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gao_GAO-05-357T | gao_GAO-05-357T_0 | TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, as outlined in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. Consistent with this goal, GAO has advocated the need to implement—at TSA and throughout the federal government—a risk management approach for prioritizing efforts and focusing resources. For example, since September 11, for example, TSA has (1) installed EDS and ETD systems at most of the nation’s commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, (2) expanded screener training and developed performance measures and indicators for the screening systems, (3) developed an air cargo strategic plan, and (4) evaluated the security of airport perimeters and access controls and provided funds for security equipment. Despite these efforts, however, we have consistently found—because of circumstances beyond TSA’s control and a lack of planning—that TSA has not conducted the systematic analysis needed to inform its decision-making processes and to prioritize security enhancements. Despite these efforts, however, we found that in moving forward, TSA had not conducted the systematic planning needed to optimize the deployment of these systems—in particular determining at which airports EDS machines should be integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems to achieve efficiencies. TSA officials stated that they used EDS machines in a stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim solution in order to meet the congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage for explosives. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA to determine the proper allocation of its resources to the areas of greatest need and to monitor the progress of its efforts. We applaud DHS’s efforts to achieve efficiencies and cost savings, leverage resources and technology, and improve internal coordination and operations. While these organizational changes should assist DHS in providing a solid foundation from which to manage and oversee its screening, credentialing, and R&D efforts, restructuring alone will not resolve all existing challenges or ensure the successful integration and achievement of DHS’s goals. We have recently reported on challenges DHS and TSA are facing with regard to some of these programs, including Secure Flight, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and research and development activities. Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation’s transportation system. Concluding Observations
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen transportation security, particularly in aviation, and their efforts should be commended. Our work has shown—in homeland security and in other areas—that a comprehensive risk management approach can help inform decision makers in allocating finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that the President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request discusses TSA’s plans to implement a risk management approach in focusing its resources related to transportation security. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical transportation systems crisscross the nation and extend beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day, making them both attractive targets to terrorists and difficult to secure. Securing these systems is further complicated by the need to balance security with the expeditious flow of people and goods through these systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faces the daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources to manage risks while addressing threats and enhancing security across all transportation modes. To assist the Congress and TSA in focusing resources on the areas of greatest need, we were asked to describe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA efforts in managing risks and allocating resources across aviation and surface transportation modes, and in integrating screening, credentialing, and research and development (R&D) efforts to achieve efficiencies.
What GAO Found
TSA has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen transportation security, particularly in aviation, and its efforts should be commended. For example, since September 11, 2001, TSA has installed explosive detection systems at most of the nation's commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives; expanded screener training and developed performance measures and indicators for the screening systems; and evaluated the security of airport perimeters and access controls and provided funding for security equipment. While these efforts are commendable, we found that TSA has not consistently implemented a risk management approach or conducted the systematic analysis needed to inform its decision-making processes and to prioritize security improvements. Our work has shown that a risk management approach can help inform decision makers in allocating finite resources to the areas of greatest need. For example, we found that since initially deploying equipment to screen checked baggage for explosive at airports in response to congressional mandates, TSA has not conducted the systematic planning needed to optimize the deployment and integration of this equipment. Limited analysis of nine airports showed that the integration of this equipment in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems--rather than continuing to maintain the equipment in a stand-alone mode--could result in significant savings for the federal government. We also found that TSA's efforts to implement a comprehensive risk management approach for its air cargo and rail security programs are ongoing. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes two key DHS organizational changes designed to leverage resources and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of various screening, credentialing, and R&D programs. While we applaud DHS's efforts, it will be important for DHS to address several program challenges as the integration moves forward because restructuring alone will not resolve all existing challenges or ensure the successful integration and achievement of DHS's goals. These challenges including developing regulations identifying eligibility requirements for the Transportation Workers Identification Credential, establishing goals with measurable objectives in research and development strategic plans, and using risk assessments to select and prioritize research and development efforts. |
gao_GAO-13-632 | gao_GAO-13-632_0 | Additionally, VHA has identified the Beneficiary Travel Program as being susceptible to significant improper payments. For VA’s 2012 Performance and Accountability Report, VHA estimated that the Beneficiary Travel Program had $71 million in improper payments. VHA Has Developed Efforts to Improve the Beneficiary Travel Program, but Lack of Internal Controls May Impede Their Effectiveness
VHA has developed multiple efforts to improve the management and oversight of its process for reimbursing veterans’ travel expenses for medical appointments. VHA Has Developed Efforts That Aim to Improve the Management and Oversight of the Beneficiary Travel Program
VHA has developed multiple efforts to improve the management and oversight of the Beneficiary Travel Program, as well as the timeliness and accuracy of payments. These efforts—many of which medical centers are or will be required to implement—are expected to increase the consistency of how the program is administered. For example, the Dashboard, a Web-based software, provides a standardized process that medical centers are required to use to determine a veteran’s eligibility for travel reimbursement, the amount of any deductibles, and the number of miles from the veteran’s residence to the closest VA medical facility where care could be provided. For example, in the fall of 2012, VHA piloted the Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) effort—a process for transferring travel reimbursement funds electronically into veterans’ bank accounts—in medical centers in 2 of the 21 VISNs. The EFT effort—along with VHA’s Debit Card effort, a VHA-wide card that veterans can use to receive travel reimbursement electronically—implements a Department of the Treasury requirement for federal agencies to convert cash payments to electronic funds payments by March 1, 2013. Without these internal controls in place, VHA cannot ensure that the efforts will meet its goals, such as improved management and oversight. The Web-based Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool, implemented March 31, 2013, generates travel reimbursement pattern reports—reports identifying questionable veteran reimbursement patterns that may indicate improper payments, such as frequently changing addresses on reimbursement claims, which may be done to inappropriately increase travel reimbursement amounts. VHA also did not provide a communication plan for sharing information on EFT with medical centers and veterans in a timely manner, as would have been consistent with internal control standards. VHA has not developed a plan to ensure medical centers’ compliance with the efforts or its existing policies, as would be consistent with internal control standards. However, VHA officials told us they do not have a plan in place to ensure that each medical center is using this new software. In the past 5 years, spending under the program has more than doubled, from about $370 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $860 million in fiscal year 2012. Specifically, VHA has not developed a plan for evaluating VHA-wide performance indicators for the Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool; provided timely guidance and effective communication tools to medical centers for EFT; ensured compliance with Dashboard and other efforts; and routinely collected information on medical centers’ local procedures to identify and share best practices. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the management and oversight of the Beneficiary Travel Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to ensure appropriate internal controls have been identified and applied in the development and implementation of all of VHA’s efforts aimed at improving the program, including developing and implementing a plan to evaluate performance indicators for the Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool, providing timely guidance and effective communication tools to medical centers as VHA completes its implementation of EFT, ensuring medical centers’ compliance with Dashboard and other routinely collecting information to identify and share best practices across medical centers. VA generally agreed with our conclusions and concurred with our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHA's Beneficiary Travel Program is designed to encourage eligible veterans to seek medical care by reducing travel costs to medical appointments. Veterans are eligible to receive reimbursement for some travel expenses, such as mileage, through the program that is administered by VA medical centers. In February 2013, the VA Office of Inspector General identified issues with inadequate management and oversight. VHA has identified the program as susceptible to significant improper payments and has estimated $71 million in improper payments for fiscal year 2012.
GAO was asked to examine VHA's Beneficiary Travel Program. In this report, GAO examined recent efforts VHA has developed or implemented to improve the program. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed VHA officials about these efforts; and determined whether VHA applied the appropriate internal controls. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from six VA medical centers, which vary on the basis of fiscal year 2012 mileage reimbursement spending, geographic location, and other factors.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has developed efforts to improve the Beneficiary Travel Program, but lack of internal controls may impede their effectiveness. Specifically, VHA has developed multiple efforts to improve the management and oversight of its process for reimbursing veterans' travel expenses for medical appointments, as well as the timeliness and accuracy of payments, including the following:
Dashboard . Web-based software that determines a veteran's eligibility for travel reimbursement, the amount of any deductibles, and the number of miles from the veteran's residence to the closest VA medical facility. The software is designed to enable VA medical center staff to quickly and consistently calculate veterans' mileage reimbursement.
Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool . Tool that provides each medical center with reports identifying questionable veteran reimbursement patterns, such as frequently changing addresses on reimbursement claims, which may be done to inappropriately increase travel reimbursement amounts. The reports are intended to help medical centers define and implement facility-level internal controls to reduce improper payments.
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) . Process to transfer travel reimbursement funds electronically into veterans' bank accounts. This effort implements a Department of the Treasury requirement for federal agencies to convert cash payments to electronic funds payments, and aims to improve efficiency, increase oversight, and reduce the amount of cash on hand.
These efforts are expected to increase the consistency of how the program is administered by medical centers. However, GAO found that internal controls were lacking for some of the efforts, including the following:
Monitoring Compliance . VHA has not developed a plan to ensure medical centers' compliance with the efforts or existing policies. For example, although medical centers are required to use the Dashboard, VHA officials told us they do not have a plan in place to ensure that each medical center is using this new software.
Evaluating Performance Indicators . VHA has not developed a plan for evaluating VHA-wide performance indicators for at least one of its efforts, the Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool.
Providing Effective Communication . VHA did not provide a communication plan for sharing information on EFT with medical centers and veterans in a timely manner.
Without necessary internal controls in place, VHA cannot ensure that its new efforts will meet its goals, such as improved management and oversight, or that the Beneficiary Travel Program, which has seen spending more than double in the past 5 years--approaching $1 billion annually--is operating effectively.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA identify and apply internal controls in its efforts to improve management and oversight of the Beneficiary Travel Program, including ensuring compliance with the Dashboard, evaluating performance indicators for the Beneficiary Travel Analytics Tool, and providing effective communication tools to medical centers for EFT. VA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions and concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-460 | gao_GAO-15-460_0 | Among Medicaid- Only Enrollees, a Small Percentage Consistently Accounted for a Large Percentage of Expenditures
A small percentage of Medicaid-only enrollees consistently accounted for a large percentage of total Medicaid expenditures for Medicaid-only enrollees. In each fiscal year from 2009 through 2011, the most expensive 1 percent of Medicaid-only enrollees in the nation accounted for about one-quarter of the expenditures for Medicaid-only enrollees; the most expensive 5 percent accounted for almost half of the expenditures; the most expensive 25 percent accounted for more than three- quarters of the expenditures; in contrast, the least expensive 50 percent accounted for less than 8 percent of the expenditures; and about 12 percent of enrollees had no expenditures. For some states, such as Tennessee and Hawaii, a high percentage of expenditures were for managed care or premium assistance, and correspondingly low percentages were for expenditures such as hospital care or acute care services. States vary widely in the distribution of their expenditures among service categories; for state-by-state information about the percentage of high- expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees’ expenditures for selected categories of services in fiscal year 2011, see appendix V.
Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. These objectives were to: (1) examine the distribution of expenditures among Medicaid-only enrollees, (2) determine whether the proportions of high- expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees in selected categories changed or remained consistent from year to year, and (3) determine whether the distribution of high-expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees’ expenditures among selected categories of service varied across states. We analyzed data from the Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) Annual Person Summary File. We used data from fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011—the most recent years for which data from almost all states were available. Appendix II: Distribution of Expenditures among Medicaid-Only Enrollees, Fiscal Year 2011
Table 4 provides information about the distribution of expenditures among Medicaid-only enrollees nationally and in each state and the District of Columbia in fiscal year 2011, including the percentages of expenditures for Medicaid-only enrollees that were attributable to the most expensive 1, 5, 10, and 25 percent of these enrollees; the percentage of expenditures for Medicaid-only enrollees that were attributable to the least expensive 50 percent of these enrollees (including those with 0 expenditures); and the Gini coefficient, which indicates the degree of inequality; that is, the extent to which the frequency distribution differs from one in which expenditures are equal for all enrollees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Studies on healthcare spending generally find that a small percentage of individuals account for a large proportion of expenditures, and Medicaid—a federal-state health financing program for low-income and medically needy individuals—is no exception. Medicaid expenditures for fiscal year 2013 totaled about $460 billion, covering about 72 million enrollees, some of whom were also eligible for Medicare. More information about Medicaid enrollees who are not also eligible for Medicare (i.e., Medicaid-only enrollees) and who account for a high proportion of expenditures could enhance efforts to manage expenditures and facilitate improvements to care.
GAO was asked to provide information about the characteristics of high-expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees and their expenditures. GAO (1) examined the distribution of expenditures among Medicaid-only enrollees, (2) determined whether the proportions of high-expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees in selected categories changed or remained consistent from year to year, and (3) determined whether the distribution of high-expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees' expenditures among selected categories of service varied across states.
GAO analyzed data from the Medicaid Statistical Information System Annual Person Summary File for fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011, the most recent years for which data from almost all states were available.
What GAO Found
A small percentage of Medicaid-only enrollees—that is, those who were not also eligible for Medicare—consistently accounted for a large percentage of total Medicaid expenditures for Medicaid-only enrollees. In each fiscal year from 2009 through 2011, the most expensive 5 percent of Medicaid-only enrollees accounted for almost half of the expenditures for all Medicaid-only enrollees. In contrast, the least expensive 50 percent of Medicaid-only enrollees accounted for less than 8 percent of the expenditures for these enrollees.
Of the Medicaid-only enrollees who were among the 5 percent with the highest expenditures within each state, the nationwide proportions of these enrollees in different eligibility groups (such as the disabled or children) and with certain conditions (such as asthma) or services (such as childbirth or delivery) were also consistent from fiscal years 2009 through 2011.
The distribution of high-expenditure Medicaid-only enrollees' expenditures among categories of service in fiscal year 2011 varied widely across states. Expenditures for managed care and premium assistance varied most widely (from 0 to 75 percent).
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-348 | gao_GAO-12-348_0 | Most Non-Federally Recognized Tribes That Received Federal Funding Were Eligible as Nonprofit Organizations or State-Recognized Tribes
Of the list of about 400 non-federally recognized tribes that we compiled, we identified 26 that received federal funding for fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Most of the 26 non-federally recognized tribes were eligible for these funds because of their status as a nonprofit or state-recognized tribe (24 out of 26). In addition, we found that 14 of the 26 non-federally recognized tribes that received funding over the 4-year period were state-recognized tribes and would be eligible to receive funding from programs specifically authorized to fund state-recognized tribes. Examples of the 24 federal programs that awarded funding to non- federally recognized tribes in the 4-year period and that are authorized to fund nonprofit organizations that meet all applicable eligibility requirements include the following: the Rural Business Enterprise Grants program, administered by the Department of Agriculture, which has statutory authority to fund public bodies, including Indian tribes on state reservations, and private nonprofit corporations for measures designed to finance and facilitate development of small and emerging private business enterprises, among other measures; the Job Opportunities for Low-Income Individuals program, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which has statutory authority to enter into agreements with nonprofits for the purpose of conducting projects that provide technical and financial assistance to private employers that assist them in creating jobs for low-income individuals; and the Retired and Senior Volunteer Program, administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service, which has statutory authority to make grants to or contract with nonprofits to support programs for certain volunteer service projects for senior citizens. As shown in table 3, the majority of this funding was awarded to a small number of non-federally recognized tribes. Some of this funding was awarded to incorporated entities—such as the Lumbee Regional Development Association—that were created by the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina to provide services to the Lumbee Indian community. Most of the funding (75 percent) awarded to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina was awarded by HUD’s Indian Housing Block Grants program. Specifically, 95 percent of the funding was awarded by seven federal programs in four agencies. Each of these programs awarded a total of more than $1.5 million to non-federally recognized tribes during the period. Agencies Have Funded Some Likely Ineligible Non- Federally Recognized Tribes, and One Agency Is in the Process of Enforcing Single Audit Act Requirements
During our review, we identified some instances where federal agencies had provided funds to non-federally recognized tribes for which grant eligibility is disputed and one instance where an agency is trying to enforce the Single Audit Act’s reporting requirements. Specifically, when we compared the eligibility requirements for each federal program that provided funding to non-federally recognized tribes for fiscal years 2007 through 2010 with the characteristics of each entity, we found that Education funded some non-federally recognized tribes under the American Indian Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program that appear to be ineligible and that HHS funded two non-federally recognized tribes in New Jersey that the state does not consider to be state recognized. HHS Has Taken Some Initial Steps in Response to the Accohannock Indian Tribe’s Noncompliance with the Single Audit Act
The Accohannock Indian Tribe, one of the non-federally recognized tribes that we identified as receiving federal funds during the period of our review, did not have an audit or submit a report for 2009 as required by the Single Audit Act. The entity’s noncompliance with the Single Audit Act was flagged, and the agency sent a letter of inquiry to the Accohannock Indian Tribe on March 8, 2011. More recently, after we began inquiring about the issue, the agency sent the entity an Audit Deficiency Notice via certified mail on February 7, 2012. Nevertheless, Education provided funds under the American Indian Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program to state-recognized tribes that were not located on state reservations but rather had self-defined tribal service areas, raising substantial questions about the tribes’ eligibility for the funding, and HHS provided funds to two non-federally recognized tribes in New Jersey as state-recognized tribes that are not officially recognized by the state. Education’s commitment to review its practices and take appropriate action is consistent with our revised recommendation. HHS agreed with the two recommendations involving its activities and stated that it will seek to clarify with the state of New Jersey the status of the Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Indians of New Jersey and the Powhatan Renape Nation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review’s objectives were to address (1) the key means by which non- federally recognized tribes have been eligible for federal funding and (2) the amount of federal funding awarded to non-federally recognized tribes for fiscal years 2007 through 2010, by agency and program. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of January 3, 2012, the United States recognized 566 Indian tribes. Federal recognition confers specific legal status on tribes and imposes certain responsibilities on the federal government, such as an obligation to provide certain benefits to tribes and their members. Some tribes are not federally recognized but have qualified for and received federal funding. Some of these non-federally recognized tribes are state recognized and may be located on state reservations.
GAO was asked to address (1) the key means by which non-federally recognized tribes have been eligible for federal funding and (2) the amount of federal funding awarded to non-federally recognized tribes for fiscal years 2007 through 2010. GAO also identified some eligibility and federal financial reporting issues related to non-federally recognized tribes. GAO compiled a list of about 400 non-federally recognized tribes and reviewed information from federal agencies, USAspending.gov, states, and other sources to identify tribes federal funding and eligibility.
What GAO Found
Of the approximately 400 non-federally recognized tribes that GAO identified, 26 received funding from 24 federal programs during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Most of the 26 non-federally recognized tribes were eligible to receive this funding either because of their status as nonprofit organizations or state-recognized tribes. Similarly, most of the 24 federal programs that awarded funding to non-federally recognized tribes during the 4-year period were authorized to fund nonprofit organizations or state-recognized tribes. In addition, some of these programs were authorized to fund other entities, such as tribal communities or community development financial institutions.
For fiscal years 2007 through 2010, 24 federal programs awarded more than $100 million to the 26 non-federally recognized tribes. Most of the funding was awarded to a few non-federally recognized tribes by a small number of programs. Specifically, 95 percent of the funding was awarded to 9 non-federally recognized tribes, and most of that funding was awarded to the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina. Similarly, 95 percent of the funding was awarded by seven programs in four agencies, and most of that funding was awarded by one Department of Housing and Urban Development program.
During the course of its review, GAO identified some instances where federal agencies had provided funding to non-federally recognized tribes for which grant eligibility is disputed and one instance where an agency was in the process of better enforcing federal financial reporting requirements with one tribe. Specifically:
The Department of Education awarded American Indian Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program funding to the United Houma Nation, the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, and a consortium consisting of the Choctaw-Apache Tribe of Ebarb and the Four Winds Cherokee. Each of these four tribes is state recognized, but it appears that none of them has a reservation as required by the statute establishing the program. GAO has substantial questions about whether Educations interpretation of the term reservation is broader than the statutory definition supports.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) awarded funding to the Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Indians of New Jersey and the Powhatan Renape Nationtwo non-federally recognized tribes in New Jerseyunder programs authorized to fund state-recognized tribes. The state of New Jersey, however, does not consider these entities to be state recognized.
HHS has initiated action to enforce federal financial reporting requirements for the Accohannock Indian Tribe. The Accohannock Indian Tribe has not filed its required financial report for 2009 that was due no later than September 30, 2010. In 2009, the Accohannock Indian Tribe reported spending over $1 million in federal funds from three different federal programs administered by the department. The department sent letters of inquiry about the delinquent financial report on March 8, 2011, and more recently, after GAO inquired about the issue, on February 7, 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education and HHS take specific actions to ensure that they are not making grants to ineligible tribes and to enforce federal financial reporting requirements. HHS agreed. Education stated its commitment to review its practices, but disagreed with GAOs finding on the statutory eligibility for the American Indian Vocational Rehabilitation Services Program, which is discussed more fully in the report. |
gao_GAO-11-113 | gao_GAO-11-113_0 | DOD Lacks Comprehensive, Departmentwide Data on Some Power Source Investments
DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in the power sources area and no single DOD office aggregates these data across all investment categories. Further, availability of complete data varies across the three investment categories: S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs. We determined that DOD invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support investments. DOD has limited data on its investments in power sources when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1 billion amount includes the investments in S&T and logistics support that we were able to identify but not power source investments as part of acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data in that area. In general, a lack of investment information can adversely affect DOD’s ability to avoid unnecessary duplication; control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues. DOD Has a High Level of Data on Power Source S&T Investments
We determined that from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 DOD invested approximately $868 million in the development of power source technologies through many individual power source S&T projects. Figure 2 depicts DOD’s approximate investment in power sources S&T by DOD component. Further, S&T planning efforts can be complicated by external factors. Though we found these mechanisms to be generally effective, agencies may miss opportunities to fully coordinate because attendance at these interagency groups and conferences is voluntary and the level of agency participation varies. S&T Strategic Planning Could Be Improved
We found that though DOD has generally effective S&T coordination mechanisms, its strategic planning process to facilitate the allocation of S&T funds for power source technologies could be improved. DOD’s Power Source Standardization Efforts Are Not Departmentwide and Lack Robust Enforcement
Though DOD officials agree that the department needs to increase its emphasis on power source standardization, it lacks a departmentwide policy to emphasize or compel early consideration of standard power sources. DOD Has Not Evaluated Departmentwide Opportunities to Standardize Power Sources in Deployed Weapon Systems and Equipment
Although it is generally more economical to address standardization early in the acquisition process and prior to the deployment of weapon systems or equipment to the field, opportunities may exist to increase standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or equipment for which a proprietary power source has already been developed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase oversight of power source investments and to allow for enhanced strategic planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide decisions and policy. The department stated that it had already taken or plans to take specific actions in response to our recommendations, but it is unclear from DOD’s response what these actions entail. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency participation in interagency coordination mechanisms. DOD also partially concurred with three recommendations related to power source standardization, namely, that the Secretary of Defense (1) identify and direct appropriate office(s) to develop a plan to optimize use of standard power sources for weapon systems or equipment types more amenable to standardization; (2) develop a DOD-wide policy similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to use a power source that is not standard or preferred; and (3) identify opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapons systems and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an existing military standard or other preferred power source. | Why GAO Did This Study
Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and equipment rely on power sources, such as batteries. In response to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, GAO determined (1) DOD's approximate investment in power sources, (2) the extent to which DOD coordinates its power source investments, and (3) the extent to which DOD's policies facilitate the use of standard power sources. To address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed DOD investment data, met with DOD officials and industry representatives, and attended DOD conferences aimed at facilitating power source coordination.
What GAO Found
GAO determined that DOD has invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. However, DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in the power sources area. Availability of complete data varies across the three investment categories: science and technology (S&T), logistics support, and acquisition programs. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support investments. DOD lacks sufficient data on its investments in power sources when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1 billion amount includes investments in S&T and logistics support that GAO was able to identify, but not power source investments as part of acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data in that area. This lack of complete, departmentwide investment data hinders DOD's oversight and future planning in the power sources area, adversely affecting its ability to ensure basic accountability, anticipate future funding, and measure performance. DOD's mechanisms for coordinating power source S&T--including interagency working groups, conferences, informal networks, and information technology resources--are generally effective. However, in some of these activities participation by pertinent member agencies is voluntary and could be more complete. Agencies may be missing opportunities to coordinate activities--such as avoiding initiation of similar research projects--and leverage resources because agency participation is voluntary and the level of participation by pertinent agencies varies. In addition, DOD's strategic planning process to facilitate the allocation of S&T funds for power source technologies could be improved. The S&T planning efforts can also be complicated by external factors, such as the additions Congress makes to DOD's budget. Although DOD power source experts GAO staff spoke with agree that the department needs to increase its emphasis on power source standardization, DOD lacks departmentwide policies to help emphasize power source standardization. Existing policies have demonstrated limited effectiveness because of compliance problems and because they may only apply to specific power source applications. Although it is generally more economical to address standardization early in the acquisition process, according to DOD officials, power sources are generally not considered early in the process, potentially hindering standardization efforts. DOD has also not evaluated departmentwide opportunities for retrofitting deployed weapon systems and equipment with standard or other preferred power sources when cost effective.
What GAO Recommends
To increase oversight of power source investments, GAO recommends that DOD consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data. To improve interagency coordination of S&T projects, DOD should determine ways to strengthen agency participation in coordination mechanisms. To increase emphasis on standardization, DOD should develop a standardization plan and enforceable departmentwide policies and identify opportunities to retrofit existing systems with standard power sources when cost effective. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the other four. It was unclear from DOD's response what actions it plans to take in response to GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-740 | gao_GAO-04-740_0 | As one of its 24 E-Gov initiatives, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2001 created SAFECOM to unify the federal government’s efforts to help coordinate the work at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels to establish reliable public safety communications and achieve national wireless communications interoperability. SAFECOM plans to conduct a nationwide survey to assess current capabilities of public safety agency wireless communications. However, SAFECOM officials said they lack current nationwide information on the interoperable communications problems of first responders. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of the various federal agencies—the FCC, DOJ, and others—involved in communications interoperability have not been fully defined and SAFECOM’s authority to oversee and coordinate federal and state efforts is limited. DHS, where SAFECOM now resides, has recently announced it is establishing an Office for Interoperability and Compatibility to coordinate the federal response to the problems of interoperability and compatibility. The exact structure and funding for the office, which will include SAFECOM, are still being developed. A national architecture has not yet been prepared to guide the creation of interoperable communications. SAFECOM’s oversight authority and responsibilities are dependant upon its overall mission. State and Local Governments’ Roles in Statewide Interoperability Planning and Communications
In our November 6, 2003,testimony, we identified three barriers to improving public safety wireless interoperable communications: problem definition, establishing interoperability goals and standards, and defining the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other entities. Although no one level of government can successfully address interoperability communications challenges, the federal government can play a leadership role developing requirements and providing support for state efforts to assess their interoperable communications capability and develop statewide plans for transitioning from today’s capability to identified required capability. States, with broad input from local governments, are a logical choice to serve as a foundation for interoperability planning. As recognized by the Federal Communications Commission, states play a central role in managing emergency communications, and state level organizations are usually in control at large-scale events and disasters or multiagency incidents. As a result, there is no assurance that federal funds are being used to support a well- developed strategy for improving interoperability. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve interoperable wireless communications for first responders, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security ensure that the following actions are taken: In coordination with the FCC and the NTIA, continue development of a nationwide database of all interoperable public safety communications frequencies, establish a common nomenclature for those frequencies, and establish clear timeframes to complete both efforts; In consultation with state and local governments, determine the current status of wireless public safety interoperable telecommunications across the nation by assessing interoperability in specific locations against interoperability requirements that can be measured, and assist states in assessing interoperability in their states against those requirements; Through DHS grant guidance encourage states to establish a single statewide body responsible for interoperable communications and that this body shall prepare a single comprehensive statewide interoperability plan for federal, state, and local communication systems in all frequency bands. SAFECOM officials said that they are trying to develop this type of model in the Commonwealth of Virginia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Lives of first responders and those whom they are trying to assist can be lost when first responders cannot communicate effectively as needed. This report addresses issues of determining the status of interoperable wireless communications across the nation, and the potential roles that federal, state, and local governments can play in improving these communications.
What GAO Found
In a November 6, 2003, testimony, GAO said that no one group or level of government could "fix" the nation's interoperable communications problems. Success would require effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and intergovernmental planning. The present extent and scope nationwide of public safety wireless communication systems' ability to talk among themselves as necessary and authorized has not been determined. Data on current conditions compared to needs are necessary to develop plans for improvement and measure progress over time. However, the nationwide data needed to do this are not currently available. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intends to obtain this information by the year 2005 by means of a nationwide survey. However, at the time of our review, DHS had not yet developed its detailed plans for conducting this survey and reporting its results. The federal government can take a leadership role in support of efforts to improve interoperability by developing national requirements and a national architecture, developing nationwide databases, and providing technical and financial support for state and local efforts to improve interoperability. In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established the federal government's Wireless Public Safety Interoperable Communications Program, SAFECOM, to unify efforts to achieve national wireless communications interoperability. However, SAFECOM's authority and ability to oversee and coordinate federal and state efforts has been limited by its dependence upon other agencies for funding and their willingness to cooperate. OMB is currently examining alternative methods to implement SAFECOM's mission. In addition, DHS, where SAFECOM now resides, has recently announced it is establishing an Office for Interoperability and Compatibility to coordinate the federal response to the problems of interoperability in several functions, including wireless communications. The exact structure and funding for this office, which will include SAFECOM, are still being developed. State and local governments can play a large role in developing and implementing plans to improve public safety agencies' interoperable communications. State and local governments own most of the physical infrastructure of public safety communications systems, and states play a central role in managing emergency communications. The Federal Communications Commission recognized the central role of states in concluding that states should manage the public safety interoperability channels in the 700 MHz communications spectrum. States, with broad input from local governments, are a logical choice to serve as a foundation for interoperability planning because incidents of any level of severity originate at the local level with states as the primary source of support. However, states are not required to develop interoperability plans, and there is no clear guidance on what should be included in such plans. |
gao_GAO-16-622 | gao_GAO-16-622_0 | Executive budget formulation. Evaluation. Federal Budget Processes Include Fewer Budgetary Controls, Fewer Reviews, and Less Information for Tax Expenditures Than Other Types of Spending
OMB and Agencies Conduct Fewer Reviews and Provide Less Information on Tax Expenditures Than Other Spending in Formulating the President’s Budget
While tax expenditures are included in the development of the President’s Budget, they are subject to fewer reviews, and less information is required to be provided on them. Instead, tax expenditure revenue loss estimates are presented separately from other types of spending in the budget’s Analytical Perspectives. We have reported in the past that this presentation makes their relative contributions toward achieving national priorities less visible than spending programs. Similar to Mandatory Spending, the Congressional Budget Process Does Not Require Annual Reapproval or Review of Non-expiring Tax Expenditures
As part of the congressional budget process, tax expenditures are treated similarly to mandatory spending in that expiring tax expenditures being considered for extension and new proposals are subject to standard congressional controls for new legislation; but existing, non-expiring tax expenditures are not subject to annual congressional budget processes. OMB and Agencies Have Made Limited Progress Identifying Tax Expenditures’ Contributions to Agency Goals
OMB Circular No. We found that 7 of the 24 CFO Act agencies identified tax expenditures as contributors to their missions (two instances) or to specific goals (five instances). The tax expenditures these seven agencies identified accounted for 11 of the 169 tax expenditures included in the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, representing an estimated $31.9 billion of $1.23 trillion in forgone revenues for fiscal year 2015. A Lack of Clarity about Agencies’ Roles Leads to Inaction in Identifying Tax Expenditures That Contribute to Agency Goals
As we have previously reported, one key impediment to including tax expenditures in agency performance reviews is the continuing lack of clarity about the roles of different federal agencies in conducting reviews of tax expenditures. A-11 guidance noted that OMB would work with Treasury and agencies to identify where tax expenditures align with their goals, and that this information was to be published on Performance.gov and included in relevant agency plans, beginning in February 2014. Options to Further Incorporate Tax Expenditures into Federal Budgeting Processes Have Various Potential Benefits and Challenges
Further incorporating tax expenditures into federal budgeting processes could help achieve various broad benefits, based on our assessment of the roundtable discussion we held with budget and tax experts and on our prior work (see figure 7). While these options offer a range of potential benefits, there are challenges and tradeoffs for policymakers to consider in whether or how to implement any policy to further incorporate tax expenditures into federal budgeting processes. Policymakers could require that all, or some subset of, tax expenditures expire after a finite period. This option could result in greater oversight of tax expenditures, as policymakers would be required to explicitly decide whether or not to extend more or all tax expenditures. We have previously reported that frequent changes in the tax code, such as from extended or expired tax provisions, can create uncertainty and contribute to compliance burden by making tax planning more difficult. Conclusions
In recent years, revenue losses from tax expenditures have reached levels similar to discretionary spending; approximately $1.23 trillion in revenue was forgone for fiscal year 2015. Without additional OMB and Treasury assistance, agencies may continue to have difficulty identifying whether or which tax expenditures are relevant to their goals, and may be limited in their understanding of how the range of federal investments and policy tools contribute to agency goals. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the contributions of tax expenditures toward the achievement of agency goals are identified and measured, the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, should work with agencies to identify which tax expenditures contribute to their agency goals, as appropriate—that is, they should identify which specific tax expenditures contribute to specific strategic objectives and agency priority goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax expenditures—special credits, deductions, and other tax provisions that reduce taxpayers’ tax liabilities—represent a substantial federal commitment. If Treasury’s estimates are summed, an estimated $1.23 trillion in federal revenue was forgone from the 169 tax expenditures reported for fiscal year 2015, an amount comparable to discretionary spending. Tax expenditures are often aimed at policy goals similar to those of federal spending programs.
GAO was asked to identify the extent to which tax expenditures are incorporated into federal budget processes. This report (1) compares the treatment of tax expenditures and other spending in federal budgeting processes; (2) evaluates the extent to which OMB and agencies have identified tax expenditures’ contributions to agency goals; and (3) examines options to further incorporate tax expenditures in federal budgeting processes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency budget documents, OMB guidance, prior GAO reports, and performance plans and reports available as of January 2016 for all 24 CFO Act agencies. GAO also held a roundtable discussion with budget and tax experts to examine options for further incorporating tax expenditures into budgeting processes.
What GAO Found
Federal budget formulation processes include fewer controls and reviews, and provide less information on tax expenditures—which represented an estimated $1.23 trillion in forgone revenues in fiscal year 2015—than for discretionary or mandatory spending. For example, in the President’s budget, tax expenditure revenue loss estimates are presented separately from related spending, making their relative contributions toward national priorities less visible than spending programs. Likewise, only proposed tax expenditures or those that expire are subject to review within congressional budget processes, similar to mandatory spending. Existing, non-expiring tax expenditures are not subject to such review.
The Office and Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made limited progress identifying tax expenditures’ contribution to agency goals. As of January 2016, 7 of the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies identified tax expenditures as contributors to their agency goals—as directed in OMB guidance—or agency missions. The tax expenditures they identified accounted for only 11 of the 169 tax expenditures included in the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, representing an estimated $31.9 billion of $1.23 trillion in forgone revenues for fiscal year 2015. Based on interviews with agencies and reviewing past GAO work, GAO found that a lack of clarity about agencies’ roles leads to inaction in identifying tax expenditures that contribute to agency goals. To address this, OMB guidance previously stated that it would work with the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and other agencies to identify where tax expenditures align with agency goals. OMB removed that language in June 2015, citing capacity constraints. Without additional OMB and Treasury assistance, agencies may continue to have difficulty identifying whether, or which of, the remaining 158 tax expenditures—representing $1.20 trillion in forgone revenues—contribute to their goals.
Based on an assessment of budget and tax experts’ input and prior GAO work, GAO found that options to further incorporate tax expenditures into budgeting processes could help achieve various benefits; but policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs in deciding whether or how to implement them. For example, one option is to require that all, or some subset of, tax expenditures expire after a finite period. This option could result in greater oversight, requiring policymakers to explicitly decide whether to extend more or all tax expenditures. However, this option could lead to frequent changes in the tax code, such as from extended or expired tax expenditures, which can create uncertainty and make tax planning more difficult, as GAO has reported previously.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, in collaboration with Treasury, work with agencies to identify which tax expenditures contribute to agency goals. OMB generally agreed with GAO’s recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-47 | gao_GAO-11-47_0 | Background
CPP was the primary initiative under TARP for stabilizing the financial markets and banking system. Treasury encouraged financial institutions that were considering applying to CPP to consult with their primary federal bank regulators. Capital and liquidity. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) describe the characteristics of financial institutions that received funding under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), and (2) assess how the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), with the assistance of federal bank regulators, implemented CPP. | What GAO Found
Congress created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to restore liquidity and stability in the financial system. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury), among other actions, established the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) as its primary initiative to accomplish these goals by making capital investments in eligible financial institutions. This report examines (1) the characteristics of financial institutions that received CPP funding and (2) how Treasury implemented CPP with the assistance of federal bank regulators. GAO analyzed data obtained from Treasury case files, reviewed program documents, and interviewed officials from Treasury and federal bank regulators. |
gao_GGD-98-145 | gao_GGD-98-145_0 | Although the UCC allows for the use of electronic check presentment, paying banks still have the legal right to insist on paper presentment. To determine the volume of checks that were electronically presented in the United States from 1995 to 1997, we collected data from the Federal Reserve Banks on their ECP services. Under the three nationally available ECP services, the collecting banks deposit checks with the Federal Reserve check offices, but the three ECP services differ in how the Federal Reserve check offices handle the paper checks after they have been electronically presented to paying banks. ECP Represented a Small but Growing Percentage of U.S. Interbank Check Volume in 1997
In 1997, 2.2 billion checks were electronically presented in the United States—almost 5 percent of the estimated U.S. interbank check volume (about 45 billion checks). During this period, the Federal Reserve’s ECP volume increased 114 percent, from slightly more than 1 billion checks to 2.2 billion checks. A Limited Sample of ECP Return Items Suggested That ECP Services Available Nationally Had Little Effect on the Percentages of Checks Returned Within Permissible Hold Periods
Our analysis of a limited sample of returned checks collected in four Federal Reserve check offices during the week of January 12 through 16, 1998, indicated that the use of ECP services that are available nationwide did not have a substantial effect on the percentage of dishonored local checks returned to depositary banks within the 2-day hold period. In interviews with regulatory officials and bankers, we identified several factors that may play a role in discouraging banks from agreeing to accept an electronically presented check, including the lack of a clear economic incentive to use electronic presentment; laws and regulations that require maintaining cancelled checks in certain situations; a perceived consumer preference for receiving cancelled checks with monthly bank statements and state laws requiring that cancelled checks be offered;
UCC and Regulation CC’s requirement that paying banks generally must physically return a dishonored check to depositary banks; operating and business factors that limit banks’ adoption of ECP; and a concern that ECP may increase banks’ vulnerability to forged signatures and counterfeit checks. Bankers Said That ECP Use Makes Banks More Vulnerable to Forged Signatures and Counterfeit Checks
In interviews and written responses to our questions, officials at five commercial banks indicated that forged signatures and endorsements, as well as counterfeit checks, have created their highest check fraud losses in the period since 1995. Because the receipt of the MICR data does not provide paying banks with information viewed as adequate for identifying forged signatures, these banking officials said they have continued to insist on paper presentment. Methodology of the ECP Return Item Survey
To determine how ECP use affects the length of time that it takes for a dishonored check to be returned to a depositary bank, that is, the return cycle time, we used data from surveys conducted by us and the Federal Reserve Board. Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) Line
The line at the bottom of a check that identifies the routing number of the paying bank, the amount of the check, the number of the check, and the account number of the customer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the current role of electronic check presentment (ECP) in the collection process for interbank checks, focusing on: (1) identifying and describing the ECP services offered to U.S. banks; (2) determining the ECP volume in the United States for 1995 through 1997; (3) determining whether ECP affects the length of time that it takes for a dishonored check to be returned to the depositary bank; (4) identifying any factors that may limit ECP use; and (5) determining how ECP may affect banks' risk of check fraud.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Federal Reserve System is the leading ECP provider in the United States; it offers three ECP services nationwide; (2) for these services, the collecting banks send the paper checks to the appropriate Federal Reserve check office, which then presents the checks electronically to paying banks; (3) these ECP services differ in how the paper checks are handled after they have been electronically presented to paying banks; (4) delivery of the magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) line data serves as presentment, and the checks are truncated at the Federal Reserve check office serving the paying bank; (5) ECP volume accounts for a small, but growing, percentage of the overall U.S. interbank check volume; (6) from 1995 to 1997, ECP volume increased 114 percent; (7) GAO's analysis of return items that were initially electronically presented suggests that use of the Federal Reserve ECP services may not have a substantial effect on the percentage of dishonored local checks that are returned to depositary banks within the 2-day hold period; (8) for these ECP services, the percentage of local checks returned within 2 days during this period was only marginally higher than the paper-check presentment method; (9) interviews with regulatory and banking officials identified several factors that deter banks from accepting the electronic presentment of checks, including: (a) the concern that ECP may increase a paying bank's vulnerability to check fraud; (b) the lack of a clear economic incentive to use electronic presentment; and (c) a perceived consumer preference for receiving cancelled checks; (10) in addition, certain types of state laws have been identified as having the effect of impeding ECP because of the laws' reliance on paper checks; (11) while ECP may allow paying banks to identify checks that might not be honored sooner and deter certain types of check fraud, banking officials expressed concerns that ECP could make paying banks more vulnerable to other types of check fraud; (12) officials at five large banks told GAO that forged signatures and endorsements, along with counterfeit checks, have created the highest check fraud losses in the period since 1995; and (13) because the receipt of the MICR line data does not provide a paying bank with adequate information for identifying forged signatures, banking officials said they continue to insist on paper checks. |
gao_GAO-17-489T | gao_GAO-17-489T_0 | DOJ and FBI Did Not Provide Timely Transparency and Have Not Fully Implemented Recommendations to Protect Privacy
DOJ Has an Oversight Structure in Place to Protect Privacy, but Did Not Publish Required Notices in a Timely Manner
Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), preserving civil liberties and protecting privacy is a responsibility shared by department level offices and components. However, the FBI did not update the NGI-IPS PIA in a timely manner when the system underwent significant changes and did not develop and publish a PIA for FACE Services before that unit began supporting FBI agents. This is because the updates were not published, as required. DOJ Disagrees with GAO’s Recommendations regarding Privacy
In our May 2016 report, we made two recommendations to DOJ regarding its processes to develop privacy documentation, and DOJ officials disagreed with both. DOJ officials did not concur with this recommendation, and stated that the FBI has established practices that protect privacy and civil liberties beyond the requirements of the law. We also recommended DOJ develop a process to determine why a SORN was not published for the FBI’s face recognition capabilities prior to using NGI-IPS, and implement corrective actions to ensure SORNs are published before systems become operational. However:
DOJ did not agree that the publication of a SORN is required by law. In 2016, we recommended that the FBI conduct audits to determine the extent to which users of NGI-IPS and biometric images specialists in FACE Services are conducting face image searches in accordance with CJIS policy requirements. At the time we issued our 2016 report, DOJ officials did not fully comment on the portion of our recommendation that the FBI audit the use of external databases, because FBI officials said the FBI does not have authority to audit these systems. FBI Has Taken Limited Actions to Address Our Recommendations for Ensuring the Accuracy of its Face Recognition Capabilities
FBI Has Conducted Limited Assessments of the Accuracy of NGI-IPS Face Recognition Searches
In May 2016, we reported that prior to accepting and deploying NGI-IPS, the FBI conducted testing to evaluate how accurately face recognition searches returned matches to persons in the database. As a result, we recommended that the FBI conduct tests of NGI-IPS to verify that the system is sufficiently accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes and ensure that both the detection rate and the false positive rate are identified for such tests. With the recommended testing, the FBI would have more reasonable assurance that NGI-IPS provides investigative leads that help enhance, rather than hinder or overly burden, criminal investigation work. We disagree with DOJ. FBI officials stated that they do not know, and have not tested, the detection rate for other candidate list sizes. We disagree with DOJ. In 2016, we reported that the FBI had not assessed the accuracy of face recognition searches of NGI-IPS in its operational setting—the setting in which enrolled photos, rather than a test database of photos—are used to conduct a search for investigative leads. As a result, we recommended the FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually that includes an assessment of the accuracy of face recognition searches to determine if it is meeting federal, state, and local law enforcement needs and take actions, as necessary, to improve the system. In 2016, DOJ concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2017, FBI officials stated they implemented the recommendation by submitting a paper to solicit feedback from users through the Fall 2016 Advisory Policy Board Process. Specifically, officials said the paper requested feedback on whether the face recognition searches of the NGI-IPS are meeting their needs, and input regarding search accuracy. Although FBI’s action of providing working groups with a paper presenting GAO’s recommendation is a step, FBI’s actions do not fully meet the recommendation. FBI’s paper was presented as informational, and did not result in any formal responses from users. As such, we continue to recommend the FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually. As a result, we recommended the FBI take steps to determine whether each external face recognition system used by FACE Services is sufficiently accurate for the FBI’s use and whether results from those systems should be used to support FBI investigations. DOJ officials stated that the FBI has no authority to set or enforce accuracy standards of face recognition technology operated by external agencies. Until FBI officials can assure themselves that the data they receive from external partners are reasonably accurate and reliable, it is unclear whether such agreements are beneficial to the FBI, whether the investment of public resources is justified, and whether photos of innocent people are unnecessarily included as investigative leads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Technology advancements have increased the overall accuracy of automated face recognition over the past few decades. This technology has helped law enforcement agencies identify criminals in their investigations. However, privacy advocates and members of the Congress remain concerned regarding the accuracy of the technology and the protection of privacy and individual civil liberties when technologies are used to identify people based on their biological and behavioral characteristics.
This statement describes the extent to which the FBI ensures adherence to laws and policies related to privacy regarding its use of face recognition technology, and ensure its face recognition capabilities are sufficiently accurate. This statement is based on our May 2016 report regarding the FBI's use of face recognition technology and includes agency updates to our recommendations. To conduct that work, GAO reviewed federal privacy laws, FBI policies, operating manuals, and other documentation on its face recognition capability. GAO interviewed officials from the FBI and the Departments of Defense and State, which coordinate with the FBI on face recognition. GAO also interviewed two state agencies that partner with FBI to use multiple face recognition capabilities.
What GAO Found
In May 2016, GAO found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had not fully adhered to privacy laws and policies and had not taken sufficient action to help ensure accuracy of its face recognition technology. GAO made six recommendations to address these issues. As of March 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI disagreed with three recommendations and had taken some actions to address the remainder, but had not fully implemented them.
Privacy notices not timely. In May 2016, GAO recommended DOJ determine why privacy impact assessments (PIA) were not published in a timely manner (as required by law) and take corrective action. GAO made this recommendation because FBI did not update the Next Generation Identification-Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS) PIA in a timely manner when the system underwent significant changes or publish a PIA for Facial Analysis, Comparison and Evaluation (FACE) Services before that unit began supporting FBI agents. DOJ disagreed on assessing the PIA process stating it established practices that protect privacy and civil liberties beyond the requirements of the law. GAO also recommended DOJ publish a system of records notice (SORN) and assess that process. DOJ agreed to publish a SORN, but did not agree there was a legal requirement to do so. GAO believes both recommendations are valid to keep the public informed on how personal information is being used and protected by DOJ components.
GAO also recommended the FBI conduct audits to determine if users of NGI-IPS and biometric images specialists in the FBI's FACE Services unit are conducting face image searches in accordance with DOJ policy requirements. The FBI began conducting NGI-IPS user audits in 2017.
Accuracy testing limited. In May 2016, GAO recommended the FBI conduct tests to verify that NGI-IPS is accurate for all allowable candidate list sizes to give more reasonable assurance that NGI-IPS provides leads that help enhance criminal investigations. GAO made this recommendation because FBI officials stated that they do not know, and have not tested, the detection rate for candidate list sizes smaller than 50, which users sometimes request from the FBI. GAO also recommended the FBI take steps to determine whether systems used by external partners are sufficiently accurate for FBI's use. By taking such steps, the FBI could better ensure the data from external partners do not unnecessarily include photos of innocent people as investigative leads. However, FBI disagreed with these two recommendations, stating the testing results satisfy requirements for providing investigative leads and that FBI does not have authority to set accuracy requirements for external systems. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid because the recommended testing and determination of accuracy of external systems would give the FBI more reasonable assurance that the systems provide investigative leads that help enhance, rather than hinder or overly burden, criminal investigation work.
GAO also recommended the FBI conduct an annual operational review of NGI-IPS to determine if the accuracy of face recognition searches is meeting federal, state, and local law enforcement needs and take actions, as necessary. DOJ agreed and in 2017 FBI stated they implemented the recommendation by submitting a paper to solicit feedback from NGI-IPS users on whether face recognition searches are meeting their needs. However, GAO believes these actions do not fully meet the recommendation because they did not result in any formal response from users and did not constitute an operational review. GAO continues to recommend FBI conduct an operational review of NGI-IPS at least annually.
What GAO Recommends
In May 2016, DOJ and the FBI partially agreed with two recommendations and disagreed with another on privacy. FBI agreed with one and disagreed with two recommendations on accuracy. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-13-503 | gao_GAO-13-503_0 | FSA uses this information to determine farm program payments, including payments for various agricultural disaster assistance programs. In a 2007 report, we recommended that FSA implement management controls, such as matching payment files with SSA’s death master file, to verify that an individual receiving payments has not died and to provide reasonable assurance that the agency does not make improper payments to deceased individuals. FSA Has Established Procedures for Preventing Improper Payments to the Deceased, but Some Supporting Information Is Incomplete
Since 2007, FSA has established procedures for preventing improper payments to deceased individuals, including matching payments to program participants with SSA’s data on deceased individuals. This match identifies any program participants who have died. We examined a generalizable random sample of 100 payments that were made to deceased individuals over a 1-year period beginning in April 2011 and coded as proper, and we estimated that FSA county offices coded 91 percent of these payments correctly. On the basis of supporting evidence FSA provided us, we found 9 payments that did not have sufficient support to be coded as proper. NRCS Does Not Have Procedures in Place to Prevent Improper Payments to Deceased Individuals
NRCS does not have procedures to prevent improper payments to deceased individuals, and its ability to verify whether payment recipients are dead or alive is limited. As a result, the agency cannot be certain that payments it made to over a thousand deceased individuals are proper. In so doing, we estimate that NRCS made $10.6 million in payments on behalf of 1,103 individuals 1 year or more after death. As a result, RMA may have provided potentially improper crop insurance subsidies and administrative allowances on behalf of thousands of deceased individuals. To determine whether some of RMA’s subsidies and allowances may have been provided on behalf of policyholders who were deceased, we matched policyholders’ Social Security numbers from RMA’s crop insurance subsidies and administrative allowance data for crop reinsurance years 2008 through 2012 against SSA’s complete death master file. We found that approximately $22 million in subsidies and allowances may have been provided on behalf of 3,434 policyholders 2 or more reinsurance years after death. Without reviewing each subsidy that could have been made to a deceased individual and reconciling it with SSA’s complete death master file, however, RMA cannot know whether such subsidies were proper or improper. Under the standards for internal control in the federal government, agencies are to clearly document internal control in the form of management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals, and the documentation should be readily available for examination.policyholders, RMA may be unable to rely on results from data mining and therefore be less likely to detect fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive crop insurance claims. FSA’s quarterly review process has largely enabled the agency to identify thousands of individuals who were paid after their dates of death. To help RMA prevent improper crop insurance subsidies on behalf of deceased individuals and to improve the effectiveness of its data mining, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of RMA to develop and implement procedures to prevent potentially improper subsidies on behalf of deceased individuals, including (1) matching RMA’s crop insurance records against SSA’s complete death master file and (2) reviewing each subsidy provided on behalf of a deceased individual to ensure that an improper subsidy was not provided. In its comment letter, USDA generally agreed with our report’s findings and recommendations but stated that it believes we inaccurately represented NRCS and RMA as having no procedures in place to identify deceased participants. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which procedures are in place to prevent (1) the Farm Service Agency (FSA) from making potentially improper payments to deceased individuals, (2) the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) from making potentially improper payments to deceased individuals, and (3) the Risk Management Agency (RMA) from providing potentially improper subsidies on behalf of deceased individuals. To determine if state and county offices accurately coded payments made to deceased individuals as proper or improper, we analyzed a generalizable, random sample of payments made by FSA to deceased individuals from April 2011 through March 2012, and we reviewed and analyzed supporting documentation to determine the individuals’ eligibility. We did not review a portion of payments made under these programs because NRCS was unable to provide us with the Social Security numbers for some program participants. Federal Farm Programs: USDA Needs to Strengthen Controls to Prevent Improper Payments to Estates and Deceased Individuals. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA spends about $20 billion annually on federal programs that support farm income, conserve natural resources, and help farmers manage risks from natural disasters, benefiting over 1 million participants. Given their cost and continuing nationwide budget pressures, these programs have come under increasing scrutiny. One concern has been the distribution of benefits to ineligible participants, including potentially improper payments to deceased individuals, which, as GAO and others have reported, may call into question whether these farm safety net programs are benefiting the agricultural sector as intended. GAO was asked to evaluate USDA controls over payments to the deceased. This report examines the extent to which procedures are in place to prevent (1) FSA and (2) NRCS from making potentially improper payments to deceased individuals and (3) RMA from providing potentially improper subsidies on behalf of deceased individuals. GAO reviewed a random sample of payments, compared USDA's databases with SSA's master list of deceased individuals, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA), which administers various programs for farmers that help support farm incomes and provide disaster assistance, has established procedures for preventing improper payments to deceased individuals, including, on a quarterly basis, matching payments to program participants with the Social Security Administration's (SSA) data on deceased individuals. In addition, FSA state and county offices review and verify whether payments made to deceased individuals are proper or improper. Overall, these procedures have enabled FSA to identify thousands of deceased individuals who were paid $3.3 million in improper payments after their dates of death, of which FSA has recovered approximately $1 million. GAO reviewed a generalizable random sample of payments to deceased individuals that FSA identified as proper and found that 9 percent did not have sufficient support to be coded as proper. More monitoring to ensure that county offices' coding of payments is supported by documentation could help reduce the error rate.
The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), a USDA agency that administers voluntary conservation programs, does not have procedures to prevent potentially improper payments to deceased individuals. For example, NRCS's ability to verify whether payment recipients have died is limited because the agency does not match these recipients against SSA's master list of deceased individuals. Under the standards for internal control in the federal government, agencies are to clearly document such control in the form of management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. GAO did a data review for fiscal year 2008 to April 2012, and estimates that NRCS made $10.6 million payments on behalf of 1,103 deceased individuals 1 year or more after their death. Some of these payments may have been proper, but NRCS cannot be certain because it neither identifies which of its payments were made to deceased individuals, nor reviews each of these payments.
USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA), which administers crop insurance programs, does not have procedures in place consistent with federal internal control standards to prevent potentially improper subsidies on behalf of deceased individuals. For example, RMA does not use SSA's master list of deceased individuals to verify whether its policyholders have died. GAO matched every policyholder's Social Security number in RMA's crop insurance subsidy and administrative allowance data for crop insurance years 2008 to 2012 with SSA's master list of deceased individuals and found that $22 million in subsidies and allowances may have been provided on behalf of an estimated 3,434 program policyholders 2 or more years after death. Many of these subsidies and allowances may have been proper, but without reviewing each subsidy and allowance made on behalf of deceased individuals, RMA cannot be certain that these subsidies and allowances are proper. In addition, without accurate records of which policyholders are deceased, RMA may be less likely to rely on results from data mining--a technique for extracting knowledge from large volumes of data--and therefore be less likely to detect fraudulent, wasteful, or abusive crop insurance claims.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FSA further strengthen its verification of payments to deceased individuals, NRCS develop and implement procedures to prevent improper payments to deceased individuals, and RMA develop and implement procedures to prevent improper crop insurance subsidies on behalf of deceased policyholders and to improve the effectiveness of its data mining. USDA generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-593 | gao_GAO-09-593_0 | Education has not described in its annual performance plan how it will coordinate various crosscutting teacher quality activities supporting its goal of improving student achievement. Our previous work has identified using strategic and annual plans as a practice that can help enhance and sustain collaboration. For example, Education found instances in 2 of our site visit states of grants being awarded by state agencies for higher education that included an ineligible partnership. Education Conducts a Variety of Teacher Quality Improvement Studies and Provides Assistance to States and Districts through Regional and National Service Providers, Which Coordinate in Various Ways
In addition to providing grants for teacher quality, Education has conducted evaluations for some of its 23 teacher quality programs, although little is known about the effectiveness of these programs. Information from the evaluation and research is provided mainly through various vehicles on the Internet, and Education directs research and assistance to states and school districts through a system of regional and national providers. Education officials reported that these regional and national providers coordinate to provide this assistance to states and school districts. Education Conducts a Variety of Evaluations of Program Operations and Their Outcomes, but Evaluations Have Been Done or Are Under Way for about Two-fifths of the Teacher Quality Programs
Education conducts various types of evaluations, such as process or implementation, outcome, and impact, which are intended to inform policymakers, program managers, and educators about program operations, how well programs are working, and which programs or interventions are having the greatest impact. States Face Several Challenges in Collaborating Internally to Improve Teacher Quality; Education Provides Some Assistance to Help Address These Challenges
State agency officials cited limited resources and incompatible data systems as the greatest challenges to their collaborative efforts within the state to improve teacher quality. Resistance to change, sustained commitment, and state governance structure also affected their efforts to collaborate. State officials said that some of their objectives for data systems are to link student and teacher data, or to link data from the K-12 education system and the postsecondary education system, to inform and measure teacher quality policy efforts. Nevertheless, state officials reported through our surveys that these coordinating bodies also face challenges to enhancing collaboration, including having limited resources and needing to set priorities and allocate roles and responsibilities. L. No. Another $250 million is provided for the State Longitudinal Data Systems grant program in the Recovery Act that could help states defray costs associated with these efforts. To help accomplish this goal, Education distributes billions of federal dollars and provides research and other assistance for teacher quality activities through multiple offices and statutorily authorized programs. While Education has engaged in some coordination to share information and expertise within the department, and from time to time has established and completed broader collaborative efforts, coordination among all the relevant offices does not occur on a regular basis. Without clearly articulated strategies and sustained collaborative activities, Education may be missing important opportunities to leverage its financial and other resources, align its activities and processes, as well as develop joint strategies to assist states, districts, and institutions of higher education in improving teacher quality. School districts. Appendix IV: Institute of Education Sciences’ Sponsored Research on Teacher Quality, 2003–2009
Improving Instruction Through Implementation of the Partnership Instructional Coaching Model The Effects of Teacher Preparation and Professional Development on Special Education Teacher Quality The Influence of Collaborative Professional Development Groups & Coaching on the Literacy Instruction of Upper Elementary Special Education Teachers Impact of Professional Development on Preschool Teachers’ Use of Embedded-Instruction Practices Integrating Science and Diversity Education: A Model of Pre-Service Elementary Teacher Preparation Using Video Clips of Classroom Instruction as Item Prompts to Measure Teacher Knowledge of Teaching Mathematics: Instrument Development and Validation Standards-Based Differentiated ELD Instruction to Improve English Language Arts Achievement for English Language Learners Enhancing Knowledge Related to Research-Based Early Literacy Instruction Among Pre-Service Teachers The Pathway Project: A Cognitive Strategies Approach to Reading and Writing Instruction for Teachers of Secondary English Language Learners Content-Focused Coaching for High Quality Reading Instruction Do Lower Barriers to Entry Affect Achievement and Teacher Retention: The Case of New York City Math Immersion Early Childhood Hands-On Science Curriculum Development and Demonstration Project National Center for Research on Early Childhood Education (NCRECE): Preschool Teacher Professional Development Study National Center for Performance Incentives Center for the Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER)
Replication and Outcomes of the Teaching SMART Program in Elementary Science Classrooms Identifying the Conditions Under Which Large Scale Professional Development Policy Initiatives are Related to Teacher Knowledge Instructional Practices, and Student Reading Outcomes Embedded Classroom Multimedia: Improving Implementation Quality and Student Achievement in a Cooperative Writing Program Enhancing the Quality of Expository Text Instruction Through Content and Case-Situated Professional Development Teaching Teachers to Teach Critical Reading Strategies (CREST) Through an Intensive Professional Development Model Examining the Efficacy of Two Models of Preschool Professional Development in Language and Literacy A Randomized Controlled Study of the Efficacy of Reading Apprenticeship Professional Development for High School History and Science Teaching and Learning Assessment of Pedagogical Knowledge of Teachers of Reading Connecting Primary Grade Teacher Knowledge to Primary Grade Student Achievement: Developing the Evidence-Based Reading/Writing Teacher Knowledge Assessment System Algebra Connections: Teacher Education in Clear Instruction and Responsive Assessment of Algebra Patterns and Problem Solving The Relationship Between Mathematics Teachers’ Content Knowledge and Students’ Mathematics Achievement: Exploring the Predictive Validity of the Praxis Series Middle School Mathematics Test Professional Development in Early Reading Improving Teacher Quality to Address the Language and Literacy Skills of Latino Children in Pre-Kindergarten Programs Can Literacy Professional Development be Improved With Web-Based Collaborative Learning Tools? | Why GAO Did This Study
Policymakers and researchers have focused on improving the quality of our nation's 3 million teachers to raise the achievement of students in key academic areas, such as reading and mathematics. Given the importance of teacher quality to student achievement and the key role federal and state governments play in supporting teacher quality, GAO's objectives included examining (1) the extent that the U.S. Department of Education (Education) funds and coordinates teacher quality programs, (2) studies that Education conducts on teacher quality and how it provides and coordinates research-related assistance to states and school districts, and (3) challenges to collaboration within states and how Education helps address those challenges. GAO interviewed experts and Education officials, administered surveys to officials at state educational agencies and state agencies for higher education in the fall of 2008, and conducted site visits to three states.
