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gao_GAO-13-244 | gao_GAO-13-244_0 | FDA uses other postmarket surveillance approaches in addition to AERs to identify potential safety concerns and conduct oversight related to dietary supplements. However, FDA may not have received information on all adverse events that are associated with dietary supplements because consumers and others may not be voluntarily reporting them to FDA—either directly or through firms—although they may be contacting poison centers about some of these events. Specifically, poison centers received over 1,000 more reports of adverse events from 2008 through 2010 than FDA did. FDA Received 6,307 AERs from 2008 through 2011, Primarily from Industry, and Mostly for Combination Products or Unclassified Products
From 2008 through 2011, FDA received a total of 6,307 AERs related to dietary supplements; 71 percent of these AERs came from industry for serious health problems (i.e., based on consumer, health care practitioner, or others’ reports), and most of these AERs were linked with dietary supplements containing a combination of ingredients—such as products containing both vitamins and minerals or otherwise unclassified dietary supplements—according to our analysis of FDA data. FDA officials said that they are interested in reviewing the poison center data related to dietary supplements and have held discussions with AAPCC representatives. FDA Has Increased Its Compliance Monitoring of Firms and Taken Some Advisory and Regulatory Actions
To help ensure firms are complying with AER requirements for submitting serious AERs, maintaining AER records, and including AER contact information on supplement labels, from 2008 through 2011, FDA increased its monitoring of firms through inspections and has taken some advisory and regulatory actions against noncompliant firms. FDA also increased the number of foreign firms it inspected over this period, from conducting no inspections in 2008 to conducting 35 from January through September 2012. FDA officials said that most AERs do not initiate or support consumer protection actions because it is difficult to establish causality based on the limited information in an AER. However, FDA does not collect information on how it uses AERs for its consumer protection actions; FDA could draw on such information to assess whether AERs are being used to their fullest extent for consumer protection. FDA is not required to provide information to the public about potential safety concerns from dietary supplement AERs as it is for drugs. Making such information public, if consistent with disclosure provisions in existing law, could expand FDA’s use of AERs and improve consumer awareness and understanding of potential health problems associated with supplements. More Information on How FDA Uses AERs May Help FDA Expand Their Use
FDA has limited information on how it uses AERs to initiate and support its consumer protection actions; such information could improve FDA’s ability to assess whether the agency is using AERs to their fullest extent in this capacity and make improvements as needed. However, FDA generally does not track AERs across these systems. FDA Has Partially Implemented All of Our 2009 Recommendations
FDA has partially implemented each of our four recommendations from our 2009 report on dietary supplements. FDA officials said that the agency is planning to issue final guidance and complete implementation for most of our recommendations, but they do not have a time frame for completion. With final guidance in these areas, firms may be able to make more informed marketing and product development decisions, including the development of safety information, and ultimately FDA’s enforcement burden in these areas may be reduced as a result. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance FDA’s ability to use AERs and to oversee dietary supplement products, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services direct the Commissioner of FDA to take the following five actions:
Continue efforts to explore all possible options to obtain poison center data if the agency determines that the data could inform FDA’s ability to identify potential safety concerns from adverse event reports for dietary supplements. Establish a time frame for issuing final guidance for the draft (1) NDI guidance and (2) guidance clarifying whether a liquid product may be labeled and marketed as a dietary supplement or as a conventional food with added ingredients. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the (1) number of adverse event reports (AER) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has received since 2008, the source of these reports, and the types of products identified; (2) actions FDA has taken to ensure that firms are complying with new reporting requirements; (3) extent to which FDA is using AERs for its consumer protection actions; and (4) extent to which FDA has implemented GAO’s 2009 recommendations for enhancing FDA oversight of dietary supplements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dietary supplements, such as vitamins and botanical products, are a multibillion dollar industry; national data show that over half of all U.S. adults consume them. FDA regulates dietary supplements and generally relies on postmarket surveillance, such as monitoring AERs, to identify potential concerns. Since December 2007, firms receiving a serious AER have had to report on it to FDA within 15 days. In January 2009, GAO reported that FDA had taken several steps to implement AER requirements and had recommended actions to help FDA identify and act on safety concerns for dietary supplements. GAO was asked to examine FDA's use of AERs in overseeing dietary supplements. This report examines the (1) number of AERs FDA has received since 2008, their source, and types of products identified; (2) actions FDA has taken to ensure that firms are complying with AER requirements; (3) extent to which FDA is using AERs to initiate and support its consumer protection efforts; and (4) extent to which FDA has implemented GAO's 2009 recommendations. GAO analyzed FDA data, reviewed FDA guidance, and interviewed FDA officials.
What GAO Found
From 2008 through 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received 6,307 reports of health problems--adverse event reports (AER)--for dietary supplements; 71 percent came from industry as serious adverse events as required by law, and most of these AERs were linked with supplements containing a combination of ingredients, such as vitamins and minerals or were otherwise not classified within FDA's product categories. However, FDA may not be receiving information on all adverse events because consumers and others may not be voluntarily reporting these events to FDA, although they may be contacting poison centers about some of these events. From 2008 to 2010, these centers received over 1,000 more reports of adverse events linked to dietary supplements than did FDA for the same period. FDA officials said that they are interested in determining whether the poison center data could be useful for their analysis and have held discussions with American Association of Poison Control Centers representatives, but cost is a factor.
To help ensure firms are complying with AER requirements (i.e., submitting serious AERs, maintaining AER records, and including firms' contact information on product labels), FDA increased its inspections of supplement firms and took some actions against noncompliant firms. Specifically, FDA increased firm inspections from 120 in 2008 to 410 from January 1 to September 30, 2012. Over this period, FDA took the following actions: 3 warning letters, 1 injunction, and 15 import refusals related to AER violations, such as not including contact information on the product label or submitting a serious AER.
FDA has used AERs for some consumer protection actions (e.g., inspections and warning letters) but may be able to expand their use. FDA officials said that most AERs do not initiate or support such actions because it is difficult to establish causality between the product and the health problem based on the limited information in an AER. However, FDA does not systematically collect information on how it uses AERs for consumer protection actions; by collecting this information, it may be able to assess whether AERs are being used to their fullest extent. In addition, FDA is not required to provide information to the public about potential safety concerns from supplement AERs as it does for drugs. Making such information public, if consistent with disclosure provisions in existing law, could expand FDA's use of AERs and improve consumer awareness and understanding of potential health events associated with dietary supplements.
