluated the overall presentation of the financial statements; obtained an understanding of SEC and its operations, including its internal control related to financial reporting (including safeguarding of assets) and compliance with laws and regulations (including execution of transactions in accordance with budget authority); obtained an understanding of the design of internal controls related to the existence and completeness assertions relating to performance measures as reported in Management’s Discussion and Analysis, and determined whether the internal controls have been placed in operation; tested relevant internal controls over financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control; considered SEC’s process for evaluating and reporting on internal control and financial management systems under the FMFIA; and tested compliance with selected provisions of the following laws and their related regulations: the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; the Securities Act of 1933, as amended; the Antideficiency Act; laws governing the pay and allowance system for SEC employees; the Prompt Payment Act; and the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986. SEC’s management provided comments on a draft of this report. The Chairman emphasized SEC’s commitment to enhance its controls in all operational areas and to ensure reliability of financial reporting, soundness of operations, and public confidence in SEC’s mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1934 to enforce the securities laws and protect investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays an important role in maintaining the integrity of the U.S. securities markets. Pursuant to the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002, SEC is required to prepare and submit to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget audited financial statements. GAO agreed, under its audit authority, to perform the audit of SEC's financial statements. GAO's audit was done to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) SEC's fiscal year 2007 financial statements were reliable and (2) SEC's management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations. GAO also tested SEC's compliance with certain laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
In GAO's opinion, SEC's fiscal year 2007 and 2006 financial statements were fairly presented in all material respects. However, because of a material weakness in internal control over SEC's financial reporting process, in GAO's opinion, SEC did not have effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2007. Recommendations for corrective action will be included in a separate report. Although certain compliance controls should be improved, SEC did maintain in all material respects effective internal control over compliance with laws and regulations material in relation to the financial statements as of September 30, 2007. In addition, GAO did not find reportable instances of noncompliance with the laws and regulations it tested. In its 2006 report, GAO reported on weaknesses in the areas of SEC's (1) recording and reporting of disgorgements and penalties, (2) information systems controls, and (3) property and equipment controls. During fiscal year 2007, SEC improved its controls over the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the disgorgement and penalty data and used a much improved database for the initial recording and tracking of these data. However, the processing of these data for financial reporting purposes is still done through a manual process that is prone to error. GAO found that the internal controls that compensated for the manual processing of the related accounts receivable balances in fiscal year 2006 were not effective in fiscal year 2007. This issue is included in the material weakness in SEC's financial reporting process for fiscal year 2007. Other control deficiencies included in this material weakness concern SEC's period-end closing process, accounting for transaction fee revenue, and preparation of financial statement disclosures. GAO also identified three significant deficiencies in internal control during fiscal year 2007. Although SEC has taken steps to strengthen its information security, some of the weaknesses identified in GAO's previous audit persisted and GAO found new weaknesses during this year's audit. Therefore, GAO is reporting information security as a significant deficiency as of September 30, 2007. In addition, GAO continued to identify the same weaknesses in controls over property and equipment and therefore considers this area a significant deficiency as of September 30, 2007. GAO also identified a new significant deficiency concerning SEC's accounting for budgetary transactions. In commenting on a draft of this report, SEC's Chairman emphasized SEC's commitment to enhance its controls in all operational areas and to ensure reliability of financial reporting, soundness of operations, and public confidence in SEC's mission. |
gao_GAO-03-837 | gao_GAO-03-837_0 | Pay.gov is a Key Electronic Government Initiative
FMS’s Pay.gov is a governmentwide transaction portal that allows federal agencies to collect and the public to make several types of payments to the federal government via the Internet. FMS has estimated that Pay.gov eventually could process about 80 million transactions and collect about $125 billion a year. However, FMS did not sufficiently assess the risk associated with the Pay.gov computing environment. For example, FMS had not conducted a business risk assessment for the computing environment because officials did not believe this was necessary. In addition, weaknesses in other information system controls, including segregation of duties, software change controls, service continuity, and application security controls, further increased risk to Pay.gov. Further, FMS performed several security reviews to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities associated with Pay.gov. Despite these controls, numerous information security control weaknesses increased the risk that external and internal users could have gained unauthorized access to Pay.gov, which could have led to the inappropriate disclosure or modification of its data or to the disruption of service. FMS and the Federal Reserve did not consistently implement effective electronic access controls to prevent, limit, and detect access to Pay.gov and its computing environment. Numerous vulnerabilities existed in Pay.gov’s computing environment because of the cumulative effects of control weaknesses in the areas of user accounts and passwords, access permissions and rights, network services and security, and audit and monitoring of security-related events. Although FMS and the Federal Reserve had implemented numerous controls for Pay.gov, the security of Pay.gov systems and data was diminished because FMS did not ensure that risks were fully assessed, policies and controls were effectively implemented, operating personnel were aware of strong security practices, known weaknesses were promptly mitigated, and systems were reviewed for security exposures after changes to the systems were made. Conclusions
Although FMS and the Federal Reserve had implemented numerous controls to protect Pay.gov computing resources, risks were not sufficiently assessed, and numerous control weaknesses increased risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Pay.gov systems and data because FMS did not provide sufficient management oversight to ensure that key elements of the Pay.gov information security program were fully or consistently implemented. These include (1) completing a comprehensive security risk assessment for the Pay.gov computing environment; (2) documenting and implementing appropriate security and management controls to protect the application and its computing environment; (3) establishing a team to periodically check the configuration of servers and networks, as well as to evaluate operational staff awareness of and adherence to established policy; (4) engaging the Federal Reserve’s National Incident Response Team and establishing an agreement with the Federal Reserve that the general auditors of the various Reserve Banks will conduct regular information technology audits of FMS’s Internet applications; (5) instituting greater separation of duties and a more rigorous software change management process to maintain stricter control over deployed software; and (6) documenting security policies in all statements of work so that all vendors are aware of and accountable for security requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
"Pay.gov" is an Internet portal sponsored and managed by the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) and operated at three Federal Reserve facilities. Pay.gov is intended to allow the public to make certain non-income-tax-payments to the federal government securely over the Internet. FMS estimates that Pay.gov eventually could annually process 80 million transactions valued at $125 billion annually. Because of the magnitude of transaction volume and dollar value envisioned for Pay.gov, GAO was asked to determine whether FMS (1) conducted a comprehensive security risk assessment and (2) implemented and documented appropriate security measures and controls for the system's protection.
What GAO Found
FMS had not fully assessed the risks associated with the Pay.gov initiative. Although the agency prepared a business risk assessment for the Pay.gov application, it had not fully assessed the risks associated with Pay.gov computing environment. Insufficiently assessing risks can lead to implementing inadequate or inappropriate security controls. Although FMS and the Federal Reserve had documented and implemented many security controls to protect Pay.gov, security controls were not always effectively implemented to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the Pay.gov environment and data. FMS and the Federal Reserve established and documented key security and control policies and procedures for Pay.gov. In addition, they established numerous controls intended to restrict access to the application and computing environment and performed several security reviews to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. However, numerous information security control weaknesses increased the risk that external and internal users could gain unauthorized access to Pay.gov, which could lead to the inappropriate disclosure or modification of its data or to the disruption of service. For example, FMS and the Federal Reserve had not consistently implemented access controls to prevent, limit, and detect electronic access to the Pay.gov application and computing environment. These weaknesses involved user accounts and passwords, access rights and permissions, and network services and security, as well as auditing and monitoring security-relevant events. In addition, weaknesses in other information systems controls--such as segregation of duties, software change controls, service continuity, and application security controls--reduced FMS's effectiveness in mitigating the risk of errors or fraud, preventing unauthorized changes to software, and ensuring the continuity of data processing operations when unexpected interruptions occur. These computer weaknesses existed, in part, because FMS did not provide sufficient management oversight of Pay.gov operating personnel at the Federal Reserve facilities to ensure that elements of the Pay.gov computer security program were fully or consistently implemented. |
gao_GAO-07-418T | gao_GAO-07-418T_0 | Prior Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Audit work we performed on FEMA’s IHP payments and DHS’s purchase card program identified widespread fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, our work on DHS purchase cards showed that control weaknesses in government purchasing programs can also result in fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, we also found that numerous registrations we selected for investigation contained bogus damaged address. These breakdowns resulted in an estimated 16 percent or $1 billion in payments made through February 2006 based on invalid registrations. Specifically, in contrast to the $1 billion in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments we estimated through February 2006, FEMA had detected, as of November 2006, about $290 million in improper payments, and had collected only $7 million. Framework for Fraud Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution
The results of our work serve to emphasize the overall lesson learned that fraud prevention is the most effective and efficient means to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse. It also demonstrates that the establishment of effective fraud prevention controls over the registration and payment process, fraud detection and monitoring adherence to those controls, and the aggressive pursuit and prosecution of individuals committing fraud are crucial elements of an effective fraud prevention program over any assistance programs with defined eligibility criteria, including disaster assistance programs. The Importance of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Prevention to Katrina and Rita Recovery Efforts
Preventive controls are a key element on an effective fraud prevention program and are also described in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Preventive controls should be designed to include, at a minimum, a requirement for data validation, system edit controls, and fraud awareness training. Fraud prevention can be achieved by requiring that registrants provide information in a uniform format, and validating these data against other government or third-party sources to determine whether registrants provided accurate information on their identity and place of residence. For example, FEMA’s failure to implement preventive controls to validate the identity of individuals who applied using the telephone resulted in FEMA making millions of dollars in payments to individuals who used Social Security numbers that had never been issued or belonged to deceased individuals. Detection and monitoring efforts are addressed in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and include data-mining for fraudulent and suspicious transactions and reviews to establish the accountability of funds. Collection Efforts, Investigations, and Prosecutions Are Far Less Effective than Up Front Fraud Prevention
Another element of a fraud prevention program is the collection of improper payments and the aggressive investigation and prosecution of individuals who committed fraud against the government. These back-end controls are often the most costly and less effective means of reducing losses to fraud, waste, and abuse. The small amount of money that FEMA had collected on overpayments related to hurricanes Katrina and Rita further emphasizes the need for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse prior to payments going out the door. Our work shows that for one FEMA individual assistance program alone it is likely that over $1 billion has been lost to fraudulent and improper payments. With effective planning, relief agencies should not have to make a choice between speedy delivery of assistance and effective fraud prevention. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. While federal and state governments continue to respond to this disaster, GAO has identified significant control weaknesses--specifically in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)'s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and in Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s purchase card program--resulting in significant fraud, waste, and abuse. In response to the numerous recommendations GAO made, DHS and FEMA have reported on numerous actions taken to address our recommendations. Lessons learned from GAO's prior work can serve as a framework for an effective fraud prevention system for federal and state governments as they consider spending billions more on disaster recovery. These lessons are particularly important because funding that is lost to fraud, waste, and abuse reduces the amount of money that could be delivered to victims in need. Today's testimony will (1) describe key findings from past GAO work and (2) use the results from that work and GAO's other experiences to discuss the importance of an effective fraud, waste and abuse prevention program.
What GAO Found
Prior GAO audit and investigative work on FEMA's controls over IHP payments and DHS's controls over purchase cards emphasizes one fundamental concept--that fraud prevention is the most effective and efficient means of minimizing fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO estimates that FEMA made about 16 percent or almost $1 billion dollars in improper and potentially fraudulent IHP payments to registrants who applied using invalid information, illustrating what can happen when fraud prevention controls are ineffective. For example, GAO found that FEMA made payments based on bogus damaged addresses, false identities, and identities belonging to federal and state prisoners. These findings highlight the need for effective controls over all types of recovery disbursements. With effective planning, relief agencies should not have to make a choice between speedy delivery of disaster recovery assistance and effective fraud prevention. Finally, GAO's findings of significant control weaknesses in DHS's purchase card program leading to fraud, waste, and abuse further underline the need for an effective framework for fraud prevention, monitoring, and detection. Our work on disaster assistance programs in particular show that preventive controls should be designed to include, at a minimum, a requirement that data used in decision making is validated against other government or third-party sources to determine accuracy. Inspections and physical validation should also be conducted whenever possible to confirm information prior to payment. System edit checks should also be used to identify problems before payments are made. Finally, providing training on fraud awareness is important in stopping fraud before it gets into any type of recovery program. Fraud detection and monitoring is also critical, although more costly and less effective than preventive controls. Key elements of detection include data mining for fraudulent information and performing reviews to establish the accountability of property and funds. The final element of a fraud prevention program is the collection of identified improper payments and the aggressive investigation and prosecution of individuals who commit fraud as a preventive measure for future disasters. These elements are most costly, and collecting money after it has been disbursed is far less effective than up front prevention--FEMA has collected only $7 million of the estimated $1 billion in potential improper and fraudulent IHP payments. |
gao_GAO-06-617 | gao_GAO-06-617_0 | Diversity in the Financial Services Industry At the Management Level Did Not Change Substantially
EEO-1 data indicate that overall diversity among officials and managers within the financial services industry did not change substantially from 1993 through 2004, but that changes by racial/ethnic group varied. Management-level representation by minorities increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent during the period, while representation by whites declined correspondingly from 88.9 percent to 84.5 percent. Management-level representation by white men declined from 52.2 percent to 47.2 percent during the period while the percentage of management positions held by white women was largely unchanged at slightly more than one-third. African-American representation increased from 5.6 percent in 1993 to 6.8 percent in 2000 but declined to 6.6 percent in 2004. Representation by American Indians remained well under 1 percent of all management- level positions. 3). 4). However, officials from financial services firms and trade associations also described the challenges they faced in implementing these initiatives, such as ongoing difficulties in recruiting and retaining minority candidates and in gaining commitment from employees to support diversity initiatives, especially at the middle management level. Officials from financial services firms also said that they had developed programs to foster the retention and professional growth of minority and women employees. First, the officials said that the industry faces ongoing challenges in recruiting minority and women candidates even though firms may have established scholarship and internship programs and partnered with professional organizations. Minority- and Women- Owned Businesses Often Face Difficulties in Obtaining Capital, but Some Financial Services Firms Have Developed Strategies to Assist Them
Studies and reports, as well as interviews we conducted, suggest that minority- and women-owned businesses have faced challenges obtaining capital (primarily bank credit) in conventional financial markets for several business reasons, such as the concentration of these businesses in the service sector and relative lack of a credit history. Other studies suggest that lenders may discriminate, particularly against minority-owned businesses. However, assessing lending discrimination against minority- owned businesses may be complicated by limited data availability. However, some financial institutions, primarily commercial banks, have recently developed strategies to market their loan products to minority- and women-owned businesses or are offering technical assistance to them. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to discuss (1) what the available data show regarding diversity at the management level in the financial services industry, from 1993 through 2004; (2) the types of initiatives that the financial services industry and related organizations have taken to promote workforce diversity and the challenges involved; and (3) the ability of minority and women-owned businesses to obtain access to capital in financial markets and initiatives financial institutions have recently taken to make capital available to these businesses. | Why GAO Did This Study
During a hearing in 2004 on the financial services industry, congressional members and witnesses expressed concern about the industry's lack of workforce diversity, particularly in key management-level positions. Witnesses stated that financial services firms (e.g., banks and securities firms) had not made sufficient progress in recruiting and promoting minority and women candidates for management-level positions. Concerns were also raised about the ability of minority-owned businesses to raise capital (i.e., debt or equity capital). GAO was asked to provide an overview on the status of diversity in the financial services industry. This report discusses (1) what available data show regarding diversity at the management level in the financial services industry from 1993 through 2004, (2) the types of initiatives that financial firms and related organizations have taken to promote workforce diversity and the challenges involved, and (3) the ability of minority- and women-owned businesses to obtain access to capital in financial markets and initiatives financial institutions have taken to make capital available to these businesses.
