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gao_GAO-10-730 | gao_GAO-10-730_0 | 1 to 3). In particular, the U.S. transit rail car fleet constitutes about 5 percent of the worldwide total. This level of specificity in transit rail car design is more common in the U.S. market than it is in other countries’ markets. Transit Agencies’ Rail Car Orders Have Implications for the Price of Rail Cars
According to rail car manufacturer and transit agency officials, certain characteristics of U.S. transit agencies’ rail car orders have implications for the per-car prices that transit agencies pay for their cars. These characteristics include the following: Small orders and customized designs: U.S. rail car orders tend to be small and customized, which results in higher per-car costs. Federal Government Is Involved to Varying Degrees in Funding and Setting Design Standards for Transit Rail Car Procurement
Federal Government Funds Pay for a Portion of Most Transit Agencies’ Rail Car Purchases
Most of the transit agencies we contacted used some type of federal funding, such as the New Starts program, to purchase rail cars for their systems. However, there are certain limitations and procedures that must be followed. The Federal Government Has a Limited Role in Setting Design Standards for U.S. Transit Rail Cars That Varies Depending on the Type of Rail System
According to FTA officials, their input into transit rail car design is limited to ensuring that Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) requirements are met and does not include applying uniform design standards for commuter, heavy, or light transit rail cars. However, in December 2009, the Secretary of Transportation proposed legislation that would give FTA the authority to establish and enforce minimum federal safety standards for rail transit systems that received federal transit funding. In February 2010, legislation was introduced that would provide that authority. Although Procuring Rail Cars Can Be Challenging, Standardization and Joint Purchasing Have the Potential to Reduce Costs
Rail Car Purchases Compete for Existing Funding with Transit Agencies’ Other Needs
Many of the transit agency officials we interviewed said that securing funding is one of the main challenges that they face when procuring transit rail cars. For example, some officials told us that while they support the need for ADA requirements, these requirements can be costly to implement. Industry associations—including APTA and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers—continue to promote standardization in transit rail car procurement to make transit rail car procurement more cost-effic As part of its standards development program, APTA convened two working groups in 2009 to develop (1) technical standards and (2) a set of standard terms and conditions for transit agencies to use when procuring light rail vehicles. A joint procurement means that rail cars are purchased by two or more agencies under the same contract. As part of this study, FTA implemented a pilot program for joint procurement of buses. 2. 3. Conclusions
Rail transit offers society a number of benefits, including reduced congestion and pollution and increased mobility. However, the relatively small and erratic market for transit rail cars in the United States can hamper transit agencies as they purchase rail cars for commuter, heavy, and light rail transit systems, including streetcars, by increasing the cost and difficulty of procuring transit rail cars. Since FTA helps fund many procurements, it may be in the best position to help transit agencies identify joint procurement opportunities. Develop a process to systematically identify and communicate opportunities for transit agencies with similar needs to participate in joint procurements of transit rail cars. Identify additional opportunities for standardization, especially for new systems, such as light rail and streetcar systems. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for review and comment. The department provided comments via e-mail, generally concurred with the report, and agreed to consider the recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the key characteristics of the U.S. market for passenger transit rail cars, we reviewed rail car databases, interviewed transit agency officials, and spoke with officials representing the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), existing and potential transit rail car manufacturers, and transit agency consultants. We also interviewed APTA officials regarding the federal government’s role in setting design standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rail transit offers society a number of benefits, including reduced congestion and pollution and increased mobility. However, rail systems and cars are costly: Transit agencies can pay more than $3 million per car, often using federal funds. As requested, this report describes (1) characteristics of the U.S. market for transit rail cars, (2) the federal government's role in funding and setting standards for transit rail cars, and (3) challenges transit agencies face when procuring rail cars. GAO analyzed U.S. and worldwide rail car market data for commuter, heavy, and light rail systems and interviewed Department of Transportation (DOT) officials and domestic and international industry stakeholders, including the American Public Transportation Association (APTA).
What GAO Found
U.S. demand for transit rail cars is limited and erratic and orders tend to be for customized cars. Transit rail cars in the U.S. comprise about 5 percent of the worldwide fleet. Transit agencies' purchases vary considerably over time: A large transit agency may replace its entire fleet in 1 year, contributing to a spike in the market, whereas in other years, there may be only a fraction of that demand for the U.S. market. Transit agencies often request custom car designs to address not only legacy infrastructure requirements and interoperability issues with existing fleets, but also preferences. Rail car orders of small size and demand for customized cars can increase the price per car by, for example, concentrating design costs among fewer cars. The federal government provides some funding for transit rail cars and has varying levels of involvement in setting design standards for transit rail cars. More than half of the transit agencies GAO interviewed purchased rail cars with some type of federal funding, such as formula or discretionary capital funds. When transit agencies use federal funds to purchase rail cars, certain requirements apply, such as "Buy America"--which requires, among other things, that rail cars be assembled in the United States. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) ensures that these requirements are met by overseeing new transit projects and through periodic reviews. The federal government's role in setting design standards for transit cars depends on the type of rail. For commuter rail, the Federal Railroad Administration has established safety standards that must be met, since these cars are intended to run on the same tracks as freight rail traffic. For other rail transit, FTA provided funds to help APTA--the standard-setting industry group--develop voluntary standards, including those for safety. However, the Secretary of Transportation proposed legislation in December 2009, which was introduced in Congress in February 2010, to give FTA more regulatory authority in relation to safety. Transit agency officials identified several challenges in procuring rail cars, including securing funding, given all of their competing needs. Manufacturers and transit agencies also face legal and regulatory requirements, such as "Buy America" requirements, but have generally adapted to challenges posed by them. However, market challenges still exist, including the small size of many orders that may affect price. Joint procurements, whereby transit agencies combine orders, can help them increase their order sizes; however, they can only combine orders if a design exists that meets both agencies' needs. While a few transit agencies have become aware of opportunities to jointly procure rail cars through informal mechanisms, such as industry meetings, there is currently no formal mechanism to identify mutually beneficial opportunities for joint procurement. As FTA helps fund many procurements, it may be in the best position to help transit agencies identify joint procurement opportunities. Furthermore, FTA and APTA have efforts under way to standardize light rail cars to make rail car procurement more efficient and cost-effective. Standards also might be beneficial for other types of systems, such as streetcars, particularly for those without existing infrastructure limitations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct DOT to work with APTA to (1) develop a process to systematically identify and communicate opportunities for transit agencies with similar needs to participate in joint procurement and (2) identify additional opportunities for standardization, especially for new systems. DOT reviewed a draft of this report, generally concurred with its contents, and agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-788T | gao_GAO-04-788T_0 | Scope and Methodology
GAO is currently conducting several reviews related to first responder grants. Another effort is focused on intergovernmental efforts to manage fiscal year 2002 and 2003 grants administered by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The reports by DHS OIG and the House Select Committee examined the distribution of homeland security grant funding to states and local governments to understand what obstacles—if any—prevent the expeditious flow of grant funding from the federal government to state and local governments. The largest of these grants were the State Homeland Security Grant Programs and the Urban Area Security Initiative grants. A key goal of first responder funding should be developing and maintaining the capacity and ability of first responders to respond effectively to and mitigate incidents that require the coordinated actions of first responders. However, a major challenge in administering first responder grants is balancing two goals: (1) minimizing the time it takes to distribute grant funds to state and local first responders and (2) ensuring appropriate planning and accountability for effective use of the funds. There are a number of sequential steps common to the distribution of ODP State Homeland Security Grants from ODP to the states and from the states to local governments. Congress appropriates funds. 9. Generally, the DHS OIG report and the report of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security found similar causes of delays in getting funds to local governments and first responder agencies. Generally, neither the IG report nor the House Select Committee report found that the delays were principally due to ODP’s grant management procedures and processes. The DHS OIG found that in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, ODP reduced the time it took to make on-line grant application guidance and applications available to states, process grant applications, and award the grants to states after applications were submitted. For the three states we examined, we found that the time between the enactment of the appropriation and ODP’s award of the grant to these states declined from 8 months in fiscal year 2002 to 3 months for fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program, Part I, and 2 months for fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program, Part II. Most States Met Deadline for Subgranting Funds But Some Local Jurisdictions Were Not Prepared to Spend Funds
As reported by the DHS OIG, Congress adopted appropriation language for the fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant, Part II, that required states to transfer 80 percent of first responder grant funds to local jurisdictions within 45 days of the funds being awarded by ODP. However, according to the DHS OIG report, this action had a limited effect because most states met the 45-day deadline by counting funds as transferred when the states agreed to allocate a specific amount of the grant to a local jurisdiction, even if the state had not determined how the funds would be spent or when contracts for goods and services would be let. In the three states we examined, we also found that states had certified they had allocated funds to local jurisdictions within the required 45-day period. Various Local Legal and Procedural Requirements Took Time
According to the DHS OIG, state and local governments were sometimes responsible for delaying the delivery of fiscal year 2002 grant funds to first responders because various governing and political bodies within the states and local jurisdictions had to approve and accept the grant funds. One city was notified on July 17, 2003 that grant funds were available for use, but the city council did not vote to accept the funds until November 7, 2003. Both the DHS OIG report and House Select Committee report noted that state and local procurements have, in some cases, been affected by delays resulting from specific procurement requirements. Some states purchase equipment centrally for all jurisdictions, while others sub-grant funds to local jurisdictions that make their own purchases. | Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the critical role first responders play at the state and local level when a disaster or emergency strikes. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress appropriated approximately $13.9 billion for domestic preparedness. A large portion of these funds were for the nation's first responders to enhance their ability to address future emergencies, including potential terrorist attacks. These funds are primarily to assist with planning, equipment purchases, training and exercises, and administrative costs. They are available to first responders mainly through the State Homeland Security Grant Programs and Urban Area Security Initiative grants. Both programs are administered through the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Domestic Preparedness. In this testimony, GAO addressed the need to balance expeditious distribution of first responder funds to states and localities with accountability for effective use of those funds and summarized major findings related to funding distribution delays and delays involving funds received by local governments, as presented in reports issued by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General and the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. The testimony incorporated supporting evidence on first-responder funding issues based on ongoing GAO work in selected states.
What GAO Found
The reports of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the House Select Committee on Homeland Security examined the distribution of funds to states and localities. Both reports found that although there have been delays in getting federal first-responder funds to local governments and first-responder agencies, the grant management requirements, procedures, and processes of the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) were not the principal cause. According to the OIG's report, in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, ODP reduced the time required to provide on-line grant application guidance to states, process grant applications, and make grant awards. For example, for fiscal year 2002 grants, it took 292 days, on average, from the time the grant legislation was enacted to the awarding of grants to states. For fiscal year 2003 grants, the total cycle was reduced to 77 days, on average. According to the reports, most states met deadlines for subgranting first-responder funds to local jurisdictions. The fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Programs and Urban Area Security Initiative required states to transfer 80 percent of first-responder grant funds to local jurisdictions within 45 days of the funds being awarded by ODP. Most states met that deadline by counting funds as transferred when states agreed to allocate a specific amount of the grant to a local jurisdiction, the OIG's report found. The House Select Committee staff concurred. And in the three states GAO examined, states certified they had allocated funds to local jurisdictions within the 45-day period. Delays in allocating grant funds to first responder agencies are frequently due to local legal and procedural requirements, the OIG's report found. State and local governments sometimes delayed delivery of fiscal year 2002 grant funds, for example, because governing and political bodies within the states and local jurisdictions had to approve and accept the grant funds. GAO's work indicated a similar finding. In one state GAO reviewed, roughly four months elapsed from the date the city was notified that grant funds were available to the date when the city council voted to accept the funds. Both reports GAO reviewed found that state and local procurement processes have, in some cases, been affected by delays resulting from specific procurement requirements. While some states purchase first-responder equipment centrally for all jurisdictions, in some instances, those purchases are made locally and procurement may be delayed by competitive bidding rules, among other things. It is important to note that those who manage homeland security grants to states and local governments must balance two sometimes competing goals: (1) getting funds to states and localities expeditiously and (2) assuring that there is appropriate planning and accountability for the effective use of the funds. |
gao_NSIAD-98-19 | gao_NSIAD-98-19_0 | State’s Employee Transfer Process Is Inefficient, Cumbersome, and Costly
State’s process for transferring employees overseas is inefficient, cumbersome, and costly. It requires employees to work with personnel in at least 12 bureaus and offices and involves over 150 support staff. State has known for years that its process for transferring employees and their households overseas was cumbersome and inefficient. State makes very limited use of “door-to-door” channels to contract with a single freight forwarder for shipping an employee’s household effects—a practice used throughout the private sector and seen as more cost-effective than using multiple vendors for the various segments of the same move. Another company that we visited and that asked for anonymity has for years had one point of contact for its employees assigned internationally. Adopting One-Stop Shopping and Centralized Program Administration
If State implemented one-stop shopping (one focal point for the employee) and centralized program administration, it could achieve benefits such as improved quality of services for employees and their families, reduced time required for employees to complete the process, and possibly lower costs resulting from fewer staff required to administer the program. Officials in State’s Bureau of Administration endorsed the development of an integrated system for tracking and coordinating the transfer process. Potential Cost Reductions
Applying best practices to State’s transfer process could result in significant cost reductions. The total that could be achieved is dependent on a number of factors, including (1) the personnel and other resources State chooses to redeploy as they are freed up in connection with a more streamlined transfer process; (2) the number of routes where the door-to-door method of shipping household effects is found to provide the best combination of overall cost-effectiveness, accountability and control, and quality of service; (3) the extent to which changes resulting from State’s Logistics Reengineering Project affect household effect shipment costs; and (4) the parts of the transfer process State decides to outsource. Although these and other variables preclude making precise projections, we believe that the potential cost reductions could total millions of dollars annually, based on (1) our limited analysis of the indirect costs associated with certain portions of State’s current process, (2) documented direct cost savings resulting from use of the door-to-door method on a pilot basis, (3) the experiences of companies and organizations that we visited as part of our benchmarking exercise, and (4) State’s own studies. Employee transfer requirements are much the same in the public and private sector, essentially focusing on ensuring that employees and their families are successfully transferred to their new overseas assignments. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the Department of State's process for transferring employees and their household effects overseas; and (2) opportunities for State to apply the best practices that private-sector and other government organizations use to complete overseas transfers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's comparison of State's process for transferring employees and their household goods overseas to the processes of other public- and private-sector organizations suggests that State's procedures are overly cumbersome and inefficient; (2) State's employee transfer process has remained essentially unchanged for years and involves at least 12 agency bureaus and offices, over 150 support staff, and numerous administrative forms; (3) State employees transferring overseas are confronted with a myriad of steps and handoffs requiring individual transactions with multiple offices; (4) no single office within the Department is held accountable for ensuring the timely and successful transfer of employees and their families; (5) similarly, employees' household shipments are typically channeled through a maze of offices and contractors, resulting in unnecessary costs; (6) the Department of State has an opportunity to significantly streamline its employee transfer process, enabling it to provide better services to its employees and to reduce costs; (7) leading U.S. companies and other organizations have achieved these benefits by implementing a number of best practices, such as: (a) providing one point of contact for assistance to the employee, a method known as one-stop shopping; (b) centralizing the administration of transfers under one organizational unit and integrating various functions into that unit; (c) developing an integrated information system for tracking and coordinating transfers; (d) contracting with one freight forwarder to ship an employee's household effects, rather than using multiple vendors for the various segments of the same move; and (e) outsourcing various parts of the transfer process; (8) although GAO was unable to develop precise cost reduction estimates for implementing these best practices, several organizations indicated that they were able to achieve substantial cost savings by doing so; (9) in addition, GAO analyses of certain cost data and other information available at State, including some of State's own studies, indicate the potential for achieving similar cost reductions for the Department; and (10) for these and other reasons, GAO believes that the potential cost reductions could total millions of dollars annually. |
gao_GAO-06-825 | gao_GAO-06-825_0 | In 2000, Congress enacted TVPA and reauthorized and amended the act twice. The accuracy of the estimates is in doubt because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data and numerical discrepancies. For example, the U.S. government’s estimate was developed by one person who did not document all of his work, so the estimate may not be replicable, casting doubt on its reliability. Moreover, country data are generally not available, reliable or comparable. There is also a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims of human trafficking. Internal trafficking data not included. Similarly, the U.S. government estimated that a total of 600,000 to 800,000 people were trafficked across transnational borders worldwide annually. Trafficking Data Collection in the United States Is Fragmented While IOM’s Is Systematic
The U.S. government has not yet established an effective mechanism for estimating the number of victims or for conducting ongoing analysis of trafficking related data that resides within various government agencies. Lack of Strategy and Performance Measures Prevents U.S. Government from Determining Overall Program Effectiveness Abroad
While federal agencies have undertaken activities to combat trafficking in persons, the U.S. government has not developed a coordinated strategy to combat human trafficking abroad, as called for in a presidential directive. The U.S. government has established an interagency task force and working group on human trafficking, which have focused on complying with U.S. policy on prostitution and avoiding duplication of effort, but they have not focused on developing and implementing a systematic way for agencies to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities in relation to each other, and identify targets of greatest need and leverage overseas activities to achieve greater results. In addition, governmentwide task forces have not developed measurable goals and associated indicators to evaluate the overall effectiveness of efforts to combat trafficking abroad or outlined an evaluation plan to gauge results, making the U.S. government unable to determine the effectiveness of its efforts abroad or to adjust its assistance to better meet needs. This report has increased global awareness about trafficking in persons, encouraged action by some governments who failed to comply with the minimum standards, and raised the threat of sanctions against governments who did not make significant efforts to comply with these standards. However, the report’s explanations for these ranking decisions are incomplete, and agencies do not consistently use the report to influence antitrafficking programs. Moreover, in justifying the tier rankings for these countries, State does not comprehensively describe foreign governments’ compliance with the standards, many of which are subjective. This lessens the report’s credibility and hampers its usefulness as a diplomatic tool. In addition, incomplete country narratives reduce the report’s utility as a guide to help focus U.S. government resources on antitrafficking programming priorities. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) estimates of the extent of global trafficking in persons, (2) the U.S. government’s strategy to combat trafficking in persons abroad, and (3) the Department of State’s (State) process for evaluating foreign governments’ antitrafficking efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human trafficking is a worldwide form of exploitation in which men, women, and children are bought, sold, and held against their will in involuntary servitude. In addition to the tremendous personal damage suffered by individual trafficking victims, this global crime has broad societal repercussions, such as fueling criminal networks and imposing public health costs. In 2000, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) to combat trafficking and reauthorized this act twice. This report reviews U.S. international antitrafficking efforts by examining (1) estimates of the extent of global trafficking, (2) the U.S. government's strategy for combating the problem abroad, and (3) the Department of State's process for evaluating foreign governments' antitrafficking efforts.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government estimates that 600,000 to 800,000 persons are trafficked across international borders annually. However, such estimates of global human trafficking are questionable. The accuracy of the estimates is in doubt because of methodological weaknesses, gaps in data, and numerical discrepancies. For example, the U.S. government's estimate was developed by one person who did not document all his work, so the estimate may not be replicable, casting doubt on its reliability. Moreover, country data are not available, reliable, or comparable. There is also a considerable discrepancy between the numbers of observed and estimated victims of human trafficking. The U.S. government has not yet established an effective mechanism for estimating the number of victims or for conducting ongoing analysis of trafficking related data that resides within government entities. While federal agencies have undertaken antitrafficking activities, the U.S. government has not developed a coordinated strategy for combating trafficking abroad or developed a way to gauge results and target its overall assistance. The U.S. government has established coordination mechanisms, but they do not include a systematic way for agencies to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities in relation to each other, identify needs, or leverage activities to achieve greater results. Further, the U.S. government has not established performance measures or conducted evaluations to gauge the overall impact of antitrafficking programs abroad, thus preventing the U.S. government from determining the effectiveness of its efforts or adjusting its assistance to better meet needs. The Department of State assesses foreign governments' compliance with minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in persons; but the explanations for ranking decisions in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report are incomplete, and the report is not used consistently to develop antitrafficking programs. It has increased global awareness, encouraged government action, and raised the risk of sanctions against governments who did not make significant efforts to comply with the standards. However, State does not comprehensively describe compliance with the standards, lessening the report's credibility and usefulness as a diplomatic tool. Further, incomplete country narratives reduce the report's utility as a guide to help focus U.S. government resources on antitrafficking programming priorities. |
gao_GAO-05-210 | gao_GAO-05-210_0 | Most States Require Insurance Policies to Cover Diabetes Services and Supplies, Although Specific Requirements Vary
In 2004, 47 states had laws or regulations related to coverage of diabetes services or supplies, although specific requirements varied by state (see fig. The model legislation also includes coverage of “diabetes equipment and supplies,” and 47 states required such coverage. Twenty-eight states identified which supplies must be covered, although their specific requirements varied. Some states had specific requirements regarding the coverage of certain services, such as diabetes education. Selected Health Plans Providing Coverage Not Subject to State Regulation Cover Most but Not All Diabetes Services and Supplies
The 3 largest plans participating in FEHBP—Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Mail Handlers, and Government Employees Hospital Association, Inc.— and the 13 large-employer self-funded plans we contacted covered most of the diabetes services and supplies we reviewed. All 16 plans covered at least 7 of the 10 diabetes services, as well as at least five of nine diabetes supplies. Large Employers’ Self- Funded Health Plans Reviewed Cover Most Diabetes Services and Supplies
Each of the 13 large employers’ self-funded health plans we reviewed covered at least 7 of 10 diabetes services, specifically, blood glucose, lipid, and urine tests; eye and foot exams; blood pressure management, and influenza vaccinations. 2). Among these plans, we found limits on coverage only for smoking cessation therapy. 3). In a nationwide telephone survey conducted in 2003, the majority of individuals with diabetes reported receiving at least one of six identified diabetes services for which national data were available. For example, an estimated 88 percent had received a test for blood glucose within the past 12 months, and an estimated 52 percent had received diabetes education. A much smaller proportion, 33 percent, had received the five services recommended that individuals with diabetes receive at least once a year— specifically, a blood glucose test, a cholesterol test, an eye exam, a foot exam, and an influenza vaccination (see fig. Individuals with Diabetes Who Have Health Coverage More Likely to Receive Services Than Those Who Lack Coverage
According to CDC’s 2003 survey, in comparison with individuals with diabetes who lacked health coverage, a larger proportion who had health coverage reported receiving one or more services. For example, an estimated 90 percent of individuals with diabetes who had health coverage at the time of the survey had received a blood glucose test, compared with 71 percent of those who reported not having such coverage (see fig. The agency provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess health care coverage and receipt of diabetes services and supplies, we obtained information from federal health agencies and national organizations concerned with diabetes patient care and identified 10 services and nine supplies that individuals with diabetes often need. To determine the extent to which states require coverage of diabetes services and supplies for the health insurance policies they regulate, we examined state laws and regulations from September 2004 through December 2004 related to diabetes and the extent to which they required coverage of specific services and supplies. To assess information on the extent to which individuals with diabetes receive diabetes services and use supplies, we analyzed data for individuals ages 18 and older provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from two nationwide surveys: the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) for 2003 and the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) for 1999–2002: BRFSS is a nationwide telephone survey conducted every year by state health departments, with technical and methodological assistance provided by CDC. | Why GAO Did This Study
Diabetes, which afflicts millions of Americans, is a manageable disease whose effects can be mitigated with proper care, regularly received. Experts recommend certain services and supplies for managing diabetes. Because these can be costly, concerns exist about whether individuals with diabetes have access to and receive what they need. Little is known, however, about health plan coverage of diabetes services and supplies. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) states require insurance policies to cover diabetes services and supplies, (2) health coverage not subject to state requirements includes diabetes services and supplies, and (3) individuals with diabetes ages 18 and older receive services and supplies. GAO analyzed all 50 states' and the District of Columbia's laws and regulations pertaining to diabetes coverage. GAO also obtained from selected health plans providing coverage not subject to state requirements--13 large-employer plans and 3 plans in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP)--information on coverage of 10 services and nine supplies identified as important for individuals with diabetes. In addition, GAO obtained national data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on individuals' receipt of diabetes services and supplies. GAO received technical comments from CDC and incorporated them in the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
In 2004, 47 states, including the District of Columbia, had laws or regulations related to coverage of diabetes services or supplies, although specific requirements varied by state. Services for which states most often required coverage were diabetes education (45 states) and medical nutrition therapy (27 states). All 47 required coverage of diabetes supplies, although some states were more specific than others about which supplies must be covered. Health plans GAO contacted that provide coverage not subject to state insurance requirements--those offered by 13 large Fortune 500 companies and the 3 largest health plans in FEHBP--covered most of the services and supplies recommended for individuals with diabetes, generally without limits on the coverage. Each plan covered at least 7 of 10 diabetes services, such as an annual blood glucose test, cholesterol and blood pressure monitoring, and influenza vaccinations, as well as at least five of nine diabetes supplies, such as insulin and insulin-administering supplies. According to a 2003 CDC nationwide survey, the majority of individuals with diabetes reported receiving at least one diabetes service within the past 12 months. Significantly fewer individuals, however, reported receiving five services that individuals with diabetes are recommended to receive at least once a year. For example, an estimated 88 percent reported receiving a test for blood glucose, whereas an estimated 33 percent had received the five recommended services: blood glucose and cholesterol tests, eye and foot exams, and an influenza vaccination. Receipt of diabetes services and supplies varied by service, state, and whether an individual had health coverage. For example, 71 percent of individuals with diabetes who had health coverage at the time of the survey received eye exams, compared with 46 percent of individuals with diabetes who lacked coverage. |
gao_PEMD-95-19 | gao_PEMD-95-19_0 | The Current Nutrition Monitoring Program
This chapter first provides background information on the National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Program. Then, the objectives, scope, and methodology of our review of current and potential approaches to achieving a model program are described. Table 1.2 lists specific activities managed by the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, which have major responsibilities for the five areas. The activities are organized around six objectives, which are to • provide for a comprehensive NNMRRP through continuous and coordinated data collection; improve the comparability and quality of data across the NNMRRP; improve the research base for nutrition monitoring; • develop and strengthen state and local capacity for continuous and coordinated nutrition monitoring data collection that complements national nutrition surveys; improve methodologies to enhance comparability of NNMRRP data across federal, state, and local levels; and improve the quality of state and local nutrition monitoring data. This panel met to help us identify promising approaches to critical elements of a nutrition monitoring system. Similarly, to provide information on subpopulation groups, national surveys could be supplemented by such means as the surveillance systems and oversampling or the national surveys could be abandoned and their resources dedicated to special studies of specific groups. The Selected Features
An ideal federal nutrition monitoring program would have a coordinated set of activities that provides data on a continuous basis, covers important population groups, and supports state and local monitoring activities. In contrast, an ongoing survey could consist of a core set of questions and rotating modules of questions that address the needs of specific users. Their suggestions for improving the availability of data on subpopulation groups and small geographic areas included different sampling strategies for different populations, contracts with states and localities to gather information on geographically-based populations, and indirect estimation to support inferences about subpopulation groups and small geographic areas. Potential Options
In addition to the state-based surveillance systems, we reviewed two other approaches to providing continuous data. Special Studies: the HHANES Model
An alternate approach to covering subpopulations is conducting a special study. The NNMRRP currently assists states through the state-based surveillance systems, which provide technical and other assistance to states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined a model nutrition monitoring system and potential approaches to incorporating it into the National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Program (NNMRRP).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) a model nutrition program would have a coordinated set of activities, provide data continuously, generate reliable subpopulation and small geographic area, and support state and local monitoring activities; (2) although NNMRRP has elements of a model program, other strategies may lead to improved nutrition monitoring capabilities; (3) alternate approaches to coordination may not provide any clear advantages to the current structure; (4) the current state-based surveillance systems cannot meet certain information needs; (5) alternative approaches to achieving a model program are to attach modules of nutrition-related questions to other ongoing surveys or to field a core set of questions continuously, supplemented periodically by questions of emerging interest; (6) current approaches to providing information on subpopulations and small geographic areas are to oversample selected groups as part of the national surveys and to collect data on specific high-risk groups through the surveillance systems, which could be complemented by special studies and indirect estimation; and (7) to support state and local monitoring activities, the Department of Health and Human Services provides technical and financial assistance for state-based surveillance systems, but community-based data collection might provide more relevant data to localities. |
gao_GGD-99-38 | gao_GGD-99-38_0 | Also, organizations that have employees who lobby on behalf of the organizations—the organizations on which this report focuses—must register under LDA. However, LDA gives organizations that lobby on their own behalf and that already use an IRC lobbying definition for tax purposes the option of using the applicable IRC lobbying definition (IRC sections 4911 or 162(e)), instead of the LDA lobbying definition, for determining whether the LDA registration threshold of $20,500 in semiannual lobbying expenses is met and calculating the lobbying expenses to meet the LDA reporting requirement. An organization that chooses to use the applicable IRC definition, instead of the LDA definition to calculate its lobbying expenses, must use the IRC definition for both lobbying reports filed during a calendar year. As agreed with your offices, our objectives for this report were to describe the differences between the LDA and IRC section 4911 and 162(e) determine the impact that differences in the definitions may have on registration and reporting under LDA, including information on the number of organizations using each definition and the expenses they have reported; and identify and analyze options, including harmonizing the three definitions, that may better ensure that the public disclosure purposes of LDA are realized. We defined impact as (1) the way differences among the definitions can affect who must register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives and what lobbying expenses and related information must be included in those reports; (2) the number of organizations that reported using the LDA and IRC section 4911 and 162(e) definitions when reporting lobbying expenses and related information for July through December 1997; and (3) the lobbying expenses reported under each of the three definitions for this period. Also, the definitions differ in their coverage of contacts with federal officials depending on whether the contact was on a legislative or nonlegislative matter. Grassroots Lobbying
The LDA lobbying definition covers only lobbying of federal government officials, so organizations using the LDA definition would not include in their lobbying reports any information related to attempts to influence legislation by affecting the opinions of the public—that is, grassroots lobbying. In addition, the lobbying definition an organization uses can materially affect the information, such as federal- level lobbying, it must disclose on its semiannual lobbying report. Those organizations that used the IRC section 162(e) definition had the highest mean and median expenses reported. If an activity is not covered under a particular definition, then the expenses related to that activity do not count toward the lobbying expenses of an organization using that definition. Whether an organization uses the LDA definition or the applicable IRC definition, it is required to disclose on its lobbying report its total estimated expenses for all activities covered by the definition. In contrast to reporting expenses, when reporting information other than expenses on the LDA lobbying reports, organizations are required to report only information related to federal lobbying. activities. Because the differences among the LDA and IRC lobbying definitions can significantly affect who registers and what they report under LDA, the use of the IRC definitions can conflict with LDA’s purpose of disclosing paid lobbyists’ efforts to influence federal decisionmaking. However, both IRC definitions cover lobbying of federal officials, as well as state and local government officials. However, contacts with all of these officials would be covered under the LDA definition of lobbying. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the reporting of lobbying activities by organizations that have employees who lobby on the organizations' behalf and have the option to report their lobbying expenses under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 or applicable Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions that they use for tax purposes, focusing on: (1) the differences between the LDA and IRC section 4911 and 162(e) definitions of lobbying; (2) the impact that differences in the definitions may have on registration and reporting under LDA, including information on the number of organizations using each definition and the expenses they have reported; and (3) identifying and analyzing options, including harmonizing the three definitions, that may better ensure that the public disclosure purposes of LDA are realized.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the LDA definition covers only contacts with federal officials; (2) the IRC definitions cover contacts with federal, state, and local officials as well as attempts to influence the public through grassroots lobbying; (3) the definitions differ in their coverage of contacts with federal officials, depending on whether the contact concerns a legislative or nonlegislative matter; (4) the differences in the lobbying definitions can affect whether organizations register under LDA; (5) an organization that engages or expects to engage in certain lobbying activities during a 6-month period, including incurring at least $20,500 in lobbying expenses, is required to register under LDA; (6) the definition an organization uses in calculating its lobbying expenses determines the expenses it counts toward the $20,500 threshold; (7) when using the LDA definition would result in expenses of more than $20,500, an organization may be able to use the applicable IRC definition to keep its lobbying expenses below $20,500 or vice versa; (8) the lobbying definition an organization uses affects the information it must disclose on its semiannual lobbying report; (9) when using an IRC definition, an organization must report its total lobbying expenses for all activities covered by that definition; (10) however, all of these expenses are reported in one total amount, so the lobbying reports do not indicate the amount related to different levels of government and types of lobbying activities; (11) when organizations report information other than expenses, they are required to report only information related to federal government lobbying, regardless of whether they use the LDA definition or one of the IRC definitions to calculate expenses; (12) because of the differences in definitions, information disclosed on lobbying reports filed by organizations using the IRC definitions is not comparable to information on reports filed by organizations using the LDA definition; (13) under the IRC definitions, organizations can disclose less information than under the LDA definition; (14) of the organizations that lobbied on their own behalf and had the option of using an IRC definition for reporting expenses under LDA, most used the LDA definition; (15) the organizations that reported using the IRC section 162(e) definition had the highest mean and median expenses; and (16) because the differences among the three lobbying definitions can significantly affect who registers and what they report under LDA, the use of the IRC definitions can conflict with LDA's public disclosure purpose. |
gao_GAO-14-48 | gao_GAO-14-48_0 | Background
Since 1993, GSA has built 79 new courthouses that replaced or supplemented 66 old courthouses. In determining whether to retain an old courthouse, GSA considers the building’s condition; its historic or architectural significance; the judiciary’s interest in occupying the building; local market conditions, such as prevailing lease rates for commercial space; and the existing and projected base of other prospective federal tenants within the area. Old Courthouses Have More Vacant Space and Many Do Not Cover Their Costs
Among the retained old courthouses we reviewed, excluding one building that was under major renovation, about 14 percent of the total space (nearly 1-million square feet) in them was vacant as of May 2013— significantly higher than the 4.8 percent overall vacant space among federally-owned buildings in 2012. GSA officials told us that replacing tenants in old courthouses can be challenging due to the buildings’ condition and needed renovations, among other reasons, as will be discussed later in this report. New Courthouse Proposals Did Not Consistently Address the Need for Old Courthouse Renovations
While old courthouses are often retained to meet federal space needs, potential renovations key to re-using old courthouses are often not included in GSA’s proposals to Congress for new courthouses. GSA is not specifically required by statute to include plans for old courthouses in its proposals to Congress for new buildings. However, GSA’s proposals are required under statute to include, among other things, a “comprehensive plan” to, in general, provide space for all federal employees in the locality of a proposed new building “having due regard” for suitable space that may continue to be available in nearby existing government buildings. In addition, OMB and we have previously reported that complete cost estimates are a best practice in capital planning, Moreover, while old courthouse plans may not be available when a new courthouse is initially proposed, GSA periodically updates Congress after the initial proposal to obtain additional authorizations. For 33 of the 40 old courthouses retained by GSA, the new courthouse proposals specified that the old courthouses would be reused for federal tenants. However, only 15 of the 40 of new courthouse proposals addressed whether renovations were needed in the old courthouse and only 11 included estimates of the renovation costs. Recommendation
To improve the transparency of cost information regarding the retention and reuse of old courthouses, we recommend that when proposing new courthouses, the Administrator of the General Services Administration, in consultation with the judiciary as appropriate, include plans for re-using or disposing of the old courthouses; challenges with implementing those plans, including any required renovations and related cost estimates, to be updated as needed; and when the plans involve re-locating federal tenants from commercially- leased space to the old courthouses, estimates of the long-term costs of occupying the old courthouses versus continuing to occupy commercially leased space. GSA concurred with the recommendation and AOUSC agreed that GSA and the judiciary should continue to work together to address the judiciary’s housing needs, but indicated that it is important not to delay the authorization and funding of new projects. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were (1) how the government is re-using old courthouses that were retained and the challenges involved; (2) how GSA disposed of old courthouses, the process involved, and the results; and (3) the extent to which GSA’s proposals for new courthouses considered the future use of the old courthouses. To determine how GSA disposed of old courthouses, the process involved, and the results, we reviewed the authorities that GSA used to dispose of the buildings, data on the length of time it took to dispose of them, the proceeds, and interviewed representatives of the new owners of selected disposed old courthouses. For all of our case studies, we reviewed GSA data and other documents and interviewed GSA officials. We selected the 17 old courthouses that represented a mix of retained and disposed buildings located in geographically diverse areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
During the last 20 years, GSA built 79 new courthouses for the judiciary that replaced or supplemented 66 old courthouses. Retaining and re-using or disposing old courthouses can be challenging for GSA because many of them are more than 80 years old, do not meet current court security standards, and have historic features that must be preserved by federal agencies in accordance with historic preservation requirements. GAO was asked to review how GSA and the judiciary are planning and managing the reuse or disposal of old courthouses. GAO examined (1) how the government is re-using old courthouses that were retained and the challenges involved; (2) how GSA disposed of old courthouses, the process involved, and the results; and (3) the extent to which GSA's proposals for new courthouses considered the future use of old courthouses. As case studies, we selected 17 old courthouses to represent a mix of retained and disposed buildings located in geographically diverse areas.
What GAO Found
Of the 66 old federal courthouses that GAO reviewed, the General Services Administration (GSA) retained 40, disposed of 25, and is in the process of disposing of another. Of the retained old courthouses, the judiciary occupies 30 of them, 25 as the main tenant, most commonly with the district and bankruptcy courts. When determining whether to retain and reuse or to dispose of old courthouses, GSA considers, among other things, a building's condition, the local real estate market, and the existing and projected base of federal tenants. GSA officials said that after the judiciary moves to new courthouses, old courthouses often require renovations to be reused. Moreover, GSA officials said that it can be challenging to find new tenants for old courthouses due to the buildings' condition and needed renovations, among other reasons. Among the retained old courthouses GAO reviewed, excluding one building that was under major renovation, about 14 percent of the total space (nearly 1-million square feet) in them was vacant as of May 2013--significantly higher than the 4.8 percent overall vacant space in federally-owned buildings in 2012.
GAO found that GSA took about 1.4 years to dispose of old courthouses that the agency determined were no longer needed. GSA officials told us that multiple parties' interest in re-using the old courthouses, the historic status of many buildings, and their specialized designs can slow the disposal process.
GSA is not specifically required by statute to include plans for old courthouses in its proposals to Congress for new courthouses. However, as with other building proposals over a certain dollar threshold, GSA is required to include, among other things, a "comprehensive plan" to provide space for all federal employees in the area, considering suitable space that may be available in nearby existing government buildings. In addition, GAO and the Office of Management and Budget have previously reported that complete cost estimates are a best practice in capital planning. GAO found that renovations needed to reuse the old courthouses, totaling over $760 million to date, were often not included in GSA's new courthouse proposals. Specifically, for 33 of the 40 retained old courthouses, the new courthouse proposals described plans for reuse by federal tenants, but only 15 proposals specified whether renovations were needed to realize these plans, and only 11 included estimates of the renovation costs. GAO found that some old courthouses were partially or wholly vacant while awaiting renovation funding, sometimes resulting in money spent leasing space in commercial buildings for the judiciary.
What GAO Recommends
In proposing new courthouses, GSA, in consultation with the judiciary, should include plans for re-using or disposing of old courthouses, any required renovations and the estimated costs, and any other challenges to re-using or disposing of the buildings. GSA concurred with the recommendation and AOUSC agreed that GSA and the judiciary should work together to address the judiciary's housing needs. |
gao_AIMD-95-222 | gao_AIMD-95-222_0 | FISVIS Goals and Strategy
To address USDA’s pervasive financial management system weaknesses and carry out its financial management system responsibilities under the CFO Act, in March 1993, the Department initiated the Financial Information Systems Vision and Strategy (FISVIS) project. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess whether the FISVIS project will (1) resolve USDA’s major financial management system weaknesses and (2) consolidate USDA’s separate financial and mixed systems that perform similar functions, as well as reengineer USDA’s financial processes. However, because the Office of the CFO has not set up a mechanism to enforce its financial system standards, FISVIS’ ultimate success is highly dependent on the voluntary compliance of USDA’s component agencies and NFC. For example, according to the CFO, one of the tasks of the financial and accounting standards administration function will be to assist component agencies and staff offices with incorporating USDA’s financial standards into their new or reengineered financial and mixed system development projects. The Office of the CFO Has Not Established a Configuration Management Policy and Version Control Process
The Office of the CFO has not established a configuration management policy or version control process to help manage and control the Foundation system software modifications and version updates. USDA has over 100 financial management systems that perform many similar functions. This environment will continue to exist even after FISVIS because USDA is planning to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to replace or redesign these systems without a financial management systems plan to consolidate these systems on a departmentwide basis. In its written comments, USDA stated that most of its current financial and mixed systems do not comply with the Department’s financial standards and agreed that USDA needed to bring them into compliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed whether the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Financial Information Systems Vision and Strategy (FISVIS) project will: (1) resolve major USDA financial system weaknesses; and (2) consolidate the separate USDA financial and mixed systems that perform similar functions, as well as reengineer USDA financial processes.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the USDA Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has demonstrated strong leadership and progress in implementing the initial phase of the FISVIS project; (2) CFO has issued departmentwide financial management standards and has signed a contract for the central Foundation Financial Information System; (3) it is unclear when USDA financial and mixed systems will be brought into compliance with the new financial standards, since CFO does not have the authority or a mechanism to enforce compliance and will have to rely on the voluntary cooperation of the USDA component agencies; (4) although USDA is planning to give CFO greater responsibility and authority over its financial systems, the major component agencies will manage their own financial systems with limited CFO oversight; (5) CFO lacks a configuration management policy and version control process for the Foundation system software to lower costs and prevent duplication; (6) FISVIS does not address eliminating or consolidating the many USDA systems that perform similar functions and has not been revised to consider reengineering financial management processes on a departmentwide basis in light of the ongoing USDA reorganization; and (7) although USDA has not addressed all aspects of its financial management systems, it plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to redesign or replace many of its existing financial and mixed systems. |
gao_GAO-13-471 | gao_GAO-13-471_0 | Among other things, the reports examine the extent to which the ISE is being implemented by agencies that possess or use terrorism-related information, operate systems within the ISE, or otherwise participate in the ISE. RISS centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers both have missions, roles, and responsibilities that include supporting investigations. Overlap in these activities can lead to benefits, such as validating information for customers, or inefficiencies, such as burdening customers who use resources to sort through redundant information. Specifically, out of the 91 instances of overlap—in which more than one type of entity in the same urban area conducted the same analytical activity or service for similar customers in the same mission area—41 were in the mission area of all crimes, and 33 were in the mission area of counterterrorism compared with 17 that were in the mission area of counternarcotics. Federal Agencies Do Not Hold Entities Accountable for Coordinating and Have Not Assessed Coordination Mechanisms to Help Reduce the Potential for Overlap
DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP acknowledge the importance of the entities working together and sharing information; however, they do not hold the entities accountable for coordinating with one another. A mechanism that holds entities accountable for coordination and enables agencies to monitor and evaluate the results of their efforts, such as performance metrics related to coordination, could help provide the agencies with information on the effectiveness of coordination among field-based entities and help reduce any unnecessary overlap in entities’ efforts. Officials in the eight selected urban areas we reviewed cited the inclusion of partners on governance boards and field-based entities’ physical or virtual colocation as two practices that helped to enhance coordination, information sharing, and efficiencies—in their view, reducing the potential for unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical and investigative support activities. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not fully assessed the extent to which such practices could be applied nationwide to increase the benefits already being realized in some urban areas. Agencies Have Not Assessed Practices That Enhance Coordination to Help Identify Additional Opportunities to Coordinate and Reduce Overlap
DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not assessed the extent to which practices that could enhance coordination and help reduce unnecessary overlap and duplication in activities—such as participation on governance boards and colocation—could be applied more comprehensively nationwide across these field-based entities. Therefore, agencies may have additional opportunities to apply these types of practices. Further, as required by the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager is to submit annual reports to Congress. According to the Program Manager, past reports have focused on broader issues such as strengthening the safeguarding of terrorism-related information, but including information on specific coordination efforts among the five types of field-based entities in future reports would provide beneficial information to the information-sharing environment. Agencies Collect Information on the Results Entities Achieve, but Vary in How They Consider Such Data when Making Decisions about Future Funding
FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP collect information on the results that JTTFs, FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers achieve. Although some of these agencies consider the results when they make decisions about future funding, others consider different factors—such as risk and threats—rather than results, or do not directly make decisions about future funding. Recommendations for Executive Action
Recognizing that agencies are taking steps to ensure that two of the three systems officers use to deconflict their law enforcement actions are interoperable, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP work with the appropriate HIDTA officials to develop milestones and time frames for actions needed to make the third system, SAFETNet, interoperable in order to prevent unnecessary delays in reducing risks to officer safety and lessening the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems. To help identify where agencies and the field-based entities they support could apply coordination mechanisms to enhance information sharing and reduce inefficiencies resulting from overlap, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or otherwise collaborate to identify characteristics of entities and assess specific geographic areas in which practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary overlap, such as cross-entity participation on governance boards and colocation of entities, could be further applied. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program
Established in 1988, the HIDTA program is a federally funded program administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) that brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into task forces that conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in designated areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies and state and local governments have established field-based entities (e.g., centers and task forces) nationwide that share terrorism-related information, among other things. GAO was asked to assess these entities. This report addresses (1) the extent to which these entities are distinct, fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative; (2) the extent to which DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP hold entities accountable for coordinating and have assessed coordination opportunities; and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP incorporate information on the results entities achieve when making funding decisions. GAO analyzed entities' missions, activities, and coordination efforts in eight selected urban areas that range in geographic dispersion and risk. Although not generalizable, this analysis provided insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in March 2013. Information the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
Five types of field-based information-sharing entities are supported, in part, by the federal government--Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Field Intelligence Groups, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, state and major urban area fusion centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers--and have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities. However, GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some analytical activities--such as producing intelligence reports--and 32 instances of overlap in investigative support activities, such as identifying links between criminal organizations. These entities conducted similar activities within the same mission area, such as counterterrorism, for similar customers, such as federal or state agencies. This can lead to benefits, such as the corroboration of information, but may also burden customers with redundant information. GAO also found that RISS centers and HIDTAs operate three different systems that duplicate the same function--identifying when different law enforcement entities may be conducting a similar enforcement action, such as a raid at the same location, to ensure officer safety--resulting in some inefficiencies. RISS and HIDTA have taken steps to connect two of the systems, but HIDTA does not have target time frames to connect the third system. A commitment to time frames would help reduce risks to officer safety and potentially lessen the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems.
Agencies have neither held entities accountable for coordinating nor assessed opportunities for further enhancing coordination to help reduce the potential for overlap and achieve efficiencies. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)--the federal agencies that oversee or provide support to the five types of field-based entities-- acknowledged that entities working together and sharing information is important, but they do not hold the entities accountable for such coordination. A mechanism that enables agencies to monitor the results of coordination efforts could encourage more coordination, help reduce any unnecessary overlap and leverage resources. Officials in the eight urban areas said that practices such as having representatives from other agencies on governance boards and colocating entities where possible enhanced coordination, information sharing, and efficiencies--in their view, reducing the potential of unnecessary overlap. Federal agencies have not assessed the extent to which such practices could be further implemented and, therefore, may be missing opportunities to maximize benefits. The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)--which manages efforts to enhance sharing governmentwide--has not reported on specific coordination efforts across the entities. Including agencies' assessment progress in the annual reports to the Congress would enhance accountability.
The agencies collect information on entities' results, but vary in the extent to which they consider the results when they make decisions about future funding. For example, agencies may consider other factors--such as risk and threats--rather than results, or funding decisions may be determined by state grant recipients or set in part by statutory or other requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ONDCP work with HIDTA officials to establish time frames to connect systems; DHS, DOJ, and ONDCP develop measures to hold entities accountable for coordination and assess opportunities to enhance coordination; and the PM-ISE report on the results of the agencies efforts to assess coordination. DHS, ONDCP, and the PM-ISE concurred. DOJ generally agreed with the intent of the recommendations, but disagreed with their underlying premises that DOJ was not already taking such actions. GAO believes these actions do not fully address the recommendations as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GGD-95-152 | gao_GGD-95-152_0 | 9.6 trillion. CRB Is Responsible for Regulation
CRB, which is an independent committee, is responsible for developing regulations applicable to all credit institutions. Banking Law Divides Responsibilities for Authorization, Regulation, and Supervision Among Three Committees
Under the 1984 Act, the responsibility for bank authorization, regulation, and supervision is divided among three committees—the Credit Institutions Committee (CEC) has responsibility for authorization, the Bank Regulatory Committee (CRB) for regulation, and the Banking Commission (CB) for supervision. CEC Authorizes Banks
CEC is responsible for authorizing and licensing credit institutions to undertake banking operations. It also may withdraw authorizations and must approve any significant changes to a credit institution’s structure or ownership. 3). It is the duty of CB to ensure that credit institutions observe legal and regulatory requirements, as well as the industry’s rules of good conduct; to ensure that the rules of sound banking practice are observed; and to monitor the financial soundness of credit institutions. CB Obtains Information Through Permanent Oversight and Bank Inspections
The Banking Commission (CB) obtains information necessary to enforce compliance with regulations and assess the financial condition of credit institutions through a combination of permanent oversight and inspection visits conducted by separate sections within CB and the Bank of France. The Bank of France Has Other Bank-Related Responsibilities; AFB Administers Deposit Protection
In addition to its role in bank regulation and supervision, the Bank of France has responsibilities for other bank-related activities such as liquidity provision, crisis management, payments clearance, international negotiations, and lender of last resort. The French Bank Association (AFB) administers the system that protects deposits in French banks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the French bank regulatory structure and its key participants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) three independent committees oversee bank authorization, regulation, and supervision in France; (2) the Credit Institutions Committee (CEC) is responsible for authorizing and licensing credit institutions, approving any significant changes to a credit institution's structure and ownership, and disapproving management changes; (3) the Bank Regulatory Committee (CRB) is responsible for developing the regulations applicable to credit institutions; (4) the Banking Commission (CB) is responsible for supervising all credit institutions authorized under the French Banking Act of 1984, monitoring the financial soundness of credit institutions, enforcing legal and regulatory requirements, and providing technical assistance to other supervisory committees; (5) the French bank regulatory system is cohesive in spite of having three regulatory bodies with distinct jurisdictions; (6) the Minister of Economic Affairs has an influential position in bank regulation and supervision because he is the Chairman of CRB and a member of CB and CEC; (7) CB obtains the information necessary to enforce compliance with banking regulations and is able to assess the financial condition of credit institutions by conducting permanent oversight and on-site inspections of financial institutions; (8) the Bank of France is responsible for bank-related activities, such as liquidity provision, crisis management, payments settlement, international negotiations, and lender of last resort; and (9) the French Bank Association administers the deposit protection program for its member banks. |
gao_GAO-09-129 | gao_GAO-09-129_0 | FEMA’s PA grant program is a significant federal tool to support longer-term recovery efforts. Cost and Scope of PA for Gulf Coast Rebuilding Is Very Large and Will Likely Increase
Federal funding for the PA program in the Gulf Coast has already surpassed that of any previous disaster, and the total cost will likely be higher than FEMA’s estimate. 2). Large Rebuilding Projects in Louisiana and Mississippi Account for the Vast Majority of PA Funds Made Available to Gulf Coast States
As of September 2008, the states of Louisiana and Mississippi have received about 90 percent of all PA funds distributed to the four Gulf Coast states. These challenges resulted in slowing rebuilding progress. These difficulties were exacerbated by the amount of damage from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes and the sheer number of rebuilding projects initiated in their wake. In the Gulf Coast large PA projects faced several challenges during the project development and start up process including difficulties in: (1) determining how much of the damage was disaster related, (2) assessing project scope including the decision to repair or replace structures, (3) estimating project costs in the postdisaster environment, (4) using program flexibilities to rebuild to post disaster needs, and (5) obtaining resources to initiate projects. For example, although much of the New Orleans water and sewer system sustained damage as a result of the disaster, FEMA and city officials had difficulty agreeing on the amount of damage due to the storm as opposed to that due to deferred maintenance. For instance, FEMA’s Public Assistance Catastrophic Disaster Recovery Concept Plan, finalized in May 2008, recognizes the need for PA regulations to allow applicants to more easily tailor projects to meet postdisaster needs. These temporary measures have already cost the federal government more than $60 million. According to federal and state officials, it was difficult to develop rebuilding estimates because of uncertain labor and material costs after the storms. Initiating projects was a special challenge in Louisiana. Challenges in Sharing and Tracking Project Information
Because the PA process is complex and requires collaboration among federal, state, and local officials, effective sharing of project information is particularly important. Although Louisiana and FEMA employed the use of a Web-based system to track the status of PA project funding, it did not facilitate the day-to-day exchange of documents related to project development. However, applicants reported that project appeal decisions were often not made within the time frames required under the Stafford Act. Human Capital Challenges Contributed to Delays
Human capital challenges at the federal, state, and local level underlie many of the operational difficulties faced during Gulf Coast rebuilding. Human capital limitations at the federal, state, and local level underlie many of these operational difficulties as well as present challenges of their own. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DHS improve the operation of the PA grant program and build on some of the actions taken to date, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take the following four actions: Improve PA reporting by better defining information presented in FEMA’s periodic reports to Congress and the public; specifically provide the number of unique PA projects in addition to figures that include changes to projects. To address our first objective, we obtained and analyzed funding data from September 2005 though September 2008 from the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Global Reports on Public Assistance in the Gulf Coast, and for September 2005 though July 2008 from FEMA’s National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS). We also interviewed and obtained information from the Louisiana Recovery Authority, which was the policy advisor for Gulf Coast rebuilding and, as of January 2008, became the state’s lead agency working with FEMA on recovery operations, including PA; the Office of the Legislative Auditor, which assisted in the reviewing of PA grant applications; and the State Department of Education, which was a major applicant in the PA process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The devastation caused by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes presented the nation with unprecedented rebuilding challenges. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) grant program is a key tool for providing funds to support recovery, including rebuilding public schools, roads, and utilities. GAO was asked to examine the amount of PA grants FEMA has provided for rebuilding the Gulf Coast; challenges in the day-to-day operation of the PA program; and human capital challenges; as well as actions taken to address them. Toward this end, GAO reviewed relevant laws, PA regulations and procedures, and analyzed data from FEMA's National Emergency Management Information System. GAO also interviewed federal officials from FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding as well as more than 60 officials from state government and eight localities in Louisiana and Mississippi.
