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gao_GAO-04-923 | gao_GAO-04-923_0 | In some of these conflicts, electric utilities and other holders of rights-of-way have had their rights-of-way across Native allotments invalidated. Legal challenges to Interior’s use of the relation back doctrine in federal court have been dismissed because the U.S. government has not waived its sovereign immunity and allowed itself to be sued with regard to Alaska Native allotments. In each of these cases, BIA and/or the allottee believes that Copper Valley has failed to obtain permission for electric lines on Native property. Additionally, there are 4 other cases where Alaska Realty is requesting that Copper Valley obtain rights-of-way without evidence that Copper Valley is in trespass. Interior Does Not Recognize Copper Valley’s State Issued Rights-of-way within Certain Federally Granted Highway Easements
There are six cases where conflict exists regarding the status of Copper Valley’s rights-of-way within Native allotments because Copper Valley has a state—but not a federal—right-of-way within a highway easement granted by the federal government to Alaska. Existing Remedies Available to Resolve Disputes over the Validity of Copper Valley Rights-of-way within Native Allotments Have Produced Limited Results
While the resolution of a number of these conflicts has been intermittently pursued since the mid-1990s, only a few cases have been resolved using existing remedies. Copper Valley currently has three remedies available to it to resolve conflicts. It could (1) negotiate rights-of-way with Native allottees in conjunction with BIA or its realty service provider; (2) relocate its electric lines outside of the Native allotment; or (3) exercise the power of eminent domain, also known as condemnation, to acquire the land. In summary, Copper Valley officials maintain that the options currently available to resolve conflicts over rights-of-way within Native allotments are too costly, impractical, and/or potentially damaging to relationships with the community. Furthermore, Copper Valley takes the position that on principle they should not have to bear the cost of resolving conflicts that they believe the federal government caused by applying the relation back doctrine and by failing to recognize state issued rights-of-way within federally granted highway easements. Copper Valley representatives, Alaska Native advocates, and GAO have identified alternatives including legislation to: (1) change Interior’s application of the relation back doctrine with respect to Alaska Native allotments, (2) allow the U.S. government to be sued with regard to Alaska Native allotments so that legal challenges to the relation back doctrine can be heard in federal court, (3) ratify the rights-of-way granted by the State of Alaska within its highway easements, and (4) establish a federal fund to pay for rights-of-way across Native allotments. Further, while we did not determine the financial costs or the legal ramifications on the property rights of the Alaska Native allottees associated with any of these options, such costs and legal ramifications would need to be assessed. Alternative 1: Change Interior’s Application of the Relation Back Doctrine to Alaska Native Allotments Congress could enact legislation directing Interior to use the date an allotment application is filed, rather than the date an allottee claimed initial use and occupancy of the land, to determine the rights of allottees and holders of rights-of-way. While BIA can and does provide training and technical assistance to its realty service providers in Alaska, the March 2004 training materials did not include information on the types of evidence that should be developed before pursuing an alleged trespass involving rights-of-way, such as the exact location of electric lines, and the boundaries of Native allotments and highway rights-of-way. Specifically we determined (1) the number of conflicts that exist between Alaska Native allotments and Copper Valley Electric Association’s rights-of-way and the factors that contributed to these conflicts; (2) the extent to which existing remedies have been used to resolve these conflicts; and (3) what legislative alternatives, if any, could be considered to resolve these conflicts. The Department of the Interior rejected their application because the land they claimed for the allotment had already been conveyed to the State of Alaska. The allotment was issued in 1975. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1906, the Alaska Native Allotment Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to allot individual Alaska Natives (Native) a homestead of up to 160 acres. The validity of some of Copper Valley Electric Association's (Copper Valley) rights-of-way within Alaska Native allotments is the subject of ongoing dispute; in some cases the allottees assert that Copper Valley's electric lines trespass on their land. The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) are responsible for granting rights-of-way and handling disputes between allotees and holders of rights-of-way. GAO determined (1) the number of conflicts between Native allotments and Copper Valley rights-of-way and the factors that contributed to these conflicts, (2) the extent to which existing remedies have been used to resolve these conflicts, and (3) what legislative alternatives, if any, could be considered to resolve these conflicts.
What GAO Found
There are 14 cases where conflict exists regarding Copper Valley's rights-of-way within Native allotments. In most of these cases, Copper Valley has been found by Interior to be in trespass because its rights-of-way have been determined to be invalid. The root of some of these conflicts is Interior's application of the so-called "relation back" doctrine. In these instances, Interior invalidated Copper Valley rights-of-way because it found that allottees' rights to the land began when they first used or occupied the land, predating when Copper Valley obtained its right-of-way and when the allotment application was made. Federal courts have dismissed legal challenges to the relation back doctrine because the U.S. government has not allowed itself to be sued with regard to this issue. In other cases, conflict exists because Interior does not recognize state issued rights-of-way that fall within certain highway easements granted to the state by the federal government. There are another 4 cases where a BIA realty service provider has requested that Copper Valley obtain rights-of-way even though GAO believes it lacks evidence that the electric lines are in trespass. While BIA has recognized the need to provide realty training, its March 2004 training course did not include information on the types of evidence that should be developed before pursuing an alleged trespass involving rights-of-way. While a resolution to a number of these conflicts has been intermittently pursued since the mid-1990s, only a few cases have been resolved using existing remedies. Copper Valley has three remedies to resolve these conflicts: (1) negotiating rights-of-way with Native allottees in conjunction with BIA; (2) relocating its electric lines outside of the allotment; or (3) exercising the power of eminent domain, also known as condemnation, to acquire the land. Copper Valley has ceased trying to resolve these conflicts because it maintains that the existing remedies are too costly, impractical, and/or potentially damaging to relationships with the community. More importantly, Copper Valley officials told GAO that on principle they should not have to bear the cost of resolving conflicts that they believe the federal government caused by applying the relation back doctrine and by not recognizing their state issued rights-of-way. Several legislative remedies have been identified to resolve these conflicts, including legislation to: (1) change Interior's application of the relation back doctrine so that the date an allotment application is filed, rather than the date an allottee claimed initial use and occupancy of the land, is used to determine the rights of allottees and holders of rights-of-way; (2) allow the U.S. government to be sued regarding Alaska Native allotments so that legal challenges can be heard in federal court; (3) ratify the rights-of-way granted by the State of Alaska within federally granted highway easements; or (4) establish a federal fund to pay for rights-of-way across Native allotments. While GAO did not determine the financial costs or the legal ramifications on the property rights of the Alaska Native allottees associated with any of these options, the costs and legal ramifications would need to be assessed. |
gao_GAO-08-424 | gao_GAO-08-424_0 | The Effectiveness of MSHA’s Approval Process Was Hampered by Several Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans
The effectiveness of MSHA’s approval process for underground coal mines’ emergency response plans was hampered by several factors that delayed approval of the plans. Specifically, MSHA issued its guidance multiple times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement until 6 months after the initial plans were due. It is understandable that the content of the plans may differ because there are differences in the specific characteristics of mines. However, in our review of the plans we sampled, we found that some plans did not specify the protections to be provided and the amount of information about these protections varied from plan to plan. As a result, in some mines, miners working in these locations may not have access to postaccident breathable air if they become trapped in the mine after an accident. While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components Have Not
Most of the components of mines’ emergency response plans have been implemented, but two key components remain. In addition, mines had not begun to implement another component—wireless communications systems or a comparable alternative—because fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA had not determined what alternative technologies mine operators will be allowed to use to meet this requirement of the MINER Act, which mines must implement by June 2009. One Key Component Had Not Been Fully Implemented Because Equipment Was Not Available
As of January 2008, because needed equipment was not available, more than three-quarters of the mines had not been able to fully implement the requirement to provide long-term postaccident breathable air for trapped miners, and one-fifth of the mines had not been able to provide all of the required self-contained self-rescuers to aid in miners’ escape. At the time of our review, MSHA officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what technology will be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement for wireless communications because they wanted to wait and see what technology is available closer to the deadline. As a result, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order enhanced communications systems to meet the deadline. MSHA’s districts have inspected many mines for compliance and issued citations to enforce implementation of their emergency response plans, but MSHA headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations related to emergency response plans to identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. In addition, MSHA headquarters has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of underground coal mines’ emergency response plans or to identify whether corrective actions might be needed. However, if MSHA does not act soon to determine what will be acceptable, it is not clear that manufacturers and mine operators will be able to plan and prepare for the implementation of new technologies before the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve trapped miners’ chances of survival after an accident. To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure that district offices are consistently applying MSHA’s guidance on approving and enforcing emergency response plans, such as: analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the information to clarify policies across districts if these analyses reveal discrepancies in policies; analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being assessed, particularly for repeat violations; and reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the content of the plans meets a consistent agencywide standard and, if not, take corrective action by clarifying the guidance. Finally, we consulted with outside individuals knowledgeable about the field of mine safety; mine company officials; and other representatives of the mining community, including the United Mine Workers of America, the National Mining Association, and the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association to obtain their views on mine safety efforts and the new requirements of the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act) for emergency response plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response plans that contain several components designed to improve accident preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA's efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members of the mining community.
What GAO Found
The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement--providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground--until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not specify the protections to be provided and information about these protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the event of an accident. Most of the components of the mines' emergency response plans have been implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First, many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The act provides that, where wireless systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued. MSHA's district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed. |
gao_GAO-02-301 | gao_GAO-02-301_0 | TVA estimates that demand for its electricity will increase about 1.7 percent annually through 2010. From the 30,365 megawatts of generating capacity available from these sources, TVA generated about 156 billion kilowatt-hours of power in fiscal year 2001. The share of electricity generated by burning fossil fuels has implications for the environment. To meet its customers’ increasing demand for electricity, TVA can upgrade its existing plants, construct new plants, purchase power from others, or— as an alternative to finding additional supply sources—provide incentives to its customers—called “demand-side management”—to reduce or shift their demand for electricity. The Department of Energy defines demand-side management as actions taken on the customer’s side of the meter to change the amount or timing of energy consumption and identifies several types of programs. Beyond 2005, TVA has committed to further reduce SO2 emissions. TVA attributes this projected decline to the planned installation of “selective catalytic reduction” systems—which remove nitrogen oxides from the exhaust gases—at some of its generating units at its coal-burning plants. Capacity Increases to Come Mainly from Energy Sources Other Than Coal
Of the 3,086 megawatts of additional capacity that TVA plans to add between 2001 and 2005, more than half (1,658 megawatts) will come from “peaking” units, which are used only during the parts of the day when demand spikes. TVA’s Demand-Side Management Programs Have Realized Few Savings to Date, but TVA Projects Bigger Savings in the Future
Between fiscal years 1996 and 2000, demand-side management programs reduced TVA’s peak load by 204 megawatts (about 41 megawatts a year, or roughly equivalent to 1/10th of 1 percent of its overall capacity). Two programs accounted for these savings: the Energy Right Program, which promotes the installation of energy-efficient heat pumps and other electric appliances; and the Cycle and Save Program, which gives residential customers a bill credit for allowing TVA to switch off their water heaters and air conditioners during peak demand periods. As a result, peak-time consumption was presumably higher than it would have been if TVA had not taken these actions. TVA Projects Bigger Demand-Side Management Savings in the Future
TVA projects that its demand-side management programs will save nearly twice as much in the fiscal year 2001 through 2005 period as they did in the previous 5-fiscal year period. Conclusions
While TVA plans to substantially reduce its SO2 and NOx emissions by three means—installing control devices, using lower-sulfur coal, and relying largely on noncoal sources for additional capacity—it could reduce emissions even more by more aggressively pursuing an existing fourth option—demand-side management. | What GAO Found
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) relied on its 11 coal-burning plants to supply 60 percent of its electric power in fiscal year 2001. These plants account for almost all of TVA's emissions of two key air pollutants--sulfur dioxide (SO2), which has been linked to reduced visibility, and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which contribute to the formation of harmful ozone. To meet an increase in demand of 1.7 percent annually through 2010, TVA estimates that it will need to expand its current generating capacity of 30,365 megawatts by 500 megawatts annually. Building new generating capacity can produce more emissions, which raises environment concerns. To lessen the need for new capacity, TVA and other electricity suppliers promote the efficient use of electricity through "demand-side management" programs, which seek to reduce the amount of energy consumed or to change the time of day when it is consumed. Even though TVA intends to increase its capacity to generate electricity through 2005, it also expects to reduce its SO2 and NOx emissions during the same time period, primarily by burning lower-sulfur coal, installing devices to control emissions at its existing plants, and relying on fuels other than coal for new capacity. Although TVA's demand-side management programs have allowed customers to cut their electrical consumption, these programs have made only modest contributions to reducing peak-time demand. TVA has limited the scope of its key program to reduce peak-time consumption by residential customers because TVA believes the program is not cost-effective. TVA projects that its demand-side programs will produce nearly twice as much in savings between 2001 and 2005 as was achieved in the previous five years. Other large utilities have more fully implemented the types of programs that TVA now has in place and have also implemented a greater array of demand-side management tools. These programs have involved a much higher proportion of their residential customers and established different prices for electricity used during different times of the day. |
gao_GAO-11-8 | gao_GAO-11-8_0 | In fiscal year 2009, DOD obligated about $380 billion on contracts for goods and services. DOD chose a best value process for approximately 95 percent of its new, competitively awarded contracts on which it had obligated $25 million or more in fiscal year 2009. Almost half of DOD’s contracts—47 percent—were awarded using a tradeoff process in which non-cost evaluation factors, when combined, were more more important than price. Our analysis of selected characteristics of contracts awarded using a best value tradeoff process in fiscal year 2009 is shown in figure 3. DOD Used a Best Value Tradeoff Process to Address Complex or Time Sensitive Needs, but Paid Relatively Few Price Differentials
DOD officials tended to use a best value tradeoff process with non-cost factors weighted more important than price when they were willing to accept a higher price if a contractor could demonstrate certain advantages, such as meet a deadline, demonstrate that it understood complex technical issues, or propose an innovative approach. DOD often indicated in tradeoff solicitations that non-cost factors would be significantly more important than price in making award decisions, but our analysis indicated that DOD selected a lower priced proposal among those offerors remaining in the final competition almost as often as it selected a higher technically rated, but more costly, proposal. Overall, DOD paid a price differential—the difference in the price of the offeror awarded the contract and the price of the offeror next in line for award—in 21 of the 68 contracts in which a price differential was considered. We found that 88 of the 129 contracts we reviewed used a best value tradeoff process. In doing so, DOD officials decided not to pay over $800 million in price differentials. Further, DOD officials stated that they do not track whether the solicitation approach used correlated with whether the contractor successfully met the terms of the contract and noted that many factors ultimately contribute to the success or failure of an individual acquisition that may not have been foreseeable when awarding the contract. DOD Faces Several Challenges in Using the Best Value Tradeoff Process
DOD officials acknowledged several challenges in using the best value tradeoff process such as the difficulties in developing meaningful evaluation factors, the additional time investment needed to conduct best value procurements, and the business judgment required of acquisition staff when compared to other acquisition approaches. DOD officials also noted that the complexity of the tradeoff process increases the risk of bid protests. While most of the protests were denied, DOD took corrective actions in 5 cases, including 4 cases in which DOD terminated the contract or made a new source selection decision when it determined that it failed to adhere to the solicitations’ requirements. With the anticipated influx of more than 6,400 DOD contracting personnel over the next few years, providing a firm foundation for use of the tradeoff process is essential. For example, while DOD’s new source selection guide provides insights on the source selection process, it is silent on how to reach decisions on when to pay a price differential, as is DOD’s current training curriculum. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help DOD effectively employ the best value tradeoff process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy to work with the Defense Acquisition University to develop training elements, such as case studies or scenarios that focus on reaching tradeoff decisions, including consideration of price differentials, as it updates the source selection curriculum. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of the best value tradeoff process, and specifically for cases in which DOD evaluated contractors’ proposals on factors other than cost or price, if these non-cost factors, when combined, were considered more important than cost or price. To respond to the mandate, we determined (1) how often and for what types of contracts DOD used the best value tradeoff process; (2) why and how DOD used the best value tradeoff process; and (3) what challenges, if any, DOD faces in using the best value tradeoff process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) obligated about $380 billion in fiscal year 2009 to acquire products and services. One approach DOD can take to evaluate offerors' proposals is the best value tradeoff process in which the relative importance of price varies compared to non-cost factors. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required GAO to review DOD's use of the best value tradeoff process, specifically when non-cost factors were more important than price. In response, GAO determined (1) how often and for what types of contracts DOD used the best value tradeoff process; (2) why and how DOD used such an approach; and (3) challenges, if any, DOD faces in using the best value tradeoff process. GAO identified a probability sample of new, competitively awarded fiscal year 2009 contracts in which DOD obligated $25 million or more. GAO reviewed guidance, solicitations, source selection decisions, and other documents for 129 contracts and interviewed DOD contracting and program staff about the use of the best value tradeoff process.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2009, DOD used best value processes for approximately 95 percent of its new, competitively awarded contracts in which $25 million or more was obligated. Almost half of DOD's contracts--47 percent--were awarded using a tradeoff process in which non-cost evaluation factors, when combined, were more important than price. DOD used best value tradeoffs principally to acquire services, such as construction of troop housing, as well as for professional management services. DOD used the best value tradeoff process in 88 of the 129 contracts GAO reviewed. For 60 of the 88 contracts, DOD weighted non-cost factors as more important than price. In these cases, DOD was willing to pay more for a contractor that demonstrated it understood complex technical issues more thoroughly, could provide a needed good or service to meet deadlines, or had a proven track record in successfully delivering products or services of a similar nature. In making tradeoff decisions, GAO found that DOD selected a lower priced proposal nearly as often as it selected a higher technically rated, but more costly proposal. Overall, GAO found that DOD paid a combined total of more than $230 million in price differentials--the difference in price between the awardee and the offeror next in line for award--on 21 contracts, but chose not to pay more than $800 million in proposed costs by selecting a lower priced offer over a higher technically rated offer in 18 contracts. DOD does not track whether the use of best value tradeoff processes correlates with the contractor successfully meeting the terms of the contract and noted that many factors ultimately contribute to an acquisition's success or failure. DOD officials identified several challenges in using the best value tradeoff process, including the difficulty in determining meaningful evaluation factors and the business judgment of acquisition staff required. DOD officials also noted that the complexity of the tradeoff process increases the risk of bid protests. For example, GAO found that 15 of the 88 contracts awarded using a best value tradeoff process reviewed were protested to GAO, resulting in 4 cases in which DOD terminated the contract or made a new source selection decision when DOD determined that it failed to adhere to the solicitations' requirements. Such concerns are heightened given the expected influx of more than 6,400 new contracting personnel over the next few years. According to DOD officials, making sound tradeoff decisions, and in particular, deciding whether or not a price differential is warranted, is one of the most difficult aspects of using a best value tradeoff process. DOD is developing a new departmentwide source selection guide and intends to subsequently revise its training curriculum, but neither the guide nor DOD's current training curriculum provides agency personnel with information on assessing price differentials when performing tradeoff analyses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that to help DOD effectively employ best value tradeoff processes, DOD develop training elements, such as case studies, that focus on reaching tradeoff decisions, as it updates its training curriculum. DOD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-762T | gao_GAO-17-762T_0 | In addition to investigating and prosecuting human trafficking crimes, federal agencies, primarily DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), support efforts to combat human trafficking and assist victims. Several components within DOJ, including the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) and the Office of Justice Programs, which includes the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the National Institute of Justice, provide grants to help state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies combat human trafficking and to support nongovernmental organizations and others in assisting trafficking victims or conducting research on human trafficking in the United States. While Federal Agencies Generally Maintain Data on Human Trafficking Cases in Indian Country, They Do Not Maintain Data on Native American Status of Victims
In March 2017, we reported that all four federal agencies that investigate or prosecute human trafficking in Indian country—the FBI, BIA, ICE, and the USAO—are required to record in their case management systems whether a human trafficking offense was involved in the case. With the exception of ICE, these agencies are also required to record in their case management systems whether the crime took place in Indian country. ICE officials explained that the agency does not record this information because, unlike BIA and the FBI, ICE is not generally involved in criminal investigations in Indian country. First, according to officials from DOJ’s Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Native American status has no impact on whether the federal government can investigate or prosecute cases outside of Indian country. Some Law Enforcement Agencies Reported Encountering Human Trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans, and Cited Victim Reluctance to Participate in Investigations and Other Factors as Barriers to Investigation and Prosecution
Tribal and Major City Law Enforcement Agencies Reported Encountering Human Trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans
In our report released in July 2017, we found that of the 132 tribal LEAs that responded to our survey, 27 reported that they initiated investigations they considered to have involved human trafficking from 2014 to 2016, as shown in figure 1. Few major city LEAs reported that they encountered human trafficking from 2014 to 2016 that involved Native American victims. Of the 27 tribal LEAs that reported initiating investigations involving human trafficking, 18 indicated that they believe victims are reluctant to participate in the investigation or prosecution of their case. Fifty Federal Grant Programs Can Be Used to Address Human Trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans, but DOJ Could do More to Identify the Number of Native American Victims Served
In March 2017, we reported that DOJ, HHS, and DHS administered 50 grant programs from fiscal years 2013 through 2016 that could help address Native American human trafficking. We reported that DOJ’s OVW requires grantees to report Native American status of victims served, but not by type of crime. DOJ’s OVC and the OJJDP do not require grantees to collect and report Native American status of victims served. However, in fiscal year 2017, OVC began providing recipients of human trafficking-specific grant programs the option to report the race or Native American status of victims served. While Native American status may not generally be a factor for determining whether a victim can receive services, it may be a factor for determining how best to assist this particular demographic. Thus we concluded that without collecting data on the Native American status of victims served, federal agencies would not know the extent to which they are achieving government-wide strategic goals to provide and improve services to vulnerable populations, including Native American human trafficking victims. Therefore, we recommended in March 2017 that DOJ require its grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims. In its comments, DOJ indicated it would implement the first part of the recommendation, which is to require grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served with grant funding. We continue to assert that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Human trafficking is the exploitation of a person typically through force, fraud or coercion for purposes such as forced labor or commercial sex, and it involves vulnerable populations including Native Americans. Several components within DOJ, DHS, and the Department of Interior investigate and prosecute human trafficking in Indian country, and federal agencies provide grant funding to support efforts to combat trafficking and assist victims.
This testimony focuses on trafficking occurring in Indian country or involving Native Americans and addresses the extent to which: (1) federal agencies collect and maintain data on investigations and prosecutions; (2) tribal and major city LEAs encounter trafficking and the factors that affect their ability to investigate and prosecute such activities; and, (3) federal grant programs are available to help address trafficking and how well the granting agencies are positioned to know the number of victims served. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in March and July 2017. To do this work GAO reviewed federal trafficking data and conducted three surveys. We surveyed the 203 known tribal LEAs, 86 major city LEAs, and 315 victim service provider organizations that received fiscal year 2015 DOJ or HHS grants that could be used to assist human trafficking victims.
What GAO Found
While federal agencies generally maintain data on human trafficking cases that occur in Indian country, they do not maintain data on whether the victims are Native American (Native American status). All four federal agencies that investigate or prosecute human trafficking in Indian country—the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices—are required to record in their case management systems whether a human trafficking offense was involved in the case. With the exception of ICE, these agencies are also required to record whether the crime took place in Indian country. ICE officials explained that the agency does not record this information because, unlike BIA and the FBI, ICE is not generally involved in criminal investigations in Indian country. Also, officials from the four agencies said they do not maintain data on Native American status of victims for various reasons, including that such data has no impact on their investigations and prosecutions.
Some law enforcement agencies (LEA) reported encountering human trafficking in Indian country or of Native Americans and cited victim reluctance to participate in investigations and other factors as barriers to investigation and prosecution. Of the 132 tribal LEAs that responded to GAO's survey, 27 reported initiating investigations they considered to have involved human trafficking from 2014 to 2016. Few major city LEAs—6 of 61 survey respondents—reported that they encountered human trafficking involving Native American victims from 2014 to 2016. Further, among the 27 responding tribal LEAs, 18 indicated that they believe victims are reluctant to participate in investigations for reasons including drug addiction and distrust of law enforcement.
The departments of Justice (DOJ), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security (DHS) administered 50 federal grant programs from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 that can be used to address human trafficking in Indian Country or of Native Americans, but DOJ could do more to identify the number of Native American victims served. For example, DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women requires grantees to report Native American status of victims served, but not by type of crime. DOJ's Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention do not require grantees to collect and report Native American status of victims served. However, in fiscal year 2017, OVC began providing recipients of human trafficking-specific grant programs the option to report the race or Native American status of victims served. While Native American status may not generally be a factor for determining whether a victim can receive services, it may be a factor for determining how best to assist this demographic. GAO recommended that DOJ require its grantees to report the number of human trafficking victims served and, as appropriate, the Native American status of those victims. DOJ agreed to implement the first part of this recommendation, but did not agree to the second part, citing victim confidentiality and other reasons. In June 2017, DOJ reported ongoing and planned actions to better capture the number of victims served but reiterated its concerns about collecting Native American status. GAO maintains that collecting grantee information on both the number and Native American status of victims served is important and will continue to monitor implementation. |
gao_GAO-07-1006 | gao_GAO-07-1006_0 | In fiscal year 2006, CBP detected 21,292 fraudulent U.S. passports, visas, and BCCs presented by travelers attempting to enter the United States through a U.S. port of entry. See appendix V for an overview of the inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. New Passports and Visas Have Been Enhanced, but Prior Generations of Travel Documents Remain More Vulnerable to Fraud, and Document Designs Are Not Periodically Reassessed
State has made enhancements to strengthen new generations of passports and visas, which contain a variety of security features that, in combination, are intended to deter attempts to alter or counterfeit the documents; however, prior generations of these documents have been fraudulently used and remain more vulnerable to fraudulent attempts for the duration of their life span. State Does Not Have a Structured Process for Periodically Reassessing and Planning for New Generations of Passports and Visas
State updates or changes the security features of its passports and visas in response, in part, (1) to detected attempts to counterfeit or alter these documents and (2) to recommended international standards for secure travel documents. Steps Taken to Secure Passports and Visas in the Issuance Process, but Additional Measures Are Needed to Address Weaknesses in Oversight of Passport Acceptance Facilities
State and GPO have enacted several measures to ensure the security and physical quality of passports and are working to address weaknesses identified in the passport issuance process; however, additional measures are needed to strengthen the process and minimize vulnerabilities. Limitations in Technology and Training Affect Inspection Officers’ Ability to Fully Utilize Security Features in Passports and Visas
The inspection of U.S. passports and visas at ports of entry is a key element in ensuring the security of these documents. For example, in advance of State’s issuance of the e-passport and the emergency passport, State did not provide a sufficient quantity of exemplars and CBP did not update its training for all inspection officers to include information on the security features of these new travel documents. Officers Lack Sufficient Training on the Security Features and Fraudulent Trends of U.S. Despite some improvements, however, the passport issuance process remains vulnerable, especially at the application acceptance stage, where oversight of the thousands of acceptance facilities—responsible for verifying the identity of applicants— remains weak. However, at land border ports this capability is not available in primary inspection. We also interviewed officials at Department of State’s Consular Affairs Bureau, Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL), the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Government Printing Office (GPO). To identify how State obtains, analyzes, and shares information on the features and fraudulent use of these documents, we reviewed relevant documentation, including fraud bulletins and alerts, and met with State officials from the Diplomatic Security and Consular Affairs Bureaus, including the fraud prevention units of passport and visa services, as well as with DHS officials from CBP and FDL. We also conducted site visits and interviewed officials at seven domestic passport offices and two U.S. consulates in Mexico. To examine the measures taken to ensure the integrity of the border crossing card (BCC), we visited two production facilities in Vermont and Nebraska where BCCs are produced. To observe inspections processes and measures, we conducted site visits to nine U.S. ports of entry. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Travel documents are often used fraudulently in attempts to enter the United States. The integrity of U.S. passports and visas depends on the combination of well-designed security features and solid issuance and inspection processes. GAO was asked to examine (1) the features of U.S. passports and visas and how information on the features is shared; (2) the integrity of the issuance process for these documents; and (3) how these documents are inspected at U.S. ports of entry. We reviewed documents such as studies, alerts, and training materials. We met with officials from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology, and U.S. Government Printing Office, and with officials at seven passport offices, nine U.S. ports of entry, two U.S. consulates in Mexico, and two Border Crossing Card production facilities.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) has developed passports and visas, including border crossing cards (BCC), that are more secure than older versions of these documents; however, older versions have been fraudulently used and remain more vulnerable to fraud during their lifespan. For example, earlier versions valid until 2011, of which there are more than 20 million in circulation, remain vulnerable to fraudulent alteration by such means as photo substitution. Although State has updated or changed the security features of its travel documents, State does not have a structured process to periodically reassess the effectiveness of the security features in its documents against evolving threats and to actively plan for new generations. State has taken a number of measures to ensure the security and quality of passports and visas, including establishing internal control standards and quality assurance measures, training of acceptance agents, and initiating new visa policies and procedures. However, additional measures are needed in the passport issuance process to minimize the risk of fraud. State lacks a program for oversight of the thousands of passport acceptance facilities that serve an important function in verifying the identity of millions of passport applicants each year. Officers in primary inspection--the first and most critical opportunity to identify fraudulent travel documents at U.S. ports of entry--are unable to take full advantage of the security features in passports and visas. These officers rely on both their observations of travelers and visual and manual examination of documents to detect fraudulent documents. However, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not yet provided most ports of entry with the technology tools to read the new electronic passports and does not have a process in place for primary inspectors to utilize fingerprints collected for visas, including BCCs, at all land ports of entry. Moreover, DHS has provided little regular training to update its officers on the security features and fraud trends in passports and visas. |
gao_GAO-08-1005 | gao_GAO-08-1005_0 | 1). The Senate report also directed us to review DOD’s master planning effort for Guam as part of our annual review of DOD’s overseas master plans. Overseas Master Plans Generally Reflect Changes, Challenges, and Our Prior Recommendations, but Could Be More Timely
The fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in the U.S. overseas defense basing strategies and requirements and current challenges that DOD faces in implementation. DOD officials said that since last year South Korea and the U.S. Air Force have taken steps to address these training challenges. No Recognition of the Training Challenges in South Korea
While the overseas master plans have continued to evolve and have provided more comprehensive data every year since fiscal year 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command master plan does not describe the challenges the command faces in addressing the U.S. Air Force’s training limitations in South Korea even though we have recommended that it should describe the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. Overseas Master Plans Generally Have Been Submitted to Congress Late
DOD has recently submitted the overseas master plans to Congress several months after the annual budget submissions even though the Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to provide updates of the master plans with each yearly military construction budget submission. However, DOD provided the defense committees the fiscal year 2007 plans on April 27 and the fiscal year 2008 plans on March 28. According to DOD officials, OSD’s most recent efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects contributed to providing Congress the plans months after the military construction budget submission. In addition, overseas command officials commented that the lengthy review and approval process among the commands and OSD has contributed to the plans’ lateness. Because of continued concern over the possibility of changes to the global defense posture, the Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2009 military construction appropriation bill extended the requirement for DOD to provide annually updated reports on the status of its global basing initiative to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress. DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam but Has Yet to Develop the Congressionally Required Master Plan
DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on Guam. However, the department has not issued a comprehensive master plan for the buildup that was initially due in December 2006, which Congress later extended to September 2008. While the Joint Guam Program Office is coordinating the development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline, this is a onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that this plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process at the time of its completion and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, the results of the environmental impact statement and resulting record of decision on the proposed military buildup, which are expected to be completed by January 2010, will influence many key decisions about the military infrastructure development on Guam. Also, Joint Guam Program Office officials estimate that the office could complete a comprehensive master plan for Guam within 90 days once these documents are completed. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam’s economic and infrastructure requirements. Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known
Although the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative identifies Marine Corps units to move to Guam, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other services’ realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Since DOD intends to replace the overseas master plans with annual updates of its global defense posture as DOD’s overseas planning report to Congress, the department has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing these reports to issue them with the administration’s annual budget submission to provide Congress with adequate time for review. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues its efforts to reduce the number of troops permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases. The Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction appropriation bill directed DOD to develop and GAO to monitor DOD's overseas master plans and to provide annual assessments. The Senate report accompanying the fiscal year 2007 military construction appropriation bill directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of these annual reviews. This report examines (1) the changes and challenges described in the fiscal year 2009 master plans, the extent the plans address GAO's prior recommendations, and the plans' timeliness and (2) the status of DOD's master planning efforts for the proposed buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam. GAO reviewed the plans and other relevant documents, and visited three overseas combatant commands, various installations, and Guam organizations.
What GAO Found
While the fiscal year 2009 master plans generally reflect recent changes in U.S. overseas basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces as well as address GAO's prior recommendations, DOD provided Congress the plans in May 2008, well after the February budget submission when the Senate and conference reports require DOD to issue the plans. This year's plans contain information on current overseas basing strategies and infrastructure requirements and the challenges that DOD faces implementing the plans. The plans also generally address GAO's recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide an update of the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea, despite GAO's prior recommendation that it should describe the challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address these training challenges. According to DOD officials, efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects and the lengthy review and approval process have contributed to the fiscal year 2009 plans' lateness. While the congressional requirement for the overseas master plans expired with the fiscal year 2009 plans, DOD said that it intends to provide Congress annual updates of its global defense posture through 2014 and that these updates would replace the master plans as DOD's overseas planning report to Congress. Since DOD will continue to provide annually updated global defense posture reports, it has an opportunity to reexamine its timeline for producing future reports earlier to provide Congress with time for review. DOD has developed a basic framework for the military buildup on Guam but has not issued the congressionally required master plan that was initially due in December 2006, and which Congress later extended to September 2008. The Joint Guam Program Office, which is planning and managing the proposed military buildup, is coordinating the multi-service development of a working-level plan for DOD that is to be submitted to Congress by the 2008 deadline. However, this is a onetime requirement, and DOD officials said that the plan will be a snapshot of the status of the planning process and will not be considered a comprehensive master plan for several reasons. First, while the required environmental impact statement and the resulting record of decision will influence many key decisions about the buildup of military forces and infrastructure on Guam, these documents are not expected to be completed until January 2010. Also, officials of the Joint Guam Program Office said that they expect to complete a comprehensive master plan within 90 days after these required documents are finalized. Second, plans for the detailed force composition of units relocating to Guam, associated facility requirements, and implications for other services' realignments on Guam continue to be refined. Third, additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam's economic and infrastructure requirements. However, without a comprehensive master plan, Congress may have limited data on requirements on which to make informed appropriation decisions and to carry out its oversight responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-10-14 | gao_GAO-10-14_0 | OPM and ALJ Agencies Share ALJ Hiring, Pay, and Performance Management Responsibilities
The conditions of employment for ALJs are unique among federal employees. HHS officials stated that they are satisfied that the process provided them with highly qualified candidates. Despite their satisfaction with the quality of the ALJ candidates, SSA and HHS officials stated that the ALJ hiring process should have more flexibility in order for them to appoint candidates that best meet their agency-specific needs. Agencies Could Experience Skill and Competency Gaps in ALJ Workforce Due to Potential Retirements
ALJ agencies could face skill and competency gaps unless ALJ agencies and OPM take concerted action to assure that, in the face of significant retirement eligibility, the ALJ agencies have developed ALJ hiring and succession plans. As of September 2008, the most current data available, 51 percent of employed ALJs were eligible to retire by the end of 2008. As of September 2008, at 9 of the 25 ALJ agencies, all of the ALJs were already eligible to retire and at 21 of the agencies half or more of the ALJs were eligible to retire. Although it appears there are abundant candidates to fill vacant positions, we have reported that retiring employees can leave gaps in institutional knowledge and technical skills. These gaps can arise because, among other reasons, it can take several months for new hires to become fully productive. OPM is the lead agency in guiding federal human capital management at executive branch agencies. Despite the significant proportion of ALJs who were eligible to retire between 2008 and 2013, OPM officials told us that, as of October 2009, they had no record or knowledge of any federal agency designation of ALJ skill gaps or competency issues. ALJ agencies must select their new ALJs from an OPM certificate of qualified candidates. To ensure federal agencies have talented staff, OPM requires agencies to make meaningful progress toward closing skills, knowledge, and competency gaps/deficiencies in all occupations used in the agency. OPM is well-positioned through its role as the ALJ program manager and its annual review of federal agencies’ human capital accountability plans to assure that ALJ agencies appropriately identify and plan for future ALJ-related skill and competency gaps. Given the many practices reportedly used to manage ALJ performance, the concerns raised by the ALJ-related associations regarding SSA emphasis on ALJ productivity, and the ALJ agency’s need to balance meeting its organizational goals with ensuring the ALJ’s decisional independence, OPM should review the state of ALJ performance management across all ALJ agencies. While the agreed-upon competencies could not be used to influence ALJ compensation, they could help improve ALJ performance management by defining the skills and supporting behaviors that ALJs need to effectively contribute to organizational results, ensuring objective and balanced discussions between managers and ALJs regarding performance, and enhancing consistency of ALJ performance. Consider the use of competencies in ALJ performance management while not influencing ALJ compensation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Based on a mandate accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, this report examines: (1) the process for hiring administrative law judges (ALJ) and selected agencies’ observations on the process; (2) the level of retirement and retirement eligibility for ALJs; (3) the reported ALJ management practices at the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the stakeholders’ views of these practices; and (4) the options that have been proposed to improve the management of the ALJ workforce, either within existing authorities or requiring new authorities. Office of Personnel Management
OPM has managed the ALJ program since the agency was created in 1979. Identifying ALJ Performance Management Practices
To identify ALJ performance management practices and stakeholder views of these practices, we interviewed agency and association officials and reviewed prior reports and testimonies from OPM, SSA, SSAB, and HHS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Administrative Procedure Act established unique conditions for administrative law judges' (ALJ) hiring and employment to protect their decisional independence. However, the potential for a wave of retirements and other events have focused attention on how ALJs are hired and managed. In response to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, this report examines, among other things, (1) the process for hiring ALJs and selected agencies' observations of the process; (2) ALJs' retirement eligibility and retirement issues; (3) and agency managers' reported ALJ performance management practices and stakeholders' views of these practices. To address these objectives GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) retirement-related data, and other program-related documents, and interviewed officials from OPM, ALJ professional associations, and the two largest federal agencies employing ALJs--the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
What GAO Found
SSA and HHS officials responsible for hiring new ALJs reported they were satisfied with the quality of the judges hired from OPM's ALJ register of qualified candidates in 2008. Despite their satisfaction with these ALJ candidates, agency officials raised several issues regarding ALJ hiring and offered suggestions to improve the process, including (1) opening the OPM registry to accept new candidates more frequently, (2) giving greater consideration to agency-specific knowledge and experience, and (3) providing additional agency flexibility in meeting the procedural requirements associated with selecting from the three best qualified candidates and awarding veterans' preference. OPM officials reported they are working to address these issues and develop new approaches, where appropriate. ALJ agencies could experience skill and competency gaps in the ALJ workforce in the near future. As of September 2008, the most currently available data, 51 percent of all ALJs were already eligible to retire. Moreover, by 2013, 78 percent of all ALJs employed as of September 2008 will be eligible to retire, while at 9 of the 25 ALJ agencies, all of the ALJs were eligible to retire. Retiring employees can leave gaps in institutional knowledge and technical skills due, in part, to the time required for new hires to become fully productive. To ensure agencies have talented staff to accomplish their missions, OPM requires agencies to make meaningful progress toward closing skills, knowledge, and competency gaps/deficiencies in all occupations in the agency. Despite the significant proportion of ALJs who were eligible to retire from 2008 to 2013, OPM officials reported that, as of October 2009, they had no record of any federal agency designation of ALJ skill gaps or competency issues. OPM, as ALJ program manager and lead agency in federal human capital management, could use its annual review of federal agencies' human capital accountability plans to assure that ALJ agencies appropriately identify and plan for future ALJ related skill and competency gaps. To safeguard the independence of ALJ decisionmaking, ALJ agencies are prohibited from rating or tying an ALJ's compensation to their performance. Nevertheless, SSA and HHS officials reported using numerous other practices to manage ALJ performance. ALJ association officials were concerned some SSA performance management practices could affect ALJs' decisional independence. The use of competencies in ALJ performance management might help OPM and ALJ agencies define needed ALJ skills and behaviors, ensure objective and balanced performance discussions between managers and ALJs, and enhance consistency in ALJ performance, while not influencing ALJ compensation. Given its role as ALJ program manager and its expertise in performance management, OPM is well-positioned to lead a review of all agencies' ALJ-related management practices. |
gao_GAO-07-646T | gao_GAO-07-646T_0 | Students with Limited English Proficiency Performed below Progress Goals in 2004 in Almost Two- Thirds of States
In nearly two-thirds of the 48 states for which we obtained data, students with limited English proficiency did not meet state proficiency goals in the 2003-2004 school year. 1). However, offering accommodations may or may not improve the validity of test results, as research in this area is lacking. Officials in 4 of these states reported following generally accepted test development procedures, while a Nebraska official reported that the state expects districts to follow such procedures. Officials in 3 of our study states told us they also used a statistical approach to evaluate test items for bias related to students with limited English proficiency. Both Education’s Peer Reviews and Our Group of Experts Raised Concerns Regarding State Efforts to Ensure Valid and Reliable Assessment Results
Education’s completed NCLBA peer reviews of 38 states found that 25 did not provide sufficient evidence on the validity or reliability of results for students with limited English proficiency. According to our expert group and our review of literature, research is lacking on what specific accommodations are appropriate for students with limited English proficiency, as well as their effectiveness in improving the validity of assessment results. Our group of experts told us that this type of assessment is difficult and costly to develop. Development of a valid native language assessment involves more than a simple translation of the original test. Most States Implemented New English Language Proficiency Assessments but Faced Challenges Establishing Their Validity
Many states implemented new English language proficiency assessments for the 2005-2006 school year to meet Education’s requirement for states to administer English language proficiency tests that meet NCLBA requirements by the spring of 2006. In the 2005-2006 school year, 22 states used assessments or test items developed by one of four state consortia, making this the most common approach taken by states. Officials in our study states and test developers we interviewed reported that they commonly apply generally accepted test development procedures to develop their assessments, but some are still in the process of documenting their validity and reliability. The study, which was funded by Education, noted that none of the assessments contained “sufficient technical evidence to support the high-stakes accountability information and conclusions of student readiness they are meant to provide.”
Education Has Provided Assistance, but States Reported Need for Additional Guidance and Flexibility
Education has offered states a variety of technical assistance to help them appropriately assess students with limited English proficiency, such as providing training and expert reviews of their assessment systems. While Education has offered states some flexibility in how they incorporate these students into their accountability systems, many of the state and district officials we interviewed indicated that additional flexibility is needed to ensure that academic progress of these students is accurately measured. While providing this technical assistance, Education has issued little written guidance on developing English language proficiency assessments that meet NCLBA’s requirements and on tracking the progress of students in acquiring English. However, officials in about one-third of the 33 states we contacted expressed uncertainty about implementing these requirements. Education Has Offered Different Accountability Options for Students with Limited English Proficiency, but State Officials Reported Additional Flexibility Is Needed
Education has offered states several flexibilities in tracking academic progress goals for students with limited English proficiency to support their efforts to develop appropriate accountability systems for these students. 2). GAO-06-815. No Child Left Behind Act: Improved Accessibility to Education’s Information Could Help States Further Implement Teacher Qualification Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA) focused attention on the academic achievement of more than 5 million students with limited English proficiency. Obtaining valid test results for these students is challenging, given their language barriers. This testimony describes (1) the extent to which these students are meeting annual academic progress goals, (2) what states have done to ensure the validity of their academic assessments, (3) what states are doing to ensure the validity of their English language proficiency assessments, and (4) how the U.S. Department of Education (Education) is supporting states' efforts to meet NCLBA's assessment requirements for these students. This testimony is based on a July 2006 report (GAO-06-815). To collect the information for this report, we convened a group of experts and studied five states (California, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and Texas). We also conducted a state survey and reviewed state and Education documents.
What GAO Found
In nearly two-thirds of 48 states for which we obtained data, students with limited English proficiency did not meet state proficiency goals for language arts or mathematics in school year 2003-2004. Further, in most states, these students generally did not perform as well as other student groups on state mathematics tests for elementary students. Officials in our five study states reported taking steps to follow generally accepted test development procedures to ensure the validity and reliability of academic tests for these students. However, our group of experts expressed concerns about whether all states are assessing these students in a valid manner, noting that some states lack technical expertise. Further, Education's completed peer reviews of assessments in 38 states found that 25 states did not provide adequate evidence of their validity or reliability. To improve the validity of these test results, most states offer accommodations, such as a bilingual dictionary. However, our experts reported that research is lacking on what accommodations are effective in mitigating language barriers. Several states used native language or alternate assessments for students with limited English proficiency, but these tests are costly to develop and are not appropriate for all students. Many states implemented new English language proficiency assessments in 2006 to meet NCLBA requirements, and, as a result, complete information on their validity and reliability is not yet available. In 2006, 22 states used tests developed by one of four state consortia. Officials in our study states reported taking steps to ensure the validity of these tests. However, a 2005 Education-funded review of 17 English language proficiency tests found insufficient documentation of their validity. Education has offered a variety of technical assistance to help states assess students with limited English proficiency. However, Education has issued little written guidance to states on developing English language proficiency tests. Officials in about one-third of the 33 states we contacted told us they wanted more guidance about how to develop tests that meet NCLBA requirements. Education has offered states some flexibility in how they assess students with limited English proficiency, but officials in our study states told us that additional flexibility is needed to ensure that progress measures appropriately track the academic progress of these students. Since our report was published, Education has initiated a partnership with the states and other organizations to support the development of valid assessment options for students with limited English proficiency. |
gao_GAO-08-813T | gao_GAO-08-813T_0 | The nuclear utility industry generates the bulk of this LLRW through the normal operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants, and through the decommissioning of these plants. In 1991, Utah amended the facility’s license to permit the disposal of some LLRW, and the Northwest Compact agreed to allow the facility to accept these wastes from noncompact states. However, fast-approaching constraints on the availability of disposal capacity for class B and class C wastes could adversely affect the disposal of many states’ LLRW. That facility currently accepts about 99 percent of the nation’s class B and class C commercial LLRW. Although waste generators in these 36 states will no longer have access to Barnwell, they can continue to minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste pending the development of additional disposal options. While NRC prefers the disposal of LLRW, it allows on- site storage as long as the waste remains safe and secure. Two-thirds of this facility is devoted to the processing and temporary storage of class A waste. In contrast, available disposal capacity for the nation’s class A waste does not appear to be a problem in either the short or long term. Our June 2004 report noted that EnergySolutions’ Clive facility had sufficient disposal capacity, based upon then-projected disposal volumes, to accept class A waste for at least 20 years under its current license. This facility currently accepts about 99 percent of the nation’s class A LLRW. This decline is primarily attributed to DOE’s completion of several cleanup projects. According to the disposal operator, capacity for this facility has been extended another 13 years, to 33 years of capacity. It is important to note, however, that our June 2004 analysis of available LLRW disposal capacity considered only domestically produced LLRW. We did not consider the impact of imported LLRW on available class A, B, and C disposal capacity at Clive, Barnwell, and Richland. Most Foreign Countries Either Have Available LLRW Disposal Capacity or Plan to Develop It
While none of the foreign countries we surveyed for our March 2007 report indicated that they have disposal options for all of their LLRW, almost all either had disposal capacity for their lower-activity LLRW or central storage facilities for their higher-activity LLRW, pending the availability of disposal capacity. Ten of the 18 countries reported having available disposal capacity for their lower-activity LLRW and 6 other countries have plans to build such facilities. Only 3 countries indicated that they have a disposal option for some higher-activity LLRW. Of the 18 countries we surveyed, only Italy indicated that it lacked disposal availability for both lower- and higher-activity LLRW and central storage facilities for this waste. It also created a national agency that would establish and operate a disposal site for radioactive waste. These approaches included, among other things, using a comprehensive national radioactive waste inventory of all types of radioactive waste by volume, location, and waste generator; providing disposition options for all types of LLRW or providing central storage options for higher-radioactivity LLRW if disposal options are unavailable; and developing financial assurance requirements for all waste generators to reduce government disposition costs. Currently, the United States does not have a national radioactive waste management plan and does not have a single federal agency or other organization responsible for coordinating LLRW stakeholder groups to develop such a plan. Our March 2007 report recommended that DOE and NRC evaluate and report to the Congress on the usefulness of adopting the LLRW management approaches used in foreign countries and developing a U.S. radioactive waste management plan. In a March 2008 letter to GAO on the actions NRC has taken in response to GAO’s recommendations, NRC stated that the approach used in the United States is fundamentally different from other countries. In particular, NRC argued that, because responsibility for LLRW disposal is placed with the states, the federal government’s role in developing options for managing and/or disposing of LLRW is limited. NRC also expressed concern about the usefulness and significant resources required to develop and implement national inventories and management plans. For example, there are no national contingency plans, other than allowing LLRW storage at waste generator sites, to address the impending closure of the Barnwell facility to class B and class C LLRW from noncompact states. The availability of a national plan and periodic reporting on waste conditions might also provide the Congress and the public with a more accessible means for monitoring the management of radioactive waste and provide a mechanism to build greater public trust in the management of these wastes in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disposal of radioactive material continues to be highly controversial. To address part of the disposal problem, in 1980, Congress made the states responsible for disposing of most low-level radioactive waste (LLRW), and allowed them to form regional compacts and to restrict access to disposal facilities from noncompact states. LLRW is an inevitable by-product of nuclear power generation and includes debris and contaminated soils from the decommissioning and cleanup of nuclear facilities, as well as metal and other material exposed to radioactivity. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ranks LLRW according to hazard exposure--classes A, B, C, and greater-than-class C (GTCC). The states are responsible for the first three classes, and the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for GTCC. Three facilities dispose of the nation's LLRW--in Utah, South Carolina, and Washington State. The testimony addresses (1) LLRW management in the United States and (2) LLRW management in other countries. It is substantially based on two GAO reports: a June 2004 report (GAO-04-604) and a March 2007, report (GAO-07-221) that examined these issues. To prepare this testimony, GAO relied on data from the two reports and updated information on current capacity for LLRW and access to disposal facilities.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in 2004, existing disposal facilities had adequate capacity for most LLRW and were accessible to waste generators (hereafter referred to as disposal availability) in the short term, but constraints on the disposal of certain types of LLRW warranted concern. Specifically, South Carolina had decided to restrict access to its disposal facility by mid-2008 for class B and C waste--the facility now accepts about 99 percent of this waste generated nationwide--to only waste generators in the three states of its compact. If there are no new disposal options for class B and C wastes after 2008, licensed users of radioactive materials can continue to minimize waste generation, process waste into safer forms, and store waste pending the development of additional disposal options. While NRC prefers that LLRW be disposed of, it allows on-site storage as long as the waste remains safe and secure. In contrast, disposal availability for domestic class A waste is not a problem in the short or longer term. In 2004, GAO reported that the Utah disposal facility--which accepts about 99 percent of this waste generated nationwide--could accept such waste for 20 years or more under its current license based on anticipated class A waste volumes. Since 2005, the volume of class A waste disposed of has declined by two-thirds primarily because DOE completed several large cleanup projects, extending the capacity for an additional 13 years, for a total of 33 years of remaining disposal capacity. However, the June 2004 analysis, and the updated analysis, were based on the generation of LLRW only in the United States and did not consider the impact on domestic disposal capacity of importing foreign countries' LLRW. Ten of the 18 countries surveyed for GAO's March 2007 report have disposal options for class A, B and most of C waste, and 6 other countries have plans to build such facilities. Only 3 countries indicated that they have a disposal option for some class C and GTCC waste; however, almost all countries that do not provide disposal for LLRW have centralized storage facilities for this waste. Only Italy reported that it had no disposal or central storage facilities for its LLRW, although it plans to develop a disposal site for this waste that will include waste from its decommissioned nuclear power plants and from other nuclear processing facilities. Italy initially expected this disposal site to be operational by 2010, but local governments' resistance to the location of this disposal site has delayed this date. The March 2007 report also identified a number of LLRW management approaches used in other countries that may provide lessons to improve the management of U.S. radioactive waste. These approaches include the use of comprehensive national radioactive waste inventory databases and the development of a national radioactive waste management plan. Such a plan would specify a single entity responsible for coordinating radioactive waste management and include strategies to address all types of radioactive waste. GAO had recommended that NRC and DOE evaluate and report to the Congress on the usefulness of these approaches. While the agencies considered these approaches, they expressed particular concerns about the significant resources required to develop and implement a national inventory and management plan for LLRW. |
gao_GAO-11-715 | gao_GAO-11-715_0 | The NDAA for fiscal year 2011 required that State, DOD, and USAID jointly develop a plan to transition the activities of the Task Force to State, with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. The plan, which was to be submitted to Congress at the same time as the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget, was to describe (1) the Task Force’s activities in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011; (2) the Task Force’s activities in fiscal year 2011 that USAID will continue in fiscal year 2012, including those activities that may be merged with similar USAID efforts; (3) any of the Task Force’s fiscal year 2011 activities that USAID will not continue and the reasons; and (4) those actions that may be necessary to transition Task Force activities that will be continued by USAID in fiscal year 2012. To identify factors to consider in planning for any transition of Task Force capabilities from DOD to USAID, we interviewed DOD, State, and USAID senior-level policy officials in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. We obtained their views on the respective capabilities and operational approaches of the Task Force and USAID and reviewed relevant and available documentation. As a result, we identified five factors to consider in planning for any transition, which generally relate to how these agencies conduct their respective activities. In particular, USAID officials noted that in addition to other activities, USAID focuses more broadly on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. Specifically, the Task Force was designed to be a small, flat, flexible organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives in various sectors of the Afghan economy. USAID funding and staffing. USAID’s fiscal year 2011 budget and fiscal year 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support Task Force activities. While both USAID and the Task Force facilitate private investment, the nature and focus of their interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force identifies and provides direct logistical and consultative support to U.S. and non- U.S. potential investors. Because the Task Force is involved in various efforts to spur private investment, senior-level DOD, State, and USAID officials in Afghanistan have stated that a transition in the near term may negatively impact these efforts, which are deemed essential for the transition of U.S. forces out of Afghanistan. The Task Force Has Not Documented Specific Guidelines for Managing Activities, and Its Information-Sharing Efforts in Afghanistan Are Focused on Senior-Level Officials and Are Not Integrated into Existing Mechanisms
To guide Task Force activities, DOD’s senior leadership and the Task Force Director have provided high-level, general direction to Task Force activities; however, the Task Force has not developed written guidance to be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. While mechanisms such as interagency working groups exist in Afghanistan for agencies involved in development activities to share information, the Task Force does not routinely participate in these mechanisms nor have DOD, State, and USAID determined how to integrate the Task Force into these information-sharing efforts. The Task Force was also required to share information on its activities and projects in Afghanistan as part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). To support U.S. goals in Afghanistan, DOD’s Task Force and USAID both undertake efforts that promote economic development, including facilitating private sector investment. Without formally defined project management guidance, the Task Force does not have the framework needed to ensure a standard operating approach and consistent project management. Without an agreed- upon approach to more fully integrate the Task Force into existing information-sharing mechanisms in Afghanistan, DOD, State, USAID, and other agencies will not be in a position to fully leverage and coordinate their respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S. economic development goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure effective project management, oversight, and accountability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Task Force to develop written guidance that documents, as appropriate, its management processes and practices, including elements such as criteria for project selection, requirements for establishing metrics and project documentation, and project monitoring and evaluation processes. In addition, USAID stated that our report notes that the Task Force has an advantage over USAID because it has greater flexibility to visit project sites and access to the military. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We began our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own initiative. This report (1) identifies factors to consider in planning any transition of Task Force capabilities to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Task Force had established guidance to manage its activities and shared information with other U.S. civilian agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others are involved in economic development activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2006, DOD established the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) to support its related efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 required that DOD, State, and USAID jointly develop a plan to transition Task Force activities to State, with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. Under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own initiative and with additional congressional direction, GAO identified (1) factors to consider in planning any transition of Task Force activities and (2) the extent to which the Task Force established guidance to manage its activities and has shared information with other federal agencies. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed multiple agency officials in Washington, D.C., Iraq, and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
As of June 2011, DOD, State, and USAID officials were discussing options for transitioning Task Force activities and preparing a response to the fiscal year 2011 NDAA requirements. Based on interviews with senior officials and a review of available data, GAO identified five factors to consider in planning for any transition of Task Force activities to USAID, which generally relate to how these agencies conduct their respective activities. First, although both the Task Force and USAID work to promote economic development, they generally take different approaches. The Task Force is a small, flat, flexible organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives, while USAID is a large agency that conducts short- and long-term projects. USAID officials noted that in addition to other activities, it focuses on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. Second, as part of DOD, Task Force employees are not subject to the same movement restrictions as USAID employees and have greater flexibility to visit project sites and access to military assets. Third, funding and staffing plans would need to be developed. For example, USAID's fiscal year 2011 budget and 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support Task Force activities. Fourth, while both agencies facilitate private sector investment, the nature and focus of their interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force actively identifies potential U.S. and non-U.S. investors and arranges meetings and provides logistical support for them, whereas USAID typically sponsors conferences to provide opportunities for prospective investors to share information. Given these differences, State and USAID officials agreed that the same type of private investment activities conducted by the Task Force may not continue at USAID. Last, the timing of a transition and impact on U.S. objectives will need to be considered. DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that because Task Force activities are important to supporting the U.S. goal of attracting investors, a transition in the near term may negatively impact these efforts. While DOD and the Task Force have provided high-level direction for Task Force activities, the Task Force has not developed written project management guidance to be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. Such guidance could include important elements, such as project selection criteria, requirements to establish metrics, and monitoring and evaluation processes. As a result, the Task Force does not have the framework needed to ensure a standard operating approach, accountability, and consistent project management. The Task Force has generally focused its information-sharing efforts on senior officials in Afghanistan whereas efforts at the project management level have been more ad hoc. Mechanisms such as working groups exist for agencies involved in development activities to share information. However, the Task Force does not routinely participate, and DOD, State, and USAID have not identified how best to integrate the Task Force to share information on its activities. As a result, the U.S. government may not be positioned to fully leverage and coordinate its respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S. goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Task Force develop written project management guidance and that DOD, State, and USAID develop an approach to integrate the Task Force into information-sharing mechanisms. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation. The three agencies generally concurred with the second. |
gao_GAO-06-659 | gao_GAO-06-659_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to assess the effectiveness of information system controls in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Treasury’s financial and sensitive auction information on key mainframe and distributed-based systems that the FRBs maintain and operate on behalf of BPD and that are relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Our assessment included a review of the supporting network infrastructure that interconnects the mainframe and distributed-based systems. Security of Treasury Auction Systems Needs to Be Addressed
Although the FRBs established and implemented many controls to protect the mainframe applications that they maintain and operate on behalf of BPD, they did not consistently implement controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to sensitive data and computing resources for the distributed-based systems and network environment that support Treasury auctions. As a result, increased risk exists that unauthorized and possibly undetected use, modification, destruction, and disclosure of certain sensitive auction information could occur. Furthermore, other FRB applications that share common network resources may also face increased risk. These information system control weaknesses existed, in part, because the FRBs did not have (1) an effective management structure for coordinating, communicating, and overseeing information security activities across bank organizational boundaries and (2) an environment to sufficiently test the auction applications. Mainframe Control Environment
The FRBs had generally implemented effective information system controls for the mainframe applications that they operate and maintain on behalf of BPD in support of Treasury’s auctions and financial reporting. More specifically, the FRBs did not consistently (1) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (2) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access was necessary and appropriate; (3) implement adequate boundary protections to limit connectivity to systems that process BPD business; (4) apply strong encryption technologies to protect sensitive data in storage and on the Federal Reserve networks; (5) log, audit, or monitor security-related events; and (6) maintain secure configurations on servers and workstations. The GAO’s audit of the Treasury auction systems was conducted as part of its review of the Bureau of the Public Debt’s FY 2005 Schedules of Federal Debt. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Reserve System's Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) serve as fiscal agents of the U.S. government when they are directed to do so by the Secretary of the Treasury. In this capacity, the FRBs operate and maintain several mainframe and distributed-based systems--including the systems that support the Department of the Treasury's auctions of marketable securities--on behalf of the department's Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD). Effective security controls over these systems are essential to ensure that sensitive and financial information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disclosure, or destruction. In support of its audit of BPD's fiscal year 2005 Schedule of Federal Debt, GAO assessed the effectiveness of information system controls in protecting financial and sensitive auction information on key mainframe and distributed-based systems that the FRBs maintain and operate for BPD. To do this, GAO observed and tested FRBs' security controls.