What GAO Found
Between 1993 through 2004, overall diversity at the management level in the financial services industry did not change substantially, but increases in representation varied by racial/ethnic minority group. During that period, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) data show that management-level representation by minority men and women increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent. Specifically, African-Americans increased their representation from 5.6 percent to 6.6 percent, Asians from 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent, Hispanics from 2.8 percent to 4.0 percent, and American Indians from 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent. The EEOC data also show that representation by white women remained constant at slightly more than one-third whereas representation by white men declined from 52.2 percent to 47.2 percent. Financial services firms and trade groups GAO contacted stated that they have initiated programs to increase workforce diversity, including in management-level positions, but these initiatives face challenges. The programs include developing scholarships and internships, establishing programs to foster employee retention and development, and linking managers' compensation with their performance in promoting a diverse workforce. However, firm officials said that they still face challenges in recruiting and retaining minority candidates. Some officials also said that gaining employees' "buy-in" to diversity programs was a challenge, particularly among middle managers who were often responsible for implementing key aspects of such programs. Research reports suggest that minority- and women-owned businesses have generally faced difficulties in obtaining access to capital for several reasons such as these businesses may be concentrated in service industries and lack assets to pledge as collateral. Other studies suggest that lenders may discriminate in providing credit, but assessing lending discrimination may be complicated by limited data availability. However, some financial institutions, primarily commercial banks, said that they have developed strategies to serve minority- and women-owned businesses. These strategies include marketing existing financial products specifically to minority and women business owners. |
gao_GGD-96-144 | gao_GGD-96-144_0 | Second, the act required us to study the feasibility and appropriateness of three specific options to increase FCSIC’s powers to (1) directly or indirectly assess association capital, (2) assess supplemental insurance premiums, and (3) establish a risk-based insurance premium system. We reviewed the basis for FCA’s 1991 legislative recommendations pertaining to increased powers for FCSIC. Two of these issues have diminished since 1991. Additionally, in our view, it is especially important that FCA set adequate capital standards for the banks and that any problems be promptly identified and resolved to minimize threats to the Insurance Fund. If the System avoids major losses in the next several years and the Insurance Fund reaches the Secure Base Amount, the Fund should continue to grow gradually because of its investment income, even though no premiums are assessed. Assuming that a repayment program might extend over a period of years, FCSIC could reduce the federal subsidy by paying interest to the Treasury on the unpaid balance. Specifically, the first option of authorizing FCSIC to assess the capital of the Farm Credit associations could provide additional short-term protection to the Insurance Fund, investors in System debt, and taxpayers. Finally, the third option, authorizing FCSIC to charge premiums that are more fully based on risk, would be a useful complement to FCA’s risk-based capital requirements. The investment income earned by FCSIC on this $260 million, or any unpaid balance, represents a continuing federal subsidy, because FCSIC is not required to pay interest to the government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the appropriateness and major advantages of three proposals to increase the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation's (FCSIC) oversight powers over its Insurance Fund.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) authorizing FCSIC to assess association capital would provide short-term additional protection to the Insurance Fund, investors, and taxpayers, but reasons for increased FCSIC power have diminished and granting this authority could destabilize the Fund if the authority were used during a period of financial stress; (2) the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) needs to set adequate capital standards for system banks and supervise and resolve any threats to the Fund; (3) FCA has not demonstrated that giving FCSIC supplemental premium authority is needed; (4) giving FCSIC supplemental premium authority could reduce the system's ability to compete, increase its instability, and reduce banks' ability to pay supplemental premiums; (5) if the system avoids major losses, it should reach a secure base amount and continue to grow gradually through investment income; (6) authorizing FCSIC to charge higher premiums to banks that are most at risk could create additional incentives for banks to manage risk prudently and complement FCA risk-based capital requirements; and (7) FCSIC should be required to pay interest on the $260 million used to start up the Fund, since this interest represents a continuing subsidy. |
gao_GAO-09-414T | gao_GAO-09-414T_0 | Providing census results. Role of IT in the Decennial Census
Automation and IT are to play a critical role in the success of the 2010 census by supporting data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Several systems will play a key role in the 2010 census. These activities were originally to be conducted using IT systems and infrastructure developed by the FDCA program. Dress Rehearsal Includes Testing of Certain Systems and Operations
In preparation for the 2010 census, the Bureau planned what it refers to as the Dress Rehearsal. Bureau Is Making Progress in Key System Testing, but Lacks Plans and Schedules
Through the Dress Rehearsal and other testing activities, the Bureau has completed key system tests, but significant testing has yet to be done, and planning for this is not complete. However, significant activities remain to be completed. In addition, the Bureau has not established a master list of interfaces between key systems, or plans and schedules for integration testing of these interfaces. With the limited amount of time remaining before systems are needed for 2010 operations, the lack of comprehensive plans and schedules increases the risk that the Bureau may not be able to adequately test system interfaces, and that interfaced systems may not work together as intended. Bureau Has Conducted Limited End-to-End Testing as Part of the Dress Rehearsal, but Has Not Developed Testing Plans for Critical Operations
Although several critical operations underwent end-to-end testing in the Dress Rehearsal, others did not. As of December 2008, the Bureau had not established testing plans or schedules for end-to-end testing of the key operations that were removed from the Dress Rehearsal, nor has it determined when these plans will be completed. Bureau Lacks Sufficient Executive-Level Oversight and Guidance for Testing
As stated in our testing guide and IEEE standards, oversight of testing activities includes both planning and ongoing monitoring of testing activities. However, these products do not provide comprehensive status information on the progress of testing key systems and interfaces. Further, the assessment of testing progress has not been based on quantitative and specific metrics. The lack of quantitative and specific metrics to track progress limits the Bureau’s ability to accurately assess the status and progress of testing activities. The Bureau also has weaknesses in its testing guidance. In summary, while the Bureau’s program offices have made progress in testing key decennial systems, much work remains to ensure that systems operate as intended for conducting an accurate and timely 2010 census. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Decennial Census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides vital data that are used, among other things, to reapportion and redistrict congressional seats and allocate federal financial assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges, including weaknesses in the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) management of its information technology (IT) systems and operations. In conducting the 2010 census, the Bureau is relying on both the acquisition of new IT systems and the enhancement of existing systems. Thoroughly testing these systems before their actual use is critical to the success of the census. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, on the status and plans of testing of key 2010 decennial IT systems.
What GAO Found
Although the Bureau has made progress in testing key decennial systems, critical testing activities remain to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 census. Bureau program offices have completed some testing of individual systems, but significant work still remains to be done, and many plans have not yet been developed (see table below). In its testing of system integration, the Bureau has not completed critical activities; it also lacks a master list of interfaces between systems and has not developed testing plans and schedules. Although the Bureau had originally planned what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, starting in 2006, to serve as a comprehensive end-to-end test of key operations and systems, significant problems were identified during testing. As a result, several key operations were removed from the Dress Rehearsal and did not undergo end-to-end testing. The Bureau has neither developed testing plans for these key operations, nor has it determined when such plans will be completed. Weaknesses in the Bureau's testing progress and plans can be attributed in part to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance. Bureau management does provide oversight of system testing activities, but the oversight activities are not sufficient. For example, Bureau reports do not provide comprehensive status information on progress in testing key systems and interfaces, and assessments of the overall status of testing for key operations are not based on quantitative metrics. Further, although the Bureau has issued general testing guidance, it is neither mandatory nor specific enough to ensure consistency in conducting system testing. Without adequate oversight and more comprehensive guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems and properly prioritizing testing activities before the 2010 Decennial Census, posing the risk that these systems may not perform as planned. |
gao_GAO-02-653 | gao_GAO-02-653_0 | FBI Plans Would Address Most Potential Effects of Next-Day Destruction of Records
To analyze and address the potential effects of the proposed requirement for next-day destruction of audit log records, the FBI reviewed all areas of NICS operations and has developed or is considering many operational and procedural changes. The document addresses applicable changes and modifications needed in computer systems and work processes, as well as policies and procedures. According to NICS officials, under the FBI’s draft plans, most areas of NICS operations would not be adversely affected. Next-Day Destruction of Records Would Affect Nonroutine Audits and Related Support to Law Enforcement
While the NICS Internal Assessment Group may not lose routine audit capabilities under next-day destruction of records, such a policy would affect certain nonroutine audits of the system. Thus, these transactions would not be affected by a policy requiring next-day destruction of records. However, our work indicates that the effect of such a policy on ATF inspections is unclear. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
Senator Richard J. Durbin, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, requested that we provide information about how the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) would be affected if records related to sales of firearms by licensed dealers were destroyed within 24 hours after the transfers were allowed to proceed. Under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, licensed dealers generally are not to transfer firearms to an individual until a NICS search determines that the transfer will not violate applicable federal or state law. However, if the background check is not completed within 3 business days, the sale is allowed to proceed by default. Regarding NICS operations, we studied the effects the proposed next-day destruction policy would have on the FBI’s ability to initiate firearm- retrieval actions, and the related public safety implications. | What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) would be affected if data on the sale of firearms by licensed dealers were destroyed within 24 hours after the transfers were allowed to proceed. Under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, licensed dealers are not to transfer firearms to an individual until a NICS search determines that the transfer will not violate applicable federal or state law. However, if the background check is not completed within 3 business days, the dealer may transfer the firearm. Although routine system audits may not be adversely affected by the proposed requirements for next-day destruction of records, other current uses of NICS records would be affected, with consequences for public safety and NICS operations. The FBI has drafted plans that would address most potential effects of the proposed policy for next-day destruction of records. In developing these plans, the FBI reviewed NICS operations and identified the changes needed in computer systems, work processes, policies, and procedures. According to NICS officials, the FBI would not lose any routine audit capabilities under the proposed policy. On the other hand, a next-day destruction policy would adversely affect certain nonroutine audits of the system. Also, a next-day destruction policy would have public safety implications and could lessen the efficacy of current operations. Finally, a next-day destruction policy would not affect the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (ATF) ability to inspect gun dealer records. However, the effect of such a policy on ATF inspection is unclear. |
gao_GAO-15-629 | gao_GAO-15-629_0 | Designation of a terrorist group as an FTO allows the United States to impose certain legal consequences on the FTO, as well as on individuals that associate with or knowingly provide support to the designated organization. 13,224 requires the blocking of property and interests in property of foreign persons the Secretary of State has determined, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Departments of Homeland Security and the Treasury, to have committed or to pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. State Uses a Six-Step Process for Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations
State has developed a six-step process for designating foreign terrorist organizations. State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) leads the designation process for State, and other State bureaus and agency partners are involved in the various steps. While the number of FTO designations has varied annually since the first 20 FTOs were designated in 1997, as of December 31, 2014, 59 organizations were designated as FTOs. FTO designation activities are led by CT, which monitors the activities of terrorist groups around the world to identify potential targets for designation. CT also considers recommendations from other State bureaus, federal agencies, and foreign partners, among others, and selects potential target organizations for designation. After selecting a target organization for possible designation, State uses a six-step process it has developed to designate a group as an FTO (see fig. 1). State Considered Input from Other Agencies in All FTO Designations between 2012 and 2014
According to State officials and our review of agency documents, State considered information and input provided by other State bureaus and federal agencies for all 13 designations made between 2012 and 2014. During our review of the 13 FTO designations between 2012 and 2014, officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported that State considered their input when making designations. Agencies Impose a Variety of Consequences on Designated FTOs and Associated Individuals
The U.S. government penalizes designated FTOs through three key consequences. Third, FTO designation imposes immigration restrictions upon members of the organization and individuals that knowingly provide material support or resources to the designated organization. We report on (1) the process for designating FTOs, (2) the extent to which the State considers input from other agencies during the FTO designation process, and (3) the consequences that U.S. agencies impose as a result of an FTO designation. To assess the extent to which State considered information from other agencies in the designation process, we interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as officials from the intelligence community, to determine when information is provided to State on organizations considered for FTO designation, as well as the nature of that information. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, has the authority to designate a foreign organization as an FTO. Designation allows the United States to impose legal consequences on the FTO or on individuals who support the FTO. As of June 1, 2015, 59 organizations were designated as FTOs.