What GAO Found
Funding for PA grants related to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes is already more than $11 billion, surpassing that of any previous disaster, and will likely be higher than FEMA's total cost estimate of $13.2 billion. About 90 percent of these funds have gone to the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, about half of which have passed from the states to grant applicants to date. GAO identified challenges in the following broad areas, many of which contributed to slowing down rebuilding projects. (1) Project Development: Challenges in the development of PA projects included difficulties determining the amount of damage that was disaster-related, using PA program flexibilities to rebuild in a way that meets postdisaster needs, assessing project scope including whether to repair or replace damaged structures, estimating project costs, and having sufficient resources to initiate projects. For example, assessing the damage to New Orleans's water and sewer system was complicated by the difficulty distinguishing disaster-related from preexisting damage. Estimating the cost of PA projects presented special challenges because of unusual market conditions for labor and materials in the postdisaster economy. (2) Information Sharing and Tracking: GAO identified challenges in sharing information among federal, state, and local participants in the PA process as well as in tracking the status of projects. For example, in Louisiana, information sharing was made more difficult in the absence of an effective document-sharing system and because key FEMA and state officials who review PA applications are located in different cities. (3) Project Approvals and Appeals: FEMA's approval decisions on some projects were reversed after applicants had already moved ahead with construction. In addition, decisions on appeals were often not made within required time frames due to the large number of rebuilding projects. (4) Human Capital: Human capital challenges at all levels of government underlie many of the above challenges and also slowed rebuilding projects. Shortages of experienced and knowledgeable staff were particularly problematic during the initial stages of rebuilding. FEMA's early reliance on temporary rotating staff did not provide the level of continuity needed for the complex demands of Gulf Coast rebuilding. Among the actions DHS has taken to address these challenges are the finalization of a PA catastrophic disaster recovery concept plan that recognizes the need to more easily tailor projects to meet postdisaster conditions; the development of new management information systems to better track and manage projects and increase the transparency of PA funding; and the creation of a credentialing program for employees. |
gao_GAO-02-240 | gao_GAO-02-240_0 | Dropout Rates Changed Little in the 1990-2000 Period and Vary Considerably Between Regions and Ethnic Groups
Nationally, dropout rates changed little in the 1990-2000 period. Data compiled by NCES indicates that the percentage of 16- through 24-year-olds who were dropouts ranged between 10.9 and 12.5 percent. In one such approach, referred to as the status dropout rate, NCES measures the percentage of all persons from 16- through 24-years-old who are not enrolled in school and have not earned a high school credential, including those who never attended school in the United States. Education and private research organizations have identified two main types of factors associated with the likelihood of dropping out—one type involving family characteristics and the other involving students’ experiences in school. However, identifying students likely to drop out is not just a matter of identifying students with high-risk characteristics, because research shows that dropping out is often the culmination of a long-term process of disengagement that begins in the earliest grades. School-wide restructuring efforts are generally implemented in schools that have many students who are dropout prone. These programs provide mentoring, counseling, and health services to students, and state funds are awarded to school districts through both competitive and formula grants. Multiple Federal Programs Provide Funds That Can Be Used for Dropout Prevention
The Dropout Prevention Demonstration Program (DPDP)—funded at $5 million for fiscal year 2001—is the only federal program that has dropout prevention as its sole objective; because the program is new, the Department of Education has not yet evaluated its effectiveness.However, other federal programs are also used by local entities to provide dropout prevention services. For example, five federal programs have dropout prevention as one of their multiple objectives and several more programs—such as Safe and Drug-Free Schools and 21st Century Community Learning Centers—serve at-risk youth even though dropout prevention is not the programs’ stated goal. | What GAO Found
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports that the national status dropout rate--the percentage of 16- through 24-year olds who are not enrolled in school and who lack a high school diploma or a high school equivalency certificate--fluctuated between 10.9 and 12.5 percent between 1990 and 2000. However, dropout rates have varied considerably between regions of the country and among ethnic groups. Research has shown that dropping out it is a long-term process of disengagement that begins in the earliest grades. NCES and private research organizations have identified two factors--an individual's family and his or her experience in school--that are related to dropping out. Various state, local, and private programs are available to assist youth at risk of dropping out of school. These programs range in scope from small-scale supplementary services that target a small group of students, such as mentoring or counseling services, to comprehensive school-wide restructuring efforts that involve changing the entire school to improve educational opportunities for all students. One federal program, the Dropout Prevention Demonstration Program, is specifically targeted to dropouts, but the program is new and the Department of Education has yet to evaluate its effectiveness. In September 2001, the program awarded grants to state and local education agencies working to reduce the number of school dropouts. Other federal programs have dropout prevention as one of their multiple objectives, and many more federal programs serve at-risk youth but do not have dropout prevention as a stated program goal. |
gao_GAO-13-253 | gao_GAO-13-253_0 | Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management—have unique roles and are facing a variety of management challenges related to climate change. Four of the Five Agencies Have Developed Climate Change Adaptation Strategies and Four of the Five Sites We Visited Have Taken Steps to Address Adaptation
The Forest Service, NOAA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service have all developed a strategic direction for addressing climate change adaptation through a variety of planning documents. The agencies have also developed guidance, training, and other tools for managers to use in adapting to climate change. The one field location we visited for each agency has taken various steps to address climate change adaptation, such as conducting vulnerability assessments. The Bureau of Land Management has not developed a strategic direction for addressing climate change impacts, but it has taken some adaptation-related steps. Managers at the bureau field location we visited, absent direction from headquarters, have not taken steps to address climate change adaptation. The Forest Service Has Set a Strategic Direction, Established a Performance Goal, and Provided Tools for National Forests to Address Climate Change Adaptation
In October 2008, the Forest Service developed a strategic framework for According to the framework, addressing responding to climate change.climate change adaptation must be a central priority for the agency because many ecosystem services provided by national forests—which include water for drinking and agriculture, as well as lumber and fiber for paper—may be lost or significantly altered if national forest ecosystems are left to adapt on their own. In February 2011, the Forest Service published a document, known as “the roadmap,” which identified actions that natural resource managers in national forests were already taking or could take to implement the strategic direction outlined in the agency’s strategic framework. According to the roadmap, ongoing actions that agency natural resource managers were already taking include collaborating with scientists to assess the vulnerability of key species to climate change and re- vegetating ecosystems that had been affected by fire or other major disturbances with plant species that are better adapted to current and future climates. In 2011, the Forest Service informed national forest managers that by 2015 they are expected to address at least one of the following three areas related to climate change adaptation: (1) assessing the vulnerability of key resources—such as the availability of clean and abundant drinking water from national forest watersheds—to the impacts of climate change, (2) reducing the vulnerability of key resources to climate change, and (3) monitoring and evaluating climate change impacts and the effectiveness of adaptation activities. This is a change from August 2007, when we reported that, while officials at the Chugach National Forest recognized that climate change was harming some natural resources in the forest, they had not taken steps to incorporate climate change adaptation into planning and management in part because it was not an agency priority.Forest attributed the change to a number of factors, including the strategic direction provided by the Forest Service to address climate change adaptation. The Agencies Have Begun Using Several Mechanisms to Collaborate and Have Prepared National Adaptation Strategies and Climate Assessments
The federal natural resource management agencies we reviewed recognize that there are limits to what they can accomplish on their own and therefore are also collaborating on climate change adaptation with, among others, each other, state and local government agencies, tribes, nongovernmental organizations, and other federal agencies. In addition, agencies have collaborated in developing reports that provide cross- cutting, national strategies for addressing climate change adaptation in the federal government and national climate assessments. Federal Natural Resource Management Agencies Have Identified a Need to Collaborate on Climate Change Adaptation and Are Using Several Mechanisms to Do So
Since 2007, key federal natural resource management agencies have identified a need to collaborate on climate change adaptation to leverage funding, staff, and resources; develop common goals; develop tools and strategies to inform landscape-scale planning and management decisions; facilitate information exchange among stakeholders; and avoid duplication. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park Service. committee, was released in March 2013. The strategy also outlined goals for addressing climate change adaptation for fish, wildlife, and plants as well as strategies for addressing these goals. National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan. We received general comments from the Departments of Commerce and the Interior. We also received technical comments from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Climate change poses a variety of threats to federally managed natural resources, such as forests and wildlife, including possibly more frequent and severe droughts and wildfires. Adaptation--adjustments in natural or human systems to a new or changing environment that exploits beneficial opportunities or moderates negative effects--can be used to help manage the risks to vulnerable natural resources. GAO was asked to review federal agencies' efforts to incorporate climate change adaptation into their natural resource planning and management since GAO last reported on this issue in 2007.
This report examines (1) steps key federal natural resource management agencies--Forest Service, NOAA, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management--have taken since 2007 to address adaptation and (2) how these agencies have collaborated at the national level on adaptation since 2007. GAO analyzed the agencies' climate change adaptation guidance and planning documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO also visited one field location for each agency, selected using a nonprobability approach, so the results are not generalizable to all of the agencies' field locations.
GAO is not making any recommendations. GAO received written comments from the Department of Agriculture, which said the Forest Service agreed with the findings. GAO also received general and technical comments from the Departments of Commerce and the Interior, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, the Forest Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service have taken steps to establish strategic directions for addressing climate change adaptation. For example, the Forest Service developed a strategic framework document that established climate change adaptation as a central agency priority and another document, known as "the roadmap," which identified actions that national forest managers were taking or could take to implement the direction outlined in the framework, including re-vegetating ecosystems that had been affected by fire with plant species that are better adapted to current and future climates. These four agencies have also developed guidance, training, and other tools for managers to use in adapting to climate change. For example, the National Park Service is developing guidance for park-based climate change adaptation plans that includes steps such as identifying conservation targets and conducting vulnerability assessments. The Bureau of Land Management has not established a strategic direction for addressing climate change impacts but is planning to develop a high-level climate change adaptation strategy by the end of the summer 2013. In addition, GAO visited one field location within each agency and found that managers at four of the five locations have taken steps to address climate change adaptation. For example:
Chugach National Forest managers have begun an assessment of the vulnerability to climate change of key resources to help set priorities and identify adaptation actions. For example, the vulnerability assessment will include information on how changes in climate are likely to affect snow cover and salmon populations, as well as an analysis of how these projected changes may affect residents in the region who rely on snow-based tourism and salmon for their livelihoods.
Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary managers are beginning to assess whether parts of their management plan should be revised to address climate change adaptation and have taken actions to protect marine resources, such as coral reefs, from climate change impacts. For example, the sanctuary is collaborating with local stakeholders to develop systems and techniques to grow coral and other reef species for replanting in depleted reef systems.
Managers at the Bureau of Land Management's Kingman Resource Area, which manages its lands for livestock grazing and other uses, have not taken steps to address climate change adaptation and are awaiting agency direction.
The federal natural resource management agencies GAO reviewed are collaborating on climate change adaptation. For example, agencies are collaborating through landscape conservation cooperatives, comprising public and private organizations working to define shared goals and provide science for conservation planning, among other things. In addition, agencies have collaborated in developing national strategies for addressing climate change adaptation in the federal government. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service, NOAA, and others collaborated on a strategy, released in March 2013, for addressing climate change adaptation in managing fish, wildlife, and plants. |
gao_GAO-17-166 | gao_GAO-17-166_0 | STB has no authority to review the terms or rates for freight shipped by contract. To protect shippers served by only one railroad with no competitive shipping alternatives—known as “captive” shippers—from unreasonably high rates, STB established a process in which shippers that transport their freight by tariff could potentially challenge the reasonableness of a rail rate and seek financial relief from the railroads, a process that we refer to as a “rate-relief” process. For example, selected stakeholders said that contracts are often customized to a specific shipper and may reflect the railroad’s and shipper’s preferences for a given route or shipment. Contract and Tariff Rates Are Based on Similar Market Factors
According to representatives from the four Class I railroads we interviewed, they individually determine contract and tariff rates based on a number of similar market factors associated with the supply and demand for the commodity the shipper plans to transport. Selected shippers told us that tariff rates are usually, but not always, higher than contract rates, and sometimes are the same, in part, because contract rates, according to a railroad representative, can be negotiated and reflect market factors specific to the shipper as well as discounts for volume commitments. A shipper association said shippers can more efficiently manage multiple routes under one contract because of the stability in rates over the duration of the contract. Another railroad representative said the railroad can also provide additional logistics services at a lower cost within a contract that contains multiple routes because the economy of scale offered by a large contract allows the railroad to provide services at a lower rate due to gains in efficiency. Specifically, one railroad representative said a contract allows the railroad to allocate locomotives and rail crews more efficiently and ensure a consistent source of revenue. As a result, contracts generally include agreements on the amount of volume a shipper is willing to commit. However, some selected shippers said tariffs may provide advantages in certain situations. However, according to railroad representatives, each railroad’s business differs. Figure 3 shows the percent of selected commodities with regulated rates by ton-miles shipped under contract from 2005 through 2014. Some Selected Shippers with Fewer Shipping Options Said They Have High Rates for Some Contract Routes and Limited Recourse for Rate Relief for Tariffs
Selected Shippers with Fewer Options Said They May Have High Rates for Some Routes in Contracts
Despite the volume discounts and other advantages to contracts with multiple O-D routes, some shippers said that contracts effectively constrain them into paying higher rates on some routes, because railroads will propose contracts with multiple O-D routes where some of the routes are priced unreasonably high, in the shippers’ view. This is particularly an issue for shippers that are “captive”—that is, shippers served by a single railroad without an economically viable transportation alternative because a trucking or barge route either does not exist or would be too costly. All four railroads and the Association of American Railroads also said that railroads use differential pricing to charge the highest rate shippers are willing to pay so railroads can cover infrastructure costs. Although shippers have the option of challenging a tariff rate before the STB, they do not have this option for challenging rates they view as unfair if agreed to in a contract, since the STB has authority to review tariff rates but not contract rates. According to two of the shippers we interviewed, combining captive and competitive routes together in one large contract can create high rates on captive routes. In contrast, officials from one railroad said that the STB tariff rate-relief process prevents railroads from forcing shippers to pay unreasonable rates, even in contracts. STB is currently reviewing its rate relief process as required in the Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to STB for comment prior to finalizing this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's freight rail network is vital to the economy, moving about 40 percent of U.S. freight and generating over $73 billion in revenue in 2013. Railroads charge various rates for moving freight from a particular origin to a particular destination. A rate may be set by the railroad in a public pricing document—known as a tariff—or negotiated through a private contract with a shipper. While most freight ships under contract, some shippers have raised concerns with how railroads negotiate contracts that contain multiple origin-to-destination routes. Though shippers that use rail to transport freight under tariff may seek relief from STB for rates they view as unreasonable, STB has authority to review tariff rates, but not contract rates.
The Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to review rail transportation contract proposals containing multiple origin-to-destination routes. This report addresses (1) similarities and differences in shipping freight under a tariff versus a contract, and the potential benefits to using each, and (2) views of selected stakeholders on the implications of shipping freight under a tariff versus a contract. GAO analyzed STB data from 2005 to 2014, reviewed documents provided by and interviewed representatives of the four largest freight railroads, the Association of American Railroads, STB officials, and representatives of nine shippers selected to represent a mix of commodities transported by rail.
What GAO Found
While rail contracts and tariffs are similar, contracts offer the flexibility to customize rates and terms to a specific shipper, according to selected stakeholders GAO interviewed. Both contract and tariff rates are based on market factors, such as competition, according to representatives from the four largest U.S. freight railroads. However, they noted that in developing contract rates, a railroad will also examine factors specific to each shipper and may negotiate discounts in exchange for the shipper committing to provide a specified volume over the contract's duration. According to railroad representatives, the volume commitments negotiated in a contract allow the railroad to more efficiently allocate its resources and ensure consistent revenues. Also, selected shippers told GAO that they can more efficiently manage multiple shipping routes under one contract because of the stability in rates over the duration of the contract. In contrast, tariffs may be preferred for smaller shipments.
Despite the volume discounts contracts can offer, some selected shippers said that contracts that include rates for multiple origin-to-destination routes can contain high rates on some routes. This is particularly an issue for shippers that are “captive”—that is, shippers served by a single railroad without an economically viable transportation alternative.
Representatives of the four largest freight railroads said they charge what shippers are willing to pay to cover infrastructure costs for the entire rail network. However, according to selected shippers GAO interviewed, combining captive and non-captive routes together in one contract can compel shippers to accept some unreasonable rates. Shippers subject to contract rates they view as unreasonable cannot challenge those rates at the Surface Transportation Board (STB) because contracts are not subject to STB oversight. A railroad official said that a shipper may ask the railroad to switch rates the shipper views as unreasonable to a tariff. However, selected shippers said that tariff rates are generally higher than contract rates, so they are reluctant to forgo a contract with a mix of rates in favor of using a tariff. While the STB process for reviewing tariff rates was designed, in part, to protect captive shippers from unreasonably high rates, selected shippers said the process is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. In 2016, STB began to reform the tariff review process with the goal of improving its efficiency. |
gao_GAO-05-700 | gao_GAO-05-700_0 | This act mandated the merger of 22 federal agencies and organizations into DHS. Each directorate is responsible for its specific homeland security mission area. DHS Has Developed and Documented an Information Security Program, but Weaknesses in Implementation Remain
Since DHS became operational in March 2003, the CISO has developed and documented departmental policies and procedures that could provide a framework for implementing an agencywide information security program; however, certain DHS components had not yet fully implemented key information security practices and controls, as required by the program. These actions include development, documentation, and dissemination of DHS information security policies and procedures, strategic program plans, risk management plans, and a management directive and handbook for the components’ use in implementing the requirements of the program; establishment of Information System Security Managers and Information System Security Officers positions to implement DHS’s information security program departmentwide; documentation and issuance of specific guides to assist security managers and security officers in aligning their individual components’ information security programs with the department’s program; development of Trusted Agent FISMA and a digital dashboard as tools to aggregate and report component and department level data for enterprise management and oversight of the departmentwide information security program; Trusted Agent FISMA is an enterprise compliance and oversight tool that manages the collection and reporting of the components’ information associated with key information security practices and controls, and the digital dashboard aggregates the data collected in Trusted Agent FISMA and is used as a visual tool using a traffic light display to gauge the progress of the departmentwide information security program; and development and documentation of a departmentwide systems inventory methodology that is designed to be used to develop, maintain, and annually update an inventory of information systems operated by the department or under its control. However, we identified that risk assessments were not complete, security plans lacked required elements, test and evaluation of security controls were either not comprehensive or not performed, plans of action and milestones lacked required elements, and continuity of operations plans were not complete, lacked required elements, or had not been tested. In addition, DHS had not yet fully developed a complete and accurate information systems inventory. Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential steps in determining what controls are required and what level of resources should be expended on controls. Until DHS has a complete and accurate systems inventory, DHS will be inhibited in its ability to oversee and manage the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Management Oversight Needs Improvement
Shortfalls in executing the responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the departmentwide information security program allowed the weaknesses that we identified to occur. Conclusions
DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program, thereby jeopardizing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and information systems that it relies on to accomplish its mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated the merging of 22 federal agencies and organizations to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose mission, in part, is to protect our homeland from threats and attacks. DHS relies on a variety of computerized information systems to support its operations. GAO was asked to review DHS's information security program. In response, GAO determined whether DHS had developed, documented, and implemented a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program.
What GAO Found
DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect the information and information systems that support its operations and assets. It has developed and documented departmental policies and procedures that could provide a framework for implementing such a program; however, certain departmental components have not yet fully implemented key information security practices and controls. For example, risk assessments--needed to determine what controls are necessary and what level of resources should be expended on them--were incomplete. Elements required for information system security plans--which would provide a full understanding of existing and planned information security requirements--were missing. Testing and evaluation of security controls--which are needed to determine the effectiveness of information security policies and procedures--were incomplete or not performed. Elements required for remedial action plans--which would identify the resources needed to correct or mitigate known information security weaknesses--were missing, as were elements required for continuity of operations plans to restore critical systems in case of unexpected events. In addition, DHS had not yet fully developed a complete and accurate systems inventory. Shortfalls in executing responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the information security program allowed these weaknesses to occur. Although DHS has an organization that is responsible for overseeing the component implementation of key information security practices and controls, its primary means for doing so--an enterprisewide tool--has not been reliable. Until DHS addresses weaknesses with using the tool and implements a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program, its ability to protect its information and information systems will be limited. |
gao_GAO-04-861T | gao_GAO-04-861T_0 | Larger farming operations and farming operations producing crops with high payment rates, such as rice and cotton, may establish several related entities that are eligible to receive payments. Under the 1987 Act as amended, if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that any person has adopted a “scheme or device” to evade, or that has the purpose of evading, the act’s provisions—in other words, the payment limitations—then that person is not eligible to receive farm program payments for the year the scheme or device was adopted and the following crop year. According to FSA’s regulations, this statutory provision includes (1) persons who adopt or participate in adopting a scheme or device and (2) schemes or devices that are designed to evade or have “the effect of evading” payment limitation rules. It is not clear whether either the statutory provision or FSA’s regulations require a demonstration of fraudulent intent in order to find that someone has adopted a scheme or device. First, FSA does not review a valid sample of recipients to be reasonably assured of compliance with the payment limitations. Second, field offices do not always conduct compliance reviews in a timely manner. For one-half of the case files we reviewed for 2001, field offices did not use all available tools to determine whether persons are actively engaged in farming. In conclusion, the Farm Program Payments Integrity Act of 1987, while enacted to limit payments to individuals and entities actively engaged in farming, allows farming operations to maximize the receipt of federal farm payments as long as all recipients meet eligibility requirements. Without specifying measurable standards for what constitutes a significant contribution of active personal management, FSA allows individuals who may have had limited involvement in the farming operation to qualify for payments. Moreover, FSA is not providing adequate oversight of farm program payments under its current regulations and policies. In our report to you, we made eight recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture for improving FSA’s oversight of compliance with the 1987 Act, including: developing measurable requirements defining a significant contribution of active personal management; clarifying regulations and guidance as to what constitutes a scheme or device; improving its sampling method for selecting farming operations for review; and developing controls to ensure all available tools are used to assess compliance with the act. However, USDA stated that its current regulations are sufficient for determining active engagement in farming and assessing whether operations are schemes or devices to evade payment limitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Farmers receive about $15 billion annually in federal payments to help produce major crops, such as corn, cotton, rice, and wheat. The Farm Program Payments Integrity Act of 1987 (1987 Act) limits payments to individuals and entities--such as corporations and partnerships--that are "actively engaged in farming." This testimony is based on GAO's report, Farm Program Payments: USDA Needs to Strengthen Regulations and Oversight to Better Ensure Recipients Do Not Circumvent Payment Limitations ( GAO-04-407 , April 30, 2004). Specifically, GAO (1) determined how well USDA's regulations limit payments and (2) assessed USDA's oversight of the 1987 Act.
What GAO Found
GAO's survey of USDA's field offices showed that for the compliance reviews the offices conducted, about 99 percent of payment recipients asserted they met eligibility requirements through active personal management. However, USDA's regulations to ensure recipients are actively engaged in farming do not provide a measurable standard for what constitutes a significant contribution of active personal management. By not specifying such a measurable standard, USDA allows individuals who may have limited involvement with the farming operation to qualify for payments. Moreover, USDA's regulations lack clarity as to whether certain transactions and farming operation structures that GAO found could be considered schemes or devices to evade, or that have the purpose of evading, payment limitations. Under the 1987 Act, if a person has adopted such a scheme or device, then that person is not eligible to receive payments for the year in which the scheme or device was adopted or the following year. Because it is not clear whether fraudulent intent must be shown to find that a person has adopted a scheme or device, USDA may be reluctant to pursue the question of whether certain farming operations, such as the ones GAO found, are schemes or devices. According to GAO's survey and review of case files, USDA is not effectively overseeing farm payment limitation requirements. That is, USDA does not review a valid sample of farm operation plans to determine compliance and thus does not ensure that only eligible recipients receive payments, and compliance reviews are often completed late. As a result, USDA may be missing opportunities to recoup ineligible payments. For about one-half of the farming operations GAO reviewed for 2001, field offices did not use available tools to determine whether persons were actively engaged in farming. |
gao_GAO-02-40 | gao_GAO-02-40_0 | The budgetary impact on Hawaii is relatively smaller but can be expected to grow as Hawaii begins to absorb health care costs that were once covered by the U.S. government. Public health problems are also an important concern for all three U.S. island areas. Because the Compact allows FAS migrants who have limited financial means and ability to pay for health care to enter the United States with few restrictions, U.S. island areas are absorbing much of the health care costs of this poor population. Further, Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI can be expected to continue to experience Compact impact as long as current poor economic conditions persist in the FSM and the RMI. Targeting future U.S. assistance to the FSM and the RMI for education and health purposes could reduce some of the motivation to migrate and improvements in migrant health and education status might be expected to reduce migrant impact in U.S. destinations. These surveys captured the number and characteristics of migrants from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau in Guam (surveys for 1992 and 1997), Hawaii (survey for 1997), and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) (surveys for 1993 and 1998). | What GAO Found
Migration from the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau has had a significant impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The health and education needs of these migrants have particularly affected the budgetary resources of Guam and the CNMI. The budgetary impact on Hawaii is smaller but is expected to grow as Hawaii absorbs health care costs once covered by the U.S. government. Public health is an important concern for all three U.S. island areas. Migrants from the region with limited financial means are able to enter the United States with few restrictions, and U.S. island areas are absorbing much of the health care costs of this population. Furthermore, Guam, Hawaii, and the CNMI can be expected to continue to experience migration as long as weak economic conditions persist in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. Targeting future U.S. assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands for education and health purposes could reduce some of the motivation to migrate. Improvements in migrant health and education status might be expected to reduce immigration to U.S. destinations. |
gao_GAO-06-270 | gao_GAO-06-270_0 | As a result, agencies have established multichannel contact centers to handle these inquiries. Four of the six included a specific metric to measure contractor performance related to providing accurate information to the public, but only one of the six used all four of the oversight practices we identified—such as actively monitoring contacts—to ensure that accurate information is provided to the public. Each agency emphasized accuracy of information to varying degrees within its practices. The agencies we reviewed varied with respect to how they implemented these practices. Table 4 shows the extent to which the six agencies we reviewed employ each of the accuracy-related oversight practices. CDC plans to implement three types of postcontact customer satisfaction surveys through a third-party contractor beginning in June 2006. Although DOL, Education, and TMA review their contractor reports, they rely upon the reports without validation. Governmentwide Guidance and Information on Contact Centers Do Not Exist
The federal government does not have comprehensive, centralized guidance for operating a contact center or for overseeing a contractor- operated center. Furthermore, until recently, no governmentwide information specific to contact centers has been collected. Because of the need for governmentwide standards for operating contact centers, GSA in consultation with OMB, took the initiative to form an interagency working group to propose guidelines to OMB and other federal agencies. Table 5 lists the NAICS codes used by the five agencies reporting data to FPDS. No governmentwide procurement information was reported to FPDS using the NAICS codes for telephone call centers in fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Although officials from three of the agencies we reviewed expressed the opinion that the definition for telephone call centers is too narrow to encompass all the work performed by a contact center, OMB told us that the telephone call center code is the correct code to use. While OMB and GSA have taken initial steps to enhance the oversight of federal contact centers by gathering some information on the universe of these centers, it is not clear whether the data collected provide enough information for governmentwide oversight of contact center operations or whether GSA’s planned data collection efforts will do so either. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate the sharing of sound oversight practices for the operation of contact centers, to help ensure that providing accurate information to the public by contact centers is a priority outcome, and to improve the quality of information gathered about these centers, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget take the following actions: Building on efforts begun by the GSA-sponsored interagency committee, work with agencies to develop a mechanism for sharing performance metrics and oversight practices for contact centers. Postal Service. DOD states that standards exist in its contract related to the accuracy of information provided by telephone. This report is available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. To describe federal agencies’ efforts to ensure accurate information is provided to the public by contractor-operated centers, we reviewed the contract terms and oversight activities for one center at each of six agencies. The contact centers selected for our review are Department of Defense TriCare Management Activity (TMA) North region—Healthnet’s contact center: provides general and personalized medical benefit and coverage information and processes enrollments and claims for military families in the North region; Department of Education (Education)—Federal Student Aid Information Center: provides general information about applications and loan issues and personalized information on the status of applications and loans to the public and academic community; Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—CDC INFO contact center: provides information about health and safety issues—including prevention, detection, and outbreak control—to the public and medical professionals; Department of Labor (DOL)—National Contact Center: provides general information and referrals regarding job issues, workplace safety, and pension and health benefits to the public and employers; General Services Administration—National Contact Center: provides general information and referrals related to any agency or government program; and U.S. Reliability of Federal Procurement Data, GAO-04-295R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies have increasingly relied on contact centers--centers handling inquiries via multiple channels such as telephone, Web page, e-mail, and postal mail--as a key means of communicating with the public. Many of these centers are contractor-operated. Concerns exist about the accuracy of responses provided through contractor-operated centers. This report examines (1) the extent to which the contract terms and oversight practices for contact centers at selected agencies emphasize the importance of providing accurate information to the public, and (2) whether guidance for the operation of contact centers and basic information needed to provide general oversight exist. GAO reviewed one contractor-operated contact center at each of six agencies: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), General Services Administration (GSA), U.S. Postal Service (USPS), and the Departments of Defense, Labor, and Education (DOD, DOL, and Education).
What GAO Found
The contracts and oversight practices for the contact centers of the six agencies reviewed, which handle millions of inquiries annually, varied significantly regarding the emphasis they placed on providing accurate information to the public. Although federal policy for disseminating information to the public specifically emphasizes accuracy, only four of the six agencies include accuracy as a performance metric in their contracts. With respect to oversight, only two of the six agencies used all four of the accuracy-related oversight practices we identified--regular knowledge database reviews, regular contact monitoring, postcontact customer satisfaction surveys, and validation of contractor reports. Although each agency used some form of oversight to assess the accuracy of the information provided by its contact center, each agency differed regarding how it implemented these practices. There is no governmentwide guidance or standards for operating contact centers--including guidance on specifying accuracy as a contract performance metric or as a key focus for oversight. Some agencies indicated that had federal guidance been available, it would have helped them establish performance indicators and develop oversight policies and practices. Recognizing the need for operational standards for contact centers, an interagency working group recently proposed draft guidelines to OMB and other federal agencies, but OMB has no plans to issue these guidelines or any standards for use by agencies. Additionally, until recently the federal government had not collected data on the universe of federal contact centers. OMB and GSA attempted to collect data on the number, types, and costs of federal contact centers in 2004, but the data collected were incomplete. In addition, no governmentwide procurement information was reported to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) in fiscal years 2000 through 2004 using the reporting code for telephone call centers, which OMB said is the appropriate code for contact centers. The five agencies we reviewed that report data to FPDS used a variety of different codes, some because they believe that the telephone call center code is too narrow to cover the services of their multichannel contact centers. |
gao_GAO-07-453T | gao_GAO-07-453T_0 | Challenges to Creating an Integrated Acquisition Function at DHS
We have reported in the past on acquisition management at several components of DHS. We have also assessed the department’s overall acquisition management efforts. A common theme in these reports is DHS’s struggle, from the outset, to provide adequate procurement support to its mission components and to provide departmentwide oversight of its acquisition function. DHS has set forth a stated goal of integrating the acquisition function more broadly across the department. However, the goal has not been accomplished. Excluding certain components from complying with management directives regarding the acquisition function hampers efforts to integrate the acquisition organization. Adequate oversight of acquisition activities across DHS is imperative, in light of the department’s mission and the problems that have been reported by us and inspectors general for some of the large components within the department. We have found that investments that were not reviewed at the appropriate points faced problems—such as redesign—that resulted in cost increases and schedule delays. It is not clear how the Deepwater acquisition has been influenced by the department’s investment review process. Deepwater Program Is Illustrative of Problems Stemming from Lack of Effective Program Management and Contractor Oversight
The Deepwater program is the Coast Guard’s major effort to replace or modernize its aircraft and vessels. It has been in development for a number of years. In 2001, we described the Deepwater project as “risky” due to the unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude within the Coast Guard. ICGS—a business entity jointly owned by Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin—is a system integrator, responsible for designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and integrating the Deepwater assets to meet Coast Guard requirements. While we recognize that the Coast Guard has taken steps to address our findings and recommendations, aspects of the Deepwater program will require continued attention, such as the risk involved in the system-of-systems approach with the contractor acting as overall integrator. Program Management
In 2004, we reported that more than a year and a half into the Deepwater contract, the key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator had not been effectively implemented. For example, integrated product teams, comprised of government and contractor employees, are the Coast Guard’s primary tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor. We found that the teams had not been effective due to changing membership, understaffing, insufficient training, lack of authority for decision making, and inadequate communication among members. Despite documented problems in schedule, performance, cost control, and contract administration throughout the first year, the program executive officer awarded the contractor an overall rating of 87 percent, which fell in the “very good” range. This rating resulted in an award fee of $4.0 million of the maximum of $4.6 million. Performance and Design Problems
In addition to overall management issues discussed above, there have been problems with the design and performance of specific Deepwater assets. Additional Reviews Ongoing
Given the size of DHS and the scope of its acquisitions, we are continuing to assess the department’s acquisition oversight process and procedures in ongoing work. In addition, the conference report to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer to develop a procurement oversight plan, identifying necessary oversight resources and how improvements in the department’s performance of its procurement functions will be achieved. We will also continue to review Deepwater implementation and contract oversight. Our objectives are to review (1) the status of the development and delivery of the major aviation and maritime assets that comprise the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program; (2) the history of the contract, design, fielding, and grounding of the converted 123-foot patrol boats and operational adjustments the Coast Guard making to account for the removal from service of the 123-foot patrol boats; and (3) the status of the Coast Guard’s implementation of our 2004 recommendations on Deepwater contract management for improving Deepwater program management, holding the prime contractor accountable for meeting key program goals, and facilitating cost control through competition. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2003, GAO designated the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) implementation and transformation as high risk because of the size and complexity of the effort and the existing challenges faced by the components being merged into the department. The success of the effort to integrate numerous agencies and organizations into one cabinet-level department rests in large part on DHS's ability to effectively acquire the wide range of goods and services it needs to achieve its mission of protecting the nation from terrorism. DHS is undertaking a number of large, complex investments as the federal government increasingly relies on contractors for roles and missions previously performed by government employees. One of the department's largest investments--the Deepwater program, now estimated to cost $24 billion--is the Coast Guard's major effort to replace or modernize its aircraft and vessels. Rather than using a traditional acquisition approach, the Coast Guard is using a system integrator to design, construct, deploy, support, and integrate the Deepwater assets. In this testimony, the Comptroller General discussed (1) the overarching challenges DHS faces in establishing an effective acquisition organization, (2) GAO's prior work on Coast Guard and contractor management of the Deepwater program, and (3) the status of GAO's ongoing reviews.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported in the past on acquisition management at several components of DHS and has assessed the department's overall acquisition management and oversight efforts. A common theme in these reports is DHS's struggle, from the outset, to provide adequate support to its mission components in acquiring goods and services and to provide departmentwide oversight of its acquisition function. DHS has a stated goal of integrating the acquisition function more broadly across the department. GAO has reported that this goal has not yet been accomplished and has identified key impediments to achieving it. A management directive intended to integrate the acquisition line of business did not provide the Chief Procurement Officer with the enforcement authority needed in practice, and it does not pertain to all component agencies. Also, the procurement organizations within the department remained somewhat autonomous, and centralized acquisition oversight had not been implemented. While DHS's review process for major investments adopts some best practices, key decision-making reviews at certain points are not required. Investments that are not reviewed at the appropriate points can face a range of problems--such as redesign--resulting in significant cost increases and schedule delays. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program illustrates problems that can occur when effective program management and contractor oversight are not in place. In 2001, GAO described the Deepwater project as "risky" due to the unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude within the Coast Guard--a system-of-systems approach with the contractor as the integrator. In 2004, GAO reported that well into the contract's second year, key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator's performance had not been effectively implemented. For example, integrated product teams, comprised of government and contractor employees, are the Coast Guard's primary tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor. GAO found that the teams had not been effective due to changing membership, understaffing, insufficient training, lack of authority for decision-making, and inadequate communication among members. GAO also reported that, despite documented problems in schedule, performance, cost control, and contract administration throughout the first year of the Deepwater contract, the contractor had received a rating of 87 percent, which fell in the "very good" range and resulted in an award fee of $4.0 million. GAO's more recent work found that, while the Coast Guard had taken steps to address some of the problems, concerns remained about program management and contractor oversight. In addition to these overall management issues, there have been problems with the design and performance of specific Deepwater assets. Given the size of DHS and the scope of its acquisitions, GAO is continuing to assess the department's acquisition oversight process and procedures in ongoing work. GAO is also currently reviewing the status of the Deepwater program's implementation and contractor oversight. |
gao_GAO-09-1002T | gao_GAO-09-1002T_0 | For the department to overcome this hurdle, we emphasized the need for DHS to establish an effective IT governance framework, including controls aimed at effectively managing system acquisition and IT-related people, processes and tools. Examples of these programs are described below. However, an exit capability is not yet operational. As of June 2009, Rescue 21’s initial operating capability has been deployed and accepted at 23 of 42 regions. As of 2009, a pilot of SBInet capabilities referred to as Project 28 has been deployed and is currently operating along 28 miles of the southwest border in Tucson, Arizona. DHS Has Made Uneven Progress in Establishing Institutional Management Controls and Capabilities for Large-Scale IT Acquisitions
The department has continued to work to establish effective corporate IT and acquisition management controls and capabilities, but progress across these disciplines has been uneven, and more remains to be done. Until DHS fully institutionalizes these controls and capabilities, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively and efficiently acquire large-scale IT systems and thereby leverage technology to support transformation and achieve mission goals and results. Since 2003, DHS has issued annual updates to its EA that have improved on prior versions by adding previously missing content. Based on our research, we issued an IT investment management framework that encompasses, among other things, best practices of successful public and private sector organizations relative to selecting and controlling individual investments as well as portfolios (segments) of investments. System Life Cycle Management Process Guidance Issued, But Improvements Still Needed
Managing IT projects and programs throughout their life cycles requires applying engineering discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, integrating, testing, deploying, and maintaining IT systems and services. Our evaluations and research show that applying such rigorous management practices improves the likelihood of delivering expected capabilities on time and within budget. More specifically, we reported that DHS lacked an overall direction for acquisition workforce planning, and notwithstanding some recent actions, had not fully involved key stakeholders, such as the CHCO and component procurement and program offices, both of which have been shown to increase the likelihood of success for workforce planning; excluded some acquisition-related career fields from its definition of acquisition workforce, thus limiting the scope of its planning efforts, and while it intended to expand its definition, it had yet to identify which positions should be included; lacked sufficient data to fully assess its acquisition workforce needs, including the gaps in the number of employees needed or the skills of these employees; and lacked sufficient insight into the number of contractors supporting its acquisition function or the types of tasks that contractors were performing. For example it has not established implementation milestones, assigned stakeholder responsibilities and accountability, or begun to track, document, and report on human capital risks. Large-Scale IT Investments Exposed to Risk Because Key Acquisition and IT Management Controls Have Not Always Been Effectively Implemented
The success of a major IT program can be judged by the extent to which it delivers promised system capabilities and mission benefits on time and within schedule. CBP has largely agreed with our recommendations, and continues to work to implement many of them. To the department’s credit, it has addressed many of the recommendations that we have made for addressing these weaknesses, and as a result the program is better positioned today for success than it has been in the past. Since 2005, we have reported on a number of acquisition and investment management weaknesses, such as requirements, testing, cost and schedule estimation, and security management, and made recommendations to address them. We made a series of recommendations to address these weaknesses, including assessing SBInet development, testing, and deployment risks and disclosing them to DHS leadership and the Congress, and defining and implementing relevant system deployment, requirements management, and testing weaknesses guidance. In closing, the department has made progress in establishing key institutional acquisition and IT investment management-related controls and implementing them on large-scale programs, including its recent efforts to increase corporate oversight of major investments and its recent deployment and operation of Secure Flight. However, considerable work remains to be accomplished before the department can be considered a mature IT system acquirer and investor. For example, the department has yet to address longstanding challenges in, among other things, sufficiently defining its enterprise architecture and strategically managing its acquisition and IT workforce. Unless this changes, ongoing and future DHS major acquisitions will likely fall short in delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and on budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invested more than $6 billion in 2009 on large-scale, information technology (IT) systems to help it achieve mission outcomes and transform departmentwide operations. For DHS to effectively leverage these systems as mission enablers and transformation tools, it needs to employ a number of institutional acquisition and IT management controls and capabilities, such as using an operational and technological blueprint to guide and constrain system investments (enterprise architecture) and following institutional policies, practices, and structures for acquiring and investing in these systems. Other institutional controls and capabilities include employing rigorous and disciplined system life cycle management processes and having capable acquisition and IT management workforces. As GAO has reported, it is critical for the department to implement these controls and capabilities on each of its system acquisition programs. GAO has issued a series of reports on DHS institutional controls for acquiring and managing IT systems, and its implementation of these controls on large-scale systems. GAO was asked to testify on how far the department has come on both of these fronts, including its implementation of GAO's recommendations. To do this, GAO drew from its issued reports on institutional IT controls and IT systems, as well as our recurring work to follow up on the status of our open recommendations.
What GAO Found
Since its inception, DHS has made uneven progress in its efforts to institutionalize a framework of interrelated management controls and capabilities associated with effectively and efficiently acquiring large-scale IT systems. To its credit, it has continued to issue annual updates to its enterprise architecture that have added previously missing scope and depth, and further improvements are planned to incorporate the level of content, referred to as segment architectures, needed to effectively introduce new systems and modify existing ones. Also, it has redefined its acquisition and investment management policies, practices, and structures, including establishing a system life cycle management methodology, and it has increased its acquisition workforce. Nevertheless, challenges remain relative to, for example, implementing the department's plan for strengthening its IT human capital, and fully defining key system investment and acquisition management policies and procedures. Moreover, the extent to which DHS has actually implemented these investment and acquisition management policies and practices on major programs has been at best inconsistent, and in many cases, quite limited. For example, recent reviews by GAO show that major acquisition programs have not been subjected to executive level acquisition and investment management reviews at key milestones and have not, among other things, employed reliable cost and schedule estimating practices, effective requirements development and test management practices, meaningful performance measurement, strategic workforce management, proactive identification and mitigation of program risks, and effective contract tracking and oversight, among other things. Because of these weaknesses, major IT programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities have not lived up to expectations. For example, full deployment of the Rescue 21 "search and rescue" system had to be extended from 2006 to 2017; development and deployment of an "exit" capability under the US-VISIT program has yet to occur; and the timing and scope of an SBInet "virtual border fence" initial operating capability has been delayed and reduced from the entire southwest border to 28 miles of the border. To assist the department in addressing its institutional and system-specific challenges, GAO has made a range of recommendations. While DHS and its components have acted on many of these recommendations, and as a result have arguably made progress and improved the prospects for success on ongoing and future programs, more needs to be done by DHS's new leadership team before the department can ensure that all system acquisitions are managed with the rigor and discipline needed to consistently deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and on budget. |
gao_GAO-06-98 | gao_GAO-06-98_0 | In managing the Caldera, the Trust is to protect and preserve the land while attempting to achieve a financially self-sustaining operation. Appointees are to be selected based on their expertise or experience. The Trust Is Making Progress toward Preserving and Protecting the Caldera and Providing Recreation and Sustained Yield Management
As required under the Preservation Act, the Board has taken steps to establish and implement management policies to achieve the goals of preserving and protecting the Caldera and providing for public recreation and sustained yield management. In particular, the Board (1) established a basic organization, (2) began to address infrastructure problems, (3) granted limited access to the public through its interim grazing and recreation programs, and (4) established an adaptive management framework. Roads. Buildings, fences, and other facilities. Hiking. The Trust Has Much Work to Do to Meet Its Statutory Goals
Despite the progress made, the Trust has much work to do to meet its mandated goals under the Preservation Act. The Trust has not developed an annual performance plan with measurable goals for the activities it allows on the Caldera, which would help it determine whether it is accomplishing the overall strategic goals. The Trust Has Not Addressed Risks Potentially Posed by Fire and Legal Liabilities
The Trust has not addressed program risks, including fire and legal liabilities that could undermine its ability to meet its financial obligations. According to the National Fire Plan, agencies need a fire management plan to outline a decision-making process for responding to naturally occurring fires. For example, in May 2005, a fire on the Caldera burned about 82 acres before being suppressed—at a cost of about $338,000. In the opinion of the Forest Service Region 3 Fire Manager, this fire could have been left to burn because it did not threaten any key resources or public infrastructure. The Trust Has Not Developed Required Mechanisms for Monitoring Progress in Meeting Financial and Other Goals
The Trust has yet to develop the mechanisms needed to monitor progress in meeting its financial and other obligations under the Preservation, Control, and Results Acts. The Trust has also experienced high turnover among key staff. To establish a more effective management control program, we recommend that the Board develop a strategic and performance plan that identifies measurable goals and objectives for protecting and preserving the Caldera, providing recreation, sustaining yield, and becoming financially self-sustaining; a plan for becoming financially self-sustaining that includes financial information detailing how and when the Trust will try to achieve this goal; mechanisms for periodic performance monitoring and reporting, including annual performance reports that enable Congress and the Trust to track progress in achieving the Trust’s program goals and objectives; and a plan for the timely replacement of key personnel. Comments from the Valles Caldera Trust
Guiding Principles of the Valles Caldera Trust
1. Future generations. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, Congress authorized the purchase of the Valles Caldera (the Caldera) in north-central New Mexico. The Valles Caldera Trust (Trust), a wholly owned government corporation, is to become financially self-sustaining and to manage the Caldera for multiple purposes while sustaining the land's valuable natural resources. GAO was mandated to assess the progress the Trust is making in meeting its statutory goals.
What GAO Found
The Trust has made progress in meeting its goals to preserve and protect the Caldera for future generations as well as to provide for public recreation and sustained yield management. Specifically, it has (1) established a basic organization with about 25 staff; (2) drafted policy and procedures and contracted with the Department of the Interior's National Business Center for accounting services; (3) begun engineering and construction efforts to address infrastructure problems--roads, water systems, fences, and buildings; (4) established interim grazing and recreation programs; and (5) implemented an adaptive management approach that focuses on making management decisions based on scientific data. The Trust, however, still has much work to do to meet its goals, including achieving a financially self-sustaining operation. Strategic and performance plans with measurable goals and objectives: For example, the Trust must decide on the level of activities (e.g., grazing, hiking, and hunting) that will be allowed without seriously harming the land's resources, and yet will still provide sufficient recreational activity and sustained yield management. The Trust also must select additional opportunities for generating revenues, such as securing private donations. Plans to manage program risks: The Trust has not addressed program risks, including fire and legal liabilities. For example, the Trust lacks a fire plan, which would outline a decision-making process for responding to fires, and has not obtained liability coverage. Because it did not have a fire plan, the Trust spent about $338,000 in May 2005 to suppress a fire, which, in the opinion of the Forest Service Region 3 Fire Manager, could have been left to burn because the fire did not threaten any key resources or public infrastructure. Also, because it has not obtained liability coverage, the Trust has restricted the number of Caldera visitors. Mechanisms for monitoring progress: Among other things, the Trust has not had annual financial audits and has not prepared performance reports that would help it assess its progress toward meeting its financial and other goals. The Trust's efforts to raise the revenues needed to bring it closer to meeting its financial self-sustainability goal could be undermined by one or more of these issues. Frequent turnover in Board members and key staff has contributed to the problems experienced to date. |
gao_GAO-15-771 | gao_GAO-15-771_0 | 2). Effect of E-cigarette Use on Cigarette Federal Excise Tax Revenue Is Not Currently Evident
No Current Evidence That E-cigarette Use Has Affected Cigarette FET Revenue
Our analysis of Treasury data on cigarette FET revenue found no current evidence that e-cigarette use has affected the historical decreasing trend in FET collections over the past 6 years. We used a time series regression to determine the change in cigarette FET revenue from April 2009, when the last increase in FET on cigarettes and other tobacco products became effective, through December 2014. 3). First, the e-cigarette market— estimated at $2.5 billion in sales in 2014—is relatively small compared with the cigarette market, which had $80 billion in sales in the same year. Third, comprehensive and reliable data about the extent to which e-cigarettes are used as substitutes for cigarettes are also not available. Relationship between Use of E-cigarettes and Cigarettes Could Determine E-cigarettes’ Effect on Cigarette FET Revenue
How consumers’ use of e-cigarettes relates to their use of cigarettes— whether e-cigarettes are substitutes, complements, or unrelated—may determine any effect of e-cigarette use on cigarette FET revenue. The most recent data from the National Youth Tobacco Survey by CDC and FDA showing high school students’ increasing use of e-cigarettes and decreasing use of cigarettes (see fig. A continued decline in cigarette smoking among high school students—which could be due, in part, to increased use of e-cigarettes—would reduce cigarette FET revenue at a greater rate than the average historical trend. Comprehensive Data on E-cigarette Quantities and Prices Are Not Available from Federal Agencies
Treasury and FDA Do Not Collect Data on E- cigarette Quantities Comparable to Data Collected for Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products
Treasury and FDA do not collect data on quantities of e-cigarettes on the U.S. market, and we did not identify any other federal agencies that do so. Under this authority, in April 2014 FDA proposed to deem additional products, including e-cigarettes, to be subject to its tobacco product regulation. Treasury collects data on quantities of cigarettes and other federally taxed tobacco products from domestic manufacturers of these products, but does not collect such data for e-cigarettes, because the IRC does not define or list a tax rate for e-cigarettes. Bureau of Labor Statistics Has Begun to Collect Limited E-cigarette Price Data
The Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) began collecting limited e-cigarette price information in September 2014 as part of its ongoing data collection for the Consumer Price Index. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which (1) use of electronic cigarettes (also known as e-cigarettes) affects federal excise tax (FET) revenue from cigarettes and (2) data on quantities and prices of e-cigarettes on the U.S. market are available from federal agencies. To address these objectives, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau and Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to obtain information and views about e-cigarette and tobacco sales and revenue trends and regulation. To describe FDA’s collection of data on quantities of tobacco products regulated by the agency, we examined FDA’s regulatory actions, including its April 2014 proposed rule to deem additional products, including e-cigarettes, to be subject to the agency’s tobacco product authorities, and the July 2014 final user fee rule, and we interviewed cognizant FDA officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
While use of traditional cigarettes in the United States continues to decline, use of e-cigarettes is increasing. Treasury collects FET on cigarettes and other tobacco products manufactured in the United States. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, does not specifically define or list a tax rate for e-cigarettes. The decline in cigarette use has led to a decline in cigarette FET revenue, from $15.3 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $13.2 billion in fiscal year 2014. FDA currently regulates four tobacco products. In April 2014, FDA proposed to deem additional tobacco products, including e-cigarettes, subject to its tobacco product authorities.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to the U.S. e-cigarette market. This report examines the extent to which (1) e-cigarette use affects cigarette FET revenue, and (2) data on quantities and prices of e-cigarettes on the U.S. market are available from federal agencies.
GAO conducted a regression analysis to assess the effect of e-cigarette use on cigarette FET revenue from April 2009 through December 2014, using Treasury data on FET revenue from cigarettes. GAO also reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency officials and industry experts.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis found no evidence that use of electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) has affected federal excise tax (FET) revenue from traditional cigarettes, which has been declining over time (see figure). Possible reasons for the lack of a detectable effect include the small size of the e-cigarette market (estimated at $2.5 billion in 2014) relative to the cigarette market ($80 billion in the same year); lack of comprehensive and reliable data on e-cigarette quantities and prices; and lack of comprehensive and reliable information about the extent to which e-cigarettes substitute for cigarettes. If users consume e-cigarettes instead of cigarettes, cigarette FET revenue would decline as fewer cigarettes are consumed. Data from a recent survey by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing high school students' increasing use of e-cigarettes and decreasing use of cigarettes suggest that these students may substitute e-cigarettes for cigarettes to some extent. If the percentage of high school students using cigarettes continues to decline, cigarette FET revenue could also decrease at a greater rate than the average historic trend observed since April 2009, when FET on cigarettes and other tobacco products was last increased.
Comprehensive data on e-cigarette quantities and prices are not available from federal agencies. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) do not collect data on e-cigarette quantities comparable to data that they collect for cigarettes and some other tobacco products. According to FDA officials, if e-cigarettes are deemed subject to FDA's tobacco product authorities as a result of a rule proposed in April 2014, the agency could start collecting some data on the types of e-cigarettes on the U.S. market but will not collect data on the quantities of e-cigarettes sold. The Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting data on e-cigarette prices in September 2014 as part of its data collection for the Consumer Price Index, but these data are limited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-05-1017T | gao_GAO-05-1017T_0 | The “One VA” vision is to create versatile new ways for veterans to obtain services and information by streamlining interactions with customers and integrating IT resources to enable VA employees to help customers more quickly and effectively. However, fully exploiting this potential presents challenges to agencies. Despite substantial IT investments, the federal government’s management of information resources has produced mixed results. One of the ways in which the Congress has addressed this issue was to establish the CIO position; an agency’s CIO serves as the focal point for information and technology management within an agency. Among these responsibilities, the Clinger-Cohen act required that the CIOs in the 24 major departments and agencies have IRM as their “primary duty.”
The view of the Congress as reflected in current law is thus that CIOs should play a key leadership role in ensuring that agencies manage their information functions in a coordinated and integrated fashion in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and operations. In July 2004, we interviewed 27 CIOs at major agencies on their roles, responsibilities, and challenges, among other things. For example: ● All the CIOs were responsible for five areas (capital planning and investment management, enterprise architecture, information security, IT/IRM strategic planning, and IT workforce planning). In carrying out their responsibilities, CIOs generally reported to their agency heads. According to members of our Executive Council on Information Management and Technology, what is most critical is for the CIO to report to a top level official. Tenure and Backgrounds of CIOs
Federal CIOs often remained in their positions for less than the length of time that some experts consider necessary for them to be effective and implement changes. At the major departments and agencies included in our review, the median time in the position of permanent CIOs whose time in office had been completed was about 23 months. To the question of how long a CIO needed to stay in office to be effective, the most common response of the CIOs (and former agency IT executives whom we consulted) was 3 to 5 years. In contrast, the CIOs interviewed for our report were generally helped in carrying out their responsibilities by the background and experience they brought to the job. Moreover, most of the them had business knowledge related to their agencies because they had previously worked at the agency or had worked in an area related to the agency’s mission. Success Factors and Challenges of CIOs
To allow CIOs to serve effectively in the key leadership role envisioned by the Congress, federal agencies must use the full potential of CIOs as information and technology management leaders and active participants in the development of the agency’s strategic plans and policies. ● Effective CIOs have legitimate and influential roles in leading top managers to apply IT to business problems and needs. In particular, CIOs view IT governance processes, funding, and human capital as critical to their success, as indicated by two challenges that were cited by over 80 percent of the CIOs: implementing effective information technology management and obtaining sufficient and relevant resources. ● Effective IT management. Roles and Responsibilities of the CIO Position at VA Have Evolved over Time
Since enactment of the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1996, the roles and responsibilities of VA’s Chief Information Officer have evolved. Noting that VA’s structure was decentralized, its IT budget was large, and its CIO faced serious information and technology management issues, we recommended that the Secretary appoint a CIO with full-time responsibilities for IRM. Among these challenges was that information systems and services were highly decentralized, and the VA administrations and staff offices controlled a majority of the department’s IT budget. ● Beginning in fiscal year 2003, the department-level CIO would assume executive authority over VA’s IT funding. In our view, the realignment of VA’s IT organization proposed in 2002 held promise for improving accountability and enabling the department to accomplish its mission. The additional oversight afforded the CIO could have a significant impact on the department’s ability to more effectively account for and manage its proposed $2.1 billion in planned IT spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out VA's mission of serving the nation's veterans and their dependents, the agency relies extensively on information technology (IT), for which it is requesting about $2.1 billion in fiscal year 2006. VA's vision is to integrate its IT resources and streamline interactions with customers, so that it can provide services and information to veterans more quickly and effectively. Fully exploiting the potential of IT to improve performance is a challenging goal for VA, as it is throughout government. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 addressed this challenge by, among other things, establishing the position of chief information officer (CIO) to serve as the focal point for information and technology management within departments and agencies. The Committee requested that GAO discuss the role of CIOs in the federal government, as well as provide a historical perspective on the roles and responsibilities of VA's CIO. In developing this testimony, GAO relied on its previous work at VA as well as on the CIO role across government, including a 2004 review of CIOs at major departments and agencies.