FDA has partially implemented all of GAO's 2009 recommendations, such as issuing guidance for new dietary ingredients, clarifying the boundary between dietary supplements and conventional foods, and expanding partnerships to improve consumer understanding. Specifically, FDA developed draft guidance in 2009, 2011, and 2012 to address three GAO recommendations about dietary supplement oversight and formed new partnerships to conduct consumer outreach. However, FDA has not issued final guidance in two cases. FDA officials said that they plan to complete implementation, but they have provided no time frame to do so. With final guidance in place, firms may be able to make more informed product development and marketing decisions, which could ultimately reduce FDA's enforcement burden in these areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FDA explore options to obtain poison center data, if determined to be useful; collect information on how it uses AERs; provide more information to the public about AERs; and establish a time frame to finalize guidance related to GAO's 2009 recommendations. FDA generally concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-691T | gao_GAO-11-691T_0 | Current Prerefund Checks Provide Significant Benefits
Prerefund compliance checks enable IRS to help confirm taxpayers’ identities and ensure that returns have required information, quickly and efficiently correct certain errors with a virtual certainty of being right, identify and audit some returns even before refunds are completed, and help detect possible fraud. Fraud Investigations
Based on IRS’s computer filters, IRS identifies some refund claims that may be fraudulent. Math error checks are among the most beneficial of the prerefund checks for both taxpayers and IRS. These checks have the potential to protect billions of dollars in federal revenue from being erroneously refunded to taxpayers, especially for refundable tax credits that have been increasingly enacted in recent years, as significant overclaimed refund amounts result, sometimes through fraudulent claims. We calculated that IRS prevented about $95 million in erroneous refunds in fiscal year 2010 using this new authority. For example, last year we reported that from January 1 through September 30, 2010, IRS corrected about 7.7 million errors associated with the Making Work Pay credit, including about 60 percent in the taxpayers’ favor. These corrections meant that taxpayers received larger refunds (or had lower taxes due) than they had anticipated. Prerefund Checks Can Be Enhanced
For almost a century, Congress has been expanding IRS’s MEA on a case- by-case basis. We suggested in 2010 that authorizing the use of MEA on a broader basis rather than on a case-by-case basis, with appropriate controls to protect taxpayer rights, could minimize the danger of that happening in the future. I already mentioned some of these earlier, but, to summarize, broader MEA could enable IRS to correct all or nearly all returns where IRS identifies the noncompliance and the needed correction with virtual certainty, not just those it can address through other enforcement means; be low cost and less intrusive and burdensome to taxpayers than audits; ensure that taxpayers who are noncompliant on a particular issue are similarly treated, that is, that a greater portion of them are brought into compliance, not just those that IRS could otherwise address through other enforcement means; enhance equity between compliant and noncompliant taxpayers because a greater portion of the noncompliant taxpayers would be brought into compliance; provide a taxpayer service as it would generally allow noncompliant taxpayers to receive their refunds faster than if IRS had to address the error through some other compliance mechanism, have their returns corrected without penalty and before interest is accrued, and avoid time- consuming interaction with IRS under its other programs for resolving noncompliance; help ensure that taxpayers receive the tax benefits for which they are eligible by identifying taxpayers who underclaim a tax benefit; free up IRS resources to pursue other forms of noncompliance; and allow IRS to quickly address provisions arising from new and quickly moving initiatives like the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pub. While providing broad MEA is ideal, we have also suggested that Congress expand MEA for more limited purposes. IRS currently matches data provided on over 2 billion information returns to tax returns only after the normal filing season. One prerequisite would be a major reworking of some fundamental IRS computer systems. Other IRS initiatives should also enhance compliance before refunds are issued. For instance, IRS could leverage new paid tax return preparer requirements to improve taxpayer compliance before tax returns are filed. The new requirements may also help IRS address compliance problems that arise during filing seasons. Appendix I: IRS Math Error Authorities
Table 2 summarizes the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 13 areas of existing math error authority (MEA). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processed about 137 million individual income tax returns and issued 107 million refunds totaling over $312 billion. The compliance checks it performs before refunds are issued thus could affect millions of taxpayers and billions of dollars of refunds by identifying taxpayers who overclaim or underclaim tax benefits to which they are entitled. Math error authority (MEA) is just one example of the prerefund compliance checks that IRS uses. During 2010, IRS sent taxpayers 8.4 million notices for almost 10.6 million math errors identified on their 2009 individual tax returns. GAO's statement today will focus on three key areas: (1) prerefund checks and their benefits, (2) how those checks can be enhanced immediately, and (3) how they may be enhanced in the future. It is mostly based on GAO's previous work issued from 2008 through 2011, including an interim report on IRS's 2011 tax filing season, and our ongoing analysis of the 2011 filing season.
What GAO Found
Prerefund compliance checks enable IRS to help confirm taxpayers' identity, quickly and efficiently correct some errors with virtual certainty, and identify and audit some returns before refunds are issued. Math error checks are among the most beneficial of these checks for both IRS and taxpayers. For example, they have the potential to deter billions of dollars in erroneous refunds, especially for refundable tax credits that have increasingly been enacted and that have resulted in significant overclaimed refunds and fraudulent claims. Taxpayers benefit from prerefund checks in several ways, including that IRS identifies those underclaiming benefits. Last year GAO reported that IRS corrected about 7.7 million errors associated with the Making Work Pay credit, including about 60 percent in the taxpayers' favor, meaning that taxpayers received larger refunds (or had lower taxes due) than they had anticipated. For almost a century, Congress has been expanding IRS's MEA on a case-by-case basis. In 2010, GAO suggested that authorizing the use of MEA on a broader basis with appropriate controls to protect taxpayer rights could help IRS immediately address compliance problems with newly created tax credits. In the absence of broader MEA, from 2008 through 2011, GAO also suggested that Congress expand MEA for more limited purposes. Longer term, other IRS initiatives, such as matching information returns to tax returns during the filing season and leveraging new paid preparer requirements, could enhance compliance before refunds are issued. One prerequisite would be a major reworking of some fundamental IRS computer systems. |
gao_GAO-17-134 | gao_GAO-17-134_0 | While Appellate Space-Use Decisions Are Decentralized, They Are Guided by a Variety of Policies and Practices, Including National Policies to Reduce Space
A Variety of Policies Guide Appellate Space-Use Decisions
The appellate judges and officials we spoke with in the 12 regional judicial circuits and 11 GSA regional offices identified the following policies as essential in helping to guide appellate space-use decisions, as well as other court-related space decisions circuit-wide: U.S. Courts Design Guide (Design Guide): The Design Guide specifies the judiciary’s criteria for designing court facilities and sets the space and design standards that GSA uses for courthouse construction and renovation. Specifically, over the course of the 7- year period between October 2008 and September 2015 (fiscal years 2009 through 2015), appellate rent costs rose from about $107 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $123 million in fiscal year 2014, but have since decreased to about $121 million in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. During the same period, appellate space occupied grew from about 4.61-million rentable square feet in fiscal year 2009 to about 4.89- million rentable square feet in fiscal year 2013, but has since decreased to 4.63-million rentable square feet in fiscal year 2015, with a similar trend for usable square feet. As of March 2016, according to the most recent AOUSC data available and our interviews with all 12 regional circuits, circuits have completed 60 appellate space- reduction projects and begun an additional 22 projects—for a total of 82 projects. Appellate space reductions will become increasingly difficult: While circuits have made progress reducing appellate space as part of the judiciary’s national 3 percent space-reduction target, most circuit officials we spoke to said future appellate space reductions required by the No Net New policy will become increasingly difficult, in part, because circuits have focused on appellate space that has been easier to reduce to date—such as circuit libraries and unneeded storage or office space, as discussed later in the report. While appellate courtrooms and judges’ chambers made up about half of all appellate space in fiscal year 2015, as previously mentioned, space reduction projects involving courtrooms and judges’ chambers made up about a quarter of all appellate space reduction projects, completed and under way, from fiscal year 2013 through March 2016. AOUSC officials agreed with GAO’s assessment that limited information is available concerning innovative appellate courtroom and judge’s chambers design or use options. AOUSC officials agreed that appellate space reductions will become increasingly difficult and said that, moving forward, they could provide additional information for circuits considering reductions in, or changes to, appellate courtrooms or judges’ chambers design and use. Recommendation
To provide circuits with information needed to help guide future space- reduction and use decisions, we recommend that the Director of AOUSC document and share additional practices on innovative and cost-effective use or design of appellate courtrooms and judges’ chambers, such as scheduling, redesign, and sharing arrangements, and any other potential approaches, with all regional circuits in order to help them determine the feasibility of these options for their circuit. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) policies and practices that guide space use decisions for federal courts of appeals; (2) trends in rent, space occupied, and use of courtrooms and other space for federal courts of appeals; and (3) actions the judiciary has taken to reduce or improve use of appellate space, including any related challenges and the extent to which it has shared information to support such efforts. We also interviewed relevant officials with GSA’s 11 regional offices who work with the judiciary on space needs and issues and officials from GSA’s central office and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) about space use policies and appellate decision making. To examine the rent and space occupied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, we analyzed nationwide judiciary rent data generated from GSA’s billing system from fiscal years 2009 through 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of fiscal year 2015, the federal judiciary paid over $1 billion in rent to the General Services Administration (GSA) for court-related space. GAO previously found that the judiciary faced challenges managing increasing space and rental costs, including for the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
GAO was asked to review the judiciary's space reduction efforts, focusing on appellate space. This report examines: (1) the policies and practices that guide space use decisions for federal courts of appeals; (2) trends in rent, space occupied, and use of appellate space; and (3) actions taken to reduce or improve use of appellate space, including any related challenges and the extent to which the judiciary has shared information to support such efforts.