What GAO Found
In general, the FRBs had implemented effective information system controls over the mainframe applications they maintain and operate for BPD in support of Treasury's auctions and financial reporting. On the distributed-based systems and supporting network environment used for Treasury auctions, however, they had not fully implemented information system controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive and financial information. The FRBs did not consistently (1) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (2) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that access was authorized only when necessary and appropriate; (3) implement adequate boundary protections to limit connectivity to systems that process BPD business; (4) apply strong encryption technologies to protect sensitive data both in storage and on its networks; (5) log, audit, or monitor security-related events; and (6) maintain secure configurations on servers and workstations. Without consistent application of these controls, the auction information and computing resources for key distributed-based auction systems remain at increased risk of unauthorized and possibly undetected use, modification, destruction, and disclosure. Other FRB applications that share common network resources may also be at increased risk. Contributing to these weaknesses in information system controls were the Federal Reserve's lack of (1) an effective management structure for coordinating, communicating, and overseeing information security activities across bank organizational boundaries and (2) an adequate environment in which to sufficiently test the security of its auction applications. |
gao_GAO-03-563 | gao_GAO-03-563_0 | Since then, INS officials told us that they have de-obligated over $6.6 million that they had obligated after August 2, 2002, and reclassified those obligations to other available sources of base “Enforcement and Border Affairs” fiscal year 2002 funding. Under this strategy, INS intends to acquire the system in two phases. Key processes include the following: Acquisition planning. However, INS obligated entry exit system funding before submitting the plan. Other Observations: Planned Entry Exit Capabilities Are Aligned with Legislation, but Future Expenditure Plans Need to Be Improved
Recent legislation has defined the capabilities that the entry exit system is to provide, and INS’s preliminary plans show that it intends for the system to provide these capabilities. Without sufficiently detailed information on system plans and progress, the Congress will be impeded in its efforts to oversee the system and constrained in its ability to provide timely guidance and release of funding. For example, the system must, among other things, (1) collect and match alien arrival and departure data electronically; (2) be accessible to the border management community, including consular officers, federal inspection agents, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies responsible for the identification and investigation of foreign nationals; and (3) support machine-readable, tamper-resistant documents containing biometric identifiers at U.S. ports of entry. Notify appropriate authorities as required. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary ensure that future expenditure plans (1) be provided to the department’s Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees in advance of entry exit system funds being obligated and (2) fully disclose what entry exit system capabilities and benefits are to be delivered, by when, and at what cost, and how it intends to manage the acquisition to provide reasonable assurance that these system capability, benefit, schedule, and cost commitments will be met. Second, it stated that it had addressed the development of a system security plan and privacy impact assessment and provided a draft document entitled Technical Architecture and Security Requirements that it said addressed these issues. An additional GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Congress limited the ability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to obligate funds for the entry exit system until INS submitted an expenditure plan (1) that meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including Circular A-11, part 3; (2) that complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, and guidelines and systems acquisition management practices of the federal government; and (3) that is reviewed by us. To satisfy our legislative mandate, our objectives were to review INS’s expenditure plan to (1) determine whether the plan satisfied the legislative conditions and (2) provide observations about the expenditure plan and INS’s management of the entry exit system. Our review focused not only on the plan, but also on related system documentation and plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to legislative direction, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security, plans to acquire and deploy an entry exit system to assist in monitoring the flow of foreign nationals in and out of the United States. By separate legislative direction, INS must submit to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations a plan for this system that meets certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO, before funds can be obligated. This report satisfies GAO's mandated review obligation by (1) addressing whether the plan submitted by INS, along with related INS documentation and plans, meets required conditions and (2) providing observations about the plan and INS's management of the system.
What GAO Found
INS's initial expenditure plan and associated system acquisition documentation and plans for the entry exit system partially meet the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress. That is, INS has implemented or has defined plans for implementing most of the legislatively mandated requirements for the plan's content, which include such areas as capital planning and investment control, acquisition, and systems acquisition management. However, key issues related to understanding and implementing system requirements, such as developing a system security plan and assessing system impact on the privacy of individuals, remain to be addressed. Moreover, INS reported that it had obligated some entry exit funding before it submitted the plan to the Appropriations Committees. Since then, INS officials told GAO that they have de-obligated and reclassified these obligations to other available funding sources. GAO observed that INS has preliminary plans showing that it intends to acquire and deploy a system that has functional and performance capabilities that satisfy the general scope of capabilities required under various laws. These include the capability to (1) collect and match alien arrival and departure data electronically; (2) be accessible to the border management community (including consular officers, federal inspection agents, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies responsible for identifying and investigating foreign nationals); and (3) support machine-readable, tamper-resistant documents with biometric identifiers at ports of entry. Each of these capabilities is integral to supporting our nation's border security process. However, GAO also observed that the initial plan does not provide sufficient information about INS commitments for the system, such as what specific system capabilities and benefits will be delivered, by when, and at what cost, and how INS intends to manage the acquisition to provide reasonable assurance that it will meet these commitments. Without sufficiently detailed information on system plans and progress, the Congress will be impeded in its efforts to oversee the system. |
gao_GAO-03-188 | gao_GAO-03-188_0 | Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Congress mandated that INS improve its ability to identify aliens who arrive and depart the United States and who overstay their visas. INS’s Alien Address Records Are Not Reliable
Despite these laws and regulations, INS’s address information cannot be relied upon to locate many aliens who are in the United States. Those aliens who wish to remain illegally in the country would not likely comply as it could lead to their removal. Lack of Publicity, No Enforcement of Penalties, and Inadequate Processing Procedures Contribute to INS’s Unreliable Address Information
Lack of publicity, no enforcement of penalties for not filing a change of address notification, and inadequate procedures and controls for processing change of address notifications explain in part why INS cannot maintain current and reliable address information. To promote compliance with the change of address notification requirement, INS needs to make aliens aware that the requirement exists. However, according to INS officials, INS does not publicize the requirement, and INS does not inform aliens of the requirement when they enter the country. Aliens may be aware of the requirement but may have little incentive to comply given that, based on our review of available data, INS does not appear to have enforced the removal penalty for noncompliance since the early 1970s. Because its alien address information is unreliable, INS has had numerous difficulties locating aliens who represented a national security threat or who could help with the nation’s anti-terrorism efforts. Taking these steps should help improve the reliability of INS’s address information, but they would not likely result in a system that would allow INS to locate all aliens. To a large extent, the accuracy and reliability of INS’s address information is contingent on aliens’ compliance. It is also likely that some aliens will not know about the requirement or may simply forget to file the forms. We recognize that there are practical and time sequential considerations associated with implementing our recommendations; however, these considerations should not obviate the need to improve the government’s ability to locate aliens by increasing the reliability of INS’s alien address information. DOJ did not comment on our recommendations to (1) establish written procedures and controls to ensure that alien address information in all automated databases is complete, consistent, accurate, and current or (2) evaluate alternative approaches and their associated costs for obtaining or assembling complete alien address information, particularly for those aliens who do not comply with the change of address notification requirement. Attorneys on the numbers of nonimmigrants who were sought, had departed the country, or who were located and interviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government's need to locate aliens in the United States was considerably heightened. Without reliable alien address information, the government is impeded in its ability to find aliens who represent a national security threat or who could help with the nation's anti-terrorism efforts. Requesters from both the Senate and House asked GAO to review the reliability of INS's alien address information and identify the ways it could be improved.
What GAO Found
Recent events have shown that INS's alien address information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were of interest to the United States. For example, the Department of Justice sought to locate and interview 4,112 aliens who were believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would assist the nation in its anti-terrorism efforts. However, as shown below, almost half of these aliens could not be located and interviewed because INS lacked reliable address information. The reliability of INS's alien address information is contingent, in part, on aliens' compliance with the requirement that they notify INS of any change of address. However, lack of publicity about the requirement that aliens should file change of address notifications, no enforcement of penalties for noncompliance, and inadequate processing procedures for changes of address also contribute to INS's alien address information being unreliable. Because INS does not publicize the change of address requirement, some aliens may not be aware of it and may not comply with it. Alternatively, some aliens who are aware of the requirement may not comply because they do not wish to be located. These aliens have little incentive to comply given that INS does not enforce the penalties for noncompliance. On the basis of our review of available data, INS does not appear to have enforced the removal penalty for noncompliance since the early 1970s. When aliens do comply with the requirement, INS lacks adequate processing procedures and controls to ensure that the alien address information it receives is recorded in all automated databases. Addressing these problems should help improve the reliability of INS's alien address information but would not necessarily result in a system that would allow INS to reliably locate all aliens, because some aliens will not likely comply. INS has recognized the need to increase the reliability of its alien address information and is taking some steps to improve it. |
gao_GAO-13-724T | gao_GAO-13-724T_0 | Background
HUD implemented the MTW demonstration program in 1999. In addition to addressing the program’s three statutory purposes—reduce costs and achieve greater cost-effectiveness in federal housing expenditures, give families with children incentives to obtain employment and become self-sufficient, and increase housing choices for low-income families—MTW agencies must meet five requirements. As we reported in 2012, HUD had not identified the performance data needed to assess the results of similar MTW activities or of the program as a whole. HUD also had not established performance indicators for MTW. The shortage of standard performance data and performance indicators had hindered comprehensive evaluation efforts, which are key to determining the success of any demonstration program. We recommended in 2012 that HUD (1) improve its guidance to MTW agencies on providing performance information in their annual reports by requiring that such information be quantifiable and outcome-oriented, (2) develop and implement a plan for quantitatively assessing the effectiveness of similar activities and for the program, and (3) establish performance indicators for the program. HUD partially agreed with these recommendations. Since our report, HUD has revised the performance reporting requirements for MTW agencies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approved these revisions on May 31, 2013. Because HUD had not developed criteria and a systematic process for identifying lessons learned, we reported in 2012 that it was limited in its ability to promote useful practices for broader implementation. HUD Could Strengthen Some Monitoring Policies and Procedures
HUD had policies and procedures in place to monitor MTW agencies but could have done more to ensure that MTW agencies demonstrated compliance with statutory requirements and to identify possible risks relating to each agency’s activities. For example, as noted in our 2012 report, HUD had not issued guidance to MTW agencies clarifying key program terms, including definitions of the purposes and statutory requirements of the MTW program. As discussed later, HUD has since updated its guidance. Without a process for systematically assessing compliance with statutory requirements, HUD lacked assurance that agencies were complying with them. HUD also lacked assurance that it had been using its limited monitoring resources efficiently. Finally, we reported that HUD did not have policies or procedures in place to verify the accuracy of key information that agencies self-report, such as the number of program participants and the average income of residents “graduating” from MTW programs. reported performance information during their reviews of annual reports or annual site visits. information that MTW agencies self-report. HUD also described steps it was taking to improve its guidance to MTW agencies and implement risk-based monitoring procedures. Additionally, according to a HUD official, the recently approved reporting requirements will result in more standardized data that HUD can verify either through audits or during site visits. Since our report was issued, four additional agencies were admitted into the program. HUD required these agencies to implement and study rent reform activities through partnerships with local universities and a research organization. HUD, Moving to Work (2010). Finally, information from a private research organization, affordable housing advocates, and MTW agencies suggested that allowing additional PHAs to participate in the program could result in additional opportunities to test innovative ideas and tailor housing programs and activities to local conditions. However, a lack of performance information (which creates a limited basis for judging what lessons could be taken from the program to date), limited HUD oversight, and concerns about the program’s impact on residents raised questions about expanding the MTW program. The report concluded that, given these limitations, expansion should occur only if newly admitted PHAs structured their programs for high-quality evaluations that permitted lessons learned to be generalized for other PHAs. Until more complete information on the program’s effectiveness and the extent to which agencies adhered to program requirements is available, it will be difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW would benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve. | Why GAO Did This Study
Implemented in 1999, HUDs MTW demonstration program gives participating PHAs the flexibility to create innovative housing strategies. MTW agencies must create activities linked to three statutory purposesreducing costs, providing incentives for self-sufficiency, and increasing housing choicesand meet five statutory requirements. Congress has been considering expanding MTW.
This testimony discusses (1) the programs progress in addressing the three purposes, (2) HUDs monitoring efforts, and (3) potential benefits of and concerns about expansion.
This testimony draws from a prior report on the MTW program ( GAO-12-490 ). For that report, GAO analyzed the most current annual reports for 30 MTW agencies; compared HUDs monitoring efforts with internal control standards; and interviewed agency officials, researchers, and industry officials. For this testimony, GAO also reviewed actions HUD has taken in response to the reports recommendations.
What GAO Found
Opportunities existed to improve how the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) evaluated the Moving to Work (MTW) program, which is intended to give participating public housing agencies (PHA) flexibility to design and test innovative strategies for providing housing assistance. GAO reported in April 2012 that HUD had not (1) developed guidance specifying that performance information collected from MTW agencies be outcome-oriented, (2) identified the performance data needed to assess results, or (3) established performance indicators for the program. The shortage of such standard performance data and indicators had hindered comprehensive evaluation efforts; such evaluations are key to determining the success of any demonstration program. In addition, HUD had not developed a systematic process for identifying lessons learned from the program, which limited HUD's ability to promote useful practices for broader implementation. Since the GAO report, HUD has revised reporting requirements for MTW agencies. These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget in May 2013. GAO is reviewing this new guidance.
In 2012, GAO also reported that HUD had not taken key monitoring steps set out in internal control standards, such as issuing guidance that defines program terms or assessing compliance with all the program's statutory requirements. As a result, HUD lacked assurance that MTW agencies were complying with statutory requirements. Additionally, HUD had not done an annual assessment of program risks, although it had a requirement to do so, and had not developed risk-based monitoring procedures. Without taking these steps, HUD lacked assurance that it had identified all risks to the program. Finally, HUD did not have policies or procedures in place to verify the accuracy of key information that MTW agencies self-report. For example, HUD staff did not verify self-reported performance information during their reviews of annual reports or annual site visits. Without verifying at least a sample of information, HUD could not be sure that self-reported information was accurate. According to HUD, the recently approved reporting requirements will result in more standardized data that HUD can verify either through audits or during site visits.
Finally, GAO noted in 2012 that expanding the MTW program might offer benefits but also raised questions. According to HUD, affordable housing advocates, and MTW agencies, expanding MTW to additional PHAs would allow agencies to develop more activities tailored to local conditions and produce more lessons learned. However, data limitations and monitoring weaknesses raised questions about expansion. HUD had reported in 2010 that expansion should occur only if newly admitted PHAs structured their programs to permit high-quality evaluations and ensure that lessons learned could be generalized. Since the GAO report was issued, four additional agencies were admitted into the program. HUD required these agencies to implement and study rent reform activities through partnerships with local universities and a research organization. Until more complete information on the program's effectiveness and the extent to which agencies adhered to program requirements is available, it will be difficult for Congress to know whether an expanded MTW would benefit additional agencies and the residents they serve.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that HUD improve MTW information and monitoring. HUD partially agreed with these recommendations and has since issued new guidance to MTW agencies. |
gao_GAO-05-818 | gao_GAO-05-818_0 | Background
Under the provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, NASA is authorized to acquire aircraft. For purposes of this aggregate comparative cost analysis, we considered available NASA reported data on costs applicable to its passenger aircraft services—both variable and fixed costs--in comparison with commercial airline service costs. Specifically, estimated costs associated with NASA’s passenger aircraft operations during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 were almost $25 million, while we estimated the cost of commercial coach tickets for the same number of travelers would have been approximately $5 million—about $20 million more to provide NASA passenger aircraft services than if commercial airlines were used to provide passenger transportation over the 2-year period. Table 1 summarizes our analysis of commercial and NASA passenger transportation costs by types of NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft. NASA Passenger Aircraft Ownership to Support Routine Business Not Justified
Not only were NASA’s passenger aircraft services significantly more costly than commercial airlines, but NASA’s continued ownership of aircraft to provide air transportation supporting routine NASA business operations was not in accordance with OMB guidance. Our analysis of available flight data showed that an overwhelming majority (86 percent) of the flights taken during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 using NASA passenger aircraft services were to support routine business operations, including attending meetings, conferences, and site visits. A-126, the governing federal policy guidance in this area, provides that agencies should own aircraft only to the extent needed to meet mission requirements, such as troop transportation, prisoner transportation, intelligence and counter narcotics activities, and aeronautical research. NASA’s studies compared its aircraft ownership costs against costs of NASA leasing aircraft to provide passenger transportation services because “commercial airlines cannot effectively meet all mission requirements.” For example, NASA’s March 2004 A-76 study was based on the assumption that NASA aircraft would be required to support mission requirements of an estimated 400-450 flight hours a year--essentially the total number of flight hours flown by that NASA center’s passenger aircraft during 2003 and 2004. However, since purchasing the aircraft, NASA has been using these aircraft as part of its passenger aircraft services fleet. This may include NASA employee spouses and relatives, contractors, or other federal agency personnel. Without agencywide data on flight purposes and costs related to its passenger aircraft services, NASA managers and Congress lack critical information they need to make key aircraft ownership decisions. Weaknesses In Justification Process for Individual Passenger Aircraft Flights
As discussed previously, our analysis of available estimates of NASA’s aggregate costs associated with its passenger aircraft services in comparison with commercial airline ticket costs showed that NASA’s passenger aircraft services cost about $20 million more than commercial airlines. To assess the effectiveness of NASA’s oversight and management of its passenger aircraft operations, we held discussions with appropriate aircraft management officials at NASA headquarters and centers operating passenger aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its creation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has operated passenger aircraft services. These operations have been questioned in several prior audit reports. GAO was asked to perform a series of audits of NASA's controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. In this audit, GAO assessed (1) the relative cost of NASA passenger aircraft services in comparison with commercial costs, (2) whether NASA aircraft services were retained and operated in accordance with governmentwide guidance, and (3) the effectiveness of NASA's oversight and management of this program.
What GAO Found
NASA-owned and -chartered passenger aircraft services provide a perquisite to employees, but cost taxpayers an estimated five times more than flying on commercial airlines. While the majority of NASA air travel is on commercial airlines, NASA employees took at least 1,188 flights using NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Use of NASA passenger aircraft services can save time, provide more flexibility to meet senior executives' schedules, and provide other less tangible and quantifiable benefits. However, GAO's analysis of available reported data related to NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed NASA reported costs were nearly $25 million compared with estimated commercial airline coach transportation costs of about $5 million. Further, this relative cost comparison, based on available NASA reported costs, did not take into account all applicable types of costs associated with its passenger aircraft services, including, for example, depreciation associated with the estimated $14 million NASA paid in 2001 to acquire several aircraft used for passenger transportation. Consequently, NASA's passenger air transportation services are much more costly than indicated by available data. Further, NASA is currently considering additional expenditures of about $77 million to upgrade and expand its existing passenger fleet. NASA's ownership of aircraft used to provide passenger transportation conflicts with federal policy allowing agencies to own aircraft only as needed to meet specified mission requirements, such as prisoner transportation and aeronautical research. GAO's analysis of NASA passenger aircraft flights for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed that an estimated 86 percent--about seven out of every eight flights--were taken to support routine business operations specifically prohibited by federal policy regarding aircraft ownership, including routine site visits, meetings, speeches, and conferences. Further, agencywide oversight and management of its passenger aircraft services was not effective. NASA's ability to make informed decisions on continued ownership of its passenger aircraft fleet and on flight-by-flight justifications was impaired by the lack of reliable agencywide data on aircraft costs and other weak management oversight practices. |
gao_GAO-02-829 | gao_GAO-02-829_0 | Reservists mobilized under federal authorities are covered by TRICARE, DOD's health care system. According to DOD’s 2000 Survey of Reserve Component Personnel, nearly 80 percent of reservists reported having health care coverage. More than three-quarters of reservists were provided health care coverage by their civilian employers’ health plans or their spouses’ health plans. 1.) Few Mobilized Reservists’ Dependents Experience Disruptions Because Most Reservists Maintain Civilian Coverage, Some at Additional Cost
Because most reservists maintained their civilian coverage when mobilized, few dependents experienced disruptions in coverage. For 2003 through 2007, the estimated cost to DOD for providing reservists and their dependents continuous health care coverage, regardless of reservists’ mobilization status, would range from about $4 billion to $19.7 billion for the 5-year period, depending on how the benefit was provided. Finally, we interviewed officials in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; the TRICARE Management Activity; the National Guard Bureau; the Department of Labor; representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserve Components; and reservist advocacy groups, including the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States, the National Guard Association of the United States, the National Military Family Association, the Ohio Air National Guard, the Reserve Officers Association, the Retired Officers Association, and the Retired Enlisted Association. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated costs associated with options specified in the 2002 NDAA for providing coverage for reservists. The 14 percent of reservists who were federal employees were excluded from the estimates because they presumably have health insurance coverage under Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). Ninety percent of reservists would use vouchers. | What GAO Found
To expand the capabilities of the nation's active duty forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on the 1.2 million men and women of the Reserve and National Guard. Currently, reserve components constitute nearly half of the total armed forces. Although DOD requires reservists to use TRICARE DOD's health care system for their own health care, using TRICARE is an option for their dependents. Nearly 80 percent of reservists had health care coverage when they were not on active duty, according to a GAO survey. The most frequently cited sources of coverage were civilian employer health plans and spouses' employer health plans. Few dependents of mobilized reservists experience disruptions in their health coverage--primarily because most maintained civilian health coverage while reservists were mobilized. Ninety percent of the reservists with civilian health coverage maintained that coverage. The 5-year cost of the coverage options delineated in the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act range from $89 million, for expanding the transition benefit allowing mobilizations, to $19.7 billion, for continuous coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-210 | gao_T-HEHS-96-210_0 | plans to have mailed statements automatically to more than 70 million workers. Overall public reaction to receiving an unsolicited PEBES has been consistently favorable. Moreover, SSA has not tested for reader comprehension and has not collected detailed information from its front-line workers on the public’s response to the PEBES. Commissioner’s Message Does Not Effectively Convey Purpose
In the 1996 PEBES, the message from the Commissioner of Social Security does not clearly explain why SSA is providing the statement. No Consensus on the Best Model for the Statement
Although the public and benefit experts agree that the current statement contains too much information, neither a standard benefit statement model exists in the public or private sector nor does a clear consensus on how best to present benefit information. By focusing on reduced printing costs as the main reason for redesigning the PEBES, SSA is overlooking the hidden costs of the statement’s existing weaknesses. Furthermore, if the PEBES frustrates or confuses people, it could undermine public confidence in SSA and its programs. To improve the statement, SSA can quickly make some basic changes. The changes include improving the layout and design and simplifying certain explanations. These revisions will require time to collect data and to develop and test alternatives. SSA can help ensure that the changes target the most significant weaknesses by systematically obtaining more detailed feedback from front-line workers. Your Personal Earnings and Benefit Estimate Statement
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Personal Earnings and Benefit Estimate Statement (PEBES).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public has reacted favorably to unsolicited PEBES, and SSA has improved the statement in response to public feedback; (2) the public generally feels that the statement is a valuable tool for retirement planning, but the statement does not clearly convey its purpose and related information on SSA programs and benefits; (3) PEBES weaknesses have resulted from its piecemeal development and the lack of testing for comprehension; (4) there is no consensus on the best model for PEBES; (5) SSA plans to redesign PEBES only if the redesign results in lower printing costs; (6) this approach fails to recognize the hidden costs arising from the need to answer public inquiries about statement information and the undermining of public confidence in SSA programs by the statement's poor design; (7) SSA needs to improve PEBES layout and design and simplify certain explanations, obtain more detailed feedback from its frontline workers, conduct comprehension tests, and consider alternative statement formats; and (8) SSA senior management attention is needed to ensure the success of the statement initiative by redesigning PEBES to present benefits information more effectively. |
gao_GAO-07-460T | gao_GAO-07-460T_0 | Background
For about a decade, the Coast Guard has been developing an Integrated Deepwater System (or Deepwater) acquisition program, a long-term plan to replace or modernize is fleet of vessels and aircraft. Deepwater is the largest and most complex acquisition project in the Coast Guard’s history. Then, in February 2006, the Coast Guard again updated its Deepwater plan to align with its fiscal year 2007 budget submissions. Coast Guard’s Acquisition Approach to Deepwater Program
In 2001, we described the Deepwater program as “risky” due to the unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude within the Coast Guard. System of Systems
Rather than using the traditional approach of replacing classes of ships or aircraft through a series of individual acquisitions, the Coast Guard chose to use a system-of-systems acquisition strategy that would replace its deteriorating assets with a single, integrated package of aircraft, vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles, to be linked through systems that provide C4ISR, and supporting logistics. This type of business arrangement can give the contractor extensive involvement in requirements development, design, and source selection of major system and subsystem subcontractors. If performance-based acquisitions are not appropriately planned and structured, there is an increased risk that the government may receive products or services that are over cost estimates, delivered late, and of unacceptable quality. We specifically made 11 recommendations to the Coast Guard, which can found at Table 1 on page 12. Our reported concerns in 2004 and in subsequent assessments in 2005 and 2006 have centered on three main areas: program management, contractor accountability, and cost control through competition. We have ongoing work to monitor and evaluate the Coast Guard’s efforts. Program Management and the Importance of Integrated Product Teams
Our previous work and recommendations were based on concerns about the Coast Guard’s program management. IPTs are the Coast Guard’s primary tool for managing the Deepwater program and overseeing the system integrator. We reported in 2004 that the teams had struggled to effectively carry out their missions. We will continue to review Deepwater implementation and contract oversight. Performance and Design Problems Creating Operational Challenges for Coast Guard
In addition to overall management issues discussed above, there have been problems with the performance and design of Deepwater patrol boats that pose significant operational challenges to the Coast Guard. Performance Problems with the Converted 123-Foot Patrol Boats
The Deepwater program’s conversion of the legacy 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats has encountered performance problems. The Coast Guard is exploring options to address operational gaps resulting from the suspension of the 123-foot patrol boat operations. Design Problems with the Fast Response Cutter
U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Public Affairs, Coast Guard Suspends Converted Patrol Boat Operations, November 30, 2006,. weight and horsepower requirements. One operational challenge related to the FRC, is that the Coast Guard will end up with two classes of FRCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Coast Guard's Deepwater program is a 25-year, $24 billion plan to replace or modernize its fleet of vessels and aircraft. While there is widespread acknowledgment that many of the Coast Guard's aging assets need replacement or renovation, concerns exist about the acquisition approach the Coast Guard adopted in launching the Deepwater program. From the outset, GAO has expressed concern about the risks involved with the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy, and continues to review Deepwater program management. This statement discusses (1) the Coast Guard's acquisition approach for the Deepwater program; (2) previous GAO recommendations to the Coast Guard on Deepwater, highlighting the importance of Integrated Product Teams; and (3) operational challenges the Coast Guard is facing because of performance and design problems with Deepwater patrol boats.
What GAO Found
In 2001, we described the Deepwater project as "risky" due to the unique, untried acquisition strategy for a project of this magnitude within the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard used a system-of-systems approach to replace deteriorating assets with a single, integrated package of aircraft, vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The Coast Guard also used a system integrator--which can give the contractor extensive involvement in requirements development, design, and source selection of major system and subsystem subcontractors. The Deepwater program is also a performance-based acquisition, meaning that it is structured around the results to be achieved rather than the manner in which the work is performed. If performance-based acquisitions are not appropriately planned and structured, there is an increased risk that the government may receive products or services that are over cost estimates, delivered late, and of unacceptable quality. GAO's reported concerns and related recommendations in 2004 and in subsequent assessments in 2005 and 2006 have centered onthree main areas: program management, contractor accountability, and cost control through competition. In the area of program management, GAO's prior work has found that Integrated Product Teams--the Coast Guard's primary tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor--have struggled to carry out their missions effectively. We have ongoing work reviewing Deepwater implementation and contract oversight and will continue to monitor the Coast Guard's implementation of our recommendations. In addition to these management issues, the Coast Guard is facing operational challenges because of performance and design problems with Deepwater patrol boats. Specifically, problems with the conversion of 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot patrol boats ultimately led the Coast Guard to suspend all normal operations of its converted 123-foot patrol boats on November 30, 2006; the Coast Guard is now exploring options to address the resulting operational gaps. In February 2006, the Coast Guard suspended design work on the Fast Response Cutter (FRC)--which was intended to replace the patrol boats--due to design risks. In moving forward with the FRC acquisition, the Coast Guard will end up with two separate classes of FRCs--an outcome that has resulted in a slippage of the anticipated FRC delivery date. |
gao_GAO-07-1144T | gao_GAO-07-1144T_0 | The Nation’s Long- Term Fiscal Challenge
Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, CBO, and others all show that despite some modest improvement in near-term deficits, we face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. In fact, the long-term fiscal challenge is largely a health care challenge. Although Social Security is important because of its size, the real driver is health care spending. It is both large and projected to grow more rapidly in the future. GAO’s current long-term simulations show ever-larger deficits resulting in a federal debt burden that ultimately spirals out of control. Although the timing of deficits and the resulting debt build up varies depending on the assumptions used, both simulations show that we are on an unsustainable fiscal path. The bottom line is that the nation’s longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting under any realistic policy scenario or assumptions. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that will be faced by future generations. As I noted earlier, despite some recent improvements in short-term deficits, the long-term outlook is moving in the wrong direction. Rapidly rising health care costs are not simply a federal budget problem; they are our nation’s number one fiscal challenge. The longer-term fiscal challenge we face is not solely a federal one—it is a national one. Figure 5 shows both the federal fiscal path and the fiscal path for the whole of government. Certainly controlling discretionary spending is important, but—as everyone in this room knows even with the large costs associated with the “Global War on Terrorism” and Iraq—discretionary spending is not the part of the budget that drives the long-term fiscal imbalance. Taken together, it is clear that Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid represent an unsustainable burden on the federal budget, our economy, and future generations. This “good news,” however, did not signal any improvement in the long-term outlook. The problem isn’t this year’s deficit—or even the deficit in 2012. The problem is that we are on an imprudent and unsustainable path. Then why should we consider restoration of statutory PAYGO? Looking ahead, the budget process will need to go beyond limiting expansions. Information over a longer time horizon: (1) The President’s budget should include an estimate of the impact of any major spending or tax proposals on these fiscal exposures and on the long-term fiscal outlook; (2) The budget should provide year-by-year data for 10 fiscal years rather than the current 5; and (3) The President’s budget should include a statement of his budgetary goals for the next decade. I have said that the first thing to do is stop digging—and the restoration of credible discretionary caps and PAYGO on both the spending and tax side of the ledger can help with that. They need to be given the facts about the fiscal outlook: what it is, what drives it, and what it will take to address it. We at GAO stand ready to assist you in this important effort. Scope and Methodology
My remarks are based largely on previous reports and testimonies, such as Long-Term Budget Outlook: Deficits Matter—Saving Our Future Requires Tough Choices Today (GAO-07-389T) and Budget Process: Better Transparency, Controls, Triggers, and Default Mechanisms Would Help to Address Our Large and Growing Long-term Fiscal Challenge (GAO-06- 761T). We updated these testimonies with the results from our most recent long-term simulations in The Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: April 2007 Update (GAO-07-983R). Contact and Acknowledgments
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony relates to the broader question: How should we deal with our nation's long-term fiscal challenge in order to help ensure that our future is better than our past? This testimony will start with our longer-term fiscal challenge. Then it will turn to the process question you present at this hearing: the reimposition of a statutory PAYGO rule(s) as a step toward dealing with this challenge. Finally it will talk about moving beyond caps and PAYGO to some ideas on how improved transparency and process changes can help in the effort to put us on a more prudent and sustainable long-term fiscal path. As widely reported earlier this month, the Administration now expects the deficit for fiscal year 2007 to be $205 billion, down from its February estimate of $244 billion and last year's deficit of $248 billion. However, because these numbers include the Social Security surpluses, they mask what GAO likes to call the "operating deficit" now estimated to be $385 billion for fiscal year 2007. Clearly lower short-term deficits are better than higher short-term deficits. However, our real challenge is not short-term deficits, rather it's the long-term structural deficits and related debt burdens that could swamp our ship of state if we do not get serious soon. Specifically, while our near-term fiscal picture is better, our long-term fiscal outlook is not. Health care costs are still growing faster than the economy and the population is still aging. Indeed, what we call the long-term fiscal challenge is not in the distant future. The first of the baby boomers become eligible for early retirement under Social Security on January 1, 2008--less than 1 year from now-- and for Medicare benefits in 2011--just 3 years later. The budget and economic implications of the baby boom generation's retirement have already become a factor in Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) 10-year baseline projections and will only intensify as the baby boomers age. Simply put, our nation is on an imprudent and unsustainable long-term fiscal path that is getting worse with the passage of time. Herbert Stein once said that something that is not sustainable will stop. That, however, should not give us comfort. Clearly, it is more prudent to change the path than to wait until a crisis occurs. While restraint in the near term and efforts to balance the budget over the next 5 years can be positive, they are not enough. It is also important that we take steps to address our longer-term fiscal imbalance. The real problem is not the nearterm deficit--it is the long-term fiscal outlook. It is important to look beyond year 5 or even year 10. Both the budget and the budget process need more transparency over and focus on the long-term implications of current and proposed spending and tax policies. GAO will suggest a number of things that it believes will help in this area in this testimony. These remarks are based on our previous work on a variety of issues, including reports and testimonies on our nation's long-term fiscal challenges and budget process reform. These efforts were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
Long-term fiscal simulations by GAO, CBO, and others all show that despite some modest improvement in near-term deficits, we face large and growing structural deficits driven primarily by rising health care costs and known demographic trends. In fact, the long-term fiscal challenge is largely a health care challenge. Although Social Security is important because of its size, the real driver is health care spending. It is both large and projected to grow more rapidly in the future. GAO's current long-term simulations show ever-larger deficits resulting in a federal debt burden that ultimately spirals out of control. Although the timing of deficits and the resulting debt build up varies depending on the assumptions used, both simulations show that we are on an unsustainable fiscal path. The bottom line is that the nation's longer-term fiscal outlook is daunting under any realistic policy scenario or assumptions. Continuing on this unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security. Our current path also increasingly will constrain our ability to address emerging and unexpected budgetary needs and increase the burdens that will be faced by future generations. |
gao_GAO-06-387 | gao_GAO-06-387_0 | OCC Described Types of State Laws That Would Be Preempted, but Questions Remain Regarding the Rules’ Scope and Effect
In the bank activities rule, OCC attempted to clarify the types of state laws that would be preempted by relating them to certain categories, or subjects, of activity conducted by national banks and their operating subsidiaries. In the visitorial powers rulemaking, OCC sought to clarify the extent of its supervisory authority. Questions Remain Concerning the Applicability of State Consumer Protection Laws
Although OCC issued the bank activities rule to clarify the applicability of state laws to national banks and their operating subsidiaries, many of the state officials, consumer groups, and law professionals we interviewed said that the preemption rules did not resolve questions about the applicability of certain types of state law to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. However, OCC has indicated that even under the standard for preemption set forth in the rules, state consumer protection laws can apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. For example, since the promulgation of the preemption rules, OCC has said that state consumer protection laws, and specifically fair lending laws, may apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. According to Most State Officials We Contacted, the Preemption Rules Have Diminished State Consumer Protection Efforts
According to most state officials we contacted, the preemption rules have limited the actions states can take to resolve consumer issues and negatively affected the way national banks respond to consumer complaints and inquiries from state officials. However, other state officials reported good working relationships with national banks and their operating subsidiaries, and some national bank officials said that cooperation with state attorneys general was good business practice. The Rules’ Effect on Charter Choice Is Uncertain, but Some States Are Addressing Potential Charter Changes
Many factors affect charter choice, and we could not isolate the effect of the preemption rules, if any, on charter changes. According to our analysis of FRB and OCC data from 1990 to 2004, the number of banks that changed between the federal and state charters was relatively small compared with all banks. For example, the size and complexity of banking operations are important factors in determining which charter will service an institution’s business needs. Suggested Measures for Addressing State Consumer Protection Concerns Include Shared Regulation, Which Raises Complex Policy Issues, and Greater Coordination between OCC and States
Some state officials and consumer groups identified three general measures that they believed could help address their concerns about protecting consumers of national banks and operating subsidiaries: (1) providing for some state jurisdiction over operating subsidiaries; (2) establishing a consensus-based national consumer protection lending standard; and (3) working more closely with OCC, in part to clarify the applicability of state consumer protection laws to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. OCC has issued guidance to national banks designed to facilitate the resolution of individual consumer complaints and address broader consumer protection issues that state officials believe warrant attention. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
On January 13, 2004, the Treasury Department’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which supervises federally chartered “national” banks, issued two sets of final rules covering the preemption of state laws relating to the banking activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries (“bank activities rule”) and OCC’s exclusive supervisory authority over those institutions (“visitorial powers rule”). In this report, we examine (1) how the preemption rules clarify the applicability of state laws to national banks; (2) how the rules have affected state-level consumer protection efforts; (3) the rules’ potential effects on banks’ decisions to seek the federal, versus state, charters; and (4) measures that could address states’ concerns regarding consumer protection. Additionally, this report provides information on how OCC and other federal regulators, as well as state bank regulators, are funded. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)--the federal supervisor of federally chartered or "national" banks--issued two final rules referred to jointly as the preemption rules. The "bank activities" rule addressed the applicability of state laws to national banking activities, while the "visitorial powers" rule set forth OCC's view of its authority to inspect, examine, supervise, and regulate national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The rules raised concerns among some state officials and consumer advocates. GAO examined (1) how the rules clarify the applicability of state laws to national banks, (2) how the rules have affected state-level consumer protection efforts, (3) the rules' potential effects on banks' choices of a federal or state charter, and (4) measures that could address states' concerns regarding consumer protection.
What GAO Found
In the bank activities rule, OCC sought to clarify the applicability of state laws by relating them to certain categories, or subjects, of activity conducted by national banks and their operating subsidiaries. However, the rule does not fully resolve uncertainties about the applicability of state consumer protection laws, particularly those aimed at preventing unfair and deceptive acts and practices. OCC has indicated that, even under the standard for preemption set forth in the rules, state consumer protection laws can apply; for example, OCC has said that state consumer protection laws, and specifically fair lending laws, may apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. State officials reacted differently to the rules' effect on relationships with national banks. In the views of most officials GAO contacted, the preemption rules have had the effects of limiting the actions states can take to resolve consumer issues, as well as adversely changing the way national banks respond to consumer complaints and inquiries from state officials. OCC has issued guidance to national banks and proposed an agreement with the states designed to facilitate the resolution of, and sharing information about, individual consumer complaints. Other state officials said that they still have good working relationships with national banks and their operating subsidiaries, and some national bank officials stated that they view cooperation with state attorneys general as good business practice. Because many factors, including the size and complexity of banking operations and an institution's business needs, can affect a bank's choice of a federal or state charter, it is difficult to isolate the effects, if any, of the preemption rules. GAO's analysis of OCC and other data shows that, from 1990 to 2004, less than 2 percent of the nation's thousands of banks changed between the federal and state charters. Because OCC and state regulators are funded by fees paid by entities they supervise, however, the shift of a large bank can affect their budgets. In response to the perceived disadvantages of the state charter, some states have reported actions to address potential charter changes by their state banks. Measures that could address states' concerns about protecting consumers include providing for some state jurisdiction over operating subsidiaries, establishing a consensus-based national consumer protection lending standard, and further clarifying the applicability of state consumer protection laws. The first two measures present complex legal and policy issues, as well as implementation challenges. However, an OCC initiative to clarify the rules' applicability would be consistent with one of OCC's strategic goals and could assist both the states and the OCC in their consumer protection efforts--for example, by providing a means to systematically share relevant information on local conditions. |
gao_GAO-10-88 | gao_GAO-10-88_0 | In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the Schedules of Federal Debt; assessed the accounting principles used and any significant estimates evaluated the overall presentation of the Schedules of Federal Debt; obtained an understanding of the entity and its operations, including its internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2009; considered BPD’s process for evaluating and reporting on internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt based on the criteria established under FMFIA; assessed the risk that a material misstatement exists in the Schedule of Federal Debt and the risk that a material weakness exists in internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt; evaluated the design and operating effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2009, based on the assessed risk; tested relevant internal control over financial reporting; tested compliance in fiscal year 2009 with the statutory debt limit (31 U.S.C. As of September 30, 2009 and 2008, outstanding gross federal debt managed by the bureau totaled $11,898 and $10,011 billion, respectively. The increase in gross federal debt of $1,887 billion during fiscal year 2009 was due to an increase in gross intragovernmental debt holdings of $144 billion and an increase in gross debt held by the public of $1,743 billion. Debt held by the public primarily reflects how much of the nation’s wealth has been absorbed by the Federal Government to finance prior federal spending in excess of total federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by over 230 individual federal government accounts with either the authority or the requirement to invest excess receipts in special U.S. Treasury securities that are guaranteed for principal and interest by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. Section 1604 of this law increased the statutory debt limit by $789 billion from $11,315 billion to $12,104 billion. Federal debt outstanding is one of the largest legally binding obligations of the Federal Government. Federal debt held by the public increased by 51.2 percent from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2007. This increase is primarily a result of the federal government's response to the financial market crisis and the economic downturn. Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt For the Fiscal Years Ended September 30, 2009 and 2008 (Note 2) (Note 3) (Discounts) (Discounts) ($39,441)
Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt
Notes to the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt For the Fiscal Years Ended September 30, 2009 and 2008 Note 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO is required to audit the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Because of the significance of the federal debt held by the public to the governmentwide financial statements, GAO audits the Bureau of the Public Debt's (BPD) Schedules of Federal Debt annually. The audit of these schedules is done to determine whether, in all material respects, (1) the schedules are reliable and (2) BPD management maintained effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt. Further, GAO tests compliance with a significant provision of law related to the Schedule of Federal Debt (statutory debt limit). Federal debt managed by BPD consists of Treasury securities held by the public and by certain federal government accounts, referred to as intragovernmental debt holdings. The level of debt held by the public primarily reflects how much of the nation's wealth has been absorbed by the federal government to finance prior federal spending in excess of federal revenues. Intragovernmental debt holdings represent balances of Treasury securities held by federal government accounts, primarily federal trust funds such as Social Security, that typically have an obligation to invest their excess annual receipts over disbursements in federal securities.
What GAO Found
In GAO's opinion, BPD's Schedules of Federal Debt for fiscal years 2009 and 2008 were fairly presented in all material respects, and BPD maintained effective internal control over financial reporting relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt as of September 30, 2009. GAO found no instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2009 with the statutory debt limit. As of September 30, 2009 and 2008, federal debt managed by BPD totaled about $11,898 billion and $10,011 billion, respectively. During the last 4 fiscal years, managing the federal debt has continued to be a challenge as evidenced by the growth of total federal debt by $3,980 billion, or 50 percent, from $7,918 billion as of September 30, 2005, to $11,898 billion as of September 30, 2009. The increase to the federal debt has become particularly acute since the onset of the recession in December 2007. Federal government actions in response to both the financial market crisis and the economic downturn have added significantly to Treasury's borrowing needs. The fiscal year 2008 increase in total federal debt of $1,018 billion was the largest annual dollar increase in history; only to be surpassed by the fiscal year 2009 increase of $1,887 billion. During fiscal years 2008 and 2009, legislation was enacted to raise the statutory debt limit on three different occasions. During this period, the statutory debt limit went from $9,815 billion to its current level of $12,104 billion, an increase of 23 percent. |
gao_GAO-07-380 | gao_GAO-07-380_0 | Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) has a contract with Boeing to provide assistance in performing the LSI functions. The Army established a number of key tenets that it wanted to achieve on the FCS program, in partnership with the LSI. The Army not only went forward with FCS, it did so with a planned schedule less than that of a single new system. The Army determined that with its existing acquisition workforce and organizations, it did not have the agility, capability, or capacity to manage the program without an LSI to assist with certain aspects of program management. In addition to the complexity of the integration task, the Army also outlined an unprecedented timeline for FCS’s development—about 5½ years—a shorter timeline than typical for a single weapon system development. Hence, the Army would not have the capacity to manage a multi-system effort like FCS with separate program offices and likely would have had to turn to contractors to fully staff the program offices. Army leadership noted that traditionally, once the Army hired a prime contractor, that contractor would bring its own supplier chains. On the one hand, the LSI plays the traditional role of developing a product for its customer, the Army, and on the other hand, the LSI also performs certain program management and integration responsibilities for the entire program and has a partner-like relationship with the Army. In forging a close partner-like relationship with the LSI, the Army sought to gain advantages such as maintaining flexibility to deal with shifting priorities. At the same time, this relationship, coupled with the vast scope of FCS and the synonymy of the program with the future Army, poses risks for the Army’s ability to provide independent oversight over the long term. OSD is in a position to provide this oversight, but thus far has largely accepted the program and its changes as defined by the Army, even though it is at wide variance from the best practices embodied in OSD’s own acquisition policies. OSD did not adopt this estimate. Contract Provides Incentives for Best Effort but Not Accountability for Program Outcomes
The Army has structured the FCS contract consistent with its desire to incentivize development efforts and make it financially rewarding for the LSI for making such efforts. As with many cost-reimbursable research and development contracts, the LSI is responsible to put forth its best effort on the development of the FCS capability. The definitized contract between the Army and the LSI is a cost-reimbursable contract that is valued at $17.5 billion, comprised of $15.2 billion in cost and up to a 15-percent fee of $2.3 billion. Majority of Program Fees and Costs Are Available to the LSI before FCS Systems Demonstrate Their Performance
Under the terms of the FCS contract, the LSI can earn over 80 percent of its $2.3 billion fee by the time the program’s critical design review is completed in 2011, and roughly 80 percent of contract costs will have been paid out by the Army by that point. We have found that most cost growth on weapon system development programs occurs after the critical design review. The FCS contract is a cost-reimbursement research and development contract. For example, FCS is not the first system-of-systems program DOD has proposed, but it is arguably the most complex. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify factors that led to the Army’s decision to use an LSI for the FCS program and to determine the work performed by the LSI, we performed the following: We obtained and analyzed the program documents including the FCS system development and demonstration contract, statement of work, Army FCS acquisition strategy report, and FCS operational requirements document to gain an understanding of the terms and conditions of LSI responsibilities, the structure and processes of the program, and goals of the Army. To evaluate the Army’s criteria for assessing the LSI’s performance, we conducted the following: We reviewed the financial terms of the contract, the criteria for assessing the LSI’s performance at program incentive events contained in the contract and integrated master plan and conducted quantitative analyses of the contract’s fixed and incentive fees; We reviewed the LSI’s presentations for the Army’s assessment and also interviewed Army officials, who were responsible for reviewing the LSI’s performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program features multiple new systems linked by a first-of-a-kind information network. The Army contracted with a lead systems integrator (LSI) for FCS that could serve in a more expansive role than a typical prime contractor would. In response to a congressional mandate, this report addresses (1) why the Army decided to employ an LSI for the FCS program; (2) the nature of the LSI's working relationship with the Army; and (3) how FCS contract fees, provisions, and incentives work. In conducting its work, GAO reviewed extensive program documentation and held discussions with key officials at DOD and throughout the FCS program.
What GAO Found
In 2003, the Army contracted with an LSI for FCS because of the program's ambitious goals and the Army's belief that it did not have the capacity to manage the program. The original timeframe for FCS's development was a shorter time frame than for an individual weapon system program, let alone a complex systems-of-systems program with a high number of immature technologies at program start. The Army realized that its compartmentalized workforce did not lend itself to the kind of crosscutting work that the FCS program would demand. The Army workforce also did not have the expertise needed to develop the FCS information network or enough people to support the program had it been organized into separate program offices. In contracting with the Boeing Company as LSI, the Army believed it found a management partner who could define and develop FCS and reach across the Army's organizations. Boeing subcontracted with another company, Science Applications International Corporation, to assist with its responsibilities as LSI. The working relationship between the LSI and the Army is complex. The LSI is a traditional contractor in terms of developing a product for its customer, the Army, but also serves like a partner to the Army in management of the FCS program. In its management role, the LSI makes decisions collaboratively with the Army. An advantage of this arrangement is that the LSI and Army can maintain flexibility when dealing with shifting priorities. However, that relationship may pose significant risks to the Army's ability to provide oversight over the long term. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is in a position to provide this oversight but thus far has allowed the Army to depart significantly from best practices and the Office's own policy for weapon system acquisitions. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has also allowed the Army to use its own cost estimates rather than independent--and significantly higher--cost estimates when submitting budget requests. The Army's experience with the LSI on the FCS program may provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense insights on broader acquisition management issues. The Army has structured the FCS contract consistent with its desire to incentivize development efforts. The definitized cost-reimbursable research and development contract valued at $17.5 billion contains up to a 15 percent total fixed/incentive fee, or about $2.3 billion. As with many research and development contracts, the FCS contract obligates the contractor to put forth its best efforts, but does not assure successful outcomes. Assuming that critical design review is completed in 2011, the Army will have paid the LSI over 80 percent to cover the contract costs, plus a possible 80 percent of its fee or profit. GAO has previously reported that most cost growth in DOD weapon system programs occurs after critical design review. Therefore, it is possible for the LSI to have garnered most of its payouts in costs and fees early next decade, even if despite its best efforts, the FCS capability ends up falling far short of the Army's goals. The Army notes that its fee structure is intended to encourage good performance early in the program. |
gao_GAO-14-631 | gao_GAO-14-631_0 | To that end, NASA plans to incrementally develop three progressively more capable SLS launch vehicles—70-, 105-, and 130-metric ton (mt) variants. Program’s Ability to Meet Schedule for 2017 Test Flight at Risk
While the SLS program is satisfying many of NASA’s metrics that measure progress against overall design goals, NASA has not established an executable business case that matches the SLS program’s cost and schedule resources with the requirement to develop the SLS and launch the first flight test in December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. Matching resources to requirements is considered a best practice for establishing a successful acquisition program. However, the development schedule of the core stage, which is driving the overall program schedule, is aggressive and substantial amounts of schedule that the program reserved to resolve unanticipated issues is already threatened. In addition, according to the program’s risk analysis, the agency’s current funding plan for SLS may be $400 million short of what the program needs to launch by 2017. NASA Has Not Matched Resources and Requirements for 2017 Initial Flight Test
NASA has not established an executable business case based on matching the SLS program’s cost and schedule resources with the requirement to develop the SLS and launch the first flight test in December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. We have also found that NASA’s previous attempts to develop new transportation systems, such as the Constellation program, have failed in part because they were focused on maturing designs without adequate funding to support those efforts. Further, eliminating asbestos as a key insulating material within the solid rocket boosters on the SLS has required changes to the booster manufacturing processes to meet safety requirements. SLS Program Has Critical Gaps in Knowledge Needed to Assess Long-Term Affordability, but Opportunities Exist to Promote Affordability
NASA has yet to make mission decisions beyond EM-2 for the SLS program and has not produced a complete life-cycle cost estimate for any of the three planned variants; however, competition opportunities exist for future development work that may promote long-term affordability. Although the agency has identified several possible destinations, it has not decided upon specific missions for the SLS program beyond EM-1 and EM-2, which will directly affect the program’s future development path and flight schedule. Mission selection will likely determine the order of future development efforts, as the program can only afford to develop one upgraded element at a time. Although the program costs are as yet unknown, there are opportunities to improve long-term affordability through competition once the element upgrade development path has been determined. NASA partially concurred with our recommendations, citing among other reasons that actions already in place such as establishing SLS, Orion, and related ground support as separate programs and a block upgrade approach for SLS— and actions it plans to take to track costs—met the intent of our recommendations. Specifically, we pointed out that establishing cost and schedule at the broader program level was unlikely to provide the detail necessary to monitor the progress of each block against a baseline; it was unclear from NASA’s response whether cost commitments the agency plans within the SLS design review process would serve the same purpose as establishing a cost baseline for each respective upgrade; and reporting costs associated with EM-2 and subsequent variants of SLS via the agency’s annual budget submission would not provide information about potential costs over the long term because budget requests neither offer all the same information as life- cycle cost estimates nor are necessarily linked to an established baseline that indicates how much NASA expects to invest to develop, operate, and sustain a capability over the long-term. Our body of work on contracting has shown that competition in contracting is a key element for maintaining cost control. An updated assessment of the launch vehicle market could better position NASA to sustain competition, control costs, and better inform the Congress about the long-term affordability of the program. The initial launch date for SLS is just 3 and a half years away. Beyond the SLS second flight in 2021, the program’s path is unclear. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, we recommend that NASA’s Administrator direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following four actions:
NASA should develop an executable business case for SLS based on matching requirements and resources that results in a level of risk commensurate with its policies. To promote affordability, before finalizing acquisition plans for future capability variants, NASA should assess the full range of competition opportunities and provide to the Congress the agency’s assessment of the extent to which development and production of future elements of the SLS could be competitively procured. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In order to assess the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) progress to conduct its first flight in 2017, we interviewed and obtained briefings and relevant documents from NASA and contractor officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
SLS is NASA's first exploration-class heavy lift launch vehicle in over 40 years. Predecessor programs, such as Constellation, were canceled in the face of acquisition problems and funding shortfalls. NASA estimates it could spend almost $12 billion developing the first of three SLS vehicle variants and associated ground systems through initial launch in late 2017 and potentially billions more to develop increasingly capable vehicles. Ensuring that this program is affordable and sustainable for the long term is a key goal of the 2013 National Space Transportation Policy.
GAO was asked to evaluate SLS program challenges. This report examines (1) the SLS program's progress toward and risks for its first test flight in 2017 and (2) the extent to which the SLS program has plans in place to achieve its long-term goals and promote affordability. To do this, GAO reviewed relevant design, development, cost, and schedule documents; interviewed program officials; and evaluated SLS program actions using acquisition and cost estimating best practices.
What GAO Found
The Space Launch System (SLS) program is making solid progress on the SLS design. However, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not developed an executable business case based on matching the program's cost and schedule resources with the requirement to develop the vehicle and conduct the first flight test in December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. NASA uses a calculation referred to as the “joint cost and schedule confidence level” to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets. NASA policy usually requires a 70 percent confidence level for a program to proceed with final design and fabrication. GAO's work on best practices has shown that programs that do not establish an executable business case that matches requirements—or customer needs—to resources, such as schedule and funding—are at increased risk of cost and schedule growth. The program is satisfying many of NASA's metrics that measure progress against design goals, such as requirements for design maturity. According to the program's risk analysis, however, the agency's current funding plan for SLS may be $400 million short of what the program needs to launch by 2017. Furthermore, the development schedule of the core stage—which drives the SLS schedule—is compressed to meet the 2017 launch date. NASA also faces challenges integrating existing hardware that was not originally designed to fly on SLS. For example, SLS is using solid rocket boosters from the Constellation program, but integrating a new non-asbestos insulating material into the booster design has proven difficult and required changes to the booster manufacturing processes.
The SLS program has not yet defined specific mission requirements beyond the second flight test in 2021 or defined specific plans for achieving long-term goals, but the program has opportunities to promote affordability moving forward. NASA plans to incrementally develop more capable SLS launch vehicles to satisfy long-term goals, but future missions have not been determined, which will directly affect the program's future development path and flight schedule. Mission selection will likely determine which element the program decides to develop next, as the program can afford to develop only one element at a time. The magnitude of these development efforts could be significant but is currently unknown as the program has not developed complete life-cycle cost estimates for the initial or future SLS launch vehicles. In May 2014, GAO recommended that NASA address this issue, and NASA partially concurred, citing that actions taken to structure the programs and track costs met the intent of the recommendations. However, GAO believes NASA's responses do not fully address the concerns about the program's cost estimates. There are opportunities, however, to improve long-term affordability through competition once the development path has been determined and NASA can finalize its acquisition approach. For example, the program plans to compete the procurement of one element; however, the agency has not finalized assessments of options for competitively procuring other future elements. Such assessments could better position NASA to sustain competition, control costs, and better inform Congress about the long-term affordability of the program. GAO's body of work on contracting has shown that competition in contracting is a key factor in controlling cost.
What GAO Recommends
Among other actions to reduce risk and allow for continued assessment of SLS progress and affordability, GAO recommends that NASA develop an executable business case for SLS that matches resources to requirements, and provide to the Congress an assessment of the SLS elements that could be competitively procured for future SLS variants before finalizing acquisition plans for those variants. NASA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-517 | gao_GAO-04-517_0 | Companies sell crop insurance to farmers through agents. Company Decisions Contributed to American Growers’ Failure
American Growers’ failure was the result of a series of company decisions that reduced the company’s surplus, making it vulnerable to collapse when widespread drought erased anticipated profits in 2002. The company’s decisions were part of an overall management strategy to increase the scope and size of American Growers’ crop insurance business. When American Growers’ expenses and losses dropped the company’s surplus below statutory minimums, NDOI declared the company to be in a hazardous financial condition and took control of the company—first placing the company under supervision in November 2002 and then in rehabilitation in December 2002. In addition, RMA did not generally share information or coordinate with state regulators on the financial condition of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program. Although RMA routinely reviewed the financial documents required under the SRA, we found the agency’s financial oversight procedures inadequate to fully assess American Growers’ financial condition. Some of the suggestions to improve the SRA included requiring companies to provide (1) “revenue and expense forecast budget data for the forthcoming year as a part of the plan of operations approval process, including agents’ commission rates and salary and other compensation for top company officials,” (2) “information relating to any planned acquisition of other crop insurance companies,” and (3) “the financial roles that will be played by parent/subsidiary companies in the crop insurance operations.”
RMA Did Not Coordinate Oversight with State Insurance Regulators
RMA did not routinely coordinate with state regulators regarding the financial condition of companies participating in the federal crop insurance program. However, at the conclusion of our review, no written confidentiality agreements had been formalized. RMA Effectively Protected American Growers’ Policyholders but Lacked a Policy to Efficiently Address Insolvencies
RMA worked with NDOI to effectively manage the failure of American Growers by ensuring that policyholder claims were paid and crop insurance coverage was not disrupted. RMA Effectively Protected American Growers’ Policyholders
RMA effectively protected American Growers’ policyholders after the company’s failure by ensuring that farmers’ claims were paid and that their crop insurance coverage was not disrupted. Conclusions
The failure of American Growers, at the time, the largest participant in the federal crop insurance program was caused by the cumulative effect of company decisions over several years, and triggered by a drought that forced the company to severely deplete its surplus to cover operating expenses. While NDOI accommodated RMA’s interests by allowing RMA to fund the operation of the company long enough to pay farmers’ claims, other actions available to the state, including liquidation, could have increased RMA’s costs or limited RMA’s flexibility in protecting policyholders. Specifically, we agreed to determine (1) what key factors led to the failure of American Growers, (2) whether Risk Management Agency (RMA) procedures were adequate for monitoring crop insurance companies’ financial condition, and (3) how effectively and efficientlyRMA handled the dissolution of American Growers. RMA suggests that the state’s initial action impacted its flexibility in working with the state and the company. However, as noted in this report, these procedures were insufficient to assess the overall financial health of a company. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with insurance companies who share in the risk of loss or gain. In 2002, American Growers Insurance Company (American Growers), at the time, the largest participant in the program, was placed under regulatory control by the state of Nebraska. To ensure that policyholders were protected and that farmers' claims were paid, RMA agreed to fund the dissolution of American Growers. To date, RMA has spent about $40 million. GAO was asked to determine (1) what factors led to the failure of American Growers, (2) whether RMA procedures were adequate to monitor companies' financial condition, and (3) how effectively and efficiently RMA handled the dissolution of American Growers.