What GAO Found
CIOs play a critical role in managing information and technology within federal agencies. According to GAO's 2004 review, CIOs generally held wide responsibilities and reported to their agency heads or other top level managers. In general, CIOs reported that they were responsible for key information and technology management areas; for example, all the CIOs were responsible for five key areas (capital planning and investment management, enterprise architecture, information security, strategic planning for information technology and information resource management, and information technology workforce planning). However, in carrying out their responsibilities, the tenure of federal CIOs was often less than the length of time that some experts consider necessary for them to be effective and implement changes: the median tenure was about 2 years, and the most common response regarding time required to be effective was 3 to 5 years. In contrast, CIOs were generally helped in carrying out their responsibilities by the background and experience they brought to the job: most had background in information technology (IT) or related fields, and many also had business knowledge related to their agencies. Other factors that help CIOs meet their responsibilities include (1) being supported by senior executives who recognize the importance to their missions of IT and an effective CIO; (2) playing an influential role in applying IT to business needs; and (3) being able to structure their organizations appropriately. At the same time, CIOs cited several challenges, of which the two most frequently mentioned were implementing effective IT management and obtaining sufficient and relevant resources. Over time, the CIO position at VA, as well as information and technology management as a whole, has received increased attention at the department. After several years with CIOs whose primary duty was not information and technology management or who were serving in an acting capacity, the department appointed a full-time permanent CIO in August 2001. In 2002, the department proposed further strengthening the position and centralizing IT management, recognizing that aspects of its computing environment were particularly challenging and required substantial management attention. In particular, the department's information systems and services were highly decentralized, and a large proportion of the department's IT budget was controlled by the VA's administrations and staff offices. To address these challenges, the Secretary issued a memo in 2002 announcing that IT functions, programs, and funding would be centralized under the department-level CIO. This realignment held promise for improving accountability and enabling the department to accomplish its mission. The additional oversight afforded the CIO could have a significant impact on the department's ability to more effectively account for and manage its IT spending. |
gao_GAO-10-506T | gao_GAO-10-506T_0 | FPS Faces Challenges in Protecting Federal Facilities
FPS’s Ability to Manage Risk Across Facilities and Implement Security Countermeasures Is Limited
FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies; however, FPS’s ability to use risk management to influence the allocation of resources is limited because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies—in the form of Facility Security Committees (FSC)—who have at times been unwilling to fund the countermeasures FPS recommends. Compounding this situation, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to risk management, using an outdated risk assessment tool to create facility security assessments (FSA), rather than taking a more comprehensive, strategic approach and assessing risks among all buildings in GSA’s inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. FPS Has Experienced Difficulty Ensuring That It Has Sufficient Staff, and Its Inspector-Based Workforce Approach Raises Questions About Protection of Federal Facilities
While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally mandated staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees, FPS has experienced difficulty determining its optimal staffing level to protect federal facilities. Prior to this mandate, FPS’s staff was steadily declining and, as a result, critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. Insufficient Oversight and Inadequate Training of Contract Guards Has Hampered FPS’s Protection of Federal Facilities
FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a GSA building. We also reported in July 2009, that FPS guards had not received adequate training to conduct their responsibilities. In addition, we also found that some guards were not provided building- specific training, such as what actions to take during a building evacuation or a building emergency. This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected their assigned responsibilities. GSA Has Not Been Satisfied With FPS’s Performance and Some Tenant Agencies Are Unclear On FPS’s Role In Protecting Federal Facilities
We found that GSA—the owner and lessee of many FPS protected facilities—has not been satisfied with the level of service FPS has provided since FPS transferred to DHS. For example, according to GSA officials, FPS has not been responsive and timely in providing assessments for new leases. About one-third of FPS’s customers indicated that they were satisfied with FPS’s level of communication, one-third were neutral or dissatisfied, while the remaining one-third could not comment on how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS’s level of communication on various topics including building security assessments, threats to their facility, and security guidance This response that suggests that the division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its customers is unclear. FPS Is Taking Steps to Better Protect Federal Facilities
Over the past 5 years, we have conducted a body of work reviewing the operations of FPS and its ability to adequately protect federal facilities and we have made numerous recommendations to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent events including last month's attack on Internal Revenue Service offices in Texas, and the January 2010 shooting in the lobby of the Nevada, federal courthouse demonstrate the continued vulnerability of federal facilities and the safety of the federal employees who occupy them. These events also highlight the continued challenges involved in protecting federal real property and reiterate the importance of protecting the over 1 million government employees, as well as members of the public, who work in and visit the nearly 9,000 federal facilities. This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies and discusses challenges Federal Protective Service (FPS) faces in protecting federal facilities and tenant agencies' perspective of FPS's services. To perform this work, GAO visited a number of federal facilities, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed documents, and interviewed officials from several federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Over the past 5 years GAO has reported that FPS faces a number of operational challenges protecting federal facilities, including: (1) FPS's ability to manage risk across federal facilities and implement security countermeasures is limited. FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to the General Services Administration (GSA) and its tenant agencies, however decisions to implement these countermeasures are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies who have at times been unwilling to fund the countermeasures. Additionally, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to risk management, rather than taking a more comprehensive, strategic approach and assessing risks among all buildings in GSA's inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. (2) FPS has experienced difficulty ensuring that it has sufficient staff and its inspector-based workforce approach raises questions about protection of federal facilities. While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally mandated staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees, FPS has experienced difficulty determining its optimal staffing level to protect federal facilities. Additionally, until recently FPS's staff was steadily declining and as a result critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. (3) FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal facility. GAO found that FPS guards had not received adequate training to conduct their responsibilities. Specifically, some guards were not provided building-specific training, such as what actions to take during a building evacuation or a building emergency. This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected their assigned responsibilities. GSA has not been satisfied with FPS's performance, and some tenant agencies are unclear on FPS's role in protecting federal facilities. According to GSA, FPS has not been responsive and timely in providing security assessments for new leases. About one-third of FPS's customers could not comment on FPS's level of communication on various topics including security assessments, a response that suggests that the division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its customers is unclear. FPS is taking some steps to better protect federal facilities. For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program and has recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program. |
gao_GAO-16-271 | gao_GAO-16-271_0 | Part of EDA’s mission is to support economic development by promoting innovation, global competitiveness, and regional collaboration. EDA Has Taken A Number of Steps to Implement the ITM Program, but Key Tasks Remain Before Loan Guarantees Can Be Issued
Since our 2013 report on the ITM program, EDA has made progress on implementing the program, but several key tasks remain to be completed before EDA can issue loan guarantees. As of November 2015, key tasks remain in developing the program, and EDA officials expect they could begin issuing loan guarantees for the ITM program as early as July 2016. EDA officials stated that the most significant of the remaining key tasks are finalizing the ITM program regulations, manuals, and forms. EDA Has Coordinated with Other Agencies on Some Issues, but Has Not Clearly Differentiated ITM from Other Programs
EDA has coordinated with other federal agencies to learn from their experiences with loan guarantee programs, but as currently designed, EDA has not clearly differentiated the ITM program from other comparable programs that we identified. EDA officials said they reached out to officials from SBA, USDA, and DOE—agencies that have loan guarantee programs comparable to the ITM program—to learn from their experiences and identify practices that could be incorporated into the ITM program. Based on what they learned, EDA officials said they decided to largely model the ITM program after the 7(a) program. EDA’s coordination with other agencies has helped avoid duplication of the effort those agencies have already expended in designing loan guarantee programs. SBA’s 7(a) program, USDA’s Business and Industry Loans program, USDA’s Biorefinery, Renewable Chemical, and Biobased Product Manufacturing Assistance program, and DOE’s Federal Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies program already provide loan guarantees to a similar pool of borrowers as those eligible for the ITM program, with roughly equivalent limitations. As required by COMPETES 2010, small and medium- sized manufacturers are to be eligible for the ITM program. EDA officials acknowledged that the ITM program is potentially duplicative with other federal loan guarantee programs in a number of respects. However, as discussed, COMPETES 2010 directs the Secretary of Commerce to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that the activities carried out under the ITM program are coordinated with, and do not duplicate, the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. GAO’s fragmentation, overlap, and duplication analysis guide states that one way to help minimize duplication among government programs is to identify and target service gaps that the programs could fill. A 2011 study commissioned by MEP about the capital access needs of small and medium-sized manufacturers identified several capital access gaps resulting in potentially underserved populations for federal loan guarantees. Coordinating more extensively on targeting marketing materials and outreach efforts to potential applicants in need of access to capital could give EDA greater assurance that ITM program loan guarantees will not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. COMPETES 2010 directed the establishment of the ITM program to help small and medium-sized manufacturers gain access to the capital they need for the use or production of innovative technologies. Working with SBA and NIST to examine how the ITM program could fill capital access gaps not filled by other federal programs, and then marketing the program to target those gaps could help EDA ensure, as COMPETES 2010 directs, that ITM program activities do not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that the activities carried out under the ITM program do not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs, such as SBA’s 7(a) program, the Secretary of Commerce should direct EDA to work with SBA and NIST to further identify any gaps in capital access that may be present that the program could fill, and then develop marketing materials and conduct outreach to help target those gaps. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy; Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and Administrator of the Small Business Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help small and medium-sized manufacturers obtain the capital they need to develop innovative technologies and remain competitive, COMPETES 2010 directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish the ITM program. When implemented, the program is to provide loan guarantees to small and medium-sized manufacturers for the use or production of innovative technologies. Under COMPETES 2010, Commerce must ensure that activities carried out under the ITM program do not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. Commerce's EDA is responsible for implementing the program.
COMPETES 2010 also included a provision for GAO to biennially review the program. This report assesses (1) the status of EDA's implementation of the ITM program and (2) the extent to which EDA has coordinated with other agencies to ensure that ITM program activities do not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. GAO analyzed applicable laws and program documents, interviewed EDA officials and contractor staff, and interviewed officials from agencies with comparable loan guarantee programs or with other expertise about the needs of small and medium-sized manufacturers.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) has taken a number of steps to implement the Federal Loan Guarantees for Innovative Technologies in Manufacturing (ITM) program, but several key tasks remain before EDA can issue loan guarantees. EDA hired a contractor to assist with developing the program, drafted program documents and published them in the Federal Register for comment, and submitted documents to the Office of Management and Budget for review, as required when creating new federal credit programs. EDA officials said the most significant of the remaining key tasks are finalizing the ITM program regulations, manuals, and forms. Other key tasks remaining include hiring additional staff, finalizing the requirements for the program's information technology systems, developing marketing materials, and conducting outreach. As of November 2015, EDA officials expected they could begin issuing ITM program loan guarantees as early as July 2016.
EDA has coordinated with other federal agencies to learn from their experiences with loan guarantee programs, but EDA has not clearly differentiated ITM from other programs, which may result in duplication.
Coordination. EDA officials said they reached out to officials from the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, and the Small Business Administration (SBA)—agencies that have loan guarantee programs comparable to the ITM program—to learn from their experiences. EDA officials decided to largely model the ITM program after an SBA program that provides loan guarantees to small businesses, and they adapted or plan to adapt the SBA program's application forms, and regulations, among other things. EDA's coordination has helped avoid duplication of the effort those agencies have already expended in designing loan guarantee programs.
Potential duplication. As currently designed, the ITM program is not clearly differentiated from SBA's program or from other programs that already provide loan guarantees to a similar pool of borrowers. EDA officials acknowledged that the ITM program is potentially duplicative with other programs in a number of respects. However, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (COMPETES 2010) directs the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that the activities carried out under the ITM program are coordinated with, and do not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs. GAO's fragmentation, overlap, and duplication analysis guide states that one way to help minimize duplication among government programs is to identify and target service gaps that the programs could fill. In 2011, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) identified several gaps in capital access for small and medium-sized manufacturers, including gaps companies face in early stages of growth. However, in coordinating with SBA and NIST, EDA did not seek information on how the ITM program could target these capital access gaps to minimize duplication with other programs. Coordinating more extensively with SBA and NIST on targeting the ITM program could provide EDA with greater assurance that ITM loan guarantees will not duplicate the efforts of other federal loan guarantee programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EDA work with SBA and NIST to further identify any gaps in capital access that the program could fill, and conduct outreach to help target those gaps. Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-972 | gao_GAO-12-972_0 | Justice and Treasury Have Shown Limited Progress since 2003 in Consolidating Asset Forfeiture Property Management Activities
Since 2003, Justice and Treasury have taken some steps to explore coordinating forfeiture program efforts, including sharing a website for posting notifications, pursuing a contract for seizure efforts abroad, and potentially sharing recycling facilities. However, the departments have made limited progress in sharing storage facilities or contracts, and Justice and Treasury have not fully explored the possibility of coordinating the management of their assets that could be consolidated to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost savings. Some Efforts Have Been Made or Are Under Way to Coordinate Forfeiture Activities but the Departments Continue to Maintain Separate Programs
In 2003, we reported that Justice’s and Treasury’s progress in improving the management of and accountability for seized and forfeited property, and their demonstrated commitment to communicate and coordinate where joint efforts could help reduce costs and eliminate duplicative activities, were sufficient to remove the high-risk designation from the asset forfeiture programs. For example, the study recommended sharing fixed-cost vehicle storage facilities and jointly disposing of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft. As a result, the departments continue to separately manage and dispose of their seized and forfeited property. According to Justice and Treasury officials, when Congress passed a law establishing the TFF in 1992, it recognized the differences in the programs’ missions, which warranted creating separate programs, and this encouraged independent operational decisions that eventually created differences between the two programs. We recognize the separate legal authorities of the asset forfeiture funds, but those legal authorities do not preclude coordinating more or consolidating certain asset management activities within the programs that we have found to be duplicative over the years across the federal government. Justice and Treasury maintain four separate IT asset tracking systems— one for Justice and three for Treasury—to support their respective asset forfeiture program activities, and these four tracking systems have similar functionality. Justice and Treasury have made limited progress in sharing storage facilities or contracts and continue to separately store assets seized under each program. In some cases, storage facilities are located in the same geographic area. In fiscal year 2011, the Marshals Service had multiple contracts for the management, storage, and disposal of assets at a cost of about $19 million. While there are some variations in the types of properties seized, both departments also seize similar assets such as vehicles and real property. Conducting a study that assesses the feasibility of consolidation, including the costs, benefits, and key questions to consider when evaluating consolidation, would better position Justice and Treasury to determine if consolidation would result in increases in efficiency, effectiveness, or cost savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given that information is needed to determine the feasibility of consolidating potentially duplicative Justice and Treasury asset forfeiture management activities, we recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury conduct a study to determine the feasibility of consolidating asset management activities including, but not limited to, the use of asset tracking systems and the sharing of vendor and contract resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Both Justice and Treasury operate separate asset forfeiture programs that are designed to prevent and reduce crime through the seizure and forfeiture of assets that represent the proceeds of, or were used to facilitate, federal crimes. Annually, participating agencies within Justice and Treasury seize millions of dollars in assets as a result of their law enforcement activities. In fiscal year 2011, the combined value of assets in these two programs was about $9.4 billion. Beginning in 1988 and through 2003, Congress and GAO have called on Justice and Treasury to consolidate management activities between their programs. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which Justice and Treasury have assessed and acted on opportunities to coordinate or consolidate forfeiture property management activities since 2003 to reduce any duplication and achieve cost savings. GAO interviewed officials to determine actions under way or completed to consolidate their management activities. GAO also analyzed IT asset tracking systems functions and the geographic proximity of contracted facilities that store vehicles, vessels, and aircraft.
What GAO Found
Since 2003, the Departments of Justice (Justice) and the Treasury (Treasury) have taken some steps to explore coordinating forfeiture program efforts, including sharing a website for posting notifications and pursuing a contract for seizure efforts abroad. However, limited progress has been made to consolidate the management of their assets. According to department officials, when Congress established the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in 1992, it recognized the differences in the programs' missions, which warranted creating separate programs, and this encouraged independent operational decisions that eventually created differences between the programs. There are some differences between the programs, but both departments seize similar assets such as vehicles. Nevertheless, the departments have not assessed the feasibility of consolidation, including whether such efforts would be cost-effective, and continue to duplicate efforts by separately managing and disposing of their seized and forfeited property. Specifically, Justice and Treasury maintain four separate information technology (IT) asset tracking systems, which perform similar functions to support their respective asset forfeiture program activities. In addition, both departments procure separate national contracts for the management of real property and they separately store assets seized under each program that are in some cases located within the same geographic area. For example, both the United States Marshals Service (Marshals)--the primary custodian of Justice's seized assets--and Treasury maintain vehicle storage facilities, 40 percent of which are within 20 miles of each other. GAO recognizes the separate legal authorities of the asset forfeiture funds, but those authorities do not preclude consolidating certain management activities within the programs. Conducting a study to evaluate the feasibility of consolidation that considers associated costs and benefits, among other things, could help Justice and Treasury effectively identify the extent to which consolidation would help increase efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Justice and Treasury conduct a study to evaluate the feasibility, costs, and benefits of consolidating their asset management activities. Justice and Treasury concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GGD-99-26 | gao_GGD-99-26_0 | For the purposes of this review, we focused on the cluster-level EAS workforce. Our analysis showed that the representation of women and all minority groups among those promoted was higher than the representation of women and minority groups in EAS 17 and above positions, with the exception of Asian women. Also, white men were promoted at a rate lower than their representation at the headquarters and area office levels. Observations on Methodologies Used in Aguirre Study
Based on our own standards for designing studies and developing methodologies to evaluate programs, we believe that the methodologies used by Aguirre International were generally reasonable, appropriate, and relevant given the established study parameters, including the 6-month time frame in which the study was to be completed and the complexities associated with addressing the sensitive issue of diversity in an organization as large as the Postal Service. Service Developed 23 Initiatives to Address Aguirre Report’s Major Issues and Recommendations
The Service developed 23 initiatives designed to improve its diversity program and address what it believed to be the Aguirre report’s major issues, concerns, and recommendations. Service officials also told us that they expected the monitoring process to be operational by the spring of 1999 and that, consequently, the scopes, completion dates, and implementation status for some of the initiatives could change. According to the Service, methods to evaluate and measure success will be completed no later than March 30, 1999. Relative to their representation in the CLF, several specific EEO groups were fully represented, while others were underrepresented. However, Aguirre’s finding that a glass ceiling appeared to exist at positions beginning at EAS 17 could be misleading. The Service has developed diversity goals and objectives, and now that its Diversity Business Plan has been approved, is in the process of developing specific targets and measures for assessing its progress in meeting its goals and objectives. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report, which follows our previous letter on selected promotions of women and minorities to Executive and Administrative Schedule (EAS) management-level positions, provides (1) information about the overall extent to which women and minorities have been promoted to or are represented in EAS management-level positions in the Postal Service; (2) our observations on the methodology used by a private contractor, Aguirre International, to study workforce diversity at the U.S. Postal Service; (3) the status of the Service’s efforts to address the recommendations in the Aguirre report; and (4) our analysis of whether the Service could better capture and use data to achieve its diversity objectives. Women and Minority Representation in the Cluster, Headquarters, and Area Office Workforces
Women and Minority Representation at the Service’s Three Workforce Levels
The following tables present information on women and minority representation at the three Service workforce levels—the cluster, headquarters, and area office levels—and includes the following comparisons for women and minorities: representation at the three workforce levels as of the end of fiscal year 1997 compared with their representation in the 1990 CLF (table II.1); changes in women and minority representation at EAS 17 and above positions at the three workforce levels for fiscal years 1993 and 1997 (table II.2); promotions to EAS 17 and above positions as of the end of fiscal year 1997 compared with women and minority representation in those positions at all three workforce levels during fiscal year 1997 before the promotions (table II.3); and women and minority representation in EAS 17 and above positions compared with their representation in EAS 11 through 16 positions (table II.4). Among area office employees, Hispanic men and Asian and Native American men and women fared better while black men, similar to black and Hispanic women, were less well represented in EAS 17 and above positions compared with the EAS 11 through 16 positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the promotion of women and minorities to high-level Executive and Administrative Schedule (EAS) management positions (EAS 17 and above) in the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), focusing on: (1) the overall extent to which women and minorities have been promoted to or are represented in EAS 17 and above positions in USPS; (2) GAO's observations on the methodology used by a private contractor, Aguirre International, to study workforce diversity at USPS; (3) the status of USPS' efforts to address the recommendations contained in the Aguirre report; and (4) GAO's analysis of whether USPS could better capture and use data to achieve its diversity objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) at the end of fiscal year (FY) 1997, black and Asian men and women and Hispanic men were fully represented while Hispanic women, Native American men and women, and white women were underrepresented in USPS at the cluster level when compared with the civilian labor force; (2) representation of women and minorities at the cluster level in EAS 17 and above positions increased between fiscal years (FY) 1993 and 1997, with the exception of black men whose representation decreased; (3) in FY 1997, women and all minority groups, except Asian women, at the cluster lever were promoted to EAS 17 and above positions at higher rates than women and minority groups were represented in those EAS positions; (4) despite this progress, the overall representation of women and minorities at the cluster level in EAS 17 and above positions was almost 20 percent lower than their representation in EAS 11 through 16 positions at the end of (FY) 1997; (5) similar comparisons at the headquarters and area office workforce levels showed some variations regarding the representation of specific equal employment opportunity (EEO) groups; (6) GAO believes that the methodologies used by Aguirre International were generally reasonable, appropriate, and relevant given the parameters established for the study and the complexities surrounding the sensitive issue of diversity in such a large organization; (7) however, GAO believes that Aguirre's finding of a glass ceiling beginning at EAS 17 positions could be misleading; (8) USPS reviewed the Aguirre report and developed 23 initiatives that it believed addresses the report's major issues and recommendations; (9) USPS believes its 23 initiatives will significantly strengthen its diversity program and address most of Aguirre's concerns; (10) USPS believes that it is generally on or ahead of its schedule for implementing these initiatives; (11) by the spring of 1999, USPS plans to create an ongoing monitoring process to ensure full implementation of its initiatives, which will result in revised scopes, completion dates, and implementation status for some of the initiatives; (12) USPS has recently developed broad goals and objectives for its diversity program, but it has not yet established specific targets and measures for determining its progress toward meeting its diversity goals and objectives; and (13) USPS officials said that specific targets and measures would be established no later than March 30, 1999. |
gao_GAO-02-119 | gao_GAO-02-119_0 | To administer these islands, the United Nations created the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1947. It also noted that it would be unwise to assume that the end of the Cold War has lessened the strategic importance of Micronesia to U.S. interests. U.S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands
The United States has maintained a military presence in the Marshall Islands for several decades, and DOD currently conducts ballistic missile and missile defense testing on Kwajalein Atoll. Use of Primary Compact-Related Defense Provisions
The United States acquired four primary defense and security rights and responsibilities as a result the Compact of Free Association and its related agreements: (1) the obligation to defend the FSM and the RMI against attack; (2) the right to deny access to foreign militaries and foreign military activity (strategic denial); (3) the right to prevent the FSM and the RMI governments from acting in a way that is incompatible with U.S. authority and responsibility for defense and security matters (defense veto); and (4) the right to use certain land (i.e., Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI) for military purposes. Pages 1 and 6 of this report state that the Compact consists of two separate international agreements, one between the United States and the RMI, the other between the United States and the FSM. | What GAO Found
The Compact of Free Association continues a defense arrangement that has existed between the United States and two Pacific island nations--Micronesia and the Marshall Islands--since the end of World War II. The United States has exercised only one of the four primary defense provisions contained in the Compact. That provision grants the United States the right to use part of the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to test nuclear missiles and space tracking operations. The United States has never been required to fulfill defense responsibilities under the other three defense provisions contained in the Compact. The Defense Department considers Kwajalein Atoll an important asset that would be costly and difficult to replicate. Ongoing negotiations over the Compact are following a course that would preserve the existing defense and security relationship between the United States and each of these nations. |
gao_GAO-11-92 | gao_GAO-11-92_0 | Since Our 2003 Report, the Number of Federal Employment and Training Programs and Funding for Them Have Increased Due to the Recovery Act
The number of employment and training programs and their funding have increased since our 2003 report when we last reported on them. Together, these programs spent approximately $18 billion on employment and training services in fiscal year 2009, according to our survey data. This is an increase of 3 programs and about $5 billion from our 2003 report. Nearly All Programs Track Multiple Outcome Measures, but Little is Known about Program Effectiveness
Almost all programs tracked multiple outcome measures related to employment and training, and many programs tracked similar measures. Little is known about the effectiveness of the employment and training programs we identified because only 5 reported demonstrating whether outcomes can be attributed to the program through an impact study, and about half of all the programs have not had a performance review since 2004. Almost All Programs Overlap with at Least One Other Program, but Differences May Exist in Eligibility, Objectives, and Service Delivery
All but 3 of the programs we surveyed overlap with at least 1 other program, in that they provide at least one similar service to a similar population. In addition, nine of these require participants to be economically disadvantaged. The target populations being served by the most programs are Native Americans, veterans, and youth. While the Extent to Which Individuals Receive the Same Services From Multiple Programs is Unknown, the TANF, ES, and WIA Adult Programs Maintain Separate Administrative Structures to Provide Some of the Same Services
The TANF, ES, and WIA Adult programs provide some of the same employment and training services to low-income individuals, despite differences between the programs. Labor and HHS officials acknowledged that greater efficiencies could be achieved in delivering employment and training services through these programs, but said they do not believe that these programs are duplicative. Options for Increasing Efficiencies Include Colocating Services and Consolidating Administrative Structures, but Implementation Can Be Challenging
Colocating Services
Colocating the employment and training services provided by the TANF, ES, and WIA Adult programs may increase administrative efficiencies. Officials in the three states, however, could not provide a dollar figure for the cost savings that resulted from consolidation. However, achieving the potential benefits of colocation may require states and localities to address a variety of challenges: how to serve additional clients given the limited capacity of one-stop centers and potential lease restrictions; how to navigate philosophical differences between programs and address the multiple needs of TANF clients in the one-stop center setting; how to ensure that services are geographically accessible; whether the potential benefits of colocating TANF in one-stop centers outweigh the potential costs of no longer colocating these services with other services for low-income families, in some cases; and whether, and to what extent, TANF will contribute to one-stop center operating costs. Florida, Texas, and Utah have taken the initiative to consolidate their state workforce and welfare agencies, and report that they reduced administrative costs and improved services for job seekers. While states and localities have undertaken some potentially promising initiatives to achieve greater administrative efficiencies, a major obstacle to further progress on this front is that little information is available about the strategies and results of these initiatives, including improvements to services and reductions in costs. In addition, little is known about the incentives states and localities have to undertake such initiatives and whether additional incentives may be needed. As a part of this effort, Labor and HHS should examine the incentives for states and localities to undertake such initiatives and, as warranted, identify options for increasing such incentives. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Program Selection
We identified federally funded employment and training programs by reviewing the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), and interviewing agency officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federally funded employment and training programs play an important role in helping job seekers obtain employment. The Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services (HHS) largely administer these programs. GAO's objectives were to determine: (1) whether the number of federal employment and training programs and funding for them have changed since our 2003 report, (2) what kinds of outcome measures the programs use and what is known about program effectiveness, (3) the extent to which the programs provide similar services to similar populations, (4) the extent to which duplication may exist among selected large programs, and (5) what options exist for increasing efficiencies among these programs. To address these objectives, GAO searched federal program lists, surveyed federal agency officials, reviewed relevant reports and studies, and interviewed officials in selected states.
What GAO Found
Due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), both the number of--and funding for--federal employment and training programs have increased since our 2003 report, but little is known about the effectiveness of most programs. In fiscal year 2009, 9 federal agencies spent approximately $18 billion to administer 47 programs--an increase of 3 programs and roughly $5 billion since our 2003 report. This increase is due to temporary Recovery Act funding. Nearly all programs track multiple outcome measures, but only five programs have had an impact study completed since 2004 to assess whether outcomes resulted from the program and not some other cause. Almost all federal employment and training programs, including those with broader missions such as multipurpose block grants, overlap with at least one other program in that they provide similar services to similar populations. These programs most commonly target Native Americans, veterans, and youth, and some require participants to be economically disadvantaged. Although the extent to which individuals receive the same employment and training services from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Employment Service (ES), and Workforce Investment Act Adult (WIA Adult) programs is unknown, the programs maintain separate administrative structures to provide some of the same services, such as job search assistance, to low-income individuals. Agency officials acknowledged that greater administrative efficiencies could be achieved in delivering these services, but said factors, such as the number of clients that any one-stop center can serve and one-stops' proximity to clients, particularly in rural areas, could warrant having multiple entities provide the same services. Options that may increase efficiencies include colocating services and consolidating administrative structures, but implementation may pose challenges. While WIA Adult and ES services are generally colocated in one-stop centers, TANF employment services are colocated in one-stops to a lesser extent. Florida, Texas, and Utah have consolidated their welfare and workforce agencies, and state officials said this reduced costs and improved services, but they could not provide a dollar figure for cost savings. An obstacle to further progress in achieving greater administrative efficiencies is that little information is available about the strategies and results of such initiatives. In addition, little is known about the incentives states and localities have to undertake such initiatives and whether additional incentives may be needed. Labor and HHS should disseminate information about state efforts to consolidate administrative structures and colocate services and, as warranted, identify options for increasing incentives to undertake these initiatives. In their comments, Labor and HHS agreed that they should disseminate this information. |
gao_GAO-08-980 | gao_GAO-08-980_0 | For its 2004 report requested by the CDC, Damp Indoor Spaces and Health, another Institute of Medicine committee reviewed the scientific literature to determine the connections among damp indoor spaces, microorganisms such as mold, and a variety of human health effects. Many Studies Associate Indoor Mold with Adverse Health Effects but Cite the Need for Additional Research
While the 2004 Institute of Medicine report, and reviews of the scientific literature published subsequently, have found evidence associating indoor mold with certain adverse health effects, the evidence supporting an association between mold and other health effects remains less certain. Most of the 20 reviews of the scientific literature published from 2005 to 2007 that we examined generally agreed with the conclusions of the 2004 Institute of Medicine report. Five of the reviews we examined contained conclusions about acute idiopathic pulmonary hemorrhage in infants and children. However, a third review—the American Academy of Pediatrics 2006 report—said that although a causal relationship has not been firmly established, a variety of studies have provided some evidence that such a relationship is plausible. Dust mites, for example, are known to cause the development of asthma. While most of the 65 ongoing research activities involving indoor mold are addressing asthma and critical data gaps in sampling and measurement methods identified in the 2000 and 2004 Institute of Medicine reports, some other important data gaps identified in the 2004 report are being studied to a lesser degree than the gaps identified in the 2000 report. Sponsored by HHS’s National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, this research will support but does not directly address the 2004 Institute of Medicine’s recommendation for research on the relationship between mold and dampness and acute pulmonary hemorrhage in infants. Limited Planning and Coordination of Research Activities May Affect Their Ability to Close Data Gaps on the Health Effects of Exposure to Indoor Mold
While the information on research activities relating to the health effects of exposure to indoor mold provides some insight into the extent to which federal agencies are addressing scientific data gaps identified by the Institute of Medicine in 2000 and 2004, the extent to which these ongoing research activities will effectively advance scientific knowledge in these areas is not clear. Less than half of the agencies’ 65 ongoing research activities are being coordinated, either within or outside their agencies. Federal agencies are not using the existing Federal Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality as a forum to coordinate their research activities on indoor mold. Federal Guidance Cites Various Adverse Health Effects of Exposure to Indoor Mold but in Some Cases Omits Less Common but Serious Effects
A majority of the 32 documents we reviewed that provide guidance to the general public on the health effects of indoor mold in their homes—issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, EPA, FEMA, HHS, and HUD—identify asthma and upper respiratory tract symptoms as potential health effects. Guidance on Mitigating Exposure to Indoor Mold Is Sometimes Inconsistent about Cleanup Agents and Protective Clothing and Equipment
A majority of the guidance documents we reviewed provide information to the public about mitigating exposure to indoor mold. In its response, EPA generally agreed with our recommendations that it use the Federal Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality to, among other things, help articulate and guide research priorities on indoor mold across relevant federal agencies and help relevant agencies review their existing guidance to the public on indoor mold to better ensure that it sufficiently alerts the public about the potential adverse health effects of exposure to indoor mold and educates the public on how to minimize exposure in homes. Specifically, we examined (1) what recent reviews of the scientific literature have concluded about the health effects of exposure to indoor mold; (2) the extent to which federal research addresses data gaps related to the health effects of exposure to indoor mold; and (3) what guidance key federal agencies are providing to the public on the health risks of exposure to mold, and on minimizing and mitigating that exposure, and the extent to which the guidance is consistent. To obtain information on federal research related to the health effects of exposure to indoor mold, we conducted two surveys of officials at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from November 2007 to May 2008. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Got Mold? | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent research suggests that indoor mold poses a widespread and, for some people, serious health threat. Federal agencies engage in a number of activities to address this issue, including conducting or sponsoring research. For example, in 2004 the National Academies' Institute of Medicine issued a report requested by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) summarizing the scientific literature on mold, dampness, and human health. In addition, the Federal Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality supports the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) indoor air research program. With respect to the health effects of exposure to indoor mold, GAO was asked to report on (1) the conclusions of recent reviews of the scientific literature, (2) the extent to which federal research addresses data gaps, and (3) the guidance agencies are providing to the general public. GAO reviewed scientific literature on indoor mold's health effects, surveyed three agencies that conduct or sponsor indoor mold research, and analyzed guidance issued by five agencies.
What GAO Found
In general, the Institute of Medicine's 2004 report, and reviews of the scientific literature published from 2005 to 2007 that GAO examined, concluded that certain adverse health effects are more clearly associated with exposure to indoor mold than others. For example, the Institute of Medicine concluded that some respiratory effects, such as exacerbation of pre-existing asthma, are associated with exposure to indoor mold but that the available evidence was not sufficient to determine whether mold and a variety of other health effects, such as the development of asthma, cancer, and acute pulmonary hemorrhage in infants, are associated. While the reviews GAO examined generally agreed with these conclusions, a few judged the evidence for some health effects as somewhat stronger. For example, the American Academy of Pediatrics concluded in 2006 that a plausible link exists between acute pulmonary hemorrhage in infants and exposure to toxins that some molds produce. In addition, the 2004 Institute of Medicine report identified the need for additional research to address a number of data gaps related to the health effects of indoor mold. The 65 ongoing federal research activities on the health effects of exposure to indoor mold conducted or sponsored by EPA, HHS, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) address to varying extents 15 gaps in scientific data reported by the Institute of Medicine. For example, many of the research activities address data gaps related to asthma and measurement methods, while other data gaps, such as those related to toxins produced by some molds, are being minimally addressed. Further, less than half of the ongoing mold-related research activities are coordinated either within or across agencies. This limited coordination is important in light of, among other things, the wide range of data gaps identified by the Institute of Medicine and limited federal resources. The Federal Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality could provide a structured mechanism for coordinating research activities on mold and other indoor air issues by, for example, serving as a forum for reviewing and prioritizing agencies' ongoing and planned research. However, it currently does not do so. Despite limitations of scientific evidence regarding a number of potential health effects of exposure to indoor mold, enough is known that federal agencies have issued guidance to the general public about health risks associated with exposure to indoor mold and how to minimize mold growth and mitigate exposure. For example, guidance issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, EPA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, HHS, and HUD cites a variety of health effects of exposure to indoor mold but in some cases omits less common but serious effects. Moreover, while guidance on minimizing indoor mold growth is generally consistent, guidance on mitigating exposure to indoor mold is sometimes inconsistent about cleanup agents, protective clothing and equipment, and sensitive populations. As a result, the public may not be sufficiently advised of indoor mold's potential health risks. |
gao_GAO-12-98 | gao_GAO-12-98_0 | Special needs children are defined as those children who a state determined cannot or should not be returned to a parent, and using specified criteria, the state can reasonably assume that the child will not be adopted without state assistance. Since the original provision was adopted in 1996, taxpayers have claimed about $4.28 billion in adoption tax credits. For tax year 2010, taxpayers filed almost 100,000 returns claiming the credit, with over $1.2 billion claimed as of August 2011. This strategy included the following major elements: Communicating and reaching out to taxpayers, tax professionals, Congress, the states, and adoption organizations, with the objective of conveying information about changes in the law and documentation requirements. Requiring taxpayers claiming the credit to submit documentation that the adoption of the child for whom credit was being claimed was already completed or in progress (an adoption order or decree for a completed adoption, or a home study, placement agreement, hospital or court document, or lawyer’s affidavit for an adoption in progress), along with IRS Form 8839. Taxpayers and Stakeholders Did Not Have Important Information on the Adoption Tax Credit
To inform taxpayers, paid preparers, state agencies, adoption advocacy groups, and other stakeholders about the new law and documentation requirements, IRS planned to use various means of communication, such as its website, media releases, phone forums, webinars, Twitter accounts, and YouTube recordings. In addition, IRS did not make an effort to communicate to state adoption program managers or convey information about documentation requirements for claims involving special needs children, which could have helped state adoption managers better inform adoptive parents who asked them what documentation to provide to IRS. In June 2011, IRS revised its training materials and the Internal Revenue Manual to indicate that a state agreement to provide adoption assistance under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act was sufficient proof of special needs status, but did not include examples of adoption assistance agreements in the revised materials. IRS Can Reduce the Number of Audits in 2012
For the 2011 filing season, IRS screeners automatically directed all returns on which taxpayers claimed the adoption tax credit and where documentation was either missing or of uncertain validity to correspondence audit (audits by mail). A senior IRS official acknowledged that this process resulted in a large number of adoption credit–related correspondence audits and diverted IRS resources from other more productive audits. As of August 6, 2011, IRS had sent 68 percent of almost 100,000 returns it had processed on which taxpayers claimed adoption credits to correspondence audit. IRS reported that it ended up disallowing all or a portion of the credit for only about 6,000 (17 percent) of the approximately 35,000 returns on which audits have been completed and assessed $17.7 million in additional tax. Finally, IRS could institute a procedure by which, immediately following initial screening of the return, it would send a letter to taxpayers who did not provide any documentation, notifying them of what documentation is needed. IRS has not yet determined whether sending a letter upon initial screening would lead to a significant number of taxpayers submitting documentation after receiving the letter, thus reducing processing time and the number of audits. IRS officials told us that data from the 2011 filing season on the number of claimants who submitted documentation while undergoing a correspondence audit should help determine whether sending an initial letter after screening the return would be more effective. In reviewing its strategy for the 2012 filing season, IRS has an opportunity to reduce the time and resources spent on correspondence audits of adoption tax credit claims as well as the number and length of refund delays while still maintaining a robust enforcement strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action
For the 2012 filing season, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue instruct appropriate officials to ensure that the communications effort specifically includes state and local adoption officials, and clarifies acceptable documentation for the certification of special needs adoptees; provide examples of adoption assistance agreements that meet the requirements for documenting special needs status, from each state and the District of Columbia, in training materials given to reviewers and examiners; place the agreements on its website to help taxpayers better understand what constitutes acceptable documentation; and determine whether requesting documentation in cases where no documentation is provided before initiating an audit would reduce the number of audits without significantly delaying refunds and, if so, implement such a strategy for the 2012 filing season. Given these additional documentation requirements already in place, we believe that the benefits of making state assistance agreements available to adoptive parents on the IRS website outweigh the risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal adoption tax credit, established in 1996, was amended in 2010. These amendments included making the credit refundable (meaning taxpayers could receive payments in excess of their tax liability) and increasing the maximum allowable credit to $13,170 of qualified adoption expenses for tax year 2010. As of August 20, 2011, taxpayers filed just under 100,000 returns, claiming about $1.2 billion in adoption credits. Following these changes, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed a strategy for processing adoption credit claims. GAO was asked to (1) describe IRS's strategy for ensuring compliance with the adoption credit for the 2011 filing season, (2) assess IRS's related communication with taxpayers and stakeholders, and (3) assess its processing and audit of claims. To conduct its analysis, GAO analyzed IRS data and documents, interviewed IRS officials, observed IRS examiners, and interviewed other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
IRS's strategy for ensuring taxpayer compliance with the adoption credit included the following: (1) Communicating and reaching out to taxpayers and other stakeholders, including tax professionals and adoption organizations, about new requirements. (2) Requiring taxpayers seeking the adoption credit to submit proof of a completed or in-progress adoption with their return. Because taxpayers claiming the credit for a special needs child (meaning that a state determined the child cannot or should not be returned to a parent, and using specified criteria, the state can reasonably assume that the child will not be adopted without state assistance) are allowed to claim the full credit without providing documentation of adoption expenses, they also needed to provide documentation certifying the special needs status of the child. (3) Requiring that returns and supporting documentation be filed on paper. (4) Automatically sending returns with missing or invalid documentation for correspondence audits (audits that IRS conducts by mail). To inform taxpayers, paid preparers and other stakeholders about new adoption credit requirements, IRS used various tools including its website, Twitter accounts, and YouTube recordings. However, IRS did not make a specific effort to communicate or convey information about documentation requirements for special needs children to state adoption managers, who administer state adoption programs. Further, IRS did not specify in training materials for its audit examiners what documentation was required to prove special needs status. IRS later revised its training materials to say that a state adoption assistance agreement (an agreement between the state and adoptive parents) was sufficient proof but did not provide samples of such agreements in the materials or place any on its website. As a consequence, taxpayers submitted a majority of returns with either no documentation or insufficient documentation. As of August 2011, 68 percent of the nearly 100,000 returns on which taxpayers claimed the adoption credit were sent to correspondence audit. However, of the approximately 35,000 returns on which audits have been completed as of August, IRS only assessed additional tax about 17 percent of the time. The equivalent rate for all correspondence audits in 2010 was 86 percent. The time it has taken IRS to audit these predominantly legitimate adoption credit claims has resulted in considerable delays in the payment of the related refunds. For the 2012 filing season, IRS has options that might allow it to reduce the number of costly audits and issue refunds faster while still maintaining a robust enforcement strategy. One option is for IRS to immediately send a letter to taxpayers who submit returns without any documentation requesting it before initiating an audit. This could potentially reduce the number of audits and delayed refunds, but IRS has not yet determined the extent of this impact. IRS officials acknowledged that data from the 2011 filing season experience should allow them to determine whether sending an initial letter requesting documentation would be more effective than initiating a correspondence audit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS communicate with state and local adoption officials, provide examiners with examples of adoption assistance agreements, place the agreements on its website, and determine whether sending a letter before initiating an audit would reduce the need for audits. IRS generally agreed with three of GAO's recommendations, but had concerns that placing sample agreements on its website may enable fraud. However, since other proof of adoption must accompany a tax credit claim, GAO believes the benefits of making these agreements available to adoptive parents outweigh the risks. |
gao_GAO-05-414T | gao_GAO-05-414T_0 | Most oil is used in the transportation sector as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, with oil-based products accounting for over 98 percent of the U.S. transportation sector’s fuel consumption. Although today the United States and its industrialized counterparts currently account for the bulk of the world oil demand, demand is growing rapidly in the developing nations, especially those in Asia, such as China and India. Going forward, the United States will increasingly rely on imported oil because although the United States is currently the world’s third largest oil producer, U.S. proven oil reserves account for only about 2 percent of total world reserves. However, because of the relative political instability in the Middle East and some of the other OPEC countries (such as Nigeria and Venezuela), occasional oil supply disruptions and price shocks have been a fact of life for about the past 30 years and may remain an issue for the foreseeable future. Choices regarding the use of coal revolve around balancing these consequences, in the light of new technologies to reduce them, with the energy benefits of using this plentiful domestic resource. Natural gas plays a vital role in meeting the country’s national energy demand, accounting for about 23 percent of the total energy consumed in the United States. EIA estimates that total natural gas demand could increase 50 percent in the next 25 years. We noted that (1) prices generally increase because limited supplies have not been able to react quickly enough to changes in demand; (2) the federal government (e.g., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and EIA) faces significant challenges in overseeing natural gas markets and ensuring that prices are determined in a competitive and informed marketplace, minimizing unnecessary price volatility; and (3) buyers of natural gas have options to reduce their exposure to volatile prices through the use of long- term contracts and financial hedging instruments. Nuclear Energy: Emission-Free Energy Source, but with Waste Storage Problems and Safety/Security Concerns
Nuclear energy was once heralded as the single answer to all of the country’s energy woes, with predictions that electricity would soon be “too cheap to meter.” While these enormous expectations have not been met, nuclear energy has become an important part of the country’s current energy picture and may remain that way for years to come. Over the past 20 years, plants have continued to be built overseas. We also reported on the ability to add new power plants in three states, concluding that the success of restructured markets hinged on private investment in power plants and that this investment was reduced by higher levels of perceived risk in some markets, such as in California. Wind energy accounted for about 2 percent of the total renewable energy consumed in 2003 but has witnessed substantial and persistent growth in recent years, more than tripling from 1998 through 2003. However, EIA estimates that if the government maintains the tax credit, wind power generation in the United States is expected to grow nearly seven-fold over the next 20 years. Reducing Energy Demand through Efficiency and Consumer Choice: the Often-Overlooked Energy Option
Experts have long contended that energy strategies that reduce demand can cost less, be brought on line faster, and provide greater environmental benefits compared to strategies that increase the amount of energy supplied—particularly if demand reductions decrease fossil fuel consumption and related pollution. According to the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy and the Alliance to Save Energy, energy efficiency investments made from 1973 through 2003 saved the equivalent of 40 to 50 quadrillion BTUs of energy in 2003, equal to about 40 to 50 percent of total energy consumption and more than any single fuel provided. For example, because energy-consuming equipment, such as air conditioners, furnaces, and lighting systems, is generally costly to purchase and lasts many years, consumers do not want to replace it unnecessarily. GAO has examined policies designed to reduce demand in electricity markets, as well as efforts to develop more fuel-efficient automobiles. Conclusions
Given the increasing signs of strain on our energy systems and our growing awareness of how our energy choices impact our environment, there is a growing sense that federal leadership could provide the first step in a fundamental reexamination of our nation’s energy policies. As the Congress, executive agencies, states and regions, industry, and consumers weigh such a reexamination, we believe that it makes sense to consider all energy sources together, along with options to encourage more efficient energy use and consumer choices to save energy. Clearly none of the nation’s energy options are without problems or trade- offs. In the same way, energy suppliers have choices about how much of each type of energy to provide, based increasingly on their interaction with competitive domestic and sometimes global markets for energy. Yet, many of these choices may be significantly influenced, or even overshadowed, by broader forces that are beyond our control, such as expected energy demand growth in the developing world. Have we charted a course that can be sustained in the 21st century? Air Pollution: Meeting Future Electricity Demand Will Increase Emission of Some Harmful Substances. | Why GAO Did This Study
Plentiful, relatively inexpensive energy has been the backbone of much of modern America's economic prosperity and the activities that essentially define our way of life. The energy systems that have made this possible, however, are showing increasing signs of strain and instability, and the consequences of our energy choices on the natural environment are becoming more apparent. The reliable energy mainstay of the 20th century seems less guaranteed in the 21st century. As a nation, we have witnessed profound growth in the use of energy over the past 50 years--nearly tripling our energy use in that time. Although the United States accounts for only 5 percent of the world's population, we now consume about 25 percent of the energy used each year worldwide. Looking into the future, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that U.S. energy demand could increase by about another 30 percent over the next 20 years. To aid the subcommittee as it evaluates U.S. energy policies, GAO agreed to provide its views on energy supplies and energy demand as well as observations that have emerged from its energy work. This testimony is based on GAO's published work in this area, conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and on EIA's Annual Energy Review, 2003 and its Annual Energy Outlook, 2005.
What GAO Found
America's demand for energy has, in recent decades, outpaced its ability to supply energy. As a result, the country has witnessed rapid price increases and volatility in some markets, such as gasoline, and reliability problems in others, such as electricity, where the blackout in 2003 left millions in the dark. Given these recent and sometimes persistent problems, as well as concerns about the impacts of energy consumption on air, water, and other natural resources, there is a growing sense that action is needed. Today, fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) provide about 86 percent of our total energy consumption, with the rest coming from nonfossil sources such as nuclear (8 percent) and renewables, such as hydroelectric energy and wind power (6 percent). Overall, the majority of the nation's energy consumption is met by domestic production. However, imports of some fuels have risen. For example, over the past 20 years, imports--primarily oil and natural gas--have doubled, and in 2003 these imports comprised about one-third of total domestic energy consumption. Imports are expected to increase still further in order to meet future domestic consumption. In light of the current and expected levels of imports, the United States is, and will increasingly be, subject to global market conditions, with the transportation sector especially affected. Global markets may face future difficulties in meeting the growing energy demands of developed nations while also meeting the demands of the developing world, particularly considering the explosive growth in some economies, such as China's and India's. If world supplies for some fuels do not keep pace with world demand, energy prices could rise sharply. GAO believes that a fundamental reexamination of the nation's energy base and related policies is needed and that federal leadership will be important in this effort. To help frame such a reexamination, we offer three broad crosscutting observations. First, regarding demand, the amount of energy that needs to be supplied is not fate, but our choice. Consumers, whether businesses or individuals, choose to use energy because they want the services that energy provides, such as automated manufacturing and advanced computer technologies. Accordingly, consumers can play an important role in using energy wisely, if encouraged to adjust their usage in response to changes in prices or other factors. Second, all of the major fuel sources--traditional and renewable--face environmental, economic, or other constraints or trade-offs in meeting projected demand. Consequently, all energy sources will be important in meeting expected consumer demand in the next 20 years and beyond. Third, whatever federal policies are chosen, providing clear and consistent signals to energy markets, including consumers, suppliers, and the investment community, will help them succeed. Such signals help consumers to make reasoned choices about energy purchases and give energy suppliers and the investment community confidence that policies will be sustained, reducing investment risk. |
gao_GAO-04-280 | gao_GAO-04-280_0 | The Nature and Attributes of Predatory Lending
Predatory lending is an umbrella term that is generally used to describe cases in which a broker or originating lender takes unfair advantage of a borrower, often through deception, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains terms that are disadvantageous to the borrower. In November 2003, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reached a settlement with a large national mortgage servicer, Fairbanks Capital, after the company was accused of unfair, deceptive, and illegal practices in the servicing of mortgage loans. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe (1) federal laws related to predatory lending and federal agencies’ efforts to enforce them; (2) the actions taken by the states in addressing predatory lending; (3) the secondary market’s role in facilitating or inhibiting predatory lending; (4) how consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosures may deter predatory lending; and (5) the relationship between predatory lending activities and elderly consumers. The written comments of the Board, DOJ, HUD, and NCUA are printed in appendixes II through V. We conducted our work between January 2003 and January 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards in Atlanta, Boston, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Address Predatory Lending, but Face Challenges
While HOEPA is the only federal law specifically designed to combat predatory mortgage lending, federal agencies, including federal banking regulators, have used a number of federal consumer protection and disclosure statutes to take actions against lenders that have allegedly engaged in abusive or predatory lending. Among the most frequently used laws are TILA, HOEPA, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and the FTC Act. HOEPA covers only a limited portion of all subprime loans, although there is no comprehensive data on precisely what that portion is. FTC is the primary federal enforcer of consumer protection laws for these nonbank subsidiaries, but it is a law enforcement rather than supervisory agency. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To enable greater oversight of and potentially deter predatory lending from occurring at certain nonbank lenders, Congress should consider making appropriate statutory changes to grant the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System the authority to routinely monitor and, as necessary, examine the nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries of financial and bank holding companies for compliance with federal consumer protection laws applicable to predatory lending practices. Most of the state laws restrict the terms or provisions of certain high-cost loans, while others apply to a broader range of loans. Some states have also reorganized their agencies’ operations to better address abuses by lenders and brokers. Federal banking regulators have said that they have found little to no evidence of predatory lending by the institutions they regulate, pointing out that federally supervised institutions are highly regulated and subject to comprehensive supervision. However, the secondary market may also serve to facilitate predatory lending, as it can provide a source of funds for unscrupulous originators that quickly sell off loans with predatory terms. Secondary market participants may use varying degrees of due diligence to avoid purchasing loans with abusive terms. The act also expressly made mortgage brokers and loan servicers liable for violations. While consumer education efforts have been shown to have some success in increasing consumers’ financial literacy, the ability of these efforts to deter predatory lending practices may be limited by several factors, including the complexity of mortgage transactions and the difficulty of reaching the target audience. Elderly Consumers May Be Targeted for Predatory Lending
Although little data is available on the incidence of predatory lending among the elderly, government officials and consumer advocacy organizations have reported consistent observational evidence that elderly consumers have been disproportionately victimized by predatory lenders. Abusive lenders are likely to target older consumers for a number of reasons, including the fact that older homeowners are more likely to have substantial equity in their homes and may be more likely to have diminished cognitive function or physical impairments that an unscrupulous lender may try to exploit. | Why GAO Did This Study
While there is no universally accepted definition, the term "predatory lending" is used to characterize a range of practices, including deception, fraud, or manipulation, that a mortgage broker or lender may use to make a loan with terms that are disadvantageous to the borrower. No comprehensive data are available on the extent of these practices, but they appear most likely to occur among subprime mortgages--those made to borrowers with impaired credit or limited incomes. GAO was asked to examine actions taken by federal agencies and states to combat predatory lending; the roles played by the secondary market and by consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosure requirements; and the impact of predatory lending on the elderly.
What GAO Found
While only one federal law--the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act--is specifically designed to combat predatory lending, federal agencies have taken actions, sometimes jointly, under various federal consumer protection laws. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has played the most prominent enforcement role, filing 19 complaints and reaching multimillion dollar settlements. The Departments of Justice and Housing and Urban Development have also entered into predatory lending-related settlements, using laws such as the Fair Housing Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Federal banking regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board, report little evidence of predatory lending by the institutions they supervise. However, the nonbank subsidiaries of financial and bank holding companies--financial institutions which account for a significant portion of subprime mortgages--are subject to less federal supervision. While FTC is the primary federal enforcer of consumer protection laws for these entities, it is a law enforcement agency that conducts targeted investigations. In contrast, the Board is well equipped to routinely monitor and examine these entities and, thus, potentially deter predatory lending activities, but has not done so because its authority in this regard is less clear. As of January 2004, 25 states, as well as several localities, had passed laws to address predatory lending, often by restricting the terms or provisions of certain high-cost loans; however, federal banking regulators have preempted some state laws for the institutions they supervise. Also, some states have strengthened their regulation and licensing of mortgage lenders and brokers. The secondary market--where mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities are bought and sold--benefits borrowers by expanding credit, but may facilitate predatory lending by allowing unscrupulous lenders to quickly sell off loans with predatory terms. In part to avoid certain risks, secondary market participants perform varying degrees of "due diligence" to screen out loans with predatory terms, but may be unable to identify all such loans. GAO's review of literature and interviews with consumer and federal officials suggest that consumer education, mortgage counseling, and loan disclosure requirements are useful, but may be of limited effectiveness in reducing predatory lending. A variety of factors limit their effectiveness, including the complexity of mortgage transactions, difficulties in reaching target audiences, and counselors' inability to review loan documents. While there are no comprehensive data, federal, state, and consumer advocacy officials report that the elderly have disproportionately been victims of predatory lending. According to these officials and relevant studies, older consumers may be targeted by predatory lenders because, among other things, they are more likely to have substantial home equity and may have physical or cognitive impairments that make them more vulnerable to an unscrupulous mortgage lender or broker. |
gao_GAO-12-385 | gao_GAO-12-385_0 | Performance in meeting schedule estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced schedule delays. Most Initiatives Fielded or Are Expected to Field Capabilities within 2 Years
A number of initiatives have been fielded in a year or less, and most initiatives (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the expectation for fielding capabilities within 2 years, as shown in figure 3. Initiatives that addressed joint urgent operational needs leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the- shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products that required development of a technology. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the quickest because they are focused on buying already-existing products. Once a contract was awarded, off-the-shelf solutions were fielded quickly. Off-the-shelf solutions took longer during the early phases, in part, because they were less likely than other solution types to leverage ongoing efforts and thus required additional time to identify, fund, and contract for the solution. Engineering centers such as the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Army Research, Development and Engineering Center typically provide support to the program offices that manage acquisition programs. The ability of program offices to field capabilities more quickly is partly explained by the expertise that these organizations have with the full range of acquisition activities, including developing test plans, accessing contract support, and planning for training and transportation. As illustrated in figure 12, the median time to contract award was 6 months shorter for initiatives that used existing contracts. While the Joint Staff worked to define and clarify urgent needs requirements during validation, officials for 16 of the 45 initiatives in our sample stated that they had to work with U.S. Central Command officials in theater and at headquarters to further develop the requirements after they were tasked with the urgent need. Schedule estimates were not consistently available in databases used by U.S. Central Command, JRAC, and JIEDDO. Several practices have potential for facilitating a quick response to warfighter needs. But, there is no requirement that an initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the process for responding to joint urgent operational needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:
Expedite fielding of off-the-shelf solutions by reducing the time it takes to identify the solution and award a contract. Devise methods for providing early funding to reimbursable organizations tasked to execute joint urgent needs. Require acquisition organizations to communicate with the combatant commands, such as Central Command, regularly about progress in executing initiatives and plans for fielding capabilities. Require that an initiative decision memorandum be developed for all initiatives that identifies the acquisition organization responsible for the initiative, schedule estimates, and expectations for acquisition strategies. To identify key practices that enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges in the development and fielding of joint urgent needs solutions, we interviewed officials from each initiative and collected data on the challenges that each executing organization encountered. We also reviewed practices that executing organizations employed to overcome these and other programmatic challenges. Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs and Executing Organizations
Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs and Executing Organizations Army, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Program Directorate Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Task Force / Unmanned Aerial Systems Task Force Army Research Laboratory
Defense Information Systems Agency, Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services Division Air Force, Director of Weather Army, Program Manager, Biometrics Identity Management Agency
Naval Sea Systems Command, Asymmetric Systems Department Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Army, Office of the Provost Marshal
Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Systems Army, Armament Research Development and Engineering Center, Combating Terrorism Technology Team Army Space & Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Directed Energy Warfare Office Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force Army, Project Manager, Distributed Common Ground System
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Intelligence Surveillance and Surveillance, Sensors Army Corps of Engineers Army, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate Army, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-266 Executing organization
Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Army, Prototype Integration Facility Air Force, Big Safari Air Force Research Laboratory Army, Communication-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Sensors Army, Project Manager, Airborne Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems Army, Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Systems Army, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs
Navy, Wide Focal Plane Array Camera, Integrated Product Team The names of some organizations are not listed because of sensitivity issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has had to accelerate efforts to field capabilities addressing urgent warfighter needs, including joint needs affecting more than one service. GAO was asked to assess (1) how quickly capabilities responding to joint urgent operational needs have been developed and fielded and (2) what key practices enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges. To do this, GAO studied a sample of joint urgent operational needs including all urgent needs over $100 million approved from April 2008 through December 2010 and a random selection of smaller urgent needs. GAO analyzed data on key events and issues in the development and fielding of solutions and met with service and DOD officials responsible for validating, assigning, and executing joint urgent needs.
What GAO Found
A majority of the initiatives GAO reviewed (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the Department of Defenses (DOD) expectation for fielding a capability in response to joint urgent operational needs within 2 years. However, performance in meeting schedule estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced schedule delays.
Initiatives leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the-shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products requiring technology development. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the quickest because existing products are being bought. However, while off-the-shelf solutions were fielded quickly once a contract was awarded, it took longer than the two other types to identify, fund, and contract for off-the-shelf solutions. In addition to the program offices that manage traditional acquisition programs, initiatives were also managed by research laboratories and engineering centers, such as the Army Research Laboratory or the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Program offices fielded solutions faster, in part, because program offices are experienced in the full range of acquisition activities. Also, laboratories and engineering centers depended on funding provided by other organizations and delays in receiving this funding affected the start of some initiatives.