What GAO Found
Education allocates billions of federal dollars for teacher quality improvement efforts through many statutorily authorized programs that nine offices administer. Education officials said these offices share information with one another as needed, and from time to time Education has established and completed broader collaborative efforts. Yet, GAO found little sustained coordination and no strategy for working systematically across program lines. Education also has not described how it will coordinate crosscutting teacher quality improvement activities intended to support its goal of improving student achievement in its annual performance plan. Our previous work has identified the use of strategic and annual plans as a practice that can help enhance and sustain collaboration. Without clear strategies for sustained coordination, Education may be missing key opportunities to leverage and align its resources, activities, and processes to assist states, school districts, and institutions of higher education improve teacher quality. Education has conducted evaluations for some of its teacher quality programs and has awarded grants to researchers for a variety of research on teacher quality interventions, which are intended to inform policymakers and educators about program operations and which programs or interventions are having an impact. While evaluations have been done or are under way for about two-fifths of these programs, little is known about whether most of the programs are achieving their desired results. Education provides information from evaluations and also from research through the Internet and a system of regional and national providers. These providers also either conduct or synthesize research and provide assistance mainly to states and school districts. These providers coordinate among themselves and with one another in various ways. State agency officials reported through our surveys that limited resources and incompatible data systems were the greatest challenges to their collaborative efforts to improve teacher quality. State officials reported that data systems could be used to inform teacher quality policy efforts by linking student and teacher data, or linking data from kindergarten through 12th grade and the postsecondary education systems. To help address these challenges, Education provides some financial support and other assistance. For example, one $65 million program that helps states develop statewide data systems also received another $250 million in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Also, the act requires states to report on the progress they are making toward linking statewide data systems that allow matching of individual student achievement to individual teachers. This additional funding could help states defray costs associated with these efforts. |
gao_GAO-11-41 | gao_GAO-11-41_0 | 2). Almost all of NIST’s federal clients advanced funds to NIST for those agreements. Unfinished Interagency Agreements Significantly Contribute to NIST’s Working Capital Fund Carryover Balance
The Working Capital Fund’s Carryover Balance Is Largely Driven by Pending and Ongoing Work Associated with Interagency Agreements
The carryover balance in NIST’s working capital fund is largely driven by pending and ongoing work associated with interagency agreements as well as work for which NIST has accepted advanced funds but not yet started. NIST accepts most of its agreements in the second half of the fiscal year. Further, since most agreements cross fiscal years, many are also likely to extend into the next fiscal year. NIST’s Management Practices Related to Interagency Agreements Do Not Ensure Compliance with Applicable Fiscal Laws
NIST Lacks Processes to Ensure It Complies with the Time Limitations of Advanced Funds
Our previous work has established that a high carryover in working capital funds may indicate poor workload planning, which could lead to inefficient use of agency resources and missed opportunities to use those funds for other needs. If the client does not have such funds available, they could be exposed to possible Antideficiency Act violations. NIST Does Not Monitor Interagency Agreements to Ensure that Work Begins within a Reasonable Time
NIST does not record or monitor whether it begins working on agreements within a reasonable amount of time after it received funds advanced by client agencies. Long delays between when an agency accepts funds advanced from clients and when it begins work on its agreements may lead to the improper use of appropriated funds. Because NIST has not considered what a reasonable standard for starting its work might be, we use 90 days as a point of reference for the purposes of this report. We estimate that NIST took, on average, 125 days to begin work on its interagency agreements in fiscal years 2004 through 2009. NIST Lacks Strategic Workload Management and Client Focus for Its Interagency Agreements
NIST lacks a high-level, senior management focus on managing its interagency agreement workload. A key principle of strategic workforce planning is the effective deployment of staff to achieve the agency’s mission and goals. NIST places a high priority on its interagency agreements. However, NIST senior managers play no role in determining whether the appropriate resources are available agencywide to support its interagency agreement workload. Without strategically managing its workload, NIST cannot be sure that it is effectively managing this high-priority area. Although NIST shares responsibility with its federal clients for ensuring the proper use of appropriated funds, it does not sufficiently communicate to clients important information about the status of work and the use of these funds—information that would help its clients know whether their funds are being properly used. Such a coordinator could communicate important information—including when NIST expects to begin work on agreements—that would better inform client decisions about how best to use their appropriated funds. NIST does not monitor the period of availability of appropriations advanced from client agencies and therefore cannot ensure that funds are legally available when it bills against them. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of NIST interagency agreements and provide reasonable assurance that NIST is efficiently using its resources and complying with applicable fiscal laws, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NIST Director to take the following five actions: (1) To help ensure efficient, effective deployment of NIST’s workforce and be a responsible steward of federal resources, hold senior management accountable for strategically managing its interagency agreements. (2) To meet its responsibilities in ensuring the proper use of federal funds, (a) develop, implement, and communicate to its clients policies regarding reasonable time frames for beginning work on interagency agreements; (b) track and monitor the work start date for each agreement; and (c) monitor and report internally, and periodically inform federal clients about, the amount of time elapsed between when funds were advanced to it from client agencies and when it actually began billing against an agreement. Appendix I: Proposed Changes to NIST’s Interagency Agreement Process
In August 2010, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provided information about the steps it is taking to improve the overall internal control of interagency agreements and funding it receives, as a result of our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously found that a significant portion of the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) working capital fund contained a growing carryover balance. Almost all of the fund's resources come from appropriations advanced from federal clients for NIST's technical services through interagency agreements. Monitoring and tracking key information about agreements and the funds advanced for them is critical for both NIST and its clients to make well-informed budget decisions, comply with applicable fiscal laws and internal controls, and ensure the proper use of federal funds. GAO was asked to review (1) the factors contributing to the working capital fund's carryover balance and (2) NIST's processes for managing its interagency agreements and workload. To do so, GAO reviewed laws and fiscal requirements, analyzed NIST budget data and policies related to its interagency agreements, analyzed a random sample of agreements, and interviewed NIST officials.
What GAO Found
NIST's working capital fund carryover balance is largely driven by appropriations advanced from federal clients to support interagency agreements. Most agreements cross fiscal years and because more than half were accepted in the second half of the fiscal year, some carryover of funds and work is expected. NIST's processes for managing agreements are insufficient to help ensure compliance with applicable fiscal laws. 1) NIST does not monitor the period of availability of appropriations advanced from client agencies and therefore cannot be sure that funds are legally available when it bills against them. If NIST were to use funds after an account closes, its clients could be exposed to possible Antideficiency Act violations. GAO found two reasons for this. First, NIST treats these funds as being available without fiscal year limitation. Second, NIST does not manage agreements in a way that would allow it to monitor the availability of client advances. 2) NIST does not ensure that it starts work on its agreements within a reasonable amount of time after client agencies advance funds to NIST. Long delays in starting work may lead to the improper use of appropriated funds. There is no governmentwide standard for a reasonable time in which to begin work. NIST has not considered such a standard for itself, but some agencies use 90 days as a general guide. NIST took, on average, an estimated 125 days to start work. Further, GAO estimates that NIST began work about 7 months after receiving funds advanced from clients for about half of its agreements. In some cases the delay was 1-2 years. There were several reasons for this, including that NIST does not record or monitor the date it begins work on agreements, and does not consider whether it has the appropriate resources agencywide before accepting new work. NIST lacks a high-level, senior management focus on managing its interagency agreement workload. Strategic workforce planning requires the effective deployment of staff to achieve agency goals. NIST places a high priority on its interagency agreements; however, senior managers play no role in determining whether appropriate resources are available agencywide to support its workload. Further, although NIST shares responsibility with its federal clients for ensuring the proper use of appropriated funds, it does not sufficiently communicate important information to clients--such as when work is expected to begin on agreements--that would better inform client decisions about how to best use their funds. Absent strategic workload management and improved client communications, NIST cannot meet the needs of this high-priority area. As a result of our review, NIST began revising its interagency agreement process. Because NIST did not provide this information to GAO until after the review was complete, GAO was unable to determine the effect of those changes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 5 recommendations to improve NIST's management of its interagency agreements, including holding senior managers responsible for strategic workload management, improving internal monitoring and reporting, ensuring compliance with applicable fiscal laws, and communicating key information to clients on its agreement status. NIST agreed with all 5 recommendations and is taking action to implement them by the end of this fiscal year. |
gao_GAO-08-623 | gao_GAO-08-623_0 | According to DHS, ESTA will allow DHS to screen citizens from VWP countries who wish to travel to the United States before they depart for U.S. ports of entry. Elimination of Visa Waiver Program Could Dramatically Increase Visa Demand and Overwhelm Visa Operations in the Near Term, but State Has Not Developed Contingency Plans
Elimination or suspension of the Visa Waiver Program could cause dramatic increases in the demand for visas that could overwhelm visa operations in the near term. To meet visa demand, State would need substantially more staff and facilities. State has conducted limited planning to address the potential impact of Visa Waiver Program elimination or suspension. We estimate that State would have to hire around 540 new Foreign Service officers worldwide, at an estimated cost of between $185 million and $201 million per year. In addition, State would have to hire around 1,350 new Foreign Service national staff worldwide, which would cost around $168 million to $190 million per year. We calculated that it would cost between $3.8 billion and $5.7 billion to construct 45 new facilities in these countries. State Would See Significant Increases in Visa Revenues, Offsetting New Staffing Costs
While staffing and facilities needs would increase if the Visa Waiver Program were eliminated, this scenario also would increase the number of travelers needing a visa; as a result, we estimate visa fee revenues would increase substantially. Expansion of the Visa Waiver Program Would Reduce Visa Demand, but Likely Have Limited Effect on State’s Visa Costs and Resources
Expansion of the Visa Waiver Program would reduce visa demand in Road Map countries, but have a limited effect on the costs and resources needed to meet the reduced demand and the amount of visa fees received. However, visa volume is relatively small in most of the Road Map countries. Even if all 13 Road Map countries were to join the program, and if all of those countries’ citizens who previously traveled with visas were to travel to the United States without visas, the total reduction in visa demand would be only around 710,000; more than 400,000 of this reduction would be in South Korea alone. Officials told us they generally expect continued visa travel as some percentage of VWP travelers will be rejected by ESTA and directed to apply for a visa at the embassy. In total, if all 13 Road Map countries joined the program, we estimate that about 21 to 31 Foreign Service officers could be moved to other posts in need of staff and 52 to 77 Foreign Service national positions could be cut. Assuming all 13 Road Map countries were admitted to the program and that most eligible foreign citizens traveled under the program, we estimate that State would lose approximately $74 million to $83 million each year in collected visa fees, generally offsetting any savings from reduced personnel costs. Most officials predicted that the percentage of travelers who choose to obtain a visa could exceed potential ESTA rejection rates of 1 percent to 3 percent. State officials told us that the influx of even a small percentage of current travelers in larger VWP countries to obtain visas could significantly disrupt visa operations at U.S. embassies. For example, if 1 percent of the United Kingdom citizens who currently travel to the United States without visas needed to or chose to apply for a visa, visa demand there could increase by 35,000 per year, or around a 31 percent increase in visa workload. We estimate annual visa fee revenues would increase and offset the year-to-year recurring staffing costs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined how three changes—Visa Waiver Program (VWP) elimination, program expansion, and implementation of the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)—would affect the demand for visas, and how changes in demand would affect the resources the Department of State (State) needs and the amount of visa fee revenue that State receives. We did not use data on the number of travelers coming to the United States under the program because (1) data from 2001 to 2007 on the number of travelers coming to the United States under the program were not available; (2) available data from 2004 to 2007 averaged 12.5 million travelers, a difference of less than 1 percent from the 12.6 million calculated using the number of travelers to the United States from each VWP country; and (3) we could not independently calculate the number of travelers coming to the United States under the program by subtracting the number of visas issued in each country annually, because not all of those people who received visas necessarily traveled in that year. GAO Comments
1. 3. We do not believe that DHS should estimate the resources that State would need to manage increased visa demand or how ESTA could affect visa fee revenues collected by State as a result of the implementation of ESTA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), citizens from 27 countries can travel to the United States visa free. Terrorism concerns involving VWP country citizens have led some to suggest eliminating or suspending the program, while the executive branch is considering adding countries to it. Legislation passed in 2007 led the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop its Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), to screen VWP country citizens before they travel to the United States; if found ineligible, travelers will need to apply for a visa. GAO reviewed how (1) program elimination or suspension, (2) program expansion, and (3) ESTA could affect visa demand, resource needs, and revenues. We collected traveler, staffing, facilities, and cost data from the Department of State (State), DHS, and embassy officials and developed estimates related to the three scenarios above.
What GAO Found
The potential elimination or suspension of the Visa Waiver Program could cause dramatic increases in visa demand--from around 500,000 (the average number of people from VWP countries who obtain a U.S. visa each year) to as much as 12.6 million (the average number of people who travel to the United States from VWP countries each year)--that could overwhelm visa operations in the near term. To meet visa demand, State officials said they could need approximately 45 new facilities, which we estimate could cost $3.8 billion to $5.7 billion. We estimate State would also need substantially more staff--around 540 new Foreign Service officers at a cost of around $185 million to $201 million per year, and 1,350 local Foreign Service national staff at around $168 million to $190 million per year, as well as additional management and support positions for a total annual cost of $447 million to $486 million. Because VWP elimination would increase the number of travelers needing a visa, we estimate annual visa fee revenues would increase substantially, by $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion, and would offset the year-to-year recurring staffing costs. State has done limited planning for how it would address increased visa demand if the program were suspended or eliminated. Adding countries to the Visa Waiver Program would reduce visa demand in those countries, but likely have a relatively limited effect overall on resources needed to meet visa demand and on State's visa fee revenues. The volume of visa applications is relatively small in most of the 13 "Road Map" countries the executive branch is considering for expansion. If all 13 Road Map countries were to join the program, and if all of those countries' citizens who previously traveled with visas were to travel to the United States without visas, the reduction in workload would, we estimate, permit State to move about 21 to 31 Foreign Service officers to other posts in need, and to cut 52 to 77 Foreign Service national positions. In addition, though program expansion would result in less space needed for visa operations, this would likely result in little or no building or lease savings because any resulting excess consular space is in government-owned facilities, and could not be sold. If all 13 Road Map countries were admitted to the Visa Waiver Program, we estimate that State would lose approximately $74 million to $83 million each year in collected visa fees, offsetting any savings in personnel costs. State and DHS officials acknowledged that the implementation of ESTA could increase visa demand in VWP countries, though neither State nor DHS has developed estimates of the increase. DHS is currently developing ESTA, and DHS officials told us the ESTA rejection rate could be between 1 percent and 3 percent, but they currently do not know. In addition, State and embassy officials believe some travelers might choose to apply for a visa rather than face potential, unexpected travel disruptions due to ESTA. Neither DHS nor State has attempted to estimate how these two factors would affect visa demand, and, as a result, State has not estimated what additional resources would be needed to manage the demand, and what additional visa fees would be received. However, State officials told us that, if 1 percent to 3 percent of current VWP travelers came to embassies in VWP countries for visas, it could greatly increase visa demand at some locations, which could significantly disrupt visa operations. |
gao_GGD-99-20 | gao_GGD-99-20_0 | We coded the regulatory provisions as being within the authority granted by the statutes if (1) the statutory provision gave the agency no discretion in how the regulations could be developed and the regulatory provision strictly adhered to the statutory requirements; or (2) the statutory provision gave the agency some or broad discretion, and the regulatory provision was consistent with the requirements or the limitations in the statute. We concluded that in relation to 13 of the 27 concerns, the agencies could not have developed less burdensome regulatory approaches. For the remaining 14 concerns in which we concluded the underlying statutes gave the agencies some or broad discretion, we could not determine whether a less burdensome regulatory approach was available. The statutes underlying other company concerns gave the agencies some or broad discretion in developing associated regulatory provisions. Our objectives were to determine, for each such concern, (1) the amount of discretion the underlying statutes gave the agencies in developing the regulatory requirements that the agencies had said were attributable to the underlying statutes, (2) whether the regulatory requirements at issue were within the authority granted by the underlying statutes, and (3) whether the rulemaking agencies could have developed regulatory approaches that would have been less burdensome to the regulated entities while still meeting the underlying statutory requirements. Concerns for Which Agencies Appeared to Have No Rulemaking Discretion
One of the objectives of our review was to determine, for each of 27 company concerns, the amount of discretion the underlying statutes gave rulemaking agencies in drafting the regulatory requirements that the agencies said were attributable to the underlying statutes. In this review we concluded that the statutory provisions underlying 13 of the 27 concerns gave the rulemaking agencies no discretion in how the related regulatory requirements could be drafted. Specifically, for each such concern it provides the following information: (1) the portion of the concern in our 1996 reports that the agency or agencies indicated was statutorily based, (2) the portion of the agency response in our 1996 reports that indicated the concern was statutorily based, (3) our analysis of the amount of rulemaking discretion the relevant statutory provisions gave the agencies (the first objective of this review), (4) our analysis of whether the regulatory requirements at issue in the concern were within the authority granted by the underlying statutes (the second objective of our review), (5) our analysis of whether the rulemaking agencies could have developed regulatory approaches that would have been less burdensome to the regulated entities while meeting the underlying statutory requirements (the third objective of our review), and (6) the main purpose of the underlying statutes (where such purpose statements were available). All of these elements were required in the statute. We believe that FDIC had some discretion in developing regulations governing bank reporting requirements. Therefore, HUD had no discretion with regard to these requirements. To do so we would have had to initiate a separate analysis of each provision for which IRS had rulemaking discretion— analyses that would have required extensive time and resource commitments that were beyond the scope of this assignment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal agencies' assertions that certain private-sector regulatory concerns were, at least in part, attributable to underlying statutes, focusing on: (1) the amount of discretion the underlying statutes gave the rulemaking agencies in developing the regulatory requirements that the agencies had said were attributable to the underlying statutes; (2) whether the regulatory requirements at issue were within the authority granted by the underlying statutes; and (3) whether the rulemaking agencies could have developed regulatory approaches that would have been less burdensome to the regulated entities while still meeting the underlying statutory requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the statutes underlying 13 of the 27 regulatory concerns that it examined gave the rulemaking agencies no discretion in establishing the regulatory requirements at issue; (2) in these cases, the underlying statutes specifically stated what the regulated entities must do, and, by inference, what the related regulations must require; (3) the underlying statutes for 12 of the 27 concerns gave the agencies some discretion in developing the regulatory requirements at issue; (4) in these cases, the agencies often had no rulemaking discretion with regard to certain issues but had some or broad discretion regarding other issues; (5) the agencies had broad discretion in developing the regulatory requirements at issue in the two remaining concerns; (6) the regulatory provisions the agencies developed in relation to all of the 27 company concerns were within the authorities granted by the underlying statutes; (7) for those concerns in which the underlying statements gave the agencies no discretion as to how the associated regulations could be developed, those regulations were consistent with, and often mirrored, the specific requirements in the statutes; (8) for those concerns in which the statutes gave the agencies some or broad rulemaking discretion, the regulations did not appear to exceed the discretion allowed in those statutes; (9) for the 13 concerns for which GAO concluded agencies had no discretion, it also concluded that there were no less burdensome regulatory approaches available to the agencies that would have met the requirements of the statutes; (10) GAO could not determine whether less burdensome regulatory approaches were available for the remaining 14 of the 27 concerns, for which the statutes gave the agencies some or broad rulemaking discretion; (11) to make those determinations, GAO would have had to conduct a detailed examination of the implementation of each of the regulatory provisions that the agencies had said were attributable to the underlying statutes and the implications of alternative approaches--analyses that would have required time and resource commitments that were beyond the scope of this review; and (12) although this review focused on only 27 regulatory concerns, GAO believes that it can offer insights into some broader issues. |
gao_GAO-17-57 | gao_GAO-17-57_0 | RPMs are the primary means by which CBP scans cargo and vehicles at U.S. ports of entry for nuclear and radiological material. 1.) RPM alarms can result from naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), which are often emitted from certain consumer and trade goods, such as ceramics, fertilizers, and granite tile. RPM alarms from NORM are termed “nuisance” alarms by DHS and require CBP officers to spend time determining that the source of the alarm is NORM and not nuclear or radiological threat materials before the cargo container or vehicle can leave the port. However, because of limitations in the design of the plastic panels in the Ludlum RPMs that DHS acquired, these RPMs cannot be upgraded with the revised operational settings and thus do not have the threat discrimination capabilities equal to the upgraded Leidos RPMs. As of August 2016, 100 percent of cargo containers and vehicles entering land border crossings and nearly 100 percent of cargo containers passing through seaports are scanned by RPMs, according to DNDO. DHS Changed Its Assessment of the Condition of the RPM Fleet and Consequently Altered Its RPM Replacement Strategy During Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015, DNDO Used a 13-Year RPM Service Life Estimate to Plan and Budget for RPM Replacements
DHS’s assessment of its RPM fleet shifted over time, and as a result DHS has changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy. However, recent DNDO studies indicate the fleet can remain operational until at least 2030, with proactive maintenance and sufficient availability of spare parts, so DHS has refocused its strategy on selective replacements to improve efficiency. The budget justification stated that funding increases would address sustainability of aging RPMs and ensure compliance with the SAFE Port Act as DHS formulates a long-term strategy for the replacement of RPMs at the end of their life cycle. DHS’s Recent Assessments Indicate the Fleet Is Sustainable, and DHS Has Shifted Its Replacement Strategy to Focus on Efficiency
According to DHS data, as of August 2016, DHS’s RPM fleet remains almost 100 percent operational, even as almost 20 percent of the RPMs have reached the end of their original estimated 13-year service life and another 40 percent are within 2 years of that date. DHS Plans to Replace RPMs at Selected Ports of Entry to Gain Operational Efficiencies
DHS plans to replace legacy RPMs at selected ports of entry with RPMs that have greater threat discrimination capabilities to gain operational efficiencies and reduce labor needs while continuing to meet detection requirements. Specifically, from fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2018, DHS is planning to replace more than 120 Ludlum RPMs at northern U.S. land border crossings with upgraded Leidos RPMs from existing inventory. GAO Recommended That the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Examine Use of Optimization Techniques to Maximize Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Potential In 2009, we examined DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) development and testing of a new type of RPM and, among other things, found that DNDO had not completed efforts to fine-tune the current fleet of RPMs to provide greater sensitivity to threat materials. Beginning in 2014, DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) took action to upgrade some of its RPMs by optimizing RPM threshold settings. During fiscal years 2018 through 2020, DHS is planning to replace upgraded Leidos RPMs at selected high-volume ports of entry with between 150 and 250 enhanced, commercially available RPMs that have even greater ability to discriminate between NORM and materials that pose a threat. According to DNDO and CBP officials, the improved threat discrimination offered by these new, enhanced RPMs will further reduce nuisance alarms and may enable high-volume ports of entry to implement remote RPM operations. However, the data indicate that some high- volume ports of entry have lanes with higher nuisance alarm rates. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials to carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. Terrorists could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device that could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and other infrastructure. DHS's fleet of almost 1,400 RPMs helps secure the nation's borders by scanning incoming cargo and vehicles for radiological and nuclear materials. DHS began deploying RPMs to seaports and border crossings in fiscal year 2003. As RPMs began to approach the end of their expected 13-year service lives, DHS raised concerns over the sustainability of the fleet, the ability to maintain current scanning coverage, and the need for fleet recapitalization.
GAO was asked to report on the sustainability of the RPM fleet. This report provides information on (1) DHS's assessment of the condition of its RPM fleet and how, if at all, that assessment has changed over time; and (2) DHS's plans for meeting detection requirements in the future. GAO reviewed agency documentation, analyzed data on RPM age and condition, and reviewed budget justifications. GAO interviewed DHS officials and officials from a national laboratory on the current status of the RPM fleet and DHS's plans for future RPM acquisitions.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report. These comments are incorporated as appropriate in the final report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) assessment of its fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPM)—large, stationary radiation detectors through which vehicles and cargo containers pass at ports of entry—shifted over time and, as a result, DHS has changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy. During fiscal years 2014 and 2015, as some RPMs began to reach the end of their estimated 13-year service life, DHS began planning for replacing the entire fleet of almost 1,400 RPMs. However, as of September 2016, the fleet remains nearly 100 percent operational and recent studies indicate that the fleet can remain operational until at least 2030 so long as proactive maintenance is carried out and RPM spare parts remain available. As a result, in 2016, DHS changed the focus of its RPM replacement strategy to selective replacement of RPMs—using existing RPMs that have been upgraded with new alarm threshold settings or purchasing enhanced, commercially available RPMs—to gain operational efficiencies and reduce labor requirements at some ports.
During fiscal years 2016 through 2018, DHS plans to replace approximately 120 RPMs along the northern U.S. border with upgraded RPMs and, during fiscal years 2018 through 2020, plans to replace between 150 and 250 RPMs at select high-volume ports with enhanced, commercially available RPMs. Specifically, DHS plans to replace some legacy RPMs—those that cannot be upgraded with the new alarm thresholds—at northern U.S. land border crossings with RPMs from existing inventory that have been upgraded. This upgrade enables improved threat discrimination and minimizes “nuisance” alarms created by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) in commonly shipped cargo such as ceramics, fertilizers, and granite tile. Improved discrimination between NORM and threat material will create efficiencies for the movement of cargo through ports and minimize time that DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers spend adjudicating the nuisance alarms. DHS is also planning limited replacement of upgraded RPMs at select high-volume ports with enhanced, commercially available RPMs that offer nuisance alarm levels significantly lower than even the upgraded RPMs. Currently, upgraded RPMs at some high-volume ports do not reduce nuisance alarm rates enough to implement remote RPM operations—which allows CBP officers to carry out other duties at the ports when not responding to an RPM alarm—because of the high number of vehicles and cargo containers passing through the ports daily. |
gao_GAO-09-14 | gao_GAO-09-14_0 | However, we found that DOL lacks a departmentwide process for tracking and addressing deficiencies and recommendations for improvement. We examined all of DOL’s initial PCARs completed as of July 2008 (18 total), and we found that DOL’s policy and procedures generally were followed in conducting the reviews. As a result, DOL is hindered in its ability to systematically monitor performance trends and determine if the winning service providers are performing more efficiently than the prior service providers. DOL Competitive Sourcing Cost Reports Are Not Comprehensive or Reliable
DOL’s savings reports for competitive sourcing, while adhering to OMB guidance, exclude a number of substantial costs and also are unreliable. By using projections rather than actual values in estimating savings, DOL excluded the higher actual personnel costs for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, even though actual numbers were available. Because of this, it cannot be known for certain if the same level of work was being performed. About 79 percent (248 workers) were reassigned to new positions at the same federal grade and salary level (see fig. All 16 workers who were demoted, and all 6 workers who were laid off, were African-American. In contrast, of the 15 workers who were promoted, 10 were Caucasian, 3 were African-American, 1 was Hispanic/Latino, and 1 was Asian/Pacific Islander. Selected Employees’ Views on Implementation and Morale Issues
Although DOL management stated that they made their best efforts to treat well those employees whose positions were competed in the competitive sourcing process, almost all DOL employees we spoke with who assisted with competition activities, and whose positions were affected by the competitions, reported that the competitive sourcing process has had a negative impact on morale. Though not a representative sample of all those involved in the process, these interviews included employees who were responsible for assisting with competition activities, as well as employees whose positions had been competed. Conclusions
As the Commercial Activities Panel report describes, the government’s goal for competitive sourcing is to obtain high-quality services at a reasonable cost and to achieve outcomes that represent the best deal for the taxpayer. DOL has conducted public-private competitions under its competitive sourcing program for 4 years and has set up performance and cost reporting systems to track its progress in meeting such goals. Yet these systems have a number of weaknesses, and unless these weaknesses are addressed, they will continue to inhibit DOL’s ability to reliably and comprehensively assess whether the cost of the work performed by the winning service providers—whether in-house government service providers or contracted private sector service providers—achieves the savings promised through the competitive sourcing process. In the interest of providing agency decision makers and policymakers with more complete information on the total costs associated with competitive sourcing, we recommend that in addition to the current cost reports that OMB requires agencies to prepare, the Director of OMB should: require agencies to systematically report all costs associated with competitive sourcing, including regular FTE staff wages for time spent on planning and conducting competitions, as well as all other precompetition, transition, and implementation costs, including postcompetition monitoring or accountability reviews. To improve the reliability and comprehensiveness of DOL’s performance assessments and savings estimates in its competitive sourcing program, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor take the following three actions: implement a consistently applied, departmentwide system to track identified deficiencies and recommendations for improvement in each of the competitions and the program overall; implement a system to track the full costs associated with managing DOL’s commercial management activities, including—but not limited to—all costs associated with competitive sourcing; and develop and implement a review process to ensure the accuracy of competitive sourcing savings reports to Congress. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As required unde directed by the House Committee on Appropriations, this report examines the use of competitive sourcing at the Department of Labor (DOL). In response, GAO’s review focused on the following: r the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, and as 1. Personnel actions resulted. Personnel actions resulted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition between federal and private organizations to provide services--referred to as "competitive sourcing"--can be one way to help achieve greater efficiency in government. Under guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), competitive sourcing has been implemented at various executive branch agencies over the years. As required under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 and directed by House Report 110-231, this report examines the use of competitive sourcing at the Department of Labor (DOL). Specifically, GAO examined the comprehensiveness and reliability of DOL's performance and cost assessments in accordance with OMB and DOL guidance as well as the impact of competitive sourcing on certain DOL workers. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant statutes, guidance, reports and personnel actions; and interviewed OMB and DOL officials and 60 DOL staff, grouped by role, in four locations.
What GAO Found
DOL first began conducting public-private competitions as part of its competitive sourcing program in fiscal year 2004, and since that time, it has set up performance and cost reporting systems to monitor progress in meeting the goals of competitive sourcing--that is, to obtain high-quality services at a reasonable cost and to achieve outcomes that represent the best deal for the taxpayer. For the most part, we found that DOL's policies and procedures were followed in conducting competitive sourcing activities; however, a number of weaknesses inhibit DOL's ability to reliably and comprehensively assess whether competitive sourcing achieves the outcomes promised. DOL lacks a departmentwide process for tracking and addressing deficiencies and recommendations for improvements that are identified in postcompetition accountability reviews. Though consistent with OMB guidance, DOL excluded a number of substantial costs in its reports to Congress--such as the costs for precompetition planning, certain transition costs and staff time, and postcompetition review activities--thereby understating the full costs of this contracting approach. DOL's savings reports are not reliable: a sample of three reports contained inaccuracies, and others used projections when actual numbers were available, which sometimes resulted in overstated savings. Because of these and other weaknesses, DOL is hindered in its ability to determine if services are being provided more efficiently as a result of competitive sourcing. Moreover, though not a representative sample of DOL personnel, in GAO's interviews with 60 employees involved with five competitions (including employees who assisted with competition activities, as well as employees whose positions were affected by the competitions), most said that they were dissatisfied with how the competitive sourcing process was implemented and that it had a negative impact on morale. Overall, DOL's competitions have resulted in few job losses or salary reductions. Among the 314 workers who experienced a personnel action, 263 were reassigned to new positions with the same title and pay or were promoted. In addition, of the 16 workers who were demoted, 14 were able to retain their same grade or pay. At the same time, certain groups have been impacted more than others. For example, though small in numbers, all 22 of those who were either demoted or laid off were African-American, while 10 of the 15 workers who were promoted were Caucasian. OMB recently issued new guidance that directs agencies to use a variety of tools to manage their commercial activities, including--but not limited to-- competitive sourcing. However, unless agencies are required to comprehensively track all the costs associated with competitive sourcing, it will be difficult to assess which tool may provide the best outcome in terms of efficiency in the management of commercial activities. |
gao_GAO-03-189 | gao_GAO-03-189_0 | The potential medical value of marijuana has been a continuing debate. Implementation in Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, and California
Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, and California laws allow medical use of marijuana under certain conditions. All four states require a patient to have a physician’s recommendation to be eligible for medical marijuana. States and Some Local California Jurisdictions Maintain Medical Marijuana Registries
To document their eligibility to engage in medical marijuana use, applicants in Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii must register with state agencies charged with implementing provisions of the medical marijuana laws in those states (hereinafter referred to as registry states). Allowable Amounts of Marijuana for Medical Use
Statutes in Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii define the maximum amount of marijuana and the number of plants that an individual registrant and their caregiver may possess under medical marijuana laws, while California’s statute does not provide such definitions. In the absence of state specified amounts, a number of the state’s 58 counties and some cities have informally established maximum allowable amounts of marijuana for medical purposes. Small Number of Medical Marijuana Registrants
Relatively few people are registered as medical marijuana users in Alaska, Hawaii and Oregon. In these states, registry data showed that the number of participants registered was below 0.05 percent or less of the total population of each respective state. Hawaii and Oregon were the only states that provided gender information; in both cases approximately 70 percent of registrants were men. In Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon state records showed that over 70 percent of all registrants in each state were 40 years of age or older. Low Physician Participation
Only a small percentage of physicians in Hawaii and Oregon were identified by state registries as having made recommendations for their patients to use marijuana as medicine. In Oregon, the physician recommending marijuana to over 800 patients was disciplined. Difficult to Measure the Impact of State Medical Marijuana Laws on Law Enforcement Activities
Data are not readily available to show whether the introduction of medical marijuana laws have affected marijuana-related law enforcement activities. On page 1 of our report, we specifically state that federal law does not recognize any accepted medical use for marijuana and individuals remain subject to federal prosecution for marijuana possession regardless of state medical marijuana laws. Specifically, for selected states, our objectives were to provide information on (1) their approach to implementing their medical marijuana laws and how they compare, and the results of any state audits or reviews, (2) the number of patients that have had doctors recommend marijuana for medical use in each state, for what medical conditions, and by age and gender characteristics, (3) how many doctors are known to have recommended marijuana in each, and what guidance is available for making these recommendations, and (4) perceptions of federal and state law enforcement officials, and whether data are available to show how law enforcement activities have been affected by the exceptions provided by these states’ medical marijuana laws. | What GAO Found
A number of states have adopted laws that allow medical use of marijuana. Federal law, however, does not recognize any accepted medical use for marijuana and individuals remain subject to federal prosecution for marijuana possession. Debate continues over medical effectiveness of marijuana, and over government policies surrounding medical use. State laws in Oregon, Alaska, Hawaii, and California allow medical use of marijuana under specified conditions. All four states require a patient to have a physician's recommendation to be eligible for medical marijuana use. Alaska, Hawaii, and Oregon have established state-run registries for patients and caregivers to document their eligibility to engage in medical marijuana use; these states require physician documentation of a person's debilitating condition to register. Laws in these states also establish maximum allowable of marijuana for medical purposes. California's law does not establish a state-run registry or establish maximum allowable amounts of marijuana. Relatively few people had registered to use marijuana for medical purposes in Oregon, Hawaii, and Alaska. As of Spring 2002, 2,450 people, or about 0.05 percent of the total population of the three states combined, had registered as medical marijuana users. Statewide figures for California are unknown. In Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii, over 70 percent of registrants were over 40 years of age, and in Hawaii and Oregon, the two states where gender information is collected, 70 percent of registrants were men. Statewide figures on gender and medical conditions were not available for Alaska or California. Hawaii and Oregon were the only two states that had data on the number of physicians recommending marijuana. As of February 2002, less than 1 percent of the approximately 5,700 physicians in Hawaii and 3 percent of Oregon's physicians out of 12,900 had recommended marijuana to their patients. Oregon was also the only state that maintained data on the number of times individual physicians recommended marijuana--as of February 2002, 62 percent of the Oregon physicians recommending marijuana made one recommendation. Data were not readily available to measure how marijuana-related law enforcement has been affected by the introduction of medical marijuana laws. Officials from over half of the 37 selected federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations GAO interviewed in the four states said that the introduction of medical marijuana laws had not greatly affected their law enforcement activities. |
gao_AIMD-96-57 | gao_AIMD-96-57_0 | First, Customs is redesigning the import process to better meet customer needs and improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. Second, Customs is developing its new automated import processing system (ACE) applications to support the new import process and comply with NCAP-mandated functions. Customs plans to begin deploying ACE in October 1998. Customs Is Not Effectively Applying Critical Management Practices
In implementing its NCAP strategy, Customs has not adhered to strategic information management best practices that help organizations (1) mitigate the risks associated with modernizing automated systems and (2) better position themselves to achieve success. Specifically, Customs did not (1) conduct the requisite analyses (e.g., cost-benefit, feasibility, alternatives) before committing to the CDC-2000 project, (2) redesign its import and other business processes before the agency selected the hardware for ACE and other systems, (3) manage ACE as an investment, and (4) designate strict accountability for ensuring that it successfully incorporates all NCAP-mandated functions into the agency’s modernization effort. This configuration is commonly referred to as an architecture and serves as a guide for modernizing automated systems. In response to these findings, Customs hired contractors to help perform these analyses, but it continues to develop ACE on CDC-2000 hardware and plans to continue making CDC-2000 purchases. We found, however, that clear accountability for meeting NCAP requirements is lacking. However, Customs has not assigned responsibility for ensuring that NCAP is successfully implemented. Customs is in the early stages of its modernization and has time to implement these best practices. Ensure that the export and passenger business processes are completed and the requirements generated from these two tasks, along with those of the import process requirements, are used to determine how Customs should accomplish its mission in the future, including who will perform operations and where they will be performed, what functions must be performed as part of these operations, what information is needed to perform these functions, and where data should be created and processed to produce such information, what alternative processing approaches could be used to satisfy Customs’ requirements, and what are the costs, benefits, and risks of each approach, and what processing approach is optimal, and not resume CDC-2000 purchases unless CDC-2000 is determined to be the optimal approach. Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of Customs’ strategy for implementing the National Customs Automation Program (NCAP), we reviewed the law—and its legislative history—establishing NCAP. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Customs Service's efforts to modernize its automated systems, focusing on: (1) the status and adequacy of Customs' implementation of the National Customs Automation Program (NCAP); and (2) whether Customs is using a best-practices approach to improve mission performance through strategic information management and technology in implementing NCAP.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Customs is redesigning its import process and plans to develop a new automated import system while it enhances its present system to meet NCAP mandates in the interim; (2) the new import process will serve customer needs better and improve operational efficiency and effectiveness; (3) Customs plans to deploy its new import system in October 1998; (4) Customs' modernization efforts are vulnerable to failure because it has not effectively applied best practices to the implementation of its NCAP strategy; (5) Customs selected new systems before it redesigned its key business processes and is not applying specific criteria in assessing projects, alternatives, costs and benefits, and systems architecture; (6) Customs has not managed its new automated system acquisition as an investment nor planned how to incorporate NCAP requirements into it; (7) two contractors' studies have highlighted the weaknesses in Customs' modernization plans and recommended ways to improve its efforts; (8) Customs plans to hire additional contractors to perform the needed modernization analyses, but it also intends to continue with system development and equipment purchases before these analyses are completed; and (9) Customs has not established clear accountability for ensuring that NCAP requirements are successfully implemented. |
gao_GAO-08-485 | gao_GAO-08-485_0 | While there may be proper justification for their post- government employment with a contractor, on the basis of this sample we estimate that at least 422 individuals could have been working on defense contracts directly related to their former DOD agency and we estimate at least nine could have been working on the same defense contracts for which they had program oversight responsibilities or decision-making authorities while at DOD. Appendix III presents more detail on the employment of former DOD senior and acquisition officials in 2006 for each of the 52 contractors. In addition, most of the former DOD officials employed by the contractors in 2006 had previously served in positions at the Air Force and Navy, followed by those who had previously served in Army positions. Estimates Are That Many Former DOD Officials Could Have Worked on Contracts Related to Their Prior DOD Agencies and a Few Could Have Worked on Contracts Related to Their Prior Direct Responsibilities
To provide information about former DOD officials work assignments with contractors, we analyzed job histories and work assignments for a stratified random sample of former DOD officials to determine if these individuals worked on defense contracts or programs for which they had direct responsibility at DOD or which were the responsibility of their former DOD agency, office, or command. Contractors Report Using a Range of Practices to Ensure Compliance with Post-Government Employment Restrictions, but Face Challenges in Providing Information for Monitoring Such Employment
Most of the 47 major defense contractors who responded to our survey on practices related to post-government employment report using a range of techniques to ensure awareness of and employee compliance with restrictions, although we found contractors were challenged to provide accurate information identifying their former DOD officials. Specifically, our analysis of the status of major defense contractors’ employment of former DOD officials in 2006, which was based on matching contractor-supplied information with DOD personnel data, found that the contractors employed a total of 1,263 former DOD senior and acquisition officials, while our match of IRS information and DOD personnel data showed the contractors employed a total of 2,435 former DOD officials, or almost twice as many. As noted earlier in this report, contractors are not required to keep copies of these letters. Nonetheless, for DOD’s purposes, ethics advisory opinions may now be more readily available and centrally located because of the 2008 defense authorization act provision that requires former officials to obtain written ethics opinions on applicable post-government employment restrictions from their DOD ethics officials before accepting compensation from defense contractors for a period of 2 years after leaving DOD service. In response, our report objectives were to (1) develop information on how many former DOD military and civilian personnel recently worked for major defense contractors and develop an estimate of how many of these were former DOD senior or acquisition officials who worked on defense contracts for these employers that were related to their former positions at DOD and (2) identify the practices used to monitor compliance with post-government employment restrictions and the information challenges that contractors and DOD face in monitoring the movement of former DOD employees to defense contractors. Recognizing that the contractors responding to our survey were self- reporting on a sensitive issue, the information sought from contractors was not designed or expected to identify specific violations of post- government employment restrictions. We analyzed responses from the 47 contractors who responded to the survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) officials who serve in senior and acquisition positions and then leave for jobs with defense contractors are subject to the restrictions of post-government employment laws, in order to protect against conflicts of interest. Congress required GAO to report on employment of such officials by contractors who received more than $500 million in DOD's 2005 contract awards. In response, this report (1) provides information on how many former DOD employees worked for contractors in 2006 and estimates how many worked on contracts that were related to their former agencies or to their direct responsibilities and (2) identifies the practices used to monitor restrictions and information challenges in monitoring post-DOD employment. To do this work, GAO matched data from DOD for all employees who left DOD over a 6 year period with data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and from 52 contractors; conducted surveys; and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
In 2006, 52 contractors employed 2,435 former DOD senior and acquisition officials who had previously served as generals, admirals, senior executives, program managers, contracting officers, or in other acquisition positions which made them subject to restrictions on their post-DOD employment. Most of the 2,435 former DOD officials were employed by seven contractors. On the basis of a stratified random sample of contractor-supplied information, GAO estimates that at least 422 former DOD officials could have worked on defense contracts related to their former agencies and that at least nine could have worked on the same contracts for which they had oversight responsibilities or decision-making authorities while at DOD. The information GAO obtained from contractors was not designed to identify violations of the restrictions. While contractors could have employed quite a few former DOD officials on assignments related to their prior DOD positions, there could be appropriate justification for each of these situations. Most of the contractors who responded to our survey reported using a range of practices to ensure awareness and compliance with post-government employment restrictions, although GAO's request proved challenging for contractors to provide accurate information identifying their former DOD officials. According to the surveyed contractors, they can identify former DOD officials with post-government employment restrictions and track their assignments during their cooling-off periods. However, GAO's analysis found a significant under-reporting of the contractors' employment of former DOD officials. Specifically, contractor-supplied data showed they employed 1,263 former DOD officials in 2006, while IRS data showed the contractors employed 2,435. New post-government employment requirements enacted in January 2008 are likely to make written ethics opinions for former DOD officials more readily available to contractors. DOD also must now keep ethics opinions in a central database. This information was not designed to provide a mechanism for DOD to effectively monitor former DOD officials' post-government employment compliance after they begin working for contractors on specific contracts. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-83 | gao_T-HEHS-98-83_0 | A computer-based education technology program has many components, as figure 1 shows, which range from the computer hardware and software to the maintenance and technical support needed to keep the system running. Our work focused on funding for school technology. Districts Used a Variety of Funding Sources
Each of the districts we visited used a combination of funding sources to support technology in its schools (see table 1). Finally, districts obtained private grants and solicited contributions from businesses. Such funding constituted about 3 percent or less of their technology funding. Four Types of Funding Barriers Most Common
Officials in the districts we visited identified a variety of barriers to obtaining technology funding. Four types of barriers were common to most districts and considered by some to be especially significant. Competing Needs
Officials in all of the districts we visited reported that district-level funding was difficult to obtain for technology because it was just one of many important needs that competed for limited district resources. Community Tax Resistance
Officials from all districts said that resistance to higher taxes affected their ability to increase district operating revenue to help meet their technology goals. Lack of Fund-Raising Staff
Many officials reported that they did not have the time to search for technology funding in addition to performing their other job responsibilities. Roswell, for example, set up a model technology school and used it to demonstrate the use of technology in school classrooms. Staff-Related Components Difficult to Fund
Nearly all districts reported maintenance, technical support, and training— components often dependent on staff—as more difficult to fund than other components. Officials in Roswell and Seattle noted that special levy and bond monies, their main sources of technology funds, could not be used to support staff because the funds were restricted to capital expenditures. Districts Plan to Use Same Funding Sources for Ongoing Costs
and (2) periodic costs of upgrading and replacing hardware, software, and infrastructure to sustain programs. They also suggested ways to accomplish this. To develop support for technology, leaders in these five school districts used a broad informational approach to educate the community, and they formed local partnerships with business. Lack of staff for seeking and applying for funding and the difficulty of funding technology support staff were major concerns of officials in all the districts we studied. The technology program in each of the five districts we visited had not yet secured a clearly defined and relatively stable funding source, such as a line item in the operating budget or a part of the state’s education funding formula. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed how school districts obtain funds for the acquisition of education technology, focusing on: (1) sources of funding school districts have used to develop and fund their technology programs; (2) barriers districts have faced in funding the technology goals they set, and how they attempted to deal with these barriers; (3) components of districts' technology programs that have been the most difficult to fund, and what the consequences have been; and (4) districts' plans to deal with the ongoing costs of the technology they have acquired.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the five districts it studied used a variety of ways to fund their technology programs; (2) four types of barriers seemed to be common to several districts: (a) technology was just one of a number of competing needs and priorities, such as upkeep of school buildings; (b) local community resistance to higher taxes limited districts' ability to raise more revenue; (c) officials said they did not have enough staff for fund-raising efforts and therefore had difficulty obtaining grants and funding from other sources such as business; and (d) some funding sources had restrictive conditions or requirements that made funding difficult to obtain; (3) to overcome these barriers, officials reported that their districts used a variety of methods to educate and inform the school board and the community about the value of technology; (4) these ranged from presentations to parent groups to the establishment of a model program at one school to showcase the value of technology; (5) the parts of the technology program that were hardest to fund, according to those GAO interviewed, were components such as maintenance, training, and technical support, which depend heavily on staff positions; (6) for example, in two locations special levy and bond funding could be used only for capital expenditures--not for staff; (7) in several districts GAO visited, officials said that staffing shortfalls in maintenance and technical support had resulted in large workloads for existing staff and in maintenance backlogs; (8) most said this resulted in reduced computer use because computers were out of service; and (9) as these districts looked to the future to support the ongoing and periodic costs of their technology programs, they typically planned to continue using a variety of funding sources despite uncertainties associated with many of these sources. |
gao_NSIAD-95-6 | gao_NSIAD-95-6_0 | These manuals are generally comprehensive and sound and, if followed, should result in effective programs. The Peace Corps’ staff training was also inadequate. Problems in Providing Volunteers With Support and Well-Developed Assignments
The Peace Corps did not provide adequate assignment programming and other support for volunteers in the countries we visited. These problems eventually led many volunteers to change their assignments or leave the Peace Corps early. They said they are taking precautionary measures to ensure better planning and preparation for future programs and actions to address problems in existing programs. Peace Corps’ Expansion Into the Former Eastern Bloc Was Not at the Expense of Other Regions
The Peace Corps’ entry into the former Eastern bloc did not appear to adversely affect staffing and financial resources for programs in the African, Asian and Pacific, and Inter-American regions. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this project, the Peace Corps stated that its programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union have been a difficult challenge. To determine whether the Peace Corps’ expansion into the former Eastern bloc came at the expense of other regions’ programs, we examined budget and staffing data and spoke with senior Peace Corps officials responsible for managing those programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Peace Corps' processes and procedures for starting programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union, focusing on: (1) the adequacy of the Peace Corps' planning and staffing procedures; (2) whether the Peace Corps provided volunteers with adequate assignments, training, and other support; and (3) whether the expansion into former Eastern bloc countries came at the expense of other regional programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the Peace Corps has comprehensive, sound written procedures for planning and implementing new programs and preparing volunteers, the Peace Corps did not follow normal procedures in its haste to start programs in former Eastern bloc countries; (2) serious difficulties due to poor design and inadequate volunteer guidance, training, and support limited the new programs' effectiveness in these countries and led to high volunteer turnover; (3) despite these problems, many volunteers believed that they had a positive impact on the people they served; (4) it is too soon to tell if the Peace Corps' actions to correct problems in the Eastern bloc programs will be effective; and (5) other regions' funding and staffing have not been affected by the new programs. |
gao_GAO-02-86 | gao_GAO-02-86_0 | 1.) 2.) 3.) Cannibalizations also take expensive aircraft out of service, sometimes for long periods of time, and can create additional mechanical problems. Services Cannibalize for Many Reasons
The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong incentives for continuing to do so. Readiness and Operational Demands
Readiness and operational demands put heavy pressure on the supply system to provide parts immediately and to wherever they may be needed. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to develop strategies to reduce the number of maintenance hours spent on cannibalization, ensure that cannibalized aircraft do not remain grounded for long periods of time, and reduce the adverse effects of cannibalizations on maintenance costs and personnel. | What GAO Found
All military services routinely use cannibalization to maintain aircraft. The adverse effects of cannibalizations include (1) higher maintenance costs due to increased mechanics' workloads, (2) morale and personnel retention problems, and (3) taking expensive aircraft out of service for long periods of time. The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong incentives for continuing to do so. In the broadest sense, cannibalizations are done because of pressures to meet readiness and operational needs and because of shortcomings in the supply system. Although the services have undertaken steps to address logistics shortfalls, few specific strategies have been developed to reduce cannibalizations and the associated maintenance hours. |
gao_GAO-07-617T | gao_GAO-07-617T_0 | The Size and Scope of FAA and ACI Airport Capital Estimates Differ
ACI’s estimate of planned capital development costs is considerably larger than FAA’s because it reported a broader base of projects. According to FAA’s estimate, which includes only projects that are eligible for AIP grants, the total cost of airport development will be about $41 billion, or about $8.2 billion per year for 2007 through 2011. The biggest difference stems from ACI’s inclusion of projects that are not eligible for AIP grants, while FAA’s estimate includes only AIP-eligible projects (see table 2). This points to differences in how the two estimates are formed. Further, the ACI estimate includes projects that FAA does not believe will be commissioned during the next 5 years. Airports Have Averaged About $13 Billion Annually in Capital Financing over the Last 5 Years and Use a Variety of Funding Sources
From 2001 to 2005, the 3,364 active airports that make up the national airport system received an average of about $13 billion per year for planned capital development from a variety of funding sources. Total Planned Development Exceeds Past Funding Levels by About $1 Billion Annually
Based on past funding levels, airports’ funding is about $1 billion per year less than estimated planned capital development costs. The $14 billion is the sum of FAA’s estimated AIP- eligible costs of $8.2 billion annually and ACI’s estimated ineligible costs of $5.8 billion annually. Larger Airports–-Planned Development Costs Exceed Past Funding by About $600 Million Annually
The difference between current funding and planned development costs for larger airports is about $600 million if both AIP-eligible and ineligible projects are considered. From 2001 through 2005, larger airports collected an average of about $9.4 billion a year for capital development, as compared to over $10 billion in annual planned development costs. Passenger traffic has rebounded to 2000 levels and bond ratings have improved. Administration’s FAA Reauthorization Proposal Would Increase Funding for Larger Airports, while the Effect on Smaller Airports is Uncertain
The administration’s reauthorization proposal for AIP would increase funding for larger airports, but its effect on smaller airports is uncertain because of the overall reduction in AIP and the proposed changes in how AIP grants are allocated between larger and smaller airports. As a separate issue, the administration’s reauthorization proposal would change the way that AIP and other FAA programs are funded and may not provide enough monies for these programs, even at the reduced levels proposed by the administration. Unlike previous reauthorization proposals, which made relatively modest changes in the structure of the AIP program, this proposal contains some fundamental changes in the funding and structure of the AIP program. FAA officials confirmed for us that in estimating fuel tax revenues they did not take into account possible reductions in fuel purchases due to the increase in the tax rates. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine how much planned development would cost over the next 5 years, we obtained planned development data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Airports Council International-North America (ACI). | Why GAO Did This Study
To address the strain on the aviation system, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed transitioning to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). To finance this system and to make its costs to users more equitable, the administration has proposed fundamental changes in the way that FAA is financed. As part of the reauthorization, the administration proposes major changes in the way that grants through the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) are funded and allocated to the 3,400 airports in the national airport system. In response, GAO was asked for an update on current funding levels for airport development and the sufficiency of those levels to meet planned development costs. This testimony comprises capital development estimates made by FAA and Airports Council International (ACI), the chief industry association; analyzes how much airports have received for capital development and whether this is sufficient to meet future planned development; and summarizes the effects of proposed changes in funding for airport development. This testimony is based on ongoing GAO work. Airport funding and planned development data are drawn from the best available sources and have been assessed for their reliability. This testimony does not contain recommendations.
What GAO Found
ACI's estimate for planned development costs is considerably larger than FAA's, reflecting a broader range of projects included as well as differences in when and how the estimates are made. For 2007 through 2011, FAA estimated annual planned capital development costs at $8.2 billion, while ACI estimated annual costs at $15.6 billion. The estimates differ primarily because FAA's estimate only includes projects that are eligible for AIP grants, while ACI's covers all projects, including $5.8 billion for projects not eligible for federal funding, such as parking garages. From 2001 through 2005, airports received an average of about $13 billion a year for planned capital development. This amount covers all types of projects, including those not eligible for federal grants. The primary source of this funding was bonds, which averaged almost $6.5 billion per year, followed by federal grants and passenger facility charges (PFC), which accounted for $3.6 billion and $2.2 billion, respectively (see figure below). If airports continue to attract this level of funding for planned capital development, this amount would annually fall about $1 billion short of the $14 billion in total planned development costs (the sum of FAA's estimated $8.2 billion in eligible costs and the industry's $5.8 billion in ineligible costs). Larger airports foresee a shortfall of about $600 million annually, while smaller airports foresee a shortfall of $400 million annually. FAA's reauthorization proposal would reduce the size of AIP by $750 million but increase the amount that airports can collect from PFCs. However, the benefit from increased PFCs would accrue mostly to larger airports and may not offset a reduced AIP grants program for smaller airports. The proposal would also change the way that AIP and other FAA programs are funded. The new fuel taxes that FAA has proposed may not provide the revenues for AIP that FAA anticipates. |
gao_GAO-04-904T | gao_GAO-04-904T_0 | The Urban Area Security Initiative funds were designated for regional use, and a plan has been developed for using the funds to benefit the region as a whole. These funds have been targeted for equipment ($26.5 million), planning ($12.4 million), exercises ($4 million), and administrative costs ($1.8 million), among other things. The other grant programs were not specifically designated for regional purposes, and spending for these funds was determined by individual local jurisdictions. Challenges to Using Coordinated, Effective Use of Federal Grants in NCR
In our report, we discuss issues associated with managing federal first responder grants in NCR, assessing gaps in first responder capacities and preparedness in the region, and the role of the Office for National Capital Region Coordination in coordinating and assessing efforts to enhance first responder capacity across NCR. However, as already noted, it is not clear how the Urban Area Security Initiative spending plan links to the actual and planned uses for the other funding sources that comprised about $279.5 million of the $340 million in federal homeland security grants to the NCR during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, there is no consistent method for identifying these gaps among jurisdictions within NCR. DHS and ONCRC Appear to Have Had Limited Role in Promoting Regional Coordination in NCR
We recognize that NCR is a complex multijurisdictional area comprising the District of Columbia and surrounding county and city jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia. To help ensure that emergency preparedness grants and associated funds are managed in a way that maximizes their effectiveness, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security take the following three actions to fulfill DHS’s statutory responsibilities in NCR: Work with NCR jurisdictions to develop a coordinated strategic plan to establish goals and priorities for enhancing first responder capacities that can be used to guide the use of federal emergency preparedness funds. Identify and address gaps in emergency preparedness and evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures in meeting those needs by adapting standards and preparedness guidelines based on likely scenarios for NCR and conducting assessments based on them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the National Capital Region (NCR), comprising jurisdictions including the District of Columbia and surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia, has been recognized as a significant potential target for terrorism. GAO was asked to report on (1) what federal funds have been allocated to NCR jurisdictions for emergency preparedness; (2) what challenges exist within NCR to organizing and implementing efficient and effective regional preparedness programs; (3) what gaps, if any, remain in the emergency preparedness of NCR; and (4) what has been the role of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in NCR to date.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, grant programs administered by the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Justice awarded about $340 million to eight NCR jurisdictions to enhance emergency preparedness. Of this total, the Office for National Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC) targeted all of the $60.5 million Urban Area Security Initiative funds for projects designed to benefit NCR as a whole. However, there was no coordinated regionwide plan for spending the remaining funds (about $279.5 million). Local jurisdictions determined the spending priorities for these funds and reported using them for emergency communications and personal protective equipment and other purchases. NCR faces several challenges in organizing and implementing efficient and effective regional preparedness programs, including the lack of a coordinated strategic plan for enhancing NCR preparedness, performance standards, and a reliable, central source of data on funds available and the purposes for which they were spent. Without these basic elements, it is difficult to assess first responder capacities, identify first responder funding priorities for NCR, and evaluate the effectiveness of the use of federal funds in enhancing first responder capacities and preparedness in a way that maximizes their effectiveness in improving homeland security. |
gao_GAO-05-853T | gao_GAO-05-853T_0 | Investigators found numerous examples of aliens and U.S. citizens obtaining U.S. passports using a false identity or the documentation of others to hide their true identity. Applicants commit passport fraud through other means, including submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; child substitution; and counterfeit citizenship documents. Assuming the identity of a deceased person is another means of fraudulently applying for a passport. Passports Used to Commit Other Crimes
According to State Bureau of Diplomatic Security documents, passport fraud is often commited in connection with other crimes, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and alien smuggling. According to Diplomatic Security officials, concerns exist within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that passport fraud could also be used to help facilitate acts of terrorism. State Faces Challenges to Fraud Detection Efforts
One of the key challenges to State’s fraud detection efforts is limited interagency information sharing. CLASS Does Not Include Names of All Wanted Federal and State Fugitives
Because the FBI and other law enforcement agencies do not currently provide State with the names of all individuals wanted by federal law enforcement authorities, State’s CLASS name-check system does not contain the names of many federal fugitives, some wanted for murder and other violent crimes; these fugitives could therefore obtain passports and potentially flee the country. State officials became aware of this situation when the union representing passport examiners brought to their attention that a number of individuals on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list were not in CLASS. Limited Intra-agency Information Sharing May Be Affecting Fraud Detection
State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud prevention library, which would enable passport-issuing office personnel to efficiently share fraud prevention information and tools. Interoffice Transfers of Passport Adjudication Workload Result, in Some Cases, in Fewer Fraud Referrals Back to Originating Office
State routinely transfers adjudication cases among the different offices to balance workloads, and Fraud Prevention Managers at a number of issuing offices said they had noticed a lower percentage of fraud referrals returned to them from the 3 offices that were assigned a bulk of the workload transfers. In commenting on a draft of our report, State said that it is adapting and expanding computer- based training for U.S. Effect of New Examiner Performance Standards on Fraud Detection Remains Unclear
Although State’s approach to developing new nationwide passport examiner production standards, implemented in January 2004, raises methodological concerns, subsequent changes to the standards make an assessment of their impact on fraud detection premature. State developed new nationwide passport examiner production standards in an effort to make performance expectations and work processes more uniform among its 16 issuing offices. Responding to concerns about their fairness due to changes that may have slowed the examination process, as well concerns that the new standards led examiners to take “shortcuts” in the examination process to meet their number targets, State made a number of modifications to the production standards during the year. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State Department's efforts to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. State issued about 8.8 million passports in 2004. During the same year, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud, and about 300 persons were convicted. Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate other crimes, including illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. GAO examined (1) how passport fraud is committed, (2) what key fraud detection challenges State faces, and (3) what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have on fraud detection.
