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gao_GAO-12-795 | gao_GAO-12-795_0 | The strategy also affected the schedules for the construction of the temporary conference building, as well as the renovation of the Conference Building and General Assembly Building. Progress Made on CMP, but Two Building Renovations May Not Be Completed and Project Is Projected to Be Approximately $430 Million over Budget
While the CMP nears completion of the renovation of two of the five buildings, the project has suspended the originally planned renovation of two buildings, faces risks meeting its 2014 completion date, and is projected to be approximately $430 million over budget. The CMP office may not renovate two buildings that were originally part of the scope of the project, due to the lack of a workable design solution to address security requirements. According to the CMP office, the estimated cost overruns result from a number of factors, including about $266 million in direct project costs and about $164 million in scope additions authorized by the UN General Assembly to be financed from within the project’s approved budget, as shown in table 2. One potential option for funding all or part of an additional U.S. member assessment for the CMP would be using credits in the UN Tax Equalization Fund (TEF) account—a UN fund used to reimburse U.S. nationals working at the UN for U.S. taxes paid on their UN salaries. After the application of these credits, the balance of TEF credits attributable to the United States stood at $120.9 million, as of May 2012. To address these concerns, the UN General Assembly requested that the CMP office improve reporting on the underlying causes of the projected CMP cost increases. In addition, member states inquired about the main factors that led to the projected increase in cost overruns. Use of Best Practices in Future CMP Cost Reporting May Address UN General Assembly Concerns
While the UN General Assembly resolution did not explicitly identify how the CMP office should report future cost information, we have found that a high-quality and reliable cost estimate should exhibit certain best practices, including being comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, These best practices include elements for documenting and credible.and reporting cost estimates. UN Considering Consolidation Building to Address UN Office Space Needs, but a Cost Estimate Has Not Been Completed
To address its future office space needs, the UN is considering the option of a new building that would be separate from the CMP, but it does not have an estimate of the project’s costs. The UN estimates that its office space needs will exceed the capacity of its current real estate portfolio by 2023, due primarily to expiring leases. As a potential solution, the City and State of New York have proposed the construction of a new office building, to be located across the street from UN headquarters, known as the consolidation building. This proposal requires UN General Assembly approval, but the UN has not entered into any formal agreements regarding the building and the current lack of a cost estimate makes its cost implications for the UN and its member states unclear. We have previously reported that reliable cost estimates are critical to program success, including informed resource investments. Financing options exist to address a portion of the projected cost overrun; however, the United States and other UN member states may be asked to provide an additional assessment to finance the remainder. Given the cost overruns and challenges of the CMP, as well as the risks and unknown costs associated with the UN’s potential consolidation building project, these practices should be used to enhance the CMP’s future cost estimates and to develop cost estimates of prospective projects to address the UN’s long-term space needs. Permanent Representative to the United Nations work with other member states to take the following two actions: 1. Direct the UN to ensure the development of a cost estimate for the consolidation building utilizing GAO’s best practices for cost estimation. Specifically, we examine (1) the extent to which the CMP is meeting its planned renovation scope, schedule, and budget; (2) the UN General Assembly’s evaluation of CMP cost estimates; and (3) the status of the UN consolidation building project. Additionally, we discussed the progress, plans, risks, and costs of the CMP and consolidation building project with officials from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of International Organizations, the U.S. Mission to the UN, New York City, and UN offices, including the CMP office and Central Support Services. To examine the UN General Assembly’s evaluation of CMP cost estimates, we reviewed and analyzed documents provided by the CMP office to the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee describing the project’s financial condition as of February 2012, UN General Assembly resolution 66/258 issued in April 2012, the 2011 CMP annual report proposing financing options, and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions report A/66/7/Add.11 on costs of the CMP. For example, State has previously requested that TEF credits be applied toward assessed contributions for the UN. Update on the United Nations’ Capital Master Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2006, the UN approved a $1.88 billion CMP to modernize its headquarters in New York City by 2014, with a scope to include the renovation of five buildings. Separately from the CMP, the UN is also considering the option of a new office building, known as the consolidation building, to be located across the street from UN headquarters. As the UNs largest contributor, the United States has a significant interest in these projects. GAO was asked to report on (1) the extent to which the CMP is meeting its planned renovation scope, schedule, and budget; (2) the UN General Assemblys evaluation of CMP cost estimates; and (3) the status of the consolidation building project.
To perform this work, GAO reviewed cost and schedule documents for the CMP, as well as planning and legal documents for the consolidation building; examined relevant UN financial documents and UN General Assembly resolutions, as well as GAOs best practices for cost estimation; and met with officials from the Department of State (State), the UN CMP office and other relevant UN departments, and New York City.
What GAO Found
The Capital Master Plan (CMP) has made progress, but may not deliver the projects original scope, faces risks meeting its scheduled completion date, and is projected to be about $430 million over budget as of February 2012. Regarding the projects scope, the CMP office may not renovate the Library and South Annextwo of the five buildings in its original scopedue to the lack of a workable design solution to address security concerns. Related to schedule, the CMP office expects to complete the CMP in 2014, but reports that previous schedule delays have reduced its ability to respond to unforeseen events without affecting the projects end date. According to the CMP office, the projects approximately $430 million in projected cost overruns are due to a number of factors, including about $266 million in direct project costs and over $164 million from scope additions authorized without a corresponding increase in budget by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The CMP office has proposed financing options that could address a portion of these cost overruns. However, even if approved, an additional member assessment may be needed. One option for funding the U.S. portion of an additional member assessment is the use of credits attributable to the United States in the UN Tax Equalization Fund (TEF)a fund used to reimburse U.S. nationals working at the UN for taxes paid on their UN salaries. According to the UN, as of May 2012, the balance of TEF credits attributable to the United States stood at $120.9 million.
After evaluating the CMPs cost estimates, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution in April 2012 stating that the estimates lacked transparency, timeliness, and clarity. For example, the UN General Assembly expressed concern about the lack of clarity regarding the renovation of the Library and South Annex buildings. Specifically, member states inquired about the schedule for the two buildings and why renovations to the buildings were delayed. To address these concerns, the UN General Assembly requested that the CMP office improve reporting on projected CMP cost increases. While the UN General Assembly resolution did not specifically identify how the CMP office should report its future cost estimates, GAO has identified best practices for high-quality and reliable cost estimates. For instance, a well-documented cost estimate should describe in detail how the estimate was developed and the methodology used. Applying these best practices, as appropriate, could address the concerns raised by the UN General Assembly regarding the CMPs cost estimates.
To address its future office space needs, the UN is considering the option of a new building that would be separate from the CMP, but it does not have an estimate of the projects costs. The UN estimates that by 2023 its office space needs will have exceeded the capacity of its current real estate portfolio, primarily due to expiring leases. As a potential solution, the City and State of New York have proposed the construction of a new building known as the consolidation building. The UN has indicated its willingness to consider this proposal, but has not entered into any formal agreements. The current lack of a cost estimate for the consolidation building makes its cost implications for the UN and its member states unclear. GAO has previously reported that cost estimates are critical to program success, such as informed resource investments.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations should work with other member states to direct the CMP office and the UN to utilize best practices identified by GAO when developing cost estimates for the CMP and the consolidation building. State and the UN concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-324 | gao_GAO-01-324_0 | Conclusions
USDA has made progress and has partially met initial E-File Act deadlines for providing agricultural producers with access to forms via the Internet and submitting required reports on initial e-file activities and plans to Congress. However, implementing full e-filing capabilities for all its farm service customers by the deadlines set by the act poses a far more complex and difficult challenge. A component critical to the success of any such initiative is the necessary authority and responsibility to manage it across different departmental entities, yet no single official has been so designated. Also, a comprehensive implementation plan—one that addresses both GPEA, the Freedom to E-File Act requirements, and OMB’s implementation guidelines—is critical to help the department achieve a more consistent approach in its entire e-government transformation. Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998 (GPEA, P.L. | What GAO Found
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has made progress in implementing the Freedom to E-File Act and has partially met the act's initial deadlines for providing agricultural producers with access to forms via the Internet and submitting required reports on initial e-file activities and plans to Congress. However, implementing full e-filing capabilities for all its farm service customers by the deadlines set by the act poses a far more complex and difficult challenge. Critical to the success of any such initiative is the necessary authority and responsibility to manage it across different departmental entities. Yet no single official has been so designated. Also, a comprehensive implementation plan--one that addresses both the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA), the Freedom to E-File Act requirements, and Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) implementation guidelines--is critical to help USDA achieve a more consistent approach in its entire e-government transformation. |
gao_T-RCED-99-79 | gao_T-RCED-99-79_0 | In recent years, the number of people living along the boundaries of the national forests has grown rapidly. The Forest Service Is Attempting to Address Wildfire Threats
In recent years, the Forest Service has taken steps to address the increasing threat of catastrophic wildfires on national forests. To implement its increased emphasis on reducing accumulated fuels, the Forest Service restructured and redefined its fiscal year 1998 budget for wildland fire management to better ensure that funds are available for these activities. The Congress has supported the Forest Service’s efforts to reduce accumulated fuels by, among other things, increasing the funding for these activities in recent years. The Agency Lacks a Cohesive Strategy for Overcoming Several Barriers to Reducing Accumulated Fuels
Several significant barriers must be overcome in developing a cohesive strategy to reduce wildfire hazards on the national forests of the interior West. A second significant barrier that must be overcome in developing a cohesive strategy is that both the timber sales management program and the fuels reduction program funded by appropriations currently contain incentives which tend to focus efforts on areas that may not present the greatest fire hazards. As a result, in order to reduce fuels on more acres, they often focus treatments on areas where the costs of reducing fuels are low, rather than on areas with the highest fire hazards, including especially wildland/urban interface areas. However, the agency’s contracting procedures for commercial timber sales—as well as for service contracts that do not involve selling timber but are let simply for the service of removing excess fuels—were not designed to (1) facilitate the systematic removal of large volumes of low-value material over a number of years, (2) readily combine funds for conducting timber sales with funds for reducing accumulated fuels, or (3) allow contractors to retain this low-value material to partially offset the costs of its removal. In conclusion, Madame Chairman, the increasing number of uncontrollable and often catastrophic wildfires in the interior West, as well as the significant costs to resolve the problem of increasing hazards to human health, safety, property, and infrastructure present difficult policy decisions for the Forest Service and the Congress: Does the agency request, and does the Congress appropriate, the hundreds of millions of dollars a year that may be required to fund an aggressive fuel reduction program? Since 1990, 90 percent of national forest acres burned by fire were in the interior West. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the wildfire hazards faced by communities located adjacent to national forests in the dry, inland portion of the Western United States, focusing on: (1) the extent and seriousness of threats posed by national forest wildfires to nearby communities in the interior West; (2) agency efforts to address them; and (3) barriers to successfully implementing these efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during this century, two major changes have occurred in the national forests of the interior West: (a) the Forest Service's decades-old policy of putting out fires in the national forests resulted in increased undergrowth and density of trees creating high levels of fuels for catastrophic wildfires; and (b) the number of people living along the boundaries of national forests has grown significantly; (2) as a result, the increasing number of large wildfires, and of acres burned by them pose increasingly grave risks to human health, safety, property, and infrastructure in these areas which are commonly referred to as wildland/urban interface areas; (3) during the 1990s, the Forest Service began to address this problem by: (a) establishing an objective of increasing the number of acres on which excessive fuel levels are reduced; (b) announcing a priority for such reductions in wildland/urban interface areas; (c) restructuring its budget to better ensure that funds are available for such reductions; and (d) proposing demonstration projects to test innovative approaches for reducing fuels; (4) Congress has supported these efforts by increasing funding for fuels reduction, authorizing demonstration projects, and authorizing a multi-year research program to better assess problems and solutions; (5) these efforts may fall short because the Forest Service lacks a cohesive strategy for overcoming several barriers to effectively and efficiently reducing fuels on national forests; and (6) these barriers include: (a) potential conflicts between fuel reduction efforts and other agency stewardship responsibilities, including protecting air quality, watersheds, and wildlife habitat; (b) program incentives that tend to focus efforts on areas that may not represent the highest fire hazards; (c) agency contracting procedures that are not designed for removing large amounts of materials with little or no commercial value; and (d) the high costs of such removals, which may be as much as several hundred million dollars annually. |
gao_GAO-10-299 | gao_GAO-10-299_0 | UCAs are considered risky contract vehicles for the government. With all allowable costs covered, contractors bear less risk and have little incentive to control costs. DOD Steps to Enhance Insight and Oversight of UCAs Are Hampered by Incomplete Data
DOD has taken a number of steps aimed at enhancing its insight into and oversight of UCA use among the components and local commands; however, data limitations hinder its full understanding of the extent to which UCAs are used. The department’s reporting requirements have evolved over time to include other types of contract actions that should be reported and DOD has instituted contract peer reviews for contracts above $1 billion, which may include UCAs. For instance, we found DOD’s centralized reporting did not include 8 of 24 UCAs we reviewed that should have been reported in the April 2009 semi- annual report. See Figure 1 for the recent changes to policies and guidance intended to increase insight and oversight of the use of UCAs. The other 2 contract actions, valued at $15 million, were overlooked. Local Commands Are Generally Not Meeting DOD’s Management Standards
Despite DOD’s recent UCA management policy, guidance, and instructions designed to improve their use, implementation varied at local commands we visited and the management policy standards were not fully met. For 66 of the 83 UCAs we reviewed that were definitized, contracting officers generally did not document the profit or fee negotiation objective or consideration of reduced cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period of work as required. In the remaining 32 of 66 UCAs we reviewed, the contract files included weighted guideline worksheets, but it was not always clear whether the contracting officers considered any reduced cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period as a factor when determining allowable profit or fee as required. Of the 66 actions that obligated near 50 percent of the not-to-exceed price, 34—52 percent— exceeded the 180-day time frame for definitization. Conclusion
Undefinitized contract actions can be an important tool for DOD to meet urgent contracting needs. DOD has issued new policies and guidance and now requires components to report semi-annually on UCA use as well as submit updated management plans detailing actions taken to ensure appropriate use. Also, in instances when cost-plus- award-fee contracts were awarded and weighted guidelines were not required, guidance was not clear as to how to consider and document any reduced risk borne by the contractor during the undefinitized period. To ensure DOD officials are able to gain insight into the risk assessment that is required to be documented in the contract file and the basis for the government’s profit or fee negotiation objective, redesign the weighted guidelines worksheet to explicitly show the incurred cost calculations and a narrative description of the reason for assigning a specific contract-type risk value. To identify whether DOD’s recent actions have resulted in local commands meeting DOD’s UCA management standards with regard to documenting the basis for negotiating the contractor profit or fee, definitization time lines and obligation percentages, and the circumstances in which UCAs are used, we conducted a contract file review using a randomized list of UCAs from among six military commands, one joint service combatant command, and a defense agency. We analyzed these data to determine how many contract actions in our review were obligated at or near the 50 percent limit at the time of award. | Why GAO Did This Study
To meet urgent needs, DOD can issue undefinitized contract actions (UCA), which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract terms. Such actions are considered to be a risky contract vehicle for the government because contractors lack incentives to control costs during this period. Defense regulations provide that the government determination of contractors' allowable profit or fee should reflect any reduced cost risk. Pursuant to the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, GAO assessed whether DOD actions taken as required by the act have (1) improved departmental insight and oversight of UCA use and (2) resulted in local commands meeting DOD's standards for documenting the basis for negotiating the contractor profit or fee, definitization timelines, and obligation amounts. GAO reviewed relevant DOD regulations and policies, and contract files for 83 randomly-selected UCAs totaling $6.1 billion at eight local commands. The findings from this contract file review can not be generalized across DOD.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken several actions since August 2008 to enhance departmental insight into and oversight of UCAs; however data limitations hinder its full understanding of the extent to which they are used. DOD issued policy that requires centralized, semi-annual reporting of undefinitized actions to gain insight in UCA use, including information on reason for award, obligation amounts at award, and definitization timelines. Over time, reporting requirements have evolved as DOD has taken steps to clarify guidance on the types of contract actions to be reported. DOD has also required components to submit management plans to describe actions taken for improved UCA use. Although these actions have helped enhance insight and oversight of UCA use, not all UCAs are included in the reports. Of the 24 UCAs GAO reviewed that should have been included in the April 2009 semi-annual report, 8 actions valued at $439 million were unreported by the local commands to DOD. Implementation of DOD's recent policies and guidance on the use of UCAs has varied at the local commands GAO visited and the associated management standards were not fully met. For the 66 UCAs GAO reviewed that were eventually definitized, contracting officers generally did not document their consideration of cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period of work as required. In 34 cases, the weighted guideline worksheets were not used when required, nor any other documentation of how any reduced cost risk during the undefinitized period of performance was considered in determining the negotiation objective. This was particularly the case for cost-plus-award fee contracts where defense regulations are not clear about how any cost risks are to be considered and documented. Even for the remaining 32 cases in which weighted guideline worksheets were used, the contracting officers' basis for risk calculations were often not clear due to limitations of the weighted guideline documentation. Other management standards were not always met. Only 41 UCAs--about 50 percent of the actions GAO reviewed--met the 180-day definitization requirement. Moreover, 66 of the 83 UCAs GAO reviewed were awarded with obligations near or above the 50 percent maximum. |
gao_GAO-07-805 | gao_GAO-07-805_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2006 and 2005 CFS, we evaluated the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control, and we followed up on the status of Treasury and OMB corrective actions to address open recommendations regarding the process for preparing the CFS that were in our prior years’ reports. These material deficiencies contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the CFS and also constitute material weaknesses in internal control, which contributed to our adverse opinion on internal control. Reconciling and Reporting Undistributed Offsetting Receipts (Component of the Budget Deficit)
The federal government reports a unified budget deficit (budget deficit) in the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and the Unified Budget Deficit and in the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities. Subsequent to our fiscal year 2006 CFS audit, we compared the fiscal year 2006 unobligated and obligated budget balances reported in the fiscal year 2006 CFS to the fiscal year 2006 actual amounts reported in the President’s Budget, issued in February 2007, and noted a material difference. Preparing and Auditing Certain Information in Federal Agencies’ Closing Packages
OMB Bulletin No. Conformity with GAAP
As we have reported in previous years, and noted during our fiscal year 2006 audit, Treasury lacks an adequate process to ensure that the financial statements, related notes, stewardship information, and supplemental information in the CFS are presented in conformity with GAAP. However, the balance of such foreign currency was not disclosed. Appendix I: Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
This appendix includes open recommendations from four of our prior reports: Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Improvement, GAO- 04-45 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Further Improvement, GAO-04-866 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Continues to Need Improvement, GAO-05-407 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2005); and Financial Audit: Significant Internal Control Weaknesses Remain in Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government, GAO-06- 415 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. Of the 143 recommendations regarding the process for preparing the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS) that are listed in this appendix, 70 remained open as of December 1, 2006, the end of GAO’s fieldwork for the audit of the fiscal year 2006 CFS. Of the 73 recommendations that were closed, 53 were closed with the issuance of Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 32, Consolidated Financial Report of the United States Government Requirements: Implementing Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts 4 “Intended Audience and Qualitative Characteristics for the Consolidated Financial Report of the United States Government.” In fiscal year 2006, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board issued this new standard, which eliminated or lessened the disclosure requirements for the CFS related to certain information that Treasury had not been reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 10 years, since GAO's first audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS. GAO has consistently reported that the U.S. government did not have adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. GAO's December 2006 disclaimer of opinion on the fiscal year 2006 CFS included a discussion of continuing weaknesses related to the preparation of the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details of continuing and new weaknesses, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) describe the status of corrective actions on 143 open recommendations related to the preparation of the CFS that GAO reported in April 2006.
What GAO Found
GAO identified continuing and new weaknesses during its audit of the federal government's process for preparing the fiscal year 2006 CFS. Such weaknesses impair the U.S. government's ability to ensure that the CFS is consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. The weaknesses GAO identified during its tests of the fiscal year 2006 CFS preparation process involved the following areas: reconciling and reporting undistributed offsetting receipts (component of the budget deficit); directly linking audited federal agencies' financial statements to the CFS; reporting unexpended budget balances; reporting operating cash; reporting and disclosing legal contingencies; reconciling intragovernmental activity and balances; preparing and auditing certain information in federal agencies' closing packages; conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and various other internal control weaknesses that were identified in previous years' audits but remained in fiscal year 2006. Of the 143 open recommendations GAO reported in April 2006 regarding the process for preparing the CFS, 70 remained open as of December 1, 2006, when GAO completed its fieldwork for the audit of the fiscal year 2006 CFS. Of the 73 recommendations that were closed, 53 were closed based on the issuance in fiscal year 2006 of Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 32, Consolidated Financial Report of the United States Government Requirements: Implementing Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts 4 "Intended Audience and Qualitative Characteristics for the Consolidated Financial Report of the United States Government." This standard eliminated or lessened the disclosure requirements for the consolidated financial statements related to certain information that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had not been reporting. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions to address the 11 new recommendations and the new remaining balance of 81 open recommendations during its fiscal year 2007 audit of the CFS. |
gao_GAO-12-669 | gao_GAO-12-669_0 | 2. Executive Agreement
In April 2010, the Secretaries of VA and Defense signed the Executive Agreement that established the FHCC and defined the relationship between VA and DOD for operating the new, integrated facility, in accordance with NDAA 2010. 1). Further Progress Has Been Made Implementing the Executive Agreement, but Costly IT Delays and Lack of MTF Designation Continue to Pose Challenges
Eleven of 12 integration areas are now either “implemented” or “in progress.” The remaining integration area, IT, remains “delayed,” as it was at our last review, resulting in costly and time-consuming workarounds. 2.) Of these 6, 4 were integration areas we previously reported as implemented: (1) governance structure, (2) access to health care at the FHCC, (3) research, and (4) contracting. The two other implemented integration areas, quality assurance and contingency planning, moved from in progress at the time of our last review to implemented in this review. For example, for the fiscal authority integration area, FHCC officials continue to make progress implementing the provisions, although they have experienced some challenges. The Executive Agreement specified three key IT capabilities that VA and DOD were required to have in place on opening day, in October 2010, to facilitate interoperability of VA and DOD electronic health record systems. In addition to delays in developing these specific IT capabilities, other IT capabilities required by the Executive Agreement have not been well defined and implementation plans for them have not been established. In particular, officials told us the FHCC has been denied access to DOD’s drug pricing arrangements for its DOD beneficiaries, which has resulted in the FHCC paying higher prices for certain drugs for DOD beneficiaries than would be the case if it were an MTF, although FHCC officials were unable to quantify the added expense. VA and DOD Have Not Yet Established a Plan for Evaluating the FHCC Demonstration
Although they are required by NDAA 2010 to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the FHCC at the end of the 5-year demonstration and submit a report on this evaluation to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Veterans’ Affairs, VA and DOD officials said the departments have not yet established an evaluation plan. Without such a plan in place during the demonstration— including well-defined measures and standards, such as target scores, for determining performance on each measure—FHCC leadership cannot track progress and make adjustments to improve performance in areas that VA and DOD determine are necessary for the FHCC’s success.addition, we have previously found that joint agreement on commonly desired outcomes, such as those established as performance measures and standards in an evaluation plan, is important for collaborating agencies, such as VA and DOD, to successfully overcome differences in In their agency missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. Furthermore, VA and DOD have not set specific target scores for determining successful performance for the existing 15 integration benchmarks. Although federal financial accounting standards, VA and DOD departmental priorities, and the Executive Agreement—which lays out the purpose of the FHCC—indicate that reliable cost information is important for evaluating the FHCC, VA and DOD officials have not determined what cost measures, if any, will be used in the FHCC’s evaluation. After spending more than $122 million on IT capabilities needed for the FHCC, key deliverables remain delayed, resulting in additional costs to the FHCC. Recommendations for Executive Action
To clarify IT requirements within the Executive Agreement, to enable VA and DOD to make an informed recommendation about whether the FHCC should continue after the end of the demonstration, and to provide useful information for other integrations that may be considered in the future, we recommend that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense take the following four actions: determine the costs associated with the workarounds required because of delayed IT capabilities at the FHCC for each year of the demonstration, including the costs of hiring additional staff and of managing the administrative burden caused by the workarounds; develop plans with clear definitions and specific deliverables, including time frames for two IT capabilities—documentation of patient care to support medical and dental operational readiness and outpatient appointment enhancements—and formalize these plans, for example, by incorporating them into the Executive Agreement; expeditiously develop and agree to an evaluation plan, including the performance measures and standards, such as target scores, to be used to evaluate the FHCC demonstration, and formalize the plan, for example, by incorporating it into the Executive Agreement; and establish measures related to the cost-effectiveness of the FHCC’s care and operations to be included as a part of the evaluation plan. Patient satisfaction measures meet Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) targets. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized VA and DOD to establish a 5-year demonstration to integrate VA and DOD medical care into a first-of-its-kind FHCC in North Chicago, Illinois. Expectations for the FHCC are outlined in the Executive Agreement signed by VA and DOD in April 2010.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, directed GAO to report on the FHCC demonstration in 2011, 2012, and 2015. This is the second of the three reports and examines (1) to what extent VA and DOD have continued to implement the Executive Agreement to establish and operate the FHCC and (2) what plan, if any, VA and DOD have to assess the provision of care and operations of the FHCC.
To conduct its work, GAO reviewed FHCC documents; interviewed VA, DOD, and FHCC officials; and reviewed related GAO work.
What GAO Found
Officials at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Defense (DOD) Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) have continued to make progress implementing provisions of the Executive Agreements 12 integration areas, but delays in the information technology (IT) area have proven costly. Specifically, for 6 integration areas, all provisions have been implemented. Some of these areas were implemented at the time of GAOs 2011 report, including establishing the facilitys governance structure and patient priority system, while 2 areasquality assurance and contingency planningwere more recently implemented. In addition, 5 integration areas, such as property and fiscal authority, remain in progress. However, as previously reported by GAO, there have been delays implementing 1 of the integration areasITwhich have resulted in additional costs for the FHCC, although the FHCC has been unable to quantify the total costs resulting from these delays. Despite an investment of more than $122 million for IT capabilities at the FHCC, VA and DOD have not completed work on all components required by the Executive Agreement, which were to have been in place in time for the FHCCs opening in October 2010. These delays have resulted in additional costs and administrative burden for the FHCC because of the need for workarounds to address them. There also are other IT capabilities required by the Executive Agreement that are ill-defined and for which plans have not been established.
Although they are required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 to assess the FHCC at the end of the 5-year demonstration, VA and DOD officials said the departments have not yet established an evaluation plan. Officials told GAO that in addition to the performance data already being collected from 15 integration benchmarks established by the Executive Agreement, the departments also expect to consider other factors; however, these factors, which may include performance measures, have not yet been established. VA and DOD officials also have not yet established the standards, such as target scores for the benchmarks, the departments will use to evaluate FHCC performance. GAO has previously found that well-defined measures and standards are essential to a sound evaluation plan. Furthermore, without VA and DOD agreement on the measures and standards, FHCC leadership is unable to track progress and make any midcourse adjustments to improve performance in areas VA and DOD have determined are necessary for the FHCCs success. Although including measures of FHCC costs in the evaluation would be consistent with the FHCCs purpose, VA and DOD departmental priorities, and federal financial accounting standards, no such cost measures have been established for evaluating the FHCC.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA and DOD (1) determine the costs associated with the workarounds required because of delays in implementing IT capabilities laid out in the FHCC Executive Agreement; (2) develop plans with clear definitions, specifications, deliverables, and time frames for IT capabilities required by the Executive Agreement but not yet defined; (3) develop and agree to an evaluation plan, to include all performance measures and standards to be used in evaluating the FHCC demonstration; and (4) establish measures related to the cost-effectiveness of the FHCC as part of their evaluation. VA and DOD generally concurred and noted steps to address GAOs recommendations |
gao_GAO-10-246 | gao_GAO-10-246_0 | Furthermore, FDA has not taken certain steps that could help ensure the safety of GRAS determinations, particularly those for which the agency has not been notified. FDA Generally Has No Information about GRAS Determinations That Are Not Submitted to Its Notification Program
Although FDA’s voluntary notification program allows the agency to review those GRAS determinations companies submit, FDA generally does not have information about other GRAS substances in the marketplace because companies are not required to provide information to FDA regarding their GRAS determinations. However, FDA has expressed concerns about the food safety regulatory systems of some foreign countries. FDA Is Not Systematically Ensuring the Continued Safety of Current GRAS Substances
FDA does not systematically reconsider the safety of GRAS substances as new information or new methods for evaluating safety become available. FDA officials also said they keep up with new developments in the scientific literature as part of their professional responsibility as scientists and, on a case-by-case basis, information brought to the agency’s attention could prompt it to reconsider the safety of a GRAS substance. FDA has not, however, revoked the GRAS status of these oils. However, we found that FDA has largely not responded to the concerns that individuals and consumer groups have raised through 11 citizen petitions submitted to the agency between 2004 and 2008. FDA Is Generally Not Aware of Companies’ Reconsiderations of their GRAS Determinations
FDA generally does not know to what extent, or even whether, companies track the evolving scientific information regarding substances the companies have determined are GRAS. Most of these studies have been published. In Canada and the European Union, any such engineered nanomaterials are required to undergo review by government regulators before they can be marketed. After reviewing the uncertainties associated with the safety of food ingredients containing engineered nanomaterials, FDA has decided that, at this time, it does not need additional authority to regulate such products, nor does it need to significantly alter its regulatory approach. FDA has, instead, encouraged companies considering using nanomaterials in food and food packaging to consult with the agency about which regulatory track to follow, including whether such a substance might be GRAS. The extent to which GRAS substances incorporating engineered nanomaterials have entered the U.S. food supply is unclear. However, because companies are not specifically required to identify whether substances they submit to FDA contain engineered nanomaterials and GRAS notification is voluntary, FDA has no way of knowing the full extent to which engineered nanomaterials have entered the U.S. food supply in GRAS substances. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure FDA’s oversight of the safety of GRAS substances, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following six actions: develop a strategy to require any company that conducts a GRAS determination to provide FDA with basic information—as defined by the agency to allow for adequate oversight—about this determination, such as the substance’s identity and intended uses, and to incorporate such information into relevant agency databases and its public Web site; develop a strategy to minimize the potential for conflicts of interest in companies’ GRAS determinations, including taking steps such as issuing guidance for companies on conflict of interest and requiring information in GRAS notices regarding expert panelists’ independence; develop a strategy to monitor the appropriateness of companies’ GRAS determinations through random audits or some other means, including issuing guidance on how to document GRAS determinations; develop a strategy to finalize the rule that governs the voluntary notification program, including taking into account the experience of the program to date, incorporating input from a new public comment period, and reporting to Congress and the public the agency’s timeline for making it final; develop a strategy to conduct reconsiderations of the safety of GRAS substances in a more systematic manner, including taking steps such as allocating sufficient resources to respond to citizen petitions in a timely manner, developing criteria for the circumstances under which the agency will reconsider the safety of a GRAS substance, and considering how to collect information from companies on their reconsiderations; and develop a strategy to help ensure the safety of engineered nanomaterials that companies market as GRAS substances without the agency’s knowledge, including taking steps such as issuing guidance recommended by the agency’s nanotechnology taskforce, developing an agency definition of engineered nanomaterials, and requiring companies to inform FDA if their GRAS determinations involve engineered nanomaterials. Trans Fats in Partially Hydrogenated Vegetable Oils
Dietary Guidelines for Americans
Health effects. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) FDA’s oversight of new GRAS determinations helps ensure the safety of these substances; (2) FDA ensures the continued safety of current GRAS substances as new scientific information emerges; and (3) FDA’s approach to regulating engineered nanomaterials in GRAS substances helps ensure the safety of the food supply. To assess whether FDA’s approach to regulating engineered nanomaterials as GRAS helps ensure the safety of the food supply, we reviewed FDA’s policies related to regulating engineered nanomaterials in food. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for ensuring the safety of most of the U.S. food supply, is not required to review substances, such as spices and preservatives, added to food that are generally recognized as safe (GRAS) for their intended use. Currently, companies may determine a substance is GRAS without FDA's approval or knowledge. However, a few substances previously considered GRAS have later been banned; and concerns have been raised about the safety of other GRAS substances, including those containing engineered nanomaterials, materials manufactured at a tiny scale to take advantage of novel properties. GAO was asked to review the extent to which (1) FDA's oversight of new GRAS determinations helps ensure the safety of these substances, (2) FDA ensures the continued safety of current GRAS substances, and (3) FDA's approach to regulating engineered nanomaterials in GRAS substances helps ensure the safety of the food supply. GAO reviewed FDA data on GRAS substances and interviewed a range of stakeholders, among other things.
What GAO Found
FDA's oversight process does not help ensure the safety of all new GRAS determinations. FDA only reviews those GRAS determinations that companies submit to the agency's voluntary notification program--the agency generally does not have information about other GRAS determinations companies have made because companies are not required to inform FDA of them. Furthermore, FDA has not taken certain steps that could help ensure the safety of GRAS determinations, particularly those about which the agency has not been notified. FDA has not issued guidance to companies on how to document their GRAS determinations or monitored companies to ensure that they have conducted GRAS determinations appropriately. Lastly, FDA has yet to issue a final regulation for its 1997 proposed rule that sets forth the framework and criteria for the voluntary notification program, potentially detracting from the program's credibility. FDA is not systematically ensuring the continued safety of current GRAS substances. While, according to FDA regulations, the GRAS status of a substance must be reconsidered as new scientific information emerges, the agency has not systematically reconsidered GRAS substances since the 1980s. FDA officials said they keep up with new developments in the scientific literature and, on a case-by-case basis, information brought to the agency's attention could prompt them to reconsider the safety of a GRAS substance. However, FDA has largely not responded to concerns about GRAS substances, such as salt and the trans fats in partially hydrogenated vegetable oils, that individuals and consumer groups have raised through 11 citizen petitions submitted to the agency between 2004 and 2008. In fact, FDA has decided on the validity of these concerns in only 1 of 11 cases. In addition, FDA does not know to what extent, or even whether, companies track evolving scientific information about their GRAS substances. FDA's approach to regulating nanotechnology allows engineered nanomaterials to enter the food supply as GRAS substances without FDA's knowledge. While some uses of engineered nanomaterials have the potential to help ensure food safety, uncertainties remain about how to determine their safety in food. After reviewing the uncertainties associated with the safety of engineered nanomaterials, FDA has decided that it does not need additional authority to regulate products containing such materials. Rather, FDA encourages, but does not require, companies considering using engineered nanomaterials in food to consult with the agency regarding whether such substances might be GRAS. Because GRAS notification is voluntary and companies are not required to identify nanomaterials in their GRAS substances, FDA has no way of knowing the full extent to which engineered nanomaterials have entered the U.S. food supply as part of GRAS substances. In contrast to FDA's approach, all food ingredients that incorporate engineered nanomaterials must be submitted to regulators in Canada and the European Union before they can be marketed. |
gao_RCED-96-159 | gao_RCED-96-159_0 | Unplanned cost increases have characterized many other FAA acquisitions. Employees in these organizations demonstrate a stronger commitment in the following four areas: mission focus, accountability, coordination, and adaptability. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In light of FAA’s persistent acquisition problems and our work at other federal agencies that highlighted a need to change organizational culture, the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations, asked us to examine FAA’s management of its ATC modernization program to (1) determine whether FAA’s organizational culture has contributed to the agency’s continuing cost, schedule, and technical problems and (2) identify steps that FAA could take to improve its acquisition management through changing its organizational culture if that is a contributing factor. Over the years, program officials did not perform mission needs analyses; set unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates; suppressed bad news; and began system production before completing development, testing, and evaluation. It is easy to understand why participants in the federal acquisition process, including FAA officials, are driven by these incentives. FAA concluded that because accountability for contract administration was not well-defined or enforced, program officials were not encouraged to exercise strong oversight of contractors. These difficulties with hierarchy and empowerment were also reflected in their attitudes regarding accountability. One major factor deterring employees from working together is FAA’s organization of key players in the acquisition process into different divisions whose stovepipes or upward lines of authority and communications are separate and distinct. FAA’s acquisitions of major ATC systems have been impaired because its employees resisted making needed changes in the agency’s approach to both specific acquisitions and its acquisition process as a whole. Recognizing the need to improve its management of acquisitions through cultural change, FAA has developed and begun implementing a reform effort. However, FAA will not know whether this system has the potential to create and sustain a more constructive culture unless the agency is able to fully establish the integrated product teams and gain the strong commitment of all stakeholders to the new system. Over the years, GAO reports have focused on these deficiencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) management of its acquisition process, focusing on: (1) whether the FAA organizational culture has contributed to persistent acquisition problems; and (2) potential management improvements that could result from FAA organizational change.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the FAA organizational culture has been an underlying cause of FAA acquisition problems; (2) employees' attitudes do not reflect FAA focus on accountability, coordination, or adaptability; (3) FAA acquisition officials make little or no mission needs analyses, set unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and begin production before systems development and testing is completed; (4) FAA fails to enforce accountability for defining systems requirements or for contract oversight; (5) the hierarchical FAA structure fosters a controlling environment, diminishes employee empowerment, and impedes information sharing; (6) FAA operations and development divisions have separate and distinct lines of authority and communications, which impedes coordination; (7) FAA officials are resistant to making needed changes in their acquisition process because FAA culture rewards conservatism and conformity and discourages innovation; (8) recognizing its need to improve the acquisition process through cultural change, FAA implemented a reform effort based on cross-functional, integrated product teams, and introduced a new acquisition management system; (9) FAA believes the product teams will improve accountability and coordination and infuse a more mission-oriented focus into the acquisition process; and (10) FAA has approved only one product team plan because it is still having difficulty in gaining the strong commitment of all employees who have a stake in the acquisition process and in forging partnerships across organizational divisions. |
gao_GAO-12-704T | gao_GAO-12-704T_0 | Undisbursed Balances in Expired Grant Accounts Have Declined but More Action Is Needed
We found that as of September 30, 2011, more than $794 million in undisbursed balances remained in PMS in 10,548 expired grant accounts. These are accounts that were more than 3 months past the grant end date, had no activity for 9 months or more, and therefore should be considered for grant closeout. This is an improvement from 2008, when we reported that at the end of calendar year 2006, roughly $1 billion in undisbursed funding remained in expired PMS grant accounts. This improvement is notable given that the overall amount of grant disbursements through PMS increased by about 23 percent from 2006 to 2011. First, we found that undisbursed balances remained in grant accounts several years past their expiration date. We found that 991 expired grant accounts containing a total of $110.9 million in undisbursed funding were more than 5 years past the grant end date at the end of fiscal year 2011. Of these, 115 expired grant accounts containing roughly $9.5 million in undisbursed funding remained open more than 10 years past the grant end date. Raising the Visibility of Grant Closeout Can Lead to Improvements
We have found that when agencies made concerted efforts to address timely grant closeout, they, their inspectors general, and auditors reported that they were able to improve the timeliness of grant closeouts and decrease the amount of undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts. While we found that roughly three-fourths of all undisbursed balances in expired PMS grant accounts were from grants issued by HHS, we also found that the total undisbursed balances in these accounts represented the lowest percentage (2.7 percent) for any federal department included on the In comments on our draft report, September 30, 2011, closeout report.HHS reported that it had identified $116 million in undisbursed balances in PMS available for deobligation through a special initiative begun in 2011 and is updating existing department policies and procedures to improve the grant closeout process going forward. In our review of CFO Act agencies’ annual performance reports for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, we found that systematic, agencywide information on undisbursed balances in grant accounts eligible for closeout was largely lacking. GAO Recommends that OMB Issue Governmentwide Guidance to Track and Report on Undisbursed Balances in Grants Eligible for Closeout
In our 2012 grant closeout report, we reiterate our recommendation that OMB instruct all executive departments and independent agencies to report on the status and resolution of the undisbursed funding in grants that have reached the grant end date in their annual performance reports, the actions taken to resolve the undisbursed funding, and the outcomes associated with these actions. Instruct agencies with undisbursed balances still obligated to grants several years past their grant end date to develop and implement strategies to quickly and efficiently take action to close out these grants and return unspent funds to the Treasury when appropriate. OMB staff said that they generally agreed with the recommendations and will consider them as they review and streamline grant policy guidance. The challenge presented by undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts is just one of a number of grants management challenges we have identified in our past work. As the federal government confronts long-term and growing fiscal challenges, its ability to maintain the flow of intergovernmental revenue, such as through grant programs, could be constrained. To make the best use of federal grant funds, it is critical to address grants management challenges that could impact the efficiency and effectiveness of federal grants processes. While Grants Have Consistently Been a Significant Component of Federal Spending, the Focus of Grants Outlays Has Shifted In the Last 30 Years
Grants have been, and continue to be, an important tool used by the federal government to provide program funding to state and local governments. According to OMB, federal outlays for grants to state and local governments increased from $91 billion in fiscal year 1980 (about $221 billion in 2011 constant dollars) to over $606 billion in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, they are the streamlining of grants management processes; the measurement of grant performance; grant lessons learned from implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act); and internal control weaknesses in grants management processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the federal government confronts long-term fiscal challenges, it is critical to improve the efficiency of federal grants processes, such as grant closeout procedures that allow for the return of unspent balances to the Treasury. In 2008, GAO reported that about $1 billion in undisbursed funding remained in expired grant accounts in the largest civilian payment system for grantsPMS. For this statement, GAO provides information from its April 2012 report updating its 2008 analysis. GAO also describes federal grant spending over the last three decades and discusses other grant management challenges identified in its past work and that of others.
This testimony addresses (1) the amount of undisbursed funding remaining in expired grant accounts; (2) actions OMB and agencies have taken to track undisbursed balances; (3) GAO recommendations to improve grant closeout; (4) recent and historical funding levels for federal grants; and (5) GAOs ongoing and future work on grants management issues.
What GAO Found
Closeout is an important final point of grants accountability. It helps to ensure that grantees have met all financial and reporting requirements. It also allows federal agencies to identify and redirect unused funds to other projects and priorities as authorized or to return unspent balances to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury). At the end of fiscal year 2011, GAO identified more than $794 million in funding remaining in expired grant accounts (accounts that were more than 3 months past the grant end date and had no activity for 9 months or more) in the Payment Management System (PMS). GAO found that undisbursed balances remained in some grant accounts several years past their expiration date: $110.9 million in undisbursed funding remained unspent more than 5 years past the grant end date, including $9.5 million that remained unspent for 10 years or more. Nevertheless, the more than $794 million in undisbursed balances remaining in PMS represents an improvement in closing out expired grant accounts with undisbursed balances in PMS compared to the approximately $1 billion GAO found in 2008. This improvement is notable given that the overall amount of grant disbursements through PMS increased by about 23 percent from 2006 to 2011.
When agencies made concerted efforts to address timely grant closeout, they and their inspectors general and auditors reported that they were able to improve the timeliness of grant closeouts and decrease the amount of undisbursed funding in expired grant accounts. GAO found that raising the visibility of the problem within federal agencies can also lead to improvements in grant closeouts. However, GAOs review of agencies annual performance reports for fiscal years 2009 to 2011 found that systematic, agencywide information on undisbursed balances in grant accounts eligible for closeout is still largely lacking.
The challenge presented by undisbursed balances in expired grant accounts is just one of a number of grants management challenges identified in past GAO work. Addressing these challenges is critical to increasing the efficient and effective use of federal grant funds, which represent a significant component of overall federal spending. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), federal outlays for grants to state and local governments, including Medicaid, increased from $91 billion in fiscal year 1980 (about $221 billion in 2011 constant dollars) to more than $606 billion in fiscal year 2011, accounting for approximately 17 percent of total federal outlays. During this 30-year period there has been a shift in grant spending, increasing the percentage of grant funding of Medicaid while decreasing the percentage of funding of non-Medicaid-related grant programs.
GAO work on grants over the last decade has identified a range of issues related to the management of grant programs, including the streamlining of grants management processes, the measurement of grant performance, grant lessons learned from implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, and internal control weaknesses. GAO will be looking at each of these grants management issue areas in future work for this Subcommittee.
What GAO Recommends
For grant closeout, GAOs April 2012 report recommended OMB revise future guidance to better target undisbursed balances and instruct agencies to take action to close out grants that are past their end date or have no undisbursed balances remaining. OMB staff said they generally agreed with and will consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-31 | gao_GAO-04-31_0 | Federal Agencies Rely on University Scientists and Agency Web Sites to Disseminate Research Results
Federal agencies rely primarily on the university scientists who receive research grants to make their research results available to the public. Agriculture, Defense, Energy, EPA, and NASA also disseminate the results of the research they fund by posting scientists’ final technical reports on their Web sites, and Education is considering whether to post research results. Agencies Rely on and Encourage Grant Recipients to Make Research Results Available
The eight agencies we examined rely on university scientists to disseminate the results of the research they fund, and their policies explicitly encourage principal investigators and universities to disseminate those results through presentations at scientific conferences and publishing in scientific journals. Most of the agency officials told us that posting technical reports on agencies’ Web sites is an effective way to share information among scientists in the field of research, as well as with the public. According to NIH officials, the risk associated with posting results that have not been scrutinized and validated by peer review is simply too great in the biomedical field. While 87 percent of our survey respondents reported that all of their federally funded research is covered by financial conflict of interest policies that are consistent with either NIH’s or NSF’s standards, 17 universities—including 5 universities in the University of California system—reported that they do not extend either the NIH or the NSF financial conflicts of interest requirements to cover research grants funded by other federal agencies. To safeguard against bias in the design, conduct, or reporting of federally funded research, we recommend that the National Science and Technology Council coordinate the development of uniform federal requirements for universities and other funding recipients to identify and resolve financial conflicts of interest. The NIH and NSF standards provide a useful starting point for this requirement. To assess agencies’ actions to ensure that universities implement policies for identifying and managing possible financial conflicts of interest, we examined whether each agency has regulations or policies requiring that universities identify and manage possible financial conflicts of interest. In addition to our review of federal agencies’ actions, we conducted a Web- based survey of the 200 universities and colleges that received the most federal research funding in fiscal year 2000. The survey contained 42 questions that asked about (1) their policies and procedures for ensuring that federally funded research results are made available to the public, (2) their views of the advantages and disadvantages of posting a grant’s final technical report to the agency’s Web site, (3) their conflict of interest and financial disclosure policies, (4) any FOIA requests federal agencies had received that asked for access to research data, and (5) data on their research funding and technology transfer activities. These agencies included Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Education, EPA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and NIH. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2001, federal agencies provided $19 billion for university research, a vital part of the nation's research and development effort. GAO was asked to examine federal agencies' actions to ensure that (1) the results of the university research grants they fund are made available to the public and (2) universities receiving such grants implement policies for identifying and managing possible financial conflicts of interest. GAO reviewed the actions of eight federal agencies and conducted a Web-based survey of 200 leading research universities (refer to GAO-04-223SP). GAO also met with officials in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to discuss the National Science and Technology Council's role in coordinating federal science policy.
What GAO Found
Each of the eight federal agencies GAO examined relies on university scientists who receive federally funded research grants to make the results available to the public. Although university scientists customarily seek to publish their research results in peer-reviewed journals, agencies cannot require such publication as a condition for funding because it is impossible to ensure in advance that the results will be accepted for publication. Agencies do, however, explicitly encourage funding recipients to make results public. The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Energy; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also disseminate the results of their funded research by posting them on their Web sites. Officials from these agencies said that posting the results is an effective way to share information among scientists, as well as with the public. In contrast, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) do not post research results on their Web sites. According to NIH officials, the risk associated with posting researchers' final reports before they have been validated by peer review is too great in the biomedical field. The Department of Education is considering how best to widely disseminate the results of research it funds. NIH and NSF are the only federal agencies that require universities to implement policies for identifying and managing possible financial conflicts of interest for the research they fund. The other six agencies do not have financial conflict of interest standards for university research grants. Of the 171 universities that responded to the GAO survey, 148 (87 percent) reported that all of their federally funded research is covered by financial conflict of interest policies that are consistent with either NIH's or NSF's standards. However, 17 universities reported that they do not extend either agency's requirements to cover research grants from other federal agencies. Unless federal agencies uniformly require that universities implement conflict of interest policies, the government cannot properly safeguard against financial conflicts of interest that might bias federally funded research. |
gao_GAO-13-4 | gao_GAO-13-4_0 | More than a third of the cost increase was caused by requirements and other changes. Revised JWST Cost Estimate Is Not Fully Consistent with Best Practices for Reliable and Credible Estimates and the Integrated Master Schedule Is Not Finalized
Our analysis of JWST’s revised cost estimate showed that it is not fully consistent with best practices for developing reliable and credible estimates, although project officials took some steps in line with best practices in the development of the estimate. In addition, we found that the cost estimate included all life cycle costs for the project. Specifically, the project’s estimate was found to substantially meet the best practice criteria for being comprehensive, and the remaining three characteristics of being well documented, accurate, and credible were found to be only partially met. The credibility of the estimate was lessened because project officials did not perform a sensitivity analysis that would have identified key drivers of costs, such as workforce size. Technically Challenging JWST Project Lacks the Schedule Reserve Flexibility and Commensurate Oversight of Integration and Test Efforts
Project officials report that the JWST schedule has 14 months of reserve, which meets Goddard guidance for schedule reserve; however, only 7 of the 14 months are likely to be available for the last three of JWST’s five complex integration and test efforts. GAO’s prior work shows that it is during integration and test where problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip. Given that JWST has a challenging integration and test schedule, this could particularly be the case. The project has made some significant progress in the past year, notably successfully completing development of the 18 primary mirror segments—considered JWST’s top technical risk. Nevertheless, ongoing challenges are indicative of the kinds of issues that can require a significant amount of effort to address. For example, instrument challenges have delayed the first integration and test effort. In addition, key long-term risks on subsystems with a significant amount of work remaining will not be retired until 2016. Currently, NASA’s plan for project oversight calls for one independent system integration review about 13 months before launch. While this is consistent with what NASA requires for its projects, this approach may not be sufficient for a project as complex as JWST. JWST is one of NASA’s most technologically complex projects to date. For example, based on recommendations from the ICRP, the project has instituted meetings at various levels throughout NASA and its contractors and subcontractors. The new system should allow for better tracking of risks than did the previous system. While these enhancements to the oversight of the project are steps in the right direction, it will take time to assess their effectiveness. It is also one of the most expensive, with a recent major replan resulting in a total cost of $8.8 billion. Without a plan to address such reductions in future years, the project could once again become susceptible to communication and oversight problems identified in earlier reviews, which could also have a detrimental impact on continued project performance. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the JWST life-cycle cost estimate conforms to best practices, GAO recommends that the NASA Administrator direct JWST officials to take the following three actions to provide high-fidelity cost information for monitoring project progress: improve cost estimate documentation and continually update it to reflect earned value management actual costs and record any reasons for variances, conduct a sensitivity analysis on the number of staff working on the program to determine how staff variations affect the cost estimate, and perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis, or joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis, using a schedule that meets best practices and includes enough detail so that risks can be appropriately mapped to activities and costs; historical, analogous data should be used to support the risk analysis. To ensure that technical risks and challenges are being effectively managed and that sufficient oversight is in place and can be sustained, GAO recommends that the NASA Administrator direct JWST officials to take the following three actions: conduct a separate independent review prior to the beginning of the OTIS and spacecraft integration and test efforts to allow the project’s independent standing review board the opportunity to evaluate the readiness of the project to move forward, given the lack of schedule flexibility once these efforts are under way, schedule the management review and approval to proceed to integration and test (key decision point D or KDP-D) prior to the start of observatory integration and test effort, and devise an effective, long-term plan for project office oversight of its contractors that takes into consideration the anticipated travel budget reductions. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which NASA’s revised cost and schedule estimates are reliable based on GAO best practices, (2) the major risks and technological challenges the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project faces, and (3) the extent to which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has improved the oversight of the JWST project. | Why GAO Did This Study
JWST is one of NASA's most expensive and technologically advanced science projects, intended to advance understanding of the origin of the universe. In 2011, JWST was rebaselined with a life cycle cost estimate of $8.8 billion and a launch readiness date in October 2018--almost nine times the cost and more than a decade later than originally projected in 1999. Concern about the magnitude of JWST's cost increase and schedule delay and their effects on NASA's progress on other high-priority missions led conferees for the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, to direct GAO to report on the project. Specifically, GAO assessed (1) the extent to which NASA's revised cost and schedule estimates are reliable based on best practices, (2) the major risks and technological challenges JWST faces, and (3) the extent to which NASA has improved oversight of JWST. To do this, GAO compared NASA's revised cost and schedule estimates with best practice criteria, reviewed relevant contractor and NASA documents, and interviewed project and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has provided significantly more time and money to the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) than previously planned and expressed high confidence in the project's new baselines. Its current cost estimate reflects some features of best practices for developing reliable and credible estimates. For example, the estimate substantially meets one of four cost characteristics--comprehensive--that GAO looks for in a reliable cost estimate, in part because all life cycle costs were included. The estimate, however, only partially met the other three characteristics--well documented, accurate, and credible--which detracts from its reliability. For example, the estimate's accuracy, and therefore the confidence level assigned to the estimate, was lessened by the summary schedule used for the joint cost and schedule risk analysis because it did not provide enough detail to determine how risks were applied to critical project activities. The estimate's credibility was also lessened because officials did not perform a sensitivity analysis that would have identified key drivers of costs, such as workforce size. Program officials believe that it would have been difficult to fully address all best practice characteristics. GAO believes there is time to improve the estimate and enhance the prospects for delivering the project according to plan.
Project officials report that the JWST schedule has 14 months of reserve, which meets Goddard guidance for schedule reserve; however, only 7 of the 14 months are likely to be available for the last three of JWST's five complex integration and test efforts. GAO's prior work shows that the integration and test phases are where problems are commonly found and schedules tend to slip. Given that JWST has a challenging integration and test schedule, this could particularly be likely. The project has made some significant progress in the past year, notably successfully completing development of the 18 primary mirror segments--considered JWST's top technical risk. Nevertheless, ongoing challenges are indicative of the kinds of issues that can require significant effort to address. For example, instrument challenges have delayed the first integration and test effort. In addition, key long-term risks on subsystems with a significant amount of work remaining will not be retired until 2016. Currently, NASA's plan for project oversight calls for one independent mission-level system integration review about 13 months before launch. While this is consistent with what NASA requires for its projects, this approach may not be sufficient for a project as complex as JWST.
JWST has taken several steps to improve communications and oversight of the project and its contractors--such as taking over responsibility for mission systems engineering from the prime contractor; instituting meetings that include various levels of NASA, contractor, and subcontractor management; and implementing a new risk management system to allow for better tracking of risks. The enhancements to the oversight of the project are steps in the right direction, but it will take time to assess their effectiveness and ensure that the efforts are sustained by the project in the future. Reductions in travel budgets, however, could require the project to adjust the oversight approach that was adopted as a result of the replan. Additional reductions in travel budgets are anticipated in future years, but officials do not have a plan to address such reductions and their potential impact on continuing the current oversight approach.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends NASA take six actions including, among others, to take steps to improve its cost estimate; to conduct an additional, earlier independent review of test and integration activities; and to develop a long-term oversight plan that anticipates planned travel budget reductions. |
gao_GAO-17-473T | gao_GAO-17-473T_0 | Background
Since 1990, we have regularly reported on government operations that we have identified as high risk due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Monitoring. Demonstrated Progress. VA Has Made Limited Progress in Addressing the Concerns That Led to the 2015 VA Health Care High-Risk Designation
VA officials have expressed their commitment to addressing the concerns that led to the high-risk designation for VA health care. As part of our work for the 2017 high-risk report, we identified actions VA had taken, such as establishing a task force, working groups, and a governance structure for addressing the five areas of concern contributing to the designation: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes; (2) inadequate oversight and accountability; (3) information technology (IT) challenges; (4) inadequate training for VA staff; and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. On August 18, 2016, VA provided us with an action plan that acknowledged the deep-rooted nature of the areas of concern, and stated that these concerns would require substantial time and work to address. Although the action plan outlined some steps VA plans to take over the next several years to address the concerns that led to its high-risk designation, several sections were missing critical actions that would support our criteria for removal from the High-Risk List, such as analyzing the root causes of the issues and measuring progress with clear metrics. Overall Rating for Managing Risks and Improving VA Health Care
As we reported in the February 2017 high-risk report, when we applied the five criteria for High-Risk List removal to each of the areas of concern, we determined that VA has partially met two of the five criteria: leadership commitment and an action plan. VA has not met the other three criteria for removal: capacity to address the areas of concern, monitoring implementation of corrective actions, and demonstrating progress. 2017 assessment of VA’s progress. Between January 2010 and February 2015 (when we first designated VA health care as a high-risk area), we made 178 recommendations to VA related to VA health care. However, there continue to be more than 100 open recommendations related to VA health care, almost a quarter of which have remained open for 3 or more years. We believe that it is critical that VA implement our recommendations not only to remedy the specific weaknesses we previously identified, but because they may be symptomatic of larger underlying problems that also need to be addressed. It is imperative, however, that VA demonstrate strong leadership support as it continues its transition under a new administration, address weaknesses in its action plan, and continue to implement our open recommendations. VA’s action plan did not adequately address the concerns that led to the high-risk designation because it lacked root cause analyses for most areas of concern, as well as clear metrics and identified resources needed for achieving VA’s stated outcomes. Until VA addresses these serious underlying weaknesses, it will be difficult for the department to effectively and efficiently implement improvements addressing the five areas of concern that led to the high-risk designation. VA Health Care: Actions Needed to Ensure Medical Facility Controlled Substance Inspection Programs Meet Agency Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation, including 168 medical centers and more than 1,000 outpatient facilities organized into regional networks. Enrollment in the VA health care system has grown significantly, from 7.9 million in fiscal year 2006 to almost 9 million in fiscal year 2016. Over that same period, VA's Veterans Health Administration's total budgetary resources have increased substantially, from $37.8 billion in fiscal year 2006 to $91.2 billion in fiscal year 2016.
Since 1990, GAO has regularly updated the list of government operations that it has identified as high risk due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. VA health care was added as a high-risk area in 2015 because of concerns about VA's ability to ensure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of veterans' health care. GAO assesses High-Risk List removal against five criteria: (1) leadership commitment, (2) capacity, (3) action plan, (4) monitoring, and (5) demonstrated progress.