What GAO Found
The failure of American Growers was caused by the cumulative effect of company decisions that reduced the company's surplus, making it vulnerable to collapse when widespread drought in 2002 erased anticipated profits. The company's decisions were part of an overall strategy to increase the scope and size of American Growers' crop insurance business. However, when anticipated profits did not cover the company's high operating expenses and dropped its surplus below statutory minimums, Nebraska's Department of Insurance (NDOI) declared the company to be in a hazardous financial condition prompting the state commissioner to take control of the company. In 2002, RMA's oversight was inadequate to evaluate the overall financial condition of companies selling federal crop insurance. Although RMA reviewed companies' plans for selling crop insurance and analyzed selected financial data, oversight procedures generally focused on financial data 6 to 18 months old and were insufficient to assess the overall financial health of the company. Additionally, RMA did not routinely share information or otherwise coordinate with state regulators on the financial condition of companies participating in the crop insurance program. For example, NDOI had identified financial and management weaknesses at American Growers. Since American Growers' failure, RMA has acted to strengthen its oversight procedures by requiring additional information on companies' planned financial operations. It is also working to improve its coordination with state insurance regulators. However, as we completed our review, neither of these initiatives had been included in written agency policies. When American Growers failed, RMA effectively protected the company's policyholders, but lacked a policy to ensure it handled the insolvency efficiently. RMA has spent over $40 million, working with the state of Nebraska, to protect policyholders by ensuring that policies were transferred to other companies and that farmers' claims were paid. NDOI accommodated RMA's interests by allowing RMA to fund the operation of the company long enough to pay farmers' claims. Prior to American Growers' failure, RMA did not have an agreement with the NDOI commissioner defining state and federal financial roles and responsibilities. If the NDOI commissioner had decided to liquidate the company, RMA may have incurred more costs and had less flexibility in protecting policyholders. |
gao_GAO-14-274 | gao_GAO-14-274_0 | Federal Agencies’ Responsibilities for Promoting Chemical Safety and Security
OSHA and EPA play key roles in protecting the public from the effects of chemical accidents, with EPA focusing on the environment and public health and OSHA focusing on worker safety and health. Also, DHS does not require certain agricultural producers to report their chemical holdings to DHS. Over 1,300 Facilities in 47 States Reported Having Ammonium Nitrate, but Data Limitations Prevent Obtaining a Complete Count of Facilities
The total number of facilities in the United States with ammonium nitrate is not known because of the different reporting criteria used by different government agencies, reporting exemptions, and other data limitations. While the total number is unknown, over 1,300 facilities reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS. DHS’s data, however, do not include all facilities that work with ammonium nitrate, in part because some facilities, such as farms, currently do not have to report to DHS and, according to DHS officials, other facilities that are required to report may fail to do so. Many of these facilities were concentrated in the South. OSHA Has Not Focused Its Enforcement Efforts on Ammonium Nitrate and EPA Has Not Regulated It as a Hazardous Material
OSHA has regulations for the storage of ammonium nitrate, but the agency has not focused its enforcement resources on the use of ammonium nitrate by the fertilizer industry, which is a primary user. OSHA Has Conducted Little Outreach to the Fertilizer Industry to Increase Awareness of Its Ammonium Nitrate Storage Regulations
Until the explosion in West, Texas, OSHA had not reached out to the fertilizer industry to inform its members of OSHA’s requirements for the storage of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. OECD chemical safety guidance suggests public authorities periodically inspect the safety performance of hazardous facilities. Other OSHA and EPA Chemical Safety Regulations Do Not Apply to Facilities with Ammonium Nitrate
OSHA’s PSM regulations for chemical safety do not cover ammonium nitrate. Under the Executive Order, OSHA and EPA Are Seeking Information on Expanding Regulation and Oversight of Ammonium Nitrate, but Have Not Yet Proposed Any Regulatory Changes
In response to the August 2013 Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, OSHA and EPA, as part of the federal working group, have invited public comment on a wide range of policy options for overseeing the housing and handling of hazardous chemicals in the United States. Some Countries Regulate and Oversee Ammonium Nitrate By Imposing Requirements on Facilities, Conducting Inspections, and Supporting Industry Initiatives to Promote Compliance
Other Countries’ Approaches Include Risk Assessments and Restrictions on Where and How Ammonium Nitrate Can Be Stored
According to foreign officials and government documents, Canada and the three EU countries we contacted—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—require facilities with specified quantities of ammonium nitrate, including fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate, to assess its risk and develop plans or policies to control the risks and mitigate the consequences of accidents. According to guidance published by Environment Canada, a federal-level regulatory agency, facilities that store 22 tons or more of ammonium nitrate must develop and implement an environmental emergency plan. Three of the countries we reviewed—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—restrict the use of wood for storage purposes in certain instances, according to information and documents provided by relevant officials. In addition, certain ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based preparations must be separated from combustible materials, for example by brick or concrete walls. Routine Inspections. Conclusions
Large quantities of ammonium nitrate are present in the United States, although the precise number of facilities with ammonium nitrate is not known. Facilities may be required, in certain circumstances, to report their chemical holdings to federal, state, and local authorities for security and emergency planning purposes. Such data sharing could help federal agencies identify facilities that are not complying with their regulations and enable OSHA to target high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate for inspection. To improve federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, as part of their efforts as members of the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group established by the Executive Order issued in August 2013, develop and implement methods of improving data sharing among federal agencies and with states. 2. 3. To strengthen federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of EPA direct OSHA and EPA, respectively, to consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate and jointly develop a plan to require high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate to assess the risks and implement safeguards to prevent accidents involving this chemical. In addition, EPA, DHS, and OSHA provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2013, about 30 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer detonated during a fire at a facility in West, Texas, killing at least 14 people and damaging nearby schools, homes, and a nursing home. This incident raised concerns about the risks posed by similar facilities across the country. OSHA and EPA play a central role in protecting workers and communities from chemical accidents, and DHS administers a chemical facility security program. GAO was asked to examine oversight of ammonium nitrate facilities in the United States and other countries. This report addresses (1) how many facilities have ammonium nitrate in the United States, (2) how OSHA and EPA regulate and oversee facilities that have ammonium nitrate, and (3) what approaches selected other countries have adopted for regulating and overseeing facilities with ammonium nitrate. GAO analyzed available federal data and data from selected states with high use of ammonium nitrate; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed government officials, chemical safety experts, and industry representatives in the United States and selected countries.
What GAO Found
Federal data provide insight into the number of facilities in the United States with ammonium nitrate but do not provide a complete picture because of reporting exemptions and other data limitations. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) do not require facilities to report their ammonium nitrate holdings. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requires facilities with certain quantities of ammonium nitrate to report their holdings for security purposes. While the total number of facilities in the United States with ammonium nitrate is unknown, as of August 2013, at least 1,300 facilities in 47 states reported to DHS that they had reportable quantities of ammonium nitrate. Federal law also requires certain facilities to report their ammonium nitrate holdings to state and local authorities for emergency planning purposes, but these data are not routinely shared with federal agencies. According to EPA, states are not required to report these data to federal agencies, and each state determines how to share its data. As part of an Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security issued in August 2013, federal agencies are exploring options for improving data sharing, but this work is not yet complete.
OSHA and EPA provide limited oversight of facilities that have ammonium nitrate. OSHA's regulations include provisions for the storage of ammonium nitrate, but the agency has done little outreach to increase awareness of these regulations within the fertilizer industry, a primary user. In addition, the regulations have not been significantly revised since 1971 and allow storage of ammonium nitrate in wooden buildings, which could increase the risk of fire and explosion. Other OSHA and EPA chemical safety regulations—which require facilities to complete hazard assessments, use procedures to prevent and respond to accidents, and conduct routine compliance audits—do not apply to ammonium nitrate. Furthermore, although OSHA targets worksites in certain industries for inspection, its inspection programs do not target facilities with ammonium nitrate and, according to OSHA officials, information on these facilities is not available to them to use for targeting the facilities. International chemical safety guidance suggests authorities should provide facilities information on how regulatory requirements can be met and periodically inspect them.
GAO reviewed approaches to overseeing facilities with ammonium nitrate in Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, selected in part based on recommendations from chemical safety experts. According to foreign officials and government documents, these countries require facilities with specified quantities of ammonium nitrate to assess its risk and develop plans or policies to prevent chemical accidents. For example, Canadian officials said facilities with 22 tons or more of ammonium nitrate are required to complete a risk assessment and an emergency plan. Some countries' storage requirements also restrict the use of wood to store ammonium nitrate. For example, officials told GAO that France restricted the use of wood for storing ammonium nitrate fertilizer after several incidents involving ammonium nitrate fertilizer, and German officials told GAO that certain ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based preparations must be separated from combustible materials by brick or concrete walls.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that federal agencies improve data sharing, OSHA and EPA consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate, and OSHA conduct outreach to the fertilizer industry and target high risk facilities for inspection. DHS, EPA, and OSHA agreed with GAO's recommendations and suggested technical changes, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-488 | gao_GAO-05-488_0 | The space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the assembly and resupply of the station. NASA plans to return the shuttle to flight in July 2005. Figure 2 shows NASA’s proposed plan for operational support of the space station until 2016. NASA’s 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but Opportunities Now Exist for More Detailed Study
According to program officials, NASA’s 2004 informal assessment concluded that alternative launch vehicles would present operational risks, technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost more than returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space shuttle the best option for both assembly and logistics missions through the end of the decade. According to previous studies and our discussions with commercial industry representatives, the time involved for developing an alternate capability would probably preclude assembly missions from consideration. Furthermore, NASA officials did not document these informal proceedings and decisions reached; therefore, the thoroughness of any assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can their conclusions be validated. NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space station. However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its retirement of the shuttle in 2010. When asked about the details of the assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal assessment was based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters and they did not formally document the decision paths. Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, especially for the logistics missions late this decade. While we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth of knowledge necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of alternative launch vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle was the best option to support space station operations. However, NASA’s recent request for information from industry offers the agency an opportunity to enhance its knowledge of alternatives to the space shuttle for providing logistics support for the space station and to explore the use of alternatives to the existing space shuttle manifest currently under review. Although alternate vehicles would not be available for missions to the space station until later this decade and difficult to use for assembly missions, several of the space shuttle’s final flights are planned logistics support missions that might be conducted using alternative launch vehicles. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better position the agency to determine the best available option for providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the NASA Administrator take the following three steps: Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to utilize a comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives that matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the launch vehicles expected to be available; As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b) perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are made for commercial space transportation services to the space station. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) space shuttle fleet has been key to International Space Station operations. Since the grounding of the fleet in February 2003, Russia has provided logistics support. However, due to the limited payload capacity of the Russian space vehicles, on-orbit assembly of the space station stopped. In May 2004 and in February 2005, NASA testified before the Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles to the space shuttle for space station operations. NASA concluded that using alternatives would be challenging and result in long program delays and would ultimately cost more than returning the space shuttle safely to flight. Yet uncertainties remain about when the space shuttle will return to flight, and questions have been raised about NASA's assessment of alternatives. GAO was asked to determine whether NASA's assessment was sufficient to conclude that the space shuttle is the best option for assembling and providing logistics support to the space station.
What GAO Found
NASA's 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated with using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and operation. According to previous studies and our discussions with industry representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using alternative vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA's assessment was insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for logistics support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the space shuttle in 2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the informal assessment, and while we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA officials did not document the proceedings and decisions reached in its assessment. As a result, the existence of this assessment of alternatives cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be validated. NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request for information from various commercial space transportation industries that could provide launch services to support space station operations, following retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station's planned retirement in 2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial launch capability to support space station operations is possible prior to the proposed shuttle retirement in 2010, but stated that this capability would not eliminate any of the scheduled space shuttle flights. NASA is also re-examining its requirements for the type of scientific research to be conducted on the space station as well as the manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of space station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, especially for logistics missions late this decade. |
gao_GAO-15-734T | gao_GAO-15-734T_0 | Refiners Bought All Helium Offered at Auction and Sales Held during the Summer of 2014 for Higher Than Expected Prices
As detailed in our April 2015 report, in the summer of 2014, refiners purchased all the helium offered in BLM’s first-ever competitive helium auction at higher than expected prices. Two refiners purchased all 93 million cubic feet of helium that was auctioned at an average price of $161 per thousand cubic feet—significantly above the prices offered by most other bidders. In interviewing BLM officials and representatives of refiners and nonrefiners and reviewing BLM’s planned implementation actions, we identified multiple, possible explanations for why refiners won all the auctioned helium for higher than expected prices. These explanations included:
Refiners may have been more willing to pay higher prices at the auction since their costs for refining crude helium are lower than those of nonrefiners. BLM officials said they changed this approach based on their interpretation of the 2013 act. the auction, nonrefiners purchased none of the federal helium that BLM made available for delivery in fiscal year 2015. In Administering the Tolling Provision, BLM Does Not Have Full Assurance That Refiners Are Satisfying It
In our April 2015 report, we found that BLM had taken steps to help improve reporting by refiners by clarifying one of the key terms in the tolling provision, but the agency did not have full assurance that refiners were satisfying the provision. The tolling provision requires refiners, as a condition of sale or auction, to make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain nonrefiners. In addition, BLM requested that refiners report information about attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that did not result in signed agreements. According to officials with the Office of the Solicitor, the act does not require refiners to report this information, so reporting is voluntary. As a result, the refiners’ responses to BLM’s request were inconsistent. For example, some refiners reported that they had attempted to negotiate agreements but did not report details about the volume or rates offered. Officials from the Office of the Solicitor said BLM may need to issue a rule to require refiners to report on their signed agreements for less than 15 million cubic feet and their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that do not result in signed agreements. But BLM officials said they do not intend to issue a rule, in part, because it is a time-consuming process that might delay future auctions and sales. Until refiners consistently provide information about signed agreements to toll less than 15 million cubic feet of helium and about their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements, BLM cannot determine the extent to which refiners are satisfying the tolling provision by making excess capacity available at commercially reasonable rates. To provide the agency with better information to support its decisions when implementing the act, in our April 2015 report, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to issue a rule—perhaps an interim final rule if BLM finds there is good cause to do so, given the time constraints—to require refiners to report information about (1) signed agreements to toll less than 15 million cubic feet of helium and (2) their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that do not result in signed agreements. Under BLM’s approach, refiners’ reporting of certain information—specifically, signed agreements to toll less than 15 million cubic feet and their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that did not result in signed agreements—remains voluntary, and not all refiners provided this information to BLM when the agency previously requested it. We continue to believe that undertaking a rulemaking is necessary so that BLM can have better assurance that refiners are satisfying the tolling provision through fiscal year 2021. BLM Faces a Number of Decisions As It Continues to Implement the Act
BLM faces a number of decisions about its continued implementation of the act, including decisions related to its upcoming fiscal year 2016 helium auction and sale. The act requires BLM to conduct each auction using a method that maximizes revenue to the federal government. BLM officials told us they considered multiple auction methods when initially choosing the live auction for the summer 2014 auction, but that they did not assess the auction methods based on maximizing revenue. As of the issuance of our April 2015 report, however, BLM helium program officials had not evaluated the various methods. Without assessing each method based on revenue generation, we found that BLM would not have reasonable assurance that the live auction method will maximize revenue, as required by the act. As a result of this finding, we recommended that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to assess auction methods based on revenue generation, using available information, and select a method that would maximize revenue for the upcoming helium auction. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
Helium is a key nonrenewable resource with a variety of uses. The federal government maintains an underground reservoir near Amarillo, Texas, for the storage of both federally owned helium and helium owned by private companies. The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 establishes a phased process for the privatization of the federal helium reserve in a competitive market fashion. As part of that process, BLM conducted an auction and two sales of federal helium in the summer of 2014.
This testimony highlights the key findings of GAO's April 2015 report (GAO-15-394). Accordingly, it addresses (1) the outcomes of BLM's summer 2014 helium auction and sales, (2) BLM's administration of the act's tolling provision (tolling refers to a helium refiner processing or refining another party's crude helium for an agreed upon price), and (3) upcoming decisions BLM faces as it continues implementing the act. For the April 2015 report, GAO reviewed the 2013 act, BLM's auction and sales results, and tolling agreement reports; interviewed BLM and other Interior officials and representatives of 12 of the 13 refiners and nonrefiners that registered to participate in the auction.
What GAO Found
In April 2015, GAO found that refiners purchased all the helium offered in the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) first-ever competitive helium auction, held in July 2014, at higher than expected prices. Two refiners purchased all 93 million cubic feet of helium that was auctioned at an average price of $161 per thousand cubic feet--significantly above the prices offered by most other bidders. BLM, refiners, and nonrefiners identified possible reasons for the auction's outcome, including that nonrefiners said that refiners had an advantage because their costs for refining crude helium were lower than nonrefiners'. After the auction, BLM sold more than 1 billion cubic feet of helium in two sales restricted to refiners.
BLM has taken steps to help improve reporting by refiners, but GAO found in its April 2015 report that the agency did not have full assurance that refiners were satisfying the tolling provision of the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013. The tolling provision requires refiners, as a condition of sale or auction of helium under the act, to make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain nonrefiners. BLM officials said that one way refiners can satisfy the provision is to attempt to negotiate tolling agreements. The act does not require refiners to report information to BLM about their attempts to negotiate agreements that do not result in signed agreements, so such reporting is voluntary. BLM requested that refiners report this information, but the refiners' responses were inconsistent. For example, some refiners reported that they had attempted to negotiate agreements but did not report details about rates offered. Officials from Interior's Office of the Solicitor said BLM may need to issue a rule to require refiners to report about their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements. However, BLM officials said they do not intend to issue a rule because it is a time-consuming process. Nevertheless, without information about refiners' attempts to negotiate agreements, BLM cannot determine the extent to which refiners with excess capacity are satisfying the tolling provision. Interior disagreed with GAO's recommendation that BLM issue a rule to, among other things, require refiners to report information about their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that do not result in signed agreements. Interior disagreed with the recommendation because it believes existing mechanisms provide needed information. By relying on existing mechanisms, refiners' reporting of this information remains voluntary, and not all refiners provided the information when BLM previously requested it. GAO continues to believe that undertaking a rulemaking is necessary so that BLM can have better assurance that refiners are satisfying the tolling provision.
In addition, GAO found in April 2015 that BLM faces a number of decisions as it continues implementing the act, including a decision about how the agency will choose a method for conducting its auction of a portion of the helium BLM will make available for delivery during fiscal year 2016. The act requires BLM to conduct each auction using a method that maximizes revenue to the federal government. BLM officials said they considered multiple methods before selecting the live auction method used for the July 2014 auction, but they did not assess the methods based on maximizing revenue. As of the issuance of GAO’s April 2015 report, BLM officials had not evaluated various methods, such as sealed bids or simultaneously auctioning multiple lots. Without assessing auction method options based on revenue generation, BLM does not have assurance that a live auction will maximize revenue as required. Interior agreed with GAO’s recommendation that BLM assess and select an auction method that would maximize revenue.
What GAO Recommends
In its April 2015 report, GAO made two recommendations to Interior. Interior concurred with one recommendation but not the other. GAO continues to believe that all of its recommendations have merit and should be fully implemented.
For information, contact Anne-Marie Fennell at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected] |
gao_GAO-04-110 | gao_GAO-04-110_0 | DEA has expressed concern that Purdue marketed OxyContin for a wide variety of conditions to physicians who may not have been adequately trained in pain management. Purdue has stated that by 2003 primary care physicians had grown to constitute nearly half of all OxyContin prescribers, based on data from IMS Health, an information service providing pharmaceutical market research. 1.) In addition, the original label’s safety warning advising patients not to crush the tablets because of the possible rapid release of a potentially toxic amount of oxycodone may have inadvertently alerted abusers to possible methods for misuse. Further, the rapid growth in OxyContin sales increased the drug’s availability in the marketplace and may have contributed to opportunities to obtain the drug illicitly. However, we could not assess the relationship between the growth in OxyContin prescriptions or increased availability with the drug’s abuse and diversion because the data on abuse and diversion are not reliable, comprehensive, or timely. OxyContin’s Formulation May Have Made It an Inviting Drug for Abuse and Diversion
While OxyContin’s potency and controlled-release feature may have made the drug beneficial for the relief of moderate-to-severe pain over an extended period of time, DEA has stated that those attributes of its formulation have also made it an attractive target for abuse and diversion. According to recent studies, oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin, is twice as potent as morphine. History of Prescription Drug Abuse in Some States May Have Predisposed Them to Problems with OxyContin
According to DEA, the abuse and diversion of OxyContin in some states may have reflected the geographic area’s history of prescription drug abuse. Federal and State Agencies and Purdue Have Taken Actions to Prevent Abuse and Diversion of OxyContin
Since becoming aware of reports of abuse and diversion of OxyContin, federal and state agencies and Purdue have taken actions intended to address these problems. Purdue has initiated drug abuse and diversion education programs, taken disciplinary actions against sales representatives who improperly promote OxyContin, and referred physicians who were suspected of improperly prescribing OxyContin to the appropriate authorities. FDA has also taken other actions to address the abuse and diversion of OxyContin. Purdue Is Implementing a Risk Management Plan for OxyContin
In response to concerns about abuse and diversion of OxyContin, in April 2001 FDA and Purdue began to discuss the development of a risk management plan to help detect and prevent abuse and diversion of OxyContin. Although risk management plans were not in use when OxyContin was approved, they are now an optional feature of new drug applications. FDA plans to complete its guidance to the pharmaceutical industry on risk management plans by September 30, 2004. We agree with DEA that Purdue conducted an extensive campaign to market and promote OxyContin using an expanded sales force and multiple promotional approaches to encourage physicians, including primary care specialists, to prescribe OxyContin as an initial opioid treatment for noncancer pain, and that these efforts may have contributed to the problems with abuse and diversion by increasing the availability of the drug in the marketplace. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amid heightened awareness that many patients with cancer and other chronic diseases suffer from undertreated pain, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Purdue Pharma's controlled-release pain reliever OxyContin in 1995. Sales grew rapidly, and by 2001 OxyContin had become the most prescribed brandname narcotic medication for treating moderate-to-severe pain. In early 2000, reports began to surface about abuse and diversion for illicit use of OxyContin, which contains the opioid oxycodone. GAO was asked to examine concerns about these issues. Specifically, GAO reviewed (1) how OxyContin was marketed and promoted, (2) what factors contributed to the abuse and diversion of OxyContin, and (3) what actions have been taken to address OxyContin abuse and diversion.
What GAO Found
Purdue conducted an extensive campaign to market and promote OxyContin using an expanded sales force to encourage physicians, including primary care specialists, to prescribe OxyContin not only for cancer pain but also as an initial opioid treatment for moderate-to-severe noncancer pain. OxyContin prescriptions, particularly those for noncancer pain, grew rapidly, and by 2003 nearly half of all OxyContin prescribers were primary care physicians. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has expressed concern that Purdue's aggressive marketing of OxyContin focused on promoting the drug to treat a wide range of conditions to physicians who may not have been adequately trained in pain management. FDA has taken two actions against Purdue for OxyContin advertising violations. Further, Purdue did not submit an OxyContin promotional video for FDA review upon its initial use in 1998, as required by FDA regulations. Several factors may have contributed to the abuse and diversion of OxyContin. The active ingredient in OxyContin is twice as potent as morphine, which may have made it an attractive target for misuse. Further, the original label's safety warning advising patients not to crush the tablets because of the possible rapid release of a potentially toxic amount of oxycodone may have inadvertently alerted abusers to methods for abuse. Moreover, the significant increase in OxyContin's availability in the marketplace may have increased opportunities to obtain the drug illicitly in some states. Finally, the history of abuse and diversion of prescription drugs, including opioids, in some states may have predisposed certain areas to problems with OxyContin. However, GAO could not assess the relationship between the increased availability of OxyContin and locations of abuse and diversion because the data on abuse and diversion are not reliable, comprehensive, or timely. Federal and state agencies and Purdue have taken actions to address the abuse and diversion of OxyContin. FDA approved a stronger safety warning on OxyContin's label. In addition, FDA and Purdue collaborated on a risk management plan to help detect and prevent OxyContin abuse and diversion, an approach that was not used at the time OxyContin was approved. FDA plans to provide guidance to the pharmaceutical industry by September 2004 on risk management plans, which are an optional feature of new drug applications. DEA has established a national action plan to prevent abuse and diversion of OxyContin. State agencies have investigated reports of abuse and diversion. In addition to developing a risk management plan, Purdue has initiated several OxyContin-related educational programs, taken disciplinary action against sales representatives who improperly promoted OxyContin, and referred physicians suspected of improper prescribing practices to the authorities. |
gao_GAO-10-278T | gao_GAO-10-278T_0 | The Federal Government Supported Disaster Case Management Programs, but Breaks in Federal Funding and Coordination Challenges Hindered Assistance
Multiple federal agencies provided resources for disaster case management programs to help thousands of households cope with the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but breaks in federal funding and coordination challenges adversely affected the delivery of these services to some hurricane victims. FEMA, HUD, and HHS Supported a Variety of Disaster Case Management Programs for Hurricane Victims, but Breaks in Federal Funding Adversely Affected Services to Some
More than $231 million of FEMA and HHS funds have been used to support disaster case management programs to assist victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 1). Breaks in federal funding for disaster case management programs initiated after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita adversely affected case management agencies and may have left victims most in need of assistance without access to case management services. Difficulties in coordinating disaster case management services resulted in a lack of accurate and timely information sharing between federal agencies and case management agencies. 2). Case Managers Faced Challenges in Meeting Client Needs Due to Federal Funding Rules on Direct Assistance and Difficulties in Accessing Needed Resources Through the Long-Term Recovery Committee Process
Case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial assistance for items such as home repairs, clothing, or furniture as key to helping clients with their basic needs; yet such assistance was not always available. Case management agencies that were part of KAT or that provided services under FEMA-funded programs, including the state-managed DCM-P program in Mississippi and the Disaster Housing Assistance Program, were not permitted to provide direct financial assistance. While long-term recovery committees were a resource for case managers to obtain direct assistance to address clients’ unmet needs, in some cases, the efforts to utilize these committees were unsuccessful. FEMA Plans to Use Ongoing Evaluations of Pilot Programs to Inform the Development of a Federal Disaster Case Management Program for Future Disasters; However, Early Evaluations Had Limitations
Several agencies’ evaluations of the various disaster case management pilot programs are ongoing, but to date, little is known about program outcomes. FEMA does not plan to conduct its own outcome evaluation, but will determine lessons learned and best practices from third party evaluations of ongoing pilot programs submitted by each of the agencies administering a pilot program. FEMA agreed with our recommendations, and, according to a FEMA official, the agency is hoping to formalize the program in June 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a result of the damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, the federal government funded several disaster case management programs. These programs help victims access services for disaster-related needs. This testimony addresses the following questions: 1) How did the federal government support disaster case management programs after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and how did federal agencies coordinate their efforts?; 2) What challenges did disaster case management agencies experience in delivering services under federally funded programs?; and 3) How will previous or existing federally funded programs be used to inform the development of a federal case management program for future disasters? This testimony is based on a July 2009 report (GAO-09-561). To complete this report GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and guidance, obtained data from two programs, conducted site visits to Louisiana and Mississippi, and interviewed case management providers and federal and state officials. For this testimony, GAO updated certain information.
What GAO Found
The federal government provided more than $231 million to support disaster case management programs for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; however, breaks in federal funding hindered service delivery, and federal agencies and case management agencies faced coordination challenges. A lack of accurate and timely information sharing and incompatible data systems may have left some victims most in need without access to disaster case management services. Case management agencies experienced challenges in delivering federally funded disaster case management services due to staff turnover and large caseloads, limited community resources, federal funding rules, and a lack of coordinated outreach. For example, case management agencies saw the ability to provide direct financial assistance for items such as home repair, clothing, or furniture as key to helping victims, yet case management agencies that provided services under FEMA-funded programs could not provide direct financial assistance. Long-term recovery committees were a resource for case management agencies to obtain direct assistance, but utilizing these committees was sometimes unsuccessful. Ongoing evaluations of disaster case management pilot programs will inform the development of a federal disaster case management program, but to date, little is known about program outcomes. FEMA plans to analyze third-party evaluations submitted by the agencies administering the pilot programs to determine lessons learned and best practices for the future. According to an agency official, FEMA hopes to formalize the new program in June 2010. |
gao_GGD-95-1 | gao_GGD-95-1_0 | We asked the investors for their opinions on the adequacy and usefulness of the loan data provided through the diskettes and the file reviews. As a result, RTC initially identified and planned to offer for sale over 60,000 nonperforming residential, consumer, and commercial loans with a total book value of about $2.7 billion. About 49,000 loans were dropped from the auction because they (1) did not meet the auction selection criteria, (2) were involved in litigation, (3) had already been designated for other sales initiatives, (4) had already been paid off or sold, or (5) had loan files that could not be located. Loan Servicers Were Not Required to Provide Data Needed to Market Loans
RTC’s loan servicing contracts did not require the loan servicers to provide needed loan data to update the central loan database to ensure that it contained complete and current data needed for marketing purposes.Therefore, current and complete loan data needed to determine whether loans met the loan selection criteria for the August 1993 national auction were not always available. The IG reported that 1,399 performing loans were sold at deep discounts in two nonperforming loan auctions conducted by RTC field offices in 1991 and 1992. Before the auction, RTC offered data about loans to investors in two ways. Our telephone survey indicated that investors who participated in the August 1993 auction generally believed the loan data provided by RTC to be useful, but they found that important data were missing or outdated. Conclusion
The process used by RTC to initially select nonperforming loans for the August 1993 auction was not efficient. As a result of these problems, some investors said they either lowered their bids or did not bid on certain loans in the August 1993 auction. 2. Resolution Trust Corporation: Effectiveness of Auction Sales Should Be Demonstrated (GAO/GGD-92-7, Oct. 31, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Resolution Trust Corporation's (RTC) August 1993 national nonperforming loan auction, focusing on the: (1) process RTC used to select loans for the auction; and (2) adequacy and usefulness of loan data provided to investors before the auction.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RTC efforts to select and dispose of nonperforming loans was hindered by incomplete and outdated loan data; (2) RTC identified over 60,000 nonperforming loans with a total book value of about #2.7 billion for the auction; (3) RTC failed to follow its contracting procedures in modifying loan servicers' contracts to require the submission of monthly standard loan data; (4) the RTC central loan database contained incomplete and outdated data because some loan servicers did not timely submit all relevant data; (5) RTC withdrew about 81 percent of the original 60,000-plus loans selected for auction because they did not meet auction criteria, were in litigation, had been paid off, sold, or designated for other sales; (6) some performing loans were erroneously included in the auction and sold at deep discounts; (7) investors generally believed that RTC loan data was useful, but important data were missing, inadequate, or invalid; (8) some investors lowered their bids or did not participate in the auction because of poor RTC loan data; and (9) RTC has taken actions to correct identified problems in conducting auctions of nonperforming loans. |
gao_GAO-03-701 | gao_GAO-03-701_0 | Changes to the New Starts Process for Fiscal Year 2004 Have Caused Difficulties for Some Project Sponsors
FTA implemented two changes to the New Starts process for fiscal year 2004. First, in response to language contained in a conference report prepared by the House Appropriations Committee, FTA instituted a preference policy in its ratings process favoring current and future projects that do not request more than a 60 percent federal share. Second, FTA revised its cost-effectiveness and mobility improvements criteria by adopting a Transportation System User Benefits (TSUB) measure that gives equal weight to benefits for both new and existing transit system riders. Furthermore, explicitly stating all of FTA’s criteria and procedures in regulations would help to ensure that project sponsors, Metropolitan Planning Organizations, and others involved in considering potential New Starts projects were fully aware of FTA’s preference policy and could make their investment decisions on the basis of a transparent evaluation and ratings process. As a result, many projects experienced difficulties that prevented them from calculating an acceptable value for the TSUB measure. These contractors provided technical support to all affected project sponsors and assisted some sponsors in correcting the underlying problems identified in their local travel forecasting models. The budget proposal also contains three initiatives—reducing the federal share to 50 percent, allowing nonfixed guideway projects to be funded through New Starts, and replacing the “exempt” classification with a streamlined ratings process for projects requesting less than $75 million in New Starts funding. Administration’s Proposed Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Requests 25 Percent Increase in New Starts Funding
The administration’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2004 requests that $1.5 billion be made available for the construction of new transit systems and expansion of existing systems through the New Starts program—an increase of $0.3 billion, or 25 percent over the $1.2 billion appropriated for fiscal year 2003. However, a reduction in the federal share may adversely affect some future projects. These sponsors said that a reduced federal share may make it more difficult for communities to participate in the New Starts program because they will have to provide an increased local share. Because FTA has not revised its regulations to reflect its 60 percent preference policy, transit sponsors, other members of the transit community, and the public may not be fully aware of FTA’s preference policy and have not had the opportunity to formally comment on it. To identify any issues related to those changes, we interviewed FTA officials and contractors hired by FTA to implement those changes; 11 of the 52 sponsors of fixed guideway transit projects being considered for New Starts funding in fiscal year 2004; Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) officials involved in 5 of the projects whose sponsors we interviewed; and transit industry officials, including senior officials at the American Public Transportation Association and the Chair of the New Starts Working Group—an organization of New Starts project sponsors, MPOs, and private transit industry firms, who advocate improvements to the New Starts evaluation and ratings process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21), Congress authorized federal funding for New Starts fixed guideway transit projects--including rail and bus rapid transit projects that met certain criteria. In response to an annual mandate under TEA-21, GAO assessed the New Starts evaluation and ratings process for the fiscal year 2004 cycle, including (1) changes to the process and any related issues and (2) any challenges related to New Starts initiatives contained in the administration's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal.
What GAO Found
FTA made two changes to the New Starts evaluation and ratings process for the fiscal year 2004 cycle. First, in response to language contained in a conference report prepared by the House Appropriations Committee, FTA adopted a 60 percent preference policy, which in effect, generally reduced the level of New Starts federal funding share for projects from 80 percent to 60 percent. Because FTA has not revised its program regulations to reflect this change, transit agencies, project sponsors, and the public did not have an opportunity to formally comment on the change. Explicitly stating its criteria and procedures in regulation would allow those involved in considering potential projects to make their investment decisions on the basis of a transparent process. Second, FTA revised some of the criteria used in the ratings process to include a new Transportation System User Benefits measure. Project sponsors GAO interviewed said that the measure was an improvement over the previous benefits measure because it considers benefits to both new and existing transit system riders. However, many project sponsors experienced difficulties in generating a value for the measure for a number of reasons, such as problems with their local forecasting models. FTA officials are working closely with project sponsors to correct these problems, but more guidance may be necessary to avert similar difficulties in the future. The administration's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal requests that $1.5 billion be made available for New Starts for that year, a 25 percent increase over fiscal year 2003. The budget proposal contains three initiatives--reducing the federal share to 50 percent, allowing certain nonfixed guideway projects to be funded through New Starts, and establishing a streamlined ratings process for projects requesting less than $75 million in New Starts funding. These initiatives may allow FTA to fund more projects and give local communities flexibility in choosing among transit modes. However, they may also create challenges for some future transit projects, such as difficulties in generating an increased local funding share or a reduction in the number of smaller communities that will participate in New Starts. |
gao_GAO-13-330T | gao_GAO-13-330T_0 | Apprehensions Decreased across the Southwest Border from Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011, but Data Limitations Preclude Comparing Overall Effectiveness of Resources Deployed across Southwest Border Sectors
Apprehensions Decreased at about the Same Rate as Estimated Known Illegal Entries across the Southwest Border from Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011; Other Data Provide a Broader Perspective on Changes in Border Security
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry as an interim measure for border security as reported in its annual performance reports. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported data meeting its goal to secure the land border with a decrease in apprehensions. Border Patrol data show that apprehensions within each southwest Border Patrol sector decreased from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring the decrease in estimated known illegal entries within each sector. Border Patrol officials attributed the decrease in apprehensions and estimated known illegal entries from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 within southwest border sectors to multiple factors, including changes in the U.S. economy and successful achievement of its strategic objectives. The Tucson sector, for example, showed little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who were apprehended by Border Patrol over the past 5 fiscal years. Our analysis of Border Patrol apprehension data showed that the recidivism rate has declined across the southwest border by about 6 percentage points from fiscal years 2008 to 2011 in regard to the number of apprehended aliens who had repeatedly crossed the border in the prior 3 years. Seizures of drugs and other contraband. Specifically, the number of drug and contraband seizures increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Data reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report show that seizures of drugs and other contraband across the southwest border decreased from 18,898 in fiscal year 2011 to 17,891 in fiscal year 2012. Southwest border sectors scheduled most agent workdays for enforcement activities during fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and the activity related to patrolling the border accounted for a greater proportion of enforcement activity workdays than any of the other activities. Across enforcement activities, our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that all sectors scheduled more agent workdays for “patrolling the border”—activities defined to occur within 25 miles of the border—than any other enforcement activity, as shown in figure 4. Border Patrol Has Not Yet Developed Goals and Measures for Assessing Efforts and Identifying Resource Needs under the New Strategic Plan
Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal. As we previously testified, at the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported achieving varying levels of operational control of 873 (44 percent) of the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles. Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the department’s evolving vision for border control, DHS established the interim performance goal and measure of the number of apprehensions between the land border ports of entry until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. To support the implementation of Border Patrol’s 2012-2016 Strategic Plan and identify the resources needed to achieve the nation’s strategic goal for securing the border, we recommended in our December 2012 report that Border Patrol establish milestones and time frames for developing a (1) performance goal, or goals, for border security between the ports of entry that defines how border security is to be measured and (2) performance measure, or measures—linked to a performance goal or goals—for assessing progress made in securing the border between ports of entry and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS agreed with these recommendations and stated that it plans to establish milestones and time frames for developing goals and measures by November 30, 2013. Milestones and time frames could better position CBP to monitor progress in developing and implementing goals and measures, which would provide DHS and Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protections (CBP) Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the southwest border between ports of entry. CBP reported apprehending over 327,000 illegal entrants and making over 17,150 seizures of drugs along the border in fiscal year 2011. Across the border, most apprehensions (over 38 percent) and drug seizures (28 percent) occurred in the Tucson sector. This statement discusses (1) apprehension and other data CBP collects to inform changes in southwest border security and data used to show effectiveness of resource deployments, and (2) the extent to which Border Patrol has developed goals and measures to identify resource needs under its new strategic plan. This statement is based on GAOs December 2012 report on CBPs management of southwest border resources and prior reports on DHSs efforts to measure border security, with selected updates from February 2013 on Border Patrol fiscal year 2012 operations data. To conduct prior work, GAO analyzed DHS documents and data from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, and interviewed CBP officials, among other things. To conduct selected updates, GAO reviewed Border Patrol data and interviewed Border Patrol officials.
What GAO Found
Since fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry as an interim measure for border security as reported in its annual performance plans. In fiscal year 2011, DHS reported a decrease in apprehensions, which met its goal to secure the southwest border. Our analysis of Border Patrol data showed that apprehensions decreased within each southwest border sector from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, generally mirroring decreases in estimated known illegal entries. Border Patrol attributed these decreases in part to changes in the U.S. economy and improved enforcement efforts. In addition to apprehension data, sector management collect and use other data to assess enforcement efforts within sectors. Our analysis of these data show that the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from fiscal years 2006 to 2011 varied across southwest border sectors; in the Tucson sector, for example, there was little change in the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended over this time period. The percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined across the border by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, southwest border sectors scheduled more agent workdays in fiscal year 2011 to enforcement activities for patrolling the border than for any other enforcement activity. The Tucson sector, for example, scheduled 73 percent of workdays for enforcement activities; of these, 71 percent were scheduled for patrolling within 25 miles of the border. Other sectors scheduled from 44 to 70 percent of enforcement workdays for patrolling the border. Sectors assess how effectively they use resources to secure the border, but differences in how they collect and report data preclude comparing results. Border Patrol issued guidance in September 2012 to improve the consistency of sector data collection and reporting, which may allow comparison of performance in the future.
Border Patrol is developing performance goals and measures to define border security and the resources needed to achieve it, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing goals and measures under its new strategic plan. Prior to fiscal year 2011, DHS used operational control---the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity--as its goal and measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal. At the end of fiscal year 2010, DHS reported achieving varying levels of operational control of 873 (44 percent) of the nearly 2,000 southwest border miles. In fiscal year 2011, citing a need to establish new goals and measures that reflect a more quantitative methodology and an evolving vision for border control, DHS transitioned to using the number of apprehensions on the southwest border as an interim goal and measure. As GAO previously testified, this interim measure, which reports on program activity levels and not program results, limits DHS and congressional oversight and accountability. Milestones and time frames could assist Border Patrol in monitoring progress in developing goals and measures necessary to assess the status of border security and the extent to which existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient.
What GAO Recommends
In a December 2012 report, GAO recommended that CBP ensure Border Patrol develops milestones and time frames for developing border security goals and measures to assess progress made and inform resource needs. DHS concurred with these recommendations and plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-549T | gao_GAO-05-549T_0 | USDA and FDA, within the Department of Health and Human Services, have most of the regulatory responsibilities for ensuring the safety of the nation’s food supply and account for most federal food safety spending. These agencies spend resources on similar food safety activities to ensure the safety of different food products. At jointly regulated facilities, both USDA and FDA inspectors verify that HACCP systems are in place. 3.) About one-third (24) of the agreements highlight the need to reduce duplication and overlap or make efficient and effective use of resources. However, the agencies cannot take full advantage of these agreements because they do not have adequate mechanisms for tracking them and, in some cases, do not effectively implement them. Stakeholders Disagree on the Significance of Overlapping Activities and on How to Improve the Federal Structure for Performing Food Safety Inspections and Related Activities
The stakeholders we contacted—selected industry associations, food- processing companies, consumer groups, and academic experts—disagree on the extent to which overlaps exist and on how best to improve the federal structure. Most of these stakeholders agree that the laws and regulations governing the system should be modernized so that scientific and technological advancements can be used to more effectively and efficiently control current and emerging food safety hazards. However, they differed about whether to consolidate food safety inspection and related functions into a single federal agency. Other Countries Have Modified Laws and Consolidated Food Safety Functions
The division of responsibility among several government agencies responsible for food safety is not unique to the United States. As reported in February 2005, we examined the efforts of Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom to streamline and consolidate their food safety systems. We found that, in each case, these countries (1) modified existing laws to achieve the necessary consolidation and (2) established a single agency to lead food safety management or enforcement of food safety legislation. Food Safety: U.S. Needs a Single Agency to Administer a Unified, Risk- Based Inspection System. Food Safety: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has issued many reports documenting problems resulting from the fragmented nature of the federal food safety system--a system based on 30 primary laws. This testimony summarizes GAO's most recent work on the federal system for ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply. It provides (1) an overview of food safety functions, (2) examples of overlapping and duplicative inspection and training activities, and (3) observations on efforts to better manage the system through interagency agreements. It also provides information on other countries' experiences with consolidation and the views of key stakeholders on possible consolidation in the United States.
What GAO Found
USDA and FDA have primary responsibility for overseeing the safety of the U.S. food supply; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Marine Fisheries Service also play key roles. In carrying out their responsibilities, these agencies spend resources on a number of overlapping activities, particularly inspection/enforcement, training, research, and rulemaking, for both domestic and imported food. For example, both USDA and FDA conduct similar inspections at 1,451 dual jurisdiction establishments--facilities that produce foods regulated by both agencies. To better manage the fragmented federal system, these agencies have entered into at least 71 interagency agreements--about a third of them highlight the need to reduce duplication and overlap or make efficient and effective use of resources. The agencies do not take full advantage of these agreements because they do not have adequate mechanisms for tracking them and, in some cases, do not fully implement them. Selected industry associations, food companies, consumer groups, and academic experts disagree on the extent of overlap, on how best to improve the federal system, and on whether to consolidate food safety-related functions into a single agency. However, they agreed that laws and regulations should be modernized to more effectively and efficiently control food safety hazards. As GAO recently reported, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom also had fragmented systems. These countries took steps to consolidate food safety functions--each country modified its food safety laws and established a single agency to lead food safety management or enforcement of food safety legislation. |
gao_GAO-05-380 | gao_GAO-05-380_0 | Wildland fires have destroyed an average of 850 homes per year since 1984, according to a National Fire Protection Association official. From 1983 through 2002, costs and damage from wildland fires in the United States exceeded $1 billion in 2 years and $2 billion in 3 years. However, homeowners and state and local governments have the primary responsibility for ensuring that preventive steps are taken to help protect homes from wildland fires. State and local governments, as well as the federal government and nongovernmental groups, help to educate homeowners and others about wildland fire and ways to minimize or prevent property damage. In addition to operating on different frequency bands, some agencies use incompatible communications systems that are not interoperable. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review addressed the following objectives: (1) measures that can help protect structures from wildland fires, (2) factors that affect the use of these protective measures, and (3) the role that technology plays in improving firefighting agencies’ ability to communicate during wildland fires. Defensible Space and Fire-resistant Roofs and Vents Are Key to Protecting Structures; Other Technologies Can Also Help
Creating and maintaining defensible space and using fire-resistant roofs and vents are critical to protecting structures from wildland fires. Fire-resistant windows. Chemical agents. Competing Concerns Affect Homeowners’ Use of Protective Measures, but Efforts to Increase Their Use Are Under Way
Homeowners may not take steps to protect their homes from wildland fires because of the time or expense involved, competing concerns such as aesthetics or privacy, lack of understanding of the nature of wildland fire risks, and failure to recognize that they share responsibility for protecting their homes. In addition, some insurance companies direct homeowners in high-risk areas to create defensible space. In such cases, defensible space and fire-resistant building materials greatly reduce a structure’s risk. Some Insurance Companies Direct Homeowners to Use Protective Measures
Although wildland fire has not resulted in significant losses for the insurance industry in comparison with other disasters, some insurance companies have instituted programs designed to increase policyholders’ use of protective measures in some at-risk areas. Effective Adoption of Technologies to Achieve Communications Interoperability Requires Better Planning and Coordination
While a variety of existing technologies can help link incompatible communications systems and others are being developed to provide enhanced interoperability, effective adoption of any technology requires planning and coordination among federal, state, local, and tribal agencies that work together to respond to emergencies, including wildland fires. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leading federal efforts to address interoperability problems across all levels of government, but as we previously reported, progress so far has been limited. Technologies Can Enhance Communications Interoperability
A number of current and emerging technologies can help overcome differences in frequencies or communications equipment and improve communications interoperability among firefighting agencies. Public safety agencies in several localities, including Washington, use them. However, software-defined radios are still being developed and are not yet available for use by public safety agencies. In addition to federal efforts, a variety of steps have been taken by state and local agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1984, wildland fires have burned an average of more than 850 homes each year in the United States and, because more people are moving into fire-prone areas bordering wildlands, the number of homes at risk is likely to grow. The primary responsibility for ensuring that preventive steps are taken to protect homes lies with homeowners and state and local governments, not the federal government. Although losses from wildland fires made up only 2 percent of all insured catastrophic losses from 1983 through 2002, fires can result in billions of dollars in damages. Once a wildland fire starts, various parties can be mobilized to fight it, including federal, state, local, and tribal firefighting agencies and, in some cases, the military. The ability to communicate among all parties--known as interoperability--is essential but, as GAO has reported previously, is hampered because different public safety agencies operate on different radio frequencies or use incompatible communications equipment. GAO was asked to assess, among other issues, (1) measures that can help protect structures from wildland fires, (2) factors affecting use of protective measures, and (3) the role technology plays in improving firefighting agencies' ability to communicate during wildland fires.
What GAO Found
The two most effective measures for protecting structures from wildland fires are: (1) creating and maintaining a buffer, called defensible space, from 30 to 100 feet wide around a structure, where vegetation and other flammable objects are reduced or eliminated; and (2) using fire-resistant roofs and vents. In addition to roofs and vents, other technologies--such as fire-resistant windows and building materials, chemical agents, sprinklers, and geographic information systems mapping--can help in protecting structures and communities, but they play a secondary role. A lthough protective measures are available, many property owners have not adopted them because of the time or expense involved, competing concerns such as aesthetics or privacy, misperceptions about wildland fire risks, and lack of awareness of their shared responsibility for fire protection. Federal, state, and local governments, as well as other organizations, are attempting to increase property owners' use of protective measures through education, direct monetary assistance, and laws requiring such measures. In addition, some insurance companies have begun to direct property owners in high-risk areas to take protective steps. Existing technologies, such as audio switches, can help link incompatible communication systems, and new technologies, such as software-defined radios, are being developed following common standards or with enhanced capabilities to overcome incompatibility barriers. Technology alone, however, cannot solve communications problems for those responding to wildland fires. Rather, planning and coordination among federal, state, and local public safety agencies is needed to resolve issues such as which technologies to adopt, cost sharing, operating procedures, training, and maintenance. The Department of Homeland Security is leading federal efforts to improve communications interoperability across all levels of government. In addition to federal efforts, several states and local jurisdictions are pursuing initiatives to improve communications interoperability. |
gao_GAO-17-329 | gao_GAO-17-329_0 | “Multiple-award IDIQ contracts” refers to situations when contracts are awarded to two or more contractors under a single solicitation. Obligations on IDIQ contracts were more than $130 billion annually during these years, with DOD accounting for more than two-thirds of all IDIQ obligations. IDIQ Obligations Accounted for about One- Third of Government-wide Contract Spending
From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the proportion of IDIQ obligations relative to total government contract obligations remained relatively constant, accounting for about a third of total obligations (see figure 1). For example, in fiscal year 2015, government-wide IDIQ obligations for services accounted for about 70 percent of total IDIQ obligations. Agencies Obligate the Majority of IDIQ Dollars through Single-Award IDIQ Contracts and Most IDIQ Contract and Order Obligations Were Competed
While the FAR states a preference for multiple-award IDIQs, the majority of all government-wide IDIQ contract dollars were obligated through single-award IDIQ contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Approximately eighty percent of all single- award IDIQ obligations were at DOD. Contracting officials noted it was easier and faster to place an order under an IDIQ contract than to solicit and award a separate contract each time a need arose. The Air Force placed an order only when a specific need arose. Ten of the 18 single-award IDIQ contracts we reviewed were not competed, generally because only one contractor could meet the need. For the 8 single-award IDIQ contracts we reviewed that were competed, contracting officials cited various reasons for using a single-award IDIQ contract, such as that orders were being used for interrelated tasks and therefore there was a need to build knowledge over time. The contracting officer cited urgency as the reason for not providing fair opportunity. The contracting officer acknowledged that although the orders did not meet any of the exceptions listed in the DFARS, he did not revise the solicitations or allow for an additional solicitation period. Once prices are established at contract award, those prices were referred to when placing an order, for instance:
The pricing for a noncompeted Navy single-award IDIQ contract with a value of up to $420 million to procure commercial radios used in fixed wing aircraft was established in the IDIQ contract. Sonobouys are well-defined products that have been used by the Navy since the 1940s. No prices were established at the time of IDIQ contract award because specific requirements were not known at the time of contract award. Prices for DOD IDIQ Contracts with a Mix of Well-Defined and Less- Defined Products and Services Established at Both IDIQ Contract Award and Order Levels
Eighteen DOD IDIQ contracts, which include both multiple- and single- award, in our selected sample had some price elements established at the time of contract award and some price elements established at the time of order award. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) federal agencies’ use of indefinite delivery / indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the latest year for which complete data were available; (2) the role of competition when awarding and using selected IDIQ contracts and orders at the Department of Defense (DOD); and (3) when and how DOD contracting officials established prices for these contracts and orders. To examine the use of IDIQ contracts by federal agencies, we analyzed government-wide Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data on IDIQ obligations from fiscal year 2011 through 2015 to identify information such as overall agency obligations on IDIQ contracts, obligations for products and services, obligations for single-and multiple-award IDIQ contracts, and extent of competition for single-award IDIQ contracts and multiple-award orders. Within DOD, we focused on the four DOD components with the highest obligations on IDIQ contracts—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 5 years, the federal government obligated over a hundred billion dollars annually through the use of IDIQ contracts. IDIQ contracts are awarded to one or more contractors when the exact quantities and timing for products or services are not known at the time of award. DOD uses IDIQ contracts more than all other agencies combined. The FAR establishes a preference for awarding multiple-award IDIQ contracts under a single solicitation such that a number of contract holders compete for subsequent orders.
GAO was requested to examine federal agencies' use of IDIQ contracts. This report addresses (1) federal agencies' use of IDIQ contracts from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the latest year for which complete data were available; (2) the role of competition when awarding selected IDIQ contracts and placing orders at DOD; and (3) when and how DOD contracting officers established prices for these contracts and orders. GAO analyzed Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation data on civilian and DOD obligations for fiscal years 2011 through 2015; reviewed and analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 31 IDIQ contracts and 76 IDIQ orders selected across four DOD components—Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Logistics Agency; and interviewed DOD contracting and program officials.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the proportion of spending by federal agencies on indefinite delivery/ indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts remained stable and accounted for about a third of total government contract obligations. Agencies obligated more than $130 billion annually on these types of contracts, as shown in the figure.
The Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs were the main users of IDIQ contracts, with DOD accounting for about 68 percent of all IDIQ obligations from 2011 through 2015. About two-thirds of government-wide IDIQ obligations were for services, with the remainder for products. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states a preference for multiple-award IDIQs, the majority of dollars government-wide, approximately 60 percent, were obligated through single-award IDIQs. About 70 percent of single-award IDIQ obligations and more than 85 percent of order obligations under multiple-award contracts were competed. Contracting officials at DOD cited flexibility as the main advantage for using IDIQ contracts, noting that it was easier and faster to place an order under an existing IDIQ contract than to award a separate contract when a specific need arose.
Ten of the 18 single-award IDIQ contracts GAO reviewed at DOD were not competed, generally because only one contractor could meet the need. For the competed single-award contracts, contracting officials cited various reasons for choosing a single-award IDIQ approach, such as the need to build and maintain knowledge as orders were awarded over time. For about one-third of the multiple-award IDIQ orders GAO reviewed, DOD did not provide an opportunity for all contract holders to compete due to urgency or other reasons.
Prices on IDIQ contracts and orders at DOD were established at different points, depending on how well-defined the requirements were at the time of contract award. For example, for a Navy contract to buy commercial radios used in fixed-wing aircraft, the pricing was established upfront in the contract since the radios were defined products that have been used for many years. In contrast, for an Air Force contract to buy research and development services for cybersecurity and malware detection, all pricing was established at the order level since specific research needs were not known when the contract was awarded.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations at this time. DOD had no comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_NSIAD-96-251 | gao_NSIAD-96-251_0 | Aviation Security System and Its Vulnerabilities
Even though FAA has increased security procedures as the threat has increased, the domestic and international aviation system continues to have numerous vulnerabilities. Nearly every major aspect of the system—ranging from the screening of passengers, checked and carry-on baggage, mail, and cargo as well as access to secured areas within airports and aircraft—has weaknesses that terrorists could exploit. In response to the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, FAA accelerated its efforts to develop explosives detection technology. Since fiscal year 1991, FAA has invested over $150 million in developing technologies specifically designed to detect concealed explosives. The Gore Commission recommends that $161 million in federal funds be used to deploy some of these devices. Devices Are Available to Address Some of the System’s Vulnerabilities, and FAA Has Developed Some Cost Estimates
A number of explosives detection devices are currently available or under development to determine whether explosives are present in checked and carry-on baggage or on passengers, but they are costly. These devices may be available within 2 years. In June 1996, the National Research Council, for example, reported that there may be a number of health, legal, operational, privacy, and convenience concerns about passenger-screening devices. Blast-Resistant Containers
To reduce the effects of an in-flight explosion, FAA is conducting research on blast-resistant containers, which might reduce the number of expensive explosives detection systems needed. The Gore Commission has recommended expanded use of bomb-sniffing dogs, profiling passengers to identify those needing additional attention, and matching passengers with their bags. In addition, who will be responsible in the long term for paying for new security initiatives has not been addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed federal efforts to protect civil aviation from terrorist acts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has increased aviation security procedures, but domestic and international aviation remain seriously vulnerable because nearly every major aspect of the aviation security system has weaknesses that terrorists could exploit; (2) since fiscal year 1991, FAA has invested over $153 million to develop explosives detection devices and a number of these devices are commercially available for checked and carry-on baggage, but all of these devices have some limitations; (3) there are also passenger-screening devices, but health, legal, operational, privacy and convenience concerns have been raised about these devices; (4) FAA is conducting research on blast-resistant cargo containers that could reduce the need for explosives detection devices; (5) the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism has recommended government purchase of some detectors for airport use, using bomb-sniffing dogs, matching passengers with their baggage, and profiling passengers; (6) Congress, the Administration, and the aviation industry need to agree and take action on the steps needed to counter terrorist threats and who will be responsible for funding new security initiatives; and (7) the government has three initiatives underway to address aviation security improvements. |
gao_GAO-13-261 | gao_GAO-13-261_0 | “Air and surface connectivity” includes the routes taken by passengers or cargo to and from the airport to and from other destinations that may be enhanced by highway, rail, and port construction and additional airline routes. Airport operators’ development efforts occur on airport property and involve: (1) providing services that directly support airline operations; (2) providing an expanded number and type of services within the airport terminals for passengers and visitors from the region; and (3) developing services for passengers and businesses, including airlines, on airport property but outside of the terminal areas. Many airport operators are also developing airport property outside the terminal area to attract businesses and to use available land to generate revenue. Most stakeholders we spoke with believe that a region’s ability to connect to a variety of domestic and international locations by air is key to attracting businesses, tourists, and cargo to the region. Funding Sources
Transportation improvements for airport-centric development may entail large capital-intensive projects that generally require pooling money from different sources. As shown in table 2, the federal government has a number of programs designed to support regional transportation infrastructure development, which some regions have leveraged as part of their airport-centric development efforts. State and locally generated money—such as state transportation trust funds, dedicated sales taxes, and highway tolls—have been used to match federal funds. A “transportation improvement district” was also established to help fund the Metrorail extension from downtown Washington, D.C. to the airport. Officials identified a variety of mechanisms to attract businesses, such as (1) linking airport development to commercial activities in the region, (2) identifying and leveraging unique cultural aspects of the region and promoting tourism or the general quality of life offered by the area, (3) developing industry clusters,incentives to attract businesses to the region. Stakeholder Collaboration
Airport-centric development efforts in the regions we studied span multiple jurisdictions and involve stakeholders from the airport, the private sector, and the government sector. Based on our review of literature, our previous work,visited, collaboration among various stakeholders can help achieve specific goals. Consultation with residents near the airport and with city officials representing the interest of their constituents is an important step in the airport-centric development process. Without collaboration or agreement among stakeholders, development plans may be difficult to implement. Regional stakeholders in Baltimore, Detroit, Indianapolis, Memphis, Milwaukee, and St. Louis formed multilateral committees including stakeholders representing the airport, the public sector, and the private sector. While these committees all had a general focus on airport-centric development, they focused on different aspects of airport-centric development and functioned in different ways, for example:
The BWI Partnership is a business-development advocacy group, representing the airport and approximately 200 developers, hotels, law firms, banks, and local government members, and focused on supporting business development and efficient transportation in the airport region. The City of Memphis was awarded $1.26 million from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to partner with the Greater Memphis Chamber of Commerce, the University of Memphis, and Shelby County to develop a master plan for airport-centered economic development efforts. The federal funds were matched with $900,000 in local funds and in-kind services. Some stakeholders provided technical information that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix III: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes the factors that our research and airport operators, government officials, developers, and other stakeholders identified as key considerations for airport-centric development. To obtain a full range of relevant stakeholder perspectives on the airport- centric development efforts, we interviewed airport officials; executives from businesses located adjacent or near to airports; representatives of real estate development organizations; local and regional economic development specialists, and federal, state, and local government officials. Based on our literature review and the interviews we conducted with experts, agency officials, and stakeholders, we identified the following factors considered by stakeholders at selected U.S. airports and regions when pursuing airport-centric development: 1) development at the airport, 2) air and surface connectivity, 3) funding sources for development, (4) development in the region, and (5) collaboration among stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to examine airport-centric development and the activities of airport operators and regional stakeholders to facilitate such development. In an effort to increase airports' efficiency in moving passengers and cargo while bolstering the economies of regions surrounding airports, some airport operators, government officials, and business owners are exploring opportunities to strategically develop airports and the regions around them. This report describes the factors considered and actions taken by airport operators, government officials, developers, and others to facilitate airport-centric development.