Acquisition organizations employed various practices to overcome challenges affecting fielding of capabilities within short time frames. For example, although these practices could affect the prices paid, shorter times were associated with using existing contracts, awarding contracts without agreeing on contract terms (prices), or awarding contracts without competition. U.S. Central Command officials stated that they were not aware of all initiatives underway or the expected schedule for fielding capabilities and this could affect planning activities. In some cases, initiative decision memorandums were prepared that documented schedule estimates but such memorandums are not required for all initiatives. Also, some organizations were proactive in communicating with U.S. Central Command and this facilitated a clearer understanding of requirements and plans for fielding initiatives, but regular communication is not required.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD reduce the time spent on identifying and contracting for off-the-shelf solutions, devise methods for providing early funding to research laboratories and engineering centers, require that initiative decision memorandums be prepared for all initiatives, and require acquisition organizations to communicate with the Central Command and other combatant commands about plans for fielding capabilities. DOD concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-785 | gao_GAO-02-785_0 | Background
Pipelines transport about 65 percent of the crude oil and refined oil products and nearly all of the natural gas in the United States. Table 1 shows the three primary types of pipelines that form a 2.2-million-mile network across the nation. (2000). OPS Has Set an Ambitious Schedule for Implementing Integrity Management
OPS has to complete several important steps to implement its integrity management approach under an ambitious self-imposed schedule, including finalizing requirements for integrity management programs and inspecting the programs of more than 1,000 hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipeline operators. During this time frame, OPS also has to perform ongoing oversight activities, such as conducting standard inspections, investigating incidents, and inspecting pipeline construction. OPS Faces Additional Challenges in Implementing the Integrity Management Approach
In addition to meeting its ambitious schedule, OPS faces a number of other challenges in implementing its integrity management approach. Other challenges—such as ensuring that operators use pipeline safety assessment methods appropriately and establishing an inspection interval—have been addressed in OPS’s requirements for integrity management programs for hazardous liquid pipelines and must now be resolved for natural gas transmission pipelines before OPS can issue a final rule for these pipelines. To address this challenge, OPS has been developing an approach for overseeing pipeline security that does not involve the development of new regulatory requirements. OPS’s Plan for Obtaining Resources and Expertise Is Not Complete or Adequately Communicated to State Partners
OPS’s efforts to ensure it has the resources and expertise needed to implement its integrity management approach are hampered by the lack of an up-to-date assessment of current and future staffing and training needs and an examination of the workforce’s deployment across the organization—essential elements of a workforce plan. | What GAO Found
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is implementing a new approach to overseeing the safety of a 2.2-million-mile network of pipelines in the United States that transports potentially dangerous materials, including hazardous liquids, such as oil and natural gas. OPS has to complete several important steps to implement its integrity management approach within an ambitious, self-imposed schedule. The agency began applying this new regulatory approach to hazardous liquid pipelines in 2000 by issuing final rules requiring operators of these pipelines to develop integrity management programs. While implementing its integrity management approach, OPS must also perform ongoing oversight duties, such as inspecting the construction of new pipelines and investigating pipeline incidents. In addition to meeting its ambitious schedule, OPS faces a number of other challenges in implementing this new regulatory approach. These challenges include (1) enforcing the integrity management requirements consistently and effectively, (2) ensuring that natural gas transmission pipeline operators use assessment methods appropriately, (3) establishing an inspection interval for natural gas transmission pipelines, (4) measuring and reporting on the effectiveness of the approach, and (5) developing and implementing an approach for overseeing pipeline security. OPS's efforts to identify the resources and expertise needed to implement its integrity management approach are hampered by the lack of an up-to-date assessment of current and future staffing and training needs and an examination of the workforce's deployment across the organization--essential elements of a "workforce plan." |
gao_GAO-08-292 | gao_GAO-08-292_0 | HSPD-12 Requires Standardized Agency ID and Credentialing Systems
In August 2004, the President issued HSPD-12, which directed Commerce to develop a new standard for secure and reliable forms of ID for federal employees and contractors to enable interoperability across the federal government by February 27, 2005. Smart cards are a primary component of the envisioned PIV system. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Implementing PIV Cards and in Using Their Full Capabilities
Agencies have made limited progress in implementing and using PIV cards. While the eight agencies we reviewed have generally taken steps to complete background checks on most of their employees and contractors and establish basic infrastructure, such as purchasing card readers, none of the agencies met OMB’s goal of issuing PIV cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that have been issued, agencies generally have not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards and have not developed implementation plans for those capabilities. Key products are not available to support all of those capabilities. Specifically, OMB set milestones that focused narrowly on having agencies acquire and issue cards in the near term, regardless of when the electronic authentication capabilities of the cards could be used. Furthermore, although agencies anticipate having to make substantial financial investments to implement HSPD-12, OMB has not considered this to be a major new investment and has not directed agencies to prepare detailed plans to support their decisions regarding how, when, and the extent to which they plan to implement the cards’ electronic authentication capabilities. Without implementing these capabilities, agencies will continue to purchase costly PIV cards to be used in the same way as the much cheaper, traditional ID cards they are replacing. More significantly, until OMB revises its approach to focus on the full use of card capabilities, HSPD-12’s objective of increasing the quality and security of ID and credentialing practices across the federal government may not be fully achieved. OMB’s Focus on Near- Term Card Issuance Has Hindered Progress in Achieving the HSPD-12 Objectives
A key contributing factor to why agencies have made limited progress is that OMB—which is tasked with ensuring that federal agencies successfully implement HSPD-12—has emphasized the issuance of cards, rather than the full use of the cards’ capabilities. While steps have been taken to enable future interoperability, progress has been limited in implementing such capabilities in current systems, partly because key procedures and specifications have not yet been developed. Such guidance should help enable agencies to establish cross-agency interoperability—a primary goal of HSPD-12. GSA officials have taken initial steps to develop guidance to help enable the exchange of identity information across agencies, and they plan to complete and issue guidance by September 2008. Require agencies to align the acquisition of PIV cards with plans for implementing their technical infrastructure to best use the cards’ electronic authentication capabilities. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the progress that selected agencies have made in (1) implementing the capabilities of the personal identity verification (PIV) cards to enhance security and (2) achieving interoperability with other agencies. The agencies we selected were the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Interior, and Labor; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Many forms of identification (ID) that federal employees and contractors use to access government-controlled buildings and information systems can be easily forged, stolen, or altered to allow unauthorized access. In an effort to increase the quality and security of federal ID and credentialing practices, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in August 2004, requiring the establishment of a governmentwide standard for secure and reliable forms of ID. The resulting standard is referred to as the personal identity verification (PIV) card. GAO was asked to determine the progress selected agencies have made in (1) implementing the capabilities of the PIV cards to enhance security and (2) achieving interoperability with other agencies. To address these objectives, GAO selected eight agencies that have a range of experience in implementing smart card-based ID systems and analyzed what actions the agencies have taken to implement PIV cards.
What GAO Found
Much work has been accomplished to lay the foundations for implementation of HSPD-12, a major governmentwide undertaking. However, agencies have made limited progress in implementing and using PIV cards. The eight agencies GAO reviewed--including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, and Labor; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--have generally completed background checks on most of their employees and contractors and established basic infrastructure, such as purchasing card readers. However, none of them met the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) goal of issuing PIV cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that have been issued, most agencies have not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards and have not developed implementation plans for those capabilities. In certain cases, products are not available to support those authentication mechanisms. A key contributing factor for why agencies have made limited progress is that OMB, which is tasked with ensuring that federal agencies successfully implement HSPD-12, has emphasized issuance of cards, rather than full use of the cards' capabilities. Specifically, OMB has set milestones that focus narrowly on having agencies acquire and issue cards in the near term, regardless of when the electronic authentication capabilities of the cards may be used. Furthermore, agencies anticipate having to make substantial financial investments to implement HSPD-12, since PIV cards are considerably more expensive than traditional ID cards. However, OMB has not considered HSPD-12 implementation to be a major new investment and thus has not required agencies to prepare detailed plans regarding how, when, and the extent to which they will implement the electronic authentication mechanisms available through the cards. Without implementing the cards' electronic authentication capabilities, agencies will continue to purchase costly PIV cards to be used in the same way as the much cheaper, traditional ID cards they are replacing. Until OMB revises its approach to focus on the full use of the capabilities of the new PIV cards, HSPD-12's objectives of increasing the quality and security of ID and credentialing practices across the federal government may not be fully achieved. While steps have been taken to enable future interoperability, progress has been limited in making current systems interoperate, partly because key procedures and specifications have not yet been developed to enable electronic cross-agency authentication of cardholders. According to General Services Administration officials, they have taken the initial steps to develop guidance to help enable the exchange of identity information across agencies, and they plan to complete and issue it by September 2008. Such guidance should help enable agencies to establish cross-agency interoperability--a primary goal of HSPD-12. |
gao_RCED-98-2 | gao_RCED-98-2_0 | However, early foreclosure rates were higher for low-income areas than for either medium- or high-income areas. Nationwide, the early foreclosure rate for low-income areas was 0.45 percent (i.e., 4.5 early foreclosures occurring for every 1,000 mortgages insured) compared with 0.30 percent and 0.21 percent for medium- and high-income areas, respectively. This pattern also held true for the six cities individually. Lenders With Early Foreclosures Made a Larger Share of Their Loans in Low- and Medium-Income Areas Than Lenders Without Early Foreclosures
For the six cities combined, lenders with early foreclosures made a larger percentage of their loans for properties in low- and medium-income areas and a smaller percentage of their loans for properties in high-income areas than lenders without early foreclosures. In San Bernadino, however, lenders with early foreclosures made a smaller proportion of their loans for properties in low-income areas and a larger proportion of their loans for properties in high-income areas than lenders without early foreclosures. Other things being equal, loans made for properties in poorer census tracts, smaller loans, loans with higher loan-to-value ratios, and loans with higher interest rates were associated with higher probabilities of early foreclosure. Our analysis did not disclose a pattern in the median time that these properties remained in HUD’s inventory in different income areas. For the six cities combined and for each of the individual cities except Dallas, the proportion of properties that had been in inventory for more than 6 months was greater in low-income areas than in either medium- or high-income areas. The equation we estimated used all of the FHA-insured single-family loans endorsed in calendar years 1992 through 1994 in six cities—Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland; Chicago, Illinois; Dallas, Texas; San Bernadino, California; and Washington, D.C. We excluded loans made for properties within the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) but outside the city’s boundaries. We did not obtain statistically significant results for Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, or Washington, D.C.
Time in Inventory for Single-Family Properties in Six Cities That Remained Unsold as of December 31, 1996, by Income Areas
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) compare early foreclosure rates on FHA-insured single-family loans made in low-, medium-, and high-income areas nationwide and in the six cities; (2) compare across income areas the proportion of loans made in the six cities by FHA-approved mortgage lenders with and without early foreclosures; (3) identify factors that influence early foreclosure rates; and (4) compare the length of time HUD-owned single-family properties remained unsold in low-, medium-, and high-income areas in the six cities. In reporting information relating to early foreclosures on FHA-insured single-family loans endorsed during calendar years 1992 through 1994 in low-, medium-, and high-income areas nationwide, we relied on HUD’s analysis of the number of loans made, the number of early foreclosures, and the early foreclosure rates in the three income areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO looked at early foreclosures in Chicago, Illinois; Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; Baltimore, Maryland; and San Bernadino, California focusing on: (1) comparing early foreclosure rates on Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured single-family loans made in low-, medium-, and high-income areas nationwide and in the six cities; (2) comparing across income areas the proportion of loans made in the six cities by FHA-approved mortgage lenders with and without early foreclosures; (3) factors that influence early foreclosure rates; and (4) comparing the length of time the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-owned single-family properties remained unsold in low-, medium-, and high-income areas in the six cities. GAO did not attempt to evaluate the soundness of mortgage underwriting decisions or the impact of vacant homes on neighborhood conditions because of the methodological difficulties that a broad examination of these issues would present.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analysis of the FHA-insured single-family loans made during calendar years 1992 through 1994 nationwide and in the six cities showed that early foreclosures occurred infrequently but that early foreclosure rates were higher for low-income areas than for either medium- or high-income areas; (2) the early foreclosure rate for low-income areas nationwide was 0.45 percent (i.e., 4.5 early foreclosures occurring for every 1,000 mortgages insured) compared with 0.30 percent and 0.21 percent for medium- and high-income areas, respectively; (3) although this pattern prevailed in the six cities, there were also differences from one city to another; (4) for four of the cities--Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, and Washington, D.C.--lenders with early foreclosures made a larger proportion of their loans for properties in low- and medium-income areas and a smaller proportion of their loans for properties in high-income areas than did lenders that did not experience early foreclosure; (5) in San Bernadino, however, lenders with early foreclosures made a smaller proportion of their loans for properties in low-income areas and a larger proportion of their loans for properties in high-income areas than lenders without early foreclosures; (6) in Chicago, lenders with early foreclosures made a smaller share of their loans in medium-income areas than lenders without early foreclosures; (7) various factors influence the probability of early foreclosure; (8) GAO's analysis of the FHA-insured loans made in calendar years 1992 through 1994 in the six cities indicated that loans made for homes in poorer census tracts, smaller loans, and loans with higher loan-to-value ratios or higher interest rates were associated with higher probabilities of early foreclosure; (9) as of December 31, 1996, HUD held a total of 1,374 properties in its inventory in the six cities GAO reviewed; (10) GAO's analysis did not identify a pattern in the median time that these properties remained in HUD's inventory in different income areas; and (11) however, in five of the six cities and for the six cities combined, the proportion of properties that had been in inventory for more than 6 months was greater in low-income areas than in either medium- or high-income areas. |
gao_GAO-10-856 | gao_GAO-10-856_0 | The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan, but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan
U.S. agencies have made progress implementing the NSC’s Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) to lead and support international efforts to counter piracy, but the effort faces several implementation challenges. U.S. Government Has Taken Steps to Implement Planned Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute Pirate Attacks but Faces Challenges
In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S. agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established in the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in ways consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. For example, as figure 7 shows, the number of hostages of various nationalities captured by Somali pirates from 2007 to 2009 more than quintupled. The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly
The Action Plan’s objective is to repress piracy in the interest of the global economy, among other things, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan’s implementation was not specifically charged with tracking the cost of U.S. activities or systematically evaluating the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan’s tasks and neither the interagency steering group nor the federal agencies involved have performed these tasks. Our prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. The United States also has collaborated well with international military partners and industry groups. Within the U.S. government, while agencies have implemented some collaborative practices, other practices could be implemented to further enhance collaboration. The U.S. government has not made substantial progress on those Action Plan tasks that involve multiple agencies and those in which the NSC has not clearly identified roles and responsibilities or coordinated with U.S. agencies to develop joint guidance. This office serves as a conduit for information focused on safety of shipping and conducts outreach with the shipping industry, such as through newsletters to encourage the use of self-protection measures. Multiple agencies are involved in collecting information on pirate finances. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve U.S. government efforts to implement the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), enhance interagency collaboration, provide information to decision makers on results, and better target resources, we recommend that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury take the following four actions: reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and plans; identify measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts; direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to (1) identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs; and (2) assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating prosecution. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC did not provide comments on the report or our recommendations. To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are collaborating with each other and with international and industry partners, we synthesized key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration on complex national security issues from our prior work. U.S., international, and industry officials credit the reduction in the rate of successful pirate attacks from approximately 40 percent in 2008 to 22 percent in 2009, in part, to international patrols in the Gulf of Aden. However, coalition officials acknowledge U.S. and international forces face challenges in interdicting pirate incidents as pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of activity to the much larger and harder- to-patrol Indian Ocean. In addition, Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991. As a result, according to FBI officials, the FBI Organized Crime Section is not working to build a case against pirate leaders and enablers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has shared information with partners for military coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable--in part because the Action Plan does not designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President's principal arm for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement their efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury provided comments to clarify facts in the report. |
gao_GAO-14-235T | gao_GAO-14-235T_0 | FPS Faces Challenges Ensuring Contract Guards Have Been Properly Trained and Certified before Being Deployed to Federal Facilities
Some FPS Contract Guards Have Not Received Required Training on Responding to Active-Shooter Scenarios
According to FPS officials, since 2010 the agency has required its guards to receive training on how to respond to an active-shooter scenario. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received active-shooter response training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight (as discussed below). When we asked officials from 16 of the 31 contract guard companies we contacted if their guards had received training on how to respond during active-shooter incidents, responses varied.of the 16 contract guard companies we interviewed about this topic: officials from eight contract guard companies stated that their guards had received active-shooter scenario training during FPS orientation; officials from five guard companies stated that FPS has not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training; and officials from three guard companies stated that FPS had not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training, but that the topic was covered at some other time. For example, an official at one contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three separate FPS contracts (awarded in 2009) have never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from FPS. Consequently, some guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use─thus raising questions about the ability of some guards to execute a primary responsibility to properly screen access control points at federal facilities. As noted above, FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to determine which guards have not had screener training and agreed to provide it to them. FPS Lacks Effective Management Controls to Ensure Contract Guards Have Met Training and Certification Requirements
In our September 2013 report, we found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure that guards have met training and certification requirements. For example, although FPS agreed with our 2012 recommendation to develop a comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight, it has not yet established such a system. FPS Continues to Face Challenges with Assessing Risk at Federal Facilities
We reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with federal standards. The preliminary results of our ongoing review of risk assessments of federal facilities indicate that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management framework and ISC risk assessment provisions call for a risk assessment to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risk and implement protective measures to mitigate risk. Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS uses an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), with which it assesses federal facilities until it develops a longer- term solution. Most notably, it does not assess consequence (the level, duration, and nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts we spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to validate. We will continue to monitor this issue and plan to report the results early next year. DHS agreed with our 2012 recommendations to incorporate NIPP’s risk management framework in any future risk assessment tool; coordinate with federal agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in FPS’s assessments; and address limitations with its interim tool to better assess risk at federal facilities. Related GAO Products
Homeland Security: Challenges Associated with Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guards and Risk Assessments at Federal Facilities. GAO-13-694. Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service. Federal Facility Security: Staffing Approaches Used by Selected Agencies. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,600 federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). Recent incidents at federal facilities demonstrate their continued vulnerability to attacks or other acts of violence. To help accomplish its mission, FPS conducts facility security assessments and has approximately 13,500 contract security guards deployed to federal facilities.
This testimony discusses challenges FPS faces in (1) ensuring contract security guards deployed to federal facilities are properly trained and certified and (2) conducting risk assessments at federal facilities. It is based on GAO work issued from 2008 through 2013 on FPS's contract guard and risk assessment programs, and preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work to determine the extent to which FPS and select federal agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies align with federal risk assessment standards. To perform this work, GAO reviewed FPS's and eight federal agencies' risk assessment documentation and compared it to the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) standards. These agencies were selected based on their missions and types of facilities.
What GAO Found
FPS faces challenges ensuring that contract guards have been properly trained and certified before being deployed to federal facilities around the country. In its September 2013 report, GAO found that providing active shooter response and screener training is a challenge for FPS. For example, according to officials at five guard companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to incidents at federal facilities involving an active-shooter, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. Similarly, an official from one of FPS's contract guard companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards have never received screener training. As a result, guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use which raises questions about their ability to screen access control points at federal facilities--one of their primary responsibilities. GAO was unable to determine the extent to which FPS's guards have received active-shooter response and screener training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight. FPS agreed with GAO's 2013 recommendation that they take steps to identify guards that have not had required training and provide it to them. GAO also found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO's 2012 recommendation that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards' training, certifications, and qualifications, it does not yet have such a system.
FPS also continues to face challenges assessing risk at federal facilities. GAO reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with federal standards. GAO's preliminary results from its ongoing work on risk assessments at federal facilities indicate that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal standards, such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 's risk management framework and ISC's risk assessment provisions, state that a risk assessment should include threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures to mitigate the risk. Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS is using an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST) to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. However, MIST does not assess consequence (the level, duration, and nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. Thus, FPS has limited knowledge of the risks facing about 9,600 federal facilities around the country. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design. GAO will continue to monitor this issue and plans to report its final results early next year.
What GAO Recommends
DHS and FPS agreed with the recommendations in GAO's 2012 and 2013 reports to improve FPS's contract guard and risk assessment processes. |
gao_GAO-02-1075T | gao_GAO-02-1075T_0 | About 6,000 agencies provide transit services in the United States, and the majority of these agencies provide more than one mode of service. Additionally, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including transit. Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems Secure
Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high ridership and open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that pass through a transit system—especially during peak hours—make some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Secure Systems
Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited were implementing measures to enhance transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and training employees on emergency preparedness. Although safety and security were both priorities, the events of September 11 elevated the importance of security. Federal Government’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving
The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. For example, FTA has expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by launching a multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety and security activities. FTA also increased the funding of its safety and security activities after the attacks of September 11. TSA’s Role In Transit Security Has Yet to Be Defined
TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, including transit. | What GAO Found
Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, realigned national priorities. Although most of the early attention following the attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies provide transit services, and each workday, 14 million Americans ride on some form of transit. Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. Certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and difficult to secure. The high ridership of some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical. Another challenge is funding identified security enhancements. Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their systems. Transit agencies visited by GAO were implementing strategies to improve both safety and security prior to September 11; however, the events of September 11 elevated the importance of security-related activity. Many agencies assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple emergency drills. The federal government's role in transit security is evolving. Although the Federal Transit Administration has limited authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a multipart security initiative and increased funding for its safety and security activities since September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for transit security; however, TSA has yet to assume full responsibility for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation. |
gao_NSIAD-99-37 | gao_NSIAD-99-37_0 | NAIS Is an Effective Information Service
Since 1994, NAIS has evolved into a procurement information system with many operational features that are effective, easy to use, and beneficial to NASA and vendors. The e-mail notification service automatically transmits announcements to subscribers immediately after new procurement information is posted on NAIS. User Feedback Was Positive
Both businesses and NASA procurement staff have provided positive feedback about NAIS. Lack of Data Makes It Difficult to Quantify NAIS Benefits
NASA’s evaluation plan for the Midrange Pilot Program did not include a separate NAIS evaluation plan. As table 1 shows, the average number of offers received per acquisition increased from 6.1 to 7.2 after NAIS implementation. The percentage share of awards to small businesses did not change significantly after NAIS implementation, but the percentage share of dollars awarded to small businesses increased substantially in 1997. Recent legislation requires the government to provide direct access to notices of agencies’ requirements and solicitations through a single governmentwide electronic point of entry. Status of Efforts to Develop a Governmentwide EPS
According to the San Antonio Electronic Commerce Resource Center,more than 400 different Internet sites provide federal procurement information. This multitude of sites makes it difficult and time-consuming for contractors to obtain governmentwide information on contracting opportunities. If testing demonstrates that the multiagency EPS is capable of providing effective access to notices and solicitations through a single point of entry, the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy will consider designating it as the single governmentwide point of entry required by section 850. OFPP also commented on our recognition that current statutory requirements for procurement notices and minimum waiting periods may limit the potential benefits of electronic commerce and indicated that the feasibility of legislative action would be studied. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the NAIS electronic notice and publication system was an effective mechanism for disseminating procurement information, we obtained information about the system’s design, development, operation, costs, and benefits. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
The NAIS Electronic Posting System
Staff at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) responsible for developing and implementing the NASA Acquisition Internet Service (NAIS) consisted of a small group of procurement and, in some cases, technical staff from each NASA center and headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Acquisition Internet Service (NAIS), focusing on: (1) whether NAIS is an effective mechanism for disseminating procurement information to industry, including small businesses; and (2) the status of efforts to develop a governmentwide electronic procurement information system similar to NAIS.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) NAIS is a simple, effective, and user-friendly system for disseminating information on contract opportunities; (2) NAIS has contributed to the development of a more standardized and streamlined acquisition process at NASA and provides a central electronic source of procurement information from NASA's decentralized facilities; (3) it allows businesses to obtain procurement information immediately, without waiting for mail delivery of printed information; (4) vendors especially like the electronic mail notification service that automatically sends announcements about procurements of interest to them; (5) vendor feedback about NAIS came primarily from small businesses and was generally positive; (6) procurement data showed that offers and awards to small businesses did not change significantly after NAIS implementation; (7) NASA noted that data limitations made it difficult to quantify other NAIS benefits; (8) NASA, the General Services Administration, and other federal agencies are working together to develop a single, governmentwide Internet entry point for information on federal procurement opportunities; (9) but a number of steps must still be taken and many obstacles remain; (10) even if the new system is successfully developed and implemented governmentwide, current statutory requirements for publication of procurement notices and minimum waiting periods for mail delivery may continue to limit the potential benefits of an electronic procurement information system; and (11) the same legislation that encouraged NASA and others to work together also requires the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to submit to Congress annual reports assessing compliance with the requirement to provide direct access to procurement information through a single governmentwide electronic point of entry. |
gao_GAO-05-38 | gao_GAO-05-38_0 | TSP and Private Sector Plan Managers Provide a Similar Range of Customer Service Options but Emphasize Different Approaches
Though they emphasize different approaches, TSP and private sector plan managers enable customers to select their preferred means of service from a similar range of service options—including telephone, Internet, and on- site assistance (fig. 1). In addition, both TSP and private managers provide Web sites that deliver plan information and allow participants to conduct personal transactions, but private plan managers emphasize the use of their Web sites as the primary vehicles for delivering retirement education and information to participants. Finally, while both TSP and private managers use on-site coordinators to provide plan information, this customer service function is more heavily used by TSP. Whereas TSP managers said that agency representatives serve as the initial contact points for actively employed TSP participants to learn about TSP, private managers use on-site representatives less and do so to supplement call center representatives and Web-based resources. Call Centers Are Used to Provide Customer Service by Both TSP and Private Sector Plan Managers
TSP managers provide an automated, toll-free telephone system and call center staff that help answer participants’ questions, and TSP managers measure the efficiency of the call centers based on quantifiable standards, such as the time it takes to respond to incoming calls. Private Sector Plan Managers Have Adopted Various Practices That TSP Managers Could Consider to Improve Customer Service
Private sector plan managers we contacted have adopted various other practices that are not featured within TSP, such as regularly assessing customer satisfaction and using regularly updated technology to improve customer service. Private managers frequently assess their performance by gathering participant feedback on the services provided and use this information to improve their customer service delivery. Although TSP managers have surveyed participants, they have not done so since the early 1990s and currently have no systematic approach to assess whether the plans customer service meets participants’ needs. In addition, private managers that we spoke with appear to utilize more up-to-date technologies to provide customer service than do TSP managers. Some managers also use short on-the-spot surveys to gather feedback about a participant’s experience on the plan manager’s Web site. These plan managers also survey participants after they have interacted with the plan’s contact center and voice response telephone system through short, automated surveys at the end of a call. All of the plan managers we spoke with emphasized the importance of incorporating participant feedback into their customer service delivery models in order to better meet the needs of their participants. Instead, TSP managers rely largely on indirect feedback from NFC and TSP staff and others, such as agency coordinators, who respond to complaints or requests for assistance from participants. For example, one plan manager’s Web site allowed participants to instantly create and print account statements for any period of time. Privately managed plans also use their Web sites to help participants understand their retirement plan and the options available to them within the plan. Appendix II: Comments from the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board | Why GAO Did This Study
Intended to resemble private sector 401(k) pension plans, the federal government's Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) held more than $128 billion in retirement assets for over 3 million participants at the end of 2003. Customer service-related difficulties during the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board's (TSP's governing body) record-keeping system conversion in 2003 led the Chairman of a Senate Committee to ask GAO to examine the customer service provided to TSP participants. This review describes (1) customer service provisions within TSP and those offered by private sector managers and (2) customer service practices used by private sector plan managers that could be considered for use in TSP.
What GAO Found
TSP managers and private managers (servicing multiple pension plans) enable participants to select their preferred means of customer service from a similar range of options--such as telephone, Web sites, and on-site representatives--but each emphasizes different approaches. Both TSP and private plan managers provide customer service through automated telephone assistance as well as live representatives located at call centers. Both TSP and private managers also use standards to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of their call centers. However, TSP managers emphasize the efficiency of call centers based on quantifiable standards, such as the time it takes to respond to incoming calls, while private plan managers place a greater emphasis on the policy of satisfying each customer's needs in one call. Both TSP and private sector plan managers also use Web sites to deliver plan information and allow participants to conduct personal transactions, and private plan managers emphasize the use of their Web sites as the primary vehicles for delivering retirement education and information to participants. Finally, while TSP managers said that agency representatives serve as the initial contact points for TSP employees to learn about TSP and receive counseling, private plan managers use on-site representatives less to supplement services provided by call center representatives and Web-based resources. Private sector plan managers we contacted have adopted various other practices that are not featured within TSP, such as regularly assessing customer satisfaction and using regularly updated technology to improve customer service. These managers gather participant feedback on their voice response system via short, automated surveys at the end of participants' calls and use short, on-the-spot surveys to gather information on participants' experience with their Web site. These plan managers emphasized the importance of incorporating participant feedback into their customer service delivery model in order to better meet the needs of their participants. Although TSP managers have surveyed participants in the past, they do not have a systematic approach to assess whether their customer service meets participants' needs. TSP managers rely largely on indirect feedback from customer service staff, agency coordinators, and others who respond to complaints or requests for assistance from participants. The privately managed plans we studied also appear to utilize more up-to-date technologies to provide customer service, such as allowing participants to create account statements for any period of time or offering seminars over the Web on different plan topics that participants can access anytime. The TSP Web site provides fewer options and relies more on basic features. |
gao_GAO-06-1094T | gao_GAO-06-1094T_0 | Trends in Security Conditions
Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and more recent Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The deteriorating conditions threaten continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. 2). The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in violence has hindered the U.S. government’s efforts to engage fully with its Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts. According to the U.S. DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the Development of Iraqi Security Forces
DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. Unit-level TRA reports provide that information. We are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports because they would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq’s security forces. As shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 294,000 as of August 2006. In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for security. Embassy Campaign Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil authorities to assume security responsibility for their provinces. We are currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Questions for Congressional Oversight
1. What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw from Iraq? The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as the country has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence? 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
What GAO Found
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces. |
gao_GAO-09-916 | gao_GAO-09-916_0 | See figure 1. After AGOA was implemented, there was an initial surge of U.S. textile and apparel imports from beneficiary countries. Expert Panel’s Options for Congressional Consideration of Possible Changes to AGOA or Other Trade Preference Programs
Based on our review of the ITC study and other related research, and in consultation with trade and industry experts, we identified four issue areas where possible changes to AGOA or other U.S. trade preference programs could be made to improve the competitiveness of the textile and apparel inputs sector in SSA beneficiary countries. Issues Related to Extending the Duration of AGOA Provisions and Making AGOA Permanent
The options considered under this issue area were to: Extend the duration of the third-country fabric provision for LDCs beyond 2012 to provide potential investors with greater long-term certainty about the program’s benefits. Countries many benefits through increased regional sourcing and integration. Align U.S. TCB and development assistance with AGOA to ensure that addresses the competitive challenges and industries, such as the textile and apparel inputs industry. Conclusion
This report is intended to provide Congress a range of options put forward by experts on ways to improve the competitiveness of SSA textile and apparel production so that AGOA beneficiary countries can better take advantage of the opportunities provided under the program. Many of these options may b helpful, but as GAO has previously reported, trade-offs are inherent in trade preference programs. Furthermore, the link between trade policy and economic development complicates potential policy responses. AGOA h benefits for textile and apparel, but many SSA countries face infrastructure and development challenges that must be addresse they can fully take advantage of these benefits. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we present information on options put forward by experts for Congress to consider for (1) possible changes to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or other U.S. trade preference programs and (2) other measures the U.S. government could take to help increase investment in and improve competitiveness of textile and apparel inputs production in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Additionally, we convened a panel of experts and key informants on June 2, 2009. The panel discussed three topics: (1) the ITC’s analysis of potentially competitive products and challenges for the textile and apparel industry in SSA, (2) possible changes to AGOA or other U.S. trade preference programs, and (3) other measures to support African textile and apparel inputs production. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to U.S. government officials, sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) textile and apparel industry has not achieved the growth anticipated under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Despite the tariff reductions under AGOA, after an initial surge, U.S. imports of these products from beneficiary countries have declined in recent years (see figure). In view of this outcome, the 2008 Andean Trade Preference Extension legislation required GAO to prepare a report identifying changes to U.S. trade preference programs "to provide incentives to increase investment and other measures necessary to improve the competitiveness of [SSA] beneficiary countries in the production of yarns, fabric, and other textile and apparel inputs." This report is intended to provide Congress a range of options put forward by experts for (1) possible changes to AGOA or other U.S. trade preference programs and (2) other measures the U.S. government could take to help increase investment in and improve competitiveness of SSA textile and apparel inputs production.
What GAO Found
Many of the options discussed by the panel of experts GAO convened address the need to consider the trade-offs inherent in trade preference programs. Furthermore, experts emphasized that the link between trade policy and economic development complicates potential policy responses. While AGOA has generous benefits for textile and apparel, many SSA countries face infrastructure and development challenges that must be addressed before they can fully take advantage of these benefits. Recognizing this interplay, GAO's panel of experts and key informants gave greatest priority to options they believed provide long-term investors with predictability of benefits and encourage regional commitments relative to other developing countries. Such options included: (1) Extending the duration of the third-country fabric provision for least developed AGOA countries beyond 2012, and (2) Extending the duration of overall AGOA benefits beyond 2015. The panel similarly gave greatest priority to the options for other development measures that focused on supporting investment through trade capacity building. Many experts considered trade capacity building to be a key component of improving the competitiveness of African textile and apparel inputs production, and in developing the physical and market infrastructure needed for a vibrant export sector. Such options included: (1) Funding regional trade hubs and focusing on market promotion and business linkages, and (2) Aligning U.S. trade capacity building and development assistance with AGOA objectives |
gao_GGD-98-174 | gao_GGD-98-174_0 | Analyses of Take-Home Pay Replacement Rates
For the more than 23,250 beneficiaries included in our analyses, we estimated that FECA benefits replaced, on average, over 95 percent of the take-home pay they would have received had they not been injured. Beneficiaries’ estimated take-home pay replacement rates ranged from a low of about 76 percent to a high of 136 percent depending on when they were injured, their pay when injured, and whether they had dependents or lived in a state with an income tax. For beneficiaries who earned higher pay, nontaxable FECA benefits replaced pay that would have been subject to higher tax rates. State Income Taxes Increase Replacement Rates
Replacement rates for beneficiaries who lived in states that taxed income were, on average, an estimated 96 percent compared with about 94 percent for those living in states with no income tax. In estimating replacement rates for beneficiaries with a spouse, we assumed that their spouses did not have taxable income. Career Patterns for Workers in Selected Occupations
We were unable to determine whether beneficiaries’ career progression patterns were affected by their on-the-job injuries. Our analyses showed that about 70 percent of all beneficiaries were over 40 years old when they were injured, and the average adjusted pay of beneficiaries in the selected occupations approximated the average pay of active workers in the same occupations. As of June 1997, about 65 percent were over 55 years old. Figure 2 contains profile information on the percentages of beneficiaries with and without dependents, by age ranges when they were injured and as of June 1997, by amounts of annualized workers’ compensation benefits, and by amounts of pay received at the time of injury adjusted to 1997 pay levels. Of the approximately 78,000 beneficiaries who received compensation benefits for the year ending in June 1997, 51,265 were on OWCP’s long-term rolls. Spousal income. Career Patterns
To obtain information on the career patterns of workers in selected occupations that were the same as the occupations of FECA beneficiaries, we first used occupational code data from OWCP’s automated systems to identify the most frequently coded occupations of FECA beneficiaries. We developed information on beneficiaries’ characteristics for 30,057 beneficiaries—nearly 23,250 beneficiaries for whom we developed replacement rate information and approximately 6,800 of the remaining 11,460 beneficiaries on the long-term rolls who were receiving FECA wage-loss compensation benefits of either 66-2/3 or 75 percent of gross pay. Table II.3 shows that average replacement rates generally increased as beneficiaries’ pay increased. Each of these factors and the extent of their effects are discussed in more detail in the following subsections. Using these deduction amounts and our other assumptions, percentages of pay at the time of injury adjusted to 1997 pay levels replaced by FECA benefits for single beneficiaries and beneficiaries with dependents were 92 and 97 percent, respectively. Likewise, if beneficiaries’ deductions were equal to or greater than their income (thereby owing no tax), the replacement rate for single and married beneficiaries would be about 73 and 82 percent, respectively, because the relationship between take-home pay (gross pay less retirement and Medicaid contributions) and FECA benefits would always be the same. GAO Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on workers' compensation benefits for lost wages provided to workers with job-related injuries under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), focusing on: (1) the percentages of take-home pay that FECA benefits replaced for beneficiaries on the long-term rolls who were receiving full benefits; (2) career patterns of workers in selected occupations that were the same as the occupations of FECA beneficiaries; and (3) beneficiaries' characteristics such as current age, age when injured, compensation benefits paid in 1997, and pay at the time of injury adjusted to 1997 pay levels.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for the more than 23,250 beneficiaries on the long-term rolls for whom GAO developed replacement rates, GAO estimated that FECA benefits replaced, on average, over 95 percent of the take-home pay beneficiaries would have received had they not been injured; (2) estimated replacement rates ranged between about 76 and 136 percent; (3) compensation benefits equaled between an estimated 80 and 99 percent of take-home pay for about 70 percent of these beneficiaries and amounted to 100 percent or more in 29 percent of the cases; (4) under assumptions GAO needed to make to compute beneficiaries' income taxes and retirement contributions, replacement rates tended to be higher for beneficiaries who: (a) received higher amounts of pay before their injury; (b) were injured before 1980; (c) received the FECA dependent benefit; and (d) lived in states with an income tax; (5) using different assumptions to show their effect on replacement rates, beneficiaries with more exemptions or deductions for income tax purposes would have had lower replacement rates because these rates generally decrease as taxable income decreases; (6) beneficiaries with a spouse who had taxable income would have higher replacement rates because replacement rates generally increase as spousal income increases; (7) single and married beneficiaries who had no income subject to income taxes while working--generally those with low incomes--would have replacement rates of about 73 and 82 percent, respectively; (8) GAO's analyses showed that about 70 percent of all beneficiaries were over 40 years old when they were injured, and the average adjusted pay of beneficiaries in the selected occupations approximated the average pay of active workers in the same occupations; (9) GAO was unable to determine the extent to which beneficiaries' career prospects were diminished by their on-the-job injuries because GAO's analyses were limited to readily available data; (10) the career patterns of individuals depended on a multitude of personal employment factors as well as the specific jobs in which individuals are employed, according to agency officials familiar with career patterns of workers; (11) about 65 percent of the 30,000 beneficiaries identified by GAO were over 55 years old, and the average age of beneficiaries was 61, as of June 1997; and (12) in June 1997, their annual compensation averaged $26,220, and their average gross pay at the time of injury adjusted to 1997 pay levels was $34,833. |
gao_GAO-10-650T | gao_GAO-10-650T_0 | Background
TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security of surface transportation systems, including developing a national strategy and implementing security programs. TSA Has Taken Some Actions to Implement a Risk Management Approach but Could Do More to Inform the Allocation of Resources across the Surface Transportation Sector
In March 2009, we reported that TSA has taken some actions called for by the NIPP’s risk management process, but has not conducted comprehensive risk assessments across aviation and four major surface transportation modes. Consequently, we recommended that TSA conduct comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector to produce a comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to guide current and future investment decisions. For example, we reported in June 2009 that TSA had not conducted its own risk assessment of mass transit and passenger rail systems that combined all three risk elements, as called for by the NIPP. For example, in April 2009, we reported that TSA’s efforts to assess security threats to freight rail could be strengthened. We recommended that TSA expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has since reported that TSA has developed a Critical Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. We expect to issue this report by the end of this year. TSA Has Generally Improved Coordination with Key Stakeholders but Additional Actions Could Enhance Current Efforts to Improve Surface Transportation Security
TSA has developed several initiatives to improve coordination with its federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. For example, we reported in April 2009 that federal and industry stakeholders have taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts, such as implementing agreements to clarify roles and responsibilities and participating in various information-sharing mechanisms. For example, we reported that TSA was not requesting data on deficiencies in security plans and training activities collected by FRA, which could be useful to TSA in developing regulations requiring high-risk rail carriers to develop and implement security plans. To improve coordination, we recommended that DHS work with federal partners such as FRA to ensure that all relevant information, including threat assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with the recommendation. Using Targeted, Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures Could Help TSA Better Monitor Strategy and Program Effectiveness
In accordance with Executive Order 13416 and requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act, DHS, through TSA, has developed national strategies for each surface transportation mode. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that TSA’s Mass Transit Modal Annex identified sectorwide goals that apply to all modes of transportation as well as subordinate objectives specific to mass transit and passenger rail systems, but did not contain measures or targets on the effectiveness of operations of the security programs identified in the annex. DHS concurred with both of these recommendations. As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s efforts to help ensure pipeline security, we are assessing the extent to which TSA has measured efforts to strengthen pipeline security. Also, developing additional performance measures—particularly outcome- based measures—that assess the effects of TSA’s efforts in strengthening pipeline security and are aligned with transportation-sector goals and pipeline security objectives could better enable TSA to evaluate security improvements in the pipeline industry. TSA Has More Than Doubled Its Surface Transportation Inspector Workforce but Faces Challenges in Balancing Priorities and Directing Current and Future Workforce Needs
Over the past two years, TSA has reported having more than doubled the size of its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, expanding the program from 93 inspectors in June 2008 to 201 inspectors in April 2010. Workforce Planning: At the time of our June 2009 report, TSA did not have a human capital or other workforce plan for its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, but the agency had plans to conduct a staffing study to identify the optimal workforce size to address its current and future program needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Terrorist attacks on surface transportation facilities in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid caused casualties and highlighted the vulnerability of such systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for security of transportation systems. This testimony focuses on the extent to which (1) DHS has used risk management in strengthening surface transportation security, (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing surface transportation with stakeholders, (3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation security-improvement actions, and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface transportation security inspectors and related challenges it faces in doing so. GAO's statement is based on public GAO products issued from January to June 2009, selected updates from September 2009 to April 2010, and ongoing work on pipeline security. For the updates and ongoing work, GAO analyzed TSA's pipeline risk assessment model, reviewed relevant laws and program management documents, and interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken actions to implement a risk management approach but could do more to inform resource allocation based on risk across the surface transportation sector--including the mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway, and pipeline modes. For example, in March 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments to compare risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to guide investment decisions, and recommended that TSA do so. TSA concurred, and in April 2010 noted planned actions. GAO has also made recommendations to strengthen risk assessments within individual modes, such as expanding TSA's efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy, including potential sabotage to bridges, tunnels, and other critical infrastructure. DHS concurred and is addressing the recommendations. TSA has generally improved coordination with key surface transportation stakeholders, but additional actions could enhance its efforts. For example, GAO reported in April 2009 that although federal and industry stakeholders have taken steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts, TSA was not requesting another federal agency's data that could be useful in developing regulations for high-risk rail carriers. GAO recommended that DHS work with its federal partners to ensure that all relevant information, such as threat assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with this recommendation and recently stated that TSA has met with key federal stakeholders regarding sharing relevant assessment information and avoiding duplication. TSA has developed national strategies for each surface transportation mode, but using targeted, outcome-oriented performance measures could enable TSA to better monitor the effectiveness of these strategies and programs that support them. For example, GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA's mass transit strategy identified sectorwide goals, but did not contain measures or targets for program effectiveness. Such measures could help TSA track progress in securing transit and passenger rail systems. GAO also reported in April 2009 that TSA's freight rail security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure, such as including more reliable baseline data to improve consistency in quantifying results. GAO recommended in both instances that TSA strengthen its performance measures. DHS concurred and noted planned actions. Preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing review of pipeline security show that TSA has taken some actions to monitor progress, but could better measure pipeline security improvements. GAO expects to issue a report by the end of 2010. GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA had more than doubled its surface transportation inspector workforce and expanded the roles and responsibilities of surface inspectors, but faced challenges balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities and had not completed a workforce plan to direct current and future program needs. TSA has initiated but not yet finished a staffing study to identify the optimal size of its inspector workforce. |
gao_GAO-06-933T | gao_GAO-06-933T_0 | Information Sharing Is Important
Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to port security activities. Interagency Operational Centers
Another approach at improving information sharing and port security operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants 24 hours a day. In addition, some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information gathering and sharing. Area Maritime Security Committees Have Improved Information Sharing
Ports Reviewed Showed Improvements in Timeliness, Completeness, and Usefulness of Shared Information
Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. Coast Guard Continues to Develop Sector Command Centers at Ports
In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up to 40 of its own operational centers—called sector command centers—at additional ports. While the report addresses the information sought by Congress, the report did not define the relationship between interagency operational centers and the Coast Guard’s own sector command centers. Coast Guard Continues to Take Steps to Grant Additional Clearances to State, Local, and Industry Officials
In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve information sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime security committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in submitting their applications for a security clearance. We also reported that as of February 2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee members who had a need to know had submitted the application forms for a security clearance. While it is unclear that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures, as of June 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it has developed guidance for using its data on committee participants. According to the Coast Guard, the guidance released to field commands regarding the state, local, and industry security clearance program clarified the process for nonfederal area maritime security committee members to receive clearances and specifically outlined responsibilities for working with applicants on completing required paperwork, including the application packages. Concluding Observations
As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information sharing among members of area maritime security committees and participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can improve the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for deterring, preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the nation’s ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting security clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve information sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these officials through the application process had been slow, it appears that as of June 2006 the Coast Guard’s efforts to process security clearances to nonfederal officials has improved considerably. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sharing information with nonfederal officials is an important tool in federal efforts to secure the nation's ports against a potential terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. The Coast Guard has established area maritime security committees--forums that involve federal and nonfederal officials who identify and address risks in a port. The Coast Guard and other agencies have sought to further enhance information sharing and port security operations by establishing interagency operational centers--command centers that tie together the efforts of federal and nonfederal participants. This testimony is a summary and update to our April 2005 report, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394 . It discusses the impact the committees and interagency operational centers have had on improving information sharing and identifies any barriers that have hindered information sharing.
What GAO Found
Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the newly formed committees were an improvement over previous information-sharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO's ongoing work indicates that these committees continue to be useful forums for information sharing. Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. The Coast Guard has developed its own centers--called sector command centers--at 35 port locations to monitor information and to support its operations planned for the future. As of today, the relationship between the interagency operational centers and the sector command centers remains to be determined. In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the lack of federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that clarified their role in obtaining clearances for nonfederal members of committees or centers. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. As of June 2006, guidance was put in place and according to the Coast Guard, was responsible for an increase in security clearance applications under consideration by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 467 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees with a need to know received some type of security clearance. This is an improvement from February 2005, when no security clearances were issued to 359 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees members with a need to know security information. |
gao_GAO-04-1084T | gao_GAO-04-1084T_0 | Recognizing the people element in these initiatives and implementing strategies to help individuals maximize their full potential in the new environment are key to a successful transformation of the intelligence community and related homeland security organizations. They require fundamental changes in strategic human capital management approaches, particularly in defining, aligning, and integrating key institutional, unit, and individual performance management and reward systems to achieve desired outcomes. Experience shows that successful major change management initiatives in large public and private sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years to help to create the accountability needed to ensure that long-term management and transformation initiatives are successfully completed. For example, while the FBI Director has a 10- year term appointment, most of the intelligence agency heads have shorter term appointments. In his August 2004 testimony on the proposed 9/11 Commission reforms, the Comptroller General suggested that the Congress may want to place attention on lengthening the period of time served by the directors of the other intelligence agencies to provide the continuity and management needed to make the tremendous changes that occur during organizational transformations. Using Performance Management Systems Is Another Key Practice to Help Transform the Intelligence Community
A central theme of the 9/11 Commission report was that one of the major challenges facing the intelligence community is moving from a culture of a “need to know” to a “need to share.” The Congress and the President are separately considering a series of important structural and policy changes that would facilitate this shift. Human Capital Flexibilities Are Also Essential Tools for Intelligence Community Transformation
Significant changes have been underway in the last 3 years regarding how the federal workforce is managed. For example, the Congress passed legislation providing certain governmentwide human capital flexibilities, such as direct hire authority. While many federal agencies have received additional human capital flexibilities, others may be both needed and appropriate for the intelligence and other selected agencies. FBI Is Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Transform and Meet Post 9/11 Challenges
Human capital challenges are especially significant for the intelligence organizations, such as the FBI, that are undergoing a fundamental transformation in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. For the last 3 years, we have been monitoring the FBI’s progress as it transforms itself from its traditional crime enforcement mission to its post September 11 homeland security priorities—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crimes. These initiatives included realigning, retraining, and hiring special agents and analysts with critical skills to address its top priorities, and taking initial steps to revamp its performance management system. Many Factors Must Be Considered in Approach to Government Security Clearance Process
The 9/11 Commission also raised concerns about minimizing national security policymaking disruptions during the change of administrations by accelerating the process for national security appointments. The Commission recommended that a single federal agency should be responsible for providing and maintaining security clearances and for ensuring uniform security clearance standards, including maintaining a single governmentwide database of clearance information, as a way to address this concern. In prior work, we have found that many factors must be considered in addressing the government security clearance process. 2). The large number of requests for security clearances for service members, government employees, and industry personnel taxes a process that already is experiencing backlogs and delays. The limited number of investigative staff available to process requests hinders efforts to issue timely clearances. Human capital considerations, such as the recruitment and retention of key skills and competencies, performance incentives to share information, and more flexible approaches to the management of human capital, are crucial to the success of the intelligence community reforms envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, and agencies involved with the intelligence community will need the most effective human capital systems to succeed in their transformation efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has performed extensive work and gained experience on government transformation and the critical role that human capital management can play in driving this change. Valuable lessons from these efforts could help guide the proposed reforms in the intelligence community envisioned by the 9/11 Commission. This statement focuses on (1) the lessons GAO has learned from successful mergers and organizational transformations; particularly the need for committed and sustained leadership and the role of performance management systems in these changes; (2) human capital flexibilities that can be used as essential tools to help achieve these reforms; (3) how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is using these lessons and human capital flexibilities to transform to meet its evolving mission in the post 9/11 environment, and (4) GAO's findings to date on the factors that must be considered in the approach to the government's security clearance process, as a means to accelerate the process for national security appointments.
What GAO Found
Recognizing that people are the critical element in transformation initiatives is key to a successful transformation of the intelligence community and related homeland security organizations. GAO's work in successful mergers and transformations shows that incorporating strategic human capital management approaches will help sustain any reforms in the intelligence community. Successful major change management initiatives in large public and private sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years to create the accountability needed to ensure this success. As a result, committed and sustained leadership is indispensable to making lasting changes in the intelligence community. Accordingly, the Congress may want to consider lengthening the terms served by the directors of the intelligence agencies, similar to the FBI Director's 10-year term. One of the major challenges facing the intelligence community is moving from a culture of a "need to know" to a "need to share" intelligence information. The experience of leading organizations suggests that performance management systems--that define, align, and integrate institutional, unit, and individual performance with organizational outcomes--can provide incentives and accountability for sharing information to help facilitate this shift. Significant changes have been underway in the last 3 years regarding how the federal workforce is managed. The Congress passed legislation providing certain governmentwide human capital flexibilities, such as direct hire authority. While many federal agencies have received human capital flexibilities, others may be both needed and appropriate for intelligence agencies, such as providing these agencies with the authority to hire a limited number of term-appointed positions on a noncompetitive basis. Human capital challenges are especially significant for the intelligence organizations, such as the FBI, that are undergoing a fundamental transformation in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. For the last 3 years, we have been using the lessons learned from successful transformations to monitor the FBI's progress as it transforms itself from its traditional crime enforcement mission to its post 9/11 homeland security priorities--counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crimes. For example, the FBI has undertaken a variety of human capital related initiatives, including major changes in realigning, retraining, and hiring special agents and analysts with critical skills to address its top priorities. The 9/11 Commission recommended that a single federal security clearance agency should be created to accelerate the government's security clearance process. Several factors must be considered in determining the approach to this process. The large number of requests for security clearances for service members, government employees, and others taxes a process that already is experiencing backlogs and delays. Existing impediments--such as the lack of a governmentwide database of clearance information, a large clearance workload, and too few investigators--hinder efforts to provide timely, high-quality clearance determinations. |
gao_GAO-08-442T | gao_GAO-08-442T_0 | Once seniors arrive at the polling places, they may face additional challenges, depending on the availability of accessible parking areas, accessibility of polling places, type and complexity of the voting equipment, availability of alternative voting methods (such as absentee voting), and the availability of voting assistance or aids. Most importantly, the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (VAEHA), enacted in 1984, requires that political subdivisions responsible for conducting elections assure that all polling places for federal elections are accessible to elderly voters and voters with disabilities (with limited exceptions). HAVA also contains a number of provisions designed to help increase the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities. Physical Access to Polling Places Was Uneven during Election 2000, but May Have Improved since HAVA Was Enacted in 2002
Our on-site inspections of polling places in the 2000 general election revealed many impediments that can limit access for older voters and voters with disabilities. These on-site inspections during the 2000 election revealed that only an estimated 16 percent of polling places were free of impediments that might prevent elderly voters and voters with disabilities from reaching voting rooms. The rest had one or more likely impediments from the parking area to the voting room, although curbside voting was often made available where permitted by the state (see fig. 2). New Provisions and Practices May Be Improving Access to Polling Places, although the Degree of Change Is Difficult to Determine
After the November 2004 general election, we found signs of improvement in access to polling places when we surveyed each state and representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide in 2005 about their state provisions and practices. Our 2000 review of state provisions and practices related to accessible voting systems and accommodations in the voting room revealed significant gaps, insofar as 27 states lacked provisions that voting systems should accommodate individuals with disabilities, 18 lacked provisions for wheelchairs in voting booths, and many lacked provisions to provide aides to the visually impaired; for example, 47 states lacked a provision to provide a large type ballot, and 45 lacked a provision to provide a Braille ballot. States Have Increased Provisions for Voting Rooms Accommodations, though the Extent of Such Improvements Is Unclear
Our 2005 survey of state election officials revealed a marked increase since the 2000 election in the number of state provisions related to accommodations in the voting room. However, GAO found little quantitative data on the usefulness of various types of bilingual voting assistance. Similarly, in a number of states that lacked provisions for allowing voters to use an alternate voting place on Election Day, our 2000 county survey data also showed that some counties and local governments offered this alternative, while others did not. Conclusions
Ensuring that seniors or individuals with disabilities successfully cast their votes in an election requires government to think broadly about access, including access to transportation, access into buildings, access with respect to voting equipment, and access to various alternative voting methods. The increase in state provisions and reports of practices to improve the accessibility of the voting process is encouraging. Understanding and addressing accessibility gaps is an enormous task for our state and local election officials who are challenged by the multiplicity of responsibilities and requirements they must attend to within resource constraints. At the same time, as our population ages, and with it the percent of voters with disabilities swells, the expectation of accommodation and assistance to participate in this basic civic exercise will grow, making accessibility a key performance goal for our election community. Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting Methods. | Why GAO Did This Study
Voting is fundamental to our democratic system, and federal law generally requires polling places for federal elections to be accessible to older voters and voters with physical disabilities. Following reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, and antiquated voting systems, the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted. Among other provisions, HAVA includes requirements for the accessibility of voting systems, effective January 1, 2006. In the past, GAO has published several reports on issues related to voting access for older voters. Our prior work, including on-site inspections of a national sample of polling places in election year 2000, a comprehensive review of the election system in 2004, and a review of transportation issues facing seniors, has identified a number of potential barriers to voting for older Americans, as well as accommodations and progress in a number of areas. Drawing from prior work, GAO's testimony will focus on (1) a variety of factors that affect the ability of older voters to travel to polling places, cast their votes in the voting room, or avail themselves of alternative voting provisions and (2) trends and changes regarding the accessibility of polling places and alternative voting methods.