GAO reviewed statutes, GSA and judicial policies and guidance, and information on projects to reduce appellate space; analyzed GSA's billing data on the judiciary from fiscal years 2009 through 2015; and visited 7 appellate courthouses, selected to include those in diverse locations with a variety of caseloads. GAO also interviewed officials in all 12 regional judicial circuits, AOUSC (the judiciary's administrative arm), GSA's central office, and GSA's 11 regional offices.
What GAO Found
Various judicial policies, such as those in the U.S. Courts Design Guide, help guide appellate space use decisions. Other key policies include the judiciary's national 3 percent space-reduction target and the No Net New policy, which requires regional judicial circuits—including each circuit's court of appeals—to offset space increases with equivalent reductions. In practice, space use decisions are generally made by appellate courts in conjunction with their regional circuit judicial councils, which exercise authority over all courts in a circuit.
After trending upward through 2014, appellate rent costs and space occupied have recently begun to decrease. Specifically, appellate rent costs rose from about $107 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $123 million in fiscal year 2014, but have since decreased to about $121 million in fiscal year 2015. During the same period, appellate space occupied grew from about 4.61-million square feet to about 4.89-million square feet in fiscal year 2013, but has since decreased to about 4.63-million square feet in fiscal year 2015. In total, courtrooms and judges' chambers account for about half of all appellate space, while libraries account for about 20 percent. Use of appellate courtrooms and judge's chambers varies across circuits, reflecting differences in circuit characteristics.
As of March 2016, circuits had completed 60 appellate space-reduction projects and begun an additional 22 projects, with the largest share of space reductions in circuit libraries. However, officials said that appellate space reductions will become increasingly challenging as easier projects are completed. To meet future requirements, most circuits said they anticipate needing to make reductions in, or changes to, appellate-courtrooms' or judges-chambers' use, such as the Third Circuit's appellate judges-chambers-sharing project (see fig.).
While circuit officials have access to space reduction information provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), limited information is available to circuits on innovative practices for design and use of appellate courtrooms and judges' chambers. As space reductions become increasingly difficult, documenting and sharing this type of information could help circuits identify and pursue innovative space-saving options for appellate courtrooms and judges' chambers in the future.
What GAO Recommends
AOUSC should document and share additional practices across courts on innovative use or design of appellate courtrooms and judges' chambers. AOUSC said it will seriously consider GAO's recommendation. |
gao_RCED-98-223 | gao_RCED-98-223_0 | A key to implementing performance-based contracting is having a clear picture of what needs to be accomplished. In addition, DOE reported during 1997 on its assessment of the implementation of performance-based incentives. DOE Has Incorporated Lessons Learned Into Fiscal Year 1998 Incentives
In developing its fiscal year 1998 incentives, DOE incorporated the lessons learned from the OIG’s reviews, its own assessment, and prior years’ experiences with performance-based incentives. DOE Has Taken Corrective Action to Improve the Performance-Based Incentive Process
DOE’s October 1997 assessment of its performance-based incentives also noted that the guidance on the development and administration of these incentives was limited and generally did not address such issues as establishing baselines and allocating fee amounts to specific incentives. Furthermore, all four sites allocated fees to individual performance incentives on the basis of their relative importance and their contribution towards the site’s mission and objectives. At three of the four sites we visited, DOE’s performance incentives incorporated the baseline measures in DOE’s 10-year plans for environmental cleanup. The fourth site has not yet developed any incentives in environmental management because it is still validating the baseline information. However, Idaho Falls has a process to link its annual work plans to the 10-year plan and DOE’s strategic plan, and the goals and objectives of the site do incorporate the performance measures from the 10-year plan for environmental cleanup. However, DOE and contractor officials stated that these successes may be due to the Department’s increased emphasis on program management rather than the result of performance-based incentives. Because the total contract amount for the Rocky Flats Site includes the amounts paid to the major subcontractors, we believe that it does not make any difference in the presentation of the information to show that the fees are separately negotiated. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOE has incorporated lessons learned in developing the fiscal year 1998 performance-based incentives, we interviewed DOE’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Procurement and Assistance Management and officials from planning and procurement organizations at DOE’s Hanford, Idaho Falls, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River sites. To determine whether the incentives incorporate DOE’s baseline measures in its 10-year plan for environmental cleanup and how fees are allocated to the incentives, we interviewed DOE’s planning and procurement personnel at the four sites. To determine how DOE evaluates completed incentive measures and determines their effectiveness, we interviewed DOE personnel at the four sites, reviewed procedures and other documentation provided by them, and reviewed supporting documentation for completed incentive measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the performance-based incentives at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford, Idaho Falls, Rocky Flats, and Savannah River sites to determine: (1) the extent to which DOE has incorporated lessons learned in developing its fiscal year (FY) 1998 performance-based incentives; (2) whether these incentives incorporate the baseline measures in DOE's 10-year plan for environmental cleanup, and how fees are allocated to the incentives; and (3) how DOE evaluates completed incentive measures and determines their effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the past year, DOE has taken steps to correct the problems identified in the Office of the Inspector General reports and its own assessment of performance-based incentives; (2) these steps have included issuing guidance, conducting training, and incorporating lessons learned into the FY 1998 incentives; (3) however, DOE believes that FY 1998 represents a transitional period to better performance-based incentives because it plans to continue to make improvements to the incentives; (4) for FY 1998, at three of the four sites GAO visited, DOE's performance-based incentives incorporated the baseline measures in the Department's 10-year plan for environmental cleanup and were generally linked to both DOE's strategic plan and the site-specific plans; (5) the fourth site, Idaho Falls, has not yet developed performance incentives in environmental management, but its goals and objectives do incorporate the 10-year plan's baseline measures; (6) furthermore, each of the four sites generally allocates fees to individual performance incentives in proportion to their relative importance and on the basis of the site's missions and objectives; (7) DOE evaluates completed actions that were tied to performance-based incentives through reviews by its technical, financial, and contracting personnel to determine whether the contractor satisfied the criteria and earned the amount of fee to be paid; (8) overall, DOE maintains that performance-based incentives have been effective in achieving desired end results; (9) however, it is not clear whether the successes reported in the departmentwide assessment have been due to the performance-based incentives or to the accompanying increased emphasis on program management; and (10) furthermore, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of the FY 1998 incentives because the evaluation of these incentives will not be complete until the end of the fiscal year. |
gao_GAO-01-1167T | gao_GAO-01-1167T_0 | The Olmstead decision is an interpretation of public entities’ obligations under title II of the ADA. At present, however, there are wide differences between states in the degree to which home and community-based services are provided. One reason for the uncertainty about how many may be affected is that, as the decision recognized, the appropriateness of a person’s being placed in an institution or receiving home or community- based services would depend in part on the person’s wishes and the recommendations of his or her treatment professionals. Provision of Home and Community-Based Services Varies Widely by State
The proportion of Medicaid long-term care spending devoted to home and community-based services varies widely among states. Full Implications of Olmstead for State Programs Not Yet Known
The Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision left open questions about the extent to which states could be required to restructure their current long- term care programs for people with disabilities to ensure that care is provided in the most integrated setting appropriate for each person’s circumstances. While the Supreme Court held in Olmstead that institutionalization of people with disabilities is discrimination under the ADA under certain circumstances, it also recognized that there are limits to what states can do, given available resources and the obligation to provide a range of services for people with disabilities. However, it recognized that states’ obligations to provide services are not boundless. | What GAO Found
In the Olmstead case, the Supreme Court decided that states were violating title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) if they provided care to disabled people in institutional settings when they could be a appropriately served in a home or community-based setting. Considerable attention has focused on the decision's implications for Medicaid, the dominant public program supporting long-term care institutional, home, and community-based services. Although Medicaid spending for home and community-based service is growing, these are largely optional benefits that states may or may not choose to offer, and states vary widely in the degree to which they cover them. The implications of the Olmstead decision--in terms of the scope and the nature of states' obligation to provide home and community-based long-term care services--are still unfolding. Although the Supreme Court ruled that providing care in institutional settings may violate the ADA, it also recognized that there are limits to what states can do, given the available resources and the obligation to provide a range of services for disabled people. The decision left many open questions for states and lower courts to resolve. State programs also may be influenced over time as dozens of lawsuits and hundreds of formal complaints seeking access to appropriate services are resolved. |