What GAO Found
Using the stolen identities of U.S. citizens is the primary method of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. False claims of lost, stolen, or damaged passports and child substitution are among the other tactics used. Fraudulently obtained passports can help criminals conceal their activities and travel with less scrutiny. Concerns exist that they could also be used to help facilitate terrorism. State faces a number of challenges to its passport fraud detection efforts, and these challenges make it more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and others. Information on U.S. citizens listed in the federal government's consolidated terrorist watch list is not systematically provided to State. Moreover, State does not routinely obtain from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the names of other individuals wanted by federal and state law enforcement authorities. We tested the names of 67 federal and state fugitives and found that 37, over half, were not in State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database for passports. One of those not included was on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list. State does not maintain a centralized and up-to-date fraud prevention library, hindering information sharing within State. Fraud prevention staffing reductions and interoffice workload transfers resulted in fewer fraud referrals at some offices, and insufficient training, oversight, and investigative resources also hinder fraud detection efforts. Any effect that new passport examiner performance standards may have on State's fraud detection efforts is unclear because State continues to adjust the standards. State began implementing the new standards in January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern that new numerical production quotas may require examiners to "shortcut" fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns, State eased the production standards during 2004 and made a number of other modifications and compromises. |
gao_GAO-09-253 | gao_GAO-09-253_0 | . . and libraries. Funding requests for telecommunications services do not require certification of CIPA compliance. Requests for E-rate Funding Consistently Exceed the Cap, and Increased Commitments for Priority 1 Services, Combined with Significant Undisbursed Funds, Limit Funding for Priority 2 Services
Each year from 1998 through 2007, the amount of funding applicants requested exceeded the amount available, but the amounts requested have generally declined since 2002, with most of the decline driven by fewer requests for Priority 2 services—the wiring and components needed for data transmission. Funding that is not disbursed in the year for which it was committed is carried over to the next funding year and made available for new commitments, but undisbursed funding is still problematic because it prevents some applicants from receiving funding in a given year. Underuse of committed funding is widespread among participants, but the proportion of participants using a higher percentage of the funds committed to them is rising. The E-rate Application Process Poses Difficulties for Some Entities, Which FCC and USAC Are Taking Steps to Address
The overall participation rate among E-rate-eligible entities is about 63 percent, with public schools participating at a substantially higher rate than private schools and libraries, based on 2005 data. We found that a key circumstance influencing nonparticipation was the burdensome nature of program participation. Moreover, we found that a substantial amount of funding is denied because applicants do not correctly carry out application procedures. Internet filtering requirements. FCC and USAC Have Taken Steps to Ease the Process for E-rate Applicants and Continue to Consider Program Improvements
In recent years, FCC and USAC have made changes intended to ease the process of participation for eligible schools and libraries, including the following: In response to FCC’s finding that a significant number of applications for E-rate funding were being denied for administrative, clerical, or procedural errors, FCC adopted the Bishop Perry order in May 2006, which stated that USAC must provide all E-rate applicants with an opportunity to cure clerical errors and errors related to FCC rules and orders in their applications. FCC Lacks Performance Goals for E-rate Program, and Recently Adopted Performance Measures Are Inadequate
FCC Has Made Efforts to ce Develop Performan s for Goals and Measure the E-rate Program, but Has Not Been Su essful cc
Since our first recom mendation in 1998 that,cordance with the Government Perform in ac (GPRA), FCC esta ance and Results Act of 1993 performance goals and measures for the E-rate program, FCC has taken steps in this direction but still has not successfully met this fundamental requirement of resu on lts-o our past findings related omme measures, our rec riented managemen t. Tabl to the E-rate program’s p o ndations, and FCC’s resp e 2 provides details erformance goals and nses. Without a strategic vision for the program, and accompanying performance goals and measures, it is difficult for FCC to make informed decisions about the future of the program and more effectively target available funding. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better provide a foundation for effective management of the E-rate program and to ensure that program funds are used efficiently and in a manner to support desired program outcomes, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission take the following two actions: Review the purpose and structure of the E-rate program and prepare a report to the appropriate congressional committees identifying FCC’s strategic vision for the program; this report should include the program’s long-term goals, whether the vision can be achieved using the existing program structure (e.g., the priority rules and discount matrix), and whether legislative or regulatory changes are necessary. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to address the following questions: (1) What are key trends in the demand for and use of E-rate funding and what are the implications of these trends? (3) What are FCC’s performance goals and measures for the E-rate program, and how do they compare to key characteristics of successful goals and measures? Private School Universe Survey (PSS). Document Review and Interviews with FCC and USAC on Performance Goals and Measures
We reviewed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to determine what the performance goals and measures for the E-rate program are and how the measures compare to key characteristics of successful performance measures. Schools and Libraries Program: Update on E-rate Funding. Telecommunications and Information Technology: Federal Programs That Can Be Used to Fund Technology for Schools and Libraries. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism--also known as the E-rate program--is a significant source of federal funding for information technology for schools and libraries, providing about $2 billion a year. As requested, GAO assessed issues related to the E-rate program's long-term goals, including (1) key trends in the demand for and use of E-rate funding and the implications of these trends; (2) the rate of program participation, participants' views on requirements, and FCC's actions to facilitate participation; and (3) FCC's performance goals and measures for the program and how they compare to key characteristics of successful goals and measures. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data going back to the first year of the program, surveyed a sample of participating schools and libraries, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials and program stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Requests for E-rate funding consistently exceed the annual funding cap, and increased commitments for telecommunications and Internet services, combined with significant undisbursed funds, limit funding for wiring and components needed for data transmission. Although still exceeding available funds, total amounts requested have generally declined since 2002, largely due to declining requests for wiring and components. Funding commitments in recent years reflect this trend, with the amount of funding for wiring and components outweighed by funding for telecommunications services and Internet access. In addition, a significant amount of committed funds are not disbursed to program participants; for commitments made in 1998 through 2006, about one-quarter of the funds have not been disbursed. Unused funds are reallocated for use in future years but are still problematic because they preclude other applicants from being funded. Participation rates and participants' views on program requirements indicate difficulties in the E-rate application process, which FCC and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC)--the program's administrator--are taking steps to address. The participation rate among the more than 150,000 eligible schools and libraries is about 63 percent, but participation rates among groups vary, from 83 percent among public schools to 13 percent among private schools. According to nonparticipants, a key circumstance influencing nonparticipation is the complexity of program requirements, even though participants reported that participation is becoming easier. Still, E-rate program data show that some funding is denied because applicants do not correctly carry out application procedures. In recent years, FCC and USAC have made changes intended to ease the process of participation for schools and libraries, such as giving applicants an opportunity to correct clerical errors in their applications. FCC officials said they will consider further changes to facilitate participation, but their primary interest is in protecting funds from improper use. FCC does not have performance goals for the E-rate program, and its performance measures are inadequate. In 1998, GAO first recommended that FCC develop specific performance goals and measures for the E-rate program in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. FCC set forth specific goals and measures for some of the intervening years, but it does not currently have performance goals in place. Further, the performance measures it adopted in 2007 lack key characteristics of successful performance measures, such as being tied to program goals. Performance goals and measures are particularly important for the E-rate program, as they could help FCC make well-informed decisions about how to address trends in request for and use of funds. Without them, FCC is limited in its ability to efficiently identify and address problems with the E-rate program and better target funding to highest-priority uses. FCC's piecemeal approach to performance goals and measures indicates a lack of a strategic vision for the program. |
gao_GAO-11-124 | gao_GAO-11-124_0 | 1). 3). Uncertain Security Conditions May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration
Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. 4). In February 2009, IOM reported that 43 percent of the post-2006 Samarra bombing IDPs surveyed did not have access to their homes, primarily because the property was occupied or destroyed (see fig. 6). IOM further reported that the returnee families it assessed listed fuel as one of the highest priority needs. International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face; However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government Commitment and Capacity
Although international and nongovernmental organizations and U.S. and Iraqi governments have taken action to address the impediments that Iraqi IDPs and refugees face to return and reintegration, the extent to which these efforts will result in reintegration (i.e., sustainable returns) is unknown. Moreover, the Iraqi government has made limited progress due to the lack of uniform government support and capacity, according to international community officials. International and Nongovernmental Organizations Have Initiated Projects Addressing Conditions That Impede Returns and Reintegration, but the Effect on Reintegration Is Not Consistently Measured
International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address impediments to returns and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Iraq, the United States, and the UN Lack Integrated Plans for Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis
Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community lack an integrated plan for reintegrating displaced Iraqis because Iraqi MODM planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support; the UN’s strategy and plans have primarily focused on assistance to the most vulnerable Iraqis and have not specifically focused on reintegration; and the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly available. Also, an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy has not been developed and made public. In addition, the UN has not integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-Agency Information Analysis Unit, which was established to provide a central point for collecting and assessing needs-based data, according to a senior IAU official. Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Stakeholder Coordination and Efficiency
Without an integrated strategy, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms for effective and efficient implementation. One area with significant potential for overlap is the establishment of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to register or assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the ability of the Iraqi and U.S. governments, international organizations, and NGOs to effectively plan and integrate their efforts to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work with the appropriate international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in developing an international strategy that addresses impediments to return and prepares for and facilitates the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. To ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, other donors, international organizations, and implementing partners have the best data available regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis, in the most efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of State encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the IAU and take advantage of IAU expertise and coordinated efforts. State and USAID also agreed with our recommendation regarding the need to work with UNHCR and other implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units to determine and achieve an optimal framework. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine efforts to reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we reviewed (1) the conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to their reintegration; (2) the actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the international community have taken to address these conditions and reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other members of the international community have an effective strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis. | Why GAO Did This Study
The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined (1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to which the international community has an effective reintegration strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad.
What GAO Found
Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration. Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to essential services--that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity, health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve as a deterrent to returns and reintegration. The international community has taken action to address the impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity, according to international and U.S. officials. Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community do not have an integrated international strategy for the reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and international officials; the United Nation's (UN) strategy and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees. Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and other vulnerable Iraqis.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in developing an effective integrated international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3) State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-619T | gao_GAO-15-619T_0 | Also, as federal agencies have taken on additional roles and responsibilities, their missions have become increasingly complex, and their employees need to possess a range of expertise and skills that may not be adequately captured by the GS system. However, as OPM implemented the system, the attributes of transparency, internal equity, simplicity, flexibility, and adaptability were reduced. This occurred, in part, because some attributes are at odds with one another. So, fully achieving one attribute comes at the expense of another. The Working Group has identified skills gaps in six government-wide, mission- critical occupations: cybersecurity specialist, auditor, human resources specialist, contract specialist, economist, and the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) professions. Although this effort was an important step forward, our 2015 work identified skills gaps in nearly two dozen occupations with significant programmatic impact. With a continual focus on implementing the recommendations we have made in these areas, we believe that OPM, the CHCO Council, and agencies should begin to make progress on addressing current and emerging skills gaps. As a result, a key resource for helping agencies improve the capacity of their personnel offices is likely being underutilized. Our past work has shown that a long-standing challenge for federal agencies has been developing credible and effective performance management systems that can serve as a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve results. OPM agreed to consult with stakeholders to determine whether longer probationary periods are needed for certain complex positions. We maintain that additional action should be considered to ensure equity in ratings and performance awards across departments. Preliminary observations from our ongoing work have found that government-wide levels of employee engagement have recently declined 4 percentage points, from an estimated 67 percent in 2011, to an estimated 63 percent in 2014, as measured by the OPM FEVS, and a score derived by OPM from FEVS— the Employee Engagement Index (EEI). However, our ongoing work also indicates that the recent government- wide average decline in EEI masks the fact that the majority of federal agencies either sustained or increased employee engagement levels during the same period. Our preliminary work indicates that 13 of 47 agencies saw a statistically significant decline in their EEIs from 2013 to 2014. Through a variety of initiatives, Congress, OPM, and individual agencies have strengthened the government’s human capital efforts since we first identified strategic human capital management as a high-risk area in 2001. Still, while many actions towards progress have been taken over the last 13 years, the job is far from over. At the end of the day, strategic human capital management is about mission accomplishment, accountability, and responsive, cost-effective government. Appendix I: Content and Status of Prior Human Capital GAO Recommendations
Product ISSUE AREA: IMPROVING MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM GAO-14-677
Human Capital: OPM Needs to Improve the Design, Management, and Oversight of the Federal Classification System (July 2014) To improve the classification system and to strengthen OPM’s management and oversight, the Director of OPM, working through the Chief Human Capital Officer Council, and in conjunction with key stakeholders such as the Office of Management and Budget, unions, and others, should use prior studies and lessons learned from demonstration projects and alternative systems to examine ways to make the GS system’s design and implementation more consistent with the attributes of a modern, effective classification system. Product ISSUE AREA: CLOSING MISSION CRITICAL SKILLS GAPS GAO-15-223
Federal Workforce: OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission- Critical Skills Gaps (January 2015) To assist the interagency working group, known as the Federal Agency Skills Team (FAST), to better identify government-wide skills gaps having programmatic impacts and measure its progress towards closing them, the Director of OPM-in conjunction with the CHCO Council- should strengthen its approach and methodology by (1) assisting FAST in developing goals for closing skills gaps with targets that are both clear and measurable; (2) working with FAST to design outcome-oriented performance metrics that align with overall targets for closing skills gaps and link to the activities for addressing skills gaps; (3) incorporating greater input from subject matter experts, as planned; and (4) ensuring FAST consistently follows key practices for project planning. A government-wide strategic plan should include input from the many participants in the human capital community—reflecting the different perspectives, missions, and resources of these organizations. Recommendation Results Oriented Management: OPM Needs to Do More to Ensure Meaningful Distinctions Are Made in SES Ratings and Performance Awards (January 2015) As OPM convenes the cross-agency working group, the Director of OPM, as the head of the agency that certifies-with OMB concurrence-SES performance appraisal systems, should consider the need for refinements to the performance certification guidelines addressing distinctions in performance and pay differentiation. Federal Workforce: Improved Supervision and Better Use of Probationary Periods Are Needed to Address Substandard Employee Performance (February 2015) To help strengthen the ability of agencies to deal with poor performers and to help ensure supervisors obtain the skills needed to effectively conduct performance management responsibilities, the Director of OPM, in conjunction with the CHCO Council and, as appropriate, with key stakeholders such as federal employee labor unions, should assess the adequacy of leadership training that agencies provide to supervisors. This report is expected to be issued by OPM in late 2014/early 2015. In October 2014, OPM partially agreed with our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Strategic human capital management plays a critical role in maximizing the government's performance and assuring its accountability to Congress and to the nation as a whole.
GAO designated strategic human capital management as a government-wide, high-risk area in 2001. Since then, important progress has been made. However, retirements and the potential loss of leadership and institutional knowledge, coupled with fiscal pressures, underscore the importance of a strategic and efficient approach to acquiring and retaining individuals with needed critical skills. As a result, strategic human capital management remains a high-risk area.
This testimony is based on a large body of GAO work issued from January 2014 through February 2015; and ongoing work related to employee engagement. This testimony, among other things, focuses on key human capital areas where some actions have been taken but attention is still needed by OPM and federal agencies on issues such as: (1) the GS classification system; (2) mission-critical skills gaps; (3) performance management; and (4) employee engagement.
What GAO Found
Serious human capital shortfalls can erode the capacity of federal agencies and threaten their ability to cost-effectively carry out their missions. GAO's prior work has shown that continued attention is needed to ensure agencies have the human resources to drive performance and achieve the results the nation demands. Key areas where the federal government has taken some actions but additional attention is still needed include the following:
General Schedule (GS) Classification System: In 2014, GAO identified eight key attributes of a modern, effective classification system, such as, flexibility, transparency, and simplicity. The GS system's design reflects some of these eight attributes, but when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) implemented the system, the attributes of transparency, internal equity, simplicity, flexibility, and adaptability were reduced. This occurred, in part, because some attributes are at odds with others so fully achieving one comes at the expense of another. GAO recommended and OPM partially concurred with the need to examine ways to make the GS system consistent with the eight attributes of an effective classification system.
Mission-Critical Skills Gaps: The challenges that agencies face were not fully captured by the Chief Human Capital Officers Council Working Group's efforts that identified skills gaps in six government-wide, mission-critical occupations. In 2015, GAO identified skills gaps in nearly two dozen occupations with significant program implementation impacts. As a result, GAO recommended OPM take a number of steps to address this issue. OPM concurred and in response has established an interagency working group, which is expected to identify a new set of government-wide skills gaps by June 2015.
Improving Performance Management: OPM makes a range of tools and guidance available to help agencies address poor performance. In 2015, GAO concluded that improved supervision and better use of probationary periods are needed to address substandard employee performance. In response, OPM agreed to consult with stakeholders regarding the need for longer probationary periods for some complex positions. In 2015, GAO also found that OPM needed to do more to ensure meaningful distinctions are made in senior executive ratings and performance awards. OPM disagreed with the recommendation. GAO maintains that additional action should be considered to ensure equity in ratings and performance awards across departments.
Strengthening Employee Engagement: GAO's ongoing work indicates that the recent government-wide decline in engagement, as measured by OPM's Employee Engagement Index, masks the fact that the majority of agencies either have sustained or increased their employee engagement levels. Government-wide, engagement has declined 4 percentage points from an estimated 67 percent in 2011 to an estimated 63 percent in 2014. However, this decline is primarily attributable to 13 agencies where employee engagement declined from 2013 to 2014. In contrast, 31 of 47 agencies have sustained and 3 agencies have increased their employee engagement levels from 2013 to 2014.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations to agencies and OPM to improve their strategic human capital management efforts. While OPM and the agencies have implemented some of GAO's recommendations, actions are still needed on others to continue to make progress in these areas in the future. |
gao_GAO-02-125 | gao_GAO-02-125_0 | The contractors explained in a report issued 60 days after the June 1997 test that the test achieved its primary objectives, but that some sensor abnormalities were noted. The Phase One Engineering Team was tasked by the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office to assess the performance of TRW’s software and to complete the assessment within 2 months using available data. The team reported that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. Based on its analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected. The Department of Defense's comments are reprinted in appendix VII. The primary limitation was that the team used Boeing- and TRW-processed target data and TRW-developed reference data in determining the accuracy of TRW reports for Integrated Flight Test 1A. Nichols’ 1998 Evaluation Methodology and Key Results
By 1998, the competitive phase of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle contracts was over. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) awarded contracts to three companies in 1990 to develop and test exoatmospheric kill vehicles. One of the contractors--Boeing North American--subcontracted with TRW to develop software for the kill vehicle. In 1998, Boeing became the Lead System Integrator for the National Missile Defense Program and chose Raytheon as the primary kill vehicle developer. Boeing and TRW reported that the June 1997 flight test achieved its primary objectives but detected some sensor abnormalities. The project office relied on Boeing to oversee the performance of TRW. Boeing and TRW reported that deployed target objects displayed distinguishable features when being observed by an infrared sensor. After considerable debate, the program manager reduced the number of decoys planned for intercept flight tests in response to a recommendation by an independent panel. The Phase One Engineering Team, which was responsible for completing an assessment of TRW's software performance within two months using available data, found that although the software had weaknesses, it was well designed and worked properly, with only some changes needed to increase the robustness of the discrimination function. On the basis of that analysis, team members predicted that the software would perform successfully in a future intercept test if target objects deployed as expected. |
gao_GAO-07-522 | gao_GAO-07-522_0 | Background
The DHS Privacy Office was established with the appointment of the first Chief Privacy Officer in April 2003. Based on these laws, the Privacy Office’s major responsibilities can be summarized into four broad categories: (1) reviewing and approving PIAs, (2) integrating privacy considerations into DHS decision making, (3) reviewing and approving public notices required by the Privacy Act, and (4) preparing and issuing reports. Reviewing and approving public notices required by the Privacy Act The Privacy Office is required by the Homeland Security Act to assure that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974. DHS Privacy Office Has Made Significant Progress Establishing Processes to Ensure Implementation of Privacy Protections, but More Work Remains
The DHS Privacy Office has made significant progress in addressing its statutory responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act by developing processes to ensure implementation of privacy protections in departmental programs. For example, the Privacy Office has established processes for ensuring departmental compliance with the PIA requirement in the E-Gov Act of 2002. Instituting this framework has led to increased attention to privacy requirements on the part of departmental components, contributing to an increase in the quality and number of PIAs issued. Further, the Privacy Office has generally not been timely in issuing public reports, potentially limiting their value and impact. Late issuance of reports has a number of negative consequences beyond failure to comply with mandated deadlines, including a potential reduction in the reports’ value and erosion of the office’s credibility. The Privacy Office Has Taken Steps to Integrate Privacy Into DHS Decision Making
The Privacy Office has also taken steps to integrate privacy considerations in the DHS decision-making process. Privacy Office Has Generally Not Issued Reports in a Timely Fashion
Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act requires that the Privacy Officer report annually to Congress on “activities of the department that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, internal controls, and other matters.” The act does not prescribe a deadline for submission of these reports; however, the requirement to report “on an annual basis” suggests that each report should cover a 1-year time period and that subsequent annual reports should be provided to Congress 1 year after the previous report was submitted. For example, a report on the Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) program, initiated in response to a complaint by the American Civil Liberties Union submitted in May 2004, was not issued until two and a half years later, long after the program had been terminated. Component-level privacy officers could help coordinate processing of PIAs. Until DHS reviews and updates its legacy notices as required by federal guidance, it cannot assure the public that its notices reflect current uses and protections of personal information. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to assess the progress of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office in carrying out its responsibilities under federal law, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the E- Government Act of 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office was established with the appointment of the first Chief Privacy Officer in April 2003, as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Privacy Office's major responsibilities include: (1) reviewing and approving privacy impact assessments (PIA)--analyses of how personal information is managed in a federal system, (2) integrating privacy considerations into DHS decision making, (3) ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, and (4) preparing and issuing annual reports and reports on key privacy concerns. GAO's objective was to examine progress made by the Privacy Office in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. GAO did this by comparing statutory requirements with Privacy Office processes, documents, and activities.
What GAO Found
The DHS Privacy Office has made significant progress in carrying out its statutory responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act and its related role in ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act of 2002, but more work remains to be accomplished. Specifically, the Privacy Office has made significant progress by establishing a compliance framework for conducting PIAs, which are required by the E-Gov Act. The framework includes formal written guidance, training sessions, and a process for identifying affected systems. The framework has contributed to an increase in the quality and number of PIAs issued as well as the identification of many more affected systems. The resultant workload is likely to prove difficult to process in a timely manner. Designating privacy officers in certain DHS components could help speed processing of PIAs, but DHS has not yet taken action to make these designations. The Privacy Office has also taken actions to integrate privacy considerations into the DHS decision-making process by establishing an advisory committee, holding public workshops, and participating in policy development. However, limited progress has been made in updating public notices required by the Privacy Act for systems of records that were in existence prior to the creation of DHS. These notices should identify, among other things, the type of data collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, and the intended uses of the data. Until the notices are brought up-to-date, the department cannot assure the public that the notices reflect current uses and protections of personal information. Further, the Privacy Office has generally not been timely in issuing public reports. For example, a report on the Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange program--a pilot project for law enforcement sharing of public records data--was not issued until long after the program had been terminated. Late issuance of reports has a number of negative consequences, including a potential reduction in the reports' value and erosion of the office's credibility. |
gao_GAO-16-71 | gao_GAO-16-71_0 | Warranties and guarantees are both mechanisms to address the correction of shipbuilder-responsible defects, but they differ in key ways. Table 2 shows key elements of warranties and guarantees. Table 3 shows the contract and vessel type for each Navy and Coast Guard ship we reviewed. Navy’s Guaranty Mechanism Generally Has No Effect on Improving Cost and Quality Outcomes, in Contrast to FRC and Commercial Warranties
The Navy and Coast Guard paid shipbuilders to repair shipbuilder- responsible deficiencies after delivery for most of the ships that we reviewed. In the four case study ships that used a fixed-price incentive contract with a guaranty, the Navy and Coast Guard paid the shipbuilder to build the ship as part of the construction process, and then paid the same shipbuilder a second time to repair the ship when defects were discovered after delivery. Contract Type and Terms Dictate the Degree to Which the Government Pays for Defects after Delivery
For the six government ships we reviewed, the type of contract and terms used to purchase the ship determined the degree to which the government or the shipbuilder paid for shipbuilder-responsible deficiencies after delivery. For ships with fixed-price incentive contracts, we found that, included in the costs the government paid to correct shipbuilder-responsible defects, the shipbuilders earned between 1 and 10 percent profit or fee under the construction contract or under a follow- on arrangement to correct the defects determined to be their responsibility for both guaranty claims and follow-on work to correct the defects. Without reassessing its practice of allowing the shipbuilder to earn profit for correcting shipbuilder-responsible defects, the Navy may be missing opportunities to improve incentives and lower costs to the taxpayer. Robust Defect Correction
In general, commercial buyers, as well as the Coast Guard for the FRC, submitted more claims for correcting defects than the Navy did for its ships with guarantees. While use of a warranty per the FAR is not mandatory, the Navy has not examined whether or not a warranty is appropriate for the ships it purchases—a practice recommended in DOD guidance. In contrast, the Coast Guard’s FRC program warranty is based on FAR principles. The FAR provides that: (1) the agency assesses whether or not a warranty is worth the cost, (2) the government may direct the contractor to repair or replace defective items at the contractor’s expense, and (3) a principal purpose of a warranty in a government contract is to foster quality performance. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, government programs require objectives and guidance to ensure that a program is achieving the desired outcomes in a manner that effectively uses funding. Although the FAR provides for consideration of certain factors in determining whether a warranty is appropriate for an acquisition and DOD requires documentation of why a warranty is or is not appropriate, the Navy has not considered or documented whether or not a warranty would be appropriate for its ships. Establish and document a clear objective for using a guaranty, and then create guidance for contracting officers that illustrates how to implement a guaranty that meets this objective. The Navy plans to coordinate its findings with DOD’s Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy and complete the study by September 30, 2016. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and appropriate congressional committees. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assessed: (1) the extent to which the Navy and Coast Guard’s guaranty or warranty mechanisms reduce the government’s exposure to additional costs and improve the quality of basic ship construction, if any, as compared to commercial shipbuilding; and (2) the extent to which the Navy and Coast Guard use available acquisition regulation and guidance in implementing guarantees and warranties in shipbuilding programs. To assess the extent to which the Navy and Coast Guard use available acquisition regulation and guidance in implementing warranties and guarantees, we reviewed and analyzed the ship construction contracts for each of the six case studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government spends about $17 billion per year building ships to support national defense and homeland security. Defects often become evident shortly after a ship is delivered. Warranties and guarantees are both mechanisms to fix defects for which shipbuilders are responsible.
Warranties give the government a contractual right to direct the correction of defects at the contractor's expense.
Guarantees are Navy-specific contractual mechanisms that provide for the correction of defects; but unlike warranties are not covered in the FAR.
The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review warranties and guarantees in government shipbuilding programs. This report assesses the extent to which (1) warranties and guarantees reduce the government's exposure to additional costs and risks of poor quality and (2) how the Navy and Coast Guard use acquisition regulations and guidance to implement warranties and guarantees. GAO reviewed the Navy's and Coast Guard's guaranty or warranty practices and policies and selected six case studies, comprised of four Navy ships—representing ships built in the last five years—and two vessels the Coast Guard most recently purchased.
What GAO Found
For five of the six Navy and Coast Guard ships GAO reviewed, guarantees did not help improve cost or quality outcomes. While the type and terms of each contract determine financial responsibility for correcting defects, the government, in most of the cases GAO examined, paid shipbuilders to repair defects. For the four ships with fixed-price incentive type contracts and guarantee clauses, the government paid the shipbuilder 89 percent of the cost—including profit—to correct these problems. This means the Navy and Coast Guard paid the shipbuilder to build the ship as part of the construction contract, and then paid the same shipbuilder again to repair the ship when defects were discovered after delivery—essentially rewarding the shipbuilder for delivering a ship that needed additional work. Navy officials stated that this approach reduces the overall cost of purchasing ships; however, the Navy has no analysis that proves their point. In contrast, the warranty on another Coast Guard ship—the Fast Response Cutter (FRC)—improved cost and quality by requiring the shipbuilder to pay to repair defects. The Coast Guard paid upfront for the warranty, which amounted to 41 percent of the total defect correction costs. The figure below shows the amount, as a portion of the millions of dollars required to address defects, shipbuilders and the government paid to correct defects for the ships GAO reviewed and the difference in defect-correction arrangements.
Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Department of Defense guidance instruct programs to, respectively, consider and document the use of a warranty, the use of warranties is not mandatory, and the Navy does not consider using them for ship contracts. In contrast, the Coast Guard's FRC warranty, as well as that planned for another upcoming ship class, fosters quality performance by following the FAR warranty provisions. The Navy may be missing opportunities for savings by not considering use of warranties. Further, the Navy has no stated objective for its guarantees, and guidance for contracting officers is minimal as to when or how to use a guaranty. While the FAR does not apply to guarantees, according to federal internal control standards, government programs require objectives and guidance to ensure that they achieve the desired results. Without a clear objective and guidance for using a guaranty and for determining when a warranty is appropriate in shipbuilding, Navy contracting officers do not have the information they need to make informed decisions regarding which mechanism is in the best interest of the taxpayer.
What GAO Recommends
DOD with the Navy should take steps to structure contracts so shipbuilders cannot earn profit for correcting defects for which they are responsible; determine whether a warranty is appropriate; and establish a guaranty objective and guidance. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations and it plans to complete a study by September 2016. |
gao_GAO-02-987 | gao_GAO-02-987_0 | Other HHS agencies and programs also provide support for national, state, and local immunization efforts nationwide. Shortages Prompt Actions to Reduce Immunization Requirements
Recent vaccine shortages have necessitated temporary modifications to the recommended immunization schedule and have caused states to scale back immunization requirements. At the state level, immunization programs are rationing the amount of vaccines distributed to providers. Many states have also suspended existing immunization requirements, allowing children who have received fewer than the previously recommended number of vaccinations to attend day care or school. Underlying Factors Could Allow Shortages to Recur
While the recent shortages have been largely resolved, the vaccine supply remains vulnerable to any number of disruptions that could occur in the future—including those that contributed to recent shortages and other potential problems, such as a catastrophic plant fire. If approved, several of these vaccines would expand the number of suppliers for these products. No Clear Path Yet to Resolve Ongoing Supply Issues
Federal agencies and advisory committees are exploring options to help stabilize the nation’s vaccine supply, but few long-term solutions have emerged. CDC vaccine stockpiles have been used successfully to help mitigate temporary supply disruptions in the past and were considered a priority strategy by workshop participants. Some of this information may already be available within HHS, but other information is available only from manufacturers or state immunization programs. Conclusions
A steady and reliable supply of childhood vaccines is critical to maintain the substantial U.S. public health achievements in combating infectious diseases. On one hand, manufacturers have economic incentives to bring new childhood vaccines to market. | What GAO Found
Immunizations are considered one of the leading public health achievements of the 20th century. Mandatory immunization programs have eradicated polio and smallpox in the United States and reduced the number of deaths from several childhood diseases, such as measles, to near zero. A consistent supply of many different vaccines is needed to support this effort. Recent childhood vaccine shortages have prompted federal authorities to recommend deferring some immunizations and have caused states to reduce immunization requirements. At the state and local levels, 49 state immunization programs reported rationing one or more vaccines. Shortages have also prompted most states to waive or change immunization requirements for school and day care programs so that children who have not received all mandatory immunizations could enroll. Many factors contributed to recent vaccine shortages, and while these have largely been resolved, the potential exists for future shortages. On the supply side, some manufacturers had production problems, causing them to fall below their expected output, while others discontinued making some vaccines altogether. On the demand side, one manufacturer could not keep pace with the greater-than-expected demand for a new recommended vaccine. Federal agencies and advisory committees are exploring ways to help stabilize the nation's vaccine supply, but few long-term solutions have emerged. One option--expanding vaccine stockpiles--is being widely considered as a short-term strategy to help cushion disruptions in vaccine supply. Stockpiles have been used successfully to help mitigate supply disruptions in the past. |
gao_GAO-12-811 | gao_GAO-12-811_0 | U.S. BRT Projects Incorporate Many Features, but Most Lack Dedicated Running Ways
BRT Projects’ Features
Based on our questionnaire results, we found that many U.S. BRT projects incorporate at least some station amenities and most other BRT features that distinguish them from standard bus service, and improve riders’ transit experience. 3.) 4.) 5 for an example.) In particular, stakeholders frequently mentioned cost considerations, community needs and input, and the ability to phase in additional physical features over time as factors influencing their decisions. Kansas City ATA officials explained that residents’ safety concerns along Troost Avenue resulted in well-lighted shelters designed with transparent backings and real-time information displays, which helped increase passengers’ sense of safety while waiting for the bus during the evening. Several major stations were also equipped with security cameras. Moreover, project sponsors in four of the five site-visit locations told us that they plan to incorporate (or are considering incorporating) additional features into their BRT projects. Most BRT Projects Reported Increased Ridership and Improved Service
BRT Increased Ridership and Travel Time Savings, Although Rail Transit Generally Serves More Riders
For systems where changes in ridership could be calculated, almost all BRT project sponsors (13 of 15), reported increased ridership over the previous transit service—typically a standard bus service—according to results from our questionnaires (see fig. Several BRT project sponsors highlighted BRT features that helped reduce travel times and attract riders. BRT Ridership Compared to Rail
Even with gains in ridership, BRT projects in the U.S. usually carry fewer total riders compared to rail transit projects, based on our analysis of project sponsor questionnaires. However, the M15 BRT in New York City has the highest total ridership of any project—more than 55,000 riders per day. However, as discussed earlier, BRT project sponsors told us that the perceptions about bus for “choice riders” can be overcome with rail-like features. In some international cities, however, given their more comprehensive systems, higher population densities, and more positive attitudes about bus service, BRT ridership in some cities exceeds rail transit ridership in the U.S.
BRT Projects Generally Have Lower Capital Costs than Rail Transit
Capital Costs and New Starts Funding
Of the planned or completed New, Small, or Very Small Starts projects that received construction grant agreements under FTA’s Capital Investment Grant program from fiscal year 2005 through February 2012, BRT projects generally had lower capital costs than rail transit projects. Factors Affecting Capital Costs
The difference in capital costs between BRT and rail transit is due in part to elements needed for rail transit that are not required for BRT projects. Cleveland RTA told us the Healthline BRT reduced the overall operating budget and the average costs per rider decreased. Some BRT Projects Have Potential to Contribute to Economic Development and Other Benefits
Overview of Case Study Findings
In general, we found that project sponsors and other stakeholders in each of our five case study locations believe that the BRT project is having some positive effect on economic development. However, these individuals were unsure about how much of the economic activity can be attributed to the presence of BRT versus other factors or circumstances (See table 2 for a summary of economic development activities near the In addition, stakeholders mentioned that five BRT projects we visited).the recent recession limited the number of development projects to date, but they expect increased economic development in the future along select areas of the BRT corridors as economic conditions improve. Project sponsors, local officials, and transit experts we spoke to believe that, in general, rail transit is a better economic development catalyst than BRT; however, this opinion was not universal. In addition, stakeholders mentioned that certain factors can enhance BRT’s ability to generate economic development similar to rail transit. Specifically, they described how economic development near BRT can be supported by having: physical BRT features that convey a sense of permanence to developers; major institutional, employment, and activity centers along or near the BRT corridor that can sponsor development projects; and transit-supportive local policies and development incentives. Differences in cost partly reflect BRT project sponsors’ limited use of the more costly features commonly associated with BRT—such as dedicated running ways, stations with major infrastructure investments, and off- board fare collection. DOT did not comment on the draft report. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine the features, costs, and community benefits of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects recommended for funding by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), we addressed the following four questions: 1. Which BRT features are included in BRT projects and why? 4. To what extent do BRT projects provide economic development and other benefits to communities? To assess how BRT projects have performed in terms of ridership and service and how they compare to rail transit projects, we reviewed existing literature on BRT and rail transit projects’ ridership and service levels. We received completed questionnaires for 18 of the 20 To assess how BRT projects compare to rail transit projects in terms of capital project costs and the New Starts, Small Starts, and Very Small Starts share of funding, we used FTA project grant data compiled by FTA to identify the 55 (30 BRT and 25 rail transit) existing or planned projects that had signed grant agreements from fiscal years 2005 through February 2012. We did not attempt to model other factors that contribute to land values, such as broader economic conditions, other major infrastructure investments and amenities, and demographic characteristics. | Why GAO Did This Study
BRT is a form of transit that has generated interest around the world to help alleviate the adverse effects of traffic congestion and potentially contribute to economic growth. BRT features can include improvements to infrastructure, technology, and passenger amenities over standard bus service to improve service and attract new riders. The use of federal funding for BRT in the United States has increased since 2005, when the Safe Accountable Flexible Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users expanded eligibility for major capital projects under FTAs Capital Investment Grant Program to include corridor-based bus projects. BRT projects can be funded through New, Small, and Very Small Start grants under the Capital Investment GrantProgram.
GAO was asked to examine (1) features included in BRT projects funded by the FTA; (2) BRT project performance in terms of ridership and service and how they compare to rail transit projects; (3) how BRT-projects costs differ from rail transit project costs; and (4) the extent to which BRT projects provide economic development and other benefits. To address these objectives, GAO sent questionnaires to officials of all 20 existing BRT and 20 existing rail-transit projects that the FTA recommended for funding from fiscal year 2005 through 2012 to collect information on project features, ridership, and service and interviewed select project sponsors. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed government, academic, and industry group officials. The U.S.Department of Transportation did not comment on the draft report.
What GAO Found
U.S. bus rapid transit (BRT) projects we reviewed include features that distinguished BRT from standard bus service and improved riders experience. However, few of the projects (5 of 20) used dedicated or semi-dedicated lanes a feature commonly associated with BRT and included in international systems to reduce travel time and attract riders. Project sponsors and planners explained that decisions on which features to incorporate into BRT projects were influenced by costs, community needs, and the ability to phase in additional features. For example, one project sponsor explained that well-lighted shelters with security cameras and real-time information displays were included to increase passengers sense of safety in the evening. Project sponsors told us they plan to incorporate additional features such as off-board fare collection over time.
The BRT projects we reviewed generally increased ridership and improved service over the previous transit service. Specifically, 13 of the 15 project sponsors that provided ridership data reported increases in ridership after 1 year of service and reduced average travel times of 10 to 35 percent over previous bus services. However, even with increases in ridership, U.S. BRT projects usually carry fewer total riders than rail transit projects and international BRT systems. Project sponsors and other stakeholders attribute this to higher population densities internationally and riders who prefer rail transit. However, some projectssuch as the M15 BRT line in New York Citycarry more than 55,000 riders per day.
Capital costs for BRT projects were generally lower than for rail transit projects and accounted for a small percent of the Federal Transit Administrations (FTA) New, Small, and Very Small Starts funding although they accounted for over 50 percent of projects with grant agreements since fiscal year 2005. Project sponsors also told us that BRT projects can provide rail-like benefits at lower capital costs. However, differences in capital costs are due in part to elements needed for rail transit that are not required for BRT and can be considered in context of total riders, costs for operations, and other long-term costs such as vehicle replacement.
We found that although many factors contribute to economic development, most local officials we visited believe that BRT projects are contributing to localized economic development. For instance, officials in Cleveland told us that between $4 and $5 billion was invested near the Healthline BRT projectassociated with major hospitals and universities in the corridor. Project sponsors in other cities told us that there is potential for development near BRT projects; however, development to date has been limited by broader economic conditionsmost notably the recent recession. While most local officials believe that rail transit has a greater economic development potential than BRT, they agreed that certain factors can enhance BRTs ability to contribute to economic development, including physical BRT features that relay a sense of permanence to developers; key employment and activity centers located along the corridor; and local policies and incentives that encourage transit-oriented development. Our analysis of land value changes near BRT lends support to these themes. In addition to economic development, BRT project sponsors highlighted other community benefits including quick construction and implementation and operational flexibility. |
gao_RCED-98-114 | gao_RCED-98-114_0 | In addition to the net outlays made through its borrowing authority, CCC had net outlays for programs and activities that receive direct appropriations and/or other funding—principally several of its commodity export programs. CCC’s Available Funding Derived Primarily From Its Borrowing Authority
Most of CCC’s funds in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 derived from its borrowing authority. CCC replenished its borrowing authority through (1) annual appropriations—about $10.5 billion in fiscal year 1996 and $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1997—and (2) program receipts amounting to about $6.9 billion in fiscal year 1996 and $5.7 billion in fiscal year 1997. The appropriations provided for these programs were unrelated to the borrowing authority. As discussed, CCC’s net outlays for its income and commodity support programs were about $4.4 billion and $5.1 billion in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, respectively. CCC’s net outlays for the commodity export programs funded through its borrowing authority were about $391.2 million and $235.7 million for fiscal years 1996 and 1997, respectively. CCC’s administrative expenses include (1) the purchase of computer and telecommunications equipment and services and (2) reimbursements to agencies within USDA and other government entities for services they provide to support CCC’s operations. Some Net Outlays Were Associated With CCC Programs and Activities That Received Direct Appropriations and Other Funding
With regard to CCC’s spending from appropriations (excluding payments made to the Department of the Treasury to repay borrowing) and other funding, CCC’s aggregate net outlays totaled about $337.5 million in fiscal year 1996 and $41.3 million in fiscal year 1997. A Variety of Management Practices Are Used to Control CCC Funds
CCC uses a variety of management practices to control its funds: (1) controls over spending related to the annual budget and apportionment processes, (2) periodic reporting of its financial activities to the Congress, (3) FSA’s implementation of internal controls to protect CCC’s assets and account for its financial transactions, (4) program managers’ allocation and monitoring of CCC funds, and (5) periodic reviews of program activity by compliance staff from agencies responsible for implementing CCC programs. In addition, USDA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits CCC’s annual financial statements, including its year-end expenditure reports. According to the OIG, the material weaknesses it noted in FSA’s internal control structure could adversely affect CCC’s ability to be reasonably assured that its transactions are properly recorded and accounted for so that it can prepare reliable financial statements and maintain accountability over its assets. To obtain information on whether CCC’s funding for administrative purposes—computer and telecommunications purchases and reimbursements paid to USDA agencies and other government entities—conformed with statutory funding caps in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, we compared the obligations made by CCC for these purposes with the statutory caps and related apportionments by OMB. To obtain information on whether the programs CCC funded had a statutory basis for using CCC funds, our Office of General Counsel reviewed relevant statutes to determine the source of funding for these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds are spent and controlled, focusing on: (1) how much money CCC had available and spent in fiscal years (FY) 1996 and 1997, including the sources of these funds and the programs and activities for which they were used; (2) the management practices used to control CCC funds; (3) whether CCC's funding for administrative purposes fell within relevant statutory funding caps; and (4) whether the programs CCC funded had a statutory basis for using CCC funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the amount of funds available to CCC through its $30-billion borrowing authority fluctuates as it alternately borrows against and replenishes the authority every business day; (2) to enable CCC to repay its debt associated with the borrowing authority, Congress made appropriations to CCC totalling $10.5 billion in FY 1996 and $1.5 billion in FY 1997; (3) CCC also received about $6.9 billion and $5.7 billion in program receipts--in FY 1996 and FY 1997, respectively--that is also used to replenish its borrowing authority; (4) in addition, CCC received separate appropriations and other funding totalling $2.1 billion in FY 1996 and $1.9 billion in FY 1997 to fund several of its commodity export programs that are not funded through its borrowing authority; (5) most of CCC's net outlays made through its borrowing authority were for its income and commodity support programs--about $4.4 billion and $5.1 billion, in FY 1996 and FY 1997, respectively; (6) the remaining outlays made in these years--about $640 million and $2.3 billion--were primarily for CCC's other programs; however, some were used for administrative purposes, such as purchasing computer and telecommunications equipment and reimbursing Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies and other government entities for services provided to support CCC's operations; (7) in addition to the net outlays associated with its borrowing authority, CCC had net outlays of about $334.4 million in FY 1996 and $38.7 million in FY 1997 for the commodity export programs that received direct appropriations and other funding; (8) a range of management practices are used to control CCC's funds; (9) these practices include: (a) controls over spending related to the annual budget and apportionment process; (b) CCC's periodic reports of its financial activities to Congress; (c) the Farm Service Agency's implementation of internal controls to protect CCC's assets and account for its financial transactions; (d) program managers' allocation and monitoring of CCC's funds used in their programs; and (e) periodic reviews of program activity by compliance staff from the agencies that implement CCC's programs; (10) in addition, the USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits CCC's annual financial statements, including its year-end expenditure reports; and (11) in a July 1997 report, the OIG noted problems with some of the Farm Service Agency's internal controls which it believes could adversely affect CCC's ability to prepare reliable financial statements and account for its assets. |
gao_NSIAD-96-21 | gao_NSIAD-96-21_0 | Acceptance of a voluntary disclosure into the program by DOD is based on four criteria. Defense Contractor Participation in the Program
The number of voluntary disclosures under the program has been relatively small and the dollar recoveries have been modest. From its inception in 1986 through September 1994, DOD reported that 138 defense contractors made 325 voluntary disclosures of potential procurement fraud, of which 129 have been closed. According to DOD, 48 of the top 100 defense contractors made 222 disclosures. The $290 million represents about 17 percent of the Justice Department’s $1.7 billion in reported settlements on DOD procurement fraud cases between fiscal years 1987 and 1994. While the value of the voluntary disclosure program may well extend beyond the amount of dollar recoveries, we note that most disclosures did not result in significant dollar recoveries for the government. Of 129 closed cases, 81 cases, or about 63 percent, had reported recoveries of less than $100,000, of which 52 cases, or 40 percent, had no dollar recoveries. Forty-eight cases had reported recoveries of $100,000 or more, of which 15 cases had reported recoveries of $2 million or more. The $290 million attributable to the program is overstated because it includes an amount that should not be considered a recovery from the program, as well as amounts related to disclosures made prior to the formal initiation of the program. With regard to the progress payments, both the contractor’s disclosure report and the government’s subsequent investigative report showed the contractor prematurely billed the government by about $75 million. Voluntary Disclosures Take an Average of 2.8 Years to Complete
For closed cases, DOD records show that it took an average of 2.8 years to complete a voluntary disclosure case, with about 25 percent taking over 4 years. As of September 30, 1994, there were 173 open cases that have been open an average of 3.5 years. There is little overlap between voluntary disclosures and related qui tam actions. For the 129 voluntary disclosure cases closed since the program began, only 4 involved qui tam actions. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated October 13, 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Voluntary Disclosure Program, focusing on the: (1) extent to which defense contractors participate in the program; (2) amount of money that has been recovered under the program; (3) time taken to close disclosure cases; (4) most common type of disclosures; and (5) extent of overlap between voluntary disclosures and qui tam actions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although 48 of the top 100 defense contractors have made voluntary disclosures, the total number of disclosures under the program has been relatively small and dollar recoveries have been modest; (2) from its inception in 1986 through September 1994, DOD reported that, of the thousands of defense contractors, 138 contractors made 325 voluntary disclosures of potential procurement fraud; (3) DOD reported recoveries from these disclosures to be $290 million, about 17 percent of total reported DOD procurement fraud recoveries between fiscal years (FY) 1987 and 1994; (4) GAO's review indicated that DOD's reported recoveries of $290 million were overstated because they included $75 million in premature progress payments and amounts from disclosures made prior to the program; (5) further, DOD accepted some disclosures into the program that the Justice Department believed were triggered by imminent government discovery and thus did not meet the criteria for admission; (6) voluntary disclosure cases took an average of 2.8 years to close, with about 25 percent taking over 4 years; (7) open cases are taking longer; (8) as of September 1994, DOD data showed that open cases averaged 3.5 years, with over half of the cases disclosed in FY 1990 still open; (9) less than full contractor cooperation with the government and low priority given by DOD and other investigative agencies to managing cases expeditiously may be problems in some cases; (10) most disclosures did not result in significant dollar recoveries for the government; (11) of 129 closed cases, 81 cases, or about 63 percent, had reported recoveries of less than $100,000, of which 52 cases, or 40 percent, had no dollar recoveries; (12) forty-eight cases had reported recoveries of $100,000 or more, of which 15 cases had reported recoveries of $2 million or more; (13) there is little overlap between voluntary disclosures and qui tam actions; and (14) of the 129 voluntary disclosure cases closed since the program began, 4 involved qui tam actions. |
gao_HEHS-96-56 | gao_HEHS-96-56_0 | In 1992, unfunded liabilities totaled roughly $200 billion, according to our estimate from the PPCC sample. 1). State and Local Government Contributions Have Fallen Short of Actuarially Required Amounts
In 1992, state and local government contributions to their pension funds fell short of the actuarially required amounts; the contribution ratio was 88 percent for all plans in the sample with complete contribution data.The contribution ratio is the proportion of the actuarially required contribution covered by actual contributions. About 15 percent of plans received less than 60 percent of required amounts. Recent Changes in Funding and Contribution Status
According to our analysis of the PPCC survey data, the funding status of state and local pension plans improved between 1990 and 1992. Of the 117 plans that had complete data for both years, 90 were underfunded in both years. More than half of underfunded plan sponsors are contributing enough to reduce their unfunded liability, while the other plans are not. Most significantly, one-third of state and local pension plans were both underfunded in 1992 and receiving less than the actuarially required sponsor contributions. Scope and Methodology
To analyze the current status of state and local pension plan funding and contributions, we used data from the Public Pension Coordinating Council (PPCC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of public pension plan funding, focusing on the basic pension plans of state and local governments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) states and localities with underfunded pension plans run the risk of reducing future pension benefits to taxpayers or raising revenues; (2) unfunded liabilities for all state and local pension plans totalled $200 billion in 1992; (3) contributions to pension funds in 1992 fell short of the actuarially required amounts by 60 percent; (4) 75 percent of state and local pension plans involved in a Public Pension Coordinating Council (PPCC) survey were underfunded; (5) more than half of the pension plan sponsors surveyed continued to make payments to pay off their unfunded liabilities; (6) between 1990 and 1992, 20 percent of the plans were both underfunded and not receiving required sponsor contributions; and (7) of 117 plans with complete data in 1990 and 1992, 90 were underfunded. |
gao_HEHS-95-74 | gao_HEHS-95-74_0 | Although states reported management efficiencies under the block grants, they also experienced increased grant management responsibilities because they had greater program flexibility and responsibility. This trend reduced state flexibility. Lessons Learned
Our research suggests that three lessons can be drawn from the experience with the 1981 block grants that would have value to the Congress as it considers creating new block grants. Three characteristics of formulas to better target funds include factors that consider (1) state or local need; (2) differences among states in the costs of providing services; and (3) state or local ability to contribute to program costs. About $32 billion was awarded for block grants in 1993. Federal Transit Capital and Operating Assistance Prevention and Treatment of Substance Abuse JTPA, Title II-A: Training Services for Disadvantaged Adults and Youth Payments to States for Child Care Assistance (Child Care and Development Block Grant)
Characteristics of the 1981 Block Grants
Under OBRA, the administration of numerous federal domestic assistance programs was substantially changed by consolidating more than 50 categorical grant programs into 9 block grants and shifting primary administrative responsibility for these programs to the states. Experience Operating Under the 1981 Block Grants
Where states had operated programs, transition to block grants was smoother as states relied on existing management and service delivery systems. Although states experienced a 12-percent federal funding reduction when the 1981 block grants were created, they were able to offset these reductions for the first several years through a variety of approaches, such as carrying funding over from categorical grants. Federal Funding Allocations Based on Prior Categorical Grants
Initially, most federal funding to states was distributed on the basis of the state’s share of funds received under the prior categorical programs in fiscal year 1981. In addition, due to the lack of comparability of information across states, state-by-state comparisons were difficult. These are the following: (1) The Congress needs to focus on accountability for results in its oversight of the block grants. 15, 1985). 5, 1987). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on federal block grant programs, focusing on: (1) states' experiences operating block grants; and (2) lessons learned that could be useful to Congress as it considers new block grants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 15 block grants with funding of $32 billion constituted a small portion of the total federal aid to states in fiscal year 1993; (2) in 1981, Congress created 9 block grants from about 50 categorical programs to broaden program flexibility among states; (3) the states' transition to block grants was generally smooth, since the states had existing management and delivery systems for most programs, but they had difficulties in two areas because these categorical programs were entirely federally funded or directed; (4) states reported administrative efficiencies with block grants, but documenting the cost savings was difficult; (5) although the states experienced a 12-percent funding reduction under the block grants, they used various approaches, such as using carry-over funds and additional state revenues, to help them offset the funding reductions; (6) problems with the 1981 block grant included inequitable initial state allocations, the lack of useful information for Congress and program managers to effectively oversee the grants, and reduced state flexibility due to Congress recategorizing some grants; (7) lessons learned from the 1981 experience should focus on accountability for results, equitable funding allocations based on state need, ability to pay, and cost of services; and (8) states could encounter greater transition difficulties with the larger, more complex programs being considered for inclusion in the new block grants. |
gao_GAO-07-1140T | gao_GAO-07-1140T_0 | Background
Executive Order 12898 stated that to the extent practicable and permitted by law, each federal agency, including the EPA, “…shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States…” In response to the 1994 order, among other things, the EPA Administrator issued guidance the same year providing that environmental justice should be considered early in the rule-making process. EPA Generally Devoted Little Attention To Environmental Justice in Drafting Three Rules and Considered it to Varying Degrees in Finalizing Them
When drafting the three clean air rules, EPA generally devoted little attention to environmental justice. We found, for example, that while EPA guidance states that workgroups should consider environmental justice early in the rulemaking process, this was accomplished only to a limited extent. Key contributing factors included a lack of guidance and training for workgroup members on identifying environmental justice issues. In finalizing the three rules, EPA considered environmental justice to varying degrees although, in general, the agency rarely provided a clear rationale for its decisions on environmental justice-related matters. Furthermore, EPA did not publish the data and assumptions supporting its position. GAO’s Recommendations and EPA’s Response
We made four recommendations to help EPA resolve the problems identified by our study. However, EPA responded more positively to each of these recommendations in an August 24, 2006 letter. The first recommendation called upon EPA rulemaking workgroups to devote attention to environmental justice while drafting and finalizing clean air rules. EPA responded that to ensure consideration of environmental justice in the development of regulations, the Office of Environmental Justice was made an ex officio member of the agency’s Regulatory Steering Committee, the body that oversees regulatory policy for EPA and the development of its rules. It also said it was considering additional economic guidance on methodological issues typically encountered when examining a proposed rule’s impacts on subpopulations highlighted in the executive order. Fourth, we recommended that the EPA Administrator direct cognizant officials to respond more fully to public comments on environmental justice by, for example, better explaining the rationale for EPA’s beliefs and by providing supporting data. The agency noted, however, that it will re-emphasize the need to respond to comments fully, to include the rationale for its regulatory approach, and to better describe its supporting data. First, regarding our recommendation that workgroups consider environmental justice while drafting and finalizing regulations, EPA had emphasized in its August 2006 letter that making the Office of Environmental Justice an ex officio member of the Agency’s Regulatory Steering Committee would not only allow it to be aware of all important EPA regulatory actions from their inception through rule development and final agency review, but more importantly, would allow it to participate on workgroups that are developing actions with potential environmental justice implications and/or recommend that workgroups consider environmental justice issues. To date, however, the Office of Environmental Justice has not participated directly in any of the 103 air rules that have been proposed or finalized since EPA’s August 2006 letter. On the other hand, some training courses that were planned have not yet been developed. Third, regarding our recommendation that EPA improve assessments of potential environmental justice impacts in economic reviews by identifying the data and developing the modeling techniques that are needed to assess such impacts, EPA officials said that their data and models have improved since our 2005 report, but that their level of sophistication has not reached their goal for purposes of environmental justice considerations. Fourth, regarding our recommendation that the Administrator direct cognizant officials to respond more fully to public comments on environmental justice, EPA officials cited one example of an air rule in which the Office of Air and Radiation received comments from tribes and other commenters who believed that the proposed National Ambient Air Quality Standard for PM 10-2.5 raised environmental justice concerns. Nonetheless, the officials with whom we met said they were unaware of any memoranda or revised guidance that would encourage more global, EPA-wide progress on this important issue. | Why GAO Did This Study
A 1994 Executive Order sought to ensure that minority and low-income populations are not subjected to disproportionately high levels of environmental risk. Studies have shown that these groups are indeed disproportionately exposed to air pollution and other environmental and health problems. The Order sought to address the problem by requiring EPA and other federal agencies to make achieving environmental justice part of their missions. In July 2005, GAO issued a report entitled, Environmental Justice: EPA Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When Developing Clean Air Rules (GAO-05-289). Focusing on three specific rules for detailed study, the report identified a number of weaknesses in EPA's approach to ensuring that environmental justice is considered from the early stages of rule development through their issuance. The report made several recommendations, to which EPA replied in an August 24, 2006 letter. GAO also met recently with cognizant EPA staff to obtain updated information on the agency's responses to these recommendations. In this testimony, GAO (1) summarizes the key findings of its 2005 report, (2) outlines its recommendations to EPA and EPA's August 2006 responses, and (3) provides updated information on subsequent EPA actions.
What GAO Found
EPA generally devoted little attention to environmental justice when drafting three significant clean air rules between fiscal years 2000 and 2004. GAO's 2005 report concluded, for example, that while EPA guidance on rulemaking states that workgroups should consider environmental justice early in the process, a lack of guidance and training for workgroup members on how to identify potential environmental justice impacts limited their ability to analyze such issues. Similarly, while EPA considered environmental justice to varying degrees in the final stages of the rulemaking process, in general the agency rarely provided a clear rationale for its decisions on environmental justice-related matters. For example, in responding to comments during the final phase of one of the rules, EPA asserted that the rule would not have any disproportionate impacts on low-income or minority communities, but did not publish any data or the agency's assumptions in support of that conclusion. Among its recommendations, GAO called on EPA to ensure that its rulemaking workgroups devote attention to environmental justice while drafting and finalizing clean air rules. EPA's August 2006 letter responded that it had made its Office of Environmental Justice an ex officio member of the Regulatory Steering Committee so that it would be aware of important regulations under development and participate in workgroups as necessary. GAO also recommended that EPA improve the way environmental justice impacts are addressed in its economic reviews by identifying the data and developing the modeling techniques needed to assess such impacts. EPA responded that its Office of Air and Radiation was examining ways to improve its air models so it could better account for the socioeconomic variables identified in the Executive Order. GAO also recommended that cognizant EPA officials respond more fully to public comments on environmental justice by better explaining their rationale and by providing the supporting data for the agency's decisions. EPA responded that it would re-emphasize the need to respond fully to public comments, include the rationale for its regulatory approach, and describe its supporting data. Recent discussions between GAO and EPA officials suggest that some progress has been made to incorporate environmental justice concerns in the agency's air rulemaking, but that significant challenges remain. For example, while the Office of Environmental Justice may be an ex officio member of the Regulatory Steering Committee, it has not participated directly in any air rules that have been proposed or finalized since EPA's August 2006 letter to GAO. Also, according to EPA staff, some of the training courses that were planned have not yet been developed due to staff turnover among other reasons. When asked about GAO's recommendation that cognizant officials respond more fully to public comments on environmental justice, the EPA officials cited a recent rulemaking in which this was done. But the officials said they were unaware of any memoranda or revised guidance that would encourage more global progress on this key issue. |
gao_GAO-06-798 | gao_GAO-06-798_0 | Similarly, in the individual market, HSA-eligible plans had lower premiums and higher deductibles than traditional plans in 2005. Enrollee Costs Would Be Higher for HSA-Eligible Plans Than for PPO Plans When Extensive Care Is Used, but Lower When Low to Moderate Care Is Used
Our illustration of enrollees’ potential health care costs—including premiums, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket costs for covered services—for the three employers’ 2005 health plans we reviewed showed that HSA-eligible plan enrollees would incur higher annual costs than PPO plan enrollees for extensive use of health care, but would incur lower annual costs than PPO plan enrollees for low to moderate use of health care. HSA-Eligible Plan Enrollees Had Higher Incomes Than Comparison Groups, but Data on Age Differences Were Inconclusive
HSA-eligible plan enrollees generally had higher incomes than comparison groups, but age differences varied depending on the data reviewed. Two of the three employers we reviewed and eHealthInsurance reported that HSA-eligible plan enrollees had higher incomes than did traditional plan enrollees in 2005. Moreover, 51 percent of tax filers reporting HSA contributions had an adjusted gross income of $75,000 or more, compared with 18 percent of all tax filers under age 65. Actively employed HSA-eligible plan enrollees also had higher incomes than traditional plan enrollees in 2005 for two of the three employers we reviewed. Just over Half of Enrollees and Most Employers Contributed to HSAs, and Account Holders Used HSA Funds to Pay for Medical Care and to Accumulate Savings
Just over half of HSA-eligible plan enrollees, and most employers, contributed to HSAs, and account holders used their HSA funds to pay for current medical care and to accumulate savings. Most employers offering HSA-eligible plans contributed to their employees’ HSAs, and the average employer HSA contribution was about $1,064 in 2004. About 45 percent of those reporting 2004 HSA contributions also reported withdrawing funds in 2004, and 90 percent of these funds were withdrawn for qualified medical expenses. The remaining 55 percent of those reporting HSA contributions in 2004 reported that they did not withdraw any funds from their HSA in 2004. Tax filers claimed an average deduction of about $2,100 for HSA contributions in 2004, and the average amount increased with income. About 55 percent of those reporting HSA contributions to IRS in 2004 did not withdraw any funds from their account in 2004. Focus Group Participants Generally Understood and Were Satisfied with HSA- Eligible Plans, but Would Not Recommend These Plans to All Consumers
Participants in our focus groups who were enrolled in HSA-eligible plans generally reported positive experiences, but most would not recommend these plans to all consumers. Participants generally understood the key attributes of their plan, such as low premiums, high deductibles, and the mechanics of using the HSA, but were confused about certain other features. Few participants researched the cost of hospital or physician services before obtaining care, although many participants researched the cost of prescription drugs. Participants said they would recommend HSA- eligible plans to healthy consumers, but not to people who use maintenance medication, have a chronic condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet the high deductible. We received technical comments from IRS and eHealthInsurance by email and incorporated these comments as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To respond to our study objectives regarding health savings accounts (HSAs) and HSA-eligible plans, we examined (1) the financial features, covered services, and enrollees’ annual costs of HSA-eligible plans in comparison with those of traditional plans; (2) the characteristics of HSA- eligible plan enrollees in comparison with those of other individuals and traditional plan enrollees; (3) the funding and use of HSAs; and (4) the experiences of enrollees with HSA-eligible plans. Characteristics of HSA-Eligible Enrollees
To compare the characteristics of HSA-eligible and traditional plan enrollees, we compared demographic data provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on adjusted gross income and age for tax filers who reported HSA contributions on their 2004 tax returns with the corresponding data for all tax filers less than 65 years of age. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Early Experience with a Consumer-Directed Health Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health savings accounts (HSA) and the high-deductible health insurance plans that are eligible to be coupled with them are a new type of consumer-directed health plan attracting interest among employers and consumers. Employers and plan enrollees may contribute to tax-advantaged HSAs, and enrollees can use the accounts to pay for health care expenses. Because HSAs and HSA-eligible plans are new, there is interest in the experiences of plan enrollees, as well as in comparing the plan features and enrollee characteristics with those of traditional plans, such as preferred provider organization (PPO) plans. GAO reviewed (1) the financial features of HSA-eligible plans in comparison with those of traditional plans, (2) the characteristics of HSA-eligible plan enrollees in comparison with those of traditional plan enrollees, (3) HSA funding and use, and (4) enrollees' experiences with HSA-eligible plans. GAO analyzed data regarding HSA-eligible and traditional plans and enrollees from national employer health benefits surveys, three selected employers, and a national broker of health insurance. GAO compared Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data for tax filers reporting HSA contributions with corresponding data for all tax filers under 65 years old. GAO also conducted focus groups with employees of the three employers.