To do this work, GAO identified five factors that facilitate airport-centric development from relevant literature, interviews with experts, and observations at selected U.S. airports and their surrounding regions. GAO examined these factors by reviewing relevant documents and interviewing stakeholders, including airport officials, business owners, representatives of development organizations, and federal, state, and local government officials. GAO selected 14 airports for more in-depth study. These airports were selected based on annual passenger enplanements and cargo amounts, and experts' recommendations. The findings from these 14 airports cannot be generalized but provide insights that may be of interest to stakeholders in other regions. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and others provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO found that airport operators, government officials, real estate developers, and other regional stakeholders are taking actions consistent with five factors when pursuing airport-centric development (development on the airport property to enhance the airport's nonaeronautical revenue and development outside the airport that leverages a region's proximity to the airport).
Development at the airport. Airport operators are developing or enhancing the number and types of services within airport terminals for passengers and visitors such as upscale shops and personal services; they are also developing services for passengers and businesses outside of the terminal areas but on airport property such as hotels and business centers.
Air and surface connectivity. Most stakeholders GAO spoke with noted that a region's ability to connect to a variety of domestic and international destinations by air is important in attracting businesses, tourists, and cargo to the region. In addition to air connectivity, the routes taken by passengers or cargo to and from the airport may be enhanced by efficient highway, rail, and port connections. One example is the Metrorail extension, which will connect Dulles International Airport with downtown Washington DC.
Funding sources. Transportation improvements for airport-centric development may entail large capital-intensive projects that generally require pooling money from different sources. The federal government has a number of programs, such as grants from the Economic Development Administration, designed to support regional transportation-infrastructure development. State and locally generated money--such as state transportation trust funds, dedicated sales taxes, and highway tolls--have been used to match federal funds. Stakeholders in Memphis, for example, were awarded a $1.26 million grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, matched with $900,000 in local funds and in-kind services, to develop a master plan for their airport-centric development efforts. The private sector may also provide funding through a public-private partnership agreement.
Development in the region. Stakeholders GAO spoke with identified a variety of mechanisms to attract businesses, such as linking airport development to commercial activities in the region; identifying and leveraging unique cultural, tourist, or general qualities of the region; developing industry clusters (groups of complementary businesses); and designing policies or providing incentives to attract businesses to the region.
Stakeholder collaboration. Collaboration among various stakeholders can help achieve specific airport-centric goals. Consultation with residents near the airport and with committee composed of representatives from the airport and the public and private sectors is important; the lack of such consultation can make it difficult to implement development plans. GAO found that multilateral committees representing airport, public-sector, and private-sector groups had been established to promote airport-centric development. |
gao_GAO-12-151 | gao_GAO-12-151_0 | Requirements for Regulatory Analyses Vary, but Federal Financial Regulators Are Not Required to Conduct Benefit-Cost Analysis
As part of the rulemaking process, federal financial regulatory agencies are required to conduct a variety of regulatory analyses, but benefit-cost analysis is not among the requirements. In addition to these generic requirements, certain federal financial regulators are required by their authorizing or other statutes to consider specific benefits, costs, and impacts of their rulemaking. We reviewed 10 of the final rules that allowed for some level of discretion on the part of the regulator. Federal Financial Regulators Have Informally Coordinated Their Rulemaking Efforts but Generally Lack Policies to Guide These Efforts
The Dodd-Frank Act requires or authorizes the federal financial regulators to promulgate hundreds of rulemakings. Although federal financial regulators informally coordinated with each other on some of the final rules that we reviewed, most of the regulators lacked written policies and procedures to facilitate interagency coordination. The Nature of FSOC’s Involvement in the Rulemaking Process Has Been Evolving
While FSOC continues to evolve and define its role, FSOC staff noted that its organizational structure helps ensure coordination among its member agencies. It Is Too Early to Determine the Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Regulations, but Opportunities for Future Analyses Exist
Federal financial regulators, industry association representatives, and others told us that assessing the actual impact of the Dodd-Frank Act regulations generally is premature for a number of reasons, including the following: Industry representatives and regulators noted that sufficient time has not elapsed to allow for many of the Dodd-Frank Act rules to be fully implemented and, in turn, assessed. Regulators Have Not Yet Developed Plans for Retrospective Reviews of Dodd-Frank Act Regulations
Federal financial regulators are required to conduct retrospective reviews of their existing rules under various statutes and will include Dodd-Frank Act rules in their future reviews. Although federal financial regulators are not required to follow E.O. According to FSOC staff, FSOC would not be able to make recommendations—for instance, to improve the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial markets—without considering the impact of the act and its regulations. GAO Is Developing a Framework for Future Impact Analyses
In response to our mandate to analyze the impact of regulations on the financial marketplace, we have begun to construct an analytical framework for doing so when practicable. While some regulators had completed some of OMB’s recommended analyses, we also found inconsistencies in the extent to which the analyses—and some rulemaking policies—reflected OMB’s guidance. Similarly, under the Dodd-Frank Act, FSOC is also required to conduct periodic studies. To strengthen the rigor and transparency of their regulatory analyses, we recommend that the federal financial regulators take steps to better ensure that the specific practices in OMB’s regulatory analysis guidance are more fully incorporated into their rulemaking policies and consistently applied. To enhance interagency coordination on regulations issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, we recommend that FSOC work with the federal financial regulatory agencies to establish formal coordination policies that clarify issues such as when coordination should occur, the process that will be used to solicit and address comments, and what role FSOC should play in facilitating coordination. To effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities, we recommend that FSOC direct the Office of Financial Research to work with its members to identify and collect the data necessary to assess the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act regulations on, among other things, the stability, efficiency, and competitiveness of the U.S. financial markets. In their written comments, the regulators generally agreed with our findings and conclusions, and some agreed with the recommendations, while others neither agreed nor disagreed but stated actions they had taken or planned to take regarding the recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) the regulatory analyses, including benefit-cost analyses, federal financial regulators have performed to assess the potential impact of selected final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act; (2) how federal financial regulators consulted with each other in implementing selected final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act to avoid duplication or conflicts; and (3) what is known about the impact of the final Dodd-Frank Act regulations. We also interviewed officials from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Stability Oversight Council, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Financial Research, OMB, and Securities and Exchange Commission to determine the extent to which benefit-cost or similar analyses were conducted and whether the analyses were required by statute, regulation, or executive order. We reviewed the Federal Register releases for the 32 rules effective as of July 21, 2011, to identify the impact or benefit-cost analysis that the agencies conducted in connection with their rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires or authorizes various federal financial regulators to issue hundreds of rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. GAO is required to annually study financial services regulations. This report examines (1) the regulatory analyses, including cost-benefit analyses, financial regulators have performed to assess the impact of selected final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act; (2) how financial regulators consulted with each other in implementing the selected final rules to avoid duplication or conflicts; and (3) what is known about the impact of the final rules. GAO examined the 32 final Dodd-Frank Act rules in effect as of July 21, 2011; the regulatory analyses conducted for 10 of the 32 rules that allowed for some level of agency discretion; statutes and executive orders requiring agencies to perform regulatory analysis; and studies on the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act. GAO also interviewed regulators, academics, and industry representatives..
What GAO Found
Federal financial regulators are required to conduct a variety of regulatory analyses, but the requirements vary and none of the regulators are required to conduct benefit-cost analysis. All financial regulators must analyze the paperwork burden imposed by their rules and consider the impact of their rules on small entities as part of their rulemaking process. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission are also required under their authorizing statutes to consider certain benefits and costs of their rules. As independent regulatory agencies, the federal financial regulators are not subject to executive orders requiring federal agencies to conduct detailed benefit-cost analysis in accordance with a guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Financial regulators are not required to follow OMB's guidance, but most told GAO that they attempt to follow the guidance in principle or spirit. GAO's review of regulators' rulemaking policies and 10 final rules found inconsistencies in the extent to which OMB's guidance was reflected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that to the extent the regulators strive to follow OMB's guidance, they should take steps to more fully incorporate the guidance into their rulemaking policies and ensure that it is consistently followed. Although federal financial regulators have coordinated their rulemaking, they generally lacked formal policies to guide these efforts. The Dodd-Frank Act establishes interagency coordination requirements for certain agencies and for specific rules or subject matters. However, for other rules, the regulators have discretion as to whether interagency coordination should occur. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is tasked with facilitating coordination among member agencies but, to date, has played a limited role in doing so beyond its own rulemakings as it continues to define its role. Several regulators voluntarily coordinated with each other on some of the rules GAO reviewed. However, most of the regulators, including the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, lacked written protocols for interagency coordination, a leading practice that GAO has previously identified for interagency coordination. GAO recommends that FSOC work with the financial regulators to develop such protocols for Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking. Little is known about the actual impact of the final Dodd-Frank Act rules, given the short amount of time the rules have been in effect. Regulators are required to conduct reviews of existing regulations to assess their impact, but some have not yet developed plans to review their Dodd-Frank Act rules. To maximize the usefulness of these reviews, GAO recommends that the regulators identify what data will be needed to retrospectively assess the impact of the rules in the future. FSOC is also required to examine, among other things, financial market and regulatory developments and make recommendations to enhance the efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of U.S. financial markets. Although FSOC officials said that FSOC plans to include an impact analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act rules in its future reports, it has not yet begun identifying and collecting the data needed for this type of analysis. GAO recommends that FSOC direct the Office of Financial Research, an entity created to support the research needs of FSOC, to work with the regulators to identify and begin collecting data needed for future analyses. GAO is making four recommendations to the regulators and FSOC to strengthen the prospective and retrospective analyses of the impact of Dodd-Frank Act regulations on financial markets and improve coordination among financial regulators on rulemaking. Regulators and FSOC generally agreed with the report's findings but most neither agreed nor disagreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-805 | gao_GAO-06-805_0 | 1. 4. After compacts enter into force, MCC may begin the disbursement of funds and countries may begin implementing projects. For the six countries whose compacts had entered into force as of the end of May 2006, completing the steps necessary for entry into force after compact signing took approximately 3 to 4 months for Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras; approximately 7 months for Georgia; 2 months for Vanuatu; and about 10½ months for Nicaragua. MCC Assessed Five Key Aspects of Proposals While Developing Guidance, but Limitations Affected the Accuracy of Economic Analyses
MCC undertook a wide range of activities in its due diligence of the Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras proposals, while at the same time developing guidance on key aspects of the countries’ proposals. Finally, MCC conducted economic analyses to assess the projects’ likely impact on economic growth. Limitations in Assumptions and Data, as Well as Country Involvement, Affected the Accuracy of Economic Analyses
During its due diligence reviews for Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras, MCC analyzed proposed projects’ probable impact on the country’s economic growth and poverty reduction. Some of the assumptions and data that MCC used in its analyses do not fully reflect the countries’ socioeconomic environment. In the two countries we visited, country representatives were not closely involved in MCC’s economic analyses of the proposed projects. The countries also have established structures for ensuring fiscal accountability and for managing procurements that appear to be effective; however, implementation is still at a very early stage, and some required elements of these structures are not yet in place. These weaknesses may limit MCC’s ability to track and account for program results. Weaknesses in Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks May Limit MCC’s Ability to Measure Results
In reviewing the frameworks for monitoring and evaluation in the three countries, we identified several challenges that MCC faces in ensuring accountability for results. Furthermore, holding countries accountable for results requires, to the extent practical and cost-effective: collecting reliable and accurate baseline data, linking economic analyses to monitoring plans, addressing the uncertainty associated with program results, and ensuring the timely development of the research design for randomized controlled trials. A formal ethics program has also been established for MCC headquarters. Specifically, our work focused on (1) the key areas that MCC examined in its due diligence assessments of proposals for Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras, and the criteria that MCC used in these assessments, and (2) the form and adequacy of the implementation structures that MCC and compact countries have put in place for governance, procurement, fiscal accountability, and monitoring and evaluation. To evaluate MCC’s assessments of proposals’ consultative process, project coherence, environmental and social impact, and institutional and financial sustainability, we relied primarily on MCC’s data and analysis contained in the due diligence books and, to some extent, in the investment memos. Comments from the Millennium Challenge Corporation
The following are GAO’s comments on the Millennium Challenge Corporation letter dated July 7, 2006. 2. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer the Millennium Challenge Account. MCC's mission is to reduce poverty by supporting sustainable, transformative economic growth in developing countries that create and maintain sound policy environments. MCC has received more than $4.2 billion in appropriations, and, as of May 2006, it had disbursed $22.4 million to four countries whose signed MCC compacts have entered into force. For the first three countries with compact entry into force--Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras--GAO was requested to examine (1) key aspects that MCC reviewed, and the criteria it used, in its due diligence assessments; and (2) the structures that have been established for implementing the compacts.
What GAO Found
MCC undertook a wide range of activities in its due diligence, including five key aspects of the Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Honduras proposals: (1) countries' consultation with local groups in developing compact proposals, (2) projects' coherence with compact goals, (3) environmental and social impacts, (4) institutional and financial sustainability, and (5) impact on economic growth and poverty reduction. MCC based its assessments on an evolving set of criteria: early, general guidance to the countries followed by later, more specific guidance. MCC's analyses of the projects' economic impact were limited in that some of the assumptions and data used may not reflect country conditions. As a result, the projects selected on the basis of the analyses may not achieve compact goals. In the two countries we visited, Madagascar and Cape Verde, MCC conducted the analyses with limited country participation, which resulted in countries' having little understanding of the process. MCC and the three countries have made progress in establishing compact country structures for oversight and management, procurement, fiscal accountability, and monitoring and evaluation, although some of these structures are not yet complete. The oversight structures allow for country management with MCC review, but some organizations were not fully staffed for months after the compacts entered into force. Madagascar and Cape Verde have implemented fiscal accountability structures for MCC-funded projects, and established procurement structures with effective characteristics; however, these structures are still largely untested and some are still under development. Finally, MCC and the countries have established monitoring and evaluation frameworks to track and account for program results. However, limitations in the baseline data collected, linkage to economic analyses, methods of addressing uncertainty associated with program results, and the timely design of randomized controlled trials may constrain MCC's ability to monitor and evaluate program results. |
gao_GAO-09-297 | gao_GAO-09-297_0 | IRS Has Little Information about How Tax Software Pricing Strategies Affect Taxpayers’ Willingness to Use Software and File Electronically
For the 2009 tax filing season, the two largest tax software companies that previously charged separate electronic filing fees for federal returns in some of their retail and downloadable products have eliminated those electronic filing fees. These standards are optional in 2009 because IRS finalized them late in 2008. Without appropriate monitoring, IRS has limited assurance that the standards have been adequately implemented or software companies are complying with the standards. IRS Has Not Assessed the Risks to Tax Administration of the Use of Commercial Tax Software by Individuals
Despite devoting some resources to oversight of the tax software industry, IRS has not conducted an assessment to understand whether reliance on commercial tax software poses any significant risks to tax administration. According to IRS officials, the agency has not conducted a risk assessment because it does not believe the benefits warrant the cost of such an assessment. As already noted, IRS has said that it is in the agency’s best interest to ensure that taxpayers can rely on commercial tax software to make electronic filing accurate, easy, and efficient. If enhancements to tax software could produce even small improvements in voluntary compliance by taxpayers, the additional dollars of tax revenue could be substantial. Without a risk assessment, IRS does not know whether its existing investment in oversight of the tax software industry is too great, about right, or needs to be expanded. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help increase electronic filing and allow IRS to better target its efforts, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue direct the appropriate officials to take the following six actions: 1. require tax software companies, as soon as practical, to include a software identification number that specifically identifies the software package used to prepare tax returns, which can be used in IRS research efforts; 2. ensure that, as part of the second phase of IRS’s Advancing E-file Study, surveys ask taxpayers the effect of tax software pricing changes and the opportunity to file for free using online tax forms on IRS’s Web site on their decision to either file or not file tax returns electronically; 3. to the extent possible, study the effect of the 2009 pricing changes and the opportunity to file for free using online tax forms on IRS’s Web site on taxpayers’ use of tax software and electronic filing rates; 4. determine if tax software companies that are authorized to participate in online filing are adhering to advisory security and privacy standards for the 2009 filing season; 5. develop and implement a plan for effectively monitoring compliance with recommended security and privacy standards for the 2010 filing season; and 6. assess the extent to which the reliance on tax software creates significant risks to tax administration, particularly in the areas of tax return accuracy, the security and privacy of taxpayer information, and the reliability of electronic filing. We also interviewed IRS and software industry officials to determine what steps they took to identify and address risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Individual taxpayers used commercial tax software to prepare over 39 million tax returns in 2007, making it critical to the tax administration system. The majority were then filed electronically, resulting in fewer errors and reduced processing costs compared to paper returns. GAO was asked to assess what is known about how pricing of tax software influences electronic filing, the extent to which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides oversight of the software industry, and the risks to tax administration from using tax software. To do so, GAO analyzed software prices, met with IRS and software company officials, examined IRS policies, and reviewed what is known about the accuracy, security, and reliability of tax software.
What GAO Found
IRS has little information about how the pricing of tax software affects taxpayers' willingness to file tax returns electronically. In 2009, the two largest tax software companies eliminated separate fees to file federal tax returns electronically when using software purchased from retail locations or downloaded from a Web site. As a result, IRS has an opportunity to study whether this and other changes are effective in increasing electronic filing. Additionally, IRS would benefit from being able to identify which software package the taxpayer used to better target research and efforts to increase software use and electronic filing. IRS provides some oversight of the tax software industry but does not fully monitor compliance with established security and privacy standards. Further, IRS has not developed a plan to monitor compliance with new standards, which are optional in 2009 but may be mandatory in 2010. Without appropriate monitoring, IRS has limited assurance that the standards are being implemented or complied with. IRS has not conducted an assessment to determine whether taxpayers' use of tax software poses any risks to tax administration. Risks include that IRS may be missing opportunities to systemically identify areas to improve software guidance and enhance information security. IRS officials said the likely benefits of an assessment would not warrant the costs but have not determined either the benefits or costs of such an assessment. Moreover, IRS has also said that it is in the agency's best interest to ensure that taxpayers can rely on commercial software to make electronic filing accurate, easy, and efficient. Further, if even small improvements in the accuracy of tax returns could be made by clarifying the guidance in tax software, the effect on revenue could be substantial. Without a risk assessment, IRS does not know whether its existing oversight of the tax software industry is sufficient or needs to be expanded. |
gao_HEHS-96-106 | gao_HEHS-96-106_0 | Small Employers May Not Be Taking Full Advantage of Training Programs
Small employers are less likely to use available training programs and resources—especially federally sponsored training programs—than are larger employers, according to the extremely limited quantitative data available. Institutional barriers may limit small employer participation in programs because they may discourage or disqualify small employers from accessing the programs. Employers told us that this assistance was critical because it helped to reduce the time needed to complete the paperwork and comply with other administrative requirements. The state training fund programs also emphasize technical assistance to help individual small employers that were not involved with consortia reduce economic barriers to participation. The case studies focused on (1) program goals and operations, (2) characteristics of the specific barriers faced by small employers for participation, and (3) whether any methods had been developed to address the barriers and foster small employer participation. Program officials acknowledged that the amount and detailed nature of the information required may discourage small employers from participating in the program because they may not want to spend the time necessary to apply for the funding, even though they may recoup their costs in the end. They noted that they did not need to train workers now because all of their workers were trained and skilled. Consortia Minimized Barriers Associated With Costs of Finding and Training Employees
Participating employers we interviewed said that TMA and EBA reduced many of the economic costs associated with finding qualified employees or training employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed small business employers' participation in federal training programs, focusing on: (1) the extent of their participation; (2) barriers that limit their participation; and (3) options for overcoming those barriers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) small businesses are less likely to use training programs than larger employers because of the prohibitive costs associated with training programs, the time needed to comply with administrative requirements, the reduced productivity of workers during training, and high attrition rates associated with newly trained employees; (2) training programs' institutional requirements may discourage or disqualify small employers from participation; (3) small employers' limited knowledge of the training programs and their needs may further prevent their participation; (4) while a reduction of institutional barriers may require fundamental changes to training programs, alliances among small employers have helped to reduce economic and informational barriers to their participation; and (5) technical assistance from training programs helped reduce economic barriers to participation for small employers that did not want to become involved with alliances or had no access to alliances. |
gao_GAO-06-813 | gao_GAO-06-813_0 | In addition, CMS uses MIP funds to support the activities of PSCs, which perform medical review of claims and identify and investigate potential fraud cases; a coordination of benefits (COB) contractor, which determines whether Medicare or other insurance has primary responsibility for paying a beneficiary’s health care costs; the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC), which screens and enrolls suppliers in the Medicare program; and the data analysis and coding (DAC) contractor, which maintains and analyzes Medicare claims data for durable medical equipment (DME), prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies. MIP Funding for All Five Activities Has Generally Increased over Time
For fiscal years 1997 through 2005, CMS generally increased the amount of funding for each of its five program integrity activities, but the amount of the funding provided and the percentage increase have varied among the activities. Provider education received the largest percentage increase in funds, while audit and medical review received the largest amount of funds overall. CMS increased its allocation for provider education by about 590 percent from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2005. CMS will be able to further increase expenditures for program integrity in fiscal year 2006. CMS plans to use some of the $112 million to address potential fraud, waste, and abuse in the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. Furthermore, CMS has not fully assessed whether MIP funds are appropriately allocated within the audit, medical review, benefit integrity, and provider education activities. CMS officials told us that they may also consider the agency’s high-level priorities. CMS does not have a means to compare quantitative data or qualitative information on the relative effectiveness of MIP activities that it could use in allocating funds. CMS’s Current MIP Allocation Approach Is Not Adequate to Address Emerging Risks
CMS’s current allocation approach will not be adequate to address Medicare’s emerging program integrity risks related to the prescription drug benefit. Because the Medicare prescription drug benefit is in the early stages of implementation, CMS does not yet have data to estimate the level of improper payments or information to determine the level of program integrity funds needed to address emerging vulnerabilities. Contracting reform will affect MIP funding allocations because of (1) changes in contractors’ responsibilities for program integrity activities and their jurisdictions, (2) the potential for operational efficiencies, and (3) increasing use of MIP funds for contractor award payments. Conclusions
We designated the Medicare program as high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in 1990, and the program remains so today. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better ensure that MIP funds are appropriately allocated among and within the five program integrity activities, we recommend that CMS develop a method of allocating funds based on the effectiveness of its program integrity activities, the contractors’ workloads, and risk. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To provide information on the amount of funds allocated to the five Medicare Integrity Program (MIP) activities over time, we interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). In addition, we interviewed CMS officials regarding changes in the Medicare program that may affect MIP funding allocations, including CMS’s plans to support activities to detect fraud and improper billing for the new Part D prescription drug benefit and MIP activities to be performed by contractors in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has considered Medicare at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The Medicare Integrity Program (MIP) provides funds to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS--the agency that administers Medicare--to safeguard over $300 billion in program payments made on behalf of its beneficiaries. CMS conducts five program integrity activities: audits; medical reviews of claims; determinations of whether Medicare or other insurance sources have primary responsibility for payment, called secondary payer; benefit integrity to address potential fraud cases; and provider education. In this report, GAO determined (1) the amount of MIP funds that CMS has allocated to the five program integrity activities over time, (2) the approach that CMS uses to allocate MIP funds, and (3) how major changes in the Medicare program may affect MIP funding allocations.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 1997 through 2005, CMS's MIP expenditures generally increased for each of the five program integrity activities, but the amount of the increase differed by activity. Since fiscal year 1997, provider education has had the largest percentage increase in funding--about 590 percent, while audit and medical review had the largest amounts of funding allocated. In fiscal year 2006, funding for MIP will increase further to $832 million, which includes $112 million in funds that CMS plans to use, in part, to address potential fraud and abuse in the new Medicare prescription drug benefit. CMS officials told us that they have allocated MIP funds to the five program integrity activities based primarily on past allocation levels. Although CMS has quantitative measures of effectiveness for two of its activities--the savings that medical review and secondary payer generate compared to their costs--it does not have a means to determine the effectiveness of each of the five activities relative to the others to aid it in allocating funds. Further, CMS has generally not assessed whether MIP funds are distributed to the contractors conducting each program integrity activity to provide the greatest benefit to Medicare. Because of significant programmatic changes, such as the implementation of the Medicare prescription drug benefit and competitive selection of contractors responsible for claims administration and program integrity activities, the agency's current approach will not be adequate for making future allocation decisions. For example, CMS will need to allocate funds for program integrity activities to address emerging vulnerabilities that could affect the Medicare prescription drug benefit. Further, through contracting reform, CMS will task new contractors with performing a different mix of program integrity activities. However, the agency's funding approach is not geared to target MIP resources to the activities with the greatest impact on the program and to ensure that the contractors have funding commensurate with their relative workloads and risk of making improper payments. |
gao_GAO-07-46 | gao_GAO-07-46_0 | CMS Has Used External Data to Inform DRG Reclassification and to Evaluate New Technology Add-on Payment Applications
CMS has used external data for two purposes: to inform DRG reclassification and to evaluate new technology add-on payment applications. To inform DRG reclassification, CMS accepts the submission of external data that are intended to demonstrate that inpatient stays involving a new technology are costlier on average than the other inpatient stays in the same DRG. CMS uses data from the MEDPAR file to validate the external data submitted. Generally, CMS will not make a reclassification decision for a DRG involving a new technology if the technology is so new that it does not appear in the MEDPAR file. To evaluate new technology add-on payment applications, CMS has generally used external data in conjunction with data from the MEDPAR file to evaluate whether a new technology meets one of three eligibility criteria, specifically, the criterion related to cost. Specifically, when external data are submitted for a proposed DRG reclassification for a procedure or new technology, CMS’s policy is to find the same or similar evidence in the MEDPAR file. CMS has generally used external data and data from the MEDPAR file to evaluate whether a new technology that is being considered for an add-on payment meets the criterion for being considered costly. Data from Other Government Agencies Have Limitations for Setting DRG Payments for Inpatient Stays Involving New Technologies
Data collected and used by other government agencies have limitations for CMS’s use in setting DRG payments for inpatient stays involving new technologies. This is because, when setting DRG payments, CMS generally needs data that are representative of the Medicare population, timely, and complete in that the data include the total charge or other measure of costliness for all services provided during an inpatient stay, including new technologies. The data we identified from BLS, VA, DOD, and AHRQ were either not representative of the Medicare population, were no timelier than data from the MEDPAR file, or were not complete. TMA pays for inpatient stays using a DRG-based payment system that is modeled on the Medicare IPPS. Concluding Observations
Data from the MEDPAR file remain the primary data source for setting DRG payments because they include all charges from inpatient claims for inpatient services provided to all Medicare beneficiaries across all hospitals paid under the IPPS. CMS needs these data to determine payment for each DRG relative to other DRGs. In instances where data from the MEDPAR file have lacked charge information for certain stays involving new technologies, CMS has used external data to inform the DRG reclassification process and to evaluate new technology add-on payment applications. To set DRG payments, CMS needs data that meet criteria of being representative, timely, and complete. Although BLS, VA, DOD, and AHRQ collect data for their own purposes that could potentially be useful to CMS, these data are limited in their utility to set DRG payments because they do not always meet CMS’s criteria. Agency and Other External Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS stated that it agreed with our findings and reiterated its commitment to using external data when appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under Medicare, hospitals generally receive fixed payments for inpatient stays based on diagnosis-related groups (DRG), a system that classifies stays by patient diagnoses and procedures. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) annually uses its own data to reclassify DRGs. CMS also makes add-on payments for stays involving new technologies that meet three eligibility criteria. Stakeholders may submit data that are external to CMS as part of a DRG reclassification request or an add-on payment application. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required GAO to examine whether CMS could improve its use of external data, including using data collected by other government agencies for DRG payments. As discussed with the committees of jurisdiction, GAO examined (1) to what extent CMS has used external data in determining payments for inpatient stays involving new technologies, and (2) to what extent can external data from other government agencies be used by CMS in determining DRG payments for inpatient stays involving new technologies. GAO interviewed officials from CMS and industry stakeholders. GAO interviewed officials from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of Defense (DOD), and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) because these agencies may have data useful to CMS. GAO also reviewed regulations and other CMS materials.
What GAO Found
CMS has used external data for two purposes: to inform DRG reclassification and to evaluate new technology add-on payment applications. To inform DRG reclassification, CMS accepts the submission of external data that are intended to demonstrate that inpatient stays involving a new technology are costlier on average than the other inpatient stays in the same DRG. CMS uses its data from the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) file to validate the external data submitted. Specifically, when external data are submitted for a proposed DRG reclassification for a procedure or new technology, CMS's policy is to find the same or similar evidence in the MEDPAR file. Generally, CMS will not make a reclassification decision for a DRG involving a new technology if the technology is so new that it does not appear in the MEDPAR file. To evaluate new technology add-on payment applications, CMS has generally used external data in conjunction with data from the MEDPAR file to evaluate whether a new technology meets one of the three eligibility criteria, specifically the criterion related to cost. Data from other government agencies have limitations for CMS's use in setting DRG payments for inpatient stays involving new technologies. This is because when setting DRG payments, CMS generally needs data that are representative of the Medicare population, timely, and complete in that the data include the total charge or other measure of costliness for all services provided during an inpatient stay, including new technologies. The data we identified from other government agencies were either not representative of the Medicare population, were not timelier than data from the MEDPAR file, or were not complete. Data from the MEDPAR file remain the primary data source for setting DRG payments because they include all charges from paid inpatient claims for inpatient services provided to all Medicare beneficiaries across all hospitals paid under the IPPS. In instances where data from the MEDPAR file have lacked charge information for certain stays involving new technologies, CMS has used external data to inform the DRG reclassification process and to evaluate new technology add-on payment applications. To set DRG payments, CMS needs data that meet criteria of being representative, timely, and complete. Although BLS, VA, DOD, and AHRQ collect data for their own purposes that could potentially be useful to CMS, these data are limited in their utility to set DRG payments because they do not always meet CMS's criteria. In commenting on a draft of this report, CMS stated that it agreed with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-07-574T | gao_GAO-07-574T_0 | It is useful to view the federal assistance provided to the Gulf Coast within the context of the overall costs of the damages incurred by the region and the resources necessary to rebuild. For example, early damage estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put capital losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita at a range of $70 billion to $130 billion while another estimate put losses solely from Hurricane Katrina— including capital losses—at over $150 billion. Further, the state of Louisiana has estimated that the economic impact on its state alone could reach $200 billion. These estimates raise important questions regarding additional assistance that will be needed to help the Gulf Coast rebuild in the future—including how the assistance will be provided and by whom. Two Key Federal Programs That Provide Long-Term Rebuilding Resources Use Different Approaches
The federal government has so far used two key programs—FEMA’s Public Assistance and the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) CDBG programs—to provide long-term rebuilding assistance to the Gulf Coast states. These two programs follow different funding models. Public Assistance provides funding on a project-by- project basis—involving an assessment of specific proposals to determine eligibility, while CDBG—a block grant—affords broad discretion and flexibility to states and localities. Community Development Block Grants
HUD’s Community Development Block Grant program—so far, the largest federal provider of long-term rebuilding assistance—received $16.7 billion in supplemental appropriations to help the Gulf Coast states rebuild damaged housing and other infrastructure. Louisiana and Mississippi Target the Majority of Their CDBG Funds to Homeowners, but Differ in Policies and Procedures
With the vast number of homes that sustained damage in Louisiana and Mississippi, each state had opted to direct the vast majority of their housing allocations to homeowners, although each state tailored its program to address the particular conditions in its state. Referred to as the Road Home, this program is designed to encourage homeowners to return to Louisiana and begin rebuilding. Of those, the program awarded payments to 4,808 homeowners with an average award amount of $74,250. Mississippi developed a two- phase program to target homeowners who suffered losses due to the storm surge. Of those, Mississippi awarded payments to 11,894 homeowners with an average award amount of $69,669. Louisiana and Mississippi Are Engaged in Planning Activities, While the Federal Government Has Assumed a Coordination Role
Restoring the region’s housing and infrastructure is taking place in the context of broader planning and coordination activities; in Louisiana and Mississippi, state and local governments are engaged in both short- and long-term planning efforts. Coordination at the Federal Level
In light of the magnitude of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, the administration recognized the need to provide a mechanism to coordinate with—and support rebuilding activities at—the federal, state, and local levels. Selected Questions for Congressional Oversight of Gulf Coast Rebuilding
Rebuilding efforts in the Gulf Coast are at a critical turning point—a time when decisions now being made in community rooms, city halls, and state houses will have a significant impact on the complexion and future of the Gulf Coast. As states and localities begin to assume responsibility for developing plans for rebuilding, there are difficult policy decisions Congress will need to make about the federal government’s contribution to the rebuilding effort and the role it might play over the long-term in an era of competing priorities. Based on the preliminary work I have discussed today, the Subcommittee way wish to consider the following questions as it continues to carry out its critical oversight function in reviewing Gulf Coast rebuilding efforts: How much will it cost to rebuild the Gulf Coast and how much of this cost should the federal government bear? How can the federal government further partner with state and local governments and the nonprofit and private sectors to leverage the public investment in rebuilding? February 28, 2007. May 4, 2006. March 28, 2006. November 2, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The size and scope of the devastation caused by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes presents unprecedented rebuilding challenges. Today, more than a year and a half since the hurricanes made landfall, rebuilding efforts are at a critical turning point. The Gulf Coast must face the daunting challenge of rebuilding its communities and neighborhoods--some from the ground up. This testimony (1) places the federal assistance provided to date in the context of the resources likely needed to rebuild the Gulf Coast, (2) discusses key federal programs currently being used to provide rebuilding assistance, with an emphasis on the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, (3) describes Louisiana's and Mississippi's approach to using CDBG funds, and (4) provides observations on planning activities in Louisiana and Mississippi and the federal government's role in coordinating rebuilding efforts. GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed state and local documents, and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
While the federal government has provided billions of dollars in assistance to the Gulf Coast, a substantial portion was directed to short-term needs, leaving a smaller portion for longer-term rebuilding. It may be useful to view this assistance in the context of the costs of damages incurred by the region and the resources necessary to rebuild. Some damage estimates have put capital losses at a range of $70 billion to over $150 billion, while the State of Louisiana estimated that the economic impact on its state alone could reach $200 billion. Such estimates raise important questions regarding additional assistance that will be needed to help the Gulf Coast rebuild in the future. To date, the federal government has provided long-term rebuilding assistance to the Gulf Coast through 2 key programs, which follow different funding models. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's public assistance program provides public infrastructure funding for specific projects that meet program eligibility requirements. HUD's CDBG program, on the other hand, provides funding for neighborhood revitalization and housing rehabilitation activities, affording states broad discretion and flexibility. To date, the affected states have received $16.7 billion in CDBG funding from supplemental appropriations--so far, the largest share of funding targeted to rebuilding. With the vast number of homes that sustained damage in Louisiana and Mississippi, each state allocated the bulk of its CDBG funds to homeowner assistance. Louisiana developed an assistance program to encourage homeowners to return to Louisiana and begin rebuilding while Mississippi developed a program to target homeowners who suffered losses due to Katrina's storm surge that were not covered by insurance. As of March 28, 2007, Louisiana has awarded 4,808 grants to homeowners with an average award amount of $74,250. Mississippi has awarded 11,894 grants with an average award amount of $69,669. Restoring the region's housing and infrastructure is taking place in the context of broader planning and coordination activities. In Louisiana and Mississippi, state and local governments are engaged in both short-and long-term planning efforts. Further, the President established a position within the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate and support rebuilding activities at the federal, state, and local levels. As states and localities begin to develop plans for rebuilding, there are difficult policy decisions Congress will need to make about the federal government's contribution to the rebuilding effort and the role it might play over the long-term in an era of competing priorities. Based on our work, we raise a number of questions the Subcommittee may wish to consider in its oversight of Gulf Coast rebuilding. Such questions relate to the costs for rebuilding the Gulf Coast--including the federal government's share, the effectiveness of current funding delivery mechanisms, and the federal government's efforts to leverage the public investment in rebuilding. |
gao_GAO-06-861T | gao_GAO-06-861T_0 | Leadership
The OPM 2004 FHCS results and OPM’s 2005 follow-up focus group discussions suggest that information is not cascading effectively from top leadership throughout the organization. Employee perceptions of senior level leadership were not as positive, however. A similar pattern of OPM SES and OPM GS-level response can be seen in Figure 1 for the percent of employees agreeing with the statement “leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.” OPM’s analysis of responses to this question by its divisions and offices show that the Human Capital Leadership and Merit System Accountability (HCLMSA) division had the lowest positive and largest negative response of any division at about 28 percent and 51 percent respectively. Based on OPM’s May 2006 action plans, the agency is planning to improve communication through such means as “visits to OPM field locations, brown bag lunches with the Director, an email box where employees can make suggestions on more efficient and effective ways of doing business, Web Casts, and employee meetings.” According to the May 11, 2006 memo from OPM’s CHCO to Director Springer, OPM has released several messages to employees regarding steps that it will be taking to improve communications agencywide and to address each of the specific critical issues within individual organizations of the agency. This division provides leadership to agencies in their human capital transformation efforts. OPM’s ability to lead and oversee human capital management policy changes that result from potential human capital reform legislation could be affected by its internal capacity and ability to maintain an effective leadership team, as well as, an effective workforce. Training. OPM Has Engaged in Workforce and Succession Planning, but Different Workforce Skills May Be Needed to Meet Future Needs
OPM’s workforce and succession planning efforts may be sufficient for maintaining the organization’s current capacity, but OPM may need more collaborative workforce skills to lead and implement human capital reform. OPM’s HCO Structure Is Viewed as a Barrier to Meeting Customer Needs
CHCOs and human resource directors informed us that, while OPM’s HCO structure is good in theory, it is often a barrier to obtaining timely technical guidance. To collaborate and share information, CHCOs said that OPM could make better use of the CHCO Council. If OPM is to successfully lead reform, it will need to strategically use the partnerships it has available to it, such as the CHCO Council and others, as well as develop a culture of collaboration, information sharing, and working with customers to understand what they will need from the agency. These practices, collectively with others we have identified in prior work, create a “line of sight” showing how unit and individual performance can contribute to overall organizational goals. OPM’s executive performance contracts achieve this objective by making executives accountable for OPM-wide goals. Require follow-up actions to address organizational priorities. Each associate director is committed to “Implement action plan to ensure OPM is rated in the top 50% of agencies surveyed in the 2006 FHCS and the top five agencies in the 2008 FHCS.” To achieve this goal, each associate director developed a FHCS action plan for their division to address employee concerns identified in the 2004 FHCS and the follow-up focus group discussions. OPM has plans to implement new performance elements and standards for all OPM employees to support the new agency Strategic and Operational Plan. If effectively implemented, these actions should address many of the concerns raised by focus group participants. To meet its current and future challenge to lead human capital across government, Director Springer has shown leadership commitment to its transformation by initiating a number of action plans to address employee concerns. While the steps taken by OPM demonstrate progress in achieving its transformation, it must continue on this path by closely monitoring and communicating with its employees and customers, expanding its workforce and succession planning efforts, and continuing to improve its performance culture and accountability for results. Appendix I
Federal Human Capital Survey, Focus Groups, and Action Plans
We used the Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) and summaries of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) focus groups to assess employee views of OPM’s organizational capacity. | Why GAO Did This Study
General recognition exists of a need to continue to develop a governmentwide framework for human capital reform to enhance performance, ensure accountability and position the nation for the future. Potential governmentwide human capital reform and likely requirements that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) assist, guide, and ultimately certify agencies' readiness to implement reforms, raise important questions about OPM's capacity to successfully fulfill its central role. This testimony addresses management challenges that could affect OPM's ability to lead governmentwide human capital reform efforts. To assess these challenges, GAO analyzed OPM's 2002 and 2004 Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) results, data from its 2005 follow-up focus group discussions, OPM's May 2006 action plans to address employee concerns, and OPM's associate directors' fiscal year 2006 executive performance contracts. GAO also conducted interviews with OPM senior officials and Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) and human resource directors from CHCO Council agencies. In commenting on a draft of this statement, the OPM Director said that OPM has addressed many of the challenges highlighted from the 2004 FHCS and achieved many meaningful and important results. GAO agrees and believes OPM should continue to build upon its progress to date.
What GAO Found
OPM has made commendable efforts towards transforming itself to being a more effective leader of governmentwide human capital reform. It can build upon that progress by addressing challenges that remain in the following areas: Leadership. OPM Federal Human Capital Survey responses and the fall 2005 follow-up focus group discussions suggests that information from OPM leadership does not cascade effectively throughout the organization and that many employees do not feel senior leaders generate a high level of motivation and commitment in the workforce. Agreement with leaders ability was lowest in one of OPM's key divisions--a unit vital to successful human capital reform. OPM is working to address employee concerns and improve perceptions of senior leaders. Talent and resources. To align talent and resources to support its reform role, OPM has made progress in assessing current workforce needs and developing leadership succession plans. However, OPM's workforce planning has not sufficiently identified future skills and competencies that may be necessary to fulfill its role in human capital reform. Customer focus, communication, and collaboration. OPM can improve its customer service to agencies and create more opportunities for dialogue. According to key officials in executive agencies, OPM guidance to agencies is not always clear and timely, OPM's human capital officer structure is often a barrier to efficient customer response, and greater opportunities exist to collaborate with agency leaders. OPM recognizes these shortcomings and has identified improvement actions to address. However, more can be done such as strategically using partnerships it has available to it, like the CHCO Council. Performance culture and accountability. OPM has made progress in creating a "line of sight" or alignment and accountability across Senior Executive Service (SES) expectations and organizational goals. It needs to build on this progress and effectively implement new performance standards for all employees to support the recently issued agency strategic and operational plan and ensure all employees receive the necessary training. To meet OPM's current and future challenge to lead governmentwide human capital reform, Director Springer has shown leadership commitment to OPM's transformation by initiating a number of action plans to address employee concerns. While the steps taken by OPM demonstrate progress in achieving its transformation, it must continue on this path by closely monitoring and communicating with its employees and customers, expanding its workforce and succession planning efforts, and continuing to create a "line of sight" throughout the organization. |
gao_GAO-05-413 | gao_GAO-05-413_0 | Most States Have Shifted to Taking Claims Remotely, and All States Provide Claimants with Information on Their Obligations and Available Reemployment Services
Nearly all states accept most initial UI claims remotely by telephone, Internet, or both. Even though claimants filing remotely no longer have face-to-face contact with UI staff at the time the claim is filed, all states told us they have found ways to provide information on eligibility requirements and reemployment services to individuals filing initial claims, often beginning at the time the claim is filed. Most states told us that the shift to remote claims did not diminish their ability to provide information on reemployment services to claimants and, in some cases, had improved customer service and helped ensure that claimants received consistent information. States Provide Claimants Access to a Range of Reemployment Services and Use UI Program Requirements to Connect Them with Available Services
Across states, UI claimants have access to a variety of reemployment services, and states make use of UI program requirements to connect claimants with available services at various points in their claim. In many states, these requirements also serve to link claimants to reemployment opportunities and services. States Target Reemployment Services to Particular Groups of Claimants
States also engage some claimants in reemployment services directly through programs that identify certain groups for more targeted assistance. States primarily target reemployment services to claimants identified as most likely to exhaust their UI benefits before finding work through federally required claimant-profiling systems. While states must meet a number of federal reporting requirements for their UI programs, and for their federally funded employment and training programs, none of these reports provide a complete picture of the services received or the outcomes obtained by all UI claimants. Furthermore, we found that few states currently go beyond the federal reporting requirements to monitor the extent to which claimants are receiving services from the range of federally funded programs that are designed to assist them, and even fewer monitor outcomes for these claimants, largely because of limited information systems capabilities. Labor has some initiatives that may begin to shed light on claimant services and outcomes, but some limitations remain. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to provide information on (1) the extent to which states have shifted to remote methods for filing initial claims and how they are making claimants aware of their responsibilities to look for work and the services available to assist them, (2) what states are doing to facilitate the reemployment of unemployment insurance (UI) claimants, and (3) what is known about the extent to which unemployment insurance claimants receive reemployment services and about the outcomes of claimants who receive these services. | Why GAO Did This Study
With unemployed workers at a greater risk of long-term unemployment than in the past, it is increasingly important to quickly connect Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants with reemployment activities. However, the shift to remote claims filing in many states has raised concerns about maintaining a connection between the UI program and reemployment services. This report examines (1) the extent to which states have shifted to remote claims filing and how they are making claimants aware of program requirements and services, (2) what states are doing to facilitate reemployment of UI claimants, and (3) what is known about the extent to which UI claimants receive reemployment services and about their outcomes.
What GAO Found
Nearly all states accept most initial UI claims remotely by telephone, the Internet, or both. Even though claimants filing remotely no longer have face-to-face contact with UI staff at the time the claim is filed, all states told us they have found ways to provide information on eligibility requirements and reemployment services to individuals filing claims, such as by including this information in the scripts used by claims takers at UI call centers or as documents on Web pages. Officials from most states told us the shift to remote claims has not diminished their ability to provide information or deliver services to claimants. In fact, some report that this shift may have improved their ability to serve their customers. cross states, claimants have access to a variety of reemployment services, and states make use of UI program requirements to connect claimants with available services at various points in their claim. All federally approved state UI programs require that claimants be able and available to work, and in many states these requirements also serve to link claimants to reemployment services. States also engage some claimants in reemployment services through programs that identify certain groups for more targeted assistance. States primarily target reemployment services to claimants identified as most likely to exhaust their UI benefits before finding work, through federally required claimant profiling programs. Little is known about the extent to which claimants receive services from the broad array of programs designed to assist them or about the outcomes they achieve. States must meet a number of federal reporting requirements for their UI and employment and training programs, but none of these reports provides a complete picture of the services received or the outcomes obtained by UI claimants. GAO also found that few states monitor the extent to which claimants are receiving these services, and even fewer monitor outcomes for these claimants, largely due to limited information systems capabilities. Labor has some initiatives that may begin to shed light on claimant services and outcomes, but none will provide a complete picture. |
gao_GAO-13-484T | gao_GAO-13-484T_0 | DOE has continued to experience management weaknesses in major projects (i.e., those costing $750 million or more). In response, since March 2009, DOE has undertaken a number of new reforms to improve its management of major projects, including those overseen by EM and NNSA. For example, DOE has updated program and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and that identify problems early. Our 2012 work examining DOE’s management of nonmajor projects— those costing less than $750 million—indicates that DOE’s reform efforts have helped in managing the department’s cost and schedule targets. In recognition of these improvements in the management of nonmajor projects, we narrowed the focus of the designation of EM and NNSA on our 2013 high-risk list to major contracts and projects at EM and NNSA. DOE’s actions to improve project management are promising, but their impact on meeting cost and schedule targets is not yet clear. Because all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years, neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can demonstrate the impact of DOE’s recent reforms. We will continue to monitor DOE’s project management and its implementation of their actions to resolve project management weaknesses. GAO’s Ongoing Review of NNSA’s Plutonium Disposition Program Highlights the Need for Continued Efforts to Address Project Management Weaknesses
Our ongoing review of NNSA’s Plutonium Disposition Program, including examining recent problems with the ongoing construction of the MOX facility—a major project—and the Waste Solidification Building—a nonmajor project—has resulted in some preliminary observations that highlight the need for continued efforts by DOE to improve contract and project management. DOE is currently forecasting an increase in the total project cost for the MOX facility from $4.9 billion to $7.7 billion and a delay in the start of operations from October 2016 to November 2019. Specifically, DOE is evaluating a project baseline change proposal prepared by NNSA’s contractor for the MOX facility. The cost increase and schedule delay will not be known until DOE completes its review of the contractor’s proposal and DOE’s project oversight office completes an independent cost estimate. With regard to the Waste Solidification Building, DOE approved in December 2012 a revised performance baseline to increase the cost from the initial estimate of $344.5 million to $414.1 million and a delay in the start of operations from September 2013 to August 2015. Our ongoing work is focused on several areas, including the following:
Critical system components’ design adequacy. Understanding the nuclear supplier base. Changes in project scope. Effectiveness of project reviews. In addition to setting the cost and schedule performance baselines of the MOX facility and Waste Solidification Building, NNSA has developed a life-cycle cost estimate for the overall effort of the Plutonium Disposition Program to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. We plan to report on this ongoing work later this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE relies primarily on contractors to carry out its diverse missions and operate its laboratories and other facilities, with about 90 percent of its annual budget spent on contracts and capital asset projects. Since 1990, GAO has reported that DOE has suffered from substantial and continual weaknesses in effectively overseeing contractors and managing large, expensive, and technically complex projects. As of February 2013, EM and NNSA remained on GAO's list of areas at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement for major contract and project management.
This testimony, which is primarily based on GAO reports issued from March 2009 to December 2012, focuses on (1) prior GAO findings on DOE major projects and the impact of recent DOE steps to address project management weaknesses and (2) preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work on the reasons behind the planned increase in the performance baseline--a project's cost, schedule, and scope--for two projects being constructed as part of NNSA's Plutonium Disposition Program--the MOX facility and the Waste Solidification Building.
GAO is making no new recommendations. DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made to improve management of the nuclear security enterprise. GAO will continue to monitor DOE's and NNSA's implementation of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
In response to GAO reports over the past few years on management weaknesses in major projects (i.e., those costing $750 million or more), the Department of Energy (DOE) has undertaken a number of reforms since March 2009, including those overseen by the Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). For example, DOE has updated program and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely and useful, and that identify problems early. In addition to actions taken to improve project management, in its 2012 work, GAO has noted DOE's progress in managing the cost and schedule of nonmajor projects--those costing less than $750 million. DOE's actions to improve project management are promising, but their impact on meeting cost and schedule targets is not yet clear. Because all ongoing major projects have been in construction for several years, neither EM nor NNSA has a major project that can demonstrate the impact of DOE's recent reforms.
GAO's ongoing review of NNSA's Plutonium Disposition Program, including examining recent problems with the ongoing construction of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Waste Solidification Building at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, has resulted in some preliminary observations that highlight the need for continued efforts by DOE to improve contract and project management. DOE is currently forecasting an increase in the total project cost for the MOX facility from $4.9 billion to $7.7 billion and a delay in the start of operations from October 2016 to November 2019. Specifically, DOE is evaluating a project baseline change proposal prepared by NNSA's contractor for the MOX facility--a major project. The cost increase and schedule delay will not be known until DOE completes its review of the contractor's proposal and DOE's project oversight office completes an independent cost estimate of the project. With regard to the Waste Solidification Building--a nonmajor project--DOE approved a revised performance baseline in December 2012 to increase the cost from the initial estimate of $344.5 million to $414.1 million and a delay in the start of operations from September 2013 to August 2015. GAO's ongoing work is focused on several areas, including the following:
critical system components' design adequacy,
understanding the nuclear supplier base,
changes in project scope,
the effectiveness of project reviews; and
lifecycle cost estimates for the Plutonium Disposition Program.
GAO plans to report on this ongoing work later this year. |
gao_GAO-11-263 | gao_GAO-11-263_0 | While the Mayor and Chancellor of the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) oversee traditional public schools, PCSB is responsible for holding the District’s charter schools accountable for academic results and compliance with applicable laws. The D.C. School Reform Act allows PCSB to grant up to 10 charters per year. Although PCSB Operates as an Independent Agency, It Is Subject to Performance Hearings and Financial Oversight
While the Mayor appoints members to the board, PCSB functions as an independent agency within D.C. government. As such, it operates outside of the policies and direction of the Mayor, and operates outside of DCPS and the Chancellor’s purview (see figure 1). While several agencies may conduct activities to review the performance and operations of PCSB, the most regular and comprehensive activities are conducted by the D.C. Council and Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) (see figure 2). In addition, OCFO oversees PCSB’s financial management. According to OCFO and PCSB, OCFO’s oversight of PCSB includes reviewing budget estimates and proposals, reviewing financial processes, and overseeing cash management and procurement activities. Other agencies may conduct audits or investigations when issues arise. Auditor may also conduct investigations or audits of PCSB. PCSB Implemented a New Accountability System to Monitor Charter Schools
PCSB’s New Accountability System Is Currently Undergoing Revision
To improve oversight of charter schools, PCSB launched a new accountability system—called the Performance Management Framework (PMF)—to capture school performance information for the 2009-2010 school year (see figure 3 for the current version of the PMF). However, in October 2010, about 2 weeks before the PMF results were to be released, the board voted to withhold the results from the public, citing concerns about the accuracy of the school-level data collected. As it revises the new system, PCSB is working collaboratively with charter school leaders. The PMF is also designed to assess schools’ nonacademic performance in finance, governance, and compliance with ESEA and other applicable laws. Charter Schools Receive Funding and Other Resources for Their Operations and Facilities
D.C. Charter Schools May Receive Local, Federal, and Private Funding for Their Operations and Facilities
D.C. charter schools may receive funding for their operations and facilities from a range of sources. Like traditional public schools in the District, the primary source of funding for charter schools is local appropriations, which is allocated on the basis of a per-pupil formula that takes several factors into consideration. D.C. Charter Schools Have Access to Nonfinancial Resources
D.C. charter schools may receive local personnel and services from the District. Charter schools may also lease former D.C. public school buildings through a provision in D.C. law, enacted in late 2004, which provides a “right of first offer” to charter schools for school buildings DCPS determines it no longer needs. The Basis for the District’s Decisions to Reject Charter School Offers for Former D.C. School Buildings Is Unclear
For the offers that are rejected, we found that the RFO does not detail all of the factors the District may consider in deciding whether to award a school building to a charter school and that the basis for the District’s decision to reject a charter school’s offer is not always sufficiently documented. Conclusions
In the District, charter schools, which enroll nearly 40 percent of all public school children in the city, offer parents more educational choice. PCSB plans to collaborate with charter schools to develop and revise the system, and has more recently begun providing more detailed information to charter schools about its plans for implementing the revised system for the 2010-2011 school year. Additional clarity and transparency regarding how the District decides to use former D.C. school buildings may increase charter schools’ understanding of the process and may help to avoid the appearance of a lack of fairness among charter school officials and advocates. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the criteria for evaluating offers from charter schools to use surplus D.C. school buildings are clear and the reasons for denial of offers are communicated, we recommend that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct DRES to take the following two actions: ensure the RFO on former D.C. school buildings clearly indicates all factors that may be considered by the selection panel, and inform charter schools, in writing, of the reasons their offers were rejected or of the opportunity to request a briefing to obtain such information. The District agreed with our recommendations and stated that DRES has begun taking steps to improve the process for awarding former D.C. school buildings to charter schools and will continue to identify ways to improve the selection process. GAO-05-7. GAO-03-11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost 40 percent of all public school students in the District of Columbia (D.C. or District) were enrolled in charter schools in the 2010-11 school year. The D.C. School Reform Act established the Public Charter School Board (PCSB) for the purpose of authorizing and overseeing charter schools. Congress required GAO to conduct a management evaluation of PCSB. GAO addresses the following: (1) the mechanisms in place to review the performance and operations of PCSB, (2) the procedures and processes PCSB has in place to oversee and monitor the operations of D.C. charter schools, and (3) the resources available to charter schools for their operations and facilities. GAO interviewed officials from D.C. agencies and 7 charter schools and reviewed oversight procedures for PCSB and charter schools. GAO also reviewed the processes for providing resources to charter schools and analyzed data on these resources.
What GAO Found
Although the Mayor appoints members to the board, PCSB has operated outside of the control of the Mayor and the Chancellor of traditional D.C. public schools; however, several agencies review PCSB's performance and operations. The D.C. Council holds annual hearings to examine PCSB's organization, personnel, budget, programs, policies, contracting, and procurement. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer oversees PCSB's budget development, operations, and financial reporting and reviews PCSB's monthly financial reports and year-end audits. Other offices monitor compliance with applicable laws and may conduct investigations or audits of PCSB when issues arise. PCSB launched its new performance accountability system to oversee the District's charter schools in school year 2009-2010. However, in October 2010, just weeks before the results were to be released, PCSB decided to withhold the results from the public due to concerns about data accuracy and plans to use the data collected to further test and develop the system. The new system, called the Performance Management Framework (PMF), is designed to assess charter schools using common measures for academic performance, compliance with applicable laws, and financial management, among other things. As it implements the new system for the 2010-2011 school year, PCSB is currently collaborating with charter schools to develop and revise the system, and has more recently begun providing more detailed information to charter schools about how it will revise the system. D.C. charter schools may receive funding from local, federal, and private sources for their operations and facilities and also have access to other District resources, including former D.C. school buildings; however, the criteria for awarding former school buildings to charter schools could be more transparent. The primary source of support for charter schools is local per-pupil funding, which is allocated to charter schools on the same basis as all public schools in the District. Charter schools also receive a per-pupil allotment from the District for facilities. In addition to local funds, charter schools are eligible to receive federal formula funding, federal discretionary grants, and private funding, such as foundation grants and commercial loans to purchase or renovate school buildings. To date, charter schools lease or will lease about half of the former D.C. school buildings that have been made available pursuant to a provision in D.C. law that provides charter schools with a right of first offer for these buildings. However, we found that the District does not include in its requests for offers all factors it may consider, such as economic development or other goals of the Mayor, when determining whether to accept or reject an offer. In addition, the District does not sufficiently document the basis for rejecting offers. Charter school officials and advocates expressed concern about the transparency and fairness in how the District makes decisions regarding former D.C. school buildings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct the Department of Real Estate Services to disclose all factors considered in reviewing charter school offers for former D.C. school buildings and make available to schools, in writing, the reasons the offers were rejected. The District agreed with our recommendations and noted that the Department of Real Estate Services has already taken steps to improve the process for awarding former D.C. school buildings to charter schools. |
gao_GAO-09-1046T | gao_GAO-09-1046T_0 | State Faces Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts
Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, State’s diplomatic readiness remains at risk for two reasons: persistent staffing vacancies and experience gaps at key hardship posts that are often on the forefront of U.S. policy interests. During the course of our review we found a number of examples of the effect of these staffing gaps on diplomatic readiness, including the following. Moreover, despite State’s continued difficulty attracting qualified staff to hardship posts, the department has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its incentives for hardship service. State Faces Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls
State continues to have notable gaps in its foreign language capabilities, which could hinder U.S. overseas operations. State has defined its need for staff proficient in some languages as “supercritical” or “critical,” based on criteria such as the difficulty of the language and the number of language-designated positions in that language, particularly at hard-to-staff posts. According to State, two main challenges are overall staffing shortages, which limit the number of staff available for language training, and the recent increase in language-designated positions. Common elements of comprehensive workforce planning— described by GAO as part of a large body of work on human capital management—include setting strategic direction that includes measurable performance goals and objectives and funding priorities, determining critical skills and competencies that will be needed in the future, developing an action plan to address gaps, and monitoring and evaluating the success of the department’s progress toward meeting goals. To address State’s long-standing foreign language proficiency shortfalls, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop a comprehensive strategic plan with measurable goals, objectives, milestones, and feedback mechanisms that links all of State’s efforts to meet its foreign language requirements. Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts. State Department: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses U.S. diplomatic readiness, and in particular the staffing and foreign language challenges facing the Foreign Service. The Department of State (State) faces an ongoing challenge of ensuring it has the right people, with the right skills, in the right places overseas to carry out the department's priorities. In particular, State has long had difficulty staffing its hardship posts overseas, which are places like Beruit and Lagos, where conditions are difficult and sometimes dangerous due to harsh environmental and extreme living conditions that often entail pervasive crime or war, but are nonetheless integral to foreign policy priorities and need a full complement of qualified staff. State has also faced persistent shortages of staff with critical language skills, despite the importance of foreign language proficiency in advancing U.S. foreign policy and economic interests overseas. In recent years GAO has issued a number of reports on human capital issues that have hampered State's ability to carry out the President's foreign policy objectives. This testimony discusses (1) State's progress in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts, and (2) State's efforts to meet its foreign language requirements.