GAO was asked to review the FTO designation process. This report provides information on the process by which the Secretary of State designates FTOs. Specifically, this report addresses (1) the process for designating FTOs, (2) the extent to which the Department of State considers input from other agencies during the FTO designation process, and (3) the consequences that U.S. agencies impose as a result of an FTO designation.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and data, and interviewed officials from Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as the intelligence community.
Separately, GAO also reviewed the duration of the designation process for FTOs designated between 2012 and 2014. That information was published in April 2015 in a report for official use only.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) has developed a six-step process for designating foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) that involves other State bureaus and agency partners in the various steps. State's Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) leads the designation process for State. CT monitors terrorist activity to identify potential targets for designation and also considers recommendations for potential targets from other State bureaus, federal agencies, and foreign partners. After selecting a target, State follows a six-step process to designate a group as an FTO, including steps to consult with partners and draft supporting documents. During this process, federal agencies and State bureaus, citing law enforcement, diplomatic, or intelligence concerns, can place a “hold” on a potential designation, which, until resolved, prevents the designation of the organization. The number of FTO designations has varied annually since 1997, when 20 FTOs were designated. As of December 31, 2014, 59 organizations were designated as FTOs, with 13 FTO designations occurring between 2012 and 2014.
State considered input provided by other State bureaus and federal agencies for all 13 of the FTO designations made between 2012 and 2014, according to officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and GAO review of agency documents. For example, State used intelligence agencies' information on terrorist organizations and activities to support the designations.
U.S. agencies reported enforcing FTO designations through three key legal consequences—blocking assets, prosecuting individuals, and imposing immigration restrictions—that target FTOs, their members, and individuals that provide support to those organizations. The restrictions and penalties that agencies reported imposing vary widely. For example, as of 2013, Treasury has blocked about $22 million in assets relating to 7 of 59 designated FTOs. |
gao_GAO-03-376T | gao_GAO-03-376T_0 | Social Security’s Long-Term Financing Problem Is More Urgent Than It May Appear
Today the Social Security program faces not an immediate crisis but rather a long-range and more fundamental financing problem driven largely by known demographic trends. Acting soon would allow changes to be phased in so the individuals who are most likely to be affected, namely younger and future workers, will have time to adjust their retirement planning while helping to avoid related “expectation gaps.” Since there is a great deal of confusion about Social Security’s current financing arrangements and the nature of its long-term financing problem, I would like to spend some time describing the nature, timing, and extent of the financing problem. As a result, the relative numbers of workers and beneficiaries has a major impact on the program’s financial condition. Decline in Budgetary Flexibility Disappears Absent Entitlement Reform
From the perspective of the federal budget and the economy, the challenge posed by the growth in Social Security spending becomes even more significant in combination with the more rapid expected growth in Medicare and Medicaid spending. This testimony is not about the complexities of Medicare, but it is important to note that Medicare presents a much greater, more complex, and more urgent fiscal challenge than does Social Security. A fundamental review of what the federal government does and how it does it will be needed. As a former public trustee of Social Security and Medicare, I am well aware of the central role these programs play in the lives of millions of Americans. Social Security is also much more than just a retirement program; it also pays benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, spouses and children of retired workers, and survivors of deceased workers. While 75-year actuarial balance is generally used in evaluating the long-term financial outlook of the Social Security program and reform proposals, it is not sufficient in gauging the program’s solvency after the 75th year. In addition, policymakers could consider the impact of proposed changes on various subpopulations, such as low-income workers, women, minorities, and people with disabilities. A number of Social Security reform proposals were introduced in the 107th Congress. Examining the Effects of Reform Using the Commission’s Proposals
Applying our criteria to the Commission models highlights trade-offs between efforts to achieve sustainable solvency and maintain adequate retirement income for current and future beneficiaries. Over the past few years, we have been developing a capacity to estimate the quantitative effects of Social Security reform on individuals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security not only represents the foundation of our retirement income system; it also provides millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. As a result, Social Security provides benefits that are critical to the current and future well-being of tens of millions of Americans. However, the system faces both solvency and sustainability challenges in the longer term. In their 2002 report, the Trustees emphasized that while the program's near-term financial condition has improved slightly, Social Security faces a substantial financial challenge in the not-too-distant future that needs to be addressed soon. In essence, the program's long-term outlook remains unchanged. Without reform, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are unsustainable, and the long-term impact of these entitlement programs on the federal budget and the economy will be dramatic. Over the past few years, a wide array of proposals has been put forth to restore Social Security's long-term solvency, and a commission established by the President has presented three models for modifying the current program. The Commission's final report called for a period of discussion lasting at least a year before legislative action is taken to strengthen and restore sustainability to Social Security. We have also done a qualitative review of three other proposals introduced in the 107th Congress.
What GAO Found
Our Social Security challenge is more urgent than it may appear. Failure to take remedial action will, in combination with other entitlement spending, lead to a situation unsustainable both for the federal government and, ultimately, the economy. This problem is about more than finances. It is also about maintaining an adequate safety net for American workers against loss of income from retirement, disability, or death; Social Security provides a foundation of retirement income for millions of Americans and has prevented many former workers and their families from living their retirement years in poverty. As the Congress considers proposals to restore the long-term financial stability and viability of the Social Security system, it also needs to consider the impact of the potential changes on different types of beneficiaries. Moreover, while addressing Social Security reform is important and will not be easy, Medicare presents a much greater, more complex, and even more urgent fiscal challenge. |
gao_GAO-02-631 | gao_GAO-02-631_0 | In 1996, the Air Force launched the Airborne Laser program to develop a defensive system that could destroy enemy missiles from a distance of several hundred kilometers. Original Cost and Schedule Goals Are Based on Inadequate Knowledge
The Air Force launched the Airborne Laser acquisition program and identified cost and schedule goals before officials had the knowledge to make realistic projections. New Strategy Incorporates Some Knowledge-Based Practices, but Additional Practice Would Reduce Program Risk
The Missile Defense Agency’s new strategy for developing the Airborne Laser incorporates some of the knowledge-based practices that characterize successful programs, but the agency would benefit from adopting another that would add greater discipline to its acquisition process. However, the agency has not established decision points with associated knowledge-based criteria for moving forward from (1) technology development to system integration, (2) system integration to system demonstration, and (3) system demonstration to production. Our previous work with successful development programs shows that once the technology is in-hand to meet the customer’s requirements, the developer can make more accurate initial estimates of the cost and time needed to develop and produce an operational system. In addition, product development requires significant investments in facilities and materials. That is, even though the agency might know that it has the technology in-hand to develop a useful military capability, it has not established a first decision point where it would determine the cost and time needed to move the program forward and whether the program should proceed into a system integration phase during which the design would be matured and optimized for reproducibility, maintainability, and reliability. The department stated that Secretary of Defense direction is not needed to implement our recommendations, the Missile Defense Agency’s acquisition process for ballistic missile defense already uses tailored versions of the knowledge-based practices recommended by us, and the agency intends to expand the use of knowledge-based criteria in the future. | What GAO Found
The Air Force launched an acquisition program to develop and produce a revolutionary laser weapon system, known as the Airborne Laser, in 1996. Being developed for installation in a modified Boeing 747 aircraft, it is intended to destroy enemy ballistic missiles almost immediately after their launch. The Air Force originally estimated development costs at $2.5 billion and projected fielding of the system in 2006. However, by August 2001, the Air Force determined that the development cost estimate rose 50 percent to $3.7 billion, and the fielding date slipped to 2010. The Department of Defense transferred responsibility for the Airborne Laser in October 2001 to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Subsequently, the Defense Secretary designated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the Missile Defense Agency and granted the agency expanded responsibility and authority. The Air Force was unable to meet the Airborne Laser's original cost and schedule goals because it did not fully understand the level of effort that would be required to develop the critical system technology needed to meet the user's requirements. The Missile Defense Agency's new strategy for developing the Airborne Laser incorporates some knowledge-based practices that characterize successful programs. However, the agency has not established knowledge-based decision points and associated criteria for moving forward from technology development to product development and on to production. Without decision points and criteria, the agency risks beginning new and more costly activities before it has the knowledge to determine the money and time required to complete them and whether additional investment in those activities is warranted. |
gao_GAO-08-758T | gao_GAO-08-758T_0 | Background
FDA regulates the content of all prescription drug advertising, whether directed to consumers or medical professionals. In March 2002, DDMAC created a DTC Review Group, which is responsible for oversight of advertising materials that are directed to consumers. FDA Reviewed a Small Portion of DTC Materials and Could Not Ensure It Was Reviewing the Highest-Priority Materials
As of 2006, FDA reviewed a small portion of the increasingly large number of DTC materials it received. FDA attempted to target available resources by focusing its reviews on the DTC advertising materials that had the greatest potential to negatively affect public health, but the agency did not document criteria for prioritizing the materials it received for review. FDA received a steadily increasing number of final materials from 1999 through 2005. We recommended in our 2006 report that the agency track which DTC materials had been reviewed. FDA officials indicated to us in May 2008 that the agency still did not track this information. At the time of our 2006 report, FDA officials identified informal criteria that the agency used to prioritize its reviews. We recommended that FDA document its criteria for prioritizing its reviews of DTC advertising materials. FDA informed us in May 2008 that it now has documented criteria to prioritize reviews. We reported in 2006 that FDA did not systematically apply its criteria for prioritizing reviews to all of the materials that it received. Furthermore, because FDA did not track information on its reviews, the agency could not determine whether a particular material had been reviewed. As a result, the agency could not ensure that it identified and reviewed the highest-priority materials. After the 2002 Policy Change, FDA’s Process for Issuing Regulatory Letters Took Longer and the Number of Letters Issued Declined
In 2006 we reported that, after the 2002 policy change requiring legal review by OCC of all draft regulatory letters, the agency’s process for drafting and issuing letters citing violative DTC materials had stretched to several months and FDA had issued fewer regulatory letters per year. Once FDA identified a violation in a DTC advertising material and determined that it merited a regulatory letter, FDA took several months to draft and issue a letter. These 31 materials appeared in a range of media, including television, radio, print, direct mail, and the Internet. Effectiveness of FDA Regulatory Letters at Halting Dissemination of Violative DTC Materials Was Limited
At the time of our 2006 report, we found that FDA regulatory letters were limited in their effectiveness at halting the dissemination of false and misleading DTC advertising materials. Furthermore, FDA’s regulatory letters did not always prevent drug companies from later disseminating similar violative materials for the same drugs. In each of the six warning letters FDA issued in 2004 and 2005 that cited DTC materials, the agency asked the drug company to disseminate truthful, nonmisleading, and complete corrective messages about the issues discussed in the regulatory letter to the audiences that received the violative promotional materials. For example, FDA issued regulatory letters citing DTC materials for a particular drug in 2000 and again in 2005 for “overstating the effectiveness of the drug.” For 4 of the 15 drugs, FDA cited the same specific violative claim for the same drug in more than one regulatory letter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for overseeing direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs, which includes a range of media, such as television, magazines, and the Internet. If FDA identifies a violation of laws or regulations in a DTC advertising material, the agency may issue a regulatory letter asking the drug company to take specific actions. In 2002, GAO reported on delays in FDA's issuance of regulatory letters. GAO was asked to discuss trends in FDA's oversight of DTC advertising and the actions FDA has taken when it identifies violations. This statement is based on GAO's 2006 report, Prescription Drugs: Improvements Needed in FDA's Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, GAO-07-54 (November 16, 2006). In this statement, GAO discusses the (1) DTC advertising materials FDA reviews, (2) FDA's process for issuing regulatory letters citing DTC advertising materials and the number of letters issued, and (3) the effectiveness of FDA's regulatory letters at limiting the dissemination of false or misleading DTC advertising. For its 2006 report, GAO examined FDA data on the advertising materials the agency received and reviewed the regulatory letters it issued citing prescription drug promotion from 1997 through 2005. For this statement, GAO also reviewed data from FDA to update selected information from the 2006 report.