What GAO Found
In 2005, HSA-eligible plans had different financial features than traditional plans--such as lower premiums and higher deductibles--but both plan types covered similar health care services, including preventive services, and used similar provider networks. For the three employers' health plans GAO reviewed to illustrate enrollees' potential health care costs, GAO estimated that HSA-eligible plan enrollees would incur higher annual costs than PPO plan enrollees for extensive use of health care, but would incur lower annual costs than PPO plan enrollees for low to moderate use of health care. HSA-eligible plan enrollees generally had higher incomes than comparison groups, but data on age differences were inconclusive. In 2004, 51 percent of tax filers reporting an HSA contribution had an adjusted gross income of $75,000 or more, compared with 18 percent of all tax filers under 65 years old. Two of the three employers GAO reviewed and a national broker of health insurance also reported that HSA-eligible plan enrollees had higher incomes than traditional plan enrollees in 2005. GAO's data sources did not conclusively indicate whether HSA-eligible plan enrollees were older or younger than individuals and enrollees in comparison groups. Just over half of all HSA-eligible plan enrollees and most employers contributed to HSAs, and account holders used their HSA funds to pay for current medical care and to accumulate savings. About 55 percent of HSA-eligible plan enrollees reported HSA contributions to IRS in 2004. Tax filers claimed an average deduction of about $2,100 for their HSA contributions in 2004, and the average amount increased with income. About two-thirds of employers offering HSA-eligible plans contributed to their employees' HSAs, and the average employer HSA contribution was about $1,064 in 2004. About 45 percent of tax filers reporting 2004 HSA contributions also reported that they withdrew funds in 2004, and 90 percent of these funds were withdrawn for qualified medical expenses. The other 55 percent of those reporting HSA contributions in 2004 did not withdraw any funds from their HSA in 2004. HSA-eligible plan enrollees who participated in GAO's focus groups generally reported positive experiences, but most would not recommend the plans to all consumers. Participants enrolled in the plans generally understood the key attributes of their plan. Few participants reported researching cost before obtaining health care services, although many researched the cost of prescription drugs. Most participants were satisfied with their HSA-eligible plan and would recommend these plans to healthy consumers, but not to those who use maintenance medication, have a chronic condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet the high deductible. GAO received technical comments from IRS and a national broker of health insurance and incorporated the comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-414 | gao_GAO-16-414_0 | DOD Identified Existing Guidance As a Framework for Its Policy for Retrograde and Reset, but This Framework Does Not Include Elements of Sound Strategic Planning DOD Identified Existing Guidance Documents Related to Retrograde and Reset Instead of Developing New Policy
In its response to the requirements of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, instead of developing new policies for retrograde and reset of operating forces used to support overseas contingency operations, DOD relied on three existing guidance documents as its policy for retrograde and reset activities in support of overseas contingency operations. Our review of the three documents (i.e., the Quadrennial Defense Review, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Defense Planning Guidance) referenced in DOD’s November 2014 report as providing the department’s strategic policy and guidance for retrograde and other activities, including reset, found that they do not contain the elements to facilitate the strategic management planning of these efforts. DOD officials stated that they believed the Quadrennial Defense Review and other strategic-level documents provide the necessary policy and guidance to inform the department’s efforts. Inconsistent Information and Descriptions of Retrograde and Reset for Budget Reporting Impact DOD’s Strategic Communications About These Efforts
We also found that DOD’s guidance is not consistent in identifying what information DOD and the services are to use in budget reporting on retrograde and reset activities. DOD emphasizes the use of consistent terms across department documents. If DOD does not ensure the use of consistent information and descriptions in policy and other departmental documents used to inform budget estimates on retrograde and reset, Congress may not receive the consistent and accurate information that it needs to make informed decisions concerning retrograde and reset. One of Four Military Services Has Published an Implementation Plan for the Retrograde and Reset of Equipment
We found that the Marine Corps has published an implementation plan for the retrograde and reset of equipment, but the Army, Navy and Air Force have not. According to DOD officials, the military services are responsible for developing implementation plans related to retrograde and reset. Some of these elements also generally correspond to several requirements in section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, generally defines retrograde as the process for the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from a forward location to a reset program or to another directed area of operations. If the Army does not develop an implementation plan that, among other things, articulates goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of equipment, the Army’s retrograde and reset efforts may not align with DOD-wide goals and strategies for retrograde and reset, reset-related maintenance costs may not consistently be included, and resources and funding for retrograde and reset may not be consistently or effectively budgeted or distributed within the service. Without a comprehensive implementation plan for retrograde and reset, the Army, Navy, and Air Force cannot ensure that their efforts are consistent or comprehensive within and across the services. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to establish a strategic policy that incorporates key elements of leading practices for sound strategic management planning, such as a mission statement and long-term goals, to inform the military services’ plans for retrograde and reset to support overseas contingency operations and to improve DOD’s response to section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. To improve Army, Navy, and Air Force planning, budgeting, and execution for retrograde and reset efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop service-specific implementation plans for retrograde and reset that incorporate elements of leading practices for sound strategic management planning, such as strategies that include how a goal will be achieved, how an organization will carry out its mission, and the resources required to meet goals. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOD developed a strategic policy consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces that support overseas contingency operations, we reviewed the two reports DOD developed and provided to the congressional defense committees in response to the requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, guidance documents related to retrograde and reset, and the three documents DOD identified in its November 2014 report as providing strategic policy and guidance for these efforts. In its November 2014 report, DOD pointed to the specific planning activities undertaken by each service related to retrograde and reset. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is in the process of resetting equipment and materiel to meet mission requirements. Retrograde refers to the movement of non-unit equipment and materiel from one forward area to another area of operation or to a reset program. Reset includes maintenance and supply activities to restore and enhance combat capability to equipment used in combat.
Section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included provisions for DOD to establish a policy and implementation plan on retrograde and similar efforts related to forces used to support overseas contingency operations and for GAO to review DOD's policy and plan. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD developed a strategic policy and (2) the services developed implementation plans consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning for the retrograde and reset of operating forces. GAO reviewed DOD reports, interviewed officials, and assessed documents against those leading practices, which include elements similar to several of the requirements in section 324.
What GAO Found
In its response to the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, instead of developing new policies for retrograde and reset of operating forces used to support overseas contingency operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) relied on three existing guidance documents as its policy for retrograde and reset activities in support of overseas contingency operations. DOD's November 2014 report to congressional committees—issued in response to requirements in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014—states that three DOD guidance documents address the department's retrograde and reset efforts: the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and the Defense Planning Guidance. DOD officials told GAO that they believe the QDR and other documents provide the policy and guidance needed to inform the department's retrograde and reset efforts. However, GAO found that these documents do not include key elements for sound strategic management planning, such as a mission statement and long-term goals. Without a strategic policy for retrograde and reset that incorporates key elements of sound strategic management planning, DOD cannot ensure that its efforts provide the necessary strategic planning framework to inform the military services' plans for these efforts. Further, DOD emphasizes the use of consistent terms across departmental documents, but GAO found that DOD's guidance is not consistent in identifying what information to use in budget reporting on retrograde and reset activities. If DOD does not ensure the use of consistent information and descriptions in policy and other departmental documents used to inform budget estimates on retrograde and reset costs, Congress may not receive consistent and accurate information to make informed decisions concerning these efforts.
GAO found that the Marine Corps has published an implementation plan for the retrograde and reset of operating forces, but the Army, Navy and Air Force have not. In DOD's November 2014 report to congressional committees, DOD pointed to the specific planning activities undertaken by each service related to retrograde and reset. According to DOD officials, the services are responsible for developing their own implementation plans. The Marine Corps has an implementation plan for retrograde and reset, which is contained in two of its guidance documents, and largely meets all the elements of sound strategic management planning, some of which generally correspond to several of the requirements in section 324 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. However, the Army, Navy and Air Force either have not published implementation plans or have provided GAO with published documents or plans that did not include all elements of leading practices for sound strategic planning—such as strategies on how a goal will be achieved, how an organization will carry out its mission, and resources required to meet goals, among others. Without implementation plans that, among other things, articulate goals and strategies for retrograde and reset of equipment, Army, Navy, and Air Force efforts may not align with DOD-wide goals and strategies for retrograde and reset, reset-related maintenance costs may not be consistently included, and resources and funding for retrograde and reset may not be consistently or effectively budgeted or distributed within the services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish a strategic policy that includes key elements of leading practices; use consistent information and descriptions for budget reporting; and that the Army, Navy and Air Force develop implementation plans for their retrograde and reset efforts. DOD generally concurred with all three recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-1004T | gao_GAO-01-1004T_0 | The dramatic expansion in computer interconnectivity and the exponential increase in the use of the Internet are changing the way our government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. Operating system controls should limit the extent of information that systems provide to facilitate system interconnectivity. Poor Incident Detection and Response Capabilities Further Impair Security
As our government becomes increasingly dependent on information systems to support sensitive data and mission critical operations, it is essential that agencies protect these resources from misuse and disruption. However, Commerce's information security management program is not effective in any of these key elements. Commerce's information security policies are significantly outdated and incomplete. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses information security controls over computer systems at the Department of Commerce.
What GAO Found
Dramatic increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of the Internet, are revolutionizing the way the government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. However, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to the nation's computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. This testimony provides information on the effectiveness of Commerce's (1) logical access controls and other information system controls over its computerized data, (2) incident detection and response capabilities, and (3) information security management program and related procedures. |
gao_GAO-14-602 | gao_GAO-14-602_0 | USAID’s TCB Strategy Does Not Guide TCB Activities and Parts of It Are No Longer Current
TCB Activities in the Field Are Guided by Country- Specific Needs
According to USAID officials, development and implementation of TCB activities in the field are guided more by country-specific strategies that incorporate country needs, circumstances, and priorities than by USAID’s 2003 TCB strategy. According to USAID officials, the priorities presented in the TCB strategy—participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade agreements, and economic responsiveness to opportunities for trade— are still relevant and cover all TCB activities although the strategy has not been updated since 2003. It is generally accepted that strategies should be periodically updated to reflect the current environment. We also note that the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 requires agencies to update and revise their strategic plans at least every 4 years. USAID officials in Washington, D.C., told us that although they have had discussions about updating the strategy, they have not updated it because they question the costs and benefits of a new strategy given that trade resources are declining and because the priorities presented in the strategy still remain relevant, in their view. TCB also contributes to meeting goals outlined in USAID and State’s Joint Strategic Plan. USAID Uses Various Methods to Coordinate Trade Capacity Building Activities with Other Agencies
At Headquarters, USAID Participates in Coordinating Bodies and Uses Informal Dialogue to Coordinate TCB Activities
The 2003 strategy calls for USAID to be the primary coordinator for U.S. government TCB efforts, and we found that USAID headquarters staff participate in coordinating bodies, such as interagency working groups, and maintain ongoing discussions with relevant counterparts to coordinate TCB activities. One coordinating body USAID uses is the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), a USTR-chaired interagency working group that includes a broad range of stakeholders, meets multiple times a year, and has subcommittees focused on development and TCB. Moreover, we found that the strategy may not be as useful as it could be because it is outdated in several areas. For example, the coordination section of the strategy does not include all agencies now providing TCB assistance, the trade initiatives discussed in the strategy are no longer current, and the categories of TCB activities identified in the strategy have changed. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that USAID’s 2003 TCB strategy is as useful as it could be for informing TCB activities, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID update the strategy to reflect the current TCB environment. We did not receive comments from State or USTR. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 2003 strategy guides USAID’s trade capacity building (TCB) activities; (2) describe methods USAID uses to coordinate TCB efforts with other U.S. government agencies at home and abroad; and (3) describe how, if at all, USAID has used TCB evaluations in its program and project management. We primarily focused on TCB activities that USAID conducted because USAID provided the most funding of all U.S. agencies for TCB activities in 2012. A variety of U.S. agencies have a role in providing TCB assistance, including the Departments of State, the Army, Labor, the Treasury, and Commerce; the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); and USAID. Those four agreements benefit from TCB in their own categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since at least 2001, the United States has provided TCB assistance to developing countries to help them participate in and benefit from global trade. Multiple agencies provide this assistance, which may include support for World Trade Organization accession, customs procedures improvement, or development of infrastructure such as ports and roads. In this report, GAO focuses primarily on USAID because it provided the most funding for TCB in fiscal year 2012 and has a formal strategy focused entirely on TCB. GAO was asked to review the strategy, which is more than a decade old. GAO was also asked to examine USAID efforts to coordinate TCB activities to ensure that the United States is fulfilling its commitment in the most effective way.
In this report, GAO (1) determines the extent to which USAID's 2003 strategy guides USAID's TCB activities and (2) describes methods USAID uses to coordinate TCB efforts with other U.S. government agencies at home and abroad. GAO analyzed agency documents, interviewed relevant officials, and conducted fieldwork in six countries in Africa and Asia, selected for their diverse stages of development and geographic locations.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) 2003 trade capacity building (TCB) strategy does not directly guide TCB activities, and parts of the strategy no longer reflect the current TCB environment. USAID's TCB activities are primarily guided by country needs and many of these activities are elements of large development projects that have their own objectives. According to USAID, the strategy's priority areas—participation in trade negotiations, implementation of trade agreements, and economic responsiveness to opportunities for trade—remain relevant. However, some parts of the strategy are not current. For example, the strategy does not include discussion of how USAID should coordinate with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which did not exist in 2003 and is a major TCB contributor (see figure). USAID officials told GAO that they had not updated the strategy because they questioned the costs and benefits of doing so given that trade resources were declining and they believed the priorities presented in the strategy were still relevant. However, USAID is still committing significant resources to TCB, and TCB contributes to goals outlined in USAID and the Department of State's joint strategic plan. USAID's TCB strategy may not be as useful as it could be for informing TCB activities because parts of it are no longer current. Moreover, directives, such as those in the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010, can serve as guidance for periodic updating of strategic plans.
The 2003 strategy calls for USAID to be the primary coordinator for U.S. government TCB efforts, and GAO found that USAID coordinates TCB activities at home and abroad using a range of methods, including structured and informal dialogue between stakeholders. Specifically, USAID staff report that they participate in interagency working groups and maintain ongoing discussions with counterparts from other agencies to coordinate TCB activities. For example, at headquarters USAID participates in the Trade Policy Staff Committee, an interagency working group that includes a range of stakeholders and has subcommittees on development and TCB. In the countries GAO visited, GAO found that USAID missions coordinate TCB through formal mechanisms, such as working groups, as well as informal communication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID update the 2003 TCB strategy to reflect the current TCB environment. USAID agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-421 | gao_GAO-11-421_0 | DOD and U.S. Cyber Command Have Broadly Identified Roles and Responsibilities for Cyberspace Operations, but Additional Clarity Is Needed
DOD and U.S. Cyber Command have made progress in identifying the roles and responsibilities of the various organizations that support DOD cyberspace operations. Our analysis showed that U.S. Cyber Command’s Concept of Operations generally meets joint guidance, but a greater level of detail is needed with regard to the categories of personnel—military, government civilian, or civilian contractor—that may conduct cyberspace operations in order for the military services to organize, train, and equip operations forces. U.S. Cyber Command has developed a Concept of Operations. Accompanying annexes are expected to provide greater detail about the command’s plans to conduct cyberspace operations. However, DOD and service officials told us that DOD is still reviewing the appropriate roles for government civilians in the cyberspace domain and service officials indicated that DOD policy guidance was insufficient to determine precisely what civilian activities or duties are permissible or prohibited in the cyberspace domain as direct participation in hostilities. Certain Specific Command and Control Relationships for Cyberspace Operations Remain Unresolved
U.S. Cyber Command’s Concept of Operations generally describes the command and control relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the other combatant commands; however, more detailed guidance is needed to clarify these relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant commands. U.S. Cyber Command’s Concept of Operations recognizes that a majority of cyber operations will originate at the theater and local levels, thereby placing them under the immediate control of the geographic combatant commanders and their components, and recognizes that nearly all cyberspace operations can simultaneously affect the global, theater, and local levels because cyberspace operations can be virtually unconstrained by geography. However, officials from all four of the military services told us they require further specificity regarding command and control relationships for cyberspace operations, and officials from U.S. Cyber Command agreed. Military Services Are Pursuing Diverse Service-Specific Approaches in the Absence of Information on Long- Term Mission Requirements and Capabilities Needs
The military services are pursuing diverse service-specific approaches to establishing cyberspace capabilities because, although U.S. Cyber Command has made progress in operational planning for its missions, it has not fully defined long-term mission requirements and capabilities for the military services to fulfill. To guide the services’ efforts to organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to combatant commands, DOD’s guidance requires that combatant commanders provide mission requirements that the services should meet. However, U.S. Cyber Command has not yet developed the next level of planning guidance, which would identify mission requirements and desired capabilities to guide the services’ efforts to recruit, train, and provide forces with appropriate skill sets. To assist the military services in fulfilling their responsibilities to organize, train, and equip cyber forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense set a timeline and direct the: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the DOD Office of General Counsel, to develop and publish detailed policies and guidance pertaining to categories of personnel that can conduct the various forms of cyberspace operations; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and publish authoritative and specific guidance regarding the supporting and supported command and control relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant commands for cyberspace operations; and Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in conjunction with U.S. Cyber Command, to develop and publish authoritative and specific guidance regarding the mission requirements and capabilities, including skill sets, that the services should meet to provide long-term operational support to U.S. Cyber Command. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Objectives
This report addresses the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Cyber Command have identified for the military services (1) roles and responsibilities including categories of personnel that can conduct various cyberspace operations; (2) command and control relationships, to include the geographic combatant commands; and (3) mission requirements and capabilities in support of U.S. Cyber Command to enable them to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. military depends heavily on computer networks, and potential adversaries see cyberwarfare as an opportunity to pose a significant threat at low cost---a few programmers could cripple an entire information system. The Department of Defense (DOD) created U.S. Cyber Command to counter cyber threats, and tasked the military services with providing support. GAO examined the extent to which DOD and U.S. Cyber Command have identified for the military services the (1) roles and responsibilities, (2) command and control relationships, and (3) mission requirements and capabilities to enable them to organize, train, and equip for cyberspace operations. GAO reviewed relevant plans, policies, and guidance, and interviewed key DOD and military service officials regarding cyberspace operations.
What GAO Found
DOD and U.S. Cyber Command have made progress in identifying the roles and responsibilities of the organizations that support DOD cyberspace operations, but additional detail and clarity is needed. GAO's analysis of U.S. Cyber Command's November 2010 Concept of Operations showed that it generally meets joint guidance and maps out U.S. Cyber Command's organizational and operational relationships in general terms. However, greater specificity is needed as to the categories of personnel that can conduct various types of cyberspace operations in order for the military services to organize, train, and equip cyber forces. The services may use military, civilian government, and contractor personnel to conduct cyberspace operations, and U.S. Cyber Command's Concept of Operations describes general roles and responsibilities for cyberspace operations performed by U.S. Cyber Command's directorates, the military services, and the respective service components. However, service officials indicated that DOD guidance was insufficient to determine precisely what civilian activities are permissible for certain cyber activities, that DOD is still reviewing the appropriate roles for government civilians in this domain, and that the military services may be constrained by limits on their total number of uniformed personnel, among other things. Without the specific guidance, the services may in the future have difficulty in meeting personnel needs for certain types of cyber forces. U.S. Cyber Command's Concept of Operations generally describes the command and control relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant commands, but additional specificity would enable the military services to better plan their support for DOD cyberspace operations. DOD guidance calls for command and control relationships to be identified in the planning process. The Concept of Operations recognizes that a majority of cyberspace operations will originate at the theater and local levels, placing them under the immediate control of the geographic combatant commanders and requiring U.S. Cyber Command to provide cyberspace operations support. However, officials from the four military services cited a need for additional specificity as to command and control relationships for cyberspace operations between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant commands, to enable them to provide forces to the appropriate command. DOD recognizes this challenge in command and control and is conducting exercises and studies to work toward its resolution. U.S. Cyber Command has made progress in operational planning for its missions but has not fully defined long-term mission requirements and desired capabilities to guide the services' efforts to recruit, train, and provide forces with appropriate skill sets. DOD guidance requires that combatant commanders provide mission requirements the services can use in plans to organize, train, and equip their forces. However, GAO determined that in the absence of detailed direction from U.S. Strategic Command, the services are using disparate, service-specific approaches to organize, train, and equip forces for cyberspace operations, and these approaches may not enable them to meet U.S. Cyber Command's mission needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD set a timeline to develop and publish specific guidance regarding U.S. Cyber Command and its service components' cyberspace operations, including: (1) categories of personnel that can conduct various cyberspace operations; (2) command and control relationships between U.S. Cyber Command and the geographic combatant commands; and (3) mission requirements and capabilities, including skill sets, the services must meet to provide longterm operational support to the command. DOD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-423T | gao_GAO-09-423T_0 | High Quality Emissions Data are Critical to the Integrity of Programs Intended to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The domestic and international experiences with market-based air pollution control and climate change programs demonstrate that comprehensive and accurate information on emissions is critical to a program’s success. Since 1995, the United States has operated a cap-and- trade program to limit sulfur dioxide emissions, an air pollutant that contributes to acid rain, from electric utilities. Prior GAO reports and independent studies have shown that strong data collection, monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements have been central to this program’s success. The European Union also has experience implementing a cap-and-trade program that illustrates the importance of quality data in a market-based system. As discussed in our November 2008 report, the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) relies on a cap-and-trade model similar to that used in the U.S. acid rain program. While the first phase provided key lessons about emissions trading, its cumulative effect on emissions is uncertain because of a lack of baseline emissions data. In the first phase, each EU member state had to identify which entities to regulate under the ETS (such as power plants, oil refineries, and other manufacturing facilities), obtain baseline emissions data for the covered entities, establish an emissions cap, and determine how many allowances to distribute to each covered entity. The lack of facility-specific baseline data also affected the price of ETS allowances. In 2006, the release of emissions data revealed that the supply of allowances—the cap—exceeded the demand, and the allowance price collapsed. These data can be used to estimate economy-wide carbon dioxide emissions as well as facility-specific data on carbon dioxide emissions from certain industrial sectors, such as power plants that have participated in the US sulfur dioxide emissions trading program. Collecting Reliable Data on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Involves Key Considerations. Monitoring, reporting, and verification needs for reliable data on greenhouse gas emissions depend first on the purpose and intended use of the data; for example, the data required for a mandatory program to limit emissions may vary substantially from that required for a business or governmental entity that voluntarily tracks its emissions for public relations or other purposes. monitoring, reporting, and verification activities—is determined by the program’s point of regulation. An upstream mitigation program would affect a relatively small population of regulated entities, such as fuel importers and producers, whose products could be less difficult to measure and report. However, other regulated entities may face greater challenges in determining their emissions due to limited monitoring data or a lack of reliable emissions factors. Furthermore, the data requirements for a mitigation program become more complex and challenging as the number and types of covered activities increases. Of the six primary greenhouse gases, emissions of some are better characterized than others. In some cases, existing emissions inventories and registries that have been developed for a variety of purposes could help regulated entities in meeting potential requirements to establish baseline emissions levels and monitor, verify, and report their ongoing emissions. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency prepares an official U.S. greenhouse gas inventory each year to comply with its commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This inventory provides national information on the activities that cause emissions and removals, as well as background on the methods used to make the calculations. In addition to the U.S. inventory, multi-state emissions reduction programs, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a regulatory program targeting reductions in carbon dioxide from electricity generators, have developed emissions inventories to guide their programs. These existing inventories and registries could assist in the development of a mandatory emissions reduction program. Other emissions inventories and registries developed by government and private entities also provide a useful starting point for understanding data requirements for establishing emissions baselines and monitoring, verifying, and reporting greenhouse gas emissions. For example, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, a widely-used international accounting system for quantifying and managing greenhouse gas emissions, has developed accounting and reporting standards that are compatible with most greenhouse gas inventory programs. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Elevated levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the resulting effects on the earth's climate could have significant impacts in the United States and internationally. Potential impacts include a change in sea levels, ecosystems, and ice cover. The United States Congress is considering proposals to limit greenhouse gas emissions using market-based mechanisms that would place a price on emissions. Such programs would create an economic incentive for regulated entities to limit their emissions. Limiting greenhouse gas emissions requires an understanding of existing emissions as well as the development of a program to monitor, report, and verify emissions from entities that might be affected by a future regulatory program. A greenhouse gas mitigation program also requires an understanding of the numerous emissions sources and methods for calculating emissions of six major greenhouse gases--carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and several synthetic gases. This testimony focuses on (1) the importance of quality data on emissions in the context of a program intended to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and (2) key considerations in developing reliable data on greenhouse gas emissions. This testimony is based on several prior GAO reports and a review of related literature.
What GAO Found
Quality data on emissions are essential to the development and implementation of a system intended to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Domestic and international experiences with cap-and-trade programs, which place a price on emissions, demonstrate the importance of data quality in establishing baselines, monitoring results, and maintaining the integrity of a program. Existing cap-and-trade programs establish an overall allowable level of emissions and distribute allowances to regulated entities, which in turn are able to buy or sell excess allowances. The United States has operated a cap-and-trade program to limit emissions of sulfur dioxide--a pollutant that contributes to acid rain-- from electric utilities since 1995. Based on prior GAO work and independent studies, the program has benefited from the development of an accurate emissions baseline for regulated entities as well as strong monitoring, verification, and reporting requirements. The European Union has also employed a cap-and-trade system to limit emissions of carbon dioxide--the most prevalent greenhouse gas--from electricity generators and certain industrial sectors since 2005. In November 2008, GAO reported that the program has faced challenges because of a lack of facility-specific data on baseline emissions. While the program has addressed many of these challenges, the European Union's experience demonstrates the importance of data quality in establishing a market-based program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Key considerations in developing reliable data on greenhouse gas emissions revolve primarily around the purpose and intended use of the data. In cases where the data are used to develop or implement a program to limit emissions, key considerations include (1) the scope of the program across emissions sources, such as whether it affects all emission-producing activities or a specified subgroup, and (2) the program's coverage across the six primary greenhouse gases. These considerations depend on the point of regulation--namely, whether the program affects a small number of "upstream" emitters such as fossil fuel producers and importers or instead affects smaller "downstream" emitters such as individual industrial facilities. Overall, the challenges in establishing baseline emissions data, as well as in monitoring, reporting, and verifying ongoing emissions will increase as the number of regulated entities, activities, and greenhouse gases increase. In some cases, existing emissions inventories (typically at the national, state, or industrial sector level) and registries (typically at the facility or project level) provide a starting point for understanding the challenges in establishing baselines and tracking emissions over time. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency maintains an official U.S. emissions inventory that provides national-level emissions data and background on methods to calculate emissions. In addition, several inventories and registries maintained at the regional level or by private and nonprofit entities provide a useful starting point for understanding data needs and developing standards for monitoring, reporting, and verification. |
gao_T-GGD-96-100 | gao_T-GGD-96-100_0 | Tax System: Issues in Tax Compliance Burden
Mr. Chairman, Representative Shadegg, and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss with the Subcommittee the results of work done on the burden that business and individual taxpayers face in complying with federal tax requirements. Finally, reducing the compliance burden on businesses and individual taxpayers will be a difficult undertaking because of the various policy trade-offs, such as revenue and taxpayer equity, that must be made. Complexities in the code can also result in the need to complete time-consuming calculations. IRS’ Administration of the Tax Code
Some business officials and tax experts also cited IRS’ administration of the federal tax code as contributing to business compliance burden, although to a lesser extent than the complexity of and frequent changes to the code. The Challenge of Reducing Business Tax Compliance Burden
While we did not identify existing reliable business tax burden cost estimates, there was consensus among the business respondents, tax experts, and the literature that tax compliance burden is significant and that it can be reduced. However, employers would face substantial additional burden and costs under the final withholding system and the tax preparation industry could be adversely affected under either system. encountered while complying with federal, state, and local tax systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed business and individual taxpayers' federal tax compliance burden.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the compliance burden is due to the tax code's complexity, ambiguous language, and frequent changes; (2) many businesses are uncertain about what they must do to comply with the code; (3) recordkeeping, time-consuming calculations, the interplay of state and local tax requirements, and Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) administration of the tax code add to the burden; (4) estimating businesses' tax compliance burden and costs would be difficult, since businesses do not collect the data needed to make reliable cost estimates of their compliance; (5) the greatest reduction in the tax compliance burden could be gained by simplifying the tax code; (6) return-free filing alternatives used in other countries could reduce individual taxpayers' tax compliance and IRS administrative burdens, but employers, tax preparers, and state tax systems could be further burdened or adversely affected; and (7) reducing businesses' and individuals' tax compliance burdens will be difficult because of tax policy tradeoffs, such as revenue, equity, and social and economic issues. |
gao_GAO-01-775T | gao_GAO-01-775T_0 | FDA enforces compliance with its regulations through on-site inspections of IRBs, clinical investigators, and sponsors. To address these concerns about authority and autonomy, HHS established OHRP in the Office of the HHS Secretary, Office of Public Health and Science in June 2000, enhancing the status and visibility of human subjects protection activities. Recent and Planned Protection Efforts Involve Strengthening Oversight Performed by Research Institutions
HHS has taken some actions to improve the review and monitoring of clinical trials by research institutions. HHS has taken several recent actions to inform investigators about human subjects protection policies and practices. Concerns Remain Regarding the Pace and Scope of HHS’ Actions to Protect Human Subjects
Although problems with the oversight of human subjects protection have received increasing attention since the 1990s, it is only recently that HHS has made a concerted effort to address these issues. At the research institution level, HHS’ efforts to support IRBs and enhance their performance appear promising, but the subject of financing IRBs remains largely unexplored. | What GAO Found
At the federal level the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is seeking to better protect human subjects in biomedical research by enhancing the visibility of its human subjects protection activities, improving its monitoring of compliance with relevant regulations by institutions and investigators, and strengthening enforcement of those regulations. HHS has also issued new guidance and is collecting information to improve oversight and monitoring at the institutional level. HHS activities directed at the investigator level consist largely of educational efforts to heighten investigators' awareness of and compliance with ethical policies and practices in conducting research. Overall, HHS' actions appear promising, but GAO has some concerns about the pace and scope of HHS' efforts to ensure the safety and protection of participants in clinical trials. |
gao_GAO-06-915T | gao_GAO-06-915T_0 | Background
In late 2003, recognizing that the current approach to managing air transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete, Congress created JPDO to plan NGATS, a system intended to accommodate the threefold increase in air traffic demand expected by 2025. For example, the Department of Defense has deployed “network centric” systems, originally developed for the battlefield, that are being considered as a conceptual framework to provide all users of the national airspace system—FAA and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security— with a common view of that system. The Director of JPDO reports to the FAA Administrator and to the Chief Operating Officer within ATO. JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning for NGATS
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with the requirements of Vision 100 and with several practices that our work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and enterprise architecture development. This framework includes an integrated plan, an organizational structure, and an enterprise architecture. This structure includes a federal interagency policy committee, an institute for nonfederal stakeholders, and integrated product teams (IPT) that bring together federal and nonfederal experts to plan for and coordinate the development of technologies that will address JPDO’s eight broad strategies. JPDO’s senior policy committee was formed and is headed by the Secretary of Transportation, as required in Vision 100. Figure 1 shows JPDO’s position within FAA and the JPDO structures that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the Institute and the IPTs. JPDO Faces Leadership, Resource, and Commitment Challenges as It Moves Forward with Planning for NGATS
JPDO faces several challenges in planning for NGATS, including addressing leadership vacancies, leveraging resources and expertise from its partner agencies, and convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the government is fully committed to NGATS. Our work has shown that, to overcome barriers to interagency coordination, committed leadership by individuals at the top of all involved organizations is critical. First, JPDO’s partner agencies have a variety of missions and priorities in addition to NGATS, and their priorities may change. Second, JPDO may have difficulty leveraging its partner agencies’ resources and expertise because it does not yet have formal, long-term agreements with the agencies on their roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. FAA Faces Institutionalization, Expertise, and Resource Challenges as It Transitions to NGATS
FAA faces challenges in implementing NGATS, including institutionalizing recent improvements in its management and acquisition processes, acquiring expertise to implement highly complex systems, and achieving cost savings to help fund NGATS technologies. Despite Recent Process Improvements, FAA Faces Challenges in Obtaining the Expertise Needed to Implement a System as Complex as NGATS
In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to shortfalls in FAA’s management of ATC modernization projects. Recognizing the complexity of the NGATS implementation effort and the possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for supplementing FAA’s capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The health of our nation's air transportation system is critical to our citizens and economy. However, the current approach to managing air transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a transformation from the current air traffic control (ATC) system to the "next generation air transportation system" (NGATS). Housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), JPDO has seven partner agencies that make up JPDO's senior policy committee: the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. This testimony, which provides preliminary results from GAO's ongoing work on JPDO, provides information on (1) the status of JPDO's efforts to plan for NGATS, (2) the key challenges facing JPDO as it moves forward with its planning efforts, and (3) the key challenges facing FAA as it implements the transformation while continuing its current operations. The statement is based on GAO's analysis of JPDO documents, interviews, and the views of a panel of experts, as well as on past GAO work.
What GAO Found
JPDO has developed a framework for planning and coordination with its federal partner agencies and nonfederal stakeholders that is consistent with the requirements of its authorizing legislation--Vision 100--and with several practices that our previous work has shown can facilitate federal interagency collaboration and the development of an enterprise architecture (i.e., system blueprint). JPDO's framework includes an integrated plan that provides a vision for NGATS, an organizational structure and processes for leveraging the resources and expertise of federal and nonfederal stakeholders, and an enterprise architecture that defines the specific requirements for NGATS. As JPDO moves forward, it will face leadership, leveraging, and commitment challenges. Currently, JPDO lacks a permanent director and a permanent chairperson of its senior policy committee to provide the leadership needed to overcome barriers to interagency coordination. In addition, despite early successes, JPDO may have difficulty continuing to leverage its partner agencies' resources and expertise for NGATS because these agencies have missions and priorities in addition to NGATS and JPDO does not yet have signed, long-term agreements with the partner agencies on their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, JPDO faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the government is fully committed to implementing NGATS, given that, in some instances, it has discontinued work on new technologies for the national airspace system. FAA faces challenges in institutionalizing recent improvements in its management and acquisition processes, as well as in obtaining the expertise and resources necessary to implement NGATS. First, institutionalizing FAA's process improvements is critical to successfully implementing NGATS. Second, FAA may lack the expertise needed to manage the NGATS effort. GAO has identified two potential approaches for FAA to supplement its capabilities that FAA is considering. Third, achieving cost savings is critical to funding the implementation of NGATS. |
gao_GAO-13-515 | gao_GAO-13-515_0 | IRS Issued Most 2012 Refunds Months Before Receiving Information Returns and Matching Them to Tax Returns
Consistent with IRS’s practice of issuing refunds promptly after a return is filed, IRS issued 50 percent of 2012 refunds for tax year 2011 to individual taxpayers by the end of February, at which point only 3 percent of all information returns had been received. While amendment rates for most information returns were low for tax year 2011, they still represented millions of returns. On Average, More Than a Year Passes Before IRS Notifies Taxpayers of Matching Discrepancies
For 2010 income tax returns which were filed starting in 2011, IRS took over 1 year (388 days), on average, to notify taxpayers about AUR discrepancies. IRS Is Generally Following Leading Practices in Its Exploratory Efforts, but Has Not Developed a Timeline or Risk Management Framework
IRS Is Exploring Options Before Deciding Whether to Pursue Real Time Tax
IRS officials and the planning documents they have developed make it clear that Real Time Tax is an exploratory effort. Officials noted that IRS management views Real Time Tax as a broad goal, and the core team did not set milestone dates to avoid causing concern among the stakeholder community that IRS has already decided on a path for Real Time Tax. Without a timeline for the overall exploratory effort, planning may go on endlessly, and IRS cannot know if its efforts are on track or will be completed in even the broad time frames IRS is considering. In addition, Congress may not be able to determine what legislative action may be needed. IRS officials stated that managing risk is a high priority for IRS, but while they have documented potential risks to Phase 2 testing, they have not developed an overall risk management framework for Real Time Tax. IRS officials plan to further develop the risk strategy if IRS decides to pursue Real Time Tax. Without systematically identifying and evaluating the risks of Real Time Tax options, IRS officials may miss critical factors that could complicate the effort, including the potential costs to IRS, taxpayers, and other stakeholders. For an effort that cuts across as many IRS functions as Real Time Tax and will likely take years to implement, a record of prior risk analyses could help prevent unnecessarily repeating the same analyses. Recommendations for Executive Action
Recognizing IRS’s exploratory efforts are in their early stages and the Real Time Tax concept will likely evolve over time, we recommend the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following actions to help ensure managers are able to assess the progress of exploratory efforts and have the information needed to weigh the potential risks, costs, and benefits of options: Identify time frames for the Real Time Tax exploratory effort’s critical phases and essential activities. In written comments, reproduced in appendix V, IRS agreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix describes our methodology for addressing the following objectives: (1) describe when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) receives and matches individual tax and information returns and (2) assess the extent to which IRS is following leading practices for managing an exploratory effort of this importance at IRS. To describe when IRS receives and matches individual tax and information returns, we reviewed IRS documents and guidance, including the Internal Revenue Manual and IRS information return forms. | Why GAO Did This Study
For tax year 2011, IRS matched over 140 million individual income tax returns against the 1.6 billion information returns it received from third parties such as employers. Generally, this match does not occur until well after refunds are issued. In early 2011 the then IRS Commissioner outlined a vision for a "Real Time Tax" system--a strategy to improve verification by matching third party information to income tax returns before refunds are issued, and IRS began exploring options for Real Time Tax later that year. GAO was asked to review IRS's strategy for exploring Real Time Tax. This report (1) describes when IRS receives and matches individual tax and information returns and (2) assesses the extent to which IRS is following leading practices for managing an exploratory effort of this importance. GAO reviewed IRS documents and guidance, including the Internal Revenue Manual, information return forms, and drafts of Real Time Tax planning documents. GAO generated descriptive data on the timing and volume of 25 information returns using IRS's Compliance Data Warehouse database. GAO identified leading practices on planning new initiatives at IRS using past GAO reports, internal control standards, and IRS documents.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) receives few information returns before issuing most tax refunds. In 2012, IRS issued 50 percent of tax year 2011 refunds to individuals by the end of February, but had only received 3 percent of information returns. Most information returns are not received by IRS until after mid-April, and IRS conducts the first match of tax and information returns in July, with subsequent matches in February and May of the following year. For tax year 2010, over a year passed on average before IRS notified taxpayers of matching discrepancies, and IRS recognizes that this long time lag burdens taxpayers.
IRS is generally following leading practices in its Real Time Tax exploratory effort by, for example, dedicating a team and defining program goals. IRS did not develop an overall timeline because management views Real Time Tax as a broad goal, and officials wanted to avoid causing concern that IRS had already decided on a path. Without a timeline for the overall exploratory effort, IRS cannot know if its efforts will be completed in even the broad time frames IRS is considering, and Congress may not be able to determine what legislative action might be required. IRS officials stated that managing risk is a high priority, but they have not developed an overall risk management framework, as they are still in the early stages of the exploratory effort. They said they plan to further develop the strategy if IRS pursues Real Time Tax. Without systematically identifying and evaluating the risks of Real Time Tax options, IRS officials may miss critical factors that could complicate the effort. A record of prior risk analyses could help prevent unnecessarily repeating the same analyses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends IRS identify time frames for the exploratory effort's critical phases and activities and develop a risk management framework for Real Time Tax. IRS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-956T | gao_GAO-09-956T_0 | Successes and Challenges of the SBIR Program
Our reviews of the SBIR program between 1985 and 1999 found numerous examples of program successes such as the following: Funding high-quality research. Throughout the life of the program, awards have been based on technical merit and are generally of good quality. The SBIR program successfully attracts many qualified companies, has had a high level of competition, consistently has had a high number of first-time participants, and attracts hundreds of new companies annually. SBIR agencies consistently reach out to foster participation by women-owned or socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses by participating in regional small business conferences and workshops targeting these types of small businesses. At various points in the life of the program we have reported that SBIR has succeeded in increasing private sector commercialization of innovations. SBIR has helped serve agencies’ missions and R&D needs, although we found that agencies differ in the emphasis they place on funding research to support their mission versus more generalized research. Our reviews of the SBIR program during that time have also identified a number of areas of weakness that, over time, have been either fully or partially addressed by the Congress in reauthorizing the program or by the agencies themselves. The FAST Program was not reauthorized when it expired in 2005. SBIR Tech-Net Database Limitations
Many of the solutions cited above to improve and strengthen the SBIR program relied to some extent on the collection of data or the establishment of a government-use database, so that SBA and participating agencies could share information and enhance their efforts to monitor and evaluate the program. However, in 2006, we reported that SBA was 5 years behind schedule in complying with the congressional mandate to develop a government database that could facilitate agencies’ monitoring and evaluation of the program. We also reported that the information SBA was collecting for the database was incomplete and inconsistent, thereby limiting its usefulness for program evaluations. According to an SBA official, the database is currently operational and agencies have entered data for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 over the Internet. Agencies Focus on Select Awardee Eligibility Criteria
In 2006, we also found that SBA and some participating agencies focused on a few select criteria for determining applicants’ eligibility for SBIR awards. Specifically, we reviewed DOD’s, NIH’s, and SBA’s processes to determine eligibility of applicants for the SBIR program and found that they focused largely on three SBIR criteria in their eligibility reviews— ownership, size in terms of the number of employees, and for-profit status of SBIR applicants. Moreover, we found that both NIH and DOD largely relied on applicants to self-certify that they met all of the SBIR eligibility criteria as part of their SBIR applications. In some cases the agencies made additional efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information applicants provided when they observed certain discrepancies in the applications. In 2006, we reported that when officials at the agencies had unresolved concerns about the accuracy of an applicant’s eligibility information, they referred the matter to SBA to make an eligibility determination. Although, SBA made the information about firms it found ineligible publicly available on its Web site so that all participating agencies and the public could access the information, we found that it did not consistently include information on the Web site identifying whether or not the determination was for the SBIR program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 established the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR) to stimulate technological innovation, use small businesses to meet federal research and development (R&D) needs, foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D. Since the program's inception, GAO has conducted numerous reviews of the SBIR program. This statement summarizes GAO's past findings on the SBIR program's (1) successes and challenges, (2) data collection issues that affect program monitoring and evaluation, and (3) how agencies make eligibility determinations for the program. GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement.
What GAO Found
Between July 1985 and June 1999, GAO found that the SBIR program was achieving its goals to enhance the role of small businesses in federal R&D, stimulate commercialization of research results, and support the participation of small businesses owned by women and/or disadvantaged persons. More specifically, GAO found that throughout the life of the program, awards have been based on technical merit and are generally of good quality. In addition, the SBIR program successfully attracts many qualified companies, has had a high level of competition, consistently has had a high number of first-time participants, and attracts hundreds of new companies annually. Further, SBIR has helped serve agencies' missions and R&D needs; although GAO found that agencies differ in the emphasis they place on funding research to support their mission versus more generalized research. During these reviews GAO also identified areas of weakness and made recommendations that could strengthen the program further. Many of these recommendations have been either fully or partially addressed by the Congress in various reauthorizations of the program or by the agencies themselves. For example, in 2005, GAO found that the issue of how to assess the performance of the SBIR program remains somewhat unresolved after almost two decades, and identified data and information gaps that make assessment of the SBIR program a challenge. Many of the solutions to improve the SBIR program could be addressed, in part, by collecting better data and establishing a government-use database, so that SBA and participating agencies can share information and enhance their efforts to monitor and evaluate the program. However, in 2006, GAO reported that SBA was 5 years behind schedule in complying with a congressional mandate to develop a government-use database that could facilitate agencies' monitoring and evaluation efforts. Moreover, the information that SBA was collecting for the database was incomplete and inconsistent, thereby limiting its usefulness. In 2006, SBA told GAO that it expected to have the government-use database operational early in fiscal year 2007. However, the database did not become operational until October 2008 and currently contains 2 years of new data, according to an SBA official. The database also does not permit information to be entered in an inconsistent format. In 2006, GAO also found that SBA, NIH, and DOD focus on a few select criteria to determine the eligibility of applicants for SBIR awards. GAO reported that both NIH and DOD largely relied on applicants to self-certify that they met all of the SBIR eligibility criteria as part of their SBIR applications, although both made additional efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information when they observed discrepancies in the applications. When the agencies were unable to verify the eligibility of an applicant, they referred the application to SBA for an eligibility determination. GAO found that when SBA finds an applicant to be ineligible for the SBIR program, it places this information on its Web site but does not consistently identify that the ineligibility determination was made for the SBIR program. |
gao_GAO-04-586 | gao_GAO-04-586_0 | However, DHS does not have current life cycle costs or a current cost/benefit analysis for US-VISIT. Observations on the Expenditure Plan
Our observations recognize accomplishments to date and address the need for rigorous and disciplined program management practices relating to system testing, independent verification and validation, and system change control. An overview of specific observations follows: Increment 1 commitments were largely met. An initial operating capability for entry (including biographic and biometric data collection) was deployed to 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry on January 5, 2004, with additional capabilities deployed on February 11, 2004. Increment 1 testing was not managed effectively and was completed after the system became operational. The department developed multiple plans, and only the final plan, which was done after testing was completed, included all required content, such as tests to be performed and test procedures. Plans for future US-VISIT increments do not call for additional staff or facilities at land ports of entry. Conclusions
The fiscal year 2004 US-VISIT expenditure plan (with related program office documentation and representations) at least partially satisfies the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress. In particular, the program office did not employ the kind of rigorous and disciplined management controls that are typically associated with successful programs, such as effective test management and configuration management practices. These controls, while significant for the initial phases of US-VISIT, are even more critical for the later phases, because the size and complexity of the program will only increase, and the later that problems are found, the harder and more costly they are to fix. Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations
Introduction
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a governmentwide program to collect, maintain, and share information on foreign nationals. Meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements
established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including OMB Circular A-11, part 3.2 Complies with DHS’s enterprise architecture. US-VISIT has developed a draft risk management plan and a process to implement and manage risks. The plan satisfies the requirement that it be reviewed by GAO. DHS has established a three-entity governance structure. According to its charter, the Advisory Board provides recommendations for overseeing US-VISIT management and performance activities, including providing advice on the overarching US-VISIT vision; recommending the overall US-VISIT strategy and its responsiveness to all operational missions, both within DHS and with its participating government agencies; recommending changes to the US-VISIT vision and strategic direction; providing a communication link for aligning strategic direction, priorities, and resources with stakeholder operations; reviewing and assessing US-VISIT programwide institutional processes to ensure that business, fiscal, and technical priorities are integrated and carried out in accordance with established priorities; and reviewing and recommending new US-VISIT program initiatives, including the scope, funding, and programmatic resources required. Among other things, this includes developing effective test plans to guide the testing activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who travel to the United States. By congressional mandate, DHS is to develop and submit for approval an expenditure plan for US-VISIT that satisfies certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. Among other things, GAO was asked to determine whether the plan satisfied these conditions, and to provide observations on the plan and DHS's program management.
What GAO Found
DHS's fiscal year 2004 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related documentation at least partially satisfies all conditions imposed by the Congress, including meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). DHS developed a draft risk management plan and a process to implement and manage risks. However, DHS does not have a current life cycle cost estimate or a cost/benefit analysis for US-VISIT. The US-VISIT program merges four components into one integrated whole to carry out its mission. GAO also developed a number of observations about the expenditure plan and DHS's management of the program. These generally recognize accomplishments to date and address the need for rigorous and disciplined program practices. US-VISIT largely met its commitments for implementing an initial operating capability, known as Increment 1, in early January 2004, including the deployment of entry capability to 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry. However, DHS has not employed rigorous, disciplined management controls typically associated with successful programs, such as test management, and its plans for implementing other controls, such as independent verification and validation, may not prove effective. More specifically, testing of the initial phase of the implemented system was not well managed and was completed after the system became operational. In addition, multiple test plans were developed during testing, and only the final test plan, completed after testing, included all required content, such as describing tests to be performed. Such controls, while significant for the initial phases of US-VISIT, are even more critical for the later phases, as the size and complexity of the program will only increase. Finally, DHS's plans for future US-VISIT resource needs at the land ports of entry, such as staff and facilities, are based on questionable assumptions, making future resource needs uncertain. |
gao_T-GGD-98-79 | gao_T-GGD-98-79_0 | Personal Bankruptcy: the Credit Research Center and Ernst & Young Reports on Debtors’ Ability to Pay
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of the Credit Research Center (the Center) report on personal bankruptcy debtors’ ability to pay their debts and share with you our observations on the February 1998 Ernst & Young report that also examines debtors’ ability to pay. Both studies share two fundamental assumptions: (1) that the information found on debtors’ initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts was accurate; and (2) that this information could be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors’ income and expenses for a 5-year period. These assumptions have been the subject of considerable debate, and the researchers did not test their validity. With regard to the first assumption, the accuracy of the data in bankruptcy petitioners’ initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts is unknown. However, both reports also stated that to the extent the data in the schedules were not accurate, the data would probably understate the income debtors have available for debt repayment. Neither report allowed for situations in which the debtor’s income decreases or expenses increase during the 5-year period. Differences Between the Two Reports
One difference between the two reports involves the calculation of debtor expenses. A third difference between the reports involves assumptions about repayment of secured, nonhousing debt. March 1998 Ernst & Young Report
On March 10, 1998 we received an Ernst & Young report that used a national sample of chapter 7 petitions from calendar year 1997 to estimate debtors’ ability to pay. Although we have not had an opportunity to examine this report in detail, the report appears to have addressed many of the sampling issues we raised regarding the Center report and February 1998 Ernst & Young report. However, the March 1998 Ernst & Young report shares the fundamental unvalidated assumptions of the Credit Center report and the February 1998 Ernst & Young report. These assumptions include (1) the data reported on debtors’ schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts are accurate; (2) the data in these schedules can be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors’ income and expenses for a 5-year period; (3) that 100 percent of debtors’ net income after expenses, as determined in the report, will be used for debt repayment over a 5-year repayment period; and (4) that all debtors will satisfactorily complete their 5-year repayment plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its review of the Credit Research Center report on personal bankruptcy debtors' ability to pay their debts and observations on the February 1998 Ernst & Young report that also examines debtors' ability to pay.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) both studies share two fundamental assumptions that: (a) the information found in debtors' initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debts is accurate; and (b) this information could be used to satisfactorily forecast debtors' income and expenses for a 5-year period; (2) these assumptions have been subject of considerable debate, and the researchers did not test their validity; (3) with regard to the first assumption, the accuracy of the data in bankruptcy petitioners' initial schedules of estimated income, estimated expenses, and debt is unknown; (4) however, both reports also stated that to the extent the data in the schedules were not accurate, the data would probably understate the income debtors have available for debt repayment; (5) with regard to the second assumption, there is also no empirical basis for assuming that debtors' income and expenses, as stated in their initial schedules, would remain stable for a 5-year period following the filing of their bankruptcy petitions; (6) these two assumption--debtors' income and expenses remain stable and all repayment plans would be successfully completed--could result in a somewhat optimistic estimate of debt repayment; (7) neither report allowed for situations in which the debtor's income decreases or expenses increase during the 5-year period; (8) one difference between the two reports involve the calculation of debtor expenses; (9) a second difference between the two reports involves the calculation of mortgage debt and family size; (10) a third difference between the reports involves assumptions about repayment of secured, nonhousing debt; (11) on March 10, 1998, GAO received an Ernst & Young report that used a national sample of chapter 7 petitions from calendar year 1997 to estimate debtors' ability to pay; (12) the report appears to have addressed many of the sampling issues GAO raised regarding the Center report and February 1998 Ernst & Young report; and (13) however, the March 1998 Ernst & Young report shares the fundamental unvalidated assumptions of the Credit Center report and the February 1998 Ernst & Young report. |
gao_GAO-08-1060 | gao_GAO-08-1060_0 | JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting Needs
While JCIDS is intended to determine needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective, capability needs continue to be proposed and defined primarily by the military services, with little involvement from the joint community—including the COCOMs, which plan and implement military operations. In addition, virtually all of the proposals for new capability needs and weapon system solutions completing the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy, taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need. Such a protracted process further undermines the department’s efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near term. By continuing to rely on stovepiped solutions to address capability needs, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. Adding to a portfolio that already contains more programs than resources can support is likely to perpetuate instability and poor outcomes in weapon system programs. The lack of early prioritization of capability needs through JCIDS makes it difficult for DOD to balance its portfolio of weapons programs. During the same time frame, the remaining costs for the major weapon systems in DOD’s portfolio went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding. JCIDS Has Proven to Be a Lengthy Process
The JCIDS process may lack the efficiency and agility needed to respond to warfighter needs—especially those that are near term—because the review and validation of capability proposals can take a significant amount of time. The department has not yet developed a structured, analytical approach to prioritize capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS process. At the same time, the military services continue to drive the determination of capability needs, in part because they retain most of DOD’s analytical capacity and resources for requirements development. This effort is intended to identify the near-, mid-, and long- term needs of the military services and other defense components and synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. A major challenge will be to determine how best to integrate service and COCOM capability perspectives that are typically based on different roles, missions, and time frames. Adjustments have also been made to try to streamline the JCIDS process to reduce the time it typically takes to validate capability proposals. Unless an analytic approach to prioritize and balance the capability needs of the services, COCOMs, and other defense components is established, DOD will continue losing opportunities to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities and constrain its portfolio of weapon system programs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs, we analyzed information and capability documents contained in the Joint Staff’s Knowledge Management/Decision Support tool compiled since the inception of JCIDS. To identify factors affecting DOD’s ability to effectively implement JCIDS, we analyzed the existing structure of the JCIDS process and evaluated the sufficiency of the Joint military community workforce for preparing and reviewing JCIDS requirements documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing combat demands and fiscal constraints make it critical for the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that its weapon system investments not only meet the needs of the warfighter, but make the most efficient use of available resources. GAO's past work has shown that achieving this balance has been a challenge and weapon programs have often experienced cost growth and delayed delivery to the warfighter. In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to prioritize and ensure that the warfighter's most essential needs are met. In response to Senate Report 109-69, GAO reported in March 2007 that DOD lacks an effective approach to balance its weapon system investments with available resources. This follow-on report focuses on (1) whether the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2) factors that have affected DOD's ability to effectively implement JCIDS. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed JCIDS guidance and capability documents and budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The JCIDS process has not yet been effective in identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective. GAO reviewed JCIDS documentation related to proposals for new capabilities and found that most--almost 70 percent--were sponsored by the military services, with little involvement from the joint community--including the combatant commands (COCOMs), which are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. In addition, virtually all capability proposals that have gone through the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated--or approved. DOD continues to have a portfolio with more programs than available resources can support. For example, the remaining costs for major weapon system programs in DOD's portfolio went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding available during fiscal year 2000 through 2007. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy--taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need--which further undermines efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term. DOD lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability needs and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS process. Further, the functional capabilities boards, which were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of needs, have not been staffed or resourced to effectively carry out these duties. Instead, the military services retain most of DOD's analytical capacity and resources for requirements development. The Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture the near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the services and other defense components, and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. However, DOD officials told us that determining how best to integrate COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because of differences in roles, missions, and time frames. Efforts have also begun to streamline the process and reduce the time it takes to validate proposals. |
gao_GAO-06-830 | gao_GAO-06-830_0 | In 1997, the then-Commander of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command proposed an innovative approach of buying training as a service, under which the contractors would own, operate, and maintain the simulator hardware and software. The military services are relying on industry to capitalize the required up- front investment needed to acquire simulator hardware and software, with the understanding that the contractors will amortize this investment by selling training services by the hour. The decision to buy simulator training as a service allowed use of O&M funds, which would alleviate the need to compete for procurement funds. However, the decision to embark on a services approach was not supported by a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits, despite a DOD directive providing that the acquisition of simulators is to be based on an evaluation of the benefits and trade-offs of potential alternative training solutions. While Training Has Improved, the Expected Number of Simulator Sites Has Not Been Activated
Air Force and Army officials told us the new simulators are big improvements over what they had previously. Later, the company cited Air Force funding problems and schedule slips as the basis for claims against the Air Force and notified the Air Force that its financial situation under the contract was no longer viable. The Air Force will let the current F-16 simulator training contract expire in June 2007 and is in the process of re-competing the contract, which will likely result in a training gap for pilots and additional costs to the Air Force. Army officials told us that, to date, O&M funding for the Flight School XXI program has not been reduced. Army’s Simulator Activation Schedule Was Also Delayed
The Army has twice rebaselined the activation schedules for the Flight School XXI simulators—the TH-67 and the advanced aircraft virtual simulators (AAVS)—as shown in figure 1. Return on the Expenditure of Taxpayer Dollars Is Not Effectively Tracked
The Air Force and the Army are not effectively tracking the return on their expenditure of taxpayer dollars to acquire simulator training services. The government is paying for activities conducted during the simulator development period but lacks insight into what it is actually paying for. Finally, award-term evaluations that were established to encourage excellent contractor performance do not always measure key acquisition outcomes such as simulator availability and concurrency, and can result in additional contract years being awarded for only “satisfactory” performance. Program officials told us that, because the Army is contracting for simulator training to be available, there was no need to track the extent to which the government is using this availability. Although the invoices reflect only the discrete tasks, such as training capabilities assessments, the wide range of invoice amounts—from $91,000 to more than $6.5 million for similar tasks—and our discussions with contractor officials suggest that the government is actually making milestone payments to the contractors for a portion of their up-front costs to acquire and develop the simulators. Figure 3 shows the development period before the start of simulator services and the original hourly rate structure under the F-15C contract. Conclusion
Because simulator training had lost out in the internal competition for procurement funds, the Air Force and Army turned to service contracts, expecting that O&M funds would be made available to meet requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the best approach is used to provide the war-fighter with needed training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and Army to conduct a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of using service contracts for simulator training to determine if it is indeed the best approach. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all but one of our recommendations. To determine if the Air Force and Army are effectively tracking the return on their expenditure of taxpayer dollars, we analyzed simulator utilization data and military service guidance on utilization rates; analyzed contractor performance measurements, annual evaluations, and award-term plans for the simulator training contracts; and compared preparatory service costs charged to the government under each of the four Air Force contracts and the Army contract. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force has turned to service contracts for the F-15C, F-16, Airborne Warning and Control System, and F-15E, and the Army has done the same for helicopter simulator training at its Flight School XXI. The contractors own, operate, and maintain the simulator hardware and software. The military services rely on industry to capitalize the required up-front investment, with the understanding that the contractors will amortize this investment by selling training services by the hour. GAO was asked to address (1) the factors that led the Air Force and Army to acquire simulator training as a service and whether the decision to use this approach was adequately supported; (2) whether implementation of the approach has resulted in the planned number of simulator training sites being activated; and (3) whether the Air Force and Army are effectively tracking the return on their expenditure of taxpayer dollars. GAO makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense intended to improve management and oversight of these service contracts to help ensure that the best approach is used to provide the war-fighter with needed training. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all but one of the recommendations, only partially concurring with one pertaining to the Army's simulator utilization rates. GAO continues to believe that the Army needs to track the extent to which it is using simulator availability.
What GAO Found
The Air Force and Army turned to service contracts for simulator training primarily because efforts to modernize existing simulator hardware and software had lost out in the competition for procurement funds. As a result, the simulators were becoming increasingly obsolete. Buying training as a service meant that operation and maintenance (O&M) funds could be used instead of procurement funds. Shifting the responsibility for simulator ownership, operation, and maintenance from the government to the contractor was thought to more quickly enable simulator upgrades to match the changing configurations of aircraft. However, the decision to take a service contract approach was not supported by a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits as compared to other alternatives, despite a Department of Defense directive that provided for such an analysis. While Air Force and Army officials told GAO the new simulators are significant improvements over the previous ones, the expected number of Air Force training sites have not been activated. For the Air Force, O&M funds have not been allocated at the anticipated levels, leading to schedule slippages. The F-16 simulator contractor cited the funding problems and subsequent schedule slippages as the basis for notifying the Air Force that its situation under the contract was no longer financially viable. The Air Force is in the process of re-competing the F-16 training contract, which will likely result in a training gap for pilots--possibly over 2 years--and additional costs to the Air Force. The start date of the Army's flight simulator training was rebaselined twice, but Army officials told us that adequate training was in place for the flight school participants. The return on expenditure of taxpayer dollars is not being effectively tracked in three key ways: Air Force utilization of simulator training frequently falls well below the hours for which the government is paying. The Army is not collecting data on utilization rates at all. The government has little insight into what it is paying for during the development period before training is activated, which can take more than a year. While invoices for preparatory efforts reflect only discrete tasks such as training capabilities assessments, the wide range of invoice amounts and GAO's discussions with contractor representatives suggest that the government is actually making milestone payments to the contractors for a portion of their up-front costs to acquire and develop the simulators. Most of the contracts contain award-term provisions, where the contractors can earn an extension of the contract period for good performance. GAO found that the award-term evaluation factors do not always measure key acquisition outcomes such as simulator availability and concurrency with aircraft upgrades. |
gao_GAO-14-606 | gao_GAO-14-606_0 | Background
The Zadroga Act established the WTCHP to provide medical monitoring and treatment benefits, and reactivated the VCF to provide financial compensation to eligible individuals. Claims paid from October 2012 (when cancers were added to the list) through March 2014 totaled about $140.7 million. Experts Indicated That the WTCHP Administrator’s Hazard-Based Approach Was Reasonable, but Could Be Improved
In determining whether to add cancers to the list of covered conditions, the Administrator used a hazard-based, multiple method approach. According to experts who a hazard-based approach focuses on participated in our meeting,identifying whether particular “hazards”—sources of potential harm—are associated with certain health conditions, and does not attempt to quantify the risks or likelihood of developing those health conditions as would a risk-based approach. Both hazard-based and risk-based approaches can be used for determining associations between exposures and health outcomes, according to these experts. They indicated that the Administrator’s use of a hazard-based, multiple-method approach was reasonable given the certification process and data constraints for the WTCHP, and the use of similar approaches by other federal compensation programs. Administrator’s Approach Was Not Communicated Clearly and Did Not Include Independent Peer Review
Although experts participating in our meeting considered the Administrator’s approach reasonable, they indicated that the approach could have been communicated more clearly to strengthen the credibility of the process. According to these experts, the approach was not clearly described in 2012 proposed and final rulemaking. Addition of Cancers to the List of Covered Conditions Accounted for a Small Portion of Spending and Led to the Need for a Third- Party Administrator
WTCHP spending on services (claims paid) directly attributable to the addition of cancers to the list of covered conditions accounted for 6.5 percent of total spending on services from October 2012 (the month when cancers were added) through March 2014. WTCHP officials and others reported that the addition of cancers has helped ensure access to high- quality cancer care for enrollees, but also required increased staff to accommodate the program’s growing scope. Addition of Cancers to the List Led to the Need for a Third-Party Administrator
WTCHP officials reported that the addition of cancers to the list led to the need for a third-party administrator to help the program provide uninterrupted cancer-related services to enrollees who had been receiving care outside of the program. The Effects on the VCF of Adding Cancers to the List of Covered Conditions Are Not Yet Known
The effects on the VCF of adding cancers to the WTCHP list of covered conditions are not yet known because there have been only a small number of compensation decisions. Further adding to the challenge of determining the effects on the VCF of adding cancers to the list, few of the compensation decisions to date have been for claimants with cancer, either alone or in combination with other conditions. In addition, the WTCHP missed an important opportunity to validate its approach by not using an independent peer review process to, among other things, assess the validity and credibility of the information upon which decisions were being made, as has been used by other federal compensation programs making similar coverage decisions. The time constraints imposed by the Zadroga Act may preclude the inclusion of such a process; however, the addition of an independent peer review process may help ensure the credibility of the Administrator’s approach, which is especially important to the extent that he plans to use the same or a similar approach for future coverage decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that future decisions related to adding conditions to the WTCHP list of covered conditions are equitable and credible, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the WTCHP Administrator to take the following actions: communicate clearly, through rulemaking or other means, the approach for decision making related to the addition of covered conditions to the list, including a clear delineation of the relationship between methods when conflicting evidence is available. include an independent peer review in the approach for adding to the list of covered conditions, seeking authority to extend time frames if necessary. Following that approach, the Administrator may have added a cancer to the list in the following circumstances:
Method 1: epidemiologic studies in the September 11-exposed population supported a causal association between September 11 exposures and the cancer type;
Method 2: there were established causal associations between the cancer and a condition already on the list;
Method 3: a hazard identified at the September 11 attack sites was identified by the National Toxicology Program to be (or reasonably anticipated to be) a human carcinogen, and the International Agency for Research on Cancer determined that there is at least limited evidence that the hazard causes the cancer; and
Method 4: The STAC provided a reasonable basis to add a cancer to the list based on its review of scientific and medical evidence. | Why GAO Did This Study
The WTCHP provides health benefits to eligible responders and survivors of the September 11, 2001, attacks. In September 2012, the WTCHP added 60 types of cancer to the list of covered conditions. The VCF—which provides financial compensation to eligible individuals—uses the WTCHP list as a basis for eligibility. GAO was asked to review the WTCHP Administrator's approach to add cancers and the effects of the additions on the WTCHP and VCF. This report (1) describes and assesses the approach for adding cancers to the list of covered conditions, (2) describes the effects the addition has had on the WTCHP, and (3) describes the effects the addition has had on the VCF. GAO reviewed relevant laws and documents, interviewed WTCHP officials, and convened a meeting of experts with the assistance of the Institute of Medicine. GAO examined data for services paid by the WTCHP from October 2012 through March 2014, and VCF claims data as of March 31, 2014.