What GAO Found
Ensuring that older voters or other individuals with disabilities successfully cast their votes in an election requires that policymakers think broadly about access. This includes access with respect to transportation, polling places, voting equipment, and alternative voting methods. During the 2000 election, most polling places we inspected had one or more potential impediments that might prevent older voters and voters with disabilities from reaching voting rooms, although curbside voting accommodations were often made available. Additionally, our 2000 review of state provisions and practices related to accessible voting systems and accommodations in the voting room revealed that provisions to accommodate individuals with disabilities varied from state to state and may vary widely in their implementation. A 2004 GAO report also found transportation gaps in meeting the needs of seniors, which may create a barrier to voting for many elderly voters, and a lack of data on the extent of unmet needs. Since the passage of HAVA and the subsequent 2004 election, we have identified a number of reported efforts taken to improve voting access for people with disabilities. In particular, our 2006 report on election systems shows a marked increase in state provisions addressing the accessibility of polling places, voting systems, and alternative voting methods. However, the degree of change in accessibility is difficult to determine, in part because thousands of jurisdictions have primary responsibility for managing elections and ensuring an accurate vote count, and the complexity of the election system does not ensure that these provisions and reported practices are reflective of what occurs at polling places on election day. Understanding and addressing accessibility gaps represent enormous tasks for state and local election officials who are challenged by the multiplicity of responsibilities and requirements they must attend to within resource constraints. At the same time, as the population ages and the percentage of voters with disabilities expands, the expectation of accommodation and assistance to participate in this basic civic exercise will grow, making accessibility a key performance goal for our election community. |
gao_GAO-14-317 | gao_GAO-14-317_0 | Most of the $608.3 Million NIST Spent on the MEP Program in Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013 Directly Supported MEP Centers
NIST spent $608.3 million in federal funding on the MEP program in fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and used most of these funds to directly support MEP centers and their work with manufacturing firms. NIST spent $78 million for contracts, and for NIST staff salaries and benefits, some of which NIST considers direct support and some administrative spending. The remaining $35.7 million was spent for agency-wide overhead charges and travel, training, performance awards, and other items, all of which NIST considers administrative spending. NIST defines direct support as spending that directly supports the MEP center system’s work with manufacturing firms, such as awards to centers or spending on training for MEP center staff. NIST considers all other spending to be administrative, including spending on performance evaluations of centers and on agency-wide overhead charges that pay for facilities operations and maintenance at the NIST campus. NIST is not required to track, and historically has not tracked, administrative spending, but NIST officials told us the agency developed its definitions of direct support and administrative spending in fiscal year 2013 in response to congressional interest. It then conducted an analysis of fiscal year 2013 federal MEP program spending using those definitions. NIST estimated that about 88.5 percent of federal MEP program spending in fiscal year 2013 was for direct support, and the remaining 11.5 percent was administrative. NIST’s Cooperative Agreement Award Spending Is Inconsistent with Beneficiary Equity
NIST’s spending on cooperative agreement awards is based on the historical amount awarded to each center when it was established. This took into account each center’s identification of target manufacturing firms in its service area—including characteristics such as business size, industry types, product mix, and technology requirements—and its costs of providing services to those manufacturing firms. However, because NIST made the awards on an incremental basis to individual centers serving different areas over a period of more than 15 years, NIST’s awards to individual centers did not take into account variations across different service areas in the demand for program services—a function of the number and characteristics of target manufacturing firms—or variations across different service areas in costs of providing services. NIST’s cooperative agreement award spending is, therefore, inconsistent This standard—which is commonly with the beneficiary equity standard.used in social science research to design and evaluate funding formulas—calls for funds to be distributed in a way that takes these variations into account so that centers can provide the same level of services to each target manufacturing firm, according to its needs. NIST officials told us that an analysis they recently conducted showed a wide variation across centers in the relationship between their cooperative agreement award amounts and the number of target manufacturing firms in their service areas. NIST officials told us they are exploring ways to revise NIST’s cooperative agreement award spending to take into account variations across service areas in the number of target manufacturing firms, among other factors. The officials discussed various options they are considering, but they did not identify an option they had agreed to implement or a timeline for decision making and implementation. Conclusions
Manufacturing plays a key role in the U.S. economy, and NIST has established a nationwide system of MEP centers dedicated to supporting and strengthening the U.S. manufacturing base. However, because NIST’s cooperative agreement award spending does not take into account variations across service areas in the demand for program services—a function of the number and characteristics of target manufacturing firms—or variations in MEP centers’ costs of providing services, centers may not be able to provide the same level of services to each target manufacturing firm, according to its needs. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that NIST’s spending on cooperative agreement awards to MEP centers is more equitable to manufacturing firms in different service areas, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce revise the program’s cooperative agreement award spending to account for variations across service areas in: the demand for program services—a function of the number and characteristics of target manufacturing firms—and
MEP centers’ costs of providing services. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce’s NIST for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Manufacturing plays a key role in the U.S. economy. Congress established the MEP program in NIST in 1988. The program's objectives are to enhance productivity and technological performance and to strengthen the global competitiveness of target manufacturing firms, namely small and medium-sized U.S.-based firms. Under this program, NIST partners with 60 nonfederal organizations called MEP centers. The centers, located in 50 states and Puerto Rico, help target firms develop new customers and expand capacity, among other things. NIST awards federal funding to centers under annually renewed cooperative agreements, subject to the centers providing matching funds and receiving a positive performance evaluation.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, mandated GAO to report on MEP program administrative efficiency, which relates to funding provided to centers. This report (1) describes, over the past 5 years, how NIST spent federal MEP program funds and (2) examines the basis for NIST's cooperative agreement award spending. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed obligations data, reviewed relevant legislation and policies, and interviewed NIST officials.
What GAO Found
Of the approximately $608 million spent by the Department of Commerce's (Commerce) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program, NIST used most of the funds to directly support MEP centers. Specifically, NIST spent about $495 million on awards to centers and spent the rest on contracts, staff, agency-wide overhead charges, and other items, some of which NIST considered direct support and some of which NIST considered administrative spending. Although NIST is not required to track, and has not historically tracked, administrative spending, NIST officials told GAO the agency developed definitions of direct support and administrative spending in fiscal year 2013 in response to congressional interest, then conducted an analysis of fiscal year 2013 federal MEP program spending using those definitions. NIST defines direct support spending as spending that directly supports the MEP center system's work with manufacturing firms, such as awards to centers or contracts to train MEP center staff on how to quickly assess innovative ideas for new products. NIST considers all other spending to be administrative, including spending on performance evaluations for MEP centers or on agency-wide overhead fees that pay for facilities operations and maintenance at the NIST campus. Using these definitions, NIST estimated that about 88.5 percent of federal MEP program spending in fiscal year 2013 was for direct support, and the remaining 11.5 percent was for administration.
NIST's spending on cooperative agreement awards is based on the historical amount awarded to each center when it was established. This took into account each center's identification of target manufacturing firms in its service area—including characteristics such as business size, industry types, product mix, and technology requirements—and its costs of providing services to those firms. However, because NIST made the awards on an incremental basis to individual centers serving different areas over a period of more than 15 years, NIST's awards did not take into account variations across service areas in the demand for program services—a function of the number and characteristics of target firms—or variations across service areas in costs of providing services. NIST's cooperative agreement award spending is, therefore, inconsistent with the beneficiary equity standard. This standard—commonly used to design and evaluate funding formulas—calls for funds to be distributed in a way that takes these variations into account so that centers can provide the same level of services to each target manufacturing firm, according to its needs. Because NIST did not account for these variations across service areas, NIST's cooperative agreement award spending may not allow centers to provide the same level of services to target manufacturing firms, according to their needs. NIST officials told GAO that an analysis they recently conducted showed wide variation across centers in the relationship between their cooperative agreement award amounts and the number of target manufacturing firms in their service areas. NIST officials told GAO they are exploring ways to revise NIST's cooperative agreement award spending to take into account variations across service areas in the number of target manufacturing firms, among other factors. The officials discussed various options they are considering, but they did not identify an option they had agreed to implement or a timeline for decision making and implementation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Commerce's spending on cooperative agreement awards be revised to account for variations across service areas in demand for program services and in MEP centers' costs of providing services. Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-636 | gao_GAO-10-636_0 | All segments are needed to take full advantage of GPS capabilities. The Air Force Continues to Face Challenges to Launching Its Satellites as Scheduled, Which Could Affect the Availability of the Baseline GPS Constellation
The Air Force faces challenges to launching its IIF and IIIA satellites as scheduled. The GPS IIIA program is progressing and the Air Force continues to implement an approach that should prevent the types of problems experienced on the IIF program. However, the IIIA schedule remains ambitious and could be affected by risks such as the program’s dependence on a ground system that will not be completed until after the first IIIA launch. Meanwhile, the availability of the baseline GPS constellation has improved, but a delay in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could still reduce the size of the constellation to below its 24- satellite baseline, where it might not meet the needs of some GPS users. After Long Development Delays, the First GPS IIF Satellite Has Been Launched, but the Program Faces Longer-Term Challenges in Launching IIF Satellites as Scheduled
Last year, we reported that under the IIF program, the Air Force had difficulty successfully building GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals, encountered significant technical problems that threatened its delivery schedule, and faced challenges with a different contractor for the IIF program. Since our last review, launch of the first IIF satellite was postponed an additional 6 months—for an overall delay of almost 3-½ years—to May 2010. Current GPS Constellation Availability Improves, but a Delay in GPS III Could Affect GPS Constellation Performance
To ensure that the GPS constellation can provide PNT information to GPS users located anywhere on the earth at almost any time of day, the performance standards for both (1) the standard positioning service provided to civil and commercial GPS users and (2) the precise positioning service provided to military GPS users commit the U.S. government to at least a 95 percent probability of maintaining a constellation of 24 operational GPS satellites. Exploitation of New Satellite Capabilities Delayed Further Because of Ground Control and User Equipment Delays and Acquisition Challenges
GPS modernization efforts across the space, ground control, and user equipment segments introduce new capabilities, such as improved resistance to jamming and greater accuracy. However, the development of GPS ground control systems has experienced years of delay and in some cases will delay the delivery of new capabilities to users. In addition, although the Air Force has taken steps to enable quicker procurement of military GPS user equipment, there are significant challenges to these systems’ implementation. DOD has taken some steps to coordinate GPS segments, but it is not likely that these will be sufficient to ensure that all GPS segments are synchronized to the maximum extent practicable, which we recommended last year. The GPS Interagency Requirements Process Is Relatively Untested and Lacks Detailed Guidance
The GPS interagency requirements process remains relatively untested and civil agencies continue to find the process confusing. The lack of detailed guidance on the process is a key source of confusion and has also contributed to other problems, such as disagreement and inconsistent implementation of the process. In addition, we found that the interagency requirements process relies on individual agencies to identify their own requirements but does not identify PNT needs across civil agencies. Both DOD and DOT concurred with this recommendation. 3. State Department officials also stated that they continue to engage other planned global navigation satellite system providers bilaterally and multilaterally in pursuit of interoperability with civil GPS signals and compatibility with GPS military signals. Moreover, this year we found that a lack of comprehensive guidance on the GPS interagency requirements process is a key source of this confusion. DOT generally agreed to consider our recommendation. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In order to assess the status of the U.S. Air Force’s efforts to develop and deliver new Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, the availability of the GPS constellation, and the potential impacts on users if the constellation availability diminishes below its committed level of performance, we performed several tasks. To assess the GPS interagency requirements process, we (1) reviewed and analyzed guidance on the process and documents related to the status of civil requirements and (2) interviewed officials from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Department of Transportation, including the Federal Aviation Administration; the Department of Commerce, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the Coast Guard; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration; the National Security Space Office; the Air Force Space Command; the Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements; and the National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global Positioning System (GPS) provides positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) data to users worldwide. The U.S. Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing the system. Last year GAO reported that it was uncertain whether the Air Force could acquire new satellites in time to maintain GPS service without interruption. GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of Air Force efforts to develop and deliver new GPS satellites, the availability of the GPS constellation, and the potential impacts on users if the constellation availability diminishes below its committed level of performance; (2) efforts to acquire the GPS ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities; (3) the GPS interagency requirements process; and (4) coordination of GPS efforts with the international PNT community. To do this, GAO analyzed program documentation and Air Force data on the GPS constellation, and interviewed officials from DOD and other agencies.
What GAO Found
The Air Force continues to face challenges to launching its IIF and IIIA satellites as scheduled. The first IIF satellite was launched in May 2010--a delay of 6 additional months for an overall delay of almost 3 1/2 years--and the program faces risks that could affect subsequent IIF satellites and launches. GPS IIIA appears to be on schedule and the Air Force continues to implement an approach intended to overcome the problems experienced with the IIF program. However, the IIIA schedule remains ambitious and could be affected by risks such as the program's dependence on a ground system that will not be completed until after the first IIIA launch. The GPS constellation availability has improved, but in the longer term, a delay in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could still reduce the size of the constellation to fewer than 24 operational satellites--the number that the U.S. government commits to--which might not meet the needs of some GPS users. Multiyear delays in the development of GPS ground control systems are extensive. In addition, although the Air Force has taken steps to enable quicker procurement of military GPS user equipment, there are significant challenges to its implementation. This has had a significant impact on DOD as all three GPS segments--space, ground control, and user equipment--must be in place to take advantage of new capabilities, such as improved resistance to jamming and greater accuracy. DOD has taken some steps to better coordinate all GPS segments. These steps involve laying out criteria and establishing visibility over a spectrum of procurement efforts. But they do not go as far as GAO recommended last year in terms of establishing a single authority responsible for ensuring that all GPS segments are synchronized to the maximum extent practicable. Such an authority is warranted given the extent of delays, problems with synchronizing all GPS segments, and importance of new capabilities to military operations. As a result, GAO reiterates the need to implement its prior recommendation. The GPS interagency requirements process, which is co-chaired by officials from DOD and DOT, remains relatively untested and civil agencies continue to find the process confusing. This year GAO found that a lack of comprehensive guidance on the GPS interagency requirements process is a key source of this confusion and has contributed to other problems, such as disagreement about and inconsistent implementation of the process. In addition, GAO found that the interagency requirements process relies on individual agencies to identify their own requirements rather than identifying PNT needs across agencies. The Department of State continues to be engaged internationally in pursuit of civil signal interoperability and military signal compatibility, and has not identified any new concerns in these efforts since GAO's 2009 report. Challenges remain for the United States in ensuring that GPS is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space-based PNT systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) develop comprehensive guidance for the GPS interagency requirements process. DOD did not concur with the recommendation, citing actions under way. DOT generally agreed to consider it. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid. |
gao_GAO-11-540T | gao_GAO-11-540T_0 | Examples of Selected Tax Administration Practices to Address Known Tax Administration Issues
The following examples illustrate how New Zealand, Finland, EU, UK, Australia, and Hong Kong have addressed well known tax administration issues. New Zealand Does Joint Evaluations of Tax Expenditures and Discretionary Spending Programs to Analyze Their Effects and Improve Program Delivery
New Zealand, like the U.S., addresses various national objectives through a combination of tax expenditures and discretionary spending programs. The research found that the WFF program aided the transition from relying on government benefits to employment, as intended. In 2005, we reported that the U.S. had substantial tax expenditures but lacked clarity on the roles of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of the Treasury, IRS, and federal agencies with discretionary spending programs responsibilities to evaluate the tax expenditures. Electronic tax administration is part of a government-wide policy to use electronic services to lower the cost of government and encourage growth in the private sector. Overall, the growth of electronic services, according to Finnish officials, has helped to reduce Tax Administration staff by over 11 percent from 2003 to 2009 while improving taxpayer service. In contrast to Finland’s self-described “simple and stable” system, the U.S. tax system is complex and constantly changing. Taxpayers are to accurately prepare and file an income tax return by its due date. This agreement addresses common issues with the accuracy and usefulness of information exchanged among nations that have differing technical, language, and formatting approaches for recording and transmitting such information. The UK and U.S. both have individual income tax returns and use information reporting and tax withholding to help ensure the correct tax is reported and paid. As announced by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 2009, the IRS formed the Global High Wealth (GHW) industry to take a holistic approach to high-wealth individuals. The IRS consulted with the ATO as GHW got up and running to discuss the ATO’s approach to the high wealth population, as well as its operational best practices. This cultural attitude helps promote compliance. IRS Considers Foreign Tax Practices That Might Merit Adoption
IRS officials learn about foreign tax practices by participating in international organizations of tax administrators. As the IRS learns of these practices, it may adopt the practice based on the needs of the U.S. tax system. Second, the IRS participates with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), which is chaired by the IRS Commissioner during 2011. IRS and OECD officials exchange tax administration knowledge. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and foreign tax administrators face similar issues regardless of the particular provisions of their laws. These issues include, for example, helping taxpayers prepare and file returns, and assuring tax compliance. GAO was asked to describe (1) how foreign tax administrators have approached issues that are similar to those in the U.S. tax system and (2) whether and how the IRS identifies and adopts tax administration practices used elsewhere. To do this, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed six foreign tax administrators as well as tax experts, tax practitioners, taxpayers, and trade group representatives. GAO also examined documents and met with IRS officials. This preliminary information is based on GAO's ongoing work for the Committee to be completed at a later date.
What GAO Found
Foreign and U.S. tax administrators use many of the same practices such as information reporting, tax withholding, providing web-based services, and finding new approaches for tax compliance. These practices, although common to each system, have important differences. Although differences in laws, culture, or other factors likely would affect the transferability of foreign tax practices to the U.S., these practices may provide useful insights for policymakers and the IRS. For example, New Zealand integrates evaluations of its tax and discretionary spending programs. The evaluation of its Working For Families tax benefits and discretionary spending, which together financially assist low- and middle-income families to promote employment, found that its programs aided the transition to employment but that it still had an underserved population; these findings likely would not have emerged from separate evaluations. GAO previously has reported that the U.S. lacks clarity on evaluating tax expenditures and related discretionary spending programs and does not generally undertake integrated evaluations. In Finland, electronic tax administration is part of a government policy to use electronic services to lower the cost of government and encourage private-sector growth. Overall, according to Finnish officials, electronic services have helped to reduce Tax Administration staff by over 11 percent from 2003 to 2009 while improving taxpayer service. IRS officials learn about these practices based on interactions with other tax administrators and participation in international organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In turn, IRS may adopt new practices based on the needs of the U.S. tax system. For example, in 2009, IRS formed the Global High Wealth Industry program. IRS consulted with Australia about its approach and operational practices. |
gao_GAO-03-615 | gao_GAO-03-615_0 | Federal Land Policy and Management Act and Other Environmental Laws Provide the Statutory Framework for BLM Timber Sales
BLM manages its public domain forestry management program within a statutory framework consisting of a land management statute and various other environmental laws. FLPMA gives BLM broad management discretion over how it emphasizes one use, such as offering timber for sale, in relation to another, such as providing recreation. BLM timber sales on public domain lands must also comply with the requirements of other environmental laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act. Shift in Program Emphasis Was the Primary Cause of the Decline in Timber Offered for Sale
Beginning in the late 1980s, the program emphasis on BLM public domain lands, like that on most other federal forests, increasingly shifted from timber production to emphasizing forest ecosystem health. Shift in Program Emphasis to Forest Ecosystem Health Has Contributed to Reduced Timber Sale Offerings
The 74 percent decline in the volume of timber sale offerings from BLM public domain lands since 1990, according to BLM officials, was primarily due to the shift in program emphasis to forest ecosystem health. According to BLM, the need to reduce forest density and restore composition diversity in forest ecosystems has necessitated a refocusing of federal forest management activities, including timber sale offerings, on the removal of smaller trees and materials that generate less volume than the larger trees more commonly offered for sale in prior years. They noted, however, that the shift had resulted in timber becoming largely a by-product, rather than a focus, of the public domain forestry management program. Scope and Methodology
To determine the legal framework for BLM timber sales on public domain lands, we reviewed laws and regulations governing BLM’s timber sales activities. To determine the trend in the volume of timber that BLM offered for sale from public domain lands, we obtained BLM information on the volumes and composition—sawtimber, firewood, posts, poles, and other wood products—of timber offered for sale by state office for fiscal years 1990 through 2002. To determine what factors contributed to the trend in the volume of timber offered for sale from public domain lands from 1990 to 2002, we met with BLM headquarters officials and visited or contacted officials at 9 of the 12 BLM state offices and six field offices—two each in the states of Colorado, Idaho, and Montana. We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Interior; the Director of the Bureau of Land Management; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. The department agreed with this clarification. | Why GAO Did This Study
For several decades, debate over how to balance timber sales with resource protection and recreational use on federally managed lands has been at the heart of controversy surrounding federal land management. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is one of the federal agencies that manages some of the nation's forests--about 53 million acres--under its public domain forestry management program and offers timber for sale from these lands. With regard to BLM's offerings of timber for sale, congressional requesters asked GAO to determine (1) the statutory framework for BLM timber sales, (2) the trend in BLM timber volume offered for sale, and (3) factors contributing to any observed trends. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and BLM policy governing BLM timber sales. GAO obtained and reviewed data on the volumes and composition of BLM timber sale offerings from fiscal years 1990 through 2002 and met with agency officials and others to identify factors affecting timber sale offering trends and their importance.
What GAO Found
A variety of land management and other environmental laws provide the statutory framework for timber sales on BLM public domain land. In particular, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act permits timber sales as one of several uses for BLM public lands. Timber sales also must comply with other environmental laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act. From 1990 to 2002, the volume of timber offered for sale by BLM declined about 74 percent. Declines were experienced for each of the timber's components--sawtimber (trees or logs suitable for conversion into lumber) and other wood products (small logs used to make firewood, posts, and poles). Consequently, in 2002, the proportion of sawtimber in the total volume offered for sale was less than it was in 1990. The principal factor contributing to the decline in timber volume was the governmentwide shift in forestry program emphasis beginning in the late 1980s from timber production to enhancing forest ecosystem health. This shift was based on the need to provide more protection for nontimber resources and to place a greater emphasis on the removal of smaller trees to reduce the risks of insects, fire, and disease. As a result, according to BLM officials, timber became a by-product rather than the focus of BLM's management of its public domain forests. |
gao_GAO-09-866 | gao_GAO-09-866_0 | If the application is for a drug designed to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses and the drug is expected to provide meaningful therapeutic benefits compared to existing treatments, and the sponsor evaluated the drug’s impact on a surrogate endpoint that only reasonably suggested clinical benefit, FDA will review the application under its accelerated approval process. For example, FDA considers lowering blood pressure as a valid surrogate endpoint to establish a drug’s clinical effectiveness in reducing the risk of stroke. FDA Has Approved Many Applications Based on Surrogate Endpoints through Its Accelerated Approval Process and about Two-Thirds of Postmarketing Studies Have Been Closed
FDA has approved 90 applications based on surrogate endpoints under its accelerated approval process since the process was established in 1992. During this period, FDA required or requested sponsors to conduct over 450 postmarketing studies associated with the approval of applications for these drugs, and the majority of these studies have been classified by FDA as closed—meaning that drug sponsors had met FDA’s requirements for these studies or FDA determined the studies were no longer needed or feasible. However, several have been classified by FDA as open for an extended period of time. 2). 3). In contrast, according to FDA officials, it is typically easier for a sponsor to complete a required confirmatory study for HIV/AIDS drugs because sponsors may simply continue the study which led to the original accelerated approval of the drug and do not have to design new studies to fulfill the postmarketing study requirements. The 52 studies FDA classified as open covered a variety of statuses, and thus were at varying levels of completion. FDA Approved about One-Third of NME Drug Applications Based on Surrogate Endpoints through Its Traditional Process and about Half of the Postmarketing Studies Requested Have Been Closed
From January 1, 1998, through June 30, 2008, FDA approved about one- third of NME drug applications based on surrogate endpoints under its traditional process. Many of these applications were for drugs to treat cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. About One-Third of the Applications for NME Drugs Approved under the Traditional Process Were Based on Surrogate Endpoints, Many for Drugs to Treat Cancer, Cardiovascular Disease, and Diabetes
From January 1, 1998, through June 30, 2008, FDA approved 204 applications for NMEs to treat diseases through the traditional approval process. FDA’s Oversight of Postmarketing Studies Is Hindered by Weaknesses in Its Monitoring and Enforcement
FDA has not been routinely monitoring the status of postmarketing studies, primarily because oversight of these studies is not considered a priority. In addition, FDA does not know whether drug sponsors are submitting complete and accurate ASRs in a timely manner. This includes several applications for drugs that FDA had approved more than 10 years ago and for which sponsors had not yet completed all of their required studies, and others where the studies failed to confirm the drug’s clinical effectiveness. Despite this, FDA did not utilize its authority to withdraw the drug from the market. Despite these tools, weaknesses in FDA’s monitoring and enforcement process hamper its ability to effectively oversee postmarketing studies. It is too early to tell if these initiatives will be successful. It has never exercised its authority to withdraw a drug it approved based on surrogate endpoints under the accelerated approval process, even when such studies have been outstanding for nearly 13 years. Recommendations
To clarify FDA’s enforcement authority under the accelerated approval process, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA take the following action: Clarify the conditions under which the agency would utilize its authority to expedite the withdrawal of drugs approved based on surrogate endpoints under the accelerated approval process if sponsors either fail to complete required confirmatory studies with due diligence, or if studies are completed, but fail to demonstrate the clinical effectiveness of the drugs. Of those 204, 69 NME drugs were approved using surrogate endpoints. Appendix III: Applications Selected and Questions Regarding FDA’s Oversight of Required Postmarketing Studies
To review specific instances of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) monitoring and enforcement activities, we selected a judgmental sample of 15 applications approved based on surrogate endpoints under the accelerated program and the 35 postmarketing studies that FDA required drug sponsors to complete for these drugs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Before approving a drug, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) assesses a drug's effectiveness. This assessment may be based on evidence showing that a drug has a positive impact on a surrogate endpoint--a laboratory measure, such as blood pressure--instead of more direct clinical evidence, like preventing strokes. After approval, FDA often requires or requests a drug sponsor to further study the drug. Concerns have been raised about FDA's reliance on surrogate endpoints and its oversight of postmarketing studies. This report provides information on (1) all drug applications approved based on surrogate endpoints in FDA's accelerated approval process, (2) a subset of applications for potentially innovative drugs approved based on surrogate endpoints under FDA's traditional process, and (3) FDA's oversight of postmarketing studies. GAO identified drugs approved based on surrogate endpoints, obtained the status of related postmarketing studies, and reviewed FDA's oversight of a sample of 35 studies it required under its accelerated approval process, selected to include studies which were at varying levels of completion.
What GAO Found
FDA approved 90 applications for drugs based on surrogate endpoints through its accelerated approval process from the creation of the process in 1992 through November 20, 2008, and about two-thirds of postmarketing studies have been closed. FDA created the accelerated approval process to expedite the approval of drugs which are designed to treat serious or life-threatening illnesses and are expected to provide meaningful therapeutic benefits compared to existing treatments. Under this process, 79 of the 90 applications were approved for drugs to treat cancer, HIV/AIDS, and inhalation anthrax. Because of the need to expedite approval, FDA approves drugs under this process based on surrogate endpoints which are not yet proven substitutes for clinical endpoints, but does require that drug sponsors complete postmarketing studies to confirm the drug's clinical benefit. FDA had required drug sponsors to conduct 144 postmarketing confirmatory studies associated with these 90 applications, and as of December 19, 2008, classified 64 percent as closed--meaning that drug sponsors had met FDA's requirements for these studies or FDA determined the studies were no longer needed or feasible. However, several of the remaining studies have been classified by FDA as open for an extended period. FDA approved 69 applications on the basis of surrogate endpoints for new molecular entities (NME)--potentially innovative drugs containing active chemical substances that have never been approved for marketing in the United States in any form--through its traditional approval process from January 1998 through June 30, 2008. These 69 NME drugs accounted for about one-third of the 204 applications for NME drugs which FDA approved through its traditional process during this period, many for drugs to treat cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. Unlike surrogate endpoints used in the accelerated process, FDA considers those used in the traditional process as valid substitutes for demonstrating the clinical benefit of drugs, and thus does not require sponsors to complete postmarketing confirmatory studies. However, FDA requested that sponsors complete 175 postmarketing studies to obtain other information on many of these NME drugs, and as of February 13, 2009, FDA classified about one-half as closed. Weaknesses in FDA's monitoring and enforcement process hamper its ability to effectively oversee postmarketing studies. FDA has not routinely been reviewing sponsors' annual submissions on the status of studies in a timely manner. It has little in the way of readily accessible, comprehensive data to monitor studies' progression and does not consider such oversight a priority. FDA is implementing initiatives to improve its oversight, but it is too early to tell if they will be effective. Although FDA has authority to expedite the withdrawal of a drug from the market if a sponsor does not complete a required confirmatory study with due diligence, or if a study fails to confirm a drug's clinical benefit, it has not specified the conditions thatwould prompt it to do so. It has never exercised its authority, even when such study requirements have gone unfulfilled for nearly 13 years. |
gao_GAO-04-493T | gao_GAO-04-493T_0 | Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and UAVs Poses a Growing Threat to U.S. National Security Interests
Although cruise missiles and UAVs provide important capabilities for the United States and its friends and allies, in the hands of U.S. adversaries they pose substantial threats to U.S. interests. The United States and other governments have traditionally used multilateral export control regimes, principally the MTCR, to address missile proliferation. The U.S. government uses its national export control authorities to address missile proliferation but finds it difficult to identify and track commercially available items not covered by control lists. This gap in U.S. export control authority enabled American companies to legally export dual-use items to a New Zealand resident who bought the items to show how a terrorist could legally build a cruise missile. Compliance with Conditions on Exports of Cruise Missiles, UAVs, and Dual-use Items Seldom Verified through End-use Monitoring
End-use monitoring refers to the procedures used to verify that foreign recipients of controlled U.S. exports use such items according to U.S. terms and conditions of transfer. Based on Commerce licensing data, we found that Commerce issued 2,490 dual-use licenses between fiscal years 1998 and 2002 for items that could be useful in developing cruise missiles or UAVs. Most countries already possess cruise missiles, UAVs, or related technology, and many are expected to develop or obtain more sophisticated systems in the future. Because some key dual-use components can be acquired without an export license, it is difficult for the export control system to limit or track their use. Furthermore, the U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with the conditions placed on items that could be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. As a result, the U.S. government does not have sufficient information to know whether recipients of these exports are effectively safeguarding equipment and technology and, thus, protecting U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests. State disagreed with the need to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of compliance with license conditions for cruise missile and UAV technology transfers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. national security interests as accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. GAO assessed (1) the tools the U.S. and foreign governments use to address proliferation risks posed by the sale of these items and (2) efforts to verify the end use of exported cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technology.
What GAO Found
The growing threat to U.S. national security of cruise missile and UAV proliferation is challenging the tools the United States has traditionally used. Multilateral export control regimes have expanded their lists of controlled technologies that include cruise missile and UAV items, but key countries of concern are not members. U.S. export control authorities find it increasingly difficult to limit or track unlisted dual-use items that can be acquired without an export license. Moreover, a gap in U.S. export control authority enables American companies to export certain dual-use items to recipients that are not associated with missile projects or countries listed in the regulations, even if the exporter knows the items might be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. American companies have in fact legally exported dual-use items with no U.S. government review to a New Zealand resident who bought the items to build a cruise missile. The U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise missile, UAV, or related technology exports. For example, State officials do not monitor exports to verify compliance with license conditions on missiles or other items, despite legal and regulatory requirements to do so. Defense has not used its end-use monitoring program initiated in 2002 to check the compliance of users of more than 500 cruise missiles exported between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Commerce conducted visits to assess the end use of items for about 1 percent of the 2,490 missile-related licenses we reviewed. Thus, the U.S. government cannot be confident that recipients are effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests. |
gao_GAO-02-590 | gao_GAO-02-590_0 | In 1996, we reported that the State Department did not have a systematic process for identifying unneeded properties and disposing of them. We also reported that decisions about the sale of unneeded overseas real estate properties had been delayed for years because of disputes between OBO and the regional bureaus and embassies. State Department Has Taken Steps to Identify Unneeded Properties but Needs to Improve Inventory Database Accuracy
Since 1996, OBO has taken steps to implement a more systematic process for identifying unneeded properties, which has resulted in post and OBO officials’ placing greater emphasis on identifying properties that could be sold. Steps reflecting this emphasis include an annual request to posts asking them to identify government-owned properties that should be considered for disposal and increased efforts by OBO and IG officials to identify such properties when they visit posts. The State Department agreed to sell 72 of these properties. Real Estate Sales Have Grown, but a Significant Number of Properties Is Still Unsold
The State Department’s performance in selling unneeded property has significantly improved in the last 5 years. Property sales proceeds were more than 3 times greater than for the previous 5-year period. However, despite this progress, the department still has a large number of potentially unneeded properties that remain unsold. The State Department sold 104 properties for more than $404 million from fiscal years 1997 through 2001. 1). State Department Has Not Yet Sold Most Properties Recommended by the Advisory Board
The State Department has not yet sold 19 of 26 properties recommended for sale by the Real Property Advisory Board and approved by department management. 2. | What GAO Found
The U.S. government owns about 3,500 properties overseas at more than 220 locations, including embassy and consular office buildings, housing, and land. The Department of State is responsible for acquiring, managing, and disposing of these properties. In 1996, GAO reported that the State Department did not have an effective process for identifying and selling unneeded overseas real estate, and that decisions concerning the sale of some properties had been delayed for years because of parochial conflicts among the parties involved. The State Department has taken steps to implement a more systematic process for identifying unneeded properties by (1) requesting posts to annually identify excess, underutilized, and obsolete property and (2) requesting its own staff and Inspector General officials to place greater emphasis on identifying such property when they visit posts. The State Department has significantly increased its sales of unneeded properties in the last 5 years. From 1997 through 2001, it sold 104 overseas properties for over $404 million, almost triple the proceeds compared with the previous 5 year period. However, the department still has a large number of unneeded properties that have not yet been sold. The State Department has not effectively implemented recommendations made by the Real Property Advisory Board to sell unneeded property. State has disposed of only 7 properties of the 26 recommended for sale by the board. |
gao_GAO-03-1031 | gao_GAO-03-1031_0 | Because the costs of the program are directly related to the length of the schedule, DOD also increased the projected life-cycle costs, from $15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in 2001 (see fig. 1). Shifts in Leadership Confuse Decision-Making Authority and Obscure Accountability
The Chem-Demil Program has experienced frequent shifts in leadership providing oversight, both between DOD and the Army and within the Army, and frequent turnover in key program positions. Recent Reorganization Has Not Reduced Organizational Complexity
The recent reorganization by the Army has not streamlined the program’s complex organization or clarified roles and responsibilities. Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program’s Inability to Anticipate and Influence Issues
The program continues to miss most milestones, following a decade long trend. The neutralization sites have not missed milestones yet but have experienced delays as well. DOD and the Army have not developed an approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. As a result, the Chem-Demil Program will have a higher level of risk of missing its schedule milestones and CWC deadlines, incurring rising costs, and unnecessarily prolonging the potential risk to the public associated with the storage of the chemical stockpile. Program officials told us that they estimate costs have already increased $1.2 billion. The program will have a low probability of achieving its principal goal of destroying the nation’s chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner within the 2001 schedule unless DOD and Army leadership take immediate action to clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout the program and implement an overarching strategic plan. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, to develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical demilitarization program that would: articulate a program mission statement, identify the program’s long-term goals and objectives, delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, establish near-term performance measures, and implement a risk management approach that anticipates and influences internal and external factors that could adversely impact program performance. To determine the progress that DOD and the Army have made in meeting revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, we interviewed relevant program officials and reviewed a number of documents. Our analysis identified the effect that schedule delays would have on schedule milestones at incineration and neutralization sites. Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade long trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended planned milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond the 1998 estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine the effect that recent organization changes have had on program performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines.
What GAO Found
The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership at the upper management levels. For example, the program has had frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further, recent reorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and fragmented organization of the program. As a result, roles and responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not always coordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves the program without a clear road map and methods to monitor program performance. Without these key elements, DOD and the Army have no assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates. DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and exceeded cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost estimates by $1.2 billion, with other factors still to be considered. Almost all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones because of schedule delays due to environmental, safety, community relations, and funding issues. Although neutralization sites have not missed milestones, they have had delays. DOD and the Army have not developed an approach to anticipate and influence issues that could adversely impact program schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and the Army adopt a risk management approach, the program remains at great risk of missing milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also likely incur rising costs and prolong the public's exposure to the chemical stockpile. |
gao_GAO-05-743T | gao_GAO-05-743T_0 | Before 1969, IRS required hospitals to provide charity care to qualify for tax-exempt status. Since then, however, IRS has not specifically required such care, as long as the hospital provides benefits to the community in other ways. Burden of Providing Uncompensated Care Varied among Hospital Groups, but Burden Was Generally Concentrated in a Small Number of Hospitals
In our review of hospitals’ provision of uncompensated care in five states, we analyzed cost data from two perspectives—namely, each hospital group’s percentage of (1) total uncompensated care costs in a state and (2) patient operating expenses devoted to uncompensated care. This difference was due, in part, to the larger number of nonprofit hospitals and their larger size relative to the for-profit hospitals. Government Hospital Groups Generally Devoted Largest Share of Patient Operating Expenses to Uncompensated Care, but Shares Varied across States
In four of the five states reviewed, government hospitals devoted substantially larger shares, on average, of their patient operating expenses to uncompensated care than did nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Differences between the nonprofit and for-profit groups were often small when compared with the substantial differences between the government group and the other two groups. Moreover, the burden of uncompensated care costs was not evenly distributed among hospitals, which meant that a small number of nonprofit hospitals accounted for substantially more of the uncompensated care burden than did others receiving the same tax preference. As for the other community benefits hospitals reported providing, we were not able to discern a clear distinction among the government, nonprofit, and for-profit hospital groups. Hospitals in the five states reported conducting a variety of activities, which the hospitals themselves considered community benefits. We were unable to assess the value of these benefits or make systematic comparisons between hospitals or across states. These observations illustrate a larger point that I and others raised at the hearing last month—namely, that current tax policy lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for charitable entities and detail on how that tax exemption is conferred. If these criteria are articulated in accordance with desired goals, standards could be established that would allow nonprofit hospitals to be held accountable for providing services of benefit to the public commensurate with their favored tax status. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the provision of uncompensated care by the three hospital ownership groups, we obtained 2003 uncompensated care data from five states—California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Texas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Before 1969, IRS required hospitals to provide charity care to qualify for tax-exempt status. Since then, however, IRS has not specifically required such care, as long as the hospital provides benefits to the community in other ways. Seeking a better understanding of the benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals, Congress requested that GAO examine whether nonprofit hospitals provide levels of uncompensated care and other community benefits that are different from other hospitals. This statement focuses on, by ownership group, hospitals' (1) provision of uncompensated care, which consists of charity care and bad debt, and (2) reporting of other community benefits. The hospital ownership groups were (nonfederal) government, nonprofit, and for-profit. To compare the three hospital ownership groups, GAO obtained 2003 data from five geographically diverse states with substantial representation of the three ownership groups in each state. GAO analyzed cost data from two perspectives--each hospital group's percentage of (1) total uncompensated care costs in a state and (2) patient operating expenses devoted to uncompensated care.
What GAO Found
Government hospitals generally devoted substantially larger shares of their patient operating expenses to uncompensated care than did nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The nonprofit groups' share was higher than that of the for-profit groups in four of the five states, but the difference was small relative to the difference found when making comparisons with the government hospital group. Further, within each group, the burden of uncompensated care costs was not evenly distributed among hospitals but instead was concentrated in a small number of hospitals. This meant that a small number of nonprofit hospitals accounted for substantially more of the uncompensated care burden than did others receiving the same tax preference. Hospitals in the five states--nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals--reported providing a variety of services and activities, which the hospitals themselves defined as community benefits. Community benefits include such services as the provision of health education and screening services to specific vulnerable populations within a community, as well as activities that benefit the greater public good, such as education for medical professionals and medical research. GAO was unable to assess the value of these benefits or make systematic comparisons between hospitals or across states. These observations illustrate a larger point--namely, that current tax policy lacks specific criteria with respect to tax exemptions for charitable entities and detail on how that tax exemption is conferred. If these criteria are articulated in accordance with desired goals, standards could be established that would allow nonprofit hospitals to be held accountable for providing services and benefits to the public commensurate with their favored tax status. |
gao_GAO-08-673T | gao_GAO-08-673T_0 | CDC Has 13 Infection Control and Prevention Guidelines Containing Almost 1,200 Recommended Practices, but Activities across HHS to Promote Implementation Are Not Guided by Prioritization of Practices
CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, and in these guidelines CDC recommends almost 1,200 practices for implementation to prevent HAIs and related adverse events. Most of the practices are sorted into five categories—from strongly recommended for implementation to not recommended—primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for each practice. In addition to strength of evidence, an AHRQ study identified other factors to consider in prioritizing recommended practices, such as costs or organizational obstacles. Furthermore, the efforts of the two agencies have not been coordinated. CMS’s and Accrediting Organizations’ Required Hospital Standards Describe Components of Infection Control Programs, and Compliance with These Standards Is Assessed through On- Site Surveys
While CDC’s infection control guidelines describe specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and the accrediting organizations require as part of the hospital certification and accreditation processes describe the fundamental components of a hospital’s infection control program. The standards are far fewer in number than the recommended practices in CDC’s guidelines—for example, CMS’s infection control COP contains two standards. Furthermore, CMS and the accrediting organizations generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC’s infection control and prevention guidelines. Multiple HHS Programs Collect Data on HAIs, but Lack of Integration of Available Data and Other Problems Limit Utility of the Data
Multiple HHS programs collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information they collect and the lack of integration across the databases maintained by these separate programs constrain the utility of the data. First, although CDC’s guidelines are an important source for its recommended practices on how to reduce HAIs, the large number of recommended practices and lack of department-level prioritization have hindered efforts to promote their implementation. A few of these are required by CMS’s or accrediting organizations’ standards or their standards interpretations, but it is not reasonable to expect CMS or accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. Second, HHS has not effectively used the HAI-related data it has collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), health-care-associated infections (HAI)--infections that patients acquire while receiving treatment for other conditions--are estimated to be 1 of the top 10 causes of death in the nation. This statement summarizes a report issued in March and released today, Health-Care-Associated Infections in Hospitals: Leadership Needed from HHS to Prioritize Prevention Practices and Improve Data on These Infections (GAO-08-283). In this report, GAO examined (1) CDC's guidelines for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs and what HHS does to promote their implementation, (2) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) and hospital accrediting organizations' required standards for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs, and (3) HHS programs that collect data related to HAIs and integration of the data across HHS. To conduct the work, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed HHS agency and accrediting organization officials.
What GAO Found
In its March report, which is summarized in this statement, GAO found CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, which contain almost 1,200 recommended practices, but activities across HHS to promote implementation of these practices are not guided by a prioritization of the practices. Although most of the practices have been sorted into categories primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for the practice, other factors to consider in prioritizing, such as costs or organizational obstacles, have not been taken into account. While CDC's guidelines describe specific clinical practices recommended to reduce HAIs, the infection control standards that CMS and the accrediting organizations require of hospitals describe the fundamental components of a hospital's infection control program. The standards are far fewer in number than CDC's recommended practices and generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC's guidelines. Multiple HHS programs have databases that collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information collected and a lack of integration across the databases constrain the utility of the data. GAO concluded that the lack of department-level prioritization of CDC's large number of recommended practices has hindered efforts to promote their implementation. GAO noted that a few of CDC's strongly recommended practices were required by CMS or the accrediting organizations but that it was not reasonable to expect CMS or the accrediting organizations to require additional practices without prioritization. GAO also concluded that HHS has not effectively used the HAI-related data it has collected through multiple databases across the department to provide a complete picture of the extent of the problem. |
gao_GAO-11-331T | gao_GAO-11-331T_0 | The Contracting Cycle and Internal Controls
The contracting cycle consists of activities throughout the acquisition process, including preaward and award, contract administration and management, and ultimately the contract closeout. Effective contract oversight includes effective internal control throughout the contracting process. Standards for Internal Control provides that to be effective, an entity’s management should establish both a supportive overall control environment and specific control activities directed at carrying out its objectives. Preventive controls—such as invoice review prior to payment—are controls designed to prevent improper payments (errors and fraud), waste, and mismanagement, while detective controls—such as incurred cost audits—are designed to identify errors or improper payments after the payment is made. A sound system of internal control contains a balance of both preventive and detective controls that is appropriate for the agency’s operations. While detective controls are beneficial in that they identify funds that may have been inappropriately paid and should be returned to the government, preventive controls such as accounting system reviews and invoice reviews help to reduce the risk of improper payments or waste before they occur. As discussed in more detail later in this statement, most contract audit activity is focused on cost-reimbursable and other nonfixed-price contracts, due to the higher risks to the federal government. Contractors and government personnel recognized the need for consistency in both contract administration and audit. At that time, DCAA’s mission was to perform all necessary contract audits for DOD and provide accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DOD components responsible for procurement and contract administration. Other audit organizations, including the DOD and other federal agency Inspectors General (IG), the Special IGs for Iraq and Afghanistan, and the military service audit agencies also have a role in the oversight of federal contracts. DCAA audits of contractor business systems and related internal controls support decisions on pricing, contract awards, and billing. Risks of Ineffective Contract Controls and Auditing
Agencies across the government are increasingly reliant on contractors to execute their missions. As illustrated in figure 2, the sheer size of federal contract spending poses significant risk if effective processes, controls, and oversight are not in place. DOD accounts for approximately 70 percent of the federal government’s FPDS-NG reported annual contract spending— $367 billion in fiscal year 2010—and other federal agencies accounted for $168 billion in contract spending. With hundreds of billions in taxpayer dollars spent on government contracts, strong contract oversight is essential. These challenges have contributed to GAO’s designating contract management as a high-risk area at DOD, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration. Contracting Control Weaknesses GAO Work
Our work has identified significant contract management weaknesses, problems with federal agency controls over contract payments , as we weaknesses in contract auditing. These weaknesses and deficiencies increase the risk of improper payments, and fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE officials advised us that they have completed action on all 11 recommendations. We are currently following up to confirm DOE’s actions. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The internal control deficiencies occurred throughout the contracting process phases. CMS officials told us they expect to complete actions on all but one of our recommendations by March 31, 2011. Ineffective Contract Auditing
In 2009, we reported on audit quality problems at DCAA offices nationwide, including compromise of auditor independence, insufficient audit testing, and inadequate planning and supervision. DOD and DCAA have taken a number of actions on our recommendations, including revising DCAA’s mission statement, appointing a new DCAA Director and a Western Region Director, establishing an internal review office to perform periodic internal evaluations and address hotline complaints, initiating outside hiring, expanding its audit quality review function, and providing training on auditing standards. DOD IG has expanded its oversight of DCAA’s audit quality control process. Funding. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies across the government are increasingly reliant on contractors to execute their missions. With hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars at stake, the government needs strong controls to provide reasonable assurance that these contract funds are not being lost to improper payments (fraud and errors), waste, and mismanagement. Effective contract oversight, which includes effective internal controls throughout the contracting process, is essential to protecting government and taxpayer interests. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides the overall framework for internal control, which includes the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring. Contract auditing is a control mechanism intended to provide those responsible for government procurement with financial information and advice relating to contractual matters and the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of contractors' operations. Today's testimony describes the (1) contracting cycle and related internal controls, (2) Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and its role in performing contract audits for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies, and (3) risks associated with ineffective contract controls and auditing. GAO's testimony is based on prior reports and testimonies, as listed at the end of this statement.
What GAO Found
The contracting cycle consists of activities throughout the acquisition process, including preaward and award, contract administration and management, and ultimately the contract closeout. Strong internal controls contain a balance of preventive and detective controls appropriate for the agency's operation and help ensure an effective contract oversight process. Preventive controls--such as invoice review prior to payment--are controls designed to prevent improper payments, waste, and mismanagement, while detective controls--such as incurred cost audits--are designed to identify improper payments after the payment is made. While detective controls identify funds that may have been inappropriately paid and should be returned to the government, preventive controls help to reduce the risk of improper payments or waste before they occur. DOD accounts for the largest share of federal contract spending. DCAA was established in 1965 in response to studies which identified the need for consistency in contract audits at DOD. DCAA serves a critical role in DOD and other federal agency contractor oversight by providing auditing, accounting, and financial advisory services in connection with the negotiation, administration, and closeout of contracts and subcontracts. The majority of DCAA audits focus on cost-reimbursable and other nonfixed-price contracts, which pose the highest risk to the government. Reported federal contract obligations--which have increased by $100 billion in real terms since fiscal year 2005, from $435 billion to $535 billion in fiscal year 2010--poses significant risk if effective contract oversight is not in place. GAO's work has identified contract management weaknesses, significant problems with federal agency controls over contract payments, and internal control deficiencies throughout the contracting process, including contract auditing. GAO also found audit quality problems at DCAA offices nationwide, including compromise of auditor independence, insufficient audit testing, and inadequate planning and supervision. DCAA and the other federal agencies mentioned in GAO's testimony have completed some actions and have actions under way to address GAO's recommendations. GAO made17 recommendations to DOD and the DOD Inspector General (IG) to address the weaknesses it identified at DCAA. DOD and DCAA have taken a number of actions on these recommendations, including revising DCAA's mission statement, appointing a new DCAA Director and a Western Region Director, establishing an internal review office to perform periodic internal evaluations and address hotline complaints, initiating outside hiring, strengthening its audit quality review function, and providing training on auditing standards. DCAA has actions under way on other recommendations. DOD IG has expanded its oversight of DCAA's audit quality control process. In addition, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have completed actions on two recommendations and expect to complete actions on all but one of the remaining 16 recommendations by March 31, 2011. Department of Energy official's stated that actions have been complete on all 11 GAO recommendations. GAO is following up to confirm. |
gao_GAO-05-946 | gao_GAO-05-946_0 | In recent years, the Congress has appropriated fewer funds than the sum of the amount designated to individual projects in the conference report. The Corps Reprogrammed Significant Amounts of Funds among Hundreds of Projects
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Corps reprogrammed funds over 7,000 times (3,415 actions in fiscal year 2003 and 3,641 actions in fiscal year 2004) among investigations and construction projects. The Corps’ reprogramming guidance allowed most reprogrammings to be categorized as fund movements that did not count toward the congressional notification thresholds. The Corps Generally Followed Its Reprogramming Guidance
In our sample of 271 projects, reprogramming actions related to only 8 projects did not follow the reprogramming guidance in place at the time when the funds were moved. The Corps’ Reprogramming Guidance Allows Numerous Movements of Funds without Congressional Notification
Although in the majority of cases we reviewed the Corps complied with its guidance, this guidance has been developed in such a manner that it provides the agency with maximum flexibility to move funds without notifying the Congress. Specifically, we found that most movements of funds that were actually reprogramming actions were categorized by the Corps, in accordance with its guidance, as other types of fund movements, which did not have to be reported to the Congress. However, the Corps also reprogrammed funds for reasons that were inconsistent with the Corps’ guidance, such as to achieve the Corps’ goal of carrying zero funds into the next fiscal year and to restore funds to donor projects without regard to funding needs. Just over 13 percent of these movements were for amounts of $1,000 or under, with one as small as 6 cents. The Corps’ Reprogramming Activities Resulted in Inefficient Management of Funds
As stated previously, Corps reprogramming guidance states that only funds surplus to current year requirements should be a source for reprogramming and that temporary borrowing or loaning is inconsistent with sound project management practices and increases the Corps’ administrative burden. We found that funds were moved into projects that had a reported “need,” but were subsequently removed because they were “excess,” revoked from projects without regard to their near-term funding requirements, reprogrammed into and out of the same project on the same day, moved into and out of the same project multiple times a year, and reprogrammed without a system to evaluate the priority level of the affected projects. Many of these actions took place only days or weeks apart from one another. During the period of our study, the Corps lacked a set of formal, Corps-wide priorities for use when deciding to reprogram funds from one project to another. Recommendations for Executive Action
To eliminate the burden of excessive reprogramming actions and to provide better financial management of projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following five actions: work with congressional committees to provide meaningful and consistent guidance for the investigations, construction, and operation and maintenance appropriations for what actions count as reprogrammings and what reporting thresholds should apply on a program and project basis; develop a financial planning and management system for the investigations, construction, and operation and maintenance appropriations that, at a minimum, changes the way the Corps allocates funds from an annual basis to a more frequent basis that reflect actual schedule and project performance; periodically reviews project schedules and performance and revises funding allocations as needed; and develops and implements criteria for setting reprogramming provide direction and training to change the culture prevalent throughout the Corps that reprogramming is an acceptable, routine financial management practice and instead place greater emphasis on the use of financial planning approaches and priority-setting mechanisms for managing project funding. However, the Corps could not provide data about reprogramming of operation and maintenance project funds. To determine how effective the Corps’ reprogramming strategy was in managing appropriated funds, we reviewed the results of our sample analysis and discussed those results with program managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has had more work to accomplish than funds available. The Congress has supported the Corps' need to reprogram funds to complete projects. Reprogramming allows the Corps to move funds from projects that can not use available funds to those that can. However, concerns have been expressed about whether the Corps reprogrammed funds in accordance with applicable guidance. GAO determined for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 (1) the amount of funds reprogrammed; (2) if the Corps followed reprogramming guidance; (3) why the Corps reprogrammed funds; and (4) how effective the Corps' reprogramming strategy was in managing funds.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Corps reprogrammed funds over 7,000 times and moved over $2.1 billion among projects within the investigations and construction appropriations. Moreover, funds were moved in and/or out of nearly two thirds of the projects within these appropriation accounts. Comparable data for the operation and maintenance appropriation could not be provided by the Corps. GAO reviewed a random sample of 271 general investigation, construction general, and operation and maintenance projects and found that the Corps generally reprogrammed funds in accordance with its guidance. However, in eight cases, the Corps' reprogramming actions did not comply with the guidance because it either exceeded established reprogramming thresholds and/or did not provide the appropriate notification to the Congress. Although in most cases the Corps reprogrammed funds according to its guidance, this guidance is written in such a way that most reprogramming actions do not count as reprogramming actions toward the congressional notification thresholds, thereby diminishing the Congress' knowledge and oversight of how the Corps spends appropriated funds. In many cases, the Corps reprogrammed funds from projects that experienced unforeseen delays to projects that could make use of additional funds. On the other hand, reprogramming actions were conducted that were inconsistent with the Corps' reprogramming guidance, such as to achieve a Corps goal that all projects carry no funds into the next fiscal year. Some of these movements were as small as 6 and 7 cents. Corps guidance states that small reprogramming actions are inconsistent with sound project management and increase its administrative burden. Funds were also moved into projects that had a reported "need" and then were subsequently removed because they were suddenly "excess"--sometimes on the same day or within a few days or weeks. Such movements appear to serve little useful purpose and create an administrative burden for the Corps because of the time and effort needed to accomplish these movements. The Corps has come to rely on reprogramming as its primary method to manage project funds. The use of reprogramming is no longer used as a tool when emergencies and unforeseen circumstances occur but instead has become the regular, recurring financial management practice. Finally, the use of numerous reprogramming actions to manage project funds, without a set of formal Corps-wide priorities, has resulted in an uncoordinated movement of funds between projects, with little consideration to pending needs or long-term planning. |
gao_GAO-14-367 | gao_GAO-14-367_0 | DOE Has Not Fully Developed or Consistently Adhered to Loan Monitoring Policies
DOE has not fully developed or consistently adhered to loan monitoring policies for its loan programs. DOE Has Policies for Most Loan Monitoring Activities, but Some Remain Incomplete or Are Outdated
DOE has established policies for most loan monitoring activities, but policies for some of these activities remain incomplete or outdated. This division was established in February 2012 and has been operating since its inception under incomplete or outdated policies. DOE officials told us that policy revisions were delayed in part because the Loan Programs Office did not have a Director of Risk Management until November 2012 and that a planned revision was put on hold to await the arrival of a new Executive Director in May 2013. Additionally, the Risk Management Division had not staffed 11 of its 16 planned positions until late 2013, when it staffed 6 of 11 vacancies. Similarly, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance specifies that credit programs should have robust management and oversight frameworks for monitoring the programs’ progress toward achieving policy goals within acceptable risk thresholds, and taking action where appropriate to increase efficiency and effectiveness. It is difficult to determine whether DOE is adequately managing risk if policies against which to compare its actions are outdated or incomplete. DOE Did Not Consistently Adhere to Its Loan Monitoring Policies Because Its Loan Programs Office Organizational Structure Was Still under Development
In some cases we examined, DOE generally adhered to its loan monitoring policies but, in other cases, DOE adhered to its monitoring policies inconsistently or not at all because DOE was still developing the Loan Programs Office’s organizational structure, including staffing, management and reporting software, and implementing procedures for policies. As a consequence, DOE was making loans and disbursing funds from 2009 through 2013 without a fully developed loan monitoring function. DOE officials told us that such reports were not produced before then because the Portfolio Management Division had not filled the staff positions needed for producing these reports, and its management and reporting software was under development. As a result, DOE disbursed more than $4.7 billion for the 10 loans in our sample before it began producing periodic credit reports as required in its policy manuals. In another example, DOE inconsistently adhered to policies for managing troubled loans. DOE’s policy manuals require that DOE prepare and approve plans for handling troubled loans to borrowers who are in danger of defaulting on their loan repayments. Further, DOE did not adhere to some existing policies for program-wide evaluation and mitigation of portfolio-wide risk, in particular policies for evaluating the effectiveness of its loan monitoring. Without conducting these evaluations, DOE management cannot assess the adequacy of its monitoring efforts and thus be reasonably assured that it is effectively managing risks associated with its loan programs. In its policy manuals, DOE recognizes the importance of monitoring loans and guarantees to proactively manage their risks and protect the financial interests of the federal government and the taxpayer. Because DOE inconsistently adhered to the policies it had in place, DOE’s assurance that it was completing activities critical to monitoring the loans has been limited. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that DOE is effectively monitoring its loans, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Executive Director of the Loan Programs Office to take the following four actions:
Fully develop its organizational structure by updating management and reporting software, and staffing key monitoring positions, completing policies and procedures for loan monitoring and risk management. In its written comments, DOE generally agreed with our recommendations. However, DOE did not indicate that it plans to prepare the required reports to evaluate the effectiveness of its loan monitoring. Because DOE is administering the LGP and Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program through one Loan Programs Office, we included both programs in this review. To assess the extent to which DOE adhered to its monitoring policies, we acquired and analyzed documentation from a nonprobability sample of 10 of the 36 loans and loan guarantees that had been made by March 2013, therefore, requiring monitoring. To develop this summary of DOE’s monitoring activities, we examined high-level DOE policy guidance—specifically DOE’s October 2011 policy manual for its Loan Guarantee Program, its 2009 policy manual for its Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program, DOE’s approved implementing procedure documents, and DOE loan monitoring documentation. 1. 2. Department of Energy: Status of Loan Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE's Loan Programs Office administers the Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) for certain renewable or innovative energy projects and the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program for projects to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles and components. As of March 2014, the programs had made more than $30 billion in loans and guarantees: approximately $21.9 billion for 33 loan guarantees under the LGP and $8.4 billion for 5 loans under the ATVM loan program. Both programs can expose the government and taxpayers to substantial financial risks should borrowers default.