What GAO Found
Despite a number of steps taken over a number of years, the State Department continues to face persistent staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts, as well as notable shortfalls in foreign language capabilities. A common element of these problems has been a longstanding staffing and experience deficit, which has both contributed to the gaps at hardship posts and fueled the language shortfall by limiting the number of staff available for language training. State has undertaken several initiatives to address these shortages, including multiple staffing increases intended to fill the gaps. However, the department has not undertaken these initiatives in a comprehensive and strategic manner. As a result, it is unclear when the staffing and skill gaps that put diplomatic readiness at risk will close. |
gao_GAO-03-575T | gao_GAO-03-575T_0 | Current law requires that military retirement pay be reduced (“offset”) by the amount of VA disability benefits received. Despite the reduction in military retirement pay, it is often to a retiree’s advantage to receive VA disability compensation in lieu of military retirement pay. As such, they are not subject to the offset provisions, and the legislation did not change the statute that prohibits concurrent receipt. Many Programs Use Offset Provisions When Individuals Are Eligible for Benefits from More than One Program
Among the programs that provide benefits to individuals based on their previous work experience or their inability to continue working because of disability, many use offset provisions when an individual qualifies for benefits under more than one program. The specific rationales for these offset provisions vary, but they generally focus on restoring equity and fairness by treating beneficiaries of more than one program in a similar manner as beneficiaries who qualify for benefits under only one of the programs. WC benefits are designed to replace the loss of earnings resulting from work- related illnesses or injuries. Offset provisions are also used by state governments. Modifying the Concurrent Receipt Provisions Has Implications for the VA Disability Compensation Program
In addition to the cost of the benefits, allowing concurrent receipt would have implications for VA program management. These new claims could further tax VA’s claims processing system. VA Disability Programs Face Fundamental Problems
While VA has had difficulty making decisions in a timely and consistent manner, VA’s disability programs also face more fundamental problems. Moreover, reorientation of the federal disability programs would necessitate the integration of the many programs and policies affecting people with disabilities, including those of DOD and VA.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the other Subcommittee members might have. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because pending legislation would modify current law, which requires that military retirement pay be reduced by the amount of VA disability compensation benefit received, the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services asked GAO to discuss the treatment of concurrent benefit receipt in other programs. GAO was also asked to discuss its broader work on federal disability programs.
What GAO Found
Three factors are important to weigh in deliberations on the merits of modifying the military offset provision. First, many benefit programs use offset provisions when individuals qualify for benefits from more than one program. Generally, the provisions are designed to treat beneficiaries of multiple programs fairly and equitably in relation to all other program beneficiaries, consistent with the program's purpose. Moreover, eliminating the military retirement offset provision could establish a precedent for other federal benefit programs that could prove costly. Second, the proposed modifications to the concurrent receipt provisions in the military retirement system would have implications not only for the Department of Defense's retirement costs but would also increase the demand placed on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) claim processing system. This would come at a time when the system is still struggling to correct problems with quality assurance and timeliness. Third, such increased demand would come at a time when the VA disability program compensation, along with other federal disability programs, is facing the need for more fundamental reform. Modifying the concurrent receipt provisions adds to the current patchwork of federal disability policies and programs at a time when transformation and modernization are needed. While we are not taking a position on whether military retirement should be modified, as the Congress and other policymakers deliberate this issue, it would be appropriate to consider how modifying the offset would affect the pursuit of more fundamental reforms. |
gao_GAO-14-757T | gao_GAO-14-757T_0 | Unreliable Data Create Challenges for Managing Excess and Underutilized Property
Federal excess and underutilized property is an ongoing challenge facing the government due in part to unreliable data. In June 2012, we found that the FRPC did not ensure that key data elements—including buildings’ utilization, condition, annual operating costs, mission dependency, and value—were defined and reported consistently and accurately. For example, the FRPP data did not accurately describe the properties at 23 of the 26 locations we visited, often overstating the condition and annual operating costs of buildings. 1). In our June 2012 report, we recommended that OMB, in consultation with the FRPC, develop a national strategy for managing federal excess and underutilized real property. We view such a strategy as a key step needed to improve the federal government’s management of its real property portfolio. Additionally, FRPP is not yet a useful tool for describing the nature, use, and extent of excess and underutilized federal real property. GSA developed an action plan for implementing GAO’s recommendations and was scheduled to complete these changes by June 2013. We are in the process of determining whether these actions improve FRPP consistency and reliability. We plan to report our results as part of our 2015 high risk update. In January 2014, we found that incorrect and inconsistent data on structures limit the value of the government-wide FRPP data the government collects. We also recommended that GSA, in coordination with the FRPC, clarify the definition of structures and assess the feasibility of limiting the data collected on structures submitted to the FRPP. OMB and GSA agreed with the recommendations, and GSA provided an action plan in December 2013 to implement them, but no timeframe was provided for when the proposed actions would be completed. Agencies Do Not Apply Standard Definitions for Deferred Maintenance and Repair Needs
In a 2014 report, we found that civilian agencies followed most leading practices in managing their facility maintenance and repair backlogs, except for transparent reporting about the funding amounts agencies are spending to maintain their assets and manage their backlogs. In addition, financial reporting requirements as well as FRPP reporting guidance do not require a specific process for determining deferred maintenance and repair backlogs, and agencies can use their existing processes to do so. We recommended that OMB, in collaboration with agencies, collect and report information on agencies’ costs for annual maintenance and repair performed and funding spent to manage their existing backlogs. OMB agreed with our recommendation, and along with FRPC, has taken actions to improve management of deferred maintenance, including working to refine FRPP data and develop performance measures that reflect current federal real-property management priorities, but OMB has not yet fully implemented our recommendation. GAO’s October 2013 review of the six selected agencies found several problems that affected the reliability and transparency of the cost savings data that the government reported in response to the June 2010 memorandum. For example, OMB did not require agencies to provide detailed documentation of their reported savings or include specific information about agencies’ reported savings on Performance.gov, limiting transparency. Furthermore the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued by OMB were not clear on the types of savings that could be reported, particularly because the term “cost savings” was not clearly defined. Agency officials stated that the memorandum broadened their understanding of real property cost-savings opportunities. As such, we recommended that OMB establish clear and specific standards to help ensure reliability and transparency in the reporting of future real-property cost savings. We are in the process of determining the extent to which OMB has implemented the recommendation and plan to report our final results as part of our 2015 high risk update. Sustained progress is needed to address the conditions and persistent challenges that make the area of federal real property management high risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal real property portfolio, comprising approximately 900,000 buildings and structures and worth billions of dollars, presents several key management challenges. GAO has designated federal real property management as a high risk issue since 2003 due to long-standing challenges including unreliable data on this property, excess and underutilized property, over-reliance on leasing, and challenges with security. Since then, the federal government has given high-level attention to reforming real property management and has made some progress. It established the FRPC, chaired by OMB, in 2004. The FRPC created the FRPP, which is intended to be a comprehensive database developed for describing the nature, use, and extent of all real property under the custody and control of executive branch agencies. The FRPP is managed by GSA and began collecting data in 2005. GAO's recent work has found, however, that data problems related to federal real property have continued.
This statement discusses data guidance and reliability issues GAO has found regarding federal civilian agencies' data on: (1) excess and underutilized property, (2) structures, (3) maintenance backlogs, and (4) cost saving estimates. It is based on previous GAO reports on federal real property issued from June 2012 through January 2014 and some updates on the status of recommendations made in those reports. To obtain these updates, GAO monitored agency actions taken and performed follow-up with agency officials.
What GAO Found
GAO found in 2012 that government-wide real property data were not sufficiently reliable to support sound management and decision making about excess and underutilized property. The Federal Real Property Council (FRPC) had not ensured that key data elements of the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP) were defined and reported consistently and accurately. For example, FRPP data did not accurately describe the properties at 23 of the 26 locations GAO visited, often overstating the condition and annual operating costs of buildings. GAO recommended that the General Services Administration (GSA), in consultation with FRPC, develop a plan to improve the FRPP. Consequently, GSA developed an action plan and was scheduled to complete these changes by June 2013. GAO is determining whether these actions improve FRPP consistency and reliability and plans to report the results as part of GAO's 2015 high risk update.
In 2014, GAO found that incorrect and inconsistent data on federal structures such as roads, bridges, railroads, and utility systems, limited the value of the government-wide FRPP data. For example, agencies GAO reviewed defined structures differently leading to inconsistencies. GAO recommended that GSA, in coordination with FRPC, clarify the definition of structures and assess the feasibility of limiting the data on structures submitted to the FRPP. GSA provided an action plan in December 2013 to implement GAO's recommendations, but no timeframe was provided for when the proposed actions would be completed.
In a 2014 report, GAO found that civilian agencies followed most leading practices in managing their facility maintenance and repair backlogs, except for transparent reporting about the funding amounts agencies are spending to maintain their assets and manage their backlogs. Different agency financial reporting requirements as well as FRPP reporting guidance did not require a specific process for determining deferred maintenance and repair backlogs, and agencies could use their existing processes. Thus, GAO recommended that OMB, in collaboration with agencies, collect and report information on agencies' costs for annual maintenance and repair performed and funding spent to manage their existing backlogs. OMB and FRPC agencies have taken actions to improve management of deferred maintenance, including working to refine FRPP data, but have not yet fully implemented GAO's recommendation.
In a 2013 review of selected agencies' reporting of real property cost savings data, GAO identified several challenges that reduced the reliability and transparency of the data the government reported. For example, OMB did not require agencies to provide detailed documentation of their reported savings or include specific information about agencies' reported savings on Performance.gov, limiting transparency. Furthermore, guidance issued by OMB was not clear on the types of savings that could be reported, particularly because the term "cost savings" was not clearly defined. GAO recommended that OMB establish clear and specific standards to help ensure reliability and transparency in the reporting of future real-property cost savings. OMB generally agreed with the recommendation. GAO is determining the extent to which OMB has implemented it and GAO plans to report the results as part of GAO's 2015 high risk update. |
gao_GAO-05-171 | gao_GAO-05-171_0 | In July 2004, it convened a roundtable discussion on the effect of tax services provided by auditors on auditor independence. IRS considers listed transactions, which must be reported on tax returns sent to IRS, to be abusive. The Joint Committee on Taxation has described listed transactions as having a tax avoidance purpose, with the tax benefits subject to disallowance under existing law. Nonlisted transactions generally are transactions reportable to IRS that may have some characteristics of abusive shelters but are not, and may never be, listed. Scope and Methodology
To address our first two objectives—relating to Fortune 500 companies, officers, and directors obtaining tax shelter services from their company auditors--we matched data from two sources—S&P and IRS. IRS’s database included information disclosed to or discovered by IRS on companies, individuals, and other taxpayers who used tax shelters. Although we do not know for sure that a company obtained tax shelter and auditing services from an accounting firm at exactly the same time, we considered it a match when at least one of the tax years for which the company received a tax benefit matched a fiscal year from 1998 through 2003 for which the accounting firm was the company’s auditor. Although they were not representative of change overall, we believe that the 8 companies illustrate some of the changes that have occurred in recent years related to auditors providing tax services. The 61 companies had 82 transactions worth about $3.4 billion in estimated potential tax losses over many years for transactions that were generally reportable on tax returns sent to IRS. Despite these data limitations, the numbers we present in this report provide a general indication of the extent to which Fortune 500 companies did use their external auditor for tax shelter services. According to Available but Limited Data, Officers or Directors Associated with 17 Fortune 500 Companies Used Tax Shelters That Had Been Promoted by the Company’s Auditor
As shown in table 4, one or more officers or directors of 17 Fortune 500 companies used tax shelters that were promoted by an accounting firm that was the Fortune 500 company’s external auditor during at least one of the years that the officer or director benefited from the tax shelter. According to Their Representatives, All Case Study Companies Recently Changed How They Acquire Tax Services from Their Auditors
According to their representatives, all eight of our case study companies adopted or refined policies or practices in 2002 or 2003 requiring their audit committees to pre-approve tax services to be obtained or governing the tax services provided. According to company representatives, all eight case study companies obtained tax services from their auditors during the period from 2000 through 2003. Only two of the companies told us of obtaining tax shelter services, and one of them obtained the services before 2000. Six of Eight Case Study Companies Said They Allowed Officers and Directors to Obtain Tax Services from the External Auditor, but Four Said They Then Stopped
Although six of our case study companies reported that officers or directors at some time since 2000 used the auditor for some tax services, such as tax return preparation, officials told us that four of the companies in 2002 or 2003 adopted policies prohibiting officers from using the auditor for the services in the future. In contrast to the situation with tax services in general, none of the companies reported officers or directors obtaining tax shelter services from the company auditor. The Commissioner also said that IRS changes and recent legislation will enable IRS to address the database limitations we note, several of which IRS had already identified and was working to overcome. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent legislative and regulatory changes have addressed the relationship between auditor-provided tax services and auditor independence. At this time, the federal regulatory community is exploring further changes. To contribute to the discussion surrounding these changes, GAO's objectives were to determine (1) according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, how many Fortune 500 companies obtained tax shelter services from their auditor; (2) according to IRS data, in how many Fortune 500 companies did the auditor provide the services to individual company officers or directors; and (3) whether selected Fortune 500 case study companies changed how they obtain tax services from their auditor in recent years. For the first two objectives, GAO used IRS and Standard and Poor's data after finding they were sufficiently reliable for our work. GAO counted a company, officer, or director as obtaining a tax shelter service from the company's external auditor when an auditor that IRS identified as promoting a tax shelter also audited the company in at least one year that the shelter was in effect. For the third objective, independent of any IRS information, GAO selected case studies on the basis of geographic location and previous GAO contact. The companies are illustrative in nature and not intended to be representative of other companies.
What GAO Found
IRS data available on tax shelter services sometimes predate legislative and regulatory changes reflecting a heightened focus on auditor independence. However, both during this earlier period covered by some of the data and also following the recent changes, auditors were allowed to provide tax services, including tax shelter services, to firms they audited. According to IRS data, 61 Fortune 500 companies obtained tax shelter services from their external auditor during 1998 through 2003 for transactions generally reportable on tax returns sent to IRS. IRS considered some reportable transactions abusive, with tax benefits subject to disallowance under existing law, and other transactions to possibly have some traits of abuse. Estimated multi-year potential tax revenue lost to the federal government from the 61 companies' auditor-related transactions was about $3.4 billion (about $1.8 billion in categories IRS considered abusive). In 17 companies, at least one officer or director used the company's auditor to obtain individual tax shelter services. These numbers are imprecise because they have important limitations. These limitations, such as some transactions in IRS's database without tax shelter providers listed, are fully discussed in this report. Commenting on a draft of this report, IRS said that ongoing changes and recent legislation will enable it to address the data limitations noted. According to their representatives, all eight case study companies adopted or refined policies or practices in 2002 or 2003 for pre-approving tax services or governing the tax services provided, such as who would provide them. All eight reported using their auditor for tax services during 2000 through 2003. Two told us of obtaining tax shelter services from their auditor, but one of them obtained the services before this period. Six of the eight reported officers or directors obtaining individual tax services from the auditor at some time since 2000, with four disallowing the practice later. None reported officers or directors using the auditor for individual tax shelter services. |
gao_RCED-98-19 | gao_RCED-98-19_0 | The most frequently cited strategies—used by every agency—are scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis and allowing a person other than the participant (an alternate) to pick up the food vouchers. Three-fourths of local WIC agencies had some provision for lunch hour appointments. Not having to spend time minding their children decreases the amount of time that women need for visits. About one-fifth of the local WIC agencies offer early morning hours—before 8 a.m.—at least once a week, and about one-tenth offer clinic hours on Saturdays at least once a month. At least one-fourth of the participants do not have access to any clinic hours outside the regular workday. The directors of local WIC agencies offered a variety of reasons for not offering extended hours of operation. Directors Generally Believe Their Clinics Are Easily Accessible
About 76 percent of the directors of local WIC agencies believed that accessibility to their clinics is at least moderately easy for working women, as measured by such factors as convenient hours of operation and reasonable waiting time at the clinics. However, about 9 percent of the directors believed that accessibility is still a problem for working women. Directors View Women’s Perceptions as a Major Factor Limiting Participation
Women’s perceptions about WIC—such as the value of the program’s benefits to them as their income rises or the perceived stigma attached to obtaining benefits—were the limitations to participation most frequently cited by the directors of local WIC agencies. Sixty-five percent of the directors considered the fact that working women lose interest in WIC benefits as their income rises as a significant factor limiting participation. Other Factors Limiting Participation
Other factors limiting WIC participation were difficulty in reaching the clinic, long waits at the clinic, or the lack of service during the lunch hour. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
We conducted our review to obtain information on the extent to which the benefits of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) are accessible for eligible working women and their children. Specifically, we (1) identified actions taken by local WIC agencies to increase access to WIC benefits for working women; (2) obtained agency directors’ assessment of their clinics’ accessibility; and (3) identified factors limiting participation in the program. The survey asked the directors of the local agencies to provide information on (1) the strategies they have implemented to increase the accessibility of their clinics, (2) their views on the overall accessibility of their clinics for working women, and (3) factors that limit participation by working women. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the extent to which Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program benefits are accessible to eligible working women, focusing on: (1) the actions taken by local WIC agencies to increase access to WIC benefits for working women; (2) asking the local WIC agency directors' opinions on the accessibility of their clinics; and (3) factors that limit program participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the directors of local WIC agencies have taken a variety of steps to improve access to WIC benefits for working women; (2) the two most frequently cited strategies are: (a) scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis; and (b) allowing a person other than the participant to pick up the food vouchers or checks, as well as nutrition information, and to pass these benefits on to the participant; (3) these strategies focus on reducing the amount of time at, or the number of visits to, the clinic; (4) although three-fourths of the local WIC agencies offer appointments during the lunch hour, only about one-tenth offer Saturday appointments, about one-fifth offer early morning appointments, and less than half offer evening appointments; (5) collectively, at least one-fourth of the participants do not have access to any clinic hours outside of the regular work day; (6) 76 percent of the directors of local WIC agencies believed that their clinics are reasonably accessible for working women; (7) in reaching this conclusion, the directors considered their hours of operation, the amount of time that participants wait for service, and the ease with which participants are able to get appointments at the desired time; (8) although most directors were generally satisfied with their clinics' accessibility and had made changes to improve access, 9 percent of the directors still rated accessibility as a problem; (9) 14 percent of the directors rated accessibility as neither easy nor difficult, and 1 percent responded that they are uncertain; (10) the directors of local WIC agencies identified several factors that limit WIC participation by working women; (11) the factors most frequently cited reflected the directors' perceptions of how women view the program; (12) specifically, the directors told GAO that women do not participate because they: (a) lose interest in the program as their income increases; (b) perceive a stigma attached to receiving WIC benefits; or (c) see the program as limited to those who do not work; and (13) directors less frequently identified other factors--such as the lack of adequate public transportation and long waits at clinics--as also limiting WIC participation by working women. |
gao_GAO-05-655T | gao_GAO-05-655T_0 | 1). In the average disability compensation claim, the veteran claims about five disabilities. During our 2002 evaluation, we reviewed the Board’s methods for selecting random samples of Board decisions and calculating accuracy rates for its decisions. These practices included not ensuring that decisions made near the end of the fiscal year were sampled and not properly weighting quality review results in the formula used to calculate accuracy rates. The quality review program now selects every 20th original decision made by the Board’s veterans law judges and every 10th decision they make on cases remanded by the court to the Board for rework. However, we found that the Board had not revised its formula for calculating accuracy rates in order to properly weight the quality review results for original decisions versus the results for decisions on remanded cases. However, to avoid the potential for reporting a misleading accuracy rate in the future, corrective action needs to be taken, and the Board agreed to correct this issue in the very near future. In our 2002 evaluation, we also found that the Board included nonsubstantive deficiencies (errors that would not be expected to result in either a remand by the court or a reversal by the court) in calculating its reported accuracy rates. Adjudicator Judgment Results in Inherent Variation in Decision- making
Adjudicators often must use judgment in making disability decisions. But it is reasonable to expect the extent of variation to be confined within a range that knowledgeable professionals could agree is reasonable, recognizing that disability criteria are more objective for some disabilities than for others. In January 2003, we reported that concerns about consistency had contributed to GAO’s designation of the VA disability program as high-risk in 2003. Reacting to these media reports, in December 2004, the Secretary instructed the Inspector General to determine why average payments per veteran vary widely from state to state. We support such efforts but still believe VA needs to directly evaluate and measure consistency across all levels of adjudication. While we believe the studies recently begun by the Office of Inspector General and VBA are positive steps forward in addressing consistency issues, the RBA 2000 data system, if found to be reliable, can provide VA with the data needed to proactively and systematically target specific impairments that have the widest variations in decision-making outcomes among the regional offices and focus VA’s efforts to study reasons for variations on those impairments. Related GAO Products
Veterans Benefits: VA Needs Plan for Assessing Consistency of Decisions. Veterans Benefits Administration: Problems and Challenges Facing Disability Claims Processing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The House Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs asked GAO to update a 2002 study to determine what VA has done to (1) correct reported weaknesses in methods used by the Board to select decisions for quality review and calculate the accuracy rates reported by the Board and (2) address the potential for inconsistency in decision-making at all levels of adjudication in VA, including VA's 57 regional offices and the Board. GAO said in 2002 that VA had not studied consistency even though adjudicator judgment is inherently required in the decision-making process, and state-to-state variations in the average disability compensation payment per veteran raised questions about consistency. In January 2003, in part because of concerns about consistency, GAO designated VA's disability program as high-risk.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken steps to respond to GAO's 2002 recommendations to correct weaknesses in the methods for selecting decisions by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) for quality review and calculating the accuracy rates reported by the Board. Specifically, the Board now ensures that decisions made near the end of the fiscal year are included in the quality review sample, and the Board now excludes from its accuracy rate calculations any errors that do not have the potential for resulting in a reversal by or remand from the court. GAO found that the Board had not yet revised its formula for calculating accuracy rates in order to properly weight the quality review results for original Board decisions versus the results for Board decisions on cases remanded by the court. However, GAO believes correcting this calculation method will not materially affect the Board's reported accuracy rates. VA still lacks a systematic method for ensuring the consistency of decision-making within VA as a whole, but has begun efforts to understand why average compensation payments per veteran vary widely from state to state. These efforts include studies underway by VA's Office of Inspector General and the Veterans Benefits Administration, which oversees the operations of VA's regional offices. Some variation is expected since adjudicators often must use judgment in making disability decisions, but VA faces the challenge of determining whether the extent of variation is confined within a range that knowledgeable professionals could agree is reasonable. |
gao_GAO-17-724 | gao_GAO-17-724_0 | DOD Has Not Identified Required Cost Savings and Does Not Have a Reliable Estimate to Support the Cost Savings It Identified
DOD has not identified $10 billion in cost savings through fiscal year 2019 as required and does not have a reliable cost savings estimate to support the cost savings it has identified. DOD has identified approximately $13.1 billion in efficiency-related cost savings through fiscal year 2021. DOD Does Not Have a Reliable Cost Savings Estimate
We determined the cost savings estimate is not reliable because the DOD-provided documentation for the two separate inputs was not sufficiently detailed consistent with the best practices for cost estimates described in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Estimated Cost Savings from Efficiencies Identified in DOD’s May 2015 Section 904 Report
DCMO based the first part of its estimated cost savings—approximately $5.3 billion—on efficiency-related reductions required by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2014 and reported the cost savings in DOD’s May 2015 Section 904 Report. DCMO-provided documentation for the estimated cost savings was a summary table listing funding and personnel reductions allocated to various organizations and included a statement that the reductions listed were “not auditable” because the baseline for the reductions had not been established, among other reasons. Estimated Cost Savings Identified in DOD’s March 2016 Update to Congress
DOD based the second part of its estimate—which it estimates will save approximately $7.8 billion by fiscal year 2021—on five categories of DOD- identified efficiency-related initiatives that the department identified in its March 2016 update to Congress describing how it would achieve the required cost savings. For its Service Requirement Review Boards category, DOD provided documentation showing specific cost savings estimates by organization, an explanation of how those estimates were calculated, and implementation actions that organizations plan to take to achieve the cost savings. Congress has directed DOD to find headquarters-related efficiencies, including mandating DOD to implement and report on a plan to achieve not less than $10 billion in cost savings from headquarters, administrative, and support activities from fiscal years 2015 through 2019. Recommendation for Executive Action
As the department seeks to report on and achieve required cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Chief Management Officer to develop reliable cost savings estimates that include detailed information and documentation to allow for clear tracking of cost savings by DOD and Congress. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD also referenced the five categories of efficiency initiatives in its March 2016 interim update to Congress regarding the requirement to report on and implement a plan to ensure DOD achieves not less than $10 billion in cost savings from headquarters, administrative, and support activities for fiscal years 2015 through 2019. According to information reported to Congress in DOD’s March 2016 interim update, the five categories of efficiency initiatives will achieve approximately $7.8 billion in cost savings for fiscal years 2017 through 2021. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 346(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 requires that DOD implement a plan to achieve no less than $10 billion in cost savings from headquarters, administrative, and support activities for fiscal years 2015 through 2019. Congress further mandated DOD to report on that plan with its budget submissions for fiscal years 2017 through 2019, and for GAO to examine each report.
DOD has not submitted the report that was required with the department's fiscal year 2017 budget submission but did submit a letter to Congress in March 2016 with an interim update on its plan. GAO examined the extent to which DOD has identified the cost savings required through fiscal year 2019 using reliable cost savings estimates.
GAO reviewed DOD's interim update and related documentation, including DOD budget and guidance documents. GAO also interviewed DOD officials about the status of the plan and related efficiency efforts.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that is being issued concurrently. Information on budget data that DOD deemed sensitive has been redacted from this report.
What GAO Found
DOD has not identified $10 billion in cost savings through fiscal year 2019 as required and does not have a reliable cost savings estimate to support the cost savings it has identified. According to DOD documents, the department estimates that it will save about $13.1 billion from fiscal years 2015 through 2021. It based its cost savings estimate on savings DOD (1) identified in May 2015 and (2) reported to Congress in its March 2016 interim update (see table below).
DOD's projected cost savings estimate is unreliable because DOD-provided documentation, when compared with best practices for cost estimates, was not sufficiently detailed to support the estimate. According to DOD's internal assessment, the $5.3 billion in cost savings identified in the May 2015 report were “not auditable” because the baseline for reductions had not been established, among other reasons. The March 2016 update identified additional cost savings in categories of efficiencies, and the level of detail in DOD's documentation related to these categories varied. For example, for one category, documentation showed cost savings estimates by organization, how estimates were calculated, and actions organizations planned to take to achieve the cost savings. In contrast, for two categories, documentation identified cost savings by fiscal year but did not include information on specific actions planned to achieve them. Without detailed documentation allowing someone unfamiliar with the program to easily recreate or update the cost savings estimate, the estimate is not reliable and, thus, does not allow for clear tracking of cost savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop reliable cost savings estimates that include detailed information and documentation. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation but did not address how it intended to implement the recommendation. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is warranted. |
gao_GAO-16-2 | gao_GAO-16-2_0 | Part B of IDEA authorizes funding for federal grants to states to enable school districts to provide services for students with disabilities aged 3 through 21. 2). Almost All States Reported at Least Some of Their Districts Faced Challenges Meeting MOE
Although states reported on our survey that most of their districts met MOE in 2012-13, almost all states indicated that some districts faced challenges, and the number of states reporting that half or more of their districts have faced or may face challenges is increasing (see fig. In response to reduced funding, the district made cuts to special education as well as general education spending, and as a result it had come close to not meeting MOE for the 2011-12 school year. This effectively reduced the amount districts spent on special education teachers and other staff, the majority of any district’s special education spending. States and Districts Report That MOE Protects Funding, but Can Create Unintended Consequences Affecting Services for Students
State and district officials had mixed views on MOE’s effects on services for students with and without disabilities. MOE is one of multiple safeguards established under IDEA to protect special education funding, and while some officials reported positive effects, others said the requirement can sometimes have the unintended consequence of deterring districts from innovating and implementing efficiencies in special education services. Additionally, some states and districts pointed out that prioritizing special education spending to meet MOE during a period of budget constraints resulted in cuts to general education spending that affected services for all students, including the many students with disabilities that spend much of their days in general education classrooms. “MOE hinders our ability to offer innovative methods for delivery of services, if the cost of the new, innovative method is less than in the previous year.” “The MOE requirement also fosters a lack of innovation in the program [special education] for fear of adding to the spending base.”
At the same time, some state and district officials we interviewed said MOE can discourage efforts to implement innovations or expand services. For example, some district officials we spoke with said that because of MOE, they do not want to commit to a higher level of spending to implement innovative services, despite other provisions in IDEA that are intended to encourage innovation. Several district officials noted that protecting special education funding does not necessarily equate to protecting or improving special education services. General education service reductions negatively affect all students—both those with and without disabilities. In 2010, when Education began its latest round of monitoring, it had a performance standard to provide feedback to states within 88 days of a verification visit. However, Education did not set a performance standard for the merged fiscal monitoring reviews. States reported that Education’s delayed feedback has kept them from taking corrective actions in a timely way. As of August 2015— the most recent data Education provided—22 states were still waiting for feedback. Officials in one district we interviewed said this was extremely helpful, allowing them to track their compliance with MOE on an ongoing basis. Education’s lack of timely monitoring feedback has hampered some states’ efforts to facilitate school district compliance with MOE—a key requirement of the law. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help districts address key challenges in meeting MOE and mitigate unintended consequences that may affect services for students with disabilities, while preserving the safeguard for funding for students with disabilities, Congress should consider options for a more flexible MOE requirement. In its comments, Education agreed with both of our recommendations. Regarding our recommendation to establish timeframes for providing prompt feedback to states on findings from its next cycle of IDEA fiscal monitoring, Education stated that in its new system of monitoring it will include timelines for providing prompt feedback on monitoring results, including findings and corrective actions. The survey included questions about the extent to which school districts (referred to by law and in the survey as local educational agencies—LEA) in the state met the local MOE requirement in the 2012-13 school year, state perspectives on challenges their school districts face in meeting the MOE requirement, procedures used by state educational agencies (SEA) for monitoring compliance with the requirement, and the state and federal role in assisting school districts in complying with the requirement. 1. f. Decline in local revenue
Yes, varied
No, stayed the same 10. To examine the characteristics of districts facing challenges and not facing challenges meeting MOE, we linked the CCD data to responses to the question on GAO’s 2011 survey of school districts that asked, “Do you currently anticipate your LEA having trouble meeting the IDEA Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement for 2011-12?” This survey was sent to a nationally generalizable sample of school districts, which means that the results of our analysis are generalizable to the total population of school districts in 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
IDEA provides federal support to school districts through grants to states for the excess cost of educating students with disabilities. Education is responsible for monitoring states' oversight of district compliance with IDEA, including an MOE requirement to ensure special education spending generally is at least equal to the level spent the preceding year. A 2011 GAO report found an estimated 24 percent of districts anticipated trouble meeting MOE. GAO was asked to examine districts' recent experiences with MOE.
This report examines: (1) the extent to which districts face challenges meeting MOE and why, (2) how MOE affects services for students with and without disabilities, and (3) how well Education and states facilitate school districts' compliance with MOE. GAO surveyed the states, as well as districts that in 2011 anticipated trouble meeting MOE; analyzed MOE data; and interviewed Education officials, disability advocates, and state and district officials in three states selected to illustrate a range of experiences with MOE.
What GAO Found
States reported that nearly all school districts generally met the local maintenance of effort (MOE) spending requirement for special education, but some districts faced challenges for various reasons. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), MOE requires districts to spend at least the same amount on special education services for students with disabilities that they spent in the preceding year, with some exceptions. In response to GAO's 50-state survey, states reported that nearly all districts met MOE based on the most recent data available in all states (school year 2012-13). However, most states reported that at least some of their districts faced challenges in doing so. In a separate GAO survey of districts, many cited budget and cost reductions—such as state or local revenue declines and new state caps on benefits, which lowered the cost of a special education teacher—as key challenges in meeting MOE.
State and district officials had mixed views on MOE's effects on services for students with and without disabilities. MOE is one of several safeguards meant to protect special education funding, and while some officials reported positive effects, others said the requirement can sometimes create unintended consequences for the services provided to special education students. They said that because the MOE requirement lacks flexibility, it can discourage districts from altering their baseline of special education spending, even when doing so would benefit students with disabilities or result in more efficient delivery of the same services. For example, despite other grant provisions in IDEA that promote innovation, some district officials commented that the MOE requirement can serve as a disincentive to districts' efforts to pilot innovative or expanded services requiring a temporary increase in funds because it would commit them to higher spending going forward. In addition, some district officials noted that prioritizing special education spending to meet MOE resulted in cuts to general education spending that affected services for all students, including the many students with disabilities who spend much of their days in general education classrooms.
The Department of Education's (Education) delayed monitoring feedback has hampered states' efforts to facilitate district compliance with MOE. In 2010, Education initiated its latest round of reviews of states' processes for overseeing their districts' compliance with IDEA, including MOE. However, Education currently has no standards for providing timely feedback on this process and—as of August 2015—had not provided feedback from these reviews to about half the states, due in part to competing priorities. Such delays are contrary to federal standards that call for prompt resolution of findings. Officials in one state said Education's untimely feedback had delayed the state's ability to provide guidance to districts regarding MOE, and in another state, monitoring was on hold until Education approved the state's process for determining MOE compliance.
What GAO Recommends
To promote innovation and efficiency while safeguarding special education funding, GAO suggests that Congress consider options for a more flexible local MOE, such as adopting a less stringent requirement. GAO also recommends, among other things, that Education take steps to establish specific time frames for providing prompt feedback to states about their fiscal monitoring of districts. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-248T | gao_GAO-06-248T_0 | However, much of this vast and valuable asset portfolio presents significant management challenges and reflects an infrastructure based on the business model and technological environment of the 1950s. Many assets are no longer effectively aligned with, or responsive to, agencies’ changing missions and are therefore no longer needed. Our high-risk reports, updated most recently in January 2005, highlighted problems with excess and underutilized property at several agencies, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), Veterans Affairs (VA), Energy, and State; USPS; and the General Services Administration (GSA). Furthermore, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration; agencies have estimated restoration, repair, and maintenance needs to be in the tens of billions of dollars. The excess and underutilized property problem, as well as the other problems that led to our high-risk designation, has been exacerbated by a number of factors that inhibit the government’s ability to efficiently dispose of or reuse excess and underutilized property. These include competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions, various legal and budget-related disincentives to businesslike outcomes, and the need for better capital planning by real property-holding agencies. We have not evaluated this initiative. Despite the progress that has been made, we still believe that current structures and processes may not be adequate to fully address the federal real property problems. The breadth and complexity of the issues involved and the long-standing nature of the problems and their underlying causes will likely continue to hamper agencies’ efforts to realign their real property assets to their missions. To be effective in addressing these problems, it would be important for the strategy to focus on the underlying obstacles by minimizing the negative effects associated with competing stakeholder interests in real property decisionmaking; providing agencies with appropriate tools and incentives that will facilitate businesslike decisions—for example, consideration should be given to what financing options should be available; how disposal proceeds should be handled; what process would permit comparisons between rehabilitation/renovation and replacement and among construction, purchase, lease-purchase, and operating lease; and how public-private partnerships should be evaluated; addressing federal human capital issues related to real property by recognizing that real property conditions affect the productivity and morale of employees and the federal government’s ability to attract and retain high-performing individuals; improving real property capital planning in the federal government by helping agencies to better integrate agency mission considerations into the capital decision-making process, make businesslike decisions when evaluating and selecting capital assets, evaluate and select capital assets by using an investment approach, evaluate results on an ongoing basis, and develop long-term capital plans; and ensuring credible, rational, long-term budget planning for facility sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization. Specifically, it has developed an action plan for addressing these long-standing issues in relation to the President’s Management Agenda and the executive order. | Why GAO Did This Study
At the start of each new Congress since 1999, we have issued a special series of reports entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges andProgram Rsks. In January 2003, GAO designated federal real property a high-risk area and issued an update in January 2005 on this area. GAO identified excess and underutilized property as one of the major reasons for the high-risk designation. This testimony discusses GAO's designation of federal real property as a high-risk area, focusing on excess and underutilized property and describes various efforts to address the problem and what more needs to be done.
What GAO Found
The conditions that led to GAO's January 2003 high-risk designation still exist. The government's vast and diverse portfolio of real property reflects an infrastructure based on the business model and technological environment of the 1950s. Many assets are no longer effectively aligned with, or responsive to, agencies' changing missions and are therefore no longer needed. GAO's high-risk reports, updated most recently in January 2005, highlighted problems with excess and underutilized property at several agencies, including the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Postal Service, and the General Services Administration. Furthermore, many assets are in an alarming state of deterioration; agencies have estimated restoration and repair needs to be in the tens of billions of dollars. These problems have been exacerbated by underlying obstacles that include competing stakeholder interests in real property decisions, various legal and budget-related disincentives to businesslike outcomes, and the need for better capital planning by agencies. The administration has acknowledged the problems in this area; in February 2004, the President added the Federal Asset Management Initiative to the President's Management Agenda and signed an executive order on real property reform. These and other efforts at the agency level are positive steps. However, despite the progress that has been made, GAO still believes that current structures and processes may not be adequate to fully address the problems. The breadth and complexity of the issues involved and the long-standing nature of the problems and their underlying causes will likely continue to hamper agencies' efforts to realign their real property assets to their missions. |
gao_GAO-01-751 | gao_GAO-01-751_0 | Moreover, a recent IG assessment of the department’s information security program found fundamental weaknesses in the areas of policy and oversight. Commerce uses IT to generate and disseminate some of the nation’s most important economic information. This information is of paramount interest to researchers, business, and policymakers. Conclusions
The significant and pervasive weaknesses that we discovered in the seven Commerce bureaus we tested place the data and operations of these bureaus at serious risk. Sensitive economic, personnel, financial, and business confidential information is exposed, allowing potential intruders to read, copy, modify, or delete these data. Moreover, critical operations could effectively cease in the event of accidental or malicious service disruptions. Poor detection and response capabilities exacerbate the bureaus’ vulnerability to intrusions. As demonstrated during our own testing, the bureaus’ general inability to notice our activities increases the likelihood that intrusions will not be detected in time to prevent or minimize damage. These weaknesses are attributable to the lack of an effective information security program, that is, lack of centralized management, a risk-based approach, up-to-date security policies, security awareness and training, and continuous monitoring of the bureaus’ compliance with established policies and the effectiveness of implemented controls. These weaknesses are exacerbated by Commerce’s highly interconnected computing environment in which the vulnerabilities of individual systems affect the security of systems in the entire department, since a compromise in a single poorly secured system can undermine the security of the multiple systems that connect to it. | What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce generates and disseminates important economic information that is of great interest to U.S. businesses, policymakers, and researchers. The dramatic rise in the number and sophistication of cyberattacks on federal information systems is of growing concern. This report provides a general summary of the computer security weaknesses in the unclassified information systems of seven Commerce organizations as well as in the management of the department's information security program. The significant and pervasive weaknesses in the seven Commerce bureaus place the data and operations of these bureaus at serious risk. Sensitive economic, personnel, financial, and business confidential information is exposed, allowing potential intruders to read, copy, modify, or delete these data. Moreover, critical operations could effectively cease in the event of accidental or malicious service disruptions. Poor detection and response capabilities exacerbate the bureaus' vulnerability to intrusions. As demonstrated during GAO's testing, the bureaus' general inability to notice GAO's activities increases the likelihood that intrusions will not be detected in time to prevent or minimize damage. These weaknesses are attributable to the lack of an effective information security program with a lack of centralized management, a risk-based approach, up-to-date security policies, security awareness and training, and continuous monitoring of the bureaus' compliance with established policies and the effectiveness of implemented controls. These weaknesses are exacerbated by Commerce's highly interconnected computing environment. A compromise in a single poorly secured system can undermine the security of the multiple systems that connect to it. |
gao_GAO-10-615T | gao_GAO-10-615T_0 | While Policies on Compensation Are Generally Comparable, Some Policy and Implementation Issues Affect the Amount, Accuracy, and Completeness of Compensation
Although policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable across agencies, we found some issues that affect the amount of compensation these civilians receive—depending on such things as the agency’s pay system or the civilian’s grade/band level—and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. However, some variations in compensation available to deployed civilians result directly from the employing agency’s pay system and the employee’s pay grade/band level. But at the time of our 2009 review, OPM had not developed such a package or provided legislative recommendations. For example, based on our survey results, we project that approximately 40 percent of the estimated 2,100 civilians deployed from January 1, 2006, to April 30, 2008, experienced problems with compensation—including not receiving danger pay or receiving it late, for instance—in part because they were unaware of their eligibility or did not know where to go for assistance to start and stop these deployment-related pays. We therefore recommended that (1) OPM oversee an executive agency working group on compensation for deployed civilians to address any differences and if necessary make legislative recommendations; (2) the agencies included in our review establish ombudsman programs or, for agencies deploying small numbers of civilians, focal points to help ensure that deployed civilians receive the compensation to which they are entitled; and (3) Labor set a time frame for issuing implementing guidance for the death gratuity. In comments on our final report, OPM officials stated that an interagency group was in the process of developing proposals for needed legislation. While Policies on Medical Benefits Are Generally Comparable, Some Issues Exist in Both Policies and Implementation
Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, our 2009 review found some issues with policies related to medical treatment following deployment and with the implementation of workers’ compensation and post-deployment medical screening that affect the medical benefits of these civilians. Our prior work has found that documenting the medical condition of deployed civilians both before and following deployment is critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment, such as traumatic brain injury. To address these matters, we recommended that (1) DOD clarify its guidance concerning the circumstances under which civilians are entitled to treatment at military treatment facilities following deployment and formally advise other agencies that deploy civilians of its policy governing treatment at these facilities; (2) Labor revise the application materials for workers’ compensation claims to make clear what documentation applicants must submit with their claims; (3) the agencies included in our review establish ombudsman programs or, for agencies deploying small numbers of civilians, focal points to help ensure that deployed civilians get timely responses to their applications and receive the medical benefits to which they are entitled; (4) DOD establish standard procedures to ensure that returning civilians complete required post-deployment medical screenings; and (5) State develop post-deployment medical screening requirements for civilians deployed under its purview. On the other hand, State officials noted that they would implement post-deployment screenings in 2010; however, as of April 2010, State had not provided documentation supporting that it established such requirements. Executive Agencies’ Ability to Track Deployed Civilians Is Limited
While each of the agencies we reviewed was able to provide a list of deployed civilians, none of these agencies had fully implemented policies and procedures to identify and track its civilians who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD, for example, issued guidance and established procedures for identifying and tracking deployed civilians in 2006 but concluded in 2008 that its guidance and associated procedures were not being consistently implemented across the agency. Lack of such information may hamper these agencies’ ability to intervene quickly to address any future health issues that may result from deployments in support of contingency operations. We therefore recommended that (1) DOD establish mechanisms to ensure that its policies to identify and track deployed civilians are implemented and (2) the five other executive agencies included in our review develop policies and procedures to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed civilians. We continue to disagree with USAID’s position since it does not have an agencywide system for tracking civilians and believe that our recommendation is appropriate. Additionally, the other agencies are now in various stages of implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) and other executive agencies increasingly deploy civilians in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior GAO reports show that the use of deployed civilians has raised questions about the potential for differences in policies on compensation and medical benefits. When these civilians are deployed and serve side by side, differences in compensation or medical benefits may become more apparent and could adversely impact morale. This statement is based on GAO's 2009 congressionally requested report, which compared agency policies and identified any issues in policy or implementation regarding (1) compensation, (2) medical benefits, and (3) identification and tracking of deployed civilians. GAO reviewed laws, policies, and guidance; interviewed responsible officials at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); and conducted a survey of civilians deployed from the six agencies between January 1, 2006 and April 30, 2008. GAO made ten recommendations for agencies to take actions such as reviewing compensation laws and policies, establishing medical screening requirements, and creating mechanisms to assist and track deployed civilians. Seven of the agencies--including DOD-- generally agreed with these recommendations; U.S. Agency for International Development did not. This testimony also updates the actions the agencies have taken to address GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
While policies concerning compensation for deployed civilians are generally comparable, GAO found some issues that can lead to differences in the amount of compensation and the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of this compensation. For example, two comparable supervisors who deploy under different pay systems may receive different rates of overtime pay because this rate is set by the employee's pay system and grade/band. While a congressional subcommittee asked OPM to develop a benefits package for civilians deployed to war zones and recommend enabling legislation, at the time of GAO's 2009 review, OPM had not yet done so. Also, implementation of some policies may not always be accurate or timely. For example, GAO estimates that about 40 percent of the deployed civilians in its survey reported experiencing problems with compensation, including danger pay. In June 2009, GAO recommended, among other things, that OPM oversee an executive agency working group on compensation to address differences and, if necessary, make legislative recommendations. OPM generally concurred with this recommendation and recently informed GAO that an interagency group is in the process of developing proposals for needed legislation. Although agency policies on medical benefits are similar, GAO found some issues with medical care following deployment and post deployment medical screenings. Specifically, while DOD allows its treatment facilities to care for non-DOD civilians after deployment in some cases, the circumstances are not clearly defined and some agencies were unaware of DOD's policy. Further, while DOD requires medical screening of civilians before and following deployment, State requires screenings only before deployment. Prior GAO work found that documenting the medical condition of deployed personnel before and following deployment was critical to identifying conditions that may have resulted from deployment. GAO recommended, among other things, that State establish post-deployment screening requirements and that DOD establish procedures to ensure its post-deployment screening requirements are completed. While DOD and State agreed, DOD has developed guidance establishing procedures for post-deployment screenings; but, as of April 2010, State had not provided documentation that it established such requirements. Each agency provided GAO with a list of deployed civilians, but none had fully implemented policies to identify and track these civilians. DOD had procedures to identify and track civilians but concluded that its guidance was not consistently implemented. Some agencies had to manually search their systems. Thus, agencies may lack critical information on the location and movement of personnel, which may hamper their ability to intervene promptly to address emerging health issues. GAO recommended that DOD enforce its tracking requirements and the other five agencies establish tracking procedures. While DOD and four agencies concurred with the recommendations and are now in various stages of implementation, U.S. Agency for International Development disagreed stating that its current system is adequate. GAO continues to disagree with this agency's position. |
gao_GAO-14-672 | gao_GAO-14-672_0 | As required or authorized by these laws, EPA recently proposed or finalized four key regulations that will affect coal-fueled units. In addition to these four regulations, on June 2, 2014, EPA proposed new regulations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil-fueled generating units that, if finalized, will impact the electricity industry, including coal-fueled generating units, aiming for overall reductions equivalent to 30 percent from 2005 emissions levels by 2030. DOE, EPA, and FERC Are Coordinating Efforts to Monitor Industry’s Response to Key EPA Regulations in Response to GAO’s Recommendation
DOE, EPA, and FERC have taken initial steps to implement the recommendation we made in our July 2012 report that these agencies develop and document a formal, joint process to monitor industry progress in responding to the four EPA regulations. As such, we recommended that these agencies develop and document a formal, joint process to monitor industry progress in responding to EPA regulations. We concluded that such a process was needed until at least 2017 to monitor the complexity of implementation and extent of potential effects on price and reliability. Since that time, DOE, EPA, and FERC have taken initial steps collectively to monitor industry progress responding to EPA regulations including jointly conducting regular meetings with key industry stakeholders. Currently, these monitoring efforts are primarily focused on industry implementation in regions with a large amount of capacity that must comply with the MATS regulation—the only one of the four regulations that has taken effect. Agency officials and stakeholders told us that state agencies are generally providing the 1- year extension for generating units—providing these units a total of 4 years to comply. Recent and Pending Actions on Regulations May Require Additional Efforts to Monitor Industry’s Progress
Recent and pending actions on the four existing regulations, as well as EPA’s recently proposed regulations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from existing generating units, may require additional agency effort to monitor industry’s progress in responding to the regulations and any potential impacts on reliability. DOE, EPA, and FERC officials told us that, in light of these changes, their coordination efforts may need to be revisited. Power Companies Plan to Retire More Generating Capacity and Retrofit Less Generating Capacity Than Initial Estimates
According to our analysis, power companies plan to retire a greater percentage of coal-fueled net summer generating capacity and retrofit less capacity with environmental controls than the estimates we reported in July 2012. Specifically, our analysis indicates that power companies retired or plan to retire about 13 percent of coal-fueled net summer generating capacity (42,192 MW) from 2012 through 2025, which exceeds the estimates of 2 to 12 percent of capacity we reported in 2012. In addition, power companies have planned or completed some type of retrofit on about 70,000 MW of net summer generating capacity to reduce SO, NO, or particulate matter from 2012 through 2025, which is less than estimates we reported in 2012. 1). In addition, we found that many of the units that companies have retired or plan to retire are those that are not used extensively and are geographically concentrated, with some exceptions. Smaller. However, some larger generating units are also planned for retirement. More polluting. 2). Specifically, about 38 percent of the net summer generating capacity that power companies retired or plan to retire from 2012 through 2025 is located in four states—Ohio (14 percent), Pennsylvania (11 percent), Kentucky (7 percent), and West Virginia (6 percent). Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We are not making new recommendations in this report. We continue to believe it is important that these agencies jointly monitor industry’s progress in responding to the EPA regulations and fully document these steps as we recommended in 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA recently proposed or finalized four regulations affecting coal-fueled electricity generating units, which provide about 37 percent of the nation's electricity supply. These regulations are the: (1) Cross-State Air Pollution Rule; (2) Mercury and Air Toxics Standards; (3) Cooling Water Intake Structures regulation; and (4) Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals regulation. In 2012, GAO reported that, in response to these regulations and other factors such as low natural gas prices, companies might retire or retrofit some units. GAO reported that these actions may increase electricity prices and, according to some stakeholders, may affect reliability–the ability to meet consumers' demand—in some regions. In 2012, GAO recommended that DOE, EPA, and FERC develop and document a formal, joint process to monitor industry's progress responding to these regulations. In June 2014, EPA proposed new regulations to reduce carbon dioxide emissions that will also affect these units.
GAO was asked to update its 2012 report. This report examines (1) agencies' efforts to respond to GAO's recommendation and (2) what is known about planned retirements and retrofits. GAO reviewed documents, analyzed data, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken initial steps to implement a recommendation GAO made in 2012 that these agencies develop and document a joint process to monitor industry's progress in responding to four proposed or finalized EPA regulations affecting coal-fueled generating units. GAO concluded that such a process was needed until at least 2017 to monitor the complexity of implementation and extent of potential effects on price and reliability. Since that time, DOE, EPA, and FERC have taken initial steps to monitor industry progress responding to EPA regulations including jointly conducting regular meetings with key industry stakeholders. Currently, these monitoring efforts are primarily focused on industry's implementation of one of four EPA regulations—the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards—and the regions with a large amount of capacity that must comply with that regulation. Agency officials told GAO that in light of EPA's recent and pending actions on regulations including those to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from existing generating units, these coordination efforts may need to be revisited.
According to GAO's analysis of public data, power companies now plan to retire a greater percentage of coal-fueled generating capacity and retrofit less capacity with environmental controls than the estimates GAO reported in July 2012. About 13 percent of coal-fueled generating capacity—42,192 megawatts (MW)—has either been retired since 2012 or is planned for retirement by 2025, which exceeds the estimates of 2 to 12 percent of capacity that GAO reported in 2012 (see fig.). The units that power companies have retired or plan to retire are generally older, smaller, more polluting and not used extensively, with some exceptions. For example, some larger generating units are also planned for retirement. In addition, the capacity is geographically concentrated in four states: Ohio (14 percent), Pennsylvania (11 percent), Kentucky (7 percent), and West Virginia (6 percent). GAO's analysis identified about 70,000 MW of generating capacity that has either completed some type of retrofit to reduce sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, or particulate matter since 2012 or plan to complete one by 2025, which is less than the estimate of 102,000 MW GAO reported in 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations but believes it is important that these agencies jointly monitor industry progress and fully document these steps as GAO recommended in 2012. The agencies concurred with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-08-138T | gao_GAO-08-138T_0 | Global efforts to improve disease surveillance have historically focused on specific diseases or groups of diseases. For example, as we reported in 2001, the international community has set up surveillance systems for smallpox, polio, influenza, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, among others, with the goal of eradicating (in the case of smallpox and polio) or controlling these diseases. Four U.S.–funded Programs Help Build Capacity for Overseas Infectious Disease Surveillance
U.S. agencies operate or support four key programs aimed at building overseas surveillance capacity for infectious diseases: Global Disease Detection (GDD), operated by CDC; Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETP), supported by CDC and USAID; Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR), supported by CDC and USAID; and Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS), operated by DOD. USAID also supports additional capacity-building projects. In 2004-2006, the U.S. government obligated about $84 million for these four programs (see table 1). Funding for these programs is obligated to support the ability of laboratories to confirm diagnosis of disease as well as the training of public health professionals who will work in their countries to improve capacity to detect, confirm, and respond to the outbreak of infectious diseases. Collectively, these four programs operate in 26 developing countries. Global Disease Detection
GDD is CDC’s primary effort to build public health capacity to detect and respond to existing and emerging infectious diseases in developing countries, according to CDC officials. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
USAID has supported CDC in (1) designing and implementing IDSR, with WHO/AFRO, in 46 African countries and (2) providing technical assistance to 8 of these countries. In 2005-2006, DOD obligated approximately $8 million through GEIS to build capacity for infectious disease surveillance. Agencies Monitor Surveillance Capacity- Building Activities and Have Begun to Evaluate Programs’ Impact
The U.S. agencies operating or supporting the disease surveillance capacity building programs collect data to monitor the programs’ activities. CDC and USAID also recently began systematic efforts to evaluate program impact, but it is too early to assess whether the evaluations will demonstrate progress in building surveillance capacity. However, as of July 2007, the agency had not collected data on the two surveillance indicators to evaluate the program’s contribution to improved surveillance. CDC has collected data such as the numbers of FETP trainees and graduates, the numbers of FETP graduates hired by public health ministries, the number of outbreak investigations conducted, and the number of surveillance evaluations conducted. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rapid spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 showed that disease outbreaks pose a threat beyond the borders of the country where they originate. The United States has initiated a broad effort to ensure that countries can detect outbreaks that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. Three U.S. agencies--the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD)--support programs aimed at building this broader capacity to detect a variety of infectious diseases. This testimony describes (1) the obligations, goals, and activities of these programs and (2) the U.S. agencies' monitoring of the programs' progress. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed budgets and other funding documents, examined strategic plans and program monitoring and progress reports, and interviewed U.S. agency officials. GAO did not review capacity-building efforts in programs that focus on specific diseases, namely polio, tuberculosis, malaria, avian influenza, or HIV/AIDS. This testimony is based on a report (GAO-07-1186), which is being released with this testimoy. GAO did not make recommendations. The agencies whose programs we describe reviewed our report and generally concurred with our findings. We incorporated their technical comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The U.S. government operates or supports four key programs aimed at building overseas surveillance capacity for infectious diseases. In fiscal years 2004-2006, U.S. agencies obligated approximately $84 million for these programs, which operate in developing countries around the world. Global Disease Detection is CDC's main effort to help build capacity for infectious disease surveillance in developing countries. The Field Epidemiology Training Programs, which CDC and USAID support, are another tool used to help build infectious disease surveillance capacity worldwide. Additionally, USAID supports CDC and the World Health Organization's Regional Office for Africa in designing and implementing Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in 46 countries in Africa, with additional technical assistance to 8 African countries. DOD's Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System also contributes to capacity building through projects undertaken at DOD overseas research laboratories. USAID supports additional capacity-building projects in various developing countries. For each of the four key surveillance capacity-building programs, the U.S. agencies monitor activities such as the number of epidemiologists trained, the number of outbreak investigations conducted, and types of laboratory training completed. In addition, CDC and USAID recently began systematic efforts to evaluate the impact of their programs; however, because no evaluations had been completed as of July 2007, it is too early to assess whether these evaluation efforts will demonstrate progress in building surveillance capacity. |
gao_GAO-08-436T | gao_GAO-08-436T_0 | For example, in 2003 we recommended that the department develop comprehensive guidance to help the services manage contractors’ supporting deployed forces. Several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, even though in many cases DOD and its components have developed guidance related to these challenges. These challenges include failure to follow long-standing planning guidance, ensure an adequate number of trained contract oversight and management personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and comprehensively train contract oversight personnel and military commanders. We have found several instances where poor oversight and management of contractors has led to negative monetary and operational impacts. DOD Leadership Needs to Ensure Implementation of and Compliance with Existing Guidance Regarding Oversight and Management of Contractors
Based on our previous work, we believe for DOD to improve its oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces in future operations and ensure warfighters are receiving the support they rely on in an effective and efficient manner, DOD leadership needs to ensure implementation of and compliance with existing guidance to improve the department’s oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces. However, as we reported in 2006, although the issuance of DOD’s new guidance was a noteworthy improvement, we found little evidence that DOD components were implementing this guidance or much of the additional guidance addressing the management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. In addition, limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on the use of contractor support to deployed forces can result in confusion regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing contractors. Future Challenges DOD Will Need to Address to Improve Its Oversight and Management of Contractors at Deployed Locations
Looking at our past work, I would like to make a number of broad observations about challenges we believe will need to be addressed by DOD to improve the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces in future operations and ensure warfighters are receiving the support they rely on in an effective and efficient manner. There are four issues in particular that merit attention by DOD: (1) incorporating contractors as part of the total force, (2) determining the proper balance of contractors and military personnel in future contingencies and operations, (3) clarifying how DOD will work with other government agencies in future contingencies and operations, and (4) addressing the use and role of contractors into its plans to expand and transform the Army and the Marine Corps. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies extensively on contractors to support deployed forces for services that range from food and housing services to intelligence analysis. Since 1997, GAO has reported on DOD's shortcomings in managing and overseeing its use of contractor support. Part of the difficulty attributed to these shortcomings is that no one person or entity that made the decision to send 129,000 contractors to Iraq. Rather, numerous DOD activities were involved, thus adding to the complexity of the problems which GAO identified in its past work on this topic. This testimony focuses on (1) the problems that DOD has faced in managing and overseeing its contractor support to deployed forces and (2) future challenges that DOD will need to address to improve its oversight and management of contractors at deployed locations. In addition, as you requested, we have developed several actions Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to take. This testimony is based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies on DOD's management and oversight of contractor support to deployed forces that focused primarily on U.S. efforts in Southwest Asia. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
DOD leadership needs to ensure implementation of and compliance with existing guidance to improve the department's oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces. While DOD issued a comprehensive guidance on contractor support to deployed forces in 2005, we found little evidence that DOD components were implementing this and other guidance. As a result, several long-standing problems have hindered DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, even in cases where DOD and its components have developed guidance related to these problems. These problems include failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, failure to systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and lack of comprehensive training for contract oversight personnel and military commanders. Our previous work in this area has identified several instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative monetary and operational impacts. Based on our past work, several challenges will need to be addressed by DOD to improve the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces in future operations and ensure warfighters are receiving the support they rely on in an effective and efficient manner. Those challenges include: (1) incorporating contractors as part of the total force, (2) determining the proper balance of contractors and military personnel in future contingencies and operations, (3) clarifying how DOD will work with other government agencies in future contingencies and operations, and (4) addressing the use and role of contractors into its plans to expand and transform the Army and the Marine Corps. |
gao_GGD-99-156 | gao_GGD-99-156_0 | Comprehensive Information on Death Care Complaints Was Not Available
Comprehensive information on consumer complaints that would indicate the overall nature and extent of problems that consumers experienced with various aspects of death care industries was not available for a number of reasons. One reason is that consumers can complain to a variety of organizations about death care issues and can complain to more than one organization about the same incident. Another reason is that no single organization or combination of organizations collects and compiles all complaints into one database. Also, each organization can have its own way of compiling and maintaining complaint information, which would confound efforts to compile and analyze aggregate complaint data. Although the organizations we contacted were able to provide some data, the number of complaints about death care was generally low compared to complaints about other categories of consumer issues. These conditions mean that the funeral consumer lacks much of the information and freedom of choice available in most other consumer transactions.”