What GAO Found
The Administrator of the World Trade Center Health Program (WTCHP)—a program of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—used a hazard-based, multiple-method approach to determine whether to add cancers to the WTCHP list of covered conditions for which treatment may be provided at no cost to an enrollee. Experts who participated in a meeting held by GAO indicated that the Administrator's approach was reasonable but could be improved.
According to these experts, a hazard-based approach focuses on identifying whether particular “hazards”—sources of potential harm—are associated with certain health conditions, and does not attempt to quantify the risks of developing those health conditions. The Administrator's approach used four methods to determine whether there was an association between a September 11 exposure and a specific cancer, and thus, whether to add that cancer to the list.
The experts considered the approach reasonable given the WTCHP certification process for enrollees to obtain coverage for treatment for a condition on the list, the lack of data related to exposure levels and risks, and the use of similar approaches by previous federal compensation programs.
The experts indicated the approach could have been communicated more clearly. For example, the description of the approach in rulemaking did not clearly articulate how decisions would be made when evidence under one method supported adding a cancer type to the list, and evidence under a different method did not. The Administrator noted that this omission was an oversight. Since the Administrator plans to use the same approach in future cancer-related decision making, the absence of a clear description can lead to questions about the credibility and equity of the program.
According to the experts, an independent peer review process similar to that used in other federal compensation programs could improve the approach. According to the Administrator, this was not feasible due to time constraints imposed by law. A process through which an independent party assesses the validity of the information upon which decisions are being made and that rationales for decisions are clearly described could help ensure the credibility of the Administrator's approach.
WTCHP spending (claims paid) directly attributable to the addition of cancers to the list of covered conditions accounted for 6.5 percent of its total spending on services from October 2012 (when cancers were added) through March 2014. The addition of cancers to the list led to the need for a third-party administrator to help the program provide uninterrupted cancer-related services to enrollees who had been receiving care outside of the program. WTCHP and other officials reported that the addition of cancers has helped ensure enrollees have access to high-quality cancer care, which may contribute to better health outcomes, but required increased WTCHP staff to accommodate the program's growing scope.
The effects on the Department of Justice's September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) of adding cancers to the list of covered conditions are not yet known because there have been a small number of compensation decisions. Of the 502 compensation decisions made as of March 31, 2014, only 39 were for claimants with cancer, either alone or in combination with other conditions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, to help ensure future decisions are equitable and credible, HHS direct the WTCHP Administrator to communicate clearly the approach used for determining whether to add conditions to its list, and include an independent peer review in the approach, seeking authority to extend time frames if necessary. HHS supports these recommendations, but noted concerns with including a peer review given statutory time frames. GAO acknowledges the time constraints by recommending HHS seek authority to extend the time frames if necessary. |
gao_GAO-14-677 | gao_GAO-14-677_0 | GS and Alternative Systems Need to More Effectively Balance Key Attributes of a Modern, Effective Classification System Eight Important Attributes of a Modern, Effective Classification System
Our analysis of subject matter specialists’ comments, related literature, and interviews with OPM officials identified a number of important characteristics for a modern, effective classification system, which we consolidated into eight key attributes. We found, in concept, these features incorporate several of the key attributes including internal and external equity, transparency, simplicity, and rank-in-position. However, as agencies implement the GS system the attributes of transparency, internal equity, simplicity, flexibility, and adaptability are reduced. This occurs, in part, because as discussed earlier in this report, some attributes are at odds with one another, so fully achieving one attribute comes at the expense of another. For example, the occupational standard for an information technology specialist clearly describes the routine duties and tasks, and experience required for the position. This information is published for all of the 420 occupations defined in the GS system, so all agencies are using the same, consistent standards when writing position descriptions. However, in practice having numerous, narrowly-defined occupational standards may actually inhibit the system’s ability to optimize these attributes for reasons including the following:
Classifying occupations and developing position descriptions in the GS system requires officials to maintain an understanding of the potential responsibilities of the individual position and of the nuances between similar occupational definitions. Without this understanding, having numerous occupations from which to choose may inhibit transparency and internal equity. As a result, officials may not be classifying positions consistently, comparable employees may not be treated equitably, and the system may seem unpredictable. Extent to Which Broadband Systems Incorporate Attributes of a Modern, Effective Classification System Is Mixed
Over the years, agencies, either through the use of demonstration projects or congressionally authorized alternative personnel systems, have sought exceptions to the GS system to mitigate some of its limitations. By using lessons learned from the alternative systems and results from prior studies of the GS system to examine ways to make the GS system more consistent with the attributes of a modern, effective classification system, OPM could better position itself to help ensure that the system is keeping pace with the government’s evolving requirements. Agencies Increased Their Use of Alternative Personnel Systems to Obtain Greater Pay Flexibilities
The proportion of federal white-collar employees covered by alternative personnel systems increased from 6 percent in 1988 to 21 percent in 2013, as shown in figure 3. occupational families, the 6 with the largest increase from GS to an alternative system were mostly concentrated in STEM occupations, as shown in figure 4. We estimated that in 2013 employees in alternative personnel systems were paid about 10 percent more, on average, than GS employees in identical occupations when controlling for factors such as tenure, location, and education in the 90 occupations we considered.was a significant range among the occupations in the difference in pay between those in the GS and those in alternative systems—going both ways. OPM Could Benefit from a More Strategic Approach to Creating and Updating Occupational Standards
OPM is responsible for establishing new—and revising existing— occupational standards after consulting with agencies; however, OPM does not know the extent to which it is meeting the needs of agencies with regard to updating occupational standards. From 2003 to 2014, OPM established 14 new occupational standards (new occupations in the federal government), and revised almost 20 percent of the occupational standards. However, there was no published review or update of 124 occupations, roughly 30 percent of the total GS system occupations, since 1990. OPM officials said that they first address occupations identified in presidential memorandums. However, OPM does not systematically track and prioritize the remaining occupational standards. Further, OPM officials could not provide the near- or long-term prioritization for reviewing occupations. OPM is required by law to review “from time to time” a number of positions in each federal agency to determine whether the agency is correctly placing positions in classes and grades according to OPM-published standards. OPM officials said the agency stopped conducting oversight reviews in the 1980s because OPM determined that the reviews were ineffective at overseeing agency compliance with the occupational standards. Without a strategic approach to oversight, OPM has limited assurance that agencies are correctly classifying positions according to the standards. However, our work and that of other organizations have shown how the GS system has not kept pace with the government’s evolving requirements. OPM stated that it did not concur with our recommendation to develop a strategy to systematically track and prioritize updates to occupational standards. Our objectives were to assess (1) the attributes of a modern, effective classification system and how the General Schedule (GS) classification system compares with the modern systems’ attributes; (2) the trends in agencies and occupations covered under the GS system and the pay difference for selected alternative systems; and (3) the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) administration and oversight of the GS system. The GS system sets promotion expectations for both the employee and the supervisor. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost since its inception in 1949, questions have been raised about the ability of the GS system—the federal government's classification system for defining and organizing federal positions—to keep pace with the evolving nature of government work. GAO was asked to review the GS classification system.
This report examined: (1) the attributes of a modern, effective classification system and how the GS system compares with the modern systems' attributes; (2) trends in agencies and occupations covered by the GS system and the pay difference for selected alternative systems; and (3) OPM's administration and oversight of the GS system. GAO analyzed personnel data from 1988 to 2013, conducted a literature review, compared legislation to OPM procedures, and interviewed subject matter specialists and OPM officials, selected to represent public policy groups, government employee unions, and academia, among others.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of subject matter specialists' comments, related literature, and interviews with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) officials identified a number of important characteristics for a modern, effective classification system, which GAO consolidated into eight key attributes (see table below). GAO's analysis shows that in concept the current General Schedule (GS) classification system's design incorporates several key attributes including internal and external equity, transparency, simplicity, and rank in position. However, as OPM implemented the system, the attributes of transparency, internal equity, simplicity, flexibility, and adaptability are reduced. This occurs, in part, because some attributes are at odds with one another so fully achieving one attribute comes at the expense of another. Thus, OPM, working with its stakeholders, is challenged to determine how best to optimize each attribute.
While the GS system's standardized set of 420 occupations, grouped in 23 occupational familes, and statutorily-defined 15 grade level system incorporates several key attributes, it falls short in implementation. For example, the occupational standard for an information technology specialist clearly describes the routine duties, tasks, and experience required for the position. This kind of information is published for the 420 occupations, so all agencies are using the same, consistent standards when classifying positions—embodying the attributes of transparency and internal equity. However, in implementation, having numerous, narrowly-defined occupational standards inhibits the system's ability to optimize these attributes. Specifically, classifying occupations and developing position descriptions in the GS system requires officials to maintain an understanding of the individual position and the nuances between similar occupations. Without this understanding, the transparency and internal equity of the system may be inhibited, as agency officials may not be classifying positions consistently, comparable employees may not be treated equitably, and the system may seem unpredictable. Several studies have concluded that the GS system was not meeting the needs of the modern federal workforce or supporting agency missions, and some studies suggested reductions in the number of occupational series and grade levels to help simplify the system. In addition, over the years agencies have sought exceptions to the GS system to mitigate some of its limitations either through demonstration projects or congressionally-authorized alternative personnel systems—often featuring a broadband approach that provided fewer, broader occupational groups and grade levels. By using lessons learned and the results from prior studies to examine ways to make the GS system more consistent with the attributes of a modern, effective classification system, OPM could better position itself to help ensure that the system is keeping pace with the government's evolving requirements.
The proportion of federal employees covered under alternative personnel systems increased from 6 percent to 21 percent of the white-collar workforce from 1988 to 2013. Occupational families (i.e., groups of occupations based upon work performed) in the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) fields are more prevalent in alternative systems. Of the GS system's 23 occupational families, the 6 with the largest increase from GS to an alternative system were mostly concentrated in STEM occupations (See figure below). GAO estimated that, in 2013, employees in alternative systems were paid about 10 percent more, on average, than GS employees in identical occupations when controlling for factors such as tenure, location, and education in the 90 occupations GAO considered.
OPM is responsible for establishing new—and revising existing—occupational standards after consulting with agencies. From 2003 to 2014, OPM established 14 new occupational standards and revised almost 20 percent of the occupational standards. However, there was no published review or update of 124 occupations since 1990. OPM officials said they first review occupations identified in presidential memorandums as needing review; however OPM does not systemically track and prioritize the remaining occupational standards for review. Therefore, OPM has limited assurance that it is updating the highest priority occupations. Further, OPM is required by law to oversee agencies' implementation of the GS system. However, OPM officials said OPM has not reviewed any agency's classification program since the 1980s because OPM leadership at the time concluded the reviews were ineffective and time consuming. As a result, OPM has limited assurance that agencies are correctly classifying positions according to standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OPM (1) work with stakeholders to examine ways to modernize the classification system, (2) develop a strategy to track and prioritize occupations for review and updates, and (3) develop cost-effective methods to ensure agencies are classifying correctly. OPM partially concurred with the first and third recommendation but did not concur with the second recommendation. OPM stated it already tracks and prioritizes occupations for updates. However, OPM did not provide documentation of its actions. GAO maintains that OPM should implement this action. |
gao_GAO-09-744 | gao_GAO-09-744_0 | MMS estimated that from fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the RIK program generated about $150 million more in net value to the government than MMS would have collected had it received royalties in cash. MMS May Be Losing Revenue Because It Does Not Accurately and Promptly Identi and Collect on R IK Gas Imbalances
MMS risks losing millions of dollars in revenue because it does not accurately and promptly identify and collect on RIK gas imbalances. Specifically, MMS (1) estimates it is owed a net of $21 million for gas imbalances, but it lacks the necessary information to determine the exact amounts; (2) does not audit RIK gas operators’ production and allocatio n data, and thus cannot verify that it receives the correct volumes of RIK gas; (3) lacks adequate policies and procedures to reconcile and resolv imbalances; (4) does not have an information system that can provide accurate and timely data for reconciling and resolving imbalances; and (5) has insuffici ent staff and training to administer the program efficiently and effectively. However, MMS does not know the exact amount it is owed for imbalances because it lacks at least three types of information. However, this leaves open the possibility that some companies that owe RIK gas could provide less gas to MMS on days when gas prices are relatively high, hat and make up the difference by providing more gas on days when prices are relatively low. To investigate the extent to which MMS has been allocated its royalty percentage of RIK gas on a daily basis, we analyzed daily volumes of to production and allocation to MMS at a sample of measurement points. MMS Does Not Audit Operators’ Records to Verify RIK Gas Production
MMS also may be forgoing revenue because it does not audit operator d to ensure it has received its entitled royalty percentage. Industry representatives told us that oil and gas companies regularly audit to ensure that they have received the gas they are entitled to. As a result, MMS analysts spend a great deal of time repeatedly calling companies to inquire about missing imbalance statements. In such cases, because MMS has not sent a demand letter to a RIK company for payment, it has not referred a company to Treasury. n System MMS’s Informatio Does Not Provide Accurate and Timely Data
MMS’s information system does not provide accurate and timely data on RIK gas imbalances, which reduces the agency’s ability to collect on thes imbalances. As a consequence, more than half of MMS’s gas imbalance work, according to the RIK gas imbalance manager, is currently done manually. For example, an RIK manager told us that, although mistakes canoccur in gas imbalance calculations, MMS does not have enough staff dedicate someone to review this work. resulting in lost revenues to MMS. Establish procedures, with reasonable deadlines, for resolvin collecting all RIK gas imbalances in a timely manner. MMS stated that it will evaluate whether it should require operators to submit imbalance statements in a standardized format. Further, we found that industry monitors imbalances on a daily basis to ensure they do not continue to believe that MMS should begin to monitor imbalances daily a changes requiring operators to deliver MMS the royalty percentage on a daily basis. To address our objective, we reviewed various reports by the Department of the Interior (Interior) and Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) on the history and current status of imbalances associated with the RIK gas program including: (1) a 2002 internal MMS assessment of RIK gas imbalances; (2) a 2002 report by Interior’s Office of Inspector General, which discussed, in part, MMS’s vulnerability to underreporting of gas receipts due to RIK gas imbalances; (3) MMS’s monthly action plan on RIK imbalances and open receivables, first prepared in August 2007; and (4) MMS’s periodic cumulative imbalance, cash-out, and keepwhole summary statements. The difference between the RIK gas owed––MMS’s entitled percentage of gas–– and the percentage of gas it actually receives is referred to as an “imbalance.” As discussed in the body of this report, MMS attempts to reconcile gas imbalances monthly. For cases in which the measurement points had differing royalty percentages, it would not have been possible to calculate whether MMS was allocated its share of gas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Companies that develop and produce oil and gas from federal lands and waters are required to report their production volumes and other data to the Department of the Interior's (Interior) Minerals Management Service (MMS) and to pay royalties either in value (cash) or in kind (oil or gas). In fiscal year 2008, MMS estimated that it had collected more than $2.4 billion in royalty-in-kind (RIK) gas. It is important that MMS ensure that it receives the RIK gas to which it is entitled. The difference between the RIK gas owed--MMS's entitled percentage of gas--and the percentage it actually receives is referred to as a "gas imbalance." GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which MMS can provide reasonable assurance that it is accurately identifying and collecting RIK gas imbalances in a timely fashion. GAO analyzed MMS documents and data, documentation of industry standards, and interviewed MMS and industry officials.
What GAO Found
MMSisforgoing revenues for gas royalties owed to the federal government because it does not provide reasonable assurance that it accurately and promptly identifies and collects on RIK gas imbalances. GAO found that MMS is forgoing revenues for the following reasons: (1) MMS estimates that it is owed a net of $21 million for past imbalances but it lacks the information necessary to calculate the full amount of revenues due. MMS does not have sufficient data to determine whether it has received its full percentage of RIK gas. Also, MMS's estimate does not include interest on some unpaid imbalances because MMS has not determined when interest begins to accrue on imbalances, as required by law. Further, MMS monitors imbalances on a monthly, rather than daily basis, which leaves open the possibility that some companies owing RIK gas could provide less gas to MMS when gas prices are relatively high, making up the difference by providing more gas when prices are relatively low, something that could cost MMS additional revenues because it could miss the opportunity to sell gas on the days when prices are high. (2) MMS does not audit gas companies' production and allocation data, therefore it cannot verify that it is receiving its entitled percentage of gas. MMS does not audit, in part, because it believes that its verification procedures are sufficient. However, other governments and gas companies routinely audit their imbalances and uncover inaccuracies that would result in lost revenues if left unchecked. (3) MMS lacks adequate policies and procedures for accurately and promptly identifying and collecting gas imbalances. For instance, the agency does not know how companies allocate gas among all parties having a claim on a share of gas produced; this may affect whether MMS receives its percentage of gas on a daily basis. In addition, MMS does not compel companies to document production and deliveries in a consistent format and meet deadlines. As a result, MMS analysts spend time gathering and reformatting data instead of identifying and collecting on imbalances. MMS also allows companies to negotiate imbalances indefinitely. For example, MMS has been negotiating with a company for more than 2 years regarding a $900,000 imbalance. (4) MMS's information system does not provide accurate and timely data on RIK gas imbalances. For instance, MMS's information system cannot calculate cash settlements for imbalances or compare various types of data that companies submit. Consequently, MMS processes more than half of its gas imbalance data manually. (5) MMS has been operating for many years without sufficient staff to reconcile gas imbalances, and the staff it has is not sufficiently trained. For instance, according to RIK management, MMS does not have sufficient staff to dedicate someone to fully review RIK gas analysts' work on imbalances, even though mistakes in that work often occur. MMS recently hired one new gas imbalance analyst but has not formally assessed staffing needs. In addition, RIK gas imbalance staff lack, among other things, training on industry standards on gas imbalance calculations. |
gao_GAO-06-656 | gao_GAO-06-656_0 | Contingent Workers Constitute a Relatively Constant Proportion of the Workforce and Are Diverse
Contingent workers constituted a relatively constant proportion of the total workforce from 1995 through 2005 and had diverse characteristics. In 2005, there were about 42.6 million contingent workers in the workforce. As shown in table 2, while the number of contingent workers grew from 39.6 million workers in 1995 to 42.6 million workers in 2005, contingent workers’ share of the total workforce remained relatively constant over this time period. Contingent workers are employed in a wide range of industries and occupations. A Smaller Proportion of Contingent Workers than Others Has Benefits or Is Covered by Key Workforce Protection Laws
A smaller proportion of contingent workers than of standard full-time workers has health insurance or pension benefits, or receives protections offered by key workforce protection laws, including ones designed to ensure proper pay and safe, healthy, and nondiscriminatory workplaces. Finally, contingent workers are less likely than standard full-time workers to receive protections offered by key workforce protection laws. Some laws contain requirements that exclude certain categories of contingent workers or contain certain time-in-service requirements that make it difficult for them to be covered. Just over half of workers—both contingent and standard full-time—who lacked employer- provided health insurance coverage in 2005 worked for an employer who offered health insurance to some of its employees. Some Categories of Contingent Workers Are Not Covered by Key Laws Designed to Protect Workers
Contingent workers who are employees are generally protected under key laws designed to protect workers, but certain categories of contingent workers—such as independent contractors and self-employed workers— may be excluded from coverage under these laws. These exemptions affect some categories of contingent workers more than standard full-time workers because a greater proportion of these contingent workers is in the agriculture industry; for example, an estimated 11 percent of self-employed workers, 2 percent of on-call workers and day laborers, 2 percent of independent contractors, and 1 percent of direct-hire temporary workers are employed in agriculture, compared with 1 percent of standard full-time workers. DOL Detects and Addresses Employee Misclassification through Investigations, but Offices We Studied Vary in How Often They Forward Misclassification Cases to Other Federal and State Agencies
DOL detects and addresses employee misclassification when enforcing the FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay provisions. As part of its FLSA investigation process, DOL examines the employment relationship— whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor—to determine which workers are covered. DOL procedures require officials to share information with other federal and state agencies whenever investigators find possible violations of other laws. In discussing a misclassification case with the employer, the investigator would explain that the workers should be classified as employees, not independent contractors, and that the employer may be violating other laws administered by other agencies, such as tax laws or workers’ compensation laws. However, investigation reports do not always include the reason for the violation. While DOL relies heavily on complaints from workers to enforce FLSA, the FLSA workplace poster does not provide a telephone number for workers or others to call to register complaints. DOL investigators identify instances of employee misclassification when responding to minimum wage and overtime pay complaints. While DOL investigators conducting FLSA investigations are required to share information with other federal and state agencies whenever they find instances of possible violations of other laws, DOL district offices we studied varied in how often they forwarded misclassification cases to other agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to determine (1) the size and nature of the contingent workforce, (2) the benefits and workforce protections provided to contingent workers, and (3) the actions that the Department of Labor (DOL) takes to detect and address employee misclassification. 201)
The Fair Labor Standards Act establishes minimum wage, overtime, and child labor standards for employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of U.S. workers participate in "contingent" employment, such as temporary or part-time work, and not in permanent or full-time jobs. The Department of Labor (DOL) enforces several labor laws to protect these and other workers, including the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which provides minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor protections. In June 2000, GAO reported that contingent workers lagged behind standard full-time workers in terms of income, benefits, and workforce protections, and that some employees do not receive worker protections because employers misclassified them as independent contractors. GAO was asked to update this report by describing (1) the size and nature of the contingent workforce, (2) the benefits and workforce protections provided to contingent workers, and (3) the actions that DOL takes to detect and address employee misclassification. We analyzed DOL survey data on contingent workers and interviewed DOL officials.
What GAO Found
Contingent workers constituted a relatively constant proportion of the total workforce from 1995 through 2005 and had diverse characteristics. While the population of the contingent workforce grew by an estimated 3 million workers during this time period, the proportion of contingent workers in the total workforce remained relatively constant at about 31 percent. In 2005, there were about 42.6 million contingent workers in the workforce. Contingent workers vary in terms of their demographic characteristics, industries, and occupations. For example, on average, contingent workers range in age from about 35 years for one category of temporary workers to about 48 years for self-employed workers. In addition, contingent workers are employed in a wide range of industries and occupations, including the services industry, construction, and retail trade. A smaller proportion of contingent workers than of standard full-time workers has health insurance or pension benefits, or is protected by key workforce protection laws, including laws designed to ensure proper pay and safe, healthy, and nondiscriminatory workplaces. While 72 percent of standard full-time workers received employer-provided health insurance in 2005, the proportion of contingent workers who received employer-provided health insurance ranged from 9 to 50 percent, depending on the category of contingent worker. With regard to pension benefits, 76 percent of standard full-time workers reported working for an employer who offered a pension, whereas 17 to 56 percent of contingent workers reported working for an employer who offered a pension. One reason that contingent workers are less likely to receive protections is that some laws contain requirements that exclude certain categories of contingent workers. DOL detects and addresses misclassification of employees by investigating complaints, but does not always forward misclassification cases to other federal and state agencies. Some workers do not receive worker protections to which they are entitled because employers misclassify them as independent contractors--a category of contingent workers excluded from many protections--when they should be classified as employees. DOL investigators detect and address employee misclassification primarily when responding to FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay complaints. DOL investigators examine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor to determine coverage under FLSA. DOL relies heavily on complaints from workers to enforce FLSA, but the FLSA workplace poster does not contain any information on employment classification or provide a telephone number for individuals to register complaints. Misclassification of employees may contribute to an FLSA violation or may violate laws enforced by other agencies, such as tax laws. DOL procedures require officials to share information with other federal and state agencies whenever investigators find possible violations of other laws. However, the district offices we contacted vary in how often they forward misclassification as a possible violation of other agencies' laws. |
gao_GAO-14-75 | gao_GAO-14-75_0 | To examine HHS’s plans for requirements and oversight of qualified CDRs to maximize CDRs’ potential impact on the quality and efficiency of care, we interviewed HHS officials and reviewed HHS documents on the department’s plans for implementing the qualified CDR program, including both a proposed and final rule and the accompanying preambles, which were published in the Federal Register during the period of our review. Clinical Data Registries Have Enabled Sophisticated Assessments of Quality of Care, but Have Less to Report on Efficiency and Have Other Limitations
CDRs have demonstrated a particular strength in assessing physician performance through their capacity to track and interpret trends in health care quality over time. Studies examining outcomes reported by several long-established CDRs demonstrate the utility of CDR data for analyzing trends in both outcomes and treatments. CDR efforts to improve outcomes typically involve a combination of performance improvement activities, including feedback reports to participating physicians, benchmarking physician performance relative to that of their peers, and related educational activities designed to stimulate changes in clinical practice. In addition, effective oversight of these requirements depends on expert judgment to take account of variation among CDRs in their circumstances and opportunities for improvement. CMS’s Plans for Implementing the Qualified CDR Program Include Little Specificity on How CDRs Will Improve Quality and Efficiency
CMS’s plans for implementing the qualified CDR program, when it begins in 2014, offer little specificity concerning CDR objectives or results and provide substantial leeway for CDRs seeking to become qualified. Key Requirements Could Improve the Quality and Efficiency of Care through Qualified CDRs
We identified several key requirements for qualified CDRs that, based on our synthesis of the input from experts at the meeting we convened with the assistance of IOM together with other relevant sources, would contribute to improved quality and efficiency of care for Medicare patients. Performance measures to address key opportunities: Having qualified CDRs focus their data collection on performance measures that address specific opportunities to improve quality and efficiency for each CDR’s target population enhances their effectiveness in promoting quality and efficiency overall. Demonstrating results: Input from experts and other relevant sources indicates that CDRs are more likely to achieve improvements in physician performance if they have specific incentives to do so. Therefore, requiring qualified CDRs to demonstrate improvement over time on the quality and efficiency measures that they collect would help to focus their attention on achieving results. HHS Actions Could Reduce Barriers to the Development of Qualified CDRs
Based on our synthesis of the input from experts at the meeting we convened with the assistance of IOM together with other relevant sources, there are several actions that HHS could take that could help reduce potential barriers to the development of qualified CDRs. Health IT, Including EHRs, Can Support the Collection and Sharing of CDR Data, and Those Activities Could Be Strengthened by HHS Actions to Align Health IT Policies with CDR Needs
In recent years, some CDRs have developed different approaches to electronically capture data from a wide variety of health IT applications, particularly EHR systems. Input from experts and other relevant sources suggests that HHS could help CDRs overcome barriers that impede the electronic collection and transmission of clinical data by supporting standard setting and adjusting meaningful use requirements. According to experts, CDRs could benefit from health IT standards that reduce variation across EHR systems on the data elements needed for the measures used by CDRs. Through its setting of these meaningful use requirements, HHS could influence the extent to which EHR systems are designed and implemented to collect data needed by CDRs to assess physician performance. While implementation of the program is just getting under way and HHS plans to have its program requirements and structure evolve over time, a key question is the extent to which that evolutionary process focuses on harnessing the potential of CDRs to promote quality and efficiency. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that qualified CDRs promote improved quality and efficiency of physician care for Medicare beneficiaries, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following five actions:
Direct CMS to establish key requirements for qualified CDRs that focus on improving quality and efficiency. Determine and implement actions to reduce barriers to the development of qualified CDRs, such as (1) developing guidance that clarifies HIPAA requirements to promote participation in qualified CDRs; (2) working with private sector entities to make relevant multipayer cost data available to qualified CDRs; (3) testing one or more models of shared savings between Medicare and qualified CDRs that achieve reduced Medicare expenditures with improved quality of care, and (4) providing technical assistance to qualified CDRs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 instructed HHS to establish a new program to designate "qualified" CDRs--entities that would work with physicians treating Medicare patients to collect clinical information and use it to improve the quality and efficiency of care. The act also mandated GAO to report on the potential for CDRs to improve quality and efficiency.
This report examines (1) improvements demonstrated by CDRs in quality and efficiency of care, (2) HHS's plans for requirements and oversight for qualified CDRs, (3) actions HHS could take to facilitate the development of qualified CDRs, and (4) actions HHS could take to facilitate CDRs' use of health IT. GAO reviewed relevant studies and documents, and interviewed HHS and CDR officials. GAO also convened an expert meeting with the assistance of the Institute of Medicine and synthesized input from experts and other sources to assess the likely effect of potential program requirements, approaches to oversight, and other actions HHS could take.
What GAO Found
Clinical data registries (CDR) have demonstrated a particular strength in assessing physician performance through their capacity to track and interpret trends in health care quality over time. Studies examining results reported by several long-established CDRs demonstrate the utility of CDR data sets for analyzing trends in both outcomes and treatments. CDR efforts to improve outcomes typically involve a combination of performance improvement activities including feedback reports to participating physicians, benchmarking physician performance relative to that of their peers, and related educational activities designed to stimulate changes in clinical practice. Studies GAO reviewed provided less insight on ways to improve the efficiency of care.
The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) plans for implementing the qualified CDR program offer little specificity and provide substantial leeway for CDRs seeking to become qualified. According to officials, HHS plans to have its program requirements and structure evolve over time, and a key question is the extent to which this evolutionary process will focus on harnessing the potential of CDRs to promote quality and efficiency. GAO's synthesis of input from experts and from other relevant sources identified several key requirements that would make it more likely that qualified CDRs promote improved quality and efficiency, which HHS's current plans for the program would do little to address. These requirements include directing CDRs to focus data collection on performance measures that address the key opportunities for improvement in quality and efficiency for each CDR's target population and requiring CDRs to demonstrate improvement over time on the quality and efficiency measures that they collect. In addition, effective oversight of these requirements depends on expert judgment to take account of variation among CDRs in their circumstances and opportunities for improvement.
Experts indicated that HHS can also help qualified CDRs to improve the quality and efficiency of care provided to Medicare patients by taking actions that could reduce potential barriers to the development of qualified CDRs, such as concerns about complying with privacy regulations and the difficulty of funding CDRs. GAO's synthesis of input from experts and from other relevant sources identified several specific actions that HHS could take. They include developing guidance to clarify federal privacy requirements for physicians participating in CDRs and testing one or more models of shared savings between Medicare and qualified CDRs that achieve reduced Medicare expenditures with improved quality of care.
In addition, input from experts and other relevant sources suggests that HHS can take actions to facilitate CDRs' use of health information technology (IT). According to CDR officials, some CDRs have developed approaches to electronically capture and transmit large amounts of detailed clinical data from a wide variety of electronic health record (EHR) systems. CDRs could benefit from new IT standard setting that focuses on data elements needed for the measures that CDRs collect. One way HHS can influence whether EHR vendors use IT standards to design EHR systems that are compatible with CDR needs is through its setting of meaningful use requirements in its EHR incentive programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) focus its requirements for qualified CDRs on improving quality and efficiency, (2) require qualified CDRs to demonstrate improvement in quality and efficiency, (3) draw on expert judgment to monitor qualified CDRs, (4) reduce barriers to the development of qualified CDRs, and (5) include, if feasible, key data elements needed by qualified CDRs in its requirements under the EHR incentive programs. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-825T | gao_GAO-04-825T_0 | Millions of Dollars Wasted on Airline Tickets that Were Unused and Not Refunded
Our analysis of limited airline data found that DOD had purchased millions of dollars in airline tickets that it did not use and did not process for refund. Reimbursements for Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Airline Ticket Claims Could Total Millions of Dollars
We found that breakdown in internal controls resulted in numerous instances during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 where DOD travelers submitted improper claims and subsequently received improper reimbursements for airline tickets they did not purchase. Specifically, DOD did not adequately protect the centrally billed accounts from being used to purchase airline tickets based on fictitious travel orders and from being compromised and used for personal gain. These weaknesses exposed the centrally billed accounts to increased risk of fraud and abuse. Consequently, we performed additional work during fiscal year 2004 to determine whether our concerns were warranted, or whether DOD could detect instances where invalid travel orders are used to obtain airline tickets. 1). Weaknesses in Design and Implementation of Key Internal Controls Contributed to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
We found that the lack of interface among DOD’s primary travel systems— travel order, ticket issuance, and travel voucher—was the common underlying cause and major contributing factor that allowed the fraud, waste, and abuse we identified to occur without detection. We found that DOD had not designed other procedures to link or reconcile tickets issued using the centrally billed accounts to the voucher system. Reconciliation would also enable DOD to detect instances where a traveler submitted a claim for airfare for which a corresponding ticket was issued using the centrally billed accounts. Excessive Reliance on Travelers to Report Unused Tickets
Another contributing factor to unused and unrefunded tickets is DOD’s excessive reliance on travelers to report unused tickets to the CTOs. Lack of Physical Safeguards Exposed Centrally Billed Accounts to Fraudulent Activities
DOD was exposed to fraudulent activities because DOD did not adequately safeguard the centrally billed account numbers. However, not all CTOs have implemented this safeguard. In response to our testimonies and reports on the individually billed accounts, the Congress took actions in the fiscal year 2003 appropriations and authorization acts and the fiscal year 2004 authorization act requiring (1) the establishment of guidelines and procedures for disciplinary actions to be taken against cardholders for improper, fraudulent, or abusive use of government travel cards; (2) the denial of government travel cards to individuals who are not creditworthy; (3) split disbursements for paying a portion of the expenses claimed on a travel voucher directly to the credit card bank and the remainder to the cardholder; and (4) offset of delinquent travel card debt against the pay or retirement benefits of DOD civilian and military employees and retirees. The use of a well-controlled individually billed account travel program as the principal mechanism for acquiring airline tickets will help limit the government’s financial exposure by reducing the magnitude of unused tickets and improper payments, and preventing improper and fraudulent use from inadequate security over centrally billed accounts. In addition, DOD has taken actions to improve management of its centrally billed account travel program based on the results of our premium class travel and unused airline ticket reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2003, GAO testified on the significant level of improper premium class travel purchased with centrally billed accounts. These findings led to concerns over the Department of Defense's (DOD) overall management of the centrally billed account program. At the request of this Committee, Senator Grassley, and Representative Schakowsky, GAO performed work to determine whether DOD controls were adequate to protect the centrally billed accounts from fraud, waste, and abuse. This testimony focuses on whether DOD (1) paid for airline tickets that it did not use and did not process for refund, (2) improperly reimbursed travelers for the cost of airline tickets paid for with centrally billed accounts, and (3) adequately secured access to centrally billed accounts against improper and fraudulent use. This testimony also addresses the internal control breakdowns that led to instances of fraud, waste, and abuse and DOD's corrective actions. In two companion reports issued today, DOD concurred with the 31 recommendations GAO made-- including moving to a well- managed individually billed account program--to improve the management of unused tickets, recover the value of outstanding unused tickets, prevent and detect improper payments, reduce the risk that airline tickets are issued on invalid travel orders, and improve security over the centrally billed accounts.
What GAO Found
A weak control environment and breakdowns of key controls over the centrally billed accounts led to millions of dollars wasted on unused airline tickets, reimbursements to travelers for improper and potentially fraudulent airline ticket claims, and issuance of airline tickets based on invalid travel orders. In some instances where the centrally billed accounts were compromised, DOD did not pay for the airline tickets because DOD disputed those charges. However, not all DOD units disputed unauthorized charges. As a result, DOD is vulnerable to paying for fraudulent charges. A major contributing factor to these problems is that DOD's travel order, ticket issuance, and travel voucher systems are not integrated, and DOD had not designed compensating procedures to reconcile data in these systems. Thus, DOD was unable to detect instances where (1) the absence of a travel voucher might indicate that an airline ticket was unused, (2) travelers improperly claimed reimbursement for tickets they did not purchase, and (3) an authorized individual did not approve the travel order submitted to obtain an airline ticket. Other causes are excessive reliance on DOD travelers to report unused tickets, inadequate voucher review, and weak centrally billed account safeguards. |
gao_GAO-06-445 | gao_GAO-06-445_0 | Today, DSN consists of communications antennas at three major sites around the world—Goldstone, Calif.; Madrid, Spain; and Canberra, Australia. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 contains a requirement that the NASA Administrator submit a plan for updating NASA’s space communications architecture for low-Earth orbital operations and deep space exploration so that it is capable of meeting NASA’s needs over the next 20 years. DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission Requirements
DSN is currently able to meet most requirements of its existing workload. Sustainability of DSN’s Infrastructure Is Unknown
DSN suffers from an aged, fragile infrastructure. Limited Capacity to Provide Coverage Is Exacerbated By An Increasing Mission Set
DSN also faces increasing competition between new and old users for coverage time on the system. DSN officials thus find themselves faced with the need to balance this new demand with an equally compelling demand from existing “legacy” missions that have remained operational beyond their original lifetimes but are still returning science data and need to be maintained. If this occurs, the opportunity to continue adding new mission customers will be limited and the potential for lost deep space science is significant. Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match Space Communications Resources With Requirements
DSN’s future utility is also in question because NASA currently does not have a mechanism in place to match funding for space communications assets with program requirements, such as infrastructure and technology development needs, from an agency wide perspective. Instead, funding for space communications capabilities is controlled by the individual communications programs and their associated mission directorates, who may not consider agency wide goals when making investments. In the former case, a program like DSN must compete for funding against individual missions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position the Deep Space Network to meet existing workload challenges and prepare the network for future deep space communications responsibilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator direct DSN to (1) identify total program requirements for deep space communications capabilities for the near and long term, in terms better defined than the single coverage commitment of 95 percent, (2) determine the extent to which the program’s current capabilities can support those identified requirements and (3) develop a plan to address any gap between those capabilities and requirements and identify the estimated costs of any enhancements needed. As NASA’s task group on space communications considers how program requirements can be better integrated into overall agency goals for space communications capabilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator direct the group to consider the following in carrying out its task: (1) identify what priority program-level requirements have in agency-level decisions affecting space communications, (2) determine how program- level requirements for space communications programs can be identified and communicated to agency-level decision makers, and (3) establish how the agency can identify program-level investments needed to address program requirements that support agency wide goals for space communications and how to coordinate those investments to avoid duplication and additional costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's Vision for Space Exploration calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In response, over the next two decades, NASA may spend $100 billion on new technologies and facilities that will require reliable ground communications to achieve those missions. Presently, that communications capability is provided by NASA's Deep Space Network--a system of antennas located at three sites around the world. However, the Network faces challenges that may hinder its provision of current and future mission support. This report discusses (1) the significant operational challenges faced by the Deep Space Network and (2) the extent to which NASA is integrating the Network into its future communications plans.
What GAO Found
While NASA's Deep Space Network can meet most requirements of its current workload, it may not be able to meet near-term and future demand. The system--suffering from an aging, fragile infrastructure with some crucial components over 40 years old--has lost science data during routine operations and critical events. In addition, new customers find they must compete for this limited capacity, not just with each other, but also with legacy missions extended past their lifetimes, such as NASA's Voyager, that nonetheless return valuable science. Program officials doubt they can provide adequate coverage to an increasing set of new mission customers, especially if they increase dramatically under the President's Vision. The Deep Space Network's future utility is also in question because NASA does not currently match funding for space communications capabilities with agency wide space communications requirements. While NASA created an agency level entity to review the technical requirements for integrating assets like the network into an agency wide space communications architecture for the future, that entity does not address program level requirements nor influence investment decisions. Control over such requirements and funding remains with the mission directorates and programs themselves. This disconnect allows programs to invest in capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space communications. After this review was initiated, NASA began to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level requirements and program-level funding, but no recommendations for action have yet been proposed. |
gao_GAO-09-199 | gao_GAO-09-199_0 | Background
Under DOD’s supply chain materiel management policy, the secondary item inventory is to be sized to minimize DOD’s investment while providing the inventory needed to support both peacetime and wartime requirements. Army Secondary Inventory Exceeded Amount Needed to Satisfy Current Requirements
Our analysis of Army secondary inventory data for the 4-year period we examined showed that about $3.6 billion (22 percent) of the average annual total inventory value of $16.3 billion was not needed to meet current requirements. During this same time period, the value of Army inventory deficits decreased but remained substantial—an average value of $3.5 billion over the 4-year period. About $3.6 Billion, or 22 Percent, of the Army’s On- Hand and On-Order Inventory Value Exceeded Current Requirements Each Year
Our analysis of Army secondary inventory data showed that, on average, about $12.7 billion (78 percent) of the total annual inventory value was needed to meet current requirements, whereas $3.6 billion (22 percent) exceeded current requirements. The value of the inventory that exceeded current requirements increased over the period of our review, from $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 to $4.4 billion in fiscal year 2007, as did the number of parts that exceeded current requirements, from 5.2 million parts to 10.2 million parts (see table 3). 1). Inaccurate demand forecasting for spare parts also contributed to the Army having inventory that was in excess of current requirements as well as having inventory deficits. After evaluating its demand forecasting procedures, the Army has issued guidance that the Army expects will improve the accuracy of its forecasts. DOD’s supply chain management regulation requires the military services to take a number of steps to provide for effective and efficient end-to-end materiel support. While these methods may be effective management tools, we found that the Army has not established metrics and goals for measuring the cost efficiency of its inventory management. Demand Forecasting Has Been Inaccurate
Our review showed that demand forecasting for spare parts has been inaccurate. According to the Army regulation on centralized management of the Army supply system, the Army uses a computer model to forecast its spare parts requirements. Army officials stated that when demand data does not accurately reflect usage or forecasts for future usage are incorrect, the result is a misalignment between inventory and current requirements. As a result, inventory did not always align with requirements. The Army’s guidance also directs managers to update forecast models based on the readiness portion of the Army Operations Update to match actual quantities of weapon systems being used in Southwest Asia. According to Army officials, previous models were updated based on estimates that were not always timely or accurate. The Army guidance was issued as we were completing our audit work. In 2008, the Army designated the Under Secretary of the Army as its chief management officer responsible for business transformation. Taking steps to reduce the high levels of inventory exceeding requirements could help to ensure that DOD is meeting supply performance goals at least cost. Strengthening the Army’s inventory management—while maintaining high levels of supply availability and meeting warfighter needs—could reduce support costs and free up funds for other needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of the Army’s secondary inventory, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following three actions: Establish metrics and goals for tracking and assessing the cost efficiency of inventory management and incorporate these into existing management and oversight processes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Army’s on-hand and on-order secondary inventory reflects the amount of inventory needed to support current requirements, we obtained the Central Secondary Item Stratification Budget Summary and item-specific reports for the Army’s Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) and the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), including summary reports and item- specific data as of September 30 for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. To determine the extent to which the Army’s on-order and on-hand secondary inventory reflects the amount of inventory needed to support requirements, we reviewed DOD and Army inventory management guidance, past GAO products on DOD and Army inventory management practices for secondary inventory items, and other related documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory management as a high-risk area. It is critical that the military services effectively and efficiently manage DOD's secondary inventory to ensure that the warfighter is supplied with the right items at the right time and to maintain good stewardship over the billions of dollars invested in their inventory. GAO reviewed the Army's management of secondary inventory and determined (1) the extent to which on-hand and on-order secondary inventory reflected the amount needed to support current requirements and (2) causes for the Army having secondary inventory that exceeded current requirements or, conversely, for having inventory deficits. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Army data on secondary inventory (spare parts such as aircraft and tank engines) from fiscal years 2004 through 2007.
What GAO Found
For the 4-year period GAO examined, the Army had significantly more inventory than was needed to support current requirements. At the same time, the Army had substantial inventory deficits. GAO's analysis of Army data reflected an annual average of about $16.3 billion of secondary inventory for fiscal years 2004 to 2007, of which about $3.6 billion (22 percent) exceeded current requirements. On average, approximately 97 percent of the inventory value exceeding requirements was on hand and the remaining 3 percent was on order. Based on Army demand forecasts, inventory that exceeded current requirements had enough parts on hand for some items to satisfy several years, or even decades, of anticipated supply needs. Also, a large proportion of items that exceeded current requirements had no projected demand. The Army also had an annual average of about $3.5 billion of inventory deficits over this 4-year period. Army inventory did not align with current requirements over this period because of (1) a lack of cost-efficiency metrics and goals and (2) inaccurate demand forecasting. DOD's supply chain management regulation requires the military services to take a number of steps to provide for effective and efficient end-to-end materiel support. For example, the regulation directs the components to size secondary inventory to minimize DOD's investment while providing the inventory needed. Although the Army has supply support performance measures for meeting warfighter needs, it has not established metrics and goals that can measure the cost efficiency of its inventory management practices. Furthermore, the Army's demand forecasts have frequently been inaccurate. The Army uses a computer model to forecast its spare parts requirements, but when demand data are inaccurate or untimely, the result is a misalignment between inventory and current requirements. As a result, the Army has accumulated billions of dollars in excess inventory against current requirements for some items and substantial inventory deficits in other items. Without accurate and timely demand data, managers cannot ensure that their purchasing decisions will result in inventory levels that are sized to minimize DOD's investment needed to support requirements. The Army has acknowledged that challenges exist in its forecasting procedures and has begun to take steps to address shortcomings. In October 2008, the Army issued guidance directing managers to reduce the forecast period from 24 months to 12 months to better account for changes in the size of the force and the resulting changes in demands. The guidance also directs managers to update forecast models to match actual quantities of weapon systems being used in Southwest Asia; previous models were updated based on estimates that were not always timely or accurate. These two changes constitute steps toward improving the accuracy of demand forecasts, but GAO was unable to assess their effectiveness because this guidance was issued as GAO was completing its audit work. Also, the Army's recent designation of the Under Secretary of the Army as its chief management officer responsible for business transformation provides an opportunity for enhanced oversight of inventory management improvement efforts. Strengthening the Army's inventory management--while maintaining high levels of supply availability and meeting warfighter needs--could reduce support costs and free up funds for other needs. |
gao_GAO-07-390T | gao_GAO-07-390T_0 | In recent years, a number of serious accidents raised concerns about the level of safety in the railroad industry. For example, as you are aware, in 2005, a train collision in Graniteville, South Carolina, resulted in the evacuation of 5,400 people, 292 injuries, and 9 deaths. FRA Has Made Progress in Targeting Its Oversight Efforts on the Basis of Risk
In planning its safety oversight, FRA focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents through a number of initiatives. FRA’s May 2005 National Rail Safety Action Plan provides a reasonable framework for the agency’s efforts to target its oversight at the highest priority risks. The plan outlines initiatives aimed at reducing the main types of train accidents, those caused by human factors and track defects. FRA has also developed a new approach for planning its inspections, based on greater use of its accident and inspection data. While these initiatives are promising, it is too early to assess their impact. Recent FRA initiatives to reduce accidents caused by human factors include proposed regulations aimed at reducing the most common causes of these accidents, such as improper positioning of track switches; a 5-year pilot project to establish a confidential voluntary system for reporting and learning from close call incidents; a study to develop a fatigue model that could be used by railroads to improve train crew scheduling practices and prevent worker fatigue; and a proposed 5-year pilot project that would use risk management to help reduce human factor accidents, as well as other types of accidents, at selected railroad worksites. FRA Relies Primarily on Direct Inspections to Identify Safety Problems and Does Not Oversee Railroads’ Management of Safety Risks
In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies a range of safety problems on railroad systems mainly through routine inspections to determine whether operations, track, and equipment are in compliance with safety standards. FRA’s inspections do not attempt to determine how well railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems. APTA, PHMSA, and Transport Canada have implemented approaches to oversee the management of safety risks by U.S. commuter railroads, U.S. pipelines, and Canadian railroads, respectively. However, because the number of FRA and state inspectors is small relative to the size of railroad operations, FRA inspections can cover only a very small proportion of railroad operations (0.2 percent). As a result, we did not recommend in our recent report that FRA adopt an approach for overseeing railroads’ management of safety risks. However, its ability to make informed decisions about its inspection and enforcement programs is limited because it lacks measures of the intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of these programs that would show how they are contributing toward the end outcomes, or ultimate safety improvements, that the agency seeks to achieve. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its enforcement approach. While FRA has developed a range of goals and measures related to its oversight of railroad safety, it lacks measures of the desired intermediate outcomes, or direct results, of its inspection and enforcement efforts—the correction of identified safety problems and improvements in compliance. In the report we issued last week, we recommended that FRA (1) develop and implement measures of the direct results of its inspection and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate the agency’s enforcement program to provide further information on its results, the need for additional data to measure and assess these results, and the need for any changes in this program to improve performance. FRA did not express a view on these recommendations when it commented on our draft report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the overall safety record of the railroad industry, as measured by the number of train accidents per million miles traveled, has improved markedly since 1980, there has been little or no overall improvement over the past decade. Serious accidents resulting in injuries and deaths continue to occur, such as one in Graniteville, South Carolina, that resulted in 9 deaths and 292 injuries. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) develops safety standards and inspects and enforces railroads' compliance with these standards. On January 26, 2007, GAO reported on FRA's overall safety oversight strategy. (See GAO-07-149 .) The report discussed how FRA (1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents in planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad systems in carrying out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. GAO recommended that FRA (1) put into place measures of the results of its inspection and enforcement programs and (2) evaluate its enforcement program. In reviewing a draft of that report, the Department of Transportation did not provide overall views on its contents or its recommendations. The statement is based on GAO's recent report.
What GAO Found
In planning its safety oversight, FRA is focusing its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents through initiatives aimed at addressing their main causes--human behaviors and defective track--as well as through improvements in its inspection planning approach. FRA's May 2005 National Rail Safety Action Plan, the agency's overall strategy for targeting its oversight at the greatest risks, provides a reasonable framework for guiding these efforts. FRA's initiatives to address the most common causes of accidents are promising, although the success of many of them will depend on voluntary actions by the railroads. In addition, under the action plan, FRA has adopted a new inspection planning approach in which inspectors focus their efforts on locations that data-driven models indicate are most likely to have safety problems. In carrying out its safety oversight, FRA identifies a range of safety problems on railroad systems mainly by determining whether operating practices, track, and equipment are in compliance with minimum safety standards. However, FRA is able to inspect only about 0.2 percent of railroads' operations each year, and its inspections do not examine how railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems that could lead to accidents. Such an approach, as a supplement to traditional compliance inspections, is used in the oversight of U.S. commuter railroads and pipelines and of Canadian railroads. GAO did not recommend that FRA adopt this approach because the agency's various initiatives to reduce the train accident rate have not yet had time to demonstrate their effects on safety. FRA uses a range of goals and measures to assess the impact of its oversight, such as (1) goals to target its inspection and enforcement programs at reducing various types of railroad accidents and (2) related measures, such as rates of track-caused accidents, to monitor its progress. However, FRA's ability to make informed decisions about these programs is limited because it lacks measures of their direct results, such as the correction of identified safety problems. Furthermore, FRA has not evaluated the effectiveness of its enforcement program. |
gao_GAO-02-427 | gao_GAO-02-427_0 | Background
Before restructuring, electric service was provided primarily by federal- and state-regulated investor-owned electric utilities. Power plants in Texas generate nearly all of the electricity that the state consumes. In contrast, in California, developers added about 4,600 megawatts, or 25 percent of the forecasted need for capacity through 2004, and in Pennsylvania, developers added about 2,100 megawatts, or less than half of its forecasted need through 2004. The States Had Different Needs for New Power Plants
In 1995, when U.S. electricity markets were beginning to restructure, NERC forecast that already planned new plant construction would adequately meet the needs of the regional markets that include each of the three states through 2004. Regulatory Processes Are Generally Similar in the Three States, Although California Requires an Additional Approval
In the three states we reviewed, state and local agencies responsible for air and water quality and land use decisions review applications for constructing and operating power plants to ensure compliance with relevant laws and regulations. The administrative law judge then makes a recommendation to the permitting agency. Connecting New Power Plants Is Less Costly and Faster for Developers in Texas Than in the Other Two States
The market rules for connecting a new power plant to the local transmission system (referred to as interconnection) in Texas differs markedly from those in California and Pennsylvania. Other developers said that they will invest in riskier projects if expected profits are higher. Lower Potential Profits and Higher Risks in California Delayed, and May Continue to Delay, Investment
According to electricity industry analysts, profitability and risk considerations in California delayed proposals to build power plants in the state. An applicant submitting its permit application to DEP must provide proof of coordination. | What GAO Found
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have restructured electricity markets by shifting from service provided through a regulated monopoly to service provided through open competition among the local utilities and their competitors. The restructuring was intended to boost competition and expand consumer choice, increase efficiency, and lower prices. Of the three states GAO studied, Texas had the greatest need for additional electric power, and it added the most new capacity from 1995 through 2001. In contrast, California added 25 percent of the forecasted need for capacity over this period. Although Pennsylvania added less than half of its forecasted need for capacity, the state continues to be a net exporter of electricity to nearby states. The three states have similar processes for approving applications to build and operate new power plants. In all three states, state and local agencies must review the applications to ensure that the developer complies with environmental, land use, and other requirements before issuing the permits necessary to build and operate a power plant. California also has a state energy commission that reviews each power plant application to determine whether the benefits of additional electricity outweigh its likely negative environmental or other effects. Texas' rules for connecting new power plants to the electricity transmission system are less costly for independent developers and are administratively simpler than the approaches used in California and Pennsylvania. In deciding where to build new power plants, independent developers said they weigh a market's risks, including uncertainty about changes in a state's market rules, against expected profits. Higher risks require higher expected profits. |
gao_GAO-03-786 | gao_GAO-03-786_0 | Scope and Methodology
To obtain an understanding of the Forest Service’s purchase card and convenience check policies and procedures, and the related internal controls, we reviewed USDA and Forest Service procurement policy, USDA PCMS guidance, Forest Service regional purchase card program policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury purchase card program policy, and previous GAO reports, as well as reports issued by USDA’s IG and an independent contractor; and observed and documented purchase card procedures and conducted telephone interviews with USDA and Forest Service management and staff to identify key purchase card, convenience check, and accountable property policies, procedures, and initiatives. To determine whether the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions were made in accordance with established policies and procedures, were reasonable, and reflected a legitimate government need, we selected transactions using three different methods. Critical Internal Control Activities Were Lacking or Inadequate
The Forest Service’s internal controls did not provide reasonable assurance that improper purchase card and convenience check purchases would not occur or would be detected in the normal course of business. During our review of the Forest Service purchase card program for fiscal year 2001, we also noted that supervisory review and approval of purchase card transactions was inadequate. However, we found instances where LAPCs had not been notified that cards had been lost by cardholders or stolen and the cards had not been canceled. Property Was Not Properly Tracked
Since 1999, we have designated financial management at the Forest Service as high risk on the basis of serious financial and accounting weaknesses. As shown in table 1, these items included all-terrain vehicles, cameras, GPS units, snowmobiles, and night-vision goggles. These included (1) purchases that were split into two or more transactions to circumvent single transaction limits, (2) purchase transactions that were paid for twice, (3) purchases of unauthorized items, (4) purchases that exceeded single purchase limits, (5) unapproved information technology (IT) purchases, (6) transactions charged to purchase card accounts of former employees, and (7) convenience checks written by cardholders to reimburse themselves. Cardholders wrote convenience checks to themselves. Poor Controls over Purchasing Practices Resulted in Certain Wasteful and Questionable Transactions
The inadequacies and ineffectiveness of internal controls were also evident in the 779 wasteful and questionable transactions we identified that totaled over $1 million. Wasteful Purchases
We identified 135 purchases totaling $212,104 that we determined to be wasteful because they were excessive in cost relative to available alternatives, of questionable government need, or both. We identified purchases for which the Forest Service was unable to identify the purpose of the award or provide supporting documentation. For example, we requested supporting documentation for a $2,315 transaction charged by Unisys Corporation. Although the purchases related to these particular transactions were not determined to be improper, this control weakness leaves the Forest Service vulnerable to improper purchases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1999, GAO has designated Forest Service's financial management as a high-risk area because of internal control and accounting weaknesses that have been identified by the Inspector General and GAO. Given these known risks and the hundreds of millions of dollars in credit card purchases made by the agency each year, GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's fiscal year 2001 purchase card transactions to determine whether (1) existing internal controls were designed to provide reasonable assurance that improper purchases would be prevented or detected, (2) purchases were made in accordance with established policies and procedures, and (3) purchases were made for a reasonable cost and reflected a legitimate government need.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses in the Forest Service's purchase card program leave the agency vulnerable to, and in some cases, resulted in, improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases. These weaknesses included inadequate segregation of duties over purchases, supervisory review and approval of purchases, monitoring activities, and control over property used in Forest Service activities. For example, GAO found instances where items highly susceptible to theft, such as all terrain vehicles, digital cameras, and snowmobiles, were purchased and retained by cardholders, but no records of the items were created in Forest Service systems. These weaknesses likely contributed to approximately $2.7 million in improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases identified in our review. GAO identified purchases that totaled over $1.6 million that were improper because they violated law, regulation, or agency policy. These included purchases that had been split into two or more segments to avoid the cardholder's single purchase limit, purchases that had been paid for twice, purchases that exceeded single transaction limits, purchases for which required approvals were not obtained, purchases of unauthorized items, transactions on accounts of former employees, and instances where cardholders wrote convenience checks to themselves. GAO also found purchases totaling $212,104 that it considered wasteful because they were excessive in cost relative to available alternatives or were for a questionable government need. Further, GAO found purchases totaling $869,825 that it considered to be questionable because the Forest Service either could not provide supporting documentation for them, or supporting documentation was incomplete or incorrect and GAO was unable to determine whether the purchases were proper. |
gao_GAO-16-26 | gao_GAO-16-26_0 | Based on the authority provided in legislation, agencies obligate and expend funds. Sequestration. However, there are some categories of activities that are permitted to continue during an appropriations lapse. Selected Agencies Vary in Their Management of Unobligated Balances, Including Use of Balances to Mitigate Effects of the 2013 Sequestration and Government Shutdown
In Reviewed Accounts, Agencies Generally Addressed Key Questions for Evaluating Unobligated Balances
As described earlier in this report, in September 2013 we identified four key questions for evaluating balances in budget accounts, including unobligated balances or the portion of the available budget authority that has not yet been obligated, to help agencies more effectively manage public funds. Mission Activities and Goals and Unobligated Balances Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Construction, Rehabilitation, Operation and Maintenance (CROM). International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Factors Affecting Size and Composition of Unobligated Balances Science. For Reviewed Accounts, Agencies Actively Estimate and Manage Unobligated Balances; However, for Two of the Accounts, Balances Exceeded Target Levels
Of the four key questions, agency management of balances is especially important in that it highlights how ongoing, routine estimation, and agency management of unobligated balances throughout the year is critical to help ensure the effective use of program resources. Our work shows that actively managing unobligated balances involves (1) regular review of unobligated balances, including ongoing monitoring and tracking, throughout the year; (2) tracking the appropriation year of the balances; (3) estimating projected annual unobligated balances and identifying the amount of unobligated balances that may be necessary to retain the following year; and (4) recognizing how unobligated balances may result from, or be affected by, events outside of an agency’s control. For Reviewed Accounts, Officials Reported Having a Process to Regularly Review Unobligated Balances throughout the Year
For all of the eight accounts we reviewed, agency officials reported having a process for managing unobligated balances throughout the year, including ongoing monitoring and tracking of the balances. It is important to track the year of appropriation for accounts with multi-year budget authority to obligate the authority in the order appropriated to maximize resources for program implementation and prevent budget authority that otherwise could have been used from expiring. Although officials in the five reviewed accounts with two-year funds said they track the appropriation year of funds to help ensure effective use of current budget authority within the appropriation’s period of availability, all of the accounts had unobligated balances that expired during fiscal years 2012 through 2014. Additionally, for the Consular and Border Security Programs (CBSP) within the D&CP account, State officials said they have a target to carryover approximately 25 percent of projected program expenditures for the next year to manage complex global visa and passport operations. This exceeded the 25 percent target of approximately $850 million by approximately $440 million. Officials said that the plan is awaiting clearance by leadership and they anticipate that it will be finalized by June 2016. According to officials, these steps included decreasing fees or delaying fee increases when unobligated balances were adequate to cover costs; realigning spending, consistent with authorities, to better coincide with actual costs; and improving internal coordination to better track and model revenues and obligations. WAPA officials reported that they developed a strategy in fiscal year 2013 for managing unobligated balances in the annual expense fund within the CROM account. WAPA officials also reported that they are considering other strategies for reducing unobligated balances to required targets. Without a finalized and fully implemented strategy for reducing unobligated balances in excess of the agencies’ predetermined targets for necessary balances for the identified programs or activities in these two accounts, Energy and State are missing opportunities to actively manage unobligated balances. Agency officials for four of the eight reviewed accounts— Energy’s EERE and WAPA CROM accounts, State’s D&CP account, and USPTO’s S&E account—reported using unobligated balances to mitigate the effects of sequestration in fiscal year 2013. Six of Eight Reviewed Accounts Used Unobligated Balances to Fund Activities during the October 2013 Government Shutdown
In the event of a government shutdown, OMB is responsible for ensuring agencies have taken the essential actions needed to manage the shutdown effectively. Specifically, agency officials managing Energy’s WAPA CROM account and State’s CBSP within the D&CP account are not taking sufficient steps to ensure that the accounts only carryover the necessary unobligated balances into the next year. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, and State; and the Administrator of NASA for comment. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to evaluate how selected agencies managed and used unobligated balances in reviewed accounts, focusing on fiscal years 2012 through 2014, which covers the fiscal year 2013 sequestration and fiscal year 2014 government shutdown. For this review, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of four agencies—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Departments of State (State), Commerce (Commerce) and Energy (Energy). | Why GAO Did This Study
Both the 2013 sequestration and government shutdown highlighted the importance of actively managing public funds. Effective management of unobligated balances that are carried over for use in the next fiscal year presents agencies with an opportunity to better respond to unexpected events in the future. GAO was asked to review how balances have changed since 2012. This report evaluates how selected agencies managed and used unobligated balances in reviewed accounts, focusing on fiscal years 2012 through 2014, which covers the 2013 sequestration and shutdown.
GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight accounts from four agencies for this review—Commerce, Energy, NASA, and State—based on their use of balances to address sequestration and large or significant changes in the balances. GAO analyzed data on the size and composition of unobligated balances, reviewed agency documentation on managing the balances, and interviewed budget officials responsible for the accounts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the selected agencies—the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and State, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—generally managed and tracked unobligated balances to ensure the effective use of program resources in the eight reviewed accounts. Agency estimation and management of unobligated balances in the reviewed accounts involved the following activities:
Regular review of unobligated balances . Agency officials for all of the eight reviewed accounts reported having a process for managing unobligated balances throughout the year. For example, officials managing NASA's Science account reported that they monitor unobligated balances monthly by considering obligations from the prior months.
Tracking the appropriation year of unobligated balances . Officials reported that agencies tracked the year of appropriation for the five reviewed accounts that receive multi-year budget authority. This action is important to help ensure that the agency obligates the authority in the order appropriated to maximize resources. All five accounts had balances that expired during fiscal years 2012 through 2014; however, there can be various reasons for an agency to not obligate funds late in the fiscal year, and in some cases, special authority expands the use of certain budget authority. For example, for State's Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement accounts, State has the authority to use expired funds beyond their initial period of availability for specific purposes and to extend the availability of certain funds.
Estimating and identifying needed unobligated balances . Officials managing three of the eight reviewed accounts identified a need to retain unobligated balances to sustain agency operations and manage financial risk. For example, officials responsible for managing Energy's Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) Construction, Rehabilitation, Operation and Maintenance (CROM) account said that two of the account's four use categories have a target to carryover equal to or up to 25 percent of funds against unexpected environmental factors that could introduce financial risk to their mission of marketing hydroelectric power. However, in fiscal year 2014, the balance for one category exceeded its target by approximately $40 million. WAPA officials reported that they have drafted a strategy to manage excess balances, but the strategy has not been fully implemented. Similarly, in fiscal year 2014, within State's D&CP account, officials reported exceeding the target to carryover about 25 percent of projected program expenditures for the next year to manage complex global visa and passport operations for the Consular and Border Security Programs (CBSP) by approximately $440 million. State officials said that they have developed a draft strategy for reducing excess unobligated balances. Officials said that they plan to finalize the strategy by June 2016. In the meantime, they reported taking steps to reduce unobligated balances for CBSP. These steps include decreasing fees or delaying fee increases when unobligated balances were adequate to cover costs.
In accordance with Office of Management and Budget guidance, the selected agencies used unobligated balances in four of the reviewed accounts to mitigate the effects of the 2013 sequestration. The agencies also used unobligated balances to fund operations in six of the accounts during the October 2013 government shutdown.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that Energy finalize and implement a strategy and that State finalize its strategy and continue efforts to ensure more effective management of unobligated balances in the WAPA CROM account and CBSP within the D&CP account, respectively. Energy and State concurred with GAO's recommendations. Commerce, Energy, and State provided technical comments which GAO incorporated; NASA had no comments. |
gao_GAO-14-813T | gao_GAO-14-813T_0 | DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, but Has Taken Some Steps to Update Guidance
In September 2012, we found that DHS did not know how much its components invested in R&D, making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department. According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the U.S. Coast Guard were the only components that conducted R&D and we found that they were the only components that reported budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process. Specifically, for fiscal year 2011, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. We also reported in September 2012 that DHS did not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities. DHS agreed with our recommendation and stated that it planned to evaluate the most effective path forward to guide uniform treatment of R&D across the department in compliance with OMB rules and was considering a management directive, multi-component steering committee, or new policy guidance to help better oversee and coordinate R&D. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to implement these recommendations. S&T Has Taken Some Actions to Coordinate R&D across DHS, but R&D Activities are Fragmented and Overlapping
We reported in September 2012 that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides S&T with the responsibility for, among other things, coordinating and integrating all research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities within DHS and establishing and administering the primary R&D activities of the department. While we did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, in September 2012 we found that DHS had not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication and did not have tracking mechanisms or policies to help ensure that overlap is avoided and efforts are better coordinated consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. According to S&T, the Office of National Laboratories’ ability to provide information on activities across the department is limited by components inconsistently operating within the defined process for working with the national laboratories. As a result, we recommended that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for overseeing R&D that includes, among other things, a description of the department’s process and roles and responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and efforts, and a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs across the department. As of July 2014, DHS has not developed new policy guidance but is conducting portfolio reviews across the department, as directed in committee reports accompanying the fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriation act, aimed at coordinating R&D activities.recommendation to develop a policy that defines roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and coordination processes, as well as a mechanism that tracks all DHS R&D projects, could better position DHS to mitigate the risk of overlapping and unnecessarily duplicative R&D projects. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D activities at the department. S&T Has Taken Steps to Obtain Feedback and Evaluate the Impact of Its Border and Maritime R&D Efforts
Costs and Types of Completed Border and Maritime R&D Projects Varied
In September 2013, we reported that DHS S&T, Coast Guard, and DNDO reported producing 97 Border and Maritime R&D deliverables at an estimated cost of $177 million from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. The type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by these R&D entities were wide-ranging in their cost and scale, and included knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software. As we reported in September 2013, R&D customers we met with had mixed views on the impact of the R&D deliverables they received. The National Academy of Sciences has stated that feedback from both R&D failures and successes may be communicated to stakeholders and used to modify future investments.At the time of our report, S&T had not established timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers on the extent to which the deliverables it provides were meeting its customer’s needs. As a result, we recommended that S&T establish timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers to determine the usefulness and impact of both its R&D projects and project deliverables, and use it to make better-informed decisions regarding future work. S&T officials concurred with the recommendation at the time of our review, and reported that it was developing R&D strategies with DHS components, which would include a strategic assessment of components’ R&D needs and updated annually on the basis of customer feedback. We will continue to monitor DHS’s efforts in this area. | Why GAO Did This Study
Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support its missions including securing the border, and detecting nuclear material among others. Within DHS, S&T conducts and is responsible for coordinating R&D across the department. Other components also conduct R&D to support their respective missions.
This statement discusses (1) how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining and overseeing its R&D efforts across the department, (2) the extent to which R&D is coordinated across DHS, and (3) the results of DHS border and maritime security R&D efforts and the extent to which DHS has obtained feedback on these efforts. This statement is based on GAO's previously issued work from September 2012 to September 2013, and selected updates conducted in July 2014 on the status of GAO's prior recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO reviewed agency documentation.
What GAO Found
In September 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not know the total amount its components invested in research and development (R&D) and did not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Coast Guard were the only components that conducted R&D, and GAO found that these were the only components that reported budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations made by other DHS components. At the time of GAO's review, DHS reported it was difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS did not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report all R&D activities. GAO recommended that DHS develop policies to assist components in better understanding how to report R&D activities and better position DHS to determine R&D investments. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of July 2014, had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D but had not yet determined the most effective path to guide R&D across the department. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts to develop its approach for overseeing R&D at the department.
GAO also reported in September 2012 that S&T had taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the department's R&D efforts were fragmented and overlapping, which increased the risk of unnecessary duplication. GAO recommended that DHS develop a policy defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and establish a mechanism to track all R&D projects to help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication. DHS concurred with the recommendation. As of July 2014, S&T has not developed new policy guidance but is conducting portfolio reviews across the department, as directed by the fiscal year 2013 appropriations act, aimed at coordinating R&D activities. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts to develop a policy to better coordinate and track R&D activities at the department.
In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS border and maritime R&D components reported producing 97 R&D deliverables from fiscal year 2010 through 2012 at an estimated cost of $177 million. GAO found that the type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO varied, and R&D customers GAO met with had mixed views on the impact of the deliverables. These deliverables included knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software. For example, S&T developed prototype radar and video systems for use by Border Patrol. However, GAO reported that S&T had not established timeframes for collecting and evaluating feedback on the extent to which deliverables met customers' needs. GAO recommended that S&T collect such feedback from its customers to better determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D projects and deliverables and make better-informed decisions regarding future work. As of July 2014, DHS had taken steps to address this recommendation, including making plans to gather customer feedback. GAO will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in this area.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior reports, GAO recommended, among other things, that DHS develop policies and guidance for defining, overseeing, coordinating, and tracking R&D activities across the department; and that S&T collect and evaluate feedback from its customers. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and has actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-17-426 | gao_GAO-17-426_0 | Federal Agencies Spent Over $1.6 Billion between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2015 to Purchase Approximately 64,500 Vehicles through GSA
From fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, federal agencies purchased 64,522 passenger vehicles and light trucks through GSA at a total cost of over $1.6 billion. Five departments (DHS, the Department of Justice, USDA, DOD, and the Department of the Interior) purchased 90 percent of the vehicles purchased through GSA during this 5-year time period, and spent a comparable percentage of the associated funds. 2). 4). Specifically, CBP did not assess the utilization of vehicles that fell below DHS’s mileage minimums, and NRCS did not use USDA’s utilization criteria or annually assess vehicles’ utilization. Cumulatively, these two agencies incurred an estimated $13.5 million in depreciation and maintenance costs for these vehicles during fiscal year 2015 (see table 5). Based on our review of policies and agency-provided data, we found that the Navy uses criteria and justification processes to determine if a vehicle is utilized and was able to determine that all of the 3,652 vehicles we selected for our review were utilized. CBP Did Not Determine if 81 Percent of Selected Vehicles Were Utilized in Fiscal Year 2015
DHS’s fleet policy requires that agencies determine if their vehicles are justified. While DHS policy instructs agencies to individually justify vehicles that did not meet DHS’s or agency-developed utilization criteria, CBP officials could not provide justifications for these 1,862 vehicles, and one official stated that CBP does not develop such justifications. Because CBP did not determine if these vehicles are utilized, some of this cost may have been for vehicles that the agency did not need. CBP officials explained that it would not be efficient or cost-effective to manually collect the data needed to establish criteria appropriate for CBP, such as “engine run time.” Furthermore, even if criteria were to be established, the lack of readily available data would make it difficult to measure vehicle performance against such criteria. However, officials stated that CBP has begun to install “telematics” devices in many of its vehicles. NRCS Did Not Determine If 9 Percent of Its Selected Vehicles Were Utilized in Fiscal Year 2015
A 2012 USDA policy memo requires that all vehicles be utilized. Specifically, all of the USDA and NRCS fleet managers we spoke to were unaware of this policy memo, which officials from USDA said had not been re-circulated since 2012. According to USDA officials, the utilization policy and the requirement for annual justifications were not widely discussed or shared. Thus, NRCS did not apply USDA’s utilization criteria to its vehicles to determine if the vehicles were utilized. While new telematics devices are capable of providing vehicle usage information, CBP risks losing the opportunity to use these new data to identify and remove underutilized vehicles because CBP has not developed a plan to determine how it will use this usage data to improve its utilization assessment processes, including processes for vehicles without telematics devices. Specifically, we analyzed information on more than 64,500 passenger vehicles and light trucks purchased by federal agencies through GSA from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015 (the most recent, complete fiscal year at the time of the request), including information such as: the quantity of vehicles purchased; the type of vehicle, such as a pickup truck or sedan; the agencies that acquired vehicles; the cost of the vehicles purchased; and the location of where the purchased vehicles were delivered. 2. 3. 4. To determine how selected federal agencies identify what vehicles are utilized, we judgmentally selected three federal agencies for review: the U.S. Navy (Navy); U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS); and U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP). First, we focused on a selected population of vehicles, which included: light trucks or passenger vehicles, because these two categories comprise the majority of federal-owned vehicle fleets (approximately 55 percent and 15 percent respectively); vehicles that are still in the selected agencies’ inventories as of November 2016; and vehicles that were acquired prior to fiscal year 2015, so that the agencies were fully accountable for the selected vehicles’ utilization over the entire fiscal year 2015 time period. In total, the selected vehicles from these agencies accounted for about 3 percent of the federally owned fleet. Group 1: Vehicle must be a law enforcement, emergency response, or tactical vehicle or located outside of the United States or no longer in the agency’s owned inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies spent about $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2015 to keep and operate almost 450,000 federally owned vehicles. Each federal agency is responsible for determining utilization criteria and assessing vehicle utilization. GAO was asked to describe federally owned vehicles and examine federal processes for assessing their utilization.
This report, among other objectives: (1) describes recently purchased vehicles, and (2) assesses selected agencies' efforts to determine if vehicles are utilized.
GAO analyzed government-wide data on approximately 64,500 light trucks and passenger vehicles purchased through GSA from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the most recent available. To assess utilization efforts, GAO selected three agencies (using factors such as fleet size), and reviewed agency utilization information on over 12,000 owned vehicles from fiscal year 2015. GAO also interviewed federal officials. These findings are not generalizable to all agencies but provide insight into the practices of agencies that procure thousands of vehicles.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies spent more than $1.6 billion to purchase approximately 64,500 passenger vehicles and light trucks through the General Services Administration (GSA) from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Five departments—Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Agriculture (USDA), Justice, and Interior—purchased 90 percent of these vehicles, and spent a comparable percentage of the associated funds. The vehicles cost an average of approximately $25,600 each.
GAO determined that the three agencies reviewed—Navy within DOD, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within DHS, and Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) within USDA—varied in efforts to determine if vehicles were utilized in fiscal year 2015. Navy determined that all of the 3,652 vehicles GAO selected for review were utilized by applying DOD and Navy criteria such as for mileage and individually justifying vehicles. CBP did not determine if 1,862 (81 percent) of its 2,300 selected vehicles were utilized in fiscal year 2015 even though the vehicles did not meet DHS's minimum mileage criteria. CBP officials stated that, contrary to DHS policy, CBP did not have criteria to measure these vehicles' utilization because it was difficult to manually collect the data needed to establish appropriate criteria and assess if vehicles met those criteria. CBP is currently installing devices in many of its vehicles that will allow it to more easily collect such data, but lacks a specific plan for how to ensure these data will allow it to determine if vehicles are utilized. NRCS did not determine if 579 (9 percent) of its 6,223 selected vehicles were utilized in fiscal year 2015. USDA and NRCS fleet officials stated that the agency did not annually assess vehicle utilization, nor did it apply USDA criteria such as mileage or days used. USDA and NRCS officials said they were unaware of USDA's policy requiring these steps because the policy had not been widely discussed or shared within USDA since 2012. CBP and NRCS cumulatively incurred an estimated $13.5 million in depreciation and maintenance costs in fiscal year 2015 for vehicles with unknown utilization (see table). While these costs may not equal the cost savings agencies derive from eliminating underutilized vehicles, without corrective action, agencies are incurring expenses to retain vehicles without determining if they are utilized.
a Selected owned vehicles for each agency in GAO's review covered all passenger vehicles and light trucks, except those that were: 1) emergency responder vehicles, 2) law enforcement vehicles, 3) tactical vehicles, or 4) located outside the Continental United States, among other limited exclusions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CBP develop a plan for how it will use its new data collection devices to establish criteria and assess vehicle utilization and that USDA communicate its vehicle utilization policy to fleet officials. DHS and USDA plan to implement these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-642 | gao_GAO-16-642_0 | Inactivation: a process to render infectious material (e.g., pathogens) unable to cause disease, but retain characteristics of interest for future use. The Total Number of Incidents Involving Incomplete Inactivation of Pathogens Is Unknown
The total number of incidents involving incomplete inactivation that occurred from 2003 through 2015 is unknown for several reasons, including the inability to easily identify such incidents in existing databases. Because the Select Agent Program and NIH cannot easily identify which incidents involve incomplete inactivation on reporting forms and within incident databases, they do not know the frequency or reason these incidents occur, making it difficult to develop guidance to help prevent future incidents. Eight of the 21 identified incidents involving incomplete inactivation that occurred from 2003 through 2015 involved Bacillus anthracis. Gaps in Science and Limited Guidance Affect the Implementation of Inactivation in High- Containment Laboratories
Several challenges affect the implementation of inactivation in high- containment laboratories including (1) gaps in the scientific knowledge of protocol development and implementation, (2) limited federal guidance for the development of inactivation protocols, (3) inconsistent implementation of safeguards to help ensure inactivation is properly conducted, and (4) varied documentation requirements for the shipment of inactivated material. Due to limited guidance, high-containment laboratories we visited varied in their interpretation of what constitutes a validated method of inactivation, resulting in researchers applying differing levels of rigor to validation of inactivation protocols. An expert from our meeting and laboratory officials we interviewed identified concerns with the Select Agent Program’s criteria for what constitutes the validation of a protocol. Without more comprehensive and consistent federal guidance on the development and validation of inactivation protocols, protocols will vary in their scientific soundness and effectiveness, increasing the risk of some protocols not always achieving inactivation. The Select Agent Program Inconsistently Referred Violations and Enforced Regulations Related to Incidents Involving Incomplete Inactivation
The two agencies that comprise the Select Agent Program—CDC and APHIS—did not consistently refer incidents involving incomplete inactivation for further investigation and enforcement to the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) or APHIS’s Investigative and Enforcement Services for violations of select agent regulations. For example, the APHIS component of the program did not refer two 2014 incidents it was investigating at CDC laboratories involving incomplete inactivation, while the CDC component of the program referred a number of incidents that it investigated at federal, private, and academic laboratories. Recommendations for Executive Action
To mitigate the risk to human and animal health due to incidents involving incomplete inactivation of dangerous pathogens used in high-containment laboratories, we are making the following six recommendations: To understand the extent to which incomplete inactivation occurs and whether incidents are being properly identified, analyzed, and addressed, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct CDC and NIH and that the Secretary of Agriculture direct APHIS to: develop clear definitions of inactivation for use within their respective guidance documents that are consistent across the Select Agent Program, NIH’s oversight of recombinant pathogens, and the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories manual; and revise reporting forms within their respective areas of oversight to help identify when incidents involving incomplete inactivation occur and analyze the information reported to help identify the causes of incomplete inactivation to mitigate the risk of future incidents. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report evaluates (1) the extent to which incidents involving incomplete inactivation occurred from 2003 through 2015; (2) any challenges that may affect the implementation of inactivation in high- containment laboratories; and (3) the extent to which the Select Agent Program referred violations and enforced regulations related to incidents involving incomplete inactivation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Several incidents involving the shipment of live pathogens, thought to be inactivated, have recently occurred, potentially exposing people to dangerous pathogens that cause infectious diseases, such as the bacterium that causes anthrax.
GAO was asked to evaluate issues related to inactivation of pathogens in high-containment laboratories. This report examines (1) the extent to which incidents involving incomplete inactivation occurred from 2003 through 2015, (2) any challenges that may affect the implementation of inactivation in high-containment laboratories, and (3) the extent to which the Select Agent Program referred violations and enforced regulations related to incidents involving incomplete inactivation. GAO convened an expert meeting with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss various issues surrounding inactivation. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance, and interviewed officials at laboratories that conduct inactivation.
What GAO Found
The total number of incidents involving incomplete inactivation—a process to destroy the hazardous effects of pathogens while retaining characteristics for future use—that occurred from 2003 through 2015 is unknown for several reasons. One key reason is that the Select Agent Program—operated by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA) to oversee certain dangerous pathogens, known as select agents—does not require laboratories to identify such incidents on reporting forms. According to the program, 10 incidents occurred from 2003 through 2015. However, GAO identified an additional 11 incidents that the program did not initially identify. Because the program cannot easily identify incidents involving incomplete inactivation, it does not know the frequency or reason they occur, making it difficult to develop guidance to help mitigate future incidents. The 21 identified incidents involved a variety of pathogens and laboratories, as shown below.
Several challenges affect the implementation of inactivation in high-containment laboratories, including gaps in scientific knowledge and limited guidance. For example, there is limited federal guidance for researchers on the development and validation of inactivation protocols. Validation helps ensure protocols are scientifically sound and produce consistent results. Due to limited guidance, laboratories varied in their interpretation of validated methods of inactivation, resulting in researchers applying differing levels of rigor. Without more comprehensive guidance, as called for by experts, protocols will vary in their scientific soundness, increasing the risk of incomplete inactivation.
The Select Agent Program did not consistently refer incidents involving incomplete inactivation for further investigation and enforcement for violations of select agent regulations. For example, the program referred incidents involving incomplete inactivation at various laboratories, but did not refer two incidents in 2014 that occurred at HHS. A memorandum of understanding between HHS and USDA states that the program should handle incidents consistently. GAO found, however, that the program does not have a consistent, written set of criteria for handling incidents. Without such criteria, the program risks inconsistent enforcement of select agent regulations. This further highlights GAO’s previous finding that existing federal oversight of high-containment laboratories is fragmented and self-policing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to HHS and USDA to, among other things, improve the Select Agent Program’s oversight of inactivation by revising reporting forms, improving guidance for development and validation of inactivation protocols, and developing consistent criteria for enforcement of incidents involving incomplete inactivation. HHS and USDA agreed with GAO’s recommendations.
or John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] . |
gao_GAO-15-749 | gao_GAO-15-749_0 | In its June 2014 Energy Report, DOD reported 180 disruptions and a financial impact that averaged about $220,000 per day for fiscal year 2013. Hazards Have Caused Utility Disruptions, with Operational and Fiscal Impacts, and Threats Have the Potential to Cause Such Impacts
Utility disruptions caused by hazards, such as mechanical failure and extreme weather events, have resulted in a number of serious operational and fiscal impacts. According to DOD officials, this incident did not result in disruption of electrical service at DOD installations. This is because a cyber-physical incident could result in a loss of utility service or the catastrophic destruction of utility infrastructure, such as an explosion. According to one of the officials, an example of a successful cyber- physical attack through ICS was the Stuxnet computer virus that was used to attack Iranian centrifuges in 2010. This $4.63 million of inaccurately reported indirect costs accounts for 66 percent of the approximately $7 million in total costs reported by DOD for fiscal year 2012. DOD’s underreporting of some disruptions that met the criteria laid out in DOD reporting instructions, and not including disruptions of DOD-owned utility infrastructure in the Energy Reports, are likely due to two factors related to instructions in DOD’s data collection template for installations. An OSD official and certain headquarters officials also explained that—in their limited time to validate all of the data included in the Energy Reports—they prioritize validation of other data types above their review of the utilities disruption data. Military Services Have Taken Actions and Implemented DOD Guidance to Mitigate Utility Disruptions
Based on our review of DOD documents, and according to officials from installations both inside and outside the continental United States that we visited or contacted, installations have taken various actions to mitigate the effects of disruptions in electrical, potable water, wastewater, and natural gas utility service. The installations in our sample also are generally taking steps in response to DOD guidance related to utility resilience and have taken steps to mitigate the risk to installations posed by utility disruptions caused by both threats and hazards.headquarters officials, there are several pieces of DOD-wide guidance related to utility resilience. However, as of February 2015, none of the military services had a complete inventory of existing ICS. Without overcoming challenges related to completing inventories, acquiring and training personnel, and identifying and programming for funding, all of which are required under DOD Instruction 8510.01, the military services’ ICS may be vulnerable to cyber incidents that could degrade operations and negatively impact missions. We recognize that DOD is in the early stages of this effort and that it plans on full implementation. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to provide DOD and Congress with more comprehensive and accurate information on all types of utility disruptions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment to take the following two actions to provide more consistent guidance to the installations:
First, in guidance provided to their installations, the military services should clearly state that all disruptions lasting 8 hours or longer should be reported, regardless of the disruptions’ impact or mitigation. Also, in order to improve the comprehensiveness and accuracy of certain data submitted by the military services to OSD and reported in the Energy Reports—such as potentially underreported data on mitigation costs and inaccurate data on both disruptions’ duration and cost—we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment to work together to improve the effectiveness of data validation steps in DOD’s process for collecting and reporting utilities disruption data. DOD also stated that it did not agree with GAO’s analysis of the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the department’s reporting on utility disruptions in the June 2013 and 2014 Energy Reports. However, as discussed in this report, DOD’s collection and reporting of utilities disruption data are not comprehensive and some data are not accurate. For example, the installations we visited or contacted reported disruptions involving DOD infrastructure with significant impacts, such as delayed satellite launches at Vandenberg Air Force Base and almost $26 million in estimated repair costs at Naval Weapons Station Earle. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether threats and hazards have caused utility disruptions on Department of Defense (DOD) installations—and if so—what impacts they have had, we reviewed various types of documents on utility disruptions and resulting impacts on installation operations. To determine the extent to which DOD’s collection and reporting of information on utility disruptions is comprehensive and accurate, we reviewed the statutory reporting requirement for the Energy Reports, compared the military services’ data submissions for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 with information we collected from the installations we visited or contacted, and reviewed DOD’s process for collecting and reporting on this data. To determine the extent to which DOD has taken actions and developed and implemented guidance to mitigate risks to operations at its installations in the event of utility disruption, we collected and reviewed DOD documents related to actions taken to mitigate risks, utility resilience guidance, and implementation efforts. We also reviewed documents describing installations’ plans for situations in which utility service is disrupted, to include emergency management plans. GAO-14-446. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available, but More Can Be Done to Promote Its Use. | Why GAO Did This Study
Continuity of operations at DOD installations is vital to supporting the department's missions, and the disruption of utility services—such as electricity and potable water, among others—can threaten this support. House Report 113-446 included a provision that GAO review DOD's and the military services' actions to ensure mission capability in the event of disruptions to utility services. This report addresses (1) whether threats and hazards have caused utility disruptions on DOD installations and, if so, what impacts they have had; (2) the extent to which DOD's collection and reporting on utility disruptions is comprehensive and accurate; and (3) the extent to which DOD has taken actions and developed and implemented guidance to mitigate risks to operations at its installations in the event of utility disruption. For this review, GAO evaluated DOD guidance and policies, interviewed appropriate officials, and visited or contacted 20 installations within and outside the continental United States, selected based on criteria to include those experiencing multiple disruptions, disruptions of more than one type of utility, and each military service.
What GAO Found
Department of Defense (DOD) installations have experienced utility disruptions resulting in operational and fiscal impacts due to hazards such as mechanical failure and extreme weather. Threats, such as cyber attacks, also have the potential to cause disruptions. In its June 2014 Annual Energy Management Report (Energy Report) to Congress, DOD reported 180 utility disruptions lasting 8 hours or longer, with an average financial impact of about $220,000 per day, for fiscal year 2013. Installation officials provided specific examples to GAO, such as at Naval Weapons Station Earle, New Jersey, where in 2012, Hurricane Sandy's storm surge destroyed utility infrastructure, disrupting potable and wastewater service and resulting in almost $26 million in estimated repair costs. DOD officials also cited examples of physical and cyber threats, such as the “Stuxnet” computer virus that attacked the Iranian nuclear program in 2010 by destroying centrifuges, noting that similar threats could affect DOD installations.
DOD's collection and reporting of utility disruption data is not comprehensive and contains inaccuracies, because not all types and instances of utility disruptions have been reported and there are inaccuracies in reporting of disruptions' duration and cost. Specifically, in the data call for the Energy Reports, officials stated that DOD installations are not reporting all disruptions that meet the DOD criteria of commercial utility service disruptions lasting 8 hours or longer. This is likely due, in part, to military service guidance that differs from instructions for DOD's data collection template. In its Energy Reports, DOD is also not including information on disruptions to DOD-owned utility infrastructure. There also were inaccuracies in the reported data. For instance, $4.63 million of the $7 million in costs reported by DOD in its June 2013 Energy Report were indirect costs, such as lost productivity, although DOD has directed that such costs not be reported. Officials responsible for compiling the Energy Report noted that utility disruption data constitutes a small part of the report and they have limited time to validate data. However, without collecting and reporting complete and accurate data, decision makers in DOD may be hindered in their ability to plan effectively for mitigating against utility disruptions and enhance utility resilience, and Congress may have limited oversight of the challenges these disruptions pose.
Military services have taken actions to mitigate risks posed by utility disruptions and are generally taking steps in response to DOD guidance related to utility resilience. For example, installations have backup generators and have conducted vulnerability assessments of their utility systems. Also, DOD is in the planning stages of implementing new cybersecurity guidance, by March 2018, to protect its industrial control systems (ICS), which are computer-controlled systems that monitor or operate physical utility infrastructure. Each of the military services has working groups in place to plan for implementing this guidance. However, the services face three implementation challenges: inventorying their installations' ICS, ensuring personnel with expertise in both ICS and cybersecurity are trained and in place, and programming and identifying funding for implementation. For example, as of February 2015, none of the services had a complete inventory of ICS on their installations. Without overcoming these challenges, DOD's ICS may be vulnerable to cyber incidents that could degrade operations and negatively impact missions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD work with the services to clarify utility disruption reporting guidance, improve data validation steps, and address challenges to addressing cybersecurity ICS guidance. DOD concurred or partially concurred with all but one recommendation and disagreed with some of GAO's analysis. GAO believes the recommendations and analysis are valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-431 | gao_GAO-03-431_0 | Development is in its final stages, and low rate initial production has begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been appropriated to acquire production aircraft, and the F/A-22 acquisition plan calls for steadily increasing annual production rates. The aircraft’s development problems and schedule delays have caused congressional concerns, particularly in light of DOD’s planned increase in production rates. The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003 prohibited the obligation of funds for the acquisition of more than 16 production aircraft in fiscal year 2003, until the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics submits the following to the congressional defense committees: (1) a formal risk assessment that identifies and characterizes the potential cost, technical, schedule, or other significant risks resulting from increasing the F/A-22 production quantities prior to the Dedicated Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (DIOT&E) of the aircraft and (2) either a certification that increasing the F/A-22 production quantity for fiscal year 2003 beyond 16 aircraft involves lower risk and lower total program cost than staying at that quantity or implementing a revised production plan, funding, and test schedule. F/A-22 Technical Problems Continue to Affect Performance
The F/A-22 developmental program did not meet key performance goals established for fiscal year 2002 and continues to confront numerous technical challenges. Major technical problems include instability of the avionics software, violent movement, or “buffeting,” of vertical fins, overheating in portions of the aircraft, weakening of materials in the horizontal tail, and the inability to meet airlift support and maintenance requirements. The Air Force implemented these recommendations. However, Air Force officials stated that they do not yet understand the problems associated with the instability of the avionics software well enough to predict when they will be able to resolve this problem. Consequently, the Air Force extended flight test schedules and reduced the number of flight tests. Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test plans, we project that the start of operational testing might be delayed until January 2004. As a result, operational testing could be delayed by several months beyond the current planned date of August 2003. In December 2002, in response to the increase in development costs, the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, approved the restructuring of the F/A-22 program. This is a very risky strategy, because, as we have previously reported, the Air Force may encounter higher production costs as a result of acquiring significant quantities of aircraft before adequate testing. Figure 3 shows the Air Force’s acquisition plan. The performance capabilities of the F/A-22 and its schedule will remain uncertain until technical problems have been addressed, including testing of modifications or fixes necessary to potentially alleviate these problems. To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost goal, we examined (1) the extent to which the development program is likely to be completed within the current cost estimate, (2) the Air Force’s plans to fund the program for fiscal year 2003, and (3) the program’s funding plan compared to the current cost estimate. F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program. Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to fly at higher speeds for longer distances, be less detectable, and improve the pilot's awareness of the surrounding situation. The F/A-22 will replace the Air Force's existing fleet of F-15 aircraft. Over the past several years the program has experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays. Congress mandated that GAO assess the development program and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. GAO also assessed the implications of the progress of the development program on production.
What GAO Found
The F/A-22 development program did not meet key performance, schedule, and cost goals in fiscal year 2002, and delays in the flight test program have led to an increase in the development cost estimate of $876 million. In response to this increase, DOD restructured the development program and reduced production aircraft by 27. If additional delays occur, further changes may be required. The program also continues to address technical problems that have limited the performance of test aircraft, including violent movement or "buffeting" of the vertical fins, overheating in portions of the aircraft, weakening of materials in the horizontal tail, and instability of avionics software. Air Force officials cannot predict when they will resolve these problems. These technical problems, along with the late delivery of aircraft to the flight test center, have delayed the development program. Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test plans, we believe that operational testing will likely be delayed several months beyond the planned August 2003 start date. The F/A-22 program is in its final stages of development, and low-rate initial production has begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been appropriated to acquire production aircraft, and the F/A-22 acquisition plan calls for steadily increasing annual production rates. However, GAO considers the Air Force's acquisition strategy at high risk for increases in production costs. In past reports, GAO has reported that acquiring aircraft while significant technical challenges remain does not allow for adequate testing of the aircraft. The uncertainties regarding performance capabilities of the F/A-22 aircraft and its development schedule will persist until technical problems have been addressed, including testing of modifications or fixes necessary to potentially alleviate these problems. In light of those uncertainties, steadily increasing annual production rates could result in the Air Force having to modify a larger quantity of aircraft after they are built. |
gao_GAO-13-366 | gao_GAO-13-366_0 | ESC served as the Air Force’s center for the development and acquisition of electronic command-and-control systems. Reorganization Affected Reporting Chains and Workforce Composition, but Did Not Change Acquisition Mission at Hanscom Air Force Base
The reorganization affected the reporting chains of command and the workforce composition for some offices, but did not change the acquisition mission at Hanscom Air Force Base. 2). Specifically, functional office personnel at Hanscom Air Force Base—who provide technical services such as acquisition, engineering, financial management, and contracting—previously were managed by locally-based ESC leadership. Under the reorganization, they report directly to senior functional managers at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. In addition to its effects on the reporting chains of command, the reorganization also affected the composition of Hanscom’s workforce by eliminating about 10 percent of its civilian authorizations.the reorganization eliminated 131 of Hanscom’s 1,258 civilian authorizations that were comprised exclusively of government positions and did not include contractor positions, according to a Hanscom contracting official. 3). Officials Identified Opportunities and Concerns Resulting from the Reorganization at Hanscom Air Force Base
The reorganization resulted in opportunities and some concerns at Hanscom Air Force Base, and AFLCMC has taken steps to facilitate its implementation. Opportunities at Hanscom Air Force Base from the Reorganization
Officials at Hanscom Air Force Base and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, as well as Hanscom customers and contractors, stated that the reorganization resulted in opportunities to help strengthen the delivery of products to customers. These opportunities include increased focus on life-cycle management of weapon systems by PEOs, an increase in collaboration of personnel within the restructured AFLCMC, and greater standardization of processes. Increased collaboration within the command. These concerns related to: increased workload for functional office personnel at Hanscom Air Force Base due to position eliminations there, process delays resulting from centralization of various administrative processes and actions at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, officials at Wright- Patterson Air Force Base not having a full understanding of Hanscom’s programs, and possible future diminished importance of Hanscom Air Force Base as the center of electronic systems for the Air Force. Lack of full understanding of Hanscom’s programs. In addressing the limited understanding of Hanscom’s electronic systems programs by Wright-Patterson Air Force Base personnel, AFMC and AFLCMC officials stated senior functional managers at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base do not require specific expertise in electronic systems because the processes, such as personnel and financial management, apply across systems and programs. Effects of the Reorganization Are Not Yet Known, and AFLCMC Has Developed Metrics to Measure How It Is Meeting Customers’ Needs
The effects of the reorganization on Hanscom’s core mission of delivering electronic systems to customers are not yet fully known, and AFLCMC has developed metrics to measure how it is meeting customers’ needs. Effects of the Reorganization Are Not Yet Known
The effects of the reorganization on Hanscom’s core mission of delivering electronic systems to customers are not yet known, as it is too early to assess changes resulting from the reorganization; also multiple factors unrelated to the reorganization may affect mission implementation. Another change involved the reduction in the level of contractor support at Hanscom Air Force Base, which was driven by multiple initiatives, unrelated to AFMC’s reorganization, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s Resource Management Decision 802. These metrics are designed to measure how AFLCMC is meeting customer needs, rather than the effects of the reorganization itself. Table 1 shows the objectives and what the related metrics are intended to measure. AFLCMC senior officials said AFLCMC began data collection for the new metrics in February 2013, with measures to be continuously tracked by individual offices and aggregated monthly at the AFLCMC level. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: AFLCMC’s Objectives and Associated Metrics
In examining the extent to which the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) developed metrics to measure how well it is meeting the needs of the customer, we obtained the objectives and the associated metrics developed by AFLCMC. | Why GAO Did This Study
Electronic command and control systems, which rely on technologies such as radar, satellite, and electronic surveillance, play a critical role in modern-day defense strategy. ESC at Hanscom Air Force Base supported the Air Force's ability to develop and acquire these capabilities. It was inactivated in July 2012 as part of an effort to respond to an initiative by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to reduce civilian positions to fiscal year 2010 levels. The reorganization consolidated ESC into AFLCMC at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, which manages weapon systems from inception to retirement. Congress directed GAO to assess the effect of the reorganization on Hanscom's mission. This report examines (1) how the reorganization affected reporting chains of command, workforce composition, and the acquisition mission at Hanscom Air Force Base, (2) opportunities and concerns resulting from the reorganization at Hanscom, and (3) what is known about the effects of the reorganization and what metrics have been developed to assess how the new organization is meeting customers' needs. GAO evaluated relevant documentation; reviewed data on eliminated positions; and interviewed Air Force officials, selected contractors based on size and proximity to Hanscom Air Force Base, and Hanscom's primary customers. Results from these interviews cannot be generalized but offer stakeholders' perspectives on the reorganization.
What GAO Found
The reorganization of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) affected reporting chains of command and workforce composition for some offices at Hanscom Air Force Base, but did not change how former components of the Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom carry out their acquisition mission. Personnel in functional offices who provide technical services previously reported to the locally-based ESC leadership; they now report directly to senior functional managers at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, who oversee functional offices across all locations of the new Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) established by the reorganization. In addition, the reorganization eliminated 131 functional office positions (about 10 percent of Hanscom's civilian positions), which AFMC determined were not directly involved with development, delivery, or sustainment of weapon systems. GAO's analysis of Hanscom's data showed that the eliminated positions included 13 which were unfilled; of personnel in the remaining 118 positions, 15 accepted voluntary-separation agreements, 102 were reassigned at Hanscom Air Force Base, and 1 was removed. The reorganization did not change the mission of directorates that deliver electronic capabilities to customers.
Various opportunities and concerns at Hanscom Air Force Base resulted from the reorganization. According to officials at Hanscom and Wright-Patterson Air Force Bases, customers, and contractors, the opportunities include increased focus on life-cycle management of electronic systems, increased collaboration within the command, and greater standardization of processes. Hanscom Air Force Base officials and contractors identified some concerns related to increased workload for functional office personnel due to position eliminations, process delays, the lack of full understanding of Hanscom's programs by AFLCMC officials, and whether Hanscom Air Force Base will continue as the center of electronic systems for the Air Force. However, AFMC and AFLCMC senior officials generally did not see these concerns as significant problems. For example, they stated that AFLCMC's senior functional managers do not require in-depth technical knowledge of Hanscom's programs because the functions, such as financial management, apply across programs. AFLCMC's steps to facilitate the reorganization include establishing a governance structure and communicating with stakeholders.
The effects of the reorganization on Hanscom's core mission of delivering electronic systems to customers are not yet fully known, but AFLCMC has developed metrics to measure how well it is meeting customer needs. Officials stated the changes went into effect only recently and multiple factors unrelated to the reorganization, such as budget changes, may affect the mission. However, AFLCMC developed organizational objectives and associated metrics in areas such as delivering cost-effective acquisition solutions and providing affordable and effective product support. The metrics, while not designed to measure the effects of the reorganization, are intended to measure how AFLCMC is meeting customers' needs. The data for the metrics will be collected by individual offices and aggregated monthly at the AFLCMC level, according to its senior officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-249 | gao_GAO-05-249_0 | CAFs have been suggested as a capital asset financing approach that would benefit federal departments and their subunits by addressing both of these challenges. These subunits would then pay the CAF a mortgage payment sufficient to cover the principal and interest payment on the Treasury loan. The CAF would use those receipts only to repay Treasury and not to finance new assets. In addition, if all existing capital assets of a department and its subunits were transferred to the CAF, the CAF would impute an annual capital usage charge on those assets to using agencies. CAFs Would Be Positioned at the Department Level and Create a More Complex Process for Financing Capital
Although CAFs do not currently exist, we can describe how they would likely operate based on written proposals and our discussions with budget experts. The CAF would receive appropriations for the full cost of an asset (or useful segment of an asset) in the form of borrowing authority. For each project funded through the CAF, the subunit’s annual budget request would need to include the annual mortgage payment in each year, for the useful life of the asset (or until the asset was sold or transferred). A CAF, however, would be appropriated up-front borrowing authority. CAF Benefits Can Be Achieved through Alternative Means Without the Added Budget Complexity
CAFs have been proposed as a way to address two challenges that arise from the full up-front funding requirement for capital projects. Allocating Annual Capital Costs and Improving Decision Making for Capital Assets May Be Achieved through Existing Initiatives
Officials we interviewed reacted to our presentation of the CAF mechanism by describing current agency initiatives and existing mechanisms that they believe can better achieve the ultimate goal of improving budgeting and decision making for capital. Hence, both would reflect the annual cost of capital in the subunits’ budgets. Several Issues to Weigh When Considering Implementation of CAFs
While in theory CAFs could be implemented at most agencies, there are several complex issues that Congress would need to consider before adopting such a mechanism. As with new assets, the capital charge on existing assets would not affect the deficit. If CAFs were applied only to new assets going forward, programs would not reflect the full annual cost of capital for decades and programs purchasing new capital would appear more expensive than those using existing capital. Even if this and other issues were tackled and improved information about capital costs was provided to managers, there is little assurance that CAFs alone would create incentives for programs to reassess their use of capital. Almost everyone we consulted concluded that implementation issues would overwhelm the potential benefits of a CAF. More importantly, current efforts under way in agencies would achieve the same goals as a CAF without introducing the difficulties. Given this, as long as alternative efforts uphold the principle of up-front funding, then a CAF mechanism does not seem to be worth the complexity and implementation challenges that it would create. Treasury, GSA, USDA and DOI generally agreed with the report. OMB recognizes the usefulness of asset management and cost accounting systems regardless of whether CAFs are adopted. | Why GAO Did This Study
CAFs have been discussed as a new mechanism for financing federal capital assets. As envisioned, CAFs would have two goals. First, CAFs would potentially improve decision making by reflecting the annual cost for the use of capital in program budgets. Second, they would help ameliorate at the subunit level the effect of large increases in budget authority for capital projects (i.e., spikes), without forfeiting congressional controls requiring the full cost of capital assets to be provided up-front. Through discussions with budget experts and by working with two case studies, the Departments of Agriculture and of the Interior, we are able to describe in this report (1) how CAFs would likely operate, (2) the potential benefits and difficulties of CAFs, including alternative mechanisms for obtaining the benefits, and (3) several issues to weigh when considering implementation of CAFs.
What GAO Found
Capital acquisition funds (CAF) have been suggested as department-level funds that would use appropriated up-front borrowing authority to buy new departmental subunit assets. These subunits would then pay the CAF a mortgage payment sufficient to cover the principal and interest payment on the Treasury loan. The CAF would use those receipts only to repay Treasury and not to finance new assets. If existing capital assets were transferred to the CAF, subunits would pay an annual capital usage charge to the CAF. CAFs might achieve the goals intended, but these goals can be achieved through simpler means. Alternative mechanisms, such as asset management systems, cost accounting systems, and working capital funds may achieve the goal of allocating annual capital costs and improving decision making for capital assets. Our case study agencies generally did not indicate problems with budget authority spikes. They budget in useful segments, use accumulated no-year authority, or finance capital assets using working capital funds. Many concerns about CAFs were raised, including the long-term feasibility of making fixed annual mortgage payments and the added complexity CAFs would create. Implementation would raise a number of issues. If CAFs were applied only to new assets going forward, all programs would not reflect the full annual cost of capital for decades. Yet the difficulties of including existing capital are numerous. Even if these issues were tackled, there is little assurance that CAFs alone would create new incentives for programs to reassess their use of capital since CAF payments would not affect the deficit. Implementation issues could overwhelm the potential benefits of a CAF. More importantly, current efforts under way in agencies would reflect asset costs as part of program costs without introducing the difficulties of a CAF. As long as alternative efforts uphold the principle of up-front funding, CAFs do not seem to be worth the implementation challenges they would create. Except for OMB, agencies generally agreed with our conclusions. |
gao_GAO-09-146 | gao_GAO-09-146_0 | Scope and Methodology
To assess IRS’s 2008 filing season performance in the key filing season activities compared to goals and past performance, report on the effect of ESP, and highlight areas where IRS could expand use of MEA, we reviewed and analyzed IRS reports, testimonies, budget submissions, and other documents and data, including workload data, data related to IRS’s performance measures and goals, and data on taxpayer usage of services and other statistics such as the number of paid preparers; observed operations at IRS’s Atlanta, Georgia, paper submission processing center, the Atlanta call site, the Joint Operations Center (which manages IRS’s telephone services) in Atlanta, and IRS’s walk-in locations in Atlanta and Baltimore, Maryland, and selected these offices for a variety of reasons, including the location of key IRS managers, such as those responsible for telephone and walk-in site services; tested for statistically significant differences between annual performance measures based on IRS sample data; analyzed staffing data for paper and electronic filing, and telephone assistance; reviewed information from organizations, such as Keynote Systems, which evaluate Internet performance; interviewed representatives of some of the larger private and nonprofit organizations that prepare tax returns, such as H&R Block, and trade organizations that represent both individual paid preparers, tax preparation companies, and professional associations, including the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; reviewed TIGTA reports and interviewed TIGTA officials about IRS’s performance and initiatives; interviewed IRS officials about current operations, performance relative to 2008 performance goals and prior filing season performance, trends, significant factors, and initiatives that affected or were intended to improve performance, monitoring, and oversight of paid tax preparers; reviewed IRS data on math errors, information on IRS’s process for identifying and correcting math errors, legislation providing IRS with math error authority; interviewed IRS officials, including those from the EITC office, about MEA; reviewed reports on MEA from the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) and TIGTA; and reviewed our prior reports and followed up on our recommendations made in those reports. IRS has toll-free assistance telephone lines which taxpayers can call with questions about tax law or their refunds. Despite the Increased Volume of Tax Returns Due to the Economic Stimulus, IRS’s Filing Season was Successful Compared to Previous Years’ with the Exception of Access to Telephone Assistance
As of September 12, 2008, IRS processed 150 million individual income tax returns, including almost 9 million ESP-only returns, and processed 105 million tax refunds totaling $246 billion. As of September 12, IRS had processed 116 million stimulus payments totaling almost $94 billion. CADE also was successful in processing 24 million stimulus payments and contributed to IRS’s early distribution of some stimulus payments. IRS agreed to study this recommendation. Telephone Performance Was Substantially Lower Compared to Last Year’s Due to the High Volume of Stimulus-Related Calls, with the Greatest Downturn Beginning in Early May
Taxpayers’ access to IRS’s telephone assistors was substantially lower than last year’s because, according to IRS, it received an unprecedented number of calls primarily due to ESP-related questions. As table 2 shows, through June 30 of this year, IRS received over 118 million calls, more than double the total number of calls from last year. 1). The Costs and Foregone Revenue Associated with Implementing ESP Are Expected to Reach over $900 Million and IRS Plans to Document Lessons Learned
Based on IRS data, the estimated costs and foregone revenue of implementing ESP will reach up to $960 million. Instead, IRS shifted hundreds of Automated Collection System (ACS) staff to answer calls to the Rebate Hotline from March through August 2008. IRS Does Not Fully Use Its Existing MEA and Congressional Expansion of MEA in Two New Areas Could Enhance Enforcement at Low Cost
IRS has authority to disallow child and dependent credit claims on returns with the filing status of “Married Filing Separately;” however, if taxpayers use this filing status, they would not be eligible for the credit. A second area where IRS has MEA but does not use it is to disallow EITC clams is when taxpayers are listed as the noncustodial parent in the FCR. IRS does not know how many of these claims were incorrect, but for the claims it audited, the error rate was about 91 percent of claims for 2006. By focusing on FCR data alone, IRS’s review may be missing another way to use MEA to verify EITC claims by noncustodial parents and minimize the chance of disallowing eligible claims. There are two areas where IRS could use its existing authority more fully and where the agency could improve service through notices informing taxpayers of potential eligibility for child and dependent care credits. The Deputy Commissioner also supported our suggestions for congressional consideration to provide IRS with legal authority to automatically correct returns for individual retirement account contributions that violate the dollar or age limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax filing season is when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has most of its contacts with taxpayers, answering questions and processing returns and refunds. The 2008 filing season was particularly challenging due to the unanticipated mandate to make economic stimulus payments. The filing season is also the start of IRS's efforts to ensure the newly filed returns are compliant with the tax laws. GAO was asked to assess IRS's performance, describe the costs and foregone revenue of administering the economic stimulus payments, and identify any opportunities for improving filing season compliance checks. GAO analyzed IRS performance data, reviewed IRS operations, and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
IRS successfully processed150 million returns and issued 105million refundsfor $246 billion as of September 12, 2008. In addition, IRS issued 116 million stimulus payments totaling $94 billion. However, taxpayers' access to IRS's telephone assistors was substantially lower than last year because of an unanticipated increase in telephone call volume. Calls to IRS more than doubled to 118 million as many taxpayers had questions about the amount of their stimulus payment or its timing. IRS acted to answer the calls including shifting hundreds of staff from collection cases to telephone assistance. IRS took other actions such as adding features to its Web site that answered stimulus-related questions and likely diverted some calls. Regardless, taxpayers' ability to get through to IRS telephone assistors declined from about 81 percent of waiting callers getting through last year to about 57 percent from January through June 30 of this year. IRS expects the costs and foregone revenue associated with issuing the economic stimulus package (ESP) payments to reach about $960 million, of which $655 million is revenue foregone due to the shift of collections staff to telephone service. There are two areas where IRS does not use its current legal authority to automatically correct errors when processing tax returns. One involves eligibility for the child and dependent care credit by taxpayers who are "Married Filing Separately." Taxpayers in this filing status are not eligible for the credit, but IRS allows the credit to be claimed, issues refunds, and then audits taxpayers to try to recover the money. The second is that IRS does not use its existing legislative authority to verify earned income tax credit claims by noncustodial parents--in 2006, $91 million of claims were unverified. IRS has plans to study one option for verifying these claims, but is not planning to study another option, combining federal data on noncustodial parents and other taxpayer characteristics to automatically determine eligibility. Finally, there are two areas where IRS lacks legal authority, but has the technical ability to use automated error checks. IRS could prevent (1) individuals from deducting contributions to individual retirement accounts above the allowable limit and (2) individuals from violating the age requirements for such contributions. |
gao_GAO-11-234 | gao_GAO-11-234_0 | Background
The Recovery Act provided the Secretary of Transportation $1.5 billion for the purpose of awarding discretionary grants on a competitive basis. The Recovery Act also directed the Secretary to meet several statutory requirements in making the final award selections including: 1. ensuring an equitable geographic distribution of funds; 2. achieving an appropriate balance in addressing the needs of urban and 3. giving priority to projects for which federal funding would be required to complete an overall financing package that includes nonfederal sources; and 4. giving priority to projects that are expected to be completed within 3 years of enactment of the act and obligating all TIGER funds by September 30, 2011. DOT Developed Comprehensive Merit- Based Selection Criteria and a Competitive Selection Process to Evaluate TIGER Applications and Meet Statutory Requirements
DOT Established Criteria for Awarding Competitive Grants That Support Merit- Based Investments in Transportation Infrastructure
To meet the Recovery Act requirement that DOT develop criteria to evaluate the merits of TIGER program applications and select grants, DOT published criteria in a May 2009 interim Notice of Funding Availability after the passage of the Recovery Act, and in June 2009, when DOT published its final Notice of Funding Availability, we evaluated the criteria. For example, DOT’s criteria clearly indicated that projects should produce long-term benefits such as improving the state of repair of existing transportation infrastructure, reducing fatalities and injuries through safety investments, and increasing economic competitiveness by improving the efficient movement of workers or goods. Specifically, we have recommended that a criteria-based selection approach—like that developed in TIGER—be used to direct a portion of federal funds in programs designed to select transportation projects with national and regional significance. Such an approach—one rarely used to fund surface transportation— represents a significant departure from the formula-based approach regularly used to fund the nation’s surface transportation program. Formula programs distribute over $40 billion annually to states and urbanized areas for highway and transit projects (compared with the $1.5 billion one-time appropriation provided for TIGER). Moreover, once the funds are apportioned, states have considerable flexibility to reallocate them among highway and transit programs. This formula-based approach can potentially result in meritorious projects of national or regional significance—in particular those involving multiple modes of transportation or those that cross state boundaries—not competing well at the state level for available funds. Half the Awardees Were Chosen from Applications Advanced by the Evaluation Teams While the Other Half Were Advanced by the Control and Calibration Team
The Review Team selected 26 awardees from the pool of 115 highly recommended applications advanced by the Evaluation Teams’ competitive review process. However, while DOT thoroughly documented the Evaluation Teams’ assessments and the reasons for its decisions and the Review Team’s memo to the Secretary described the strengths and benefits of projects recommended for award, DOT did not document the Review Team’s reasons for its decisions, including the reasons for selecting recommended projects over highly recommended ones. We analyzed these draft minutes and found that they reflected questions Review Team members raised about the strengths and weaknesses of various applications—questions consistent with TIGER criteria and requirements. For instance, the Review Team raised questions about the following projects, none of which received an award: The extent to which financial commitments of project partners had been secured. Whether projects were sufficiently ready-to-go. Whether a project’s economic benefits were overstated. However, DOT officials told us that these questions did not necessarily reflect the reason a project was ultimately recommended or rejected for award. Specifically, officials stated that that 15 highly recommended projects in the West and the Central regions were rejected to limit the awards to these regions. While the DOT’s draft minutes and our discussions with OST officials provide some insight into the deliberations of the Review Team, because there was no internal documentation from the Review Team meetings in which final decisions to recommend or reject projects for award were made, DOT cannot definitively demonstrate the basis for its award selections, particularly the reasons why recommended projects were selected for half the awards over highly recommended ones. DOT made less information publicly available on the outcome of its selection process—for instance, it did not publish the reasons for the Review Team’s decisions or why some applications were selected while others were rejected. To assess the extent to which DOT publicly communicated outcome information, we compared the information TIGER externally communicated to the information communicated by 22 other similar Recovery Act competitive grant programs (for a list of these programs, see app. Congress expressed an interest in continuing this new approach when it enacted TIGER II, and DOT has proposed a new $2 billion discretionary grant program in its fiscal year 2012 budget modeled after TIGER. Rail, port, and other projects each had about one-tenth of applications forwarded. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) appropriated $1.5 billion for discretionary grants for capital investments in surface transportation projects of national and regional significance, including highways, transit, rail, ports, and others. The act required the Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop criteria to award these grants--known as the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants--and to meet several statutory requirements. GAO was asked to review (1) the criteria and process used to evaluate applications and award grants, (2) the outcome of the process, and (3) the extent to which DOT communicated information to applicants and the public. GAO reviewed documentation of the award process and selection documentation and interviewed key DOT officials.
What GAO Found
DOT developed criteria to evaluate TIGER applications, such as improving the state of repair of critical infrastructure, reducing fatalities and injuries, and increasing economic competitiveness by improving the efficient movement of workers or goods. GAO has called for a more performance-oriented approach to funding surface transportation and has recommended that a merit-based competitive approach--like TIGER--be used to direct a portion of federal funds to transportation projects of national and regional significance. This is a departure from the formula-based approach regularly used for surface transportation in which funds are largely returned to their state of origin and states have considerable flexibility in selecting projects for these funds--an approach that can potentially result in projects of national or regional significance that cross state lines and involve more than one transportation mode not competing well at the state level for these funds. DOT provides over $40 billion annually in formula funds to states and urbanized areas for highway and transit projects; by contrast, TIGER provided $1.5 billion on a one-time basis. However, TIGER was part of the Recovery Act, which was intended to provide economic stimulus across the nation, and the act required TIGER to balance using a competitive approach with achieving an equitable geographic distribution of funds. DOT has proposed a discretionary grant program like TIGER in its fiscal year 2012 budget, which means that DOT and Congress have the opportunity to consider how to balance the goals of merit-based selection of projects with geographic distribution of funds. Of the 51 applications that received awards, 26 were from the highly recommended applications advanced by the Evaluation Teams and the other 25, which received one-third of TIGER funds, were from the recommended applications advanced by the Control and Calibration Team. While DOT thoroughly documented the Evaluation Teams' assessments and the Review Team's memo described the strengths of projects recommended for award, it did not document the Review Team's final decisions and its rationale for selecting recommended projects for half the awards over highly recommended ones. Internal documentation of the Review Team's deliberations was limited to draft minutes from the team's initial assessments of projects. These draft minutes, which were not complete and never finalized or approved, reflect questions Review Team members raised about the strengths and weaknesses of various applications. For example, the Review Team questioned the extent to which financial commitments of project partners had been secured, whether projects were "ready-to-go," or whether a project's economic benefits were overstated. However, these questions did not necessarily reflect the reason a project was ultimately recommended or rejected for award. In addition, DOT officials told us that some highly recommended projects were not selected to achieve an equitable geographic distribution of award funds. In particular, DOT officials stated that some highly recommended projects from the Central and Western regions were rejected to prevent these regions from being overrepresented and that they advanced recommended projects from the South because projects initially selected for award underrepresented this region. DOT's TIGER program externally communicated outcome information similar to other Recovery Act competitive grant programs GAO examined, including the Review Team's memo to the Secretary and the amount of funding awarded. As with most other programs, DOT did not publish the reasons for the Review Team's decisions or why some applications were selected while others were rejected. GAO found no requirements for federal programs to externally communicate the reasons for their selection decisions and federal agencies rarely publicly disclose the reasons for their selection decisions. |
gao_GAO-17-53 | gao_GAO-17-53_0 | The Air Force and the Army Have Not Fully Applied Most of the Key Principles for Effective Strategic Human Capital Planning for UAS Pilots to Resolve Key Challenges in Managing UAS Pilots
The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning in the actions taken to resolve the challenges that each faces in managing its UAS pilot workforce (see table 1 for a summary of our assessment). We determined that the Air Force applied this principle in the actions taken to address UAS pilot shortages because the Air Force has involved top senior Air Force leaders, stakeholder offices, and UAS pilots in UAS units to develop a strategy (i.e., the Get Well Plan) to address UAS pilot shortages. In documentation of the Get Well Plan the Air Force describes its UAS pilot shortage, the plan’s goals, and initiatives to address the shortages, such as by reassigning some of the UAS workload to Air National Guard units and by supporting training and operations through the use of contractors. According to Army officials, by addressing UAS unit training shortfalls, the Army could address those UAS mishaps that are due to human error. The Air Force has developed a strategy designed to address UAS pilot shortfalls and the Air Force has increased the staffing levels of UAS pilots; however, we determined that the Air Force partially applied this principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address persistent gaps such as continuing to rely on manned- aircraft pilots, limitations in cadet interest in the UAS pilot career field, and the high workload of UAS pilots. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel filling UAS pilot positions were temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots. Without developing strategies and tools that are more fully tailored to address this gap, the Air Force’s UAS pilot workforce will continue to lose the experience that temporarily assigned manned aircraft pilots have acquired. 2). A senior Army official acknowledged that continued UAS unit training shortfalls is a concern for the Army. Without revising its strategy to address root causes of training shortfalls to address these contributing factors, the Army risks that its Shadow units may continue to train at levels that are well below Army requirements. Army—partially applied. The Air Force and the Army Have Not Evaluated the Workforce Mix of Personnel to Fly UAS and Have Not Conducted Workforce Cost Analyses
The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor the Army has evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to fly some UAS. In addition, if the Air Force and the Army do not revise their strategies to fully tailor them to address remaining issues with gaps, the Air Force risks continuing to not meet its requirements and the Army risks continuing to train at levels that are below Army requirements. In addition, the Air Force and Army did not inform their workforce decisions with cost analyses that would provide information on the most cost- effective workforce for meeting mission needs. For the nine recommendations with which DOD partially concurred, DOD noted actions that it had been taken that DOD believed addressed the intent of our recommendations. Given this, we believe that the Army needs to revise its strategy to more fully tailor it to address the barriers to help it address these training shortfalls. To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements, we compared Air Force and Army efforts to determine the type of personnel to use for UAS pilots positions with criteria in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1100.4 Guidance for Manpower Management which articulates DOD policy that assigned missions shall be accomplished using the least costly mix of military, civilian, and contract personnel consistent with military requirements and other needs of the department and DOD Instruction 1100.22 Policies and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, which establishes the workforce mix decision process, including the consideration of cost as a deciding factor in workforce mix decisions, and states that manpower authorities consider all available personnel when determining the workforce mix, including active military, federal civilians, and contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
The demand for UAS combat operation support has grown dramatically in the last decade. Since 2008, the Air Force has more than quadrupled its requirements for UAS pilots but faced challenges meeting the requirements due to UAS pilot shortages. Meanwhile, a 2015 Army review found that Army UAS units' mishap rate was higher than for other aircraft and Army officials stated that training shortfalls had contributed to the mishaps.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review Air Force and Army UAS personnel strategies. GAO assesses the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have (1) applied key principles of effective strategic human capital planning for managing UAS pilots and (2) evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements. GAO compared its previously developed key principles of effective strategic human capital planning with Air Force and Army actions. GAO analyzed data on required and actual Air Force UAS pilots and data on Army UAS training.