GAO assessed the extent to which DOE has developed and adhered to loan monitoring policies for its loan programs for 2009 to 2013. GAO analyzed relevant regulations and guidance; prior audits; DOE policies; and DOE data, documents, and monitoring reports for a nonprobability sample of 10 loans and guarantees. Findings from the sample are not generalizable, but the sample covered a range of technologies and loan statuses. GAO also interviewed DOE officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has not fully developed or consistently adhered to loan monitoring policies for its loan programs. In particular, DOE has established policies for most loan monitoring activities, but policies for evaluating and mitigating program-wide risk remain incomplete and outdated. These activities are generally the responsibility of the Risk Management Division in DOE's Loan Programs Office. This division, established in February 2012, has been operating since its inception under incomplete or outdated policies. DOE has missed several internal deadlines for updating its loan monitoring policies. DOE officials told GAO that updated policies were delayed in part because the Loan Programs Office did not have a Director of Risk Management until November 2012. Additionally, the Risk Management Division had not staffed 11 of its 16 planned positions until late 2013, when it staffed 6 of the 11 vacancies. Under federal guidance, credit programs should have robust management and oversight frameworks for monitoring the programs' progress toward achieving policy goals within acceptable risk thresholds, and taking action where appropriate to increase efficiency and effectiveness. It is difficult to determine whether DOE is adequately managing risk if policies are outdated or incomplete and key monitoring positions are not fully staffed.
In some cases GAO examined, DOE generally adhered to the loan monitoring policies that it had in place. For example, DOE generally adhered to its policies for authorizing disbursement of funds to borrowers. But, in other cases, DOE adhered to the policies inconsistently or not at all because the Loan Programs Office had staff vacancies and was still developing management and reporting software and procedures for implementing policies. For example:
DOE inconsistently adhered to its policies for monitoring and reporting on credit risk, particularly for preparing credit reports—periodic reviews of project progress and factors that may affect the borrower's ability to meet the terms of the loan. DOE did not prepare dozens of credit reports, mostly in 2011, because according to officials it had not filled positions or fully developed the software needed for producing these reports.
DOE inconsistently adhered to its policies for managing troubled loans requiring that it prepare and approve plans for handling loans to borrowers in danger of defaulting on their loan repayments. For two troubled loans, officials said DOE did not prepare a formal plan, as called for in its policy, in part because implementing procedures were incomplete.
DOE did not adhere to its policy requiring it to evaluate the effectiveness of its loan monitoring because of continuing staff vacancies. Without conducting these evaluations, DOE management cannot assess the adequacy of its monitoring efforts and thus be reasonably assured that it is effectively managing risks associated with its loan programs.
As a result, DOE was making loans and disbursing funds from 2009 through 2013 without a fully developed loan monitoring function. During this time, inconsistent adherence to policies limited assurance that DOE was completing activities important to monitoring the loans and protecting the government's interest.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) staff key positions, (2) update management and reporting software, (3) complete policies for loan monitoring, and (4) evaluate the effectiveness of its loan monitoring. DOE generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1123 | gao_GAO-08-1123_0 | 1). 2). The Complementary Nature of Some SBA and Rural Development Programs Provides a Rationale for Collaboration
Some SBA loan programs and Rural Development business programs are complementary, providing a rationale for the agencies to collaborate. Both types of programs can fund start-up and expansion projects, equipment purchases, and working capital to rural borrowers and, in some cases, the eligibility requirements for the programs are comparable. Collaboration Allows SBA and Rural Development to Leverage Each Agency’s Strengths and Increase Financing Options in Rural Areas
According to SBA and Rural Development officials who are engaged in collaborative relationships, collaboration allows the agencies to leverage the unique strengths of each agency’s programs and increase the number of financing options to better promote economic development. In other states we visited, such as Nebraska and New Mexico, SBA and Rural Development worked with each other less frequently and on a more informal basis. A Few SBA and Rural Development Field Offices Have Established Formal Collaborative Efforts
Our site visits and the results of the query of field offices identified a few SBA and Rural Development offices, such as those in North Dakota, Ohio, and Washington state that appeared to be collaborating frequently. In New Mexico, SBA and Rural Development officials reported conducting joint monthly meetings and community outreach sessions, or “Access to Capital” forums. SBA and Rural Development have Collaborated with Each Other and Other Agencies in the Past
SBA and Rural Development have collaborated in the past with each other and with other agencies. As discussed previously, based on the results of each agency’s query, we found a few locations where SBA and Rural Development are involved in frequent and formal collaborative efforts, some locations where the agencies are involved in informal efforts, and many locations where the agencies appear not to be working together at all. However, SBA and Rural Development’s collaborative efforts to date have been sporadic and mostly self-initiated by specific officials in each agency’s field offices. Officials of each agency worked together frequently in some locations and infrequently in others. However, when comparing these past efforts with our criteria for effective interagency collaboration, we found that the agencies could take further steps to facilitate collaboration by establishing and implementing a formal approach. Our previous work in this area shows that adopting key practices—such as defining and articulating a common outcome; specifying roles and responsibilities; establishing a mechanism to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; and reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative efforts—can help federal agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. Such an approach can help SBA and Rural Development to effectively leverage each other’s unique strengths to help improve small business opportunities and promote economic development in rural communities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve SBA and Rural Development’s collaborative efforts, we recommend that the Administrator of SBA and Secretary of Agriculture: take steps to adopt a formal approach to encourage further collaboration in support of common economic development goals in rural areas. To determine the extent to which SBA and Rural Development’s primary loan and business programs are complementary and to identify the rationale for SBA and Rural Development to collaborate, we reviewed the mission and structure of SBA and Rural Development offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Rural Development offices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture both work in rural areas to foster economic development by promoting entrepreneurship and community development. This report discusses (1) the complementary nature of some SBA and Rural Development programs and the extent to which it provides a rationale for the agencies to collaborate, (2) past and current efforts by SBA and Rural Development to work together and with other agencies, and (3) opportunities for the agencies to improve their collaborative efforts. In completing its work, GAO analyzed agency documentation and prior reports on collaboration, conducted site visits at locations where SBA and Rural Development were working together, and interviewed agency and selected economic development officials.
What GAO Found
The complementary nature of some SBA loan programs and Rural Development business programs provides a rationale for the agencies to collaborate. SBA and Rural Development have similar economic development missions, and their programs provide financing for similar purposes, including start-up and expansion projects, equipment purchases, and working capital for small businesses. According to SBA and Rural Development officials currently involved in collaborative working relationships, working together allows the agencies to leverage the unique strengths of each other's programs, increase the number of financing options available to borrowers in rural areas, and ultimately better promote economic development in these areas. However, collaboration between SBA and Rural Development to date has been sporadic and mostly self-initiated by officials in field offices. GAO found that the extent of the collaborative efforts and use of formal agreements such as memorandums of understanding (MOU) varied across locations. The two agencies worked together frequently in a few locations, infrequently in others, and not at all in many locations. The SBA and Rural Development offices in North Dakota that GAO visited collaborated frequently and had formal agreements in place. Officials there established an MOU with other community development organizations to provide "one-stop" shopping assistance to borrowers at a single location. The SBA and Rural Development offices in Nebraska and New Mexico that GAO visited worked with each other less frequently and more informally, conducting community outreach sessions and holding periodic meetings and joint training sessions. But many other locations--about half of SBA and Rural Development's field offices--did not appear to be collaborating at all or to have an established framework to facilitate collaboration. Opportunities exist for SBA and Rural Development to improve their collaborative efforts. In an October 2005 report, GAO identified key practices that could help federal agencies enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. In comparing SBA and Rural Development's efforts with these criteria, GAO found that the agencies could take steps to improve their efforts by implementing a more formal approach to encourage collaboration. This approach would provide the agencies with a mechanism that reflected several of GAO's key practices--to define and articulate a common outcome, agree on roles and responsibilities, monitor key progress and results, and reinforce accountability for collaborative efforts. With such an approach, SBA and Rural Development could more effectively leverage each other's unique strengths and help to improve small business opportunities in rural communities. |
gao_T-GGD-96-40 | gao_T-GGD-96-40_0 | Asset Forfeiture Programs Identified as High-Risk
In January 1990, the Comptroller General identified seized and forfeited assets as a high-risk area because it had been characterized by mismanagement and internal control weaknesses. The OIG also said that $2.5 million of the excessive costs and lost revenue resulted from a lack of effective Marshals Service oversight of real property management. In our February 1995 report, we stated that while its efforts are commendable, Customs must establish and implement additional policies and procedures, such as periodically summarizing and assessing the results of its seizure efforts and making significant enhancements to its seized property tracking system to ensure proper accountability for and stewardship over seized property. Property Management Consolidation Efforts Unsuccessful
In addressing the issue of duplication of effort, one of the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 required the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and maintain a joint plan to coordinate and consolidate postseizure administration of property seized for drug-related offenses. Accordingly, there are no plans for consolidation of asset management and disposition functions. Further Action Needed
As we have reported, Justice and Treasury have made many improvements to their asset forfeiture programs over the years. However, enhancements to seized property tracking systems and development and implementation of additional policies and procedures are needed to help ensure adequate accountability and stewardship over seized property. High-Risk Series: Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-93-17, Dec. 6, 1992). Asset Forfeiture: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Departments of Justice's and Treasury's asset forfeiture programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the asset forfeiture programs present a high risk for abuse and fraud because of program mismanagement and internal control weaknesses; (2) Marshals Service mismanagement, ineffective oversight, slow disposition, and poor recordkeeping of seized property has resulted in excessive costs and millions of dollars in lost revenue; (3) the Justice asset forfeiture program lacks closing procedures to ensure the proper recording of all seized property in its property management system; (4) the Customs asset forfeiture program lacks adequate safeguards over seized property and has incomplete and inaccurate accounting and reporting of seized property; (5) the agencies have made many improvements to their asset forfeiture programs, agencies need to additionally enhance their tracking systems and to develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure proper accountability for and stewardship over seized property; and (6) although consolidating the management and disposition of seized assets could reduce administrative costs and duplicative efforts, the agencies cite legislative acts and federal reporting requirements as barriers to developing a joint plan for consolidation. |
gao_GAO-08-768 | gao_GAO-08-768_0 | DHS Did Not Collaborate with Non- Federal Stakeholders As Fully As Planned or Required in Developing the NRF
While DHS included non-federal stakeholders at the initial and final stages in the process of revising the December 2004 Plan, it did not collaborate with them as fully as planned in its revision work plan or as required by the Post-Katrina Act. However, DHS deviated from its work plan after the first draft was completed in April 2007. However, rather than sending this first draft to stakeholders for comment, DHS conducted its internal, federal review of the draft document for approximately 5 months until September 2007. FEMA officials said that DHS did not release this April 2007 draft for comment because the draft required further modifications DHS considered necessary. The government affairs committee chair of the International Association of Emergency Managers testified, “The document we saw bore no resemblance to what we had discussed so extensively with FEMA and other stakeholders in the December 2006 through February 2007 timeline.” Additionally, the National Emergency Management Association representative, who served on the Steering Committee, expressed his concern that its association had been effectively shut out of the process, testifying that the collaborative process in rewriting the 2004 Plan “broke down…with no stakeholder input, working group involvement, or steering committee visibility.”
After the Internal, Federal Review, DHS Provided All Stakeholders an Opportunity to Comment before Final Publication and Considered All Comments in Finalizing the New Framework
After the approximate 5-month internal, federal review period, DHS released a draft of the newly renamed National Response Framework for public comment on September 10, 2007. However, DHS did not incorporate the NAC by amending its approved September 2006 work plan for revising the 2004 Plan or establish the NAC in time for the Council to incorporate non-federal stakeholder input into the revision of the 2004 Plan, as directed by the October 2006 Post-Katrina Act. FEMA and the Post- Katrina Act Have Recognized the Importance of Including Non-Federal Stakeholders in Developing National Response Doctrine, but FEMA Lacks Guidance and Procedures for Future NRF Revisions
While FEMA has recognized the importance of partnering with non-federal stakeholders to achieve the nation’s emergency management goals, both in congressional testimonies as well as in its January 2008 strategic plan, FEMA has not yet developed guidance and procedures for how future revisions of the NRF will be managed or how the newly established National Advisory Council will be integrated into the revision process in accordance with the Post-Katrina Act. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management guidance, policies, and procedures are an integral part of any agency’s planning for, and achieving, effective results. Developing such policies and procedures for how the NRF will be revised in the future and how FEMA will integrate the NAC and other non-federal stakeholders in the process is essential for helping to ensure that FEMA attains its goal of partnering with nonfederal stakeholders to help achieve the nation’s emergency management goals. Recognizing the importance of collaboration, the Post-Katrina Act requires that the FEMA Administrator partner with non-federal stakeholders from state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to build a national system of emergency management that can effectively and efficiently utilize the full measure of the nation’s resources to respond to all disasters, including catastrophic incidents, and acts of terrorism. The 2008 NRF, while it states that it merits periodic review and revision, does not contain such language regarding the circumstances and time frames for its review and revision. We recommended, among other things, that the Department of Defense develop a thorough process to guide its coordination with the states. While the NRF is published by DHS, it belongs to the nation’s emergency response community that is collectively responsible for effectively implementing the NRF’s provisions should another catastrophic disaster like Hurricane Katrina occur. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent did the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) collaborate with non-federal stakeholders in revising and updating the December 2004 National Response Plan into the January 2008 National Response Framework (NRF)? To determine what happened during the revision process and the extent to which DHS involved non-federal stakeholders in that process, we interviewed FEMA officials and non-federal stakeholders who served in key positions in the revision process and the chairman of FEMA’s National Advisory Council (NAC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina illustrated that effective preparation and response to a catastrophe requires a joint effort between federal, state, and local government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is responsible for heading the joint effort. In January 2008, DHS released the National Response Framework (NRF), a revision of the 2004 National Response Plan (2004 Plan), the national preparation plan for all hazards. In response to the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 and as discussed with congressional committees, this report evaluates the extent to which (1) DHS collaborated with non-federal stakeholders in revising and updating the 2004 Plan into the 2008 NRF and (2) FEMA has developed policies and procedures for managing future NRF revisions. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed DHS and FEMA documents related to the revision process, analyzed the relevant statutes, and interviewed federal and non-federal officials who held key positions in the revision process.
What GAO Found
While DHS included non-federal stakeholders--state, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector--in the initial and final stages of revising the 2004 Plan into the NRF, it did not collaborate with these stakeholders as fully as it originally planned or as required by the October 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (Post-Katrina Act). As the revision process began in 2006, DHS involved both federal and non-federal stakeholders by soliciting and incorporating their input in determining the key revision issues and developing the first draft in April 2007. However, after this first draft was completed, DHS deviated from its revision work plan by conducting a closed, internal federal review of the draft rather than releasing it for stakeholder comment because the draft required further modifications DHS considered necessary. DHS limited communication with non-federal stakeholders until it released a draft for public comment 5 months later on September 10, 2007. The following day, non-federal stakeholders testified at a congressional hearing that DHS had shut them out during that 5-month period. In addition, the Post-Katrina Act required that DHS establish a National Advisory Council (NAC) for the FEMA Administrator by December 2006 to, among other things, incorporate nonfederal stakeholders' input in the revision process. However, FEMA stated the necessary time to select quality NAC members required additional time, and FEMA did not announce the NAC's membership until June 2007. The NAC did not provide comments on a revision draft until one month before DHS publicly released the final NRF in January 2008. FEMA anticipates that the NRF will be revised in the future; however, FEMA does not have policies or procedures in place to guide this process or ensure a collaborative partnership with stakeholders. FEMA has emphasized the importance of partnering with relevant stakeholders to effectively prepare for and respond to major and catastrophic disasters, and the Congress, through the Post-Katrina Act, requires such partnership. In addition, the Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government calls for policies and procedures that establish regular communication with stakeholders and monitor performance over time as essential for achieving desired program goals. Furthermore, previous GAO work on the Department of Defense's civil support plans and the administration's national pandemic influenza implementation plan has shown the need for participation of state and local jurisdictions in emergency planning. Especially in view of a new administration, the experience of the previous revision process illustrates the importance of collaborating with stakeholders in revising a plan that relies on them for its successful implementation. While the NRF is published by DHS, it belongs to the nation's emergency response community. Developing such policies and procedures is essential for ensuring that FEMA attains the Post- Katrina Act's goal of partnering with non-federal stakeholders in building the nation's emergency management system, including the periodic review and revision of the NRF. |
gao_NSIAD-98-89 | gao_NSIAD-98-89_0 | Another weakness of the hospitalization data systems has been the lack of coverage of outpatient medical care. DOD currently has no centralized reporting system for its outpatient facilities, although an automated system is under development. Until recently, VA did not have an automated system either. Using DOD’s and VA’s Automated Hospitalization Reporting Systems to Assess Tumors Among Gulf War Veterans
VA Tumors Analysis
In May 1996, VA completed an analysis requested by your Subcommittee that provided some information on the number of tumors among Gulf War veterans compared with the number in a sample of nondeployed veterans. Cancer registries can be effective tools for determining incidence rates and for directing cancer control efforts. Voluntary reporting is also encouraged from DOD and VA hospitals. The study design notes that it would not be informative to analyze cancer incidence sooner because the time interval between any exposures that may have occurred during the Gulf War and the diagnosis of most cancers is “probably at least 10 years and may extend as long as 20 to 40 years.” It is also intended that these health outcomes be linked to information about potential environmental exposure factors that may exist or become available from DOD military records and other sources, including the location database being compiled by the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Gulf War Veteran Health Registries
Both DOD and VA have established separate programs that provide medical examinations and diagnostic services, free of charge, to Gulf War veterans. While the registry programs are primarily intended to provide diagnostic services and treatment to Gulf War veterans, the programs also gather and report data on the nature of the veterans’ health problems and the types of risk factors veterans may have been exposed to in the Gulf War. As designed, the registries are not intended to be used to determine the frequency and causes of illnesses among the general Gulf War veteran population. VA National Survey
This approach is being employed by VA to study the general health status of Gulf War veterans. The overall response rate to the survey has been relatively low (57 percent). The sample size of VA’s survey may also be too small to identify elevated incidence of most cancers. With respect to the issue of statistical power, VA has acknowledged that, “the study may provide inadequate statistical power to detect a small increase in risk for rare adverse health outcomes in a particular subgroup of veterans.”
In 1996, the Institute of Medicine concluded, “This is a well-designed and well-intended study.” According to the Institute, however, “there appeared to be little statistical input in the analysis plan reviewed, and these data will require sophisticated statistical adjustment.”
Iowa State Survey
A population-based survey to assess the prevalence of self-reported symptoms and illnesses among Gulf War veterans was also conducted in Iowa. However, the existing data sources and research applications we reviewed, provide very limited information about the incidence of tumors or other illnesses among Gulf War veterans. Thus, it will also be difficult to determine whether Gulf War veterans have a higher incidence of tumors than other veterans in the future. They noted the report does a good job in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the data sources available for assessing the incidence of tumors among Gulf War veterans, but that it does not include a comparable review of other non-cancer health information systems or research studies that may exist. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed data on the incidence of tumors among Gulf War veterans, focusing on: (1) the reliability of data sources available for determining the incidence of tumors among Gulf War veterans; and (2) the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of data sources to monitor tumors and other illnesses among Gulf War veterans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) none of the data sources that provide information on the health characteristics of Gulf War veterans can be used to reliably estimate the incidence of tumors; (2) VA's benefits information system can track the vital status and causes of deaths among Gulf War veterans; (3) however, not all cancers result in death and those that do may take several years to show up; (4) as a result, the system will underreport overall incidence; (5) DOD and VA maintain large hospitalization reporting systems; (6) however, a large majority of Gulf War veterans do not use DOD and VA hospitals and there has been little effort to determine whether this hidden population has health conditions similar to those of the population captured by the reporting systems; (7) DOD's reporting system also does not account for outpatient medical care; (8) VA has recently begun to fill this gap for its outpatient facilities, but it may take several years before consistent and reliable reporting is available; (9) a national cancer registry reports aggregate population rates and trends but cannot be used to track the Gulf War population; (10) DOD and VA health registries report information on the type of health problems Gulf War veterans have experienced at the time of their examination; (11) however, because not all veterans are examined, the information collected cannot be used to estimate the frequency of illnesses among all Gulf War veterans; (12) VA is conducting a national survey to study the general health status of Gulf War veterans; (13) the study uses representative samples of deployed and nondeployed veterans; (14) however, the response rate to the survey has been low and the study's sample size may be too small to assess any elevated incidence of most cancers; (15) DOD and VA have initiated efforts to improve the utility of these data systems but have not developed the capability to specifically address questions about tumors or other illnesses among Gulf War veterans; (16) as a result, it is not known how many Gulf War veterans have tumors or whether they have a higher incidence of them than other veterans; and (17) according to agency officials, no other plans aside from periodic assessments of mortality have been made to monitor tumor cases within this population. |
gao_GAO-12-74 | gao_GAO-12-74_0 | Background
As we have reported previously, EPA estimates that across the federal government 10,000 computers are disposed of each week. Once these used electronics reach the end of their original useful lives, federal agencies have several options for disposing of them. Agencies generally are to donate their used electronics to schools or other nonprofit educational institutions; exchange them with other federal, state, or local agencies; sometimes trade them with vendors to offset the costs of new equipment; sell them—generally through the GSA’s surplus property program, which sells surplus federal government equipment, including used federal electronics, at public auctions; or give them to a recycler. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive (OFEE) each play important roles in providing leadership, oversight, and guidance to assist federal agencies with implementing the requirements of these executive orders. Specifically, (1) EPA has led or coordinated several improvement initiatives and issued guidance aimed at improving the management of used federal electronic products, (2) GSA has issued personal property disposal guidance and instituted new requirements for electronics recyclers it has contracted with to dispose of federal electronic products, (3) the President has issued executive orders that established goals for improving the management of used federal electronics, and (4) an interagency task force issued the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship, which is intended to lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal government’s management of used electronics. Federal Electronics Challenge. In 2003, EPA, along with several other agencies, piloted the FEC.that encourages federal facilities and agencies to purchase environmentally friendly electronic products, reduce the impacts of these products during their use, and manage used electronics in an environmentally safe way. As we reported in July 2010, EPA convened electronics manufacturers, recyclers, and other stakeholders and provided funding to develop Responsible Recycling (R2) practices, so that electronics recyclers could obtain certification to show that they are voluntarily adhering to the adopted set of best practices for environmental protection, worker health and safety, and security practices. The strategy assigns primary responsibility for overseeing or carrying out most of the projects to either EPA or GSA. The Management of Used Federal Electronics Has Improved and Opportunities Exist for Further Improvements, but Challenges Remain
According to our review of agency documents and discussions with agency officials, federal agencies have made some progress to improve their management of used electronic products, as measured by greater participation in the FEC and an increase in certified electronics recyclers, but opportunities exist to expand their efforts. HUD does not participate in the FEC. The Tracking and Reporting of Data on the Disposition of Used Electronics Presents Challenges
Currently, due to challenges associated with the tracking and reporting of used federal electronics, the ultimate disposition of these electronics is unknown—making it difficult to measure the effectiveness of Executive Orders 13423 and 13514, which were aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics and ensuring the proper disposal of electronics that have reached the end of their useful life. For the five agencies we reviewed, data provided to us on the disposition of electronic products were similarly inconsistent, which hampered our efforts to accurately assess the extent to which electronic products procured by these federal agencies were disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. Consequently, each of the agencies we reviewed used its own definition of electronic products to report progress in implementing policies for electronics stewardship. Finally, if federal agencies sell used functional electronic products through auctions, neither the agency nor the auction entities are required to perform due diligence by conducting auditing to determine whether all downstream reusers of such products follow environmentally sound end- of-life practices. To support federal agencies’ efforts to improve electronics stewardship, we recommend that the Director of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration collaborate on developing and issuing implementing instructions for Executive Order 13514 that define key terms such as “electronic products” and “environmentally sound practices;” address inconsistencies between this executive order and Executive Order 13423; and as appropriate, provide clear direction on required agency actions under the national strategy; and require consistent information tracking and reporting on the disposition of used electronics among agencies. Even with their general concurrences, in some instances, the agencies proposed alternative approaches for executing the recommendations. To identify improvements resulting from federal initiatives to improve management of used federal electronics and challenges that impede progress, we selected a nonprobability sample of five federal agencies— the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Education (Education), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD); and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—to examine how the federal policy framework is carried out in those agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that across the federal government 10,000 computers are discarded each week. Once these used electronics reach the end of their original useful lives, federal agencies have several options for disposing of them. Agencies generally can donate their reusable electronics to schools; give them to a recycler; exchange them with other federal, state, or local agencies; or sell them through selected public auctions, including auctions sponsored by the General Services Administration (GSA). As the worlds largest purchaser of information technology, the U.S. government, through its disposition practices, has substantial leverage to influence domestic recycling and disposal practices. GAO was asked to examine (1) key initiatives aimed at improving the management of used federal electronics and (2) improvements resulting from these initiatives and challenges that impede progress, if any. To do this, GAO evaluated federal guidance and policy, as well as guidance and initiatives at five selected agencies. GAO selected agencies based on, among other things, the amount of electronics purchased.
What GAO Found
Over the past decade, the executive branch has taken steps to improve the management of used federal electronics. Notably, in 2003, EPA helped to pilot the Federal Electronics Challenge (FEC)a voluntary partnership program that encourages federal facilities and agencies to purchase environmentally friendly electronic products, reduce the impacts of these products during their use, and manage used electronics in an environmentally safe way. EPA also led an effort and provided initial funding to develop third-party certification so that electronics recyclers could show that they are voluntarily adhering to an adopted set of best practices for environmental protection, worker health and safety, and security practices. In 2006, GSA issued its Personal Property Disposal Guide to assist agencies in understanding the hierarchy for disposing of excess personal property, including used electronic products: reutilization, donation, sale, and abandonment or destruction. In 2007 and 2009, executive orders were issued that, among other things, established improvement goals and directed agencies to develop and implement improvement plans for the management of used electronics. The Office of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive each play important roles in providing leadership, oversight, and guidance to assist federal agencies with implementing the requirements of these executive orders. To lay the groundwork for enhancing the federal governments management of used electronic products, an interagency task force issued the July 2011 National Strategy for Electronics Stewardship. The strategy, which describes goals, action items, and projects, assigns primary responsibility for overseeing or carrying out most of the projects to either EPA or GSA.
Federal agencies have made some progress to improve their management of used electronic products, as measured by greater participation in the FEC and an increase in certified electronics recyclers, but opportunities exist to expand their efforts. For instance, agency participation in the FEC represents only about one-third of the federal workforce. GAO identified challenges with the tracking and reporting on the disposition of federal electronic equipment. For the five agencies GAO reviewed (Departments of Defense, Energy, Education, and Housing and Urban Development and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration), data provided on the disposition of electronic products were inconsistent, which hampered GAOs efforts to accurately assess the extent to which electronic products procured by federal agencies are disposed of in an environmentally sound manner. Challenges associated with clarifying agencies responsibility for used electronics sold through auctions also remain. Currently, neither the agency nor the auction entities are required to determine whether purchasers follow environmentally sound end-of-life practices. Not having controls over the ultimate disposition of electronics sold through these auctions creates opportunities for buyers to purchase federal electronics and export them to countries with less stringent environmental and health standards. Other challenges that may impede progress toward improving federal agencies management of used electronics include defining key terms such as electronic product and environmentally sound practices, as each agency uses its own definition of electronic products to report progress in implementing policies for electronics stewardship.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Management and Budget, and GSA take actions to require consistent tracking and reporting of used electronics and ensure appropriate management of electronics sold at auction. Each agency concurred with GAOs recommendations but, in some instances, proposed alternatives for executing the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-991T | gao_GAO-07-991T_0 | Exclusions under the flood policy include damages caused by wind or a windstorm. In such cases, the WYO insurer must determine and apportion the damages caused by wind that it insures, along with those caused by flooding, insured by NFIP. NFIP Does Not Systematically Collect and Analyze Data on Related Wind Damages When Collecting Flood Claims Data
For hurricane-damaged properties, NFIP does not know whether both wind and flooding contributed toward damages nor the apportionment of damages between them, limiting its ability to monitor the accuracy of flood payments and address potential conflicts of interest that may arise in certain damage scenarios. Based on our preliminary review, we found that NFIP did not systematically collect and analyze data on wind-related damage when collecting flood claims data on properties subjected to both high winds and flooding, such as those damaged in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Further, such information is not sought even when the same insurance company serves as both the NFIP WYO insurer and the insurer for wind-related risks, posing a potential conflict in certain damage scenarios where properties are subjected to both types of perils. In our review of data elements in NFIP’s claims database, we found that NFIP does not require WYO insurers, which are responsible for adjusting the flood claim, to report information on property damages in a manner that could allow NFIP to differentiate how these damages (to the building or its contents) were divided between wind and flooding, even when the WYO insurer is also the wind insurer for the property. This lack of transparency over both the wind and flood damages on hurricane- damaged properties limits NFIP’s ability to verify that damages paid for under the flood policy were caused only by the covered loss of flooding. FEMA officials stated that they do not have access to wind damage claims data from the WYO insurers. FEMA may request summaries and analyses of this information at any time to ensure proper processing of flood claims. As a result, for hurricane damaged properties subjected to both high winds and flooding, NFIP may not have all the information it needs to ensure that its claims payment was limited to only flood damage. However, we found that FEMA’s reinspection program did not systematically incorporate a means for identifying whether nor the extent to which wind-related damages contributed to the losses. Without the ability to examine damages caused by both wind and flooding, the reinspection program is limited in its ability to assess whether NFIP paid only the portion of damages it was obligated to pay under the flood policy. That is, information about the wind damage during the reinspection process was not documented or analyzed in a systematic fashion. Finally, we explored whether NFIP could use data collectively gathered by state insurance regulators on property-casualty claims resulting from the 2005 hurricane season to match with NFIP flood claims data. Obtaining both the flood and wind adjustment claims data, whether from the same WYO insurer that services both or from different insurers, would be necessary to NFIP to verify the accuracy of the payments made for flood claims. Information collected and assessed through FEMA’s claims reinspection program is also of limited usefulness in confirming or validating the accuracy of flood payments made by NFIP on properties damaged by both wind and flooding. Finally, we determined that using hurricane claims data collected by state insurance regulators would not have provided data on a property- or community-level basis to help NFIP determine how much damage was caused by wind versus flooding, and how these damages were apportioned between the two perils. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disputes between policyholders and property-casualty insurers over coverage from the 2005 hurricane season highlight challenges in determining the appropriateness of claims for multiple-peril events. In particular, events such as hurricanes that can cause both wind and flood damages raise questions about the adequacy of steps taken by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to ensure that claims paid by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) covered only damages caused by flooding. As a result, the Subcommittees asked GAO to provide preliminary views on (1) the information available to and obtained by NFIP through its claims process in determining flood damages for properties that sustained both wind and flood damages, and (2) the information collected by FEMA as part of the NFIP claims reinspection process. GAO collected data from FEMA, reviewed reinspection reports, reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and interviewed agency officials and others knowledgeable about NFIP.
What GAO Found
NFIP does not collect and analyze both wind and flood damage claims data in a systematic fashion, which may limit FEMA's ability to assess whether flood payments on hurricane-damaged properties are accurate. Instead, NFIP focuses only on the flood claims data to determine whether the amount actually paid on a claim reflects the damages caused by flooding. Flood claims data, collected by NFIP through the write-your-own (WYO) insurers--including those that sell and service both the wind and flood policies--do not include information on total damages to the property from all perils. That is, NFIP does not systematically collect information on wind damages from the WYO insurer when a flood claim is received. FEMA officials state that they do not have authority to collect wind damage claims data from WYO insurers, even when the insurer services both the wind and flood policies on the same property. As a result, for hurricane-damaged properties, such as those damaged by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, NFIP does not have all the information it needs to ensure that its claims payments were limited to damage caused by flooding. Concerns over the processing of these flood claims are heightened when the same insurance company serves as both NFIP's WYO insurer and the property-casualty (wind) insurer for a given property. In such cases, the same company is responsible for determining damages and losses to itself and to NFIP, creating a potential conflict of interest. The lack of both flood and wind damage data also limits the usefulness of FEMA's quality assurance reinspection program for NFIP flood claims. GAO found that the NFIP reinspection program did not incorporate a means for collecting and analyzing both the flood and wind damage data together in a systematic fashion to reevaluate the extent to which wind and flooding were deemed to have contributed toward damages to the property. Further, we explored whether the wind-related claims data collectively gathered by state insurance regulators would be useful to NFIP to reevaluate damage assessments. We determined that this information would be of limited value to NFIP in reevaluating wind versus flood damage determinations made because such data is not collected in enough geographic detail to match with the corresponding flood claims data on a property- or community-level basis. Without the ability to examine damages caused by both wind and flooding, the reinspection program is limited in its ability to confirm whether NFIP paid only for losses caused by flooding. |
gao_GAO-12-412 | gao_GAO-12-412_0 | In addition, statutes also specify DOD responsibilities for cleanup of its contaminated sites. DOD Has Policies for Identifying and Responding to Environmental Exposures but They Have Limitations
DOD has four types of policies to address aspects of environmental exposure: (1) environmental restoration policies that require the services to identify and respond to hazardous releases at military installations, (2) occupational and environmental health policies that require the services to identify and respond to unsafe or unhealthy activities in DOD workplaces, (3) deployment health policies that require the services to collect and analyze occupational and environmental health data for individuals deployed in military operations in order to help identify environmental exposures, and (4) public health emergency management policies that establish general guidance for responding to specific situations (see fig. For example, at Camp Lejeune, while environmental compliance and Defense Environmental Restoration Program policies were relevant to the actions taken to provide safe drinking water and to begin investigating the groundwater contamination, there was no policy guiding installations on what actions it should consider to address past exposures. Several Programs May Provide Health Care or Compensation for Environmental Exposures but Access May Be Affected by Various Factors
Although several programs potentially provide either health care or compensation to active servicemembers, military retirees, veterans, dependents, federal workers, or contractors suffering from adverse health conditions potentially caused by environmental exposures, the ability of some individuals to establish eligibility and actually obtain these benefits—particularly compensation—is often affected by documentary, scientific, and legal factors. However, it is often difficult to document the specific time, place, or level of an environmental exposure because such exposures are not always identified, defined, and measured at the time of the occurrence since adverse effects of the exposure may not be immediately apparent. In many cases, obtaining compensation for an environmental exposure further depends on an individual’s ability to establish causation between an exposure and the adverse health condition, but this is often difficult because scientific research has not always established a clear link between the contaminant and an adverse health effect. Certain individuals have legal standing under the Federal Tort Claims Act to file a lawsuit against the U.S. government for damages due to an environmental exposure under some circumstances. But damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act are not available to other types of individuals, and for certain types of claims, due to legal precedent or statutes. The structures of these alternative programs for compensation vary and the programs are not generally designed to address all past or future environmental exposures occurring on military installations, such as those discussed in this report. Departments of Labor and Justice officials told us that when programs provide outreach and assistance to potential claimants both claimants and administrators benefit because the filed claims are more complete and contain fewer errors. Furthermore, because DOD does not have a policy establishing when it is appropriate for installations to request public health assessments or follow-up work beyond the initial assessment of proposed National Priorities List sites by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, DOD could be missing opportunities to identify and resolve concerns about some health threats. In its comments, DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation and did not concur with our second and third recommendations. We continue to believe our recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report. As noted in our report, the tracking system data provided to GAO indicated that DOD did not have information on the status of DOD’s response to 80 percent of the recommendations. DOD stated that its cleanup policy is adequate because the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act does not require responsible parties to identify individuals who may have been exposed to contamination in the past. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to determine (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has policies for identifying and responding to possible human exposures to environmental hazards on its installations; (2) what programs currently exist to provide health care and compensation to individuals for adverse health conditions resulting from environmental exposures on military installations and any factors that may affect these individuals’ access to health care or compensation; and (3) the features of alternative federal programs that provide medical benefits or compensation to large groups of individuals affected by a specific environmental exposure, which may be considered as possible options in the design of any future programs for individuals harmed by environmental hazards. | Why GAO Did This Study
There have been various reported incidents of individuals being potentially exposed to environmental hazards while on military installations. Indeed, some incidents, such as contaminated air due to burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq and contaminated water at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, have received considerable attention, and in the case of Camp Lejeune have resulted in claims seeking billions of dollars from the government.
Public Law 111-383, §314(2011) directed GAO to assess Department of Defense (DOD) policies regarding environmental exposures. GAOs objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which DOD has policies that identify and respond to environmental exposures, (2) what programs exist to provide health care or compensation to individuals for environmental exposures, and (3) which features of other federal programs may provide options in designing future compensation programs. GAO briefed the Armed Services Committees in December 2011, to satisfy the mandate. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant documentation, visited installations, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
DOD relies on four types of policies to identify and respond to many but not all aspects of environmental exposures: (1) environmental restoration policies address hazardous releases at military Installations; (2) occupational and environmental health policies address workplace exposures; (3) deployment health policies address the collection of occupational and environmental health data for deployed individuals; and (4) public health emergency management policies. Nonetheless, there are some limitations in the policies coverage. For example, DODs environmental restoration policies do not specify when to conduct public health assessments at its sites beyond the initial assessment of certain priority sites required by the Superfund law. In addition, DOD has not fully documented its responses to recommendations that result from the assessments. DOD officials responsible for oversight reported that they did not know what actions, if any, installations had taken on about 80 percent of the recommendations. Without a comprehensive tracking system, DOD has no assurance that it is addressing recommendations appropriately and could be missing opportunities to identify and resolve concerns about some health threats. Further, DOD has no policy guiding services and their installations on appropriate actions to address health risks from past exposures, which DOD attributes to the Superfund law not specifically requiring responsible parties to address such risks.
Although several programs potentially provide either health care or compensation to various types of individuals suffering from environmental exposures, the ability of some individuals to actually obtain benefitsparticularly compensationis often complicated by documentary, scientific, and legal factors. First, it is often difficult to document an environmental exposure because they are often not always identified at the time they occurred. Second, it is often difficult to establish causation between an environmental exposure and a health condition, because scientific research has not always established a clear link. Third, although under certain circumstances some individuals have legal standing under the Federal Tort Claims Act to file a lawsuit against the U.S. government for damages due to an environmental exposure, damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act are not available to other types of individuals, and for certain types of claims due to legal precedent or statutes.
In several cases, Congress has established alternative programs to provide compensation to specific populations exposed to specific environmental hazards, such as for individuals involved in the production of nuclear weapons and those who worked in coal mines. Agency officials in charge of managing these alternative programs told us that certain features of these programs have proven to be beneficial to both claimants and administrators and should be considered for inclusion if any future programs are established to compensate individuals for environmental exposures on military installations. For example, Department of Labor and Department of Justice officials told GAO a compensation program that resolves claims in a nonadversarial manner and provides outreach to potential claimants is more beneficial to both claimants and administrators. In contrast, a more adversarial with limited claimant assistance usually leads to delays and increased cost for both claimants and the agency adjudicating claims.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to DOD to identify and respond to limitations in its policies for responding to environmental exposures. DOD generally disagreed with GAOs recommendations, commenting that current policies are adequate. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_RCED-95-74 | gao_RCED-95-74_0 | The 1991 Revisions Reduced Government Spending for Administrative Costs and Made Rates More Uniform
The 26-percent administrative cap has reduced government spending for universities’ administrative costs by about $104 million per year and has made universities’ overall indirect cost rates more uniform. The cap affected 37 public and 32 private universities. The Effect of the 1993 Revisions Is Unclear
The effect of the 1993 changes on universities’ ability to recover costs is unclear because federal agencies are implementing the changes only when each university renegotiates its multiyear rate agreement. In particular, the following alternatives would control indirect cost growth, improve consistency in the way that universities treat costs, and/or streamline cost accounting procedures:
Overall indirect cost rates could be capped through a system of flat rates. Effect of the 26-Percent Administrative Cap
Alternatives for Revising OMB Circular A-21
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-21 is designed to provide that the federal government bear its fair share of universities’ costs for performing federally funded research, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. They stated that limiting cost recovery for facilities would adversely affect universities’ ability to provide modern laboratory facilities and equipment needed to perform advanced scientific research. A university can be reimbursed for a major share of the study’s cost because it is an allowable indirect cost. We also were asked to identify alternatives for further revising Circular A-21 to control the growth of indirect costs, improve consistency in the way that universities treat costs, and/or streamline indirect cost accounting procedures. This review follows up on our August 1992 report on universities’ indirect costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the government's regulations that allow universities to recover indirect costs associated with federally funded research, focusing on the effects of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) revisions that: (1) established a 26-percent cap on federal reimbursements for universities' administrative costs; (2) further clarified and tightened certain indirect cost accounting procedures; and (3) control indirect cost growth, improve the consistency of cost treatments, and streamline indirect cost accounting procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the 26-percent administrative cost cap affected 69 to 82 of the 140 universities surveyed and reduced annual administrative costs reimbursements by about $104 million; (2) the cap also lead to more uniform indirect cost rates among the universities; (3) the 1991 revisions eliminated or reduced some previously allowable indirect costs; (4) the effects of the 1993 revisions are not fully known because federal agencies are implementing them through renegotiated multiyear rate agreements; (5) the change in the treatment of tuition remission costs could reduce the number of science and engineering doctoral candidates at 4 universities; (6) OMB has proposed several revisions to its indirect cost principles to control indirect cost growth and improve accounting procedures; and (7) federal and university officials oppose a total cap on indirect cost rates because it could adversely affect the universities' ability to provide modern laboratory facilities and equipment. |
gao_GAO-13-8 | gao_GAO-13-8_0 | Background
This section discusses the development of NRC’s fire safety regulations, NRC’s adoption of risk-informed regulation, and the status of the nuclear industry’s adoption of the risk-informed fire safety approach. In response to charges that the processes for granting exemptions and deviations under the deterministic approach were burdensome, NRC issued a regulation in 2004 permitting plants to voluntarily transition to risk-informed fire protection requirements. NRC implemented one of our three recommendations and took actions to resolve issues we had identified in making the other two recommendations but did not specifically implement these recommendations. Furthermore, as part of this mitigation effort, NRC required corrective actions at the 36 plants that have a total of 57 reactors remaining under deterministic regulations (hereafter referred to as nontransitioning plants). NRC did not implement our recommendation that it address safety concerns related to extended use of interim compensatory measures but, in April 2009, the agency reported that it had committed its staff to resolving the issues that underlie the need for compensatory measures and developing metrics to gauge the progress of this effort. Such a capability allows the plant to mitigate multiple spurious operations at a reactor. Benefits Cited in the Risk-Informed Fire Safety Approach, but NRC Considers Plants That Meet the Deterministic Approach to Be Safe
The risk-informed regulatory approach to fire safety offers benefits over the deterministic approach, according to NRC documents we reviewed, and NRC officials, consultants and experts, plant operators, and industry representatives we spoke with, but NRC made the adoption of the risk- informed approach voluntary instead of mandatory because it considers plants that meet deterministic requirements to be safe. NRC ultimately elected to make the transition voluntary because of uncertainty over whether agency staff could make the required determination regarding the approach’s protection of health and safety to impose new requirements. NRC considers plants that meet deterministic requirements to be safe, including plants that do so through approved exemptions and deviations. First, according to NRC officials, the modifications and risk assessments that plant operators perform as part of the transition process will help them identify and devote resources to activities that quantifiably reduce risk while allowing them greater flexibility in areas that do not significantly affect risk. to determine whether a new requirement should be implemented. Plants Transitioning to the Risk-Informed Approach Face Three Key Challenges
NRC documents we reviewed and some of the plant operators, industry representatives, consultants and experts we spoke to identified three primary challenges that may affect plants’ ability to transition to the risk- informed approach by 2014, when NRC expects to have received requests for license amendments from all of the plants that have currently committed to make the transition. First, transition costs have been higher than expected. Operators from all of the nontransitioning plants we contacted cited the cost of the transition as a reason why they are remaining under the deterministic approach, and five of the nine consultants and experts we spoke with stated that cost was a basis for plants not to transition to the risk-informed approach. Second, it may be difficult to develop realistic PRAs, according to industry documents and some of the plant operators, consultants, and experts we interviewed. Third, the number of people experienced in fire modeling and probabilistic risk assessment is relatively small compared with the potential need, according to plant operators, consultants, and experts we spoke with. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review provides information on: (1) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) progress in resolving the long-standing fire safety issues raised in our 2008 report at plants remaining under the deterministic approach and at those plants transitioning to the risk- informed approach; (2) the potential benefits of transitioning to a risk- informed approach and the basis for NRC’s decision to make adoption of this approach voluntary; and (3) challenges, if any, in efforts to transition to a risk-informed approach in regulating fire safety. To obtain information on NRC’s progress in resolving the long-standing fire safety issues raised in our 2008 report at plants remaining under the deterministic approach and at those plants transitioning to the risk- informed approach, we reviewed relevant documents obtained from NRC and selected plant operators related to NRC’s progress in resolving fire safety issues raised in our 2008 report. We also reviewed NRC reports and guidance on the use of fire wraps at nuclear power plants and documentation on how operators resolved issues associated with the use of fire wraps. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1975, a fire at a nuclear power plant damaged critical control cables and hampered operators' ability to monitor the status of the plant's reactor. NRC subsequently issued deterministic fire safety regulations for plants to follow, but differences in plant design, coupled with changes in NRC guidance, made it difficult for most plants to meet the regulations without seeking numerous exemptions. In 2004, NRC issued a regulation permitting plants to voluntarily transition to risk-informed fire protection requirements. This new approach mirrors NRC's efforts to adopt a more risk-informed regulatory approach to nuclear safety in general. In 2008, GAO reported on three key fire safety issues and recommended NRC take action to address them.
GAO was asked to examine (1) NRC's progress in resolving the long-standing fire safety issues raised in GAO's 2008 report at plants remaining under the deterministic approach and at those plants transitioning to the risk-informed approach; (2) the potential benefits of transitioning to a risk-informed approach and the basis for NRC's decision to make adoption of this approach voluntary; and (3) challenges, if any, in efforts to transition to a risk-informed approach in regulating fire safety. GAO reviewed documents; analyzed responses from operators at a nonprobability sample of 12 nuclear plants and from nine consultants or academic experts on fire safety issues and risk-informed regulations; and interviewed NRC, industry, and public interest group representatives.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. NRC found the report to be accurate and complete.
What GAO Found
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), together with plant operators, has made progress in resolving three fire safety issues raised in GAO's 2008 report by implementing GAO's recommendations or taking other actions. NRC implemented the recommendation on multiple spurious operations (malfunctions caused by fire that could cause safety-related equipment to malfunction) by issuing new guidance or requiring additional modifications at the 36 plants with 57 reactors operating under deterministic regulations. NRC did not implement the recommendations to address the effectiveness of fire wraps or the extended use of interim compensatory measures plants use instead of repairing or replacing damaged safety equipment; however, NRC did take some actions, including (1) evaluating and reporting on corrective actions plants used to mitigate safety concerns associated with fire wraps and (2) developing metrics to gauge the progress of NRC's staff in resolve underlying issues related to the extended use of compensatory measures.
According to NRC, plants transitioning to a riskinformed fire safety approach are continuing to resolve these issues through modifications and analyses required as part of the transition process. GAO visited two transitioning plants and observed examples of such modifications. According to NRC officials, plant operators, and others GAO spoke with, the riskinformed regulatory approach to fire safety offers benefits over the deterministic approach, but NRC made adoption of the risk-informed approach voluntary because it considers plants that meet deterministic requirements to be safe. NRC officials stated that the risk-informed approach (1) will provide plant operators with information to help them quantifiably reduce risk and with flexibility in areas that do not affect risk and (2) allow operators to more easily demonstrate compliance with simplified licensing requirements. According to some of the plant operators, consultants, and experts GAO spoke with, plants will improve their safety using the risk-informed approach. NRC considered mandating the riskinformed approach, but it did not do so because of uncertainties over whether the agency could determine if the approach could improve protection of health and safety enough to impose new regulations. NRC considers plants that meet deterministic requirements to be safe, including plants that do so through approved exceptions to these requirements; thus, it does not plan to further analyze whether the risk-informed approach should be mandatory.
Plant operators, consultants, and experts GAO spoke with identified three challenges that may affect NRC's transition schedule and the number of plants that ultimately transition to the risk-informed approach. First, transition costs have been higher than initially expected, and operators from all of the nontransitioning plants GAO contacted cited this as reason they are remaining under the deterministic approach. Second, according to some operators, consultants, and experts, the absence of fire data may hinder the development of realistic risk assessments and contribute to overly conservative NRC risk assessment guidance, potentially leading to a misallocation of resources. NRC and other stakeholders disagreed with this assessment. Third, few people have expertise in risk analysis and fire modeling, and some operators, consultants, and experts expressed concern that the need for such expertise could compete with other safety-related efforts. However, most consultants and experts GAO spoke with believed that the number of people with expertise will be sufficient to support the transition effort. |
gao_GAO-06-22 | gao_GAO-06-22_0 | Institutions Consider Accreditation when Deciding Which Transfer Credits to Accept and Commonly Accept Credits Earned at Regionally Accredited Institutions
We found that when making decisions about whether or not to accept transfer credits, institutions often used the sending institution’s accreditation as the initial measure of the quality of the institution and its coursework. Several officials from postsecondary institutions with regional accreditation told us that as a rule, they did not accept credits earned at institutions with national accreditation. They advised students to assume that credits would not transfer to regionally accredited institutions. Institutions Said That Transfer Agreements, though Time-Consuming, Do Facilitate Transfers
While many institutions use accreditation as a factor to assess transfer credits, about 69 percent of postsecondary institutions have entered into voluntary transfer agreements with other institutions. Institutions Review the Comparability of Coursework but Vary in How They Administer This Process
Some institutions review students’ transcripts to determine the comparability of the students’ coursework. For their part, accrediting agencies facilitate the transfer process through the standards they set for affiliated institutions. The six regional accrediting agencies that we reviewed generally encourage their member institutions not to accept or deny transfer credit exclusively on the basis of the accreditation of the sending institution. Some State Legislation and Statewide Initiatives Ease Credit Transfer
States facilitate the transfer of credits among public institutions through various statewide legislation and initiatives that, among other things, support the establishment of statewide transfer agreements, common core curricula, and common course numbering systems, and encourage institutions and others to make transfer information available to the public. Accrediting Agencies Set Accreditation Standards, and Some Encourage Institutions to Promote the Consistent Evaluation of Transfer Credit
Accrediting agencies’ standards for evaluating transfer credit generally reflect the three criteria specified in a 1978 joint national statement on the transfer and award of credit: the educational quality of the sending institution, the comparability of credit to be transferred to the receiving institution, and applicability of the credit in relation to the programs being offered at the receiving institution. Students’ Inability to Transfer Credits May Have Cost Implications, but Financial Effects on Students and the Federal Government Are Unknown
The inability to transfer credits may result in longer enrollment, more tuition payments, and additional federal financial aid awards, but the full extent to which such results occur cannot be determined because institutions told us they do not collect specific data on students that are unable to transfer credit. Our analysis of Education’s postsecondary education data found that transfer students fare differently from nontransfer students. In addition, we spoke with national experts and reviewed national studies related to the implications for students and the federal government of student’s inability to transfer credits. S.D. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year thousands of students transfer from one postsecondary institution to another. The credit transfer process, to the extent that it delays students' progress, can affect the affordability of postsecondary education and the time it takes students to graduate. Seeking information on the processes and requirements that postsecondary institutions have in place to assess requests to transfer academic credits, Congress asked GAO to examine (1) how postsecondary education institutions decide which credits to accept for transfer, (2) how states and accrediting agencies facilitate the credit transfer process, and (3) the implications for students and the federal government of students' inability to transfer credits.
What GAO Found
When deciding which credits to accept from transfer students, receiving institutions consider the sending institution's type of accreditation, whether academic transfer agreements with the institution exist, and the comparability of coursework. However, institutions vary in how they evaluate and apply a student's transferable credits. Many officials from postsecondary institutions with regional accreditation told GAO that they would not accept credits earned from nationally accredited institutions. To streamline the transfer process, most institutions have transfer agreements with other institutions that generally provide for the acceptance of credits from the other institution without further evaluation. In some instances, institutions review student credits--not rejected for other reasons, such as accreditation--to determine comparability to their academic offerings. State legislation, statewide initiatives, and the accreditation standards that accrediting agencies set help facilitate the transfer of academic credits from one postsecondary institution to another. Among other things, states support the establishment of statewide transfer agreements, common core curricula, and common course numbering systems. Accrediting agencies facilitate the transfer process through the standards they set. The accrediting agencies that GAO reviewed generally adhere to the principle that institutions should not accept or deny transfer credit exclusively on the basis of a sending institution's type of accreditation. A student's inability to transfer credit may result in longer enrollment, more tuition payments, and additional federal financial aid, but current data do not allow GAO to quantify its effects on the students or the federal government. Data are not available on the number of credits that do not transfer, making it difficult to assess the actual costs associated with nontransferable credits. |
gao_GAO-06-14 | gao_GAO-06-14_0 | Background
The 1999 Act, as amended, establishes a program to provide college-bound students domiciled in the District of Columbia with greater choices among institutions of higher education by affording them the benefits of in-state tuition at state colleges and universities outside the District of Columbia. For fiscal years 2000-2004, Congress appropriated $17 million annually for the DCTAG program and appropriated $25.6 million for fiscal year 2005. However, we found that SEO’s controls over determining student eligibility were less effective because some of the documents required to determine if applicants were eligible were not in the files. Invoices are then processed for payment by the District’s Office of Finance and Resource Management (OFRM) and recorded in SOAR. We did not note any exceptions or discrepancies for these tests, and as a result, concluded that the SEO has effective controls for determining institution eligibility and processing payments to those institutions for the DCTAG program. High Management Turnover at SEO Affected the Control Environment and Program Operations
The DCTAG program has experienced significant management turnover since its beginning in 2000. When District officials performed a reconciliation in May 2005 at our request, they discovered a difference of approximately $11 million that had not been reconciled—$8.3 million of which should have been transferred from the DCTAG-dedicated bank accounts to the District’s general fund and $2.7 million of which was interest that had been earned in the dedicated bank accounts since these accounts were established. The SEO’s Forecasting Method to Project Future Funding Needs Has Not Been Reviewed for Methodological Soundness
The District’s forecasting method to estimate the number of students and the average cost per student for those participating in the DCTAG program each year for future years is based on assumptions that have not been reviewed against historical experience or developed using other available information. Total Amount of the Administrative Expenses for the DCTAG Program Unknown
While the District reported that it used 5.3 percent ($0.9 million) of the $17 million of federal funds appropriated in fiscal year 2004 appropriated funds, less the rescission, the District does not track the full amount of administrative expenses incurred for the program. District officials acknowledged that they did not know how much the total administrative costs were, but estimated that operating the DCTAG program costs more than the 7 percent legislatively set limit for federal funding. They explained that these additional costs are absorbed using District funds. Conclusions
The SEO has taken actions to put program and financial management procedures in place, but DCTAG is at risk in the areas of student eligibility and program budgeting. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct the head of the State Education Office to require applicants for DCTAG program funds to provide a valid Student Aid Report or other document with similar information with their applications so that applicants’ identities and citizenship will have been verified by the federal government before the District receives the information, establish and implement procedures to ensure that sufficient evidence is obtained and maintained to demonstrate that applicants are actually domiciled in the District prior to providing participants with DCTAG funding, develop and retain documentation that clearly shows how eligibility decisions are reached when it reviews applications submitted by students with unusual circumstances, develop a sound methodology for forecasting (1) numbers of students in the program and (2) funds needed for future fiscal years, coordinate with OFRM and the Office of Budget and Planning to ensure that interest earned on DCTAG-dedicated bank accounts is made available to be expended for the DCTAG program, and refine the current mechanisms for identifying and recording the actual costs of administering the DCTAG program, in coordination with the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and OFRM. However, we found that the reconciliations had not been performed prior to our review. The CFO added that when GAO made the request, the District’s general fund had not been fully reimbursed for all DCTAG expenditures. To assess whether funds for the DCTAG program were being accounted for separately in dedicated accounts, we reviewed District procedures for maintaining the dedicated accounts for the DCTAG program and for reimbursing the District’s general fund for disbursements made on behalf of the program. We reconciled the bank statements to reports from SOAR, the District’s financial management system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program in 1999 to provide D.C. college-bound residents with greater choices among institutions of higher education by affording them the benefits of in-state tuition at state colleges and universities outside the District of Columbia. Congress appropriated $17 million annually for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and $25.6 million for fiscal year 2005. GAO was asked to assess whether (1) adequate controls exist over the use of federal funds, including processes to determine institution and student eligibility, manage the cash needs of the program, and pay administrative expenses; (2) funds for the DCTAG program are accounted for separately from the District's general fund; and (3) administrative expenses for the program charged against federal funds are within the 7 percent limit of the total amount appropriated for the program.