gao_GAO-04-385 | gao_GAO-04-385_0 | However, TSA has not fully completed testing these initial two increments because it was unable to obtain passenger data needed for testing from air carriers, which would not provide the passenger data because of privacy concerns. Critical CAPPS II Plans Are Not Complete
TSA has not yet developed critical elements associated with sound project planning, including a plan for what specific functionality will be delivered, by when, and at what cost throughout the development of the system. Developmental, Operational, and Privacy Issues Identified by the Congress Remain Unresolved
TSA has not fully addressed seven of the eight issues identified by the Congress as key areas of interest related to the development and implementation of CAPPS II. Although TSA is in various stages of progress on addressing each of these eight issues, as of January 1, 2004, only one—the establishment of an internal oversight board to review the development of CAPPS II—has been fully addressed, as shown in table 1. Additional Challenges Could Affect the Successful Implementation of CAPPS II
In addition to facing developmental, operational, and public acceptance challenges related to key areas of interest to the Congress, CAPPS II also faces a number of additional challenges that may impede its success. We identified three issues that, if not adequately resolved, pose major risks to the successful development, implementation, and operation of CAPPS II. These issues include developing the international cooperation needed to obtain passenger data, managing the expansion of the program’s mission beyond its original purpose, and ensuring that identity theft—in which an individual poses as and uses information of another individual—cannot be used to negate the security benefits of the system. Uncertainties surrounding the system’s future functionality and schedule alone result in the potential that the system may not meet expected requirements, may experience delayed deployment, and may incur increased costs throughout the system’s development. 519. a) None of the funds provided by this or previous appropriations Acts may be obligated for deployment or implementation, on other than a test basis, of the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) plans to utilize to screen aviation passengers, until the General Accounting Office has reported to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives that— 1. a system of due process exists whereby aviation passengers determined to pose a threat and either delayed or prohibited from boarding their scheduled flights by the TSA may appeal such decision and correct erroneous information contained in CAPPS II; 2. the underlying error rate of the government and private data bases that will be used both to establish identity and assign a risk level to a passenger will not produce a large number of false positives that will result in a significant number of passengers being treated mistakenly or security resources being diverted; 3. the TSA has stress-tested and demonstrated the efficacy and accuracy of all search tools in CAPPS II and has demonstrated that CAPPS II can make an accurate predictive assessment of those passengers who may constitute a threat to aviation; 4. the Secretary of Homeland Security has established an internal oversight board to monitor the manner in which CAPPS II is being developed and prepared; 5. the TSA has built in sufficient operational safeguards to reduce the 6. substantial security measures are in place to protect CAPPS II from unauthorized access by hackers or other intruders; 7. the TSA has adopted policies establishing effective oversight of the use and operation of the system; and 8. there are no specific privacy concerns with the technological architecture of the system. To assess the status of CAPPS II in addressing the issues identified in Public Law 108-90, we did the following. | Why GAO Did This Study
The security of U.S. commercial aviation is a long-standing concern, and substantial efforts have been undertaken to strengthen it. One of these efforts is the development of a new Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) to identify passengers requiring additional security attention. The development of CAPPS II has raised a number of issues, including whether individuals may be inappropriately targeted for additional screening, and whether data accessed by the system may compromise passengers' privacy. GAO was asked to determine (1) the development status and plans for CAPPS II; (2) the status of CAPPS II in addressing key developmental, operational, and public acceptance issues; and (3) other challenges that could impede the successful implementation of the system.
What GAO Found
Key activities in the development of CAPPS II have been delayed, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not yet completed important system planning activities. TSA is currently behind schedule in testing and developing initial increments of CAPPS II, due in large part to delays in obtaining needed passenger data for testing from air carriers because of privacy concerns. TSA also has not established a complete plan identifying specific system functionality that will be delivered, the schedule for delivery, and estimated costs. The establishment of such plans is critical to maintaining project focus and achieving intended results within budget. Without such plans, TSA is at an increased risk of CAPPS II not providing the promised functionality, of its deployment being delayed, and of incurring increased costs throughout the system's development. TSA also has not completely addressed seven of the eight issues identified by the Congress as key areas of interest related to the development, operation, and public acceptance of CAPPS II. Although TSA is in various stages of progress on addressing each of these eight issues, as of January 1, 2004, only one--the establishment of an internal oversight board to review the development of CAPPS II--has been fully addressed. However, concerns exist regarding the timeliness of the board's future reviews. Other issues, including ensuring the accuracy of data used by CAPPS II, stress testing, preventing unauthorized access to the system, and resolving privacy concerns have not been completely addressed, due in part to the early stage of the system's development. The following table is a summary of TSA's status in addressing the eight key issues. GAO identified three additional challenges TSA faces that may impede the success of CAPPS II. These challenges are developing the international cooperation needed to obtain passenger data, managing the possible expansion of the program's mission beyond its original purpose, and ensuring that identity theft--in which an individual poses as and uses information of another individual--cannot be used to negate the security benefits of the system. GAO believes that these issues, if not resolved, pose major risks to the successful deployment and implementation of CAPPS II. |
gao_GGD-98-34 | gao_GGD-98-34_0 | According to the responses to our survey results, an estimated 4,990 banks, or about 15 percent) of the banks in the United States, plan to offer some type of on-line banking service to their customers by the end of 1998. Although U.S. banks offer a wide range of services on-line, reviews of account information and funds transfers between a customer’s accounts were the most common services reported to be available to bank customers at the time we conducted our survey in June 1997. Half of the banks reported that their expectations were met, and another 77 banks (42 percent) said that their expectations were exceeded. Some Banks That Reported Offering On-Line Banking Said They Did Not Conduct Risk Assessments
On-line banking presents a wide range of potential risks, according to information security experts and banking regulators. However, 12 banks (13 percent) said they had not performed such assessments. Another 16 banks (17 percent) did not know if they had performed risk assessments of their on-line banking systems. To help prevent unauthorized access to on-line banking systems, information security experts and regulatory officials emphasize the importance of banks’ implementing mitigating controls, such as restrictions on access, secure firewalls that restrict access between computer networks, intrusion detection software, and tests of on-line banking system vulnerability. Some Banks Reported Problems With Their On-Line Banking Systems
For the 93 banks that they directly represented, we asked bank officials for information on the types of problems they had experienced with their systems, whether other banking systems were connected to their systems, and the types of controls they had in place to mitigate risks. Although responses of most of the banks we contacted indicated that their on-line banking systems had met or exceeded their expectations, the introduction of on-line banking technology exposes banks and their customers to risks from electronic interception, data corruption, and fraud. Although many of the banks we surveyed had conducted such assessments, others had not and, thus, lacked assurance that they were taking appropriate mitigating measures to protect their on-line banking systems. Telephone Survey Instrument