This statement, which is based on GAO's February 2017 high-risk report, addresses (1) actions VA has taken over the past 2 years to address the areas of concern that led GAO to designate VA health care as high risk, (2) the number of open GAO recommendations related to VA health care, and (3) additional actions VA needs to take to address the concerns that led to the high-risk designation.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken action to partially meet two of the five criteria GAO uses to assess removal from the High-Risk List (leadership commitment and an action plan), but it has not met the other three (agency capacity, monitoring efforts, and demonstrated progress). Specifically, VA officials have taken leadership actions such as establishing a task force, working groups, and a governance structure for addressing the issues that led to the high-risk designation. VA provided GAO with an action plan in August 2016 that acknowledged the deep-rooted nature of the five areas of concern GAO identified: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes; (2) inadequate oversight and accountability; (3) information technology challenges; (4) inadequate training for VA staff; and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. Although VA's action plan outlined some steps VA plans to take over the next several years, several sections were missing analyses of the root causes of the issues, resources needed, and clear metrics to measure progress.
Also of concern are the more than 100 open recommendations GAO has made between January 2010 and February 2017 related to VA health care, almost a quarter of which have been open for 3 or more years. Since February 2015, GAO has made 74 new recommendations relating to the areas of concern.
To address its high-risk designation, additional actions are required of VA, including: (1) demonstrating stronger leadership support as it continues its transition under a new administration; (2) developing an action plan to include root cause analyses for each area of concern, clear metrics to assess progress, and the identification of resources for achieving stated outcomes; and (3) implementing GAO's recommendations, not only to remedy the specific weaknesses identified, but because they may be symptomatic of larger underlying problems that also need to be addressed. Until VA addresses these serious underlying weaknesses, it will be difficult for the department to effectively and efficiently implement improvements addressing the five areas of concern that led to the high-risk designation. |
gao_GAO-16-350 | gao_GAO-16-350_0 | Automakers have also been installing a growing number of advanced technology features into vehicles to further improve passenger safety as well as to enhance driver and passenger convenience. For example, automakers may locate all ECUs on a single in- vehicle network or include one network to support safety-critical vehicle functions, such as steering and braking, and another network to support convenience and entertainment systems. Remote Attacks Involving Safety- Critical Vehicle Systems Could Have the Greatest Impact on Passenger Safety
Cyberattacks through Direct and Remote Access Are Possible, but Remote Attacks Are of Most Concern to Stakeholders
Based on our analysis of research and industry stakeholder views, modern vehicles contain multiple interfaces—connections between the vehicle and external networks—that if not properly secured, can become entry points—or attack paths—for cyber attackers. Cyberattacks through Direct Access
Selected industry stakeholders we interviewed identified several vehicle interfaces that can be compromised through direct, physical access to a vehicle (see fig. This port is mandated in passenger vehicles by regulation for emissions-testing purposes and to facilitate diagnostic assessments by auto dealers, repair shops, and car owners. In addition to being prevalent in modern vehicles, this port also provides direct and largely unrestricted access to in-vehicle communication networks. Thus, it can provide an attacker with sufficient access to compromise the full range of a vehicle’s systems, including safety-critical systems, such as the brakes and steering wheel. Cyberattacks through Remote (Short- and Long-Range Wireless) Access
Selected industry stakeholders we interviewed identified several main interfaces that could be used to undertake a remote cyberattack through short- or long-range wireless channels, such as built-in Bluetooth and cellular-calling capabilities (see fig. The majority of these industry stakeholders (23 out of 32) agreed that remote attacks are the most concerning for passenger safety. Through such interfaces, the cyber attacker could theoretically exploit vulnerabilities to access the target vehicles from anywhere in the world and take control over the vehicles’ safety-critical systems. A Variety of Key Practices and Technologies Are Available to Mitigate Vehicle Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and the Impacts of Potential Attacks
Key Practices Used by Other Industries Are Available for Use in the Auto Industry
Selected industry stakeholders informed us that a range of key practices are available to identify and mitigate potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities in vehicles. The concept of domain separation was also identified as a key practice by the majority of selected industry stakeholders we spoke with (22 out of 32). Despite general agreement that domain separation can be a very effective mitigation strategy, some stakeholders pointed out that complete isolation or segregation is often not possible or practical because some limited communication will likely need to occur between safety-critical and non-safety-critical systems. Notably, most of the technologies identified by selected industry stakeholders we spoke with cannot be added on existing vehicles; rather, they must be incorporated into the vehicle design and production process, which as we describe later in this report, takes approximately 5 years to complete. Stakeholders Face Challenges Related to Vehicle Cybersecurity, Some of Which May Be Addressed by Industry-Led Efforts
Stakeholders Identified Several Challenges Facing the Industry Related to Vehicle Cybersecurity
The most frequently cited set of challenges facing the industry in ensuring vehicle cybersecurity—mentioned by 15 of the 32 selected industry stakeholders we spoke with—was the lack of transparency, communication, and collaboration regarding vehicles’ cybersecurity among the various players in the automotive supply chain, as described in the following examples. Some stakeholders also noted that it can be difficult for automakers to oversee and exert control over suppliers’ software code. Another set of challenges cited by 13 of the 32 selected industry stakeholders was the cost of incorporating cybersecurity protections into vehicles. Similar to ISACs created for other industries, such as the Financial Services ISAC, the Automotive ISAC is intended to serve as a central hub for intelligence collection and analysis and provide a forum for members to anonymously share threat and vulnerability information with one another. Selected industry stakeholders we spoke with, as well as DOT officials, generally expressed positive views regarding the potential effectiveness of an Automotive ISAC. NHTSA Is Developing Guidance to Help Ensure Consistent Responses to Vulnerabilities
In November 2015, NHTSA officials informed us that they were developing guidance to help automakers understand the agency’s determinations—and to assist automakers in making their own determinations—regarding the types of vehicle cybersecurity vulnerabilities that would constitute a safety defect and, therefore, merit a recall. As of July 2015, officials estimated that the agency was about 3 years away from making a final determination about the need for additional government standards or regulation in this area; thus, such a final determination is not expected until at least 2018. NHTSA Has Not Yet Defined and Documented Its Roles and Responsibilities in Responding to a Vehicle Cyberattack
In its whitepaper NHTSA and Vehicle Cybersecurity, NHTSA states that its goal is to “be ahead of potential vehicle cybersecurity challenges, and seek ways to address or avoid them altogether.” As described above, NHTSA has made progress in many areas in an effort to proactively address potential cybersecurity threats to vehicle safety-critical systems; however, NHTSA has not yet formally defined and documented the agency’s role and responsibilities in the event of a real-world vehicle cyberattack and how the agency’s response actions would be coordinated with other federal agencies. Until such a plan is developed, NHTSA’s response efforts—regardless of the threat environment in which an attack is carried out—could be slowed as agency staff and other stakeholders may not be able to quickly identify the appropriate actions that NHTSA should take. DOT concurred with our recommendation to define and document NHTSA’s roles and responsibilities in response to a vehicle cyberattack involving safety-critical systems. The Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and Commerce reviewed our report, but did not have any comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine: (1) available information about the key cybersecurity vulnerabilities in modern vehicles that could impact passenger safety; (2) key practices and technologies, if any, available to mitigate vehicle cybersecurity vulnerabilities and the impacts of potential attacks; (3) views of selected stakeholders on the challenges they face related to vehicle cybersecurity and industry-led efforts to address vehicle cybersecurity; and (4) the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) efforts to address vehicle cybersecurity. Automakers were selected to ensure we had representation from each of the 3 major auto-producing regions of the world (the U.S., Europe, and Asia) and the two U.S. industry associations (the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of Global Automakers) that were jointly pursuing several efforts related to vehicle cybersecurity, such as the formation of an Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Over time, the amount of software code in vehicles has grown exponentially to support a growing number of safety and other features. However, the reliance on software to control safety-critical and other functions also leaves vehicles more vulnerable to cyberattacks.
GAO was asked to review cybersecurity issues that could impact passenger safety in modern vehicles. This report addresses, among other things, (1) available information about the key cybersecurity vulnerabilities in modern vehicles that could impact passenger safety; (2) key practices and technologies, if any, available to mitigate vehicle cybersecurity vulnerabilities and the impacts of potential attacks; (3) views of selected stakeholders on challenges they face related to vehicle cybersecurity and industry-led efforts to address vehicle cybersecurity; and (4) DOT efforts to address vehicle cybersecurity.
GAO reviewed relevant existing regulations and literature and interviewed officials from DOT; the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; industry associations; and 32 selected industry stakeholders, including automakers, suppliers, vehicle cybersecurity firms, and subject matter experts. The experts were selected based on a literature search and stakeholder recommendations, among other things.
What GAO Found
Modern vehicles contain multiple interfaces—connections between the vehicle and external networks—that leave vehicle systems, including safety-critical systems, such as braking and steering, vulnerable to cyberattacks. Researchers have shown that these interfaces—if not properly secured—can be exploited through direct, physical access to a vehicle, as well as remotely through short-range and long-range wireless channels. For example, researchers have shown that attackers could compromise vulnerabilities in the short-range wireless connections to vehicles' Bluetooth units—which enable hands-free cell phone use—to gain access to in-vehicle networks, to take control over safety-critical functions such as the brakes. Among the interfaces that can be exploited through direct access, most stakeholders we spoke with expressed concerns about the statutorily mandated on-board diagnostics port, which provides access to a broad range of vehicle systems for emissions and diagnostic testing purposes. However, the majority of selected industry stakeholders we spoke with (23 out of 32) agreed that wireless attacks, such as those exploiting vulnerabilities in vehicles' built-in cellular-calling capabilities, would pose the largest risk to passenger safety. Such attacks could potentially impact a large number of vehicles and allow an attacker to access targeted vehicles from anywhere in the world. Despite these concerns, some stakeholders pointed out that such attacks remain difficult because of the time and expertise needed to carry them out and thus far have not been reported outside of the research environment.
a In this context, long-range refers to access at distances over 1 kilometer.
b This port is mandated in vehicles by statute for emission-testing purposes and to facilitate diagnostic assessments of vehicles, such as by repair shops. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(6).
Selected industry stakeholders, both in the United States and Europe, informed GAO that a range of key practices is available to identify and mitigate potential vehicle-cybersecurity vulnerabilities. For instance, the majority of selected industry stakeholders we spoke with (22 out of 32) indicated that—to the extent possible—automakers should locate safety-critical systems and non-safety-critical systems on separate in-vehicle networks and limit communication between the two types of systems, a concept referred to as “domain separation.” However, some of these stakeholders also pointed out that complete separation is often not possible or practical because some limited communication will likely need to occur between safety-critical and other vehicle systems. In addition, selected industry stakeholders we spoke to identified technological solutions that can be incorporated into the vehicle to make it more secure. However, according to stakeholders, many of these technologies—such as message encryption and authentication, which can be used to secure and verify the legitimacy of communications occurring along in-vehicle networks—cannot be incorporated into existing vehicles. Rather, such technologies must be incorporated during the vehicle design and production process, which according to stakeholders, takes approximately 5 years to complete.
Selected industry stakeholders identified several challenges they face related to vehicle cybersecurity. For instance, the lack of transparency, communication, and collaboration regarding vehicles' cybersecurity among the various levels of the automotive supply chain and the cost of incorporating cybersecurity protections into vehicles were the two most frequently cited challenges—mentioned by 15 and 13 of the 32 selected industry stakeholders, respectively. However, several industry-led efforts are planned and under way that, according to stakeholders, could potentially help automakers and parts suppliers identify and mitigate vehicle cybersecurity vulnerabilities and address some of the challenges that industry stakeholders face. For example, two U.S. industry associations have been leading the effort to establish an Automotive Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) to collect and analyze intelligence information and provide a forum for members to anonymously share threat and vulnerability information with one another. Selected industry stakeholders we spoke to, as well as DOT officials, generally expressed positive views regarding the potential effectiveness of an Automotive ISAC.
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has taken steps to address vehicle cybersecurity issues but has not determined the role it would have in responding to a real-world vehicle cyberattack. For example, NHTSA added more research capabilities in this area and is developing guidance to help the industry determine when cybersecurity vulnerabilities should be considered a safety defect, and thus merit a recall; it expects to issue this guidance by March 31, 2016. Further, pursuant to a statutory mandate, NHTSA is examining the need for government standards or regulations regarding vehicle cybersecurity. However, officials estimated that the agency will not make a final determination on this need until at least 2018. Although NHTSA's stated goal is to stay ahead of potential vehicle-cybersecurity challenges, NHTSA has not yet formally defined and documented its roles and responsibilities in the event of a real-world cyberattack. Until it develops such a plan, in the event of a cyberattack, the agency's response efforts could be slowed as agency staff may not be able to quickly identify the appropriate actions to take.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT define and document its roles and responsibilities in response to a vehicle cyberattack involving safety-critical systems. DOT concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-5 | gao_GAO-16-5_0 | Figure 1 illustrates DOD’s technology management process. Overall Transition Rates Not Determinable, but Selected Programs Illustrate Factors for Transition Success
Since 2010, DARPA has had success in transitioning new technologies from the research environment to military users, including DOD acquisition programs and warfighters. Our analysis of the 10 selected programs did, however, identify four factors that contributed to transition successes, the most important of which were military or commercial demand for the planned technology and linkage to a research area where DARPA has sustained interest. This approach shapes how the agency defines, pursues, and tracks technology transition. Figure 2 illustrates in more detail DARPA’s process for assessing technology transition outcomes in its programs. Figure 3 highlights these four factors. DARPA Prioritizes Innovation and Deemphasizes Technology Transition in Key Processes
DARPA’s investment of program funds and staff are primarily focused on the highest priority of its agency mission, which is creating radically innovative technologies that support DOD’s warfighting mission. In addition, although DARPA disseminates information on its past programs, it does not take full advantage of available, government-sponsored resources for sharing technical data. DARPA has also elected not to participate in most DOD programs intended to facilitate technology transition, with the exception of mandated small business programs, citing the challenges it perceives in meeting the process and reporting requirements of these DOD programs within DARPA’s typical timeframes for executing its research initiatives. However, these reviews do not assess a program’s strategy for achieving technology transition. DARPA leadership delegates oversight and review of technology transition strategies to the agency’s Adaptive Execution Office, which coordinates with program managers to review and provide input on technology transition strategies, particularly in the latter stages of programs. DARPA’s limited training for program managers on technology transition is inadequate to consistently position programs for transition success. For many years, DOD has maintained website-accessible databases that disseminate information within the department, and to a lesser extent, to the public and to private companies. Currently, DARPA disseminates information on past programs through both internal and external means, but does not share information with key data repositories that the federal government sponsors, which may obscure visibility into its programs and lead to missed transition opportunities. Consequently, DOD did not agree that technology transition training requirements should be increased for DARPA program managers and stated that DARPA’s current approach of “tailored curricula focused on a program’s unique transition needs” remained appropriate. Further, DOD did not agree that increased dissemination of technical data on completed DARPA programs was warranted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report covers the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) (1) effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year 2010, including identifying the factors that contributed to successful technology transitions, and (2) implementation of Department of Defense (DOD) policies and programs intended to facilitate the transition of technologies. To assess DARPA’s effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year 2010, including identifying factors that contributed to successful transitions, we requested and reviewed portfolio-level data identifying the names, funding amounts, and technology transition of those DARPA programs successfully completing technology development during fiscal years 2010 through 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into orbit in 1957, the U.S. government made a commitment to initiate, rather than react to, strategic technological surprises. DOD relies on DARPA's disruptive innovations to maintain this promise, backed by congressional appropriations of over $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 alone. In April 2015, DOD reported that U.S. technological superiority is again being challenged by potential adversaries and renewed efforts to improve its products. Meanwhile, GAO found deficiencies in DOD's technology transition processes that may hinder these efforts and DARPA's goals.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's technology transition processes, practices, and results. This report focuses on DARPA and assesses its (1) effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year 2010, including identifying factors that contribute to successful transitions, and (2) implementation of DOD policies and programs intended to facilitate technology transition. GAO reviewed DARPA programs completed since 2010; identified transition factors by analyzing program documentation for a random sample of 10 cases; reviewed DOD policies; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2010, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has had success in technology transition—the process of migrating new technologies from the research environment to military users, including Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs and warfighters. However, inconsistencies in how the agency defines and assesses its transition outcomes preclude GAO from reliably reporting on transition performance across DARPA's portfolio of 150 programs that were successfully completed between fiscal years 2010 and 2014. These inconsistencies are due in part to shortfalls in agency processes for tracking technology transition. Nevertheless, GAO's analysis of 10 selected programs identified four factors that contributed to transition success, the most important being military or commercial demand for the planned technology and linkage to a research area where DARPA has sustained interest. Both of these factors were generally evident at the time a program started, while the other two factors were observed later, once the program was underway. The figure below highlights the four factors.
DARPA's implementation of DOD programs intended to foster technology transition has been limited and neither DOD nor DARPA have defined policies for managing transition activities. DARPA has also largely elected not to participate in DOD technology transition programs, with the exception of federally mandated small business programs, citing challenges in meeting program requirements within DARPA's typical three- to five-year timeframe for executing its research initiatives. Instead, DARPA primarily focuses its time and resources on creating radically innovative technologies that support DOD's warfighting mission and relegates technology transition to a secondary priority. DARPA leadership defers to its program managers to foster technology transition, but provides limited related training. Moreover, while its leadership conducts oversight of program managers' activities through periodic program reviews, these reviews do not regularly assess technology transition strategies. GAO has found that this approach does not consistently position programs for transition success. Further, while DARPA disseminates information on its past programs within DOD, to the public, and among private companies, it does not take full advantage of government-sponsored resources for sharing technical data, which may obscure visibility into its programs and lead to missed transition opportunities.
What GAO Recommends
DARPA should regularly assess technology transition strategies, refine training requirements, and increase dissemination of technical data for completed programs. DOD did not agree to take GAO's recommended actions, which remain warranted, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-13-76 | gao_GAO-13-76_0 | Treasury Has Made Progress in Developing Compliance Guidance and Processes for SBLF and SSBCI
In response to our previous recommendation on SBLF compliance procedures, Treasury has developed procedures for monitoring SBLF participant compliance with legal and reporting requirements. SBLF-Funded Institutions and SSBCI-Funded States Have Begun to Support Small Business Lending, but Treasury’s Policy for Timely Use of SSBCI Funds Is Unclear
As of June 30, 2012, SBLF participants had increased their business lending over the baseline from 2010. States had used about $154 million (about 10 percent) of these funds through a variety of programs. SBLF participants increased both small business loans under $1 million as well as total business lending. The act provides Treasury’s discretionary authority to encourage the states to use the funds in a timely manner, but without a formal written policy, how Treasury would use this authority in a consistent manner is unclear. In addition, such guidelines could help states understand the need to use the funds in a timely manner while meeting program requirements and could provide clarity to states about the associated consequences of not meeting the 2-year time frame. Treasury Could Enhance Its Reporting of Program Performance Information
Treasury has established performance measures to manage its programs but could enhance its public reporting of program performance information. Treasury officials told us that they are continuing to consider different approaches for evaluating SBLF. However, Treasury has not made any decisions on the specific SSBCI performance information that it might publicly release. In its analysis, Treasury adjusted the comparison group for a number of factors, including an institution’s asset size and geography, thereby excluding institutions that fell outside the asset size range of SBLF participants and that were headquartered in states that did not have an institution participating in SBLF.helpful step in understanding the possible effects of SBLF funding. 6).SBLF participant had a 31 percent increase in total business lending, compared with a 2 percent increase for the comparison group and a 6 percent increase for the peer group. Many states did not receive their first SSBCI allocation until late 2011 and thus, Treasury had limited data to evaluate SSBCI. Treasury’s performance measures will rely on the data from these annual reports. Information on SSBCI’s performance measures regarding the amount of small business loans or investments and the amount of private leveraging resulting from SSBCI funds would provide Congress and SSBCI participants with useful information on the progress of SSBCI and its effectiveness in increasing small business lending. In response to our previous recommendation on SBLF monitoring, Treasury has developed procedures for monitoring SBLF participant compliance with legal and reporting requirements. Treasury also issued the standards for compliance to provide states with best practices for reviewing participants’ compliance with SSBCI’s legal and policy requirements and developed procedures for sampling transaction-level data to evaluate the accuracy of the states’ annual reports. Although a Treasury official has publicly indicated that Treasury does not currently plan to exercise the authority to terminate funds that have not been allocated within 2 years from the states’ approval date, it retains the authority to do so in the future. As we found in our December 2011 SBLF report, Treasury has yet to finalize plans for assessing the performance of the program, including measures that can isolate the impact of SBLF from other factors that affect small business lending. Our own analysis using a peer group showed that SBLF participants had increased their lending compared to peers, but also showed that the difference in small business lending growth was somewhat smaller than what Treasury’s analysis suggests. However, Treasury has not yet determined how and when it will make this information public. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury take the following three actions:
To help ensure that Treasury is transparent and accountable in its decision making, Treasury should develop a written policy explaining how it will use the Secretary’s discretionary authority to terminate the availability of allocated funds to SSBCI participating states if funds have not been transferred to the participant by the end of the 2-year period beginning on the date that the Secretary approved the state for participation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) the status of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) efforts to monitor participants’ compliance with program requirements under the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and the State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI); (2) the status of SBLF and SSBCI participants’ small business lending; and (3) the extent to which Treasury evaluates and communicates SBLF and SSBCI program outcomes. To examine the status of Treasury’s efforts to monitor participants’ compliance with program requirements under SBLF and SSBCI, we analyzed Treasury’s documentation. To review SSBCI participants’ small business lending, we collected and reviewed data from the Quarterly Report as of June 30, 2012—the most recent quarter available. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 aimed to stimulate job growth by, among other things, establishing the SBLF and SSBCI programs within Treasury. SBLF uses capital investments to encourage community banks with assets of less than $10 billion to increase their small business lending. SSBCI provides funding to strengthen state and municipal programs that support lending to small businesses. Under the act, GAO is required to conduct an audit of both programs annually. GAO's first reports were on the programs' implementation and made recommendations. This second report examines (1) the status of Treasury's efforts to monitor participants' compliance with program requirements under SBLF and SSBCI, (2) the status of SBLF's and SSBCI's small business lending, and (3) Treasury's evaluation of SBLF and SSBCI and communication of outcomes to Congress and interested parties. GAO reviewed Treasury documents on SBLF and SSBCI procedures; analyzed the most recent available performance information for both programs and data on financial institutions; and interviewed officials from Treasury and nine states participating in SSBCI.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has made progress in developing guidance and procedures to monitor participants' compliance with requirements for the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and the State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) programs. In response to GAO's previous recommendation on SBLF monitoring, Treasury has developed procedures for monitoring SBLF participant compliance with legal and reporting requirements. Treasury also issued standards to provide states with best practices for reviewing participants' compliance with SSBCI's legal and policy requirements and developed procedures for sampling transaction-level data to evaluate the accuracy of the states' SSBCI annual reports.
As of June 30, 2012, SBLF participants had increased their business lending over the 2010 baseline. The median SBLF participant had a 31 percent increase in total business lending and a 14 percent increase for small business loans under $1 million, according to GAO's analysis. For SSBCI, states had used about 10 percent of the funds as of June 30, 2012. The act provides Treasury with authority to terminate funds that have not been allocated to states within 2 years of Treasury's approval of the state's participation in SSBCI. However, Treasury has not yet developed a formal written policy explaining what actions it will take if SSBCI participants have not met the requirements to receive their full allocation of funds within the 2-year time frame. Treasury officials said that they currently have no plans to use this authority but retain the ability to do so in the future. Nevertheless, formal guidelines on how Treasury will use this authority could help ensure consistent use of the authority if used in the future and provide clarity to states about the consequences of not using the funds in a timely manner.
Treasury has taken steps to evaluate SBLF's and SSBCI's performance but could enhance public reporting of program outcome information. In a quarterly report to Congress, Treasury compares business lending in SBLF participants to a large comparison group that it adjusted for certain aspects of bank size and geography. GAO's analysis using a peer group that was adjusted for financial health as well geography and size showed that in nearly every case, the difference in total business lending growth was somewhat smaller than in Treasury's analysis. Treasury considered using a more refined peer group that adjusted for these factors but judged that the differences were not significant. However, Treasury did not disclose these options in the report or explain why the larger comparison group was chosen, which compromised the transparency of Treasury's methodology. Furthermore, Treasury's approach did not isolate the impact of SBLF from other factors that could affect lending, as GAO recommended in its first SBLF report. Treasury officials said they are continuing to explore evaluation approaches, including collecting additional data from a survey of SBLF institutions. In response to GAO's 2011 recommendation on SSBCI performance measures, Treasury has designed performance measures, such as the amount of private leverage states have achieved with SSBCI funds. However, Treasury has not yet developed a way to make this performance information public. Treasury shares information with the states through conferences and technical assistance, but performance information could help Congress and the states to better understand the effectiveness of SSBCI's various programs.
What GAO Recommends
Treasury should develop a policy on how it will use its authority to terminate SSBCI funds. Treasury should also expand its methodology discussion in SBLF reports and make the results of SSBCI performance measures public. |
gao_GAO-09-902T | gao_GAO-09-902T_0 | DCPS Quickly Implemented Many Separate Initiatives to Improve Overall Student Performance and Is Refocusing Its Approach as It Moves Forward
During the first 2 years of its reform efforts, DCPS implemented several classroom-based initiatives to improve students’ basic skills in core subjects. For example, to improve students’ basic skills and standardized test scores in reading and math, DCPS introduced targeted interventions for students struggling in these subjects and provided additional instruction and practice to improve students’ responses to open-ended questions, including test questions. Table 1 provides a list of DCPS’s major initiatives to improve student outcomes, as well as descriptions and the status of these initiatives. The D.C. Council and several community groups have criticized the process for its lack of transparency and questioned the fairness of the decisions made. For example, it established guidance about what changes it will allow principals to make to the staffing model and disseminated this guidance to school leaders at the beginning of the budgeting process. DCPS Replaced Teachers and Principals and Introduced Professional Development Initiatives, but Encountered Challenges in Implementation
DCPS focused on a workforce replacement strategy to strengthen teacher and principal quality. After the 2007-2008 school year, about one-fifth of the teachers and one-third of the principals resigned, retired, or were terminated from DCPS. DCPS terminated about 350 teachers and an additional 400 teachers accepted financial incentives offered by DCPS to resign or retire in the spring of 2008. In addition, DCPS did not renew the contracts of 42 principals. To replace the teachers and principals who left the system, DCPS launched a nationwide recruitment effort for the 2008- 2009 school year and hired 566 teachers and 46 principals for the 2008- 2009 school year. The State Superintendent’s Office and DCPS Have Developed and Begun Implementing Strategic Plans; However, DCPS Has Not Always Involved Relevant Stakeholders in Planning and Implementing Key Initiatives
The state superintendent’s office and DCPS each developed their 5-year strategic plans and involved stakeholders in the process. The state superintendent’s office and the State Board of Education collaboratively developed the District’s state- level, 5-year strategic plan, and released it in October 2008. DCPS released the draft of its 5-year strategic plan in late October 2008. In contrast to the state-level plan which includes the public charter schools, the DCPS plan is specific to prekindergarten through grade 12 education in its 128 schools. DCPS recently increased its efforts to involve stakeholders in various initiatives; however, it has not always involved stakeholders in key decisions and initiatives. DCPS and the State Superintendent’s Office Have Taken Steps to Improve Accountability and Performance, and DCPS Has Yet to Align Key Aspects of Its Performance Management System to Organizational Goals
DCPS has taken steps to improve accountability and performance of its central office. To improve accountability for central office departments, DCPS developed departmental scorecards to identify and assess performance expectations for each department. The state superintendent’s office also implemented a new performance management system, effective October 2008, to hold its employees accountable and improve the office’s performance. The office is converting to a single electronic management system to track and evaluate employee performance by December 2009. In addition to implementing a performance management system, the State Superintendent has begun to address long-term deficiencies identified by Education related to federal grant management. Education designated the District as a high-risk grantee because of its poor management of federal grants. The state superintendent’s office developed a corrective action plan, which it reports to Education and intends to use the plan to strengthen the monitoring of the school districts. Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve Sustainability of Reform Efforts
The District’s Mayor and his education team have taken bold steps to improve the learning environment of the District’s students. In addition, since the Reform Act, the District has taken several steps to improve central office operations, such as providing more accountability at the departmental level and implementing a new individual performance management system. Link individual performance evaluations to the agency’s overall goals. In written comments on the report, all three District education offices— DCPS, the state superintendent’s office and the Deputy Mayor for Education—concurred with our recommendations. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony presents information on the District of Columbia's (D.C. or the District) progress in reforming its public school system. The District's school system has had long-standing problems with student academic performance, the condition of school facilities, and its overall management. The District's public schools have fallen well behind the District's own targets for demonstrating adequate yearly progress toward meeting the congressionally mandated goal of having 100 percent of students proficient in math, reading, and science by 2014, as outlined in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA). In addition, the U. S. Department of Education (Education) designated the District as a high-risk grantee in April 2006 because of its poor management of federal grants. Of the nearly $762 million the District spends on D. C. public schools (DCPS), 16 percent comes from federal sources. In an effort to address the school system's long-standing problems, the Council of the District of Columbia (D.C. Council) approved the Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007 (Reform Act), which made major changes to the operations and governance of the school district. The Reform Act gave the Mayor broad authority over the District's public school system, including curricula, operations, budget, personnel, and school facilities. In doing so, the District joined a growing number of cities to adopt mayoral governance of public school systems in an effort to expedite major reforms. The Reform Act transferred the day-to-day management of the public schools from the Board of Education to the Mayor and placed DCPS under the Mayor's office as a cabinet-level agency. It also moved the state functions into a new state superintendent's office, established a separate facilities office, and created the D.C. Department of Education headed by the Deputy Mayor for Education. Because of the broad changes in governance, Congress asked GAO to evaluate the District's reform efforts. In our report, we addressed the following questions: (1) What steps has the District taken to address student academic achievement? (2) What actions has the District taken to strengthen the quality of teachers and principals? (3) To what extent have the District's education offices developed and implemented long-term plans and how has DCPS used stakeholder input in key initiatives? (4) What steps have DCPS and the state superintendent's office taken to improve their accountability and performance?
What GAO Found
DCPS's early efforts to improve student achievement focused on implementing initiatives to improve student performance, including implementing a new staffing model; restructuring underperforming schools; and creating and enhancing data systems. During the first 2 years of its reform efforts, DCPS implemented several classroom-based initiatives to improve students' basic skills in core subjects. For example, to improve students' basic skills and standardized test scores in reading and math, DCPS introduced targeted interventions for students struggling in these subjects and provided additional instruction and practice to improve students' responses to open-ended questions, including test questions. DCPS is also attempting to improve the quality of its teacher and principal workforce by hiring new teachers and principals and by providing professional development, but it has encountered challenges in effectively implementing these changes. DCPS focused on a workforce replacement strategy to strengthen teacher and principal quality. After the 2007-2008 school year, about one-fifth of the teachers and one-third of the principals resigned, retired, or were terminated from DCPS. DCPS terminated about 350 teachers and an additional 400 teachers accepted financial incentives offered by DCPS to resign or retire in the spring of 2008. In addition, DCPS did not renew the contracts of 42 principals. To replace the teachers and principals who left the system, DCPS launched a nationwide recruitment effort for the 2008-2009 school year and hired 566 teachers and 46 principals for the 2008-2009 school year. The state superintendent's office and DCPS each developed 5-year strategic plans and involved stakeholders in developing these plans. DCPS released the draft of its 5-year strategic plan in late October 2008. In contrast to the state-level plan which includes the public charter schools, the DCPS plan is specific to prekindergarten through grade 12 education in its 128 schools. DCPS recently increased its efforts to involve stakeholders in various initiatives; however, it has not always involved stakeholders in key decisions and initiatives. DCPS and the state superintendent's office also have taken steps to improve accountability and performance of their offices. While DCPS has taken steps to improve accountability and link its individual performance management system to organizational goals, it has not yet linked its employee expectations and performance evaluations to organizational goals. DCPS has taken steps to improve accountability and performance of its central office. To improve accountability for central office departments, DCPS developed departmental scorecards to identify and assess performance expectations for each department. The state superintendent's office also implemented a new performance management system, effective October 2008, to hold its employees accountable and improve the office's performance. The office is converting to a single electronic management system to track and evaluate employee performance by December 2009. |
gao_GAO-16-125 | gao_GAO-16-125_0 | Medicare Payment for Dialysis Care
Medicare uses different methods to pay (1) dialysis facilities for providing dialysis treatments to patients and for training them to perform home dialysis and (2) physicians for managing patients’ dialysis care and educating them about their condition. Percentage of Patients on Home Dialysis Generally Declined between 1988 and 2008 and then Slightly Increased; Stakeholder Estimates Suggest Potential for Future Growth
Historical trends in the overall percentage of all dialysis patients on home dialysis—including both Medicare and non-Medicare patients—show a general decrease between 1988 and 2008 and a more recent increase thereafter through 2012. According to USRDS data, 16 percent of 104,200 dialysis patients received home dialysis in 1988. Home dialysis use generally decreased over the next 20 years, reaching 9 percent in 2008, and then slightly increased to 11 percent of 450,600 dialysis patients in 2012—the most recent year of data available from USRDS. Estimates from dialysis experts and other stakeholders suggest that further increases in the use of home dialysis are possible over the long term. As another example, physician stakeholders we interviewed estimated that 15 to 25 percent of dialysis patients could realistically be on home dialysis. In the short term, however, an ongoing shortage of peritoneal dialysis solution has reduced the use of home dialysis, and this shortage could have a long-term impact as well. Incentives for Facilities to Provide Home Dialysis May Have Limited Impact in Short Term
Medicare payments to dialysis facilities, including those that provided home dialysis, gave them an overall financial incentive to provide dialysis, as shown by their generally positive Medicare margins. When CMS established the current payment system, it stated that its decision to have a single payment rate regardless of the type of dialysis would give facilities a powerful financial incentive to encourage the use of home dialysis, when appropriate. In contrast, increasing home dialysis resulted in a smaller benefit. For example, although the average cost of an in-center hemodialysis treatment is typically higher than the average cost of a peritoneal dialysis treatment, facilities may be able to add an in- center patient without incurring the cost of an additional dialysis machine because each machine can be used by six to eight patients. Reliable cost report data are important for CMS to be able to perform effective fiscal management of the program, which involves assessing the adequacy of payment rates. Medicare Payment Policies and Limited Nephrology Training May Constrain Physicians’ Prescribing of Home Dialysis
Medicare physician payments for dialysis care do not consistently result in incentives for physicians to prescribe home dialysis. Medicare Physician Payments May Not Consistently Result in Incentives to Prescribe Home Dialysis
We found that the structure of Medicare’s monthly physician payments— one of several factors that could affect the use of home dialysis—may give physicians a disincentive for prescribing home dialysis, which could undermine CMS’s goal of encouraging the use of home dialysis when appropriate. Payment Limitations on Categories of Providers and Patients for Kidney Disease Education Benefit May Constrain Its Use
Few Medicare patients have used the KDE benefit, which covers the choice of therapy (such as in-center hemodialysis, home dialysis, or kidney transplant) and the management of comorbidities, and stakeholders generally told us this low usage was related to payment limitations on the types of providers who are permitted to furnish the benefit and on the Medicare patients eligible to receive it. According to USRDS, less than 2 percent of eligible Medicare patients used the KDE benefit in 2010 and 2011—the first two years it was available—and use of the benefit has decreased since then. Conclusions
The number and percentage of patients choosing to dialyze at home have increased in recent years, and our interviews with home dialysis experts and stakeholders indicated potential for future growth. If training payments are inadequate, facilities may be less willing to provide home dialysis. The Administrator of CMS should examine Medicare policies for monthly payments to physicians to manage the care of dialysis patients and revise them if necessary to ensure that these policies are consistent with CMS’s goal of encouraging the use of home dialysis among patients for whom it is appropriate. In response to our first recommendation that CMS improve the reliability of cost report data for training and treatment associated with specific types of dialysis, HHS said that it is willing to consider reasonable modifications to the cost report that could improve the reliability of cost report data. HHS did not concur with our third recommendation that CMS examine the KDE benefit and, if appropriate, seek legislation to revise the categories of providers and patients eligible for the benefit. We noted in the report that certain visits for managing in-center patients can be provided via telehealth. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, Medicare spent about $11.7 billion on dialysis care for about 376,000 Medicare patients with end-stage renal disease, a condition of permanent kidney failure. Some of these patients performed dialysis at home, and such patients may have increased autonomy and health-related quality of life.
GAO was asked to study Medicare patients' use of home dialysis and key factors affecting its use. This report examines (1) trends in home dialysis use and estimates of the potential for wider use, (2) incentives for home dialysis associated with Medicare payments to dialysis facilities, and (3) incentives for home dialysis associated with Medicare payments to physicians. GAO reviewed CMS policies and relevant laws and regulations, and GAO analyzed data from CMS (2010-2015), the United States Renal Data System (1988-2012), and Medicare cost reports (2012), the most recent years with complete data available. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, selected dialysis facility chains, physician and patient associations, and experts on home dialysis.
What GAO Found
The percentage of dialysis patients who received home dialysis generally declined between 1988 and 2008 and then slightly increased thereafter through 2012, and stakeholder estimates suggest that future increases in the use of home dialysis are possible. Dialysis patients can receive treatments at home or in a facility. In 1988, 16 percent of 104,200 dialysis patients received home dialysis. Home dialysis use generally decreased over the next 20 years, reaching 9 percent in 2008, and then slightly increased to 11 percent of 450,600 dialysis patients in 2012—the most recent year of data for Medicare and non-Medicare patients. Physicians and other stakeholders estimated that 15 to 25 percent of patients could realistically be on home dialysis, suggesting that future increases in use are possible. In the short term, however, an ongoing shortage of supplies required for peritoneal dialysis—the most common type of home dialysis—reduced home dialysis use among Medicare patients from August 2014 to March 2015. Some stakeholders were also concerned the shortage could have a long-term impact.
Medicare's payment policy likely gives facilities financial incentives to provide home dialysis, but these incentives may have a limited impact in the short term. According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), setting the facility payment for dialysis treatment at the same rate regardless of the type of dialysis gives facilities a powerful financial incentive to encourage the use of peritoneal dialysis when appropriate because it is generally less costly than other dialysis types. However, GAO found that facilities also have financial incentives in the short term to increase provision of hemodialysis in facilities, rather than increasing home dialysis. This is consistent with information from CMS and stakeholders GAO interviewed. For example, facilities may be able to add an in-center patient without paying for an additional dialysis machine, because each machine can be used by six to eight in-center patients. In contrast, for each new home patient, facilities may need to pay for an additional machine. The adequacy of Medicare payments for home dialysis training also affects facilities' financial incentives for home dialysis. Although CMS recently increased its payment for home dialysis training, it lacks reliable cost report data needed for effective fiscal management, which involves assessing payment adequacy. In particular, if training payments are inadequate, facilities may be less willing to provide home dialysis.
Medicare payment policies may constrain physicians' prescribing of home dialysis. Specifically, Medicare's monthly payments to physicians for managing the care of home patients are often lower than for managing in-center patients even though physician stakeholders generally said that the time required may be similar. Medicare also pays for predialysis education—the Kidney Disease Education (KDE) benefit—which could help patients learn about home dialysis. However, less than 2 percent of eligible Medicare patients received the benefit in 2010 and 2011, and use has declined since then. According to stakeholders, the low usage was due to statutory limitations in the categories of providers and patients eligible for the benefit. CMS has established a goal of encouraging home dialysis use among patients for whom it is appropriate, but the differing monthly payments and low usage of the KDE benefit could undermine this goal.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS (1) take steps to improve the reliability of the cost report data, (2) examine and, if necessary, revise policies for paying physicians to manage the care of dialysis patients, and (3) examine and, if appropriate, seek legislation to revise the KDE benefit. HHS concurred with the first two recommendations but did not concur with the third. GAO continues to believe this recommendation is valid as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-02-73 | gao_GAO-02-73_0 | Background
DOD’s health care program—TRICARE—provides health care services to active duty military members and their dependents and military retirees and their dependents. Also, Medicare-eligible uniformed services retirees age 65 and over and their spouses, dependents and survivors are entitled to TRICARE benefits as of October 1, 2001—referred to as TRICARE For Life (TFL). Number of Program Participants and Program Costs Differ Significantly
As of June 2001, there were a total of 38 participants in ICMP-PEC whose services for the fiscal year were projected to cost about $6 million. PFPWD Is Accessible but Changes May Reduce Caseloads
Regional program managers generally agreed that PFPWD is meeting its goal of financially assisting disabled ADFMs with their special health care service and equipment needs. The 2001 Defense Authorization Act eliminated copayments for TRICARE Prime but not for PFPWD participants, effective April 1, 2001. Data are not available, however, on how many PFPWD participants are affected by the program’s $1,000 monthly benefit limit. ICMP-PEC and PFPWD Benefits Are Better Than or Comparable to Other Programs and Plans
Comparing ICMP-PEC’s unlimited home health and SNF benefits with Medicare and Medicaid showed that ICMP-PEC’s benefits are more generous. ICMP-PEC’s home benefit is up to 24 hours a day of skilled nursing care, 7 days a week. Currently, ICMP-PEC lacks a clearly enunciated purpose, well-defined eligibility criteria and benefits, and an efficient application process thereby impeding beneficiary access. Recommendations
To ensure that DOD’s active duty and retired beneficiaries and dependents with seriously disabling conditions can readily access needed services and equipment,we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to take the following actions aimed at improving ICMP-PEC: clarify ICMP-PEC’s purpose, eligibility criteria, and service coverage and provide guidance to better equip regional program managers in administering the program and target groups in understanding it; provide guidance on how the legislative changes made to ICMP-PEC since its inception are to be implemented; and make needed improvements to TMA’s ICMP-PEC records to ensure that they capture the actual case-by-case cost data needed to properly plan and manage the current program. | What GAO Found
The military's health program--TRICARE--provides medical care to about 8.3 million active duty service members and retired beneficiaries and their dependents and survivors. The Department of Defense (DOD) also provides benefits for persons severely disabled by physical or mental problems through its Individual Case Management Program for Persons with Extraordinary Conditions (ICMP-PEC) and for less severely disabled active duty dependents through its Program for Persons with Disabilities (PFPWD). Recently, military families and advocacy groups have raised concerns about accessing ICMP-PEC benefits. Also, the DOD Authorization Act for 2001 entitled military retirees age 65 and older and their dependents and survivors to TRICARE benefits for life which may have caseload and cost effects on ICMP-PEC. As of June 2001, 38 ICMP-PEC participants were projected to receive $6 million in services in fiscal year 2001, Their annual per-case costs were projected to range from $13,000 to $382,000. ICMP-PEC now lacks a clear purpose, well-defined eligibility criteria and benefits, and an efficient application process. In contrast, PFPWD is an established program with well defined criteria and benefits that assist thousands of ADFMs with their special health care service and equipment needs. Also, before April 2001, PFPWD provided many services and equipment at modest cost to ADFMs with severe disabilities that were also available at higher copayments to less seriously disabled ADFMS under TRICARE Basics. Data are unavailable on how many PFPWD participants are affected by the program's $1,000 monthly benefit limit. A comparison of ICMP-PEC's home care benefit of up to 24 hours of skilled nursing care per day, seven days per week-and unlimited skilled nursing facility coverage with Medicare and selected Medicaid programs showed that ICMP-PEC's benefits are more generous. |
gao_GAO-17-704 | gao_GAO-17-704_0 | ATA Funding Allocations for Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016
As shown in figure 1, in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, State allocated approximately $715 million to the ATA program for training, mentoring, equipment, and other services to help partner nations build or enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. State Officials and Contractors Have Taken Various Steps to Ensure that Domestic Tactical Training Facilities Used by ATA Align with Security Requirements
State Has Taken Steps to Oversee the Contract for ATA Training, Which Includes General Requirements for Facility Security
State’s steps to oversee the security of the tactical training facilities used for domestic ATA training are predicated on the GATA contract. State officials said that it is the responsibility of the prime contractors to ensure that the training facility subcontractors have the necessary federal, state, and local permits for the storage of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Weaknesses Exist in ATA Data and Oversight of Participants, Some of Whom May Still Be in the United States
ATA Course and Participant Data Are Incomplete and Sometimes Inaccurate
ATA program data on the courses that ATA delivered in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and the participants of those courses, are incomplete and inaccurate. Without management efforts to ensure the implementation of ATA’s revised procedures, ATA will lack reasonable assurance that its data collection efforts will improve data completeness and accuracy, and officials may not be able to accurately report the number of participants trained, in line with program performance indicators. State and DHS Have Acted on Incidents of Participants’ Unauthorized Departures from Domestic ATA Training Activities
State and DHS have acted on 10 documented participant unauthorized departures from ATA training activities in the United States since fiscal year 2012. However, ATA officials noted that the procedures were not always followed. ATA officials told us that they had asked the U.S. Without a process to confirm and document that ATA participants return to their home countries, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to which participants are making use of training to help detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism, in line with program goals. In addition, without some way to identify ATA participants who do not return home and, therefore, may have remained in the United States following the completion of ATA training, ATA may not be able to provide information to DHS about participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement action. Officials told us that procedures for the collection of course and participant data have been inconsistently implemented. (Recommendation 1)
The Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security should develop and implement a process to confirm and document whether future ATA participants return to their home countries following the completion of ATA training and, for any participants trained in the United States who do not, share relevant information with the Department of Homeland Security. Having received evidence that State had provided the relevant information to DHS, we removed this recommendation from the final report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what steps the Department of State (State) has taken to ensure that facilities used for Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training in the United States align with applicable facility and equipment security requirements, we analyzed the security requirements in the Global Antiterrorism Training (GATA) contract, which is used to secure third- party services to manage and deliver ATA training activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
State's ATA program aims to enhance foreign partners' capabilities to prevent acts of terrorism, address terrorism incidents when they do occur, and apprehend and prosecute those involved in such acts. In fiscal years 2012 through 2016, State allocated about $715 million to the ATA program, which it reports to have used to train about 56,000 security force officials from more than 34 partner nations. At least 2,700 of those participants were trained at facilities in the United States.
GAO was asked to review ATA program management. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) State's ability to oversee ATA participants trained in the United States and (2) the steps State has taken to ensure that facilities used for domestic ATA training align with applicable security requirements. GAO conducted fieldwork at two domestic training facilities selected because they provide tactical training; analyzed State and DHS data and documentation related to fiscal year 2012 through 2016 domestic training participants; and interviewed State and DHS officials, including those who oversee ATA training for three partner nations receiving significant ATA training. GAO also interviewed contractors who help implement the ATA program and analyzed related documents.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses exist in Department of State (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program data and oversight of participants, including those trained in the United States. ATA course and participant data are incomplete and sometimes inaccurate, despite ATA's procedures for the collection of those data. ATA officials told GAO that procedures were not always followed. Without ensuring the implementation of procedures to collect complete and accurate program data, officials may not be able to accurately report the number of participants trained, in line with program performance indicators. Among participants trained in the United States since 2012, ATA has documented 10 participant unauthorized departures from ATA activities and provided related information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for follow-up. In addition to these 10, ATA recently identified 20 ATA participants trained in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 for whom departure from the United States following the completion of training is unconfirmed. ATA officials told GAO there is no formal process to confirm participants' return to their home countries following the completion of training (see fig.). Without such a process, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to which it is using training in line with program goals. Further, State may not be able to provide information to DHS about participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement action.
State and the contractors who implement ATA training have taken steps to ensure that facilities used for domestic training align with applicable security requirements. State's ATA training contract requires the secure storage of weapons and explosives and that the contractors have the relevant federal, state, and local permits. State reports overseeing the contractors through the receipt of copies of relevant licenses such as those required for possessing explosives; visits to the training facilities, including surveys examining storage security; and frequent meetings. Both of the domestic tactical training facilities that GAO visited had relevant licenses and, during site visits, GAO observed some suggested security measures, including fences, secured gates, and security patrols.
What GAO Recommends
State should ensure implementation of its data collection procedures and establish a process to confirm and document participants' return to their home countries. State agreed with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-624 | gao_GAO-06-624_0 | Federal Wood Utilization Research and Product Development Activities Fall into Five Categories and Are Coordinated Both Informally and Formally
Wood utilization research and product development conducted by 12 federal agencies span a broad spectrum of activities, and coordination of these activities is both formal and informal. These activities fall into five broad categories: (1) harvesting, (2) wood properties, (3) manufacturing and processing, (4) products and testing, and (5) economics and marketing. All 12 agencies had activities in the manufacturing and processing category. The Forest Service and CSREES were the only two agencies that had wood utilization research and product development activities in all five categories. Scientists share information at scientific and industry conferences and professional meetings and through publications, and in some cases work informally to share staff and equipment. Federal Agencies Made Available at Least $54 Million Annually for Wood Utilization Research and Product Development in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005; Forest Service Support Fluctuated Moderately, and CSREES Support Increased Over 10 Years
The 12 federal agencies we reviewed made available at least $54 million annually in financial support for wood utilization research and product development activities in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, measured either in budget authority or expenditures. Furthermore, the Forest Service employed almost 175 scientists and support staff in each of these two fiscal years. Over the same period, overall, CSREES’ budget authority for the wood utilization research centers increased (in 2004 inflation-adjusted dollars), in part because four new wood utilization research centers were added during fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2004. Of the 12 agencies, only the Forest Service directly employs full-time scientists and support staff to conduct wood utilization research and product development. Federal Agencies Rely on Scientists and Specialists to Transfer Technology Through a Variety of Methods
The 12 federal agencies generally rely on scientists and technology transfer specialists to transfer technologies to industry through a variety of methods, such as information dissemination, technical assistance, demonstration projects, and patents and licensing. Applying Forest Products Laboratory research, TMU specialists helped the company specialize in producing flooring from small-diameter trees by, among other things, providing solutions to product imperfections like warping and discoloration. The Forest Service, DOT, Energy, and Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) the types of wood utilization research and product development activities supported by federal agencies and how these efforts are coordinated; (2) the level of support federal agencies made available for these activities in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and changes in the level of support at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and at the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)-funded wood utilization research centers from fiscal years 1995 through 2005; and (3) how the federal government transfers technologies and products from its wood utilization research and product development activities to industry. To address the second objective—describe the level of support federal agencies made available for wood utilization research and product development activities in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and changes in the level of support at the Forest Service and CSREES wood utilization research centers from fiscal years 1995 through 2005—we collected budget authority or expenditure information from the 12 agencies for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and from the Forest Service and CSREES’ wood utilization centers for fiscal years 1995 through 2005. We reported dollars in either budget authority or expenditure data, depending on the availability of agency data. | Why GAO Did This Study
More wood is consumed every year in the United States than all metals, plastics, and masonry cement combined. To maximize their use of wood, forest product companies rely on research into new methods for using wood. At least 12 federal agencies have provided support to wood utilization research and product development activities, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)-funded wood utilization research centers, which historically have specifically targeted support to these activities. GAO was asked to identify (1) the types of wood utilization research and product development activities federal agencies support and how these activities are coordinated; (2) the level of support federal agencies made available for these activities in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and changes in the level of support at the Forest Service and at the CSREES-funded wood utilization research centers for fiscal years 1995 through 2005; and (3) how the federal government transfers the technologies and products from its wood utilization research and product development activities to industry. GAO provided a draft of this report to the 12 federal agencies for review and comment. Some of the agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Federal wood utilization research and product development span a broad spectrum of activities. These activities fall into five categories: harvesting, wood properties, manufacturing and processing, products and testing, and economics and marketing. Of the 12 federal agencies that provided support to wood utilization research and product development, only the Forest Service and the CSREES-funded wood utilization centers had activities in all five categories; although all the agencies had activities in manufacturing and processing. Coordination of these activities is both informal and formal. Scientists informally coordinate their activities by conferring with each other and sharing information at conferences and professional meetings and through publications. In some cases, coordination occurs through more formal mechanisms, such as cooperative arrangements and other joint ventures. During fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the 12 federal agencies made available at least $54 million annually for wood utilization research and product development activities, measured either in budget authority or expenditures. (Dollars are reported in either budget authority or expenditure data, depending on the availability of agency data.) The Forest Service made available about half of these funds. In addition, the Forest Service--the only agency that directly employs scientists and support staff to conduct wood utilization research and product development--reported having almost 175 full-time equivalent scientists and support staff in each of these years. For fiscal years 1995 through 2005, the Forest Service's budget authority for wood utilization research and product development activities fluctuated moderately from year-to-year (in inflationadjusted dollars). In contrast, overall, CSREES' budget authority for the wood utilization research centers increased over the period (in inflation-adjusted dollars), in part because of the addition of four new wood utilization research centers between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. To transfer technologies and products to industry, federal agencies generally rely on scientists and technology transfer specialists, who use methods such as information sharing, technical assistance, and demonstration projects. For example, applying research from the Forest Products Laboratory, Forest Service technology transfer specialists assisted a small forest products company in producing flooring from small trees by, among other things, providing solutions to product imperfections like warping and discoloration. |
gao_GAO-06-770 | gao_GAO-06-770_0 | 1). The Border Patrol Implemented the Border Safety Initiative in June 1998
In response to concerns about the number of migrants who are injured or die while attempting to cross the border, the INS implemented the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) and a number of related programs beginning in June 1998. The primary objectives of the BSI are to reduce injuries among migrants and to prevent migrant deaths in the southwest border region. As of October 2005, the Border Patrol had deployed 164 BORSTAR agents within its nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest border. Because many migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally may not carry identification, the BSI also attempts to identify those who have died while crossing the border. BSI and NCHS Data Show That, Since the Late 1990s, Increases in Deaths along the Southwest Border Were Accounted for by Increases in Deaths in the Tucson Sector
Our analysis of the BSI and NCHS data shows consistent trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of deaths over time. 2). To the extent that an increased number of apprehensions generally can be assumed to represent an increased number of migrants attempting illegal entry, the inverse relationship between apprehensions and deaths in Tucson suggests that deaths have increased despite the fact that there has not been a corresponding increase in the number of people attempting to cross in that sector. A Number of Factors Would Need to Be Considered in Order to Assess Cause and Effect Relationships between Migrant Crossings, Border Enforcement, the BSI, and Related Efforts
Because multiple factors beyond the efforts of the BSI may potentially affect the number of border-crossing deaths in any given year, the influence of each would need to be taken into account and measured in relation to the number of migrant deaths in order to accurately assess the impact of the BSI. Measuring the effectiveness of the BSI in reducing border-crossing deaths would require a comparison of changes in the number of migrant deaths with changes in other causal factors—such as the Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts, the number of migrants attempting to cross the border illegally, and weather conditions, as well as changes in how and where the BSI is implemented over time. For example, changes in the Border Patrol’s enforcement efforts might lead to shifts in the locations where migrants attempt to cross. Because both the NCHS and BSI data indicate that the problem of migrant border-crossing deaths has been growing in recent years, it is important to continue to improve the available data about these deaths by refining methods for tracking and recording deaths, including procedures for communicating with local authorities in order to share information about all potential cases of border-crossing deaths that occur within the BSI target zone. (3) To what extent do existing data allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and other Border Patrol efforts to prevent border- crossing deaths? Methods Used to Identify Trends in Federal Data on the Numbers, Locations, Causes, and Characteristics of Border-Crossing Deaths
We analyzed specific data elements in the BSI data that were relevant to our analysis of border-crossing deaths. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reports in recent years have indicated that increasing numbers of migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally die while crossing the southwest border. The Border Patrol implemented the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) in 1998 with the intention of reducing injuries and preventing deaths among migrants that attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO assessed: (1) Trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of border-crossing deaths. (2) Differences among the Border Patrol sectors in implementing the BSI methodology. (3) The extent to which existing data allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and other efforts to prevent border-crossing deaths.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of data from the BSI, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), and studies of state vital registries shows consistent trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of migrant border-crossing deaths that occurred along the southwest border between 1985 and 2005. Since 1995, the number of border-crossing deaths increased and by 2005 had more than doubled. This increase in deaths occurred despite the fact that, according to published estimates, there was not a corresponding increase in the number of illegal entries. Further, GAO's analysis also shows that more than three-fourths of the doubling in deaths along the southwest border since 1995 can be attributed to increases in deaths occurring in the Arizona desert. Differences among the BSI sector coordinators in collecting and recording data on border-crossing deaths may have resulted in the BSI data understating the number of deaths in some regions. Despite these differences, our analysis of the BSI data shows trends that are consistent with trends identified in the NCHS and state vital registry data. However, the Border Patrol needs to continue to improve its methods for collecting data in order to accurately record deaths as changes occur in the locations where migrants attempt to cross the border--and consequently where migrants die. Improved data collection would allow the Border Patrol to continue to use the data for making accurate planning and resource allocation decisions. Comprehensive evaluations of the BSI and other efforts by the Border Patrol to prevent border-crossing deaths are challenged by data and measurement limitations. However, the Border Patrol has not addressed these limitations to sufficiently support its assertions about the effectiveness of some of its efforts to reduce border-crossing deaths. For instance, it has not used multivariate statistical methods to control for the influences of measurable variables that could affect deaths, such as changes in the number of migrants attempting to cross the border. |
gao_GAO-14-354 | gao_GAO-14-354_0 | Cyber incidents reported by federal agencies increased in fiscal year 2013 significantly over the prior 3 years (see fig. Federal Law and Policy Establish a Framework for Managing Cyber Risks
FISMA sets up a layered framework for managing cyber risks and assigns specific responsibilities to (1) OMB, including to develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines for information security; to report, at least annually, on agency compliance with the act; and to approve or disapprove agency information security programs; (2) agency heads, including to provide information security protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the agency; (3) agency heads and chief information officers, including to develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security program; (4) inspectors general, to conduct annual independent evaluations of agency efforts to effectively implement information security; and (5) NIST, to provide standards and guidance to agencies on information security. Agencies Did Not Consistently Demonstrate Effective Cyber Incident Response Practices
Based on our statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012, we estimate that the 24 agencies did not effectively or consistently demonstrate actions taken in response to a detected incident in about 65 percent of reported incidents. Further, although the 6 selected agencies we reviewed had developed policies, plans, and procedures to guide their incident response activities, such efforts were not comprehensive or consistent with federal requirements. Our sample indicates that agencies demonstrated that they had contained the majority of their cyber incidents. However, selected agencies’ policies, plans, and procedures did not always include key information. In addition, the current CyberStat reviews have not generally covered agencies’ cyber incident response practices, such as considering impact to aid in prioritizing incident response activities, recording key steps in responding to an incident, and documenting the costs for responding to an incident. Without addressing response practices in these reviews, OMB and DHS may be missing opportunities to help agencies improve their information security posture and more effectively respond to cyber incidents. DHS components, including US-CERT, offer services that assist agencies in preparing to handle incidents, maintain awareness of the current threat environment, and deal with ongoing incidents. Based on responses to our survey, officials at 24 major agencies were generally satisfied with DHS’s service offerings, although they identified improvements they believe would make certain services more useful, such as improving reporting requirements. US-CERT Receives Feedback to Improve Services, but Has Not Yet Developed Performance Measures for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Assistance Provided to Agencies
We and othersmeasures that demonstrate results. However, without results-oriented performance measures, US-CERT will face challenges in ensuring it is effectively assisting federal agencies with preparing for and responding to cyber incidents. However, agencies did not consistently demonstrate that they responded to cyber incidents in an effective manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of governmentwide cyber incident response activities, we recommend that the Director of OMB and Secretary of Homeland Security address agency incident response practices governmentwide, in particular through CyberStat meetings, such as emphasizing the recording of key steps in responding to an incident. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate the extent to which (1) federal agencies are effectively responding to cyber incidents and (2) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides cyber incident assistance to agencies. First, we selected 6 agencies from the population of 24 major agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act, using probability proportionate to the number of cyber incidents those agencies had reported to US-CERT in fiscal year 2012, divided by 32,442—the total number of cyber incidents reported to US-CERT in fiscal year 2012—sampling without replacement. This statistical sample allowed us to project the results, with 95 percent confidence, to the 24 major agencies. To address the effectiveness with which agencies responded to a cyber incident, we reviewed documents (extracted from agencies’ incident tracking systems) covering the incidents in our sample to determine the extent to which the agencies had performed analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, reporting, and post-incident procedures in accordance with federal requirements and guidance and their own policies and procedures. In addition, we interviewed agency officials from the six agencies selected as part of our random sample regarding their interactions with DHS in receiving cyber incident assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The number of cyber incidents reported by federal agencies increased in fiscal year 2013 significantly over the prior 3 years (see figure). An effective response to a cyber incident is essential to minimize any damage that might be caused. DHS and US-CERT have a role in helping agencies detect, report, and respond to cyber incidents.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' ability to respond to cyber incidents. To do this, GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) federal agencies are effectively responding to cyber incidents and (2) DHS is providing cybersecurity incident assistance to agencies. To do this, GAO used a statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012 to project whether 24 major federal agencies demonstrated effective response activities. In addition, GAO evaluated incident response policies, plans, and procedures at 6 randomly-selected federal agencies to determine adherence to federal guidance. GAO also examined DHS and US-CERT policies, procedures, and practices, and surveyed officials from the 24 federal agencies on their experience receiving incident assistance from DHS.