FTC’s Efforts to Promote Compliance Include Distributing Guidelines, Test- Shopping, and Working With Funeral Home Industry
Over the last 5 years, FTC has taken steps, including distributing compliance guides and working with the funeral home industry, to promote compliance with the Funeral Rule. FTC took these steps because it was concerned about what it perceived as a relatively low level of compliance. Despite Its Efforts, FTC Cannot Measure Industrywide Compliance With Funeral Rule
FTC maintains that compliance among providers covered by the Rule has increased “substantially” over the years. FTC’s efforts to measure compliance have been limited to narrowly scoped test-shopping sweeps in selected areas. We analyzed the available records of funeral homes FTC test-shopped in fiscal years 1997 and 1998. Our analysis indicated that among the limited sample of homes visited, compliance indeed was high for the Funeral Rule’s core requirement--giving consumers itemized price lists early in their meetings with funeral home staff--and somewhat lower for other elements of the Rule we reviewed. Selected States Varied in Their Approaches to Protecting Consumers Who Arrange Death Care
The five selected states differed in their approaches to protecting consumers who deal with funeral homes and cemeteries and make preneed arrangements. However, FTC cannot, with any reasonable assurance, report that there is high nationwide compliance with the Rule or a substantial increase in compliance compared to a decade ago, because FTC does not have a systematic or structured process for measuring funeral homes’ compliance so that overall conclusions can be drawn about their actual compliance with the Rule and the effectiveness of FTC’s enforcement strategies. FTC's Funeral Rule
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the availability of information on the nature and extent of consumer complaints about the death care industry, (2) describe and assess the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) efforts to ensure compliance with its Funeral Rule, and (3) provide information on selected state governments’ roles in protecting consumers in their transactions with the death care industry. Trusting requirements are 100% for funeral goods and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined various issues involving consumers' dealings with funeral-related or death care industries, which include businesses that provide funeral and cemetery goods or services, focusing on: (1) the availability of information on the nature and extent of consumer complaints about death care industries; (2) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) efforts to ensure compliance with its Funeral Rule; and (3) selected state governments' roles in protecting consumers in their death care transactions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) comprehensive information on consumer complaints that would indicate the overall nature and extent of problems that consumers experienced with various aspects of death care industries was not available for a variety of reasons; (2) one reason is that consumers can complain to a variety of organizations about death care issues and can lodge the same complaint to more than one organization; (3) another reason is that no single organization or combination of organizations collects and compiles all complaints into one database; (4) also, each organization can have its own way of compiling and maintaining complaint information, which would confound efforts to compile and analyze aggregate complaint data; (5) although the organizations GAO contacted were able to provide some data, the number of complaints about death care was generally low compared to complaints about other categories of consumer issues; (6) FTC's Funeral Rule requires that funeral providers give consumers accurate, itemized price information and various other disclosures about funeral goods and services; (7) over the last 5 years, FTC has taken steps, including distributing compliance guides and working with the funeral home industry, to promote compliance with the Funeral Rule; (8) FTC took these steps because it was concerned about what it perceived as a relatively low level of compliance--about one-third--among funeral homes in the late 1980s; (9) FTC maintains that compliance among providers covered by the Rule has increased substantially over the years; (10) however, FTC does not have a systematic or structured process for measuring funeral homes' compliance so that overall conclusions can be drawn about their actual compliance with the Rule; (11) FTC's efforts to measure compliance have been limited to narrowly scoped test-shopping sweeps in selected areas; (12) GAO analyzed the available records of funeral homes FTC test-shopped in fiscal years 1997 and 1998; (13) GAO's analysis indicated that among the limited sample of homes visited, compliance indeed was high for the Funeral Rule's core requirement and somewhat lower for other elements of the Rule GAO reviewed; and (14) the five selected states differed in their approaches to protecting consumers who deal with funeral homes and cemeteries and make preneed arrangements. |
gao_RCED-98-181 | gao_RCED-98-181_0 | The Joint Tribal/BIA/DOI Advisory Task Force on Bureau of Indian Affairs Reorganization, which was created in 1990 to develop goals and plans for reorganizing BIA to strengthen its administration of Indian programs, recommended that all small tribes—those with service populations of 1,500 or less—be brought up to a minimum level of TPA base funding to allow them the opportunity to develop basic self-governance capability.The task force recommended that the small tribes in the lower 48 states have available at least $160,000 in TPA base funds and that the tribes in the state of Alaska have available $200,000. BIA distributes TPA base funds primarily on the basis of historical distribution levels. BIA’s distribution of TPA base funds has been criticized over the last 20 years for, among other things, not being responsive to changes in the relative needs of the tribes. BIA’s Distribution of TPA Funds
The majority of the fiscal year 1998 TPA base funds was distributed on the basis of historical funding levels, as has been the case for decades. In contrast to the base funds, the non-base funds—used for such programs as road maintenance, housing improvement, welfare assistance, and contract support—are generally distributed according to specific program criteria that consider, in some cases, individual income. As long as it continues to use a funding distribution method that is relatively static, based largely on the initial division of funds among the tribes that was developed in the early 1970s, BIA has no assurance that its current TPA distribution is most effectively meeting the needs of the tribes. Tribes’ Own Revenues Not a Factor in Distributing TPA Base Funds
Because the tribes’ own revenues are not considered in distributing TPA base funds, rich and poor tribes alike receive them. In fact, the tribes in our analysis that reported the highest amounts of their own revenues received more in TPA base funds, in total, than did those tribes that reported the lowest amounts of their own revenues. Of the 72 tribes, 62 reported having revenues of their own, and 10 reported having no revenues or having losses. Much of this information, however, is not currently or readily available. Ultimately, however, the issues of how TPA and other federal funds are distributed and what information should be considered in that process are policy questions for the Congress and other federal decisionmakers to decide. Whether comprehensive financial reporting should be required for the tribes and how that information should be used in determining the distribution of TPA funds are policy questions for the Congress and other federal decisionmakers to address. Although TPA was nearly half of BIA’s 1998 appropriation, it represented just 10 percent of the $7.5 billion in federal funding appropriated for Indian programs in 1998. But we disagree with BIA’s characterization as “meaningless” our statement that, under the current method for distributing TPA funds, there is no assurance that the funds are effectively targeting the most pressing needs among tribes. 2. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the: (1) Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) method for distributing Tribal Priority Allocation (TPA) funds; and (2) other revenues available to the tribes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under the current method for distributing TPA funds, there is no assurance that the funds are effectively targeting the most pressing needs among the tribes; (2) currently, BIA distributes two-thirds of TPA funds, referred to as base funds, largely on the basis of historical funding levels; (3) in distributing these base funds, BIA does not take into consideration changing conditions, such as the tribes' levels of need or the tribes' own revenues from nongovernmental sources; (4) the remaining one-third of TPA funds, known as non-base funds, are used for such activities as road maintenance and housing improvement and are generally distributed on the basis of specific program criteria; (5) BIA's distribution of TPA base funds has been widely criticized over the last 20 years for, among other things, not being responsive to changes in the relative needs of the tribes; (6) furthermore, because the tribes' own revenues are not considered in the distribution of TPA base funds, the tribes with the highest revenues receive TPA base funds just as the tribes with the lowest revenues do; (7) GAO's analysis showed that each of the 6 tribes with the highest reported revenues received more TPA base funds than did each of the 16 tribes with no reported revenues or with losses; (8) in addition, 62 small tribes reported having revenues of their own yet received the same amount of TPA base funds as small tribes that reported no revenues of their own; (9) a decision about whether and in what way to redistribute TPA funds is as complex as it is controversial; (10) as long as BIA continues to distribute TPA base funds on a historical basis, it cannot be certain that the distribution accommodates the changing needs of the tribes; (11) to determine an equitable distribution among the tribes, several types of data may be considered, however, much of this information is not currently or readily available in a consistent and reliable form; (12) furthermore, questions of equity in federal financial assistance extend beyond BIA and TPA funds; (13) although TPA was nearly half of BIA's 1998 appropriation, it represented just 10 percent of the $7.5 billion in federal funding appropriated for Indian programs in 1998; and (14) ultimately, however, the issues of how TPA and other federal funds should be distributed and what information should be considered in that process are policy questions for Congress and other federal decisionmakers to address. |
gao_T-GGD-99-78 | gao_T-GGD-99-78_0 | In brief, our reports and testimonies all indicate that federal paperwork burden estimates have increased dramatically since the PRA was first enacted in 1980, although some of that increase is due to changes in measurement techniques. Agencies’ burden estimates have continued to increase since 1995 despite congressional expectations for reductions in federal paperwork burden. The increase in the governmentwide paperwork estimate appears largely attributable to continued increases in the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) estimates. However, IRS said these increases are due to increased economic activity and new statutory requirements—factors it does not control. In addition,we believe that OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has not fully satisfied all of the responsibilities that the PRA assigns to that Office. Regarding the data that OMB provided to the Subcommittee, we believe it indicates a troubling disregard by agencies for the requirement that they obtain OMB approval before collecting information from the public. Using OMB’s measure of the costs associated with federal paperwork, we estimate that agencies have imposed at least $3 billion in unauthorized burden in recent years. OMB can do more to encourage agencies that are not complying with the PRA to come into compliance, and we offer some options in that regard. violation of the PRA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's reports and testimonies all indicate that federal paperwork burden estimates have increased dramatically since the PRA was first enacted in 1980, although some of that increase is due to changes in measurement techniques; (2) agencies' burden estimates have continued to increase since 1995 despite congressional expectations for reductions in federal paperwork burden; (3) the increase in the governmentwide paperwork estimate appears largely attributable to continued increases in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) estimates; (4) however, IRS said these increases are due to increased economic activity and new statutory requirements--factors it does not control; (5) in addition, GAO believes that the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has not fully satisfied all of the responsibilities that the PRA assigns to that office; (6) regarding the data that OMB provided to the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, GAO believes it indicates a troubling disregard by agencies for the requirement that they obtain OMB approval before collecting information from the public; (7) using OMB's measure of the costs associated with federal paperwork, GAO estimates that agencies have imposed at least $3 billion in unauthorized burden in recent years; and (8) OMB can do more to encourage agencies that are not complying with the PRA to come into compliance, and GAO offers some options in that regard. |
gao_GAO-10-1069T | gao_GAO-10-1069T_0 | Exports, and trade more broadly, contribute to the U.S. economy in a variety of ways. In addition to the longer-term benefits of trade and exports, exports can serve as a countercyclical force for the U.S. economy—that is, strengthening the economy when other parts of it are relatively weaker. For a number of years, as the United States increasingly imported more than it exported, the U.S. economy was an engine of growth for other nations. The National Export Initiative Sets Ambitious Goals for Increasing U.S. Exports and Contains a Key Role for Ex-Im
The President created the National Export Initiative on March 11, 2010, with an ambitious goal of doubling exports in the next 5 years to support job creation. To facilitate achieving this goal, the National Export Initiative established an Export Promotion Cabinet that includes Ex-Im as well as 15 other agencies and executive departments. The report identifies several actions for Ex-Im. Congress Has Set Targets Regarding the Composition of Ex- Im’s Export Financing
GAO has reported on Ex-Im’s efforts to achieve specific targets set by Congress regarding the composition of Ex-Im’s export financing. We also reported that Ex-Im needs to further clarify its definitions and improve its reporting on environmentally beneficial exports. We reported that while Ex-Im has taken steps to increase financing for environmentally beneficial exports, it could benefit from more consistently following strategic planning practices such as involving stakeholders and realigning resources. Small Business Exports Are a U.S. Trade Priority, and Congress Has Required Ex-Im to Provide a Certain Level of Support for These Exports
Promoting exports by small business has been a long-time priority of Congress as well as the executive branch, given these exports’ role in generating growth and employment. In 2006, we identified weaknesses in Ex-Im’s data systems for tracking and reporting on its small business financing and made recommendations for improvement. As the nation’s export credit agency, the Export-Import Bank is a key part of the initiative, and there are a number of detailed initiatives related to export credit in the report that was released on September 16, 2010. Our work on Ex- Im’s financing with respect to small business—including minority and women-owned businesses—and environmentally beneficial exports has demonstrated that substantial steps have been taken, and Ex-Im continues to face substantial challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the role of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) in promoting exports and achieving other U.S. policy goals. As Congress considers policies to achieve more robust growth in the U.S. economy, it must consider the full range of tools available to further growth and create new jobs for U.S. workers. Some of these tools are related to promoting exports, which can have broad benefits to the U.S. economy. As the official export credit agency of the United States, Ex-Im has a key role in helping many U.S. firms achieve sales in foreign markets. In addition to establishing Ex-Im's broad mandate of supporting U.S. employment through exports, Congress has laid out specific, targeted goals for the bank in areas such as increasing financing for environmentally beneficial exports and expanding services to small and minority-owned businesses. This testimony provides some broad observations regarding Ex-Im's contribution to the export promotion goals announced in the President's National Export Initiative. It also describes progress Ex-Im has made in achieving the specific targets set by Congress, as well as some challenges the bank faces in meeting those targets. The statement also provides some background information concerning the ways in which exports can enhance U.S. economic output.
What GAO Found
The President's National Export Initiative has put forth an ambitious goal of doubling exports in the next 5 years. Ex-Im has been identified as having a key role in the initiative, and a recent administration report identifies a number of specific actions for Ex-Im. Our work on Ex-Im's financing with respect to small business found areas where Ex-Im needed to improve its data systems for accurate reporting as well as its tracking of efforts to increase small business financing. Regarding Ex-Im's environmentally beneficial exports financing, we found that the bank could benefit from more consistently following strategic planning practices. Ex-Im has taken a number of steps in response to GAO recommendations, but opportunities for improvement remain. Additional attention to these issues will enable Ex-Im to develop better communication with Congress and other stakeholders regarding the balance between the small business and environmental export targets and the broader priorities in the National Export Initiative. |
gao_GGD-97-60 | gao_GGD-97-60_0 | Recently, however, DOD has begun an initiative to better manage its technology investments using its planning, programming, and budgeting system. NWS has addressed some of our concerns in these areas, but others remain. To do this, GAO has worked closely with the Congress and the administration to fundamentally revamp and modernize federal information management practices. Both the PRA and the Clinger-Cohen Act incorporate this practice by making agency heads directly responsible for establishing goals for using information technology to improve the effectiveness of agency operations and service to the public, measuring the actual performance and contribution of technology in supporting agency programs, and including with their agencies’ budget submissions to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a report on their progress in meeting operational improvement goals through the use of technology. This major milestone represents the first time that all major government agencies will have exercised the type of financial reporting and control discipline that has been required in the private sector for over 60 years and in state and local governments since the early 1980s. Also, implementing the CFO Act’s blueprint for financial management improvements is at the heart of resolving many of DOD’s high-risk problems. Since 1990, auditors have made over 400 recommendations aimed at helping to correct DOD’s financial management problems. When financial statement audits under the CFO Act are completed, it will be important for the Congress to ensure that agencies promptly and thoroughly correct problems that these audits identify. continuing to build stronger financial management organizations by upgrading skill levels, enhancing training, and ensuring that CFOs possess all the necessary authorities within their agencies to achieve change; devising and applying more effective solutions to address difficult problems plaguing agencies’ underlying financial systems; designing comprehensive accountability reports to permit more thorough and objective assessments of agencies’ performance and financial conditions, as well as to enhance the budget preparation and deliberation process; and implementing complementary legislative requirements, including (1) the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 enacted to expand and strengthen federal agency debt collection practices and authorities and (2) the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 requiring agencies to comply with new federal accounting standards, federal financial systems requirements, and the U.S. government’s standard general ledger. In crafting GPRA, the Congress built on the experiences of leading states and local governments and other countries that were successfully implementing management reform efforts and becoming more results-oriented. In 1995, progress in addressing five high-risk areas was sufficient to warrant the high-risk designation being removed, including the following. Of these, 5 were designated just last month. Sustained Congressional Oversight and Focused Attention Are Essential
We have also long advocated sustained oversight and attention by the Congress to agencies’ efforts to fix high-risk problem areas and implement broad management reforms. Under the Government Management Reform Act, several agencies are preparing accountability reports on a pilot basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed actions needed to bring about lasting solutions to serious and long-standing federal government management problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its mission is helping the Congress in its efforts to improve management of our national government; (2) one approach has entailed identifying critical management problems before they become uncontrollable crises; (3) since 1990, GAO has produced a list for the Congress of areas that GAO identified, based on its work, as highly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement; (4) to help solve high risk problems, GAO has made hundreds of recommendations to get at the heart of these problems, which have at their core a fundamental lack of accountability; (5) this list helps focus attention by the administration and the Congress on critical management problems; (6) the high risk designation has prompted agencies to take action in many areas, and progress in addressing management problems has ensued; (7) the need to address fundamental management problems also was a factor in prompting the Congress to to enact important reforms such as the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act and the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act to better manage investments in information technology (IT), the Government Management and Reform Act of 1994, which expanded the 1990 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act's requirement for financial statements and controls that can pass the test of an independent audit, and the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to better measure performance and focus on results; (8) this legislation forms an integrated framework that will help agencies identify and monitor high risk areas and operate programs more efficiently and will assist the Congress in overseeing agencies' efforts to achieve these results; (9) through the set of reforms embodied in the CFO Act, GRPA, and the IT initiatives, the Congress has laid the groundwork for the federal government to use proven best management practices that have been successfully applied in the private sector and state and local governments; and (10) these reforms will not produce lasting improvements, however, without successful implementation by agencies and relentless Congressional involvement. |
gao_HEHS-99-6 | gao_HEHS-99-6_0 | The handful of studies looking at physician specialty differences within an HMO setting have focused on other medical conditions. Assessing the Appropriateness of Care for Heart Attack Survivors
Our study compares the use of three specific pharmacological treatments among Medicare heart attack survivors who saw cardiologists regularly and those who did not. Usage rates for aspirin were much higher but still below recommended levels. Medicare HMO Enrollees Who See a Cardiologist Regularly Are More Likely to Report Taking Cholesterol-Lowering Drugs and Beta-Blockers
Approximately 2 years after their heart attack, 41 percent of our sample reported that they saw a cardiologist regularly. We found clear differences in the use of cholesterol-lowering drugs and beta-blockers—and a smaller difference in aspirin usage—between patients under the regular care of a cardiologist and all others. As table 1 shows, both cholesterol-lowering drugs and beta-blockers were taken 50-percent more often by respondents who routinely saw a cardiologist compared to those without regular cardiology appointments. Healthier Patients Are More Likely to Report Taking Cholesterol- Lowering Drugs, Beta-Blockers, and Aspirin
In general, we found that healthier patients were more likely to take all three types of drugs, although the specific predictive factors varied among the drug categories. Regular cardiology care was not associated with gender, educational attainment, current income, the presence of comorbidities, or self-reported health status. Observations
On the whole, our conclusion that patients under the regular care of a cardiologist are more likely to take recommended medications parallels the findings of other studies of physician specialty differences in the United States. Our results also reinforce the findings of the small number of other studies specifically concerned with HMO members. Our sample, however, was limited to heart attack survivors enrolled in Medicare HMOs who remained enrolled for the roughly 2-year period from their heart attack until we interviewed them. Those respondents were coded as not having a cardiologist. Patients with regular cardiology appointments Patients with occasional cardiology appointments Patients with no cardiology appointments Patients who did not see a cardiologist or saw one only occasionally (B+C)
Our main analysis compared group A with group D (see table 1); this analysis compares group A with group B to make inferences about group C. If, as suggested by the alternative explanation, the principal determinant of drug use is the regularity of physician appointments regardless of the physician’s specialization, then one would expect the same proportion of patients who did not see a cardiologist to receive these drugs depending on whether they saw any other physician regularly or not. All of the figures we used in the above calculations reflect the responses provided by the particular sample HCFA drew from the population of Medicare heart attack survivors in HMOs. Multivariate Analyses for Cholesterol- Lowering Drugs, Beta-Blockers, Aspirin, and Regular Cardiology Appointments
For our major analyses, we compared the usage rates of cholesterol-lowering drugs, beta-blockers, and aspirin for respondents who had regularly scheduled cardiology visits with the rates for those who do not see a cardiologist regularly. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the potential differences in treatment patterns for health maintenance organizations (HMO) patients treated by specialists and those treated by generalist physicians, focusing on: (1) the proportion of Medicare heart attack survivors enrolled in HMOs who take cholesterol-lowering drugs, beta-blockers, and aspirin; and (2) whether Medicare heart attack survivors in HMOs regularly treated by a cardiologist are more likely to take cholesterol-lowering drugs, beta-blockers, and aspirin than those who do not have regular cardiology appointments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the ongoing use of cholesterol-lowering drugs and beta-blockers reported by Medicare heart attack survivors enrolled in HMOs generally parallels the patterns for heart attack survivors in the U.S. health care system overall; (2) as others have found for the general patient population, GAO found a much smaller proportion of respondents reported taking cholesterol-lowering drugs (36 percent) or beta-blockers (40 percent) than would be expected if everyone who would benefit from using these drugs were taking them; (3) Medicare HMO heart attack survivors with regular cardiology care--40 percent of GAO's survey respondents--were more likely to take the recommended drugs than those without regular appointments with a cardiologist; (4) enrollees who saw cardiologists regularly for their cardiac care were approximately 50 percent more likely to take cholesterol-lowering drugs and beta-blockers--a finding consistent with other comparisons of care provided by cardiologists and generalists; (5) although factors such as age, education, self-reported health status, and the presence of other illnesses also influenced who took cholesterol-lowering drugs and beta-blockers, they did not account for the higher use levels observed among patients who had routine cardiology appointments; (6) still, even patients of cardiologists often did not take one or both of these drugs; (7) by contrast, the overall use of aspirin was much higher--71 percent--and while regular patients of cardiologists were still more likely to take aspirin, the difference between them and other patients was smaller and not statistically significant (75 percent versus 68 percent); (8) on the whole, GAO's results for heart attack survivors treated by cardiologists and generalist physicians in Medicare HMOs are consistent with those of other studies of physician specialty differences in the United States; and (9) GAO's finding that patients under the regular care of cardiologists are more likely to take recommended medications reinforces the findings of the small number of other studies of physician specialty differences that are specifically concerned with HMO members and extends those findings to an older population and to a different medical condition. |
gao_GAO-16-869T | gao_GAO-16-869T_0 | The Administration Has Taken Steps to Reform Real Property Management
Since 2012, the government has made efforts to improve real property management. As we reported in 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued government-wide guidance—the National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property— in 2015, which aligns with many of the desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has identified, including describing the purpose, defining the problem, and outlining goals and objectives. We concluded that the strategy is a major step forward that could help agencies strategically manage real property by establishing a government-wide framework for addressing real property challenges. Agencies Face Long- standing Challenges in Disposing of Excess and Underutilized Real Property
Despite this progress, significant challenges to managing real property in general and excess property in particular, remain. Lack of Reliable Data: A lack of reliable data makes it difficult to accurately measure the amount of excess property. The data used to manage the government’s real property, the Federal Real Property Profile (FRPP), are unreliable due to challenges with the accuracy and consistency of data reported by federal agencies. However, we found in 2011 that this process can be challenging for federal agencies. We found in 2012 that—in addition to Congress, OMB, and real property holding agencies— several other stakeholders have an interest in how the federal government carries out its real property acquisition, management, and disposal practices. Limited Accessibility of Federal Properties: As we found in 2012, the locations of some federal properties can make property disposal difficult. However, we have reported on some vacant properties in the Washington, D.C., area that illustrate the challenges associated with disposing of or repurposing vacant property. As discussed below, we made recommendations for addressing these issues. GSA Warehouses: In 2014, we found that some GSA warehouses listed in FRPP as utilized had been vacant for as long as 10 years. Implementing GAO Recommendations Could Address Challenges Related to Excess and Underutilized Property
In recent years, we have made recommendations to GSA and other federal agencies that, if implemented, would increase the federal government’s capacity to manage its portfolio and document any progress of reform efforts. The Comptroller General highlighted our highest-priority recommendations to GSA in an August 1, 2016, letter to the GSA Administrator. Of the six open recommendations, the letter included the following three related to excess and underutilized property In April 2016, we recommended that, to improve the quality and transparency of FRPP data, GSA, along with OMB and federal agencies, (1) assess the reliability of the data by determining how individual agencies collect and report data for each field, (2) analyze the differences in collecting and reporting practices used by these agencies, and (3) identify and make available to users the limitations of using FRPP data. Finally, several real property reform bills have been introduced in Congress that could address the long-standing problem of federal excess and underutilized property. For example, the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 could help address stakeholder influence by establishing a Public Buildings Reform Board to identify opportunities for the federal government to significantly reduce its inventory of civilian real property and reduce its costs. Although both bills have passed the House of Representatives, neither one has been enacted yet. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, GAO added “Federal Real Property” to GAO's biennial High-Risk list, in part, due to long-standing challenges federal agencies face in managing federally owned real property, including disposal of excess and underutilized property. Continuing to maintain these unneeded facilities puts the government at risk for wasting resources due to ongoing maintenance costs as well as lost revenue from failing to sell excess property. Despite implementing policies and systems that may help federal agencies manage real property, the federal government continues to maintain excess and underutilized property. In fiscal year 2015, federal agencies reported over 7,000 excess or underutilized real property assets.
This testimony addresses (1) efforts by the federal government to address excess and underutilized properties since 2012, (2) long-standing challenges to managing and disposing of federal real property and (3) potential solutions to address these long-standing challenges.
This statement summarizes the results of a number of previous GAO reports on real property utilization and management that were issued from 2011 through 2016. GAO also included some updates based on follow-up, conducted on the status of GAO's recommendations in 2015 and 2016.
What GAO Found
Since 2012, the administration has taken steps to reform real property management and address the long-standing challenge of reducing excess and underutilized property. For example, in 2015, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued government-wide guidance—the National Strategy for the Efficient Use of Real Property—which GAO found in 2016 could help agencies strategically manage real property.
However, GAO's work has found that significant challenges persist in managing real property in general and excess and underutilized property in particular. They include:
a lack of reliable data with which to measure the extent of the problem,
a complex disposal process,
costly environmental requirements,
competing stakeholder interests, and
limited accessibility of some federal properties.
Properties in the Washington, D.C., area such as the Cotton Annex building, vacant General Services Administration (GSA) warehouses, and buildings on the St. Elizabeths campus (pictured below) illustrate the challenges for disposal and re-utilization of vacant federal buildings. For example, GAO found in 2014 that real property data indicated some GSA warehouses were utilized when they had been vacant for as long as 10 years.
In addition to the steps already taken by the administration, further action by federal agencies to implement GAO's previous recommendations could help to address some of these challenges. For example, GAO has made recommendations to GSA and other federal agencies that, if implemented, would increase the federal government's capacity to manage its portfolio and document the progress of reform efforts. GAO highlighted its highest priority open recommendations to GSA in an August 2016 letter to GSA. Among those are three recommendations related to excess and underutilized property, including a recommendation to assess the reliability of data collected and entered into GSA's Federal Real Property Profile database by individual federal agencies. Additionally, real property reform bills that could address the long-standing problem of federal excess and underutilized property have been introduced in Congress. Specifically, two bills have been passed by the House of Representatives in 2016, but neither has been enacted yet. |
gao_GAO-07-625T | gao_GAO-07-625T_0 | Under the proposed system, funding for ATO would come primarily from user charges on commercial aircraft and fuel taxes on general aviation aircraft. The reauthorization proposal would also create an advisory board and give FAA limited borrowing authority. The administration’s proposal also calls for changing FAA’s budget structure by establishing two new budget accounts—(1) Air Traffic Organization and (2) Safety and Operations—to align with FAA’s lines of business and proposed funding. See table 2 for a comparison of the current and proposed FAA budget structure. If, to fund the additional costs of NextGen or for other reasons, Congress chooses to increase spending on aviation beyond what can be paid for at current excise tax rates, it can obtain additional revenue through the current funding structure by increasing excise tax rates, the General Fund contribution, or both, although the nation’s fiscal imbalance could make such an increase difficult. Some of the administration’s proposed changes for funding FAA, such as establishing direct user charges for commercial aviation and substantially increasing fuel taxes for general aviation are intended to link FAA’s revenues more closely with its costs. FAA estimates that NextGen will cost between $15 billion to $22 billion through 2025. Thus, it is necessary to look at factors other than a need for more revenues to justify a major change in FAA’s funding structure. Funding Changes in Reauthorization Proposal Are Intended to Address Concerns about Long-term Revenue Adequacy, Equity, and Efficiency of Current Funding Structure
FAA has expressed concern that revenues from the current funding structure depend heavily on factors, such as ticket prices, that are not connected to FAA’s workload and costs. Revenues collected from excise taxes are primarily dependent on the price of tickets and the number of passengers on planes, while workload is driven by flight control and safety activities. Concerns about the Soundness of the Cost Allocation Methodology and Adherence to Principle of Cost-Based Funding May Limit Proposal’s Ability to Address FAA’s Key Concerns
A better alignment of FAA’s revenues and costs can address revenue adequacy, equity and efficiency concerns, but the ability of the proposed funding structure to link revenues and costs to address these concerns depends critically on two things—first, the soundness of FAA’s cost allocation system in allocating costs to users and, second, how closely the proposed funding structure adheres to the principle of cost-based funding. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the FAA Administrator would have substantial discretion in how much to use the advisory board’s expertise. Observations on Proposed Changes to the Budget Structure and on the Method for Determining the General Fund Contribution
The reauthorization proposal to align FAA’s budget accounts with FAA’s lines of business has advantages and disadvantages. Such a restructuring is consistent with FAA’s emphasis on aligning revenues and costs and could allow FAA to more specifically distinguish those funding options that provide a better links between costs and revenues. However, some FAA activities may not be clearly divisible into discrete categories. Linking the General Fund contribution to FAA’s budget, as the administration is proposing, would explicitly recognize that users of the system are not the only beneficiaries of it. An approach that links a General Fund contribution to public benefits is consistent with the principle of public finance that public benefits should come from the General Fund and not from user contributions. Concluding Observations
The administration has introduced a complex proposal for funding FAA, and we believe that it deserves serious and thoughtful consideration. Adopting this proposal is not necessary to provide more money to FAA if Congress thinks that additional spending on aviation is needed to address air traffic increases and new investment demands, including NextGen, because additional funding can be provided within the current structure. FAA’s cost allocation methodology is new and has raised issues, suggesting that further analysis and more time may be needed to reach a consensus as to whether it is sufficiently sound to support a cost-based funding structure for FAA. Given the relatively low uncommitted balance in the Trust Fund, a lapse in tax revenues could affect the funding of most FAA activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recently, the administration submitted a proposal for reauthorizing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the excise taxes that fund most of its budget. FAA's current authorization expires in 6 months. The proposal calls for major changes to FAA's funding and budget structure that are intended to address concerns about the long-term revenue adequacy, equity, and efficiency of FAA's current funding structure and to provide a more stable, reliable basis for funding a new air traffic control system that FAA is developing (at an estimated cost of $15 billion to 22 billion through 2025) to meet forecasted increases in air travel demand. The proposal would introduce cost-based charges for commercial users of air traffic control services, eliminate many current taxes, substantially raise fuel taxes for general aviation users, charge commercial and general aviation users a fuel tax to pay primarily for airport capital improvements, modify FAA's budget accounts to align with specific FAA activities, and link the portion of FAA's budget that comes from the Treasury's General Fund with public benefits FAA provides. This statement offers GAO's observations on the proposed changes in FAA's (1) funding and (2) budget structure and is based on GAO's analysis of FAA's proposal and a recent GAO report on FAA funding options.
What GAO Found
Funding Structure: The current funding structure has supported FAA as FAA's budget has grown, and it can continue to do so to fund planned modernization. Excise tax revenues are forecasted to increase if the current taxes are reauthorized without change and thus could support additional spending. If necessary, Congress can obtain more revenue by increasing the excise tax rates or the General Fund contribution to FAA's budget, although the nation's fiscal imbalance could make such an increase difficult. FAA is concerned because revenues from the current funding structure depend primarily on ticket prices and passenger numbers, which are not well linked to FAA's workload and costs. The proposed new funding structure would link revenues more closely with costs to ensure that revenues rise with increases in FAA's air traffic control and safety activities. According to FAA, cost-based user charges would also be more equitable and could create incentives for more efficient use of the system by aircraft operators. How well FAA's proposed funding structure, if enacted, would achieve these goals is uncertain because it depends on two unknowns--the soundness of a new FAA cost allocation methodology and the extent to which the proposed structure links revenues to costs. Also uncertain are the adequacy of FAA's proposed fuel tax rate to collect anticipated revenues, the implications of a proposed advisory board, and the impact of a proposal to give FAA limited debt-financing authority. Furthermore, GAO notes, user charges would reduce Congress's role in setting revenues. Budget Structure: Modifying FAA's budget accounts is consistent with FAA's emphasis on aligning revenues and costs, but may present implementation issues, in that some FAA activities may be difficult to categorize. More specifically, the proposed restructuring could allow FAA to better identify funding options that link revenues and costs and may improve transparency by showing how much is being spent on specific FAA activities. However, some activities, such as those related to safety, may not lend themselves to placement in discrete categories. Linking the General Fund contribution to public benefits is appropriate, but since some activities may provide both public and private benefits, judgment rather than a precise calculation may determine the contribution. Concluding Observations: The administration has introduced a complex proposal for funding FAA that GAO believes deserves serious and thoughtful consideration. While not necessary to provide more money for FAA, the proposed structure may address some of the concerns raised by the current structure if its cost allocation is sound. Because FAA's cost allocation model is new, further analysis and more time may be needed to determine whether it can adequately support a cost-based funding structure for FAA. Timely reauthorization of funding for FAA for at least the next year is, however, critical to prevent a lapse in funding for most FAA activities, regardless of the action taken on the proposed changes. |
gao_GAO-05-672 | gao_GAO-05-672_0 | It was not until September 2003 that DTRA finalized the terms of the contract for collecting the radiological sources and collections began throughout Iraq. To further secure the most dangerous sources it had collected, in June 2004, DTRA and DOE together removed about 1,000 of the 1,400 previously collected sources from Iraq. Despite DTRA’s efforts, however, the total number of radiological sources in Iraq remains unknown. According to DOE officials, they raised this issue of ownership when the removal mission was being planned, but it was never resolved. Second, DOD did not search in all places in Iraq where sources might be found. The United States Helped Create an Iraqi Agency to Regulate Sources, but Future Assistance Is Uncertain
The Department of State supported the Coalition Provisional Authority in creating an independent Iraqi agency, the Iraqi Radiological Source Regulatory Authority (IRSRA), to regulate sources, and State and DOE are assisting the new agency by providing equipment, technical assistance, and funding. Iraq’s Political Transition and Continuing Hostilities Are Creating Uncertainties for IRSRA and U.S. Assistance
According to State officials, because of uncertainties associated with the continuing formation of the Iraqi government, State will have to monitor Iraqi efforts to ensure the continued growth and success of an independent, competent, and sustainable regulatory authority for the control of radioactive sources and materials. In addition, to ensure that planning and preparing for potential future missions is carried out in advance, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide specific guidance for collecting and securing radiological sources, including integrating the objective of collecting and securing radiological sources with military combat objectives, including specifying how security protection, if needed, would be provided to the organization with responsibility for managing radiological sources and whether combat troops would be required to secure sources and provide protection for operations to collect and secure radiological sources; determining criteria to define which radiological sources (1) are of greatest risk and should be collected, (2) are being properly used and secured and thus can be left in place, and (3) pose minimal threat and thus do not need to be collected; specifying the health and safety standards, after considering how U.S. standards for handling, securing, transporting, and disposing of radiological sources were modified for use in Iraq; officially designating the organization responsible within DOD for collecting, securing, and disposing of sources and establishing agreements between that organization and other DOD organizations that may be involved with these efforts; establishing agreements and points of contact with DOE and other federal agencies, as needed, to specify the coordination, technical expertise, equipment, and facilities that may be needed to collect and secure sources in, or remove them from, a foreign country; identifying under which circumstances and for what purposes DOD will contract with private firms to conduct activities to collect and secure radiological sources, and address legal and contracting issues to ensure the timely use of contractors; and establishing guidelines concerning the role of radiological experts from the country where sources need to be collected and secured. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
This report (1) assesses Department of Defense (DOD) readiness to collect and secure radiological sources in Iraq from the start of the 2003 war, (2) presents information on the number of radiological sources the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) secured by the time of the June 2004 transition to the interim Iraqi government, (3) describes the assistance the United States has provided, and plans to provide in the future, to the Iraqi government to help regulate radiological sources in Iraq, and (4) examines DOD and Department of Energy (DOE) actions to assess their experiences in Iraq and apply any lessons learned to possible future radiological source collection missions. We also reviewed a February 2004 National Defense University study of lessons learned from the mission to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and discussed the study with its author. Based on the Iraq experience, the NDU report recommended that DOD develop and maintain the capability to quickly eliminate WMD in hostile environments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, concerns were raised about the security of Iraq's radiological sources. Such sources are used in medicine, industry, and research, but unsecured sources could pose risks of radiation exposure, and terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." This report provides information on (1) the readiness of the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect and secure sources, (2) the number of sources DOD collected and secured, (3) U.S. assistance to help regulate sources in Iraq, and (4) the lessons DOD and the Department of Energy learned.
What GAO Found
DOD was not ready to collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in March 2003 and for about 6 months thereafter. Before DOD could collect radiological sources, it had to specify criteria for which sources should be collected and how to safely collect them, coordinate within DOD, coordinate assistance from the Department of Energy (DOE), and resolve contract issues. DOD did not issue guidance for collecting and securing sources until July 2003 and did not finalize the terms of the contract to collect sources until September 2003. Until radiological sources could be collected, some sources were looted and scattered, and some troops were diverted from their regular combat duties to guard sources in diverse places. In June 2004, DOD removed about 1,000 of the 1,400 radiological sources collected in Iraq and sent them to the United States for disposal. DOD left in place approximately 700 additional sources that it had judged were adequately secured and being used properly by Iraqis. According to DOD and Department of State officials, however, the total number of radiological sources in Iraq remains unknown. The United States assisted in establishing an Iraqi agency to regulate radiological sources. Since June 2004, State and DOE have helped this new agency develop an action plan with assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, according to State officials, because of uncertainties associated with the continuing formation of the Iraqi government, State will have to monitor Iraqi efforts to ensure the continued growth and success of an independent, competent, and sustainable regulatory authority for the control of radioactive sources and materials. Both DOD and DOE are considering improvements based on their Iraq experiences. A 2004 study of lessons learned, requested by DOD, recommended that DOD develop the capability to quickly eliminate weapons of mass destruction in hostile environments, but it did not focus on the narrower radiological source mission. In contrast, DOE has contracted for a study to examine lessons from its role in removing radiological sources from Iraq. |
gao_GAO-06-535 | gao_GAO-06-535_0 | Beginning in 2002, State introduced three key initiatives focused on reaching younger and broader Muslim audiences to supplement the standard exchange and information programs used by most embassies; these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended. Specifically, we noted that while State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs received the largest overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest percentage increases in such resources occurred in regions with significant Muslim populations. 2). The YES and PLUS programs, with a combined budget of $25 million, remain active in fiscal year 2006. In addition, posts are not required to develop in-depth analysis to better inform and support their program decisions or country-specific communication plans to help inform and guide their implementation efforts. Target Audiences Have Not Been Clearly Defined
Private sector best practices suggest that analyzing target markets in depth and segmenting these markets are critical to developing effective information campaigns. The reviewers suggested that exchange programs could be reinforced with targeted strategic information programs. In 2004, the National Security Council and the department created the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee to develop an interagency strategy to marginalize extremists. Staffing Challenges at Posts in the Muslim World: Tour Length, Time, and Language Capability
Insufficient numbers of public diplomacy staff and staff time hinder outreach efforts at posts in the Muslim world. To address these challenges, State has taken several steps, both at the department and post level, highlighted by the Secretary’s transformational diplomacy initiative, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this initiative. According to data provided by State, in countries with significant Muslim populations, 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions are filled by officers without the requisite proficiency in those languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. State’s efforts will focus on critical languages spoken in the Muslim world, such as Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, and Urdu, among others. State Lacks Systematic Means for Communicating Best Practices
While individual posts have devised innovative approaches to overcome the challenges their public diplomacy programs face, State generally lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of communicating these practices and transferring knowledge and experience across posts. Conclusions
In recent years, State has shifted public diplomacy resources to the Muslim world, but three of its new initiatives specifically designed to reach Muslim audiences have been short-lived. These are all positive steps. State currently lacks a systematic mechanism for sharing best practices, which could help address some of these challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the delivery of public diplomacy messages to Muslim audiences around the world, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to take the following two actions: To increase the sophistication and effectiveness of U.S. outreach efforts, develop written guidance detailing how the department intends to implement its public diplomacy goals as they apply to the Muslim world and incorporates the strategic communication best practices discussed in this report. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what public diplomacy resources and programs the State Department (State) has directed to the Muslim world, we reviewed State budget requests, annual performance and accountability reports, and other documents. To assess whether posts adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, we reviewed Washington-produced mission performance planning guidance prepared by the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources (located within the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the results of a fiscal year 2005 review of mission performance plans conducted by the Bureau of Resource Management, public opinion polling results prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and related strategic planning and evaluation documents prepared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of International Information Programs. The United States has no clearly defined strategic framework, themes, or messages. | Why GAO Did This Study
Public opinion polls have shown continued negative sentiments toward the United States in the Muslim world. Public diplomacy activities--led by the State Department (State)--are designed to counter such sentiments by explaining U.S. foreign policy actions, countering misinformation, and advancing mutual understanding between nations. GAO was asked to examine (1) what public diplomacy resources and programs State has directed to the Muslim world, (2) whether posts have adopted a strategic approach to implementing public diplomacy, and (3) what challenges remain to be addressed.
What GAO Found
State has increased public diplomacy resources to countries with significant Muslim populations in recent years and launched three major initiatives directed at the Muslim world. Comparing data for fiscal years 2004 and 2006, overseas operations budgets have increased, with the largest percentage increases going to regional bureaus with significant Muslim populations. However, the number of authorized overseas positions in all regional bureaus increased slightly or not at all. As part of the Secretary of State's newly announced transformational diplomacy initiative, the department intends to reposition staff to better align with policy priorities. Since 2002, State has initiated three public diplomacy activities focused on the Muslim world--a media campaign, a youth-oriented magazine, and a group of youth-focused exchange programs--but these initiatives have been largely terminated or suspended. However, several exchange programs continue to target youth in the Muslim world. In addition, posts in the Muslim world use a range of standard programs and tools which the Under Secretary plans to supplement with several new initiatives. GAO's fieldwork revealed that posts' public diplomacy efforts generally lacked important strategic communication elements found in the private sector, which GAO and others have suggested adopting as a means to better communicate with target audiences. These elements include having core messages, segmented target audiences, in-depth research and analysis to monitor and evaluate results, and an integrated communication plan that brings all these elements together. These findings were reinforced by State's own post-level review. State established a new strategic framework for public diplomacy in fiscal year 2006, calling for, among other things, marginalizing extremists and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures. However, posts have not been given written guidance on how to implement this strategy. Such guidance is a critical first step to developing in-depth communication plans in the field. Posts in the Muslim world face several challenges in implementing their public diplomacy programs, including the need to balance security with public outreach and concerns related to staff numbers and language capabilities. For example, we found that 30 percent of language designated public diplomacy positions in the Muslim world were filled by officers without the requisite language skills. State has begun to address many of these challenges, but it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these efforts. Further, State lacks a systematic, comprehensive means of sharing best practices in public diplomacy, which could help transfer knowledge and experience across posts. |
gao_AIMD-98-4 | gao_AIMD-98-4_0 | Of the 173 respondents, almost 70 percent were military officers. The officers served mainly as comptrollers and budget officers at major commands and comptrollers at installations, and the civilians most often served in budget officer positions at installations. Two of the respondents also reported holding doctoral degrees. About 30 percent of these 158 respondents majored in accounting, while approximately 50 percent had other business-related majors. Table 4 shows the majors reported by the 99 officers and 30 civilians holding master’s degrees. Four respondents reported holding more than one major. About 50 percent of all respondents, officers and civilians, reported performing tasks in several financial management-related functions included in our review throughout their careers. The officers’ careers ranged from 3 to 38 years, averaging 18 years, while the civilians’ careers ranged from 12 to 44 years, averaging 27 years. Of the 86 officers and 45 civilians receiving training, 9 out of 10 listed general topics, such as computers and supervision, as examples of the training they had completed. Meanwhile, about one-half of both officers and civilians reported completing some training in financial-related topics, while only about 2 out of 10 reported completing training in accounting-related topics, such as accounting standards and financial reporting. Professional Certifications Held
Almost 20 percent of the respondents reported holding financial management-related certifications. In the Air Force, the 208 key financial managers selected for this review included:
4 senior executives in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)—SAF/FM&C, including the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller); Deputy Assistant Secretary, Financial Operations; and Deputy Assistant Secretary, Budget;
10 SAF/FM&C staff involved in financial operations, financial management policy, and/or budget execution-related functions; and
194 staff serving in comptroller, deputy comptroller, budget officer, and working capital fund manager positions at 87 major commands and installations involved in operations, training, supply and maintenance, and the research, development, test, evaluation, and procurement of aircraft, missiles, and other Air Force systems, such as launch systems, satellites, and communications/electronics. Of the 208 selected Air Force financial managers located at 88 organizations, 177 from 79 of these organizations responded to this review. We then worked with Air Force officials in developing a data collection instrument to gather the following types of information under each indicator: formal education: degrees attained, majors, and specific accounting and financial-related courses completed; professional work experience: (1) number of years working in current position, years at DOD, years in other government agencies, and years in the private sector, and (2) experience in five specific financial management-related functions; training: during 1995-1996, specific subjects completed related to accounting, other financial-related topics, and general topics; and professional certifications: CPA, CGFM, other financial management-related certifications, and other nonfinancial management-related certifications held. Two civilians also held doctoral degrees, one in business administration and the other in law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative mandate, GAO provided information on key financial managers within the Department of the Air Force, specifically focusing on the qualifications and professional work experience of 4 Air Force management executives and 173 key financial management staff representing 79 of the 88 Air Force organizations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the four Air Force financial management executives included the: (a) Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller); (b) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller); (c) Deputy Assistant Secretary, Financial Operations; and (d) Deputy Assistant Secretary, Budget; (2) each of the executives had attained masters degrees; (3) none held professional certifications; and (4) of the 173 other key Air Force financial managers responding to GAO's review: (a) almost 70 percent (117) were military officers, serving mainly as comptrollers and budget officers at major commands and as comptrollers at installations; (b) 56 were civilian personnel serving mainly in budget officer positions at installations; (c) all of the 117 officers and 41 of the 56 civilians reported holding bachelors degrees; (d) about 30 percent of respondents with bachelors degrees majored in accounting, while approximately 50 percent majored in other business-related areas; (e) 129 (99 officers and 30 civilians) also reported holding advanced degrees; (f) about two-thirds of these degrees were in business-related majors other than accounting, while the majors of the remaining respondents were not business-related, and two civilians held doctoral degrees--one in business administration and the other in law; (g) the officers' careers ranged from 3 to 38 years, averaging 18 years, while the civilians' careers ranged from 12 to 44 years, averaging 27 years; (h) officers with less than 12 years of experience were most often assigned as budget officers at installations; (i) about 50 percent of all respondents reported performing tasks throughout their careers in several financial management-related functions included in GAO's review; (j) 131 respondents (86 officers and 45 civilians) reported receiving training during 1995 and 1996, with 9 out of every 10 listing general topics, such as computers and supervision, as examples of the training completed; (k) about one-half also reported completing financial-related training during this period, while only about 2 out of 10 reported completing accounting-related training, such as accounting standards and financial reporting; (l) about 20 percent of the respondents reported holding one or more financial management-related certifications; and (m) of the 32 holding certificates, 6 were Certified Public Accountants (CPA), 6 were Certified Government Financial Managers (CGFM), and 24 were others, such as Certified Cost Analysts and Certified Acquisition Professional in Financial Management and Comptrollership. |
gao_GAO-17-268T | gao_GAO-17-268T_0 | Background
The federal government receives amounts from numerous sources in addition to tax revenues, including user fees, fines, penalties, and intragovernmental fees. In 2013, we identified six key fee design decisions related to how fees are set, used, and reviewed that, in the aggregate, enable Congress to design fees that strike its desired balance between agency flexibility and congressional control. Four of the six key design decisions relate to how the fee collections are used and in 2015 we reported that they are applicable to fines and penalties (see figure 1). Congress determines the availability of collections by defining the extent to which an agency may use (i.e., obligate and spend) them, including the availability of the funds, the period of time the collections are available for obligation, the purposes for which they may be used, and the amount of collections that are available to the agency. Design Options Related to Agency’s Access to and Use of Its Collections
Our design guides can help Congress consider the implications and tradeoffs of various design alternatives. Requiring an appropriation to make the funds available to an agency increases opportunities for congressional oversight on a regular basis. Dedicated Collections Available without Further Congressional Action
Legislation authorizing a fee, fine, or penalty may give the agency authority to use collections without additional congressional action. We refer to the legal authorities that provide agencies with permanent authority to both collect and obligate funds from sources such as fees, fines, and penalties as “permanent funding authorities.” Agencies with these permanent funding authorities have varying degrees of autonomy, depending in part on the extent to which the statute limits when, how much, and for what purpose funds may be obligated. Even when an agency has a permanent authority to use collections, collections remain subject to congressional oversight at any point in time and Congress can place limitations on obligations for any given year. For example,
U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Crime Victims Fund (CVF) Fines and Penalties: Criminal fines and penalties collected from offenders, among other sources, are deposited in the CVF and can be used without further appropriation to fund victims’ assistance programs and directly compensate crime victims. Collections with a Combination of Different Authorities
In some cases, Congress has provided agencies with permanent authority to use a portion of collections and designated other portions of the collections for another use or to be deposited to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Third Edition, Volume II. GAO-17-44. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress exercises its constitutional power of the purse by appropriating funds and prescribing conditions governing their use. Through annual appropriations and other laws that constitute permanent appropriations, Congress provides agencies with authority to incur obligations for specified purposes. The federal government receives funds from a variety of sources, including tax revenues, fees, fines, penalties, and settlements. Collections from fees, fines, penalties, and settlements involve billions of dollars and fund a wide variety of programs.
The design and structure—and corresponding agency flexibility and congressional control—of these statutory authorities can vary widely. In many cases, Congress has provided agencies with permanent authority to collect and obligate funds from fees, fines, and penalties without further congressional action. This authority is a form of appropriations and is subject to the fiscal laws governing appropriated funds. In addition, annual appropriation acts may limit the availability of those funds for obligation. Given the nation's fiscal condition, it is critical that every funding source and spending decision be carefully considered and applied to its best use.
This testimony provides an overview of key design decisions related to the use of federal collections outlined in prior GAO reports, with examples of specific fees, fines, and penalties from GAO reports issued between September 2005 and November 2016.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has identified four key design decisions related to how fee, fine, and penalty collections are used that help Congress balance agency flexibility and congressional control.
One of these key design decisions is the congressional action that triggers the use of collections. The table below outlines the range of structures that establish an agency's use of collections and examples of fees, fines, and penalties for each structure.
Source: GAO analysis of applicable laws ǀ G AO-17-268T
As GAO has previously reported, these designs involve different tradeoffs and implications. For example, requiring collections to be annually appropriated before an agency can use the collections increases opportunities for congressional oversight on a regular basis. Conversely, if Congress grants an agency authority to use collections without further congressional action, the agency may be able to respond more quickly to customers or changing conditions. Even when an agency has the permanent authority to use collections, the funds remain subject to congressional oversight at any point in time and Congress can place limitations on obligations for any given year. |
gao_GAO-15-792T | gao_GAO-15-792T_0 | CDC and APHIS were delegated authority by their respective department Secretaries to regulate the use, possession, and transfer of select agents. Preliminary Observations on DOD’s and CDC’s Efforts to Address Weaknesses in the Management of Their High-Containment Laboratories
DOD and CDC had existing policies and procedures that addressed biosafety and biosecurity within their high-containment labs at the time the safety lapses occurred in 2014 and 2015. However, as a result of these lapses—which illustrated multiple breakdowns in compliance with established policies and procedures and inadequate oversight—both DOD and CDC have identified weaknesses in the management of their high-containment laboratories and have begun to take some steps to review and revise policies and procedures and improve monitoring and evaluation activities. DOD Steps to Address Weaknesses in Laboratory Management Our ongoing work shows that DOD has begun to take some steps to address weaknesses in the management of its high-containment laboratories but had not yet implemented them prior to the May 2015 anthrax safety lapse. In addition, DOD officials told us that they identified further changes that they plan to make to this policy as a result of the May 2015 anthrax safety lapse, which they will make after the current changes are finalized. DOD plans to collect inspection reports from its select agent-registered laboratories; however, it does not plan to collect and monitor the results of any reports of inspections conducted at high-containment laboratories that are not registered with the select agent program but nonetheless conduct research on potentially high-risk biological agents. DOD has also begun to address weaknesses in its incident reporting requirements. DOD requires its laboratories to report potential exposures to and possible theft, loss, or misuse of select agents to CDC’s or APHIS’s select agent office, but, according to officials, DOD does not currently track these incidents or laboratories’ responses to them at the department level. DOD officials told us that the May 2015 anthrax safety lapse is the first incident that DOD has tracked at the department level; the updated biosecurity policy will include requirements for tracking exposures and other biosafety and biosecurity incidents. As we conduct our ongoing review of federal management of high- containment laboratories, we are assessing CDC’s progress in implementing the recommendations from its internal and external workgroups. For example, CDC reported that, in response to the recommendation to develop overarching biosafety policies, it is developing policies for specimen transport and laboratory training. However, as of July 2015, CDC has not developed other agency-wide policies that include comprehensive requirements for laboratory biosafety, such as policies that outline requirements for appropriate laboratory documentation and for laboratories to maintain site-specific operational and emergency protocols, to fully address the workgroup recommendation. In addition, CDC is taking other steps intended to improve the management of high-containment laboratories but has not yet completed these activities. Increased Federal Oversight of High- Containment Laboratories Continues to Be Needed
Since 2007, we have reported on several issues associated with high- containment laboratories and the risks posed by past biosafety incidents and recommended improvements for increased federal oversight. Our prior work included recommendations that address (1) the need for government-wide strategic planning for requirements for high- containment laboratories, including assessment of their risks; (2) the need for national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, operating, and maintaining such laboratories; and (3) the need for federal oversight of biosafety and biosecurity at high-containment laboratories. HHS and other agencies to which the recommendations were directed have conducted some activities to respond but have not fully implemented most of the recommendations. In addition, no single federal entity has been In summary, the safety lapses of 2014 and 2015 continue to raise questions about the adequacy of (1) federal biosafety and biosecurity policies and procedures and (2) department and agency monitoring and evaluation activities, including appropriate levels of senior management involvement. Preliminary observations on DOD’s and CDC’s steps to address weaknesses in managing potentially high-risk biological agents in high-containment laboratories—as well as findings and recommendations from our previous work on high-containment laboratories—continue to highlight the need to consider how best the federal government as a whole and individual departments and agencies can strengthen laboratory oversight to help ensure the safety of laboratory personnel; prevent the loss, theft, or misuse of high-risk biological agents; and help recognize when individual safety lapses that appear to be isolated incidents point to systemic weaknesses, in order to help prevent safety lapses from continuing to happen. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent safety lapses at high-containment laboratories raise questions about how federal departments and agencies manage high-risk biological agents. DOD and CDC both conduct research on high-risk biological agents at their respective laboratories. Biosafety and biosecurity practices in these laboratories are intended to reduce exposure to, and prevent loss, theft, or misuse of, biological agents. CDC regulates the possession, use, and transfer of certain biological agents that pose potentially severe threats to public health under the select agent program.
This statement summarizes (1) preliminary observations from ongoing GAO work on federal laboratories' biosafety and biosecurity policies and practices and (2) GAO's past work on oversight of high-containment laboratories. To conduct ongoing and past work, GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed federal agency officials, including those from DOD and CDC, about policies and procedures for high-containment laboratories; efforts to monitor compliance and evaluate effectiveness of biosafety and biosecurity policies and practices; and the status of federal oversight activities.
What GAO Found
Recent safety lapses—including shipments of live anthrax bacteria from the Department of Defense (DOD) to U.S. and international laboratories and potential exposures of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) laboratory personnel to live anthrax bacteria—have illustrated multiple breakdowns in compliance with established policies and inadequate oversight of high-containment laboratories. In these laboratories, researchers work with potentially high-risk biological agents that may result in serious or lethal infection in humans. Preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work show that DOD and CDC have begun to address weaknesses in the management of their high-containment laboratories, but their activities have not yet been fully implemented. GAO's ongoing work will include further examination of the status of DOD's and CDC's activities to improve management of high-containment laboratories.
DOD began taking steps to address weaknesses in its management of high-containment laboratories in 2012 by reviewing and revising biosecurity policies and procedures. According to officials, the revised biosecurity policies will require all DOD laboratories that conduct research with certain high-risk biological agents to submit all inspection reports to senior DOD management, which was not previously required. DOD plans to finalize these policies by September 2015. DOD also plans to make further changes to these policies as a result of its assessment of the May 2015 anthrax incident, after the first set of revisions is finalized. DOD has also begun to track biosafety and biosecurity incidents at the senior department level, such as potential exposures to or misuse of biological agents, which it had not done prior to the May 2015 anthrax incident. DOD officials said the May 2015 incident is the first incident that DOD has tracked at the senior department level.
CDC also began taking steps to address weaknesses identified in internal and external working group assessments of the June 2014 anthrax incident and other safety incidents but has not yet completed implementing some recommendations intended to improve its laboratory oversight. For example, an internal workgroup recommended that CDC develop agency-wide policies to provide clear and consistent requirements for biosafety for all agency laboratories. In response, CDC developed a specimen transport policy but has not developed other agency-wide policies, such as requirements for laboratory documentation and emergency protocols.