What GAO Found
Since 1999, FDA has received a steadily increasing number of advertising materials directed to consumers. In 2006, GAO found that FDA reviewed a small portion of the DTC materials it received, and the agency could not ensure that it was identifying for review the materials it considered to be highest priority. While FDA officials told GAO that the agency prioritized the review of materials that had the greatest potential to negatively affect public health, the agency had not documented criteria to make this prioritization. GAO recommended that FDA document and systematically apply criteria for prioritizing its reviews of DTC advertising materials. In May 2008, FDA indicated that it had documented criteria to prioritize reviews. However, FDA still does not systematically apply its criteria to all of the DTC materials it receives. Furthermore, GAO noted in its 2006 report that FDA could not determine whether a particular material had been reviewed. GAO recommended in that report that the agency track which DTC materials had been reviewed. FDA officials indicated to GAO in May 2008 that the agency still did not track this information. As a result, the agency cannot ensure that it is identifying and reviewing the highest-priority materials. GAO found in 2006 that, since a 2002 policy change requiring legal review of all draft regulatory letters, FDA's process for drafting and issuing letters was taking longer and the agency was issuing fewer letters per year. FDA officials told GAO that the policy change contributed to the lengthened review. In 2006, GAO found that the effectiveness of FDA's regulatory letters at halting the dissemination of violative DTC materials had been limited. By the time the agency issued regulatory letters, drug companies had already discontinued use of more than half of the violative advertising materials identified in each letter. In addition, FDA's issuance of regulatory letters had not always prevented drug companies from later disseminating similar violative materials for the same drugs. |
gao_GAO-17-390 | gao_GAO-17-390_0 | This report found that the dilute and dispose approach would be significantly less expensive than the MOX approach and would face fewer technical risks. DOE’s Revised Cost Estimate for Constructing the MOX Facility Substantially Met Best Practices, but NNSA Has Not Yet Applied Best Practices to the Revised Life-cycle Cost Estimate for Completing the Overall Program
DOE’s revised cost estimate for completing construction of the MOX facility substantially met best practices and, therefore, we believe it can be considered reliable because it substantially met all four characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In contrast, NNSA has not yet applied best practices when revising its life-cycle cost estimate for the Plutonium Disposition Program using the MOX approach, as we previously recommended. DOE’s 2016 revised cost estimate for MOX construction substantially met all four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost estimate: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. This is because, according to NNSA officials, they developed the $56 billion cost estimate to satisfy an annual requirement to record the plutonium environmental liability on departmental financial statements that were due in September 2016. NNSA is currently assessing the extent to which any new equipment and facilities would be needed to pursue this approach and, according to NNSA officials, will complete a life-cycle cost estimate that will follow GAO’s cost estimating best practices, including having the estimate independently validated. According to the program requirements document that NNSA created to outline its plans for conducting the dilute and dispose approach and NNSA officials, NNSA’s life-cycle cost estimate for the program using this approach will include several program elements: preparing the plutonium for dilution, diluting the plutonium into waste, and disposing of it at WIPP. DOE developed this capability as a technology development project. These officials also said that if DOE needs to expand the disposal space at WIPP in order to accept all of the plutonium from the dilute and dispose approach, the costs for such an expansion would not be part of the life-cycle cost estimate currently under development for the program using the dilute and dispose approach. WIPP Will Need to Be Expanded to Dispose of Defense TRU Waste Already Planned for WIPP
DOE does not have sufficient disposal space available in WIPP for the TRU waste planned for disposal identified in its 2016 annual TRU waste inventory report, and DOE will need to expand the repository to accommodate this waste. While DOE officials stated that they recognize expansion of WIPP’s disposal space may be necessary in the future, they have not analyzed or planned for expanding the facility because their focus has been on resuming waste emplacement operations at WIPP. DOE relies on several types of overpacks for the disposal of TRU waste. DOE’s most current formal planning document for WIPP, the TRU waste management plan, covers 5 years. Completion of the new model for WIPP that is needed to begin the regulatory approval process for expansion is not expected to be ready until 2024, and then the approval and subsequent construction process could take another 4 years or longer. Without developing a long-term plan for WIPP that includes the need for expanding WIPP’s disposal space and an integrated schedule that describes how DOE will complete the regulatory approval process and construction of new space before WIPP’s existing space is full, DOE will not have reasonable assurance that it will be able to expand the repository in a timely manner. Conclusions
DOE is currently in the process of reevaluating the best approach for disposing of 34 MT of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. DOE has not adequately planned for all possible waste that it may be expected to dispose of in WIPP, complicating its ability to determine whether the waste from the dilute and dispose approach can be disposed of at WIPP. DOE does not have plans to show how additional space will be excavated in time to prevent a disruption in waste shipments after the facility’s existing disposal space is filled in 2026. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) revised cost estimate for completing construction of the Mixed- oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX facility) and the revised life-cycle estimate for completing the Plutonium Disposition Program using the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel approach met cost-estimating best practices, (2) the status of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) development of a life-cycle cost estimate for completing the Plutonium Disposition Program using the dilute and dispose approach, and (3) the extent to which DOE has sufficient disposal space and statutory capacity at its Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to dispose of all defense transuranic (TRU) waste, including the diluted plutonium resulting from the dilute and dispose approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has pledged to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus, weapons-grade plutonium. The current U.S. approach relies on disposing of the plutonium by irradiating it as MOX fuel—a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides—in modified commercial nuclear reactors. Due to a significant rise in cost, DOE recently proposed terminating the MOX approach in favor of the dilute and dispose approach, which DOE stated may be less expensive. Under this approach, plutonium would be diluted with inert material and then disposed of in a geologic repository.
GAO was asked to review DOE's planning for both the MOX and dilute and dispose approaches. This report examines: (1) the extent to which DOE's revised cost estimates for completing the construction of the MOX facility and for completing the overall Plutonium Disposition Program met best practices, (2) the status of NNSA's development of a life-cycle cost estimate for the dilute and dispose approach, and (3) the extent to which DOE has sufficient disposal space and statutory capacity at WIPP to dispose of all defense TRU waste, including waste from the dilute and dispose approach. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed DOE and NNSA officials, including officials from five major waste-generating sites.
What GAO Found
In August 2016, the Department of Energy's (DOE) revised cost estimate for completing construction of the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility was approximately $17.2 billion and assumed annual funding of $350 million. This estimate substantially met best practices and can be considered reliable as it substantially met all four characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate: comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. In contrast, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has not yet applied best practices when revising its life-cycle cost estimate of $56 billion for the Plutonium Disposition Program using the MOX approach, as GAO previously recommended. This is because NNSA officials developed the revised life-cycle cost estimate to satisfy an annual requirement to record the plutonium environmental liability on departmental financial statements that were due in September 2016.
NNSA is developing a life-cycle cost estimate for completing the Plutonium Disposition Program using the dilute and dispose approach, which would dispose of diluted plutonium at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). WIPP is an underground repository for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) nuclear waste, which is waste contaminated by nuclear elements heavier than uranium, such as diluted plutonium. NNSA is currently assessing the extent to which any new equipment and facilities would be needed to pursue this approach, and it expects to develop an independently validated life-cycle cost estimate for the program by late 2018. NNSA has outlined an initial set of milestones for the program using the dilute and dispose approach; these milestones include program elements such as preparing the plutonium for dilution, diluting the plutonium into waste and securely storing it, and disposing of it at WIPP.
DOE does not have sufficient space at WIPP to dispose of all defense TRU waste. DOE's current plan is to fill the existing disposal space in WIPP by 2026, and additional space will need to be excavated to dispose of all the waste included in DOE's current TRU waste inventory report. While DOE officials recognize that expansion of WIPP's disposal space may be necessary in the future, they have not analyzed or planned for the facility's expansion because their focus has been on resuming operations at WIPP, which had been suspended in 2014 after two separate accidents at the facility. Specifically, GAO found the following:
DOE's TRU waste management plan, which includes planning for WIPP, covers a 5-year period and does not address possible expansion. Moreover, DOE's TRU waste management plan does not include a schedule for expanding DOE's disposal space before existing space is full.
Expanding WIPP's disposal space will require regulatory approval that is expected to take several years. However, DOE modeling that is needed to begin the regulatory approval process is not expected to be ready until 2024.
Without developing a plan for WIPP that includes an integrated schedule for completing the regulatory approval process and constructing new space before WIPP's existing space is full, DOE does not have reasonable assurance that it will be able to expand the repository in a timely manner.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE develop a plan for expanding WIPP's disposal space that includes a schedule for completing the expansion before existing space is full. DOE concurs with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-661 | gao_GAO-02-661_0 | For federal fiscal years 1997 to 2002, states received federal TANF block grants totaling $16.5 billion annually. HHS oversees states’ TANF programs. In 2001, state and local governments spent more than $1.5 billion on contracts with nongovernmental entities, or at least 13 percent of all federal TANF and state maintenance-of-effort expenditures (excluding those for cash assistance). Services Contracted Out Typically Include Job Preparation, Placement, and Retention
States and localities contract with nongovernmental entities to provide services to facilitate employment, administer program functions, and strengthen families. Finally, some states and localities are using TANF funds to contract for services related to the TANF objectives of preventing and reducing the incidence of nonmarital pregnancies and encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Single Audits Assess TANF Procurement and Subrecipient Monitoring
HHS relies primarily on state single audits to oversee TANF contracting by states and localities. Different Approaches Have Been Used To Help Ensure Compliance with, and Identify Problems in, Implementing Bid Solicitation and Contract Award Processes
State and local governments rely on third parties to help ensure compliance with procurement requirements, including bid protests, judicial processes, and external audits. Deficiencies Have Been Identified with Contract Oversight and Contractor Performance in the States and Localities We Reviewed
State and local governments use a variety of approaches to help ensure that TANF-funded contractors expend federal funds properly and comply with TANF program requirements, such as on-site reviews and independent audits. Second, PRWORA expanded the scope of services that could be contracted out to nongovernmental entities, such as determining eligibility for TANF. Moreover, in four of the six states we visited, independent audits have identified deficiencies in state or local oversight of TANF contractors. However, HHS officials told us that they do not know the extent and nature of problems pertaining to the oversight of TANF contractors that state single audit reports have cited because HHS does not analyze these reports in such a comprehensive manner. This is due, in part, to HHS’s focus on those problems identified by single audit reports that involve unallowable or questionable costs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To facilitate improved oversight of TANF contractors by all levels of government, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Assistant Secretary for Children and Families to use state single audit reports in a more systematic manner to identify the extent and nature of problems related to state oversight of nongovernmental TANF contractors and determine what additional actions may be appropriate to help prevent and correct such problems. | What GAO Found
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWPRA) of 1996 changed the nation's cash assistance program for needy families with children. The former program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was replaced with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, which provides states with $16.5 billion each year through 2002 to serve this population. TANF's goals include ending the dependence of needy families on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; preventing and reducing the incidence of nonmarital pregnancies; and encouraging two-parent families. PRWORA expanded the scope of services that could potentially be contracted out, such as determining eligibility for TANF, which had traditionally been done by government employees. Moreover, with the large drop in TANF caseloads nationally, a greater share of federal TANF block grant funds and state funds is now devoted to various support services that are typically contracted out. Although PRWORA expanded the flexibility of states to design and administer TANF programs, its also limited the ability of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to regulate states' TANF programs. Contracting with nongovernmental entities to provide TANF-funded services occurs in almost every state and exceeds $1.5 billion in federal TANF and state maintenance-of-effort funds for 2001. HHS relies primarily on state single audit reports to oversee TANF contracting by states and localities. Their regional offices follow up on the TANF deficiencies identified by these reports, and HHS focuses on reported deficiencies that involve unallowable or questionable costs. However, HHS does not know the extent and nature of problems pertaining to the oversight of nongovernmental TANF contractors that have been cited by state single audits because they do not analyze the reports in a comprehensive manner. State and local governments rely on third parties to help ensure compliance with bid solicitation and contract award procedures, including bid protests, judicial processes, and external audits. State and local government agencies use various approaches to oversee TANF contractors, and problems have been identified with both contract oversight and contractor performance. State and local governments have primary responsibility for overseeing TANF contractors, and they rely on various approaches, including reviewing contractor-provided information and performing on-site reviews. However, auditors in four of the six states identified deficiencies in state or local oversight of TANF contractors, such as uneven oversight by local contracting agencies. |
gao_GAO-06-822T | gao_GAO-06-822T_0 | The supporting data of the estimate is not timely because it does not contain the most current information from testing and evaluation. As noted above, the Bureau now estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion, making it the most expensive in history, even after adjusting for inflation. As we stated in our January 2004 report, in June 2001, the Bureau derived its 2010 cost estimate by using the actual cost of the 2000 Census combined with assumptions about cost drivers, such as (1) staffing needs, (2) enumerator productivity, (3) pay rates for census workers, (4) the nonresponse rate for mailing back the questionnaires, and (5) inflation. However, the most recent life-cycle cost estimate does not incorporate current information about those 2001 assumptions. However, the Bureau’s existing assumptions about the use and reliability of the MCD were not updated to reflect information from the 2004 test, which showed that assumptions about staffing and space associated with the new technology had changed since the June 2001 estimate. The Bureau’s evaluations about those test results indicate that more help desk staff at the local census office were needed to support the use of the MCD, and additional storage space was needed for the devices. Bureau Has Taken Steps to Reduce Nonresponse Follow- up Costs, But Challenges with Technology Remain
Since 2000, the Bureau has reengineered the decennial census and has begun to implement new initiatives. While these initiatives show promise, the Bureau will need to address technological challenges with the MCD that will be used to collect data for nonresponse follow-up. During the 2004 Census Test, the MCDs experienced transmission problems, memory overloads, and difficulties with a mapping feature—all of which added inefficiencies to the nonresponse follow-up operation. However, if after the 2008 Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found not to be reliable, the Bureau could be faced with a remote but daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly, paper-based census used in 2000. As the Bureau moves from testing to demonstrating the design in the Dress Rehearsal, it will be important for the Bureau to have risk mitigation plans in place to reduce the severity of challenges to a cost-effective census. We have made recommendations addressing those issues, such as developing mitigation plans with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior managers. The Bureau has agreed to complete these activities as soon as possible. Bureau Does Not Have a Plan to Assess Resources Needed to Update Address and Map Files in Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