What GAO Found
Twenty-four major federal agencies did not consistently demonstrate that they are effectively responding to cyber incidents (a security breach of a computerized system and information). Based on a statistical sample of cyber incidents reported in fiscal year 2012, GAO projects that these agencies did not completely document actions taken in response to detected incidents in about 65 percent of cases (with 95 percent confidence that the estimate falls between 58 and 72 percent). For example, agencies identified the scope of an incident in the majority of cases, but frequently did not demonstrate that they had determined the impact of an incident. In addition, agencies did not consistently demonstrate how they had handled other key activities, such as whether preventive actions to prevent the reoccurrence of an incident were taken. Although all 6 selected agencies that GAO reviewed in depth had developed parts of policies, plans, and procedures to guide their incident response activities, their efforts were not comprehensive or fully consistent with federal requirements. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct CyberStat reviews, which are intended to help federal agencies improve their information security posture, but the reviews have not addressed agencies' cyber incident response practices. Without complete policies, plans, and procedures, along with appropriate oversight of response activities, agencies face reduced assurance that they can effectively respond to cyber incidents.
DHS and a component, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), offer services that assist agencies in preparing to handle cyber incidents, maintain awareness of the current threat environment, and deal with ongoing incidents. Officials from the 24 agencies GAO surveyed said that they were generally satisfied with the assistance provided, and made suggestions to make the services more useful, such as improving reporting requirements. Although US-CERT receives feedback from agencies to improve its services, it has not yet developed performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of the assistance it provides to agencies. Without results-oriented performance measures, US-CERT will face challenges in ensuring it is effectively assisting federal agencies with preparing for and responding to cyber incidents.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to OMB and DHS to address incident response practices governmentwide, particularly in CyberStat meetings with agencies; to the heads of six agencies to strengthen their incident response policies, plans, and procedures; and to DHS to establish measures of effectiveness for the assistance US-CERT provides to agencies. The agencies generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-571 | gao_GAO-11-571_0 | Management involvement. PI firm business strategies. This study also found an increase in CNA staffing after PI acquisition. From 2003 to 2009, total deficiencies increased and the likelihood of a serious deficiency decreased in PI homes; the changes in these deficiency measures from 2003 to 2009 in other for-profit and nonprofit homes did not differ significantly from the changes in PI homes. Compared to Nonprofit Homes, PI Homes Were More Likely to Have Had a Serious Deficiency Before but Not After Acquisition
In 2009, PI homes did not differ significantly from nonprofit homes in the likelihood of a serious deficiency when we controlled for other explanatory factors, even though PI homes were more likely than nonprofit homes to have had a serious deficiency in 2003. Reported Total Nurse Staffing Ratios Were Lower in PI Homes, but Reported RN Ratios Increased More in PI Homes than Other Homes
On average, total reported nurse staffing ratios (hours per resident per day) were lower for PI homes than for other types of homes in both 2003 and 2009, but PI homes’ reported RN ratios—the most skilled component of total nurse staffing—increased more from 2003 to 2009. 3.) CNA ratios. PI Homes’ Financial Performance Showed Cost Increases and Higher Facility Margins Compared to Other Homes
The financial performance of PI homes showed both cost increases and higher margins when compared to other for-profit or nonprofit homes. Despite increased costs, PI homes also showed increased facility margins but the increase was not significantly different from the change in other for-profit homes. In contrast to PI and other for-profit homes, the margins of nonprofit homes decreased. Facility costs. The increase in facility costs per resident day from 2003 to 2008 was less, on average, if the same PI firm acquired both the operations and real estate than if it did not. Two PI firms’ homes showed increases that were greater than other homes acquired by PI firms: (1) one of these sets of homes, for which different PI firms acquired the operations and real estate, reported lower capital-related costs in 2003 than other PI homes, but higher costs in 2008 and (2) the other firm’s homes reported higher capital-related costs than other PI homes in both 2003 and 2008. The increase in facility margins among PI homes from 2003 to 2008 was not significantly different, on average, if the same PI firm acquired both the homes’ operations and the real estate than if it did not. Concluding Observations
The acquisition of nursing homes by private investment firms has raised questions about the potential effects on the quality of care. In fact, reported RN staffing increased more in PI- acquired homes than other homes. However, the performance of these PI homes was mixed with respect to the other quality variables we examined. Our findings were consistent with the fact that PI firms we studied are to varying degrees attempting to increase the attractiveness of their homes to higher paying residents, including those whose care is reimbursed by Medicare. In its written comments, HHS provided CMS’s observations on our methodology. CMS suggested an alternative to our “before and after” acquisition methodology to take into account the fact that PI firms acquired nursing homes at different points in time during 2004 through 2007. In addition, CMS identified a number of alternative analyses that it believed could help to explore the relationship between PI ownership and quality. CMS also acknowledged that the report is an important step toward better understanding the effect of nursing home ownership on the quality of care provided to residents. One of the studies we cited used such a methodology. We chose to use a different methodology and believe that the use of different methodologies enhances the understanding of an issue. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether nursing homes that are owned by private investment (PI) firms differ from other nursing homes in deficiencies cited on state surveys, nurse staffing levels, or financial performance, we (1) identified nursing homes for which PI firms had acquired the operations or the real estate or both from 2004 through 2007 and (2) compared data from before and after acquisition of these homes to data from other nursing homes, including other for-profit homes and nonprofit homes. Again, we statistically controlled for other variables that may influence deficiencies, staffing, and financial performance. Moreover, the 10 PI firms in our sample acquired about 94 percent of the nursing homes that were acquired by PI firms from 2004 through 2007; we could not identify the other approximately 6 percent of PI-acquired nursing homes, and as a result, some homes that we classified as other for-profit or nonprofit homes may have been PI-owned. | Why GAO Did This Study
Private investment (PI) firms' acquisition of several large nursing home chains led to concerns that the quality of care may have been adversely affected. These concerns may have been in part due to PI firms' business strategies and their lack of financial transparency compared to publicly traded companies. In September 2010, GAO reported on the extent of PI ownership of nursing homes and firms' involvement in the operations of homes they acquired. In this report, GAO examined how nursing homes that were acquired by PI firms changed from before acquisition or differed from other homes in: (1) deficiencies cited on state surveys, (2) nurse staffing levels, and (3) financial performance. GAO identified nursing homes that had been acquired by PI firms from 2004 through 2007 and then used data from CMS's Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting system and Medicare Skilled Nursing Facility Cost Reports to compare these PI homes to other forprofit and nonprofit homes. For PIacquired homes, GAO also compared homes for which the operations and real estate were owned by the same firm to those that were not. Because research has shown that other variables influence deficiencies, staffing, and financial performance, GAO statistically controlled--that is adjusted--for several factors, including the percent of residents for whom the payer is Medicare, facility size, occupancy rate, market competition, and state. Any differences GAO found cannot necessarily be attributed to PI ownership or acquisition.
What GAO Found
On average, PI and other for-profit homes had more total deficiencies than nonprofit homes both before (2003) and after (2009) acquisition. PI-acquired homes were also more likely to have been cited for a serious deficiency than nonprofit homes before, but not after, acquisition. Serious deficiencies involve actual harm or immediate jeopardy to residents. From 2003 to 2009, total deficiencies increased and the likelihood of a serious deficiency decreased in PI homes; these changes did not differ significantly from those in other homes. Reported average total nurse staffing ratios (hours per resident per day) were lower in PI homes than in other homes in both 2003 and 2009, but the staffing mix changed differently in PI homes. Staffing mix is the relative proportion of registered nurses (RN), licensed practical nurses (LPN), and certified nurse aides (CNA). RN ratios increased more from 2003 to 2009 in PI homes than in other homes, while CNA ratios increased more in other homes than in PI homes. The increase in RN ratios in PI homes from 2003 to 2009 was greater if the same PI firm acquired both operations and real estate than if not. The financial performance of PI homes showed both cost increases from 2003 to 2008 and higher margins in those years when compared to other for-profit or nonprofit homes. Facility costs as well as capital-related costs for PI homes increased more, on average, from 2003 to 2008 than for other ownership types. The increase was less if the same PI firm acquired both the operations and real estate than if it did not. In 2008, PI homes reported higher facility costs than other for-profit homes (but lower costs than nonprofit homes) and higher capital-related costs than other ownership types. Despite increased costs, PI homes also showed increased facility margins and the increase was not significantly different from that of other for-profit homes. In contrast, the margins of nonprofit homes decreased. Although the acquisition of nursing homes by PI firms raised questions about the potential effects on quality of care, GAO's analysis of data from before and after acquisition did not indicate an increase in the likelihood of serious deficiencies or a decrease in average reported total nurse staffing. The performance of these PI homes was mixed, however, with respect to the other quality variables GAO examined. We found differences among PI-acquired homes that reflected management decisions made by the firms and, to varying degrees, some of the changes in the PI firms we studied were consistent with attempts to increase their homes' attractiveness to higher paying residents. HHS provided CMS's observations on our methodology. CMS suggested an alternative to our "before and after" acquisition methodology to take into account the fact that PI firms acquired nursing homes at different points in time during 2004 through 2007. One of the studies we cited used such a methodology and we believe that the use of different methodologies enhances the understanding of an issue. CMS also identified a number of additional approaches for exploring the relationship between PI ownership and quality. We agree that such approaches merit future attention. CMS also acknowledged that the report is an important step toward better understanding the effect of nursing home ownership on the quality of care provided to residents. |
gao_GAO-08-285T | gao_GAO-08-285T_0 | Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE’s efforts to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major U.S. city has been surveyed. Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both Agencies from Developing a Strategy to Inform Cities about the Surveys
Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting surveys. In addition, DOE and DHS notified one city—Chicago—about the benefits of the surveys since we issued our report. DOE officials told us that the department is reluctant to conduct large numbers of additional surveys if cities request them because they have a limited number of helicopters, and these are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies. In short, in the absence of clear mission responsibility, neither DOE nor DHS has any plans to conduct additional surveys. DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities
DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at The Two Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE’s Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats
Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’ capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories include (1) teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) planes and helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location of radiological sources in U.S. cities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These capabilities took on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the country to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological attack. This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities and (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance. It is based on GAO's report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency response capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could be Strengthened [Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]).
What GAO Found
DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. One of these unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and DHS disagree about which department is responsible for informing cities about the surveys, and funding and conducting surveys if cities request them. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have not informed cities about the surveys and have not conducted any additional surveys. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes than can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. |
gao_T-GGD-98-63 | gao_T-GGD-98-63_0 | Adequacy of IRS’ Controls to Ensure Fair Treatment of Taxpayers Cannot Be Determined
The new IRS Commissioner and IRS management have expressed a commitment to ensure that taxpayers are treated properly. Even so, problems with current management information systems make it impossible to determine the extent to which allegations of taxpayer abuse and other taxpayer complaints have been reported, or the extent to which actions have been taken to address the complaints and prevent recurrence of systemic problems. That is because, as we reported to you in 1996, information systems currently maintained by IRS, Treasury OIG, and the Department of Justice do not capture the necessary management information. Treasury OIG and IRS Inspection Roles for Investigating Taxpayer Abuse Allegations
The 1988 amendments to the Inspectors General Act, which created the Treasury OIG, did not consolidate IRS Inspection into the Treasury OIG, but authorized the Treasury OIG to perform oversight of IRS Inspection and conduct audits and investigations of the IRS as appropriate. How Treasury OIG Assesses IRS’ Action in Response to Investigations or Referrals
Treasury OIG officials are to assess the adequacy of IRS’ actions in response to Treasury OIG investigations and referrals as follows: (1) IRS is required to make written responses on actions taken within 90 days and 120 days, respectively, on Treasury OIG investigative reports of completed investigations and Treasury OIG referrals for investigations or management action; (2) Treasury OIG investigators are to assess the adequacy of IRS’ responses before closing the Treasury OIG case; and (3) Treasury OIG’s Office of Oversight is to assess the overall effectiveness of IRS Inspection capabilities and systems through periodic operational reviews. Organizational Placement of IRS Inspection Remains Subject of Debate
At the Committee’s September 1997 IRS oversight hearings, some IRS employees raised concerns about the effectiveness of IRS Inspection and its independence from undue pressures and influence from IRS management. The Inspectors General Act provides guidance on the authorities, qualifications, safeguards, resources, and reporting requirements needed to ensure independent investigative and audit capabilities. No matter where IRS Inspection is placed organizationally, certain mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that it is held accountable and can achieve its mission without undue pressures or influence. The position was originally codified in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 1 as the Taxpayer Ombudsman, although IRS has had the underlying Problem Resolution Program (PRP) in place since 1979. In the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, the Taxpayer Advocate and the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate replaced the Taxpayer Ombudsman position and the headquarters PRP staff. The authorities and responsibilities of this new office were expanded, for example, to address taxpayer cases involving IRS enforcement actions and refunds. Even with the enhanced legislative authorities and numerous activities and initiatives, questions about the effectiveness of the Taxpayer Advocate persist. The questions relate to the Advocate’s (1) organizational independence within IRS; (2) resource commitments to achieve its mission; and (3) ability to identify and correct systemic problems adversely affecting taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the: (1) adequacy of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) controls over the treatment of taxpayers; (2) responsibilities of the Offices of the Chief Inspector (IRS Inspection) and the Department of the Treasury Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in investigating allegations of taxpayer abuse and employee misconduct; (3) organizational placement of IRS Inspection; and (4) role of the Taxpayer Advocate in handling taxpayer complaints.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in spite of IRS management's heightened awareness of the importance of treating taxpayers properly, GAO remains unable to reach a conclusion as to the adequacy of IRS' controls to ensure fair treatment; (2) this is because IRS and other federal information systems that collect information related to taxpayer cases do not capture the necessary management information to identify instances of abuse that have been reported and actions taken to address them and to prevent recurrence of those problems; (3) Treasury OIG and IRS Inspection have separate and shared responsibilities for investigating allegations of employee misconduct and taxpayer abuse; (4) IRS Inspection has primary responsibility for investigating and auditing IRS employees, programs, and internal controls; (5) Treasury OIG is responsible for the oversight of IRS Inspection investigations and audits and may perform selective investigations and audits at IRS; (6) the two offices share some responsibilities as reflected in a 1994 IRS Commissioner-Treasury OIG Memorandum of Understanding; (7) in the Committee's September 1997 hearings, questions were raised about the independence of IRS Inspection; (8) subsequently, suggestions have been made to remove IRS Inspection from IRS and place it in Treasury OIG; (9) regardless of where IRS Inspection is placed organizationally, within IRS or Treasury OIG, mechanisms need to be in place to ensure its accountability and its ability to focus on its mission independent from undue pressures or influences; (10) the Inspectors General Act as amended in 1988, provides guidance on the authorities, qualifications, safeguards, resources, and reporting requirements needed to ensure independent investigation and audit capabilities; (11) in 1979, the Taxpayer Ombudsman was established administratively within IRS to advocate for taxpayers and assume authority for IRS' Problem Resolution Program; (12) in 1988, this position was codified in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 1; (13) in 1996, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 replaced the Ombudsman with the Taxpayer Advocate and expanded the responsibilities of the new Office of the Taxpayer Advocate; (14) the Advocate was charged under the legislation with helping taxpayers resolve their problems with the IRS and with identifying and resolving systemic problems; and (15) it is now nearly 20 years after the creation of the first executive-level position in IRS to advocate for taxpayers, and questions about the effectiveness of the advocacy continue to be asked. |
gao_NSIAD-95-18 | gao_NSIAD-95-18_0 | Figure 1.1 illustrates the DOD’s weapon system acquisition process. Also, approval of this phase will often involve a commitment to low-rate initial production (LRIP). Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) is a key internal control to ensure that decisionmakers have objective information available on a weapon system’s performance, to minimize risks of procuring costly and ineffective systems. Specifically, the Senators asked that we determine whether
LRIP policies were resulting in the production of systems with adequate performance capabilities and the legislation underlying the LRIP policies was adequate. As a result, major production commitments are often made during LRIP. Nevertheless, the existing LRIP legislation does not include any specific principles or guidelines on when and how programs should begin LRIP, on the type and amount of testing to be done before LRIP, on how much LRIP can or should be done, or under what circumstances LRIP should be curtailed or stopped. DOD is currently considering what, if any, actions will be taken in light of the DOD-IG’s recommendations. Decisionmakers need verifiable information on system design maturity and where corrective actions are needed before production start-up. In today’s national security environment, there should be very few cases in which an urgent need dictates that DOD start production without assurance that the system will work as intended. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD’s acquisition policies in the following ways:
Require that, before entry into LRIP, programs (with the exception of ships, satellites, and those other programs that involve inherent fabrication complexity, small procurement quantities, high unit costs, and long unit production periods) plan, buy prototypes for, and conduct enough realistic testing for the service’s independent testing agency and/or DOT&E to be able to certify to the decision authority that (1) the system’s developmental testing is essentially complete and the basic results of that testing have been validated in an operational environment; (2) the system has clearly shown that it can meet the key parameters among its minimum acceptable performance requirements; (3) the system has clearly demonstrated the potential to fully meet all of its minimum acceptable requirements for performance and suitability without major or costly design changes; and (4) the system should be able to readily complete its remaining OT&E in time to support the planned full-rate production decision. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of low-rate initial production (LRIP) in its systems acquisition programs, focusing on whether: (1) DOD LRIP practices result in the production of adequate systems; and (2) the legislation underlying LRIP policies is adequate.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite congressional emphasis on the need for operational test and evaluation (OT&E) prior to system production, legislation and DOD policies permit LRIP to start before any OT&E is conducted because there are no specific guidelines on the type and amount of testing required prior to LRIP; (2) the lack of guidelines has resulted in substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapons that need costly modifications and some deployments of substandard systems to combat forces; (3) correction of system deficiencies in prematurely produced systems lengthens production schedules and increases resource consumption; (4) major production decisions are often made during LRIP; (5) LRIP severely limits Congress' and DOD decisionmakers' options for dealing with deficient systems; (6) DOD needs accurate, independent information on system performance and suitability to minimize the risks of procuring costly and ineffective systems; and (7) in light of the current national security environment, there should not be an urgent need to start LRIP before system capabilities are adequately tested. |
gao_GGD-98-47 | gao_GGD-98-47_0 | Because the debtors’ schedules used in the report must be obtained from the case files at each court location, obtaining the data used for the Center report represented a considerable investment of Center time and money. On the basis of the Center report’s assumptions and the formula used to determine income available for repayment of nonpriority, nonhousing debt, the report estimated that about 50 percent of the chapter 13 debtors in the 13 locations combined would have sufficient income, after living expenses, to repay all of their nonpriority, nonhousing debt over a 5-year period; and an additional 19 percent could pay 60 percent or more over the same period. Study’s Fundamental Assumptions Were Not Validated
The Center report’s analysis was based on data from the initial schedules of current estimated monthly income, current estimated average monthly expenditures, and debts that debtors submitted at the time they filed for bankruptcy. Such amendments were not included in the Center’s analysis. Center Report Did Not Clearly Define the Universe of Nonhousing Debts for Which It Estimated Debtors’ Ability to Pay
There is some evidence in the Center report that the intent of the analysis was to estimate debtors’ ability to pay their eligible dischargeable nonhousing debts—secured and unsecured. Because the Center report focused on the results from all 13 locations combined, it included little discussion of the considerable variations among the 13 locations used in the study. The authors discussed each of the report’s five areas of concern that, together, led to our conclusion that additional research and clarification would be needed to confirm the accuracy of the Center’s report’s conclusions regarding the proportion of debtors who may have the ability to repay at least a portion of their nonpriority, nonhousing debts and the amount of debt such debtors could repay. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. The Center commented that it did not intend to obtain a nationally representative probability sample and agrees that it did not use a scientific random sampling methodology to select the 13 bankruptcy locations or the bankruptcy petitions used in the analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Credit Research Center report on personal bankruptcies, focusing on the report's research methodology and formula for estimating the income that debtors have available to pay debts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, the Center report represents a useful first step in analyzing the ability of bankruptcy debtors to pay their debts; (2) because there is little empirical basis on which to assess the accuracy of the data used in the report's analysis, and because the data provided by the authors showed considerable variation among the 13 locations used for analysis, the report's general findings must be interpreted with caution; (3) GAO's review of the Center report suggests that additional research and clarification would be needed to confirm the accuracy of the report's conclusions regarding the proportion of debtors who may have the ability to repay at least a portion of their nonpriority, nonhousing debts; and (4) there were five areas of concern with the Center's report that could affect interpretation of the report's conclusions: (a) the report's assumption's about the information debtors provide at the time of filing bankruptcy regarding their income, expenses, and debts and the stability of their income and expenses over a 5-year period were not validated; (b) the report did not clearly define the universe of debts for which it estimated debtors' ability to pay; (c) payments on nonhousing debts that debtors stated they intended to reaffirm--voluntarily agree to repay--were not included in debtor expenses in determining the net income debtors had available to pay their nonpriority, nonhousing debts; (d) the report presented results based on data from all 13 locations combined and provided little discussion of the considerable variation among the 13 locations used in the analysis; and (e) a scientific, random sampling methodology was not used to select the 13 bankruptcy locations or the bankruptcy petitions used in the analysis. |
gao_GAO-17-227 | gao_GAO-17-227_0 | For example, one right is to have the OIG of the executive agency conduct an investigation into reprisal complaints when the contractor employee believes reprisal has occurred as a result of disclosing certain information to authorized persons or bodies, such as a member of Congress. The pilot program not only enhances agency responsibility to help ensure contractor employees are aware of their rights, but clearly identifies which office within the agency has responsibility for handling reprisal complaints. If the reprisal complaint is covered, the OIG must investigate the complaint and submit a report of its findings to the agency head, the complainant, the head of the contracting activity, and the contractor. OIGs may make a preliminary determination of whether reprisal occurred based on the investigation; however, the final determination of reprisal must be made by the agency head. Energy agreed with this recommendation. According to the OIGs, of the estimated 1,560 reprisal complaints received from July 1, 2013, to December 31, 2015, the OIGs investigated about one-third of the total 127 complaints submitted by contractors, subcontractors, and grantee employees covered under the pilot program. Of the estimated 1,560 reprisal complaints received from July 1, 2013, through December 31, 2015, OIGs from the 14 departments reported that 127 were submitted by employees of contractors, subcontractors, and grantees under the pilot program. Of the 32 reprisal complaints submitted but not investigated, OIGs determined that the cases were one of the following: frivolous, previously decided by another federal or state judicial proceeding, to be referred to another investigative body, or to receive an “other disposition.” In cases that received other dispositions, OIGs reported that these cases could not proceed because the complainants did not respond to requests for information or declined to waive confidentiality, which they stated were necessary to conduct an investigation. Under the pilot program as implemented, contracting officers are also required to include a FAR clause—which instructs contractors to communicate to their employees, in writing and in their predominant language, their protections under the pilot program—in new contracts (contracts awarded after September 30, 2013) that exceeded the simplified acquisition threshold, generally over $150,000. Moreover, the pilot program requires that the departments’ OIGs forward a report of their investigation findings to several entities, but we found two OIGs with completed investigations that did not fully implement these reporting requirements. Selected OIGs Provided Internal Training on the Pilot Program
At the four selected departments we reviewed, the OIGs reported that they provided internal training on the protections provided by the pilot program. Specific details follow:
Commerce OIG officials provided a flow chart and a legal memorandum as the pilot program guidance which detail the OIG and department responsibilities under the pilot program. As a result, the reports were not received by the correct contact in the department, and the agency head did not make the determination in either case, as required by law. Some New Contracts at the Four Departments Were Missing the FAR Clause, and the Departments Lack Processes to Ensure the FAR Clause Is Inserted
In addition to investigating reprisal complaints, the pilot program required a new FAR clause to be inserted into contract actions; this action is to be accomplished by the departments’ contracting officials. Opportunities Exist to Improve Communications between Department Officials and Contractors
Some contractors we spoke with were unaware of their obligations under the pilot program. At the four selected departments, department officials reported taking no additional action beyond inserting the FAR clause to inform contractors about their responsibilities to communicate to their employees—in writing and in the employees’ predominant language—their rights under the pilot program. We also recommend that the Secretaries of Commerce, Homeland Security, Interior, and State develop policies and processes to help ensure that the FAR clause 52.203-17 is inserted in new contracts and major modifications as appropriate, contracting officials can determine whether a modification is major and the applicability of the FAR clause, and whether they are making their best efforts to include the clause into existing contracts during major modifications, and contracting officials communicate with contractors and subcontractors to help ensure employees are informed about the requirements and protections provided by the whistleblower protection pilot program. All four departments concurred with the recommendations. Appendix I: Survey
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 contained a provision for us to evaluate and report on the implementation of the Pilot Program for the Enhancement of Contractor Employee Whistleblower Protections (pilot program). Our report: (1) describes the results of the whistleblower pilot program between July 1, 2013, and December 31, 2015, across 14 executive departments; and (2) assesses the extent to which four selected departments implemented the pilot program. To identify whether a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause was included in contracts as required, we reviewed a non-generalizable sample from each of the four case study departments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 introduced a pilot program to expand whistleblower rights against reprisal for executive agencies' contractors, subcontractors, and grantee employees. Also, in 2013, the FAR was amended to require agencies to insert a contract clause to ensure contractors communicate rights to their employees for certain contracts.
The act also contained a provision for GAO to report on the status of the pilot program. This report: (1) describes the results of the whistleblower pilot program across 14 selected executive departments from July 1, 2013, to December 31, 2015 and (2) assesses the extent to which four departments implemented the pilot program. GAO analyzed survey data from 14 executive departments, which are a subset of all entities covered by the legislation; selected four departments based on high and low contract funds awarded to conduct a more detailed review of the pilot program implementation; interviewed agency officials and contractors; and reviewed a non-generalizable sample of contracts included in the pilot program.
What GAO Found
The Whistleblower Protections Pilot Program (pilot program) provides enhanced legal protections to contractor employees who believe that they have experienced reprisal as a result of disclosing certain wrongdoings. Among other enhancements, the act expanded the persons and entities to which a whistleblower could disclose wrongdoing and identified which office within an agency has responsibility for handling complaints. For example, under the pilot program, when the Office of Inspector General (OIG) receives a complaint, it must determine whether a complaint is covered by the pilot program and if covered, conduct an investigation and submit the findings to the agency head, complainant, and contractor. The 14 selected departments that GAO reviewed reported receiving an estimated 1,560 whistleblower reprisal complaints from July 1, 2013, through December 31, 2015. Of these complaints, 127 were submitted by contractor, subcontractor, and grantee employees under the pilot program. The 14 OIGs investigated 44 of the 127 complaints but did not find that reprisal had occurred in any of them. The complaints not investigated by the OIGs were excluded for a variety of reasons, such as the complaint was deemed to be frivolous or was being decided by another judicial authority.
GAO's in-depth review of four selected departments' implementation of the pilot program found various opportunities for improvement. Specific details follow:
The pilot program requires findings of investigated reprisal complaints to be forwarded to several entities, including to the agency head for a determination of whether reprisal occurred and, as of December 2015, to the head of the contracting activity. However, at two of the four departments reviewed, the OIGs either did not forward their investigation findings to the appropriate entities or did not forward findings in the necessary format because, according to OIG officials, they were unclear about how to execute the requirement. As a result, at these two departments, the agency heads did not make the determination of whether reprisal occurred as required by the pilot program.
Contracting officers must insert the required Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) whistleblower clause to be inserted into contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold, which is generally $150,000, as a method to communicate with contractors about pilot program requirements. However, while the four selected departments reported that they inserted the clause into the required contracts, GAO found new contracts awarded during the pilot program's timeframe that did not include the required clause. Without effective internal control policies, agencies may continue to omit the required clause.
Some contractors GAO spoke with were unaware of their obligations under the pilot program. Officials from all four departments reported taking no additional action to communicate to contractors their responsibilities to inform employees of their rights under the pilot program. This is inconsistent with federal internal control standards for communication. Without actions to help contractors fully understand their responsibilities under the pilot program, the departments do not have assurance that contractor employees are also aware of the protections afforded by the pilot program legislation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making specific recommendations to the four selected departments to improve whistleblower protections policies and guidance and communication with contractors. The departments agreed with the recommendations and have taken or identified actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-591 | gao_GAO-02-591_0 | FAA Is Facing Increased Controller Hiring because of Higher Staffing Levels and Growing Attrition
Although the exact number and timing of the controllers’ departure is impossible to determine, attrition scenarios developed by both FAA and GAO indicate that the total attrition will grow substantially in the short and long terms. As a result, FAA will likely need to hire thousands of air traffic controllers in the next decade to meet increasing traffic demands and to address the anticipated attrition of experienced controllers, predominately created by retirements. GAO also found that the potential for retirement among frontline supervisors and controllers at some of FAA’s busiest facilities may be high. FAA generally hires new controllers only when current, experienced controllers leave, and it does not adequately take into account the time necessary to fully train these replacements. In addition, FAA has not provided its training academy with the resources necessary to handle the expected large increase in controller candidates. More time will thus likely be needed to train new controllers. Finally, safety and equity issues associated with the age-56 separation exemptions could affect the morale of the controller workforce and the safety of air traffic. | What GAO Found
Thousands of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) controllers will soon be eligible to retire because of extensive hiring in the 1980's to replace striking air traffic controllers. Although the exact number and timing of the controllers' departures has not been determined, attrition scenarios developed by both FAA and GAO indicate that the total attrition will grow substantially in both the short and long term. As a result, FAA will likely need to hire thousands of air traffic controllers in the next decade to met increasing traffic demands and to address the anticipated attrition of experienced controllers, predominately because of retirement. FAA has yet to developed a comprehensive human capital workforce strategy to address its impending controller needs. Rather, FAA's strategy for replacing controllers is generally to hire new controllers only when current, experienced controllers leave. This does not take into account the potential increases in future hiring and the time necessary to train replacements. In addition, there is uncertainty about the ability of FAA's new aptitude test to identify the best controller candidates. Further, FAA has not addressed the resources that may be needed at its training academy. Finally, exemptions to the age-56 separation rules raise safety and equity issues. |
gao_GAO-06-351 | gao_GAO-06-351_0 | Ex-Im Generally Classifies Companies’ Small Business Status Correctly, but Weaknesses Limit Its Ability to Accurately Measure Small Business Financing
While Ex-Im generally classifies companies’ small business status correctly, weaknesses in its data systems and data limit Ex-Im’s ability to accurately determine its small business financing amounts and share. Ex-Im’s methodology for calculating its small business financing is based on directly counting the value of small business financing for transactions where the exporter can be identified and estimating the small business value of transactions where the exporter cannot be identified at the time Ex-Im authorizes the transaction. In addition, in its required reporting on the number—as opposed to the value—of transactions benefiting small business, Ex-Im includes transactions which do not directly benefit small business. For most transactions, Ex-Im can identify the exporter at the time the transaction is authorized and, in those cases, it bases its calculation on whether the exporter qualifies as a small business under the SBA definition. Second, Ex-Im’s data systems sometimes contain conflicting information for the same company. Ex-Im’s Interpretation of the Small Business Financing Mandate
Prior to the enactment of credit reform legislation, Ex-Im interpreted the mandate as requiring it to make available for financing small business exports an amount equal to the legislatively established percent of the aggregate principal amount of loans, guarantees and insurance specified by Congress for that fiscal year. Given changes in law over time, Ex-Im currently interprets the small business financing mandate as requiring Ex- Im to attempt to ensure that 20 percent of the value of its transactions is provided directly to small business. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reliability of Ex-Im Bank reporting on its direct support for small business we recommend that the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank take the following four steps: improve the completeness, accuracy, and consistency of the data Ex-Im maintains on its customers, especially with regard to their small business status; improve the system for estimating the value and proportion of direct small business support for those transactions where the exporter is not known at the time Ex-Im authorizes the transaction; more accurately determine and clearly report the number of transactions that directly benefit small business; and have its external auditor audit Ex-Im’s annual legislatively-mandated reporting of its direct support for small business as a part of its review of Ex-Im’s compliance with laws and regulations. This report (1) analyzes Ex-Im’s methodology for calculating its direct support of small business and the reliability of Ex-Im’s data used in the methodology and (2) describes Ex- Im’s legal interpretation of its requirement under the statutory 20 percent small business mandate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) provides loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to support U.S. exports. Its level of support for small business has been a long-standing issue of congressional interest. Most recently in 2002, Congress increased the proportion of financing Ex-Im must make available for small business to 20 percent. GAO examined legal and policy issues related to Ex-Im's small business financing. Specifically, GAO (1) analyzes Ex-Im's methodology for calculating its direct support of small business and the reliability of Ex-Im's data used in the methodology and (2) describes Ex-Im's legal interpretation of its obligations under the statutory 20 percent small business mandate.
What GAO Found
While Ex-Im generally classifies companies' small business status correctly, weaknesses in its data systems and data limit its ability to accurately determine its small business financing. Ex-Im uses a combination of direct counts and estimates to calculate its small business financing, based on the authorized value of individual transactions. For most transactions, Ex-Im can identify the exporter and thus bases its determination of the small business financing share on whether the exporter qualifies as a small business. For other transactions, Ex-Im cannot identify the exporter at the time it authorizes the transaction and estimates the small business share based on shipment patterns in an earlier period. GAO determined that Ex-Im generally classifies companies' small business status correctly. However, GAO identified weaknesses in Ex-Im's process for calculating its small business support. For transactions where Ex-Im can identify the exporter, GAO found internal control weaknesses such as Ex-Im's data systems containing conflicting records for the same company. For transactions where Ex-Im cannot identify the exporter when it authorizes the transaction, a weakness is not including a large value of shipments in its calculations. GAO also determined that Ex-Im's reporting on the number of transactions--as opposed to the value of transactions--that directly benefit small business includes transactions that do not benefit small business. Prior to the enactment of credit reform legislation, Ex-Im interpreted the mandate as requiring it to make available for financing small business exports an amount equal to 10 percent of the aggregate principal amount of loans, guarantees and insurance specified by Congress for that fiscal year. Given changes in law including federal credit reform and the removal of specific financing authority limits, Ex-Im currently interprets its statutory small business financing mandate as requiring it to attempt to ensure that 20 percent of the authorized value of its transactions during a year directly benefits small business. |
gao_RCED-95-17 | gao_RCED-95-17_0 | EPA and OSHA Have Fully Implemented Some Report Recommendations but Not Others
Of the task force’s recommendations, EPA and/or OSHA have fully implemented three. On the basis of the 75 RCRA violations detected, EPA and the states initiated enforcement actions and collected over $2 million in penalties. EPA’s education of compliance officials. EPA did not fully implement the recommendation that it conduct research on the cause for and impact of using certain operating equipment—automatic waste feed cutoffs and emergency safety vents, or vent stacks—and that it reopen permits, as necessary, to address the use of this equipment. However, the types of inspections conducted after the task force’s inspections differed in scope from the task force’s inspections, and EPA, OSHA, and the states have not detected as many or the same pattern of health or safety violations as did the task force. EPA and OSHA Have Taken Other Actions Beyond Those Recommended by the Task Force
In addition to those actions recommended by the task force’s report, EPA and OSHA have initiated other actions to protect health and safety at incineration facilities. OSHA is planning to issue a regulation requiring hazardous waste facilities, including incinerators, to have accredited training programs for workers. However, OSHA has no method to ensure that (1) all hazardous waste facilities submit training programs for accreditation and (2) all facilities’ programs are accredited. 6. 7. 9. 29. We continue to believe that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has not implemented the task force’s recommendation to improve its coverage of inspections by including hazardous waste incinerators on OSHA’s lists of programmed inspections. 3. 4. To determine other actions taken by EPA and OSHA to improve workers’ and the public’s health and safety at hazardous waste incineration facilities, we interviewed and obtained documentation on EPA’s and the states’ enforcement actions and draft waste minimization and combustion strategy, and OSHA’s proposed policies and procedures for Hazardous Waste Training Accreditation from (1) EPA’s Office of Permits and State Programs and RCRA Enforcement Divisions and (2) OSHA’s Directorate of Policy, Office of Health and Safety Standards Program, Office of Field Programs, and Office of Statistics. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed hazardous waste incinerators' compliance with federal health and safety regulations, focusing on the: (1) Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) efforts to protect workers' health and safety at hazardous waste incinerators; and (2) results of inspections and enforcement actions at 29 facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EPA and OSHA have fully implemented three task force recommendations to correct violations, educate the industry, and improve inspections; (2) EPA and the states have initiated enforcement actions and collected over $2 million in penalties for safety violations; (3) EPA and OSHA have conducted education outreach programs on the importance of health and safety compliance; (4) EPA has taken steps to educate its compliance officials, but it has not fully implemented recommendations to improve EPA inspection coverage, conduct research on the use of certain operating equipment, and revise facilities' incineration permits to limit the use of this equipment if necessary; (5) OSHA has not fully implemented recommendations on educating its compliance officials and improving its inspection coverage; (6) EPA and the states reinspected the incinerator facilities, but they did not detect the same pattern of violations that the task force found because the scope of their inspections differed; (7) OSHA did not reinspect the facilities because it believes that the relative risk of working at these incinerators is low; (8) EPA and OSHA have taken additional steps beyond the task force's recommendations to protect workers' health and safety at the incinerators; and (9) OSHA plans to require these facilities to have accredited training programs for workers handling hazardous wastes, but OSHA does not have a good plan to ensure that all facilities submit their programs for accreditation. |
gao_GAO-03-652 | gao_GAO-03-652_0 | Negotiations between airlines and their labor unions on these contracts are conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The act was amended in 1936, after discussions with airline labor and management, to include the airline industry and its labor unions. Length of Negotiations and Number of Nonstrike Work Actions Have Increased, While Number of Strikes Has Declined
In the 25 years since deregulation, airline contract negotiation lengths have increased while the frequency of strikes has declined, but the number of nonstrike work actions have increased. Also, all have a history of strikes and/or court-recognized, nonstrike work actions. For example, the median length of time to negotiate contracts at US Airways in the 1990s was 34 months. Of the 16 strikes that occurred since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and 4 occurred subsequently. All six occurred since 1990. However, no studies have yet synthesized such information for a thorough picture of a strike’s impact on a community. Airline Strikes Have Had Negative Economic Impacts on Communities
With the reduction of air service stemming from an airline strike, communities have experienced economic disruptions from a number of sources. The department reports the extent of potentially lost air service to hub and spoke cities of the affected carrier, the number of passengers that would have no service if a strike were to occur, possible financial impacts on the carrier, indirect impacts on the national economy, and the mitigating and aggravating factors on the impacts of a strike. Nonstrike Work Actions Have Greater Impacts on Passengers than Lengthy Negotiations
Our analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased, there has been a slight decline in on-time flights. However, the impact of these negotiations has been unclear, because the decline may also have been affected by other factors such as poor weather, aircraft maintenance, runway closures, air traffic control system decisions, or equipment failures. By comparison, the 10 court-recognized, nonstrike work actions more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through such measures as a decrease in the number of on-time flights, an increase in the number of flight problem complaints, and a decrease in passenger traffic. Congressional interventions do not involve the airlines. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the following three questions: What have been the major trends of labor negotiations in the airline industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978, including the number and length of negotiations and the number of strikes, presidential interventions to avoid or end strikes, and nonstrike work actions? What has been the impact of airline strikes on communities? We obtained our data from major U.S. airlines and various labor organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Labor negotiations in the airline industry fall under the Railway Labor Act. Under this act, airline labor contracts do not expire, but instead, become amendable. To help labor and management reach agreement before a strike occurs, the act also provides a process--including possible intervention by the President--that is designed to reduce the incidence of strikes. Despite these provisions, negotiations between airlines and their unions have sometimes been contentious, and strikes have occurred. Because air transportation is such a vital link in the nation's economic infrastructure, a strike at a major U.S. airline may exert a significant economic impact on affected communities. Additionally, if an airline's labor and management were to engage in contentious and prolonged negotiations, the airline's operations--and customer service--could suffer. GAO was asked to examine trends in airline labor negotiations in the 25 years since the industry was deregulated in 1978, the impact of airline strikes on communities, and the impact of lengthy contract negotiations and nonstrike work actions (such as "sickouts") on passengers.
What GAO Found
Since the airline industry was deregulated in 1978, the average length of negotiations has increased, strikes have declined, and nonstrike work actions (e.g., sickouts) have increased. After 1990, the median length of time needed for labor and management at U.S. major airlines to reach agreement on contracts increased from 9 to 15 months. Of the 16 strikes that occurred at those airlines since 1978, 12 occurred prior to 1990, and 4 occurred subsequently. All ten court-recognized, nonstrike work actions and all six presidential interventions occurred since 1993. Airline strikes have had obvious negative impacts on communities, including lost income for striking and laid off workers, disrupted travel plans, and decreased spending by travelers and the struck airline. However, such impacts have yet to be thoroughly and systematically analyzed. The potential net impacts of a strike on a community would depend on a number of factors, such as availability of service from competing (nonstriking) airlines and the length of the strike. For example, of two recent strikes, one lasted 15 days and one lasted 24 minutes. GAO's analysis indicates that passenger service has been affected more adversely by nonstrike work actions than by an increase in the length of negotiations. Generally, but not always, as negotiation periods increased, there has been a slight decline in on-time flights. However, the impact of these negotiations has been unclear because the decline may also have been affected by other factors such as poor weather. By comparison, the 10 court-recognized, nonstrike work actions more clearly resulted in negative impacts on passengers, as shown through such measures as a decrease in the number of on-time flights, an increase in the number of flight problem complaints, and a decrease in passenger traffic. |
gao_GAO-10-787 | gao_GAO-10-787_0 | Nature of These Schemes Makes Them Difficult to Combat, and Legal Approaches Vary by State
State law enforcement officials noted that these schemes are difficult to combat because state law enforcement authorities are often unable to locate the persons who committed the schemes or provide restitution to the victims. Although Data That Can Be Used to Describe the Prevalence of Schemes Are Limited, Some Information Suggests That Schemes Are an Important Problem
Federal law enforcement agencies with key roles in combating these schemes—FTC, FBI, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys in our five case-study states provided anecdotal observations that support their belief that these schemes are a problem. Federal Efforts to Combat These Schemes Are Part of a Broader Focus on Mortgage Fraud, and a Public-Private Effort Focuses on Consumer Education
The primary multiagency effort to combat financial crimes, including foreclosure rescue schemes, is the FFETF, which an executive order established in November 2009. Current Federal Effort to Combat These Schemes Is the FFETF, Which Incorporated Previous Federal Efforts
As we have previously discussed, in November 2009, an executive order established the FFETF to strengthen the efforts of DOJ in conjunction with federal, state, and local agencies to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes and violations relating to the current financial crisis and economic recovery efforts. Other Major Federal, Private, and Nonprofit Coordinated Efforts Focus on Consumer Education and Information Gathering
In addition to the FFETF, there are other coordinated efforts involving federal, state, private, and nonprofit entities aimed at addressing the problem of foreclosure rescue schemes through activities intended to enhance consumer outreach and education. Several Factors Co Affect the Federal Government’s Suc and the Working Group’s Efforts Be Limited by Weakness Planning
Several Key Factors May Affect the Federal Government’s Likelihood of Success in Combating Foreclosure Rescue and Loan Modification Schemes
Our analysis of interviews with representatives of federal and state agencies and nonprofit organizations suggests that several factors may affect the federal government’s likelihood of success in combating foreclosure rescue schemes. Consequently, the plan does not include strategies or performance measures that relate to foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes. In addition, the group may be limited in its ability to develop performance measures related to these particular schemes. The action plan also, in part, addresses two of the key factors that we identified as important to federal efforts in combating foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes—educating consumers about deceptive practices and effectively coordinating law enforcement efforts to combat these schemes. However, the action plan does not address key practices that can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies, such as the need for a clear, long-term strategy; clear delineation of roles and responsibilities; and results-oriented performance measures. In addition, the working group’s action plan does not specify strategies for foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes, and the distinctive nature of these schemes suggests that they warrant a specific approach, particularly in identifying ways for supporting state- level law enforcement efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To develop a comprehensive strategy for the FFETF’s Mortgage Fraud Working Group’s efforts to combat mortgage fraud, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General, as the head of the FFETF, do the following: (1) develop clear, long-term strategies and performance measures that the working group can use to evaluate its progress toward achieving its long- term goal of increasing enforcement in the area of mortgage fraud and (2) to the extent that the working group considers foreclosure rescue schemes to be a priority, develop strategies specific to these schemes, including those that enhance coordination of law enforcement agencies and that provide consumer education. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what is known about the nature and prevalence of mortgage foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes, we collected available data from and interviewed representatives of the four federal agencies— the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Departments of Justice (DOJ), the Treasury (Treasury), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—and their relevant bureaus or divisions that were identified as members of a multiagency initiative to combat these schemes as announced by the administration on April 6, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
One of the most devastating aspects of the current financial crisis for homeowners is the prospect of losing their homes to foreclosure, and many homeowners have fallen victim to foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes. In 2009, the administration created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF), which is led by the Department of Justice (DOJ), to combat these and other financial crimes. This report examines (1) the nature and prevalence of these schemes, (2) federal efforts coordinated to combat these schemes and other major efforts, and (3) factors that may affect federal efforts' success in combating these schemes. To address these objectives, GAO obtained information from federal agencies participating in the FFETF and interviewed representatives of five states with high exposure to potential foreclosures and nonprofit organizations undertaking related activities.
What GAO Found
Although data that would establish the prevalence of foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes are limited, officials told GAO that these schemes can take several forms--the most active scheme is one in which individuals or companies charge a fee for services not rendered. Agency and nonprofit officials said that the perpetrators of these schemes are likely to be former mortgage industry employees, professional scam artists, and unethical attorneys and that the range of potential victims is wide. Law enforcement officials said that the nature of the schemes makes them difficult to combat because they can easily be conducted by Internet or across state lines. While law enforcement agencies and nonprofits have information, such as research studies and consumer complaints, that supports their belief that these schemes are widespread, there are no nationwide data that can reliably be used to describe their prevalence. Collaborative federal law enforcement efforts and other coordinated efforts involving federal and private organizations are under way to combat foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes. The FFETF was established in November 2009 to strengthen the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies to investigate and prosecute a variety of financial crimes, including foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes. Prior to the FFETF, the administration announced a multiagency effort to combat these schemes in April 2009, for which agencies, notably the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and the Federal Trade Commission, took supporting actions. The FFETF's Mortgage Fraud Working Group, which has primary responsibility for coordinating activities related to these schemes, has focused on facilitating communication and exchanging information among law enforcement agencies by sponsoring training sessions and conferences. In addition to the FFETF, there are other major coordinated efforts aimed at combating these schemes, such as a public-private effort that focuses primarily on consumer education and outreach. Several factors may affect federal efforts to combat foreclosure rescue and loan modification schemes, and lack of a clear, long-term strategy could limit the FFETF's effectiveness. Key factors affecting federal success in combating these schemes include educating consumers about them and coordinating federal and state law enforcement efforts. The Mortgage Fraud Working Group has created an action plan that partly addresses these factors but does not fully incorporate certain key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. In particular, the plan largely focuses on short-term strategies, does not clearly identify members' roles and responsibilities, and does not clearly identify performance indicators that would allow it to measure progress over time. In addition, the plan outlines strategies for addressing mortgage fraud as a whole and identifies few specific approaches to combating foreclosure schemes. Without long-term strategies and performance measures specific to foreclosure schemes, the working group may be limited in its ability to combat these schemes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the U.S. Attorney General direct DOJ to develop clear, long-term strategies and performance measures that DOJ can use to evaluate its progress toward combating mortgage fraud, and consider developing strategies specific to foreclosure rescue schemes. DOJ concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-565 | gao_GAO-02-565_0 | Principal Findings
Selected Spare Parts Price Increases Are Driven by Higher Material Costs
In our recent review of prices for a selected group of spare parts for three Navy aircraft and their engines that we examined in the November 2000 report, we found that prices continued to rise. Our analysis suggested that the major factor driving these increases was the cost of the materials used to repair spare parts, while other factors, such as higher overhead fees and growing labor costs, also contributed. Between fiscal year 1999 and 2002, the total cost of spare parts increased from $1.6 billion to $2.7 billion. The prices for the remaining 258 parts, however, spiraled dramatically—an average of 91.5 percent during the 3-year period (see app. However, the Navy’s data systems did not provide sufficient information on each repair event to allow us to determine why the prices increased for each spare part. It has undertaken several initiatives to control repair costs, but these have centered on enhancing the reliability and maintenance process, which could help stabilize prices for repairable parts. Also, the Navy might learn from DLA’s efforts to address price increases for consumable spare parts. These efforts focus on improving the reliability of repairable parts, and thereby reducing demand while reducing or eliminating support costs. Tracking System May Identify Causes of Repair Cost Hikes
One promising initiative—a serial number tracking system for the Navy’s inventory of parts—has the potential for identifying the underlying reasons for price changes. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to develop the information and action necessary to address the underlying causes for price increases, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to:
Develop an overall plan with implementation milestones, resource requirements, and accountability within the Naval Supply Systems Command to identify the underlying reasons for price increases in aviation spare parts. Overall, the average increase in the price charged to customers for these parts was 37.2 percent between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2002. The report contained three recommendations: (1) the Secretary of Defense ensure that the Navy follow through on the results of its planned studies by identifying and implementing solutions to reduce and stabilize prices and surcharge rates, (2) the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to allocate condemnation costs to the specific parts or groups of parts incurring the costs, and (3) the Secretary of Defense report to the Congress on the Navy’s progress in addressing these recommendations. | What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 1999, the Navy's budget for repairing spare parts to support its aviation weapons systems has increased by about 50 percent, from $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion. Some military commands have asserted that the escalating cost of these parts has adversely impacted the funds available for the readiness of military forces. Overall, the prices for Navy repairable spare parts continue to climb for the three aircraft and their engines that GAO focused on in its November 2000 report. GAO's assessment of selected parts being repaired showed that while nearly 45 percent of the parts decreased in price, about 55 percent increased an average of 91.5 percent between fiscal year 1999 and 2002. The price increases were primarily due to the dramatically higher costs of the materials needed to repair spare parts, although other factors, such as overhead fees and labor rates, contributed. However, GAO could not determine the underlying causes for the rising material costs because the Navy's database lacked key information on each repair. The Navy's progress in developing an overall plan to identify and address the reasons for higher spare parts prices has been limited. It has not yet identified and implemented ways to reduce and stabilize prices. Further, the Navy has undertaken several initiatives, but most of these efforts focused on improving the reliability or the maintenance processes for repairing spare parts rather than on identifying why prices continue to rise. One initiative, the establishment of an automated serial number tracking system for spare parts, however, has potential for providing the specific information needed to determine why the spare parts prices are increasing and develop a strategy for stabilizing them. In addition, the Navy may learn from the Defense Logistics Agency's efforts to address causes for price increases--thereby allowing the Navy to better apply its resources supporting the readiness of the forces. |
gao_GAO-04-91 | gao_GAO-04-91_0 | Data Lacking on Income Characteristics of Credit Union Members and Users
It has been generally accepted, particularly by NCUA and credit union trade groups, that credit unions have a historical emphasis of serving people with modest means. Federal Reserve Board Data Suggest That Credit Unions Serve a Slightly Lower Proportion of Low- and Moderate-income Households
Our analysis of the Federal Reserve Board’s 2001 SCF suggested that credit unions overall served a lower percentage of households of modest means (low- and moderate-income households combined) than banks. We also found that states had chartered a higher percentage of their credit unions to serve geographic areas (communities) than NCUA. While this consultative approach helped NCUA, it still faces a number of challenges that create additional opportunities for NCUA to leverage off the experience of the other depository institution regulators. Moreover, unlike other depository institution regulators, NCUA currently lacks authority to inspect third-party vendors, which credit unions increasingly rely on to provide services such as electronic banking. Further, credit unions are not subject to the internal control reporting requirements that banks and thrifts are subject to under FDICIA. ASI has not had large losses since 1975. These larger credit unions control a larger percent of industry assets than they did in 1991. This concentration of industry assets creates the need for greater risk management on the part of credit union management and NCUA with respect to monitoring and controlling risks to the federal share insurance fund. In addition, NCUSIF’s pricing for federal share insurance coverage does not reflect the risk that an individual credit union poses to the fund. Recommendations for To promote NCUA’s ability to meet its goal of assisting credit unions in Executive Action safely providing financial services to all segments of society, to enable more consistent federal oversight of financial institutions, and to enhance share insurance management (for example, improving allocation costs, providing insurance according to risk, and improving the loss estimation process), we recommend that the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration use tangible indicators, other than “potential membership,” to determine whether credit unions have provided greater access to credit union services in underserved areas; consult with other regulators through FFIEC more consistently about risk-focused programs to learn how these regulators have dealt with past challenges (for example, training of information technology specialists); continuously improve the process for and documentation of the overhead transfer rate by consistently calculating and applying those rates, updating the rates annually, and completing the survey with full representation; evaluate options for implementing risk-based insurance pricing. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were evaluate (1) the financial condition of the credit union industry; (2) the extent to which credit unions “make more available to people of small means credit for provident purposes;” (3) the impact, if any, of the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 (CUMAA) on the credit union industry with respect to membership provisions; (4) how the National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA) examination and supervision processes have changed in response to changes in the industry; (5) the financial condition of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF); and (6) issues concerning the use of private share (deposit) insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent legislative and regulatory changes have blurred some distinctions between credit unions and other depository institutions such as banks. The 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act (CUMAA) allowed for an expansion of membership and mandated safety and soundness controls similar to those of other depository institutions. In light of these changes and the evolution of the credit union industry, GAO evaluated (1) the financial condition of the industry and the deposit (share) insurance fund, (2) the impact of CUMAA on the industry, and (3) how the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) had changed its safety and soundness processes.