What GAO Found
The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning for managing pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that are important for resolving the Air Force's pilot shortages and the Army's training shortfalls (see table below). Consistent with the first principle, the Air Force involved top senior leaders, UAS pilots, and stakeholders to develop a plan to resolve its UAS pilot shortages—including reassigning UAS workload to Air National Guard units and supporting training and operations with contractors. The Air Force partially applied the second principle to tailor its strategy to address gaps, or shortages, in UAS pilots, such as by using temporary personnel. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel filling UAS pilot positions are temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots. Air Force headquarters personnel stated that no other career field in the Air Force relies on temporarily assigned personnel to this extent. Without tailoring its strategy to provide more permanently assigned pilots, the Air Force risks losing the experience that temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots have acquired. The Army partially applied the second principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address its shortages in unit training. The Army experienced training shortfalls—61 of 73 UAS units flew fewer than half of the 340-flight-hour per unit annual minimum training goal in fiscal year 2015. A Senior Army official acknowledged the continued training shortfalls was a concern for the Army. Without revising its strategy to address the remaining training shortfalls, the Army risks that its UAS units may continue to train at levels below Army goals.
The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor the Army have evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to fly some UAS. Without evaluating their workforce mix, the Air Force and the Army do not have information on alternatives for meeting UAS pilot personnel requirements to meet mission needs. In addition, although the Air Force and the Army deci use private sector contractors to meet mission needs, they did not conduct cost analyses to inform this decision. Without such an analysis, the Air Force and the Army may not be using the most cost-effective workforces to achieve UAS missions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO's 11 recommendations include that the Air Force tailor its strategy to address UAS pilot shortages; the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls; and that both services evaluate their workforce mix for UAS pilot positions and conduct analysis to ensure cost effectiveness of workforce decisions. DOD concurred with 2 recommendations and partially concurred with 9, noting actions that it believed addressed the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that DOD needs to take actions to fully address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-605 | gao_GAO-04-605_0 | Agency officials could not provide the contract files for a limited number of small-dollar contracts awarded during the early stages of the reconstruction effort. These 25 contract actions represented about 97 percent of the total dollars obligated for reconstruction through September 30, 2003. Overall, the 25 contracts or task orders consisted of the following: the largest contract awarded and the 4 largest task orders, by dollar value, issued to support CPA operations; 9 contracts awarded and 1 task order issued by USAID, as well as 1 task order issued under an Air Force contract to provide logistical support for USAID-managed efforts; 2 contracts awarded and 4 task orders issued by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Army Field Support Command to help restore Iraq’s oil or electrical infrastructure; 1 contract awarded and 1 task order issued by the Army to train or equip the New Iraqi Army; and 1 contract awarded by the Department of State to support Iraqi law enforcement efforts. As of September 30, 2003, the agencies had obligated nearly $3.7 billion on 100 contracts or task orders for reconstruction efforts (see table 2). These obligations came from various funding sources, including U.S. appropriated funds and Iraqi assets. In November 2003, Congress appropriated an additional $18.4 billion for rebuilding activities. Before awarding a task order under an existing contract, however, the agency must determine that the work to be added is within the scope of that contract (i.e., that the work fits within the statement of work, performance period, and maximum value of the existing contract). New Contract Awards Generally Complied with Competition Requirements, but Task Orders Were Less Compliant
Agencies generally complied with applicable laws and regulations governing competition when using sole-source or limited competition approaches to award the initial reconstruction contracts we reviewed. We found several instances, however, in which agencies had issued task orders for work that was outside the scope of existing contracts. Agencies Properly Justified Use of Other Than Full and Open Competition in Awarding New Contracts
The agencies responsible for rebuilding Iraq generally complied with applicable requirements governing competition when awarding new contracts. While CICA requires that federal contracts be awarded on the basis of full and open competition, the law and implementing regulations recognize that there may be circumstances under which full and open competition would be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be awarded quickly to respond to unforeseen and urgent needs or when there is only one source for the required product or service. In the remaining case, the Department of State justified and approved the use of limited competition under a unique authority that, in our opinion, may not be a recognized exception to the competition requirements. State could have justified and approved its limited competition under recognized exceptions to the competition requirements. Agencies Did Not Always Satisfy Competition Requirements When Issuing Task Orders under Existing Contracts
We found a lesser degree of compliance when agencies issued task orders under existing contracts. In each of these cases, the out-of-scope work should have been awarded using competitive procedures or supported with a Justification and Approval for other than full and open competition in accordance with legal requirements. Consequently, the orders are outside the scope of the underlying contracts. Until agreement is reached, contract incentives to control costs are likely to be less effective. Staffing constraints and security concerns posed further challenges. Reaching Agreement on Key Contract Terms and Conditions
To meet urgent operational needs, as is the case in Iraq’s reconstruction, agencies are permitted to authorize contractors to begin work before contracts or task orders have been definitized—that is, before key terms and conditions, including price, have been defined and agreed upon. Given the high cost involved, particularly for the Iraq oil mission (over $2.5 billion), any reduction in cost control incentives potentially involves a significant contract cost risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion since April 2003 to support rebuilding efforts in Iraq. This complex undertaking, which is occurring in an unstable security environment and under significant time constraints, is being carried out largely through contracts with private-sector companies. As of September 2003, agencies had obligated nearly $3.7 billion on 100 contracts or task orders under existing contracts. Given widespread congressional interest in ensuring that reconstruction contracts are awarded properly and administered effectively, GAO reviewed 25 contract actions that represented about 97 percent of the obligated funds. GAO determined whether agencies had complied with competition requirements in awarding new contracts and issuing task orders and evaluated agencies' initial efforts in carrying out contract administration tasks.
What GAO Found
Agencies used sole-source or limited competition approaches to issue new reconstruction contracts, and when doing so, generally complied with applicable laws and regulations. Agencies did not, however, always comply with requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts. For new contracts, the law generally requires the use of full and open competition, where all responsible prospective contractors are allowed to compete, but permits sole-source or limited competition awards in specified circumstances, such as when only one source is available or to meet urgent requirements. All of the 14 new contracts GAO examined were awarded without full and open competition, but each involved circumstances that the law recognizes as permitting such awards. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers properly awarded a sole-source contract for rebuilding Iraq's oil infrastructure to the only contractor that was determined to be in a position to provide the services within the required time frame. The Corps documented the rationale in a written justification, which was approved by the appropriate official. The U.S. Agency for International Development properly awarded seven contracts using limited competition. The Department of State, however, justified the use of limited competition by citing an authority that may not be a recognized exception to competition requirements, although a recognized exception could have been used. There was a lesser degree of compliance when agencies issued 11 task orders under existing contracts. Task orders are deemed by law to satisfy competition requirements if they are within the scope, period of performance, and maximum value of a properly awarded underlying contract. GAO found several instances where contracting officers issued task orders for work that was not within the scope of the underlying contracts. For example, to obtain media development services and various subject matter experts, the Defense Contracting Command-Washington placed two orders using a management improvement contract awarded under the General Services Administration's schedule program. But neither of the two orders involved management improvement activities. Work under these and other orders should have been awarded using competitive procedures or, due to the exigent circumstances, supported by a justification for other than full and open competition. The agencies encountered various contract administration challenges during the early stages of the reconstruction effort, stemming in part from inadequate staffing, lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, changing requirements, and security constraints. While some of these issues have been addressed, staffing and security remain major concerns. Additionally, the Army and its contractors have yet to agree on key terms and conditions, including the projected cost, on nearly $1.8 billion worth of reconstruction work that either has been completed or is well under way. Until contract terms are defined, cost risks for the government remain and contract cost control incentives are likely to be less effective. |
gao_GAO-16-56 | gao_GAO-16-56_0 | Second, the briefing document noted potential contributions to DOD’s mission. DOD Has Taken Steps to Implement Additive Manufacturing to Improve Performance, Improve Combat Capability, and Achieve Cost Savings
DOD has taken steps to implement additive manufacturing to improve performance and combat capability, as well as achieve associated cost savings. We obtained information on multiple efforts being conducted across DOD components. For example, the Army used additive manufacturing, instead of conventional manufacturing, to prototype aspects of a Joint Service Aircrew Mask to test a design change, and it reported thousands of dollars saved in design development and potential combat capability improvements. According to a senior Air Force official, the Air Force is researching potential performance improvements that may be achieved by embedding devices such as antennas within helmets through additive manufacturing that could enable improved communications. DOD uses additive manufacturing for design and prototyping and for some production—for example, parts for medical applications— and it is conducting research to determine how to use the technology for new applications, such as printing electronic components for circuitry and antennas. See figure 12. DOD Uses Various Mechanisms to Coordinate on Additive Manufacturing Efforts but Does Not Systematically Track Additive Manufacturing Efforts Department-wide
DOD uses various mechanisms to coordinate on additive manufacturing efforts, but it does not systematically track components’ efforts department-wide. DOD components share information regarding additive manufacturing through mechanisms such as working groups and conferences that, according to DOD officials, provide opportunities to discuss challenges experienced in implementing additive manufacturing—for example, qualifying materials and certifying parts. However, DOD does not systematically track additive manufacturing efforts, to include (1) all projects, henceforth referred to as activities, performed and resources expended by DOD; and (2) results of their activities, including actual and potential performance and combat capability improvements, cost savings, and lessons learned. DOD has not designated a lead or focal point at the OSD level to systematically track and disseminate the results of these efforts, including activities and lessons learned, department-wide. Without designating a lead to track information on additive manufacturing efforts, which is consistent with federal internal control standards, DOD officials may not obtain the information they need to leverage ongoing efforts. Without designating a lead or focal point responsible for developing an approach for systematically (1) tracking department-wide activities and resources, and results of these activities; and (2) disseminating, department-wide, the results of these activities and an inventory of additive manufacturing equipment, DOD officials may not obtain the information they need to leverage resources and ongoing experiences of the various components. To determine the extent to which the briefing document to the Senate Armed Services Committee (henceforth referred to as “the Committee”) addresses the three directed elements, two GAO analysts concurrently assessed DOD’s May 2014 briefing document to determine whether it included the following Committee-directed elements: (1) potential benefits and constraints of additive manufacturing, (2) how the additive manufacturing process could or could not contribute to DOD missions, and (3) what technologies being developed at America Makes are being transitioned for DOD use. To determine the extent to which DOD has taken steps to implement additive manufacturing to improve performance, improve combat capability, and achieve cost savings, we reviewed DOD planning documents, such as the December 2014 DOD Manufacturing Technology Program report and briefing reports documenting the status of DOD’s additive manufacturing efforts, as well as examples of any actual or potential performance and combat capability improvements, and examples of actual or potential cost savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Additive manufacturing—building products layer-by-layer in a process often referred to as three-dimensional (3D) printing—has the potential to improve aspects of DOD's mission and operations. DOD and other organizations, such as America Makes, are determining how to address challenges to adopt this technology throughout the department.
Senate Report 113-44 directed DOD to submit a briefing or report on additive manufacturing to the Senate Armed Services Committee that describes three elements. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review DOD's use of additive manufacturing. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's briefing to the Committee addresses the directed elements; (2) DOD has taken steps to implement additive manufacturing to improve performance, improve combat capability, and achieve cost savings; and (3) DOD uses mechanisms to coordinate and systematically track additive manufacturing efforts across the department. GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD documents and interviewed DOD and academia officials.
What GAO Found
GAO determined that the Department of Defense's (DOD) May 2014 additive manufacturing briefing for the Senate Armed Services Committee addressed the three directed elements—namely, potential benefits and constraints; potential contributions to DOD mission; and transition of the technologies of the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation Institute (“America Makes,” a public-private partnership established to accelerate additive manufacturing) for DOD use.
DOD has taken steps to implement additive manufacturing to improve performance and combat capability, and to achieve cost savings. GAO obtained information on multiple efforts being conducted across DOD components. DOD uses additive manufacturing for design and prototyping and for some production, such as parts for medical applications; and it is conducting research to determine how to use the technology for new applications. For example, according to a senior Air Force official, the Air Force is researching potential performance improvements that may be achieved by embedding devices such as antennas within helmets through additive manufacturing that could enable improved communications; and the Army used additive manufacturing to prototype aspects of a Joint Service Aircrew Mask to test a design change, and reported thousands of dollars thereby saved in design development (see figure).
DOD uses various mechanisms to coordinate on additive manufacturing efforts, but it does not systematically track components' efforts department-wide. DOD components share information regarding additive manufacturing via mechanisms such as working groups and conferences that, according to DOD officials, provide opportunities to discuss challenges experienced in implementing additive manufacturing—for example, qualifying materials and certifying parts. However, DOD does not systematically track additive manufacturing efforts, to include (1) all activities performed and resources expended by DOD; and (2) results of these activities, including actual and potential performance and combat capability improvements, cost savings, and lessons learned. DOD has not designated a lead or focal point at a senior level to systematically track and disseminate the results of these efforts, including activities and lessons learned, department-wide. Without designating a lead to track information on additive manufacturing efforts, which is consistent with federal internal control standards, DOD officials may not obtain the information they need to leverage ongoing efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD designate an Office of the Secretary of Defense lead to be responsible for developing and implementing an approach for systematically tracking department-wide activities and resources, and results of these activities; and for disseminating these results to facilitate adoption of the technology across the department. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-4 | gao_GAO-17-4_0 | The act provides mortgage-related protections, including prohibiting foreclosures on active-duty servicemembers’ homes without court orders. 1). Number of Servicemembers Who Received the SCRA Interest Rate Cap on Student Loans Has Increased
Number of Servicemembers with Federal Student Loans Who Received the Rate Cap Increased Dramatically with Automatic Eligibility Checks
The number of servicemembers with federal student loans who received the SCRA interest rate cap increased dramatically when Education required servicers of these loans to use an automated process to identify qualifying servicemembers and apply the cap to their eligible loans. In particular, Education in 2014 required that federal loan servicers use the SCRA website each month to identify borrowers with qualifying periods of active military service and automatically apply the rate cap to their eligible federal loans, rather than requiring servicemembers to provide written notice of eligibility. 3). (For additional information on servicemembers who received the cap, see appendix II.) Federal internal control standards state that agencies should externally communicate the information necessary to achieve their objectives, but inaccurate information about the SCRA rate cap not only falls short of those standards, it may also prevent some servicemembers who have private student loans from receiving a benefit for which they are eligible. Eligible Servicemembers Are at Risk of Not Receiving the Rate Cap for Some Private Student Loans
There is a risk that not all servicemembers who are eligible for the SCRA interest rate cap are receiving it on their private student loans for several reasons. Federal Agencies Use Various Mechanisms to Oversee Application of the Interest Rate Cap for Student Loans, but Limitations Exist
Education Oversees Application of the Rate Cap for Federal Loans and Commercial FFEL Loans, but Lacks a Systematic Way to Track Complaints
Education, as part of its oversight of federal student loan servicers, uses a variety of mechanisms to oversee how servicers apply the SCRA interest rate cap for federal student loans and commercial FFEL loans held by eligible servicemembers. Nonbank lenders include institutions of higher education and private companies that are not banks. This may be because none of these agencies currently has the authority to routinely oversee SCRA compliance at nonbank private student loan lenders and servicers. CFPB and DOJ could communicate this need to the Congress. The resulting lack of routine oversight for nonbank lenders and servicers increases the risk that SCRA violations for private student loans will go undetected and that some servicemembers may not benefit from the rate cap for which they are eligible. 3. To better ensure that servicemembers with private student loans benefit from the SCRA interest rate cap, we recommend that the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Attorney General of the Department of Justice coordinate with each other, and with the four federal financial regulators, as appropriate, to determine the best way to ensure routine oversight of SCRA compliance for all nonbank private student loan lenders and servicers. Given that Military OneSource is a key source of information for servicemembers and that, as we note in this report, 2 of the 8 documents DOD provided state that the SCRA rate cap does not apply to student loans, we continue to believe that servicemembers are not always receiving accurate and up-to-date information about how the SCRA rate cap applies to student loans. (2) what challenges do servicemembers face obtaining the cap? To identify challenges servicemembers face obtaining the cap and assess the extent to which federal agencies oversee implementation of the rate cap, we interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Department of Defense (DOD), Education, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). In addition, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Information on Mortgage Protections and Related Education Efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
SCRA helps servicemembers financially by capping interest rates on student loans during active duty. As of May 2016, about 1.3 million servicemembers were on active duty. The number of active duty servicemembers with student loans is unknown, as is the number eligible for the rate cap who may not have received it. GAO was asked to review implementation of the rate cap for servicemembers' student loans.
This report examines: (1) the number of servicemembers who received the cap for student loans (2) challenges that servicemembers face in doing so, and (3) the extent to which federal agencies oversee implementation of the cap. GAO analyzed data from 2008 through 2015 from the 10 federal student loan servicers; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, policies, and training materials; and interviewed representatives of the servicers and servicemember advocacy groups, and officials from DOD, Education, the CFPB and DOJ.
What GAO Found
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) provides servicemembers with an interest rate cap of 6 percent on student loans while they are on active duty. The number of servicemembers with federal student loans who received this rate cap increased as a result of the Department of Education (Education) requiring federal loan servicers to regularly use the Department of Defense's (DOD) SCRA website to identify eligible servicemembers and automatically apply the rate cap without requiring servicemembers to provide written notice of active duty (see figure). Using the automated process, some federal loan servicers identified borrowers who had been eligible for the rate cap as far back as 2008, when the SCRA rate cap first applied to federal loans, and retroactively applied the cap.
Servicemembers can face challenges obtaining the SCRA rate cap due to their failure to receive accurate information. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should externally communicate the information necessary to achieve their objectives. However, some servicemembers eligible for the cap may not receive it because information used by DOD to inform them about the cap is inaccurate: for example, some DOD information states that the rate cap does not apply to student loans. In addition, because the automated process to identify eligible servicemembers is not required for private student loans, servicemembers with private loans may be particularly at risk of not receiving the accurate information needed to obtain the cap themselves.
While Education monitors the application of the SCRA cap for federally owned or guaranteed student loans, there is a gap in oversight for private student loans. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), four federal financial regulators of banks, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) each oversees aspects of private student loans or SCRA, but none has the authority to routinely oversee SCRA compliance at nonbank entities that handle private student loans. These nonbank entities include institutions of higher education and private companies. The resulting gap in oversight of SCRA compliance for these nonbank entities that make or service private student loans increases the risk that servicemembers will not receive a benefit for which they are eligible.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD improve the accuracy of SCRA information on student loans, and that CFPB and DOJ collaborate to ensure routine oversight of nonbank lenders and servicers, and seek additional authority, if needed. DOD disagreed and said it already provides accurate information. DOJ agreed and CFPB did not specifically agree, but said that all eligible servicemembers should receive the cap. GAO maintains that DOD's outreach materials are not always accurate and that routine oversight is necessary for nonbank lenders and servicers. |
gao_HEHS-96-70 | gao_HEHS-96-70_0 | Telephone Demonstration Project: Design and Installation
To improve the public’s telephone access to its local offices, SSA is conducting a demonstration project to test telephone equipment known as automated attendant and voice mail. Under method B, busy-signal rates dropped greatly, but more calls were being placed on hold. We also found that SSA staff in the demonstration offices strongly believe that the voice mail equipment on their desk phones enhanced efficiency and public service. The method A configuration did not produce a statistically significant change in access under our test. Among method A offices, significant improvement in access occurred in 1 more office—4 of the 10 offices instead of 3 of the 10 offices improved. SSA noted that its internal studies on these issues will be completed by the end of February 1996. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine if the installation of the new telephone equipment has improved the public’s access to the participating offices in SSA’s demonstration project. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) telephone access demonstration project.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) under one of the two telephone demonstration project configurations tested, telephone access improved significantly, busy-signal rates dropped, and the number of callers reaching SSA improved; (2) although improvements were statistically significant under a broader access definition, more callers were placed on hold because staffing had not increased; (3) configuration results varied among SSA offices; (4) SSA field office staff believe that the installation of voice mail equipment has improved office efficiency and public service; (5) SSA expects to complete its internal evaluations of the project's effect on local operations, employees, and public relations by the end of February 1996; and (6) the equipment tested in the demonstration project has the potential to further SSA public service goals, but SSA must assess the costs and contributions of the equipment before installing it systemwide. |
gao_GAO-12-587T | gao_GAO-12-587T_0 | From 1994 through 2010, NASA estimates that it directly invested over $48 billion in development and construction of the on-orbit scientific laboratory, the ISS. With ISS expected to be in use only through 2015, this slower pace shortened the amount of time NASA had available to take advantage of the significant monetary investment and to fully utilize the station. NASA planned for the space shuttle to serve as the means of transporting crew, hardware, and supplies to the ISS through the end of the station’s life. NASA Faces Challenges Transporting Cargo and Crew to and from the ISS
The greatest challenge facing NASA is transporting cargo and crew to and from the ISS to make effective use of the ISS. NASA’s decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles is inherently risky because the vehicles are still in development and not yet proven or fully operational. NASA Plans to Use International Partner and Commercial Flights but International Agreements Are Not in Place and Commercial Vehicles Remain Unproven
NASA is relying on 51 flights of international partner and commercial vehicles to transport cargo to the ISS from 2012 through 2020, but agreements for international flights after 2016 are not in place and the commercial vehicles are unproven. NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. If the international partner agreements and commercial service provider contracts do not materialize as NASA plans for the years beyond 2016, this could lead to a potential cargo shortfall. NASA Lacks a Domestic Ability to Transport Crew to the ISS until at Least 2017
NASA faces two major challenges in transporting crew to the ISS— adjusting its acquisition strategy for crew vehicles to match available funding and deciding if and when to purchase crew seats on the Russian Soyuz in case domestic commercial crew vehicles are not available as planned in 2017. Additionally, the agency faces another looming challenge—a decision about if and when to purchase crew space on the Russian Soyuz vehicle. NASA will likely need to decide by the end of 2013 whether to purchase additional seats that might be needed beyond 2016 because the lead time for acquiring additional seats on the Soyuz is 3 years. These restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination. NASA Faces Challenges Maximizing ISS Research Utilization
NASA’s greatest challenge to utilizing the ISS for its intended purpose— scientific research—is inextricably linked with the agency’s ability to carry scientific experiments and payloads to and from the ISS. As mentioned previously, SpaceX, however, will provide NASA with the capability to transport research payloads back to earth. Since the establishment of CASIS as the management body of ISS research is relatively recent, we have not examined its effectiveness; therefore, it is too early for us to say whether it will be successful in ensuring full scientific utilization of the station as a national laboratory. NASA Has a Reasonable Approach to Meeting the Challenge of Estimating ISS Spares and Assessing Structural Health and Safety
We recently reported that NASA has an appropriate and reasonable approach in place to determine the spares needed for the ISS as well as to assess ISS structural health and safety. NASA currently anticipates that—with some mitigation—the ISS will remain structurally sound for continued operations through 2020. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Construction of the International Space Station (ISS) required dedication and effort on the part of many nations to be successful. Further, the funding necessary to accomplish this task was significant, with the United States alone directly investing nearly $50 billion in its development. As construction of the on-orbit laboratory is complete, now is the time for the United States and its partners to make use of this investment and recently, Congress took steps to extend the life of the ISS until at least 2020.
GAO has cautioned for years that NASA should ensure it has a capability to access and utilize the space station following retirement of the space shuttle in 2011. We have highlighted the challenges associated with transporting cargo and crew to and from the ISS, as well as the difficulties NASA faces in ensuring the ISS supports its purpose of scientific research and in safely operating the station. Some risks have been realized. For example, commercial vehicles are significantly behind schedulewith the first launch to the space station planned for 2012.
GAO's statement today will focus on the progress NASA has made and the challenges the agency faces in accessing, ensuring full utilization of, and sustaining the ISS. To prepare this statement, GAO relied on prior relevant work on the ISS and NASA's commercial cargo and crew efforts and conducted a limited amount of additional work to update planned flight information.
What GAO Found
NASA plans to use international partner and new domestic commercial launch vehicles to access, utilize, and sustain the International Space Station from 2012 through 2020. However, the agency faces challenges in transporting cargo and crew to the ISS as well as ensuring the station is fully utilized. NASAs decision to rely on the new commercial vehicles to transport cargo starting in 2012 and to transport crew starting in 2017 is inherently risky because the vehicles are not yet proven and are experiencing delays in development. Further, NASA does not have agreements in place for international partners to provide cargo services to the ISS beyond 2016. The agency will also face a decision regarding the need to purchase additional seats on the Russian Soyuz vehicle beyond 2016, likely before commercial vehicles have made significant progress in development, given the three-year lead time necessary for acquiring a seat. This decision is further complicated because restrictions prohibit NASA from making certain payments to Russia in connection with the ISS unless the President makes a determination. Further, NASA currently expects to transport all cargo needed by the ISS in 51 flights through 2020, but if international partner agreements and commercial service contracts do not materialize as the agency plans for the years beyond 2016, the situation could lead to a potential cargo shortfall.
If NASA can access the station, it will next be challenged with fully utilizing the ISS national laboratory for its intended purposescientific research. To take steps to meet this challenge and consistent with a 2009 GAO recommendation, in 2011 NASA selected an organization to centrally oversee ISS national laboratory research decision-making. It is too soon, however, to determine whether this organization is ensuring full scientific utilization of the ISS. Regardless of the efforts of the management body, as GAO noted in a 2009 report, constraints on crew time for conducting science could also impact full utilization.
If NASA can overcome its challenges related to accessing the station, it has reasonable approaches in place for estimating spare parts and assessing the structural health of the space station. These approaches provide NASA with increased assurance that the agency will have sufficient spares and will put mitigations in place to effectively and safely utilize the space station. |
gao_RCED-95-137 | gao_RCED-95-137_0 | Most OSDBU Directors Report to Appropriate Agency Officials
Of the eight federal agencies we reviewed, only DLA’s and DOE’s OSDBU heads do not report to the appropriate agency official. Currently, DOD’s OSDBU director reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, who is the Secretary’s designee. Two OSDBU Directors Do Not Report to the Agency Head or Deputy
The OSDBU directors at DLA and DOE report to officials other than the agency head or agency’s deputy. Defense Logistics Agency
DLA’s OSDBU director reports to the agency’s Deputy Director for Acquisition. In response to a congressional request, in 1993 OMB surveyed federal agencies to determine the organizational reporting levels of their OSDBU directors. OSDBUs Perform a Variety of Activities to Assist Small Businesses
All eight OSDBUs we examined conduct activities consistent with the requirements of Public Law 95-507 and OFPP’s Policy Letter 79-1 for assisting small and disadvantaged businesses in obtaining federal contracts. These activities include (1) developing the agency’s small business contracting and subcontracting goals, (2) sponsoring and/or participating in small business outreach efforts, (3) serving as an interagency liaison for procurement activities relating to small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses, and (4) supervising and training employees involved with the agency’s small business activities. Conclusions
The organizational reporting levels of the OSDBU directors at the Defense Logistics Agency and the Department of Energy do not comply with the requirements of Public Law 95-507. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) at eight federal agencies, focusing on: (1) whether OSDBU directors report to the required agency official and, if not, the rationale for the deviation; and (2) OSDBU activities to assist small and disadvantaged businesses (SDB) in obtaining federal contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) except for at the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Department of Energy (DOE), OSDBU directors report to the appropriate agency official as required; (2) DLA OSDBU director reports to the Deputy Director for Acquisition, since that official is responsible for all contracting matters; (3) DLA plans to have its OSDBU director report either to the DLA head or the DLA principal deputy under its reorganization plan; (4) DOE maintains that its authorizing legislation enables the Secretary of Energy to use discretion in determining the OSDBU director's reporting level; (5) DOE plans to comply with federal OSDBU reporting requirements; (6) OSDBU activities are consistent with legal requirements for assisting SDB in obtaining federal contracts; (7) these activities include developing contracting goals, sponsoring or participating in outreach efforts, being an interagency liaison for small business procurement activities, and supervising and training agency staff who work with small businesses; and (8) several agency OSDBU have undertaken additional initiatives to promote SDB participation in federal contracting. |
gao_GAO-10-410 | gao_GAO-10-410_0 | The joint report focuses on differences in the agencies’ existing authorities and does not cover issues related to gaps in the agencies’ authorities to oversee over-the- counter derivatives, which were the subject of congressional deliberation at the time of their analysis. Most of the Joint Report’s Recommendations Have Yet to Be Enacted or Remain in the Planning Stages
The joint report’s recommendations for statutory changes have yet to be enacted, and the recommendations for agency action remain in the planning stages. One Requested Legislative Action Has Been Taken, and Proposed Legislation Includes Provisions That Would Address Some Recommended Statutory Changes
According to CFTC and SEC staff, since issuing the joint report in October 2009, the agencies have been focused on working with Congress on drafting legislation to address statutory changes recommended in the joint report. Agency staff said they expect to have the Joint Advisory Committee functioning by late spring or early summer 2010 but have not set firm time frames for implementing the joint report’s other recommendations requiring agency action. Additional Harmonization Opportunities Exist, and the Agencies’ Future Harmonization Efforts Could Benefit from Clearer Goals and Accountability Requirements
While the joint report’s recommendations would reduce or eliminate certain inconsistencies in the two agencies’ regulatory approaches, additional harmonization opportunities exist and the agencies’ future harmonization efforts could benefit from clearer goals and accountability requirements. In their written comments, respondents identified areas they believe could benefit from additional harmonization efforts. Although agency staff told us that they plan to use the Joint Advisory Committee to coordinate future harmonization efforts, CFTC and SEC have not yet established goals with respect to harmonization or developed requirements to report and evaluate their progress toward these goals. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in Appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe how the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) identified and assessed significant differences in their statutes and rules, we reviewed and analyzed the joint report of CFTC and SEC on harmonization (joint report); transcripts of the panel discussions held at the joint public meetings hosted by the agencies on September 2 and 3, 2009; statements submitted to CFTC and SEC in response to the agencies’ request for public comment on opportunities for harmonization; CFTC and SEC analyses of relevant differences in their statutes and regulations; and other agency documentation related to the joint report. We reviewed the provision of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, that authorized funding for the Joint Advisory Committee as well as the agencies’ draft charter for this committee. Scope and Methodology
To accomplish our objectives, we
reviewed and analyzed the SEC/CFTC harmonization report, documentation of public input obtained by CFTC and SEC through joint public meetings and a public comment period, and preliminary analyses conducted by CFTC and SEC on relevant differences in their statutes and regulations; interviewed CFTC and SEC officials about how they identified and assessed harmonization opportunities and developed recommendations; progress made on the report’s recommendations; and additional harmonization opportunities that may exist; reviewed provisions in proposed legislation that may address SEC/CFTC recommendations for statutory changes; obtained the views of market participants and other experts on the report’s recommendations and additional opportunities for harmonization; and reviewed prior GAO work and other relevant studies. Background (continued)
In October 2009, CFTC and SEC responded to this request
with a joint report on harmonization of their regulatory approaches. In drafting the joint report, the agencies grouped issues into eight potential areas for harmonization and made at least one recommendation in all but one of these areas. The agencies also made several recommendations to enhance Create a Joint Advisory Committee to be tasked with considering and developing solutions to emerging and ongoing issues of common interest in the futures and securities markets; Create a Joint Agency Enforcement Task Force; Establish a cross-agency training program; Develop a program for sharing staff through detail assignments; Create a Joint Information Technology Task Force. Recommendation
To ensure that CFTC and SEC are strategically positioned to
implement the joint report’s recommendations and address remaining harmonization opportunities, we recommend that as CFTC and SEC continue to develop the charter for the Joint Advisory Committee, they take steps to establish clearer goals for future harmonization efforts and requirements for reporting and evaluating progress towards these goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The conference report accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 directed GAO to assess the joint report of the (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on harmonization of their regulatory approaches. In October 2009, CFTC and SEC issued this report in response to the Department of the Treasury's recommendation that the two agencies assess conflicts in their rules and statutes with respect to similar financial instruments. GAO's objectives were to review (1) how CFTC and SEC identified and assessed harmonization opportunities, (2) the agencies' progress toward implementing the joint report's recommendations, and (3) additional steps the agencies could take to reduce inconsistencies and overlap in their oversight. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed the joint report and related documentation, interviewed agency officials, and obtained and analyzed written comments on the report from market participants.
What GAO Found
CFTC and SEC conducted joint analyses and sought public input to inform their efforts to identify and assess significant differences in their rules and statutes and develop recommendations to address such differences. The agencies obtained public input through joint public meetings and a public comment period and worked together to analyze this input. In drafting the joint report on harmonization of their regulatory approaches, CFTC and SEC focused their analysis on eight potential areas for harmonization and made at least one recommendation in all but one of these areas. The joint report also includes several recommendations to enhance coordination between the agencies. For example, the report recommended the creation of a Joint Advisory Committee to be tasked with considering and developing solutions to issues of common interest in the futures and securities markets. The joint report did not cover gaps in the agencies' authorities to oversee over-the-counter derivatives, which were the subject of congressional deliberation at the time of their study. The joint report's recommendations for statutory changes have yet to be enacted, and the recommendations for agency action remain in the planning stages. According to agency staff, since issuing the joint report in October 2009, the agencies have been focused on working with Congress on drafting legislation to address recommended statutory changes. Congress authorized CFTC and SEC to fund the Joint Advisory Committee, as requested in the joint report, and proposed legislation includes provisions that would partially address recommended statutory changes in areas including oversight of exchange rules and enforcement. CFTC and SEC have drafted a charter for the Joint Advisory Committee and expect to have this committee functioning by early summer 2010. Agency staff said the agencies have not set firm timelines for the implementation of the other recommendations for agency action. Additional harmonization opportunities exist beyond those addressed by the joint report's recommendations, and future efforts by CFTC and SEC to assess these opportunities could benefit from clearer goals and accountability requirements. With only a few months to complete their report, agency staff said the agencies could not address all differences in their rules and statutes through the joint report's recommendations. Market participants identified several areas they believe could benefit from additional harmonization efforts, including portfolio margining and investor definitions and categories. The agencies plan to coordinate future harmonization efforts through the Joint Advisory Committee, but they have not yet developed clear goals for harmonization or developed requirements for the agencies to evaluate and report their progress toward meeting such goals. Without a clearer vision to guide future harmonization efforts and mechanisms to ensure accountability for these efforts, CFTC and SEC may not be strategically positioned to implement the joint report's recommendations and address remaining harmonization opportunities. |
gao_GAO-05-347T | gao_GAO-05-347T_0 | In addition, not all tribes are eligible for the regulatory process. Congressional policymakers have struggled with the tribal recognition issue for decades. For example, H.R. 4933 and H.R. 5134, introduced in the 108th Congress, and H.R. 512, which was introduced last week, have focused on the timeliness of the recognition process. In 2001 the Recognition Process Was Ill Equipped to Provide a Timely Response
BIA’s regulations outline a process for active consideration of a completed petition that should take about 2 years. However, because of limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for providing information to interested third parties, we reported in 2001 that the length of time needed to rule on tribal petitions for federal recognition was substantial. In light of these problems, we recommended in our November 2001 report that the Secretary of the Interior direct BIA to develop a strategy to improve the responsiveness of the process for federal recognition. Such a strategy was to include a systematic assessment of the resources available and needed that could lead to the development of a budget commensurate with the workload. Timeliness Has Improved, but It Will Still Take Years to Clear the Existing Backlog of Petitions
In response to our report, Interior’s Office of Federal Acknowledgment has hired additional staff and taken a number of other important steps to improve the responsiveness of the tribal recognition process. However, it still could take 4 or more years, at current staff levels, to work through the existing backlog of petitions currently under review, as well as those ready and waiting for consideration. In response to our report, two vacancies within Interior’s Office of Federal Acknowledgment were filled, resulting in a professional staff of three research teams, each consisting of a cultural anthropologist, historian, and genealogist. In addition, the September 2002 Strategic Plan, issued by the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs in response to our report, has been almost completely implemented by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment. The main impediment to completely implementing the Strategic Plan and to making all of the information that has been compiled more accessible to the public is the fact that BIA continues to be disconnected from the Internet because of ongoing computer security concerns involving Indian trust funds. While Interior’s Office of Federal Acknowledgment has taken a number of actions during the past 3 years to improve the timeliness of the process, it will still take years to work through the existing backlog of tribal recognition petitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) regulatory process for recognizing tribes was established in 1978. The process requires groups that are petitioning for recognition to submit evidence that they meet certain criteria--basically that the petitioner has continuously existed as an Indian tribe since historic times. Critics of the process claim that it produces inconsistent decisions and takes too long. Congressional policymakers have struggled with the tribal recognition issue for over 27 years. H.R. 4933 and H.R. 5134, introduced in the 108th Congress, and H.R. 512, which was introduced last week, have focused on the timeliness of the recognition process. This testimony is based in part on GAO's report, Indian Issues: Improvements Needed in Tribal Recognition Process ( GAO-02-49 , November 2, 2001). Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the timeliness of the recognition process as GAO reported in November 2001 and (2) the actions the Department of the Interior's Office of Federal Acknowledgment has taken since 2001 to improve the timeliness of the recognition process.
What GAO Found
In November 2001, GAO reported that BIA's tribal recognition process was ill equipped to provide timely responses to tribal petitions for federal recognition. BIA's regulations outline a process for evaluating a petition that was designed to take about 2 years. However, the process was being hampered by limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for providing information to interested third parties, such as local municipalities and other Indian tribes. As a result, there were a growing number of completed petitions waiting to be considered. In 2001, BIA officials estimated that it could take up to 15 years for all the completed petitions to be resolved. To correct these problems, we recommended that BIA develop a strategy that identified how to improve the responsiveness of the process for federal recognition. Such a strategy was to include a systematic assessment of the resources available and needed that could lead to the development of a budget commensurate with the workload. While Interior's Office of Federal Acknowledgment has taken a number of important steps to improve the responsiveness of the tribal recognition process, it still could take 4 or more years, at current staff levels, to work through the existing backlog of petitions currently under review, as well as those that are ready and waiting for consideration. In response to GAO's 2001 report, two vacancies within the Office of Federal Acknowledgment were filled, resulting in a professional staff of three research teams, each consisting of a cultural anthropologist, historian, and genealogist. In addition, the September 2002 Strategic Plan, issued by the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs in response to GAO's report, has been almost completely implemented by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment. The main impediment to completely implementing the Strategic Plan and to making all of the information that has been compiled more accessible to the public is the fact that BIA continues to be disconnected from the Internet because of ongoing computer security concerns involving Indian trust funds. |
gao_GAO-10-908 | gao_GAO-10-908_0 | To ensure compliance with FCC rules, USAC has periodically selected beneficiaries to audit. For our review of the design of E-rate’s internal control structure, we classified the control activities into three broad areas: (1) processing applications for discounted service and making funding commitment decisions, (2) processing invoices requesting reimbursement, and (3) monitoring the effectiveness of internal controls through audits of schools and libraries. We found that FCC and USAC have established a number of internal controls in each of these three areas. Processing Applications and Making Funding Commitment Decisions
E-rate’s internal control structure centers around USAC’s complex, multilayered, Program Integrity Assurance (PIA) application review process. This increasing complexity, in turn, has led USAC to expand the E-rate program’s internal control structure over time to address program complexity and to address risks to the program as they became apparent. Although USAC has performed financial reporting and fraud risk assessments, USAC has not conducted a robust risk assessment of the E- rate program and, consequently, may not be efficiently using its resources to reasonably target program risks. This internal control structure, however, was not designed on the basis of a robust risk assessment of the E-rate program. To date, FCC has not directed USAC to undertake a robust risk assessment that would involve a critical examination of the entire E- rate program to determine whether modifications to business practices and internal controls are necessary to cost-effectively address programmatic risks. Automated Invoice Review Process May Not Appropriately Target Risk
The internal control structure around the E-rate invoicing process is more limited than the structure around the application review process, but it is again not clear that the controls in place appropriately target risks. Audit Findings Are Not Effectively Considered in Assessing Internal Controls of the E-rate Program
Although FCC and USAC use the results of beneficiary audits to identify and report beneficiary noncompliance, they have not effectively used the information gained from audits to assess and modify the E-rate program’s internal controls. Of those 64 beneficiaries, 36 had repeat audit findings of the same program rule violation, such as those that we previously mentioned, in each of the audited years. We also found that FCC and USAC do not have documented and approved policies and procedures for the beneficiary audit process. Policies and procedures could also contribute positively to a systematic process for considering audit results when assessing the program’s internal controls and in identifying opportunities for modifications to existing controls. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve internal controls over the E-rate program, we recommend that the Federal Communications Commission take the following four actions: conduct a robust risk assessment of the E-rate program; based on the findings of the risk assessment, conduct a thorough examination of the overall design of E-rate’s internal control structure to ensure that the procedures and administrative resources related to internal controls are aligned to provide reasonable assurance that program risks are appropriately targeted and addressed; implement a systematic approach to assess internal controls that appropriately considers the results of beneficiary audits and that is supported by a documented and approved set of policies and procedures; and develop policies and procedures to periodically monitor the internal control structure of the E-rate program, including evaluating the costs and benefits of internal controls, to provide continued reasonable assurance that program risks are targeted and addressed. In its written comments, FCC agreed with our recommendations. (2) Does the design of the E-rate program’s internal control structure appropriately consider program risks? Specifically, we reviewed the design of the program’s key internal controls for (1) processing applications and making funding commitments, (2) processing invoices requesting reimbursement, and (3) monitoring the effectiveness of internal controls through audits of schools and libraries. A comprehensive assessment focused on the E-rate program would consider the existing design of the E-rate program as a whole, including the roles of FCC, USAC, beneficiaries, and service providers; whether the design and mix of preventive and detective controls already in place for the E-rate program are appropriate; and whether the program lacks internal controls that are needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism--commonly known as the "E-rate" program--has been a significant federal source of technology funding for schools and libraries. FCC designated the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) to administer the program. As requested, GAO examined the system of internal controls in place to safeguard E-rate program resources. This report discusses (1) the internal controls FCC and USAC have established and (2) whether the design of E-rate's internal control structure appropriately considers program risks. GAO reviewed the program's key internal controls, risk assessments, and policies and procedures; assessed the design of the internal control structure against federal standards for internal control; and interviewed FCC and USAC officials.
What GAO Found
FCC and USAC have established many internal controls for the E-rate program's core processes: (1) processing applications and making funding commitment decisions, (2) processing invoices requesting reimbursement, and (3) monitoring the effectiveness of internal controls though audits of schools and libraries that receive E-rate funding (beneficiaries). E-rate's internal control structure centers around USAC's complex, multilayered application review process. USAC has expanded the program's internal control structure over time to address the program's complexity and to address risks as they became apparent. In addition, USAC has contracted with independent public accountants to audit beneficiaries to identify and report beneficiary noncompliance with program rules. The design of E-rate's internal control structure may not appropriately consider program risks. GAO found, for example, that USAC's application review process incorporates a number of different types and levels of reviews, but that it was not clear whether this design was effectively and efficiently targeting resources to risks. Similarly, GAO found no controls in place to periodically check the accuracy of USAC's automated invoice review process, again making it unclear whether resources are appropriately aligned with risks. While USAC has expanded and adjusted its internal control procedures, it has never conducted a robust risk assessment of the E-rate program's core processes, although it has conducted risk assessments for other purposes, such as financial reporting. A risk assessment involving a critical examination of the entire E-rate program could help determine whether modifications to business practices and the internal control structure are needed to appropriately address the risks identified and better align program resources to risks. The internal control structure--once assessed and possibly adjusted on the basis of the results of a robust risk assessment--should then be periodically monitored to ensure that the control structure does not evolve in a way that fails to appropriately align resources to risks. The results of beneficiary audits are used to identify and report on E-rate compliance issues, but GAO found that the information gathered from the audits has not been effectively used to assess and modify the E-rate program's internal controls. As a result, the same rule violations have been repeated each year for which beneficiary audits have been completed. For example, of 64 beneficiaries that had been audited more than once over a 3-year period, GAO found that 36 had repeat audit findings of the same rule violation. GAO found that the current beneficiary audit process lacks documented and approved policies and procedures. Without such policies and procedures, management may not have the assurance that control activities are appropriate and properly applied. Documented and approved policies and procedures could contribute positively to a systematic process for considering beneficiary audit findings when assessing the E-rate program's internal controls and in identifying opportunities to modify existing controls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FCC conduct a robust risk assessment of the E-rate program, conduct a thorough examination of the overall design of E-rate's internal control structure, implement a systematic process to assess internal controls that appropriately considers beneficiary audit findings, and establish procedures to periodically monitor controls. FCC agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-614 | gao_GAO-07-614_0 | VBA Is Following Course Recommended by SEI, but Weaknesses Remain to Be Addressed
As recommended by SEI, VBA is continuing to work on the replacement initiative at a reduced pace and taking action to address identified weaknesses in the project’s overall management and software development processes. For example, VBA has established a new governance structure and has developed an integrated master schedule that provides additional time and includes the full range of project activities. Further, VBA has not yet institutionalized many of the improvements that it has undertaken for the initiative. In particular, process improvements remain in draft and have not been established through documented policies and procedures. Nonetheless, if VBA does not institutionalize these improvements, it increases the risk that these process improvements may not be maintained through the life of the project or be available for application to other development initiatives. By implementing the new governance and organizational structure and ensuring that the project has priority, VBA partially responded to SEI’s concerns in this area; however, VBA has not yet taken action with regard to ownership responsibility for total system and process operating costs, as SEI advised. However, according to project management officials, these costs do not include expenditures for in-house development work. VETSNET Is Currently Processing a Portion of Compensation Claims, but Much Work Remains
After more than 10 years of effort, including the recent management, organizational, and process improvements, VBA has achieved critical functionalities needed to process and pay certain original compensation claims using the replacement system, but it remains far from completing the project. Nonetheless, the system requires further development before it can be used to process claims for the full range of compensation and pension benefits available to veterans and their dependents. According to VBA officials, all five of the software applications that make up the new system are now being used in VA’s 57 regional offices to establish and process new compensation claims for veterans. As of March 2007, VBA leadership reported that the replacement system was providing monthly compensation payments to almost 50,000 veterans (out of about 3 million veterans who receive such payments). Specifically, while all five software applications can now be used to process original compensation claims for veterans, two of the applications—Awards and FAS—require further development before the system will be able to process claims for the full range of benefits available to veterans and their dependents. It has not defined processes and resources for capacity planning for the project. In addition, although VBA has improved key processes for managing the software development, these processes have not yet been institutionalized in defined policies and procedures, and performance measures of productivity and user satisfaction have not been developed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) to what extent the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has followed the course of action recommended by the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) and addressed the concerns that it raised and (2) the current status of the replacement project, the Veterans Service Network (VETSNET). | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1996, the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) has been working on an initiative to replace its aging system for paying compensation and pension benefits. In 2005, concerned about the slow pace of development, VBA contracted with the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) for an independent evaluation of the project, known as the Veterans Service Network (VETSNET). SEI advised VBA to continue working on the project at a reduced pace while addressing management and organization weaknesses that it determined had hampered the project's progress. GAO was requested to determine to what extent the VETSNET project has followed the course of action recommended by SEI and describe the project's current status. To perform its review, GAO analyzed project documentation, conducted site visits, and interviewed key program officials.
What GAO Found
VBA is generally following the course of action recommended by SEI by continuing to work on the replacement initiative at a reduced pace, while taking action to address identified weaknesses in overall management and software development processes. For example, VBA established a new governance structure for the initiative that included senior management and involved all stakeholders, and it incorporated all critical areas of system development in an integrated master schedule. However, not all of SEI's management concerns have been addressed. For example, SEI advised VBA to ensure that stakeholders take ownership responsibility for the project, including the total system and process operating costs; however, although VBA is tracking costs incurred by contractors, it is not yet tracking and reporting in-house costs incurred by the project. Further, although the project has improved its management processes, such as establishing a process to manage and stabilize system requirements, it has not yet developed processes for capacity planning and management. This will be important for ensuring that further VETSNET development does not lead to delays and slowdowns in processing of benefits. In addition, although the project has established certain performance measures, it has not yet established results-oriented measures for productivity and user satisfaction, both of which will be important for measuring progress. Finally, the process improvements that VBA has incorporated in the replacement initiative remain in draft and have not been established through documented policies and procedures. If VBA does not institutionalize these improvements, it increases the risk that they may not be maintained through the life of the project or be available for application to other development initiatives. After more than 10 years of effort, including the recent management, organizational, and process improvements, VBA has developed critical functionalities needed to process and pay certain original compensation claims using the replacement system, but it remains far from completing the project. According to VBA officials, all five of the major software applications that make up the new system are now being used to establish and process new compensation claims for veterans. In total, the replacement system is currently providing monthly compensation payments to almost 50,000 veterans (out of about 3 million veterans who receive such payments); the system was used to process about 83 percent of all new compensation claims completed in March 2007. Nonetheless, the system requires further development before it can be used to process claims for the full range of compensation and pension benefits available to veterans and their dependents. |
gao_GAO-06-547 | gao_GAO-06-547_0 | Prior to October 2004, Energy administered Subtitle D to help its contractors’ employees file state workers’ compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to have been caused by exposure to toxic substances in the course of employment at an Energy facility. Energy Did Not Establish Effective Controls over Payments to Contractors or Overall Contract Costs
Energy’s control environment and specific internal control activities over payments to contractors and overall contract costs were not effective in reducing the risk of improper payments. Energy did not establish an effective review and approval process for contractor invoices that enabled it to verify that goods and services billed had actually been received and charged at the agreed-upon amounts. Further, accountability for equipment purchased and reimbursed by Energy for the program by contractors was not maintained. Nearly $15 million of $92 million in OWA program costs were incurred by subcontractors. We also identified $778,613 in improper and questionable payments for other direct costs, including amounts for add- ons and base fees, and certain travel and related costs. Further, we questioned whether certain other payments toward the end of the program for furniture and computer equipment, totaling nearly $1.2 million, were an efficient use of government funds. Given Energy’s poor control environment and the fact that we only reviewed selected Energy payments, other improper and questionable payments may have been made that have not been identified. SEA billed approximately $970,930 under labor categories that did not reflect actual duties performed. This practice resulted in over $4 million in “markups” on subcontracted labor charges that were paid by Energy. Conclusion
The questionable and improper payments we identified during our review represent nearly 30 percent of total program funds spent through September 30, 2005. In light of the findings in this report, we recommend that the Commanding Officer, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, New Orleans, reassess the organization’s procedures for carrying out its delegated responsibilities in connection with interagency agreements for delegated contract administration responsibilities, including the following: Assess the adequacy of the review and approval process for contractor invoices, including (1) oversight and monitoring of contractor services and linkage of these activities to the invoice review and approval process, (2) verification that labor hours are billed in the appropriate categories at the appropriate rates, and (3) determining that contractor travel and other direct costs are in accordance with the contract and applicable federal regulations. To determine whether Energy’s internal controls provided reasonable assurance that improper payments to contractors would not be made or would be detected in the normal course of business, we used Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government as a basis to assess the internal control structure—control environment, risk assessment procedures, control activities, information and communications, and monitoring efforts of Energy over its OWA program. The scope of our work was to determine whether internal controls over program payments were adequately designed, and if program payments were properly supported as a valid use of government funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA) authorized the Department of Energy (Energy) to help its former contractor employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses that could be linked to exposure to toxic substances during their employment. Concerned with the relatively small number of finalized cases and the overall effectiveness of the program, Congress asked GAO to review costs incurred by Energy to administer the program. Specifically, Congress asked GAO to determine whether (1) internal controls over program payments were adequately designed to provide reasonable assurance that improper payments to contractors would not be made or would be detected in the normal course of business and (2) program payments were properly supported as a valid use of government funds.
What GAO Found
Energy did not establish an effective control environment over payments to contractors or overall contract costs. Specifically, because Energy lacked an effective review and approval process for contractor invoices, it had no assurance that goods and services billed had actually been received. Although responsibility for review and approval of invoices on the largest contract rested with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, New Orleans (SSC NOLA) through an interagency agreement, Energy did not ensure that SSC NOLA carried out proper oversight. Energy also failed to maintain accountability for equipment purchased by contractors. Further, subcontractor agreements, which represented nearly $15 million in program charges, were not adequately assessed, nor were overall contract costs sufficiently monitored or properly reported. These fundamental control weaknesses made Energy highly vulnerable to improper payments. GAO identified $26.4 million in improper and questionable payments for contractor costs, including billings of employees in labor categories for which they were not qualified or that did not reflect the duties they actually performed, the inappropriate use of fully burdened labor rates for subcontracted labor, add-on charges to other direct costs and base fees that were not in accordance with contract terms, and various other direct costs that were improperly paid. Further, certain payments toward the end of the program for furniture and computer equipment may not have been an efficient use of government funds. These improper and questionable payments represent nearly 30 percent of the $92 million in total program funds spent through September 30, 2005, but could be even higher given the poor control environment and the fact that GAO only reviewed selected program payments. |
gao_GAO-03-1165T | gao_GAO-03-1165T_0 | To accomplish this mission, the act established specific homeland security responsibilities for the department and directed it to coordinate its efforts and share information within DHS and with other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and other entities. Also, sharing information on terrorists and criminals can help to secure our nation’s borders. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS with the primary responsibility of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and minimizing damage and assisting in recovery from attacks that do occur. Other DHS responsibilities related to information sharing include requesting and receiving information from other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and the private sector relating to threats of terrorism in the United States; distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the distribution of warnings and information with other federal agencies, state and local governments and authorities, and the public; creating and fostering communications with the private sector; promoting existing public/private partnerships and developing new public/private partnerships to provide for collaboration and mutual support; and coordinating and, as appropriate, consolidating the federal government’s communications and systems of communications relating to homeland security with state and local governments and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) is responsible for accessing, receiving, and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other threat and incident information from respective agencies of federal, state, and local governments and the private sector, and for combining and analyzing such information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. Although improvements have been made in protecting our nation’s critical infrastructures and continuing efforts are in progress, further efforts are needed to address the following critical CIP challenges that we have identified: developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate CIP information sharing, which clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities, defines interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for achieving objectives, and establishes performance measures; developing fully productive information sharing relationships within the federal government and between the federal government and state and local governments and the private sector; improving the federal government’s capabilities to analyze incident, threat, and vulnerability information obtained from numerous sources and share appropriate timely, useful warnings and other information concerning both cyber and physical threats to federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector; and providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase information sharing with the federal government. We have identified critical success factors to information sharing that DHS should consider. Also, in addition to the need to develop technological solutions, key management issues that DHS must overcome to achieve success include integrating existing IT resources of 22 different agencies, making new IT investments, ensuring that sensitive information is secured, developing secure communications networks, developing a performance focus, integrating staff from different organizations and ensuring that the department has properly skilled staff, and ensuring effective oversight. We found that these practices include: establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents; developing standards and agreements on how shared information will be establishing effective and appropriately secure communications taking steps to ensure that sensitive information is not inappropriately disseminated. DHS should develop and implement an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, to integrate the many existing systems and processes required to support its mission. This architecture will also guide the department’s investments in new systems to effectively support homeland security in the coming years. As such, information sharing is an essential part of DHS’s responsibilities and is critical to achieving its mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), brought together 22 diverse organizations to help prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, and minimize damage and assist in recovery from attacks that do occur. To accomplish this mission, the act established specific homeland security responsibilities for the department, which included sharing information among its own entities and with other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and others. GAO was asked to discuss the significance of information sharing in fulfilling DHS's responsibilities, emphasizing GAO's related prior analyses and recommendations for improving the federal government's information sharing efforts.
What GAO Found
DHS's responsibilities include coordinating and sharing information related to threats of domestic terrorism within the department and with and between other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and other entities. To accomplish its missions, DHS must, for example, access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other threat, incident, and vulnerability information from federal and nonfederal sources and analyze such information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats. DHS must also share information both internally and externally with agencies and law enforcement on such things as goods and passengers inbound to the United States and individuals who are known or suspected terrorists and criminals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations related to information sharing particularly as they relate to fulfilling DHS's critical infrastructure protection responsibilities. Although improvements have been made, more efforts are needed to address the following challenges, among others, that GAO has identified: (1) developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to facilitate information sharing on critical infrastructure protection; (2) developing productive information sharing relationships between the federal government and state and local governments and the private sector; and (3) providing appropriate incentives for nonfederal entities to increase information sharing with the federal government and enhance other critical infrastructure protection efforts. Through our prior work, we have identified critical success factors and other key management issues that DHS should consider as it establishes systems and processes to facilitate information sharing among and between government entities and the private sector. These success factors include establishing trust relationships with a wide variety of federal and nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially useful information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents. Further, as part of its information technology management, DHS should continue to develop and implement an enterprise architecture to integrate the many existing systems and processes required to support its mission and to guide the department's investments in new systems to effectively support homeland security in the coming years. Other key management issues include ensuring that sensitive information is secured, developing secure communications networks, integrating staff from different organizations, and ensuring that the department has properly skilled staff. |
gao_GAO-13-345 | gao_GAO-13-345_0 | Lower-Priced ARV Drugs, Economies of Scale, and Program Maturity Have Helped Reduce Per-Patient Costs and Contributed to Expanding Treatment Programs PEPFAR’s Reported Per- Patient Treatment Costs Have Declined Substantially
Declining prices for ARV drugs have been a key source of per-patient cost savings, with most of these savings coming from the purchase of generic ARV drugs. OGAC has reported a substantial decline in PEPFAR per-patient treatment costs, from $1,053 in 2005 to $339 in 2011. 1). The calculation also does not capture funds from other funding sources. PEPFAR estimates that in fiscal years 2005 to 2011, it saved almost $934 million by buying generic versions of ARVs instead of equivalent branded products. As Per-Patient Costs Have Declined, PEPFAR Has Supported Treatment for More People
As per-patient treatment costs have declined in PEPFAR-supported programs, savings have contributed to substantial increases in the number of people on ARV treatment, including both people directly supported by PEPFAR and those who receive treatment through country programs (see fig. 3). However, there are three key limitations. Although PEPFAR has taken steps to strengthen cost estimation, country treatment-cost studies have been conducted in only a small number of countries (eight partner countries) and delivery sites (usually about nine clinics per country). In addition, although PEPFAR-supported treatment programs are changing rapidly, for five of the eight studies that have been completed, data were collected between 2006 and 2007. PEPFAR currently does not have a plan for systematically conducting or repeating country treatment-cost studies, as appropriate, in partner countries. Without such a plan, PEPFAR may be missing opportunities to identify potential savings, which are critical for expanding HIV treatment programs to those in need. Using an OGAC-developed budgetary formula, PEPFAR has met this treatment spending requirement. Since PEPFAR was reauthorized in 2008, PEPFAR country teams’ budgets allocated to capacity building have increased. As a result, it is not possible to determine the full amount of PEPFAR funds that are allocated to support the HIV treatment and care services identified in the spending requirement. Using OGAC’s Budgetary Formula, PEPFAR Has Met the Treatment Spending Requirement
Budgets for “treatment and care for people living with HIV” (Budgets for Treatment + Care + Prevention program areas)
To determine the amount of the PEPFAR budget that constitutes “treatment and care for people living with HIV,” OGAC sums the amounts allocated by all country teams each year to six of the seven budget codes within the Treatment and Care program areas (see app. By fiscal year 2012, budgets in the Other program area represented more than 21 percent of all program area budgets, up from about 15 percent in fiscal year 2008. However, the treatment spending requirement expires at the end of September 2013. Conclusions
PEPFAR has supported rapid expansion of HIV programs since 2008, providing direct support for more than half of the estimated 8 million people on ARV treatment in low- and middle-income countries. However, because OGAC cannot fully account for the contributions that its country capacity building activities have made to the HIV treatment and care services identified in the treatment spending requirement, it cannot provide complete information on how PEPFAR funds are being allocated to meet both the treatment spending requirement and the goal of promoting country ownership. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve PEPFAR’s ability to help countries expand their HIV treatment programs to address unmet need, and do so through the efficient allocation of resources and effective program planning, the Secretary of State should direct PEPFAR to develop a plan to do the following: systematically expand the use of country treatment-cost studies to additional sites and partner countries, where it is cost-effective to do so, to help estimate costs and examine country-specific characteristics of comprehensive HIV treatment that may result in cost savings; and work with partner countries, where feasible, to broaden PEPFAR’s expenditure analysis to capture treatment costs across all partners that support each country program and develop more timely information on the full costs of comprehensive HIV treatment. State’s comments also emphasized that, because in-depth cost studies are time- and resource-intensive to conduct, those studies should be complemented with more timely data from expenditure analysis to help ensure that PEPFAR-supported programs have a portfolio of information that can be used to inform program decision making. Global AIDS Coordinator. To describe how per-patient costs have changed and their effect on program implementation in treatment programs supported by the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), we focused our work on PEPFAR’s reported trends in cost information relating to fiscal years 2005 through 2011. We selected these countries on the basis of program size, estimates of HIV disease burden, travel logistics, and other factors. To describe how PEPFAR’s cost information supports countries’ efforts to expand treatment, we assessed the timeliness and completeness of information generated through PEPFAR’s cost estimation and expenditure analysis approaches. See: Department of State, Office of the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through PEPFAR--first authorized in 2003--the United States has supported major advances in HIV/AIDS treatment, care, and prevention in more than 30 countries, including directly supporting treatment for almost 5.1 million people. However, millions more people still need treatment. Congress reauthorized PEPFAR in 2008--authorizing up to $48 billion over 5 years--making it a major policy goal to help partner countries develop independent, sustainable HIV programs. Congress also set spending and treatment targets. OGAC leads PEPFAR by allocating funding and providing guidance to implementing agencies. As requested GAO reviewed PEPFAR-supported treatment programs. GAO examined (1) how perpatient treatment costs have changed and affected program implementation, (2) how PEPFAR cost information supports efforts to expand treatment, and (3) how PEPFAR has met a legislated treatment spending requirement. GAO reviewed cost analyses and reports and analyzed ARV drug data relating to fiscal years 2005 through 2011; conducted fieldwork in three countries selected on the basis of program size and other factors; and interviewed PEPFAR officials and implementing partners.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) has reported that per-patient treatment costs declined from about $1,053 to $339 from 2005 to 2011. Purchasing generic antiretroviral (ARV) drugs, together with declining drug prices, has led to substantial savings. OGAC estimates that the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has saved $934 million since fiscal year 2005 by buying generic instead of branded products. PEPFAR's analyses of data from eight country treatment-cost studies indicate that per-patient costs also declined as programs realized economies of scale while taking on new patients. Furthermore, the analyses suggest that costs decreased as countries' treatment programs matured, particularly in the first year after programs expanded, and reduced one-time investments. Per-patient cost savings have facilitated substantial increases in the number of people on ARV treatment. In September 2012, an estimated 8 million were on treatment in lowand middle-income countries, of which PEPFAR directly supported 5.1 million-- an increase of 125 percent since 2008, the year the program was reauthorized.