The Bureau does not have a plan to assess additional resources that may be needed to update the address and map file for areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The task of updating Census address files to reflect the changes caused by the hurricanes will be formidable and possibly costly, as much has changed to the landscape since the 2000 Census. For example, the Red Cross estimated that nearly 525,000 people were displaced as a result of hurricane Katrina and approximately 90,000 square miles were affected. Given the magnitude of the area, population, and infrastructure affected, it would be prudent for the Bureau to begin assessing whether new procedures will be necessary, determining whether additional resources may be needed, and identifying whether local partners will be available to assist the Bureau in its effort to update address and map data, as well as other census-taking activities. 2010 Census: Counting Americans Overseas as Part of the Decennial Census Would Not Be Cost-Effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally mandated activity, with immutable deadlines. It produces data used to allocate about $200 billion yearly in federal financial assistance, reapportion the seats of the House of Representatives, and provide a profile of the nation's people to help guide policy decisions. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion, making it the most expensive census in the nation's history, even after adjusting for inflation. Based primarily on GAO's issued reports, this testimony addresses the extent to which the Bureau has (1) developed detailed and timely cost data for effective oversight and cost control, (2) reduced nonresponse mail follow up costs, and (3) produced risk mitigation plans to address identified challenges.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's most recent life-cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census does not reflect the most current information from testing and evaluation nor provide complete information on how changing assumptions may affect cost. As GAO reported in January 2004, the Bureau derived its initial cost estimate by considering the cost of the 2000 Census along with certain assumptions that drive costs, such as staffing needs, the nonresponse rate for mailing back the census questionnaire, census worker productivity and pay rates, and inflation; however, GAO's ongoing work has found that the most recent (September 2005) estimate does not incorporate current information on certain 2001 assumptions. For example, the 2004 Census Test suggests some assumptions about staffing and space associated with new technology have changed. Specifically, Bureau evaluations indicate that more staff at the local census office was needed to support the use of the new hand-held mobile computing device (MCD) and additional storage space was needed for the MCDs. Since 2000, the Bureau has reengineered the decennial census and has begun new initiatives to reduce nonresponse follow up costs. Key to the Bureau's steps to reduce the costs of nonresponse follow up is successfully using the MCDs to eliminate millions of paper questionnaires and maps. Importantly, the Bureau must first resolve the MCD's technological challenges. During 2004 and 2006 tests, the MCDs had significant reliability problems. For example, in the 2004 test the MCDs experienced transmission problems, memory overloads, and difficulties with the map ping feature. Bureau officials have contracted the design and implementation for a new MCD that will not be ready until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal. If after the Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found not to be reliable, the Bureau could be faced with the remote but daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly paper-based Census used in 2000. The Bureau does not have risk mitigation plans to address certain identified challenges to a cost-effective census. Most notably, the Bureau does not have a plan to assess additional resources that may be needed to update the address and map file for areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Moreover, the Bureau has not yet assessed whether new procedures will be necessary nor whether local partners will be available to assist in updating address and map data. Updating address files to reflect the changes caused by the hurricanes will be formidable, in part because, according to Red Cross estimates, nearly 525,000 people were displaced in a 90,000 square mile area. Another risk to be mitigated stems from the need to closely monitor the performance of about $1.9 billion in contracts. The Bureau has agreed to take steps to mitigate some of those risks. For example, the Bureau has said it will enhance the ability of key contract project offices to better manage contracts through such actions as developing mitigation plans with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior managers. |
gao_GAO-12-40 | gao_GAO-12-40_0 | The transition from high school to postsecondary school can present challenges for all students, and especially for students with disabilities because they must assume more responsibility for their education by identifying themselves as having a disability, providing documentation of their disability, and requesting accommodations and services. Testing companies included in our study also consider what accommodations are appropriate for their tests. For example, one testing company official told us that three applicants with ADHD all might apply for extra time to complete the exam, but the testing company may decide different accommodations are warranted given each applicant’s limitations––extra time for an applicant unable to maintain focus; extra breaks for an applicant who has difficulty sitting still for an extended time period; preferential seating for the applicant who is easily distracted. Based on their reviews, testing companies reported granting between 72 and 100 percent of accommodations that were requested in the most recent testing year for 6 of the 10 tests for which we received data. Most of the applicants we spoke with told us that they requested accommodations that they were accustomed to using and were often frustrated that testing companies did not readily provide those accommodations. Testing Company Challenges
Testing companies we interviewed reported challenges with ensuring fairness to all test takers when reviewing applications for accommodations. For example, officials from two of the companies said some applicants may see an advantage to getting an accommodation, such as extra time, and will request it without having a legitimate need. Testing company officials told us that reviewing requests that contain limited information can be challenging because they do not have sufficient information to make an informed decision. Officials from two testing companies and an attorney representing some of the testing companies included in our study also told us they have concerns about testing companies being required to provide accommodations that best ensure that applicants’ test results reflect the applicants’ aptitudes rather than their disabilities since they believe the ADA only requires testing companies to provide reasonable accommodations. Federal Enforcement Is Largely Complaint- Driven, and Justice Lacks a Strategic Approach to Ensure Testing Company Compliance
Enforcement of Testing Company Compliance Generally Occurs in Response to Complaints, and Involves Multiple Agencies
Federal enforcement of laws and regulations governing testing accommodations primarily occurs in response to citizen complaints that are submitted to federal agencies. While Justice has overall responsibility for enforcement of Title III of the ADA, which includes Section 309 that is specifically related to examinations offered by private testing companies, other federal agencies such as Education and HHS have enforcement responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act for testing companies that receive federal financial assistance from them. After Justice reviews the complaint at in-take, it advises complainants that it might not make a determination about whether or not a violation has occurred in each instance. Justice Has Clarified ADA Requirements for Testing Accommodations but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Enforcement
Justice’s regulations implementing Section 309 of the ADA provide the criteria for its enforcement efforts, and it has recently taken steps to clarify ADA requirements pertaining to testing accommodations by adding new provisions to regulations. While Justice officials said they have conducted similar searches in reference to a specific complaint, they have not conducted systematic searches of their data systems to inform their overall enforcement efforts. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend to the Attorney General that Justice take steps to develop a strategic approach to target its enforcement efforts related to testing accommodations. For example, the strategic approach could include (1) analyzing its complaint and case data to prioritize enforcement and technical assistance, (2) working with the Secretaries of Education and HHS to develop a formal coordination strategy, and (3) updating technical assistance materials to reflect current requirements. With regard to analyzing its data, Justice stated that it utilizes complaint and case data through all stages of its work and makes decisions about which complaints to pursue based on ongoing and prior work. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what types of accommodations individuals with disabilities apply for and receive, and how schools assist them; (2) what factors testing companies consider when making decisions about requests for testing accommodations; (3) what challenges students and testing companies experience in receiving and granting testing accommodations; and (4) how federal agencies enforce compliance with relevant federal disability laws and regulations. We chose tests that are commonly used to gain admission into undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs and to obtain professional certification or licensure. To determine the types of accommodations requested by individuals with disabilities and granted by testing companies, we reviewed data provided by testing companies on accommodations requested and granted, interviewed testing company officials, interviewed disability experts, and reviewed literature to understand the types of accommodations applicants with disabilities might require. | Why GAO Did This Study
Standardized tests are often required to gain admission into postsecondary schools or to obtain professional certifications. Federal disability laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require entities that administer these tests to provide accommodations, such as extended time or changes in test format, to students with disabilities. GAO examined (1) the types of accommodations individuals apply for and receive and how schools assist them, (2) factors testing companies consider when making decisions about requests for accommodations, (3) challenges individuals and testing companies experience in receiving and granting accommodations, and (4) how federal agencies enforce compliance with relevant disability laws and regulations. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed disability experts; individuals with disabilities; officials from high schools, postsecondary schools, testing companies; and officials from the Departments of Justice (Justice), Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS). GAO also reviewed testing company policies and data, federal complaint and case data for selected testing companies, and relevant laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
Among accommodations requested and granted in the most recent testing year, approximately three-quarters were for extra time, and about half were for applicants with learning disabilities. High school and postsecondary school officials GAO interviewed reported advising students about which accommodations to request and providing documentation to testing companies, such as a student's accommodations history.
Testing companies included in GAO's study reported that they grant accommodations based on their assessment of an applicant's eligibility under the ADA and whether accommodation requests are appropriate for their tests. Testing companies look for evidence of the functional limitations that prevent the applicant from taking the exam under standard conditions. They also consider what accommodations are appropriate for their tests and may grant accommodations that were different than those requested. For example, one testing company official told GAO that applicants with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder all might request extra time, but may be granted different accommodations given their limitations--extra time for an applicant unable to maintain focus; extra breaks for an applicant unable to sit still for an extended time period; a separate room for an easily distracted applicant.
Documenting need and determining appropriate accommodations can present challenges to students and testing companies. Some applicants GAO interviewed found testing companies' documentation requirements difficult to understand and unreasonable. Most applicants GAO spoke with said they sought accommodations that they were accustomed to using, and some found it frustrating that the testing company would not provide the same accommodations for the test. Testing companies reported challenges with ensuring fairness to all test takers and maintaining the reliability of their tests when making accommodations decisions. Testing company officials said that reviewing requests that contain limited information can make it difficult to make an informed decision. Some testing company officials also expressed concern with being required to provide accommodations that best ensure an applicant's test results reflect the applicant's aptitude rather than providing what they consider to be reasonable accommodations.
Federal enforcement of laws and regulations governing testing accommodations is largely complaint-driven and involves multiple agencies. While Justice has overall responsibility for enforcing compliance under the ADA, Education and HHS have enforcement responsibilities under the Rehabilitation Act for testing companies that receive federal financial assistance from them. Education and HHS officials said that they investigate each eligible complaint. Justice officials said they review each complaint at in-take, but they do not make a determination on every complaint because of the large volume of complaints it receives. Justice has clarified ADA requirements for testing accommodations primarily by revising its regulations, but it lacks a strategic approach to targeting enforcement. Specifically, Justice has not fully utilized complaint data--either its own or that of other agencies--to inform its efforts. Justice officials said that they reviewed complaints on a case-by-case basis but did not conduct systematic searches of their data to inform their overall approach to enforcement. Additionally, Justice has not initiated compliance reviews of testing companies, and its technical assistance on this subject has been limited. GAO recommends that the Department of Justice take steps to develop a strategic approach to enforcement such as by analyzing its data and updating its technical assistance manual. Justice agreed with GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Justice take steps to develop a strategic approach to enforcement such as by analyzing its data and updating its technical assistance manual. Justice agreed with GAOs recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-453T | gao_GAO-09-453T_0 | GAO’s Plans to Carry Out Its Recovery Act Responsibilities
Our bimonthly reviews of selected states’ and localities’ will examine how Recovery Act funds are being used and whether they are achieving the stated purposes of the act. These purposes include: to preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery; to assist those most impacted by the recession; to invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits; and to stabilize state and local government budgets in order to minimize and avoid reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax increases. We have selected a core group of 16 states that we will follow over the next few years to provide an ongoing longitudinal analysis of the use of funds under the Recovery Act. These states contain about 65 percent of the U.S. population and are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental grants funds available through the Recovery Act. In addition, we will sample localities within these states to provide a perspective on the use of Recovery Act funds at a local level. In addition to reporting on the core group of 16 states, we will be reviewing the recipient reports from all 50 states as part of our responsibilities to review these filings. How GAO’s Responsibilities Relate to Other Oversight Authorities
The Recovery Act delineates an important set of responsibilities for the accountability community. GAO is charged with reviewing the use of funds by selected states and localities. IGs across government are expected to audit the efforts of federal agencies’ operations and programs related to the Recovery Act, both individually within their particular entities and collectively, as many of them are members of the Board. The Recovery Act established the Board to help prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. The Board is to review contracts and grants to ensure they meet applicable standards, follow competition requirements, and are overseen by sufficient numbers of trained acquisition and grants personnel. Because funding streams of the Recovery Act will flow to the states and localities from different federal agencies, it is important for us to coordinate with the IGs and the Board. It is also important for us to coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), especially in regard to reporting requirements and other guidance to fund recipients and on what information is to be collected in order to adequately evaluate how well the Recovery Act achieves its objectives. Lessons Learned and Best Practices That Can Be Helpful in Addressing Challenges to Implementing the Recovery Act
There are many implementation challenges to ensuring adequate accountability and efficient and effective implementation of the Recovery Act. Experience tells us that the risk for fraud and abuse grows when billions of dollars are going out quickly, eligibility requirements are being established or changed, new programs are being created, or a mix of these characteristics. This suggests the need for a risk-based approach to target for attention specific programs and funding structures based on known strengths, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses, such as a track record of improper payments or contracting problems. In that regard, the accountability community has, in recent years, produced a wide variety of best practice and related guides, which are available to agencies to assist them in ensuring they have the needed internal controls in place from the outset. These best practice and related guides cover such areas as: Fraud Prevention: By establishing an effective fraud prevention program, agencies can provide reasonable assurance that Recovery Act funds benefit intended recipients. In summary, GAO welcomes the responsibility that Congress has placed on us to assist it in the oversight, accountability, and transparency of the Recovery Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's plans to carry out its oversight role related to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). The Recovery Act funds are provided for purposes including: preserving and creating jobs and promoting economic recovery; assisting those most impacted by the recession; investing in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure to provide long-term economic benefits; and stabilizing state and local government budgets. The Recovery Act assigns GAO a range of responsibilities to help promote accountability and transparency. Some are recurring requirements such as providing bimonthly reviews of the use of funds by selected states and localities. Others include targeted studies in several areas such as small business lending, education, and trade adjustment assistance. This statement discusses (1) GAO's plans to carry out its responsibilities under the Recovery Act, (2) how GAO's responsibilities relate to other oversight authorities, such as the Inspectors General (IG) and the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (Board), and (3) the challenges posed in ensuring accountability over the use of funds and associated lessons learned and best practices that can be helpful in addressing those challenges.