What GAO Found
The financial condition of the credit union industry has improved since GAO's last report in 1991, and the federal share insurance fund appears financially stable. However, a growing concentration of industry assets in large credit unions creates the need for greater risk management on the part of NCUA. The question of who benefits from credit unions' services has also been widely debated. While it has been generally accepted that credit unions have a historical emphasis on serving people of modest means, our analysis of limited available data suggested that credit unions served a slightly lower proportion of low- and moderate-income households than banks. CUMAA and subsequent NCUA regulations enabled federally chartered credit unions to expand their membership, serve larger geographic areas, and add underserved areas. According to NCUA officials, these changes were necessary to maintain the competitiveness of the federal charter with respect to state-chartered credit unions. While NCUA has stated its commitment to ensuring that credit unions provide financial services to all segments of society, NCUA has not developed indicators to determine if credit union services have reached the underserved. In response to the growing concentration of industry assets and increased services offered by credit unions, NCUA recently adopted a risk-focused examination and supervision program but still faces a number of challenges, including lack of access to third-party vendors that are providing more services to credit unions. Further, credit unions are not subject to internal control and attestation reporting requirements applicable to banks and thrifts. GAO also found that the insurance fund's rate structure does not reflect risks that individual credit unions pose to the fund, and NCUA's estimation of fund losses is based on broad historical analysis rather than a current risk profile of insured institutions. |
gao_T-RCED-96-209 | gao_T-RCED-96-209_0 | In general, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service manage their lands primarily for noncommodity uses. Both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management have legislatively based incentives for producing resource commodities. They believe that it is sometimes difficult to reconcile differences among laws and regulations. Ecological considerations also suggest that the federal land management agencies rethink their organizational structures and relationships with one another. Strategies for Improving Federal Land Management
Two basic strategies have been proposed to improve federal land management: (1) streamlining the existing structure by coordinating and integrating functions, systems, activities, programs, and field locations and (2) reorganizing the structure by combining agencies. In summary, Mr. Chairman, the responsibilities of the four major federal land management agencies have become more similar and the management of federal lands more complex over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed ways to improve the management of federal lands.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the responsibilities of the National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Forest Service have become increasingly similar; (2) federal land management has become increasingly complex due to the differences among laws and regulations; (3) federal land management agencies could be more cost efficient and ecologically effective if they improve their organizational structures and interagency relationships; (4) the two basic strategies to improve federal land management include streamlining the management structure by coordinating and integrating functions, systems, activities, programs, and field locations, and combining land management agencies; and (5) due to the lack of consensus for change, no legislation to streamline or reorganize the federal land management agencies has been enacted. |
gao_GAO-08-389 | gao_GAO-08-389_0 | In addition, some college students may obtain coverage through public health insurance programs, such as Medicaid or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Under federal law, college students who have lost eligibility for dependent coverage under a parent’s employer-sponsored insurance plan may be able to use provisions in COBRA to continue their health insurance for a limited period of time. Specifically, about 42 percent of nonstudents aged 18 through 23 were uninsured in 2006. Certain Groups, Including Part-time Students and Older Students, Were More Likely Than Others to Be Uninsured in 2006
Of the 1.7 million college students aged 18 through 23 who were uninsured in 2006, certain groups of students—including part-time students, older students, and students from families with lower incomes—were more likely than others to be uninsured. 2.) These differences among uninsured college students from different regions are consistent with characteristics of the uninsured found in the general U.S. population. Over Half of Colleges Offered Student Insurance Plans in Academic Year 2007- 2008, and These Plans Were Customized and Plan Benefits Varied
Over half of colleges nationwide offered health insurance plans to their students in the 2007-2008 academic year, and these plans were customized and benefits varied across plans. Student Insurance Plans Were Customized to Reflect Colleges’ Priorities, and Plan Benefits Varied
Student insurance plans were customized to reflect colleges’ priorities in making health insurance premiums affordable for their students while at the same time providing coverage that meets the needs of students. For example, some plans we reviewed charged relatively low annual premiums—$30 to $200. These plans also set relatively low limits on the amount they pay for covered services—with some having limits as low as $2,500 for each illness or injury. The benefits offered by student insurance plans varied in terms of the services they covered and the extent to which they paid for or limited payment for covered services. 6.) Colleges and States Have Taken a Variety of Steps to Increase the Number of Insured College Students
To increase the number of insured college students, colleges and states have taken a variety of steps, such as requiring students to have health insurance. Some States Have Expanded Dependents’ Eligibility for Private Health Insurance
Some states have expanded dependents’ eligibility for private health insurance, and because most college students obtain health insurance as dependents, this effort has made health insurance more available to college students. External Comments
We provided a draft of this report to ACHA, an advocacy and leadership organization for college and university health. ACHA officials provided a technical comment, which we incorporated. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined (1) the insurance status of college students, (2) characteristics of uninsured college students and the financial impact of this population on health care systems, (3) the extent to which colleges offered student insurance plans in the 2007-2008 academic year and the characteristics of available plans, and (4) efforts to increase the number of insured college students. The supplement also gathers data on demographic characteristics. Availability and Characteristics of College Student Insurance Plans
To describe the extent to which colleges offered student insurance plans and the characteristics of available plans, we collected data on student insurance plans offered at a random sample of 340 colleges. We reviewed plan and policy documentation available for each college plan, and interviewed officials from each college regarding their college student insurance plan and policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
College students face challenges obtaining health insurance--they may not have access to insurance through an employer, and as they get older, they may lose dependent coverage obtained through a parent's plan. Federal law ensures continued access to health insurance for some, but not all, such students. Without health insurance, college students may be unable to pay for their health care, and the cost of this care may be passed on to federal and state payers, such as Medicaid. College students may have access to student insurance plans offered by their colleges. GAO was asked to report on uninsured college students, student insurance plans, and efforts to increase the number of insured students. GAO reviewed (1) college students' insurance status, (2) uninsured college students' characteristics, (3) the extent to which colleges offered student insurance plans and the characteristics of available plans, and (4) efforts to increase the number of insured students. GAO analyzed data from a national survey on college students' insurance status and uninsured college students' characteristics. GAO collected data from 340 colleges on the availability of student insurance plans and the characteristics of available plans, and also gathered detailed plan information from case studies of 10 colleges and interviews with experts and insurance industry officials. GAO also reviewed some states' laws.
What GAO Found
About 80 percent of college students aged 18 through 23 had health insurance in 2006. While 67 percent of college students were covered through employer-sponsored plans, 7 percent were covered through other private health insurance plans, such as student insurance plans, and 6 percent were covered by public programs, such as Medicaid. Most insured students were covered, for example, as a dependent, on a policy under another person's name. About 20 percent of college students aged 18 through 23 (1.7 million) were uninsured in 2006, and certain groups of students--such as part-time students, nonwhite students, and students from families with lower incomes--were more likely than others to be uninsured. The characteristics of uninsured students are consistent with those of the uninsured found in the general U.S. population. Over half of colleges nationwide offered student insurance plans in the 2007-2008 academic year, and plans' benefits varied. Colleges customized their plans to reflect their priorities in making premiums affordable for students while providing coverage that meets students' needs. The plans GAO reviewed varied in the services they covered and how they paid for covered services. Specifically, some plans excluded preventive services from coverage and some plans limited payment for benefits such as prescription drugs. In addition, plans also varied in terms of premiums and maximum benefits, with annual premiums ranging from $30 to $2,400 and maximum benefits ranging from $2,500 for each illness or injury to unlimited lifetime coverage. Colleges and states have taken a variety of steps to increase the number of insured college students. For example, GAO estimated that about 30 percent of colleges nationwide required students to have health insurance in academic year 2007-2008, and some states also have health insurance requirements for college students. Finally, some states have expanded dependents' eligibility for private health insurance, which makes insurance more available to college students who obtain coverage as dependents. Officials from the American College Health Association (ACHA)--an advocacy and leadership organization for college and university health--provided a technical comment, which we incorporated. |
gao_GAO-10-140T | gao_GAO-10-140T_0 | Background
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a constitutionally mandated enterprise critical to our nation. Census data are used to apportion seats and redraw congressional districts, and to help allocate over $400 billion in federal aid to state and local governments each year. LUCA Submissions Generated a Small Percentage of Additions to the MAF
Under the LUCA program, the Bureau partners with state, local, and tribal governments, tapping into their knowledge of local populations and housing conditions in order to secure a more complete count. Between November 2007 and March 2008, over 8,000 state, local, and tribal governments provided approximately 42 million addresses for potential addition, deletion, or other actions. Address canvassing confirmed the existence of around 2.4 million addresses submitted by LUCA participants that were not already in the MAF (or about 7 percent of the 36 million proposed additions). The Bureau Generally Completed Address Canvassing Ahead of Schedule but Went Over Budget
The Bureau conducted address canvassing from March to July 2009. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to the reliability of the HHCs prior to the start of address canvassing, including a final field test that was added to the Bureau’s preparations in December 2008, played a key role in the pace of the operation; but other factors, once address canvassing was launched, were important as well, including the (1) prompt resolution of problems with the HHCs as they occurred and (2) lower than expected employee turnover. The Bureau’s address list at the start of address canvassing consisted of 141.8 million housing units. Listers added around 17 million addresses and marked about 21 million for deletion because, for example, the address did not exist. All told, listers identified about 4.5 million duplicate addresses, 1.2 million nonresidential addresses, and about 690,000 addresses that were uninhabitable structures. Validating the Group Quarters Address List Is Important for Reducing Potential Duplicates and Other Errors
To help ensure group quarters are accurately included in the census, the Bureau is conducting an operation called Group Quarters Validation, an effort that is to run during September and October 2009, and has a workload of around 2 million addresses in both the United States and Puerto Rico. If the dwelling is in fact a group quarter, it must then be determined what category it fits under (e.g., boarding school, correctional facility, health care facility, military quarters, residence hall or dormitory, etc. Concluding Observations
The Bureau recognizes the critical importance of an accurate address list and maps, and continues to put forth tremendous effort to help ensure MAF/TIGER is complete and accurate. The operations we included in this review generally have proceeded as planned, or are proceeding as planned. Nevertheless, accurately locating each and every dwelling in the nation is an inherently challenging endeavor, and the overall quality of the Bureau’s address list will not be known until the Bureau completes various assessments later in the census. Moreover, while the Bureau has improved its management of MAF/TIGER IT systems, we continue to be concerned about the lack of finalized test plans, incomplete metrics to gauge progress, and an aggressive testing and implementation schedule going forward. Given the importance of MAF/TIGER to an accurate census, it is critical that the Bureau ensure this system is thoroughly tested. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and help allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. A complete and accurate master address file (MAF), along with precise maps--the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) mapping system is called Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER)--are the building blocks of a successful census. If the Bureau's address list and maps are inaccurate, people can be missed, counted more than once, or included in the wrong location. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for the 2010 Census and covers: (1) the Bureau's progress in building an accurate address list; and (2) an update of the Bureau's information technology (IT) system used to extract information from its MAF/TIGER? database. Our review included observations at 20 early opening local census offices in hard-to-count areas. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing work.
What GAO Found
The Bureau has taken, and continues to take measures to build an accurate MAF and to update its maps. From an operational perspective, the Local Update of Census Addresses (LUCA) and address canvassing generally proceeded as planned, and GAO did not observe any significant flaws or operational setbacks. Group quarters validation got underway in late September as planned. A group quarters is a place where people live or stay that is normally owned or managed by an entity or organization providing housing and/or services for the residents (such as a boarding school, correctional facility, health care facility, military quarters, residence hall, or dormitory). LUCA made use of local knowledge to enhance MAF accuracy. Between November 2007 and March 2008, over 8,000 state, local, and tribal governments participated in the program. However, LUCA submissions generated a relatively small percentage of additions to the MAF. For example, of approximately 36 million possible additions to the MAF that localities submitted, 2.4 million (7 percent) were not already in the MAF. The other submissions were duplicate addresses, non-existent, or non-residential. Address canvassing (an operation where temporary workers go door to door to verify and update address data) finished ahead of schedule, but was over budget. Based on initial Bureau data, the preliminary figure on the actual cost of address canvassing is $88 million higher than the original estimate of $356 million, an overrun of 25 percent. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to the reliability of the hand held computers prior to the start of address canvassing played a key role in the pace of the operation, but other factors were important as well, including the prompt resolution of technical problems and lower than expected employee turnover. The Bureau's address list at the start of address canvassing consisted of 141.8 million housing units. Listers added around 17 million addresses and marked about 21 million for deletion. All told, listers identified about 4.5 million duplicate addresses, 1.2 million nonresidential addresses, and about 690,000 addresses that were uninhabitable structures. The overall quality of the address file will not be known until later in the census when the Bureau completes various assessments. While the Bureau has made some improvements to its management of MAF/TIGER? IT such as finalizing five of eight test plans, GAO continues to be concerned about the lack of finalized test plans, incomplete metrics to gauge progress, and an aggressive testing and implementation schedule going forward. Given the importance of MAF/TIGER? to an accurate census, it is critical that the Bureau ensure this system is thoroughly tested. |
gao_AIMD-98-148 | gao_AIMD-98-148_0 | OMB is the lead agency for overseeing a framework of recently enacted financial, information resources, and performance planning and measurement reforms designed to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of federal agencies. OMB. Historically, There Have Been Questions About Whether to Integrate or Separate Management and Budget Functions
OMB’s perennial challenge is to carry out its central management leadership responsibilities in such a way that leverages opportunities of the budget process, while at the same time ensuring that management concerns receive appropriate attention in an environment driven by budget and policy decisions. To carry out its responsibilities, OMB’s Resource Management Offices (RMO) are responsible for examining agency budget, management, and policy issues. Greater Attention to Financial Management Issues
OMB’s DDM and the OFFM, in concert with the CFO Council, have led governmentwide efforts to focus greater attention on financial management issues. OMB has played a pivotal role in fostering ongoing financial management reforms ranging from improved financial systems and reporting to new accounting standards. Streamlining the Procurement Process
OMB’s OFPP has worked to implement FASA and the Clinger-Cohen Act. OFPP has also been working to streamline the procurement process, promote efficiency, and encourage a more results-oriented approach to planning and monitoring contracts. Improving Capital Decision-Making
OMB’s efforts to improve capital decision-making are a third example of where OMB’s leadership efforts are yielding some results. Enhancing Information Security
To address widespread weaknesses in federal information security, the CIO Council, under OMB’s leadership, has taken some significant actions, which include designating information security as one of six priority areas and establishing a Security Committee. Increasing Year 2000 Compliance
processes and supporting systems. Reviewing Regulations
We also have found that improvements are needed in the process used to review and clear regulations. Analyzing Crosscutting Issues
Finally, OMB’s oversight role across the government can provide the basis for analyzing crosscutting program design, implementation, and organizational issues. The experiences to-date suggests that certain factors are associated with the successful implementation of management initiatives, regardless of the specific organizational arrangement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its observations on the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) efforts to carry out its responsibilities to set policy and oversee the management of the executive branch.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OMB is the lead agency for overseeing a framework of recently enacted financial, information resources, and performance planning and measurement reforms designed to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of federal agencies; (2) OMB's perennial challenge is to carry out its central management leadership responsibilities in a way that leverages opportunities of the budget process, while at the same time ensuring that management concerns receive appropriate attention in an environment driven by budget and policy decisions; (3) OMB's Deputy Director for Management and the Office of Federal Financial Management, in concert with the Chief Financial Officers Council, have led governmentwide efforts to focus greater attention on financial management issues; (4) OMB has played a pivotal role in fostering ongoing financial management reform, ranging from improved financial systems and reporting to new accounting standards; (5) despite this progress, GAO was not able to form an opinion on the reliability of the federal government's consolidated financial statements because of serious deficiencies; (6) OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has worked to implement the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act and the Clinger-Cohen Act; (7) OFPP has also been working to streamline the procurement process, promote efficiency, and encourage a more results-oriented approach to planning and monitoring contracts; (8) OMB's efforts to improve capital decisionmaking are a third example of where OMB's leadership efforts are yielding some results; (9) to address widespread weaknesses in federal information security, the Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council, under OMB's leadership, has taken some significant actions; (10) agencies' computer systems' year 2000 compliance remains a concern, and serious vulnerabilities remain, although OMB, the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, and the CIO Council all have focused attention on increasing compliance; (11) GAO also found that improvements are needed in the process used to review and clear regulations; (12) OMB's Circular A-76 sets forth federal policy for determining whether commercial activities associated with conducting the government's business will be performed by federal employees or contractors; (13) OMB's oversight role across the government can provide the basis for analyzing crosscutting program design, implementation, and organizational issues; and (14) the experiences to date suggest that certain factors are associated with the successful implementation of management initiatives. |
gao_GAO-07-352 | gao_GAO-07-352_0 | Two federal statutes enacted in 2000 and 2003 modified the slot and perimeter rules at Reagan National Airport. Figure 2 shows each market by number of slots and airline. FAA Indicates Some Additional Capacity Could Be Added, but Airports Authority Cites Airport Infrastructure Constraints as an Obstacle
According to FAA officials, whose estimate is based on airside capacity (principally runways) and not landside infrastructure (such as terminals and parking facilities), Reagan National can presently accommodate four additional slots per hour. Airport officials were unsure of how many additional flights, if any, the airport could accommodate. Even without increasing the number of slots, there are opportunities to accommodate more flights and passengers. The study estimated that the airport’s balanced capacity is 67 flights per hour, or 4 more than what is currently in place, resulting in an additional 60 flights per day based on an 15-hour operating period. Airports Authority Questions Reagan National’s Capacity to Accommodate Additional Slots
Airport officials disagree with FAA’s estimate because it assumes balanced capacity, whereas the airport prefers to measure capacity differently. Airport official said the absence of general aviation flights helped the airport to absorb the additional slots that were authorized under AIR-21 and Vision 100. These limitations involve several aspects of the airport’s infrastructure. For the recent slots awarded under AIR-21 and Vision 100, the airports authority has been able to accommodate new entrants with gates and other facilities. The second way in which current capacity could be expanded is to reduce the number of smaller commuter planes using slots that are allocated for larger jet planes that carry more passengers. Airlines with Nonstop Service between Beyond-Perimeter Airports and Reagan National Gained Significant Market Share of Traffic in Those Markets, While the Effect on Flights to Other Area Airports Is Not Evident
Airlines awarded slots for nonstop service between Reagan National and airports beyond the 1,250 mile perimeter have been able to gain a significant market share of traffic for routes. In half of the cases the nonstop fare was on average $25 to $50 higher than the connecting flight fares to and from Reagan National. The Effect of Beyond- Perimeter Slots on Area Airports Is Not Evident
We did not find evidence that beyond-perimeter flights to and from Reagan National affected flights from the same airports to or from Dulles or BWI. DOT acknowledges that all available slots at Reagan National Airport are not used to maximum effect and agreed that there are a number of reasons for this, including curfew restrictions, the commercial viability of slots in the early morning or late evening under current regulations, and the concentration of the majority of slot holdings among a relatively small number of carriers. While the airports authority believes that the airport can accommodate some additional capacity, it is something less than the 4 slots per hour as suggested by DOT. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how many additional slots Reagan National Airport can accommodate, we analyzed Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (airports authority) operational data, reviewed prior capacity studies, and interviewed airports authority, FAA, and Department of Transportation (DOT) officials. To assess traffic between Washington, D.C., area airports and the six beyond-perimeter airports for which nonstop service to Reagan National was awarded since 1999, we analyzed DOT’s Origin and Destination ticket data; we used these data to examine changes in fares and passenger levels between Reagan National, Dulles International (Dulles) and Baltimore- Washington Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI), and these airports. For this analysis, we conducted a historical look at traffic between the six airports and the three Washington-Baltimore area airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1999, GAO reported that Reagan National Airport could accommodate at least 36 more slots, which are authorizations from the Department of Transportation (DOT) for a takeoff or landing. In 2000 and 2003, two federal statutes, known as AIR-21 and Vision 100, permitted DOT to award 44 new slots to airlines, 24 of which could be used for flights to cities more than 1,250 miles, which was the statutorily mandated limit for non stop flights from Reagan National. The DOT awards went to airlines serving six cities (Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Seattle). For this year's reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), GAO was asked for an update on the capacity of Reagan National to accommodate additional slots and the effect of relaxing the perimeter rule. GAO updated its 1999 study to answer these key questions: (1) To what extent can Reagan National accommodate additional flights? (2) Since AIR-21 and Vision 100, what changes have occurred in market share and fares for flights operating between the six beyond-perimeter cities and the three Washington, D.C., area airports? In commenting on this report, DOT and the airports authority generally agree with our findings but with one exception, the airports authority disagrees with DOT's estimate of slots because it disputes their methodological assumptions. We believe the department's methodology for estimating airport capacity is appropriate.
What GAO Found
Reagan National Airport can accommodate some additional in capacity, but airport infrastructure constrains how much can be added. FAA officials believe that some additional slots can be added, while airport officials have not made an estimate. FAA, using the results of a 1995 DOT capacity study, determined that the airport's airside infrastructure (e.g., runways) could accommodate four additional slots per hour. Airport officials said they were unsure how many additional slots, if any, the airport could accommodate but cited several factors that could limit the airport's capacity to absorb additional slots including the limited number of gates currently available for loading airplanes and other infrastructure constraints. GAO's work shows that even if the number of slots is not increased, there is some opportunity to expand current capacity by filling unused slots and increasing the size of aircraft on existing slots to increase the number of flights and the number of passengers served. Currently, nearly 80 slots are unused because they are at early morning or late evening times and airlines have not applied to use these time slots. In addition, many of the slots reserved for large passenger jets are currently being used by smaller regional jets. Airlines awarded slots for direct flights between Reagan National and the six beyond-perimeter cities gained significant market share in those selected cities, but the effect of these slots on competing flights operating between these cities and the other Washington, D.C. area airports is not evident. For each of the six beyond-perimeter cities, the direct flights to and from Reagan National captured the majority of passengers flying between that city and Reagan National. In most cases, the airlines charged higher fares than competing connecting flights. GAO did not find evidence in passengers or fare data that would indicate that the new service between Reagan National and the six beyond perimeter cities had substantially affected service from Dulles or Baltimore-Washington International airports to these cities. |
gao_GAO-12-23 | gao_GAO-12-23_0 | The first source of stem cells used for transplant was bone marrow, but now stem cells from the bloodstream and cord blood can also be used. Cord Blood Banking for the NCBI
Thirteen banks are currently under contract with HRSA to contribute cord blood units to the NCBI and list the units on the NMDP registry. As a part of their banking activities, the cord blood banks recruit donors, collect cord blood, process and store units, and distribute the units for transplant and research. HRSA Contracts with Cord Blood Banks
HRSA has awarded contracts to the cord blood banks, based on requirements set out in the Stem Cell Act, through a competitive request- for-proposal process. HRSA’s reimbursement rate for each cord blood unit banked for the NCBI is negotiated with each bank. The largest source of revenue for the banks comes from the sale of cord blood units for transplantation. The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Cord Blood
The FDA regulates cord blood for use in transplants when the patient is not related to the donor. Expanding the number of collection sites could also increase the number and diversity of cord blood units in the NCBI, but banks reported funding challenges related to establishing new sites. Banks Reported Practices That Could Increase Collections at Existing Sites, but Increased Expenditures and Other Factors Could Present Challenges
Ten of the 13 banks that we interviewed told us that the following practices could increase the number of cord blood units collected at existing collection sites: Adding more staff at collection sites during more hours of the day and/or more days of the week. Lowering the age of consent for donating cord blood. Resource limitations, as well as competition from private cord blood banks, could make increasing collections at existing sites challenging. Expanding the Number of Collection Sites Could Increase the Size and the Diversity of the NCBI, but Banks Reported Challenges Funding New Sites
Another way to increase the number of units in the NCBI, and the inventory’s diversity, is to expand the number of collection sites, especially if banks can identify collection sites that will add to the racial and ethnic diversity of their collections. Whether the bank is trying to increase cord blood collection at an existing site or by adding a new site, the banks reported the following practices: identifying a “champion” associated with the collection site, such as a doctor or administrator, to support the site’s collection efforts and to motivate staff to collect cord blood; providing bank staff or paying the salaries of hospital staff to carry out some or all of the collection activities at each site; contributing to the nurses’ education fund at the site; or paying for space to use for collection activities. Banks Reported Additional Practices for Increasing the Genetic Diversity of the NCBI, but Characteristics Associated with Some Units Pose Challenges
In addition to adding new collection sites with diverse populations, 6 of the 13 banks that we interviewed reported specific practices to recruit donors and bank cord blood from various racial and ethnic groups in order to increase collections that enhance the genetic diversity of the NCBI. Increase in Demand of U.S. Cord Blood Units Has Slowed and Could Challenge Banks’ Efforts to Increase the NCBI
Worldwide demand for U.S. cord blood units has slowed compared to the demand that existed when the NCBI was created. Alternative treatments to cord blood transplantation may also affect the demand for cord blood. Some banks also reported uncertainty about the effect of FDA regulations on costs and revenues. One cost-saving practice reported by 11 of the 13 banks we interviewed is to use an early screening process to identify units that do not meet the NCBI cell count threshold of 900 million cells or the bank’s own volume or weight requirements before incurring the costs of processing these units. Some Banks Reported Uncertainty about the Effect of Complying with FDA Licensure Regulations on Costs and Revenues
Five of the 13 banks reported that their efforts to apply for FDA licensure have already increased their costs or noted that the total cost burden of operating as an FDA licensed bank is unclear. For example, two banks reported having to hire external consultants or reorganize staff duties to complete the application for licensure. Two banks reported that they have already incurred significant expenditures to make building renovations, buy new equipment, or hire additional staff in attempts to comply with FDA regulations. However, FDA officials told GAO in a July 2011 interview that they are taking the approach that neither individuals nor hospitals that have agreements with banks to collect cord blood will be required to register separately with FDA. FDA officials said that such entities are required to comply with product requirements applicable to their collecting activities, and the cord blood bank is responsible for ensuring that these entities under contract with the bank comply with FDA regulations. FDA officials have said that the benefits of cord blood licensure include greater assurance among doctors and patients of the quality and efficacy of cord blood units. However, some banks also reported that they were uncertain whether potential increased revenue from licensed units will offset their costs. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS provided additional information concerning several content areas of the report, including demand for U.S. cord blood units, HRSA’s pilot project for remote collections of cord blood units, and efforts to increase the diversity of the cord blood units collected for the NCBI. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, many people diagnosed with diseases such as leukemia and lymphoma require transplants of stem cells from umbilical cord blood or other sources. The Stem Cell Therapeutic and Research Act of 2005 authorized funding for banking 150,000 new units of high quality and genetically diverse cord blood and directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to contract with cord blood banks to assist in cord blood collection. HHS, through the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), established the National Cord Blood Inventory (NCBI) program to support banking of cord blood units and contracted with 13 cord blood banks to bank these units. The 2010 reauthorization required GAO to report on efforts to increase cord blood unit collection for the NCBI. As of May 2011, HRSA had reimbursed banks for over 41,000 units banked for the NCBI. In this report, GAO describes (1) practices identified to increase banking of cord blood units for the NCBI and related challenges and (2) practices cord blood banks are using to lower costs and improve the efficiency of cord blood banking and associated challenges. To do so, GAO reviewed relevant regulations and documents, and interviewed officials from pertinent organizations. These included officials from HRSA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for regulating cord blood used in transplants for patients who are not related to the donor, the National Marrow Donor Program (NMDP), which operates a national registry of cord blood units and other sources of stem cells, and the 13 banks with contracts to bank cord blood units for the NCBI..
What GAO Found
The 13 banks with NCBI contracts reported various practices that could increase the number of cord blood units banked at existing and new collection sites, as well as increasing the diversity of the units collected. However, challenges to increasing collection for these banks include resource limitations, as well as competition from other cord blood banks, which collect units for use only by family members of the donor, and slowing growth in demand for U.S. cord blood units. Cord blood banks reported that increasing staff at collection sites, providing feedback to those who collect cord blood, and lowering the age for those donating could increase the number of units collected for the NCBI at existing sites. Expanding the number of collection sites could also increase the number and diversity of NCBI units. However, the banks in our review reported financial challenges related to increasing the number of units collected at existing or new collection sites, such as a limited ability to address the costs associated with hiring additional staff to cover more hours of collection or to support bank and hospital staff salaries at new sites. These banks identified additional practices for increasing the diversity of the units collected for the NCBI, but also reported that the units collected from some racial groups have lower volumes or cell counts compared to other groups, making such units less likely to meet standards for inclusion in the NCBI. Further, growth in sales of U.S. cord blood units, banks' primary source of funding, has slowed and could challenge banks' efforts. Demand for cord blood could increase or decrease depending on a number of variables, such as whether new research identifies ways to increase the benefits of cord blood or conversely, the development of alternative treatments to cord blood transplantation. Most of the 13 banks with NCBI contracts reported adopting practices to reduce costs and improve the efficiency of cord blood banking, but also reported some uncertainty about the effect on costs and revenues of complying with FDA licensure regulations that now apply to cord blood. These banks reported practices such as using an early screening process to identify units that do not meet NCBI or the bank's own requirements prior to incurring the costs of processing these units. Further, banks with NCBI contracts reported that efforts to comply with applicable FDA regulations could increase the costs of banking cord blood. For example, some banks reported hiring external consultants or additional staff, reorganizing staff duties, beginning building renovations, or purchasing new processing equipment in attempts to comply with FDA regulations regarding cord blood manufacture and licensing. Some banks also said they were uncertain whether these efforts would comply with FDA requirements or if their collection sites would have to register with the FDA as an establishment that manufactures cord blood. However, FDA officials told GAO that neither individuals nor collection sites that have agreements with banks to collect units will be required to register, though banks must ensure the collection sites comply with FDA regulations. Further, some banks also reported that they were uncertain whether potential increased revenue from licensed units will offset their costs of cord blood banking. HHS provided additional information regarding our findings, which was incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-772 | gao_GAO-07-772_0 | The Proportion of Flexible Funding Used on Transit Projects Has Been Relatively Low
Overall, from the enactment of ISTEA in late 1991 through 2006, the relative amount of flexible funding used for transit projects, either directly through FHWA or through transfer to FTA, has been low, averaging less than 3 percent of the total federal-aid highway program and 13 percent of available flexible funding. Figure 6 shows the proportion of FTA funding in each state that came from transferred STP and CMAQ funds. Of the flexible funding transferred to FTA from 1992 through 2006, more than half was used on purchases of vehicles—both rail cars and motor vehicles such as buses—and on projects related to rail lines or bus lanes. The heaviest users of transferred flexible funding on transit—urbanized areas with populations of over 1 million—spent 55 percent on these types of projects. Projects for Flexible Funding Are Often Selected through a Competitive Process, Particularly at the Local Level
Of the 10 urbanized areas included in our case-study review that have decision-making authority for flexible funding, 7 selected projects for at least some of these funds using competitive processes in which all eligible project types were considered, including highway, transit, bikeway and pedestrian, and others. Projects competing in the alternative transportation category were evaluated based on congestion reduction, air quality benefit, and the fuel efficiency of the mode of transportation. Flexibility Enables State and Local Officials to Fund Their Highest Priorities, Which Is Advantageous Due to Demand for Transportation Funding
As a result of the broad eligibility of STP and CMAQ funds, states and urbanized areas can use a multimodal approach to transportation planning, selecting projects that they believe best address their transportation priorities—whether a road project, a transit project, or projects such as intelligent transportation systems or traffic demand management strategies. Officials with the MPOs and state transportation departments we met with said that due to its broad, multimodal eligibility, flexible funding considerably benefits their ability to plan and fund their transportation programs, particularly because of the challenge of finding sufficient revenues to pay for transportation improvements. DOT generally agreed with the report’s findings. These officials provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine the degree to which flexible funding has been used on transit and how this use varies across states and urbanized areas, we analyzed data from FTA and FHWA. To determine how states and urbanized areas have made decisions about what projects to fund with flexible funding and what the outcomes of these decisions have been, we selected 9 states and 12 urbanized areas for case-study reviews. We collected and reviewed: (1) documentation from the case-study states and urbanized areas, including information on state and metropolitan planning processes, the criteria and procedures used in project selection competitions, and projects funded using flexible funding; (2) federal regulations and guidance related to transportation planning and the CMAQ and STP programs; and (3) prior reports on the use of flexible funding by states and urbanized areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 introduced two highway programs--the Surface Transportation Program (STP) and the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Program (CMAQ)--that may be used on both highway and transit projects and that are referred to as "flexible funding" for the purposes of this report. GAO was asked to examine (1) the degree to which STP and CMAQ funding has been used on transit and how this use varies across states and urbanized areas, and (2) how states and urbanized areas decide which projects to fund with STP and CMAQ funding and what the outcomes of these decisions have been. To address these issues, GAO analyzed data on flexible funding used on transit projects from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and spoke with officials in selected states and urbanized areas about their project-selection processes for flexible funding and the outcomes of these funding decisions. States and urbanized areas were selected based on their prior use of flexible funding. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the report's findings and provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated in the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since the 1991 creation of the two flexible funding programs this report examines--STP and CMAQ--$12 billion from these programs has been spent on transit projects, either directly through FHWA or through transfer to FTA. This spending on transit represents 13 percent of the apportionments for these programs since 1992 and 3 percent of the total federal-aid highway program. However, the amount of FTA funding used in some states has been augmented significantly by these funds; in four states, funds transferred from these programs to FTA made up 20 percent or more of total FTA expenditures. Nearly 80 percent of transferred funds have been used in urbanized areas with populations over one million, and the most common uses of these funds include purchases of transit vehicles such as buses and rail cars, and projects related to rail lines or bus lanes. The 9 states and 12 urbanized areas in our case study review had formal processes for selecting projects for flexible funding. Of these, 7 urbanized areas and 4 states selected projects for all or some of these funds through competitive processes in which projects for different transportation modes were evaluated and selected using established criteria and input from transportation stakeholders. States and urbanized areas that did not use competitions selected projects based on transportation priorities and plans. Regarding the outcomes of decisions on how to utilize flexible funding, state and local officials told us that the broad, multimodal eligibility of this funding program enhances their ability to fund their transportation priorities, particularly in light of the challenge of finding sufficient revenues to pay for transportation improvements. |
gao_GAO-16-793 | gao_GAO-16-793_0 | Background
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Program
The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) and its implementing regulations provide compensation for federal civilian employees who suffer disabilities resulting from work-related injuries or diseases. An incentive to return to work within the FECA program is the reduction of benefits for partial-disability beneficiaries, as noted in our prior work. DOD Represented 17 Percent of All Claimants Government-Wide in 2015, and Total- Disability DOD Beneficiaries Were Older Than Non-DOD Beneficiaries
DOD Accounted for about 17 Percent of All FECA Claimants, and DOD Beneficiaries Received Various Types and Levels of Benefits
In 2015, DOD’s FECA claimants represented 17 percent of all FECA claimants government-wide, and DOD beneficiaries received approximately $553.7 million worth of benefits (see fig. 2). In comparison, DOD’s more than 720,000 employees represented about 35 percent of the federal civilian workforce. For example, in 2015 approximately 35 percent of DOD beneficiaries received medical benefits only, and about 20 percent received partial- or total- disability benefits. About 31 percent of DOD claimants received cash benefits in 2015, compared to 26 percent of non-DOD claimants (see fig. In addition, about 56 percent of DOD beneficiaries were at or above their full Social Security retirement age, compared to 32 percent of non-DOD beneficiaries. For more information on the age of DOD and non-DOD beneficiaries, as well as a discussion of total-disability beneficiaries at full Social Security retirement age, see appendix I.
DOD Officials We Interviewed Reported Claims Data Are Generally Available to Process FECA Claims, but Said They Experience Challenges Regarding Process Timelines
DOD Officials Report Generally Sufficient Access to FECA Claims Data and Information Necessary to Carry Out Responsibilities
Most of the DOD injury compensation specialists, liaisons, and program offices we interviewed reported they had the necessary FECA-related information to effectively conduct their work. Moreover, without a full understanding of any issues that may exist, DOD is unable to communicate the scope of any such problems to DOL. Employing agencies are responsible for returning employees to work, but DOL is responsible for determining whether a job offer is suitable to return an employee to work and to obtain a second opinion on an employee’s medical condition or work capacity. For instance, according to Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service officials, DOD has experienced what they perceive as lengthy periods waiting for suitability determinations from DOL, in some instances over a year. DOL officials told us that the process can take several months due to the exchange of information among each of the parties involved, including DOL, the employing agency (such as DOD), and the claimant. However, waiting for such long periods, according to DOD officials, creates a hardship on the employing agency, as it must both keep the position open for the injured employee, as well as continue to pay the claimant until a decision is made. DOL officials stated that if DOD is experiencing ongoing challenges, more information about these challenges would be helpful to find a solution. Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service officials stated that monitoring information like response times could help them further understand any issues or problems they may experience and help inform future communication with DOL. Facilitating return-to-work outcomes can depend on timely job-suitability determinations. While not generalizable, our discussions with the military departments’ injury compensation specialists, DOD liaisons, and FECA program managers indicate that the department may face challenges in its efforts to work with DOL to effectively manage DOD’s FECA process. However, without monitoring the timelines associated with injury compensation specialists’ processing of FECA claims—particularly the significant claims-management actions over which DOL has approving authority—the department is not positioned to identify the extent to which delays or inefficiencies are present, at what points in the process they occur, or any reasons or resolutions for such issues. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help support DOD management of its FECA responsibilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in collaboration with the Secretaries of the military departments and other defense agency leaders, to monitor timelines associated with significant FECA claims- management actions in order to identify the extent to which delays or inefficiencies may be occurring and at what points in the process; to identify any known reasons for the delays; and to communicate this information to DOL as appropriate for consideration and action. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD employs more than 720,000 civilians—approximately 35 percent of the federal civilian workforce—in an array of critical positions worldwide. DOD civilians who are injured or ill as a result of a work-related incident are covered under the DOL-administered FECA program. DOL, along with employing agencies like DOD, works to return injured employees to work and provides compensation for work-related disabilities. In 2015, about 90 percent of DOD's injured workers returned to work within 2 years of injury.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review DOD's use of the FECA program. This report analyzes (1) characteristics of DOD's 2015 FECA claimants and how they compared to non-DOD claimants and (2) the extent to which DOD experiences any challenges managing its FECA responsibilities and facilitating return-to-work outcomes.
GAO analyzed 2015 DOL data to identify characteristics, such as the age and benefit type, of FECA claimants, including those who received benefits that year (beneficiaries). GAO also analyzed relevant law, policies, and guidance on DOL and DOD's management of FECA, and interviewed DOL and DOD officials—including a nongeneralizable sample of DOD program officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) 47,340 civilian employees who filed claims under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) made up 17 percent of FECA claimants in 2015, and DOD total-disability beneficiaries (i.e., with no capacity to work) were generally older than those from the rest of government. About 35 percent of DOD beneficiaries received medical benefits only, and 31 percent received cash payments for injury or death—including the nearly 20 percent receiving partial- or total-disability benefits. About 56 percent of DOD total-disability beneficiaries were at or above their full Social Security Retirement age, compared to 32 percent of non-DOD beneficiaries (see figure).
DOD FECA officials that GAO interviewed generally had sufficient access to Department of Labor (DOL) data to manage their FECA responsibilities; however, they reported perceived delays with receiving certain decisions from DOL. As the administrator of FECA, DOL has responsibility and authority for managing all claims, but employing agencies have roles in returning employees to work. DOD FECA program managers, injury compensation specialists, and liaisons GAO interviewed reported experiencing some challenges in instances requiring DOL action or approval, such as determining whether a potential job is suitable in order to return an injured employee to work. According to DOD officials, in some instances such determinations have taken over a year, which could affect DOD as it must both hold the job unfilled and continue to pay compensation until a decision is made. According to DOL, this process can take several months due to the amount of information and communication required among the employing agency, the injured employee, DOL, and other parties, such as an employee's physician. Additionally, DOD has not monitored the timelines associated with requesting DOL action to determine the extent to which delays or related issues may exist across DOD, any known reasons for these issues, and any effect possible delays may have on DOD's return-to-work efforts. DOD officials said that such monitoring could help them understand any issues. DOL officials stated that if DOD experiences challenges, more information could help DOL find a solution. Without monitoring timelines, DOD is not positioned to identify the nature and extent of any problems, make any improvements, or communicate such issues to DOL.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD monitor timelines associated with significant FECA claims-management actions to identify the extent to which delays may occur and any known reasons, and communicate with DOL as appropriate. DOD agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-993 | gao_GAO-03-993_0 | When workers pay social security taxes, they earn coverage credits, and 40 credits—equal to at least 10 years of work— entitle them to social security benefits when they reach retirement age. SSA officials told us that the process used to develop the proposed totalization agreement with Mexico was the same as for prior agreements with other countries. The process—which is not specified by law or outlined in written policies and procedures—is informal, and the steps SSA takes when entering into agreements are neither transparent nor well-documented. During their visit, these officials told us that they toured social security facilities, observed how Mexico’s automated social security systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. In effect, SSA only briefly observed the operations of the Mexican social security program. Totalization Agreements Will Increase Benefit Payments to Mexican Citizens
A totalization agreement with Mexico will increase the number of Mexican citizens who will be paid U.S. social security benefits in two ways. In addition, more family members of covered workers will qualify for dependent and survivor benefits. Totalization agreements generally override Social Security Act provisions that prohibit benefit payments to noncitizens’ dependents and survivors who reside outside the United States for more than 6 months, unless they can prove that they lived in the United States for 5 years in a close family relationship with the covered worker. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) in 2050. SSA’s actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries was equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure is not directly related to the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and their family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison to those estimates. Estimated Cost of Mexican Limited data about unauthorized workers make any estimate of the Agreement Is Highly Uncertain expected costs of a Mexican totalization agreement highly uncertain. The INS estimate, however, does not include unauthorized Mexican workers and family members who no longer live in the United States and could also conceivably benefit from a totalization agreement. The cost estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change after a totalization agreement goes into effect. Under totalization, unauthorized workers would have an additional incentive to enter the United States to work and to maintain the appropriate documentation necessary to claim their earnings under a false identity. Although it would be unreasonable to expect all unauthorized Mexicans in the United States to qualify for totalized benefits, the very large difference between estimated and potential beneficiaries underscores the uncertainty of the estimate and the potential costs of an agreement could be higher than OCACT projects. OCACT has estimated that the agreement would not generate a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance. However, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at our request shows that a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance of the trust funds will occur if the baseline figure is underestimated by more than 25 percent—just 13,000 additional beneficiaries above the estimated 50,000 new beneficiaries. However, it is important to note that the number of estimated beneficiaries for prior agreements is substantially smaller than for the proposed Mexican agreement. Regarding the potential benefits of totalization agreements, our report specifically notes that such agreements foster international commerce, protect benefits for persons who have worked in foreign countries, and eliminate dual social security taxes for multinational employers and employees. As table 2 shows, error rates associated with SSA’s estimates of potential beneficiaries under prior agreements have often been substantial, even in cases where uncertainties about the number of unauthorized workers were less prevalent. OCACT prepares estimates of initial beneficiaries for each proposed agreement with an individual country. Appendix II: Comments from the Social Security Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
Totalization agreements foster international commerce, protect benefits for persons who have worked in foreign countries, and eliminate dual social security taxes that employers and their employees pay when they operate and reside in countries with parallel social security systems. Because Mexicans are believed to represent a large share of the millions of unauthorized workers present in the United States, a totalization agreement with Mexico has raised concerns that they would become newly eligible for social security benefits. To shed light on the possible impacts, GAO was asked to (1) describe the Social Security Administration's (SSA) processes for developing the agreement with Mexico, (2) explain how the agreement might affect the payment of benefits to Mexican citizens, and (3) assess the cost estimate for such an agreement.
What GAO Found
SSA has no written policies or procedures it follows when entering into totalization agreements, and the actions it took to assess the integrity and compatibility of Mexico's social security system were limited and neither transparent nor well-documented. SSA followed the same procedures for the proposed Mexican agreement that it used in all prior agreements. SSA officials told GAO that they briefly toured Mexican facilities, observed how its automated systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. However, SSA provided no information showing that it assessed the reliability of Mexican earnings data and the internal controls used to ensure the integrity of information that SSA will rely on to pay social security benefits. The proposed agreement will likely increase the number of unauthorized Mexican workers and family members eligible for social security benefits. Mexican workers who ordinarily could not receive social security retirement benefits because they lack the required 40 coverage credits for U.S. earnings could qualify for partial social security benefits with as few as 6 coverage credits. In addition, under the proposed agreement, more family members of covered Mexican workers would become newly entitled because the agreements usually waive rules that prevent payments to noncitizens' dependents and survivors living outside the United States. The cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow to $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) in 2050. The actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries is equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure does not directly consider the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison with those estimates. The estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change and does not recognize that an agreement would create an additional incentive for unauthorized workers to enter the United States to work and maintain documentation to claim their earnings under a false identity. Although the actuarial estimate indicates that the agreement would not generate a measurable long-term impact on the actuarial balance of the trust funds, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at GAO's request shows that a measurable impact would occur with an increase of more than 25 percent in the estimate of initial, new beneficiaries. For prior agreements, error rates associated with estimating the expected number of new beneficiaries have frequently exceeded 25 percent, even in cases where uncertainties about the number of unauthorized workers were less prevalent. Because of the significant number of unauthorized Mexican workers in the United States, the estimated cost of the proposed totalization agreement is even more uncertain than in prior agreements. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-129 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-129_0 | Background
The United States has assisted the Mexican government in its counternarcotics efforts since 1973, providing about $350 million in aid. Among other things, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify annually that major drug-producing and -transit countries are fully cooperating with the United States in their counternarcotics efforts. In 1997, the United States set the following objectives for evaluating Mexico’s counternarcotics cooperation as part of the 1998 certification process: (1) reducing the flow of drugs into the United States from Mexico, (2) disrupting and dismantling narco-trafficking organizations, (3) bringing fugitives to justice, (4) making progress in criminal justice and anticorruption reform, (5) improving money laundering and chemical diversion control, and (6) continuing improvement in cooperating with the United States. Some of the actions include (1) increasing counternarcotics cooperation with the United States; (2) initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States; (3) passing an organized crime law that enhanced the government’s authority against money laundering and illegal use and diversion of precursor and essential chemicals; and (4) implementing measures aimed at reducing corruption, such as increasing the role of Mexico’s military forces in law enforcement activities. Although no Mexican national has ever been surrendered to the United States on drug-related charges, since 1996 Mexico has approved the extradition of 4 of 27 Mexican nationals charged with drug-related offenses. In addition, there is no reporting requirement on currency leaving the country. Although all of Mexico’s actions are positive steps to reducing drug-related activities, there are still many issues that need to be resolved. For example,
U.S. and Mexican officials indicated that personnel shortages exist in the Special Prosecutor’s office and the special units; the special units face operational and support problems, including inadequate Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel, and salary supplements for personnel assigned to the units, and the lack of standard operating procedures;
U.S. law enforcement agents assigned to the Bilateral Task Forces cannot carry arms in Mexico; and
Mexico continues to have difficulty building competent law enforcement institutions because of low salaries and little job security. Planning and Coordination of U.S.-Provided Assistance
U.S.-provided assistance has enhanced the counternarcotics capabilities of Mexico’s military. However, the effectiveness and usefulness of some equipment provided or sold to Mexico is limited due to inadequate planning and coordination among U.S. agencies, particularly military agencies within DOD. As a result of this visit, the Mexican military agreed to accept U.S. counternarcotics assistance. DOD plans to provide about $13 million worth of counternarcotics assistance under section 1004 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 to Mexico’s military in fiscal year 1998. While some of the equipment has helped improve Mexico’s capabilities, some has been of limited usefulness. Additionally, inadequate logistics support to the Mexican military has hindered its efforts to reduce drug-related activities in Mexico. We believe that planning and coordination of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico could be improved. Performance Measures for U.S. and Mexican Drug Control Efforts
Without measures of effectiveness, it is difficult for U.S. decisionmakers to evaluate the progress that the United States and Mexico are making to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. We have previously noted the need for ONDCP to develop drug control plans that include performance measures to allow it to assess the effectiveness of antidrug programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work on the counternarcotics efforts of the United States in Mexico, focusing on the: (1) nature of the drug threat from Mexico and results of efforts to address this threat; (2) planning and coordination of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican military; and (3) need to establish performance measures to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Mexico is the principle transit country for cocaine entering the United States and, despite U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts, the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from Mexico has not significantly diminished; (2) no country poses a more immediate narcotics threat to the United States than Mexico, according to the Department of State; (3) the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border and the daunting volume of legitimate cross-border traffic provide near-limitless opportunities for smuggling illicit drugs, weapons, and proceeds of crime, and for escape by fugitives; (4) Mexico, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to improve its capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States; (5) among other things, the Mexican government has taken action that could potentially lead to the extradition of drug criminals to the United States and passed new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical control; (6) it has also instituted reforms in law enforcement agencies and expanded the role of the military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption--the most significant impediment to successfully diminishing drug-related activities; (7) while Mexico's actions represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and challenges to their full implementation remain; (8) no Mexico national has actually been surrendered to the United States on drug charges, new laws are not fully implemented, and building competent judicial and law enforcement institutions continues to be a major challenge; (9) since fiscal year 1996, Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the Mexican military with $76 million worth of equipment, training, and spare parts; (10) the Mexican military has used this equipment to improve its counternarcotics efforts; (11) however, due, in part, to inadequate planning and coordination within DOD, the assistance provided has been of limited effectiveness and usefulness; (12) improved planning and coordination could improve Mexico's counternarcotics effectiveness; (13) although the Mexican government has agreed to a series of actions to improve its counternarcotics capacity, and the United States has begun to provide a larger level of assistance, at the present time there is no system in place to assess their effectiveness; and (14) even though the United States and Mexico have recently issued a binational drug control strategy, it does not include performance measures. |
gao_GAO-06-988 | gao_GAO-06-988_0 | U.S. Is Underrepresented in Three of Five UN Agencies and Increased Hiring of Americans Is Necessary to Meet Employment Targets
U.S. citizens are underrepresented at three of the five UN agencies we reviewed: IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR. Given projected staff levels, retirements, and separations for 2006-2010, these agencies need to hire more Americans than they have in recent years to meet their minimum targets for equitable U.S. representation in 2010. U.S. citizens are equitably represented at the UN Secretariat, though at the lower end of its target range, while the fifth agency—UNDP—has not established a target for U.S. representation. U.S. citizens fill about 11 percent of UNDP’s professional positions. While Common Barriers to Increasing U.S. Representation Exist, UN Agencies Also Face Distinct Employment Challenges
A combination of barriers, including some common factors as well as agency-specific factors, adversely affects recruitment and retention of professional staff, including Americans, at each of the five UN agencies. Barriers common to most UN agencies we reviewed include nontransparent human resource practices, a limited number of positions open to external candidates, lengthy hiring processes, comparatively low or unclear compensation, required mobility and rotation, and limited U.S. government support. For example, candidates serving in professional UN positions funded by their member governments are more likely to be hired by the Secretariat than those who take the Secretariat’s entry-level exam; however, the United States has not funded such positions at the Secretariat. IAEA has difficulty attracting U.S. employees because the pool of American nuclear specialists is decreasing. State Has Increased Efforts to Promote U.S. Representation, but Additional Options Exist to Target Professional Positions
State targets its recruitment efforts for senior and policy-making UN positions, and, although it is difficult to directly link State’s efforts to UN hiring decisions, U.S. representation in these positions has either improved or displayed no trend in the five UN agencies we reviewed. State also has increased its efforts to improve overall U.S. representation, including adding staff to its UN employment office and increasing coordination with other U.S. agencies; however, despite these efforts, U.S. representation in entry-level positions has declined or did not reflect a trend in four of the five UN agencies we reviewed. U.S. Missions Share U.S. These steps include maintaining a roster of qualified candidates, expanding marketing and outreach activities, increasing and improving UN employment information on U.S. agency Web sites, and analyzing the costs and benefits of sponsoring JPOs. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we reviewed (1) U.S. representation status and employment trends at five United Nations (UN) organizations, (2) factors affecting these organizations’ ability to meet U.S. representation targets, and (3) the U.S. Department of State’s current efforts to improve U.S. representation and additional steps that could be taken. We reviewed five UN organizations: the UN Secretariat; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and UN Development Program (UNDP). These five agencies together comprise approximately 50 percent of total UN organizations’ professional staff. Calculating U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Congress continues to be concerned about the underrepresentation of U.S. professionals in some UN organizations and that insufficient progress has been made to improve U.S. representation. In 2001, GAO reported that several UN agencies fell short of their targets for U.S. representation and had not developed strategies to employ more Americans. This report reviews (1) U.S. representation status and employment trends at five UN agencies, (2) factors affecting these agencies' ability to meet employment targets, and (3) the U.S. Department of State's (State) efforts to improve U.S. representation and additional steps that can be taken. We reviewed five UN agencies that together comprise about 50 percent of total UN organizations' professional staff.
What GAO Found
The United States is underrepresented at three of the five United Nations (UN) agencies we reviewed, and increased hiring of U.S. citizens is needed to meet employment targets. The three agencies where the United States is underrepresented are the International Atomic Energy Agency; UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. U.S. citizens are equitably represented at the UN Secretariat, though close to the lower end of its target range. The UN Development Program has not established a target for U.S. representation, although U.S. citizens fill about 11 percent of its professional positions. Given projected staff levels, retirements, and separations, IAEA, UNESCO, and UNHCR would need to increase hiring of Americans to meet their minimum targets for U.S. representation in 2010. While the five UN agencies face some common barriers to recruiting and retaining professional staff, including Americans, they also face their own distinct challenges. Most of these barriers and challenges are outside of the U.S. government's control. The common barriers include nontransparent human resource practices, limited external hiring, lengthy hiring processes, comparatively low or unclear compensation, required mobility, and limited U.S. government support. UN agencies also face distinct challenges. For example, at the Secretariat, candidates serving in professional UN positions funded by their governments are more likely to be hired than those who take the entry-level exam; however, the United States has not funded such positions. Also, IAEA has difficulty recruiting U.S. employees because the number of U.S. nuclear specialists is decreasing. Since 2001, State has increased its efforts to achieve equitable U.S. representation at UN agencies, and additional options exist. State has targeted efforts to recruit U.S. candidates for senior and policymaking UN positions, and although it is difficult to link State's efforts to UN hiring decisions, U.S. representation in these positions has improved or displayed no trend in the five UN agencies. U.S. representation in entry-level positions, however, has declined or did not reflect a trend in four of the five UN agencies despite State's increased efforts. Additional steps include maintaining a roster of qualified U.S. candidates, expanding marketing and outreach activities, increasing UN employment information on U.S. agency Web sites, and assessing the costs and benefits of sponsoring entry-level employees at UN agencies. |
gao_GGD-98-59 | gao_GGD-98-59_0 | IRS has had several efforts under way to improve its performance measures. To identify any challenges IRS faces in developing and implementing performance measures to gauge its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service, we reviewed IRS’ strategic-level measures to improve customer service in its September 30, 1997, Strategic Plan for fiscal years 1997 through 2002; its fiscal year 1997 Strategic Plan; and selected program-level customer service measures in its Annual Performance Plan for fiscal year 1997. First-Tier Measure Is to Gauge Overall Performance
IRS’ mission-level effectiveness indicator (MEI) is intended to measure the agency’s performance in accomplishing its primary mission of collecting the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost. With the MEI, IRS has a mission-level performance indicator that includes the taxpayer compliance rate, the cost or burden to taxpayers of complying with the tax laws, and the cost of operating IRS. IRS uses five indicators to gauge its progress in improving customer service: (1) taxpayer burden cost for IRS to collect $100, (2) initial contact resolution rate, (3) toll-free telephone level of access, (4) tax law accuracy rate for taxpayer inquiries, and (5) customer satisfaction rates (being developed at the time our review). IRS Faces Challenges Developing and Implementing Customer Service Measures
IRS is striving to develop and implement a results-oriented performance measurement system to meet the requirements of the Results Act. However, IRS faces some difficult challenges in measuring the results of its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service. The key challenges we identified are (1) developing a reliable measure of taxpayer burden, including the portion that IRS can influence; (2) developing measures that can be used to compare the effectiveness of the various customer service programs; and (3) refining or developing new measures that gauge the quality of the services provided. IRS recognizes the limitations of its burden measure and is looking for alternatives. IRS added three new strategic-level measures in its September 30, 1997, Strategic Plan: (1) toll-free telephone level of access, which is intended to compare the number of calls attempted to the number of calls answered; (2) tax law accuracy rate for taxpayer inquiries, which is intended to measure the accuracy of tax law information provided to taxpayers through the toll-free telephone assistance program; and (3) customer satisfaction rates. Obtaining stakeholder involvement is especially important for IRS as it seeks to balance its efforts and resources between assisting taxpayers and enforcing compliance with the nation’s tax laws. However, IRS faces some difficult challenges as it develops and implements its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service. At the same time, IRS will be faced with making decisions on how to minimize the costs of collecting data and measuring results over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to implement the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), focusing on: (1) IRS's system of performance measures; and (2) the challenges IRS faces in developing and implementing performance measures to gauge its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS is striving to develop and implement a results-oriented performance measurement system that will meet the requirements of GPRA; (2) however, IRS faces some difficult challenges in measuring the results of its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service; (3) IRS has a three-tiered system of performance measures; (4) at the highest level, IRS has a mission effectiveness indicator, which is intended to measure the agency's overall performance in collecting the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost or burden to the government and the taxpayer; (5) the second level of indicators is intended to gauge IRS' progress in meeting its strategic objectives to improve customer service, increase taxpayer compliance, and increase its productivity; (6) to gauge its progress in improving customer service, IRS uses five initial indicators: (a) taxpayer burden cost for IRS to collect $100; (b) initial contact resolution rate for taxpayer inquiries; (c) toll-free telephone level of access; (d) tax law accuracy rate for taxpayer inquiries; and (e) customer satisfaction rates (being developed at the time of GAO's review); (7) the third level of indicators is intended to measure the accomplishments of specific IRS programs or operations, such as IRS' toll-free telephone operations; (8) IRS' 1997 Annual Performance Plan had 30 program-level customer service measures, which measure such things as the number of taxpayer calls answered and the average number of calls answered per full-time employee; (9) although IRS is striving to improve its overall performance measurement system, it faces some difficult challenges as it develops and implements performance measures to gauge its efforts to reduce taxpayer burden through improved customer service; (10) the key challenges GAO identified are: (a) developing a reliable measure of taxpayer burden; (b) developing measures that can be used to compare the effectiveness of the various customer service programs; and (c) refining or developing new measures that gauge the quality of the services provided; (11) it is important that IRS obtain stakeholder involvement to balance its efforts between assisting taxpayers and enforcing compliance with the tax laws; (12) IRS recognizes the limitations of its taxpayer burden measure and is looking for alternatives; and (13) at the same time, IRS will be faced with making decisions on how to minimize the costs of collecting data and measuring results over time. |
gao_GAO-02-341 | gao_GAO-02-341_0 | The judiciary and other key stakeholders believe that the judiciary should retain its one-judge, one-courtroom policy for active district judges to avoid ineffective judicial administration. However, the judiciary has recognized that courtroom sharing may be possible among visiting judges—judges from other locations who temporarily use courtrooms— and senior judges who have reduced caseloads. Senior judges with more than 10 years in senior status appeared to be the primary candidates for courtroom sharing. However, some sharing was occurring in existing facilities among some active and senior district judges. To meet the third objective, which was to determine the judiciary’s efforts to explore the potential for senior judges to share courtrooms in future courthouse construction projects, we reviewed the methodology that the judiciary used to prepare its courtroom needs assessment studies and analyzed the studies that had been completed for 33 of the 45 proposed projects in the judiciary’s long-range construction plan for fiscal years 2002 through 2006. The chief judge said courtroom sharing has not posed problems for these judges. However, there have been occasions where a trial had to be continued because a courtroom was unavailable. The court provided an example of the cascading effects of trying to deal with courtroom needs. | What GAO Found
In recent years, concerns have been raised that new courtrooms continue to be built for district judges, even though existing courtrooms appear to be under used. The judiciary wants to maintain its one-judge, one-courtroom policy because of concerns about the effect of shared courtroom space on judicial administration. The judiciary has not, however, determined whether courtroom sharing may be possible among senior judges--the likeliest candidates for such an arrangement because of their reduced caseloads. Some active and senior judges in areas with a courtroom shortage are currently sharing space. Many of these judges oppose courtroom sharing because they believe that it interferes with the courts business and harms the judicial process. The judiciary plans to have some senior judges share space in future courthouse projects. Significant courtroom sharing appears unlikely in the near future, even among senior judges. |
gao_GAO-14-329 | gao_GAO-14-329_0 | HHS’s ASPR leads PHEMCE and the federal medical and public health response to public health emergencies, including strategic planning and support for developing and securing medical countermeasures. As part of these activities, HHS develops priorities for which medical countermeasures are needed. Within ASPR, BARDA—established by the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006—coordinates and supports advanced research and development, manufacturing, and initial procurement of medical countermeasures for CBRN threats, pandemic influenza, and emerging infectious diseases into the Strategic National Stockpile—the national repository for medications, medical supplies, and equipment for use in a public health emergency. HHS Awarded $440 Million in Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 in Contracts for Activities to Support Flexible Manufacturing for Medical Countermeasures
In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, HHS’s BARDA awarded nearly $440 million to establish its CIADMs and a network of facilities to provide packaging support to ready the product for distribution, known as the Fill Finish Manufacturing Network. The CIADMs and the Fill Finish Manufacturing Network Are Intended to Provide Three Activities to Support Flexible Manufacturing
BARDA’s CIADMs are intended to provide three activities—surge capacity for manufacturing pandemic influenza vaccine, core services for the development of CBRN medical countermeasures, and workforce training—to support HHS’s flexible manufacturing activities. According to HHS, the primary goal of the CIADMs is to provide core service assistance to CBRN medical countermeasure developers, their ability to provide some core services depends on the retrofitting of existing, or building of new, facilities that are also needed to provide surge capacity. These facilities are to include a biologics development and manufacturing facility that is intended to provide core services for CBRN medical countermeasures, with the added capability of developing and manufacturing live virus vaccine candidates; a current Good Manufacturing Practices vaccine bulk manufacturing facility dedicated to large-scale surge manufacturing of pandemic influenza vaccines; a laboratory and office building to support process development and technology transfer of CBRN medical countermeasures into the CIADM; and a facility to support the fill and finish requirements for medical countermeasures. Each of the three CIADMs are to be able and, in the event of an influenza pandemic, be required to produce 50 million doses of vaccine within four months of receipt of the influenza virus strain, with the first doses for the public available to HHS within 12 weeks. BARDA anticipates placing task orders for pandemic influenza vaccine, if needed, during the annual contract option periods available to extend the contracts at the end of the respective base periods. Core Services
For the core services activity, the CIADMs are to provide services for the development and production of CBRN medical countermeasures, such as assisting CBRN medical countermeasure developers in manufacturing small amounts of products that can be used in clinical trials. BARDA officials told us that during the contract base period, the CIADMs are required to develop their workforce training programs, and that the agency may begin to request workforce training activities through task orders in fiscal year 2014. HHS’s Flexible Manufacturing Activities Are Designed to Support the Development and Production of CBRN Medical Countermeasures, but It Is Too Early to Determine Their Effectiveness
HHS established the CIADMs to provide needed core services to support the development and production through flexible manufacturing of certain CBRN medical countermeasures that were identified as priorities by PHEMCE. However, it is too early to tell how effective this approach will be because HHS has not begun to issue task orders to CIADMs for core services. As Core Services Have Not Yet Been Provided, It Is Too Early to Tell How Helpful They Will Be to Countermeasure Developers
BARDA has not issued any task orders for core services to date, as the CIADMs are still completing activities associated with the contract base periods. The steering committee is to then While it is too early to tell how effective HHS’s approach to providing core services to CBRN medical countermeasure developers through the CIADMs will be, some industry stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about demand, availability of funding, and communication with BARDA. BARDA officials told us that they expect to have sufficient funding for task orders in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Public Health Preparedness: Developing and Acquiring Medical Countermeasures Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Agents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public health emergencies, such as the 2001 anthrax attacks and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, raise concerns about the nation's vulnerability to threats from CBRN agents and new or reemerging infectious diseases, such as pandemic influenza. HHS is the federal agency primarily responsible for identifying medical countermeasures needed to address the potential health effects from exposure to CBRN agents and emerging infectious diseases. HHS conducted a review to assess how to better address these concerns. Its August 2010 review concluded that the advanced development and manufacture of CBRN medical countermeasures needed greater support. The review recommended that HHS develop centers to provide such support, in part by using flexible manufacturing technologies, such as disposable equipment, to aid in the development and rapid manufacture of products.