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this assignment were to determine (1) the number of banks and thrifts (referred to as banks in this report) that reported they offer, or plan to offer, on-line banking and the types of services they reported; and (2) the experiences reported by banks in implementing their on-line banking systems as well as their efforts to mitigate associated risks. We obtained information for 185 banks on (1) the channels used to deliver on-line banking services, (2) the reasons for implementing on-line banking, (3) whether on-line banking met or exceeded expectations, and (4) the electronic links that banks had with other payment systems. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request GAO reviewed: (1) the channels used to deliver online banking services; (2) the reasons for implementing online banking; (3) whether online banking met or exceeded expectations; and (4) the electronic links that banks had with other payment systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of June 1997, an estimated 7 percent of U.S. banks offered online banking services, which most typically allow customers to access account information and transfer funds between their accounts; (2) on the basis of plans reported to GAO by surveyed banks, GAO projected rapid growth in online banking over the next year and a half as the number of U.S. banks implementing online systems is expected to increase about fivefold nationwide; (3) bank officials identified three primary reasons for their banks' offering online banking: keeping existing customers, remaining competitive, and attracting new customers; (4) officials of 170 of the 185 surveyed banks offering online services said their online banking systems had met or exceeded their expectations; (5) although an estimated 47 percent of U.S. banks reported that they expect to offer online banking services by the end of 1998, introduction of this technology brings with it some attendant risks; (6) responses from 93 of the banks GAO surveyed indicated that some had not performed risk assessments, which can serve as a tool to protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of their online operations; (7) although 65 of the banks responded that their banks had assessed the potential risk exposure of their systems, 12 banks reported that they had not assessed these types of security risks, and another 16 banks said that they did not know if they had assessed such risks; (8) risk assessments are an important step in protecting an online system so that appropriate controls can be implemented to mitigate risks; (9) although many of the 93 banks that responded to this question reported they had implemented controls to prevent unauthorized access to their online systems, 9 banks said they lacked firewalls for restricting access between computer networks; (10) 10 banks reported that they did not have such basic security features as detection software for computer viruses and worms; (11) many of the 93 banks that responded indicated they had experienced lapses in service, security problems, or system operation difficulties; and (12) with the projected rapid growth in online banking, it is important that banks take those steps necessary to ensure they protect their online banking operations. |
gao_GGD-98-138 | gao_GGD-98-138_0 | Some of the steps involved in converting existing systems include (1) converting applications; (2) upgrading hardware and/or systems software for mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers; (3) upgrading telecommunications networks; and (4) ensuring that external data exchanges are Year 2000 compliant. The other parallel Year 2000 efforts are 2 major replacement efforts: (1) the replacement of the Distributed Input System (DIS) and the Remittance Processing System (RPS) with the Integrated Submission and Remittance Processing (ISRP) system and (2) the consolidation of the mainframe computer processing operations at 10 service centers to 2 computing centers. IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts Are Experiencing Some Delays
IRS is experiencing delays in completing conversion efforts for its existing systems and major systems replacement efforts. IRS has made the most progress in converting its applications for the systems it has deemed mission-critical. As of April 24, 1998, IRS reported that it had completed the first 12 steps of its 14-step conversion process on applications for about 46 percent (59 systems) of its 127 mission-critical systems. IRS’ schedule calls for completing the first 12 steps for the remaining 54 percent (68 systems) of the mission-critical systems by January 1999. IRS is still in the initial steps of its 14-step conversion process for most of its systems software, hardware, and telecommunications network components. IRS officials said they expect to complete the Year 2000 portions of mainframe consolidation (i.e., terminal replacement and the communication replacement system) by the original completion date of December 1998. According to our assessment guide, a master conversion and replacement schedule should be a part of an agency’s Year 2000 program plan. Thus, IRS faces the risk that resources may not be available when needed. One of the support activities that IRS identified in the statement of work was the development of an integrated schedule identifying (1) the interfaces and dependencies among Year 2000 projects and (2) efforts to implement legislative changes for the 1999 filing season. IRS expects to make its existing service center mainframe computers Year 2000 compliant by January 1999. Recommendations
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following steps to better ensure that IRS has adequately assessed the vulnerabilities of its core business processes in the event of Year 2000-induced system failures: solicit the input of business functional area officials to identify IRS’ core business processes and prioritize those processes that must continue in the event of Year 2000-induced failures; map IRS’ mission-critical systems to those core business processes; determine the impact of information system failures on each core business assess any existing business continuity and contingency plans that may have been developed for non-Year 2000 reasons to determine whether these plans are applicable to Year 2000-induced failures, and develop and test contingency plans for core business processes if existing plans are not appropriate. We recognize that IRS needs to leverage its resources, particularly its information systems resources, to ensure that it completes all of the required Year 2000 conversion work on schedule. Implementation. According to IRS documents, this risk assessment will also trigger the development of contingency plans for mission-critical systems that are found to be at risk for not being converted on time. IRS’ goal is to convert all personal computers by January 1999. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to have its information systems function correctly when processing dates beyond December 31, 1999, focusing on: (1) IRS' progress in converting its systems according to the guidelines in GAO's year 2000 assessment guide; (2) the risks IRS faces to completing the year 2000 effort on time; and (3) risks to the continuity of IRS operations in the event of year 2000-induced system failures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) according to IRS, before January 1999, it needs to complete 12 steps of its 14-step process for converting: (a) the applications for its existing systems; (b) the telecommunications networks; and (c) systems software and hardware for mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers; (2) in addition, before January 1999, IRS needs to: (a) ensure that external data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant; (b) implement the Integrated Submission and Remittance Processing System and, at a minimum, the year 2000 portions of mainframe consolidation; and (c) modify application software to implement tax law changes for the 1999 and 2000 filing seasons; (3) if these efforts are not completed, IRS' tax processing and collection systems may fail to operate or may generate millions of erroneous tax notices, refunds, interest calculations, and account adjustments; (4) for the conversion of its existing systems, IRS has made more progress on its applications than on its information systems infrastructure; (5) specifically, as of April 24, 1998, IRS reported that it had completed the first 12 steps of its 14-step conversion process for applications for about 46 percent of the 127 systems it has deemed as mission-critical; (6) IRS expects to convert the applications for the remaining 54 percent of the mission-critical systems by January 1999; (7) the two major systems replacement efforts, which are also expected to follow IRS' 14-step conversion process, are experiencing some schedule slippages; (8) IRS officials said they expect to complete the year 2000 portions of the mainframe consolidation by the original completion date of December 1998; (9) GAO identified two risk areas for IRS' year 2000 effort: (a) the lack of an integrated master conversion and replacement schedule; and (b) a limited approach to contingency planning; (10) since GAO's briefing, IRS has decided to have a contractor develop an integrated schedule of its year 2000-related efforts, including making all of the necessary tax law changes for 1999; (11) IRS officials said they hope to have a baseline, master integrated schedule in June 1998; and (12) in part, due to IRS officials' concerns that the same resources that are doing year 2000 conversion work would be needed to do contingency planning, IRS officials decided to develop a process that would minimize the number of contingency plans that would have to be developed. |
gao_GAO-15-442 | gao_GAO-15-442_0 | Background
340B Program
The 340B Program, which is administered and overseen by HRSA, within HHS, is named for the statutory provision authorizing it, which was added Eligibility for the program is to the Public Health Service Act in 1992.statutorily defined and is limited to entities that participate in specified federal programs and hospital types that meet certain eligibility criteria. Under the OPPS, Medicare reimburses all hospitals for separately payable Part B drugs at rates determined by a statutorily defined formula regardless of the price the hospital pays for the drug. 340B DSH Hospitals Were Generally Larger and Many Provided More Charity Care and Uncompensated Care Compared with Non-340B Hospitals, with Notable Exceptions
Compared with non-340B hospitals—including both non-340B DSH hospitals and other non-340B hospitals—340B DSH hospitals in our analysis tended to be larger in terms of annual total facility revenue, annual Medicare revenue, and the number of inpatient beds in 2012.The differences between 340B DSH hospitals and non-340B hospitals were most pronounced among major teaching hospitals, and among the 279 major teaching hospitals, 189 (or nearly 70 percent) were 340B DSH hospitals (see table 1). However, there were notable numbers of 340B DSH hospitals that provided low amounts of uncompensated care and charity care. For example, while we found that 340B DSH hospitals tended to provide a larger amount of charity and uncompensated care compared with non- 340B hospitals, 12 percent of 340B DSH hospitals in our analysis were among the hospitals that provided the lowest amounts of charity care. The differences we found did not appear to be explained by the hospital or patient population characteristics we examined. Because Medicare pays hospitals at set rates for Part B drugs regardless of their costs for acquiring them, there is a financial incentive at hospitals participating in the 340B program to prescribe more drugs or prescribe more expensive drugs to Medicare beneficiaries. Per Beneficiary Part B Drug Spending Was Substantially Higher at 340B DSH Hospitals Compared with Non-340B Hospitals