What GAO Found
The Recovery Act delineates an important set of responsibilities for GAO and others in the accountability community. GAO's bimonthly reviews of selected states' and localities' uses of the Recovery Act funds will examine how funds are being used and achieving the stated purposes of the Recovery Act. GAO has selected a core group of 16 states to follow over the next few years to provide an ongoing longitudinal analysis of the use of funds under the Recovery Act. These states contain about 65 percent of the U.S. population and are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental grants funds available through the Recovery Act. In addition, GAO will sample localities within these states to provide a perspective on the use of funds at the local level. In addition to reporting on the core group of 16 states, GAO will be reviewing the recipient reports from all 50 states as part of its responsibilities to review these filings. Depending on those assessments and other risk-based analyses, GAO's reviews may include additional states, localities, or other recipients as implementation proceeds. GAO is charged with reviewing the use of funds by selected states and localities. IGs across government are expected to audit the efforts of federal agencies' operations and programs related to the Recovery Act, both individually within their particular entities and collectively, as many of them are members of the Board. Because funding streams for the Recovery Act will flow to states and localities from different federal agencies, it is important for GAO to coordinate with the IGs and the Board, which is charged with coordinating and conducting oversight of Recovery Act funds in order to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Among other things, the Board is to review contracts and grants to ensure they meet applicable standards. It is also important for GAO to coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget, especially with regard to reporting requirements and other guidance to fund recipients and on what information should be collected in order to adequately evaluate how well the Recovery Act achieves its objectives. There are many implementation challenges to ensuring adequate accountability and efficient and effective implementation of the Recovery Act. Experience tells us that the risk for fraud and abuse grows when billions of dollars are going out quickly, eligibility requirements are being established or changed, and new programs are being created. This suggests the need for a risk-based approach for targeting attention on specific programs and funding structures early on based on known strengths, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses such as a track record of improper payments or contracting problems. In that regard, the accountability community has, in recent years, produced a wide variety of best practices and related guides, which are available to agencies to assist them in ensuring they have the needed internal controls in place from the outset. These best practices and related guides cover such areas as fraud prevention, contract management, and grants accountability. |
gao_GAO-17-61 | gao_GAO-17-61_0 | Quality measure rating. CMS Collects Information on the Use of the Nursing Home Compare Website, but Lacks a Systematic Process for Prioritizing and Implementing Improvements
CMS Collects Information on Website Use
We found that CMS utilizes three standard mechanisms for collecting information on the use of the Nursing Home Compare website: website analytics, website user surveys, and website usability tests. Specifically, the usability tests are not designed to assess the website’s usefulness to consumers, and the website analytics and user surveys only provide information about consumers who access the website. However, CMS does not have a documented and systematic approach describing how to prioritize recommended changes to the website and assessing the potential improvements. Instead, officials described a fragmented approach to reviewing and implementing recommended website changes that may include verbal discussions of various factors, such as which changes would provide the broadest impact. CMS has stated the goal for its Nursing Home Compare website as assisting consumers in finding and comparing information about nursing home quality. In addition, under federal internal control standards, management should address identified program deficiencies on a timely basis and evaluate appropriate actions for improvement. However, in the absence of an established process to evaluate and prioritize implementation of improvements, CMS cannot ensure that it is fully meeting its goal for the website. Several Factors Inhibit the Ability of the Five-Star System to Help Consumers Understand Nursing Home Quality and Choose Between Homes
Our analysis for the Five-Star System’s ratings data found that its overall rating provided consumers with distinctions between the highest and lowest performing nursing homes for health inspections in most states. 1. According to CMS Five-Star System documentation, the rating system is not designed to compare nursing homes nationally. Because the Five-Star System does not include consumer satisfaction information—a key quality performance measure—the rating system is missing important information that could help consumers distinguish between high- and low- performing nursing homes. To help improve the Five-Star System’s ability to enable consumers to understand nursing home quality and make distinctions between high- and low- performing homes, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: add information to the Five-Star System that allows consumers to compare nursing homes nationally; evaluate the feasibility of adding consumer satisfaction information to the Five-Star System; and develop and test with consumers introductory explanatory information on the Five-Star System to be prominently displayed on the home page. We maintain that the ability for consumers to compare nursing homes nationally is critical to making nursing home decisions, especially for those consumers who live near state borders or have multistate options, and that our recommendation remains valid. We analyzed Five-Star System data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 2. 4. We used the results of 2015 nursing home resident satisfaction surveys from two of our selected states that collect such information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 15,600 nursing homes participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs provide care to 1.4 million residents each year. To help consumers make informed choices about nursing homes, CMS developed the Nursing Home Compare website, and on the site made available the Five-Star System, which rates homes on quality components.
GAO was asked to assess the website and rating system as tools for consumers. GAO examined (1) the information CMS collects about the use of Nursing Home Compare, including its usefulness to consumers, and potential areas, if any, to improve the website, and (2) the extent to which the Five-Star System enables consumers to understand nursing home quality and make distinctions between homes. GAO reviewed CMS documents and interviewed CMS officials and national and a non-generalizable sample of state-level stakeholders from four states, selected on factors such as size. GAO also analyzed Five-Star System and consumer complaint data, and analyzed resident satisfaction data from two of the four selected states.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) collects information on the use of the Nursing Home Compare website, which was developed with the goal of assisting consumers in finding and comparing nursing home quality information. CMS uses three standard mechanisms for collecting website information—website analytics, website user surveys, and website usability tests. These mechanisms have helped identify potential improvements to the website, such as adding information explaining how to use the website. However, GAO found that CMS does not have a systematic process for prioritizing and implementing these potential improvements. Rather, CMS officials described a fragmented approach to reviewing and implementing recommended website changes. Federal internal control standards require management to evaluate appropriate actions for improvement. Without having an established process to evaluate and prioritize implementation of improvements, CMS cannot ensure that it is fully meeting its goals for the website.
GAO also found that several factors inhibit the ability of CMS's Five-Star Quality Rating System (Five-Star System) to help consumers understand nursing home quality and choose between high- and low- performing homes, which is CMS's primary goal for the system. For example, the ratings were not designed to compare nursing homes nationally, limiting the ability of the rating system to help consumers who live near state borders or have multistate options. In addition, the Five-Star System does not include consumer satisfaction survey information, leaving consumers to make nursing home decisions without this important information. As a result, CMS cannot ensure that the Five-Star System fully meets its primary goal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including, that CMS establish a process to evaluate and prioritize website improvements, add information to the Five-Star System that allows homes to be compared nationally, and evaluate the feasibility of adding consumer satisfaction data. HHS agreed with three of GAO's recommendations, but did not agree to add national comparison information. GAO maintains this is important information, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-11-662 | gao_GAO-11-662_0 | PCIPs Generally Had Similar Cost Sharing, but Varied in Coverage Limits, Premiums, and Criteria for Demonstrating Pre- Existing Conditions
Health insurance plans offered by state- and federally run PCIPs generally had similar cost sharing features. For example, the most popular plans available in most states had annual deductibles ranging from $1,000 to $2,999, out-of-pocket maximums at or near the legal maximum of $5,950, and coinsurance of 20 percent. In 2011, almost all state- and federally run PCIPs had coverage limits for some benefits; however, the selected benefits and the extent of coverage limits varied. As of June 2011, the average monthly premium for a 50-year-old person was $407 across all states, ranging from $240 in Utah to $1,048 in Alaska. Until July 1, 2011, applicants for the federally run PCIP generally had fewer options available to demonstrate their eligibility based on a pre- existing condition than did those in the state-run PCIPs. PCIP Enrollment and Spending Remain Significantly Lower Than Initial Projections, Though Enrollment Has Increased Steadily
As of April 2011, enrollment in state- and federally run PCIPs was significantly lower than projected, though it has increased steadily. By November 2010, after about 4 months of coverage, total PCIP enrollment was about 9,000, and increased to nearly 21,500 by April 2011, ranging from 0 in Vermont to nearly 3,200 in Pennsylvania. We found that lower than expected enrollment may be attributed to five factors: (1) the statutory requirement that applicants be uninsured for 6 months prior to applying, (2) affordability concerns, (3) a lack of awareness about the program, (4) the processes used for determining eligibility, and (5) existing state laws or state-supported health insurance programs. In efforts to improve the affordability of PCIP coverage and to increase awareness of the program, CCIIO lowered PCIP premiums and undertook additional marketing and outreach efforts beginning in 2011. Specifically, state- run PCIPs collectively expended about $78 million as of March 31, 2011, and HHS expended almost $26 million for the federally run PCIP and about $1.6 million for its own administrative expenses, which together represented about 2 percent of the total $5 billion appropriation. Three federal agencies—CCIIO, OPM, and HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG)—are currently engaged in or planning oversight activities. CCIIO Established Contracts Intended to Ensure Key Program Requirements Are Met
The contracts HHS signed with states and GEHA to provide PCIP coverage are a primary means to ensure that the state- and federally run PCIPs are implemented efficiently and as intended. For example, state-run PCIPs are contractually required to: verify that the enrollee meets all PCIP eligibility criteria; implement disease and utilization management procedures to ensure enrollees receive necessary but cost-effective care; establish a detailed claims database that tracks each covered service; develop operating procedures to detect and report to CCIIO incidences of fraud, waste, abuse, and insurer dumping; notify CCIIO if enrollment reaches 75 percent of projected levels or if the state expects its expenses to exceed its allotted funding, and develop a mitigation strategy to control costs, which may include raising premiums, reducing benefits, or capping enrollment, as approved by CCIIO; submit monthly cost reports—certified as being accurate and complete—with information on administrative expenses, paid claims, premiums collected, and withdrawals from HHS; provide CCIIO with an independently audited financial report detailing all PCIP finances by June 30 of each year, 2011 through 2013, in accordance with the state’s standard accounting practices or generally accepted accounting principles. While ultimately responsible for the entire program, CCIIO also relies on OPM in its capacity as administrator of the contract with GEHA to perform oversight. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Premiums for the Most Popular Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans (PCIP) by State, June 2011
Appendix III: Criteria for Demonstrating a Pre-Existing Condition by State, June 2011
State-run Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans (PCIP)
Appendix IV: Enrollment and Expenditures for State- and Federally Run Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans (PCIP)
Appendix IV: Enrollment and Expenditures for State- and Federally Run Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plans (PCIP)
State
Legend: N/A = Not applicable For the federally run PCIP states, administrative expenses and federal reimbursements were not available on a state-by-state basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Individuals applying for health insurance are often denied coverage due to a pre-existing condition. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act appropriated $5 billion to create a temporary pool--known as the Pre- Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) program--to provide access to insurance for such individuals until new protections take effect in 2014. Twenty-seven states opted to run their own PCIPs, while 23 states and the District of Columbia opted to let the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) run the PCIPs for their residents. Initial projections of total enrollment varied from 200,000 to 375,000, and questions have been raised about funding, implementation, and oversight of this new program. GAO examined (1) PCIP features, premiums, and criteria for demonstrating a pre-existing condition, (2) trends in PCIP enrollment and spending, including administrative costs, and (3) federal oversight activities. GAO reviewed PCIP benefits and rates; interviewed officials from selected state PCIPs, HHS, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which assists HHS in administering aspects of the federally run PCIP; analyzed data provided by HHS and OPM; and examined contracts and interagency agreements. In its comments, HHS emphasized its recent efforts to increase enrollment and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
State- and federally run PCIPs generally had similar cost sharing arrangements, although other features varied. Most states had annual deductibles falling within $1,000 to $2,999, with out-of-pocket limits at or near $5,950. Coverage limits were common but varied, both in terms of the benefits affected and the extent of the limits. Monthly premiums ranged considerably--from $240 in Utah to $1,048 in Alaska for a 50-year-old enrollee--and were generally lower in the federally run PCIP. Additionally, applicants in the federally run PCIP generally had fewer options to demonstrate a pre-existing condition--a criteria of program eligibility-- than did those in the state-run PCIPs. Enrollment and spending for state- and federally run PCIPs have been significantly lower than initial projections. As of April 30, 2011, enrollment had exceeded 21,000, ranging from 0 in one state to nearly 3,200 in another state. Factors contributing to low enrollment include the statutory requirement that enrollees be uninsured for 6 months prior to applying; premiums that may be unaffordable to many; and a lack of PCIP awareness. In response, HHS reduced premiums in the federally run PCIP states and increased its outreach efforts in 2011. Spending was also lower than projected--about 2 percent of total program funding had been spent, or about $78 million by state-run PCIPs and $26 million for the federally run PCIP. To provide for program oversight, HHS established contracts with states and the carrier selected to provide benefits for the federally run PCIP, which include numerous provisions to ensure program requirements are met. For example, the contracts require regular reporting of expense and enrollment data, and annual completion of independently audited financial reports. Also, HHS and OPM are engaged in ongoing oversight activities, such as reconciling the reported data, and HHS intends to conduct performance audits in the future. |
gao_HEHS-96-17 | gao_HEHS-96-17_0 | Mammography is one of the most technically challenging radiological procedures, and ensuring the quality of the radiologic image is difficult. Among other things, MQSA requires that
FDA establish quality standards for mammography equipment, personnel, all mammography facilities be accredited by an FDA-approved accrediting body (either a nonprofit organization or a state agency) and obtain a certificate from FDA in order to legally provide mammography services after October 1, 1994; and all mammography facilities be evaluated annually by a certified medical physicist and be inspected annually by FDA-approved inspectors. Since early 1994, FDA has been working with the National Mammography Quality Assurance Advisory Committee to develop the final regulations. Quality of Mammography Services Has Improved
Early indications point to a general improvement in the quality of mammography services under the act. In implementing these requirements, FDA adopted the standards that had been set by ACR in its voluntary compliance program. Accreditation Process Has Produced Change at Many Facilities
MQSA called for facilities to comply with the new standards through an accreditation process. As a result, although some facilities have discontinued services, so far the number of closures is relatively small and access to services has not been significantly affected. As a result, as of July 26, 1995, FDA had not closed any facilities for noncompliance found during inspections. The costs associated with a system upgrade vary depending on the type and the extent of changes that are required. Mammography quality standards are now in place in all states, and these standards do not appear to have had a negative effect on access to services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined whether the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) implementation of the Mammography Quality Standards Act has had any effect on the: (1) quality of mammography services; and (2) access to such services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the act has had a positive effect on the quality of mammography services; (2) a uniformed set of standards for mammography services is required in all states; (3) many facilities have had to improve their services in order to become fully certified; (4) annual inspections of mammography facilities help ensure that these facilities are in compliance with the standards set by the American College of Radiology; (5) the number of facilities ceasing mammography services rather than complying with the quality standards is relatively small; and (6) FDA has not closed many of the facilities unable to meet the new certification requirements, but it has given them time to comply with the new quality assurance requirements and to correct the problems found during inspection. |
gao_GAO-13-643 | gao_GAO-13-643_0 | By law, only individuals accredited by VA can represent claimants in the VA claims process. As of May 2013, VA had on its rolls approximately 20,000 individuals who are accredited to represent claimants. To this end, OGC staff review accreditation applications and make approval decisions, monitor whether accredited representatives meet ongoing program requirements, and investigate issues and complaints that could lead to a representative having his or her accreditation cancelled or suspended. VA’s Procedures and Requirements Do Not Sufficiently Ensure That Representatives Are Qualified
VA Does Not Sufficiently Assess Whether Representatives Have Good Character
For four of these individuals, VA received complaints alleging these same individuals charged non-allowable fees for filing claims. However, our work shows that an attorney’s standing with a state bar may not always be a sufficient proxy for good character. In this instance, VA chose not to accredit the individual based on his self- reported criminal record, but it is not clear what the outcome would have been had VA relied on his bar membership status in the absence of such self-reported information. In addition, VA’s initial and ongoing training requirements do not ensure accredited attorneys and agents are knowledgeable and VA does not consistently enforce existing requirements. Moreover, VA does not consistently ensure that attorneys and agents complete required training. Inadequate Resource Allocation and Unclear Communication with Claimants Hinder Efforts to Administer Accreditation
Inadequate Staffing and Information Technology Leads to Backlogs and Limited Program Monitoring
VA has dedicated only a few staff to administer its accreditation program, which has resulted in limited monitoring efforts and workload backlogs. Even so, VA has a significant backlog of accreditation applications to review. Because by law only accredited individuals may represent claimants, this backlog may cause delays for claimants who need assistance with their claims. This may also affect OGC’s plans to increase its oversight of accredited representatives because those plans are contingent upon eliminating the backlog of initial applications. Further, an official noted that a significant amount of data entry is required when applicants submit information for accreditation. For example, VA’s accreditation website does not explicitly state how to report concerns about representatives. Accreditation Does Not Address Some Emerging Threats
VA faces challenges with unaccredited individuals helping veterans file claims and charging claimants for assistance. Conclusions
Hundreds of thousands of veterans and their families rely on accredited representatives to guide them through the process of applying for VA benefits. Additionally, without providing better information to claimants about how to report issues or concerns about their representation, claimants may not know where to turn to report an abuse or not even recognize that their representative is engaged in prohibited practices. Lastly, claimants may be vulnerable to emerging threats—such as unaccredited representatives—in the absence of VA tools to provide protection. VA concurred in principle with our second recommendation that it explore strengthening initial and continuing knowledge requirements. Additionally, VA expressed concerns that additional knowledge or testing requirements could have a chilling effect on attorney representation for claimants. VA noted that imposing penalties on unaccredited individuals, individuals who inappropriately charge claimants, or sell financial products to claimants could help curb inappropriate practices, but in some cases may have a chilling effect on the legitimate activities of others. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) accredits and oversees veterans’ representatives, our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which VA’s procedures adequately ensure representatives meet program requirements, and (2) any obstacles that may impede VA’s effort to adequately implement its accreditation process. To determine the extent to which VA’s procedures are adequate, we reviewed pertinent federal laws and regulations and interviewed officials in VA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) and Veterans Benefits Administration. We determined whether the evidence in each file indicated that VA carried out the procedures that VA officials stated they follow when reviewing files.reviewed all 24 complaints that OGC received in 2012 regarding attorneys and claim agents in order to understand the actions that VA takes in response to concerns. Additionally, we selected a random, judgmental sample of 21 attorneys and agents to determine whether an independent background check would uncover issues that could call their character into question. | Why GAO Did This Study
Representatives accredited by VA serve a critical role in helping veterans or their family members file claims for VA benefits. By law, accredited individuals must demonstrate good moral character and program knowledge and VA's OGC is tasked to ensure they do so by reviewing initial applications and monitoring ongoing requirements, such as training.