What GAO Found
The District's State Education Office (SEO) has taken actions to put program and financial management procedures in place, but DCTAG is at risk in the areas of student eligibility and program budgeting. The District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant program has effective controls for determining the eligibility of higher education institutions to participate in the program and for processing institutions' invoices for payment. Other controls, however, were less effective. SEO did not have sufficient documentation to demonstrate that some students approved for DCTAG program funds were eligible because documents required to be submitted by applicants were not available. The most commonly missing documents were those intended to establish domicile in the District. Moreover, SEO officials were not verifying applicants' Social Security numbers, which should be used to establish citizenship. Furthermore, SEO did not have documentation or procedures for determining the eligibility of applicants with special circumstances. The SEO has experienced significant turnover at the top management levels since it was created by legislation in 2000. High management turnover affects an organization's control environment and its ability to plan, direct, and control operations to effectively and strategically achieve its mission. The District established dedicated cash accounts for the DCTAG program, separate from the District's general fund, as required by law. Reconciliations between these dedicated bank accounts and the District's financial management system, however, had not been performed prior to our review. At our request, the Office of Finance and Resource Management (OFRM) reconciled the dedicated bank accounts and discovered that the District's general fund had not been reimbursed for approximately $8.3 million for prior-period cash expenditures made from the District's general fund on behalf of the DCTAG program. Also, about $2.7 million in interest earned since the DCTAG-dedicated accounts were established had not been recorded as funds available for the program. The District's forecasting method to project the number of students eligible to receive DCTAG funds in current and future years has not been reviewed for methodological soundness. While projections are based on the numbers of students that apply for the first time and those who submit renewal applications during a fiscal year, these projections have not been measured against actual results to include the historical experience of the program. While the District reported that it used 5.3 percent ($0.9 million) of the federal funds during fiscal year 2004 for DCTAG program administrative expenses, the District does not track the full amount of administrative expenses incurred for the program. District officials estimate that operating the DCTAG program costs more than the 7 percent legislatively set limit, and these additional costs were absorbed using District funds. |
gao_GAO-14-489 | gao_GAO-14-489_0 | Actions VA and IHS Have Taken to Improve Access to Care for Native American Veterans Face Implementation Challenges, and Oversight and Accountability Are Lacking
VA and IHS staff have taken actions to improve access to care, including strengthening outreach and enrollment efforts, expanding services offered, increasing efforts to improve cultural competency, and implementing reimbursement agreements. VA and IHS Have Taken Actions to Improve Access to Care, but Implementation Challenges Limit Their Effectiveness
In four main areas, VA and IHS have taken actions to improve access to care for Native American veterans: (1) outreach and enrollment, (2) expanded services including telehealth, (3) training and improvement in cultural competency, and (4) reimbursement agreements. Although VA and IHS have undertaken a variety of outreach efforts, officials from VA, IHS, and THP facilities identified two main ongoing challenges to implementing effective outreach to Native American veterans—the lack of available data to identify eligible Native American veterans and insufficient agency resources to effectively conduct outreach in rural areas. According to VA and IHS officials at another site we visited, the local VA medical center and an IHS facility collaborated to establish a VA primary care presence at the IHS facility. First, oversight of the MOU’s implementation is inconsistent and, in 2013, the officials tasked with this oversight did not meet and did not systematically evaluate the progress of MOU implementation. Without consistent oversight, formal guidance on responsibilities for MOU implementation, and the prioritization of MOU implementation, leadership in VA and IHS do not have reasonable assurance that the objectives of the MOU related to access to care are being addressed. According to VA and IHS agency officials, the only documentation outlining the procedures to report VA and IHS progress in implementing the MOU is contained in a set of training slides used in a December 2012 staff training session. However, VA and IHS officials said that these training slides are not binding because they have not been formalized in written policy or guidance, including establishing clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Prioritization of MOU Implementation Is Lacking
VA and IHS leaders have not made MOU implementation a priority, which threatens the ability of the two agencies to move forward in implementing the MOU as it relates to access to care. Moreover, key members of the Joint Implementation Task Force attributed their lack of tracking and oversight of the MOU activities in part to their perception that other work-related responsibilities had a higher priority than some of their MOU related responsibilities. Native American Veterans and Their Representatives Reported Mixed Views on Whether Access to Care Has Improved
Although the majority of Native American veterans and their representatives we contacted reported that they thought access to care for Native American veterans had improved over the past 3 years, a number of others said either that they did not believe that access to care had improved during that time or they did not know whether it had. Of the 102 representatives, 53 reported that in the last 3 years there had been an increase in the number of Native American veterans accessing health care at a VA, IHS, or THP facility. However, 12 felt that there had been no change and 36 reported that they didn’t know. Conclusions
Native American veterans have historically faced many issues in accessing health care and to their credit, both VA and IHS have taken actions under the 2010 memorandum of understanding to improve access to care for Native American veterans. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve access to care for Native American veterans through MOU implementation, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following action: Establish written policy or guidance designating specific roles and responsibilities for agency staff to hold leadership accountable and improve implementation and oversight of the MOU. | Why GAO Did This Study
Native Americans who have served in the military may be eligible for health care services from both VA and IHS, but according to reports some have had problems accessing care. In 2010 these two agencies expanded upon an MOU designed to improve Native American veterans' access to care at their facilities. GAO was asked to examine how the MOU has increased access to care.
This report examines: (1) the actions that VA and IHS have taken to implement the provisions in the 2010 MOU related to access to care for Native American veterans, and (2) what is known about how access to care for Native American veterans has improved. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed agency documents and VA and IHS reimbursement data and interviewed VA and IHS officials. GAO also visited three sites selected to reflect geographic variation to learn about access to care locally through interviews with regional VA and IHS officials, health facility officials, and Native American veterans and their tribal representatives. GAO also contacted other individuals who help Native American veterans seek enrollment in the VA to obtain their insights about improvements in access to care.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Indian Health Service (IHS) have taken a variety of actions to improve access to care for Native American veterans under their 2010 memorandum of understanding (MOU); however according to stakeholders, these agencies face substantial implementation challenges. VA and IHS have taken actions to (1) strengthen outreach and enrollment through information sharing and training; (2) expand services through national and local projects; (3) increase training about cultural competency for staff at VA and IHS facilities; and (4) establish reimbursement agreements that allow VA to reimburse IHS facilities for services provided to veterans. However, in each of these areas challenges remain, such as insufficient data to identify Native American veterans for outreach, obstacles to reaching those who live in very remote areas, and technological challenges such as lack of Internet connectivity or phone lines.
While VA and IHS have taken actions to increase access, the oversight, accountability, and prioritization of MOU implementation are lacking. Specifically:
Oversight is inconsistent: In 2013, the officials tasked with oversight of the implementation of the MOU did not meet and did not systematically evaluate the progress of MOU implementation.
Written policies and guidance are lacking: According to officials, the only documentation outlining the procedures to report VA and IHS progress on implementation efforts is contained in a set of training slides used in a December 2012 training session, and these slides have not been formalized in written policy or guidance.
Prioritization of MOU implementation is lacking: Leadership of VA and IHS have not made MOU implementation a priority, which threatens the ability of the two agencies to move forward in implementing the MOU. Key officials attributed this, in part, to their perception that their non-MOU related responsibilities had a higher priority.
Without consistent oversight, formal policy or guidance on responsibilities for MOU implementation, and the prioritization of MOU implementation, VA and IHS leadership do not have reasonable assurance that the objectives of the MOU related to access to care are being addressed.
Native American veterans and their representatives that GAO contacted reported mixed views on whether access to care has improved over the past 3 years. Although a majority reported that access to care had improved, others either said that that they did not think it had improved or were unsure. For example, 53 of 102 Native American veterans representatives GAO contacted reported that in the last 3 years there had been an increase in the number of Native American veterans accessing health care at VA or IHS-funded facilities; however, 12 felt there had been no change, and 36 said they did not know.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA and IHS establish written policy or guidance designating specific roles and responsibilities for agency staff to hold leadership accountable and improve implementation and oversight of the MOU. VA and IHS agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-95-171 | gao_RCED-95-171_0 | Check-Off Boards Plan Activities Using Market Research, Evaluation, and Coordination
In planning future activities, check-off boards rely heavily on market research and program evaluation. Agricultural Marketing Programs in Four Foreign Countries Are Significantly Different From U.S. Check-Off Programs
National agricultural marketing programs in the four countries we reviewed—Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—varied significantly from U.S. check-off programs in their organizational structure, sources of funding, activities performed, and emphasis on export promotion activities. Unlike U.S. check-off programs, some foreign countries’ marketing programs either have government members on their boards or are guided by councils that include government members. Some foreign marketing organizations receive significant funding from sources other than mandatory industry assessments. Marketing Organizations in Foreign Countries Differ in Activities Performed and Emphasis on Export Activities
Like the U.S. check-off programs, many foreign marketing programs carry out promotion and research activities. However, unlike their U.S. counterparts, these foreign programs may provide other services, such as buying and selling products, providing training to industry, inspecting products, and licensing exporters. This appendix provides information on the boards’ promotion, research, and evaluation activities and their joint efforts with related groups. Nutrition. These advertisements resulted in a sales increase of 9.6 percent. Production. Product development and new uses. Basic research focuses on developing new products to compete with petroleum-based plastics and adhesives. Therefore, the authorizing legislation includes an exemption to the prohibition on influencing governmental action for “any action designed to market soybean or soybean products directly to a foreign government or political subdivision thereof.”
Information on Selected Agricultural Promotion and Research Programs in Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
We reviewed the activities of 19 marketing organizations in four countries: (1) Australia, (2) Germany, (3) New Zealand, and (4) the United Kingdom. The organizations carry out these activities in both the domestic and export markets. Two assessment rates—a general assessment and an assessment for specific species promotion. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on U.S. and foreign promotion and research programs that are designed to increase domestic and foreign sales of agricultural products, focusing on: (1) how U.S. check-off programs are planned and organized; and (2) how comparable marketing organizations in Australia, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom carry out their agricultural promotion activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the six U.S. check-off programs reviewed vary by board composition, revenues collected, assessment methods, and options for initiating, continuing, and terminating programs; (2) check-off boards differ in their emphasis on developing domestic or foreign markets, their methods for selling their products, and their reliance on research to develop new products, enhance production, and address nutritional concerns; (3) check-off boards use market research and program evaluation techniques to plan their future activities while coordinating with related groups in preparing and carrying out these plans; (4) the foreign promotion and research programs reviewed differ from the U.S. check-off programs in their organizational structure, funding mechanisms, types of activities performed, and emphasis on export activities; (5) some foreign marketing organizations have government members on their boards or guiding councils and do not require legislative action to change their assessment rates; (6) some foreign programs promote product groups rather than a single industry; (7) in general, the foreign marketing organizations do not exempt small producers from assessments and some receive significant funding from sources other than their industry assessments; (8) foreign organizations generally engage in a wider range of promotional activities, such as buying and selling products and providing training and inspection services than their U.S. counterparts and focus more on exports than domestic sales; and (9) market development programs may become more important in the future, since the new international trade regulations do not limit their use and increase competition. |
gao_GAO-07-252T | gao_GAO-07-252T_0 | Potentially Improper and/or Fraudulent Housing Assistance Payments Related to Trailers and Apartments
We found that FEMA provided nearly $17 million in potentially improper and/or fraudulent rental assistance payments to individuals already housed in other accommodations that FEMA provided through other disaster assistance programs. In this case, FEMA paid nearly $46,000 in rental assistance to 10 residents of an apartment complex in Plano, Texas, from September 2005 through June 2006. Our review of FEMA records indicated that 7 of the 10 individuals certified to FEMA that they were in need of rental assistance, even after they had been provided with free housing. Potentially Improper and/or Fraudulent IHP Assistance Payments to Individuals Claiming Damages from Both Hurricanes
FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who submitted claims for damages to the same primary residences from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Potentially Improper and/or Fraudulent Payments to Nonqualified Aliens
FEMA made at least $3 million dollars of improper and potentially fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP financial assistance. Consequently, FEMA paid at least $3 million to foreign students from four selected universities. This amount could understate the total payments to ineligible foreign students because we requested information on international students from only four of the colleges and universities in the areas affected by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of November 2006, FEMA had detected through its own processes about $290 million in overpayments and had collected nearly $7 million of the about $290 million identified as improper. In total, of the 246 items we investigated for this testimony, 85 items (34 percent) are lost or stolen. A November 27 DHS memo supports the results of this investigation, acknowledging that many items purchased for hurricane relief efforts are still missing. Conclusions
Ineffective preventive controls for FEMA’s IHP have resulted in substantial fraudulent and improper payments. The additional examples of potentially fraudulent and improper payments in our testimony today further show that our estimate of $1 billion in improper and/or fraudulent payments through February is likely understated. We have provided 25 recommendations to DHS and FEMA to improve management of IHP and the purchase card program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent rental payments to individuals at the same time it was providing the registrant’s free lodging in FEMA trailers and rent-free (i.e., FEMA-provided) apartments, we interviewed FEMA officials, reviewed Title 8 of the United States Code, and reviewed the Stafford Act (Pub. To determine whether FEMA made duplicate payments to individuals who claimed damages for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita using the same damaged addresses, we compared the social security numbers and damaged addresses maintained in the FEMA databases for hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and reviewed National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) data on selected individuals. To conduct our investigation into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) purchase card program, we traveled to New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Fort Worth, Texas, in September 2006, to physically inspect selected property. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continues to respond to this disaster, GAO's previous work identified significant control weaknesses--specifically in FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) purchase card program--resulting in significant fraud, waste, and abuse. Today's testimony will address whether FEMA provided improper and potentially fraudulent (1) rental assistance payments to registrants at the same time it was providing free housing via trailers and apartments; (2) duplicate assistance payments to individuals who claimed damages to the same property for both hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and (3) IHP payments to non-U.S. residents who did not qualify for IHP. This testimony will also discuss (1) the importance of fraud identification and prevention, and (2) the results of our investigation into property FEMA bought using DHS purchase cards. To address these objectives, GAO data mined and analyzed FEMA records and interviewed city officials, university officials, and foreign students. GAO also traveled to Louisiana and Texas to inspect selected property items and to investigate improper housing payments to individuals living in FEMA-provided housing.
What GAO Found
FEMA continued to lose tens of millions of dollars through potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These payments include $17 million in rental assistance paid to individuals to whom FEMA had already provided free housing through trailers or apartments. In one case, FEMA provided free housing to 10 individuals in apartments in Plano, Texas, while at the same time it sent these individuals $46,000 to cover out-of-pocket housing expenses. In addition, several of these individuals certified to FEMA that they needed rental assistance. FEMA made nearly $20 million in duplicate payments to thousands of individuals who claimed the damages to the same property from both hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA also made millions in potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments to nonqualified aliens who were not eligible for IHP. For example, FEMA paid at least $3 million to more than 500 ineligible foreign students at four universities in the affected areas. This amount likely understates the total payments to ineligible foreign students because it does not cover all colleges and universities in the area. FEMA also provided potentially improper and/or fraudulent IHP assistance to other ineligible non-U.S. residents, despite having documentation indicating their ineligibility. Finally, FEMA's difficulties in identifying and collecting improper payments further emphasized the importance of implementing an effective fraud, waste, and abuse prevention system. For example, GAO previously estimated improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to the IHP application process to be $1 billion through February 2006. As of November 2006, FEMA identified about $290 million in improper payments and collected about $7 million. GAO's previous work on the DHS purchase cards also showed significant problems with property accountability. Of 246 items we investigated that FEMA purchased for hurricane relief efforts using DHS's purchase cards, 85 items--or 34 percent--are still missing and presumed lost or stolen. |
gao_RCED-97-22 | gao_RCED-97-22_0 | To verify whether FAA chose the most cost-effective option for providing radar approach control to the Grand Junction airport, we performed an independent cost analysis of FAA’s 1995 study. When these factors are considered, FAA’s total projected savings attributable to remoting and contracting out the tower operation at Grand Junction are reduced by about $500,000, from $5.9 million to $5.4 million. Radar Remoting and Contract Towers Are Safe and Efficient
The representatives of the city of Grand Junction expressed concern that by remoting the radar signal to Denver and by contracting out a tower’s operation, FAA jeopardizes the safety and the efficiency of the air traffic control system at the Grand Junction airport. In both the Grand Junction and the Yakima projects, FAA took a relatively ad hoc approach in deciding whether to remote radar data. In both cases, our review showed that while FAA chose the most cost-effective option, it did not include all relevant cost factors in its savings computation and did little to communicate the rationale for its decision to the affected communities, thereby contributing to subsequent misperceptions by community representatives. However, this approach has led to the agency’s omitting certain telecommunications costs and not reflecting the more realistic scenarios for staffing facilities and has raised concerns in the affected communities. Nevertheless, FAA recognized that improvements can be made in its decision-making process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) whether the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) chose the most cost-effective option for handling radar-based air traffic control activities at the Grand Junction, Colorado, airport; (2) whether the safety and efficiency of the air traffic control system would be compromised by remoting radar data and contracting out tower operations at Grand Junction; and (3) what can be done to improve the FAA process for determining when and where to remote radar data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it agreed with the FAA determination that remoting the Grand Junction radar signal to a terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facility in Denver is the most cost-effective option for handling radar data from the site; (2) the FAA 20-year projected savings attributable to the remote option should be reduced by about $500,000, from $5.9 million to $5.4 million, since FAA overlooked certain telecommunications costs and did not utilize more realistic staffing scenarios; (3) GAO analysis of the available data disclosed no valid concerns about the safety and efficiency of remoting radar data or contracting out a tower's operation; (4) the FAA process for deciding when and where to remote radar signals was generally sound, but relatively ad hoc; and (5) a formal methodology for making such decisions would have helped FAA to ensure that all relevant factors were properly considered and communicate to the affected communities how its decision was made. |
gao_RCED-95-92 | gao_RCED-95-92_0 | Specifically, our objectives were to review the Commission’s efforts to finance and administer its capital program and the Commission’s internal controls used to ensure that its business affairs were appropriately conducted. The Commission issued $121 million in tax-exempt bonds in 1992 to finance its capital program and refinanced this debt by issuing $133 million in bonds in 1993 to take advantage of the very favorable interest rates available at that time. Although the Commission began efforts to seek agreements as early as 1990, it did not enter into a formal agreement on the process for obtaining them until May 1995, in part because of misunderstandings about the types of approvals needed and the appropriate authorities from whom the approvals and agreements were needed. Conclusions
The Commission’s capital program is a complex and sophisticated undertaking that required extensive coordination and agreements, as well as entry into the capital bond market. We found that the Commission had new policies in place to guide procurement and the remuneration of commissioners but that in some instances it had not ensured that these policies were consistently followed. We found errors in payments made in both procurement and commissioner remuneration. No federal or New York State legislation specifically provides for oversight of the Commission. The costs for these services were not supported by detailed billings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the operations of the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission, focusing on its: (1) efforts to finance and administer its 30-year capital program; and (2) internal controls used to ensure that its business affairs are conducted appropriately.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission: (1) is a complex undertaking that requires extensive coordination and agreements with several federal and state entities, as well as entry into the capital bond market; (2) began efforts to obtain agreements on historic preservation and environmental assessment as early as 1990, but its projects were delayed because of misunderstandings about approvals or agreements needed to implement the project; (3) financed its capital program in 1992 by issuing over $120 million in tax-exempt bonds and refinancing the debt a year later to take advantage of lower interest rates; (4) had new policies in place to guide the procurement and renumeration of commissioners but, in some instances, the Commission did not follow the policies consistently; and (5) made errors in payment for procurement and commissioner renumeration, and some attorneys' fees were not supported by detailed billings. In addition, GAO found that there are no federal or state laws that explicitly provide authority for governmental oversight of the Commission. |
gao_GAO-02-1033 | gao_GAO-02-1033_0 | Nation’s Extensive Marine Transportation System Fills Many Roles
The United States is the world’s largest maritime trading nation, accounting for 1 billion metric tons, or nearly 20 percent of the world’s oceanborne trade. Over 95 percent of the U.S. overseas trade tonnage is shipped by sea. Federal, state, and local governments and private sector organizations all participate in financing the marine transportation system. Federal Funding for the Commercial Marine Transportation System
During fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, federal expenditures for the commercial marine transportation system averaged about $3.9 billion each year, most of which was provided from general revenues. Federal Funding for the Aviation and Highway Transportation Systems
During fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, federal expenditures averaged $10 billion each year for the aviation system and $25 billion each year for the highway system. Unlike the funding approach used for the commercial marine transportation system, which relies heavily on general tax revenue, the aviation and highway transportation systems were primarily funded by collections from users of the systems that are accounted for in trust funds. Most of these customs duties were deposited into the U.S. Treasury’s general fund. During the three- year period, assessments on system users were the funding source for about 88 percent of the amount spent on the aviation system and over 99 percent of the amount spent on the highway system. | What GAO Found
As the world's leading trading nation, the United States depends on a vast marine transportation system. Ninety-five percent of overseas trade tonnage moves by water, and the cargo moving through the U.S. marine transportation system contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the U.S. gross domestic product. As it does with the nation's highway and aviation systems, the federal government participates with hundreds of public and private entities in maintaining and improving the marine transportation system. During fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, federal expenditures for the commercial marine transportation system averaged $3.9 billion per year. Funding for about 80 percent of these expenditures came from the U.S. Treasury's general fund. During this same period, federal agencies collected $1 billion each year from marine transportation system users. During the same three-year period, federal expenditures for aviation and highway transportation systems averaged $10 billion and $25 billion, respectively, each year. Unlike the funding approach for the marine transportation system, which relies extensively on tax revenue, the federal funding approach for aviation and highway relies almost exclusively on assessments on users of the transportation systems. |
gao_NSIAD-96-70 | gao_NSIAD-96-70_0 | Background
The Air Force and the Navy budget and spend billions annually to procure and repair aviation spare parts. Air Force and Navy Policies Result in Overstated Requirements
Although Air Force and Navy policies and procedures related to reserving on-hand assets for depot maintenance requirements differ, both agencies’ policies and procedures result in overstated requirements. These inaccuracies were due to the use, in requirement computations, of unsupported or incorrect (1) maintenance replacement rates, (2) demand rates, (3) planned program requirements, (4) due-out quantities, (5) lead times, (6) repair costs, and (7) asset quantities on hand and on order. The inaccuracies caused the fiscal year 1995 budget requirements to be understated by about $2 million on some items and overstated by about $10 million on others. We obtained and reviewed fiscal years 1995 and 1996 buy and repair budgets for the Air Force’s aviation spare parts. We have decreased the amount of assets reserved for depot maintenance needs from $226 million to $132 million. This reflects a reduction in the Navy’s assets from at least $154 million to at least $60 million. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Air Force's and Navy's policies and procedures for procuring aviation spare parts, focusing on whether their requirements and budgets reflect the amounts they actually need.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Air Force and Navy budgeted $132 million more than needed for aviation spare parts because they used questionable policies to determine their requirements and assign accountability for depot maintenance assets; (2) the Air Force did not include $72 million of its on-hand assets in preparing its fiscal year (FY) 1996 budget request; (3) the Navy twice counted $60 million in depot maintenance requirements when preparing its FY 1997 budget request; (4) Air Force and Navy computation errors were a result of unsupported and incorrect maintenance replacement rates, demand rates, planned program requirements, repair costs, lead times, due-out quantities, and asset quantities on hand and on order; and (5) errors found in the sample items reviewed totalled $35 million and resulted in some requirements being overstated by as much as $25 million and some being understated by $10 million. |
gao_GAO-10-11 | gao_GAO-10-11_0 | Through its collections program, FMS also provides services to federal agencies to collect, deposit, and account for federal collections. Specifically, we reported that electronic collections provide better accuracy, lower mailing and processing costs, and fewer delinquencies and defaults. Such reimbursements are deposited in the Treasury’s general fund. Fully electronic payments accounted for more than 80 percent of dollars collected by agencies other than IRS for fiscal years 2005 through 2009, with $441 billion of the almost $509 billion collected using fully electronic methods in fiscal year 2009. As shown in figure 2, there was a significant shift from nonelectronic to partly electronic methods from 2005 to 2009. The growth in partly electronic payments largely represents a change in agency processes rather than in payer behavior: the shift is largely the result of a growth in electronic check processing capacity both at agencies and through lockbox banks. Movement to Electronic Collection Methods Can Reduce Costs and Mitigate Some Risks, but Agency-Specific Circumstances Have Affected Adoption of These Methods
FMS, case-study agencies, and the payer groups we interviewed have identified a variety of cost savings stemming from the use of electronic collection methods. Other agency considerations also influence the selection and adoption of collection methods. By not reviewing agency responsibility to pay for collection services, FMS does not make use of an available incentive to agencies to move to more efficient collection methods. Agencies not scheduled for review until later years also may lack information on how to overcome barriers to the use of electronic collection methods or invest in more cost-effective collection methods. With better information about the capabilities and benefits of the various collection methods, agencies could in turn communicate that information to their payer groups. Some FMS collections guidance is outdated, but the Holistic Approach plan does not include a strategy for updating guidance based on lessons- learned from the agency reviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze opportunities to improve the efficiency of federal collections governmentwide we examined (1) the extent to which agencies other than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) use collection methods in the Financial Management Service’s (FMS) collections program, (2) how FMS and these agencies can maximize the benefits of and overcome barriers to use of the various collection methods, and (3) issues FMS should consider as it implements its plans for improving the efficiency and security of these collections. We selected this set of case-study agencies to cover the use of the variety of collection methods, a variety of payer and payment characteristics, programs with significant collection totals, representation of at least two departments, potential for improved efficiency, and instances of a recent change in collection method. To identify the issues FMS should consider in implementing its plans for improving the efficiency and security of collections, we reviewed relevant legislation and FMS plans and agency agreements, applied relevant findings from our case studies, and interviewed FMS and case-study agency officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) collections program provides services to agencies to collect, deposit, and account for collections through a variety of methods. Electronic collection methods can reduce government borrowing costs and agency administrative costs, while improving compliance and security. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to identify (1) the extent to which agencies other than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) use various collection methods, (2) ways to maximize the benefits of and overcome any barriers to agency use of the various collection methods, and (3) issues that FMS should consider in its plans to improve the efficiency and security of collections. GAO analyzed collections data, plans, and documents from FMS and five case-study agencies in the Departments of the Interior and Commerce that use a variety of collection methods, observed fee collection methods, and interviewed FMS and case-study agency officials. GAO also interviewed selected payer groups for case study agencies.
What GAO Found
Over the past 5 years, more than 80 percent of funds collected by agencies other than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were collected using fully electronic methods, including wire transfers and credit cards. As shown in the figure below, from fiscal year 2005 through 2009 there was a significant shift from nonelectronic collection methods to partly electronic methods. This shift was largely a result of a growth in electronic check-processing capacity. Moving to electronic collection methods can reduce costs and mitigate risks, such as theft, but the specific circumstances of individual agencies and payers have affected agencies' ability to fully adopt these methods. Use of electronic methods can result in cost savings, increased processing speed and accuracy, and improved security of staff and deposits. Specifically, FMS reports that on average the government saves 78 cents for each electronic transaction. Additionally, case-study agencies and payer groups GAO spoke with reported reduced costs when using electronic collection methods. Despite the advantages, payer characteristics, other agency considerations, and set-up costs or required system changes have limited agencies' adoption of electronic collection methods. Also, agencies may not have enough information to make cost-effective decisions about their choice of collection method. FMS is implementing a plan to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal collections, but the plan excludes important cost considerations and does not use all available incentives. Specifically, the plan does not consider the cost differences among different electronic methods or ensure the consistent application of policies on reimbursement for certain services. The FMS plan also does not include a strategy for incorporating key lessons-learned from agency reviews into its guidance and communicating that information to agencies. With such information, agencies not scheduled for review until later years could begin to transition to more efficient methods. |
gao_GAO-05-576T | gao_GAO-05-576T_0 | The Housing GSEs Share Similar Missions
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mission is to enhance the availability of mortgage credit across the nation during both good and bad economic times by purchasing mortgages from lenders (banks, thrifts, and mortgage lenders), which then use the proceeds to make additional mortgages available to home buyers. MBS issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are either sold to investors (off- balance sheet obligations) or held in their retained portfolios (on-balance sheet obligations). More recently, the FHLBanks initiated programs to purchase mortgages directly from their members and hold them in their retained portfolios. Housing GSE Activities Involve Significant Risks
While the housing GSEs have generated public benefits, their large size and activities pose potentially significant risks to taxpayers. As a result of their activities, the GSEs’ outstanding debt and off-balance sheet financial obligations were about $4.6 trillion as of year-end 2003. The potential exists that Congress and the executive branch would determine that such assistance was again necessary in the event that one or more of the GSEs experienced severe financial difficulties. In particular, if Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the FHLBank System were unable to meet their financial obligations, other financial market participants depending on payments from these GSEs may in turn become unable to meet their financial obligations. Housing GSE Regulatory Structure Is Divided among OFHEO, HUD, and FHFB
The current regulatory structure for the housing GSEs is divided among OFHEO, HUD, and FHFB, as described below: OFHEO is an independent office within HUD and is responsible for regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness. Housing GSE Regulatory Reform Is Necessary to Better Ensure Safety and Soundness and Mission Achievement
As I stated previously, OFHEO has moved aggressively over the past year to identify and address risk management and accounting deficiencies at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and FHFB has entered into written agreements with two FHLBanks to correct interest rate risk management deficiencies. While HUD’s ability to ensure adequate resources for its GSE oversight responsibilities is limited, its mission oversight responsibilities are increasingly complex. A Single Housing GSE Regulator with a Board or Hybrid Board/Director Governance Model and Equipped with Sufficient Authorities Is Critical
To address the deficiencies in the current GSE regulatory structure that I have just described, we have consistently supported and continue to believe in the need for the creation of a single regulator to oversee both safety and soundness and mission of the housing GSEs. Further, a single regulator would be better positioned to consider potential trade-offs between mission requirements and safety and soundness considerations, because such a regulator would develop a fuller understanding of the operations of these large and complex financial institutions. In our previous work, however, we have stated that a “stand-alone” agency with a board of directors would better ensure the independence and prominence of the regulator and allow it to act independently of the influence of the housing GSEs, which are large and politically influential. Adequate Regulatory Authorities Are Essential
It is also essential that the new GSE regulator have adequate powers and authorities to address unsafe and unsound practices, respond to financial emergencies, and ensure that the GSEs comply with their public missions. The criteria could include the extent to which the mortgage portfolios enhance the GSEs’ housing mission, increase financial risks, and raise financial stability concerns. Without the authority to police such practices, the new regulator would not be able to fully carry out its oversight responsibilities. Capital Structure of the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Federal Housing Finance Board: Actions Needed to Improve Regulatory Oversight. Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Development of the Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Regulator. | Why GAO Did This Study
Serious concerns exist regarding the risk management practices and the federal oversight of the housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)--Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBank System), which had combined obligations of $4.6 trillion as of year-end 2003. In 2003, Freddie Mac disclosed significant accounting irregularities. In 2004, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) cited Fannie Mae for accounting irregularities and earnings manipulation. Fannie Mae has to restate its financial statements for 2001-2004 and OFHEO has required the GSE to develop a capital restoration plan. Also in 2004, the FHLBanks of Chicago and Seattle entered into written agreements with their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), to implement changes to enhance their risk management. To assist Congress in its housing GSE oversight, this testimony provides information on GSEs' missions and risks, the current regulatory structure, and proposed regulatory reforms.
What GAO Found
While the GSEs provide certain public benefits, they also pose potential risks. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's primary activity involves purchasing mortgages from lenders and issuing mortgage-backed securities that are either sold to investors or held in the GSEs' retained portfolio. The 12 FHLBanks traditionally made loans to their members and more recently instituted programs to purchase mortgages from their members and hold such mortgages in their portfolios. While not obligated to do so, the federal government could provide financial assistance to the GSEs if one or more experienced financial difficulties that could result in significant costs to taxpayers. Due to the GSEs' large size, the potential also exists that financial problems at one or more of the GSEs could have destabilizing effects on financial markets. The current housing GSE regulatory structure is fragmented and not well-equipped to oversee their financial soundness or mission achievement. For example, although all the GSEs face increasingly similar risks (particularly potential losses in their mortgage portfolios resulting from fluctuations in interest rates), OFHEO is responsible for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's safety and soundness oversight while FHFB is responsible for the safety and soundness and mission oversight of the FHLBanks. OFHEO also lacks key regulatory authorities necessary to fulfill its oversight responsibilities. Moreover, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which has housing mission oversight responsibility for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, faces a number of challenges in carrying out its responsibilities. In particular, HUD may not have sufficient resources and technical expertise to review sophisticated financial products and issues. Creating a single housing GSE regulator could better ensure consistency of regulation among the GSEs. With safety and soundness and mission oversight combined, a single regulator would be better positioned to consider potential trade-offs between these sometimes competing objectives. To ensure the independence and prominence of the regulator and allow it to act independently of the influence of the housing GSEs, this new GSE regulator should have a structure that consists of a board or a hybrid board and director model. To be effective, the single regulator must also have all the regulatory oversight and enforcement powers necessary to address unsafe and unsound practices, respond to financial emergencies, monitor corporate governance and compensation practices, assess the extent to which the GSEs' activities benefit home buyers and mortgage markets, and otherwise ensure that the GSEs comply with their public missions. |
gao_GAO-11-869T | gao_GAO-11-869T_0 | DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for GNDA, but It Does Not Yet Discuss Key Elements for Addressing Gaps
In our past work on GNDA, we made recommendations about the need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overall strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. In January 2009, we also recommended that DHS develop strategies to guide the domestic aspects of the GNDA including establishing time frames and costs for addressing previously identified gaps in the GNDA—land border areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and small maritime vessels. In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic plan for the GNDA. For example, the Department of Energy has the lead for several aspects of enhancing international capabilities for detecting nuclear materials abroad, DHS has the lead for detecting nuclear materials as they cross the border into the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the lead on reporting and sharing information on lost or stolen domestic radiological material. In addition, earlier this year, DNDO released the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011. This review describes the current status of GNDA and includes information about the multiple federal programs that collectively seek to prevent nuclear terrorism in the United States. However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011 interagency review identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives nor establishes monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements—key elements of a strategic plan that we previously identified in our recommendations. In our view, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a comprehensive means of establishing priorities, and using these priorities to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being addressed. Accordingly, while DNDO’s new strategic plan represents an important step forward in guiding the development of the GNDA, DNDO could do more to articulate strategies, priorities, timeframes and costs in addressing gaps and further deploying the GNDA in order to protect the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. In discussing these issues with DHS officials, they indicated that they will be producing a GNDA implementation plan later this year that will address several of these issues. DHS Continues to Make Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment
As we reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress in deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, deploying nearly two-thirds of the radiation portal monitors identified in its deployment plan. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported, DHS has made less progress scanning for radiation in (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) international air cargo; and (3) international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. Similarly, at major seaports, according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. DHS Has Had Difficulty in Developing New Technologies to Detect Nuclear Materials
Since 2006, we have reported that DHS faces difficulties in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Specifically, we have reported on longstanding problems with DNDO’s efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors. DNDO’s problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are examples of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring new technologies to meet homeland security needs. However, it is still too early to assess the impact of DHS’s efforts to address these challenges. Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008). Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA. Some progress has been made, but DHS and other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials. This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.
What GAO Found
In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue before the end of this year. As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. For example, according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key performance requirements. DHS has plans to enhance its development and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to assess their impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our past work. |
gao_RCED-98-242 | gao_RCED-98-242_0 | Information Used by MMS to Justify Revised Regulations
MMS’ decision to revise the oil valuation regulations relied on the findings of an interagency task force that examined whether the use of posted prices for the purpose of determining federal royalties in California was appropriate. The task force concluded that posted prices were inappropriately used for this purpose and recommended that MMS revise its oil valuation regulations. MMS also initiated audits of two of the seven major oil companies that produced oil from federal leases in California. The company also agreed that it would subsequently value oil from state leases on the basis of NYMEX futures prices. How MMS Has Addressed Industry’s and States’ Concerns
From December 1995 through June 1998, in five Federal Register notices and in 14 meetings throughout the country, MMS solicited public comments on its proposal to change the way oil from federal leases is valued for royalty purposes, and it has revised the proposed regulations three times in response to the comments received. When MMS disagreed with a comment received, the agency provided reasons for not revising the proposed regulations as suggested. In total, MMS solicited comments on 39 major issues and received 183 letters in response. MMS has received 34 letters on its most recent revision of the proposed regulations but has not yet publicly addressed these comments. In particular, the programs seem to be most workable if the lessors have (1) relatively easy access to pipelines to transport the oil or gas to market centers or refineries, (2) leases that produce relatively large volumes of oil or gas, (3) competitive arrangements for processing gas, and (4) expertise in marketing oil or gas. However, these conditions do not exist for the federal government or for most federal leases: The federal government does not currently have relatively easy access to pipelines, has thousands of leases that produce relatively low volumes, has many gas leases for which competitive processing arrangements do not exist, and has limited experience in oil or gas marketing. Comments From the Department of the Interior
Scope and Methodology
To determine what information MMS used to justify the need for revising its oil valuation regulations, we reviewed MMS’ reasons for proposing new regulations as published in Federal Register notices and read all of the comments submitted in response to the first notice that solicited information on oil marketing and the relevance of posted prices. To determine what existing studies and programs indicate about the feasibility of the federal government’s taking its oil and gas royalties in kind, we (1) identified and read two studies—a 1997 study by MMS of the feasibility of royalties in kind and a 1997 analysis by the Congressional Research Service on the oil royalty-in-kind program run by the Canadian Province of Alberta—and interviewed their authors and (2) identified nine royalty-in-kind programs that are currently in operation and interviewed representatives of these programs: the seven oil royalty-in-kind programs operated by MMS, the Canadian Province of Alberta, the City of Long Beach, the University of Texas, and the states of Alaska, California, and Texas; and the two gas royalty-in-kind programs operated by Texas and the University of Texas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) efforts to revise its regulations for valuing oil from federal leases, focusing on: (1) the information used by MMS to justify the need for revising its oil valuation regulations; (2) how MMS has addressed concerns expressed by the oil industry and states in developing these regulations; and (3) the feasibility of the federal government's taking its oil and gas royalties in kind, as indicated by existing studies and programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in justifying the need to revise its oil valuation regulations, MMS relied heavily on the findings and recommendations of an interagency task force--composed of representatives from MMS and the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Justice, and the Interior--assembled in 1994 by Interior to study the value of oil produced from federal leases in California; (2) the task force concluded that the major oil companies' use of posted prices in California to calculate federal royalties was inappropriate and recommended that the federal oil valuation regulations be revised; (3) MMS subsequently determined that in other parts of the country as well, posted prices should not be used as the basis to calculate royalties on oil from federal leases; (4) beginning in 1995, MMS solicited public comments on the proposed regulations in five Federal Register notices; it solicited comments in each notice and revised its proposed regulations three times in response to the comments received; (5) however, the agency did not agree with all the comments it received and in these cases provided reasons for not incorporating the suggested changes, noting that it planned to seek input on this issue through other means; (6) in total, the agency asked for comments on 39 major issues and received 183 letters from states, representatives of the oil industry, and other parties; (7) on its most recent revision of the proposed regulations, the agency received 34 comments but has not yet publicly addressed them; (8) information from studies of royalties in kind, as well as specific royalty-in-kind programs operated by various entities, indicates that it would not be feasible for the federal government to take its oil and gas royalties in kind except under certain conditions; (9) these conditions include having relatively easy access to pipelines to transport the oil and gas, leases that produce relatively large volumes of oil and gas, competitive arrangements for processing gas, and expertise in marketing oil and gas; (10) however, these conditions are currently lacking for the federal government and for most federal leases; and (11) specifically, the federal government does not have relatively easy access to pipelines, has thousands of leases that produce relatively low volumes, has many gas leases for which competitive processing arrangements do not exist, and has limited experience in oil and gas marketing. |
gao_GAO-04-346 | gao_GAO-04-346_0 | Eligible Working Families Participate in the Food Stamp Program at a Lower Rate than Eligible Nonworking Families
A lower percentage of food stamp-eligible individuals in working families received food stamp benefits than those in eligible nonworking families, and certain family characteristics are associated with the likelihood of participation. Finally, working families that receive unearned income through other government assistance programs are more likely to receive food stamps than those with no unearned income. Just Over Half of Members of Eligible Working Families Participated in the Food Stamp Program in 2001
In September 2001, an estimated 52 percent of individuals in eligible working families participated in the Food Stamp Program, according to an analysis done for FNS. Among them are whether the family is aware of the program’s existence and the family’s possible eligibility, the family’s willingness to deal with the program’s administrative process, whether the family judges the amount of food stamp benefits received to be worth the effort and cost of participating in the program, and the extent to which the family associates a stigma with food stamp receipt. In addition, it is clear that there are potentially significant benefits— including fraud and error prevention, targeting benefits to need, and the provision of more cost-effective service—to some of the administrative processes. For working individuals, getting to a food stamp office during the work week can be difficult. Program officials also cite the amount of benefits as a reason that some working families do not participate. FNS and Some States and Localities Have Taken, or Suggested, Steps to Help Working Families Participate in the Program While Ensuring Program Integrity
FNS and the states and localities we visited have taken or suggested a variety of steps to address identified program impediments that may hinder the participation of working families in the Food Stamp Program. These efforts include informing the public about the availability of food stamps, easing the administrative processes, estimating eligibility and the potential size of benefits, and reducing the stigma associated with food stamps while also adopting strategies to ensure that serving working families does not jeopardize program integrity. While the usage of these tools shows promise where they have been put into place, the final outcomes of their use are still largely unknown. Many of the federal, state, and local officials we spoke with believe the program could do more to serve eligible working families, and FNS’s goal is to make it easier for low-income and working families to access the benefits to which they are entitled. | Why GAO Did This Study
Eligible working families are believed to participate in the Food Stamp Program at a lower rate than the eligible population as a whole. As a result, many federal, state, and local officials believe the program is not living up to its potential as a component of the nation's work support system. This report examines: (1) what proportion of eligible working families participate in the program and what family characteristics are associated with a family's participation; (2) what factors may be acting as impediments to a working family's decision to participate in the program; and (3) what steps are being taken, or have been suggested, to help eligible low-income working families participate in the program while ensuring program integrity.
What GAO Found
In 2001, an estimated 52 percent of eligible individuals in working families participated in the Food Stamp Program compared with about 70 percent of eligible members of nonworking families. Participating working families are more likely to receive greater food stamp benefit amounts than those eligible working families that do not participate. Also, participating working families were more likely to participate in other government assistance programs and to rent rather than own their home. Factors that can impede an eligible working family's participation in the program include whether the family is aware of the program's existence and eligibility criteria and whether a family considers the program's administrative process--including having to make frequent trips to a food stamp office during working hours and providing documentation of income--overly burdensome. However, there are some potentially significant benefits, including error and fraud prevention, to some of the administrative requirements. Evidence also suggests that some families weigh the perceived burdens of participation against the benefits of doing so and perceive a stigma attached to receiving food stamps. The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and several states and localities have taken or suggested steps to address the impediments to participation in the program for working families, while also considering ways to balance easier participation with program integrity. These efforts include increasing food stamp outreach, adopting new administrative processes to ease participation and reduce program error, developing tools to help families estimate food stamp benefit amount, and re-naming the program to reduce the stigma associated with food stamps. Compiling a complete picture of these steps was not possible, however, because FNS does not systematically track these efforts, and the outcomes of their use are still largely unknown. |
gao_GAO-06-974T | gao_GAO-06-974T_0 | The 1995 PRA amendments also required OMB to set specific goals for reducing burden from the level it had reached in 1995: at least a 10 percent reduction in the governmentwide burden-hour estimate for each of fiscal years 1996 and 1997, a 5 percent governmentwide burden reduction goal in each of the next 4 fiscal years, and annual agency goals that reduce burden to the “maximum practicable opportunity.” At the end of fiscal year 1995, federal agencies estimated that their information collections imposed about 7 billion burden hours on the public. Estimated Paperwork Burden Increased in 2005
After 2 years of slight declines, OMB reports that burden hours increased in fiscal year 2005 and are expected to increase again in fiscal year 2006. According to OMB’s most recent PRA report to Congress, the estimated total burden hours imposed by government information collections in fiscal year 2005 was 8.4 billion hours; this is an increase of 441 million burden hours (5.5 percent) from the previous year’s total of 8.0 billion hours. OMB’s report also states that burden will increase in fiscal year 2006 by an estimated 303 million hours to about 8.7 billion hours; however, according to OMB, most of this projected increase (250 million hours or 83 percent) is attributable to a new method of estimating burden that is being implemented by IRS, rather than to any increase in the actual burden. ● Adjustments do not result from federal activities but from external factors. In contrast to changes due to new statutes, changes due to agency action did not contribute significantly to the overall change in burden this year, adding 180,000 hours out of the total rise of 441 million. However, in the 12 case studies that we reviewed, this CIO certification occurred despite a lack of rigorous support that all standards were met. OMB’s instructions to agencies on minimizing burden on small entities require agencies to describe any methods used to reduce burden only if the collection of information has a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” This does not appropriately reflect the act’s requirements concerning small business: the act requires that the CIO certify that the information collection reduces burden on small entities in general, to the extent practical and appropriate, and provides no thresholds for the level of economic impact or the number of small entities affected. When support for the PRA certifications is missing or inadequate, OMB, the agency, and the public have reduced assurance that the standards in the act, such as those on avoiding duplication and minimizing burden, have been consistently met. Two Agencies Have Developed Processes to Reduce Burden Associated with Information Collections
IRS and EPA have supplemented the standard PRA review process with additional processes aimed at reducing the burden while maximizing the public benefit and utility of the information collected. Agencies Could Strengthen PRA Review and Try Alternative Approaches to Reducing Burden
In our 2005 report, we concluded that the CIO review process was not working as Congress intended: It did not result in a rigorous examination of the burden imposed by information collections, and it did not lead to reductions in burden. In addition, we recommended (among other things) that agencies strengthen the support provided for CIO certifications and that OMB update its guidance to clarify and emphasize this requirement (including that agencies provide support showing that they have taken steps to reduce burden, determined whether small entities are affected and reduced reporting burden on them, and established a plan to manage and use the information to be collected, including the identification of necessary resources). Since our report was issued, the four agencies have reported taking steps to strengthen their support for CIO certifications: ● According to the HUD CIO, the department established a senior- level PRA compliance officer in each major program office, and it revised its certification process to require that before collections are submitted for review, they be approved at a higher management level within program offices. OMB has updated parts of its guidance and plans to incorporate other guidance into an automated system to be used by agencies submitting information collections for clearance. The targeted approaches to burden reduction used by IRS and EPA appear promising, but the experience of these agencies suggests that success requires top-level executive commitment, extensive involvement of program office staff with appropriate expertise, and aggressive outreach to stakeholders. GAO-05-424. Regulatory Management: Implementation of Selected OMB Responsibilities Under the Paperwork Reduction Act. Environmental Protection: Assessing EPA’s Progress in Paperwork Reduction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans spend billions of hours each year providing information to federal agencies by filling out information collections (forms, surveys, or questionnaires). A major aim of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is to minimize the burden that responding to these collections imposes on the public, while maximizing their public benefit. Under the act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is to approve all such collections and to report annually on the agencies' estimates of the associated burden. In addition, agency chief information officers (CIO) are to review information collections before submitting them to OMB for approval and certify that the collections meet certain standards set forth in the act. GAO was asked to testify on OMB's burden report for 2005 and on a previous study of PRA implementation (GAO-05-424), which focused on the CIO review and certification processes and described alternative processes that two agencies have used to minimize paperwork burden. To prepare this testimony, GAO reviewed the current burden report and its past work in this area. For its 2005 study, GAO reviewed a governmentwide sample of collections, reviewed processes and collections at four agencies that account for a large proportion of burden, and performed case studies of 12 approved collections at the four agencies.
What GAO Found
After 2 years of slight declines, OMB reports that paperwork burden grew in fiscal year 2005 and is expected to increase further in fiscal year 2006. Estimates in OMB's annual report to Congress show that the total paperwork burden imposed by federal information collections increased last year to about 8.4 billion hours--an increase of 5.5 percent from the previous year's total of about 8.0 billion hours. Nearly all this increase resulted from the implementation of new laws (for example, about 224 million hours were due to the implementation of voluntary prescription drug coverage under Medicare). The rest of the increase came mostly from adjustments to the estimates due to such factors as changes in estimation methods and in the numbers of respondents. Looking ahead to fiscal year 2006, OMB expects an increase of about 250 million hours because of a new model for estimating burden being implemented by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). According to OMB, this expected rise does not reflect any real change in the burden on taxpayers, but only in how IRS estimates it. The PRA requires that CIOs review information collections and certify that they meet standards to minimize burden and maximize utility; however, these reviews were not always rigorous, reducing assurance that these standards were met. In 12 case studies at four agencies, GAO determined that CIOs certified collections proposed by program offices despite missing or inadequate support. Providing support for certifications is a CIO responsibility under the PRA, but agency files contained little evidence that CIO reviewers had made efforts to improve the support offered by program offices. Numerous factors contributed to these problems, including a lack of management attention and weaknesses in OMB guidance. Based on its review, GAO recommended (among other things) that agencies strengthen the support provided for certifications and that OMB update its guidance to clarify and emphasize this requirement. Since GAO's study was issued, the four agencies have reported taking steps to strengthen their support for CIO certifications, such as providing additional resources and guidance for the process, and OMB has updated parts of its guidance. In contrast to the CIO review process, which did not lead to reduced paperwork burden in GAO's 12 case studies, IRS and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have set up alternative processes specifically focused on reducing burden. These agencies, whose missions involve numerous information collections, have devoted significant resources to targeted burden reduction efforts that involve extensive outreach to stakeholders. According to the two agencies, these efforts have led to significant reductions in paperwork burden on the public. In light of these promising results, the weaknesses in the current CIO review process, and the persistent increases in burden, a new approach to burden reduction appears warranted. GAO suggested that Congress should consider mandating pilot projects to target some collections for rigorous analysis along the lines of the IRS and EPA approaches. |
gao_GAO-13-264 | gao_GAO-13-264_0 | According to FAA officials, environmental reviews typically take from 30 days to 2 years, depending on project factors such as the presence of sensitive environmental resources (e.g., national parks) and the potential for significant impacts such as noise or emissions. To deliver benefits more quickly and avoid some obstacles that have hampered prior NextGen efforts, FAA has made trade-offs in selecting sites and the scope of proposed improvements, concentrating on those projects that can demonstrate some benefits in the midterm and leaving more time-consuming but potentially higher benefit-yielding projects for the longer term. The agency has also made some progress in the other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading airborne traffic management to enhance the flow of aircraft in congested airspace and revising standards to enhance airport capacity. This initiative is also designed to provide benefits to airlines and airports in those metroplexes. 5 for an illustration of these procedures.) Concerns about potential implementation delays also factored into FAA’s decision about which metroplexes to address in the midterm. Fuel savings, reduced taxiway congestion, and enhanced safety are among the benefits. FAA is also developing a new surface-management capability system, the Terminal Flight Data Manager, but does not plan to implement it until at least 2017, which will likely limit potential midterm benefits. Figure 8 provides examples of key additional or revised standards that FAA is pursuing through 2018. FAA has a number of efforts under way to help overcome previously identified, overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation, such as streamlining processes and updating the air traffic controller handbook Many of these efforts are scheduled to and procedure design criteria.take a number of years, particularly when proposed changes must be evaluated to ensure that they will maintain, if not enhance, the system’s current level of safety. Some, such as those aimed at increasing stakeholder involvement in planning and implementation of PBN procedures, do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. Flight Procedure Implementation Process Is Being Streamlined, but Impact Will Not Be Known for Several Years
FAA and others have identified the process for developing PBN and other new flight procedures as a challenge. FAA Has Limited Data to Demonstrate Midterm NextGen Benefits, and More Information Is Needed in NextGen Plans
Performance Metrics Are Being Developed and Linked to Targets
FAA has made some progress developing performance metrics, which we recommended that the agency do in 2010. Information on Some Costs and Benefits Is Available, but Insufficient to Encourage Airline Investments in the Midterm
FAA has begun to report on implementation progress and benefits at certain airports and metroplexes, as well as for some capabilities, but implementation and benefits information is incomplete. is currently equipped. FAA has estimated that total industry equipage could cost $6.6 billion—compared to $11.5 billion in NextGen implementation costs for FAA—through 2018. Conclusions
The implementation of NextGen is expected to enhance safety, improve efficiency, and result in a reduction in the environmental costs of aviation. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that NextGen operational improvements are fully implemented in the midterm, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following five actions: work with airlines and other users to develop and implement a system to systematically track the use of existing PBN procedures; develop processes to proactively identify new PBN procedures for the NAS, based on NextGen goals and targets, and evaluate external requests so that FAA can select appropriate solutions; require consideration of other key operational improvements in planning for NextGen improvements, including PBN projects at metroplexes such as OAPM, as well as the identification of unused flight routes for decommissioning; develop and implement guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion of appropriate stakeholders, including airport representatives, in the planning and implementation of NextGen improvement efforts; and assure that NextGen planning documents provide stakeholders information on how and when operational improvements are expected to achieve NextGen goals and targets. DOT responded by email and did not agree or disagree with our recommendations, but provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) progress implementing key Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) operational improvements in the midterm and demonstrating benefits from these improvements. To do so, we addressed the following questions: 1) What key operational improvements is FAA pursuing to deliver NextGen benefits with existing technologies through 2018? 3) To what extent is FAA measuring and demonstrating midterm NextGen benefits and assessing outcomes? We also interviewed aviation stakeholders and experts with knowledge and experience related to NextGen implementation: representatives from industry associations, including RTCA, Airlines for America, and the Airports Council International–North America; airlines, including Alaska Airlines and Southwest Airlines, which have both advocated for the increased use of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures; airports involved in OAPM efforts in North Texas and Southern California, in the Greener Skies over Seattle (Greener Skies) initiative, and in surface improvement efforts for airports in New York and New Jersey; avionics and aircraft manufacturers and other aviation vendors, including Boeing, Honeywell, and Raytheon; and air traffic controllers with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and at individual air-traffic control facilities, including facilities involved in the OAPM effort in North Texas and the Greener Skies initiative. To determine how FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, we identified obstacles and challenges to developing, implementing, or fully using key NextGen improvements primarily from findings and recommendations made by the RTCA task force and an FAA study on obstacles to PBN implementation. Although some of the performance metrics contained in this table have been established, FAA may continue to refine these metrics to ensure that the measurements align with agency targets and goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA, collaborating with other federal agencies and the aviation industry, is implementing NextGen, an advanced technology air-traffic management system that FAA anticipates will replace the current ground-radar-based system. At an expected cost of $18 billion through 2018, NextGen is expected to enhance safety, increase capacity, and reduce congestion in the national airspace system. To deliver some of these benefits in the midterm, FAA is implementing operational improvements using available technologies. Delivering midterm benefits could build support for future industry investments, but a task force identified obstacles, such as FAA's lengthy approval processes.
GAO was asked to review FAA's midterm NextGen efforts. GAO examined (1) key operational improvements FAA is pursuing through 2018, (2) the extent to which FAA is addressing known obstacles to the implementation of NextGen operational improvements, and (3) the extent to which FAA is measuring and demonstrating midterm benefits. GAO reviewed FAA documents, as well as the task force's recommendations to FAA, and interviewed FAA and airport officials and aviation experts.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is pursuing key operational improvements to implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in the "midterm," which is 2013 through 2018. These improvements focus on establishing Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures at key airports, but benefits could be limited in the midterm. PBN uses satellite-based guidance to improve air-traffic control routes (known as "procedures"). These procedures can deliver benefits to airlines, such as fuel savings and increased efficiency, particularly in congested airspace. To deliver benefits more quickly, FAA made trade-offs in selecting sites and in the scope of proposed improvements. For example, FAA is not implementing procedures that will trigger lengthy environmental reviews. These trade-offs, with which airlines and other stakeholders generally agree, will likely limit benefits from these PBN initiatives early in the midterm. FAA has also made some progress in other key operational improvement areas, such as upgrading traffic management systems and revising standards to improve aircraft flow in congested airspace. However, FAA has not fully integrated implementation of all of its operational improvement efforts at airports. Because of the interdependency of improvements, their limited integration could also limit benefits in the midterm.