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 requires GAO to examine HHS's flexible manufacturing initiatives and the activities these initiatives will support. This report addresses (1) how much funding HHS has awarded for flexible manufacturing activities for medical countermeasures, and (2) the extent to which these activities will support the development and production of CBRN medical countermeasures. To address these objectives, GAO examined HHS documents and interviewed HHS officials, contractors, and stakeholders. In comments on a draft of the report, HHS agreed with its findings and provided additional information.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) awarded nearly $440 million in contracts to establish three Centers for Innovation in Advanced Development and Manufacturing (CIADM) and a network of facilities to provide packaging support for medical countermeasure distribution, known as the Fill Finish Manufacturing Network (FFMN). The contracts require the CIADMs to develop three activities to support flexible manufacturing for medical countermeasure development and production: the manufacture of pandemic influenza vaccines during an emergency; core services to support the development and production of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) medical countermeasures; and workforce training. During the contract base periods, each CIADM is to retrofit existing or build new facilities able to produce 50 million doses of pandemic influenza vaccine within 4 months of receipt of the influenza virus strain and to establish the capacity to provide core services, such as assisting countermeasure developers by manufacturing products to be used for clinical trials. The CIADMs are also required to develop workforce training programs, which are intended to increase expertise in CBRN medical countermeasure development. The CIADM base contracts are intended to retrofit or build facilities to stand ready to provide these three activities and maintain this readiness through annual contract option periods. Once the facilities are prepared to provide these activities, BARDA may place task orders for provision of CIADM vaccine surge capacity, core services, or training, and BARDA, through the task orders, would provide additional payments to obtain these services. The FFMN is to supplement CIADMs' pandemic influenza surge capacity, packaging up to 117 million doses of pandemic influenza vaccine in 12 weeks, if needed, and can also provide core services as CIADM subcontractors.
HHS's CIADM core services activities are designed to support the development and production of certain CBRN medical countermeasures, but it is too early to tell how effective this approach will be. BARDA's establishment of the CIADMs implements a recommendation from HHS's review of the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE)—a federal interagency body that advises HHS on medical countermeasure priorities. The CIADMs are to support the development of biologics-based countermeasures only, which are products like vaccines that are derived from living sources such as cells, because BARDA considers these countermeasures to need the greatest support. BARDA has identified some of its current biologics-based countermeasure development contracts that could use core services' support and are priorities for PHEMCE. However, the CIADMs are still completing activities associated with their contract base period. Thus, BARDA has not issued any task orders for core services to date, but has created a CIADM steering committee and completed guidance to govern the task order process once the CIADMs are operational. Until the CIADM core services are used, it will be unclear how effectively they will support the development and production of CBRN medical countermeasures. Stakeholders we interviewed were uncertain about the demand for and availability of funding for core services. BARDA officials said that they anticipate having sufficient demand for the services and funding for task orders in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. |
gao_GAO-03-592T | gao_GAO-03-592T_0 | DOD employs four civilian health care companies or managed care support contractors (contractors) that are responsible for developing and maintaining the civilian provider network that complements the care delivered by MTFs. In the remaining areas, a network is not required. DOD requires that contractors have a sufficient number and mix of providers, both primary care and specialists, necessary to satisfy the needs of beneficiaries enrolled in the Prime option. In addition, DOD has access-to-care standards that are designed to ensure that Prime beneficiaries receive timely care. DOD has delegated oversight of the civilian provider network to the regional TRICARE lead agents. DOD’s Civilian Provider Network Oversight Has Weaknesses
DOD’s ability to effectively oversee—and thus guarantee the adequacy of—the TRICARE civilian provider network is hindered by (1) flaws in its required provider-to-beneficiary ratios, (2) incomplete reporting on beneficiaries’ access to providers, and (3) the absence of a systematic assessment of complaints. Although DOD has required its network to meet established ratios of providers to beneficiaries, the ratios may underestimate the number of providers needed in an area. Required Provider-to- Beneficiary Ratios May Not Account for Actual Number of Beneficiaries or Availability of Providers
In some cases, the provider-to-beneficiary ratios underestimate the number of providers, particularly specialists, needed in an area. The ratio is most likely to result in an underestimation of the need for providers in areas in which the MTF is a clinic or small hospital with a limited availability of specialists. Specifically, for the network adequacy reports we reviewed from 5 of the 11 TRICARE regions, we found that contractors reported less than half of the required information on access standards for appointment wait, office wait, and travel times. DOD and Contractors Report Three Factors That May Contribute to Network Inadequacies
DOD and contractors have reported three factors that may contribute to network inadequacy: geographic location, low reimbursement rates, and administrative requirements. While reimbursement rates and administrative requirements may have created dissatisfaction among providers, it is not clear how much these factors have affected network adequacy because the information the contractors provide to DOD is not sufficient to reliably measure network adequacy. According to contractor officials, TRICARE Prime providers have expressed concerns about decreasing reimbursement rates. Contractors also report that providers have expressed dissatisfaction with some TRICARE administrative requirements, such as credentialing and preauthorizations and referrals. For example, many providers have complained about TRICARE’s credentialing requirements. Because the new contracts are not expected to be finalized until June 2003, the specific mechanisms DOD and the contractors will use to ensure network adequacy are not known. However, TNEX does not specify how this will be measured. Referral requirements will be reduced, but the MTFs will still retain the “right of first refusal.”
On the other hand, TNEX may be creating a new administrative concern for contractors and providers by requiring that 100 percent of network claims submitted by providers be filed electronically. In fiscal year 2002, only 25 percent of processed claims were submitted electronically. | Why GAO Did This Study
During 2002, in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Personnel, beneficiary groups described problems with access to care from TRICARE's civilian providers, and providers testified about their dissatisfaction with the TRICARE program, specifying low reimbursement rates and administrative burdens. The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 required that GAO review DOD's oversight of TRICARE's network adequacy. In response, GAO is (1) describing how DOD oversees the adequacy of the civilian provider network, (2) assessing DOD's oversight of the adequacy of the civilian provider network, (3) describing the factors that may contribute to potential network inadequacy or instability, and (4) describing how the new contracts, expected to be awarded in June 2003, might affect network adequacy. GAO's analysis focused on TRICARE Prime--the managed care component of the TRICARE health care delivery system. This testimony summarizes GAO's findings to date. A full report will be issued later this year.
What GAO Found
To oversee the adequacy of the civilian network, DOD has established standards that are designed to ensure that its network has a sufficient number and mix of providers, both primary care and specialists, necessary to satisfy TRICARE Prime beneficiaries' needs. In addition, DOD has standards for appointment wait, office wait, and travel times that are designed to ensure that TRICARE Prime beneficiaries have adequate access to care. DOD has delegated oversight of the civilian provider network to lead agents, who are responsible for ensuring that these standards have been met. DOD's ability to effectively oversee--and thus guarantee the adequacy of--the TRICARE civilian provider network is hindered in several ways. First, the measurement used to determine if there is a sufficient number of providers for the beneficiaries in an area does not account for the actual number of beneficiaries who may seek care or the availability of providers. In some cases, this may result in an underestimation of the number of providers needed in an area. Second, incomplete contractor reporting on access to care makes it difficult for DOD to assess compliance with this standard. Finally, DOD does not systematically collect and analyze beneficiary complaints, which might assist in identifying inadequacies in the TRICARE civilian provider network. DOD and its contractors have reported three factors that may contribute to potential network inadequacy: geographic location, low reimbursement rates, and administrative requirements. However, the information the contractors provide to DOD is not sufficient to measure the extent to which the TRICARE civilian provider network is inadequate. While reimbursement rates and administrative requirements may have created dissatisfaction among providers, it is not clear that these factors have resulted in insufficient numbers of providers in the network. The new contracts, which are expected to be awarded in June 2003, may result in improved network participation by addressing some network providers' concerns about administrative requirements. For example, the new contracts may simplify requirements for provider credentialing and referrals, two administrative procedures providers have complained about. However, according to contractors, the new contracts may also create requirements that could discourage provider participation, such as the new requirement that 100 percent of network claims submitted by providers be filed electronically. Currently, only about 25 percent of such claims are submitted electronically. |
gao_RCED-98-10 | gao_RCED-98-10_0 | U.S. and foreign airlines have reported that they have used FOQA analysis to identify a variety of potential safety problems and take corrective action to resolve or mitigate them. Because FOQA programs analyze additional data on aircraft systems and engine conditions, airlines are better able to achieve optimum fuel consumption and avoid unneeded engine maintenance. Although more difficult to quantify and directly relate to a FOQA program, enhanced safety should result in lower costs over time as a result of accidents avoided and lower insurance premiums. Factors Impeding Implementation and Actions to Overcome Impediments
Although airline officials, pilot organizations, and FAA officials recognize the potential for improving safety and operations through FOQA programs, airline officials and representatives of the pilot organizations were unanimous in their view that data protection issues need to be resolved. According to the Flight Safety Foundation’s 1992 report, the greatest impediment to the implementation of FOQA in the United States is associated with the “protection of data from use for other than safety and operational improvement purposes.” Basically, airline managers and pilots have three concerns: (1) that the information may be used in enforcement/discipline actions, (2) that such data in the possession of the federal government may be obtained by the public and the media through the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and (3) that the information may be obtained in civil litigation through the discovery process. Airline Enforcement. The report states that to provide assurance that such information is not publicly released, the legislation would prohibit FAA from disclosing voluntarily submitted safety information. FAA is currently working on a rulemaking procedure that will prohibit the release of voluntarily submitted safety data through FOIA. 9.13). If the agency is a party to the litigation, FAA will seek to protect the information, if appropriate, under a claim of government privilege and, if that fails, to release the information under a protective order. Over the years, the number of foreign airlines that have implemented a FOQA-type program has steadily risen. “The proposal was based on FSF’s conviction, formed by the positive experiences of its international member airlines using FOQA, that the appropriate use of FOQA data by airlines, pilot associations and aircraft and equipment manufacturers would result in a significant improvement of flight safety by identifying operational irregularities that can foreshadow accidents and incidents.”
The FSF study concluded that FOQA must proceed in the United States and that the implementation of FOQA by U.S. airlines would have a more positive impact on Part 121 operational safety than any other human factors program included in FAA’s research and development plans. Data capture. These include Boeing 737-500s, –600s, –700s, and –800s as well as a number of 757s. Begun in July 1996, the program has analyzed the flight data from over 5,000 flights to date. FAA’s Voluntary Safety Reporting: Selected Programs
FAA has implemented a number of voluntary programs involving the self-reporting of safety-related information to enhance aviation safety. Aviation Safety Reporting Program. Under 14 C.F.R. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) how the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) and U.S. airlines' Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs will enhance aviation safety; (2) the costs and benefits of such programs; and (3) the factors that could impede their full implementation and actions that could be taken to overcome any impediments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the early experience of domestic airlines with established FOQA programs, as well as the testimony of foreign airlines with extensive experience in this area, attests to the potential of such programs to enhance aviation safety by identifying possible safety problems that could lead to accidents; (2) airlines have used FOQA programs to identify potential problems that were previously unknown or only suspected; (3) where potential problems where already known, airlines have used these programs to confirm and quantify the extent of the problems; (4) on the basis of analyses of flight data, airlines have taken actions to correct problems and enhance aviation safety; (5) costs associated with implementing a FOQA program depend on a large number of factors, including the technology used to capture flight data, the number and types of aircraft to be equipped with this technology, and personnel costs; (6) although the program is primarily viewed as a safety program, U.S. and foreign airlines have reported financial benefits as well; (7) with additional data on aircraft systems and engine conditions, airlines are better able to achieve optimum fuel consumption and avoid unneeded engine maintenance; (8) enhanced safety should result in lower costs over time as a result of accidents avoided and lower insurance premiums; (9) FAA's estimates suggest a net savings from 50 aircraft of $892,000 per year; (10) the primary factor impeding the implementation of FOQA programs among the major domestic carriers is the resolution of data protection issues; (11) airline managers and pilots raise three significant data protection concerns: (a) use of data for enforcement and disciplinary purposes; (b) disclosure to the media and the public under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act; and (c) disclosure through the civil litigation discovery process; (12) FAA has taken a number of actions that may resolve these issues, although it is not clear whether the aviation community will be satisfied with FAA's actions; (13) FAA has begun work on a rulemaking procedure to establish what protections from enforcement actions, if any, will apply to information submitted to FAA under a FOQA program; (14) Congress enacted legislation, and FAA has begun work on a rulemaking procedure, that would prohibit the Administrator from disclosing voluntarily submitted safety information under certain circumstances; and (15) airlines seek to protect voluntarily collected safety information from disclosure in civil litigation on a case-by-case basis. |
gao_GAO-06-839 | gao_GAO-06-839_0 | DOD has referred to this contingency as an “exit strategy.”
Army and Air Force Encountered Limitations in Their Sustainment Plans for Some Fielded Weapon Systems
The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. According to Air Force officials, there are some instances where the sub-vendor is unwilling to provide the needed technical data. Without the rights to the technical data or a partnership with the sub-vendor, the Air Force cannot develop a core maintenance capability for this equipment item. Although we did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on technical data rights during the acquisition of these systems, several factors may complicate program managers’ decisions on long-term technical data rights for weapon systems. The extent to which the system being acquired incorporates technology that was not developed with government funding. DOD Acquisition Policies Do Not Specifically Address Long-term Needs for Technical Data Rights
DOD’s acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term needs for technical data rights to sustain weapon systems over their life cycle, and in the absence of a DOD-wide policy, the Army and the Air Force are working independently to develop structured approaches for defining technical data requirements and securing rights to those data. DOD’s current acquisition policies do not specifically require program managers to assess long-term needs for technical data rights to support weapon systems and, correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. Army and Air Force logistics officials have recognized weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing technical data rights, and each service has begun to address these weaknesses by developing more structured approaches. However, current DOD acquisition policies do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses and secures its rights for the use of technical data early in the weapon system acquisition process when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate, DOD may face later challenges in developing sustainment plans or changing these plans as necessary over the life cycle of its weapon systems. These assessments and corresponding acquisition strategies should be developed prior to issuance of the contract solicitation; address the merits of including a priced contract option for the future delivery of technical data; address the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the weapon system’s life cycle, which may include the development of maintenance capability at public depots, the development of new sources of supply to increase production, or the solicitation of competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components; and apply to weapon systems that are to be supported by performance- based logistics arrangements as well as to weapon systems that are to be supported by other sustainment approaches. For the other seven weapon system programs—the C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J aircraft, Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4 carbine—we obtained information on the service’s requirement for rights to use the data, their success in obtaining data rights from the manufacturer, and the effect that a lack of data rights had on system sustainment plans. Specifically, DOD should: “consider requiring program offices, during weapon system acquisition, to develop acquisition strategies that provide for a future delivery of sufficient technical data to enable the program office to select an alternative source—public or private—or to offer the work out for competition if the performance-based arrangement fails or becomes prohibitively expensive.”
Objectives
GAO will analyze and report on the following: To what extent DOD policies limit the services from purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons systems; The status of DOD’s plans to revise acquisition policy in response to the previous GAO recommendation on technical data; The costs for obtaining access in order to view, modify, or distribute technical data relating to the sustainment of procured systems; and The amount of time required to reach back to the system manufacturer for technical data and what impact, if any, that delay has on repairing or modifying fielded systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
A critical element in the life cycle of a weapon system is the availability of the item's technical data--recorded information used to define a design and to produce, support, maintain, or operate the item. Because a weapon system may remain in the defense inventory for decades following initial acquisition, technical data decisions made during acquisition can have far-reaching implications over its life cycle. In August 2004, GAO recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) consider requiring program offices to develop acquisition strategies that provide for future delivery of technical data should the need arise to select an alternative source for logistics support or to offer the work out for competition. For this review, GAO (1) evaluated how sustainment plans for Army and Air Force weapon systems had been affected by technical data rights and (2) examined requirements for obtaining technical data rights under current DOD acquisition policies.
What GAO Found
The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services' flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. GAO identified seven weapon system programs that encountered such limitations--C-17, F-22, and C-130J aircraft, Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4 carbine. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a result of the limitations encountered, the services had to alter their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, developing new sources of supply to increase production, or soliciting competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. For example, the Air Force identified a need to develop a core maintenance capability for the C-17 at government depots to ensure it had the ability to support national defense emergencies, but it lacked the requisite technical data rights. To mitigate this limitation, the Air Force is seeking to form partnerships with C-17 sub-vendors. However, according to Air Force officials, some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical data needed to develop core capability. Although GAO did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition, several factors, such as the extent the system incorporates technology that was not developed with government funding and the potential for changes in the technical data over the weapon system's life cycle, may complicate program managers' decisions. Current DOD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term technical data rights for weapon system sustainment. For example, DOD's policies do not require program managers to assess long-term needs for technical data rights to support weapon systems and, correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. DOD, as part of the department's acquisition reforms and performance-based strategies, has deemphasized the acquisition of technical data rights. Although GAO has recommended that DOD emphasize the need for technical data rights, DOD has not implemented these recommendations. The Army and the Air Force have recognized weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing technical data rights and have begun to address these weaknesses by developing more structured approaches. However, DOD acquisition policies do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses and secures its rights for the use of technical data early in the weapon system acquisition process when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate, DOD may face later challenges in sustaining weapon systems over their life cycle. |
gao_GAO-11-945T | gao_GAO-11-945T_0 | The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force. As a result of this review, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system. Prior GAO Work Evaluated Preliminary Plans for Separate NOAA and DOD Satellite Programs and Recommended Actions to Solidify Plans and Address Risks
In May 2010, we reported on NOAA’s and DOD’s preliminary plans for initiating new environmental satellite programs and highlighted key transition risks facing the agencies. At that time, NOAA had developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition program—called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). In addition, NOAA planned to transfer the management of the satellite acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center so that it could be co-located at a space system acquisition center, as advocated by an independent review team. In our report, we noted that both agencies faced key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs. Among other things, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their planned programs and to direct their respective follow-on programs to develop plans to address the key transition risks we identified. As discussed below, the agencies have not yet fully implemented these recommendations. NOAA and DOD Have Made Progress, but Decisions are Needed to Address Potential Gaps in Weather and Climate Data
Over the last year, NOAA and NASA have worked to establish the JPSS program, to keep the NPP satellite’s development on track, and to begin developing plans for the JPSS satellite. According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges, and floods—would be diminished. Given the potential for a gap in satellite data, NOAA officials are considering whether to remove functionality from JPSS-1 in order to allow it to be developed—and launched—more quickly. The DWSS program will be comprised of two satellites—the first expected to be launched no earlier than 2018. Each will have three sensors: a Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite, a Space Environment Monitor, and a microwave imager/sounder. Although we recommended in May 2010 that DOD expedite decisions on the cost, schedule, and capabilities of DWSS, DOD has not yet finalized the functionality that will be provided by the DWSS program, or developed a cost and schedule baseline. NOAA and DOD Continue to Face Key Transition Risks
Over a year ago, we identified key transition risks facing NOAA and DOD, including the need to support the other agency’s requirements, ensure effective oversight of new program management, manage cost and schedule implications from contract and other program changes, and ensure the availability of key staff and capabilities, and we recommended that the agencies move to mitigate these risks. Today, the agencies continue to face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their new programs. The agency could not provide a time frame for when it expects this issue to be resolved. As a result, it still is not clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost. Until both NOAA and DOD can develop and finalize credible plans for their respective programs, and mitigate or minimize the risks, neither agency’s users can plan for how to address this gap. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental satellites provide critical data used in weather forecasting and measuring variations in climate over time. In February 2010, the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy disbanded the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency satellite acquisition that had encountered continuing cost, schedule, and management problems--and instructed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) to undertake separate acquisitions. Both agencies have begun planning their respective programs--the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)--including creating program offices and transitioning contracts. GAO was asked to summarize the status of ongoing work assessing (1) NOAA's and DOD's plans for their separate acquisitions and (2) the key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to these new programs. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on the work supporting previous reports, attended monthly program management meetings, reviewed documentation on both programs, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
In May 2010, GAO reported on the transition from NPOESS to two separate programs, and recommended that both NOAA and DOD expedite decisions on the cost, schedule, and capabilities of their respective programs. Since that time, both agencies have made progress on their programs, but neither has finalized its plans or fully implemented the recommendations. NOAA is currently focusing on the October 2011 launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite--a demonstration satellite that the agency now plans to use operationally in order to minimize potential gaps in coverage. In addition, NOAA has transferred contracts for satellite sensors from the NPOESS program to the JPSS program. However, NOAA officials stated that the agency slowed down the development of the first JPSS satellite due to budget constraints, causing a delay in the launch date. As a result, NOAA is facing a potential gap in satellite data continuity. Such a delay could significantly impact the nation's ability to obtain advanced warning of extreme weather events such as hurricanes. Meanwhile, DOD began planning for its satellite program. Department officials reported that DWSS is to consist of two satellites with three sensors: an imager, microwave imager/sounder, and a space environment sensor. The first satellite is to be launched no earlier than 2018. The department has not, however, finalized the cost, schedule, and functionality of the program. It expects to do so in early 2012. Until both NOAA and DOD develop and finalize credible plans for their respective programs, it will not be clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost. In its prior report, GAO also recommended that NOAA and DOD establish plans to mitigate key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to the successor programs, including ensuring effective oversight of JPSS program management, and addressing cost and schedule implications from contract and program changes. Both agencies have taken steps to mitigate these risks, but more remains to be done. For example, NOAA could not provide firm time frames for completing its management control plan or addressing residual contracting issues. Moving forward, it will be important for the agencies to continue efforts to mitigate these risks in order to ensure the success of their respective programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_HEHS-97-17 | gao_HEHS-97-17_0 | SSA Plans to Conduct Required SSI CDRs and Test the Use of the Mailer CDR
For fiscal year 1996, SSA planned to conduct full medical CDRs for the legally required SSI CDRs and to test the mailer CDR process on over 100,000 additional SSI recipients. As of June, DDSs had completed about 60 percent of the required reviews in each category. Resources Appear Sufficient for Required SSI CDRs, but Competing Priorities Pose Challenges
SSA plans to use CDR funds to conduct the legally required SSI CDRs and disability eligibility redeterminations in fiscal years 1996 through 2002. For children, SSA limited its selection to low-birth-weight babies, who totaled about 7,200. SSA currently estimates that CDRs will remove only about 5 percent of SSI recipients from the rolls in the long run. However, if the CDR process was not in place, recipients’ continuing disability eligibility would be uncertain and the number of ineligible recipients would likely increase over time. SSA estimates that CDRs on adults SSA has classified as MIE or MIP save about $3 in federal SSI and Medicaid benefits for every $1 spent conducting CDRs on those categories. Options exist for making SSI CDRs more cost-effective and helping SSA meet the challenge of conducting all required CDRs. Specifically, we recommended that SSA replace the routine scheduling of CDRs with a new process that, if extended by the Congress to all recipients, would (1) be cost-effective by selecting for review individuals with the greatest potential for medical improvement and subsequent benefit termination, (2) correct a weakness in SSA’s current CDR process by reviewing a random sample of all other recipients, and (3) improve program integrity by instituting contact with those not selected for CDRs or financial eligibility redeterminations. As part of this effort, we also recommended that the Commissioner of Social Security develop a legislative package to obtain the authority the agency needs to enact this new process for those portions of the SSI and DI populations that are subject to routinely scheduled CDRs. This database contained records on all recipients SSA had determined were due or overdue for a CDR in fiscal year 1996. Social Security Disability: Improvements Needed to Continuing Disability Review Process (GAO/HEHS-97-1, Oct. 16, 1996). 24, 1996). 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) strategy for conducting legally required continuing disability reviews (CDR) on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients, focusing on: (1) SSA plans to conduct legally required SSI CDR in fiscal years 1996 through 1998; (2) the resources committed to meeting this requirement; (3) how SSA selects recipients for SSI CDR; (4) the potential benefits of conducting CDR on the SSI population; and (5) potential options for improving the CDR process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SSA planned to conduct required CDR on about 118,000 SSI recipients in fiscal year (FY) 1996; (2) SSA also planned to conduct an additional 100,000 CDR on SSI recipients that were not legally required; (3) as of June 1996, SSA had completed about 60 percent of the required CDR; (4) other competing priorities may make it difficult for SSA to conduct all required SSI CDR after FY 1996; (5) in FY 1996, SSA limited its selection for CDR to those recipients for whom medical improvement is either expected or possible; (6) SSA estimates that conducting CDR will result in removing only about 5 percent of SSI recipients from the rolls, but without CDR, the number of ineligible recipients will likely increase over time; (7) SSA estimates that conducting CDR on SSI adult recipients for whom medical improvement is expected or possible results in about $3 in federal program savings for every $1 spent conducting CDR; and (8) SSA needs to establish less rigid requirements for determining who should be scheduled for CDR, ensure that contact is made with all SSI recipients, and develop a legislative proposal to obtain the authority needed to extend this new process to all recipients. |
gao_GAO-04-689 | gao_GAO-04-689_0 | About $4.0 Billion of the Inventory Exceeding Current Operating Requirements Was Consumed Since September 30, 2001
Our analysis of approximately 1.5 million items with inventory on hand valued at $35.1 billion that exceeded current operating requirements as of September 30, 2001, showed that about $2.5 billion of the inventory was used, $0.5 billion was disposed of, and $1.0 billion was condemned since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom and through the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. About 937,000 items with $24.4 billion of on-hand inventory exceeding current operating requirements as of September 30, 2001, had neither inventory usage nor gains during the period of review—these items had an equal amount of inventory returned for repair as was disposed of, condemned, and demanded. Further, 923,000 of the 1.5 million items had no customer demands. Some DOD Practices Contribute to Ineffective and Inefficient Inventory Management
While reviewing Air Force and Army items to determine why inventory exceeding current operating requirements was being retained, we identified three ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices that may affect inventory levels, including the inventory exceeding current operating requirements. First, although DLA has begun to charge its customers for inventory storage based on the actual space occupied by items, the military components are not using the DLA storage cost data, and instead continue to use estimated storage costs in their inventory management decision-making processes. Third, Air Force item managers are not required to enter codes into the Air Force inventory system for items that are categorized as potential reutilization and/or disposal materiel, but that the Air Force wants to retain; thus, the items are not properly categorized and are at risk of disposal. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address the inventory management shortcomings that we identified, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: direct the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency to determine whether it would be beneficial to use the actual storage cost data provided by DLA in their computations, instead of using estimated storage costs, and include that data in their systems and models as appropriate; direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish and implement a systemwide process for correcting causes of inventory discrepancies between the inventory for which item managers are accountable and the inventory reported by bases and repair centers; and direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise its policy to require item managers to code inventory so that the inventory is properly categorized. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has identified the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory management as a highrisk area. Ineffective management practices--such as the use of inaccurate data, lack of inventory controls and visibility, and information system weaknesses--have contributed to high levels of inventory. DOD has reduced its inventory since 1990, from about $100 billion to about $67 billion as of September 30, 2002. However, at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, about half of the inventory exceeded current operating requirements. GAO, under its statutory authority, analyzed the extent to which inventory that exceeded current operating requirements as of September 30, 2001, was consumed through cutoff dates ranging from March through October 2003 and identified three ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of 1.5 million items with $35.1 billion of inventory on hand that exceeded current operating requirements as of September 30, 2001, showed that about $4.0 billion was consumed--$2.5 billion was used, $0.5 billion was disposed of, and $1.0 billion was condemned--since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom and through the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. GAO found that, once disposals and condemnations were accounted for, 539,000 items had inventory that was used, 18,000 had inventory gains, and 937,000 had neither inventory usage nor gains. Of the 1.5 million items, customers did not make demands for 923,000 items during the period of review. GAO also identified three ineffective and inefficient inventory management practices that may affect inventory levels, including the inventory exceeding current operating requirements. First, although Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has begun to charge its customers for inventory storage based on the actual space occupied by items, the military components are not using the DLA storage cost data, and instead continue to use estimated storage costs in their inventory management decision-making processes. Second, the Air Force does not have a systemwide process for correcting the causes of discrepancies between the inventory for which item managers are accountable and the inventory reported by bases and repair centers. Third, Air Force item managers are not required to enter codes into the Air Force inventory system for items that are categorized as potential reutilization and/or disposal materiel, but that the Air Force wants to retain; thus, the items are not properly categorized and are at risk of disposal. |
gao_GAO-05-998T | gao_GAO-05-998T_0 | Ongoing DTS Testing Remains a Concern
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the system would perform as intended. Given the lack of adherence to such a key practice, it is not surprising that critical flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. Our recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that the testing of DTS is not always adequate prior to updated software being released for use by DOD personnel. As a result of these two weaknesses, DOD travelers might not have received accurate information on available flights and airfares, which could have resulted in higher travel costs. Since the PMO-DTS neither performed an end-to-end test nor made sure that the information returned from this commercial product was in agreement with the information contained in the GDS, it did not have reasonable assurance that DTS was displaying the proper flights and airfares information to the users. DTS Has Corrected Some Previously Reported Travel Problems
Of the four previously reported DOD travel problems, DTS has corrected one of the problems while the others remain. However, the remaining problems are not necessarily within the purview of DTS and may take departmentwide action to fully address. Duplicate Payments Related to Centrally Billed Accounts (CBA). Our preliminary observations indicate that DTS was designed to ensure that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be claimed on the individual’s travel voucher as a reimbursement to the traveler. DTS Faces Challenges in Achieving the Goal of a Standard DOD Travel System
DOD’s goal of making DTS the standard travel system within the department depends upon the development, testing, and implementation of system interfaces with the myriad of related DOD systems, as well as private-sector systems such as the system used by credit card company that provides DOD military and civilian employees with travel cards. While DOD has developed 32 interfaces, the PMO-DTS is aware of at least 17 additional DOD business systems for which interfaces must be developed. Additionally, the underutilization of DTS at the sites where it has been deployed is also hindering the department’s efforts to have a standard travel system throughout the department. Underutilization of DTS Affects Estimated Savings
Another challenge for DTS in achieving its goal of a standard travel system within DOD is the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems, which are owned and operated by the various DOD components. Because of the continued operation of the legacy systems at locations where DTS has been fully deployed, DOD components pay DFAS higher processing fees for processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS. We also would like to reiterate that following this testimony, we plan to issue a report that will include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving the department’s implementation of DTS. Appendix I: Department of Defense Rights to Property in the Defense Travel System
DOD has taken several steps to address its needs for the use of intellectual and tangible property in the DTS, but it has not yet completed the exercise of the rights it determined necessary for long-term development and implementation of the DTS. In this regard, we focused on how DTS addresses issues related to premium class travel, unused tickets, and centrally billed accounts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been working to develop and implement a standard end-to-end travel system for the last 10 years. Congress has been at the forefront in addressing issues related to DOD's travel management practices with the hearing today being another example of its oversight efforts. Because of widespread congressional interest in the Defense Travel System (DTS), GAO's current audit is being performed under the statutory authority given to the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO's testimony is based on the preliminary results of that audit and focuses on the following three key questions: (1) Has DOD effectively tested key functionality in DTS related to flights and fare information? (2) Will DTS correct the problems related to DOD travel previously identified by GAO and others? and (3) What challenges remain in ensuring that DTS achieves its goal as DOD's standard travel system? In addition, the Subcommittee asked that GAO provide a description of the intellectual property rights of DOD in DTS. Subsequent to this testimony, GAO plans to issue a report that will include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at improving the department's implementation of DTS.
What GAO Found
DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will perform as intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. GAO's recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability has been delivered as intended. For example, GAO found that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that DTS properly display flight and airfare information. This problem was not detected prior to deployment, since DOD failed to properly test system interfaces. Accordingly, DOD travelers might not have received accurate information which, could have resulted in higher travel costs. DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems but others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally billed accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium class travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of traveler's claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and will take departmentwide action to address. GAO identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD's standard travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS has developed 32 interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will have to develop interfaces with at least 17 additional systems--not a trivial task. Furthermore, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems results in underutilization of DTS and affects the savings that DTS was planned to achieve. Components incur additional costs by operating two systems with the same function--the legacy system and DTS--and by paying higher processing fees for manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS. |
gao_GAO-04-606 | gao_GAO-04-606_0 | Reliability of NMFS’ Pacific Groundfish Stock Assessments Is Questionable
The reliability of NMFS’ stock assessments is questionable for the Pacific hake and four rockfish species we reviewed, although they were based on the best information available at the time the assessments were conducted. The reliability of the stock assessments we reviewed is questionable because (1) four of the assessments did not have at least one NMFS-collected data source of sufficient scope and accuracy; (2) NMFS lacked a standard process for assessing the reliability of non-NMFS data used in all five assessments; and (3) for four of the assessments, the stock assessment reports did not adequately identify the uncertainty of the biomass estimates. The 2003 NMFS report also found that darkblotched groundfish are less abundant in untrawlable waters, while canary and bocaccio species are more abundant in untrawlable waters. Lacking a standard process, some assessors reviewed the quality of the raw non-NMFS data, while others did not. Assessors who reviewed for data quality found mistakes that they believed made some of the data unusable or that could have impaired the accuracy of the stock assessments. In a review of the 2002 canary assessment, the stock assessment review panel recommended that standard estimates of uncertainty be included in future assessments because it is difficult to determine the reliability of the stock assessment without them. The Northwest Center has concentrated most of its efforts on implementing recommendations aimed at obtaining more data. Recommendations aimed at increasing the types of data and improving their quality have not yet been fully implemented for a variety of reasons, such as staffing and funding limitations. Extended the geographic range of the groundfish shelf and slope bottom trawl survey. The surveys are now coastwide from Cape Flattery, Washington to the Mexican border, adding over 300 more miles along the southern California coast. Finally, the improvement plan recommended that NMFS prepare a comprehensive plan that combines the improvement plan with other complementary plans, such as the NOAA Fisheries Data Acquisition Plan and the NMFS Social Sciences Plan. However, the actual cost of implementing remaining improvements to Pacific groundfish stock assessments may be even higher because the Northwest Center’s budget requests primarily reflect the amount of money the Center believed it could realistically obtain, rather than the actual cost of the improvements. Remaining Improvements Are Estimated to Cost at Least $8.9 Million, but Estimate Is Likely Understated
According to NMFS, the Northwest Center needs at least $8.9 million to complete ongoing and planned improvements for Pacific groundfish stock assessments: $2.6 million that NMFS’ Northwest Center requested but did not receive between fiscal years 2001 to 2003 and $6.3 million the Center requested for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Specifically, as shown in table 2, the Northwest Center records have identified the following funding needs $7.7 million to improve the types of data used, including $2.4 million for surveys of untrawlable waters, $2.1 million to expand acoustic and recruitment surveys, and $3.2 million to collect ecosystem data; and $1.2 million to improve the quality of data used in stock assessments, including $600,000 to enhance the calibration of vessel equipment; $525,000 to develop and implement methods to collect information on stock identification, structure, and movement; and $75,000 to standardize trawl survey procedures. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) stock assessments for five species of Pacific groundfish: Pacific hake (Pacific whiting) as well as four types of rockfish—bocaccio, canary, darkblotched, and yelloweye. Specifically, for these five species you asked us to (1) assess the reliability of NMFS’ stock assessments, (2) identify which relevant recommendations from the stock assessment improvement plan have been implemented and which have not, and (3) identify the estimated costs associated with planned and ongoing improvements to groundfish stock assessments. We revised the report to clearly show that NMFS has not collected enough ecosystem data and that the frequency and range of recruitment surveys are limited. The NMFS data used in the bocaccio, canary, and darkblotched assessments were limited because NMFS conducted its surveys in trawlable waters only. NMFS data were unavailable for the yelloweye assessment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of concerns raised about the accuracy of National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) stock assessments, GAO reviewed the assessments for five species of Pacific groundfish: Pacific hake and four types of rockfish--bocaccio, canary, darkblotched, and yelloweye. Specifically, for these five species GAO (1) assessed the reliability of NMFS' stock assessments, (2) identified which relevant recommendations from NMFS' stock assessment improvement plan have been implemented and which have not, and (3) identified the costs associated with planned and ongoing improvements to groundfish stock assessments.
What GAO Found
The reliability of the NMFS assessments is questionable for the five species GAO reviewed, although the assessments were based on the best information available at the time they were conducted. According to NMFS officials and a National Research Council report, to obtain reliable results each stock assessment should include at least one NMFS data source of sufficient scope and accuracy because such data are derived from unbiased, statistical designs. However, in the yelloweye assessment, no NMFS data were used, and in the darkblotched, canary, and bocaccio assessments, the NMFS data were limited because the NMFS' surveys were conducted in trawlable waters only. A 2003 NMFS report concluded that darkblotched groundfish are less abundant and bocaccio and canary are more abundant in untrawlable waters. Also for all five species, NMFS lacks a standard approach for ensuring the reliability of non-NMFS data used in stock assessments. Some assessors reviewed the quality of non-NMFS data; others did not. The assessors who reviewed the quality of the non-NMFS data found errors that made some of the data unusable or that could have impaired the reliability of certain stock assessments. Finally, for four species, the stock assessment reports were questionable because they did not present the uncertainty associated with the population estimates. For example, the canary stock assessment review panel recommended that standard estimates of uncertainty be included in the assessment report because without them it is difficult to determine their reliability. NMFS has taken steps to implement some of the recommendations contained in the NMFS stock assessment improvement plan, but much remains to be done. NMFS has concentrated its efforts mostly on improving data quantity. For example, NMFS increased the frequency of groundfish stock assessments and extended the geographic ranges of the shelf and slope surveys to cover over 300 more miles along the southern California coast. However, because of staffing and funding limitations, NMFS has not yet implemented many of the recommendations aimed at obtaining more types of data and improving data quality. For example, NMFS has not collected enough ecosystem data, and the frequency and range of recruitment surveys (estimated production of new members of a fish population) are limited. Finally, because of other program priorities, NMFS has not implemented the recommendation to create a comprehensive plan that combines the improvement plan and its complementary plans. NMFS records indicate at least $8.9 million is needed to complete ongoing and planned stock assessment improvements--$2.6 million that NMFS' Northwest Fisheries Science Center requested but did not receive in fiscal years 2001 to 2003, and $6.3 million requested for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. It will cost about (1) $7.7 million to improve the types of data used, such as more untrawlable water and recruitment surveys and (2) $1.2 million to improve the quality of data used in stock assessments, such as enhanced calibration of vessel equipment and standardized trawl survey procedures. The actual cost of the remaining improvements may be even higher than the $8.9 million estimated because the estimates primarily reflect the amount of money that agency officials believed could be realistically obtained, rather than what the improvements might cost. |
gao_GAO-12-150 | gao_GAO-12-150_0 | In addition, in order for a student to be eligible for Title IV funds, the college must ensure that the student meets the following requirements, among others: (1) has a high-school diploma or a recognized equivalent (such as a General Educational Development certification), or completes a secondary-school education in a home-school setting as recognized under state law, or is determined to have an “ability-to-benefit” from the education by a method approved by Education or a state, or the college; (2) is working toward a degree or certificate in an eligible program; and (3) is maintaining satisfactory academic progress once in college. Results of Undercover Testing
The experience of each of our undercover students is unique and cannot be generalized to other students taking courses offered by the for-profit colleges we tested or to other for-profit or nonprofit colleges. During the course of our testing at the selected colleges, we documented our observations related to the following phases of the student experience: enrollment, cost, financial aid, course structure, substandard student performance, withdrawal, and exit counseling. In addition, on the basis of our observations for the courses we tested, 8 of the 15 colleges appeared to follow existing policies related to academic dishonesty, exit counseling, and course grading standards. At the 7 remaining colleges, we found mixed results. Of the 7 colleges, as discussed below, instructors at 2 colleges appeared to act in a manner inconsistent with college policies regarding academic dishonesty, instructors at 4 colleges appeared to act in a manner inconsistent with course grading standards, and 3 colleges appeared to act in a manner inconsistent with federal regulations on exit counseling. Enrollment: We attempted to enroll undercover students at 15 colleges, and were successful in enrolling at 12. Two colleges (Colleges 13 and 14) declined our student’s request for enrollment based on insufficient proof of high-school graduation. College 15 stated that it did not accept any home-school credentials but accepted our fictitious closed-school diploma and allowed us to begin class, but rescinded our acceptance after 1 week of classes, stating a lack of high-school accreditation as the reason for expulsion. Only 10 of our students actually received federal loan disbursements, according to documentation we received; the other 2 students were expelled without the college requesting or receiving any federal student aid funds (Colleges 3 and 12). In no instances did we observe that a college collected federal student aid funds after the withdrawal date of any of our students (that was not fully refunded immediately). Our students took 31 classes in total at an average cost of $1,287 per class. These costs included such items as tuition, books, and technology fees. Since our students were just starting their respective programs, most classes were introductory in nature, such as Introduction to Business, Introduction to Computer Software, Keyboarding, and Learning Strategies and Techniques. Individual courses ranged in length from 4 weeks to 11 weeks, and our students took from 1 to 4 courses concurrently. Examples of Instructor or College Behavior Not in Accordance with Policies or Standards At College 4, our student submitted work in one class that did not meet the requirements of the assignment (such as photos of political figures and celebrities in lieu of essay question responses). Withdrawal: Generally, our students who were not expelled for performance or attendance reasons were able to withdraw from their respective colleges without incident. Two of our three expelled students received no federal student loans and therefore their colleges were not required to provide federally mandated exit counseling (Colleges 3 and 12). We have referred the names of the colleges that did not provide exit counseling to the Department of Education. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of your interest in the student experience at for-profit colleges, we agreed to conduct undercover testing by enrolling in online classes under degree-granting programs. We selected 15 for-profit colleges and, once enrolled, engaged in behaviors consistent with substandard academic performance. However, there exists a possibility that tested entities were able to determine that our students were fictitious and therefore altered their behavior based on the assumption that they were under observation. Finally, we selected the remaining 9 for-profit colleges using a systematic selection process. At each of the 15 selected colleges, we attempted to enroll using fictitious identities and one or two possible fictitious pieces of evidence of high- school graduation–a home-school diploma or a diploma from a closed high school. We enrolled in each college for approximately one term, as defined by the college. To engage in behaviors consistent with substandard academic performance, we used one or more of the following strategies for each student: (1) failure to attend class, (2) failure to submit assignments, (3) submission of objectively incorrect assignments (e.g, submitting incorrect answers on multiple-choice quizzes), (4) submission of unresponsive assignments (e.g., submitting pictures when prompted to submit an essay), and (5) submission of plagiarized assignments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Once comprised of local, sole-proprietor ownership, the nation's for-profit institutions now range from small, privately owned schools to publicly traded corporations. Enrollment in such colleges has grown far faster than in traditional higher-education institutions. Moreover, during the 2009-2010 school year, for-profit colleges received almost $32 billion in grants and loans provided to students under federal student aid programs, as authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended. Because of interest in the student experience at for-profit colleges, GAO was asked to conduct undercover testing by enrolling in online classes under degree-granting programs. To conduct this testing, GAO selected 15 for-profit colleges using a selection process that included the 5 largest colleges and a random sample and attempted to enroll using fictitious identities. Once enrolled, each fictitious student engaged in behaviors consistent with substandard academic performance. Each fictitious identity enrolled for approximately one term, as defined by the college. The experience of each of GAO's undercover students is unique and cannot be generalized to other students taking courses offered by the for-profit colleges we tested or to other for-profit or nonprofit colleges. GAO intended to test colleges that were unaware of its true identity. However, there exists a possibility that these colleges identified GAO's fictitious students and altered their behavior based on the assumption that they were under observation. This product contains no recommendations. Where applicable, GAO referred information to the Department of Education for further investigation.
What GAO Found
During the course of undercover testing, GAO documented its observations related to enrollment, cost, financial aid, course structure, substandard student performance, withdrawal, and exit counseling. Overall, GAO observed that 8 of the 15 colleges appeared to follow existing policies related to academic dishonesty, exit counseling, and course grading standards. At the 7 remaining colleges, GAO found mixed results. For example, one or more staff at these colleges appeared to act in conflict with school policies regarding academic dishonesty or course grading standards, or federal regulations pertaining to exit counseling for student loans, while other staff acted consistent with such policies. Enrollment: GAO attempted to enroll its students using fictitious evidence of high-school graduation--either a home-school diploma or a diploma from a closed high school--at all 15 colleges and successfully enrolled in 12. Two declined GAO's request for enrollment based on insufficient proof of high-school graduation. Another allowed GAO's student to begin class, but rescinded acceptance after 1 week, citing lack of high-school accreditation. Cost and Financial Aid: GAO's students took 31 classes in total at an average cost of $1,287 per class. These costs included such items as tuition, books, and technology fees. All 12 students were eligible for federal student aid, but only 10 actually received disbursements; the other students were expelled without receiving disbursements. We did not observe that a college collected federal student aid funds after the withdrawal date of any of our students (that was not fully refunded immediately). Course Structure: GAO's students were enrolled in introductory classes, such as Introduction to Computer Software and Learning Strategies and Techniques. Courses ranged in length from 4 to 11 weeks, and students took from one to four courses concurrently. Courses generally consisted of online discussion forum postings; writing assignments; multiple-choice quizzes and exams; and skills exercises, such as keyboarding tests or computer exercises. Substandard Academic Performance: GAO's students engaged in substandard academic performance by using one or more of the following tactics: failure to attend class, failure to submit assignments, submission of objectively incorrect assignments, submission of unresponsive assignments, and plagiarism. At 6 colleges, instructors acted in a manner consistent with school policies in this area, and in some cases attempted to contact students to provide help outside of class. One or more instructors at 2 colleges repeatedly noted that the students were submitting plagiarized work, but no action was taken to remove the student. One or more instructors at the 4 remaining colleges did not adhere to grading standards. For example, one student submitted photos of celebrities and political figures in lieu of essay question responses but still earned a passing grade. Withdrawal and Exit Counseling: Three of GAO's students were expelled for performance or nonattendance. Eight of the 9 students withdrew from their respective colleges without incident. At the remaining school, GAO's request to withdraw was never acknowledged and the student was eventually expelled for nonattendance. 3 students did not receive federally mandated exit counseling, advising students of repayment options and the consequences of default. |
gao_HEHS-95-173 | gao_HEHS-95-173_0 | Creating securities that would encourage pension plans to invest in public facilities was a novel idea because private pension plans do not generally invest in public projects within the United States. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Given continuing congressional interest in infrastructure and pension issues, and at the request of the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, we initiated a study to identify the role that current federal policies play in providing incentives for private pension plans to invest in infrastructure projects and analyze the Infrastructure Commission’s 1993 proposals relating to pension plan investment to determine how pension plans might respond. Federal law also exempts the plans’ earnings from taxation. The lower return on tax-exempt municipal bonds means that the securities cannot compete effectively for pension plan assets. This means that the justification for an expanded government role to encourage investment in infrastructure can depend on the values expressed by the voters. Private Pension Plan Managers Cite Disincentives to Infrastructure Investment
Earlier, we discussed the fundamental disincentive for pension plan investment in infrastructure that results from the tax-exempt status of the plans and the use of tax-exempt municipal bonds as a common vehicle to finance infrastructure. At any rate, alternative investment portfolios are small. The goal of attracting pension capital to infrastructure is problematic. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the role that pension plans play in expanding public investment in infrastructure projects.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) pension plans have not been investing in domestic public infrastructure because of the combined effects of federal law, which requires plans to seek the highest rate of return on investments and encourages growth by exempting earnings from taxation; (2) to encourage public investment in infrastructure, federal law provides a tax exemption on interest income to those who invest in municipal bonds; (3) pension plans have no incentive to invest in lower-interest municipal bonds, since plan earnings are already tax exempt; (4) although the Infrastructure Commission recommended creating two federal financing entities to attract pension plans to invest, the share of plan assets that might go to infrastructure would likely be small; and (5) the federal capitalization of state revolving funds may be an option to expand infrastructure investment without relying on pension plans. |
gao_GAO-01-862T | gao_GAO-01-862T_0 | Restructuring Raises Financing and Beneficiary Participation Issues
Medicare’s two parts have distinct financing and participation arrangements. However, HI trust fund solvency is an incomplete measure of Medicare’s fiscal health. Improved measures of Medicare sustainability and agreed-upon thresholds will not, however, alter the difficult decisions facing this and future Congresses. Any solution to address the financial imbalance will affect beneficiaries, taxpayers, providers, or some combination of the three groups. In Medicare, however, current estimates suggest that the combination of cost-sharing requirements on covered services and the cost of services not covered by Medicare leaves beneficiaries liable for about 45 percent of their health care costs. Partial benefits could be extended to those who do not fully participate in the program. Regardless of whether the relationship between parts A and B is restructured, HCFA faces challenges in seeking to more efficiently manage Medicare services due to its outdated and inadequate IT systems, statutory constraints, and the fundamental need for public accountability that accompanies a large public program. NASI has reviewed many of these private sector activities and concluded that they could have potential value for Medicare. It is essential that HCFA has the ability to monitor changes in care delivery in a timely and objective manner to determine how these payment policies may need to be adjusted in the future. HCFA has begun to implement some innovations and experiment with others. HCFA’s ability to encourage use of preferred providers is also limited. | What GAO Found
Medicare faces many challenges. The overarching issue is how to sustain the program for future generations. Meeting that challenge will require difficult decisions that will affect beneficiaries, providers, and taxpayers. However, the financing issue should not obscure other important challenges. Medicare's current cost-sharing arrangements do not encourage the efficient use of services without discouraging necessary care. Moreover, the lack of catastrophic coverage can leave some beneficiaries liable for substantial Medicare expenses. Finally, some aspects of Medicare's program management are inefficient and lag behind modern private sector practices. Changes in Medicare's program management could improve both the delivery of health care to beneficiaries and the program's ability to pay providers appropriately. Some view restructuring of the relationship between parts A and B as an important element of overall Medicare reform. Fundamentally, assessing the program as a whole is an important first step in addressing Medicare's challenges. Solutions to many of these challenges could be crafted without restructuring. However, restructuring may provide opportunities to implement desired reforms--with or without unifying the Hospital Insurance and Supplemental Medical Insurance trust funds--while undoubtedly raising issues that will have to be considered. |
gao_GAO-03-947 | gao_GAO-03-947_0 | Specific revisions in the final rule include the following: a revised method for determining a facility’s baseline emissions level that a company would use as the starting point for determining whether any changes in emissions resulting from a planned physical change or change in the method of operation subjected the company to NSR; a revised test that a company would use after establishing a facility’s baseline emissions level to determine if a physical or operational change would increase emissions beyond the NSR threshold; exemptions from the program if companies demonstrate that (1) equipment qualifies as a “clean unit” because they already use state-of-the- art pollution control equipment or (2) a proposed modification specifically controls air pollution and achieves an environmental benefit; and a mechanism for companies to work with state or local permitting authorities to develop plantwide emissions limits, which would allow companies to make changes in one part of a facility’s operations as long as they offset any emissions increases with decreases elsewhere within the facility. EPA’s approach, while limited, is consistent with agency guidance for assessing the economic impacts of proposed rules. OMB agreed that the rule would not have a significant economic impact but was significant for policy reasons. OMB asked EPA if it could better quantify impacts and was convinced that the agency lacked the necessary data to do so. Some stakeholders have formally asked EPA to reconsider the rule, arguing, among other things, that it will enable facilities to increase their emissions. OMB Concurred with EPA’s Analysis and Conclusions and Determined That Data Limitations Precluded More Quantitative Analysis
According to senior EPA and OMB staff, OMB agreed with EPA’s finding that the final rule was not economically significant because it was not expected to impose costs or provide benefits beyond the $100 million threshold that triggers requirements to conduct a more thorough analysis. Our review did not identify any comprehensive assessments of the final rule’s effects that contradicted or supported the results of EPA’s analysis or the assertions of those who oppose the final rule. EPA Relied Primarily on Anecdotes from Industries Most Affected by NSR to Conclude That It Discouraged Some Energy Efficiency Projects
EPA relied primarily on anecdotal information from industry in concluding that the NSR program, prior to the final rule, discouraged some energy efficiency projects—such as upgrades to industrial boilers—including some projects that would have reduced air emissions. Several environmental groups disputed EPA’s findings. Several environmental groups experienced in NSR issues disagreed with industry’s claims about the NSR program’s effects on energy efficiency. Because EPA based its conclusions on anecdotes, the agency’s findings do not necessarily represent NSR’s effect on energy efficiency projects within the industries that provided the anecdotes or across all industries subject to the program. The executive director of one industry trade association stated that it would make economic sense to increase production at more efficient facilities. Therefore, any emissions increases due to higher production levels at more efficient facilities would be offset by decreased production elsewhere. Recommendations for Executive Action
Because of the lack of data and uncertainties about the NSR final rule’s impacts, we recommend that the EPA Administrator: determine what data are available that the agency could use to monitor the emissions impacts of the rule, work with state and local air quality agencies to identify any additional data needs and possible ways to fill them, and use the monitoring results to determine whether the rule has created adverse effects that the agency needs to address. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and Senator Lieberman asked us to determine the basis of (1) EPA’s analysis of the economic impacts of the final rule and its conclusion that the rule would not create significant enough benefits or costs to merit a more detailed analysis and (2) EPA’s conclusions that the NSR program (prior to the final rule) discouraged some energy efficiency projects. We also met with senior OMB staff responsible for reviewing EPA’s analysis within the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
A recent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) final rule changing the Clean Air Act's New Source Review (NSR) program--a key means to protect public health and enhance air quality--has been under scrutiny by the Congress, industry, environmental groups, state and local air quality agencies, and the courts. GAO was asked to determine the basis of EPA's conclusions that (1) the rule's economic impacts would not be significant enough to merit a detailed analysis and (2) the NSR program, prior to the rule, discouraged some energy efficiency projects. GAO, among other things, reviewed EPA's analysis of the rule and its impacts, as well as guidance from EPA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on analyzing such impacts. GAO also met with industry and environmental stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Consistent with agency guidance, EPA used a limited screening analysis that relied on staff's professional judgment and public comments from earlier reform proposals to conclude that the final rule would decrease emissions and health risks and not impose significant costs. EPA determined that neither the rule's benefits nor its costs would exceed a $100 million threshold that triggers requirements to conduct a more comprehensive assessment. EPA issued the rule to streamline the NSR permitting process and provide flexibility to industry. For example, the rule provides a mechanism for companies to develop plantwide emissions limits, which would allow them to make changes in one part of a facility's operations as long as they offset emissions increases with decreases elsewhere within the facility. While OMB agreed with EPA's conclusion that the rule would not have significant economic effects, it determined that the rule was significant for policy reasons. Therefore, OMB asked EPA if it could better quantify the rule's potential impacts, but the agency lacked the necessary data to do so. EPA lacked comprehensive data on the program's economic impacts, and could not predict how many facilities would use the rule's optional provisions. Several states and environmental groups disagree with EPA's conclusions, claiming that it will enable facilities to increase their emissions. These parties have filed suit against EPA challenging the rule and also have petitioned EPA to reconsider the rule. We did not identify any comprehensive assessments that contradicted or supported EPA's conclusions or the assertions of those who oppose the rule. Because of the data limitations, it was not possible to verify EPA's conclusions about the rule's effects. Because it lacked comprehensive data, EPA relied on anecdotes from the four industries it believes are most affected by NSR to conclude that the NSR program (prior to the rule) discouraged some energy efficiency projects, such as upgrades to industrial boilers, including some that would have decreased emissions. Because the information is anecdotal, EPA's findings do not necessarily represent the program's effects across the industries subject to the program. Several environmental groups disputed EPA's findings. One such group said that factors other than NSR, such as economic downturns, discouraged the projects. Furthermore, EPA's conclusion that some projects would have decreased emissions assumed that facilities would not increase production after performing the projects. However, according to EPA and the executive director of an industry group, companies often expand production after implementing energy efficiency projects because it is advantageous to maximize production at the most efficient facilities. Such expansions could increase emissions and related health risks, although EPA asserts that this would be offset by decreased production and emissions at less efficient facilities. |
gao_GAO-01-679 | gao_GAO-01-679_0 | Prompted by the Congress, EPA has responded with a variety of programs, including the NPDES Storm Water Program, which requires more than 1,000 local governments to implement storm water management programs. Those municipalities that are currently involved in Phase I of the program have been attempting to reduce pollutants in storm water runoff for several years. It is time to begin evaluating these efforts. In addition, the agency has not attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of this program in reducing storm water pollution or to determine its cost. The agency attributes this problem to inconsistent data reporting from permitted municipalities, insufficient staff resources, and other competing priorities within the Office of Wastewater Management. Although Phase I municipalities report monitoring and cost data to EPA or state regulatory agencies annually, these agencies have not reviewed this information to determine whether it can be of use in determining the program’s overall effectiveness or cost. Our analysis shows that the reported cost information will be difficult to analyze unless EPA and its state partners set guidelines designed to elicit more standardized reporting. Better data on costs and program effectiveness are needed—especially in light of the Phase II program that will involve thousands more municipalities in 2003. EPA’s planned research grant to the University of Alabama and its pilot project in the agency’s Region IV to analyze data from annual reports and develop baseline indicators is a step in the right direction and could point the way for a more comprehensive approach. Recommendation
To determine the extent to which activities undertaken through the NPDES Storm Water Program are reducing pollutants in urban runoff and improving water quality, and the costs of this program to local governments, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, direct the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water to establish measurable goals for the program; establish guidelines for obtaining consistent and reliable data from local governments with Phase I permits, including data on the effects of the program and the costs to these governments; review the data submitted by these permittees to determine whether program goals are being met and to identify the costs of the program; and assess whether the agency has allocated sufficient resources to oversee and monitor the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers the contaminants in storm water runoff as a significant threat to water quality across the nation. Prompted by Congress, EPA has responded with various initiatives, including the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Storm Water Program, which requires more than 1,000 local governments to undertake storm water management programs. Those municipalities in Phase I of the program have been trying to reduce pollutants in storm water runoff for several years, and it is time to begin evaluating their efforts. EPA however, has not established measurable goals for this program, nor has it attempted to evaluate the program's effectiveness in reducing storm water pollution or to determine its cost. EPA attributes its inaction to inconsistent data reporting from municipalities, insufficient staff resources, and other competing priorities within the Office of Wastewater Management. Although municipalities report monitoring and cost data to EPA or state regulatory agencies annually, these agencies have not reviewed this information to determine whether it can be useful in determining the program's overall effectiveness or cost.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the reported cost information will be difficult to analyze unless EPA and its state partners set guidelines to elicit more standardized reporting. Better data on costs and program effectiveness are needed--especially in light of the Phase II program that will involve thousands more municipalities in 2003. EPA's planned research grant to the University of Alabama and its pilot project to analyze data from annual reports and develop baseline indicators is a step in the right direction and could point the way for a more comprehensive approach. |
gao_GAO-02-571 | gao_GAO-02-571_0 | In 1991, we reported on Interstate conditions. In that report, we raised concerns about the poor condition of Interstate highways and about FHWA’s oversight of them. The original purposes of the system were to provide for efficient long-distance travel, support defense requirements, and connect metropolitan and industrial areas. State departments of transportation manage most of the “hands-on” work of constructing, maintaining, and planning for the future of the Interstate System. State spending of federal, state, and local funds for Interstates grew from $13.0 billion in 1992 to $16.2 billion in 2000. 11). Furthermore, Interstate highways are generally more congested than other freeways and other principal arterials. State respondents generally do not expect that their efforts to alleviate congestion will be entirely successful. IV for the states’ responses.) Costs to Maintain Interstates Are Uncertain
It is difficult to identify state needs on the Interstate System and to determine what level of funding is needed to meet these needs. Accordingly, this report examines the condition of the Interstate System, including, (1) how the role of the Interstate System has changed over time; (2) the roles of the federal and state governments in managing and funding the Interstate System; (3) the financial resources that states and the federal government have devoted to the system; (4) how physical conditions, safety, and congestion of the Interstate System have changed and how they compare to other classes of roads; and (5) the factors that could affect future Interstate conditions and the cost of addressing these factors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal spending on Interstate highways has contributed to changes in residential and business land-use patterns. In 1991, GAO raised concerns about the condition of Interstate highways and rising levels of congestion. The original purposes for the Interstate system were to provide for efficient long-distance travel, support defense, and connect metropolitan and industrial areas. Today, the most important role that the Interstates perform, other than supporting safe travel, is moving freight traffic across their states. The federal government provides funding for, and oversight of, the Interstate system while the states do most of the maintaining and planning for the future of the system. Combined federal and state spending on the Interstate System increased from $13.0 billion in 1992 to 16.2 billion in 2000.