GAO examined (1) the extent to which VA's procedures adequately ensure representatives meet program requirements, and (2) any obstacles that may impede VA's efforts to adequately implement its accreditation process. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations and procedures, and interviewed VA officials and organizations of accredited representatives. GAO also reviewed a representative sample of accreditation decisions made in 2012 as well as complaints received by VA in 2012. GAO also conducted additional checks on a random but small and non-representative sample of accredited individuals.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Office of General Counsel (OGC) procedures do not sufficiently ensure that accredited representatives have good character and knowledge. While GAO's analysis shows that VA follows its procedures for reviewing initial accreditation applications, VA relies on limited self-reported information to determine whether applicants have a criminal history or their character could be called into question, which in turn leaves VA vulnerable to accrediting individuals who may not provide responsible assistance. For example, when GAO conducted additional checks on a non-representative sample of accredited individuals, GAO found that some individuals had histories of bankruptcies or liens, information which could help develop a more complete picture of applicants' character and prompt further inquiry by VA into their background. VA's procedures also do not ensure that representatives have adequate program knowledge. For example, VA's initial training requirements are minimal and VA does not consistently monitor whether representatives meet additional continuing education requirements. As a result, some accredited representatives may not have adequate program knowledge to effectively assist clients with their claims. After being briefed on GAO's findings in May 2013, VA's OGC announced plans to take additional steps toward conducting background checks on applicants and auditing ongoing character and training requirements.
VA efforts to administer accreditation are hindered by an inadequate allocation of resources and unclear communication with claimants. For example, OGC has only four staff dedicated to overseeing thousands of accreditation applications each year, in addition to monitoring approximately 20,000 accredited representatives. As a result, OGC has not kept pace with pending accreditation applications, and has not consistently monitored continuing requirements. OGC's reliance on manual data entry results in resource-intensive program administration. For instance, OGC lacks information technology systems and tools that would help it proactively and efficiently identify representatives who are not meeting ongoing training requirements. Moreover, VA does not clearly solicit feedback from claimants about accredited representatives. For example, neither VA's accreditation web page nor information VA sends to claimants clearly communicates their rights or how to report abuses. Absent such outreach, claimants may not be aware that some representatives may be engaging in prohibited practices. Lastly, VA's current accreditation program does not address some emerging threats to claimants. For instance, VA has received complaints regarding unaccredited individuals inappropriately charging claimants to apply for benefits. By law, only accredited individuals can assist claimants. However, VA is not aware of the extent these unaccredited individuals operate, and is limited in the actions it can take to prevent them from assisting claimants.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the integrity of accreditation, GAO recommends that VA explore options for strengthening knowledge requirements and addressing emerging threats, improve its outreach, and determine the resources needed to adequately carry out accreditation. VA concurred or concurred in principle with GAO's recommendations and cautioned that imposing additional requirements to address concerns with representative knowledge or address emerging threats could have a chilling effect on representation. |
gao_T-GGD-99-58 | gao_T-GGD-99-58_0 | Personal Bankruptcy: Methodological Similarities and Differences in Three Reports on Debtors’ Ability to Pay
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to share our observations on the principal methodological similarities and differences of three reports on bankruptcy debtors’ ability to pay their debts. The three reports were issued by the Credit Research Center (Credit Center), Ernst & Young, and Creighton University/American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI). year repayment plan would successfully complete the plans—an assumption that historical experience suggests is unlikely. However, the reports have some methodological differences, including different (1) groupings of the types of debts that could be repaid; (2) gross income thresholds used to identify those debtors whose repayment capacity was analyzed, (3) assumptions about debtors’ allowable living expenses, (4) treatment of student loans that debtors had categorized as unsecured priority debts; and (5) and assumptions about administrative expenses. The Credit Center estimated that 30 percent of the chapter 7 debtors in its sample could repay at least 21 percent of their nonhousing, nonpriority debts, after deducting from their gross monthly income monthly mortgage payments and monthly living expenses. The Ernst & Young and ABI reports estimated the proportion of debtors who had sufficient income, after living expenses, to repay over a 5-year repayment period: • all of their nonhousing secured debt, such as automobile loans (debtors’ payments on home mortgage debt were included in the debtors’ living expenses); • all of their secured priority debts, such as back taxes, alimony, and child support (child support and alimony payments were assumed to continue for the full 5-year payment period unless otherwise noted in the debtors’ financial schedules); and • at least 20 percent of their unsecured nonpriority debts. The Ernst & Young and ABI reports estimated that 15 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively, of the chapter 7 debtors in their individual samples met all of these criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the principal methodological similarities and differences of three reports on bankruptcy debtors' ability to pay their debts. The three reports were issued by the Credit Research Center, Ernst & Young, and Creighton University/American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Credit Center report estimated that 30 percent of the chapter 7 debtors in its sample could pay at least 21 percent of their nonhousing, nonpriority debt, after deducting their mortgage debt payments and living expenses (exclusive of debt payments); (2) Ernst & Young and ABI estimated that 15 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively, of the debtors in their individual samples had sufficient income, after deducting allowable living expenses, to pay all of their nonhousing secured debts, all of their unsecured priority debts, and at least 20 percent of their unsecured nonpriority debts; (3) the reports have some characteristics in common, such as the use of debtor-prepared income, expense and debt schedules, the assumption that the debtor's income would remain stable over a 5-year repayment period, and the assumption that all debtors who entered a 5-year repayment plan would successfully complete the plans--an assumption that historical experience suggests is unlikely; (4) however, the reports have some methodological differences, including different: (a) groupings of the types of debts that could be repaid; (b) gross income thresholds used to identify those debtors whose repayment capacity was analyzed; (c) assumptions about debtors' allowable living expenses; (d) treatment of student loans that debtors had categorized as unsecured priority debts; and (e) assumptions about administrative expenses; and (5) these methodological differences contributed to the reports' different estimates of debtors' repayment capacity. |
gao_RCED-96-234 | gao_RCED-96-234_0 | The largest share of the funding support for the 12 agreements covered was related directly or indirectly to the objectives and concerns of the United Nations (U.N.) Framework Convention on Climate Change (the Framework Convention). This share accounted for approximately 71 percent of the total spending. The Framework Convention was followed by the Convention on Biological Diversity, which represented approximately 20 percent of the total spending, and by the International Tropical Timber Agreement, which represented approximately 5 percent of the total. The great majority of the five agencies’ spending in connection with these agreements was devoted to the agencies’ specific programs and projects, which accounted for about 98 percent of the spending. In the 3-year period covered by our review, EPA reported that it spent a total of $77.7 million in direct or indirect support of the objectives and concerns of the environmental agreements that were our focus. With respect to the general purposes for which EPA spent these funds, the largest single share, about 85 percent, went for specific projects and programs. This amount constituted approximately 23 percent of all nations’ support for UNEP’s environmental programs in this period. During 1992-95, the United States contributed a total of $7.09 million to the special purpose trust funds administered by UNEP. This amount was slightly more than 11 percent of all nations’ contributions to these trust funds. U.S. Financial Support for Multilateral Development Banks and Other International Financial Institutions
Financing of environmental projects, particularly in developing countries, is also made possible by loans, grants, and other assistance provided by multilateral development banks and affiliated international financial institutions supported by the United States and other governments. The World Bank received approximately 70 percent of this amount. The World Bank, in a recent “green accounting” of its lending portfolio in the 3 years following the Rio Earth Summit, reported that almost 10 percent—some $6.5 billion—of its cumulative portfolio was devoted to projects with environmental objectives. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Specifically, he asked us to identify the (1) funding of international environmental programs and activities by federal agencies and (2) federal financial support for the environmental programs and activities of specialized agencies of the United Nations and multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, regional development banks, and the Global Environment Facility. These agencies—the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Commerce—were selected on the basis of such considerations as the Committee’s interest and jurisdiction (the Department of State and USAID), the nature of the agencies’ roles, missions and activities, the magnitude and importance of their environmental programs, and our assessment of the agencies’ ability to respond in a timely manner to our requests for data. U.S. Government’s Contributions to UNEP’s Environment Fund and Estimated U.S. Financial Participation in UNEP’s Environmental Programs, 1992-1995
U.S. Government’s Contributions to UNEP-Administered Trust Funds
West and Central African Region $2,626,343 (25,000)
U.S. Financial Support for Multilateral Development Banks and Selected Other International Financial Institutions, Fiscal Years 1993-95
Totals, fiscal years 1993-95 For fiscal year 1993, the Congress appropriated $30 million for the Global Environment Facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal funding for international environmental activities, focusing on: (1) the level of funding related to 12 prominent international environmental agreements for fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1995; (2) funding provided by the Departments of State and Commerce, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and (3) federal financial support for the environmental programs and activities of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and other multilateral financial institutions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that; (1) in fiscal years (FY) 1993 through 1995, the Departments of State and Commerce, DOE, AID and EPA spent a combined total of $975.2 million in support of programs and activities related to the 12 international environmental agreements that were covered by GAO's review; (2) the greatest share of this spending, about 71 percent of the total, was related to the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; (3) the next largest shares of the spending, about 20 percent and 5 percent, respectively, related to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Tropical Timber Agreement; (4) AID accounted for the largest single share, 61 percent of the total spending by the five federal agencies, followed by DOE, which contributed nearly 31 percent of the agencies' spending; (5) the spending by both agencies was primarily related to fulfilling the individual missions of those agencies, and was devoted principally to funding specific projects and programs; (6) in both cases, this spending related more closely to the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change than to the other international environmental agreements covered by GAO's review; (7) the U.S. government's financial support for the international environmental programs and activities of nonfederal agencies consisted primarily of financial support for the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and for the activities of the World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions, including the Global Environment Facility; (8) from 1992 through 1995, the United States contributed a total of $74.61 million to UNEP's Environment Fund, which represented about 23 percent of all nations' contributions to the fund during that period; (9) from 1992 through 1995, the United States also contributed a total of $7.09 million to the special purpose trust funds administered by UNEP, which was approximately 11 percent of all nations' contributions to these funds in that period; (10) in FY 1993 through 1995, the United States provided a total of $4.73 billion to support the overall activities of multilateral development banks and other international financial institutions; (11) while it is not possible to determine precisely what percentage of this amount went for environmental projects, the World Bank, which received approximately 70 percent of this funding, recently reported that almost 10 percent of its investment portfolio was devoted to projects with primarily environmental objectives; and (12) another recipient of funds for environmental purposes was the Global Environment Facility, which in the same period received U.S. contributions totaling $120 million to provide developing countries with grants and loans, at favorable terms, for projects and activities designed to protect the global environment. |
gao_HEHS-95-102 | gao_HEHS-95-102_0 | Most respondents reported that these health problems limited their activities to some extent. Eighty-one reported that they were currently experiencing health problems associated with that service; 76 reported that, overall, their health was worse than shortly before they went to the Persian Gulf.Sixty-nine respondents said that health problems, which they believed were caused to some extent by their Persian Gulf service, limited their physical (56) or social activities (57). Additionally, 23 respondents reported that family members or individuals they lived with were experiencing health problems the veteran believed were related to the veteran’s Persian Gulf service. Some received care from more than one source, but more veterans received care from outside VA and DOD than from VA or DOD facilities. Most reported getting less than half of the care they believe they need for their Persian Gulf-related health problems. The registry was authorized in November 1992 by the Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Status Act, which specified five groups who were to be included: Persian Gulf veterans who (1) had requested the VA examination, (2) had applied for medical service in VA medical facilities, (3) had filed a claim for compensation for a disability that might be related to Persian Gulf service, (4) had died and are survived by a claimant for VA dependency and indemnity compensation, or (5) had received the DOD special examination and asked to be included in the VA registry. Many of the veterans were dissatisfied with the special examinations they were given. Most respondents were also dissatisfied with the other care they received from VA and DOD medical facilities. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs, and other interested parties. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on certain Persian Gulf War veterans' chronic health problems, focusing on: (1) the veterans' current military and health status; (2) the health care services they received after the war; and (3) their opinions on post-war care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the veterans surveyed were still concerned about their health and were dissatisfied with the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) services; (2) most of these veterans were still on active duty and believe their health problems are linked to their service in the Persian Gulf; (3) less than half of the separated veterans reported that health problems related to their Persian Gulf service contributed to their discharges; (4) most of the veterans reported that their health problems limited their physical and social activities; (5) almost one-third of the respondents reported that family members also experienced health problems that were related to their Gulf service; (6) although over half of these veterans had used VA or DOD health care services, many veterans received care from sources other than VA or DOD; and (7) VA and DOD have taken a variety of actions to address Persian Gulf veterans' concerns by expanding special health examinations and their outreach efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-1081 | gao_GAO-06-1081_0 | While the extent of regulation varies by state and by line of insurance, state insurance regulators oversee the provision of insurance; for example, states may approve the rates (prices) insurers may charge and require insurers to cover certain events. Applying Common Principles for Assessing Insurability Presents Challenges in Measuring and Predicting NBCR Risks