Despite substantial declines in per-patient treatment costs, it is important that countries continue to improve the efficiency of their programs to expand to meet the needs of the estimated 23 million people eligible for ARV treatment under recent international guidelines. PEPFAR's cost estimation and expenditure analysis approaches provide complementary information that can help partner countries expand treatment and identify potential cost savings. However, as currently applied, these approaches do not capture the full costs of treatment. Cost estimation provides in-depth information, but data are limited because detailed cost studies have been done in only eight partner countries, at a small number of sites. Moreover, although treatment programs are changing rapidly, key data for most of the studies are no longer timely, since they were collected in 2006 and 2007. PEPFAR does not have a plan for systematically conducting or repeating cost studies in partner countries. Data from expenditure analyses, while more timely, are limited because they do not include non-PEPFAR costs. Without more timely and comprehensive information on treatment costs, PEFPAR may be missing opportunities to identify potential savings, which are critical for expanding HIV treatment programs to those in need.
Using an OGAC-developed budgetary formula, PEPFAR has met the legislative requirement that more than half of its funds be spent each year to provide specific treatment and care services for people living with HIV. From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, PEPFAR funds allocated to capacity building--to strengthen health systems, laboratory capacity, and strategic information systems--increased from 15 percent to 21 percent of PEPFAR's total funds to support country programs. However, the current formula does not include the capacity building funds. These funds--which support PEPFAR country teams' efforts to meet another legislative goal of promoting sustainable country-owned programs--and other PEPFAR activities also contribute to HIV treatment and care services. PEPFAR does not currently have a methodology to account for those contributions. Without such a methodology, it is not possible to determine the full amount of PEPFAR funds that are allocated to support the HIV treatment and care services identified in the spending requirement. However, the treatment spending requirement expires at the end of September 2013.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State develop a plan for (1) expanding the use of indepth cost studies to additional countries and sites, where appropriate, and (2) broadening expenditure analysis to include non-PEPFAR costs, as feasible. State generally agreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-487T | gao_GAO-06-487T_0 | The F-22A and JSF, along with the F/A-18E/F, are the central elements of DOD’s overall recapitalization strategy for its tactical air forces. F-22A and JSF Acquisition Business Cases Still Include Considerable Risks
The future of DOD’s tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs—which represent about $245 billion in investments to be made in the future. Currently, there is a significant mismatch between the Air Force’s stated need for F-22A aircraft and the resources the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is willing to commit. The business case for the JSF program, which has 90 percent of its investments still in the future, significantly overlaps production with development and system testing—a strategy that often results in cost and schedule increases. A 198-aircraft gap between what the Air Force needs and what is affordable raises questions about what additional capabilities need to be included in the F-22A program. JSF Business Case Still Contains Cost and Schedule Risks
The JSF program appears to be on the same path as the F-22A program. The JSF program expects to begin low-rate initial procurement in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed and no production representative prototypes built for the three JSF variants. 2). DOD’s Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Goals Are Not Being Met
DOD has not been able to achieve its recapitalization goals for its tactical aircraft forces. 3). The delivery of these new aircraft has also been delayed past original plans. Further delays or changes in the F-22A or JSF programs could require additional funding to keep legacy aircraft in the inventory and relevant to the warfighter’s needs. In February 2006, the Secretary of Defense testified that recapitalization of DOD’s tactical aircraft is important to maintain America’s air dominance. Despite this continued declaration about recapitalizing tactical aircraft, DOD’s 2006 QDR report did not present a detailed investment strategy that addressed needs and gaps, identified alternatives, and assessed costs and benefits. DOD Has an Opportunity to Set Its Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Efforts on Track
As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft force, it has the opportunity to reduce operating costs and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. Specifically, the department must change how it selects weapon systems to buy, and how it establishes and executes the business case. In conclusion, despite DOD’s repeated declaration that recapitalizing its aging tactical aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department continues to follow an acquisition strategy that consistently results in escalating costs that undercut DOD’s buying power, forces DOD to reduce aircraft purchases, and delays delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter. GAO Related Products
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356 (Washington D.C.: March 15, 2006). Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs aim to replace many of the Department's aging tactical fighter aircraft--many of which have been in DOD's inventory for more than 20 years. Together, the F-22A and JSF programs represent a significant investment for DOD--currently estimated at almost $320 billion. GAO has reported on the poor outcomes in DOD's acquisitions of tactical aircraft and other major weapon systems. Cost and schedule overruns have diminished DOD's buying power and delayed the delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Last year, GAO testified that weaknesses in the F-22A and JSF programs raised questions as to whether DOD's overarching tactical aircraft recapitalization goals were achievable. At the request of this Subcommittee, GAO is providing updated testimony on (1) the extent to which the current F-22A and JSF business cases are executable, (2) the current status of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts, and (3) potential options for recapitalizing the air forces as DOD moves forward with its tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts.
What GAO Found
The future of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs--which represent about $245 billion in investments to be made in the future. Both programs continue to be burdened with risk. The F-22A business case is unexecutable in part because of a 198 aircraft gap between the Air Force requirement and what DOD estimates it can afford. The JSF program, which has 90 percent of its investments still in the future, plans to concurrently test and produce aircraft thus weakening DOD's business case and jeopardizing its recapitalization efforts. It plans to begin producing aircraft in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed. DOD's current plan to buy about 3,100 new major tactical systems to replace its legacy aircraft represents a 33-percent reduction in quantities from original plans. With reduced buys and delays in delivery of the new systems, costs to keep legacy aircraft operational and relevant have increased. While the Secretary of Defense maintains that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a recapitalized force, DOD has not presented an investment strategy for tactical aircraft systems that measures needs, capability gaps, alternatives, and affordability. Without such a strategy, DOD cannot reasonably ensure it will recapitalize the force and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter within cost and schedule targets. As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft, it needs to rethink the current business cases for the F-22A and JSF programs. This means matching needs and resources before more F-22A aircraft are procured and ensuring the JSF program demonstrates acceptable aircraft performance before it enters initial production. |
gao_GAO-10-230T | gao_GAO-10-230T_0 | Background
As computer technology has advanced, federal agencies have become dependent on computerized information systems to carry out their operations and to process, maintain, and report essential information. Conversely, ineffective information security controls can result in significant risk to a broad array of government operations and assets. Federal Systems and Infrastructures Face Increasing Cyber Threats
Cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In September 2007, we reported that these threats can be unintentional and intentional, targeted or nontargeted, and can come from a variety of sources. A targeted attack is when a group or individual attacks a specific system or cyber-based critical infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified multiple sources of threats to our nation’s critical information systems, including foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, domestic criminals, hackers, virus writers, and disgruntled employees and contractors working within an organization. These groups and individuals have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal. Furthermore, as we have previously reported, the techniques have characteristics that can vastly enhance the reach and impact of their actions, such as the following: ● Attackers do not need to be physically close to their targets to perpetrate a cyber attack. ● Technology allows actions to easily cross multiple state and national borders. ● Attackers can more easily remain anonymous. The growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, and other critical services. Reported Security Incidents Are on the Rise
Consistent with the evolving and growing nature of the threats to federal systems, agencies are reporting an increasing number of security incidents. Similarly, our audits have identified control deficiencies in both financial and nonfinancial systems, including vulnerabilities in critical federal systems. To illustrate, weaknesses were reported in such controls at 23 of 24 major agencies for fiscal year 2008. For example, agencies did not consistently (1) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (2) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access was necessary and appropriate; (3) establish sufficient boundary protection mechanisms; (4) apply encryption to protect sensitive data on networks and portable devices; and (5) log, audit, and monitor security-relevant events. An underlying cause of information security weaknesses identified at federal agencies is that they have not yet fully or effectively implemented key elements for an agencywide information security program. An agencywide security program, required by the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), is intended to provide a framework and continuing cycle of activities, including assessing and managing risk, developing and implementing security policies and procedures, promoting security awareness and training, monitoring the adequacy of the entity’s computer-related controls through security tests and evaluations, and implementing remedial actions as appropriate. Opportunities Exist for Enhancing Federal Cybersecurity
Over the past several years, we and inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies for actions necessary to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. In addition, the White House, OMB, and certain federal agencies have undertaken several governmentwide initiatives that are intended to enhance information security at federal agencies. In preparation for that testimony, we obtained the views of experts (by means of panel discussions) on critical aspects of the strategy, including areas for improvement. Unintended incidents and attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as criminals, terrorists, and adversarial foreign nations, have the potential to cause significant damage to the ability of agencies to effectively perform their missions, deliver services to constituents, and account for their resources. To help in meeting these threats, opportunities exist to improve information security throughout the federal government. In addition, the prompt and effective implementation of the hundreds of recommendations by us and by agency inspectors general to mitigate information security control deficiencies and fully implement agencywide security programs would also strengthen the protection of federal information systems, as would efforts by DHS to develop better capabilities to meets its responsibilities, and the implementation of recommended improvements to the national cybersecurity strategy. Information Security: Cyber Threats and Vulnerabilities Place Federal Systems at Risk. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pervasive and sustained cyber attacks continue to pose a potentially devastating threat to the systems and operations of the federal government. In recent months, federal officials have cited the continued efforts of foreign nations and criminals to target government and private sector networks; terrorist groups have expressed a desire to use cyber attacks to target the United States; and press accounts have reported attacks on the Web sites of government agencies. The ever-increasing dependence of federal agencies on computerized systems to carry out essential, everyday operations can make them vulnerable to an array of cyber-based risks. Thus it is increasingly important for the federal government to have effective information security controls in place to safeguard its systems and the information they contain. GAO was asked to provide a statement describing (1) cyber threats to federal information systems and cyber-based critical infrastructures, (2) control deficiencies at federal agencies that make these systems and infrastructures vulnerable to cyber threats, and (3) opportunities that exist for improving federal cybersecurity. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
Cyber-based threats to federal systems and critical infrastructure are evolving and growing. These threats can be unintentional or intentional, targeted or non-targeted, and can come from a variety of sources, including criminals, terrorists, and adversarial foreign nations, as well as hackers and disgruntled employees. These potential attackers have a variety of techniques at their disposal, which can vastly enhance the reach and impact of their actions. For example, cyber attackers do not need to be physically close to their targets, their attacks can easily cross state and national borders, and cyber attackers can more easily preserve their anonymity. Further, the growing interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructure presents increasing opportunities for such attacks. In addition, reports of security incidents from federal agencies are on the rise, increasing by over 200 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008. Compounding the growing number and kinds of threats, GAO--along with agencies and their inspectors general--has identified significant weaknesses in the security controls on federal information systems, resulting in pervasive vulnerabilities. These include deficiencies in the security of financial systems and information and vulnerabilities in other critical federal information systems. GAO has identified weaknesses in all major categories of information security controls at federal agencies. For example, in fiscal year 2008, weaknesses were reported in such controls at 23 of 24 major agencies. Specifically, agencies did not consistently authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access to systems; apply encryption to protect sensitive data; and log, audit, and monitor security-relevant events, among other actions. An underlying cause of these weaknesses is agencies' failure to fully or effectively implement information security programs, which entails assessing and managing risk, developing and implementing security policies and procedures, promoting security awareness and training, monitoring the adequacy of security controls, and implementing appropriate remedial actions. Multiple opportunities exist to enhance cybersecurity. In light of weaknesses in agencies' information security controls, GAO and inspectors general have made hundreds of recommendations to improve security, many of which agencies are implementing. In addition, the White House and the Office of Management and Budget, collaborating with other agencies, have launched several initiatives aimed at improving aspects of federal cybersecurity. The Department of Homeland Security, which plays a key role in coordinating cybersecurity activities, also needs to fulfill its responsibilities, such as developing capabilities for protecting cyber-reliant critical infrastructures and implementing lessons learned from a major cyber simulation exercise. Finally, a panel of experts convened by GAO made several recommendations for improving the nation's cybersecurity strategy. Realizing these opportunities for improvement can help ensure that the federal government's systems, information, and critical cyber-reliant infrastructure are effectively protected. |
gao_GAO-08-743T | gao_GAO-08-743T_0 | Currently, the IRIS database contains assessments of more than 540 chemicals. Findings and Recommendations from Our March 2008 Report on the Productivity and Credibility of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
The IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because the agency has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease a backlog of 70 ongoing assessments. Specifically, although EPA has taken important steps to improve the IRIS program and productivity since 2000 and has developed a number of draft assessments for external review, its efforts to finalize the assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors including the imposition of external requirements, the growing complexity and scope of risk assessments, and certain EPA management decisions. In addition, the changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering at the time of our review would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. Several key factors have contributed to EPA’s inability to achieve a level of productivity that is needed to sustain the IRIS program and database: new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; the growing complexity and scope of risk assessments; certain EPA management decisions and issues, including delaying completion of some assessments to await new research or to develop enhanced analyses of uncertainty in the assessments; and the compounding effect of delays. In addition, the OMB/interagency reviews have hindered EPA’s ability to independently manage its IRIS assessments. Specifically, despite the OMB/interagency review process that OMB required EPA to incorporate into the IRIS assessment process in 2005, certain federal agencies continued to believe they should have greater and more formal roles in EPA’s development of IRIS assessments. These additional process steps, which would have lengthened assessment times considerably, include giving federal agencies and the public 45 days to identify additional information on a chemical for EPA’s consideration in its assessment or to correct any errors on an additional assessment draft that would provide qualitative information; giving potentially affected federal agencies 30 days to review the public comments EPA received and initiate a meeting with EPA if they want to discuss a particular set of comments; allowing potentially affected federal agencies to have assessments suspended for up to 18 months to fill a data gap or eliminate an uncertainty factor that EPA plans to use in its assessment; and allowing other federal agencies to weigh in on (1) the level of independent peer review that would be sought (that is, whether the peer reviews would be conducted by EPA Science Advisory Board panels, National Academies’ panels, or panels organized by an EPA contractor); (2) the areas of scientific expertise needed on the panel; and (3) the scope of the peer reviews and the specific issues they would address. In its February 21, 2008, letter providing comments on our draft report, EPA said it would consider each of our recommendations in light of the new IRIS process the agency was developing. Key Changes to the IRIS Assessment Process That EPA Implemented in April 2008
On April 10, 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process, effective immediately (see app. While the revised process is largely the same as the draft proposed process we evaluated in our March 2008 report, there are several key differences that are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility issues we identified in our report. Given the importance and sensitivity of IRIS assessments, we believe it is critical that input from all parties, particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments, be publicly available. The newly implemented IRIS assessment process broadens EPA’s characterization of IRIS assessments from “the Agency’s scientific positions on human health effects that may result from exposure to environmental contaminants” to “the Agency’s science and science policy positions” on such effects. To effectively maintain IRIS, EPA must streamline its lengthy assessment process and adopt transparency practices that provide assurance that IRIS assessments are appropriately based on the best available science and that they are not inappropriately biased by policy issues and considerations. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In light of the importance of the IRIS program to EPA’s ability to protect the public health and the environment, the Congress should consider requiring EPA to suspend implementation of its new IRIS assessment process and develop a process that is responsive to our recommendations for a streamlined process that is transparent and otherwise responsive to our recommendations aimed at improving the timeliness and credibility of IRIS assessments. This series of delays has limited EPA’s ability to conduct its mission. However, as of December 2007, the draft assessment had not yet been provided to the National Academies. Appendix II: Summary of Two GAO Reports on EPA’s Toxic Substances Control Act and Chemical Control Regulations in the EU
This appendix summarizes information presented in two prior GAO reports and related work on EPA’s regulation of toxic chemicals. Appendix III: EPA’s IRIS Assessment Process as of April 10, 2008
No, it is not mission critical. critical? | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) mission includes evaluating and regulating toxic chemicals. EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) program is a chemical evaluation program that is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental regulations and policies. The IRIS database contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. This testimony highlights GAO's work on toxic substances, focusing on (1) its March 2008 report, Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System and (2) key changes to the IRIS assessment process EPA included in its revised IRIS assessment process released on April 10, 2008. It also highlights the findings of two GAO reports on EPA's regulation of toxic chemicals. For the IRIS report, GAO analyzed EPA data and interviewed officials at relevant agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For this testimony, GAO supplemented the IRIS report with a review of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process announced earlier this month. Given the importance of the IRIS program to EPA's ability to protect public health and the environment, Congress should consider requiring EPA to suspend its new process and develop one that is responsive to GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
The IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because EPA has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments--a total of 4 were completed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition, recent assessment process changes, as well as other changes EPA was considering at the time of GAO's review, further reduce the timeliness and credibility of IRIS assessments. Although EPA has taken steps to improve the IRIS program since 2000 and has developed a number of draft assessments for external review, its efforts to finalize assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors, including two new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await new research; and the compounding effect of delays--even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science and methods. The OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments involve other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility of IRIS assessments and hinders EPA's ability to manage them. For example, the OMB/interagency reviews lack transparency, and OMB required EPA to terminate five assessments EPA had initiated to help it implement the Clean Air Act. The changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering, but had not yet issued at the time of GAO's review, would have added to the already unacceptable level of delays in completing IRIS assessments and further limited the credibility of the assessments. On April 10, 2008, EPA issued a revised IRIS assessment process, effective immediately. In its February 2008 comments on GAO's draft report, EPA said it would consider the report's recommendations, which were aimed at streamlining the process and better ensuring that EPA has the ability to develop transparent, credible assessments. However, EPA's new process is largely the same as the draft GAO evaluated, and some key changes also are likely to further exacerbate the productivity and credibility concerns GAO identified. For example, while the draft process would have made comments on IRIS assessments from other federal agencies part of the public record, EPA's new process expressly defines such comments as "deliberative" and excludes them from the public record. GAO continues to believe it is critical that input from all parties--particularly agencies that may be affected by the outcome of IRIS assessments--be publicly available. As recommended in GAO's March 2008 report, to effectively maintain IRIS, EPA must, among other things, streamline its lengthy assessment process and adopt transparency practices that provide assurance that IRIS assessments are appropriately based on the best available science and that they are not inappropriately biased by policy considerations. Since EPA's new process is not responsive to GAO's recommendations, the viability of this critical database has been further jeopardized. |
gao_GAO-10-935 | gao_GAO-10-935_0 | In fiscal year 2009, the type of prosthetic items for which VA spent the largest amount was surgical implants, which accounted for 27 percent of the more than $1.6 billion VA spent for prosthetic items that year. PSAS Roles and Responsibilities
After physicians and other clinicians at VA medical facilities determine the prosthetic needs of veterans and prescribe specific prosthetic items to meet those needs, PSAS is responsible for processing the prescriptions and providing the prescribed prosthetic items to individual veterans. Specifically, PSAS officials in VA’s central office establish national policies and procedures on VA’s provision of prosthetic items; allocate VA specific purpose funding for prosthetic items among the 21 VISNs; monitor the spending of this specific purpose funding and, if appropriate, facilitate the reallocation of funding among the VISNs; and establish and monitor mechanisms, such as performance measures and goals, to evaluate VA’s performance in providing prosthetic items. In Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009, Actual Spending Needs for Prosthetic Items Differed from Estimates, Resulting in the Reallocation of Funding Available for Prosthetic Items
In each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009, VA’s actual spending needs for prosthetic items differed from the estimates VA reported in its congressional budget justifications for those years, on which the initial allocation to PSAS for prosthetic items was based. These differences—about $82 million in fiscal year 2006 and about $150 million in fiscal year 2007—represented 7 and 12 percent, respectively, of VA’s actual spending for prosthetic items during those fiscal years. In fiscal years 2005, 2008, and 2009, VA spent about $91 million, $83 million, and $183 million more, respectively, than originally estimated (9, 6, and 11 percent, respectively, of VA’s spending for prosthetic items in those fiscal years). PSAS officials reported that they do perform some analysis to identify new trends in VA’s spending for prosthetic items, which are taken into account when allocating specific purpose funding for prosthetic items. In addition to the efforts VA made at the national level to reallocate funds to better match specific purpose funding for prosthetic items with actual spending needs, for 3 of the 5 fiscal years we reviewed, some VISNs and VAMCs used general purpose funds for prosthetic items. PSAS Uses Administrative Data and Veteran Feedback Mechanisms to Monitor Its Performance in Processing and Providing Prosthetic Items to Veterans
PSAS has performance measures that monitor the timeliness of its processing of prosthetic prescriptions and a number of veteran feedback mechanisms to identify problems in how it provides prosthetic items to veterans. In fiscal year 2009, PSAS’s performance measures showed that nearly all of its prescriptions for prosthetic items met its performance goals. While in many cases, PSAS’s performance measures serve as a reasonable proxy for monitoring the timeliness of veterans’ receipt of their prosthetic items, they may miss some instances in which veterans experience long wait times. Recognizing this shortcoming, PSAS officials rely on a number of other mechanisms—such as feedback submitted through telephone calls from veterans and receipt of veteran evaluation cards—to obtain information on veteran satisfaction that may alert them of timeliness or other problems not reflected in its performance measures. VA Is Making Local, Regional, and National Efforts to Improve PSAS’s Performance
Officials at PSAS’s central office, the VISNs, and the VAMCs in our sample told us about a number of local, regional, and national efforts to enhance management effectiveness and efficiency and improve prosthetic services for veterans. PSAS’s central office has recommended that VISNs adopt this management structure for PSAS for more than a decade, but as part of VA’s overall decentralized management structure, each VISN’s leadership has the authority to determine how PSAS is managed in its region. These contracts also help ensure that the quality of the prosthetic items provided to veterans is consistent across the country. This appendix presents the total costs and number of prosthetic items provided to veterans in fiscal years 2005 through 2009. For fiscal year 2009, the total costs for prosthetic items for VISNs ranged from about $34 million in VISN 5 (Capitol Health Care Network) to about $164 million in VISN 8 (VA Sunshine Healthcare Network). | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provided more than 59 million prosthetic items to more than 2 million veterans. After VA physicians and other clinicians prescribe prosthetic items, VA's Prosthetic and Sensory Aids Service (PSAS) is responsible for processing prescriptions and providing prosthetic items to veterans. PSAS is also responsible for managing VA's spending for prosthetic items--more than $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2008, this spending exceeded VA's budget estimates. Each year, VA makes an initial funding allocation for prosthetic items, and may reallocate by increasing or decreasing the funding available for prosthetic items during the fiscal year. GAO was asked to examine (1) how, for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, VA's spending for prosthetic items compared to budget estimates, and the extent to which VA reallocated funding for prosthetic items; (2) how PSAS monitors its performance in processing and providing prosthetic items to veterans; and (3) the efforts VA has undertaken to improve PSAS's performance. GAO reviewed VA's spending and funding allocation data for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed VA officials at headquarters, 5 of VA's 21 regional health care networks, called VISNs, and 13 VA medical centers (VAMC).
What GAO Found
VA spending for prosthetic items for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009 differed from budget estimates, varying in amounts--both under and over budget estimates--ranging from 6 to 12 percent of VA's overall spending for prosthetic items during the 5 fiscal years. In fiscal years 2005, 2008, and 2009, VA spent about $91 million, $83 million, and $183 million more, respectively, than VA originally estimated for its congressional budget justification. Conversely, in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, VA spent about $82 million and about $150 million less, respectively, for prosthetic items than estimated. VA officials reported that they did not perform analysis to determine the specific causes of these differences, but that new trends are taken into account when allocating funding to be used for prosthetic items. In an effort to more closely match funds available for prosthetic items to actual spending needs, VA reallocated the funding available to PSAS and relied on VISNs and VAMCs to address the need for additional funding for prosthetic items at specific VA locations. For example, in fiscal year 2008, when an additional $83 million in funding was required for prosthetic items, VA reallocated $56 million to PSAS and VISNs and VAMCs covered $27 million in spending for prosthetic items. PSAS has performance measures that monitor the timeliness of its processing of prosthetic prescriptions and a number of veteran feedback mechanisms to identify problems in how it provides prosthetic items to veterans. In fiscal year 2009, PSAS's performance measures showed that nearly all of its prescriptions for prosthetic items met its performance goals. While in many cases, PSAS's performance measures serve as a reasonable proxy for monitoring the timeliness of veterans' receipt of their prosthetic items, they may miss some instances in which veterans experience long wait times. Recognizing this shortcoming, PSAS officials rely on a number of other mechanisms--such as telephone calls from veterans and receipt of veteran evaluation cards--to obtain information on veteran satisfaction that may alert them to timeliness or other problems not reflected in their performance measures. VA is making a number of efforts at various levels to improve its performance in providing prosthetic items to veterans. For example, in 7 of VA's 21 VISNs, PSAS personnel at the VISN level centrally manage the provision of prosthetic items at all of the VAMCs in their region. According to VA officials in several VISNs that have adopted this centralized management structure, giving VISN-level PSAS personnel more authority has allowed local PSAS personnel at the VAMCs to devote more time to meeting veterans' needs, and in some cases, has enhanced management effectiveness and efficiency. At the national level, in fiscal year 2009, PSAS had 49 national contracts for prosthetic items, which, according to PSAS officials, help ensure that the quality of prosthetic items provided to veterans is consistent across the country. VA provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-258 | gao_GAO-13-258_0 | KC-46 Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance Estimates Remain Unchanged but There Are Some Concerns as Development Progresses
The KC-46 program estimates for cost, schedule, and performance are essentially unchanged from last year. The contractor is running very close to its budget and schedule. Development work is more than one-fourth complete and the program successfully accomplished its preliminary design review (PDR) on schedule. Also, the program has now implemented metrics, in response to our prior recommendation, to measure the development progress toward achieving its nine key performance parameters and projects it will meet those requirements by the end of development. However, there are two areas of concern at this point. First, both the contractor and the government estimate that Boeing’s development cost will exceed the contract ceiling price of $4.9 billion, and second, the contractor has already allocated about 80 percent of the management reserves budget set aside for known and unknown development risks with about 5 years of work remaining. The program also completed a major schedule milestone in April 2012 with a successful PDR that determined no major design changes were needed. For example, only 8 KC-135 aircraft have the capability to receive fuel from another aerial refueling tanker while airborne. The program has not yet evaluated how the significant use of these funds early in development could impact future milestones. Program Is Working On Some Testing, Design, Manufacturing, and Technical Challenges
With development generally proceeding as planned, the program is addressing, in varying degrees, some key challenges. Also, in preparing for the program’s critical design review, completing extensive engineering drawings on time will be challenging and some lower level subsystem design reviews are behind schedule. Furthermore, Boeing changed its plans and location for manufacturing and assembling military equipment and is still in the process of relocating key personnel and establishing needed facilities. Flight Test Plans a Concern among Program Stakeholders
The Air Force, DOD, Boeing, and the FAA have all identified the aggressive KC-46 flight test schedule as a risk. Growth in these two software classifications is not a favorable trend. Aircraft weight. Wing aerial refueling pod. Boom refueling system. Program Has Effective Mechanisms for Mitigating Risks and Conducting Program Oversight
The KC-46 program continues to mitigate risks principally through its acquisition strategy and contract mechanism. The use of a fixed price incentive contract limits government cost risk and the plan to convert a commercial derivative aircraft into the KC-46 tanker lessens technology risk. Our assessments of the KC-46 master schedule, the acquisition plan, and management framework find that they favorably compare with best practices and acquisition reform legislation, with some exceptions. Program Has Generally Adhered to Acquisition Best Practices and Reform Legislation
On the whole, the KC-46 program’s acquisition plan and management framework continue to favorably compare with the standards and requirements in GAO’s best practices work on acquisition development and reform legislation. Also, improvements to a few aspects of the program’s master schedule could make it more complete and robust to further help ensure program success. To help understand and monitor the causes of the majority of contractor management reserves being allocated two years into development, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Air Force, after Boeing has fully resolved the relevant design and technical issues, to analyze the root causes for the rate of expenditure of reserves in order to help the Air Force fully recognize and mitigate risk areas. DOD concurred with our two recommendations. Regarding the recommendation to improve the master schedule, DOD stated that the Air Force is taking action to address each of the 3 schedule best practices we cited. We also discussed related software development, test, and integration with the DCMA, Director, Operational Test, and Evaluation (DOT&E) officials, and OSD Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) officials and reviewed DOT&E and DT&E annual assessments on the KC- 46 program, integrated test team minutes, program assessment reports, and contractor and program office risk summary charts to identify risk areas and what actions are being taken to address challenges to the program. MOAs are expected with owning aircraft using commands to support receiver certifications. (2) Sequencing all activities
The schedule should be planned so that critical project dates can be met. | Why GAO Did This Study
Aerial refueling allows U.S. military aircraft to fly further, stay airborne longer, and carry more weapons, equipment, and supplies. Yet the mainstay of U.S. tanker forces--the KC-135 Stratotanker--is over 50 years old. It is increasingly costly to support and its age-related problems could potentially ground the fleet. As a result, the Air Force has initiated the $52 billion KC-46 program to replace the aerial refueling fleet. The program plans to produce 18 tankers by 2017 and 179 aircraft by 2027.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 requires GAO to annually review the KC-46 program through 2017. This report addresses (1) progress made in 2012 toward cost, schedule, and performance goals, (2) identified program challenges, and (3) program risk mitigation tools. To address these areas, GAO reviewed key program documents, discussed development plans and results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, and the prime contractor, Boeing. GAO assessed the program's development schedule and technology risks. GAO also assessed the program's acquisition plan to determine compliance with acquisition legislation and acquisition best practices.
What GAO Found
The KC-46 program 2012 estimates for cost, schedule, and performance are virtually the same as last year's, with the contractor running very close to the planned budget and schedule. Development work is more than one-fourth complete and a successful preliminary design review was held on schedule in April 2012. In response to a prior GAO recommendation, the program now has fully implemented metrics to measure the progress toward its key performance parameters and expects to meet these requirements. There are two areas of concern regarding program cost: first, both the contractor and government estimate the cost of development will exceed the contract ceiling price of $4.9 billion (although government liability is capped at that ceiling); and second, the contractor has already allocated about 80 percent of the management reserves budget, primarily for identified, yet unresolved, development risks, with the bulk of work--about 5 years--remaining. GAO maintains that significant use of these funds early in a program may indicate problems. The program has not yet evaluated how the significant use of these funds early could impact future milestones.
With development generally stable, the program is addressing, in varying degrees, some key challenges. First, defense, contractor, and federal aviation officials all identify the flight test schedule as a substantive concern. An integrated test team continues to evaluate and adjust flight test plans ahead of the 2015 start. Second, the contractor must still complete a significant number of engineering drawings needed for the upcoming critical design review; about three-fifths are complete and some lower level subsystem reviews are behind schedule. Third, the contractor is still in the process of relocating key personnel and establishing facilities needed for integrating defense equipment after deciding to close the original location. Additional work continues to more fully mature critical technologies, solidify software plans, address growth in aircraft weight, and ensure there are no design issues with the wing refueling pods and the boom refueling system. Program officials continue to monitor these issues to ensure they will not have major impacts.
The KC-46 program acquisition strategy and contract type are effective mechanisms for mitigating risks. The use of a fixed price contract limits government cost risk and technology risk is lessened by converting a commercial derivative aircraft into the KC-46 tanker. The KC-46 master schedule, acquisition plan, and management framework favorably compare with best practices and acquisition reform legislation, with some exceptions. For example, the master schedule met 7 of 10 best practices criteria, but did not include and sequence all activities and could have incorporated a broader range of uncertainty, leaving room to improve the schedule so program success is not jeopardized.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) analyze the root causes for the rapid allocation of management reserves and improve the KC-46 master schedule. DOD fully concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-324T | gao_GAO-08-324T_0 | Most of these programs have targets for households with extremely low incomes—30 percent or less of their area median incomes. More Than Half of Low-Income Veteran Renter Households Had Housing Affordability Problems
According to our analysis of ACS data, of the 4.3 million veteran households that rented their homes, an estimated 2.3 million, or about 53 percent were low-income in 2005. More Than Half of Low- Income Veteran Renters Had Problems Affording Their Rents
According to our analysis of ACS data, an estimated 1.3 million low- income veteran households, or about 56 percent of the approximate 2.3 million such households, had rents that exceeded 30 percent of their household income in 2005 (see table 2). The extent of housing affordability problems among low-income veteran renter households varied significantly by state in 2005 (see fig. In 2005, an estimated 53,000, or 2 percent, of low-income veteran renter households lived in inadequate housing. HUD Rental Assistance Programs Do Not Take Veteran Status into Account When Determining Eligibility or Subsidy Amounts
HUD’s major rental assistance programs are not required to take a household’s veteran status into account when determining eligibility and calculating subsidy amounts. Most Contacted Housing Agencies and Owners of Project- Based Properties Did Not Offer Veterans’ Preference for Admission to HUD’s Rental Assistance Programs
Currently, HUD’s policies give public housing agencies and owners of project-based properties the discretion to establish preferences for certain groups when selecting households for housing assistance. Most of the 41 public housing agencies we contacted used a preference system for admission to their public housing and housing choice voucher programs, but less than half offered a veterans’ preference. Similarly, of the 40 housing agencies that administered the housing choice voucher program, 34 used admission preferences, and 13 employed a preference for veterans. According to all of the performance-based contract administrators we contacted, owners of project-based properties that they oversee generally did not employ a veterans’ preference when selecting tenants. At Least 250,000 Veteran Households Received HUD Rental Assistance, but Veterans Were Less Likely to Receive Such Assistance Than Other Low-Income Households
Low-income veteran renter households were less likely to receive HUD rental assistance than other households. Thus, the level of veteran demand for rental assistance may be lower than that of nonveteran households. Our August 2007 report contains additional information on the demographic and income characteristics of veteran and nonveteran households, as well as the extent to which HUD programs take veteran status into account when determining eligibility and subsidy amounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans returning from service in Iraq and Afghanistan could increase demand for affordable rental housing. Households with low incomes (80 percent or less of the area median income) generally are eligible to receive rental assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) housing choice voucher, public housing, and project-based programs. However, because rental assistance is not an entitlement, not all who are eligible receive assistance. This testimony, based on a 2007 report, discusses (1) the income status and demographic and housing characteristics of veteran renter households, (2) how HUD's rental assistance programs treat veteran status (whether a person is a veteran or not) and whether they use a veteran's preference, and (3) the extent to which HUD's rental assistance programs served veterans in fiscal year 2005. The 2007 report discussed in this testimony made no recommendations.
What GAO Found
In 2005, an estimated 2.3 million veteran renter households had low incomes. The proportion of veteran renter households that were low income varied by state but did not fall below 41 percent. Further, an estimated 1.3 million, or about 56 percent of these low-income veteran households nationwide, had housing affordability problems--that is, rental costs exceeding 30 percent of household income (see map for state percentages). Compared with other (nonveteran) renter households, however, veterans were somewhat less likely to be low income or have housing affordability problems. HUD's major rental assistance programs are not required to take a household's veteran status into account when determining eligibility and calculating subsidy amounts, but eligible veterans can receive assistance. The majority of the 41 largest public housing agencies that administer the housing choice voucher or public housing programs had no veterans' preference for admission. The 13 largest performance-based contract administrators that oversaw most properties under project-based programs reported that owners generally did not adopt a veterans' preference. In fiscal year 2005, an estimated 11 percent of all eligible low-income veteran households (at least 250,000) received assistance, compared with 19 percent of nonveteran households. Although the reasons for the difference are unclear, factors such as differing levels of need for affordable housing among veteran and other households could influence the percentages. |
gao_GAO-07-570 | gao_GAO-07-570_0 | Background
Individual federal taxpayers have several options for preparing and filing their returns as shown in figure 1. As part of the Free File agreement, IRS agreed not to compete with the Alliance members by providing free, on-line tax return preparation and filing services to taxpayers on its Web site. Some taxpayers electronically prepare their returns but they choose to print and mail the tax return to IRS. MITS has the information technology (IT) and programming staff that develops and maintains IRS’s electronic filing systems, including hardware and software. Some states restricted eligibility by income, residency requirements, or number of itemized deductions. State I-file Systems Reduced Paper Filing, but the Magnitude of the Benefits Was Limited by Low Usage
According to officials in five of the eight states we profiled, state I-file systems generated benefits (before subtracting the costs of system development and operation) by increasing e-filing and reducing paper filing. However, the benefits were limited by the low usage. While Pennsylvania had 20 percent of eligible taxpayers using I-file, GAO is interpreting this as a low usage rate since the state instituted the system in 2000. The number of taxpayers converted from paper filing to electronic filing due to state I-file systems is relatively modest. Taxpayers who were charged electronic filing fees and convert to I-file would save. Available data on total I-file costs show costs are a small percentage of state tax agencies’ budgets. For example, California spent just over $700,000 to develop and operate CalFile from 2003 to 2005—less than 0.1 percent of the tax agency’s annual budget. Several factors contributed to keeping I-file costs relatively modest. Whether States Realize Benefits Greater Than Costs from Their I-file Systems Is Unclear
In all states profiled, whether benefits are greater than costs is unclear for two reasons. As previously noted (1) data on benefits and costs was incomplete and (2) based on available data, both benefits and costs were modest. Achieving a Net Cost Savings for IRS Depends on the Cost of Developing the System and the Number of Paper Filers Converted
Providing federal taxpayers with an I-file system would be a new service for which IRS would incur new costs. To develop the new service, IRS would have to (1) create or procure return preparation software for IRS’s Web site and (2) extend direct e-filing to individuals, in which the return would be routed into the current stream of electronically filed returns coming in from EROs. Transactional Web sites require more security and other features not necessary for an informational Web site. Other factors that could cause IRS’s fixed costs to differ from the states’ fixed costs include the relative complexity of the federal tax system, the types of taxpayers who are eligible, and the features of the I-file system, such as memory. Features such as save and return and auto- populating can require additional memory and potentially increase costs. IRS’s variable costs for an I-file system could also be higher than the states’. The key to IRS achieving a net cost savings depends on the number of individuals converted from paper to electronic filing and the savings per return (estimated to be $2.36 per return by IRS). Because v-coders prepare their return on a computer, they are presumably more comfortable with computers and may be more willing to try I-file than taxpayers who did not use a computer to prepare their returns. The report is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Reported benefits to the agency: Fewer processing errors Increase in taxpayers paying via e-pay Faster payment processing Cost savings per I-filed return Reported benefits to the taxpayers: Direct submission to tax agency/no third party involvement Faster refunds Tax preparation industry objections Ensuring security of the system Updates to system based on late tax law changes Total costs for development of the system were approximately $1 million to $2 million with an annual maintenance fee of $480,000 for individual and business users. We found 20 states and the District of Columbia provided I-file services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some states and countries allow taxpayers to prepare and file tax returns on their Internet Web sites at no charge, an option not available to federal taxpayers. Such a service might mitigate the concerns taxpayers have about current electronic filing options, which require filing through a third party and may involve fees. Increased electronic filing would reduce IRS's paper processing costs, reduce transcription errors, and speed up refunds. However, the idea is controversial. IRS already has a Free File program which offers free return preparation and filing by private companies for some people via IRS's Web site. Some are opposed to IRS competing with tax preparation software companies. GAO was asked to (1) describe IRS's options for on-line preparation and filing (I-file) based on states' experiences; (2) determine the benefits and costs of I-file based on the experiences of the states; and (3) describe the potential for IRS to realize cost savings from I-file. GAO profiled 7 states and the District of Columbia, 2 foreign countries and 3 federal agencies to describe I-file options and determine their benefits and costs.
What GAO Found
The options available to IRS for implementing I-file system vary in technology, features, and eligibility. The states profiled all employed an interactive format on their Web sites for tax return preparation. The systems varied in whether they included features such as the ability to save and return. Systems also varied in eligibility, i.e. limiting income or residency. For the systems profiled, both reported benefits and costs were relatively modest and it is unclear whether benefits were greater than costs. I-file systems may generate benefits by increasing electronic filing and reducing filing fees for taxpayers. California and Pennsylvania estimated savings of $1.00 per return and $3.47 respectively per return converted from paper. However, the benefits were limited by low usage. I-file usage rates were less than 6 percent. Available data on I-file costs, while limited, shows costs are a very small percentage of state tax agencies' budgets. For example, California reported spending $700,000 to develop and operate CalFile from 2003 to 2005--less than 0.1 percent of the tax agency's annual budget. States kept I-file costs relatively modest by restricting eligibility and features. Several states used contractors to develop and operate their I-file system as well as provide the computer hardware. Low usage also contributed to modest costs. For example, some states said low usage meant they could use existing computer equipment. IRS's potential to realize net cost savings from an I-file system depends on the costs of developing the system and the number of taxpayers converted from paper to electronic filing. IRS's costs could be higher than the states'. First, the federal tax system is more complex. Second, unlike states which already had Web sites with Internet transaction capabilities, IRS would have to significantly upgrade its Web site and incur new security costs. Finally, developing an I-file system would further stretch IRS's capability to manage systems development, a GAO high risk area since 1995. Converting paper filers to electronic filing generates savings of $2.36 per return, according to IRS estimates. However, the number of paper filers who would convert is uncertain. The 13 million individual taxpayers who prepared their returns on a computer but then printed and mailed them to IRS are one target for conversion to I-file. |
gao_GAO-05-757 | gao_GAO-05-757_0 | In 1996, the Coast Guard began developing what came to be known as the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) acquisition program as its major effort to replace or modernize these aircraft and cutters. The Deepwater program represents a unique approach to a major acquisition in that the Coast Guard is relying on a prime contractor—the system integrator—to identify and deliver the assets needed to meet a set of mission requirements the Coast Guard has specified. Legacy Assets Show Declining Condition, but Measures Are Imprecise and Fail to Capture Impact on Mission Capabilities
Coast Guard condition measures show that the condition of most deepwater legacy assets generally declined between 2000 and 2004, but the Coast Guard’s available measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of precision and are insufficient for determining the impact on mission capabilities. In response to both the continued decline in the condition of its legacy assets, as well as to various observations we have made to the Coast Guard about its need to develop more objective information on mission capability needs and more precise condition measures, the Coast Guard has begun to undertake additional efforts. These ongoing efforts, while promising, are largely untested, and so it is too soon to tell whether they will allow the Coast Guard to better determine and improve the mission capabilities of its legacy assets. From this strategic document, the Coast Guard has identified a number of upgrades to improve the capabilities of the deepwater legacy aircraft and cutters. Enhancements are also planned for certain classes of deepwater cutters. However, because these measures have not been finalized or fully implemented, we were unable to assess their effectiveness. In 2004 we reported that, well into the contract’s second year, key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator’s performance had not been effectively implemented. As the Coast Guard continues to develop condition measures that are more robust and able to link the assets’ condition with mission capabilities, and as it further develops and implements its Capital Asset Management System, it will be in a better position to make more informed decisions regarding where its budget should be spent to maximize the capabilities of its legacy assets as the Coast Guard transitions to the Integrated Deepwater System. However, projects to address these problems are nevertheless likely to be needed. Our work focused on three key questions: (1) How has the condition of the Coast Guard’s deepwater legacy assets changed during fiscal years 2000 through 2004? (2) What actions has the Coast Guard taken to maintain, upgrade, and better manage its deepwater legacy assets? (3) What are the management challenges the Coast Guard faces in acquiring new assets, especially if a more aggressive schedule is adopted? This project would include hull sustainment work. GAO Related Products
Coast Guard’s Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project’s Justification and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998)
Coast Guard: Budget Challenges for 2001 and Beyond, GAO/T-RCED-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000)
Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks Remain, GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001)
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks, GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001)
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002)
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T (Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003)
Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004)
Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine, GAO-04-595 (Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2004)
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005 and Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004)
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed, GAO-04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004)
Coast Guard: Observations and Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005)
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005)
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-651T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005) | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard has been asserting that its deepwater legacy assets are "failing at an unsustainable rate." After the events of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard's deepwater missions expanded to include a greater emphasis on ports, waterways, and coastal security. These heightened responsibilities required changes to the Deepwater implementation plan to provide the assets with greater operational capabilities. To address these needs, in 2002, the Coast Guard began a multiyear acquisition program to replace or modernize its deepwater assets that is currently estimated to cost $19 to $24 billion. More recently, it began studying options for replacing or modernizing the assets more rapidly in an effort to avoid some of the costs that might be involved in keeping aging assets running for longer periods. This report addresses three questions related to this effort: (1) How has the condition of the Coast Guard's deepwater legacy assets changed during fiscal years 2000 through 2004? (2) What actions has the Coast Guard taken to maintain, upgrade, and better manage its deepwater legacy assets? and (3) What are the management challenges the Coast Guard faces in acquiring new assets, especially if a more aggressive acquisition schedule is adopted?
What GAO Found
Available Coast Guard condition measures indicate that the condition of most Coast Guard legacy aircraft and cutters generally declined during fiscal years 2000-2004, but these measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition with any precision. GAO's field visits and interviews with Coast Guard staff, as well as reviews of other evidence, showed significant problems in a variety of asset systems and equipment that are not currently captured in the Coast Guard's condition measures. The Coast Guard has already taken actions to help keep its deepwater legacy assets operational. For example, to help meet mission requirements, Coast Guard staff are performing more extensive maintenance between deployments, but even so, aircraft and cutters continue to lose mission capabilities. Responding to these continued concerns, as well as to matters raised during this review and in prior GAO reports, the Coast Guard has begun to explore additional strategies and approaches to better determine and improve the mission capabilities of its legacy assets. These actions include (1) developing a more proactive approach for prioritizing maintenance and capability enhancement projects needed on its legacy assets; (2) developing measures that more clearly demonstrate the extent to which assets' conditions affect mission capabilities; and (3) for one command, proposing a new strategy to sustain one of its oldest classes of cutters. These ongoing efforts, while promising, are too new to allow GAO to assess whether they will allow the Coast Guard to better determine and improve the mission capabilities of its legacy assets. If the Coast Guard adopts a more aggressive acquisition schedule, it will likely continue to face a number of challenges to effectively manage the Deepwater program. GAO has warned that the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy of relying on a prime contractor ("system integrator") to identify and deliver the assets needed carries substantial risks. GAO found that well into the contract's second year, key components for managing the program and overseeing the system integrator's performance had not been effectively implemented. While the Coast Guard has been addressing these problems--for example, putting more emphasis on competition as a means to control costs--many areas have not been fully addressed. A more aggressive acquisition schedule would only heighten the risks. |
gao_GAO-11-371T | gao_GAO-11-371T_0 | NTIA and RUS Awarded Grants and Loans for Several Hundred Broadband Projects in Two Funding Rounds
By the end of fiscal year 2010, NTIA and RUS awarded grants and loans to 553 broadband projects across the country (see table 1). These projects represent almost $7.5 billion in funds awarded, which exceeds the $7.2 billion provided by the Recovery Act because an agency such as RUS that awards loans can award and obligate funds in excess of its budget authority. In our review of the first funding round, we found that NTIA and RUS, with the help of the agencies’ contractors—Booz Allen Hamilton and ICF International, respectively—consistently substantiated information provided by award recipients in their applications during the first round of funding. Although NTIA officials reported that these steps allowed the agency to complete the initial portion of its review ahead of schedule, we have not evaluated the thoroughness of the revised evaluation process used by the agencies in the second round of funding. Even with Steps Taken to Address Project Oversight, Risks to the Success of the Broadband Programs Remain
We previously reported that NTIA and RUS face several challenges to successfully overseeing the broadband programs. These challenges include: Number and scale of projects. NTIA and RUS will need to monitor and oversee a combined total of 553 projects that are diverse in scale, scope, and technology. Providing oversight after Recovery Act funding has ceased. However, the Recovery Act did not provide specific funding for the administration and oversight of BTOP- and BIP-funded projects beyond September 30, 2010. Because of these challenges, in our 2009 and 2010 reports, we recommended that NTIA and RUS take several actions to ensure that funded projects receive sufficient oversight: 1. NTIA and RUS should develop contingency plans to ensure sufficient resources for oversight of funded projects beyond fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, we recommended that the agencies incorporate into their risk-based monitoring plans, steps to address the variability in funding levels for postaward oversight beyond September 30, 2010. 2. NTIA and RUS have taken several actions to address these recommendations and improve oversight of funded projects. These actions include: NTIA and RUS developed oversight plans. In addition, RUS intends to conduct desk and site reviews. RUS secured contractor support through fiscal year 2013. NTIA established audit requirements for commercial awardees. Even with these actions, NTIA and RUS have not fully addressed all our recommendations and we therefore remain concerned about the oversight of the broadband programs. Therefore, we believe the agencies, especially NTIA, need to do more to ensure their oversight plans reflect current fiscal realities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to broadband service--a highspeed connection to the Internet--is seen as vital to economic, social, and educational development, yet many areas of the country lack access to, or their residents do not use, broadband. To expand broadband deployment and adoption, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $7.2 billion to the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) for grants or loans to a variety of program applicants. The Recovery Act required the agencies to award all funds by September 30, 2010. This testimony addresses (1) NTIA's and RUS's efforts to award Recovery Act broadband funds and (2) the remaining risks that NTIA and RUS face in providing oversight for funded projects. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and summarized information from prior GAO work. GAO also reviewed NTIA and RUS reports on the status of the agencies' programs and gathered information from the agencies on steps taken to respond to prior GAO recommendations. In past work, GAO recommended that the agencies take several actions, such as developing contingency plans to ensure sufficient resources for project oversight. NTIA and RUS have taken some steps to address GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
NTIA and RUS awarded grants and loans for several hundred broadband projects in two funding rounds. By the end of fiscal year 2010, NTIA and RUS awarded grants and loans to 553 broadband projects across the country. These projects represent almost $7.5 billion in awarded funds, which exceeds the $7.2 billion provided by the Recovery Act because RUS-- which awards loans that must be repaid to the government--has authority to provide funds in excess of its budget authority. In its review of the first funding round, GAO found that NTIA and RUS, with the help of the agencies' contractors, consistently substantiated information provided by award recipients' applications. GAO has not evaluated the thoroughness of the process used by the agencies in the second round of funding. Even with steps taken to address project oversight, risks to the success of the broadband programs remain. GAO previously reported that NTIA and RUS face several challenges to successfully overseeing the broadband programs. These challenges include (1) monitoring and overseeing a combined total of 553 projects that are diverse in scale, scope, and technology and (2) conducting project oversight activities after the expiration of Recovery Act funding on September 30, 2010. Because of these challenges, in two previous reports, GAO recommended that NTIA and RUS take several actions to ensure that funded projects receive sufficient oversight. For example, GAO recommended that NTIA and RUS develop contingency plans to ensure sufficient resources for oversight of funded projects beyond fiscal year 2010. The agencies have taken several actions to address GAO's recommendations and improve oversight of funded projects--both agencies developed oversight plans, RUS secured contractor support though fiscal year 2013, and NTIA established audit requirements for commercial awardees. Even with these actions, GAO remains concerned about the oversight of the broadband programs. In particular, GAO believes the agencies, and especially NTIA, need to do more to ensure their oversight plans reflect current fiscal realities. |
gao_HEHS-00-48 | gao_HEHS-00-48_0 | To provide information for congressional oversight, we undertook a review of states’ efforts to meet the information needs for welfare reform, with a focus on the TANF program. For this study, we (1) assessed the extent to which current automated systems in selected states meet key information needs of programs that help low-income individuals with children obtain employment and become economically independent, (2) identified the approaches states are using to develop or modify their automated systems to better meet these information needs, and (3) identified the major obstacles states have encountered in working to improve their automated systems and the potential role of the federal government in helping overcome these obstacles. We developed a questionnaire to obtain information on four topics: (1) the extent to which automated systems for different programs share data; (2) the accessibility of data from different automated systems using the desktop computers of TANF case managers; (3) the overall extent to which information needs for case management, service planning, and monitoring program performance are met by current automated systems; and (4) the most helpful actions that the federal government could take to help resolve the major obstacles encountered by states and localities in developing or modifying automated systems. This shortcoming constrains the ability of case managers to arrange needed services; ensure that these services are provided; and respond quickly when problems arise, such as when a recipient does not attend a scheduled work activity. Difficulties in Querying Automated Systems to Obtain Needed Information Limit Capabilities for Service Planning
In addition to supporting the activities of TANF case managers, automated systems can provide aggregate information on the characteristics and service needs of TANF recipients to help program managers determine the appropriate services to provide for their TANF caseloads. In contrast, local officials in the six states reported having more limited capabilities to monitor the employment progress of TANF clients. Other projects, geared more to improving the capabilities of program managers to obtain and analyze data from different programs, involve developing new databases and query tools. These projects are intended to enhance the capabilities of frontline workers in such ways as the following. Table 9 provides an overview of projects in the states we reviewed. Federal Action Could Help Overcome Obstacles States Face in Improving Automated Systems
States face a number of obstacles to improving their automated systems, such as the magnitude of changes due to welfare reform, the inherent difficulties involved in successfully managing information technology projects, competition with the private sector to recruit and retain information technology staff, and the complexity of obtaining federal approval and funding for systems projects that involve multiple agencies. Disseminate information on best practices for managing information technology, particularly in the area of welfare reform. Addressing the need for states to have access to cross-state information on individuals’ TANF receipt to enforce the 5-year TANF time limit. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed states' efforts to meet the information needs associated with welfare reform, with a focus on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), focusing on the: (1) extent to which automated systems in selected states meet key information needs of programs that help low-income individuals with children obtain employment and become economically independent; (2) approaches states are using to develop or modify their automated systems to better meet these information needs; and (3) major obstacles states have encountered in working to improve their automated systems as well as the potential role of the federal government in helping overcome these obstacles.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although automated systems in the states GAO examined support welfare reform in many ways, a number of these systems have major limitations in one or more of three key areas; (2) with respect to information needs for case management, the major shortcoming is an inability to obtain data on individual TANF recipients from some of the agencies serving them, including job assistance agencies; (3) this situation makes it difficult for TANF case managers to arrange needed services, ensure that the services are provided, and respond quickly when problems arise; (4) officials in the states, especially those at the local level, said that it is sometimes difficult or impossible to query automated systems to obtain information for planning service strategies for their overall TANF caseloads, such as information on the number of adults with no prior work experience; (5) automated systems have shortcomings for program oversight purposes, specifically, they do not provide enough information to support enforcement of the 5-year TANF time limit and to monitor the employment progress of TANF recipients overall in some instances; (6) states' automated systems projects embody a range of approaches to expanding the ability of system users to obtain and analyze data from multiple sources; (7) some projects are designed primarily to support TANF case managers and other frontline workers in providing more coordinated delivery of services; (8) other projects, geared more to improving the ability of program managers to collect and analyze data from different programs, involve developing new query tools and databases that are expected to help program managers with key tasks, such as determining program results and assessing the performance of service providers; (9) states face a number of obstacles to improving their automated systems, such as the magnitude of changes in the mission and operations of welfare agencies due to welfare reform, the inherent difficulties associated with successfully managing information technology projects, competition with the private sector to recruit and retain information technology staff, and the complexity of obtaining federal funding for systems projects that involve multiple agencies; (10) the federal government could take various actions to help overcome such obstacles, such as providing more information on best practices for managing information technology; and (11) in this way, the federal government could serve a facilitative role, in addition to its regulatory role, in helping states improve automated systems for social programs. |
gao_GAO-12-324 | gao_GAO-12-324_0 | In general, it provides that that the prudent man standard is satisfied if the fiduciary has given appropriate consideration, among other facts and circumstances, to the following factors (1) the composition of the plan portfolio with regard to diversification of risk; (2) the volatility of the plan investment portfolio with regard to general movements of investment prices; (3) the liquidity of the plan investment portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan; (4) the projected return of the plan investment portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan; and (5) the prevailing and projected economic conditions of the entities in which the plan has invested and proposes to invest. To date, Labor has not implemented this recommendation. In responding to GAO’s 2008 recommendation, Labor noted that while it would consider the recommendation, the lack of uniformity among hedge funds and private equity funds could make development of comprehensive and useful guidance difficult. Selected Pension Plans Reported Mixed Experiences with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Investments, and Some Faced Significant Losses and Other Challenges
Hedge Fund and Private Equity Investments Were Affected by the Financial Crisis, but Most Selected Plans Indicated These Investments Met Expectations
Hedge fund and private equity indexes show that these investments were significantly affected by the financial market turbulence of recent years, and plans and experts we contacted indicated that pension plan investments were not insulated from losses. Given these reasons for investing in hedge funds, most of the 22 plan representatives we interviewed for this report said that these investments met plan expectations (see table 2 for an overview of the responses). In contrast, a number of plan sponsor representatives and experts noted that hedge funds did not perform as expected. Given the long-term nature of private equity investments, nearly all of the 22 pension plan representatives we interviewed were generally satisfied with their private equity investments over the last 5 years. A representative from one plan, for example, remarked that the plan’s venture capital investments did not perform well. Some Selected Plans Faced Specific Challenges with Hedge Fund and Private Equity Investments in Recent Years
Pension plan representatives we contacted experienced some challenges in hedge fund and private equity investing beyond those of more traditional investing, including limited liquidity and transparency, and the negative impact of the actions of other investors in the fund—sometimes referred to as co-investors. Consequently, a few plans had to look for liquidity in their portfolio in order to fund capital commitments. However, they were unable to do so, because the fund manager had imposed a discretionary gate to prevent further losses. Plans Continue to Invest in Hedge Funds and Private Equity, but Some Plan Sponsors Have Taken Steps to Address Challenges
Available data reveal that plan investments in hedge funds and private equity have continued to increase, and our contacts with 22 public and private defined benefit (DB) plan sponsors also reveal a continued commitment to these investment vehicles. Nonetheless, some plans have reduced their allocations or made significant changes to their strategic approach as a result of experiences in recent years. According to a Pensions & Investments survey, the percentage of large plans (as measured by total plan assets) investing in hedge funds grew from 47 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2010 (see fig. Most Plans Have Modified Investment Strategies in Recent Years
Experiences of recent years have led most plans we contacted to make significant changes to their hedge fund or private equity strategies, and in three cases, reductions in the overall allocation to hedge funds or private equity. According to industry press, this technique largely fell out of favor as a result of substantial investment losses during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. More advantageous fee terms. Further, plan representatives and some experts indicated that not all plans would be able to take the steps described above. In 2009, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets issued a report detailing important considerations and best practices for hedge fund investors, including specific guidance for fiduciaries. In 2011, the ERISA Advisory Council specifically revisited the issue of pension plans’ investments in hedge funds and private equity. In 2008, we recommended that the Secretary of Labor issue guidance designed for qualified plans under ERISA concerning alternative investment practices. What steps have federal agencies and other entities taken to help plan sponsors make and manage investments in such alternative assets, and what additional steps might be warranted? Specifically, we asked how pension plans’ hedge fund and private equity investments have performed; lessons learned with respect to pension plan hedge fund and private equity investments; changes to pension plan hedge fund and private equity investment practices; the extent to which pension plans observe best practices in hedge fund and private equity due diligence; and actions federal agencies, such as Labor, should take to ensure that pension plan fiduciaries better make and manage their hedge fund and private equity investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans rely on defined benefit pension plans for their financial well-being in retirement. Plan representatives are increasingly investing in a wide range of assets, including hedge funds and private equity funds. In recent years, GAO has noted that plans may face significant challenges and risks when investing in these alternative assets. These challenges and ongoing market volatility have raised concerns about how these investments have performed since 2008.
As requested, to better understand plan sponsors experiences with these investments, GAO examined (1) the recent experiences of pension plans with investments in hedge funds and private equity, including lessons learned; (2) how plans have responded to these lessons; and (3) steps federal agencies and other entities have taken to help plan sponsors make and manage these alternative investments.
To answer these questions, GAO analyzed available data; interviewed relevant federal agencies and industry experts; conducted follow-up interviews with 22 public and private pension plan sponsors selected among the top 200 plans and contacted in the course of GAOs prior related work; and surveyed 20 plan consultants, academic experts and other industry experts.
This report reemphasizes a 2008 recommendation that the Secretary of Labor provide guidance to help plans investing in hedge funds and private equity.
What GAO Found
While plan representatives GAO contacted generally stated that their hedge fund and private equity investments met expectations in recent years, a number of plans experienced losses and other challenges, such as limited liquidity and transparency. National data indicated that hedge fund and private equity investments were significantly affected by the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and plans and experts GAO contacted indicated that pension plan investments were not insulated from losses. Most of the 22 plan representatives GAO interviewed said that their hedge fund investments met expectations overall, despite, in some cases, significant losses during the financial crisis. A few plan representatives, however, expected hedge fund investments to be much more resilient in turbulent markets, and found the losses disappointing. Given the long-term nature of private equity investments, almost all of the representatives were generally satisfied with these investments over the last 5 years. Some plan representatives described significant difficulties in hedge fund and private equity investing related to limited liquidity and transparency, and the negative impact of the actions of other investors in the fundsometimes referred to as co-investors. For example, representatives from one plan reported they were unable to cash out of their hedge fund investments due to discretionary withdrawal restrictions imposed by the fund manager, requiring them to sell some of their stock holdings at a severe loss in order to pay plan benefits.
Most plans included in our review have taken actions to address challenges related to their hedge fund and private equity investments, including allocation reductions, modifications of investment terms, and improvements to the fund selection and monitoring process. National data reveal that plans have continued to invest in hedge funds and private equityfor example, one survey revealed that the percentage of large plans investing in hedge funds grew from 47 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2010and most plans GAO contacted have also maintained or increased their allocations to these investments. However, most plans have adjusted investment strategies as a result of recent years experiences. For example, three plans have reduced their allocations to hedge funds or private equity. Other plan representatives also took steps to improve investment terms, including more favorable fee structures and enhanced liquidity. However, some plan representatives and experts indicated that smaller plans would likely not be able to take some of these steps.
The Department of Labor has provided some guidance to plans regarding investing in derivatives, but has not taken any steps specifically related to hedge fund and private equity investments. In recent years, however, other entities have addressed this issue. For example, in 2009, the Presidents Working Group on Financial Markets issued best practices for hedge fund investors. Further, both GAO and a Department of Labor advisory body have recommended that the department publish guidance for plans that invest in such alternative assets. To date, it has not done so, in part because of a concern that the lack of uniformity among such investments could make development of useful guidance difficult. In 2011, the Department of Labor advisory body specifically revisited the issue of pension plans investments in hedge funds and private equity, and a report is expected in early 2012. |
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