What GAO Found
States are required to pay ten percent of the cost of an Interstate project; however, GAO found that the average nonfederal share of urban Interstate projects was 15 percent and 11 percent for rural projects. Interstate highways are in better physical condition and are safer than other classes of roads, although they are generally more congested. The states expect that increased traffic, the aging of the infrastructure, and funding constraints will affect their ability to maintain physical and safety conditions of the Interstate Systems and to alleviate congestion, but the costs to address the factors pressuring their Interstates were difficult to determine. |
gao_GAO-01-540 | gao_GAO-01-540_0 | Conclusion
While the criteria used to rate the bonds of TVA and other electric utilities are the same, they are weighted differently and, as a result, the basis for TVA’s bond rating is more nonfinancial in nature than that for other electric utilities. According to bond analysts, TVA’s high bond rating is largely based on the perception that its debt is federally backed because of its ties to the federal government as a wholly owned government corporation and its legislative protections from competition. If these conditions were to change, TVA’s bond rating would likely be lowered, which in turn would affect the cost of new debt. This would add to its already high interest expense and corresponding financial challenges in a competitive market. | What GAO Found
Although the criteria used to rate the bonds of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and other electric utilities are the same, they are weighted differently and, as a result, the basis for TVA's bond rating is more nonfinancial in nature than that for other electric utilities. According to bond analysts, TVA's high bond rating is largely based on the perception that its debt is federally backed because of its ties to the federal government as a wholly owned government corporation and its legislative protections from competition. If these conditions were to change, TVA's bond rating would likely be lowered, which, in turn, would affect the cost of new debt. This would add to its already high interest expense and corresponding financial challenges in a competitive market. |
gao_GAO-02-737 | gao_GAO-02-737_0 | The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, among other things, provided specific guidance on DOD’s acquisition workforce definition. The civilian agencies we reviewed all had policies describing the education and training requirements for each member of their acquisition workforce. The development of the new system, however, has experienced considerable delays. However, we did not review or validate acquisition workforce training budget and obligation data. DOD, the military services, and civilian agencies stated they had sufficient funds to meet their current minimum core training requirements. Other agencies reviewed did not indicate concerns about future training and career development. Recommendations for Executive Action
In an effort to ensure agencies succeed in defining a multifunctional and multidimensional acquisition workforce, we recommend that the Administrator of OFPP work with all the agencies to determine the appropriateness of further refining the definition of the acquisition workforce and to determine which positions, though not formally included in the acquisition workforce, nonetheless require certain training to ensure their role in the acquisition process is performed efficiently and effectively. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional committees, the secretaries of Defense, Army, Air Force, Navy, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs; and the administrators of General Services Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's continuing reviews of the acquisition workforce, focusing on the Department of Defense (DOD); the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Energy, and Health and Human Services; the General Services Administration; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, indicate that some of the government's largest procurement operations are not run efficiently.
What GAO Found
GAO found that requirements are not clearly defined, prices and alternatives are not fully considered, or contracts are not adequately overseen. The ongoing technological revolution requires a workforce with new knowledge, skills, and abilities, and the nature of acquisition is changing from routine simple buys toward more complex acquisitions and new business practices. DOD has adopted multidisciplinary and multifunctional definitions of their acquisition workforce, but the civilian agencies have not. DOD and the civilian agencies reviewed have developed specific training requirements for their acquisition workforce and mechanisms to track the training of acquisition personnel. All of the agencies reviewed said they had sufficient funding to provide current required core training for their acquisition workforce, but some expressed concerns about funding training for future requirements and career development, particularly because of budget cuts made recently at the Defense Acquisition University. |
gao_GAO-03-147 | gao_GAO-03-147_0 | Navy Has High Delinquency and Charge-off Rates but Recent Actions Have Resulted in Some Improvements
The Navy’s delinquency rate was slightly lower than the Army’s, which is the highest delinquency rate in the federal government. As of March 31, 2002, over 8,000 Navy cardholders had collectively $6 million in delinquent debt. In addition, as discussed later in this report, the Navy did not exempt personnel with poor credit histories from required use of travel cards. Most of this reduction may be attributed to a salary and military retirement payment offset program—similar to garnishment—started in November 2001. Of these, over 250 might have committed bank fraud by writing three or more NSF checks to Bank of America during either fiscal year period. Table 6 provides examples of the types of abusive charges we found during our review. We have reported similar problems with the Army travel card program and in our testimony on the Navy travel card program. Our audit found that 27 of 57 travel cardholders we examined whose accounts were charged off or placed in salary offset as of March 2002 still had active secret or top-secret security clearances in August 2002. As discussed previously, many of the Navy travel cardholders that we audited who wrote numerous NSF checks, were severely delinquent, or had their accounts charged off had histories of delinquencies and charge-offs relating to other credit cards, accounts in collection, and numerous bankruptcies. As a result, the cardholder was overpaid by more than $1,700. The fiscal year 2003 Department of Defense Appropriations Act requires the Secretary of Defense to establish guidelines and procedures for disciplinary actions to be taken against cardholders for improper, fraudulent, or abusive use of the government travel card and to deny issuance of the government travel card to individuals who are not creditworthy. Our assessment covered the reported magnitude and impact of delinquent and charged-off Navy travel card accounts for fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002, along with an analysis of causes and related corrective actions; an analysis of the universe of Navy travel card transactions during fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002 to identify potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card; the Navy’s overall management control environment and the design of selected Navy travel program management controls, including controls over (1) travel card issuance, (2) APCs’ capacity to carry out assigned duties, (3) limiting card activation to meet travel needs, (4) transferred and “orphan” accounts, (5) procedures for terminating accounts when cardholders leave military service, and (6) access for Bank of America’s travel card database; and tests of statistical samples of transactions to assess the implementation of key management controls and processes for three Navy units’ travel activity including (1) travel order approval, (2) accuracy of travel voucher payments, (3) the timely submission of travel vouchers by travelers to the approving officials, and (4) the timely processing and reimbursement of travel vouchers by the Navy and DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
Poor oversight and management of DOD's travel card program has led to high delinquency rates, costing DOD millions in lost rebates and increased ATM fees. As a result, the Congress asked GAO to report on (1) the magnitude, impact, and cause of delinquencies, (2) the types of fraudulent and abusive uses of the travel card, and (3) the effectiveness of internal controls over DOD's travel card program. GAO previously reported on travel card management at the Army. This report focuses on travel card management at the Navy, including the Marine Corps.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2002, over 8,000 Navy cardholders had $6 million in delinquent debt. For the prior 2 years, the Navy's average delinquency rate of 12 percent was nearly identical to that of the Army, which had the highest federal agency delinquency rate. Since November 1998, Bank of America had charged off nearly 14,000 Navy accounts totaling almost $17 million, and placed many more in a salary offset program similar to garnishment. During the period covered under this review, over 250 Navy personnel might have committed bank fraud by writing three or more nonsufficient fund (NSF) checks to Bank of America. In addition, as shown in the table, many cardholders abusively used the card for inappropriate purchases including prostitution and gambling without Navy management being aware of it. Many of these purchases were made when individuals were not on travel. The Navy's overall delinquency and charge-off problems were primarily associated with lower-paid, low-to midlevel enlisted military personnel. A significant relationship also existed between travel card fraud, abuse, and delinquencies and individuals with substantial credit history problems. For example, some cardholders had accounts placed in collections while others had filed bankruptcies prior to receiving the card. The Navy's practice of authorizing issuance of the travel card to virtually anyone who asked for it compounded these problems. We also found inconsistent documented evidence of disciplinary actions against cardholders who wrote NSF checks, or had their accounts charged off or put in salary offset. Further, almost one-half of these cardholders still had, as of August 2002, active secret or top-secret clearances. Other control breakdowns related to the Navy's failure to provide the necessary staffing and training for effective oversight, and infrequent, or nonexistent, monitoring of travel card activities. As a result of these and similar findings in the Army travel card program, the recently enacted fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations Act included provisions requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish guidelines and procedures for disciplinary actions and to deny issuance of the travel card to individuals who are not creditworthy. |
gao_GGD-95-56 | gao_GGD-95-56_0 | Minimal Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice Systems’ Handling of Status Offenders
Our analyses of 6 years of national data indicated that there were only relatively small differences in the percentages of female and male status offenders detained, adjudicated, and placed. For example, as would be expected, offenders’ prior offense history generally affected their detention outcomes. Survey Responses of Probation Officers Revealed No Differences in Processing
Table 3 shows that the probation officers who responded to our survey did not perceive any differences in the way females and males with similar status-offense histories were processed. Comparative Availability of Facilities and Services for Status Offenders Believed Similar
Generally, both our national survey respondents and the juvenile justice officials and facility representatives we interviewed in four states told us there were not any significant differences in the facilities and services available to female and male status offenders. However, both groups emphasized that they believed that more services were needed for status offenders, irrespective of gender. Some of the juvenile justice representatives and professional staff said that early intervention services were needed for first-time offenders to divert them from further involvement with the juvenile justice system. 93-415) mandated that we study gender-bias issues in state juvenile justice systems. For most offenses, the probability of being detained decreased for both males and females between 1986 and 1991. Overview of Services for Female and Male Status Offenders in Selected Facilities
Generally, we found no significant gender-based differences in the counseling, educational, and medical services provided to females and males at the 15 facilities we visited, although the extent of such services varied by type of facility. Also, females and males reportedly were given health screenings and/or physical examinations before or after admission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed whether gender bias existed in state juvenile justice systems between 1986 and 1991.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there was minimal gender bias in state juvenile justice systems during that period; (2) 40 percent of the 500,620 juvenile status-offender cases between 1986 to 1991 involved females and females and males had similar probabilities of being detained, adjudicated, or placed for a status offense; (3) the offenders' prior offense history and age generally affected the judicial outcomes; (4) although there were few gender-based differences in the availability of counseling, educational, and medical services for females and males, the type and extent of such services varied by facility; (5) females were sometimes given admission physicals and additional access to health care services that were not applicable to males; (6) county probation officers believed that there were not any significant differences in the way females and males with similar status-offense histories were treated within their juvenile justice systems; (7) juvenile probation officers reported that treatment options were equally available for detained female and male status offenders and more facilities were needed for both males and females; (8) it could not determine whether there was a disproportionate number of facilities for males; (9) local officials believed that more facilities and early intervention services were needed for status offenders of both sexes; and (10) there were mixed views about whether the needs of status offenders were better met by co-educational or single-gender facilities. |
gao_GAO-05-586T | gao_GAO-05-586T_0 | These treatments are intended to provide better growing conditions for trees and include activities such as removing competing vegetation and thinning forests when trees are too crowded. Forest Service Reports Increasing Reforestation and Timber Stand Improvement Needs, but Inconsistent Definitions and Data Make It Difficult to Accurately Quantify Its Needs
Forest Service reports to the Congress show a generally increasing trend in reforestation and timber stand improvement needs during the last 5 years, as shown in figure 1. While the Forest Service data are sufficiently reliable to identify this relative trend, they are not sufficiently reliable to accurately quantify the agency’s specific needs, establish priorities among treatments, or estimate a budget. Forest Service Data Are Not Sufficient to Accurately Quantify the Agency’s Needs
The Forest Service’s reforestation and timber stand improvement data, when combined with other information from Forest Service officials and nongovernmental experts—as well as data on recent increases in natural disturbances such as wildland fires—are sufficiently reliable for identifying relative trends in needs. However, we have concerns about the use of these data in quantifying the acreage of Forest Service lands needing reforestation and timber stand improvement treatments for several reasons. First, Forest Service regions and forests define their needs differently. Third, Forest Service regions do not always update the data to reflect current forest conditions or review the accuracy of the data. Forest Service officials acknowledge these problems and are preparing an action plan to address them. Agency Officials Link Natural Causes and Management Decisions to Increasing Reforestation and Timber Stand Improvement Needs
Forest Service officials told us that reforestation needs have been rising largely because such needs have increasingly been generated by causes other than timber harvests, and funding to address these needs has not kept pace. Timber harvests, which provided sufficient revenue to pay for related reforestation needs, are no longer the main source of such needs. According to Forest Service reports, beginning around 2000, the acreage burned in wildland fires and damaged by insects and diseases annually began to increase significantly, leaving thousands of acres needing reforestation. As the acreage affected by these natural disturbances increased, so did reforestation needs. For timber stand improvement, agency officials said that management practices have been the primary factor contributing to the increase in acreage needing treatment. Agency Officials Cite Adverse Effects That Could Result If Needs Are Not Addressed, but Have Not Positioned the Agency to Manage Such Effects
If reforestation and timber stand improvement needs continue to accumulate in the future and the Forest Service is unable to keep pace with the needs, the agency will likely have to postpone some treatment projects. According to agency officials, the agency’s ability to achieve forest management objectives may consequently be impaired; treatment costs could increase; and forests could become more susceptible to fire, disease, and insect damage. While Forest Service officials expressed concern about the potential harmful effects of delaying projects, the agency has not clarified its direction and priorities for the reforestation and timber stand improvement program to reflect this concern and the current context in which the program operates. Achievement of Management Objectives Could Be Impaired; Treatment Costs Could Increase; and Forests Could Become More Vulnerable to Fire, Insects, and Disease
The Forest Service’s ability to meet the management objectives defined in its forest plans—such as maintaining a variety of tree species in a forest or appropriate habitat for certain wildlife—could be impaired if reforestation or timber stand improvement treatments are delayed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Forest Service reported to the Congress that it had a backlog of nearly 900,000 acres of land needing reforestation--the planting and natural regeneration of trees. Reforestation and subsequent timber stand improvement treatments, such as thinning trees and removing competing vegetation, are critical to restoring and improving the health of our national forests after timber harvests or natural disturbances such as wildland fires. GAO was asked to (1) examine the reported trends in federal lands needing reforestation and timber stand improvement, (2) identify the factors that have contributed to these trends, and (3) describe any potential effects of these trends that Forest Service officials have identified. This testimony is based on GAO's report Forest Service: Better Data Are Needed to Identify and Prioritize Reforestation and Timber Stand Improvement Needs (GAO-05-374), being released today.
What GAO Found
The acreage of Forest Service lands needing reforestation and timber stand improvement has been generally increasing since 2000, according to Forest Service officials and data reported to the Congress, as well as other studies. While the Forest Service data are sufficiently reliable to identify this relative trend, they are not sufficiently reliable to accurately quantify the agency's specific needs, establish priorities among treatments, or estimate a budget. The data's reliability is limited in part because some Forest Service regions and forests define their needs differently, and some do not systematically update the data to reflect current forest conditions or review the accuracy of the data. Forest Service officials acknowledge these problems, and the agency is implementing a new data system to better track its needs. While helpful, this action alone will not be sufficient to address the data problems GAO has identified. According to Forest Service officials, reforestation needs have been increasing in spite of declining timber harvests because of the growing acreage of lands affected by natural disturbances such as wildland fires, insect infestation, and diseases. In the past, reforestation needs resulted primarily from timber harvests, whose sales produced sufficient revenue to fund most reforestation needs. Now needs are resulting mainly from natural causes, and funding sources for such needs have remained relatively constant rather than rising in step with increasing needs. For timber stand improvement, the acreage needing attention is growing in part because high-density planting practices, used in the past to replace harvested trees, are creating needs for thinning treatments today and because treatments have not kept pace with the growing needs. Forest Service officials believe the agency's ability to achieve its forest management objectives may be impaired if future reforestation and timber stand improvement needs continue to outpace the agency's ability to meet these needs. For example, maintaining wildlife habitat--one forest management objective--could be hindered if brush grows to dominate an area formerly forested with tree species that provided forage, nesting, or other benefits to wildlife. Also, if treatments are delayed, costs could increase because competing vegetation--which must be removed to allow newly reforested stands to survive--grows larger over time and becomes more costly to remove. Further, without needed thinning treatments, agency officials said forests become dense, fueling wildland fires and creating competition among trees, leaving them stressed and vulnerable to insect attack and disease. While agency officials expressed concern about these potential effects, the agency has not adjusted its policies and priorities for the reforestation and timber stand improvement program so that adverse effects can be minimized. Forest Service officials did, however, acknowledge the need to make such changes. |
gao_GAO-04-809 | gao_GAO-04-809_0 | Flaring and Venting Data Are Limited, but the Federal Government Has Opportunities to Improve Them
In the United States, DOE’s EIA collects and reports data provided voluntarily by the states on the amount of natural gas flared and vented, but the data are incomplete, inconsistent, and not as useful as they could be from an environmental perspective. EIA could improve flaring and venting data by enhancing its guidance to states and collecting data directly from oil and gas producers; EIA, MMS, and BLM could also improve data by collecting and reporting data on venting separately from data on flaring. Many states do not provide this information, however, and EIA has no authority to require them to do so. Since flaring and venting data are not a high priority for EIA, the agency has provided only limited guidelines to states to promote consistency in the information that they voluntarily submit. As a result, only 8 of the 32 oil- and gas-producing states provide data that EIA considers consistent, leaving EIA to estimate the amount of flaring and venting in the other 24 states. Although worldwide estimates of flaring and venting constitute a small portion of total greenhouse gas emissions, many countries have undertaken efforts to reduce flaring and venting. Three Percent of the World Production of Natural Gas Is Flared or Vented, Which Represents a Significant Amount of Unused Resources
While flaring and venting represent only 3 percent of the total natural gas production, the natural gas flared and vented—about 100 billion cubic meters a year—is enough to meet the annual natural gas consumption of both France and Germany. Investigating Market Barriers Affecting Associated Gas and Continuing to Work with Other Countries Could Help Reduce Global Flaring and Venting
The government could also have an effect on flaring and venting worldwide by (1) addressing market barriers affecting gas produced outside the United States that would otherwise be flared or vented and (2) continuing to work with other countries. Second, because of the limited guidance on what data to report, EIA considers most of the information it receives from the states to be inconsistent. Third, the data collected do not distinguish between flared gas and vented gas—an important distinction, since the methane emitted during venting is potentially much more harmful to the atmosphere than the carbon dioxide emitted during flaring. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Regarding natural gas flaring and venting from oil and gas production in the United States and the rest of the world, you asked us to (1) describe the data collected and reported on natural gas flaring and venting and what the federal government could do to improve it; (2) report, on the basis of available information, on the extent of flaring and venting and its contribution to greenhouse gases; and (3) identify opportunities for the federal government to reduce such flaring and venting. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1995, the average price of natural gas in the United States has almost tripled as demand has grown faster than supply. Despite this increase, natural gas is regularly lost as it is burned (flared) and released into the atmosphere (vented) during the production of oil and gas. GAO was asked to (1) describe flaring and venting data and what the federal government could do to improve them; (2) report, on the basis of available information, on the extent of flaring and venting and their contributions to greenhouse gases; and (3) identify opportunities for the federal government to reduce flaring and venting.
What GAO Found
U.S. and global data on natural gas flaring and venting are limited. First, the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects and reports data voluntarily provided by oil- and gas-producing states. Because EIA has no authority to require states to report, some do not, leading to incomplete data. Second, EIA has provided limited guidance to states to promote consistent reporting. As a result, only about one-fourth of the states reporting provide data that EIA considers consistent. Third, the data EIA collects do not distinguish between flared gas and vented gas--an important distinction since they have dramatically different environmental impacts. Data on flaring and venting outside the United States are also limited, since many countries report unreliable data or none at all. To improve data on flaring and venting, EIA could use its authority to collect data directly from oil and gas producers; to obtain more consistent data, EIA could improve its guidelines for reporting. From an environmental perspective, EIA, the Minerals Management Service, and the Bureau of Land Management could require flaring and venting data to be reported separately from each other. Globally, the federal government could set an example by continuing to improve U.S. data, continuing to support global efforts, and using U.S. satellite data to detect unreported flaring. On the basis of the limited data available, the amount of gas emitted through flaring and venting worldwide is small compared with global natural gas production and represents a small portion of greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, flaring and venting have adverse environmental impacts and result in the loss of a significant amount of energy. Annually, over 100 billion cubic meters of gas are flared or vented worldwide--enough to meet the natural gas needs of France and Germany for a year. While flaring and venting do occur in the United States, less than 1 percent of global production is flared and vented. Opportunities exist in several areas to help reduce flaring and venting, both in the United States and globally. For example, exploring ways to address market barriers affecting associated gas could help identify approaches to reduce global flaring and venting. |
gao_GAO-16-475 | gao_GAO-16-475_0 | A nonrefundable credit can be used to offset tax liability, but any excess of the credit over the tax liability is not refunded to the taxpayer. This report focuses on the design and administration of the other three refundable tax credits available to individuals. A qualifying child must meet certain age, relationship, and residency requirements. In 2013, taxpayers claimed a total of $68.1 billion in EITC with $59 billion (87 percent) of this amount refunded; the total was $55.1 billion for the CTC and ACTC with $26.7 billion (48 percent) refunded as ACTC and a total of $17.8 billion in AOTC with $5 billion refunded (28 percent). Lack of Third Party Data and Filing and Refund Deadlines Complicate IRS’s Enforcement Efforts
Lack of third party data complicates IRS’s ability to administer these credits, but such data are not easy to identify. Developing a Comprehensive Strategy for RTC Compliance Efforts and Greater Use of Available Data Could Help IRS Better Target Limited Enforcement Resources
IRS’s Lack of a Comprehensive Compliance Strategy for RTCs Hampers Its Ability to Make Informed Resource Allocation Decisions
Sustained annual budget reductions at IRS have heightened the importance of determining how best to allocate declining resources to ensure it can still meet agency-wide strategic goals of increasing taxpayer compliance, using resources more efficiently, and minimizing taxpayer burden. The average yearly amount overclaimed for the EITC was $18.1 billion, for the CTC/ACTC was $6.4 billion, and for the AOTC was $5.0 billion. IRS officials observed an increase in the ACTC overclaim percentage from 2009 to 2011. IRS Is Missing Opportunities to Use Available Data to Identify Drivers of ACTC and AOTC Noncompliance
IRS does not track the number of returns erroneously claiming the ACTC and AOTC identified through screening activities. There is some evidence that PEPS may be a useful tool for detecting noncompliance. Conclusions
Each year the EITC, ACTC, and AOTC help millions of taxpayers—many of whom are low-income—who are working, raising children, and paying tuition. IRS is working on a strategy to document current EITC compliance efforts and identify and evaluate potential new solutions to address improper payments, but this review does not include the other refundable credits. IRS is also missing opportunities to use available data to identify potential sources of noncompliance and develop strategies for addressing them. Structural changes to the credits, such as changes to eligibility rules, will involve trade-offs with respect to standard tax reform criteria, such as effectiveness, efficiency, equity, simplicity, and revenue adequacy. Take necessary steps to ensure the reliability of collections data and periodically review that data to (a) compute a collections rate for post- refund enforcement activities and (b) determine what additional analyses would provide useful information about compliance results and costs of post-refund audits and document-matching reviews. However, we found that a significant amount of enforcement activity is occurring in the post-refund environment. We recognize that gathering collections data has costs and the data have limitations, notably that not all recommended taxes are collected. However, use of these data— once IRS is able to verify its reliability – could better inform resource allocation decisions and improve the overall efficiency of enforcement efforts. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) describes the claimant population including the number of taxpayers and the amount they claim along with other selected characteristics for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), and American Opportunity Tax Credit ( AOTC); (2) describes how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administers these credits and what is known about the administrative costs and compliance burden associated with each credit; (3) assesses the extent to which IRS identifies and addresses noncompliance with these credits and collects improperly refunded credits; and (4) assesses the impact of selected proposed changes to elements of the EITC, ACTC, and AOTC with respect to three criteria for a good tax system: efficiency, equity, and simplicity. Appendix III: Research Findings on the Current Refundable Tax Credits
The following is a summary of the findings in the policy literature of the effect of the current design of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), and the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) on the effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and simplicity of these credits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Refundable tax credits are policy tools available to encourage certain behavior, such as entering the workforce or attending college. GAO was asked to review the design and administration of three large RTCs (the EITC, AOTC, and ACTC). The ACTC is sometimes combined with its nonrefundable counterpart, the Child Tax Credit. For this report GAO described RTC claimants and how IRS administers the RTCs. GAO also assessed the extent to which IRS addresses RTC noncompliance and reviewed proposed changes to the RTCs.
GAO reviewed and analyzed IRS data, forms and instructions for claiming the credits, and planning and performance documents. GAO also interviewed IRS officials, tax preparers, and other subject-matter experts.
What GAO Found
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), and the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) provide tax benefits to millions of taxpayers—many of whom are low-income—who are working, raising children, or pursuing higher education. These credits are refundable in that, in addition to offsetting tax liability, any excess credit over the tax liability is refunded to the taxpayer. In 2013, the most recent year available, taxpayers claimed $68.1 billion of the EITC, $55.1 billion of the CTC/ACTC, and $17.8 billion of the AOTC.
Eligibility rules for refundable tax credits (RTCs) contribute to compliance burden for taxpayers and administrative costs for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These rules are often complex because they must address complicated family relationships and residency arrangements to determine who is a qualifying child. Compliance with the rules is also difficult for IRS to verify due to the lack of available third party data. The relatively high overclaim error rates for these credits (as shown below) are a result, in part, of this complexity. The average dollar amounts overclaimed per year for 2009 to 2011, the most recent years available, are $18.1 billion for the EITC, $6.4 billion for the CTC/ACTC, and $5.0 billion for the AOTC.
IRS uses audits and automated filters to detect errors before a refund is sent, and it uses education campaigns and other methods to address RTC noncompliance. IRS is working on a strategy to address EITC noncompliance but this strategy does not include the other RTCs. Without a comprehensive compliance strategy that includes all RTCs, IRS may be limited in its ability to assess and improve resource allocations. A lack of reliable collections data also hampers IRS's ability to assess allocation decisions. IRS is also missing opportunities to use available data to identify potential noncompliance. For example, tracking the number of returns erroneously claiming the ACTC and AOTC and evaluating the usefulness of certain third party data on educational institutions could help IRS identify common errors and detect noncompliance.
Proposals to change the design of RTCs--such as changing eligibility rules--will involve trade-offs in effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and simplicity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends 1) IRS develop a comprehensive compliance strategy that includes all RTCs, 2) use available data to identify potential sources of noncompliance, 3) ensure reliability of collections data and use them to inform allocation decisions, and 4) assess usefulness of third-party data to detect AOTC noncompliance. IRS agreed with three of GAO's recommendations, but raised concerns about cost of studying collections data for post-refund enforcement activities. GAO recognizes that gathering collections data has costs. However, a significant amount of enforcement activity is occurring in the post-refund environment and use of these data could better inform resource allocation decisions and improve the overall efficiency of enforcement efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-525 | gao_GAO-06-525_0 | OIC Program Performance Has Been Mixed, and IRS Has Not Researched the Reasons for Some Performance Trends
Based on our analysis of OIC data, program performance has been mixed relative to five objectives—timeliness, quality, accessibility, compliance, and cost. However, some taxpayers wait more than 2 years to get an offer accepted, and cost per offer has increased. IRS has numeric targets for timeliness and quality. Timeliness Has Improved for Some Taxpayers but Remains Mixed, and IRS’s Timeliness Goals Are Set for Offers, Not Taxpayers
The OIC Program measures timeliness based on how long it takes to make a decision about an offer and not how long it has taken taxpayers, some of whom have repeat offers, to get their tax liabilities finally resolved. Furthermore, IRS has not analyzed the effect of the number and growth of repeat offers on timeliness. For example, it might be less costly for IRS to deal once with a taxpayer, even if it takes more time to work the single case, rather than have to process repeat offers. IRS also met its field quality goal of 84 percent using CQMS for fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2005, IRS would have been able to reassign 110 FTEs in COICs and 7 FTEs in field offices. ETA Regulations Are Consistent with Statute, but Hardship ETA and DATC Offers Are Not Meaningfully Distinct and Non- Hardship ETA Offers Are Rare
IRS’s ETA regulations are consistent with the provisions of the Restructuring Act, which were broadly written. The lack of distinction between DATC and hardship ETA offers causes unnecessary program complexity and confusion for taxpayers and tax practitioners. Because of the wording of the instructions, taxpayers applying for hardship ETA also are faced with the paradoxical process of proving that they can pay the tax liability and then explaining in writing why they cannot afford to pay it. Conclusions
Because some delinquent taxpayers will always be unable to fully pay their tax debts, IRS's OIC Program is necessary to ensure that taxpayers pay what they can and have a “fresh start” toward complying with their future obligations. The success of the program also depends on how well IRS management understands the reasons for the program’s performance. One step in understanding performance is measuring it. IRS’s tracking of the future compliance of program participants is also incomplete because it does not routinely measure compliance. Another step in understanding performance is setting goals. The numeric goals for OIC timeliness still are not based on an analytical assessment of taxpayer needs and other benefits, and the goals are set for each case rather than for taxpayers. A third step in understanding performance is analysis that determines the causes of performance. In addition, IRS has not analyzed factors that affect trends in the OIC Program’s accessibility. Furthermore, IRS does not set goals from the perspective of taxpayers. Distinguishing between Multiple Offers Submitted by Taxpayers
Because many taxpayers submit more than one offer in an effort to compromise tax liabilities, and because IRS does not track multiple offers from the same taxpayer, we independently developed estimates of the average (1) number of offers taxpayers submitted on the same tax liability, (2) time it took IRS to process all of these offers, and (3) calendar time duration between the date the first in a series of offers was submitted and the date the last in the series was closed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Taxpayers unable to fully pay their tax liabilities may apply for an offer in compromise (OIC), an agreement with IRS to pay what they can afford. IRS writes off the rest of the liability. In 2005, IRS accepted over 14,000 offers. Because of concerns about program performance and a new category of offers based on exceptional circumstances, GAO was asked to (1) describe the trends in program's performance and their causes and (2) determine whether IRS's regulations for exceptional circumstance offers are consistent with statute. GAO examined five program objectives: timeliness, quality, accessibility, compliance, and cost.
What GAO Found
OIC Program performance has been mixed. Timeliness improved for taxpayers making one offer to 5.8 months in 2005 but stayed constant, at an average of two years, for those making repeat offers. Quality goals have been met but IRS does not routinely track compliance and accessibility. Further, cost per offer has increased in that IRS has not decreased staffing since fiscal year 2003 in proportion to declines in offers. Improving the program depends on how well IRS management understands the reasons for the program's performance. One step in understanding performance is measuring it. However, IRS does not measure timeliness from the perspective of the taxpayer--for taxpayers with repeat offers IRS measures the time to decide each offer but not the overall time to resolve the taxpayer's liability. IRS lacks compliance and accessibility trend data useful for assessing performance. Another step in understanding performance is setting goals. IRS set numeric goals for timeliness and quality, but IRS's timeliness goals do not have a rationale and are not based on taxpayer needs or other benefits. A third step in understanding performance is analysis. While IRS has done some analyses that led to program changes, IRS has not analyzed the effect of repeat offers on timeliness to determine whether it would be less costly to deal once with a taxpayer rather than have to process repeat offers. IRS also has not analyzed whether the decrease in offers accepted since fiscal year 2003 reflects a decrease in program accessibility, or whether the efforts to improve the compliance of program participants have been successful. IRS's regulations for exceptional circumstance offers, intended for taxpayers who can fully pay, are consistent with statute. However, most exceptional circumstance offers are granted to taxpayers who cannot fully pay. These offers are not meaningfully distinct from the more common offers based on inability to fully pay. The lack of distinction causes unnecessary program complexity and confusion. Taxpayers are faced with the paradoxical process of proving that they can pay their tax liability and then explaining why they cannot. |
gao_GAO-12-707 | gao_GAO-12-707_0 | If the Army chooses a new camouflage uniform, officials estimate that it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace its uniform and related protective gear. It also encourages DOD components to actively seek to reduce costs by standardizing basic materials and accessories, such as new clothing items, and provides information on costs to introduce a new uniform into inventory. Military Services Have Not Used a Consistent Decision-Making Process to Produce Effective Camouflage Uniforms
The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to apply acquisition guidance for their uniform development, and varied in their use of the guidance. The two elements are: clear policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and a knowledge-based approach that includes meaningful data to determine whether a product will meet customer requirements. However, the Army and Air Force did not follow the two key elements, and they found that their new uniforms did not meet specific mission requirements. The Army used a decision process for the development of a new uniform that did not produce a successful outcome, and it had to replace that uniform in 2010. Military Services’ Fragmented Approach to Developing Uniforms Has Resulted in Inconsistent Protection for Service Members and No Collaboration to Reduce Costs
The military services’ fragmented approach to developing uniforms, without any joint criteria for meeting combat requirements, has not ensured that the resulting uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for service members, and the services have not collaborated to reduce the costs for uniforms in inventory. Without joint criteria on the performance of uniforms to guide activities, one or more service may develop uniforms without knowing whether its uniforms include the newest technology, the newest materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of performance. DOD and Its Components Have Not Developed a Policy to Ensure That Service-Specific Uniforms Provide Equivalent Levels of Protection and Have Not Collaborated to Minimize Risk
Each military department has developed its own standards for combat uniforms, and DOD does not have a policy to ensure that the services’ fragmented uniform programs comply with statutory policy to provide equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to individual service members operating in the joint battle space, to the maximum extent practicable. The Army is currently testing camouflage patterns to support the development of new camouflage uniforms for service-wide use and has estimated that the service could avoid initial inventory fees of as much as $82 million by partnering with another service or services. However, during our review none of the services had reached an agreement to partner with the Army. In the absence of DOD requirements that the services collaborate to standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, the services may continue to miss opportunities to increase efficiencies and forego tens of millions of dollars in cost savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:
To better ensure camouflage uniforms being developed by the military services meet mission requirements, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure that the services have and consistently use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach to produce successful outcomes. To facilitate the department’s ability to meet the statutory requirement to develop joint criteria for camouflage uniforms, direct the Secretaries of the military departments to identify and implement actions necessary to enable the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to develop and issue joint criteria for uniforms prior to the development or acquisition of any new camouflage uniform. As we discuss in our report, without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures for a knowledge-based approach to developing effective uniforms, some services may continue to lack assurance that they have a disciplined process that is capable of delivering uniforms that meet warfighter requirements. We assessed whether three services—the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force—followed the two key elements that GAO has determined are key practices for a decision process that produces successful outcomes, and to what extent each service developed uniforms that met requirements. To determine the extent to which the services have used a joint approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs, we reviewed the DOD guidance, the requirement of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the military departments establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms, and policy established by the act permitting the design and fielding of service- unique, future ground combat uniforms so long as they, to the maximum extent practicable, provide equivalent levels of performance and protection to all service members commensurate with their assigned combat missions and minimize the risk to the individual service members operating in the joint battle space, among other things. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the military services have introduced seven new camouflage uniforms with varying patterns and colors--two desert, two woodland, and three universal. In addition, the Army is developing new uniform options and estimates it may cost up to $4 billion over 5 years to replace its current uniform and associated protective gear. GAO was asked to review the services' development of new camouflage uniforms. This report addresses: 1) the extent to which DOD guidance provides a consistent decision process to ensure new camouflage uniforms meet operational requirements and 2) the extent to which the services have used a joint approach to develop criteria, ensure equivalent protection and manage costs. To do this, GAO reviewed DOD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO acquisition guidance and key practices, statutory requirements and policies, interviewed defense officials, and collected and analyzed records about uniform development.
What GAO Found
The military services have a degree of discretion regarding whether and how to apply Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition guidance for their uniform development and they varied in their usage of that guidance. As a result, the services had fragmented procedures for managing their uniform development programs, and did not consistently develop effective camouflage uniforms. GAO identified two key elements that are essential for producing successful outcomes in acquisitions: 1) using clear policies and procedures that are implemented consistently, and 2) obtaining effective information to make decisions, such as credible, reliable, and timely data. The Marine Corps followed these two key elements to produce a successful outcome, and developed a uniform that met its requirements. By contrast, two other services, the Army and Air Force, did not follow the two key elements; both services developed uniforms that did not meet mission requirements and had to replace them. Without additional guidance from DOD on the use of clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, the services may lack assurance that they have a disciplined approach to set requirements and develop new uniforms that meet operational needs.
The military services' fragmented approach for acquiring uniforms has not ensured the development of joint criteria for new uniforms or achieved cost efficiency. DOD has not met a statutory requirement to establish joint criteria for future uniforms or taken steps to ensure that uniforms provide equivalent levels of performance and protection for service members, and the services have not pursued opportunities to seek to reduce clothing costs, such as by collaborating on uniform inventory costs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the military departments to establish joint criteria for future ground combat uniforms. The departments asked the Joint Clothing and Textiles Governance Board to develop the joint criteria, but the task is incomplete. If the services do not use joint criteria to guide their activities, one or more service may develop uniforms without certainty that the uniforms include the newest technology, advanced materials or designs, and meet an acceptable level of performance. Further, DOD does not have a means to ensure that the services meet statutory policy permitting the development of service-unique uniforms as long as the uniforms, to the maximum extent practicable, provide service members the equivalent levels of performance and protection and minimize the risk to individuals operating in the joint battle space. Without a policy to ensure that services develop and field uniforms with equivalent performance and protection, the services could fall short of protecting all service members equally, potentially exposing a number to unnecessary risks. Finally, the services may have opportunities for partnerships to reduce inventory costs for new uniforms. The Army may be able to save about $82 million if it can partner with another service. Under DOD guidance, the services are encouraged to actively seek to reduce costs. The Air Force has shown interest in the Army's current uniform development, but none of the services has agreed to partner with the Army on a new uniform. In the absence of a DOD requirement that the services collaborate to standardize the development and introduction of camouflage uniforms, the services may forego millions of dollars in potential cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take four actions to improve the development of camouflage uniforms and enhance collaboration among the services: ensure that the services have and use clear policies and procedures and a knowledge-based approach, establish joint criteria, develop policy to ensure equivalent protection levels, and pursue partnerships where applicable to help reduce costs. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations and identified planned actions. |
gao_GAO-09-10 | gao_GAO-09-10_0 | In updates to our high-risk report, we acknowledged that the administration and real- property-holding agencies had made progress toward strategically managing federal real property and addressing some long-standing problems. This fiscal exposure is created because there is an expectation that the government will incur costs associated with maintaining and operating the assets it owns. Agencies Estimate Their Backlogs through Condition Assessments, Though Estimates Are Not Comparable
At the six agencies we reviewed, we found processes in place for the agencies to periodically assess the condition of their assets—processes that the agencies also generally used to identify repair and maintenance backlogs for their assets. From these, GSA develops what it refers to as its reinvestment liability, which includes cost estimates for repair and maintenance items that GSA has determined need to be done now and expects will need to be done within the next 10 years. VA officials told us that VA’s deferred maintenance estimate is used only to comply with FASAB’s requirement and does not represent the cost to repair and maintain VA’s facilities. As a result, agencies reported backlog estimates associated with assets that are inactive, that are not critical to their missions, or that have been identified for demolition in the next few years. Agencies Manage Their Backlogs as Part of Their Overall Mission-Driven Real Property Management Programs
Each agency that we reviewed manages its backlog as part of its overall real property management. In spite of these efforts, agency officials generally expect their backlog estimates to increase as the federal portfolio of real property continues to age and the cost of making repairs increases. Agencies Manage Repair and Maintenance Work Based on Safety and Potential Impact on Mission
Real property managers at the six agencies told us that it is more important to prioritize repair and maintenance work on the basis of safety and the potential impact of not doing the work on the agencies’ missions rather than on when the work was identified to be done. Impact of Backlogs Has Been Limited at Sites We Visited
At the six agencies we reviewed, officials have managed their facility repairs and maintenance to minimize the impact of their backlogs on the agencies. Officials said that their repair and maintenance backlogs have generally not affected the ability of their agencies to accomplish their missions, but the backlogs have led to higher operating and maintenance costs and short-term inconveniences. Also, some officials cautioned that their backlogs create a real potential for an unanticipated incident to occur that could adversely affect an agency’s mission. Agency officials at some of the sites told us that the effect of their repair and maintenance backlog is difficult to see, because the maintenance staff have prioritized projects that directly affect the mission and have done an excellent job of keeping the facility operating while facing increased repair needs. Newer systems, such as heating and air-conditioning systems, could operate more efficiently, provide more reliable service to the tenants, and reduce operating costs. In addition, overall maintenance costs increase when a roof that is due for replacement is repeatedly patched rather than replaced. Such a reporting requirement should include a standardized definition of repair and maintenance costs related to all assets that agencies determine to be important to their mission and therefore capture the government’s fiscal exposure related to its real property assets. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how agencies estimate their repair and maintenance backlogs, (2) determine how agencies manage their backlogs and the expected future changes in maintenance and repair backlogs, and (3) identify how backlogs have affected some facilities. To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed the six agencies that each told us in 2007 that they had over $1 billion in repair and maintenance backlogs associated with their held assets: the Departments of Defense, Energy, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs, the General Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. For each agency, we interviewed headquarters officials, reviewed agency documents, obtained data on repair and maintenance backlogs for the agency’s held assets, and visited two agency sites to determine how the sites estimate and manage their backlogs as well as the extent to which the sites’ missions have been affected by their backlog. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk area. In 2007, GAO reported that real-property-holding agencies and the administration had made progress toward managing their real property, but underlying problems, such as backlogs in repair and maintenance, still existed and six agencies reported having over $1 billion in repair and maintenance backlogs. Owning real property creates a fiscal exposure for the government from the expectation that agencies will incur future maintenance and operations costs. GAO was asked to (1) describe how six agencies estimate their repair and maintenance backlogs, (2) determine how these agencies manage their backlogs and the expected future changes in these backlogs, and (3) identify how backlogs have affected operations at some sites. GAO reviewed agency documents, interviewed officials, and visited two sites at each of the six agencies.
What GAO Found
The six agencies that GAO reviewed all periodically assess the condition of their assets to identify needed repairs and maintenance but then use different methods to define and estimate their repair and maintenance backlogs. As a result, the agencies' estimates are not comparable. Three of the six agencies--the Departments of Energy (DOE), the Interior (DOI), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--defined their backlogs as work that was identified to correct deficiencies. A fourth agency, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), also defined its backlog as work identified to correct deficiencies, but VA's backlog included only work on systems, such as mechanical and plumbing systems, found to be in poor or critical condition. The General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) both did not track a backlog. Instead, GSA calculated its reinvestment liability--the cost of repairs and maintenance needed now and in the next 10 years. DOD assigned a quality rating to each facility which was based on the ratio of repair costs to the asset's value. The backlog estimates do not necessarily reflect the costs the agencies expect to incur to repair and maintain assets essential to their missions or to avert risks to their missions. For example, these estimates could understate an agency's backlog because they are based on industry-standard costs, or could overstate an agency's backlog because they include inactive assets that are not essential to the agency's mission or may be demolished. The six agencies GAO reviewed generally manage their backlogs as part of their overall real property management and expect the size of their future backlogs to increase. Agencies focus on maintaining and repairing real property assets that are critical to their missions and have processes to prioritize maintenance and repair items based on the effects those items may have on their missions, regardless of whether the items are considered part of the backlogs. For example, VA officials told us that their first priority is to perform maintenance and repairs at places that directly affect patient care, such as operating rooms. Agencies are using strategies such as demolishing assets that are no longer needed to reduce their overall backlogs. However, agency officials generally expect their backlogs to increase as the federal portfolio of real property continues to age and construction costs increase. At the six agencies GAO reviewed, officials have managed their facility repairs and maintenance to minimize the impact of their backlogs on their operations. Officials said that postponing repairs and maintenance generally leads to higher operating and maintenance costs and short-term inconveniences, but they have managed the risks so that the agencies can continue to accomplish their missions. For example, maintenance costs increase when a roof that is due for replacement is repeatedly patched rather than replaced. While several officials said their maintenance staffs have been able to limit the impact of backlogs on operations, they cautioned that there is a real potential for an incident to adversely affect an agency's mission. At one site GAO visited, a multimillion-dollar piece of equipment could have been damaged by a leak from an air conditioning system if it had not been covered with a tarp. |
gao_GAO-09-526 | gao_GAO-09-526_0 | Background
To help Iraq assume responsibility for sustaining U.S. reconstruction efforts, U.S. agencies are implementing programs to build the capacity of Iraq’s central and provincial governments, including State’s PRDC program to strengthen the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to deliver essential services such as water and electricity and USAID’s NCD program to assist the Iraqi government in improving the administrative capacity of several ministries and executive offices through training. State Cannot Ensure That the PRDC Program Is Achieving Its Objective to Build Capacity
State’s PRDC program has management control weaknesses in organization, monitoring, and communication that hinder the achievement of its goal of building provincial government capacity. Second, State lacks a performance monitoring system that measures progress toward building the capacity of provincial governments. Third, State’s guidelines and policies have changed frequently, as has the direction of the program, but State did not fully communicate or consult with program implementers about these changes. However, no single program manager was clearly responsible for overall management of the program until May 2009, when State designated one in response to GAO’s findings. However, this is a measure of State’s ability to obtain and use U.S. funds. Our review of time and attendance records for 152 USACE employees, totaling about $2.5 million in net labor charges to 36 PRDC projects, disclosed that about 26 percent of these charges did not have adequate supporting documentation. The units responsible for training Iraqi officials and working with the ministries are clearly identified, and the chain of command is unambiguous. For example, USAID will now monitor the value of capital projects approved, the number of capital projects approved by the Ministry of Planning, and the rate of capital projects implemented. In October 2008, USAID reported that some target measures were exceeded, some were not achieved, and several were on track. Iraq Has Agreed to Sustain the Programs and Is Providing Some Support for NCD, but Budget Expenditures Are Unclear
Iraq committed to sustaining U.S.-funded projects and programs and sharing in their costs in several official documents and the International Compact for Iraq. Several ministries also made 2009 budget commitments to continue the NCD training and provide equipment for training centers, among other efforts. The Iraqi Government Has Committed to Operate and Maintain PRDC Projects and Is Supporting NCD Efforts
For the PRDC program, 16 of the 40 projects we reviewed had indications that the Iraqi government agreed to sustain the projects; however, none of the records we examined included specific funding or resource commitments that would allow a check against actual Iraqi budgets and expenditures. The provinces spent 32 percent of their investment budget. Also, USACE financial controls for the timekeeping process did not ensure adequate documentation, although USACE introduced initiatives to correct this. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help these programs achieve their objectives of building the capacity of the provincial governments and central ministries, We recommend that, for the PRDC program (1) the Secretary of State ensure that management control weaknesses are addressed in the PRDC program by designating an overall program manager; developing outcome measures of effectiveness; and documenting actual Iraqi government budget allocations and expenditures for fiscal year 2007 PRDC projects; and (2) the Secretary of the Army ensure that USACE initiatives to improve the financial controls for the timekeeping process correct the deficiencies discussed in this report. We recommend that, for the NCD program, the USAID Administrator (1) revise USAID policy and procedures for confirming receipt of goods or services applicable to the NCD program in Iraq to include (a) clarifying that confirmation of receipt of goods/or services must be noted separately from the administrative approval or (b) documenting reasons precluding actual confirmation such as prohibitive personal danger or security protection costs; (2) ensure that USAID/Iraq initiatives to improve the documentation of the voucher examiner’s required review of contractor invoices correct the deficiencies discussed in this report; and (3) document actual Iraqi government budget allocations and expenditures to ensure funds committed to support NCD activities are expended. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the management controls of the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) program and the National Capacity Development (NCD) program support the achievement of the programs’ objectives, we interviewed agency officials and analyzed project contracts, program files, agency reports, guidelines, financial and programmatic databases, and assessments for both the PRDC and NCD programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the United States has provided $49 billion to help rebuild Iraq. To build the capacity of Iraq's central and provincial governments to sustain this effort, the United States is implementing programs including Department of State's (State) Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) National Capacity Development (NCD). The use of key management controls, such as appropriate organizational structure and program monitoring, helps ensure programs achieve their objectives. Through field visits in Iraq, interviews with program officials, analyses of official reports, and examination of a sample of projects, we assessed whether the PRDC and NCD's management controls support the programs' objectives of building the capacity of Iraq's government. We also assessed Iraq's commitment to sustaining these U.S. programs.
What GAO Found
Through the PRDC program, State and USACE work with Iraqis in the provinces to develop proposals and undertake small-scale projects such as building schools, repairing roads, and developing water facilities. However, weaknesses in State's management controls hinder achieving the program objective to build provincial government capacity. First, the program involves multiple organizations and a complex process but had no clearly identified program manager until May 2009 when State designated one in response to GAO's findings. Second, State lacks a performance monitoring system that measures progress toward building provincial capacity to deliver essential services. Third, the program's guidelines and policies have changed frequently, but State did not adequately communicate or consult with the USACE, the program implementer, about these changes. Finally, USACE's financial controls for the timekeeping process did not ensure adequate documentation of time and attendance records for labor charges on projects. USAID's management controls generally supported the NCD program's objective of building ministry capacity by training Iraqi employees in administrative skills such as planning and budgeting and supporting Iraqi training centers. First, USAID's organizational structure is clear, including who is responsible for overall program management. Second, in response to an audit report, USAID narrowed the NCD program objective to improving ministries' administrative capabilities and clearly linked them to measures of outcome. Some of these measures include Iraqi ministries' execution of their capital budgets, including the number of capital projects approved and the rate of spending on capital projects. USAID reported it was on track to meet or exceed its 2008 targeted results. However, as of March 2009, final data on results were not available. Third, USAID's guidelines and program expectations for NCD are documented, clear, and communicated throughout the organization. However, with regard to financial controls, GAO found that USAID officials did not confirm receipt of goods and services for invoices totaling about $17 million of $79 million, prior to payment. The officials did not always document reasons such as security risks, when confirmation was not possible. Iraq has committed to sustaining U.S.-funded programs and sharing in their costs, but actual budget expenditures for such activities are unclear. For the PRDC program, 16 of the 40 projects in our sample had evidence that the Iraqi government agreed to sustain the project; however, the records did not specify actual financial or budget commitments. For the NCD program, the Iraqi government is supporting the program by providing trainers and allocating funds in their 2009 budgets for training center equipment and other NCD efforts. These funds are to be spent in 2009. We have previously reported that the Iraqi government includes funding in its budgets for investment activities such as operating and maintaining U.S.-funded reconstruction projects and training, but does not subsequently expend these funds. |
gao_GAO-13-469T | gao_GAO-13-469T_0 | In January 2012, we issued a classified report on TSA’s procurement and deployment of AIT that addressed the extent to which (1) TSA followed DHS acquisition guidance when procuring AIT and (2) deployed AIT units are effective at detecting threats. TSA Has Taken Some Steps to Address Challenges Identified in Developing, Testing, and Delivering Select Screening Technologies
While TSA has taken some steps and is taking additional steps to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, additional challenges remain. (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA’s five key performance parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during qualification testing. However, we concluded that, according to a February 2010 acquisition decision memorandum from DHS, the ARB gave approval to TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed key performance parameter. DHS officials stated that the ARB should have formally reviewed changes made to the key performance parameter to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. We recommended that TSA develop a road map that specifies development milestones for AIT and have DHS acquisition officials approve the road map. In January 2013, we found that TSA began deploying passenger screening canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational effectiveness. In June 2012, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate the effectiveness of passenger screening canine teams. We recommended that on the basis of the results of DHS’s assessments, TSA expand and complete operational assessments of passenger screening canine teams, including a comparison with conventional explosives detection canine teams before deploying passenger screening canine teams on a nationwide basis to determine whether they are an effective method of screening passengers in the U.S. airport environment, particularly since they cost the federal government more than TSA’s conventional canine teams.screening canine teams before it had completed an assessment to Additionally, we found that TSA began deploying passenger determine where within the airport (i.e., the public, checkpoint, or sterile areas) the teams would be most effectively utilized. DHS concurred with our recommendation to expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of the teams in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. As of April 2013, TSA concluded testing with DHS S&T of passenger screening canine teams in the sterile areas of airports, and TSA is still in the process of conducting its own testing of the teams in the sterile and public areas of the airports. On the basis of our findings, we recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors’ progress in meeting all key performance parameters because it is important that TSA convey vendors’ progress in meeting those requirements and full costs of the technology to decision makers when making deployment and funding decisions. However, DHS has efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component acquisition processes. We found in September 2012 that while DHS has initiated efforts to address the department’s acquisition management challenges, most of the department’s major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. We identified 42 programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs’ costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011—an aggregate increase of 166 percent. On the basis of our findings, we concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remains. We recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key program and portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS concurred with our recommendations and reported taking actions to address some of them. For example, in September 2012, DHS stated that it was in the process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management practices to enable DHS to more rapidly respond to programs’ needs by facilitating the development, approval, and delivery of more specific guidance for programs. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing Acquisition of Screening Technologies. Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions Are Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life cycle costs and support a range of aviation security programs, including technologies used to screen passengers and checked baggage. Within DHS, TSA is responsible for establishing requirements for testing and deploying transportation system technologies. Since 2010, GAO has reported that DHS and TSA faced challenges in managing acquisition efforts, including deploying technologies that did not meet requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated.