Since 2007, GAO has reported on issues associated with high-containment laboratories and recommended improvements for federal oversight. GAO's prior work recommended the establishment of a single federal entity to (1) conduct government-wide strategic planning for requirements for high-containment laboratories, including assessment of their risks, and (2) develop national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, operating, and maintaining such laboratories. Federal departments to which GAO's recommendations were addressed agreed with them and have conducted some activities to respond but have not implemented the recommendation to establish a single federal entity with responsibility for oversight of high-containment laboratories.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made recommendations to agencies to enhance biosafety and biosecurity. Because this work is preliminary, GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. GAO shared preliminary observations from this statement with DOD and CDC and incorporated comments as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-685T | gao_GAO-07-685T_0 | Recent Actions Warranted the Postal Service’s Removal from Our High-Risk List
Several actions—both by the Service and the Congress—led us to remove the Service’s transformation efforts and long-term outlook from our high- risk list. The Service’s basic business model, which assumed that rising mail volume would cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, was outmoded as First-Class Mail volumes stagnated or deteriorated in an increasingly competitive environment. Much of the Service’s recent financial improvement was due to the change from this law that reduced the Service’s annual pension expenses. This change enabled the Service to significantly cut its costs, achieve record net incomes, repay over $11 billion of outstanding debt, and delay rate increases until January 2006. After years of thorough discussion, Congress passed a comprehensive postal reform law in late December 2006 that provides tools and mechanisms that can be used to establish an efficient, flexible, fair, transparent, and financially sound Postal Service. The Postal Service’s Current Financial Condition
The Service’s financial condition for fiscal year 2007 has been affected by the reform act, which, along with the May change in postal rates, will continue to affect its near- and long-term financial outlook. Since enactment of the reform law, the Service has updated its expense projections. These uncertainties include how the Service and its customers will respond to the: limited implementation times—the 2-month implementation period (the Postal Service Board of Governors decision on March 19, 2007, stated that most new rates would become effective on May 14, 2007) leaves little time for the Service to educate the public and business mailers on the new rate changes and to allow mailers sufficient time to adjust their mailing practices and operations accordingly; delayed implementation times—how mailers and the Service will be affected by the delay in implementing new Periodical rates until mid-July; magnitude of certain restructured rates, particularly for those specific types of mail that will experience rather significant increases, and the related impact on volumes and revenues; and unfamiliarity with restructured rates—the prices for many popular products, such as certain types of First-Class Mail, will experience significant shifts based on the shape of the mail. Postal Reform Law Provides Opportunities to Address Challenges
The new postal reform law provides new opportunities to address challenges facing the Service as it continues its transformation in a more competitive environment with a variety of electronic alternatives for communications and payments. 3). 4). Reducing debt was one of the key factors we cited in removing the Service’s high-risk designation. While the reform act takes actions that increase current costs by improving the balance of retiree health benefit cost burdens between current and future ratepayers, it also eliminates other payments and provides opportunities to offset some of these costs pressures through efficiency gains that could restrain future rate increases. We have identified several major issues considered significant by various postal stakeholders, as well as areas related to implementation of the law that will warrant continued oversight. These key issues and areas for continued oversight include: the effect of the upcoming rate increases and statutory changes on the Postal Service’s financial condition; the decision by the Service whether or not to submit a rate filing under the old rate structure; actions by the PRC to establish a new price-setting and regulatory the Service’s ability to operate under an inflationary price cap while some of its cost segments are increasing above the rate of inflation; actions by the Service, in consultation with the PRC, to establish modern service standards and performance measures, and the Postal Service’s plan for meeting those standards; the Service’s ability to maintain high-quality delivery service as it takes actions to reduce costs and realign its infrastructure and workforce; and the PRC’s development of appropriate accounting and reporting requirements aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability of the Service’s internal data and performance results. The successful transformation of the Postal Service will depend heavily upon innovative leadership by the Postmaster General and the Chairman of the PRC, and their ability to work effectively with their employees, employee organizations, the mailing industry, Congress, and the general public. | Why GAO Did This Study
When GAO originally placed the U.S. Postal Service's (the Service) transformation efforts and long-term outlook on its high-risk list in early 2001, it was to focus urgent attention on the Service's deteriorating financial situation. Aggressive action was needed, particularly in cutting costs, improving productivity, and enhancing financial transparency. GAO testified several times since 2001 that comprehensive postal reform legislation was needed to address the Service's unsustainable business model, which assumed that increasing mail volume would cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases. This outdated model limited its flexibility and incentives needed to realize sufficient cost savings to offset rising costs, declining First-Class Mail volumes, unfunded obligations, and an expanding delivery network. This limitation threatened the Service's ability to achieve its mission of providing affordable, high-quality universal postal services on a self-financing basis. This testimony will focus on (1) why GAO recently removed the Service's transformation efforts and outlook from GAO's high-risk list, (2) the Service's financial condition in fiscal year 2007, (3) the opportunities and challenges facing the Service, and (4) major issues and areas for congressional oversight. This testimony is based on GAO's past work, review of the postal reform law, and updated information on the Service's financial condition.
What GAO Found
Key actions by both the Service and Congress have led GAO to remove the Service's transformation efforts and long-term outlook from its high-risk list in January 2007. Specifically, the Service developed a Transformation Plan and achieved billions in cost-savings, improved productivity, downsized its workforce, and improved its financial reporting. Congress enacted a law in 2003 that reduced the Service's annual pension expenses, which enabled it to achieve record net incomes, repay debt, and delay rate increases until January 2006. Finally, the postal reform law enacted in December 2006 provides tools and mechanisms that can be used to address key challenges facing the Service as it moves into a new regulatory and increasingly competitive environment. The two key factors that will affect the Service's financial condition for this fiscal year are the new reform law and new postal rates that go into effect in May. The reform law increases the costs of funding retiree health benefits but provides opportunities to offset some of these cost pressures through efficiency gains and eliminating certain pension payments. For the rest of the year, Service officials do not expect significant changes from its projected expenses and revenues. Other factors, such as costs for fuel or labor resolutions varying from plan, could affect the Service's projected outcome for this fiscal year. Congress's continued oversight of the Service's transformation is critical at this time of significant changes for the Service, Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), and mailing industry. Also, key to a successful transformation is innovative leadership by the Postmaster General and the PRC Chairman and their ability to work effectively with stakeholders to realize new opportunities provided under the postal reform law. GAO has identified key issues and areas for oversight related to implementing the reform law and new rate-setting structure, as well as other challenges to ensure the Service remains financially sound. |
gao_GAO-10-215 | gao_GAO-10-215_0 | However, DOD’s efforts toward implementing the other five recommendations reflect less progress, which is likely to hinder the effectiveness of DOD’s efforts to oversee its programs. DOD Did Not Meet the Statutory Deadline for Implementing the Database, and It Does Not Have a Schedule with Reliable Time Frames for Doing So
DOD has established conceptual plans for acquiring and deploying a centralized sexual assault incident database. Based on these milestones and the absence of a reliable program schedule, DOD did not meet its legislative mandate to implement the database by January 2010, and when it will implement the database is uncertain. Associated with this progression, DOD has taken steps to begin employing a number of key information technology acquisition management disciplines that are provided for in DOD and related guidance. Coast Guard Has Partially Implemented One of Our Two Recommendations from 2008
The Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations from 2008 to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, but it has not addressed the other. Although the Coast Guard has identified broad program objectives, it has not addressed our recommendation to develop an oversight framework that provides comprehensive and specific guidance for operating its programs. As we previously reported, the Coast Guard was not able to fully evaluate the results achieved by its efforts, and thus we recommended that it develop an oversight framework that at a minimum includes long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring progress. However, until the Coast Guard establishes a systematic process for the collection, documentation, and maintenance of these data, it will be challenged in its ability to efficiently retrieve data and its visibility over sexual assault incidents will remain limited. For example, Coast Guard officials noted that in fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, in the course of its investigations, documented 78 reports of sexual assault, while Coast Guard Headquarters, using the hard copy log of reports from its coordinators, had documented only 30. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 10 actions: To improve the management, strategic planning, and comprehensiveness of OSD’s oversight of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to strengthen OSD’s oversight framework by identifying how the results of performance assessments will be used to guide the development of future program initiatives, identifying how OSD’s program resources correlate to its achievement of strategic program objectives, and correlating its oversight framework to the program’s two strategic plans so that program objectives, timelines, and strategies for achieving objectives are synchronized. To enhance the oversight of the sexual assault prevention and response program in DOD, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that the development and implementation of the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database includes adherence to the following key system development and acquisition management processes and controls developing a reliable integrated master schedule that addresses the nine key practices discussed in this report, adequately assessing the program’s overlap with and duplication of related programs through architecture compliance, adequately justifying investment in the proposed approach on the basis of reliable estimates of life cycle costs and benefits, effectively developing and managing system requirements, adequately testing system capabilities, and effectively managing program risks. The Coast Guard also concurred with our recommendations aimed at improving the oversight, accountability, and execution of its sexual assault prevention and response programs, including (1) establishing a systematic process for collecting, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incidence data; (2) establishing quality control processes to ensure that program information collected is valid and reliable; and (3) establishing and administering a curriculum for all key program personnel to ensure that they can provide proper advice to Coast Guard personnel. To determine the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard has taken steps to address our previous recommendations regarding policies and programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault, we identified relevant legislative requirements and obtained and analyzed the Coast Guard’s policies, guidance, and procedures for the prevention of and response to sexual assault incidents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sexual assault is a crime with negative implications to military readiness and esprit de corps. In response to a congressional request, GAO, in 2008, reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Coast Guard sexual assault prevention and response programs and recommended a number of improvements. GAO was subsequently asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) DOD has addressed GAO's 2008 recommendations and further developed its programs, (2) DOD has established a sexual assault database, and (3) the Coast Guard has addressed GAO's 2008 recommendations and further developed its programs. To do so, GAO analyzed legislative requirements and program guidance, interviewed officials, and compared database implementation efforts to key information technology best practices.
What GAO Found
DOD has addressed four of GAO's nine recommendations from 2008 regarding the oversight and implementation of its sexual assault prevention and response programs. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) evaluated department program guidance for joint and deployed environments, and it evaluated factors that may hinder access to health care following a sexual assault. But DOD's efforts to address the other recommendations reflect less progress. For example, GAO recommended that DOD develop an oversight framework, to include long-term goals and milestones, performance goals and strategies, and criteria for measuring progress. However, GAO found that the draft framework lacks key elements needed for comprehensive oversight of DOD's programs, such as criteria for measuring progress and an indication of how it will use the information derived from such measurement to improve its programs. Until OSD incorporates all key elements into its draft oversight framework, it will remain limited in its ability to effectively manage program development to help prevent and respond to sexual assault incidents. DOD acknowledges that more work remains in order to fully develop its oversight framework. DOD has taken steps to begin acquiring a centralized sexual assault database. However, it did not meet a legislative requirement to establish the database by January 2010, and it is unclear when the database will be established because DOD does not yet have a reliable schedule to guide its efforts. Also, key system acquisition best practices associated with successfully acquiring and deploying information technology systems, such as economically justifying the proposed system solution and effectively developing and managing requirements, have largely not been performed. OSD officials said they intend to employ these acquisition best practices. Until this is accomplished the program will be at increased risk of not delivering promised mission capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of GAO's two recommendations for further developing its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In June 2009, the Coast Guard began assessing its program staff's workload, which represents progress in addressing GAO's recommendation to evaluate its processes for staffing key installation-level positions in its program. However, it has not addressed GAO's recommendation to develop an oversight framework. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process for assembling, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incident data, and lacks quality control procedures to ensure that the program data being collected are reliable. In fiscal year 2008, for example, different Coast Guard offices documented conflicting numbers of sexual assault reports: the Coast Guard Program Office documented 30, while the Investigative Office documented 78. The Coast Guard had to resolve this significant discrepancy before it could provide its data to DOD. Without a systematic process for tracking its data, the Coast Guard lacks reliable knowledge on the occurrence of sexual assaults. |
gao_GAO-06-429 | gao_GAO-06-429_0 | Background
PBGC’s single-employer insurance program is a federal program that protects the retirement incomes of more than 34 million workers and retirees covered by almost 29,000 private sector defined benefit pension plans. PBGC Has a Process in Place to Monitor and Ensure the Accuracy of Its Single- Employer Probable Claims Forecasts
PBGC reports that it monitors its probable claims on an ongoing basis by contacting plan sponsors to obtain certain plan financial information, reviewing filings submitted by probable plans to conduct a risk analysis, and performing valuations to determine, among other things, the present value of net probable claims and expected date of probable plan termination. PBGC Takes Steps to Ensure the Accuracy of Its Probable Claims
PBGC reports that it takes certain steps to help ensure the accuracy of its probable claims. Although PBGC and public companies follow the same accounting standards for recording probable losses in their annual financial statements, they each follow different policies and requirements when reporting information about probable losses throughout the fiscal year. When reporting information on liability settlements, PBGC follows its own set of policies and procedures, while public companies are required to follow the standards set forth by SEC requirements. Differences in PBGC and Public Company Liability Settlement Reporting Result from Differences between PBGC Disclosure Policies and SEC Requirements
PBGC and publicly traded companies have different practices for disclosing information on liability settlements, including probable losses. Unlike public companies, PBGC and FDIC are not subject to SEC requirements. In addition, pension experts, financial analysts, and industry association representatives told us that PBGC’s disclosures are likely to become increasingly important in light of upcoming changes in the pension accounting rules for plan sponsors. Over the last several years PBGC took the following actions to improve the transparency of its disclosures: it published a fact sheet on its Web site that provides answers to questions that have been raised about PBGC financial condition, including its deficit, the true cost of its insurance program, and pension underfunding; it revised its annual report to include more detailed information about its methodology for determining probable claims; it revised its Pension Insurance Data Book 2003 , which has detailed statistics for the agency’s insurance programs, to include information related to PBGC’s claims experiences in order to provide more historical data on the number and size of claims by the year the plans terminated, the funding levels of the plans at termination, and the size of the plans at termination; it released extensive data about PBGC’s financial condition, as well as explanatory and white papers about how to understand PBGC’s financial condition, reports, and methods available on its Web site (www.pbgc.gov); and it revised the agency’s Web site to make it more user-friendly. For example, PBGC does not include sufficient information to determine the financial impact of new terminations on PBGC’s financial position when it issues a press release. To improve the transparency of the interest rate assumptions PBGC uses to calculate its liabilities, we recommend that PBGC makes it interest rate methodology more widely available to the public. Appendix I: Comments from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Appendix II: Comments from the Securities and Exchange Commission
Appendix III: Other Concerns Regarding the Information PBGC Discloses about Its Financial Condition
Pension experts and others had additional concerns about the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) methodology and practices that have been addressed by PBGC. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) single-employer insurance program insures the pension benefits of over 34 million participants in almost 29,000 private sector defined benefit pension plans. The increase in PBGC's probable claims has raised questions about PBGC's monitoring and financial disclosure practices, including whether the information that PBGC discloses is sufficient for interested parties to understand the effect on PBGC's financial condition. GAO examined (1) the steps that PBGC takes to monitor and ensure the accuracy of its probable claims, (2) how PBGC's financial liability reporting compares with those of publicly traded companies, and (3) the steps PBGC has taken to improve the transparency of its financial reporting and whether additional improvement is needed.
What GAO Found
PBGC takes steps to monitor and ensure the accuracy of its single-employer probable claims forecasts. PBGC reported it monitors its probable claims on an ongoing basis by contacting plan sponsors to obtain certain plan financial information, reviewing filings submitted by probable plans to conduct a risk analysis, and performing valuations to determine the present value of net probable claims and expected date of probable plan termination. To ensure the accuracy of its probable claims, PBGC reported that it uses an automated system and available plan financial data to calculate the assets and liabilities for probable plans. PBGC and public companies have different practices for disclosing certain information about liability settlements, including probable losses, that arise from the differences between PBGC's responsibilities and disclosure policies, and the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) requirements for public companies. While PBGC and public companies follow the same accounting standards for recording probable losses in their annual financial statements, they each follow different policies and requirements when reporting information about probable losses throughout the fiscal year. When reporting information on liability settlements, public companies are required to follow the standards set forth by SEC requirements, while PBGC, which is not subject to SEC requirements, follows its own set of policies and procedures. GAO found that PBGC's disclosure practices regarding probable losses are more comparable to those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). PBGC has made efforts to improve the transparency of the information it discloses about its financial condition, but pension experts, financial analysts, and others believe that additional improvements are still needed. PBGC has recently taken steps to include more information about its methodology for determining probable claims in its annual reports and make more detailed information on its financial condition available on its Web site. However, pension experts, analysts, and industry association representatives still have concerns about transparency. Many stated that the press releases PBGC issues that announce newly terminated plans do not provide the public with enough information to determine the financial impact of such plans on PBGC's published deficit. In addition, these parties expressed concern about the lack of transparency regarding the methodology PBGC uses to determine its interest rate its uses to calculate its liabilities. Specifically, these parties told us the fact that PBCG does not widely disclose the interest rate methodology contributes to ambiguity about PBGC's assumptions and means that these parties are unable to fully assess PBGC's financial condition. |
gao_GAO-13-718 | gao_GAO-13-718_0 | Further, of the analyses performed by the two
PortfolioStat reviews. For example, in September 2011, we reported that results of OMB initiatives to identify potentially duplicative IT investments were mixed and that several federal agencies did not routinely assess their entire IT portfolios to identify and remove or consolidate duplicative systems.OMB’s recent initiatives had not yet demonstrated results, and several agencies had not routinely assessed legacy systems to determine if they were duplicative. Specifically, of the 590 IT investments reviewed, we identified 12 potentially duplicative investments (within 5 purpose groups) at DHS, DOD, and HHS which accounted for about $321 million in reported IT spending for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. With regard to the 12 investments, we found, as shown in table 2, the following: two potentially duplicative investments totaling about $30 million at DHS that are used to “book” and process apprehended illegal aliens who are suspected of committing criminal and administrative violations, commonly referred to as immigration enforcement booking management; four such investments totaling about $31 million at DOD, which include two investments totaling $16 million that track health care status of warfighters and two investments totaling $15 million that manage dental care; and six potentially duplicative investments totaling approximately $260 million at HHS, which include four investments totaling $257 million that support enterprise information security and two totaling $4 million for Medicare Coverage Determination. It is important that federal agencies avoid duplicative investments, whenever possible, to ensure the most efficient use of resources. DOD officials agreed that these investments had areas of duplication, and stated that they recently canceled the Clinical Case Management Information Technology Initiative, in part to address this duplication. Nonetheless, HHS officials stated that the department is currently conducting a review, to be completed by September 2013, to identify opportunities for consolidation of information security activities across its components. With regard to the other functions, the officials said that they determined that consolidating these functions would be more costly than keeping them separate, due to issues such as differences in mandated processes, security requirements and the size and complexity of the systems, but were not able to provide documentation showing this cost analysis. In other instances, DHS, DOD, and HHS have not yet demonstrated evidence of plans to do so. As a result, the agencies cannot provide assurance they are not spending resources on duplicative investments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure agencies avoid duplicative investments, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct appropriate officials to: address the potentially duplicative investments identified in this report, including assessing the extent to which a single system could meet CBP and ICE immigration enforcement booking requirements. We also note (and discuss in the report) that ICE was unable to provide analyses showing, among other things, that its specific requirements could not be satisfied by the E3 system. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to identify whether there are potentially duplicative information technology (IT) investments at key federal agencies. To do this, we first selected for review the three agencies with the largest amount of planned IT spending during fiscal year 2012—namely, the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). We then discussed these investments with the appropriate agency officials, including whether the investments could be consolidated or eliminated, and obtained additional information on each investment. This included reviewing and assessing agencies’ rationales for having multiple systems that perform similar functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government budgets more than $82 billion annually for IT. Given the magnitude of this investment, it is important that federal agencies avoid investing in duplicative systems to ensure the most efficient use of resources. GAO's prior work has shown that agencies were funding IT investments that perform similar functions, thus raising concern that these agencies were investing in unnecessary systems. This work also raised questions about whether agencies have similar potentially duplicative investments in other areas.
GAO was asked to review duplicative IT investments. The objective of this report was to identify whether there are other potentially duplicative IT investments at key federal agencies. To do so, GAO selected for review the three agencies with the largest amount of planned IT spending--DHS, DOD, and HHS. GAO analyzed agency budgetary data (submitted to the Office of Management and Budget) that categorize investments by function to identify investments that performed similar functions. Such investments were further grouped by their specific mission purpose and discussed with agency officials, including whether they could be consolidated or eliminated.
What GAO Found
Of the 590 information technology (IT) investments reviewed, GAO identified 12 potentially duplicative investments at three key federal agencies--namely, the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Health and Human Services (HHS). These investments accounted for about $321 million in reported IT spending for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Of the 12 investments, GAO identified:
two potentially duplicative investments at DHS that support immigration enforcement booking management, which includes the processing of apprehended illegal aliens suspected of committing criminal violations of immigration law;
four such investments at DOD, which include two investments that track health care status of warfighters, with one since having been canceled, and two investments that manage dental care; and
six potentially duplicative investments at HHS, which include four investments that support enterprise information security and two for Medicare coverage determination.
DHS officials said having the two immigration booking investments were due in part to one component agency's unique requirements but were unable to provide analysis showing why one system could not satisfy the unique requirements. DOD officials recognized that the investments GAO identified were duplicative and have canceled one of the health care systems and intend to consolidate the dental systems by 2015 but had not developed a plan on how this was to be accomplished. HHS officials disagreed that its information security investments were duplicative but nonetheless plan to review them by September 2013 to identify opportunities for consolidation. Regarding the Medicare coverage determination investments, HHS officials noted that they have consolidated several functions but could not provide documented justification for why the other functions were not consolidated. By addressing these duplications, the agencies will be able to provide assurance they are avoiding investing in unnecessary systems and thus saving resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a plan and DHS and HHS conduct analyses to address the potentially duplicative investments identified in this report. DOD and HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations but DHS disagreed. GAO believes that analysis by DHS on why one system would not support both agencies' requirements is needed. |
gao_GAO-04-666 | gao_GAO-04-666_0 | NTIA is principally responsible for developing and articulating domestic and international telecommunications policy and for managing the federal government’s use of the radio spectrum. Agencies’ Decisions to Invest in New Technologies Are Generally Driven by Factors Other Than Achieving Spectrum Efficiency
Federal agencies have made some investments in technologies that may provide improved spectrum efficiency. However, their decisions to invest in those technologies are primarily driven by their individual missions— not by an underlying, systematic consideration of spectrum efficiency. Other considerations that influence agencies’ technology decisions include technical and operational concerns and costs that may make spectrum efficient technologies impracticable. Agency investments in technologies that provide greater spectrum efficiency have tended to occur when agencies need to make greater use of available spectrum to meet a mission requirement and the additional spectrum is not readily available, as is the case with DOD. As a result, information can be transferred without relying on the radio- frequency spectrum. Operational considerations also can affect radar aboard military aircraft. Federal Spectrum Management System May Limit the Development and Adoption of Spectrum Efficient Technologies
The current structure and management of spectrum in the United States— allocating bands of spectrum to certain users for specific uses—may limit the development and adoption of some emerging technologies that promise improved spectrum efficiency. At the same time, there are few regulatory requirements and incentives to encourage agencies to develop and use spectrum more efficiently. Current Spectrum Structure and Management Could Constrain Efforts to Use Spectrum More Efficiently
To manage the use of the radio-frequency spectrum in the United States, FCC and NTIA allocated the spectrum into federal, nonfederal, and shared bands and designated specific bands for specific uses, such as broadcast radio and television. For example, software-defined cognitive radios—radios that adapt their use of the spectrum to the real- time conditions of their operating environments—could be used to sense unused frequencies, or “white spaces,” and automatically make use of those frequencies. It may also be possible to use software-defined cognitive radios to exploit “gray spaces” in the spectrum—areas where emissions exist but that could accommodate additional users without raising the overall noise level in a band to a level unacceptable to incumbent users—to increase spectrum efficiency. Lack of Knowledge and Varying Perspectives about Spectrum May Further Constrain the Use of More Spectrum Efficient Technologies
The extent to which emerging and future technologies, such as those that would exploit white and gray spaces, could be utilized to increase spectrum efficiency is dependent on the degree of freedom these technologies would be provided to operate across the spectrum. Federal Requirements to Invest in Spectrum Efficient Technologies Are Limited
NTIA is responsible for promoting the efficient and effective use of spectrum that has been assigned to federal users. NTIA has generally relied on agencies to ensure that their systems are as spectrally efficient as possible. However, the acquisition guidance and policies of the agencies we reviewed do not require the systematic consideration of spectrum efficiency in the design and development of systems. Ensuring spectrum supportability could ultimately result in some spectrum efficiencies. Further development and use of spectrum efficient technologies may provide an answer to this dilemma without negatively affecting the ability of agencies to carry out their missions; however, users have not actively pursued these technologies because there are few regulatory requirements or incentives to do so and because factors associated with the nation’s current spectrum management system may not encourage the use of these technologies. DOJ did not have comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent advances in technologies that rely on the use of the radiofrequency spectrum have turned science fiction of the past into reality. Cellular telephones, wireless computer networks, global positioning system receivers, and other spectrum-dependent technologies are quickly becoming as common to everyday life as radios and televisions. Further, these technologies have become critical to a variety of government missions, including homeland security and strategic warfare. However, with the increased demand, the radio-frequency spectrum--a resource that once seemed unlimited--has become crowded and, in the future, may no longer be able to accommodate all users' needs. As a result, there has been a growing debate among spectrum policy leaders about how to use spectrum more efficiently. To help inform these debates, GAO was asked to look at agencies' investments in spectrum efficient technologies and how the nation's spectrum management system may affect the development and adoption of these technologies.
What GAO Found
The nine federal agencies that GAO reviewed--which are among the largest users and investors in technologies and systems impacting spectrum use--have made some investments in technologies that provide improved spectrum efficiency. However, these investments have tended to occur when agencies needed to make greater use of available spectrum to meet a mission requirement--not by an underlying, systematic consideration of spectrum efficiency. For example, as a result of growing spectrum constraints, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration began investing in technologies that would increase the throughput of information while using smaller segments of their available spectrum. However, agencies also consider other factors--including cost and technical and operational concerns--that may dissuade them from investing in spectrum efficient technologies. For example, DOD may need to use more spectrum to meet an operational requirement to field a jam-proof and accurate radar for military aircraft. The current structure and management of spectrum use in the United States does not encourage the development and use of some spectrum efficient technologies. Because the spectrum allocation framework largely compartmentalizes spectrum by types of services (such as aeronautical radio navigation) and users (federal, nonfederal, and shared), the capability of emerging technologies designed to use spectrum in different ways is often diminished. For example, software-defined cognitive radios--radios that adapt their use of the spectrum to the real-time conditions of their operating environments--could be used to sense unused frequencies, or "white spaces," and automatically make use of those frequencies. It may also be possible to use software-defined cognitive radios to exploit "gray spaces" in the spectrum--areas where emissions exist yet could still accommodate additional users without creating a level of interference that is unacceptable to incumbent users--to increase spectrum efficiency. Currently, however, the spectrum allocation system may not provide the freedom needed for these technologies to operate across existing spectrum designations, and defining new rules requires knowledge about spectrum that spectrum leaders do not have. At the same time, there are few federal regulatory requirements and incentives to use spectrum more efficiently. While the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for managing the federal government's use of spectrum and ensuring spectrum efficiency, NTIA primarily relies on individual agencies to ensure that the systems they develop are as spectrum efficient as possible. Agencies' guidance and policies, however, do not require systematic consideration of spectrum efficiency in their acquisitions. The lack of economic consequence associated with the manner in which spectrum is used has also provided little incentive to agencies to pursue opportunities proactively to develop and use technologies that would improve spectrum efficiency governmentwide. |
gao_NSIAD-98-38 | gao_NSIAD-98-38_0 | To gain assurance that the designs of the submarine and its subsystems will result in the submarine successfully performing its various missions, the Navy requires that the Program Manager use computer simulations as a principal tool to model the NSSN’s capabilities against existing and potential threats. A More Capable Threat Has Been Defined
In April 1996, the Office of Naval Intelligence revised its classified underseas threat assessment and noted several technological advances in the open-ocean, antisubmarine warfare threat. Several improvements resulting in a more capable threat were noted over the previous threat of record, which the Navy used to model the survivability of the NSSN design in the 1995 assessment. As a result of the 1995 assessment, the Navy tester expressed concern that if the NSSN were just to meet minimum requirements for survivability, the NSSN may not be operationally effective against the most capable threat that the Navy was projecting at that time. The Navy tester’s report noted reduced performance of several subsystems and developmental problems in others that also will result in reductions in planned performance. The Navy tester concluded that the NSSN could potentially be operationally effective and suitable. However, he recommended that a new NSSN modeling baseline be established to reflect more current information, because the performance of some subsystems had been reduced below the performance modeled in the 1995 NSSN milestone II cost and operational effectiveness analysis and the April 1995 early operational assessment. The tester also recommended that this new design baseline be evaluated against the currently projected threat. Navy program officials are cognizant of the Navy tester’s report but have indicated that there are no plans to perform an updated survivability modeling of the total system against the new threat. Without an evaluation that reflects current conditions, DOD and Navy program officials appear to have little basis for their confidence in how the submarine, with its design changes, will perform. Available research and development funding could be used for this modeling. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed: (1) the status of the new attack submarine (NSSN) development program; (2) current information on the antisubmarine warfare threat; and (3) the Navy's plans to model the NSSN's survivability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since modeling the NSSN's survivability in 1995, the Navy, because of technical and funding limitations, has modified the design for some subsystems that reduce performance below the optimal levels used to model the 1995 baseline design; (2) other systems also have developmental problems; (3) at the same time, Navy threat assessments have reported that the open ocean antisubmarine warfare threat has improved, resulting in a more capable threat than previously projected; (4) the Navy tester's 1997 assessment report concluded that the NSSN could potentially be operationally effective and suitable, but noted a number of significant changes and risks in the development program; (5) the report also noted several technological advances in the open ocean antisubmarine warfare threat; (5) in addition, the report stated that budgetary pressures resulted in tradeoffs in some of the performance modeled in the NSSN milestone II cost and operational effectiveness analysis and the tester's 1995 early operational assessment; (6) as of November 1997, the Navy program manager planned no additional survivability modeling to test the NSSN with its potential for reduced performance against the improved threat; (7) however, as a result of its 1997 assessment, the Navy tester recommended that the Navy develop a new modeling baseline that reflects the reduced performance of some subsystems and that this new design baseline be evaluated against the increased threat; and (8) without such modeling, the Department of Defense and Navy program officials appear to have little basis for their confidence that the currently designed submarine will perform as expected. |
gao_GAO-08-49 | gao_GAO-08-49_0 | However, in 1991, Congress authorized SBA to make awards for 3-year projects, and in 1997, Congress authorized SBA to make awards to WBCs for 5-year projects. Several WBCs that we spoke with expressed concern about the funding term limits and pointed out that the SBDC and SCORE programs did not have the same limits, even though SBA also administers those programs. Because WBCs sometimes established their operations with SBA funds and depended on SBA funds to leverage other support, many were concerned about their ability to continue operations after 5 to 10 years of receiving SBA funding. In September 2007, SBA made WBC awards for fiscal year 2007 to fund activities in fiscal year 2008, and SBA officials told us that they plan to begin providing the 3-year renewable awards in fiscal year 2008 as soon as practicable after appropriations are received. SBA Has Oversight Procedures in Place, but Imbalances in Its Staff Resources and Ineffective Communication with WBCs Have Hindered Their Effectiveness
SBA has developed oversight procedures for the WBC program, but imbalances in the agency’s staff resources for WBC oversight and ineffective communication with WBCs reduce the effectiveness of these procedures. We found that SBA had taken some steps to adapt WBC program oversight procedures to its limited staff resources and to increase efficiency in some areas. One study we reviewed reported that 54 percent of 52 WBCs surveyed said that SBA could improve its communication with them. WBCs Make Some Efforts to Coordinate with SBDCs and SCORE, but SBA Provides Limited Guidance to Support These Efforts
The WBCs that we spoke with focused on a different type of client than the SBDCs and SCORE chapters in their areas, and several WBCs actively coordinated with the other programs to avoid duplicating services. Our review of the statutory authorities governing the WBC, SBDC, and SCORE programs found that each of the programs is required to provide training and counseling, but the WBC program’s statutory authority requires SBA to evaluate WBCs on, among other things, their ability to target services to socially and economically disadvantaged clients. Also, WBCs raised concerns about how to effectively coordinate by colocating with an SBDC or SCORE chapter. WBCs and SCORE still have similar measures, and some measures could hinder collaborative efforts. However, concerns about whether the federal investment was sufficient to create sustainable WBCs led Congress to create a pilot program to provide sustainability awards for an additional 5 years. This year, Congress created a more permanent funding stream for WBCs that continue to meet the program’s requirements by establishing 3-year renewable awards. Communication between SBA and WBCs could also be improved. SBA is aware that duplication could occur and has taken steps to encourage coordination but there is no explicit guidance on how to successfully coordinate services. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we address (1) the uncertainties associated with the funding process for Women’s Business Centers (WBC); (2) the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) oversight of the WBC program, including policies and procedures for monitoring compliance with program requirements and assessing program effectiveness; and (3) the services that WBCs provide to small businesses and actions that SBA and WBCs have taken to avoid duplicating the services offered by the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) and SCORE (formerly Service Corps of Retired Executives) programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Women's Business Center (WBC) Program provides training and counseling services to women entrepreneurs, especially those who are socially and economically disadvantaged. In fiscal year 2007, the Small Business Administration (SBA) funded awards to 99 WBCs. However, Congress and WBCs expressed concerns about the uncertain nature of the program's funding structure. Concerns have also been raised about whether the WBC and two other SBA programs, the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) and SCORE programs, duplicate services. This report addresses (1) uncertainties associated with the funding process for WBCs; (2) SBA's oversight of the WBC program; and (3) actions that SBA and WBCs have taken to avoid duplication among the WBC, SBDC, and SCORE programs. GAO reviewed policies, procedures, examinations, and studies related to the funding, oversight, and services of WBCs and interviewed SBA, WBC, SBDC, and SCORE officials.
What GAO Found
Until 2007, SBA funded WBCs for up to 10 years, at which time it was expected that they would become self-sustaining. Specifically, since 1997, SBA has made annual awards to WBCs for up to 5 years. Because of concerns that WBCs could not sustain operations without continued SBA funding, in 1999, Congress created a pilot program to extend funding an additional 5 years. Due to continued uncertainty about WBCs' ability to sustain operations without SBA funding, in May 2007, Congress passed legislation authorizing renewable 3-year awards to WBCs that "graduated" from the program after 10 years and to current program participants. Like the current awards, the 3-year awards are competitive. SBA is revising its award process and plans to provide the 3-year awards in fiscal year 2008. Though SBA has oversight procedures in place to monitor WBCs' performance and use of federal funds, GAO found indications that staff shortages from the agency's downsizing and ineffective communication was hindering SBA's oversight efforts. SBA relies extensively on district office staff to oversee WBCs, but these staff members have other agency responsibilities and may not have the needed expertise to conduct some WBC oversight procedures. SBA provides annual training and has taken steps to adjust its oversight procedures to adapt to staffing changes, but concerns remain. Some WBCs also cited problems with communication, and one study reported that 54 percent of 52 WBCs responding to its survey said that SBA could improve its communication with the centers. Ineffective communication led to confusion among some WBCs about how to meet program requirements. Under the terms of the WBC award, SBA requires WBCs to coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters. However, GAO found that SBA provided limited guidance or information on successful coordination. Most of the WBCs that GAO spoke with explained that in some situations they referred clients to an SBDC or SCORE counselor, and some WBCs took steps to more actively coordinate with local SBDCs and SCORE chapters to avoid duplication and leverage resources. Still, some WBCs said that coordinating services was difficult, as the programs have similar performance measures and could end up competing for clients. Such concerns thwart coordination efforts and could increase the risk of duplication in some geographic areas. |
gao_GAO-11-779T | gao_GAO-11-779T_0 | Performance and Accountability of USDA Programs
USDA must ensure that its programs are being implemented efficiently and services are being delivered effectively. To do so, USDA must review the progress it has made in achieving program goals and developing strategies to address any gaps in performance and accountability. Our work on domestic food assistance programs—an area where three federal agencies administer 18 programs, consisting of more than $90 billion in spending in fiscal year 2010—suggests not enough is known about the effectiveness of these programs. Research we reviewed suggests that participation in seven of the USDA food assistance programs we examined, including four of the five largest—Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children; the National School Lunch Program; the School Breakfast Program; and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—is associated with positive health and nutrition outcomes consistent with the programs’ goals. These goals include raising the level of nutrition among low-income households, safeguarding the health and well-being of the nation’s children, and strengthening the agriculture economy. However, little is known about the effectiveness of the remaining 11 programs—9 of which are USDA programs— because they have not been well studied. GAO suggested that USDA consider which of the lesser-studied programs need further research, and USDA agreed to consider the value of examining potential inefficiencies and overlap among smaller programs. Coordination within USDA and between USDA and Other Agencies to Help Minimize Overlap and Duplication
USDA must effectively coordinate with many groups within and outside of the agency to achieve its missions. Based on our prior work, we have identified the following examples that illustrate how improving coordination within USDA or across agencies has contributed or could contribute to the improved performance of USDA programs. In September 2005, we reported on the need for improved coordination, including information-sharing and communication, between the Risk Management Agency (RMA) and Farm Service Agency (FSA). Under USDA guidance, RMA is to provide FSA with a list of farmers who have had anomalous crop insurance losses or who are suspected of poor farming practices. However, we found FSA conducted about 64 percent of the inspections RMA requested, and FSA offices in nine states did not conduct any of the field inspections RMA requested in 1 or more of the years in our review. We also found that FSA may not be as effective as possible in conducting field inspections because RMA does not share with FSA information on the nature of anomalous crop insurance losses and suspected poor farming practices, or the results of follow-up inspections. Sufficiency of USDA Management Capacity
USDA must have sufficient internal management capacity to effectively and efficiently fulfill its multiple missions. The following are examples, drawn from our work, of USDA programs where improvements are needed in these areas: Financial management. For example, we reported in October 2008 that USDA provided farm program payments to thousands of individuals with incomes exceeding income eligibility caps. We recommended that USDA work with the Internal Revenue Service to develop a system for verifying the income eligibility for all recipients of farm program payments, which the agencies subsequently did. Human capital. The OIG identified information technology security as a significant management challenge for fiscal year 2010. GAO stands ready to help Congress in its application of GPRAMA tools to its oversight of USDA programs and its deliberations on Farm Bill reauthorization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current fiscal environment, ongoing deliberations for the next Farm Bill, and the public's expectations for a high-performing and efficient government underscore the need for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to focus on program results and customer needs, work across organizational lines to help minimize any overlap and duplication, and build its internal capacity. USDA comprises 15 agencies in seven mission areas that are responsible for, among other things, assisting farmers and rural communities, overseeing meat and poultry safety, providing access to nutritious food for low-income families, and protecting the nation's forests. For fiscal year 2010, USDA estimated that its 15 agencies would have total outlays of $129 billion. This statement highlights examples from GAO's previous work that illustrate how USDA can address challenges it faces in three key areas: (1) the performance and accountability of USDA programs, (2) coordination within USDA and between USDA and other agencies to minimize duplication and overlap, and (3) the sufficiency of USDA management capacity. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of work on USDA programs authorized under the Farm Bill and issued from September 2005 through May 2011.
What GAO Found
USDA must ensure that its programs are being implemented efficiently and services are being delivered effectively, which requires it to review the progress it and its agencies have made in achieving program goals and developing strategies to improve performance and accountability. GAO's work notes cases in which USDA programs have either met or fallen short of meeting program goals. In April 2010, GAO reported on domestic food assistance programs--an area where three federal agencies administered 18 programs consisting of more than $90 billion in spending in fiscal year 2010. GAO suggested that not enough is known about the effectiveness of these programs. Research GAO reviewed suggested that participation in seven USDA food assistance programs it examined, including four of the five largest, is associated with positive health and nutrition outcomes consistent with the programs' goals; these goals include raising the level of nutrition among low-income households, safeguarding the health and well-being of the nation's children, and strengthening the agriculture economy. Little, however, is known about the effectiveness of the remaining 11 programs--9 of which are USDA programs--because they have not been well studied. GAO suggested that USDA consider which of the lesser-studied programs need further research. To achieve its missions, USDA must effectively coordinate with many groups both within and outside the agency. GAO's work provides instances of where improving coordination within USDA or across agencies has contributed or could contribute to improved performance of USDA programs. For example, in September 2005, GAO reported on USDA's need to improve coordination, including information-sharing and communication, between its Risk Management Agency (RMA) and Farm Service Agency (FSA) on potential fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. For example, FSA offices in nine states did not conduct any of the field inspections RMA requested of farmers' fields in cases of anomalous crop insurance losses or when farmers were suspected of poor farming practices in 1 or more of the years in GAO's review. Also, RMA did not share with FSA information on the nature of the suspected poor farming practices or the results of follow-up inspections. GAO recommended actions to both agencies to more effectively conduct field inspections. USDA must have sufficient internal management capacity in the areas of financial management, human capital management, and information technology to effectively and efficiently fulfill its multiple missions. GAO has reported on USDA programs where improvements are needed in these areas. For example, GAO reported in October 2008 that USDA provided farm program payments to thousands of individuals with incomes exceeding income eligibility caps. GAO recommended that USDA work with the Internal Revenue Service to develop a system for verifying the income eligibility for recipients of all farm program payments, which the agencies subsequently did. |
gao_GAO-06-481T | gao_GAO-06-481T_0 | Also affected were the estimated 40,000 responders who were involved in some capacity in the days, weeks, and months that followed, including personnel from many government agencies and private organizations as well as other workers and volunteers. Several federally funded programs monitor the health of people who were exposed to the WTC attack and its aftermath. Of the four programs that offer medical examinations to WTC responders, the only one that is open to federal workers who responded to the disaster in an official capacity is the one implemented by HHS. Health Monitoring Programs Implemented by State and Local Governments or Private Organizations Have Made Progress
Three federally funded programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations, with total federal funding of about $104 million—the FDNY WTC Medical Monitoring Program, WTC Medical Monitoring Program (worker and volunteer program), and New York State responder screening program—have made progress in monitoring the physical and mental health of people affected by the WTC attack. In January 2006, CDC received a $75 million appropriation to fund baseline health screening, long-term monitoring, and treatment for WTC responders. The FDNY program completed initial screening for over 15,000 firefighters and emergency medical service personnel, and the worker and volunteer program completed initial screening for over 14,000 other responders. Programs Provide Data for WTC-Related Health Research
In addition to providing medical examinations, these three programs—the FDNY program, the worker and volunteer program, and the New York State program—have collected information for use in scientific research to better understand the health consequences of the WTC attack and other disasters. For example, the FDNY program reported on the injuries and illnesses experienced by firefighters and emergency medical service workers after responding to the attack. Program Officials Are Concerned That Current Federal Funding Arrangements Will End before Needed Monitoring Is Complete
Officials from the FDNY, worker and volunteer, and WTC Health Registry programs are concerned that current time frames for federal funding arrangements for programs designed to track participants’ health over time may be too short to allow for identification of all the health effects that may eventually develop. The program began in June 2003—about a year later than other monitoring programs—and had completed screenings for 394 workers through March 2004. HHS Program Screened Few Federal Workers and Recently Started Conducting Examinations after a Hiatus of Almost 2 Years
HHS’s WTC Federal Responder Screening Program was established to provide free voluntary medical screening examinations for an estimated 10,000 federal workers whom their agencies sent to respond to the WTC disaster from September 11, 2001, through September 10, 2002, and who were not eligible for any other monitoring program. Under this agreement, FOH clinicians can now make referrals for follow-up care. Lessons from WTC Health Monitoring Programs Could Assist Future Monitoring Efforts
Officials involved in the WTC health monitoring programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations—including officials from the federal administering agencies—derived lessons from their experiences that could help officials design such programs in the future. They include the need to quickly identify and contact people affected by a disaster, the value of a centrally coordinated approach for assessing individuals’ health, the importance of monitoring both physical and mental health, and the need to plan for providing referrals for treatment when screening examinations identify health problems. However, the program HHS established to screen the federal employees whose agencies sent them to the WTC after the attack has accomplished little, completing screenings of 527 of the thousands of federal responders. Because of this program’s limited activity, and the inability of federal workers to participate in other monitoring programs because of the assumption that they would have the opportunity to receive screening examinations through the HHS program, many federal responders may not have had an opportunity to identify and seek treatment for health problems related to the WTC disaster. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), nearly 3,000 people died and an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people in the vicinity were affected. An estimated 40,000 people who responded to the disaster--including New York City Fire Department (FDNY) personnel and other government and private-sector workers and volunteers--were exposed to physical and mental health hazards. Concerns remain about the long-term health effects of the attack and about the nation's capacity to plan for and respond to health effects resulting from future disasters. Several federally funded programs have monitored the physical and mental health effects of the WTC attack. These monitoring programs include one-time screening programs and programs that also conduct follow-up monitoring. GAO was asked to assess the progress of these programs and examined (1) federally funded programs implemented by state and local government agencies or private institutions, (2) federally administered programs to monitor the health of federal workers who responded to the disaster in an official capacity, and (3) lessons learned from WTC monitoring programs. GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed federal, state, and local officials and others involved in WTC monitoring programs. This statement updates information GAO provided to Congress on September 10, 2005.
What GAO Found
Three federally funded monitoring programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations after the WTC attack, with total funding of about $104 million, have provided initial medical examinations--and in some cases follow-up examinations--to thousands of affected responders to screen for health problems. For example, the FDNY medical monitoring program completed initial screening for over 15,000 firefighters and emergency medical service personnel, and the worker and volunteer program screened over 14,000 other responders. The New York State responder screening program screened about 1,700 state responders before ending its examinations in 2003. These monitoring programs and the WTC Health Registry, with total federal funding of $23 million, have collected information that program officials believe researchers could use to help better understand the health consequences of the attack and improve treatment. Program officials expressed concern, however, that current time frames for federal funding arrangements may be too short to allow for identification of all future health effects. CDC recently received a $75 million appropriation to fund health screening, long-term monitoring, and treatment for WTC responders and is deciding how to allocate these funds. In contrast to the progress made by other federally funded programs, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) program to screen federal workers who were sent by their agencies to respond to the WTC disaster has accomplished little and lags behind. The program--which started in June 2003, about one year later than other WTC monitoring programs--completed screening of 527 of the estimated 10,000 federal workers who responded in an official capacity to the disaster, and in early 2004, examinations were suspended for almost 2 years. The program's limited activity and the exclusion of federal workers from other monitoring programs because of the assumption that they could receive screening examinations through the HHS program may have resulted in many federal responders losing the opportunity to identify and seek treatment for their WTC-related health problems. Officials involved in WTC health monitoring programs cited lessons from their experiences that could help others who may be responsible for designing and implementing health monitoring efforts that follow other disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. These include the need to quickly identify and contact people affected by a disaster; to monitor for mental health effects, as well as physical injuries and illnesses; and to anticipate when designing disaster-related monitoring efforts that there will likely be many people who require referrals for follow-up care and that handling the referral process may require substantial effort. |
gao_GAO-16-119 | gao_GAO-16-119_0 | In fiscal year 2014, DOD obligated over $156 billion on contracted services, which constituted more than half of DOD’s total contract spending. DOD’s Process for Planning, Programing, Budgeting, and Execution
Each year DOD uses the PPBE process to determine and prioritize requirements and allocate resources and funding to the military departments and defense agencies. Further, DOD obligated more than half of contracted service dollars to three service portfolio groups—knowledge-based, research and development, and facility-related services. DOD’s programming policy and supplemental military guidance, however, does not require components to identify future spending on contracted services beyond the budget year. For example, the Army plans to request data from program offices, such as product service code data, on all service contracts to be awarded over the next 5 years. In contrast, the Air Force plans to continue to collect object class data only for those service contracts using operations and maintenance funds beyond the budget year. DOD, however, lacks a mechanism to coordinate these efforts which increases the risk of the collection of inconsistent data. Planned Service Contract Spending Is Not Required to Be Identified in the POM Submissions Beyond the Budget Year
While program offices we reviewed generally maintained data on their service contract requirements beyond the budget year, neither DOD Directive 7045.14 or supplemental military department guidance require program offices to identify which requirements through the FYDP will be met through the use of service contracts in POM inputs. DOD Budget Exhibits Submitted to Congress Provide Limited Visibility into Contracted Services Spending
DOD budget exhibits provide limited visibility to Congress on planned spending for contracted services. In addition, the primary budget exhibit for services does not meet statutory reporting requirements. In 2009, Congress required DOD to develop an exhibit to identify amounts requested for its service contract spending, in part, to improve oversight by DOD and Congress of DOD’s contracted services. In implementing this provision, however, DOD excluded up to $100 billion—almost two- thirds—on its estimated spending on contracted services for fiscal year 2014 on which it was required to report, in part to maintain consistency with other reporting requirements. Moreover, unlike DOD budget exhibits for weapon systems and other major acquisitions, DOD’s other budget exhibits that contain some information on contracted services are not required to include data on projected spending on contracted services beyond the current budget fiscal year. Without a roadmap of future service contract spending needs, Congress has limited visibility into an area that constitutes more than half of DOD’s annual contract spending. DOD’s contracted services budget exhibit intended to meet that statutory reporting requirement, found in the Operation and Maintenance Overview report, however, significantly underreports DOD’s estimated budget request for contracted services. Nevertheless, this approach has resulted in DOD not meeting its reporting requirements on services. Other DOD Budget Exhibits Provide Only Limited Information on One Year of Future Spending Data for Service Contracts
Although DOD spends the majority of its contract spending on services, requirements to forecast future year spending is limited to the next budget year. As a result, the Congress has limited insights into DOD’s planned expenditures for services beyond the current budget year. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that senior leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments are better positioned to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force revise their programming guidance to collect information on how contracted services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year. To ensure the military departments’ efforts to integrate services into the programming process and senior service managers efforts to develop forecasts on service contract spending provide the department with consistent data, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a mechanism, such as a working group of key stakeholders—which could include officials from the programming, budgeting and requirements communities as well as the senior services managers—to coordinate these efforts. In written comments, DOD concurred with one of our three recommendations and partially concurred with two. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, DOD obligated over $156 billion to contractors that provide services, such as for engineering support, to meet needs. These contracted services constituted more than half of DOD's total contract spending. House Report 113-446 contained a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's management of contracted services. This report assesses (1) trends in DOD spending on contracted services, (2) DOD's insight into its requirements for contracted services, and (3) how DOD reports on contracted services in its budget requests to Congress. GAO analyzed the most recent data available on DOD service contract spending from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, reviewed programming guidance and budget documents as well as a non-generalizable selection of six program office inputs to the budget and planning process for three military commands that spent the most on services in 2013, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Over the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) consistently obligated more on services than products. These obligations are significant. For example, in 2014 alone, DOD obligated $85 billion on its three largest types of services—knowledge-based, research and development, and facility-related services. This amount was more than double the amount DOD obligated for aircraft, land vehicles and ships, the three largest product categories DOD acquired.
Program offices within each of the military departments that GAO met with maintained data on current and estimated future spending needs for contracted service requirements, but they did not identify service contract spending needs beyond the next year, as there was no requirement to do so. As a result, DOD leadership's insight into future spending on contracted services is limited. DOD programming policy requires the military departments and defense agencies to develop a program objective memorandum (POM) that identifies and prioritizes requirements and total funding needs for the current budget year and then four additional years into the future. This policy and the military departments' supplemental POM guidance, however, do not address contracted services. The military departments have started efforts to collect data on contract services requirements beyond the budget year but these efforts could result in the collection of disparate data. For example, the Army plans to request data from program offices on all service contracts to be awarded over the next 5 years. In contrast, the Air Force plans to continue to collect data only for service contracts using operations and maintenance funds beyond the budget year. Unless DOD establishes a mechanism to coordinate efforts—a key internal control standard—it risks collecting different data leading to inconsistency across the department.
DOD's budget exhibits on contract services provide limited visibility to Congress on planned spending, and the primary exhibit for contracted services does not meet statutory reporting requirements. In 2009, Congress required DOD to develop an exhibit to summarize its service contract spending, in part, to improve oversight by DOD and Congress of DOD's contracted services. In its fiscal year 2014 exhibit, however, DOD excluded up to $100 billion—almost two-thirds—of its estimated spending on contracted services, including those for contingency operations and for medical care, on which it was statutorily required to report. Unlike DOD budget exhibits for weapon systems, DOD's other budget exhibits that contain limited information on contracted services do not include data on projected spending beyond the current budget year. Without a roadmap of future service contract spending needs, Congress has limited visibility into an area that constitutes more than half of DOD's annual contract spending.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider amending reporting requirements to include estimated spending on services beyond the budget year. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense and military departments revise POM guidance, coordinate efforts to forecast services, and fully comply with budget reporting. DOD concurred with the budget reporting recommendation and partially concurred with the two others, citing challenges with estimating future spending, but did not address revised guidance or coordination. GAO believes such actions are needed. |
gao_GAO-17-597 | gao_GAO-17-597_0 | Online: Many services are available online. SSA Has Reduced Its Physical Footprint and Expanded Remote Service Delivery
SSA Has Reduced Its Total Square Footage and Number of Facilities Since 2012
SSA reduced its square footage and the number of its facilities from fiscal year 2012, when the overall federal effort began to limit agencies’ physical footprint, to fiscal year 2016. SSA reduced its footprint by about 1.4 million square feet (or 5.2 percent) from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016, according to our analysis (see fig. 1). SSA Is Expanding Benefit Application and Management Services It Offers Remotely, but Overall Demand for Field Office Services Has Not Decreased
SSA is expanding its remote delivery of services—such as online and other new technologies to connect with the agency—to provide more choices to its customers and because of overall trends in Americans’ use of online services. SSA has also increased use of video service delivery, which allows SSA staff to take claims or conduct hearings remotely, either in SSA facilities or in third- party locations such as senior centers. For example, the number of in-person visits to field offices in fiscal year 2007 (42.9 million) was about the same as in fiscal year 2016 (42.7 million), according to SSA data. SSA officials said this may be due to increased demand for certain services and customer preference. SSA’s Steps to Reconfigure Its Physical Footprint Do Not Fully Incorporate Changes in Service Delivery and Also Face External Constraints
While SSA Has Developed Strategic Goals, It Does Not Always Consider Evolving Service Delivery or Collect Needed Information
SSA has developed strategic goals for expanding remote service delivery while reconfiguring its physical footprint and is beginning to implement initiatives that may help reduce space; however, SSA has not integrated its facility plan with its strategic plan, provided flexibility for individual offices, or compiled accurate facility data as suggested by standards for internal control and leading practices for facility planning. SSA Has Taken Steps to Make Remote Services Easier to Use, but Does Not Consistently Evaluate These Services
SSA Is Trying to Make Its Online Services More User-Friendly, but Lacks Comprehensive Data on Issues with Online Claims
The complexity of SSA’s programs can make it challenging for customers to complete certain processes online, especially disability applications, according to SSA officials. Customers’ difficulties with online applications could limit SSA’s ability to shift more of its business online and further reconfigure its physical footprint. For example, SSA is adding new features that make it possible for online customers to interact with SSA staff to resolve problems. SSA Has Introduced New Approaches to Enhance Access to Remote Delivery of Services, but Lacks Performance Goals
Some of SSA’s customers may have difficulty accessing online services, according to SSA staff and data from an SSA survey, which may also limit the agency’s ability to further reconfigure its footprint. However, SSA has not established performance goals for all of these new approaches. Without a long-term facilities plan for reconfiguring its field office structure as it expands options for customers to access services remotely and in light of the wide variation in remote service use across offices, SSA could miss opportunities to further reduce its footprint. In addition, unless it establishes clear performance goals and collects related data for alternative service approaches such as desktop icons and video service at third-party sites, SSA risks foregoing opportunities to improve service delivery for customers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the trends in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) physical footprint and how it delivers services, (2) assess the steps SSA is taking to reconfigure its physical footprint, and (3) assess the steps SSA is taking to address any challenges to expanding remote service delivery. We applied criteria previously identified by GAO for facility planning and customer service standards, as well as standards for internal control in the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA has one of the largest physical footprints of any federal agency. It has about 1,500 facilities nationwide, including field offices where customers can meet with SSA staff to apply for benefits and conduct other business. SSA is re-examining its footprint in light of expanding online and other remote service options and a 2012 government-wide initiative to make more efficient use of physical space. GAO was asked to examine SSA's changing footprint and service delivery.
This report (1) describes the trends in SSA's physical footprint and service delivery, (2) assesses the steps SSA is taking to reconfigure its footprint, and (3) assesses the steps SSA is taking to address any challenges to expanding remote service delivery. GAO reviewed SSA documents and data on facilities and service delivery for fiscal years 2006 to 2016; interviewed officials from SSA and other federal agencies; and visited SSA facilities in four states, chosen for diversity in geographic location, visitor to staff ratio, and proportion of local residents with Internet access, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has reduced its physical footprint and expanded delivery of services remotely, including online. SSA reduced the total square footage of its facilities by about 1.4 million square feet (or about 5 percent) from fiscal years 2012 to 2016, according to GAO's analysis, by applying new standards for determining the size of offices and consolidating facilities (see figure). SSA has also expanded the services it offers remotely, and online use has increased for certain services such as disability and retirement applications. Despite this increase, in-person contacts at field offices have not changed substantially, with about the same number in fiscal year 2016 as in fiscal year 2007 (approximately 43 million). This may be due to growing demand for services as well as certain services not yet being fully available online.
SSA's steps to reconfigure its footprint do not fully incorporate changes in service delivery, such as the expansion of remote service delivery. As mentioned above, SSA has been expanding the services it delivers online. While SSA has a strategic goal of re-thinking its footprint as it expands remote service delivery, it lacks a facility plan that links to this goal, as called for by facility planning criteria. Without a plan that considers the increasing use of online services and wide variation in online service use across field offices, SSA may miss opportunities to further reduce its footprint.
SSA is taking steps to make remote services easier to use, for example by adding new features to its website and offering alternate approaches for accessing services, but does not consistently evaluate them, which could limit its ability to shift more services online and further reconfigure its footprint. For example, SSA has added features allowing online customers to interact directly with SSA staff. However, SSA does not track staff follow-ups to deal with any errors in online benefit applications in order to improve them, as called for by federal internal control standards. To enhance access to remote services, SSA has introduced alternate service approaches such as videoconferencing in third-party sites; however, it does not have performance goals for these approaches. GAO has previously identified performance goals as a best practice, which may help agencies improve their customer service.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that SSA develop a facility plan for reconfiguring its footprint as it expands remote service delivery, track staff follow-ups of online applications, and develop performance goals for alternate service approaches. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-495 | gao_GAO-16-495_0 | Over the past 10 fiscal years, FTA has provided states, cities, and other localities with almost $18 billion in federal funding to plan and build new projects through this program. Within the Capital Investment Grant program, project sponsors have typically applied for funding as either a New Starts or a Small Starts project. For example, MAP-21 reduced the number of phases in the process that projects must follow to be eligible for and receive federal funding. In addition, MAP-21 created a new category of eligible projects called Core Capacity Improvement projects, which are substantial corridor-based capital investments in existing fixed-guideway systems that increase the capacity of a corridor by at least 10 percent in a corridor that is at or above capacity today or is expected to be within 5 years. Small Starts projects. As shown in table 1, FTA has issued policy guidance outlining the new review and evaluation process and criteria for New Starts, Small Starts, and Core Capacity Improvement projects and also provided project sponsors with instructions on how they can request to pre-qualify for a satisfactory rating based on the characteristics of their project, otherwise known as warrants. Issuing Rules for Evaluating and Rating Projects
FTA has promulgated new rules for the Capital Investment Grant program but plans to initiate the rulemaking necessary to fully implement the changes MAP-21 made to the program in the future. FTA officials told us they plan to address the remaining requirements of MAP-21 and now the Fast Act in future rulemaking. Selected Project Sponsors Expressed Support for MAP-21 Changes to the Capital Investment Grant Program and FTA’s Implementation of Those Changes
The selected project sponsors we contacted were generally supportive of the changes MAP-21 made to the Capital Investment Grant program and of FTA’s implementation of the changes. In addition, while the number of projects in the Capital Investment Grant program has increased by about 70 percent since 2012, project sponsors also told us it was too early to tell the extent to which the MAP-21 changes will help expedite projects through the program. Project Sponsors Generally Support the MAP-21 Changes but Are Concerned about Some Changes’ Potential Effects
A prevalent theme from our discussions with representatives from 13 project sponsors was that they generally support changes—such as: (1) streamlining the project development process, (2) establishing Core Capacity Improvement projects as a new category of eligible projects, (3) instituting a 2-year requirement for New Starts and Core Capacity Improvement projects to complete Project Development, and (4) revising the evaluation and rating process, that MAP-21 made to the Capital Investment Grant program. Representatives from 9 of the 13 project sponsors we interviewed told us that the changes streamlined the project development process by decreasing the number of time-consuming reviews FTA undertakes or by eliminating what these representatives considered to be burdensome requirements, such as the alternatives analysis requirement under SAFETEA-LU. Representatives from one project sponsor said the addition of these projects is a positive development because these projects give project sponsors options to increase the capacity of a system as ridership increases, while two others noted that the addition of Core Capacity Improvement projects expands project eligibility for projects that would likely not have rated favorably under New Starts criteria. Selected Project Sponsors Generally Support FTA’s Efforts in Implementing the MAP-21 Changes
Representatives from 11 of 13 project sponsors indicated that they were generally satisfied with FTA’s implementation of the MAP-21 changes. For example, representatives from four project sponsors said that FTA has made a good effort to listen to and incorporate many of the recommendations offered by project sponsors. Although project sponsors were generally satisfied with FTA’s efforts thus far, they pointed out that not all MAP-21 changes, such as the programs of interrelated projects provisions, have been implemented yet. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report discusses: (1) the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) progress in implementing changes the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) made to the Capital Investment Grant program and (2) how selected project sponsors view the MAP-21 changes and FTA’s implementation of those changes. These project sponsors represent 7 New Starts projects, 8 Small Starts projects, and 2 Core Capacity Improvement projects, as well as different rail modes (heavy rail, light rail, commuter rail) and both bus rapid transit and streetcar projects, as shown in table 2. GAO-13-40. Public Transportation: Preliminary Information on FTA’s Implementation of SAFETEA-LU Changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
FTA's Capital Investment Grant program provides roughly $2 billion in appropriated funds each year to help states, cities, and localities plan and build new or extensions to existing fixed-guideway transit systems. Under this program, project sponsors—usually local transit agencies—have typically applied for their projects to receive federal funding as either a New Starts or a Small Starts project. In 2012, MAP-21 created a new category of eligible projects called Core Capacity Improvement projects and also revised the process proposed projects must follow to be eligible for and receive federal funding.