FAA has efforts under way to help overcome overarching obstacles to NextGen implementation identified by an advisory task force, but challenges remain, and many of these efforts are scheduled to take a number of years. FAA efforts include, for example, a new process for focused and concise environmental reviews for some proposed actions (e.g., new procedures), where a detailed analysis of the environmental impacts is limited to only those categories involving potentially significant impacts, such as increased noise or emissions. Some of these efforts do not, however, fully address previously identified obstacles. FAA has not fully addressed obstacles to selecting new PBN procedures that will best relieve congestion and improve efficiency, for example. FAA continues to rely on requests for new procedures from airlines and other stakeholders. This reliance may or may not result in procedures that maximize benefits to the national airspace system. Not addressing remaining challenges could delay NextGen implementation and limit potential benefits.
FAA has made progress in developing NextGen performance metrics, but according to key stakeholders, FAA currently provides limited data to demonstrate its progress in implementing midterm improvements and the associated benefits. FAA is in the process of harmonizing performance metrics across all agency programs to ensure that metrics align with agency targets and goals. However, information is incomplete on the midterm improvements and their benefits at selected airports, and airlines and others lack access to needed information to make fully informed investment decisions. FAA has developed a website to report on NextGen implementation, but published information is not fully tied to FAA's implementation goals. FAA's plans also provide limited information about future implementation, such as locations and expected benefits. Better performance and planning information would provide airlines with a stronger basis for making decisions to invest an estimated $6.6 billion on NextGen technology through 2018.
What GAO Recommends
FAA should, among other things, better integrate NextGen efforts; develop processes for selecting new PBN procedures; and ensure that stakeholders have needed information on NextGen progress to facilitate investment decisions. DOT did not agree or disagree with GAO's recommendations, but provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-06-538 | gao_GAO-06-538_0 | The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act, for fiscal year 2001, authorized the Secretary of Defense to carry out at least three pilot programs—one at a military department and two at DOD agencies. The act exempts the programs from EEOC’s procedural requirements or restrictions. The Three Programs Emphasize ADR Techniques, Share Common Implementation Strategies, and Report Low Case Activity
Although features of the three programs vary by agency and focus on different stages of the complaint process, they all emphasize the use of ADR techniques available under the current federal EEO process. RESOLVE is managed by DLA’s General Counsel. The first step of CORE involves mediation. In our review of the programs and subsequent discussions with DOD and program officials, DeCA and USAF conducted some level of outreach to program-eligible employees to inform them about the programs. At the end of the first year, program officials reported continued low program activity. Although Containing Some Strengths, Limitations in Its Evaluation Plan Will Hinder DOD’s Ability to Assess Pilot Program Results
Our initial assessment of DOD’s evaluation plan for the pilot program found both strengths and limitations. Without such features, DOD will be limited in its ability to conduct an accurate and reliable assessment of the programs’ results. Officials from DOD’s pilot program oversight entities have acknowledged shortcomings and have indicated a willingness to modify the plan. Well-developed evaluation plans, which include key evaluation features, have a number of benefits, perhaps most importantly, increasing the likelihood that evaluations will yield methodologically sound results, thereby supporting effective program and policy decisions. In addition, although authorized to operate outside of current EEOC regulations, to a large extent, two of the three programs have been designed by DOD to operate within the requirements of current regulations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the performance and results of the pilot program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, the Deputy Undersecretary for Equal Opportunity, and the Civilian Personnel Management Service to take the following actions: Establish regular intra-agency exchanges of information on outreach strategies, training, and electronic data collection from which the pilot programs could achieve potential benefits that would not be available if working separately. Develop a sound evaluation plan to accurately and reliably assess the pilot programs’ results, including such key features as well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives; measures that are directly linked to the program objectives; criteria for determining pilot program performance; a way to isolate the effects of the pilot programs; a data analysis plan for the evaluation design; and a detailed plan to ensure that data collection, entry, and storage are reliable and error-free. In its response, DOD also commented on our observation that to a large extent two of the three pilot programs were designed and are operating within existing EEOC requirements. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing all of these laws. Figure I illustrates the EEO complaint process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Delays in processing of equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints have been a long-standing concern. In 2000, as part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2001 authorization act, Congress authorized DOD to carry out a 3-year pilot program for improving processes to resolve complaints by civilian DOD employees by testing procedures that would reduce EEO complaint processing times and eliminate redundancy, among other things. The act requires two reports from GAO--90 days after the first and last fiscal years of the pilot program's operation. In December 2005 and January 2006, we provided briefings on our initial review of the pilot program. This report (1) describes key features and status of the three programs and (2) assesses DOD's plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the pilot program.
What GAO Found
In August 2004, the Secretary of Defense authorized 2-year programs in (1) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), (2) the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), and (3) components of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) which became operational in fiscal year 2005. While the legislation stated that the pilot program is exempt from procedural requirements of current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, to a large extent two of the three programs were designed and are operating within existing EEOC requirements, with a specific emphasis on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as encouraged in DOD's memo soliciting pilot program proposals. ADR techniques include, but are not limited to, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, or arbitration and usually involve the intervention or facilitation by a neutral third party. After the first year, program officials reported low case activity and stated that they plan to request approval from the Secretary to continue their respective programs for a third year. To carry out the programs, officials used similar strategies--outreach to inform eligible staff about the pilot programs, staff training, and the use of electronic data collection--but implemented them differently. Our assessment of DOD's evaluation plan for the pilot program found both strengths and limitations. A sound evaluation plan contains such features as criteria for determining program performance and measures that are directly linked to program objectives. Such key features increase the likelihood that the evaluation will yield sound results, thereby supporting effective program and policy decisions. Lacking these key features, DOD is limited in its ability to conduct an accurate and reliable assessment of the program's results, and Congress is limited in its ability to determine whether features of the overall program have governmentwide applicability. Officials from DOD's pilot program oversight entities have acknowledged shortcomings and have indicated a willingness to modify the plan. |
gao_AIMD-98-29 | gao_AIMD-98-29_0 | In summary, Mr. Chairman, because of the progress that agencies have made in developing their strategic plans over the last several months, these plans generally should provide a workable foundation for the agencies’ continuing efforts to move to a more performance-based form of management. Much of this progress appears to have been the result of the active participation of Members and congressional staff in consulting on those plans. While difficult implementation challenges remain, by taking advantage of the consultation process, Congress and the agencies established the basis for continued progress in implementing the Results Act and ensuring that efforts under the Act provide the information that agency and congressional decisionmakers need to improve the management of the federal government. The Results Act establishes an iterative process for performance-based management, with the foundation being the agency’s strategic plan. The next step—the annual performance plans—offer the opportunity for Congress and the agencies to continue to clarify goals and ensure that proper strategies are in place to achieve those goals. Agencies’ annual plans and the governmentwide performance plan prepared by the President can form the basis for agency and congressional decisionmaking about the best way to manage crosscutting program efforts. Finally, the annual plans, and later accountability reports, provide mechanisms for highlighting and addressing issues centering on the collection and analysis of program performance and cost information. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed (1) the strategic plans that agencies submitted to Congress and the Office of Management and Budget in September; and (2) how Congress and the agencies can build on those plans to more effectively implement the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because of the progress that agencies have made in developing their strategic plans over the last several months, these plans generally should provide a workable foundation for the agencies' continuing efforts to move to a more performance-based form of management; (2) much of this progress appears to have been the result of the active participation of members and congressional staff in consulting on those plans; (3) while difficult implementation challenges remain, by taking advantage of the consultation process, Congress and the agencies established the basis for continued progress in implementing the Results Act and ensuring that efforts under the act provide the information that agency and congressional decisionmakers need to improve the management of the federal government; (4) the Results Act establishes an iterative process for performance-based management, with the foundation being the agency's strategic plan; (5) the next step--annual performance plans--offers the opportunity for Congress and the agencies to continue to clarify goals and ensure that proper strategies are in place to achieve those goals; (6) agencies' annual plans and the governmentwide performance plan prepared by the President can form the basis for agency and congressional decisionmaking about the best way to manage crosscutting program efforts; and (7) the annual plans, and later accountability reports, provide mechanisms for highlighting and addressing issues centering on the collection and analysis of program performance and cost information. |
gao_GAO-04-1080T | gao_GAO-04-1080T_0 | United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program
US-VISIT aims to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and facilitating information sharing and coordination among appropriate agencies. Biometric Visa Implementation Nearing Completion, but Some Guidance Still Needed
State’s implementation of the technology aspects of the biometric visa program is currently on schedule to meet the October 26, 2004, deadline. In fact, 201 nonimmigrant visa (NIV)-issuing posts out of 207 had the software and hardware installed and were transmitting prints to IDENT for analysis as of September 1, 2004. Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Required on Many Aspects of Visa Processing and Border Security
Since September 11, 2001, we have issued reports recommending that State and DHS work together to improve several aspects of border security and the visa process, as described below. In addition to these and other challenges, the program’s operational context, or homeland security enterprise architecture, is not yet adequately defined. In July 2004, we followed up on our findings and recommendations regarding interagency coordination in the visa revocation process and found that State and DHS had taken some actions in the summer of 2003 to address these weaknesses. However, our review showed that some weaknesses remained. Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, overall, our work has demonstrated that coordinated, joint actions by State and DHS are critical for homeland and border security. Therefore we have recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State develop and provide comprehensive guidance to consular posts on how best to implement the Biometric Visa Program. The guidance should address the planned uses for the information generated by the Biometric Visa Program at consular posts including directions to consular officers on when and how information from the IDENT database on visa applicants should be considered. This is an essential component in establishing biometric policy and creating consistency between the DHS-run US-VISIT program and State’s Biometric Visa program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has made a concerted effort to strengthen border security by enhancing visa issuance policies and procedures, as well as expanding screening of the millions of foreign visitors who enter the United States annually. Consistent with the 9/11 Commission report that recommends a biometric entry-exit screening system for travelers, the Department of State's biometric program complements the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program--a governmentwide program to better control and monitor the entry, visa status, and exit of visitors. GAO was asked to present the findings of its report on State's Biometric Visa Program, as well as discuss other aspects of visa processing and border security that require coordinated, joint actions by State and DHS.
What GAO Found
Our report issued today finds that State is implementing the Biometric Visa Program on schedule and will likely meet the October 26, 2004, deadline for issuing visas that include biometric indicators, as mandated by Congress. As of September 1, 2004, State had installed program hardware and software at 201 visa issuing posts overseas and plans to complete the installation at the remaining 6 posts by September 30. Technology installation has progressed smoothly, however State and DHS have not provided comprehensive guidance to consular posts on when and how information from the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) on visa applicants should be considered by adjudicating consular officers. In the absence of such guidance, we found that these officers are unclear on how best to use the biometric program and IDENT information. Since September 11, State and DHS have made many improvements to visa issuance and border security policies. Nevertheless, in prior reports, we have found additional vulnerabilities that need to be addressed through joint, coordinated actions. For example, DHS has not adequately defined the operational context for US-VISIT, which affects the biometric program. In addition, we identified systemic weaknesses in information sharing between State and DHS in the visa revocation process. Moreover, we found related weaknesses in an interagency security check process aimed to prevent the illegal transfer of sensitive technologies. |
gao_GAO-11-241 | gao_GAO-11-241_0 | To achieve this mission, State relies on more than 66,000 Foreign Service, civil service, and LE staff at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and serving at 271 missions in 189 countries worldwide. According to the organizational directive outlined in the Foreign Affairs Manual, State “is fully committed to the career development of all its employees, consistent with organizational needs, in order to improve service, increase efficiency and economy, and build and maintain a force of skilled and efficient employees.” The department’s Annual Training Plan states that “the purpose of the department’s training program is to develop the men and women our nation requires to fulfill our leadership role in world affairs and to advance and defend U.S. interests.”
Located at the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, Virginia, FSI was established in 1947 to promote career development within the Foreign Service and to provide necessary training and instruction in the field of foreign relations to members of the Foreign Service and to employees of the department and of other agencies. In fiscal year 2010, FSI had over 2,100 offerings of non-language classroom courses, which include courses that focus on job-related professional and technical skills, as well as leadership and management skills, at its domestic and overseas locations. FSI has also increased its focus on distance learning in recent years. State Workforce Training Incorporates Many Aspects of Effective Training Programs, but Strategic Weaknesses Exist
State has taken many steps to incorporate the interrelated elements of an effective training program—planning, design, implementation, and evaluation—into its training for personnel, but the department’s strategic approach to workforce training has several key weaknesses. State demonstrated a variety of examples of ways in which the department has endeavored to develop an effective training program, such as by compiling an annual training plan and implementing a range of training evaluation mechanisms. However, in our analysis of the extent to which State’s training program reflects key attributes identified in prior GAO guidance, we found several key gaps in the department’s efforts to strategically plan and prioritize training, ensure efficient and effective training design and delivery, and determine whether or how training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and desired results. The department also has a learning management system that can track delivery of training. State Lacks Data Needed to Assure That Support for Training Is Consistent and Appropriate
Although State collects some information on the cost and delivery of training, the department does not collect data needed for an analysis and comparison of training provided to employees in different groups, bureaus, regions, or posts. Further, officials at most of the posts we interviewed said finding time for training can be a challenge at post. We found several potential gaps and areas for improvement in State’s efforts to evaluate personnel training. Performance Measures Do Not Fully Address Training Goals
State’s performance measures for training generally do not fully address training goals. However, the measures generally do not fully address the goals and are output- rather than outcome-related. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of State take the following five actions: To help ensure that State’s personnel training is connected to improving individual and agency performance and that department resources are directed to actual training needs and priorities, direct FSI and the Bureau of Human Resources, in collaboration with other bureaus and offices, as appropriate, to develop and implement a plan for a systematic, comprehensive training needs assessment process, incorporating all bureaus and posts. To enhance State’s efforts to provide transparent, complete, and accurate information to help employees plan training and development throughout their careers, direct FSI and other bureaus and offices, as appropriate, to collaborate in developing and updating information for employees on training to ensure that employees have complete and accurate guidance, including information on any mandatory, required, and recommended training for specific employee groups. In light of recent GAO work addressing shortfalls in State personnel’s foreign language skills, this report does not focus on language training. To identify State’s purpose and structure for training personnel, we reviewed and analyzed legislative, regulatory, and State policy and procedural criteria relevant to training, including information contained in State’s Foreign Affairs Manual on key training roles and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because the U.S. Department of State (State) is the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, its personnel require certain knowledge, skills, and abilities to address the global challenges and security threats facing the United States. State devoted about $255 million to personnel training in fiscal year 2010; the department's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) is the primary training provider for State's more than 66,000 Foreign Service, civil service, and locally employed staff (LE staff) worldwide. GAO was asked to examine (1) State's purpose and structure for training personnel and (2) the extent to which State's training incorporates elements for effective training programs. GAO reviewed and analyzed data and documentation related to the agency's training efforts; completed a training assessment using a tool developed based on prior GAO guidance; and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and at 12 overseas posts.
What GAO Found
State's purpose for training personnel is to develop the men and women the United States requires to fulfill its leadership role in world affairs and to advance and defend U.S. interests. State guidance outlines key training roles, including FSI's primary role in developing training policies and facilitating necessary training, and the Bureau of Human Resources' role in assigning employees to training and working with FSI to help ensure it meets their needs. Other bureaus, offices, and posts also share responsibilities for training. FSI currently offers more than 700 classroom courses, and has recently increased its focus on distance learning. Overall, about 40 percent of personnel training over the last 5 fiscal years, on average, was in foreign language skills. Other training for personnel generally focused on developing leadership, management, and other professional and technical skills and knowledge. State has taken many steps to incorporate the interrelated elements of an effective training program--planning, design, implementation, and evaluation--into its extensive training for personnel; however, the department's strategic approach to workforce training has several key weaknesses. The department demonstrated a variety of ways in which it has endeavored to develop an effective training program, such as by compiling an annual training plan, and implementing a range of training evaluation mechanisms and a learning management system that can be used to track training delivery. However, GAO's analysis found several gaps in the department's efforts to strategically plan and prioritize training, ensure efficient and effective training design and delivery, and determine whether or how training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and desired results. For example: (1) State lacks a systematic, comprehensive training needs assessment process incorporating all bureaus and overseas posts. (2) State developed training continuums to provide information for employees about training opportunities, career paths, and how training can help employees attain career goals, but the continuums do not provide complete and accurate information, and other guidance does not cover all personnel. (3) State lacks formal guidance for curriculum design and for data collection and analysis, and thus cannot be assured that proper practices and procedures are systematically and comprehensively applied. (4) State could not sufficiently demonstrate consistent and appropriate support for training, because the department does not track detailed information on training cost and delivery that would allow for an analysis and comparison of employees in different groups, bureaus, regions, or posts. (5) State's performance measures for training generally do not fully address training goals, and are generally output- rather than outcome-oriented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making several recommendations for State to improve strategic planning and evaluation of the department's efforts to train personnel, including for improvements to State's efforts to assess training needs and efforts to ensure training achieves desired results. State reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-948 | gao_GAO-04-948_0 | Smart cards are plastic devices about the size of a credit card that contain an embedded integrated circuit chip capable of both storing and processing data. The larger the card’s electronic memory, the more functions can be supported, such as tracking itineraries for travelers, linking to immunization or other medical records, or storing cash value for electronic purchases. Specifically, we recommended that the Director, OMB, issue governmentwide policy guidance regarding adoption of smart cards for secure access to physical and logical assets; the Director, NIST, continue to improve and update the government smart card interoperability specification by addressing governmentwide standards for additional technologies—such as contactless cards, biometrics, and optical stripe media—as well as integration with PKI; and the Administrator, GSA, improve the effectiveness of its promotion of smart card technologies within the federal government by (1) developing an internal implementation strategy with specific goals and milestones to ensure that GSA’s internal organizations support and implement smart card systems consistently; (2) updating its governmentwide implementation strategy and administrative guidance on implementing smart card systems to address current security priorities; (3) establishing guidelines for federal building security that address the role of smart card technology; and (4) developing a process for conducting ongoing evaluations of the implementation of smart card–based systems by federal agencies to ensure that lessons learned and best practices are shared across government. Of the remaining projects, 11 were operational, 5 were in the planning or pilot phase, and agencies did not provide current information on 8. The operational and planned projects consist mostly of large-scale projects intended to provide identity credentials to an entire agency’s employees or other large groups of individuals. Agencies reported that the majority (28) of the above projects had been terminated since our last review was conducted. According to agency officials, reasons for termination were primarily that the projects were absorbed into other smart card projects or were deemed no longer feasible. DOD’s CAC card is to be used to authenticate the identity of nearly 3.5 million military and civilian personnel and to improve security over online systems and transactions. As the table shows, 12 of these are large-scale projects. However, they are smaller in scale, serving populations ranging from 612 to 3,100 individuals. In response to our survey, agency officials reported 8 additional smart card projects that were ongoing at the time of our last review but not previously reported. The remaining 4 projects were planned for single applications such as stored value, logical access to computer systems and networks, or processing travel documents. Based on these reported projects, more agencies are using GSA’s Smart Card Access Common ID contracting vehicle to acquire smart card technology. These 10 projects vary widely in size, including small-scale projects— involving smart cards issued to as few as 126 cardholders—as well as much larger scale initiatives. For example, Department of Labor officials reported that the Employment and Training Administration physical access control smart card was issued to 126 federal employees and contractors as of December 2003. In contrast, VA plans to issue an estimated 500,000 smart cards to employees and contractors under its Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure Project. Through this initiative, smart cards will be used for identity credentials, accessing buildings or other facilities, and accessing computer systems. Agencies’ Reported Use of GSA’s Contracting Vehicle
GSA developed the Smart Card Access Common ID contracting vehicle to help make it easier for federal agencies to acquire commercial smart card products and services. Between December 2004 and December 2008, five agencies—including NASA and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs—are planning to make an aggregated purchase of up to 40 million cards through the GSA contract. Implementation of Agencywide Smart Card Initiatives
Agencies continue to move towards integrated agencywide initiatives that use smart cards as identity credentials that agency employees can use to gain both physical access to facilities, such as buildings, and logical access to computer systems and networks. In some cases, additional functions, such as asset management and stored value, are also being included. These projects are in various stages of deployment. Both GSA and OMB generally agreed with the content in the draft report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the current status of smart card projects under way at the time of our last review, (2) identify and determine the status of projects initiated since our last review was completed, and (3) identify integrated agencywide smart card projects that are currently under way. | Why GAO Did This Study
Smart cards--plastic devices about the size of a credit card--use integrated circuit chips to store and process data, much like a computer. Among other uses, these devices can provide security for physical assets and information by helping to verify the identity of people accessing buildings and computer systems. They can also support functions such as tracking immunization records or storing cash value for electronic purchases. Government adoption of smart card technology is being facilitated by the General Services Administration (GSA), which has implemented a governmentwide Smart Card Access Common ID contract, which federal agencies can use to procure smart card products and services. GAO was asked to update information that it reported in January 2003 on the progress made by the federal government in promoting smart card technology. Specific objectives were to (1) determine the current status of smart card projects identified in GAO's last review, (2) identify and determine the status of projects initiated since the last review, and (3) identify integrated agencywide smart card projects currently under way. To accomplish these objectives, GAO surveyed the 24 major federal agencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, officials from GSA and the Office of Management and Budget generally agreed with its content.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's survey results, as of June 2004, more than half of the smart card projects previously reported as ongoing (28 out of 52) had been discontinued because they were absorbed into other smart card projects or were deemed no longer feasible. Of the remaining 24 projects, 16 are in planning, pilot, or operational phases and are intended to support a variety of uses (agencies did not provide current information for 8 projects). Twelve of the 16 projects are large-scale projects intended to provide identity credentials to an entire agency's employees or other large group of individuals. For example, the Department of Defense's (DOD) Common Access Card is to be issued to an estimated 3.5 million DOD-related personnel, and the Transportation Security Administration's Transportation Worker Identification Credential is to be used by an estimated 6 million transportation industry workers. The other 4 projects are smaller in scale, and are intended to provide access or other services to limited groups of people. For example, the Department of Commerce's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory Access Card is to be issued to about 612 employees, contractors, and research collaborators. Further, in response to the survey, agencies reported 8 additional smart card projects that were ongoing at the time of the last review. These projects include 4 planned for multiple applications (such as identity credentials and access) and 4 for single applications, including stored value, access to computer systems, and processing travel documents. Based on GAO's survey of federal agencies, 10 additional smart card projects have been initiated since the last review. These projects vary widely in size and scope. Included are small-scale projects, involving cards issued to as few as 126 cardholders (such as a project in the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration), and large-scale agencywide initiatives, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure card, which is to be issued to an estimated 500,000 employees and contractors. Four agencies reported purchases under GSA's Smart Card Access Common ID contracting vehicle, and others likewise have plans to use this contract. Specifically, five agencies--the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--are planning to make an aggregated purchase of up to 40 million cards over the next 4 years using the GSA contract. Finally, nine agencies are developing and implementing integrated agencywide smart card initiatives. These projects are intended to use one card to support multiple functions, such as providing identification credentials, accessing computer systems, and storing monetary values. |
gao_RCED-96-204 | gao_RCED-96-204_0 | Competitive Impact of Restructuring Depends Largely on Two Factors
Currently, there is a wide belief among those that favor more competition, such as private satellite companies, and those that favor more flexibility for the treaty organizations, such as some signatories, that changes are necessary in the structure and functioning of INTELSAT and Inmarsat. However, according to officials in the U.S. Department of State, most of the member governments and signatories, especially in the developing countries, are concerned that without the treaty organizations, their access to certain basic telecommunications services—including telephone and data services at reasonable rates—may be threatened. Key factors in developing options to promote competition are the number of new entities that are created and the extent of their ties to the parent organization or its owners. For any option to enhance competition by reducing some of the barriers to competition, it must address the fundamental competitive problems of the present structure, such as (1) the incentives for the signatories to favor any newly created affiliates, in which they have an ownership interest, over other potential competitors for access to their domestic markets; (2) the potential dominance of the market by either a residual treaty organization or any resulting new entities; and (3) the advantages, such as tax privileges, immunity from lawsuits, and easier access to orbital slots and spectrum, currently enjoyed by INTELSAT and Inmarsat. The United States supported the formation of ICO on condition that its structure include certain principles that favor competition. Another proposal, which has been supported by a coalition of several U.S. satellite companies, calls for separating INTELSAT into at least three entities: a residual intergovernmental entity and at least two affiliates. As such, the group that developed the U.S. proposal stated that the 20-percent limit on the amount of the affiliate that the signatories could own was an important upper limit to ensure that INTELSAT and its signatories have minimal influence on any new entities created. Making changes to the present structure of the treaty organizations could be difficult because doing so would likely depend on achieving consensus among member nations around the world that have a broad range of perspectives and interests. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Additional copies are $2 each. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the potential competitive impact of restructuring the international satellite organizations, focusing on: (1) possible alternative approaches to enhance market access; (2) the affiliate created by the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) to provide new services; and (3) proposals for restructuring the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there is widespread belief that changes are necessary in the structure and functions of INTELSAT and Inmarsat; (2) many satellite companies believe that private competitors already offer or will offer better global services at lower rates to the developing world; (3) most member governments and signatories in developing countries are concerned that their access to certain basic telecommunications services may be threatened without the presence of treaty organizations; (4) although most of the options for restructuring the organizations favor enhancing competition by dismantling the organizations or creating affiliates, the competitive impact of these options depends on how these organizations are structured, the number of entities created, and the degree of parent organization ownership; (5) the new Inmarsat affiliate may have competitive advantages over other potential competitors; (6) although the United States originally supported the creation of the Inmarsat affiliate, the United States and its signatory are pursuing action to ensure that it adheres to certain principles that favor competition; (7) restructuring INTELSAT into two entities and limiting the amount of signatory ownership in those entities to 20 percent could improve the competitiveness of the global telecommunications market; (8) another proposal supported by a coalition of U.S. satellite firms favors establishing two new private companies in addition to a scaled-down parent organization; (9) the effect on competition of either proposal depends on whether INTELSAT market dominance can be reduced and new companies are allowed to gain entrance into foreign telecommunications markets; and (10) changing the present structure of the treaty organizations would likely depend on reaching a consensus among world member nations that have broad perspectives and interests. |
gao_GAO-03-602 | gao_GAO-03-602_0 | The Air Force, which already provides private sleeping rooms, plans to eliminate its barracks deficit and replace its worst barracks by fiscal year 2009. DOD and the Military Services Have Not Determined the Feasibility of Barracks Privatization
While the services have considered barracks privatization over the past several years, they have not yet initiated pilot project proposals to determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks. According to DOD officials, barracks privatization involves unique challenges compared to family housing privatization. These challenges range from the potentially higher amount of appropriated funds needed to secure a privatization contract (as a result of the services’ requirement that unmarried junior members live in barracks) to the differences in where private developers and the military prefer barracks to be located. Recently, each service has independently given increased attention to developing project proposals, with the Navy hoping to do so by the end of 2003. Opportunities Exist to Make Better Use of Existing Barracks
The services could minimize housing costs by ensuring full use of existing barracks space. Had these members been assigned to the barracks, the Air Force potentially could have reduced its annual housing allowance costs by about $20 million. First, widespread adoption of residential construction practices in building government- owned barracks has been hampered because of concerns about barracks durability and unanswered questions about the ability of wood-frame barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection requirements. Second, lenient barracks utilization guidance—which in some cases does not require full use of existing government-owned barracks before authorizing housing allowances for junior members to live off base—and limited enforcement of existing guidance have led in some cases to the routine acceptance of less than maximum use of barracks and the payment of housing allowances when vacancies exist. To examine opportunities for reducing costs through adoption of residential construction practices for barracks construction, we reviewed Army studies and analyses in this area. Appendix III: Details on Cost Differences in Barracks Built with Residential and Traditional Construction Practices
Compared to traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block construction, Army analyses show that use of residential construction can reduce typical barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to house unmarried junior enlisted servicemembers, primarily in military barracks. Over the next several years, the Army, Navy, and Air Force plan to spend about $6 billion to eliminate barracks with multi-person bathroom facilities and provide private sleeping rooms for all permanent party members. Given the cost of the program, GAO looked at (1) the status of efforts to examine the potential for private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks; (2) the opportunity to reduce the construction costs of barracks through widespread use of residential construction practices; and (3) whether opportunities exist to make better use of existing barracks.
What GAO Found
GAO found three areas where DOD could potentially reduce costs in its unmarried servicemember housing program. DOD and the services have not determined whether "privatization," or private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks is feasible and cost-effective. Barracks privatization involves a number of unique challenges ranging from the funding of privatization contracts to the location of privatized barracks. Recently, each service has independently given increased attention to developing privatization proposals. A collaborative, rather than independent, approach could minimize duplication and optimize lessons learned. DOD could reduce the construction costs of government-owned barracks through the widespread use of residential construction practices rather than traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block. The Army estimated that residential type construction could reduce barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. However, concerns about barracks durability and unanswered engineering questions have prevented widespread use of these practices. DOD's full use of required existing barracks space could reduce the cost of housing allowances paid to unmarried junior members to live off base in local communities. GAO found that the services have authorized housing allowances for unmarried members to live off base even when existing barracks space was available. This occurred because of lenient barracks utilization guidance, which in some cases does not require full use of existing barracks, and possible noncompliance with guidance. The Air Force could have potentially reduced annual housing allowances by about $20 million in fiscal year 2002 by fully using available barracks space. |
gao_T-GGD-00-26 | gao_T-GGD-00-26_0 | Sustaining top leadership commitment to improvement is particularly challenging in the federal government because of the frequent turnover of senior agency political officials. success. The U.S. improvement initiatives into programmatic decisions, planning to chart the direction the improvements will take, employee involvement in the change efforts, organizational realignment to streamline operations and clarify accountability, and congressional involvement and oversight. Experience has shown that when these elements are in place, lasting management reforms are more likely to be implemented that ultimately lead to improvements in the performance and cost-efficiency of government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed efforts to improve the management and performance of the federal government.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) serious and disciplined efforts are needed to attack the management problems confronting some of the federal government's largest agencies; (2) successful management improvement efforts often contain a number of common critical elements, including top leadership commitment and accountability, the integration of management improvement initiatives into programmatic decisions, planning to chart the direction the improvements will take, employee involvement in the change efforts, organizational realignment to streamline operations and clarify accountability, and congressional involvement and oversight; and (3) experience has shown that when these elements are in place, lasting management reforms are more likely to be implemented that ultimately lead to improvements in the performance and cost-efficiency of government. |
gao_GAO-16-40 | gao_GAO-16-40_0 | Most of the structures installed and removed were fixed platforms and caissons installed in shallow water. Interior Has Procedures to Oversee Decommissioning and Estimate Related Costs but Faces Data System Limitations and Has Not Documented Some Procedures
Interior’s BSEE has developed procedures to oversee the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas infrastructure and estimate costs associated with decommissioning liabilities, but limitations in its data system may affect the accuracy and completeness of some cost estimates. BSEE Has Procedures to Oversee Decommissioning and Estimate Costs, but Data System Limitations May Affect the Accuracy and Completeness of Some Cost Estimates
Officials in BSEE’s Gulf regional office have developed procedures for overseeing the activities of lessees in decommissioning oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf and estimating the costs of doing so, but limitations in its data system for estimating costs may affect the accuracy and completeness of some cost estimates. According to BSEE regional officials, they have manually entered updated cost estimates for most leases in the Gulf. Interior’s Procedures for Obtaining Financial Assurances for Decommissioning Liabilities Pose Risks to the Federal Government, and Interior Plans to Revise Them
Interior’s procedures for obtaining financial assurances for offshore decommissioning liabilities pose financial risks to the federal government. Officials from Interior’s BOEM told us that the bureau plans to revise its procedures that determine how much financial assurance a lessee must provide, and that they expect these procedures to reduce the risk that the government could incur costs associated with decommissioning. If a lessee passes the financial strength test by demonstrating its financial ability to pay for decommissioning on its leases, BOEM waives its requirement for the lessee to provide supplemental bonds. Our prior reports have found that the use of financial strength tests and corporate guarantees in lieu of bonds poses financial risks to the federal government. In commenting on a draft of this report, Interior officials stated that on September 22, 2015, BOEM issued proposed guidance to clarify its financial assurance procedures. However, it is too soon to evaluate the specific details of BOEM’s proposed changes to its financial assurance procedures because BOEM has not issued any final revisions to its procedures. Interior Faces Two Key Challenges Managing Potential Decommissioning Liabilities
Interior faces two key challenges managing potential decommissioning liabilities. Internal control standards in the federal government call for agencies to obtain information from external stakeholders that may significantly affect their abilities to achieve agency goals. However, according to BSEE regional officials, the rule does not require lessees to submit expense information on costs associated with decommissioning pipelines, and officials were unable to provide details as to when or whether BSEE would issue a new rule to require the reporting of such costs. In addition, in December 2015, BSEE issued final regulations (proposed in 2009) requiring lessees to report decommissioning costs directly to BSEE. First, BSEE’s recent regulations do not require lessees to report costs associated with decommissioning pipelines. Without access to complete data on decommissioning costs, and without the ability to accurately and completely record data in Interior’s main data system, BSEE does not have reasonable assurance that its estimates of decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf are accurate, and BOEM may not have reasonable assurance that it is requiring sufficient amounts of financial assurance based on BSEE’s estimates. First, BOEM identified roughly $2.3 billion in decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf that may not be covered by financial assurances but was unable to determine the extent to which these liabilities were valid after several months of analysis due to limitations with the TIMS data system and inaccurate data. Until BOEM revises its financial assurance procedures, the federal government remains at increased risk of incurring costs should lessees fail to decommission oil and gas infrastructure. Develop a plan and set a time frame to ensure that Interior’s data system for managing offshore oil and gas activities will be able to identify, capture, and distribute data on decommissioning liabilities and financial assurances in a timely manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil and gas produced on federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico are important to the U.S. energy supply. Historically, most offshore production was in shallow water, but more than two-thirds of the more than 5,000 active oil and gas leases in the Gulf are now located in deep water. When oil and gas infrastructure is no longer in use, Interior requires lessees to decommission it so that it does not pose safety and environmental hazards. Decommissioning can include plugging wells and removing platforms, which can cost millions of dollars. Interior requires lessees to provide bonds or other financial assurances to demonstrate that they can pay these costs; however, if lessees do not fulfill their decommissioning obligations, the federal government could be liable for these costs.
GAO was asked to review Interior's management of liabilities from offshore oil and gas production. This report examines Interior's (1) procedures for overseeing decommissioning and estimating its costs, (2) procedures for obtaining financial assurances for these liabilities, and (3) challenges managing these liabilities. GAO reviewed agency regulations and procedures and interviewed officials from Interior, credit rating agencies, academia, and trade associations.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior (Interior) has developed procedures to oversee the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas infrastructure and estimate costs associated with decommissioning liabilities but has not addressed limitations with its system for tracking cost estimates. According to officials, Interior's procedures include (1) identifying and tracking unused infrastructure, (2) reviewing lessee plans to decommission infrastructure, and (3) using different cost estimates for decommissioning in shallow and deep water. However, inconsistent with internal control standards, Interior officials must manually enter cost estimates into Interior's main data system to override inaccurate estimates automatically calculated by the system. Without a more accurate data system, Interior does not have reasonable assurance that it will consistently estimate the costs associated with decommissioning.
Interior's procedures for obtaining financial assurances for decommissioning liabilities pose financial risks to the federal government, and Interior is planning to revise its procedures to address these risks but has not finalized its approach. As of October 2015, for an estimated $38.2 billion in decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf, Interior officials identified about $2.3 billion in liabilities that may not be covered by financial assurances. However, these officials were unable to determine the extent to which these data were valid due to limitations with Interior's data system, among other things. Of the remaining $35.9 billion in decommissioning liabilities, Interior held or required about $2.9 billion in bonds and other financial assurances, and had foregone requiring about $33.0 billion in bonds for the remaining liabilities. Interior has procedures that allow it to waive its requirement for a lessee to provide a bond if the lessee passes a financial strength test. Prior GAO work has shown that the use of financial strength tests in lieu of bonds poses risks to the federal government. Interior recognizes the risks associated with its procedures, and Interior officials stated that they issued draft guidance to clarify their procedures in September 2015. Interior has not issued any final revisions to its procedures; therefore, it is too soon to evaluate the details of these proposed changes. Until Interior improves its ability to obtain valid data from its data system and revises and implements its financial assurance procedures, the federal government remains at increased risk of incurring costs should lessees fail to decommission oil and gas infrastructure.
Interior faces challenges managing potential decommissioning liability. For example, until December 2015, Interior did not have a requirement for lessees to report on costs associated with decommissioning activities in the Gulf. Instead, Interior contracted studies to obtain data on decommissioning costs, but some data were decades old. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to obtain information from external stakeholders that may significantly affect their ability to achieve agency goals. However, in December 2015, Interior issued final regulations (proposed in 2009) requiring lessees to report data on most, but not all, decommissioning costs to Interior. Unless and until Interior obtains accurate and complete data on decommissioning costs, Interior may not have reasonable assurance that its cost estimates of decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf are accurate, or that it is requiring sufficient amounts of financial assurance based on these estimates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Interior take several steps to improve its data system, complete plans to revise its financial assurance procedures, and revise its cost reporting regulations, among other things. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-72 | gao_GAO-14-72_0 | On the basis of the replan, NASA announced that the project would be rebaselined with a life- cycle cost at $8.835 billion—a 78 percent increase—and would launch in October 2018—a delay of 52 months. One recommendation was that the project should perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk, or JCL, analysis. NASA concurred with these two recommendations. JWST Project Is Generally Executing to Its 2011 Cost and Schedule Baseline; Recent Performance Has Declined
The JWST project is generally executing to its September 2011 revised cost and schedule baseline. Through the administration’s annual budget submissions, NASA has requested funding for JWST that is in line with the rebaseline plan and the project is maintaining 14 months of schedule reserve to its October 2018 launch date. Cumulative performance data from the prime contractor, which is responsible for more than 40 percent of JWST’s remaining $2.76 billion in development costs, indicate that work is being accomplished on schedule and at the cost expected. The JWST project is maintaining oversight established as part of the replan, for example, by continuing quarterly NASA and contractor management meetings and instituting a cost and schedule tracking tool for internal efforts. The project, however, is not planning to perform an updated integrated cost and schedule risk analysis, which would provide management and stakeholders with information to continually gauge progress against the baseline estimates. Despite these improvements in oversight, JWST project officials said that they are not planning to perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis—or joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL) analysis as GAO’s cost estimating best practices call for we recommended in 2012. a risk analysis and risk simulation exercise—like the JCL analysis—to be conducted periodically through the life of a program, as risks can materialize or change throughout the life of a project.updated on a regular basis, the cost estimate cannot provide decision makers and stakeholders with accurate information to assess the current status of the project. Project Made Progress Addressing Technical Risks; Challenges Persist
The JWST project has made progress in addressing some technical risks; however, other technical challenges exist that have caused development delays and cost increases at the subsystem level. This was the second time in less than 2 years that the cryocooler subcontract was modified. Near-term Funding Constraints May Limit Project’s Ability to Meet Future Commitments
Several current near-term funding constraints such as low cost reserves, a higher-than-expected rate of spending, and potential sequestration impacts are putting at risk NASA’s ability to meet its cost and schedule commitments for JWST. The need to allocate a significant portion of cost reserves in fiscal year 2014 and 2015 has been driven primarily by the technical issues with the MIRI cryocooler. The project shares this concern given that Northrop Grumman’s cost reserves are eroding faster than anticipated. This direction by NASA could have an impact on other major NASA projects. However, the schedule lacked a schedule risk assessment—a best practice that gives decision makers confidence that the estimates are credible based on known risks and allows management to account for the cost of a schedule slip when developing the life-cycle cost estimate. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following two actions: In order to ensure that the JWST project has sufficient available funding to complete its mission and meet its October 2018 launch date and reduce project risk, ensure the JWST project has adequate cost reserves to meet the development needs in each fiscal year, particularly in fiscal year 2014, and report to Congress on steps it is taking to do so, and In order to help ensure that the JWST program and project management has reliable and accurate information that can convey and forecast the impact of potential issues and manage the impacts of changes to the integrated master schedule, perform a schedule risk analysis on OTE, ISIM, and cryocooler schedules, as well as any other subschedules for which a schedule risk analysis was not performed. We maintain that NASA should provide more detail to Congress on its plans given the already constrained cost reserve posture the project has early in fiscal year 2014 and past issues with low levels of cost reserves that forced the project to defer work, which led to significant cost increases and schedule delays. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is meeting its cost and schedule commitments and maintaining oversight established as part of the project’s replan, (2) the current major technological challenges facing the JWST project, (3) the extent to which cost risks exist that may threaten the project’s ability to execute the project as planned, and (4) the extent to which the JWST project schedule is reliable based on best practices. We also reviewed the project’s analysis of the estimate at completion for internal work being performed on the Integrated Science Instrument Module. | Why GAO Did This Study
JWST is one of NASA's most complex and costly science projects. Effective execution of the project is critical given the potential effect further cost increases could have on NASA's science portfolio. The project was rebaselined in 2011 with a 78 percent life-cycle cost estimate increase --now $8.8 billion--and a launch delay of 52 months--now October 2018. GAO has made a number of prior recommendations, including that the project perform an updated cost and schedule risk analysis to improve cost estimates. GAO was mandated to assess the program annually and report on its progress. This is the second such report.
This report assesses the (1) extent to which the JWST project is meeting its cost and schedule commitments and maintaining oversight, (2) current major technological challenges facing the project, (3) extent to which cost risks exist that may threaten the project's ability to execute as planned, and (4) extent to which the JWST project schedule is reliable based on scheduling best practices. GAO reviewed relevant NASA and contractor documents, interviewed NASA and contractor officials, and compared the project schedule with best practices criteria.
What GAO Found
The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is generally executing to its September 2011 revised cost and schedule baseline; however, several challenges remain that could affect continued progress. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has requested funding that is in line with the rebaseline and the project is maintaining 14 months of schedule reserve prior to its launch date. Performance data from the prime contractor indicate that generally work is being accomplished on schedule and at the cost expected; however, monthly performance declined in fiscal year 2013. Project officials have maintained and enhanced project oversight by, for example, continuing quarterly NASA and contractor management meetings and instituting a tool to update cost estimates for internal efforts. Program officials, however, are not planning to perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis, as GAO recommended in 2012, stating that the project performs monthly integrated risk analyses they believe are adequate. Updating the more comprehensive analysis with a more refined schedule and current risks, however, would provide management and stakeholders with better information to gauge progress.
The JWST project has made progress addressing some technical challenges that GAO reported in 2012, such as inadequate spacecraft mass margin, but others have persisted, causing subsystem development delays and cost increases. For example, the development and delivery schedule of the cryocooler--which cools one instrument--was deemed unattainable by the subcontractor due to technical issues and its contract was modified in August 2013 for the second time in less than 2 years, leading to a cumulative 120 percent increase in contract costs. While recent modifications have been made, execution of the cryocooler remains a concern given that technical performance and schedule issues persist.
Overall the project is maintaining a significant amount of cost reserves; however, low levels of near-term cost reserves could limit its ability to continue to meet future cost and schedule commitments. Development challenges have required the project to allocate a significant portion of cost reserves in fiscal year 2014. Adequate cost reserves for the prime contractor are also a concern in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 given the rate at which these cost reserves are being used. Limited reserves could require work to be extended or work to address project risks to be deferred--a contributing factor to the project's prior performance issues. Potential sequestration and funding challenges on other major NASA projects could limit the project's ability to address near-term challenges.
GAO's analysis of three subsystem schedules determined that the reliability of the project's integrated master schedule--which is dependent on the reliability of JWST's subsystem schedules--is questionable. GAO's analysis found that the Optical Telescope Element (OTE) schedule was unreliable because it could not adequately identify a critical path--the earliest completion date or minimum duration it will take to complete all project activities, which informs officials of the effects that a slip of one activity may have on other activities. In addition, reliable schedule risk analyses of the OTE, the cryocooler, or the Integrated Science Instrument Module schedules were not performed. A schedule risk analysis is a best practice that gives confidence that estimates are credible based on known risks so the schedule can be relied upon to track progress.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider directing NASA to perform an updated integrated cost/schedule risk analysis. GAO recommends that NASA address issues related to low cost reserves and perform schedule risk analyses on the three subsystem schedules GAO reviewed. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-429T | gao_GAO-16-429T_0 | 1). We found that ORR was initially unprepared to care for the rapid increase in children needing services; however, ORR solicited new grantees to provide shelter services in both 2013 and 2014 and awarded additional cooperative agreements. To further manage its capacity to care for the increased number of children, ORR updated policies and procedures to reduce the number of days children spend in its custody and expedite their release to sponsors. Agency officials also noted that they can now more quickly release children to their parents or other relatives. We also found that ORR is taking other actions to ensure it has the capacity to meet demand caused by increases in the number of unaccompanied children and to minimize the risks of not being able to provide care and services to these children. Specifically, ORR developed a framework for fiscal year 2015 that included plans and steps to manage its capacity, based in part on the record levels of children needing care in 2014. ORR’s bed capacity framework for fiscal year 2015 was based on the number of children served in fiscal year 2014. We concluded that not having a documented and continually updated process for capacity planning may hinder ORR’s ability to be prepared for an increase in unaccompanied children while at the same time minimizing excess capacity to conserve federal resources. Grantees Provided Education, Medical, and Therapeutic Services to Unaccompanied Children in ORR Custody, but ORR’s Monitoring of Grantees Is Inconsistent
ORR relies on grantees to provide care for unaccompanied children, such as housing and educational, medical, and therapeutic services, and to document in children’s case files the services they provide. Without all of the documents included in the case files, it is difficult for ORR to verify that required services were actually provided in accordance with ORR policy and cooperative agreements. In 2014, ORR revised its on- site monitoring program to ensure better coverage of grantees and implemented a biennial on-site monitoring schedule. Nevertheless, ORR did not meet its goal to visit all of its facilities by the end of fiscal year 2015, citing lack of resources. We recommended in our February 2016 report that the Secretary of HHS direct ORR to review its monitoring program to ensure that onsite visits are conducted in a timely manner, case files are systematically reviewed as part of or separate from onsite visits, and that grantees properly document the services they provide to children. ORR Grantees Identified and Screened Sponsors before Placing Children with Them
ORR grantees that provide day-to-day care of unaccompanied children are responsible for identifying and screening sponsors prior to releasing children to them. Grantees conduct background checks on potential sponsors. The types of background checks conducted depend on the sponsor’s relationship to the child (see table 1). In our February 2016 report, we found that between January 7, 2014, and April 17, 2015, nearly 52,000 children from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras were released to sponsors by ORR. Of these children, nearly 60 percent were released to a parent. Limited Information Is Available on Services Provided and the Status of Children Once Released from ORR Care
Limited Information Currently Exists on Post- Release Status of Children
There is limited information available about the services provided to unaccompanied children after they leave ORR custody. According to ORR officials, a relatively small percentage of unaccompanied children received post-release services, and they said ORR’s responsibility for the other children typically ended once it transferred custody of the children to their sponsors. In addition, in May 2015, ORR began operating a National Call Center help-line. And in August 2015, ORR instituted a new policy requiring grantee facility staff to place follow-up calls, referred to as Safety and Well Being follow up calls, to all children and their sponsors 30 days after the children are placed to determine whether they are still living with their sponsors, enrolled in or attending school, aware of upcoming removal proceedings, and safe. However, ORR does not have processes to ensure that all of these data are reliable, systematically collected, and compiled in summary form to provide useful information about this population for its use and for other government agencies, such as state child welfare services. As a result, in our February 2016 report, we recommended that the Secretary of HHS direct ORR to develop a process to ensure all information collected through its existing post-release efforts are reliable and systematically collected so that the information can be compiled in summary form and provide useful information to other entities internally and externally. For example, representatives we spoke with in four of the six school districts, as well as representatives from a county office of education, discussed the mental and behavioral health needs of these children. USCIS received 534 such applications in fiscal year 2011 and 6,990 in fiscal year 2014. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
ORR is responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied children. The number of children placed in ORR's care rose from nearly 6,600 in fiscal year 2011 to nearly 57,500 in fiscal year 2014. GAO was asked to review how ORR managed their care.
This testimony is based on GAO’s February 2016 report and addresses (1) ORR's response to the increase in unaccompanied children, (2) how ORR cares for children in its custody and monitors their care, (3) how ORR identifies and screens sponsors for children, and (4) what is known about services, challenges, and the status of removal proceedings for children after they leave ORR custody.
For its February 2016 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, ORR policies, and ORR and Executive Office for Immigration Review data. GAO also visited nine ORR grantee facilities in three states selected to vary in the type of care provided, shelter size, and location, and conducted a random, non-generalizable case file review of 27 case files of children released from these facilities. GAO interviewed agency officials and community stakeholders in six counties that received unaccompanied children, representing diversity in geographic location, size, and demographics.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2014, nearly 57,500 children traveling without their parents or guardians (referred to as unaccompanied children) were apprehended and transferred to the care of the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Most of these children were from Central America. GAO found that ORR was initially unprepared to care for that many children; however, the agency increased its bed capacity. Given the unprecedented demand for capacity in 2014, ORR developed a plan to help prepare it to meet fiscal year 2015 needs. The number of children needing ORR's care declined significantly through most of fiscal year 2015, but began increasing again toward the end of the summer. Given the inherent uncertainties associated with planning for capacity needs, ORR's lack of a process for annually updating and documenting its plan inhibits its ability to balance preparations for anticipated needs while minimizing excess capacity.
ORR relies on grantees to provide care for unaccompanied children, including housing and educational, medical, and therapeutic services. GAO's review of a sample of children's case files found that they often did not contain required documents, making it difficult to verify that all required services were provided. ORR revised its on-site monitoring program in 2014 to ensure better coverage of grantees. However, ORR was not able to complete all the visits it planned for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, citing lack of resources. By not monitoring its grantees consistently, ORR may not be able to identify areas where children's care is not provided in accordance with ORR policies and the agreements with grantees.
ORR grantees conduct various background checks on potential sponsors prior to releasing children to them. These potential sponsors are identified and screened by the grantees as part of their responsibilities for the unaccompanied children in their care. The extent of the checks conducted depends on the relationship of the sponsor to the child. Between January 2014 and April 2015, ORR released nearly 52,000 children from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras to sponsors. In nearly 90 percent of these cases, the sponsors were a parent or other close relative already residing in the United States. Sponsors do not need to have legal U.S. residency status.
There is limited information available on post-release services provided to children after they leave ORR care. In part, this is because ORR is only required to provide services to a small percentage of children, such as those who were victims of trafficking. In May 2015, ORR established a National Call Center to assist children who may be facing placement disruptions, making post-release services available to some of them. Also, in August 2015, ORR began requiring well-being follow-up calls to all children 30 days after their release. ORR is collecting information through these new initiatives, but does not currently have a process to ensure that the data are reliable, systematically collected, or compiled in summary form. Service providers GAO spoke with also noted that some of these children may have difficultly accessing services due to the lack of bilingual services in the community, lack of health insurance, or other barriers.
What GAO Recommends
In its February 2016 report, GAO recommended that HHS (1) develop a process to regularly update its capacity plan, (2) improve its monitoring of grantees, and (3) develop processes to ensure its post-release activities provide reliable and useful summary data. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-664T | gao_GAO-09-664T_0 | VA Faces Challenges in Formulating Its Health Care Budget
Our prior work highlights some of the challenges VA faces in formulating its budget: obtaining sufficient data for useful budget projections, making accurate calculations, and making realistic assumptions. Our 2006 report on VA’s overall health care budget found that VA underestimated the cost of serving veterans returning from military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in part because estimates for fiscal year 2005 were based on data that largely predated the Iraq conflict. According to VA officials, the agency subsequently began receiving the DOD data needed to identify these veterans on a monthly basis rather than quarterly. VA made computation errors when estimating the effect of its proposed fiscal year 2006 nursing home policy, and this also contributed to requests for supplemental funding. We found that VA underestimated workload—that is, the amount of care VA provides—and the costs of providing care in all three of its nursing home settings. In 2006, we recommended that VA strengthen its internal controls to better ensure the accuracy of calculations it uses in preparing budget requests. VA agreed with and implemented this recommendation for its fiscal year 2009 budget justification by having an independent actuarial firm validate the savings estimates from proposals to increase fees for certain types of health care coverage. In its March 23, 2009, letter to GAO, VA stated it concurs with this recommendation and will implement our recommendation in future budget submissions. In January 2009, we also reported that VA may have underestimated its nursing home spending and noninstitutional long-term care spending for fiscal year 2009 because it used a cost assumption that appeared unrealistically low, given recent VA experience and economic forecasts of health care cost increases. We recommended that in future budget justifications, VA use cost assumptions for estimating both nursing home and noninstitutional long- term care spending that are consistent with VA’s recent experience or report the rationale for alternative cost assumptions. VA health care offers illustrations of and insights into growing health care costs. For example, in fiscal year 2009 about $3 billion of approximately $41 billion for VA health care programs was made available for two years. The provision of advance appropriations would “use up” discretionary budget authority for the next year. In doing so it limits Congress’s flexibility to respond to changing priorities and needs and reduces the amount available for other purposes in the next year. While providing funds for 2 years in a single appropriations act provides certainty about some funds, the longer projection period increases the uncertainty of the data and projections used. If VA is expected to submit its budget proposal for health care for both years at once, the lead time for the second year would be 30 months. This additional lead time increases the uncertainty of the estimates and could worsen the challenges VA faces when formulating its health care budget. Concluding Observations
Given the challenges VA faces in formulating its health care budget and the changing nature of health care, proposals to change the availability of the appropriations it receives deserve careful scrutiny. Providing advance appropriations will not mitigate or solve the problems noted above regarding data, calculations, or assumptions in developing VA’s health care budget. Nor will it address any link between cost growth and program design. Congressional oversight will continue to be critical. In addition, providing advance appropriations for VA health care will not resolve the problems we have identified in VA’s budget formulation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimates it will provide health care to 5.8 million patients with appropriations of about $41 billion in fiscal year 2009. It provides a range of services, including primary care, outpatient and inpatient services, long-term care, and prescription drugs. VA formulates its health care budget by developing annual estimates of its likely spending for all its health care programs and services, and includes these estimates in its annual congressional budget justification. GAO was asked to discuss budgeting for VA health care. As agreed, this statement addresses (1) challenges VA faces in formulating its health care budget and (2) issues surrounding the possibility of providing advance appropriations for VA health care. This testimony is based on prior GAO work, including VA Health Care: Budget Formulation and Reporting on Budget Execution Need Improvement (GAO-06-958) (Sept. 2006); VA Health Care: Long-Term Care Strategic Planning and Budgeting Need Improvement (GAO-09-145) (Jan. 2009); and VA Health Care: Challenges in Budget Formulation and Execution (GAO-09-459T) (Mar. 2009); and on GAO reviews of budgets, budget resolutions, and related legislative documents. We discussed the contents of this statement with VA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work highlights some of the challenges VA faces in formulating its budget: obtaining sufficient data for useful budget projections, making accurate calculations, and making realistic assumptions. For example, GAO's 2006 report on VA's overall health care budget found that VA underestimated the cost of serving veterans returning from military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to VA officials, the agency did not have sufficient data from the Department of Defense, but VA subsequently began receiving the needed data monthly rather than quarterly. In addition, VA made calculation errors when estimating the effect of its proposed fiscal year 2006 nursing home policy, and this contributed to requests for supplemental funding. GAO recommended that VA strengthen its internal controls to better ensure the accuracy of calculations used to prepare budget requests. VA agreed and, for its fiscal year 2009 budget justification, had an independent actuarial firm validate savings estimates from proposals to increase fees for certain types of health care coverage. In January 2009, GAO found that VA's assumptions about the cost of providing long-term care appeared unreliable given that assumed cost increases were lower than VA's recent spending experience and guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget. GAO recommended that VA use assumptions consistent with recent experience or report the rationale for alternative cost assumptions. In a March 23, 2009, letter to GAO, VA stated that it concurred and would implement this recommendation for future budget submissions. The provision of advance appropriations would "use up" discretionary budget authority for the next year and so limit Congress's flexibility to respond to changing priorities and needs. While providing funds for 2 years in a single appropriations act provides certainty about some funds, the longer projection period increases the uncertainty of the data and projections used. If VA is expected to submit its budget proposal for health care for 2 years, the lead time for the second year would be 30 months. This additional lead time increases the uncertainty of the estimates and could worsen the challenges VA already faces when formulating its health care budget. Given the challenges VA faces in formulating its health care budget and the changing nature of health care, proposals to change the availability of the appropriations it receives deserve careful scrutiny. Providing advance appropriations will not mitigate or solve the problems we have reported regarding data, calculations, or assumptions in developing VA's health care budget. Nor will it address any link between cost growth and program design. Congressional oversight will continue to be critical. |
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