Among the hospitals in our analysis that provided outpatient services and whose 340B status did not change between 2008 and 2012, on average, per beneficiary Medicare Part B drug spending was substantially higher at 340B DSH hospitals compared with non-340B hospitals in both 2008 and 2012. For example, in 2012, average per beneficiary spending at 340B DSH hospitals was $144, compared to $60 and $62 at non-340B DSH and other non-340B hospitals, respectively. Differences in Per Beneficiary Part B Drug Spending at 340B and Non-340B Hospitals May Reflect Responses to Incentives in the 340B and Medicare Programs
Medicare uses a statutorily defined formula to pay hospitals at set rates for drugs, regardless of their costs for acquiring them, which CMS cannot alter based on hospitals’ acquisition costs, and the 340B statute does not restrict covered entities from using drugs purchased at the 340B discounted price for Medicare Part B beneficiaries. Unnecessary spending has negative implications, not just for the Medicare program, but for Medicare beneficiaries as well, who would be financially liable for larger copayments as a result of receiving more drugs or more expensive drugs, and higher Part B premiums that reflect the increases in Medicare spending for those drugs. Conclusions
Certain providers, including hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients, have access to discounted prices on outpatient drugs through the 340B Drug Pricing Program. Currently, approximately 40 percent of all U.S. hospitals participate in the program, including approximately 1,000 DSH hospitals. While limiting hospitals’ Medicare Part B reimbursement for 340B discounted drugs or eliminating the 340B discount for drugs provided by hospitals to Medicare Part B beneficiaries could diminish the incentive to prescribe more drugs or more expensive drugs than necessary at 340B hospitals, CMS and HRSA are unable to take such actions because they do not have the statutory authority to do so. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure the financial sustainability of the Medicare program, protect beneficiaries from unwarranted financial burden, and address potential concerns about the appropriateness of the health care provided to Part B beneficiaries, Congress should consider eliminating the incentive to prescribe more drugs or more expensive drugs than necessary to treat Medicare Part B beneficiaries at 340B hospitals. For example, they noted that 340B hospitals are larger, more likely to be teaching hospitals, and more likely to treat cancer patients or otherwise higher-risk patients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approximately 40 percent of all U.S. hospitals participate in the 340B Drug Pricing Program, and the majority of 340B discounted drugs are sold to hospitals. Medicare reimburses hospitals for Part B drugs under a statutory formula regardless of the prices hospitals paid for the drugs. Stakeholders have questioned the increase in hospital participation in the 340B program, and the implications for Medicare and its beneficiaries, especially regarding cancer care; and whether certain of the program's hospital eligibility criteria target hospitals appropriately.
GAO was asked to review hospitals' participation in the 340B and Medicare programs. This report (1) compares 340B hospitals with non-340B hospitals in terms of financial and other characteristics and (2) compares spending for Medicare Part B drugs at 340B hospitals, for all drugs and for oncology drugs, with spending at non-340B hospitals. To examine hospital participation using the most recent data available, GAO analyzed 2008 and 2012 data from HRSA and CMS to compare characteristics and Medicare Part B drug spending for 340B hospitals and non-340B hospitals.
What GAO Found
Certain providers, including hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients, have access to discounted prices on outpatient drugs through the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS). In 2012, these hospitals—referred to as 340B disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) because they are eligible for the program based on their serving a disproportionate share of low-income patients and other specified criteria—were generally larger and more likely to be teaching hospitals compared with non-340B hospitals. They also tended to provide more uncompensated and charity care than non-340B hospitals; however, there were notable numbers of 340B hospitals that provided low amounts of these types of care. For example, 12 percent of 340B DSH hospitals were among the hospitals that reported providing the lowest amounts of charity care across all hospitals in GAO's analysis. Overall financial margins for 340B DSH hospitals tended to be lower compared with non-340B hospitals, which could be attributable, in part, to the tendency for 340B DSH hospitals to provide more uncompensated and charity care.
GAO found that in both 2008 and 2012, per beneficiary Medicare Part B drug spending, including oncology drug spending, was substantially higher at 340B DSH hospitals than at non-340B hospitals. This indicates that, on average, beneficiaries at 340B DSH hospitals were either prescribed more drugs or more expensive drugs than beneficiaries at the other hospitals in GAO's analysis. For example, in 2012, average per beneficiary spending at 340B DSH hospitals was $144, compared to approximately $60 at non-340B hospitals. The differences did not appear to be explained by the hospital characteristics GAO examined or patients' health status. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers the Medicare program, uses a statutorily defined formula to pay hospitals for drugs at set rates regardless of hospitals' costs for acquiring the drugs. Therefore, there is a financial incentive at hospitals participating in the 340B program to prescribe more drugs or more expensive drugs to Medicare beneficiaries. Unnecessary spending has negative implications, not just for the Medicare program, but for Medicare beneficiaries as well, who would be financially liable for larger copayments as a result of receiving more drugs or more expensive drugs. In addition, this raises potential concerns about the appropriateness of the health care provided to these beneficiaries. HRSA and CMS have limited ability to counter this incentive because the 340B statute does not restrict covered entities from using drugs purchased at the 340B discounted price for Medicare Part B beneficiaries and the Medicare statute does not limit CMS reimbursement for such drugs.
In commenting on a draft of this report HHS noted some concerns with GAO's conclusions and suggested that further analysis may be needed to examine patient outcomes and differences in health status. GAO believes its methods appropriately support its conclusions as further discussed in the report.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider eliminating the incentive to prescribe more drugs or more expensive drugs than necessary to treat Medicare Part B beneficiaries at 340B hospitals. |
gao_GAO-07-415 | gao_GAO-07-415_0 | DOD is continuing efforts to recapitalize its tactical air forces (replace legacy with new) by acquiring and fielding the Air Force’s F-22A, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and the joint service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) weapon systems. New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars and Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally Planned
Midway through a 40-year effort to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces, DOD’s efforts have been blunted by relatively poor outcomes in its cornerstone new acquisition programs. Increased costs, extended development times, requirement changes, and budget pressures have reduced DOD’s buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about 1,500 fewer new tactical aircraft than it had originally planned—a reduction of one-third. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion—with almost three- fourths still to be invested—to acquire about 3,200 aircraft (see table 2). Total quantities have been reduced by one-third compared to original plans at each program’s inception (see table 3). New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing Decisions for Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient
The problems and delays encountered by the new tactical aircraft acquisition programs have direct and significant impacts on legacy systems plans and costs. Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it difficult to effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and legacy retirement schedules. Program managers are hard-pressed to allocate funds or set sunset schedules for legacy fleets until the outcomes of new acquisitions are known. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threat capabilities and is depleting modernization accounts, reducing the department’s flexibility to invest in new weapons. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate problems. A Joint Enterprise- Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft Is Lacking As Services Plan Independently
DOD does not have a single, integrated investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical air forces. Moving forward, projected plans are likely unaffordable given competing demands from future defense and nondefense budgets. Legacy aircraft would be virtually replaced by the more capable new systems. Options to erase these shortfalls include buying more new aircraft and extending the life of legacy aircraft. The JSF program represents 90 percent of the investments to go for new tactical aircraft and projected plans are likely unaffordable given projected future budget constraints and competing demands. With limited information contained in the QDR report, many questions are still unanswered about the future of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization efforts. This capability—one of the few examples of a truly joint asset shared by the military services—is now expected to diminish, to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. The Secretary should take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed combat capabilities to the warfighter including adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of system design and development; and reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up delivery of initial capabilities; and develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD; strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and addressing long-term needs; and considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft, unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the same type targets as the tactical aircraft. It is also DOD’s largest cooperative development program. Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more capable and stealthy aircraft. Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today's constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable and sustainable. Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the current status of DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs; identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD's overall investment plan for tactical aircraft.