MAP-21 included a provision for GAO to biennially review FTA's and the Department of Transportation's implementation of this program. This report discusses: (1) FTA's progress in implementing changes to the program required by MAP-21 and (2) how selected project sponsors view the MAP-21 changes and FTA's implementation of those changes. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed the relevant provisions of pertinent laws and FTA's policy guidance, interviewed FTA officials and representatives from 13 project sponsors representing 17 of 52 projects participating in the program, and visited the sites of two Core Capacity Improvement projects. Project sponsors and locations visited were selected based on previous experience in the program, among other things.
In written comments, DOT emphasized its commitment to improve and streamline the Capital Investment Grant program.
What GAO Found
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has implemented most of the key changes the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Act (MAP-21) made to the Capital Investment Grant program, which helps fund investments in new public transit systems or extensions to existing systems. Projects funded under this program fall into different categories, depending on the total project's cost and the amount of federal funding requested. For example, under MAP-21, New Starts projects had capital costs that were $250 million or greater while Small Starts projects had capital costs that were less than $250 million. As required by MAP-21, FTA has issued guidance outlining the new review and evaluation process for New Starts and Small Starts projects—as well as Core Capacity Improvement projects, which is a new category of eligible projects MAP-21 created and which are designed to increase the capacity of an existing system. In addition, FTA has informed project sponsors how they can pre-qualify for a satisfactory rating based on the characteristics of their projects. FTA officials said they plan to address the remaining requirements, such as completing the rulemaking to fully implement the MAP-21 provisions, over the next 2 years.
The 13 project sponsors GAO contacted—representing 7 New Starts projects, 8 Small Starts projects, and 2 Core Capacity Improvement projects—were generally supportive of the changes MAP-21 made to the Capital Investment Grant program, as well as FTA's implementation of the changes.
Representatives from 9 of 13 project sponsors indicated that the MAP-21 changes streamlined the Capital Investment Grant program's project development process, such as by reducing the number of time-consuming FTA reviews.
Of the three project sponsors that indicated they had an opinion on the addition of Core Capacity Improvement projects as a new category of projects, all were supportive, with representatives from one noting, for example, that this change gives them options to increase the capacity of existing systems as ridership increases. Such projects could include lengthening rail platforms to accommodate additional train cars or to reduce platform overcrowding.
Also, representatives from 11 of 13 project sponsors supported FTA's implementation efforts, noting, for example, that FTA has taken steps to listen to and incorporate many of the recommendations offered by project sponsors in implementing the MAP-21 changes.
While project sponsors raised some concerns about the potential impact certain changes—such as limiting the amount of time New Starts and Core Capacity Improvement projects can spend in Project Development—might have on project sponsors in the future, they also acknowledged that not all the MAP-21 changes have been implemented yet. While participation in the program has increased substantially—by 70 percent—since the enactment of MAP-21, both project sponsors and FTA officials pointed out that it is too early to tell what impact the changes will ultimately have on the Capital Investment Grant program—including if the changes will help expedite projects through the program. |
gao_GAO-14-811T | gao_GAO-14-811T_0 | Cigarettes continue to dominate the market for domestic and imported smoking tobacco products, accounting for approximately 88 percent of sales in fiscal year 2013. In 2009, CHIPRA significantly raised the tax rates on these four products. The act equalized the rates for cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, and small cigars, but not for pipe tobacco (see fig. CHIPRA also significantly changed the federal excise tax rate on large cigars. Treasury collects the federal excise taxes on domestic tobacco products when these products leave manufacturing facilities. Large Tax Disparities among Similar Tobacco Products Triggered Significant Market Shifts to Avoid Higher Taxes
Large federal excise tax disparities among tobacco products resulting from CHIPRA created opportunities for tax avoidance and led to significant market shifts by manufacturers, importers, and price-sensitive consumers toward the lower-taxed products. According to government, industry, and nongovernmental organization representatives, many roll-your-own tobacco and small cigar manufacturers shifted to the lower-taxed products after CHIPRA to avoid paying higher taxes. Total annual sales of pipe tobacco grew from about 5.2 million pounds in fiscal year 2008, the last year before CHIPRA, to 43.7 million pounds in fiscal year 2013, representing an increase of about 740 percent. Over the same period, total annual sales of roll-your- own tobacco declined from about 21.3 million pounds to 3.8 million pounds, a decrease of 82 percent. Cigar Market Shifted from Small to Large Cigars after CHIPRA
CHIPRA’s 2009 changes in federal excise tax rates on tobacco products resulted in an immediate shift in the cigar market, with sales of lower- taxed large cigars rising sharply while sales of higher-taxed small cigars dropped. Over the same period, total annual sales of small cigars declined from about 5.7 billion sticks to 0.7 billion sticks, a decrease of 88 percent. Market Shifts to Avoid Taxes Have Reduced Federal Revenue, and Treasury Has Limited Options to Respond
Estimated Federal Revenue Losses from Market Shifts after CHIPRA Range from $2.6 Billion to $3.7 Billion
While tax revenue collected for domestic and imported smoking tobacco products, including cigarettes, from April 2009 through February 2014, amounted to about $77 billion, we estimate that federal revenue losses due to the market shifts from roll-your-own to pipe tobacco and from small to large cigars range from approximately $2.6 billion to $3.7 billion for the same period. 5). Treasury and CBP collected about $4.2 billion in tax revenue from domestic and imported small and large cigars from April 2009 through February 2014. Developing Standards to Differentiate between Roll- Your-Own and Pipe Tobacco Presents Challenges to Treasury
Differentiating between roll-your-own and pipe tobacco for tax collection purposes presents challenges to Treasury because the definitions of the two products in the IRC do not specify distinguishing physical characteristics and are based on such factors as the use for which the products are suited and their packaging and labeling. The federal excise tax on imported large cigars is based on the price for which they are sold by the U.S. importer upon release from customs. We maintain that Congress should consider equalizing tax rates on roll- your-own and pipe tobacco and, in consultation with Treasury, also consider options for reducing tax avoidance due to tax differentials between small and large cigars. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, CHIPRA increased and equalized federal excise tax rates for cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, and small cigars. Although CHIPRA also increased federal excise tax rates for pipe tobacco and large cigars, it raised the pipe tobacco tax to a rate significantly below the equalized rate for the other products, and the large cigar excise tax can be significantly lower, depending on price. Treasury collects federal excise taxes on domestic tobacco products. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collects federal excise taxes on imported tobacco products.
This testimony highlights and provides selected updates to key findings from GAO's April 2012 report ( GAO-12-475 ) by examining (1) market shifts among smoking tobacco products since CHIPRA, and (2) the impact of the market shifts on federal revenue and Treasury's actions to respond to these shifts. GAO analyzed Treasury and CBP data to identify sales trends for domestic and imported smoking tobacco products and to estimate the effect of the market shifts to lower-taxed products on federal tax revenues.
What GAO Found
Large federal excise tax disparities among smoking tobacco products, which resulted from the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009, created opportunities for tax avoidance and led to significant market shifts toward lower-taxed products by manufacturers, importers, and price-sensitive consumers. From fiscal year 2008, the last year before CHIPRA, to fiscal year 2013, annual sales of domestic and imported pipe tobacco increased from about 5.2 million pounds to 43.7 million pounds, while sales of domestic and imported roll-your-own tobacco declined from about 21.3 million pounds to 3.8 million pounds. Over the same period, annual sales of domestic and imported large cigars increased from about 5.8 billion sticks to 12.4 billion sticks, while sales of domestic and imported small cigars declined from about 5.7 billion sticks to 0.7 billion sticks. According to government, industry, and nongovernmental organization representatives, many roll-your-own tobacco and small cigar manufacturers shifted to the lower-taxed products after CHIPRA to avoid paying higher taxes.
While revenue collected for domestic and imported smoking tobacco products, including cigarettes, from April 2009 through February 2014, amounted to about $77 billion, GAO estimates that federal revenue losses due to market shifts from roll-your-own to pipe tobacco and from small to large cigars range from about $2.6 to $3.7 billion for the same period. GAO found that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has limited options to respond to these market shifts. Differentiating between roll-your-own and pipe tobacco for tax collection purposes presents challenges to Treasury because the definitions of the two products in the Internal Revenue Code do not specify distinguishing physical characteristics and are based on such factors as the use for which the products are suited and their packaging and labeling. GAO also found that Treasury continues to have limited options to address the market shift from small cigars to large cigars—which are differentiated in the Internal Revenue Code only by weight—and faces added complexity in monitoring and enforcing tax payments due to the change in large cigar tax rates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. In its 2012 report, GAO suggested that Congress consider equalizing tax rates on roll-your-own and pipe tobacco and, in consultation with Treasury, consider options for reducing tax avoidance due to tax differentials between small and large cigars. Treasury generally agreed with GAO's conclusions and observations. |
gao_AIMD-96-140 | gao_AIMD-96-140_0 | IRS did not perform the necessary requirements analysis for Cyberfile or identify alternative ways to satisfy these requirements. Neither did it prepare an acquisition strategy documenting how it would acquire the most cost-effective alternative. IRS cited the Brooks ADP Act, rather than the Economy Act,for its authority to enter into its interagency agreement with NTIS. NTIS Did Not Fully Comply With Procurement Laws and Regulations for the Cyberfile Acquisition
In procuring Cyberfile, NTIS did not fully comply with federal acquisition laws and regulations, which are intended to encourage full and open competition and help agencies develop and acquire information systems that meet their needs and are delivered on time and within budget. Specifically, NTIS (1) awarded a Section 8(a) contract on a sole source basis without making a reasonable determination that the value of the contract was below SBA competition thresholds, (2) improperly modified the contract to add a requirement to develop Cyberfile, and (3) did not effectively hold the contractor accountable for specific deliverable dates, attributes, and quality. For procurements such as NTIS’ technical services support contract, the threshold is $3 million. IRS Did Not Adequately Oversee NTIS’ Systems Development and Acquisition Efforts
IRS abdicated its responsibility to ensure that NTIS was managing the Cyberfile effort efficiently and effectively. We also found that IRS did not properly account for Cyberfile obligations and costs because it did not effectively discharge its financial management responsibilities for the project. This is essential to maintaining good financial management information and effectively tracking project obligations and costs. Our review found that NTIS did not maintain adequate supporting documentation for many Cyberfile transactions. IRS Improperly Accounted for Cyberfile Advances
NTIS received two advances totaling about $17.1 million from IRS. As of August 3, 1996, however, IRS has only recorded about $17.1 million. As a result, excess costs were incurred. Interagency Agreement Did Not Minimize IRS’ Costs
IRS did not structure its agreement with NTIS to minimize its costs. Recommendations
In light of the severity of acquisition and financial problems identified, we recommend that, before resuming the Cyberfile project, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service:
Provide to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the House Committee on Ways and Means, a report detailing the weaknesses in IRS’ acquisition and financial management processes and controls that permitted Cyberfile mismanagement (e.g., permitted IRS to disregard system acquisition policies and procedures, disregard federal acquisition regulations, and provide inadequate oversight of NTIS system development and acquisition efforts); actions that have been taken to ensure that these weaknesses in IRS’ processes and controls have been corrected and that resulting mismanagement does not recur; and
IRS’ plans for Cyberfile, including a business case analysis addressing costs, mission-related benefits and technological risks, schedule and milestones, and acquisition strategy. We interviewed IRS and NTIS program and information system officials to understand (1) why NTIS was considered to develop Cyberfile, (2) how IRS evaluated NTIS, and (3) how NTIS performed on other projects done for IRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) acquisition of Cyberfile, an electronic filing system that the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) is developing for IRS, focusing on whether: (1) the IRS decision to use NTIS to develop Cyberfile was based on sound analysis; (2) IRS and NTIS followed applicable procurement laws and regulations; (3) IRS and NTIS properly accounted for Cyberfile obligations and costs; and (4) IRS cost-effectively acquired equipment and services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS did not adequately analyze its requirements, consider alternative ways to satisfy its requirements, prepare a strategy for how it would acquire the most cost-effective alternative, or assess NTIS ability to develop, deliver, and operate an electronic filing system before deciding to use NTIS to develop Cyberfile; (2) IRS selected NTIS because of expediency and its belief that NTIS could meet a delivery date of February 1996; (3) IRS suspended development after advancing $17.1 million to NTIS; (4) IRS is reevaluating the project, since NTIS did not deliver it on time; (5) IRS cited the Brooks Act for its authority to procure Cyberfile, but it did not fully comply with the implementing regulation's requirements; (6) IRS did not obtain the proper delegation of procurement authority from the Treasury Department; (7) NTIS did not obtain the Small Business Administration's (SBA) approval to modify an existing sole-source Section 8(a) contract to add the Cyberfile project for a total cost of $3.3 million, and violated SBA rules for competing the procurement among eligible firms; (8) NTIS did not hold the contractor accountable for delivery dates and costs; (9) IRS did not ensure that NTIS efficiently and effectively managed the project; (10) IRS understated Cyberfile obligations and improperly accounted for the $17.1-million NTIS advance; (11) NTIS did not properly document significant financial transactions or record obligations and costs; and (12) IRS did not implement adequate controls to ensure that it did not incur excess costs after the project's suspension. |
gao_GAO-09-219 | gao_GAO-09-219_0 | According to the latest data available from FHWA, most PNRS, NCIIP, and CBI projects had been reviewed by FHWA, and funds had been distributed to states; however, some states had not initiated efforts to obtain federal funds for their projects under these programs. The federal contributions to estimated total project costs varied by program. Most Projects Have Been Reviewed and Funds Have Been Distributed, but Some States Have Not Requested Funds for Certain Projects
As of December 2, 2008, FHWA had received project descriptions for and reviewed and distributed funds for most of the projects funded by congressional directive (46 of 55 projects) under PNRS and NCIIP, as shown in table 4. As shown in table 5, as of September 30, 2008, FHWA had obligated nearly $1.2 billion, or about 33 percent of the $3.6 billion authorized under the three programs through that period. Officials we interviewed in two of those states offered varied reasons for not using the funds. For high-cost projects—those whose estimated total costs equaled or exceeded $500 million (11 of 19 PNRS projects, 11 of 27 NCIIP projects, and 1 of 98 CBI projects)—PNRS funds averaged about 8 percent of estimated total costs, NCIIP funds averaged about 4 percent of estimated total costs, and CBI funds averaged about 13 percent of estimated total costs. Majority of Projects Are for Highway Improvements
States have used the funds from the three national and regional programs mainly for highway projects. Stakeholders Cited Advantages Less Often Than Challenges Associated with DOT’s National and Regional Programs
In discussing the three programs, stakeholders discussed a wide variety of both advantages and challenges, but they cited advantages less often than challenges. The most frequently cited advantage was the support the programs provided to initiate projects and to advance those that were already under construction. Funding uncertainty presents a challenge because almost all PNRS and NCIIP projects were funded below their full cost and project sponsors do not know whether they will receive additional federal funds beyond fiscal year 2009 to complete their projects. Under the NCIIP program, the federal funding contributions represented less than 30 percent of the estimated total project costs for about half of the reviewed projects. Key Program Enhancements Include Defining a Clear Federal Role and a Criteria-Based, Competitive Project Selection Process
According to our interviews with program stakeholders and our prior work on federal surface transportation programs, clearly defining the federal role in surface transportation is an important step toward focusing these three programs. Criteria-Based Competition and a More Clearly Defined Federal Role in Transportation May Provide Best Opportunity to Enhance These Programs
According to stakeholders we interviewed and our prior work, a criteria- based, competitive approach, such as the competitive process included in SAFETEA-LU for PNRS and NCIIP, could provide the best opportunity to enhance these programs by better targeting federal investments in transportation infrastructure. The officials generally agreed with the information in this report and stated that the department would be happy to assist Congress as it considers the proposed matters. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we assessed three federal transportation programs established by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), enacted in August 2005, to target funds to infrastructure projects that have high costs, involve national or regional impacts, and cannot easily or specifically be addressed within existing federal surface transportation programs. The programs, administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), include the Projects of National and Regional Significance (PNRS), the National Corridor Infrastructure Improvement Program (NCIIP), and the Coordinated Border Infrastructure (CBI) program. As requested, we addressed the following questions: (1) What are the goals, funding status, and types of projects and activities funded for the three programs? Retain or increase the program’s ability to invest in different modes. Allow more states to conduct environmental impact statements. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help meet increasing transportation demands, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) created three programs to invest federal funds in national and regional transportation infrastructure. As requested, this report provides (1) an overview of the goals, funding status, and types of projects and activities funded by the three programs; (2) advantages and challenges identified by program stakeholders; and (3) potential program enhancements. GAO reviewed pertinent federal laws and rules; examined plans for selected projects; conducted site visits; and interviewed officials, stakeholders, and experts.
What GAO Found
The goals of the projects funded by the three national and regional infrastructure programs--Projects of Regional and National Significance (PNRS), the National Corridor Infrastructure Improvement Program (NCIIP), and the Coordinated Border Infrastructure (CBI) program--are varied, most projects have been reviewed and funded, most projects are for highway improvements, and funds have been applied toward various related activities. PNRS and NCIIP funds were distributed by congressional directive, and CBI funds were distributed by formula. The states GAO visited or whose officials GAO interviewed had established a variety of project goals, including increasing capacity and enhancing mobility. As of December 2008, the Federal Highway Administration had reviewed most projects submitted by states and had obligated $1.2 billion, or about 33 percent of the $3.6 billion authorized for the three programs through September 30, 2008. However, some states had not initiated efforts to obtain available funding. The officials GAO interviewed cited various reasons for not pursuing the funds, such as trying to complete an environmental impact statement and trying to identify a project that met the program's funding criteria. The programs' contributions to projects' estimated total costs varied, from less than 30 percent of the estimated total costs for the majority of reviewed PNRS projects and about half of the reviewed NCIIP projects to 80 percent or more of the estimated total costs for almost half of the reviewed CBI projects. Furthermore, for high-cost projects--those expected to cost over $500 million--the programs' funding contributions ranged from about 4 to 13 percent of the estimated total project cost. States have used the program funds mainly for highway projects and for various related activities, such as conducting environmental studies and expanding ongoing projects. In discussing the three programs, stakeholders cited advantages less often than challenges. The most frequently cited advantage was the funding the programs provided to support and move projects forward. The most commonly cited challenge also involved funding and included funding uncertainty. This was a challenge because project sponsors did not know whether they would receive additional federal funds to complete their projects--especially high-cost projects. According to GAO's interviews and prior work, clearly defining the federal role in surface transportation is an important step in enhancing these programs. Two historical approaches could then be used to distribute federal funds--a criteria-based competition or a formula-based distribution. GAO's interviews and prior work suggest that a criteria-based competition could enhance these programs. Some interviewees also called for a wide range of other enhancements, from broad proposals to increase investment in different transportation modes to specific suggestions, such as using cost-benefit analysis in selecting projects. The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the report's information and conclusions and offered to work with Congress on GAO's three proposed matters. |
gao_GAO-06-854 | gao_GAO-06-854_0 | Persons entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a national be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for business or have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States; have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the program (for example, individuals must have stayed in the United States for 90 days or less during prior visa waiver visits); if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. government to participate in the program, and must have arrived in the United States aboard such a carrier; and if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile abroad to which they intend to return. In 2002, we reported that eliminating the program would increase State’s resource requirements. Lost and stolen passports from visa waiver countries are highly prized travel documents, according to the Secretary General of Interpol. Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with fraudulent passports at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver country. In 2004, DHS reviewed the law enforcement and security risks posed by the continued participation of 25 of the 27 countries in the program. Specifically, DHS has: conducted site visits in all 27 participating countries; completed comprehensive assessments of 25 participating countries, examining the effect of continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. security and law enforcement interests, including the enforcement of immigration laws; identified risks in some of the countries and brought the concerns to the attention of host-country governments in five visa waiver countries; submitted a six-page report to Congress in November 2005 that summarized the findings from the 2004 assessments; and initiated assessments for the remaining two countries in August and September 2005. DHS Lacks a Clearly- Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess Risks of Visa Waiver Program
Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of the program, we identified several problems with the process DHS uses to assess the risks posed by each of the visa waiver countries’ continued participation in the program—namely the mandated biennial country assessment process. Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders
We found that the review process lacked clear protocols, as key stakeholders were left out of the report development process. In particular, DHS has not finalized its operating procedures for site visits. DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks
DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver Program, such as terminating the use of the German temporary passport for travel under the program. Since 2002, the law has required the timely reporting of passport thefts for continued participating in the Visa Waiver Program, but DHS has not established and communicated time frames and operating procedures to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries use and contribute to Interpol’s database, four do not. However, Interpol’s data on lost and stolen travel documents is not automatically accessible to border inspectors at primary inspection—one reason why it is not currently an effective border screening tool, according to DHS, State, and Justice officials. To evaluate the U.S. government’s efforts to assess and mitigate these risks, we analyzed the laws governing the program, relevant agency operating procedures, and DHS OIG reports. We also spoke with U.S. Embassy officials in six Visa Waiver Program countries, as well as foreign government officials in three of these countries. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people entered the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures, and reports on participating countries.
What GAO Found
The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. The U.S. government's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, preparation for the in-country site visits was not consistent, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries participate with Interpol's database, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the data at primary inspection. |
gao_GAO-07-677 | gao_GAO-07-677_0 | The United States, Iraq, and Donors Have Funded Reconstruction of Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Sectors, but Iraq’s Future Needs Are Significant and Sources of Funding Uncertain
For fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the United States made available about $7.4 billion, obligated about $7.1 billion, and spent about $5.1 billion in U.S. funds to rebuild Iraq’s oil and electricity sectors. However, these sources of funding remain uncertain. The Iraqi government has not made full use of potential international contributions, and future donor funding is also uncertain. Additionally, the United States spent $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on oil and electricity sector reconstruction activities. Billions of Additional Dollars Needed to Rebuild Oil and Electricity Sectors, but Future Iraqi Funding Is Uncertain
According to the Iraqi government, the UN, and the U.S. government, Iraq’s Ministries of Oil and Electricity will need billions of additional dollars to rebuild, maintain, and secure Iraq’s oil and electricity infrastructure and achieve production goals. According to U.S. and foreign officials, the Ministries of Oil and Electricity have encountered difficulties spending these budgets because of government weaknesses in budgeting, procurement, and financial management. Some grants have been provided to the electricity sector. Iraq’s Oil and Electricity Production Goals Have Not Been Met, Oil Production Figures May Be Overstated, and Iraq Faces Difficulties Sustaining Infrastructure
Oil and electricity production have consistently fallen below U.S. program goals, undermining U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to improve essential services. If the Ministry of Electricity’s master plan for 2006 to 2015 to rehabilitate and expand the national grid is implemented, the ministry estimates that Iraq will be able to meet its projected demand for electricity in 2009. However, these projections assume a stable supply of fuel for electricity generation, which has been lacking in the past due to poor coordination between the ministries. Second, corruption, smuggling, and other illicit activities have diverted government revenues potentially available for rebuilding efforts. Poor Security Conditions Have Slowed Reconstruction and Increased Costs
The U.S. reconstruction effort was predicated on the assumption that a permissive security environment would exist. Moreover, looting and vandalism have continued since 2003. Lack of Integrated Energy Planning Creates Inefficiencies and Could Hinder Future Rebuilding Efforts
Although the oil and electricity sectors are mutually dependent, the Iraqi government lacks integrated planning for these sectors, according to U.S. and international donor community officials. In addition, the lack of a clear legal and regulatory environment impedes new foreign investment. However, no supporting details were released on what additional financial commitments, if any, are being provided to Iraq’s energy sector as part of this compact. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine U.S. activities directed at rebuilding the oil and electricity sectors, we assessed (1) the funding made available to rebuild Iraq’s oil and electricity sectors and the factors that may affect Iraq’s ability to meet its future funding needs, (2) the U.S. goals for the oil and electricity sectors and progress in achieving these goals, and (3) the key challenges the U.S. government faces in helping Iraq restore its oil and electricity sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the United States has provided several billion dollars in reconstruction funds to help rebuild Iraq oil and electricity sectors, which are crucial to rebuilding Iraq's economy. For example, oil export revenues account for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90 percent of government revenues. The U.S. rebuilding program was predicated on three key assumptions: a permissive security environment, the ability to restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels, and funding from Iraq and international donors. This report addresses (1) the funding made available to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, (2) the U.S. goals for these sectors and progress in achieving these goals, and (3) the key challenges the U.S. government faces in these efforts.
What GAO Found
Billions have been provided to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, but Iraq's future needs are significant and sources of funding uncertain. From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the United States spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild the oil and electricity sectors. The United States also spent an additional $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on these sectors. However, Iraq will need billions of additional dollars to rebuild these sectors. The Iraqi government and donors represent important sources of potential funding. However, the oil and electricity ministries have encountered difficulties spending capital improvement budgets because of weaknesses in budgeting and procurement practices and major security challenges. Moreover, Iraq has not made full use of potential international contributions. It is also unclear what additional financial commitments, if any, will be provided to Iraq's oil and electricity sectors as part of a new international compact. Despite 4 years of effort and the substantial resources expended, production in both sectors has consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. In addition, State's estimate of Iraq's oil production levels may be overstated due to inadequate metering that does not allow precise measurement of crude oil production. The Iraqi government projects that it will be able to meet the demand for electricity in 2009. However, these projections assume that the Ministry of Electricity will be assured of the stable supply of the fuel needed for electricity generation, which has been lacking due to poor coordination between the oil and electricity ministries. A variety of security, corruption, legal, and planning challenges have impeded U.S. and Iraqi efforts to restore Iraq's oil and electricity sectors. The challenging security environment and insufficient protection efforts have continued to place workers and infrastructure at risk. Corruption, smuggling, and other illicit activities result in revenue losses and low cost recovery. Furthermore, the Iraqi government has difficulty attracting foreign investment because, according to the World Bank, it lacks an adequate legal framework, including comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would govern distribution of future oil revenues and granting of exploration rights. Finally, although the oil and electricity sectors are mutually dependent, the Iraqi government lacks integrated planning for these sectors, which has led to inefficient management of the country's resources. |
gao_GAO-15-160 | gao_GAO-15-160_0 | U.S. All CAFTA-DR countries, Colombia, and Peru received a combined total of about $222 million in labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities since the passage of implementing legislation for these FTAs. Stakeholders Reported Limited Enforcement Capacity and Gaps in Labor Rights in Selected Partner Countries
CAFTA-DR: El Salvador and Guatemala
El Salvador. Stakeholders whom we interviewed in the selected five partner countries generally expressed a lack of awareness or understanding of DOL’s submission process, which may have limited the number of submissions filed. DOL Has Closed One of Five Labor Submissions Accepted since 2008
Since 2008, DOL has accepted labor submissions filed under the Bahrain, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru FTAs and has closed the Peru FTA submission. DOL Did Not Meet 6- Month Time Frame for Any Submission, Showing the Time Frame to Be Unrealistic
Although DOL accepted most of the submissions it received within the 60- day time frame established by its guidelines, it did not complete its reviews of the submission within the established 180-day time frame. Guatemala. As a result, according to the union representative, the conditions of workers identified in the submission have not improved. U.S. They also took some proactive monitoring steps with several FTA partners. USTR’s, DOL’s, and State’s annual reports to Congress provide information about labor conditions in partner countries. However, reflecting in part USTR’s and DOL’s limited monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, the reports generally do not detail concerns about the implementation of FTA labor provisions by partner countries that have not been the subject of labor submissions. .
USTR and DOL Pledged in 2009 to Strengthen Monitoring and Enforcement of FTA Labor Provisions
In 2009, USTR made a public statement pledging to address weaknesses in monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions such as those we identified in our July 2009 report. When agencies identify possible inconsistencies with FTA provisions, agencies take a variety of actions to encourage and obtain foreign compliance with trade agreements. Peru. DOL officials expressed concern that challenges related to resource limitations will grow as the number of FTAs increases. Further, although USTR and DOL jointly pledged in 2009 to adopt a more assertive, interagency approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA labor provisions, in practice the agencies systematically investigate possible inconsistencies with these provisions primarily in response to labor submissions. Nevertheless, USTR and DOL took issue with our findings that the agencies do not systematically monitor and enforce labor provisions for all FTA partners and lack a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring and enforcement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) steps that selected partner countries have taken, and U.S. assistance they have received, to implement free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions and other labor initiatives and the reported results of such steps; (2) complaints—known as submissions— about possible violations of FTA labor provisions that DOL has accepted and any problems related to the submission process; and (3) the extent to which the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Department of Labor (DOL), and Department of State (State) monitor and enforce partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions and report results to Congress. Objective 1: Examine Steps That Selected Partner Countries Have Taken, and U.S. Assistance They Have Received, to Implement FTA Labor Provisions and Other Labor Initiatives and the Reported Results of Such Steps
To examine the steps that the selected FTA partner countries have taken to implement labor protection commitments under the respective agreements and other labor initiatives in the context of the respective FTAs, as well as the reported results of these steps, we obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documents from a variety of sources, including the four selected FTAs and their associated labor annexes as well as the CAFTA-DR White Paper and the Colombia Labor Action Plan. For example, union members, in addition to union leaders, are now included in the UNP’s jurisdiction. U.S. Government Has Provided Assistance to Colombia to Address Violence, Including Violence against Unionists
In support of reducing violence in Colombia, including violence against unionists, U.S. agencies have funded multiple assistance projects. Monitoring of Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives
In addition to being responsible for monitoring partner countries’ implementation of free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions, U.S. agencies are responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor initiatives such as the White Paper and the Labor Action Plan, which were developed in the context of, respectively, the Dominican Republic- Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia FTA). However, in our view, reliance on labor submissions to assess compliance and take enforcement actions is inconsistent with USTR’s 2009 commitment to no longer enforce FTA partners’ labor commitments “only on a complaint-driven basis” but instead to “immediately identify and investigate labor violations.”
Comment 10: As stated, the report acknowledges that labor submissions are a key component of USTR’s and DOL’s monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions and that the agencies undertake considerable research and analysis in the process of addressing submissions We modified the text of the report to clarify that after DOL receives a submission, it works with USTR and State to engage diplomatically to address concerns, as well as independently to investigate and analyze the issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has signed 14 FTAs, liberalizing U.S. trade with 20 countries. These FTAs include provisions regarding fundamental labor rights in the partner countries. USTR and DOL, supported by State, are responsible for monitoring and assisting FTA partners' implementation of these provisions.
GAO was asked to assess the status of implementation of FTA labor provisions in partner countries. GAO examined (1) steps that selected partner countries have taken, and U.S. assistance they have received, to implement these provisions and other labor initiatives and the reported results of such steps; (2) submissions regarding possible violations of FTA labor provisions that DOL has accepted and any problems related to the submission process; and (3) the extent to which U.S. agencies monitor and enforce implementation of FTA labor provisions and report results to Congress. GAO selected CAFTA-DR and the FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru as representative of the range of FTAs with labor provisions, among other reasons. GAO reviewed documentation related to each FTA and interviewed U.S., partner government, and other officials in five of the partner countries.
What GAO Found
Partner countries of free trade agreements (FTA) that GAO selected—the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru—have taken steps to implement labor provisions and other initiatives to strengthen labor rights. For example, U.S. and foreign officials said that El Salvador and Guatemala—both partners to CAFTA-DR—as well as Colombia, Oman, and Peru have acted to change labor laws, and Colombia and Guatemala have acted to address violence against union members. Since 2001, U.S. agencies have provided $275 million in labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities for FTA partners, including $222 million for the four FTAs GAO reviewed. However, U.S. agencies reported, and GAO found, persistent challenges to labor rights, such as limited enforcement capacity, the use of subcontracting to avoid direct employment, and, in Colombia and Guatemala, violence against union leaders.
Since 2008, the Department of Labor (DOL) has accepted five formal complaints—known as submissions—about possible violations of FTA labor provisions and has resolved one, regarding Peru (see fig.). However, for each submission, DOL has exceeded by an average of almost 9 months its 6-month time frame for investigating FTA-related labor submissions and issuing public reports, showing the time frame to be unrealistic. Also, union representatives and other stakeholders GAO interviewed in partner countries often did not understand the submission process, possibly limiting the number of submissions filed. Further, stakeholders expressed concerns that delays in resolving the submissions, resulting in part from DOL's exceeding its review time frames, may have contributed to the persistence of conditions that affect workers and are allegedly inconsistent with the FTAs.
Five Labor Submissions Accepted by DOL Regarding Free Trade Agreements
In 2009, GAO found weaknesses in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) and DOL's monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions. In the same year, the agencies pledged to adopt a more proactive, interagency approach. GAO's current review found that although the agencies have taken several steps since 2009 to strengthen their monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, they lack a strategic approach to systematically assess whether partner countries' conditions and practices are inconsistent with labor provisions in the FTAs. Despite some proactive steps, they generally rely on labor submissions to begin identifying, investigating, and initiating steps to address possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions. According to agency officials, resource limitations have prevented more proactive monitoring of all FTA labor provisions. As a result, USTR and DOL systematically monitor and enforce compliance with FTA labor provisions for only a few priority countries. USTR's annual report to Congress about trade agreement programs provides limited details of the results of the agencies' monitoring and enforcement of compliance with FTA labor provisions.
What GAO Recommends
DOL should reevaluate its submission review time frame and better inform stakeholders about the submission process. USTR and DOL should establish a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring and enforcement labor provisions. USTR's annual report to Congress should include more information of USTR's and DOL's monitoring and enforcement efforts. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations but disagreed with some findings, including the finding that they lack a systematic approach to monitor and enforce labor provisions in all FTAs. GAO stands by its findings. |
gao_GAO-02-1021 | gao_GAO-02-1021_0 | Background
According to the State Department’s 2002 Annual Performance Plan, the department’s counterterrorism goals are to reduce the number of terrorist attacks, bring terrorists to justice, reduce or eliminate state-sponsored terrorist acts, delegitimize the use of terror as a political tool, enhance the U.S. response to terrorism overseas, and strengthen international cooperation and operational capabilities to combat terrorism. Programs and Activities to Prevent Terrorism Abroad
The State Department conducts multifaceted activities in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks on Americans abroad. State has several programs to help warn Americans living and traveling abroad against potential threats, including those posed by terrorists. The councils are a voluntary, joint effort between State and the private sector to exchange threat- and security-related information. These programs and activities rely on military, multilateral, economic, law enforcement, and other capacities, as the following examples illustrate: The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates with Department of Defense on military cooperation with other countries. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, working with the Department of Justice, cooperates with foreign intelligence, security, and law enforcement entities to track and capture terrorists in foreign countries, assist in their extradition to the United States, and block attempted terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens and assets abroad. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and other agencies, coordinates State’s role in facilitating the arrest of suspected terrorists through an overseas arrest, known as a rendition, when the United States lacks an extradition treaty. This includes measures to protect Americans, minimize incident damage, terminate terrorist attacks, and bring terrorists to trial. These include the Departments of Defense, Justice, and the Treasury; the various intelligence agencies; the FBI and other law enforcement agencies; and USAID. State uses a variety of methods to coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism abroad, including the following: In Washington, D.C., State participates in National Security Council interagency working groups, issue-specific working groups, and ad hoc working groups. Table 2 describes: the strategic framework of State’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad; State’s programs and activities to prevent terrorism abroad; State’s programs and activities to disrupt and destroy terrorist State’s programs and activities to respond to terrorist incidents abroad. | What GAO Found
Efforts to combat terrorism have become an increasingly important part of government activities. These efforts have also become important in the United States' relations with other countries and with international organizations, such as the United Nations (U.N.). The Department of State is charged with coordinating these international efforts and protecting Americans abroad. State has helped direct the U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad by building the global coalition against terrorism, including providing diplomatic support for military operations in Afghanistan and other countries. State has also supported international law enforcement efforts to identify, arrest, and bring terrorists to justice, as well as performing other activities intended to reduce the number of terrorist attacks. The State Department conducts multifaceted activities in its effort to prevent terrorist attacks on Americans abroad. For Americans traveling and living abroad, State issues public travel warnings and operates warning systems to convey terrorism-related information. For American businesses and universities operating overseas, State uses the Overseas Security Advisory Councils--voluntary partnerships between the State Department and the private sector--to exchange threat information. To disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations abroad, State has numerous programs and activities that rely on military, multilateral, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and other capabilities. State uses extradition treaties to bring terrorists to trial in the United States and cooperates with foreign intelligence, security, and law enforcement entities to track and capture terrorists in foreign countries. If the United States has no extradition agreements with a country, then State, with the Department of Justice, can work to obtain the arrest of suspected terrorist overseas through renditions. The State Department leads the U.S. response to terrorist incidents abroad. This includes diplomatic measures to protect Americans, minimize damage, terminate terrorist attacks, and bring terrorists to justice. To coordinate the U.S. effort to combat terrorism internationally, State uses a variety of mechanisms to work with the Departments of Defense, Justice, and the Treasury; the intelligence agencies; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and others. These mechanisms include interagency working groups at the headquarters level in Washington, D.C., emergency action committees at U.S. missions overseas, and liaison exchanges with other government agencies. |
gao_GAO-09-395 | gao_GAO-09-395_0 | Among its compliance assistance efforts, OSHA established the VPP in 1982 to recognize worksites with safety and health systems that exceed OSHA’s standards. They must meet a number of requirements, including having an active safety and health management system that takes a systems approach to preventing and controlling workplace hazards. The VPP Has Grown Significantly in Recent Years Due to OSHA’s Emphasis on Program Growth and Outreach to New Participants
The VPP has grown steadily since its inception, with the number of employer worksites in the program more than doubling—from 1,039 sites in 2003 to 2,174 sites in 2008. The motor freight transportation industry, which had only 20 sites in 2003, grew tenfold to just over 200 sites in 2008, due in part to the growth in the number of Postal Service sites. As shown in figure 4, the proportion of VPP sites with fewer than 100 workers increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 39 percent in 2008. A key factor influencing growth of the VPP has been OSHA’s emphasis on expansion of the program. OSHA Lacks a Policy Requiring Documentation of Actions Taken by the Regions in Response to Fatalities and Serious Injuries at VPP Sites
OSHA’s lack of a policy requiring documentation in the VPP files of actions taken by the regions in response to incidents, such as fatalities and serious injuries, at VPP sites limits the national office’s ability to ensure that regions have taken the required actions. From our review of OSHA’s VPP files, we found that there was no documentation of actions taken by the regions’ VPP staff to (1) assess the safety and health systems of the 30 VPP sites where 32 fatalities occurred from January 2003 to August 2008 or (2) determine whether these VPP sites should remain in the program. OSHA’s Internal Controls Do Not Ensure That Its Regional Offices Comply with VPP Policies
OSHA’s oversight of the VPP is limited because it does not have internal controls, such as management reviews by the national office, to ensure that its regions consistently comply with VPP policies for verifying sites’ injury and illness rates and conducting on-site reviews. In addition, OSHA’s national office did not review the actions taken by the regions to ensure that they followed up when VPP sites’ injury and illness rates rose above the minimum requirements for the program. As a result, some sites that have not met a key requirement of the VPP have remained in the program. First, OSHA has not developed performance goals or measures to assess the performance of the program. However, these rates may not be the best measure of performance. Second, OSHA has not evaluated the impact of the VPP on sites’ injury and illness rates, such as comparing VPP sites’ injury and illness rates with those of similar sites that do not participate in the program. OSHA Has Not Adequately Evaluated the Effectiveness of the VPP
In response to a recommendation in our 2004 report that the agency evaluate the effectiveness of the VPP, OSHA contracted with The Gallup Organization to study the effectiveness of the program—the results of which were reported in September 2005. However, the study had significant design flaws. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure proper controls and measurement of program performance, the Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to take the following three actions: develop a documentation policy regarding information on follow-up actions taken by OSHA’s regional offices in response to fatalities and serious injuries at VPP sites; establish internal controls that ensure consistent compliance by the regions with OSHA’s VPP policies for conducting on-site reviews and monitoring injury and illness rates so that only qualified worksites participate in the program; and establish a system for monitoring the performance of the VPP by developing specific performance goals and measures for the program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the number and characteristics of employer worksites in the Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP), we analyzed data in the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) VPP database. To determine the extent to which OSHA ensures that only qualified worksites participate in the VPP, we reviewed OSHA’s internal controls for the program and limited our review to VPP sites in the federally managed program that were part of the Star program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for ensuring workplace safety. OSHA has established a number of programs, including the Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP), that take a cooperative approach to obtaining compliance with safety and health regulations and OSHA's standards. OSHA established the VPP in 1982 to recognize worksites with exemplary safety and health programs. GAO was asked to review (1) the number and characteristics of employer worksites in the VPP and factors that have influenced growth, (2) the extent to which OSHA ensures that only qualified worksites participate in the VPP, and (3) the adequacy of OSHA's efforts to monitor performance and evaluate the effectiveness of the VPP. GAO analyzed OSHA's VPP data, reviewed a representative sample of VPP case files, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The VPP has grown steadily since its inception in 1982, with the number of employer worksites in the program more than doubling--from 1,039 sites in 2003 to 2,174 sites in 2008. Although industries represented have not changed significantly, with the chemical industry having the largest number of sites in the VPP, the number of sites in the motor freight transportation industry--which includes U.S. Postal Service sites--increased tenfold from 2003 to 2008. The proportion of smaller VPP sites--those with fewer than 100 workers--increased from 28 percent in 2003 to 39 percent in 2008. Key factors influencing growth of the VPP have been OSHA's emphasis on expansion of the program and VPP participants' outreach to other employers. OSHA's internal controls are not sufficient to ensure that only qualified worksites participate in the VPP. The lack of a policy requiring documentation in VPP files regarding follow-up actions taken in response to incidents, such as fatalities and serious injuries, at VPP sites limits the national office's ability to ensure that its regions have taken the required actions. Such actions include reviewing sites' safety and health systems and determining whether sites should remain in the program. GAO reviewed OSHA's VPP files for the 30 sites that had fatalities from January 2003 to August 2008 and found that the files contained no documentation of actions taken by the regions' VPP staff. GAO interviewed regional officials and reviewed the inspection files for these sites and found that some sites had safety and health violations related to the fatalities, including one site with seven serious violations. As a result, some sites that no longer met the definition of an exemplary worksite remained in the VPP. In addition, OSHA's oversight is limited because it does not have internal controls, such as reviews by the national office, to ensure that regions consistently comply with VPP policies for monitoring sites' injury and illness rates and conducting on-site reviews. For example, the national office has not ensured that regions follow up as required when VPP sites' injury and illness rates rise above the minimum requirements for the program, including having sites develop plans for reducing their rates. Finally, OSHA has not developed goals or measures to assess the performance of the VPP, and the agency's efforts to evaluate the program's effectiveness have been inadequate. OSHA officials said that low injury and illness rates are effective measures of performance. These rates, however, may not be the best measures because GAO found discrepancies between the rates reported by worksites annually to OSHA and the rates OSHA noted during its on-site reviews. In addition, OSHA has not assessed the impact of the VPP on sites' injury and illness rates. In response to a recommendation in a GAO report issued in 2004, OSHA contracted with a consulting firm to conduct a study of the program's effectiveness. However, flaws in the design of the study and low response rates made it unreliable as a measure of effectiveness. OSHA officials acknowledged the study's limitations but had not conducted or planned other evaluations of the VPP. |
gao_T-GGD-96-117 | gao_T-GGD-96-117_0 | Bank Oversight: Fundamental Principles for Modernizing the U.S. Structure
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss your efforts to modernize the federal bank oversight structure. Specifically, we believe that structural reform should provide for more consolidated and comprehensive oversight of companies owning federally insured banks and thrifts, with coordinated functional regulation and supervision of individual components; independence from undue political pressure, balanced by appropriate accountability and adequate congressional oversight; consistent rules, consistently applied for similar activities; and finally, enhanced efficiency and reduced regulatory burden. Each of the five foreign oversight structures we studied reflects an unique history, culture, and banking industry, and as a result, no two of the five are identical. Furthermore, all of the countries we reviewed had more concentrated banking industries than does the United States, and all but Japan have authorized their banks to conduct broad securities and insurance activities in some manner. Although we did not attempt to assess the effectiveness of bank oversight in these countries, we found that each reflected these four principles in some way, and with few, if any, exceptions, each had fewer national agencies involved with bank regulation and supervision than is the case in the United States; had substantial oversight roles for their central banks, and ensured that their ministries of finance were, at the least, kept informed of important industry and supervisory developments; had relatively narrow roles for their deposit insurers; and lastly, incorporated mechanisms and procedures to ensure consistent, consolidated oversight and limit regulatory burden. In each of the five countries, the national government recognized that it had the ultimate responsibility to maintain public confidence and stability in the financial system. While each country included its central bank and finance ministry in some capacity in its oversight structure, most also recognized the need to guard against undue political influence by incorporating checks and balances unique to each country. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed efforts to modernize the U.S. federal bank oversight structure, focusing on: (1) how the U.S. oversight structure compares with five other industrialized countries; and (2) whether these countries' structures can be used to assist U.S. reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. structural reform should include a more consolidated and comprehensive oversight of companies owning federally insured banks and thrifts, independence from undue political pressure, appropriate accountability and adequate congressional oversight, consistent rules, and enhanced efficiency and reduced regulatory burden; (2) the five countries have oversight structures that are diverse, banking industries that are more concentrated than in the U.S., and banks that are authorized to conduct broad securities and insurance activities; (3) in each of the five countries, there are no more than two national agencies involved in oversight operations; (4) each country was heavily involved in bank oversight and ensured that its ministry of finance was informed of important industry and supervisory developments; (5) the countries' oversight structures have systems of checks and balances to guard against political pressure and maintain the public trust and stability in its financial system; (6) each country has given deposit insurers limited roles and viewed them as primarily a source of funding for bank failures; (7) the oversight structures incorporate mechanisms to ensure consistent oversight and limited regulatory burden; and (8) there are a number of ways that the U.S. can simplify its bank oversight structure. |
gao_NSIAD-95-86 | gao_NSIAD-95-86_0 | In the Short Term, the United States Is Likely to Remain Strong in the World Market, but Further Growth Will Be Limited
While the global defense export market has declined since the late 1980s, the United States has become the world’s leading defense exporter. The market share of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom combined has increased from 26 percent of total arms deliveries in 1990 to 32 percent in 1993. Further growth in the U.S. market share will be limited by several factors, including U.S. national security and export control policies. For example, in order to reduce dangerous or destabilizing arms transfers, the United States does not sell its defense products to certain countries, as part of its national security objectives. Certain major foreign country buyers’ practices of diversifying weapons purchases among multiple suppliers further limits U.S. market share. These studies indicate that (1) each sale has its own unique set of circumstances and (2) the outcome is dependent on various factors. While the study was conducted to determine the need for defense export financing, it found that other factors influence defense sales, such as price, technical sophistication of the equipment, the cost and availability of follow-on support, system performance, lead time from placement of order to delivery, the availability of training, political influence, and the financial and economic conditions of purchasing countries. Governments Generally Provide the Same Types of Assistance to Defense Exporters
We found that France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States generally provided the same types of assistance, but the extent and structure of the assistance varies. Government-Backed or -Provided Export Financing
All three European countries provide some form of government-backed export credit guarantees for both non-defense and defense exports as a means to provide security assistance and promote sales of their defense products. Scope and Methodology
Because of the continuing debate on how much support to provide to defense exporters, we reviewed conditions in the global defense export market and the tools used by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States to enhance the competitiveness of their defense exports. Specifically, we compared the U.S. position in the global defense market relative to its major competitors and analyzed the various factors that can contribute to a sale, including export financing and other types of government support. In 1993 these four countries represented 81 percent of the world’s total defense market. This group included officials from national governments, academia, and European defense companies. U.S. Defense Export Financing Primarily Provided Through the Foreign Military Financing Program
In the United States, most financing is provided through the government’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, with limited financing provided by commercial banks. Moreover, the U.S. government has long recognized the positive impact that defense exports can have on the defense industrial base. At that time, the Secretary of State directed overseas personnel to assist defense companies in marketing efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the global defense export market and on the tools used by the United States and three major foreign competitors to enhance the competitiveness of their defense exports.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the United States has been the world's leading defense exporter since 1990; by 1993 its market share had increased to 49 percent of the global market; (2) the increased U.S. market share occurred during a period of worldwide decreases in total defense exports; (3) the three European countries reviewed (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) had in 1993 a combined global market share of about 32 percent of total defense exports, which also increased since 1990; (4) in the short term, at least, the United States will likely remain strong in the world market; however, further growth in its market share will be limited by a number of factors, including U.S. policies to reduce dangerous or destabilizing arms transfers to certain countries and certain major foreign country buyers' practices of diversifying weapons purchases among multiple suppliers; (5) government involvement in the defense industry's sales affects the position of defense manufacturers in overseas markets, but other factors also influencing defense sales include technical sophistication and performance, the cost and availability of follow-on support and training, price, financing, and offset arrangements; (6) government policies and programs can also affect these other factors; (7) because each sale has its own unique set of circumstances, it is not possible to quantify or rank the contribution of any one factor across the board; (8) the U.S. government has long recognized the positive impact that defense exports can have on the defense industrial base; (9) in 1990, the Secretary of State directed overseas missions to support the marketing efforts of U.S. defense companies as in all other areas of commercial activity; (10) governments in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States generally provide comparable types of support, including: (a) government-backed or -provided export financing; (b) advocacy on behalf of defense companies by high-level government officials; and (c) organizational entities that promote defense exports; (11) although all four countries generally provide comparable types of assistance to their defense exporters in these areas, the extent and structure of such assistance varies; (12) central organizations support defense exports in France and the United Kingdom, while in the United States several government agencies share in supporting defense exports; and (13) all three European countries provide government-backed guarantees for commercial bank loans, while in the United States, financing is provided primarily through the Foreign Military Financing Program in the form of grants and loans and available only to a small group of countries. |
gao_GAO-17-264T | gao_GAO-17-264T_0 | Two years later, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) increased and expanded the statutory target volumes for renewable fuels and extended the ramp-up period through 2022. Biomass-based diesel: Advanced biomass-based diesel must have life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions at least 50 percent lower than traditional petroleum-based diesel fuels. EPA administers the RFS in consultation with DOE and USDA. EPA’s responsibilities for implementing the RFS include setting annual volume requirements. The RFS Is Expected to Fall Short of Its Goals Because of Limited Production of Advanced Biofuels and Reliance on Conventional Corn- Starch Ethanol
As we found in our November 2016 report, it is unlikely that the goals of the RFS—reduce greenhouse gas emissions and expand the nation’s renewable fuels sector—will be met as envisioned because there is limited production of advanced biofuels and limited potential for expanded production by 2022. Advanced biofuels achieve greater greenhouse gas reductions than conventional biofuels, although the latter account for most of the biofuel blended into domestic transportation fuels under the RFS. As a result, the RFS is unlikely to achieve greenhouse gas emissions reductions as envisioned. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blended into the domestic transportation fuel supply in 2015 was less than 5 percent of the statutory target of 3 billion gallons. Partly as a result of low production of advanced biofuels, EPA has reduced the RFS targets for such fuels through waivers in each of the last 4 years. According to experts we interviewed, the shortfall of advanced biofuels is the result of high production costs, and the investments in further R&D required to make these fuels more cost-competitive with petroleum-based fuels, even in the longer run, are unlikely in the current investment climate. Several experts raised concerns about the extent to which the RFS is achieving its goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, given that most biofuel blended under the RFS is corn-starch ethanol. Experts Suggested Multiple Federal Actions That Could Improve the RFS Framework by Incrementally Encouraging Investment in Advanced Biofuels
As we reported in November 2016, while advanced biofuels are not likely to be produced in sufficient quantities to meet the statutory targets, experts identified actions that they suggested could improve the existing RFS framework by incrementally increasing investment in advanced biofuels, which may lead to greater volumes of these fuels being produced and used in the longer term. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2006 the RFS has required that transportation fuels—typically gasoline and diesel—sold in the United States be blended with increasing volumes of biofuels to meet environmental and energy goals. Annual targets for the volumes of biofuels to be blended are set by statute. EPA is responsible for adjusting the statutory targets through 2022 to reflect expected U.S. industry production levels, among other factors, and for setting volume targets after 2022. Biofuels included in the RFS are either conventional (primarily corn-starch ethanol) or advanced biofuels (e.g., cellulosic ethanol and biomass-based diesel). Advanced biofuels emit fewer greenhouse gases than petroleum-based fuels and corn-starch ethanol.
In November 2016, GAO issued two reports on the RFS. This testimony is based on those two reports: GAO-17-94 and GAO-17-108 . It provides information on whether the RFS is expected to meet its production and other targets, as well as expert views on any federal actions that could improve the RFS framework, among other things.
For the reports on which this testimony is based, GAO analyzed legal requirements and EPA data. In addition, GAO worked with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a meeting of experts from industry, academia, and research organizations in May 2016. GAO also contracted with the National Academy of Sciences for a list of experts on issues related to the RFS. Further information on how GAO conducted its work is contained in the reports.
What GAO Found
It is unlikely that the goals of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)—to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and expand the nation's renewable fuels sector while reducing reliance on imported oil—will be met as envisioned because there is limited production of advanced biofuels and limited potential for expanded production by 2022. Advanced biofuels, such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-based diesel, achieve greater greenhouse gas reductions than conventional biofuels (primarily corn-starch ethanol), but the latter account for most of the biofuel blended into domestic transportation fuels under the RFS. As a result, the RFS is unlikely to achieve the targeted level of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blended into the transportation fuel supply in 2015 was less than 5 percent of the statutory target of 3 billion gallons. Partly as a result of low production of advanced biofuels, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which administers the RFS in consultation with other agencies, has reduced the RFS targets for such fuels through waivers in each of the last 4 years (see figure). According to experts GAO interviewed, the shortfall of advanced biofuels is due to high production costs. The investments required to make these fuels more cost-competitive with petroleum-based fuels, even in the longer run, are unlikely in the current investment climate, according to experts. |
gao_GGD-98-80 | gao_GGD-98-80_0 | The directors asserted that OCC did not have the authority to assess these civil money penalties. No Evidence Found That OCC’s Net Worth Calculation and Loan Classifications Were Improper
Rushville directors have questioned whether OCC followed its policies and procedures in closing Rushville and have alleged that OCC misclassified performing loans during its last examination to make it appear that the bank was insolvent. GAO’s Review of OCC’s Net Worth Calculation
Our review found that OCC’s net worth calculation showing that Rushville was insolvent by about $326,000 was essentially based on examiners’ determination that the bank lacked sufficient equity to cover estimated loan losses from problem loans. Our review of other banks closed in the 6 months before and after the closure of Rushville did not find evidence that the other banks were treated more favorably. In the 6 months before Rushville’s closure, OCC closed 22 national banks—although 13 of the 22 banks were subsidiaries of a single holding company. No Evidence Found That OCC Influenced the Decision to Recall Holding Company Loan
Rushville directors alleged that, in early 1992, OCC conspired to close Rushville by contacting Liberty National Bank of Louisville (Liberty) to suggest that it call in a $800,000 loan to Rushville’s holding company, Hoosier Bancorp, which was collateralized by Rushville stock. OCC officials and Liberty officers stated that OCC had not attempted to influence the recall of the Hoosier Bancorp loan. Officers of the creditor bank told us that an internal loan review committee identified the Hoosier loan as a problem in 1990 because the Rushville bank stock that collateralized the loan was of questionable value and they doubted the Rushville chairman’s capacity to repay the loan. The judge’s decision is sent to the Comptroller of the Currency for the final determination of the penalty. We found that OCC procedures allow for such increases when examiners-in-charge and OCC officials believe circumstances warrant them. In setting the 1992 Rushville penalties, OCC appears to have followed its procedures that allow for such increases, but for two of the four assessments we found little documentation to support the increases in amounts or the use of factors not covered in the penalty matrix as the basis for setting penalties. The $25,000 penalty assessed against a director was first proposed to be $10,000. Regarding this allegation, a number of the Rushville directors claimed that an OCC attorney expressly stated at the November 12, 1992, meeting at which the chairman was suspended from banking that he could not sell his Rushville stock. In response to a lawsuit filed to allow the chairman to sell his stock, OCC officials sent a letter to the chairman’s attorney on December 4, 1992, telling him that the chairman could sell his stock. To ascertain the nature of OCC’s involvement with the proposed sale of Rushville stock by the chairman and whether OCC followed its policies and procedures, we met with Rushville directors and reviewed documentation they provided. The directors of Rushville gave us documents that they considered relevant, including a chronology of events and related depositions. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the events leading up to the 1992 closure of the Rushville National Bank by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), focusing on whether OCC followed its policies and procedures in its: (1) net worth calculation and loan classifications, which led to Rushville's being declared insolvent; (2) decision to close the bank before implementation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA); (3) contacts with the bank that recalled a loan to Rushville's holding company; (4) determination of civil money penalties assessed against the former Rushville chairman and directors; and (5) involvement with the proposed sale of Rushville holding company stock by Rushville's suspended chairman.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during its review, it found that OCC properly calculated Rushville's net worth; (2) also, GAO did not find evidence that OCC's loan classifications or insolvency determination were improper; (3) although some calculations and classifications were based to a great extent on examiner judgment, the examiners' net worth calculation and loan classifications followed OCC procedures; (4) however, GAO's review of loan classifications was made more difficult by the lack of certain documentation; (5) GAO determined that FDICIA's prompt corrective action provisions would not have allowed Rushville to remain open longer; (6) Congress enacted FDICIA to eliminate delays in the closure of problem institutions, and OCC officials told GAO that, for that reason, even if they had not had a pre-FDICIA basis to close Rushville, they would have closed the bank without delay once FDICIA was implemented; (7) in GAO's review of OCC electronic mail and related documents, it found no support for the allegation that OCC tried to close Rushville by seeking to influence the recall of a loan made by a creditor bank to Rushville's holding company; (8) OCC officials and officers of the creditor bank told GAO that OCC never attempted to influence the recall of the holding company loan; (9) officers of the creditor bank told GAO that they first sought repayment of the loan in 1990 because the Rushville bank stock that collateralized the loan was of questionable value and they doubted the Rushville chairman's capacity to repay the loan; (10) regarding the penalties assessed against Rushville directors, GAO found that OCC followed its policies and procedures; (11) however, in a number of instances in the 1990s, the penalties ultimately assessed by OCC were higher than those originally proposed by district officials; (12) while documentation was insufficient for GAO to ascertain how the OCC amounts were determined, OCC procedures allow for such penalty adjustments when circumstances warrant; (13) GAO found no evidence substantiating the Rushville directors' assertion that an OCC official told the Rushville chairman during the meeting at which he was suspended that he could not sell his stock; and (14) moreover, when OCC became aware of the misunderstanding, OCC sent a letter to the chairman stating that he could sell his stock subject to OCC approval. |
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