As requested, this testimony discusses (1) the extent to which TSA addressed challenges relating to developing and meeting program requirements, testing new screening technologies, and delivering capabilities within cost and schedule estimates for selected programs, and (2) DHS efforts to strengthen oversight of component acquisition processes. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from January 2010 through January 2013, including selected updates conducted in March 2013 on TSA's efforts to implement GAO's prior recommendations and preliminary observations from ongoing work. To conduct the updates and ongoing work, GAO analyzed documents, such as the AIT road map, and interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken and is taking steps to address challenges related to developing, testing, and delivering screening technologies for selected aviation security programs, but challenges remain. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges developing and meeting key performance requirements for the acquisition of advanced imaging technology (AIT)--i.e., full-body scanners. Specifically, GAO found that TSA did not fully follow Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS approving nationwide AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA's revised specifications. DHS required TSA to notify DHS's Acquisition Review Board (ARB) if AIT could not meet any of TSA's five key performance parameters or if TSA changed a key performance parameter during testing. However, GAO found that the ARB approved TSA for full-scale production without reviewing the changed parameter. DHS officials said that the ARB should have formally reviewed this change to ensure that TSA did not change it arbitrarily. GAO recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors' progress in meeting all key performance parameters. DHS agreed, and developed a road map to address the recommendation, but faces challenges implementing it--e.g., due to vendor delays. Additionally, in January 2013, GAO reported that TSA faced challenges related to testing and deploying passenger screening canine teams. Specifically, GAO concluded that TSA began deploying these canine teams to airport terminals in April 2011 prior to determining the canine teams' operational effectiveness. In June 2012, DHS and TSA began conducting operational assessments to help demonstrate canine teams' effectiveness. Also, TSA began deploying teams before it had completed an assessment to determine where within the airport the canine teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that on the basis of DHS assessment results, TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of canine teams in areas of the airport deemed appropriate. DHS agreed and officials said that as of April 2013, TSA had concluded testing in collaboration with DHS of canine teams in airport sterile areas--in general, areas of an airport for which access is controlled through screening of persons and property--and is testing teams on its own in airport sterile and public areas.
DHS has some efforts under way to strengthen its oversight of component investment and acquisition processes, but additional actions are needed. In September 2012, GAO reported that while DHS had initiated efforts to address the department's acquisition management challenges, most of DHS's major acquisition programs continue to cost more than expected, take longer to deploy than planned, or deliver less capability than promised. GAO identified 42 DHS programs that experienced cost growth, schedule slips, or both, with 16 of the programs' costs increasing from a total of $19.7 billion in 2008 to $52.2 billion in 2011--an aggregate increase of 166 percent. GAO concluded that DHS recognized the need to implement its acquisition policy more consistently, but that significant work remained. GAO recommended that DHS modify acquisition policy to better reflect key program and portfolio management practices and ensure acquisition programs fully comply with DHS acquisition policy. DHS agreed, and in September 2012 officials stated that it was in the process of revising its policy to more fully reflect key program management practices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to help strengthen its acquisition processes and oversight. DHS and TSA generally concurred and are taking actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-773 | gao_GAO-15-773_0 | 13597 in January 2012 to improve visa processing and travel promotion while continuing to protect U.S. national security. 13597 contained multiple goals for State and DHS for processing visitors to the United States, including the following:
Ensure that 80 percent of NIV applicants worldwide are interviewed within 3 weeks of receipt of application. State Has Undertaken Various Efforts to Improve NIV Processing Capacity and Has Reduced NIV Interview Wait Times
State Has Implemented Multiple Efforts to Reduce NIV Interview Wait Times
State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, as well as consular management officials and consular officers at the four posts we visited, reported that increased staffing levels, policy changes, and organizational reforms implemented since 2012 have all contributed to increasing NIV processing capacity, reducing NIV interview wait times worldwide. 13597’s goals of expanding NIV processing capacity and reducing worldwide wait times, particularly at U.S. posts in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. In response to E.O. 13597), and January 19, 2013, from 50 to 111 in Brazil, and 103 to 150 in China, a 122 and 46 percent increase, respectively (see fig. 2 for additional information on consular staffing increases in Brazil and China). As a result, State met its goal of increasing its NIV processing capacity in Brazil and China by 40 percent within a year of the issuance of E.O. Specifically, as figure 4 shows, since July 2012, at least 80 percent of B visa applicants worldwide have been able to obtain an interview within 3 weeks of their application. Rising NIV Demand and Significant Technology Concerns Could Impact State’s NIV Processing Operations
Projected NIV Demand Increases May Affect the Sustainability of State’s Efforts to Keep Wait Times Low
State projects that the number of NIV applicants will rise worldwide from 12.4 million in fiscal year 2014 to 18.0 million in fiscal year 2019, an increase of 45 percent. For example, according to State officials, State is currently hiring to meet vacancies caused by attrition and is expected to increase the number of consular officers by only 57 in fiscal year 2015, a 3 percent increase, and not increase consular officers in fiscal year 2016. State Should Evaluate Its Efforts To Improve NIV Processing Capacity Given Future NIV Demand Projections
According to State officials, efforts implemented since E.O. Furthermore, State’s evaluation policy emphasizes the importance of evaluations for bureaus to improve their programs and management processes to inform decision makers about current and future activities. A systematic evaluation of efforts by State to reduce NIV interview wait times would provide a clear indication of the efforts that yield the greatest impact on NIV processing efficiency and could assist the agency in continuing to meet the goals of E.O. State Does Not Systematically Obtain End User Input to Prioritize Improvement Efforts for Current IT Systems
Although consular officers and managers we spoke with identified CCD and the NIV system as one of the most significant challenges to the efficient processing of NIVs, State does not systematically measure end user (i.e., consular officers) satisfaction. According to Commerce, international travelers contributed $220.6 billion to the economy and supported 1.1 million jobs in 2014. Document a plan for obtaining end user (i.e., consular officers) input to help improve end user satisfaction and prioritize enhancements to information technology systems. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report reviews Department of State’s (State) nonimmigrant visa (NIV) processing operations and provides an update on the status of the goals in Executive Order (E.O.) Specifically, this report examines (1) the efforts State has undertaken to expand capacity and reduce NIV applicants’ interview wait times and the reported results to date, and (2) the challenges that impact State’s ability to efficiently process NIVs. To determine the challenges that impact State’s ability to efficiently process NIVs, we reviewed relevant documents, including State planning and NIV demand projections, interviewed State, DHS, and Commerce officials in Washington, D.C., including officials from State’s Office of Inspector General, and conducted focus groups with consular officers. | Why GAO Did This Study
International travel and tourism contributed $220 billion to the U.S. economy and supported 1.1 million jobs in 2014, according to the Department of Commerce. A portion of those travelers to the United States were required to obtain an NIV. After a period in which travelers experienced extensive waits in obtaining a required interview for an NIV in 2011, the President issued E.O. 13597 in 2012 to improve visa and foreign visitor processing, while continuing to protect U.S. national security. The E.O. set goals for State to increase NIV processing capacity in Brazil and China and reduce NIV interview wait times for applicants worldwide. This report examines (1) efforts State has undertaken to expand capacity and reduce NIV applicants' interview wait times and the reported results to date and (2) challenges that impact State's ability to efficiently process NIVs. GAO analyzed State's historical and forecast NIV data and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and consular officers and management in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. These countries represent the four highest demand countries for U.S. NIVs.
What GAO Found
Since 2012, the Department of State (State) has undertaken several efforts to increase nonimmigrant visa (NIV) processing capacity and decrease applicant interview wait times. Specifically, it has increased consular staffing levels and implemented policy and management changes, such as contracting out administrative support services. According to State officials, these efforts have allowed State to meet the goals of Executive Order (E.O.) 13597 of increasing its NIV processing capacity by 40 percent in Brazil and China within 1 year and ensuring that 80 percent of worldwide NIV applicants are able to schedule an interview within 3 weeks of State receiving their application. Specifically, State increased the number of consular officers in Brazil and China by 122 and 46 percent, respectively, within a year of the issuance of E.O. 13597. Additionally, according to State data, since July 2012, at least 80 percent of worldwide applicants seeking a tourist visa have been able to schedule an interview within 3 weeks.
Two key challenges—rising NIV demand and problems with NIV information technology (IT) systems—could affect State's ability to sustain the lower NIV interview wait times. First, State projects the number of NIV applicants to rise worldwide from 12.4 million in fiscal year 2014 to 18.0 million in fiscal year 2019, an increase of 45 percent (see figure).
Given this projected NIV demand and budgetary limits on State's ability to hire more consular officers at posts, State must find ways to achieve additional NIV processing efficiencies or risk being unable to meet the goals of E.O. 13597 in the future. Though State's evaluation policy stresses that it is important for bureaus to evaluate management processes to improve their effectiveness and inform planning, State has not evaluated the relative effectiveness of its various efforts to improve NIV processing. Without conducting a systematic evaluation, State cannot determine which of its efforts have had the greatest impact on NIV processing efficiency. Second, consular officers in focus groups expressed concern about their ability to efficiently conduct adjudications given State's current IT systems. While State is currently enhancing its IT systems, it does not systematically collect information on end user (i.e., consular officer) satisfaction to help plan and guide its improvements, as leading practices would recommend. Without this information, it is unclear if these enhancements will address consular officers' concerns, such as having to enter the same data multiple times, and enable them to achieve increased NIV processing efficiency in the future.
What GAO Recommends
To improve State's ability to process NIVs, while maintaining a high level of security to protect our borders, GAO is recommending that State (1) evaluate the relative impact of efforts undertaken to improve NIV processing and (2) document a plan for obtaining input from end users (consular officers) to help improve their satisfaction and prioritize enhancements to IT systems. State concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-488 | gao_GAO-03-488_0 | Key Practices for Effective Performance Management
An effective performance management system can be a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve desired results. We found that public sector organizations in the United States and abroad have implemented a selected, generally consistent set of key practices as part of their performance management systems. Federal agencies can implement these practices to develop effective performance management systems that help create the line of sight between individual performance and organizational success and transform their cultures to be more results-oriented, customer- focused, and collaborative in nature. Align Individual Performance Expectations with Organizational Goals
An explicit alignment of daily activities with broader results is one of the defining features of effective performance management systems in high- performing organizations. Consequently, organizations that are flatter and focused on collaboration, interaction, and teamwork across organizational boundaries are increasingly critical to achieve results. Provide and Routinely Use Performance Information to Track Organizational Priorities
High-performing organizations provide objective performance information to individuals to show progress in achieving organizational results and other priorities, such as customer satisfaction and employee perspectives, and help individuals manage during the year, identify performance gaps, and pinpoint improvement opportunities. Require Follow-up Actions to Address Organizational Priorities
High-performing organizations require individuals to take follow-up actions based on the performance information available to them. By requiring and tracking such follow-up actions on performance gaps, these organizations underscore the importance of holding individuals accountable for making progress on their priorities. Competencies, which define the skills and supporting behaviors that individuals are expected to exhibit to carry out their work effectively, can provide a fuller picture of an individual’s performance. Link Pay to Individual and Organizational Performance
High-performing organizations seek to create pay, incentive, and reward systems that clearly link employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational results. At the same time, these organizations recognize that valid, reliable, and transparent performance management systems with adequate safeguards for employees are the precondition to such an approach. 4.) In doing so, performance management systems in high- performing organizations typically seek to achieve three key objectives: (1) they strive to provide candid and constructive feedback to help individuals maximize their contribution and potential in understanding and realizing the goals and objectives of the organization, (2) they seek to provide management with the objective and fact-based information it needs to reward top performers, and (3) they provide the necessary information and documentation to deal with poor performers. Involve Employees and Stakeholders to Gain Ownership of Performance Management Systems
High-performing organizations have found that actively involving employees and stakeholders, such as unions or other employee associations, when developing results-oriented performance management systems helps improve employees’ confidence and belief in the fairness of the system and increase their understanding and ownership of organizational goals and objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is in a period of profound transition and faces an array of challenges and opportunities to enhance performance, ensure accountability, and position the nation for the future. High-performing organizations have found that to successfully transform themselves, they must often fundamentally change their cultures so that they are more results-oriented, customer-focused, and collaborative in nature. To foster such cultures, these organizations recognize that an effective performance management system can be a strategic tool to drive internal change and achieve desired results. Based on previously issued reports on public sector organizations' approaches to reinforce individual accountability for results, GAO identified key practices that federal agencies can consider as they develop modern, effective, and credible performance management systems.
What GAO Found
Public sector organizations both in the United States and abroad have implemented a selected, generally consistent set of key practices for effective performance management that collectively create a clear linkage--"line of sight"--between individual performance and organizational success. These key practices include the following. (1) Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals: An explicit alignment helps individuals see the connection between their daily activities and organizational goals; (2) Connect performance expectations to cross-cutting goals: Placing an emphasis on collaboration, interaction, and teamwork across organizational boundaries helps strengthen accountability for results; (3) Provide and routinely use performance information to track: organizational priorities. Individuals use performance information to manage during the year, identify performance gaps, and pinpoint improvement opportunities; (4) Require follow-up actions to address organizational priorities: By requiring and tracking follow-up actions on performance gaps, organizations underscore the importance of holding individuals accountable for making progress on their priorities; (5) Use competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance: Competencies define the skills and supporting behaviors that individuals need to effectively contribute to organizational results; (6) Link pay to individual and organizational performance: Pay, incentive, and reward systems that link employee knowledge, skills, and contributions to organizational results are based on valid, reliable, and transparent performance management systems with adequate safeguards; (7) Make meaningful distinctions in performance: Effective performance management systems strive to provide candid and constructive feedback and the necessary objective information and documentation to reward top performers and deal with poor performers; (8) Involve employees and stakeholders to gain ownership of performance management systems: Early and direct involvement helps increase employees' and stakeholders' understanding and ownership of the system and belief in its fairness; and (9) Maintain continuity during transitions: Because cultural transformations take time, performance management systems reinforce accountability for change management and other organizational goals. |
gao_GAO-10-41 | gao_GAO-10-41_0 | Overall, where information sharing among federal, local, and tribal agencies along the borders occurred, local and tribal officials generally said they had discussed their information needs with federal agencies in the vicinity and had established information sharing partnerships with related mechanisms to share information with federal officials—consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing—while the agencies that reported not receiving information from federal agencies generally said they had not discussed their needs and had not established partnerships. Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information from Their Federal Partners Found It Useful in Enhancing Their Situational Awareness of Border Crimes and Potential Terrorist Threats
Officials from three-quarters (15 of 20) of the local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the border communities we contacted said they received information directly from the local office of at least one federal agency (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI), and 9 of the 20 reported receiving information from the local office of all three of these federal agencies. By more consistently and more fully identifying the information needs of local and tribal agencies in border communities, as called for in the National Strategy for Information Sharing, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide these local and tribal agencies with useful information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to fusion centers in border states to support the creation of such products, and is developing related plans, but cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers to deploying such personnel. Identifying and Sharing Promising Practices from Fusion Centers That Develop Border Intelligence Products and Soliciting Feedback on Their Usefulness Would Support Other Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Such Products
The creation of border intelligence products—such as those developed by the Arizona and New York fusion centers—represent potential approaches that other border state fusion centers could use to target products for local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities. While it is understandable that I&A would focus on its own activities, DHS could benefit from identifying promising practices related to fusion center border intelligence products because of the importance the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback on the utility and quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop. Suspicious Activity Indicators That Are Associated with Criminal Activity along the Borders Could Assist Local and Tribal Officials in Identifying Potential Terrorist Threats
According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, senior intelligence officials at fusion centers in two of the five border states we contacted, and other subject matter experts—including federal and state officials who were involved in developing suspicious activity indicators for local and tribal agencies in border communities—the suspicious activity indicators could be more useful if they also contained terrorism-related behaviors, activities, or situations that were more applicable to the border or border crimes and were periodically updated to reflect current threats. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; (2) federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop border intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and (3) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they should report this information. To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing, such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act). We also asked whether federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials’ information needs and had established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them—consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices described in GAO reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'--where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing--efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.
What GAO Found
Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the border communities GAO contacted said they received information directly from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI) that was useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Nine of the 20 agencies reported receiving information from all three federal agencies. Overall, where federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials' information needs and had established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them--consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices--the majority of the local and tribal officials reported receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal officials that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs and had not established partnerships with them also said they had not received useful information. By more fully identifying the information needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing information sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide local and tribal agencies with information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited were supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products or reports that contained information on border crimes and potential terrorist threats, as discussed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to other fusion centers in border states to, among other things, support the creation of such products, and is developing plans to do so, but cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers. The creation of border intelligence products--such as those developed by two of the fusion centers we visited--represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt. Identifying such practices is important because of the central role the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop. Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would support DHS and FBI efforts to improve the utility and quality of future products. Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined what suspicious activities or indicators rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported to federal agencies or fusion centers. Recognizing this problem, federal agencies are participating in national efforts to standardize suspicious activity reporting. Until such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious activity indicators and current reporting processes would help better position local and tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats. |
gao_GAO-06-969 | gao_GAO-06-969_0 | NRCS’s Process for Allocating EQIP Funds to the States Does Not Clearly Address the Program’s Purpose of Optimizing Environmental Benefits
NRCS’s process for providing EQIP funds to the states is not clearly linked to the program’s purpose of optimizing environmental benefits. In addition, the financial assistance formula relies on some questionable and outdated data. As a result, NRCS may not be directing EQIP funds to states with the most significant environmental concerns arising from agricultural production. NRCS Does Not Have A Specific, Documented Rationale for Formula Factors and Weights
Although the 31 factors and weights used in the general financial assistance formula give it an appearance of precision, NRCS does not have a clearly documented rationale for including each factor in the formula and assigning or modifying each weight. For example, the formula includes a factor addressing river and stream impairment but no factor for impaired lakes and other bodies of water. While the factors in the EQIP general financial assistance formula determine what resource and environmental characteristics are considered when allocating funds, the weights associated with these factors directly affect how much total funding is provided for each factor and, thus, the amount of money each state receives. In 2006, if the weight of any of the 31 factors had increased by 1 percent, $6.5 million would have been allocated on the basis of that factor at the expense of one or more other factors. Such a shift could impact the amount of financial assistance received by each state. For example, a 1 percent increase in the weight of the specialty cropland factor with a corresponding decrease of 1 percent in the American Indian tribal land factor could result in large changes to the distribution of EQIP general financial assistance. Not using recent data raises questions about whether the formula allocates funds to areas of the country that currently have the greatest environmental needs, because recent changes in a state’s agricultural or environmental status may not be reflected. As part of its 2005 strategic planning effort, NRCS developed outcome-based, long-term measures to assess changes to the environment resulting from the installation of EQIP conservation practices. According to NRCS, it has developed baselines for its long-term, outcome- based performance measures and plans to assess and report on them once computer models and other data collection methods that estimate environmental change are completed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To achieve EQIP’s purpose of optimizing environmental benefits, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Natural Resources Conservation Service to take the following two actions: ensure that the rationale for the factors and weights used in the general financial assistance formula are documented and linked to program priorities, and data sources used in the formula are accurate and current; and continue to analyze current and newly developed long-term performance measures for the EQIP program and use this information to make any further revisions to the financial assistance formula to ensure funds are directed to areas of highest priority. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the Ranking Democratic Member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, we reviewed the extent to which (1) the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) process for allocating Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) funds to states is consistent with the program’s purpose of optimizing environmental benefits and (2) USDA has developed measures to monitor program performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) assists agricultural producers who install conservation practices, such as planting vegetation along streams and installing waste storage facilities, to address impairments to water, air, and soil caused by agriculture or to conserve water. EQIP is a voluntary program managed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). NRCS allocates about $1 billion in financial and technical assistance funds to states annually. About $650 million of the funds are allocated through a general financial assistance formula. As requested, GAO reviewed whether USDA's process for allocating EQIP funds to states is consistent with the program's purposes and whether USDA has developed outcome-based measures to monitor program performance. To address these issues, GAO, in part, examined the factors and weights in the general financial assistance formula
What GAO Found
NRCS's process for providing EQIP funds to states is not clearly linked to the program's purpose of optimizing environmental benefits; as such, NRCS may not be directing funds to states with the most significant environmental concerns arising from agricultural production. To allocate most EQIP funds, NRCS uses a general financial assistance formula that consists of 31 factors, including such measures as acres of cropland, miles of impaired rivers and streams, and acres of specialty cropland. However, this formula has several weaknesses. In particular, while the 31 factors in the financial assistance formula and the weights associated with each factor give the formula an appearance of precision, NRCS does not have a specific, documented rationale for (1) why it included each factor in the formula, (2) how it assigns and adjusts the weight for each factor, and (3) how each factor contributes to accomplishing the program's purpose of optimizing environmental benefits. Factors and weights are important because a small adjustment can shift the amount of funding allocated to each state on the basis of that factor and, ultimately, the amount of money each state receives. For example, in 2006, a 1 percent increase in the weight of any factor would have resulted in $6.5 million more allocated on the basis of that factor and a reduction of 1 percent in money allocated for other factors. In addition to weaknesses in documenting the design of the formula, some data NRCS uses in the formula to make financial decisions are questionable or outdated. For example, the formula does not use the most recent data available for 6 of the 31 factors, including commercial fertilizers applied to cropland. As a result, any recent changes in a state's agricultural or environmental status are not reflected in the funding for these factors. During the course of GAO's review, NRCS announced plans to reassess its EQIP financial assistance formula. NRCS recently developed a set of long-term, outcome-based performance measures to assess changes to the environment resulting from EQIP practices. The agency is also in the process of developing computer models and other data collection methods that will allow it to assess these measures. Thus, over time, NRCS should ultimately have more complete information on which to gauge program performance and better direct EQIP funds to areas of the country that need the most improvement. |
gao_GAO-01-326 | gao_GAO-01-326_0 | U.S. Imports of Milk Protein Concentrates, Including Dry Ultra- filtered Milk, From 1990 Through 1999
Specific data on U.S. imports of ultra-filtered milk do not exist because these imports are included in the broader classification of milk protein concentrates. Products such as milk protein concentrates, which are believed to pose minimal safety risks, are frequently released automatically. However, federal and industry sources could not provide data on the amount of wet ultra-filtered milk produced domestically or on its use. USDA and state officials told us that 22 dairy manufacturing plants nationwide and 4 large dairy farms in New Mexico and Texas have the capacity to make wet ultra-filtered milk. The milk concentrated at on-farm ultra-filtration plants is transported mainly to cheese plants in the Midwest to make standardized cheese or other products. Ultra Filtration of Milk Is Part of the Cheese-making Process in Many Plants
Many U.S. cheese-making plants have adopted ultra filtration of milk as part of the cheese-making process under the provisions in FDA’s standards of identity regulations allowing for “alternate make” procedures for many of the standardized cheese and related cheese products. In addition, states conduct their own inspections of cheese plants for compliance with standards of identity requirements under state law. In fiscal year 2000, FDA had contracts with 37 states to cover food inspections. | What GAO Found
The ultra-filtration process for milk, developed in the 1970s, removes most of the fluid components, leaving a high concentration of milk protein that allows cheese and other manufacturers to produce their products more efficiently. No specific data on amount of ultra-filtered milk imports exists because these imports fall under the broader U.S. Customs Service classification of milk protein concentrate. Exporters of milk protein concentrates face minimal U.S. import restrictions, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) believes the milk protein concentrates pose minimal safety risks. Similarly, there is little data on the amount and use of domestically produced ultra-filtered milk in U.S. cheese making plants. According to the Department of Agriculture and state sources, a total of 22 dairy plants nationwide and five large dairy farms in New Mexico and Texas produce ultra-filtered milk. The plants primarily produce and use ultra-filtered milk in the process of making cheese. The five farms transport their product primarily to cheese-making plants in the Midwest, where most is used to make standardized cheeses. FDA relies on its own inspections, and those it contracts with 37 states, to enforce its standards of identity regulations. In addition to these federally funded inspections, some states conduct their own inspections of cheese plants for compliance with standards of identity requirements under state law. |
gao_GAO-10-274 | gao_GAO-10-274_0 | Background
According to the International Organization for Migration, the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara triggered sectarian violence, which increased the number of displaced Iraqis. Iraqi Refugees and SIV Holders Arrive under Three Different U.S. Programs and Face Challenges upon Arrival in the United States
Between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, the United States has admitted 34,470 Iraqi refugees under State’s Refugee Admissions Program. Since fiscal year 2007, State has issued 4,634 SIVs to Iraqis. Resettlement agencies, working under cooperative agreements with State, have resettled Iraqis throughout the United States, but particularly in California and Michigan. These agencies have found that Iraqis arrive in the United States with high levels of trauma, injury, and illness, which contribute to the challenges they face in resettling in a new country. In addition, entry-level jobs normally available to refugees are scarce and more competitive in the current economic downturn. DHS and State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs also have implemented two SIV programs, established by Congress, to further assist qualified Iraqis who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government and who want to immigrate to the United States. PRM, ORR, and the resettlement agencies reported that educated Iraqis are struggling to find entry-level employment in the United States, much less employment in their professional field of work. As of December 2009, Iraqi SIV Holders Are Eligible for Resettlement Assistance and Public Benefits to the Same Extent as Refugees
Iraqi refugees and SIV holders are eligible for PRM-funded basic needs support and services upon arrival in the United States. In addition, qualified Iraqi refugees and—as a result of December 2009 legislation— qualified Iraqi SIV holders can receive certain assistance generally for up to 7 years through public benefits programs. Prior to December 19, 2009, Iraqi SIV holders’ eligibility for public benefits generally ceased after 8 months. Both groups can receive up to 8 months of ORR-funded cash and medical assistance. According to PRM, its assistance typically lasts for 30 days; however, support may continue for up to 90 days if basic needs have not been met. Iraqi SIV holders do not automatically receive these benefits; they must sign up to receive them within 10 days of receiving their visas. In addition, ORR funds social services, for which Iraqi refugees and SIV holders may be eligible, for up to 5 years. ORR social services, which include job preparation, English language classes, and assistance with job interviews, do not have income requirements and are designed to find refugees employment within 1 year of enrollment. Specifically, most federal jobs in the United States require U.S. citizenship and background investigations, and Arabic language positions often require security clearances, which noncitizens cannot obtain. Finally, DOD and State have not implemented a program intended to employ SIV holders under authority granted in 2009 legislation. Citizenship and Background Investigations; Most Arabic Positions Also Require a Security Clearance
U.S. government hiring requirements limit the extent to which noncitizens—including Iraqi refugees and SIV holders—can be employed in federal government positions in the United States. DOD and State Have Not Used Their Statutory Authority to Employ Iraqi SIV Holders
In fiscal year 2009, the NDAA authorized DOD and State to jointly establish a temporary program to employ Iraqi SIV holders who have resettled in the United States as translators, interpreters, and cultural awareness instructors, but the agencies have not done so. State, DHS, and HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) provide information on the status of resettled Iraqis in the United States and the initial challenges they face, (2) review the benefits afforded to Iraqi refugees and special immigrant visa (SIV) holders, and (3) review the challenges faced by Iraqi refugees and SIV holders in obtaining employment with the federal government. To provide information on the number and location of resettled Iraqis and the initial challenges they face, we collected and analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Consular Affairs; the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara that triggered the displacement of thousands of Iraqis, the United States has taken a lead role in resettling the displaced. The administration has indicated its intent to assist those Iraqis who supported the United States in Iraq. In addition, Congress authorized the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) to jointly establish and operate a program to offer temporary employment to Iraqi special immigrant visa (SIV) holders in the United States. This report provides information on the (1) status of resettled Iraqis in the United States and the initial challenges they face, (2) benefits afforded Iraqi refugees and SIV holders, and (3) challenges they face obtaining employment with the federal government. GAO conducted this review under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO analyzed data on Iraqi refugees and SIV holders in the United States, and laws and regulations on the benefits afforded to them. GAO also analyzed U.S. government employment and personnel security requirements. GAO interviewed officials from five key agencies regarding these requirements. This report does not contain recommendations. DOD provided official comments. State and the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services (HHS) provided technical comments. GAO incorporated these comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, the United States admitted 34,470 Iraqi refugees under State's Refugee Admissions Program. In addition, State issued 4,634 SIVs to Iraqis pursuant to two programs, established by Congress to help Iraqis who previously worked for the U.S. government in Iraq. Resettlement agencies, working under cooperative agreements with State, have resettled Iraqis throughout the United States but particularly in California and Michigan. These agencies have found that Iraqis arrive in the United States with high levels of trauma, injury, and illness, which contribute to the challenges they face in resettling in a new country. In addition, entry-level jobs normally available to refugees are scarce and more competitive in the current economic downturn. Iraqi refugees generally have high levels of education, according to U.S. officials and representatives from the resettlement agencies. Nevertheless, Iraqis have struggled to find entry-level employment in the United States. Iraqi refugees and SIV holders are eligible for resettlement assistance and public benefits upon arrival in the United States. State provides resettlement agencies $1,800 per person to cover basic housing, food, and assistance for accessing services during their first 30 days in the United States; however, support may continue for up to 90 days if basic needs have not been met. Refugees automatically receive these benefits; Iraqi SIV holders must elect to receive them within 10 days of receiving their visas. In addition, qualified Iraqi refugees and, as a result of December 2009 legislation, qualified SIV holders can receive certain assistance for up to 7 years through public benefits programs. Prior to December 19, 2009, Iraqi SIV holders' eligibility for public benefits generally ceased after 8 months. Both groups can also receive up to 8 months of cash and medical assistance from HHS if they do not qualify for public benefits. In addition, HHS funds social services, including job preparation, English language classes, and assistance with job interviews, for which Iraqi refugees and SIV holders may be eligible for up to 5 years. Iraqi refugees and SIV holders, including those who acted as interpreters and linguists for civilian agencies and military commands in Iraq, have limited opportunities for federal employment. Most federal positions in the United States require U.S. citizenship and background investigations; certain positions, including most positions related to Arabic or Iraq, also require security clearances, which noncitizens cannot obtain. However, GAO did identify positions at DOD's Defense Language Institute and State's Foreign Service Institute open to qualified noncitizens. Finally, State and DOD have not established the temporary program intended to offer employment to Iraqi SIV holders under authority granted the agencies in fiscal year 2009 legislation. Although both agencies have positions requiring Arabic language skills, neither identified any unfilled needs that could be met by employing Iraqi SIV holders through this joint program. |
gao_GAO-06-261 | gao_GAO-06-261_0 | The QMU Methodology Is Highly Promising but Still in the Early Stages of Development
NNSA has endorsed the use of a new common methodology, known as the quantification of margins and uncertainties, or QMU, for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. To date, NNSA has commissioned two technical reviews of the implementation of QMU at the weapons laboratories. While strongly supporting QMU, the reviews found that the development and implementation of QMU was still in its early stages. The reviews recommended that NNSA take steps to further define the technical details supporting the implementation of QMU and integrate the activities of the three weapons laboratories in implementing QMU. Starting in 2001, LLNL and LANL began developing what is intended to be a common methodology for assessing and certifying the performance and safety of nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. The process envisaged in the white paper focuses on creating a “watch list” of factors that, in the judgment of nuclear weapons experts, are the most critical to the operation and performance of a nuclear weapon. Specifically, the QMU methodology seeks to quantify (1) how close each critical factor is to the point at which it would fail to perform as designed (i.e., the performance margin or the margin to failure) and (2) the uncertainty in calculating the margin. In a broad range of key planning and management documents that have followed the issuance of the white paper, NNSA and the weapons laboratories have endorsed the use of the QMU methodology as the principal tool for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. The Development and Implementation of QMU Is at an Early Stage and Important Differences Exist Among the Weapons Laboratories in their Application of QMU
According to NNSA and laboratory officials, the weapons laboratories have made progress in applying the principles of QMU to the certification of life extension programs and to the annual stockpile assessment process. For example, LLNL and LANL officials told us that, at a detailed level, the two laboratories are pursuing different approaches to calculating and combining uncertainties. According to NNSA policies, campaign managers at NNSA headquarters are responsible for developing campaign plans and high-level milestones, overseeing the execution of these plans, and providing input to the evaluation of the performance of the weapons laboratories. However, NNSA’s management of these processes is deficient in four key areas. Second, NNSA has not developed a clear, consistent set of milestones to guide the development and implementation of QMU. Third, NNSA has not established formal requirements for conducting annual, technical reviews of the implementation of QMU or for certifying the completion of QMU-related milestones. Finally, NNSA has not established adequate performance measures to determine the progress of the laboratories in developing and implementing QMU. To ensure that NNSA can more effectively manage the development and implementation of QMU, we recommend that the Administrator of NNSA take the following three actions: Develop an integrated plan for implementing QMU that contains (1) clear, consistent, and realistic milestones for the development and implementation of QMU across the weapons complex and (2) formal requirements for certifying the completion of these milestones. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1992, the United States began a unilateral moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. To compensate for the lack of testing, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed the Stockpile Stewardship Program to assess and certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. In 2001, NNSA's weapons laboratories began developing what is intended to be a common framework for a new methodology for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the new methodology NNSA is developing and (2) NNSA's management of the implementation of this new methodology.
What GAO Found
NNSA has endorsed the use of the "quantification of margins and uncertainties" (QMU) methodology as its principal method for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Starting in 2001, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) officials began developing QMU, which focuses on creating a common "watch list" of factors that are the most critical to the operation and performance of a nuclear weapon. QMU seeks to quantify (1) how close each critical factor is to the point at which it would fail to perform as designed (i.e., the margin to failure) and (2) the uncertainty that exists in calculating the margin, in order to ensure that the margin is sufficiently larger than the uncertainty. According to NNSA and laboratory officials, they intend to use their calculations of margins and uncertainties to more effectively target their resources, as well as to certify any redesigned weapons envisioned by the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. According to NNSA and weapons laboratory officials, they have made progress in applying the principles of QMU to the assessment and certification of nuclear warheads in the stockpile. NNSA has commissioned two technical reviews of the implementation of QMU. While strongly supporting QMU, the reviews found that the development and implementation of QMU was still in its early stages and recommended that NNSA further define the technical details supporting the implementation of QMU and integrate the activities of the three weapons laboratories in implementing QMU. GAO also found important differences in the understanding and application of QMU among the weapons laboratories. For example, while LLNL and LANL both agree on the fundamental tenets of QMU at a high level, they are pursuing different approaches to calculating and combining uncertainties. NNSA uses a planning structure that it calls "campaigns" to organize and fund its scientific research. According to NNSA policies, campaign managers at NNSA headquarters are responsible for developing plans and high-level milestones, overseeing the execution of these plans, and providing input to the evaluation of the performance of the weapons laboratories. However, NNSA's management of these processes is deficient in four key areas. First, NNSA's existing plans do not adequately integrate the scientific research currently conducted across the weapon complex to support the development and implementation of QMU. Second, NNSA has not developed a clear, consistent set of milestones to guide the development and implementation of QMU. Third, NNSA has not established formal requirements for conducting annual, technical reviews of the implementation of QMU at the three laboratories or for certifying the completion of QMU-related milestones. Finally, NNSA has not established adequate performance measures to determine the progress of the three laboratories in developing and implementing QMU. |
gao_T-GGD-96-192 | gao_T-GGD-96-192_0 | Statement
Smithsonian Institution: Care of National Air and Space Museum Aircraft
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the report that we issued last October to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison on matters relating to aircraft restoration at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum (NASM). In fiscal year 1994, NASM received about $15.4 million in federal appropriations, grants, and contracts. Few Resources Devoted to Restoration
We found that NASM devoted relatively few resources to aircraft restoration. NASM had consistently requested increased funding for collections management and for storage facilities repairs in recent years, but it had to compete with other Smithsonian museums for limited resources and was unable to obtain needed funding. However, it was uncertain when or whether the extension will be built, given the museum’s need to raise at least $100 million in private funds for its construction. Further, the Director indicated that as NASM prepares to move to the Dulles extension in about 5 years, it will assess each artifact to ensure that it rightfully belongs in the collection and plays a meaningful role in exhibits and for research, or whether it could be deaccessioned or traded; has not yet established collecting priorities that are linked directly to its mission statement and prioritized the aircraft in its collections based on their historical and technological significance; is preparing a list of artifacts that will be relocated to the Dulles extension for public display and plans to assess the condition of, and develop an action plan and treatment schedule for, each aircraft on the list. For those aircraft that cannot be displayed immediately, a preservation and storage strategy will be developed; and will launch a major capital campaign this fall for the Dulles extension after Congress has authorized construction of the facility. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its 1995 report on the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum's (NASM) aircraft restoration and preservation efforts, focusing on: (1) the adequacy of aircraft storage facilities; (2) recommendations for improving the care of museum aircraft; and (3) the Smithsonian's response those recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NASM devoted relatively few resources to aircraft restoration in fiscal year 1994; (2) inadequate storage facilities contributed to the deterioration of previously restored aircraft; (3) NASM must compete with other Smithsonian museums for limited funding; (4) NASM ability to raise $100 million in private funds for the construction of a storage facility is in doubt; (5) NASM has drafted a new mission statement that will focus the museum on its original goal, but it has not established collecting priorities that are linked to that mission statement; and (6) NASM will launch a major capital campaign to raise funds for the Dulles extension facility. |
gao_AIMD-98-114 | gao_AIMD-98-114_0 | This statement is based on (1) our review of the administration’s fiscal year 1999 budget request for IRS and supporting documentation, including IRS’ February 2, 1998, budget estimates, which provide details behind the administration’s request; (2) interim results of our review of the 1998 tax return filing season; (3) our past work on IRS information systems and performance measures; and (4) our ongoing reviews of the Taxpayer Advocate’s Office, IRS’ efforts to reduce noncompliance associated with the Earned Income Credit (EIC), and IRS’ efforts to make its information systems Year 2000 compliant. Our statement makes the following points: • The most critical issue facing IRS this year and next is the need to make its computer systems century-date compliant. • As shown in appendix I, the administration’s fiscal year 1999 budget request for IRS totals $8.339 billion and 102,013 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff years, which are increases of $534 million (6.8 percent) and 1,462 FTEs (1.5 percent) over IRS’ proposed operating level for fiscal year 1998.Included in the fiscal year 1999 request is $323 million for the information technology investments account. Because $246.5 million of that request has not been justified on the basis of analytical data or derived using a verifiable estimating method, we believe that Congress should consider reducing the administration’s request by that amount. • Also included in the fiscal year 1999 budget request is $103 million and 1,024 FTEs to enhance customer service. • Data on the first 2 1/2 months of the 1998 filing season indicate that IRS is continuing to make progress in two important areas—the use of electronic filing and the ability of taxpayers to reach IRS by telephone. Although it is too soon to assess the results of this initiative, we do have some observations on two aspects of the initiative—special assistance being provided to EIC claimants and IRS efforts to develop a baseline measure of EIC compliance. IRS’ goal is to implement all Year 2000 efforts by January 1999. IRS’ latest estimates indicate that additional funds will be needed for fiscal year 1998. IRS officials are also refining their estimates for fiscal year 1999 in light of more current information. Smaller amounts are to be used to, among other things, strengthen the Taxpayer Advocate’s Office; create citizen advocacy panels; make it easier for taxpayers to get answers in person; and improve the clarity of notices, forms, and publications. Various Factors Diminish the Value of IRS’ Budget Estimates for Oversight Purposes
Each year, IRS submits detailed budget estimates to support the administration’s budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the administration's fiscal year (FY) 1999 budget request for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the status of the 1998 tax return filing season.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the administration is requesting about $8.3 billion and 102,000 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff years for IRS in FY 1999; (2) this is an increase of about $500 million and 1,500 FTEs over IRS' proposed operating level for FY 1998; (3) the most critical issue IRS faces this year and next is the need to make its computer systems century date compliant; (4) the goal is to implement all year 2000 efforts by January 1999 to allow time for testing; (5) IRS' latest estimates indicate that additional funds will be needed for FY 1998 beyond the amount already available; (6) IRS is also refining its budget estimates for FY 1999 in light of more current information; (7) for FY 1999, the administration is requesting $323 million for IRS' Information Technology Investments Account; (8) when combined with the $325 million appropriated for this account last year, the request would increase the account's total to $648 million; (9) because $246.5 million of the request has not been justified on the basis of analytical data or derived using a verifiable estimating method, GAO believes that Congress should consider reducing the administration's request by that amount; (10) the administration's request also includes $103 million to enhance customer service; (11) IRS plans, among other things, to provide better telephone service, improve customer service training, strengthen the Taxpayer Advocate's Office, make it easier to get answers in person, and improve the clarity of forms and notices--all areas that are critical to good customer service and that need improvement; (12) each year, IRS submits detailed budget estimates to support the administration's budget request; (13) in GAO's opinion, several factors limit the utility of those budget estimates for oversight purposes; (14) interim data on the 1998 filing season indicate that IRS is continuing to make progress in two important areas--the use of electronic filing and the ability of taxpayers to reach IRS by telephone; and (15) although it is too soon to assess the results of IRS' new initiative to reduce Earned Income Credit noncompliance, GAO does have some observations on two aspects of that initiative. |
gao_AIMD-95-65 | gao_AIMD-95-65_0 | The following questions and answers provide information on the average time taken to complete the various steps in the IT acquisition process, as well as on other related factors. The average time to award IT contracts increases as the size of the contract increases. Hardware, software, maintenance, and support services are the major types of IT resources being acquired. How Do Bid Protests Affect Contract Time? Protested contracts took longer to award than nonprotested contracts in every dollar strata. In addition to the time taken to resolve the protests, other factors, such as competition type and evaluation method, can also increase the contract award time. As shown in figures 3 and 7, full and open contracts take longer to award than sole source contracts and best value contracts take longer to award than lowest cost contracts. Furthermore, large dollar contracts are much more likely to be protested. Of the four major IT resources—hardware, software, maintenance, and support services—why does it take so much longer to acquire software in the $2.5 million to $25 million strata and hardware in the $25 million or more strata? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal information technology (IT) acquisitions to determine how various factors affect the IT acquisition process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the average time taken to complete an IT acquisition varies according to the procurement type, dollar value, and whether a bid protest is filed; (2) hardware, software, maintenance, and support services are the major types of IT resources being acquired; (3) contracts under $250,000 take an average of 158 days to award, while contracts $25 million or more take 669 days to award; (4) most procurements are awarded either as sole source or full and open competition contracts; (5) the average time taken to award IT contracts increases as the contract value increases; (6) protested contracts take longer to award than nonprotested contracts in every dollar strata; (7) large dollar contracts are much more likely to be protested; and (8) other factors such as competition type and evaluation methods also increase contract award time. |
gao_GAO-09-812T | gao_GAO-09-812T_0 | This is the opposite of what happens in forward mortgages, which are characterized as “falling debt, rising equity” loans. A number of federal and state agencies have roles in overseeing the reverse mortgage market. These agencies include HUD, which administers the HECM program and oversees entities that provide mandatory counseling to prospective HECM borrowers. Although Various Agencies Have Some Responsibility for Assessing HECM Marketing, Some Advertisements Contain Potentially Misleading Claims
Various state and federal agencies have some responsibility for assessing marketing for reverse mortgage products, including FTC, federal and state banking regulators, and HUD. While the extent of misleading HECM marketing is unknown, our limited review of marketing materials found some examples of claims that were potentially misleading because they were inaccurate, incomplete, or employed questionable sales tactics. This claim was made by HUD itself in its instructions to approved HECM lenders; however, in December 2008, HUD issued guidance to HECM lenders explaining the inaccuracy of this claim. Furthermore, consumers who have not been cautioned about such claims could pursue HECMs with misunderstandings about the product. Development of HECM-Specific, Cross-Selling Regulations Is in Preliminary Stage, and States Have Uncovered Some Evidence of Inappropriate Cross- Selling
Concerns exist that reverse mortgage borrowers could be vulnerable to inappropriate cross-selling, a practice involving the sale of financial or insurance products that are unsuitable for the borrower’s financial situation using the borrower’s reverse mortgage funds. Because cross-selling typically involves the sale of insurance products generally regulated at the state level, the role of federal agencies in addressing the issue of cross-selling in conjunction with HECMs has been limited and largely has been focused on consumer education and disclosures. The provisions are intended to curb the sale of unsuitable financial products to consumers using HECM funds. A number of state insurance regulators have reported cases of inappropriate cross-selling involving violations of state laws governing the sale of insurance and annuities. Many states have passed suitability laws that are designed to protect consumers from being sold unsuitable insurance products, including annuities. HUD’s Internal Controls Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That Counseling Agencies Are Complying with HECM Counseling Requirements
HUD’s internal controls for HECM counseling do not provide reasonable assurance of compliance with HUD requirements. These controls include (1) counseling standards as set forth in regulations, mortgagee letters, and a counseling protocol; (2) a counselor training and examination program, and (3) a Certificate of HECM Counseling (counseling certificate) that, once signed by the counselor and the counselee, should provide HUD with assurance that counselors complied with counseling standards and that prospective borrowers were prepared to make informed decisions. Although none of the 15 counselors covered all of the required topics, all of them provided useful and generally accurate information about reverse mortgages and discussed key program features. For example, 6 of the counselors did not provide estimates of the maximum amount of funds that might be available to the counselee under the HECM payment plan options. However, 6 of the 15 counselors for our undercover sessions overstated the length of the counseling sessions on the counseling certificates. Because of the weaknesses in HUD’s internal controls, some prospective borrowers may not be receiving the information necessary to make informed decisions about obtaining a HECM. | Why GAO Did This Study
Reverse mortgages--a type of loan against the borrower's home that is available to seniors--are growing in popularity. These mortgages allow seniors to convert their home equity into flexible cash advances while living in their homes. However, concerns have emerged about the adequacy of consumer protections for this product. Most reverse mortgages are made under the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. HUD insures the mortgages, which are made by private lenders, and oversees the agencies that provide mandatory counseling to prospective HECM borrowers. GAO was asked to examine issues and federal activities related to (1) misleading HECM marketing, (2) the sale of potentially unsuitable products in conjunction with HECMs, and (3) the oversight of HECM counseling providers. This testimony is based on a GAO report being released today (GAO-09-606).
What GAO Found
While HECMs have the potential to play a key role in meeting the needs of seniors facing financial hardship or seeking to improve their quality of life, the product is relatively complex and costly and the population it serves is vulnerable. GAO's work identified areas of consumer protection that require further attention, including the area of HECM marketing. Various federal agencies have responsibility for protecting consumers from the misleading marketing of mortgages. Although these agencies have reported few HECM marketing complaints, GAO's limited review of selected marketing materials for reverse mortgages found some examples of claims that were potentially misleading because they were inaccurate, incomplete, or employed questionable sales tactics. Federal agency officials indicated that some of these claims raised concerns. For example, the claim of "lifetime income" is potentially misleading because there are a number of circumstances in which the borrower would no longer receive cash advances. Consumers who have not been cautioned about such claims could pursue HECMs with misunderstandings about the product. To date, federal agencies have had a limited role in addressing concerns about the sale of potentially unsuitable insurance and other financial products in conjunction with HECMs (known as "inappropriate cross-selling"). States generally regulate insurance products, and some of the states GAO contacted reported cases of inappropriate cross-selling involving violations of state laws governing the sale of insurance and annuities. HUD is responsible for implementing a provision in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that is intended to restrict inappropriate cross-selling, but the agency is in the preliminary stages of developing regulations. HUD's internal controls do not provide reasonable assurance that counseling providers are complying with HECM counseling requirements. GAO's undercover participation in 15 HECM counseling sessions found that while the counselors generally conveyed accurate and useful information, none of the counselors covered all of the topics required by HUD, and some overstated the length of the sessions in HUD records. For example, 7 of the 15 counselors did not discuss required information about alternatives to HECMs. HUD has several internal controls designed to ensure that counselors convey required information to prospective HECM borrowers, but has not tested the effectiveness of these controls and lacks procedures to ensure that records of counseling sessions are accurate. Because of these weaknesses, some prospective borrowers may not be receiving the information necessary to make informed decisions about obtaining a HECM. |
gao_GAO-13-318 | gao_GAO-13-318_0 | Some taxpayers with large offshore account balances are also required to report additional account information, such as the name and location of their bank, by filing a form TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). 1). As described later, the offshore programs offer a reduced risk of criminal prosecution, and lower penalties than taxpayers could receive if unreported offshore accounts were discovered in an audit. Other taxpayers have attempted to disclose their offshore accounts without paying all the delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties required by the programs. Taxpayers might also try to circumvent some of the taxes, interest, and penalties that would otherwise be owed in offshore programs by reporting the existence of any offshore accounts and any income from the accounts on their current year’s tax return, without amending prior years’ returns. Almost All 2009 OVDP Participants Received the Maximum Offshore Penalty, Almost Half Had Accounts in Switzerland, and About Half of the Revenue Collected Came from a Small Percentage of High Penalty Cases
Summary of All 2009 OVDP Closed Cases
Participants in IRS’s 2009 OVDP had offshore accounts that varied considerably in size. Of the 10,439 closed cases, most were assessed offshore penalties and 96 percent of those assessed penalties received the standard offshore penalty—20 percent of the highest aggregate value of the offshore accounts, which was also the maximum offshore penalty rate in the 2009 OVDP. The 20 percent penalty was generally levied when the total account value was greater than $75,000 and when taxpayers used the accounts (e.g., made deposits or withdrawals) during the period under review (2003 to 2008). 3). For large penalty cases, we estimate that more than 50 percent of taxpayers had one or more bank accounts with Swiss bank UBS. IRS Generally Has Used 2009 OVDP Data Strategically, But Has Not Used the Data to Identify Additional Opportunities to Educate Taxpayers on Offshore Filing Requirements
IRS Used 2009 OVDP Data to Identify Noncompliance Involving Additional Banks and Countries and to Improve Subsequent Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs
As previously discussed, one of the intended purposes of the 2009 OVDP was mining, or analyzing, data collected from OVDP applications and audits of participants and nonparticipants to identify entities and individuals who promoted or otherwise helped U.S. citizens hide assets and income offshore. In our case file review, we found examples of immigrants who stated in their 2009 OVDP applications that they were unaware of their FBAR filing requirements. IRS officials from the Offshore Compliance Initiative office agree that more could be done to improve taxpayer education and outreach about offshore reporting requirements. IRS May Not Be Identifying a Large Number of Quiet Disclosures or Other Attempts to Circumvent Some of the Taxes, Interest, and Penalties that would be Otherwise Owed by Not Participating in an Offshore Program
Taxpayer Use of Quiet Disclosures to Avoid Offshore Penalties Involves Significant Risk
Quiet disclosures matter because if IRS does not identify them, it undermines the incentive to participate in the offshore programs. When quiet disclosures remain undetected, they also result in lost revenue for the government. IRS also looked at amended returns with increased tax assessments over an established threshold during tax year 2003 to tax year 2010. Together, these four efforts led to the review of several thousand tax returns. Given the importance of IRS’s ability to detect quiet disclosures and evidence that they exist, we tested a different methodology to identify potential quiet disclosures, and found many more than IRS detected. IRS agreed with our methodology as reasonable and appropriate. From tax year 2007 to tax year 2010 (the most recent data available), IRS estimated that the number of taxpayers reporting offshore accounts on Form 1040, Schedule B nearly doubled to 516,000, as shown in figure 4. unreported offshore income. Through these programs, IRS has collected more than $5.5 billion to date, brought tens of thousands of taxpayers into compliance, and gained increased information on offshore noncompliance. IRS may also have missed other attempts at circumvention by not researching the upward trends of taxpayers reporting offshore accounts for the first time. Explore options for employing a methodology for identifying and pursuing potential quiet disclosures to provide more assurance that actual quiet disclosures are not being missed and then implement the best option. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the nature of the noncompliance of taxpayers participating in the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), (2) determine the extent to which Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used data from the 2009 OVDP in order to better prevent and detect future noncompliance, and (3) assess IRS’s efforts to identify taxpayers who may have attempted quiet disclosures or other ways of circumventing some of the taxes, interest, and penalties that would otherwise be owed in its offshore programs. We confirmed this methodology with IRS officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax evasion by individuals with unreported offshore financial accounts was estimated by one IRS commissioner to be several tens of billions of dollars, but no precise figure exists. IRS has operated four offshore programs since 2003 that offered incentives for taxpayers to disclose their offshore accounts and pay delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties. GAO was asked to review IRSs second offshore program, the 2009 OVDP. This report (1) describes the nature of the noncompliance of 2009 OVDP participants, (2) determines the extent IRS used the 2009 OVDP to prevent noncompliance, and (3) assesses IRSs efforts to detect taxpayers trying to circumvent taxes, interests, and penalties that would otherwise be owed. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed tax return data for all 2009 OVDP participants and exam files for a random sample of cases with penalties over $1 million; interviewed IRS Offshore officials; and developed and implemented a methodology to detect taxpayers circumventing monies owed.
What GAO Found
As of December 2012, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) four offshore programs have resulted in more than 39,000 disclosures by taxpayers and over $5.5 billion in revenues. The offshore programs attract taxpayers by offering a reduced risk of criminal prosecution and lower penalties than if the unreported income was discovered by one of IRS's other enforcement programs. For the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP), nearly all program participants received the standard offshore penalty--20 percent of the highest aggregate value of the accounts--meaning the account value was greater than $75,000 and taxpayers used the accounts (e.g., made deposits or withdrawals) during the period under review. The median account balance of the more than 10,000 cases closed so far from the 2009 OVDP was $570,000. Participant cases with offshore penalties greater than $1 million represented about 6 percent of all 2009 OVDP cases, but accounted for almost half of all offshore penalties. Taxpayers from these cases disclosed a variety of reasons for having offshore accounts, and more than half of them had accounts at Swiss bank UBS.
Using 2009 OVDP data, IRS identified bank names and account locations that helped it pursue additional noncompliance. Based on a review of cases, GAO found examples of immigrants who stated in their 2009 OVDP applications that they were unaware of their offshore reporting requirements. IRS officials from the Offshore Compliance Initiative office said they have not targeted outreach efforts to new immigrants. Using information from the 2009 OVDP, such as the characteristics of taxpayers who were not aware of their reporting requirements, to increase education and outreach to those populations could promote voluntary compliance.