Several commonly accepted principles underlie insurers’ ability to determine whether to offer coverage for a particular risk and at what price. However, measuring and predicting losses associated with NBCR risks can be particularly challenging for a number of reasons, including lack of experience with similar attacks, difficulty in predicting terrorists’ intentions, and the potentially catastrophic losses that could result. Insurers may still decide to offer insurance for risks that deviate from the “ideal.” However, as one or more of the factors vary from the ideal, the ability of the insurer to estimate future losses decreases, the risk increases, and the insurer’s capital is more exposed to inadequate prices for the coverage that the insurer offers. These principles are The law of large numbers must apply. The loss must be definite and measurable. We interviewed representatives from three rating agencies, two of whom said they generally viewed NBCR risks as not insurable because of their potential for catastrophic losses. Insurers’ Exposure to NBCR Risks Varies Widely by Line of Insurance, and Insurers Offering Coverage Face Challenges in Pricing
Insurers’ exposure to NBCR risks varies widely by line of insurance, and insurers offering coverage face challenges in pricing. In view of the underlying difficulties in insuring NBCR risks, property/casualty insurers generally have tried to exclude such events from their coverage. Representatives of property/casualty insurers said that these risks continue to be unattractive to insure because of difficulties in predicting the frequency and severity of these risks, the potential for large and uncertain losses, and the limited amount of private reinsurance. Relatively Little NBCR Coverage Available in Property/Casualty Market Because Most Insurers Remain Unwilling to Cover Risks
Unlike workers’ compensation, life, and health insurers, insurers selling property/casualty insurance largely have excluded NBCR risks from their policies. Certified as a terrorist act. According to representatives of two large homeowners’ insurers, the exclusions limited their exposure to NBCR risks. Insurers in Workers’ Compensation, Life, and Health Generally Cover NBCR Risks, but Prices May Not Take Account of Potential Losses
Should an NBCR event occur, workers’ compensation, life, and health insurers would be responsible for covering loss of life and medical treatment for injuries because they generally provide coverage for these events. According to multiple sources, applicable state laws generally require workers’ compensation insurers to cover nearly all perils, including those from NBCR risks. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to discuss (1) commonly accepted principles of insurability and whether nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) risks are measurable and predictable and (2) whether private insurers currently are exposed to NBCR risks and the challenges they face in pricing such risks. Principles of Insurability and Assessing Whether NBCR Risks Are Measurable and Predictable
To identify commonly accepted principles of insurability and whether NBCR risks are measurable and predictable, we reviewed standard insurance references to identify principles that underlie insurers’ evaluations of the insurability of risks. Finally, to obtain a broad understanding of the characteristics of NBCR weapons and the types of damage they could cause, we consulted several sources of information. Assessing Exposure to NBCR Risks
To assess whether insurers are exposed to NBCR events, we identified lines of insurance that could be affected in the event of an NBCR terrorist attack: life, health, workers’ compensation, commercial property/casualty, and homeowners insurance. The information from both the surveys and the interviews about the availability of NBCR coverage is limited to the specific brokerage clients and individual companies, and cannot be generalized to all policyholders in the United States. Terrorism Insurance: Implementation of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorists using unconventional weapons, also known as nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological (NBCR) weapons, could cause devastating losses. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002, as well as the extension passed in 2005, will cover losses from a certified act of terrorism, irrespective of the weapon used, if those types of losses are included in the coverage. Because of a lack of information about the willingness of insurers to cover NBCR risks and uncertainties about the extent to which these risks can be and are being insured by private insurers across various lines of insurance, GAO was asked to study these issues. This report discusses (1) commonly accepted principles of insurability and whether NBCR risks are measurable and predictable, and (2) whether private insurers currently are exposed to NBCR risks and the challenges they face in pricing such risks. GAO collected information from and met with some of the largest insurers in each line of insurance, associations representing a broader cross section of the industry and state insurance regulators. GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Insuring NBCR risks is distinctly different from insuring other risks because of the potential for catastrophic losses, a lack of understanding or knowledge about the long-term consequences, and a lack of historical experience with NBCR attacks in the United States. Measuring and predicting NBCR risks present distinct challenges to insurers because the characteristics of the risks largely diverge from commonly accepted principles used in determining insurability. According to these common principles, when assessing insurability, the risk generally must (1) have past occurrences sufficient in number and homogeneous enough (invoking the "law of large numbers") to enable insurers to accurately predict future losses, (2) be definite and measurable in terms of dollar value, (3) occur by chance, and (4) not result in catastrophic losses for the insurer. While the condition of insurability or uninsurability is not an absolute, NBCR risks generally fail to meet most or all of these principles of an insurable risk. Indeed, insurance experts GAO interviewed said that the potential severity of NBCR risks alone could diminish the willingness of some insurers to insure NBCR risks. Although NBCR risks may not fully satisfy the principles of insurability, there are enough variations in exposure across lines of insurance that some insurers or some lines of insurance may have no willingness to offer coverage for NBCR, while others may choose to offer coverage for some or all of the risks. For example, even with TRIA, property/casualty insurers generally have attempted to limit their exposure to NBCR risks by excluding nearly all NBCR events from coverage, both for commercial property/casualty and homeowners. According to industry representatives, property/casualty insurers believe they have excluded NBCR coverage by interpreting existing exclusions in their policies to apply to NBCR risks, but some of the exclusions could be challenged in courts. Unlike property/casualty insurers, however, workers' compensation, life, and health insurers are exposed to NBCR risks and generally have not excluded them from coverage for a variety of reasons. Specifically, workers' compensation insurers generally offer NBCR coverage because many states limit the exclusion of perils for workers' compensation. Conversely, while life and health insurers may not always be required to insure NBCR risks, they generally face other challenges in segregating and excluding NBCR risks. However, representatives of workers' compensation, life, and health insurers expressed concerns that the prices they currently charge may not cover their potential exposures to NBCR risks, sometimes because of regulatory limitations, and generally because of difficulties in measuring and pricing for NBCR losses. Given the challenges faced by insurers in providing coverage for, and pricing, NBCR risks, any purely market-driven expansion of coverage is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. |
gao_GAO-17-572 | gao_GAO-17-572_0 | Member states collectively finance these organizations by providing assessed contributions, in accordance with the organizations’ regulations. According to U.S. officials, the United States provides voluntary contributions to the OAS, IICA, and PAHO primarily through grants for specific projects from State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Health and Human Services. 2013 Reform Act
The Reform Act directs the Secretary of State to submit “a multiyear strategy that…identifies a path toward the adoption of necessary reforms that would lead to an assessed fee structure in which no member state would pay more than 50 percent of the OAS’s assessed yearly fees.” According to the Reform Act, it is the sense of Congress that it is in the interest of the United States, OAS member states, and a modernized OAS that the OAS move toward an assessed quota structure that (1) assures the financial sustainability of the organization and (2) establishes, by October 2018, that no member state pays more than 50 percent of the organization’s assessed contributions. U.S. Assessed Contributions Constituted Over Half of Total Assessed Contributions to the Four Organizations, and the United States Also Made Voluntary Contributions to Three of Them
The United States’ assessed contributions constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member states to the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH from 2014 through 2016, as shown in table 1. During this time, the United States’ assessed quota for these organizations did not change, and the total assessed contributions for all member states of these organizations remained about the same; thus, the actual amounts assessed to the United States generally remained the same. All four organizations apply a similar assessed quota structure that uses the relative size of member states’ economies, among other things, to help determine each member state’s assessed contributions. For example, State officials told us they engaged with other OAS member states, including Canada and Mexico, to explore options for quota structure reform. In addition, officials at the U.S. Mission to the OAS worked with their counterparts from Mexico to review the OAS’s assessed quota structure and to consult on alternatives that would adjust all member states’ quotas so that no member pays more than 50 percent of the OAS’s assessed contributions. According to State officials, Venezuela’s contentious political relationship with the OAS has hindered progress on various efforts promoted by the United States, including quota structure reform. State officials told us that the large amounts owed by a few member states had contributed to smaller OAS member states’ reluctance to increase their annual assessed quotas to ensure that no member state provides more than 50 percent by 2018. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report responds to a request for GAO to review several issues related to the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). In this report, we (1) determine the amounts and percentages of U.S. contributions assessed by these organizations and voluntary contributions paid to them in calendar years 2014 to 2016, and (2) describe the Department of State’s (State) efforts to comply with requirements in the Organization of American States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (Reform Act) regarding a strategy for reform of the assessed quota structure of the OAS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States belongs to several inter-American organizations, including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, security, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange in the Western Hemisphere. The United States helps finance these organizations' operating expenses through assessed contributions (fees) that are based in part on the size of the U.S. economy relative to those of other members. The Reform Act required State to submit a strategy identifying, among other things, a path toward the adoption of reforms to the OAS's assessed quota structure to ensure that no member will pay more than 50 percent of OAS assessed contributions. In addition, the United States also provides the OAS, PAHO, and IICA with project-specific voluntary contributions.
GAO was asked to review U.S. financial contributions to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) determines the amounts and percentages of U.S. contributions assessed by these organizations and voluntary contributions paid to them in calendar years 2014 to 2016, and (2) describes State's efforts to comply with the Reform Act's requirements regarding a strategy for reform of the assessed quota structure of the OAS. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the four organizations. GAO also analyzed the four organizations' annual audited financial reports.
What GAO Found
The United States' assessed contributions constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member states to four inter-American organizations from 2014 to 2016. These organizations are the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH). During this time, the annual U.S. percentages (or quotas) of these organizations' assessed contributions have remained about the same. The United States also provided voluntary contributions to three of these organizations, as shown in the table.
In response to a requirement in the Organization of American States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 (Reform Act), the Department of State (State) submitted to Congress a strategy that included working with OAS member states toward ensuring that the OAS would not assess any single member state a quota of more than 50 percent of all OAS assessed contributions. State officials told GAO that reaching member state agreement on assessed quota reform by 2018 will be difficult, although not impossible. State officials informed GAO that State continues to implement a strategy that includes engaging with other OAS member states, such as Canada and Mexico, to explore assessed quota reform options. For example, State officials have consulted with their counterparts from Mexico to review the OAS's assessed quota structure and to consult on alternatives that would adjust all member states' quotas so that no member state's quota exceeds 50 percent of the OAS's assessed contributions. According to State and OAS officials, obstacles to assessed quota reform include tensions among member states. For example, State officials noted that Venezuela's contentious political relationship with the OAS has hindered progress on various reforms, including assessed quota reform. State officials explained that some member states' failure to fully pay assessed contributions from previous years and smaller member states' reluctance to increase their annual assessed contributions have also impeded assessed quota reform efforts. |
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