What GAO Found
DOD's efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended development times have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft compared to original plans at each program's inception. The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new aircraft--particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs--make it difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and reduces the department's flexibility to invest in new weapons. DOD's tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services' separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The EA-6B--providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint asset--is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps might occur in DOD's tactical aircraft acquisitions. |
gao_GAO-01-729 | gao_GAO-01-729_0 | Assessment of Justice’s Progress and Strategies in Achieving Selected Key Outcomes
This section discusses our analysis of Justice’s performance in achieving the selected key outcomes and the strategies it has in place, particularly strategic human capital management and information technology, when appropriate, for accomplishing these outcomes. Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for its performance related to dismantling Asian criminal enterprises, dismantling Eurasian criminal enterprises, and cases in Indian Country.Justice did not set performance targets for these measures because it considered two of the measures to be new measures, and for the number of cases in Indian Country, Justice did not want to set performance levels because it believes that setting performance targets could cause the public to perceive law enforcement as engaging in “bounty hunting” or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for the sake of meeting particular goals. Again, we believe that opportunities exist for Justice to improve the usefulness of its annual report and plan by better articulating a results-orientation that would include explanatory information on goals and measures. And finally, we also noted that this year Justice issued a combined fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan. The third column discusses the extent to which Justice’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan includes performance goals and measures to address the challenges that we and the OIG identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Justice's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and assesses Justice's progress in achieving selected key outcomes that were identified as important mission areas.
What GAO Found
Justice's overall progress toward achieving the key outcomes was difficult to ascertain because generally the performance report lacked fiscal year 2000 performance targets to measure success and lacked clear linkage between performance measures and outcomes. Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for some measures because the measures were new, and for some measures Justice believes that setting performance targets could cause the public to perceive law enforcement as engaging in "bounty hunting" or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for the sake of meeting particular goals. Justice's strategies varied in the extent to which they included sufficient information to inform decisionmakers about initiatives to achieve these outcomes. GAO notes opportunities for Justice to improve the usefulness of its reports and plans. |
gao_GAO-17-761T | gao_GAO-17-761T_0 | FFS payments are based on claims data received directly from providers. Under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as amended, CMS reported that the FFS improper payment rate was 11 percent for fiscal year 2016. Also in FFS, CMS uses different types of contractors to conduct prepayment and postpayment reviews of Medicare claims at high risk for improper payments. Whereas Medicare pays FFS providers for services provided, Medicare pays MAOs a fixed monthly amount per enrollee regardless of the services enrollees use. To identify and recover MA improper payments resulting from unsupported data submitted by MAOs for risk adjustment purposes, CMS conducts two types of RADV audits: national RADV activities and contract-level RADV audits. Both types determine whether the diagnosis codes submitted by MAOs are supported by a beneficiary’s medical record. CMS has RADV audits underway for three payment years—2011, 2012, and 2013. CMS calculates a beneficiary’s risk score—a relative measure of projected Medicare spending—based on both demographic characteristics and health status (diagnoses). Several Factors Hinder CMS’s Efforts to Recover MA Improper Payments
In our 2016 report, we found several factors that hamper CMS’s recovery activities, including its failure to select contracts for audit that have the greatest potential for payment recovery, delays in conducting CMS’s first two RADV payment audits, and its lack of specific plans or a timetable for incorporating Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) into the MA program to identify improper payments and help with their recovery. CMS Did Not Focus RADV Audits on Contracts with Highest Potential for Improper Payments
Our 2016 report found that the results from the RADV audits of 2007 payments indicated that the scores CMS calculates to identify contracts that are candidates for audit, called coding intensity scores, were not strongly correlated with the percentage of unsupported diagnoses. The second reason audits are not targeted to the contracts with the greatest potential for recovery is that CMS does not always use the information available to it to select audit contracts with the highest potential for improper payments. Also, CMS’s 2011 contract selection methodology did not consider results from the agency’s prior RADV audits, potentially overlooking information indicating contracts with known improper payment risk. We made two recommendations to address these issues:
We recommended that (1) CMS improve the accuracy of coding intensity calculations, and (2) modify its processes for selecting contracts for RADV audit to focus on those most likely to have improper payments. We recommended that CMS develop specific plans for incorporating a RAC into the RADV program. In July 2017, CMS officials told us that the agency is evaluating its strategy for the MA RAC with CMS leadership. CMS Has Made Limited Progress Validating Encounter Data Used to Ensure Proper Payments
In July 2014, we recommended that CMS complete all the steps necessary to validate encounter data, including performing statistical analyses, reviewing medical records, and providing MAOs with summary reports on CMS’s findings, before using the data to risk adjust payments or for other intended purposes. In our 2017 report, we found that CMS had made limited progress toward validating encounter data. As of January 2017, CMS had begun compiling basic statistics on the volume and consistency of data submissions and preparing automated summary reports for MAOs indicating the diagnosis information used for risk adjustment; however CMS had not yet taken other important steps identified in its Medicaid protocol, which we used for comparison. This step would provide recommendations to MAOs for improving the completeness and accuracy of encounter data. We found in our 2017 report that CMS had made progress in defining its objectives for using MA encounter data for risk adjustment and in communicating its plans and time frames to MAOs. CMS reported it plans to fully transition to using MA encounter data for risk adjustment purposes by 2020. Given CMS’s limited progress in planning and time frames for all authorized uses of the data, we continue to believe CMS should implement our July 2014 recommendations that CMS should establish specific plans for using MA encounter data and thoroughly assess data completeness and accuracy before using the data to risk adjust payments or for other purposes. In response to our 2014 recommendations, the Department of Health and Human Services did not specify a date by which CMS would develop plans for all authorized uses of the data and did not commit to completing data validation before using the data for risk adjustment in 2015. In conclusion, Medicare remains inherently complex and susceptible to improper payments. Therefore, actions CMS takes to ensure the integrity of the MA program by identifying, reducing, and recovering improper payments would be critical to safeguarding federal funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program because of its size, complexity, and susceptibility to mismanagement and improper payments, which reached an estimated $60 billion in fiscal year 2016.
CMS contracts with MAOs to provide services to about one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries, and paid MAOs about $200 billion for their care in 2016. CMS's payments to the MAOs vary based on the health status of beneficiaries. For example, an MAO receives a higher risk-adjusted payment for an enrollee with a diagnosis of diabetes than for an otherwise identical enrollee without this diagnosis. Improper payments in MA arise primarily from diagnosis information unsupported by medical records that leads CMS to increase its payments.
This testimony is based on GAO's 2016 and 2017 reports addressing MA improper payments and highlights (1) factors that have hindered CMS's efforts to identify and recover improper payments through payment audits and (2) CMS's progress in validating encounter data for use in risk adjusting payments to MAOs. For these reports, GAO reviewed research and agency documents, analyzed data from ongoing RADV audits, and compared CMS's activities with the agency's protocol for validating Medicaid encounter data and federal internal control standards. GAO interviewed CMS officials for both reports, and also asked for updates on the status of GAO's prior recommendations for this statement.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) estimated that about $16 billion—nearly 10 percent—of Medicare Advantage (MA) payments in fiscal year 2016 were improper. To identify and recover MA improper payments, CMS conducts risk adjustment data validation (RADV) audits of prior payments. These audits determine whether the diagnosis data submitted by Medicare Advantage organizations (MAOs), which offer private plan alternatives to fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare, are supported by a beneficiary's medical record. CMS pays MAOs a predetermined monthly amount for each enrollee. CMS uses a process called risk adjustment to project each enrollee's health care costs using diagnosis data from MAOs and demographic data from Medicare. In its 2016 report, GAO found several factors impeded CMS's efforts to identify and recover improper payments, including:
RADV audits were not targeted to contracts with the highest potential for improper payments. The agency's method of calculating improper payment risk for each contract, based on the diagnoses reported for the contract's beneficiaries, had shortcomings, and CMS did not use other available data to select the contracts with the greatest potential for improper payment recovery.