IRS has detected some taxpayers with previously undisclosed offshore accounts attempting to circumvent paying the taxes, interest, and penalties that would otherwise be owed, but based on GAO reviews of IRS data, IRS may be missing attempts by other taxpayers attempting to do so. GAO analyzed amended returns filed for tax year 2003 through tax year 2008, matched them to other information available to IRS about taxpayers' possible offshore activities, and found many more potential quiet disclosures than IRS detected. Moreover, IRS has not researched whether sharp increases in taxpayers reporting offshore accounts for the first time is due to efforts to circumvent monies owed, thereby missing opportunities to help ensure compliance. From tax year 2007 through tax year 2010, IRS estimates that the number of taxpayers reporting foreign accounts nearly doubled to 516,000. Taxpayer attempts to circumvent taxes, interest, and penalties by not participating in an offshore program, but instead simply amending past returns or reporting on current returns previously unreported offshore accounts, result in lost revenues and undermine the programs' effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that IRS (1) use offshore data to identify and educate taxpayers who might not be aware of their reporting requirements; (2) explore options for employing a methodology to more effectively detect and pursue quiet disclosures and implement the best option; and (3) analyze first-time offshore account reporting trends to identify possible attempts to circumvent monies owed and take action to help ensure compliance. IRS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-400 | gao_GAO-04-400_0 | Fiscal year 2003 expenditures were $2.02 million. Thus, OOC is not alone among organizations in seeking to answer critical questions about its overall effectiveness. OOC’s effort to develop a results-oriented strategic plan is an important and positive development that is still very much a work in progress—as the Board and OOC’s senior leadership clearly appreciate. Perhaps most important is OOC’s recognition that its planning effort provides a vehicle for engaging and consulting with key congressional and other stakeholders on the fundamental purposes of OOC (strategic goals), how those purposes will be achieved (programs and strategies), how progress will be assessed (performance measures), and what progress is being made and improvement opportunities exist (accountability reporting). OOC also recognizes the need to make better use of IT when enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health Act-related provisions of the CAA. Ensuring an Effective Program Structure
Our work looking at leading organizations has often found that as organizations shift their orientation from outputs and activities to the results that those outputs and activities are intended to achieve, new, different, and more effective ways of doing business will emerge. Towards this end, OOC has taken a number of actions including establishing and administering a dispute resolution process for employees who allege violations of civil rights, labor, and employment laws covered by the CAA; conducting investigations and periodic inspections of legislative branch facilities to ensure compliance with safety, health, and disability access standards; adopting substantive regulations, many of which have been approved by the Congress, to apply covered laws to the legislative branch; educating both employees and employing offices about their rights and responsibilities under the law; and regularly reporting to the Congress on its activities in a variety of required reports and studies. Occupational safety and health. Recommended Next Steps
We recommend that OOC’s Executive Director and General Counsel: identify potential improvements to how the Office measures its activities and performance, including the possibility of using benchmark data from federal agencies with similar functions for purposes of comparison and analysis; provide a more complete picture of OOC’s workload by improving how it tracks and reports on single-issue large group requests for counseling and mediation; work with the Congress to develop a strategy to ensure that all facilities under OOC’s jurisdiction and located in the Capitol Hill complex and the surrounding Washington, D.C. area—including the Senate and House page dormitories, and LOC’s National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped—are covered as part of the biennial safety inspections required by the CAA; establish a clearinghouse for sharing best practice information on topics covered by the CAA; work with the Congress to determine the feasibility of using such mechanisms as feedback surveys and focus groups to provide valuable information on the actual level of awareness among target populations concerning OOC’s programs and activities; outreach to other groups and forums such as the Senate Administrative Managers-Chief Clerks Steering Committee; use data on the number and type of complaints received by OOC to better target education and information distribution efforts; and develop capacity to use safety and health data to facilitate risk-based decision making. OOC has recently undertaken a number of important initiatives to improve communications and coordination. Consistent with that commitment, we recommend that OOC take the following steps: Develop congressional protocols, in close consultation with congressional stakeholders, that would document agreements between the Congress and OOC on what congressional stakeholders can expect as the Office carries out its work. Develop agency protocols, in cooperation with legislative agencies, that would clarify and clearly communicate the procedures OOC will follow when interacting with agencies while carrying out its work. Creating and Sustaining an Enhanced Management Control Environment Essential for Effective Operations
The creation of an enhanced control environment forms the foundation for an organization’s ability to put in place the management controls necessary for effective and efficient operations. Since it was created in 1995, OOC has operated without having any formal performance management system for its Executive Director and General Counsel. Specifically, a number of congressional and legislative agency officials we interviewed had the perception that a previous General Counsel’s emphasis on a strict “gotcha” approach toward enforcement led to a combative and adversarial relationship with legislative agencies and other stakeholders that was at odds with the more collaborative approach supported by OOC’s Executive Director. However, the standards of effective management control and OOC’s own past experience demonstrate the need for the office to take appropriate steps to address the OOC’s organizational structure and presents a challenge to effective management control. On the other hand, there are areas where the system can be improved as OOC’s efforts in this area move forward. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To meet our objective of assessing key management controls in place at the Office of Compliance (OOC) and identify what improvements, if any, could be taken to strengthen OOC’s effectiveness and efficiency, we followed a multipronged approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 Conference Report mandated that GAO review the Office of Compliance (OOC), an independent legislative branch agency created by the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA). OOC, a 15-person office with about $2 million in expenditures during fiscal year 2003, administers and enforces various CAA provisions related to fair employment and occupational safety and health among certain legislative branch agencies. OOC's current Executive Director has been in place since April 2001 and its General Counsel joined the Office in June 2003. The mandate directed GAO to assess the OOC's overall effectiveness and efficiency and to make recommendations, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
OOC is in the early stages of a concerted and vitally needed effort to improve and strengthen management control across the Office and to carry out its mission more effectively and efficiently while safeguarding its institutional independence. OOC's success in completing this important effort depends upon making significant progress on a number of key management control areas: Sharpen focus on results. OOC's current strategic planning initiative is beginning to address the more fundamental question of the Office's effectiveness rather than the Office's traditional focus on activities and outputs, such as the number of cases processed and inspections conducted. OOC's planning initiative can also provide a vehicle for engaging and consulting with key congressional and other stakeholders on OOC's purposes, how those purposes will be achieved, how progress will be assessed, and for sustaining feedback on what progress is being made and what additional improvement opportunities exist. The planning initiative is still very much a work in progress and continued efforts are needed in a number of key areas including developing results oriented performance measures. Ensuring an effective program structure. As OOC shifts its focus from outputs and activities to results, it must put in place a more effective program structure that includes new ways of doing business. OOC has taken a number of actions to administer the CAA, such as managing a dispute resolution process and conducting investigations and inspections to ensure compliance with safety and health standards. However, OOC is not fully in compliance with the CAA's requirement concerning biennial safety and health inspections of legislative branch agency facilities. OOC also needs to expand on recent efforts to develop programs that are based on collaboration with legislative branch agencies. Building effective communication emphasizing outreach and coordination. OOC's congressional and other stakeholders whom we interviewed said that OOC recently has used a more collaborative approach rather than the "gotcha" approach of the past. On the other hand, several agency officials said that current interactions with OOC could be improved. To facilitate more effective communications, OOC should establish congressional and agency protocols to document agreements between the Congress, legislative branch agencies, and OOC on what can be expected as OOC carries out its work. Creating and sustaining an enhanced management control environment. Since its creation, OOC has operated without having any formal performance management system for its Executive Director and General Counsel. OOC should establish an enhanced management control environment and strengthen accountability by requiring performance agreements between the Board and both the Executive Director and General Counsel, as well as expanding and improving on OOC's performance management system for all staff. Another important challenge concerns the lack of institutional continuity that may occur due to statutory term limits on OOC's leadership positions. To prevent the loss of critical organizational knowledge, the Congress should consider changing the term limits contained in the CAA. |
gao_OCE-98-2 | gao_OCE-98-2_0 | To estimate the cost to BLS of updating the expenditure weights for the CPI on a 5-year cycle, we asked BLS to provide us with certain actual and estimated cost data. More Frequent Updating Is Deemed Desirable by Individuals Knowledgeable of the CPI That We Contacted
We spoke with 10 individuals who were former officials of BLS or who had otherwise studied the CPI, and they were unanimous in stating that 10 years between updates of the expenditure weights was too long. However, there was less agreement among the individuals on exactly how often the updating should occur. According to information obtained from BLS and international publications, seven major industrial countries have consumer price indexes but, among them, only the United States updates its CPI as infrequently as once a decade. Professional Opinions on Updating
Two former BLS officials told us that updating the weights about every 5 years was about right. However, BLS officials noted that some of these countries base their updates on national data that are not comparable to the U.S. continuing CEX. According to BLS, the estimated cost to update the expenditure weights in 2003 would be $3.1 million over a 3-year budget period. The most important reason, they said, was a lack of empirical evidence to support more frequent updates and a void of theoretical guidance on how often to do them. BLS’ Reasons for Not Updating Expenditure Weights More Often
We spoke with the current BLS Commissioner and other current BLS officials about the timing of major revisions and about the obstacles to updating the weights. Although theoretical guidance is not available on all facets of updating expenditure weights, such as exactly when to update, economic literature suggests that an index is more accurate if the expenditure weights used to compute it represent, as much as practical, current consumer spending. III), there is sufficient reason to believe that the weight base had changed appreciably before major revisions to the CPI. BLS estimated that it would cost $3.1 million over 3 years to update the expenditure weights in 2003. If the growth in the CPI decreased by 0.1 percentage point per year, CBO estimates show that this would lead to a cumulative total of a $10.8 billion increase in the projected budget surplus over the 4 years after the update.However, regardless of the effect on the budget, the point of doing an update outside of a major revision would be the increased value of having the CPI reflect, as closely as practical, the current spending patterns of consumers. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain views on updating the Consumer Price Index’s (CPI) expenditure weights more often than every 10 years, which addressed our first objective, we asked two former Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) officials and eight individuals who have studied the CPI for their views on how often the CPI should be updated. To address our third objective—estimate the dollar effect on the federal budget if the CPI weights were updated on a 5-year cycle—we obtained assistance from BLS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Major revisions were made to the CPI about every 10 years to update the fixed market basket; the next major revision is scheduled to be released in January 1998. In addition, BLS estimated that, for the upcoming 1998 revision, measured inflation will likely be reduced by 0.1 or 0.2 percentage point. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Consumer Price Index (CPI) market basket expenditure weights, focusing on: (1) the views of individuals who were knowledgeable of the CPI on updating the weights between major revisions to the CPI and the practices followed by other industrialized countries in updating their consumer price indexes; (2) the additional cost to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to update the weights on a 5-year cycle; (3) the dollar effect on the federal budget if the weights were updated on a 5-year cycle; and (4) BLS' reasons as to why updates of the weights have only occurred during major revisions to the CPI, which have been about every 10 years.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the weight of professional opinion supported updating the market basket's expenditure weights more frequently than major revisions to the CPI have been made; (2) GAO spoke with 10 individuals who were knowledgeable about the CPI, and they were unanimous in believing that 10 years between updates was too long to reflect "current" consumer spending; (3) there was less agreement among the 10 individuals, however, on exactly how often updates should occur; (4) other major industrial countries update their consumer price indexes more often than the United States, according to information provided by BLS and contained in international publications; (5) however, BLS officials noted that some of these countries based their updates on national data that are not comparable to data used by the United States; (6) the cost of updating the expenditure weights is significantly less than the cost of a major revision; (7) BLS estimated that the cost to update the weights in 2003 would be about $3.1 million; (8) in comparison, BLS estimates that it will spend about $66 million on the upcoming 1998 revision; (9) because federal tax brackets and federal payments are adjusted for inflation, a CPI that more accurately measures inflation could affect the federal budget; (10) the Congressional Budget Office estimated that, assuming no other changes in policy or economic assumptions, if updating the weights in 2003 (5 years after the planned 1998 revision) reduced the CPI growth by 0.1 percentage point annually, the projected budget surplus would be increased by a cumulative total of $10.8 billion over the 4-year period of 2004 through 2007; (11) BLS cited several reasons for not updating the expenditure weights between major CPI revisions; (12) the foremost reasons, according to BLS, were a lack of empirical evidence to support more frequent updates and a void of theoretical guidance on how often to do them; (13) although theoretical guidance is not available on all facets of updating expenditure weights, such as exactly how often updates should occur, the preponderance of the data GAO reviewed supports the need for updating expenditure weights more frequently than about every 10 years; and (14) BLS' concerns about updating the expenditure weights between major revisions were indicated in June 1997, when BLS officials said that BLS has the technical ability to update the expenditure weights, but it must work through the challenging issues that now surround the CPI program. |
gao_GAO-08-599 | gao_GAO-08-599_0 | Mail that uses certified paper. For example, USPS has undertaken five key mail-related recycling initiatives, including the establishment of annual goals to increase its recycling revenue from $7.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to $40 million in fiscal year 2010 and a pilot recycling program in New York City. Representatives of the mailing industry and other stakeholders also have undertaken a wide range of initiatives to, among other actions, increase the amount of mail that is recycled. For example, three mailing industry associations recently introduced separate recycling awareness campaigns to encourage mail recipients to recycle their catalogs, envelopes, and magazines. In addition, the Direct Marketing Association—whose members collectively send about 80 percent of all Standard Mail—is undertaking several initiatives, including an effort to encourage mailers to use environmentally preferable mail attributes. However, by excluding savings that result from lower waste disposal costs, the goals do not reflect the full financial benefit attributable to mail-related recycling. Furthermore, recycling these materials appears to be consistent with the Postmaster General’s recent commitments to minimize the agency’s impact on every aspect of the environment and to act as a positive environmental influence in U.S. communities. The Mailing Industry and Other Stakeholders Have Undertaken Several Key Initiatives to Increase the Amount of Mail with Environmentally Preferable Attributes
In addition to their efforts to increase mail-related recycling, the mailing industry and other stakeholders have undertaken a variety of key initiatives to increase the amount of mail with environmentally preferable attributes. Stakeholders Cited Five USPS Mail- Related Recycling Opportunities, but USPS Would Need to Assess Several Factors in Deciding Whether to Adopt Them
USPS, mailing industry, and other stakeholders we spoke to identified five opportunities that USPS could choose to undertake to increase its recycling of mail-related materials and to encourage mailers to increase the amount of mail with environmentally preferable attributes. The five opportunities cited most frequently were for USPS to (1) implement a program for recognizing mail-related recycling achievements; (2) increase awareness among mail recipients that mail is recyclable and encourage them to recycle their mail through, among other actions, collaboration with mailing industry and other stakeholder initiatives; (3) collaborate with parties interested in increasing the supply of paper fiber available for recycling; (4) establish a special, discounted postal rate—or Green Rate— as a means of inducing mailers to adopt one or more environmentally preferable attributes in their mailpieces; and (5) initiate a mail take-back program in locations that do not have access to municipal paper recycling. USPS Would Need to Assess Several Factors in Deciding Whether to Adopt the Opportunities
Each of the five stakeholder-identified opportunities appears to be consistent with (1) the agency’s long-standing commitment to environmental leadership and (2) the Postmaster General’s recently expressed commitment to minimize USPS’ impact on every aspect of the environment and to act as a positive environmental influence in U.S. communities. Depending on the magnitude of variance between the expected costs and revenues, USPS may find implementing one or more of the opportunities unacceptable. This is, in part, because as we recently testified, USPS faces multiple short- and long-term pressures in improving its operational efficiency, increasing its revenues, and controlling its costs—some of which are increasing faster than the overall inflation rate. For example, (1) Where will USPS store its mail-related materials for recycling? Such factors include costs to USPS; feasibility, such as logistical considerations; and compatibility with USPS’ mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) discarded about 317,000 tons of undeliverable-as-addressed advertising mail. Such mail can be disposed of using incineration, landfills or through other methods. USPS recently committed to minimizing the agency's impact on every aspect of the environment. Recycling undeliverable advertising mail can help USPS achieve this commitment, while generating revenue and reducing its costs and financial pressures. In response to the 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, this report addresses (1) recent mail-related recycling accomplishments (initiatives) undertaken by USPS, the mailing industry, and others and (2) additional recycling opportunities that USPS could choose to engage in, or influence mailers to undertake. To conduct this study, GAO analyzed relevant data and documents, visited USPS and other facilities, and interviewed about 40 stakeholders.
What GAO Found
USPS and the mailing industry have undertaken numerous initiatives to increase (1) the recycling of mail-related materials and (2) the amount of mail with environmentally preferable attributes, such as mail that uses recycled paper. USPS has five key recycling-related initiatives underway. For example, USPS recently established annual goals to increase its revenue from mail-related recycling from $7.5 million to $40 million from fiscal years 2007 to 2010. However, by excluding savings that result from lower waste disposal costs--which accompany increased recycling--the goals do not reflect the full financial benefit attributable to mail-related recycling. USPS also has launched a pilot recycling program in New York City, but it is not known whether USPS will require its managers elsewhere to adopt applicable "lessons learned" from the pilot. Representatives of the mailing industry and other stakeholders also have undertaken a wide range of initiatives to, among other actions, increase the amount of mail that is recycled. For example, three mailing industry associations recently introduced separate awareness campaigns to encourage mail recipients to recycle their catalogs, envelopes, and magazines. In addition, the Direct Marketing Association--whose members collectively send about 80 percent of all Standard Mail--is undertaking several initiatives, including an effort to encourage mailers to use environmentally preferable mail attributes. USPS, mailing industry, and other stakeholders GAO interviewed identified five opportunities that USPS could choose to undertake to increase its recycling of mail-related materials and to encourage mailers to increase the amount of mail with environmentally preferable attributes. The five opportunities stakeholders cited most frequently were for USPS to: (1) implement a program for recognizing mail-related recycling achievements; (2) increase awareness among mail recipients that mail is recyclable and encourage them to recycle their mail; (3) collaborate with parties interested in increasing the supply of paper fiber available for recycling; (4) establish a special, discounted postal rate--or "Green Rate"--as a means of inducing mailers to adopt environmentally preferable attributes; and, (5) initiate a "mail take-back" program in locations that do not have access to municipal paper recycling. Each of these opportunities appears to be consistent with the agency's long-standing commitment to environmental leadership and the Postmaster General's recent commitments to minimize the agency's impact on every aspect of the environment and to act as a positive environmental influence in U.S. communities. Based on GAO's analysis, however, USPS would need to assess several factors including cost, feasibility (including logistical considerations), and mission compatibility in deciding whether to adopt these opportunities. For example, depending on the magnitude of variance between the expected costs and revenues, USPS may find implementing one or more of the opportunities unacceptable. This is, in part, because USPS faces multiple short- and long-term pressures in improving its operational efficiency, increasing its revenues, and controlling its costs--some of which are increasing faster than the overall inflation rate. |
gao_GAO-03-1062 | gao_GAO-03-1062_0 | Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the fiscal year 2002 financial statement audit reports for the 24 CFO Act agencies to identify the (1) auditors’ assessments of agency financial systems’ compliance, (2) problems that affect FFMIA compliance, and (3) agency management’s FFMIA assessments. While agencies are making progress in producing auditable financial statements and addressing their financial management systems weaknesses, most agency systems are still not substantially compliant with FFMIA’s requirements. For fiscal year 2002, IGs and their contract auditors reported that the systems of 19 of the 24 CFO Act agencies did not substantially comply with at least one of FFMIA’s three requirements—federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, or the SGL. While more CFO Act agencies have obtained clean or unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements, there is little evidence of marked improvements in agencies’ capacities to create the full range of information needed to manage day-to-day operations. The CFO Act calls for agencies to develop and maintain an integrated accounting and financial management system that complies with federal systems requirements and provides for (1) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information that is responsive to the financial information needs of the agency and facilitates the systematic measurement of performance, (2) the development and reporting of cost management information, and (3) the integration of accounting, budgeting, and program information. In addition to recommending that OMB require agency auditors to provide a statement of positive assurance when reporting substantial compliance, we also previously recommended that OMB (1) explore further clarifications of the definition of “substantial compliance” to help ensure consistent application of the term, (2) reiterate that the indicators of compliance in its January 4, 2001, guidance are not meant to be all inclusive, (3) develop additional guidance, in accordance with the GAO/PCIE FAM, to specify procedures that auditors should perform when assessing FFMIA compliance, and (4) emphasize the importance of cost accounting to managers by requesting that auditors pay special attention to agencies’ ability to meet the requirements of SFFAS No. As we recently reported, as of September 30, 2002, 17 agencies advised us that they were planning to or were in the process of implementing a new core financial system. Nevertheless, it is imperative that agencies adopt leading practices to help ensure successful systems implementation. Successful implementation of financial management systems has been a continuous challenge for both federal agencies and private sector entities. Federal agencies, such as NASA and DOD, have experienced many of these challenges in attempting to implement new financial management systems. Our recent reports highlight this and other investment management and project weaknesses at DOD. The widespread systems problems facing the federal government need sustained management commitment at the highest levels of government. When providing negative assurance with FFMIA, auditors state that nothing came to their attention indicating that these agencies’ financial management systems did not substantially meet FFMIA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ability to produce the data needed to efficiently and effectively manage the day-to-day operations of the federal government and provide accountability to taxpayers has been a long-standing challenge to most federal agencies. To help address this challenge, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) federal accounting standards, and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger (SGL). FFMIA also requires GAO to report annually on the implementation of the act.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies are making progress to address financial management systems weaknesses. At the same time, for fiscal year 2002, 19 of the 24 CFO Act agency inspectors general or their contract auditors reported that these agencies' financial management systems did not comply with FFMIA. The nature and seriousness of the reported problems indicate that, generally, agency management does not yet have the full range of reliable information needed for accountability, performance reporting, and decision making. Audit reports highlight six recurring problems that have been consistently reported for those agencies whose auditors reported noncompliant systems. Following OMB's reporting guidance, auditors for 5 agencies provided negative assurance on agency systems' FFMIA compliance for fiscal year 2002. This means that nothing came to their attention indicating that these agencies' financial management systems did not meet FFMIA requirements. GAO does not believe that this type of reporting is sufficient for reporting under the act. FFMIA requires the auditor to state "whether" the agency systems are in substantial compliance, which in our view, requires the auditor to perform sufficient audit tests to be able to provide positive assurance. Agencies have recognized the seriousness of their financial systems weaknesses, and as of September 30, 2002, 17 of the 24 CFO Act agencies were planning to or were implementing a new core financial system. It is imperative that agencies adopt leading practices, such as top management commitment and business process reengineering, to ensure successful systems implementation. The JFMIP Principals, congressional oversight, and the President's Management Agenda are driving governmentwide initiatives to transform federal financial management. Modernization of agency financial systems and continued attention is needed to sustain momentum on these initiatives. |
gao_GAO-01-615 | gao_GAO-01-615_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to evaluate the design and test the effectiveness of information system general controls over the financial systems maintained and operated by the Department of Interior at its NBC-Denver data center. NBC-Denver has made progress in correcting the weaknesses identified by the OIG and has taken other steps to improve security. Specifically, NBC-Denver had not adequately limited the access granted to all authorized users, controlled all aspects of the system software environment, or completely secured access to its network. The risks created by these access control weaknesses were heightened because the center had not established a comprehensive program for routinely monitoring access activity to identify and investigate unusual or suspicious access patterns that could indicate unauthorized access. Computer Security Management Program Is Essential
A key reason for NBC-Denver’s weaknesses in information system controls was that it had not yet fully developed and implemented a comprehensive entitywide security management program to ensure that effective controls were established and maintained and that computer security received adequate attention. This report contains recommendations to you. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews information system general controls over the financial systems maintained by the Department of the Interior at its National Business Center (NBC) in Denver, Colorado.
What GAO Found
GAO found that although the Denver center has made progress in correcting previously cited computer security weaknesses, additional weaknesses affect the Denver center's information system control environment. These weaknesses affect the center's ability to prevent and detect unauthorized changes to financial information, control electronic access to sensitive personnel information, and restrict physical access to sensitive computing areas. The Denver center did not adequately limit access granted to authorized users, control all aspects of the system software controls, or secure access to its network. Also, the Denver center had not fully established a comprehensive program to routinely monitor access to its computer facilities and data and to identify and investigate unusual or suspicious access patterns that could indicate unauthorized access. The primary reason for these weaknesses was that the Denver center had not yet fully developed and implemented a comprehensive entitywide program to manage computer security. |
gao_GAO-11-632 | gao_GAO-11-632_0 | HHS Has Spent Almost 70 Percent of Available Supplemental Funds
From June 2009 through December 2010, HHS spent about $4.17 billion (about two-thirds) of the $6.15 billion that it had available from the 2009 supplemental appropriation, according to HHS’s report to the Congress on pandemic influenza preparedness spending. The majority of these funds were provided to the states through Public Health Emergency Response (PHER) grants. HHS spent the remaining $1 billion (24 percent) on other purposes. Federal Response to the H1N1 Pandemic Highlighted a Number of Key Issues
Several key issues were raised by the federal government’s response to the H1N1 pandemic. Not All Aspects of the Existing Strategy and Plan Were Relied on, but Earlier Funding and Planning Paid Off
Elements of National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan Were Not Relied on Because of the Nature of the H1N1 Pandemic
Given the specific characteristics of the H1N1 pandemic, the federal government did not rely on some aspects of the national pandemic strategy and national pandemic implementation plan, such as critical infrastructure protection and border and trade measures. Prior Federal Funding and Planning Built Capacity and Interagency Relationships, Which Facilitated the Federal Response
Federal funding and planning for pandemic preparedness prior to the onset of the H1N1 pandemic paid off by building capacity in several areas, including (1) vaccine production, (2) influenza diagnosis, and (3) antiviral drug development and stockpiling. Officials from HHS’s ASPR and CDC, DHS, and Education stated that these interagency meetings, working together on existing pandemic and nonpandemic programs, and exercises conducted prior to the H1N1 pandemic built relationships that were valuable for the H1N1 pandemic response. The credibility of all levels of government was diminished when the amount of vaccine available to the public in October 2009 did not meet expectations set by federal officials. While the use of a central vaccine distributor was generally cited as an effective practice by state and local health officials during the H1N1 pandemic, some state health officials noted challenges with the distribution process. Nevertheless, a DHS official commented that sharing lessons from the reports with stakeholders would foster a spirit of government transparency and might help build stakeholder trust. Furthermore, the NSS did not indicate how the after-action reports—and the associated lessons learned—will be used in future planning and preparedness efforts. Conclusions
The H1N1 pandemic was the first human influenza pandemic in more than four decades. Although the NSS has requested that federal agencies prepare after-action reports, NSS officials have not decided how they will work with HHS and DHS to incorporate these lessons into any future planning, as called for by the National Response Framework, or how they will share these lessons with key stakeholders. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Staff to take the following two actions: In order to help the federal government prepare for a future influenza pandemic, work with the Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security—as well as other federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions, as applicable—to update planning and exercising by incorporating lessons learned from federal agencies’ H1N1 after-action reports and the lessons we identified from the H1N1 pandemic. These lessons may include developing communication strategies for better managing public expectations about pandemic vaccine availability while working to reduce the length of time required to produce a pandemic vaccine; identifying state and local jurisdictions’ need for materials for non- English-speaking populations and examining ways to facilitate the timely and efficient translation of key communication materials; and updating SNS plans by identifying tools for tracking SNS supplies, ensuring that the supplies in the SNS meet the needs of states and local jurisdictions, and accommodating previously unanticipated scenarios, such as the need for possible long-term storage or recovery of unused supplies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic was the first human pandemic in over four decades, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that there were as many as 89 million U.S. cases. Over $6 billion was available for the response, led by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS), with coordination provided by the Homeland Security Council (HSC) through its National Security Staff (NSS). In particular, HHS's CDC worked with states and localities to communicate with the public and to distribute H1N1 vaccine and supplies. GAO was asked (1) how HHS used the funding, (2) the key issues raised by the federal response, and (3) the actions taken to identify and incorporate lessons learned. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from five states about their interaction with the federal government. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from HHS, DHS, the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), NSS, and others, such as associations.
What GAO Found
As of December 2010, HHS had spent about two-thirds of the $6.15 billion that it had available for the H1N1 pandemic response. HHS spent the majority of the funds on developing and purchasing H1N1 vaccine and providing grants to all the states and selected local jurisdictions. State and local health officials reported that the grant funding was critical to their response efforts but also noted challenges presented by the grants' administrative requirements. HHS's spending plans for the remaining $1.98 billion include longer-term pandemic preparation efforts, such as activities to reduce the length of time required to produce a vaccine. Several key issues were raised by the federal government's response to the H1N1 pandemic. (1) Prior pandemic planning efforts and federal funding paid off, although specific aspects of prior planning were not relied on because of the nature of the H1N1 pandemic. For example, interagency meetings and exercises built relationships that were valuable during the response. Prior funding built capacity in several areas, including vaccine production. (2) The credibility of all levels of government was diminished when the amount of vaccine available to the public in October 2009 did not meet expectations set by federal officials. However, state and local jurisdictions valued the flexibility that they had in deciding their distribution methods. Additionally, while the use of a central distributor for the vaccines was generally cited as an effective practice, the 100- dose minimum order was viewed to be problematic. (3) Public surveys generally found CDC's communication efforts to be successful in reaching a range of audiences; however, these messages fell short in meeting the needs of some non-English-speaking populations. (4) Deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile--a supply of medicines and medical supplies to be used for a national emergency--met the established goal. However, CDC and state officials identified gaps in planning, including disparities between the materials expected and those delivered, as well as the need for long-term storage plans for stockpile materials. The NSS asked federal agencies--including HHS and DHS--to complete after-action reports based on their involvement in the pandemic response. The NSS has not determined if these reports--and the associated lessons learned--will be shared with key stakeholders. Nevertheless, a DHS official commented that sharing lessons from the reports with key stakeholders would foster a spirit of government transparency and might help build stakeholder trust.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the HSC direct the NSS, in concert with HHS and DHS, to incorporate lessons from the H1N1 pandemic into future planning and share these lessons with key stakeholders. NSS agreed to take the recommendations under advisement. HHS, DHS, and OSHA provided comments and generally agreed with our findings. |
gao_NSIAD-98-55 | gao_NSIAD-98-55_0 | The KC-135 aircraft is the Air Force’s core refueler. Missions Can Be Fulfilled With Larger-Sized Reserve Component Units
Larger-sized reserve component units would still be able to perform peacetime missions. Creating fewer larger-sized flying squadrons should have little impact on wartime missions as well. Wartime requirements for C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are not typically defined by the number of squadrons or wings but by the number of aircraft. The manner in which the Air Force plans to use reserve component units in wartime also minimizes the impact of reducing the number of flying squadrons. Although squadrons are assigned to wings in peacetime, war plans described to us did not call for these wings to deploy or operate together. Reorganizing C-130 and KC-135 Squadrons at Fewer Locations Could Reduce Costs
Redistributing the reserve’s component C-130 and KC-135 existing aircraft into fewer, larger squadrons and wings would reduce operating costs. For example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from two 8-aircraft wings to one 16-aircraft wing would save about $11 million dollars annually, primarily from personnel savings. Options for Reorganizing Aircraft and Achieving Savings
We developed five options for redistributing the existing reserve component C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized squadrons that show a gradual increase in savings in operating costs—from $51 million to $209 million annually. Recommendation
The reserve components’ C-130 and KC-135 aircraft can be redistributed into larger-sized squadrons and still accomplish their peacetime and wartime missions. This option would save about $32 million annually. There was adequate capability to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements at most locations, and facilities could be expanded at low cost. Other organizations would be affected only slightly. In making this assessment, we (1) determined the effect of a reorganization of the C-130 and KC-135 aircraft on mission accomplishment, (2) determined whether costs could be reduced through a restructuring of the aircraft squadrons, and (3) developed five possible options for increasing the number of aircraft in C-130 and KC-135 squadrons and analyzed their effect on operations and costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO assessed the cost-effectiveness of organizing the Air Force's airlift and refueling force into fewer, larger-sized squadrons and wings, focusing on: (1) the effect that reorganization may have on mission accomplishment; (2) whether costs could be reduced through redistributing aircraft among fewer wings; and (3) five possible options for redistributing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft among fewer wings at lower operating costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force could reduce costs and meet peacetime and wartime commitments if it reorganized its C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized squadrons and wings at fewer locations; (2) these savings would primarily result from fewer people being needed to operate these aircraft; (3) for the reorganization options GAO developed, up to $209 million dollars could be saved annually; (4) creating larger-sized squadrons and wings would still allow the Air Force to accomplish its peacetime and wartime missions with the existing number of aircraft; (5) in peacetime deployments, reserve component C-130 and KC-135 personnel do not participate as part of entire squadrons or wings but rather as individual volunteers; (6) thus, creating larger-sized squadrons and wings should not compromise these missions; (7) for wartime deployments, requirements for C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are typically stated by the number of aircraft rather than by squadrons or wings; (8) moreover, war plans where existing flying squadrons are assigned can be changed to accomodate larger-sized squadrons; (9) specific reserve component wings are not usually assigned in existing war plans; (10) thus, the impact of reducing them would be minimal; (11) redistributing the reserve component's C-130 and KC-135 existing aircraft into fewer, larger-sized squadrons and wings would reduce operating costs; (12) for example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from two 8-aircraft wings to one 16-aircraft wing would save about $11 million annually, primarily from personnel savings; (13) GAO developed five options to illustrate the kind of savings that can be achieved by creating larger-sized squadrons; (14) these savings range from about $51 million to $209 million annually; and (15) sufficient personnel could be recruited and most locations' facilities could be inexpensively expanded to accomodate the unit sizes in GAO's options. |
gao_GGD-97-80 | gao_GGD-97-80_0 | It also shows the U.S. supervisor for each office. The Six Supervisory Products Are to Provide a Wide Range of Supervisory Information
The six supervisory products of the FBO Program are to provide information about the home countries of the FBOs, the FBOs themselves, and the FBOs’ operations in the United States. The six products are
Review of Home Country Financial System,
Review of Significant Home Country Accounting Policies and Practices,
Strength-of-Support Assessment,
Comprehensive Examination Plan, and
Summary of Condition and Combined Rating. We refer to the first two products, which focus on a country’s financial system and accounting policies and practices, as “the country reports.” The contents of the six supervisory products are summarized in table 3. The FBO Program is to provide for the coordination of examination schedules through the development of an annual comprehensive examination plan for each FBO with banking offices licensed by more than one supervisory agency and/or with significant U.S. nonbanking activities.Other U.S. supervisors of FBO offices in the United States are to provide responsible Federal Reserve Banks with a copy of their preliminary examination schedules. The overall assessment of an FBO’s combined U.S. operations is intended to provide the FBO and the U.S. supervisory agencies with a view of the overall condition of the FBO’s U.S. operations and help put into context the strengths and weaknesses of individual offices. Supervisors Identified Benefits of the Program
Although the FBO Program has not been fully implemented, FRS staff and other banking supervisors told us of a number of benefits of the program—most importantly, improved communication and cooperation among supervisors and bank management, both domestic and foreign, and improved access to information about FBOs and their home countries. These officials said such preparation has helped them supervise the U.S. operations of foreign banks. This program is designed to put all of the FBO Program products on-line. Conclusions
Banking supervisors have made progress in implementing the FBO Program. At the same time, supervisors have just begun to use the information in SOSA and country reports to improve supervision and enforcement, and some supervisors indicated some skepticism about how useful the information from SOSA and country reports will be in improving FBO oversight. The various Federal Reserve Banks are developing different formats and strategies for integrating the information into the supervisory process. In addition, we identified a number of weaknesses in SOSA and country reports that could limit the program’s effectiveness, including inconsistent, incomplete, or outdated information, as well as SOSA rankings that did not appear to be justified by information in the report. GAO Comments
1. 2. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the oversight of the U.S. operations of foreign banking organizations (FBO), focusing on the: (1) FBO program; and (2) banking supervisors' progress in implementing this program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the FBO Program focuses on integrating into supervisory procedures a common understanding of a given FBO in its entirety, including policies and practices in the FBO's home country as well as the overall condition of the FBO's combined U.S. operations; (2) the program calls for coordinated development and common use of five new products; (3) GAO refers to two of these as "the country reports"; (4) one country report is to provide information about the financial system and the supervisory and governmental policies in the FBO's home country, and the other is to provide information about significant accounting policies and practices in the home country; (5) a third product, the Strength-of-Support Assessment (SOSA), which is to be based on the country reports and other financial data, is to provide analysis and a ranking to reflect the U.S. supervisors' judgment about the FBO's ability to provide its U.S. operations necessary financial and managerial support; (6) a fourth product, the Summary of Condition and Combined Rating, is designed to provide FBO management and U.S. supervisors with an overall assessment of the FBO's U.S. operations; (7) the last new supervisory product, an annual comprehensive examination plan, is intended to better coordinate examinations of U.S. offices of FBOs with multiple U.S. banking operations and/or significant U.S. nonbanking operations; (8) in GAO's review of the FBO Program, GAO found that banking supervisors had made progress in implementing the program and had begun to realize benefits from it; (9) however, GAO also identified areas where improvements could be made; (10) supervisors identified some broad benefits of the program, particularly increased communication and cooperation among supervisors and improved access to information about FBOs and their home countries; (11) at the same time, comments of supervisory officials and staff indicated some skepticism about how useful the information from the SOSA reports will be in improving FBO supervision; (12) however, they also said that the various Federal Reserve Banks are developing different formats and strategies for integrating the information into the supervisory process; and (13) in addition, GAO identified a number of weaknesses in SOSA and country reports that could limit the program's effectiveness, including inconsistent, incomplete, or outdated information. |
gao_GAO-06-104 | gao_GAO-06-104_0 | For example, agencies serving populations of more than 150,000 persons contributed about 58 percent of all violent crimes reported to the UCR during this time period while receiving about half of all COPS funds. From 1994 through 2001, a total of about 10,300 agencies spent COPS funds. This contribution varied by year. For example, for 1997 we estimate that COPS funds contributed about 14,000 additional officers in that year—or about 2.4 percent of the total number of sworn officers nationwide—and for 2000, COPS funds contributed about 17,000 additional officers—or about 3 percent of the total number of sworn officers nationwide. For example, the 2.4 percent increase in sworn officers due to COPS expenditures in 1997 was responsible for about a 1.1 percent decline in the total index crime rate from 1993 to 1997, while the roughly 3 percent increase in officers due to COPS expenditures in 2000 was responsible for about 1.3 percent decline in the total index crime rate from 1993 to 2000. According to our review studies of the effectiveness of policing practices, problem-solving and place-oriented practices are among those that the crime literature indicates may be effective in reducing crime. In its written comments, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) drew upon information from both this report and our prior correspondence on the effects of COPS grants on crime. They said that we were careful and diligent in our research, and that our findings support conclusions reached by others and correspond with what local law enforcement leaders report. COPS and Other Local Law Enforcement Grants Distributed throughout the 1990s
According to our analysis of Office of Justice Programs data, from 1994 through 2001, the COPS Office distributed more than $7.6 billion in grants. Specifically, it covers (1) the amount of COPS obligations between 1994 and 2001, (2) the distribution of grant funds to larger and smaller agencies relative to total index and violent crimes, (3) the number of agencies in our sample that received COPS grants, (4) the amounts of COPS expenditures, and (5) the amount of these expenditures relative to total local law enforcement expenditures. COPS Expenditures Led to Increases in Sworn Officers above Levels That Would Have Been Expected without Them and Were Responsible for about 88,000 Officer- Years
We found that COPS hiring grants were significantly related to increases in sworn officers above levels that would have been expected without the expenditures, after controlling for economic conditions in the counties in which agencies were located, population composition, and preexisting trends in agencies in the growth rate of sworn officers. COPS Expenditures Led to Reductions in Crime through Increases in Officers
Estimating the impact of COPS expenditures on changes in crime rates through their effects on the number of sworn officers, we found that COPS expenditures were associated with declines in crime rates for total, violent, and property crimes, as compared with their baseline levels in 1993, the year prior to the distribution of COPS grants. For 1999 and 2000, COPS expenditures led to about a reduction of about 2.4 percent in violent crime, from the 1993 level. In addition, through the use of state-by- year fixed effects, we controlled for state-level factors that could affect crime rates, such as changes in sentencing policy or state incarceration. Factors other than COPS Expenditures Contributed Larger Amounts to the Reduction in Crimes, but COPS Contribution Was in Line with COPS Expenditures
The decline in crimes attributable to COPS expenditures accounted for at most about 10 percent of the total drop in crime from 1993 to 1998, and about 5 percent of the drop from 1993 to 2000. From 1994 through 2001, COPS expenditures amounted to slightly more than 1 percent of total local expenditures for police services nationwide. Although we observed larger average increases in reported policing practices among agencies that spent COPS grant funds than among agencies that did not spend COPS grant funds, when we controlled for underlying trends in the reported adoption of policing practices and agency characteristics, we found that changes in per capita COPS expenditures made between the period preceding wave 1 of the survey (1994 through 1996) and the period following wave 1 of the survey (1997 through 2000) were not associated with changes in reported overall policing practices between 1996 and 2000 (app. Appendix VI: Methods Used to Estimate the Effects of COPS Funds on Officers and Crime
In this appendix, we describe the methods we used to address our reporting objective regarding the impacts of the COPS funds on officers and crime: determining (1) the extent to which COPS grant expenditures contributed to increases in the number of sworn officers in police agencies in the 1990s and (2) the extent to which COPS expenditures contributed to declines in crime in the 1990s through their effects, if any, on officers. The Research Literature Shows That Some Policing Practices May be Effective in Reducing Crime
Our analysis of six systematic reviews of evaluations of the effectiveness of various policing practices in preventing crime indicates that the current evidence ranges from moderate to strong that problem-oriented policing practices and place-oriented practices are either effective or promising as strategies for addressing crime problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between 1994 and 2001, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) provided more than $7.6 billion in grants to state and local communities to hire police officers and promote community policing as an effective strategy to prevent crime. Studies of the impact of the grants on crime have been inconclusive. GAO was asked to evaluate the effect of the COPS program on the decline in crime during the 1990s. GAO developed and analyzed a database containing annual observations on crime, police officers, COPS funds, and other factors related to crime, covering years prior to and during the COPS program, or from 1990 through 2001. GAO analyzed survey data on policing practices that agencies reportedly implemented and reviewed studies of policing practices. GAO assessed: (1) how COPS obligations were distributed and how much was spent; (2) the extent to which COPS expenditures contributed to increases in the number of police officers and declines in crime nationwide; and (3) the extent to which COPS grants during the 1990s were associated with policing practices that crime literature indicates could be effective. In commenting on a draft of this report, the COPS Office said that our findings are important and support conclusions reached by others.
What GAO Found
About half of the COPS funds distributed from 1994 through 2001 went to law enforcement agencies in localities of fewer than 150,000 persons and the remainder to agencies in larger communities. This distribution roughly corresponded to the distribution of major property crimes but less so to the distribution of violent crimes. For example, agencies in larger communities received about 47 percent of COPS funds but accounted for 58 percent of the violent crimes nationwide. From 1994 through 2001, COPS expenditures constituted about 1 percent of total local expenditures for police services. For the years 1994 through 2001, expenditures of COPS grants by grant recipients resulted in varying amounts of additional officers above the levels that would have been expected without the expenditures. For example, during 2000, the peak year of COPS expenditures by grant recipients, they led to an increase of about 3 percent in the level of sworn officers--or about 17,000 officers. Adding up the number of additional officers in each year from 1994 through 2001, GAO estimated that COPS expenditures yielded about 88,000 additional officer-years. GAO obtained its results from fixed-effects regression models that controlled for pre-1994 trends in the growth rate of officers, other federal expenditures, and local- and state-level factors that could affect officer levels. From its analysis of the effects of increases in officers on declines in crime, GAO estimated that COPS funds contributed to declines in the crime rate that, while modest in size, varied over time and among categories of crime. For example, between 1993 and 2000, COPS funds contributed to a 1.3 percent decline in the overall crime rate and a 2.5 percent decline in the violent crime rate from the 1993 levels. The effects of COPS funds on crime held when GAO controlled for other crime-related factors--such as local economic conditions and state-level policy changes--in its regression models, and the effects were commensurate with COPS funds' contribution to local spending on police protection. Factors other than COPS funds accounted for the majority of the decline in crime during this period. For example, between 1993 and 2000, the overall crime rate declined by 26 percent, and the 1.3 percent decline due to COPS, amounted to about 5 percent of the overall decline. Similarly, COPS contributed about 7 percent of the 32 percent decline in violent crime from 1993 to 2000. From 1993 though 1997, agencies that received and spent COPS grants reported larger changes in policing practices and in the subsets of practices that focus on solving crime problems or focus on places where crime is concentrated than did agencies that did not receive the grants. The differences held after GAO controlled for underlying trends in the reported use of these policing practices. From 1996 to 2000, there was no overall increase in policing practices associated with COPS grants. In its review of studies on policing practices, GAO found that problem-solving and place-oriented practices can be effective in reducing crime. |
gao_GAO-17-317 | gao_GAO-17-317_0 | High-Risk Areas Making Progress
Since our last high-risk update, while progress has varied, many of the 32 high-risk areas on our 2015 list have shown solid progress. As shown in table 1, 23 high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from our High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. In two other areas, enough progress was made that we removed a segment of the high-risk area—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management. The other eight areas improved in at least one criterion rating by either moving from “not met” to “partially met” or from “partially met” to “met.”
One High-Risk Designation Removed
We removed the area of Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland from the High-Risk List because the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and key departments and agencies have made significant progress to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other information (collectively referred to in this section as terrorism-related information), is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private-sector partners. High-Risk Areas Highlighted for Significant Attention
In the 2 years since the last high-risk update, two areas—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources—have expanded in scope because of emerging challenges related to these overall high-risk areas. Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. The 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the $9.4 billion cost of the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). Monitoring. Demonstrated Progress. GAO-15-41. Modernizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory System and the Federal Role in Housing Finance
Why Area Is High Risk
Congress and financial regulators have made progress in meeting criteria for removing the issue area of reforming the U.S. financial regulatory system from our High-Risk List. In July 2009, we added USPS’s financial condition to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch to achieve broad-based restructuring. U.S. Restructuring of Offshore Oil and Gas Oversight
capabilities. GAO-17-3. Improving Federal Management of Programs that Serve Tribes and Their Members
Why Area Is High Risk
For nearly a decade, we, along with inspectors general, special commissions, and others, have reported that federal agencies have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and inefficiently fulfilled their responsibilities for managing the development of Indian energy resources. In particular, we have found numerous challenges facing the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)—both under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs)—and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS), in administering education and health care services, which put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk. The cost of the census, in terms of cost for counting each housing unit, has been escalating over the last several decennials. What Remains to Be Done
The Bureau plans to implement several new innovations in its design of the 2020 Census. GAO-14-59. Decennial Census: Additional Actions Could Improve the Census Bureau’s Ability to Control Costs for the 2020 Census. For fiscal year 2016, the federal government’s estimated environmental liability was $447 billion—up from $212 billion for fiscal year 1997. Since 1994, we have made at least 28 recommendations related to addressing the federal government’s environmental liability. Of these, 13 recommendations remain unimplemented. This recommendation has not been implemented. GAO-16-5. What GAO Found
Since 2015, DOD’s progress in improving its financial management processes and operations has been mixed. DOD has made partial progress toward demonstrating leadership commitment and developing capacity and action plans. February 26, 2015. As a result, we are expanding this high-risk area to include DOD’s polar-orbiting weather satellites. Department of Energy: Whistleblower Protections Need Strengthening. Further, there are several areas where CMS needs to take action to address issues and recommendations that have not been fully implemented, including: considering which additional databases that states and Medicaid managed care plans use to screen providers, which could be helpful in improving the effectiveness of these efforts, and determining whether any of these databases should be added to the list of databases identified by CMS for screening purposes; developing a plan to regularly assess the effectiveness of checks for duplicate coverage between Medicaid and federally facilitated exchanges, including thresholds for the level of duplicate coverage it deems acceptable; continuing its efforts to work with Social Security Administration to share its Death Master File with states and providing additional guidance to states to better identify beneficiaries who are deceased; and conducting systematic assessments of federal determinations of Medicaid eligibility in states that delegated this authority to the federal marketplace until it is part of the regular review processes that are expected to resume in 2018. All recommendations from this report have been closed as implemented. GAO-17-30. GAO-16-83. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities: about $3.9 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2016 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO's high-risk program identifies government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2015 and actions that are still needed to assure further progress, and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems potentially save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability.
GAO uses five criteria to assess progress in addressing high-risk areas: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's last high-risk update, many of the 32 high-risk areas on the 2015 list have shown solid progress. Twenty-three high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. Progress has been possible through the concerted efforts of Congress and leadership and staff in agencies. For example, Congress enacted over a dozen laws since GAO's last report in February 2015 to help address high-risk issues.
GAO removed 1 high-risk area on managing terrorism-related information, because significant progress had been made to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Sufficient progress was made to remove segments of 2 areas related to supply chain management at the Department of Defense (DOD) and gaps in geostationary weather satellite data.
Two high-risk areas expanded—DOD's polar-orbiting weather satellites and the Department of the Interior's restructuring of offshore oil and gas oversight. Several other areas need substantive attention including VA health care, DOD financial management, ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure, resolving the federal role in housing finance, and improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations.
GAO is adding 3 areas to the High-Risk List, bringing the total to 34:
Management of Federal Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members. GAO has reported that federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior's Bureaus of Indian Education and Indian Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service, have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and inefficiently developed Indian energy resources. Thirty-nine of 41 GAO recommendations on this issue remain unimplemented.
U.S. Government's Environmental Liabilities. In fiscal year 2016 this liability was estimated at $447 billion (up from $212 billion in 1997). The Department of Energy is responsible for 83 percent of these liabilities and DOD for 14 percent. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. Since 1994, GAO has made at least 28 recommendations related to this area; 13 are unimplemented.
The 2020 Decennial Census. The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several decennials; the 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, about 31 percent more than the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) plans to implement several innovations—including IT systems—for the 2020 Census. Successfully implementing these innovations, along with other challenges, risk the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective census. Since 2014, GAO has made 30 recommendations related to this area; however, only 6 have been fully implemented.
GAO's 2017 High-Risk List
What GAO Recommends
This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress. |
gao_GAO-10-395 | gao_GAO-10-395_0 | MS-13 and 18th Street gang members removed from the United States to Central American countries established gangs in those countries. The 93 U.S. The Interagency Antigang Strategy Clarifies Roles and Specifies Agency Activities, but Lacks an Approach for Oversight and Comprehensive Measures to Assess Implementation Efforts
Various federal departments and agencies under the auspices of the NSC developed an interagency strategy for combating gangs with connections to Central America that defines the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in carrying out the strategy, identifies the problems and risks associated with the gangs, defines its scope and purpose, and identifies specific activities to be taken to achieve results. However, it lacks other key characteristics, such as providing an approach or framework to include an entity for overseeing implementation, and goals and measures for assessing progress and performance in implementing the strategy. According to State and USAID officials as well as officials from the FBI and ICE, State and USAID have not consulted or worked with DOJ and DHS agencies such as FBI and ICE in developing these performance measures because State’s and USAID’s measures are intended to encompass only their own programs and efforts. To coordinate their implementation of antigang programs, agencies use a variety of mechanisms such as interagency committees and task forces. However, for the antigang unit in El Salvador, coordination among the FBI, ICE, and Salvadoran law enforcement in sharing investigative information on gangs could be enhanced by reaching agreement on ICE’s participation in the unit. Further, although agencies have taken steps to develop performance measures and obtain data on those measures to track the results of programs, agencies are just starting to collect performance data due to the early stage of implementation of most of these programs. Federal Agencies Have Developed a Variety of Programs to Implement the Interagency Strategy
To carry out the Strategy and combat transnational gangs with connections to Central American countries, federal agencies have developed and implemented a variety of programs in the United States and in host countries in the region, such as El Salvador and Guatemala. Federal Agencies Have Coordinated Their Antigang Programs through Various Mechanisms, but Could Strengthen Coordination by Examining the Establishment and Composition of a Salvadoran-Based Law Enforcement Unit
Federal agencies have taken action to coordinate their antigang programs and share information with each other through various interagency and coordinating groups. Appendix IV provides additional information on the roles and responsibilities of these and other headquarters-level coordinating entities as well as task forces that coordinate antigang efforts at the field level within the United States. The FBI agents then pass the requests to Salvadoran national police officials if the FBI agents do not have the information needed to fulfill ICE’s requests. By reaching agreement on ICE’s role, which the FBI and ICE have been considering since 2008, the two agencies would be in a better position to leverage their existing resources and information- sharing processes for gang investigations with a nexus to El Salvador. For example, USAID has established measures for its community policing program, such as the number of communities that have implemented community policing programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen oversight and accountability for implementation of the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy), we recommend that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in conjunction with DOJ, DHS, State, USAID, and DOD, revise the Strategy to include, or include in the CARSI if the Strategy is incorporated into that initiative an approach or framework for overseeing implementation of the Strategy and antigang efforts in Central America, and performance goals and measures to assess progress made in achieving intended results under the Strategy. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State (State); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); and the National Security Council (NSC). Appendix V: Scope and Methodology
To determine to what extent the U.S. federal government has developed a strategy to combat transnational gangs with connections to Central America, we examined the interagency strategy, called the Strategy to Combat the Threat of Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico (the Strategy), and compared the contents of the Strategy to select criteria in our prior work on desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, including (1) clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) discussion of problems, risks, and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and (4) delineation of roles and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Thousands of gang members in the United States belong to gangs such as MS-13 and 18th Street that are also active in Central American countries. Federal entities with responsibilities for addressing Central American gangs include the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State; and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO was asked to review federal efforts to combat transnational gangs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the federal government has developed a strategy to combat these gangs, and (2) how federal agencies have implemented the strategy and other programs to combat these gangs, coordinated their actions, and assessed their results. GAO examined federal agencies' antigang plans, resources, and measures; interviewed federal, state, and local officials in seven localities representing varying population sizes and geographic regions; and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials in El Salvador and Guatemala where U.S. agencies have implemented antigang programs. The results of these interviews are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The NSC, in conjunction with State, DOJ, DHS, and USAID, developed a strategy to combat gangs with connections to Central America; however, the strategy lacks an approach or framework to oversee implementation and performance goals and measures to assess progress. GAO previously reported that characteristics such as defining the problem to be addressed as well as the scope and methodology of the strategy; describing agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities; providing an approach to oversee implementation; and establishing performance measures, among other characteristics, can enhance a strategy's effectiveness. While the antigang strategy contains some of these characteristics, such as identifying the problems and risks associated with the gangs, describing the scope and purpose of the strategy, and defining roles and responsibilities of federal agencies as well as specific implementation activities, it lacks other characteristics such as an approach for overseeing implementation and goals and measures for assessing progress. For example, although agencies coordinate the strategy's implementation through an interagency task force, agency officials reported that this task force does not oversee the strategy's implementation and that no entity exercises oversight responsibility for the strategy's implementation. Similarly, while State and USAID are developing measures to assess the outcomes of their antigang programs, these measures do not encompass all programs under the strategy or track results of the strategy as a whole. Incorporating these characteristics could enhance the accountability of agencies to implement the strategy and provide a means for assessing progress. To carry out the strategy and combat transnational gangs, federal agencies have implemented programs and taken steps to coordinate their actions and develop performance measures to assess results of individual programs; but, coordination could be strengthened in an antigang unit in El Salvador by reaching agreement on Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) role in the unit, the only such unit currently in Central America. Agencies use various interagency groups to coordinate with each other, such as DOJ's Anti-gang Coordination Committee. However, improved coordination at the FBI-initiated antigang unit in El Salvador could enhance information sharing. While the FBI requests information directly from Salvadoran police, ICE requests go to its country attache, then to FBI agents at the unit who pass it on to Salvadoran police, as ICE does not have an agent at the unit. Prior GAO work has shown that agencies should facilitate information sharing and look for opportunities to leverage resources. Although FBI and ICE officials agree that the process could be improved by posting an ICE agent at the unit and have been discussing the possibility since 2008, they have not yet reached agreement on ICE's role. By reaching agreement, the FBI and ICE could strengthen coordination and information sharing. While agencies have established measures to assess programs, as some of the programs are just starting, data collection for many measures is in the early stages. |
gao_GAO-07-637T | gao_GAO-07-637T_0 | The CPA did not dissolve the Ministry of Interior. Although Iraq’s Security Budget Has Grown, the United States Continues to Fund a Significant Portion of Iraq’s Security Needs
The 2007 increase in Iraq’s security budget is attributable to increases in planned expenditures and an appreciation of the Iraqi currency against the U.S. dollar. Given Iraq’s continued difficulties in spending funds for these items, DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional funds to help purchase these critical items and provide other assistance to Iraq’s security ministries. Reported Increase in Iraq’s 2007 Security Budget Is Partially Attributable to Exchange Rate Appreciation
DOD’s March 2007 report to Congress stated that the 37-percent increase in Iraq’s 2007 security budget is evidence of Iraq’s growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. For example, the Ministry of Defense’s 2007 budget for capital goods—including weapons, ammunition, and vehicles—will decrease whether using a constant exchange rate (17 percent) or appreciated exchange rate (2 percent). DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi security forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request (see table 3). Iraq Faces Personnel and Logistical Challenges in Developing its Security Ministries’ Management Capabilities
Iraq’s security ministries face numerous challenges if they are to more effectively direct and sustain Iraq’s security forces. In addition, a 2006 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreement with Iraq will enable the security ministries to bypass their ineffective procurement systems and purchase needed equipment and supplies directly from the United States, according to U.S. officials. In addition, the security ministries have difficulties in accounting for their equipment. As of March 2007, the U.S.-led coalition had assigned 215 military, civilian, and contracting personnel to advise Iraqi staff at the MOD and MOI on establishing plans and policies, budgeting, and managing personnel and logistics. In December 2006, the government of Iraq transferred $1.9 billion into an Iraqi account for FMS purchases. However, in the long term, it is unclear whether Iraq’s use of the FMS program will contribute to the ministries’ capacity to improve their inefficient procurement and contracting systems. Conclusion
DOD expects that the Iraqi government will be capable of sustaining its security forces by 2008. Agency Comments
The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq provided comments on a draft of this statement. The government of Iraq has clearly recognized its inability to responsibly make procurements on behalf of its military and police forces and so has entered into a $1.7 billion Foreign Military Sales Agreement with 2006 funding. We anticipate that another $1.55 billion investment into United States FMS this calendar year.”
We added information in this statement to reflect MNSTC-I’s comments. However, both DOD and GAO agree that it will take considerable time and resources to address the challenges the U.S. and Iraqi governments face in developing fully functioning security ministries and capable Iraqi forces. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2005, the President issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. According to the strategy, victory will be achieved when Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terror. To help Iraq achieve this, the U.S. is, among other efforts, helping strengthen the capabilities of the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior (police forces) so they can assume greater responsibility for the country's security. The United States has provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and institutions. In this testimony, GAO discusses preliminary observations on (1) U.S. and Iraqi funding to develop and sustain the Iraqi security forces, and (2) key challenges the United States and Iraq face in improving the security ministries' operations and management. This statement is based on prior GAO reports, recent fieldwork in Iraq and Department of Defense, U.S. Treasury and Embassy budget documents. GAO added information to this statement in response to comments from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. We completed the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
In March 2007, DOD reported that Iraq will increase its 2007 security budget from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion (a 37-percent increase). DOD states this increase provides evidence of the country's growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. However, our analysis shows that some of this increase is due to the appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar. Using a constant exchange rate, Iraq's 2007 security budget grows by 15 percent. Also, Iraq faced problems spending its 2006 security budget. As of November 2006, the Iraq Ministry of Defense had spent only about 1 percent of its capital goods budget for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional U.S. funds to help purchase these items for Iraq and provide assistance to its security ministries. The United States and Iraq face personnel and logistical challenges in developing ministries that can sustain Iraq's growing security forces. For example, the ministries have inadequate systems to account for personnel and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. Also, both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to develop Iraq's security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors at the ministries. The United States signed a foreign military sales agreement with Iraq that, according to U.S. officials, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to purchase equipment directly from the United States. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its account for foreign military sales. However, it is unclear whether this program will help improve the ministries' procurement and contracting capacity. |
gao_RCED-99-67 | gao_RCED-99-67_0 | USDA Has Expanded the Insurance Program for Specialty Crops Using a Multiyear Process
USDA insures 52 specialty crops —14 of which have been added since 1994—and plans to begin testing coverage for another 9 specialty crops by 2001. While these 61 crops represent a majority of the value of all specialty crops, insurance coverage will still not be available for about 300 crops, such as taro and parsley. Programs for specialty crop insurance have not expanded more rapidly because USDA follows a deliberate multistep process to ensure that the programs it develops are actuarially sound. This process can be lengthy, typically requiring about 5 years, because, among other things, the data on production history needed to develop a specialty crop program are often not readily available. According to USDA, while the development process is necessary to ensure actuarial soundness, additional resources would allow it to evaluate more crops concurrently. These strategies could increase producers’ participation and ultimately reduce the government’s administrative reimbursements to insurance companies, and one of these strategies could also reduce producers’ premiums. At the same time, however, according to USDA, these strategies have some potential disadvantages. New Strategies Have Potential to Increase Participation and Decrease Costs for Federal Crop Insurance
In recent years, insurance companies have used alternatives to the traditional structure of having independent agents market federal crop insurance to producers. Ultimately, increased sales by a number of companies could raise participation in the crop insurance program and reduce the administrative fees the government pays insurance companies. Higher Insurance Fees for Catastrophic Insurance Would Reduce Producer Participation, but the Magnitude of the Reduction Is Unclear
Under the now-rescinded provision of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. While we were unable to estimate the magnitude of the decline, available studies for crop insurance show that, in general, for each 10-percent increase in insurance costs to producers, there is a 2- to 9-percent decrease in participation. However, the magnitude of the effect on participation is unclear. To review the new marketing practices insurance companies have introduced for specialty crops and to identify potential advantages and disadvantages of the practices, including their effect on producers’ participation, we reviewed pertinent documents from USDA and producer associations. Comments From the U.S. Department of Agriculture
GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the availability of the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) federal crop insurance for specialty crops, focusing on: (1) USDA's recent progress in expanding coverage to specialty crops; (2) the new marketing practices insurance companies have introduced for specialty crops and the potential advantages and disadvantages of the practices, including their effect on producers' participation; and (3) the potential effect on participation by producers in the catastrophic crop insurance program if they were charged higher fees.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USDA insures 52 specialty crops and plans to begin testing coverage for another 9 specialty crops by 2001; (2) these 61 crops represent a majority of the value of all specialty crops, but insurance coverage will not be available for about 300 crops; (3) while programs for specialty crop insurance have expanded in recent years, more rapid expansion has not occurred because USDA follows a deliberate multistep process involving the assessment of risk and setting of premiums to ensure that the programs it develops are actuarially sound; (4) this process, including testing, is lengthy, typically requiring about 5 years, because, among other things, the production history data needed to develop a specialty crop program are often not readily available; (5) according to USDA, while the development process cannot be accelerated because of the need to ensure actuarial soundness, additional resources would allow USDA to evaluate more crops concurrently; (6) in recent years, insurance companies have used alternatives to the traditional strategy of having independent agents market federal crop insurance to producers; (7) one alternative strategy uses endorsements--an insurance company pays a fee to a producer association to promote the sale of its insurance product; (8) a proposed strategy would allow an insurance company to pass through administrative savings to producers in the form of reduced premiums; (9) these strategies could increase producers' participation and, ultimately, if USDA chooses to share in these administrative cost savings, reduce the administrative fees the government pays insurance companies; (10) however, these strategies have some potential disadvantages; (11) under the rescinded provision of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, the increase in the processing fee for many specialty crop farmers would have been large and participation would have declined; and (12) while GAO was unable to estimate the magnitude of the decline, available studies on traditional crop insurance show that, in general, for each 10-percent increase, there is a 2- to 9-percent decrease in participation. |
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