Substantial delays in RADV audits in progress jeopardize CMS's goal of eventually conducting annual RADV audits. CMS had RADV audits underway for payment years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
CMS had not expanded the use of Recovery Audit Contractors (RAC) to the MA program as required by law in 2010. RACs have been used in other Medicare programs to recover improper payments for a contingency fee.
GAO recommended that CMS improve the accuracy of its methodology for identifying contracts with the greatest potential for improper payment recovery, modify the processes for selecting contracts to focus on those most likely to have improper payments, and improve the timeliness of the RADV audit process. CMS reported in July 2017 that it had taken initial actions to address these recommendations, but none had been fully implemented. GAO also recommended that CMS develop specific plans for incorporating a RAC into the RADV program. In July 2017, CMS reported that the agency is evaluating its strategy for the MA RAC with CMS leadership.
CMS has begun to use encounter data, which are similar to FFS claims data, along with diagnosis data from MAOs to help ensure the proper use of federal funds by improving risk adjustment in the MA program. Encounter data include more information about the care and health status of MA beneficiaries than the data CMS uses now to risk adjust payments. In its January 2017 report, GAO found CMS had made progress in developing plans to use encounter data for risk adjustment. However, CMS had made limited progress in validating the completeness and accuracy of MA encounter data, as GAO recommended in 2014. GAO continues to believe that CMS should establish plans for using encounter data and thoroughly assess the data for completeness and accuracy before using it to risk adjust payments. |
gao_GAO-03-752 | gao_GAO-03-752_0 | NRC Actions to Enhance Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants since September 11, 2001
In order to respond to the heightened risk of terrorist attack, NRC has had extensive interactions with the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council on security at commercial nuclear power plants. Three Aspects of NRC’s Security Inspection Program Inhibit Effective Oversight
NRC’s security inspection program may not be fully effective because of weakness in three areas. Violations were judged to be of low significance and categorized as a non-cited violation if the problem had not been identified more than twice in the past year or if the problem had no direct, immediate, adverse consequences at the time it was identified. In one incident, an inspector observed guards who failed to physically search several individuals for metal objects after a walk- through detector and a hand-held scanner detected metal objects in their clothing. The unchecked individuals were then allowed unescorted access throughout the plant’s protected area. NRC Does Not Systematically Collect, Analyze, and Disseminate Information That May Improve Security at All Plants
NRC does not have a routine, centralized process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to identify problems that may be common to other plants or to identify lessons learned in resolving a security problem that may be helpful to plants in other regions. Although these exercises have provided learning experiences for the plants and may have helped improve plant security, the exercises did not fully demonstrate the plants’ security preparedness. Furthermore, NRC has made only limited use of some available administrative and technological improvements that would make force-on-force exercises more realistic and provide a more useful learning experience. Federal Law Limits the Type of Weapons That Guards Can Use, and State Laws Vary on Guards’ Authority to Deal with Intruders
Commercial nuclear power plants face challenges in securing their plants against intruders because federal and state laws limit security guards’ ability to defend these plants. As a result, no nuclear power plants use automatic weapons in their defense. As a result, guards at nuclear power plants could be at a great disadvantage in terms of firepower, if attacked. Finally, guards at nuclear power plants do not have nationwide legal authority and clear guidance on when and how to arrest and/or detain intruders at the nation’s plants. Lack of follow-up reduces the likelihood that needed improvements will be made. Such a mechanism may help other plants to improve their security. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen NRC’s security inspection program, we recommend that the NRC Commissioners ensure that NRC’s revised security inspection program and force-on- force exercise program are restored promptly and require that NRC regional inspectors conduct follow-up visits to verify that corrective actions have been taken when security violations, including non-cited violations, have been identified; ensure that NRC routinely collects, analyzes, and disseminates information on security problems, solutions, and lessons learned and shares this information with all NRC regions and licensees; and make force-on-force exercises a required activity and strengthen them conducting the exercises more frequently at each plant; using laser equipment to ensure accurate accounts of shots fired; requiring the exercises to make use of the full terrorist capabilities stated in the design basis threat, including the use of an adversary force that has been trained in terrorist tactics; continuing the practice, begun in 2000, of prohibiting licensees from temporarily increasing the number of guards defending the plant and enhancing plant defenses for force-on-force exercises, or requiring that any temporary security enhancements be officially incorporated into the licensees’ security plans; and enforcing NRC’s requirement that force-on-force exercise reports be issued within 30 to 45 days after the end of the exercise to ensure prompt correction of the problems noted. Furthermore, NRC commented that our characterization of non-cited violations as minimizing the significance of security problems is a serious misrepresentation. Scope And Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) inspection program to oversee security at commercial nuclear power plants and (2) legal challenges currently affecting physical security at the power plants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks intensified the nation's focus on national preparedness and homeland security. Among possible terrorist targets are the nation's nuclear power plants--104 facilities containing radioactive fuel and waste. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) oversees plant security through an inspection program designed to verify the plants' compliance with security requirements. As part of that program, NRC conducted annual security inspections of plants and force-on-force exercises to test plant security against a simulated terrorist attack. GAO was asked to review (1) the effectiveness of NRC's security inspection program and (2) legal challenges affecting power plant security. Currently, NRC is reevaluating its inspection program. We did not assess the adequacy of security at the individual plants; rather, our focus was on NRC's oversight and regulation of plant security.
What GAO Found
NRC has taken numerous actions to respond to the heightened risk of terrorist attack, including interacting with the Department of Homeland Security and issuing orders designed to increase security and improve plant defensive barriers. However, three aspects of its security inspection program reduced NRC's effectiveness in overseeing security at commercial nuclear power plants. First, NRC inspectors often used a process that minimized the significance of security problems found in annual inspections by classifying them as "non-cited violations" if the problem had not been identified frequently in the past or if the problem had no direct, immediate, adverse consequences at the time it was identified. Non-cited violations do not require a written response from the licensee and do not require NRC inspectors to verify that the problem has been corrected. For example, guards at one plant failed to physically search several individuals for metal objects after a walk-through detector and a hand-held scanner detected metal objects in their clothing. The unchecked individuals were then allowed unescorted access throughout the plant's protected area. By making extensive use of non-cited violations for serious problems, NRC may overstate the level of security at a power plant and reduce the likelihood that needed improvements are made. Second, NRC does not have a routine, centralized process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating security inspections to identify problems that may be common to plants or to provide lessons learned in resolving security problems. Such a mechanism may help plants improve their security. Third, although NRC's force-on-force exercises can demonstrate how well a nuclear plant might defend against a real-life threat, several weaknesses in how NRC conducted these exercises limited their usefulness. Weaknesses included using (1) more personnel to defend the plant during these exercises than during a normal day, (2) attacking forces that are not trained in terrorist tactics, and (3) unrealistic weapons (rubber guns) that do not simulate actual gunfire. Furthermore, NRC has made only limited use of some available improvements that would make force-on-force exercises more realistic and provide a more useful learning experience. Even if NRC strengthens its inspection program, commercial nuclear power plants face legal challenges in ensuring plant security. First, federal law generally prohibits guards at these plants from using automatic weapons, although terrorists are likely to have them. As a result, guards at commercial nuclear power plants could be at a disadvantage in firepower, if attacked. Second, state laws vary regarding the permissible use of deadly force and the authority to arrest and detain intruders, and guards are unsure about the extent of their authorities and may hesitate or fail to act if the plant is attacked. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-9 | gao_T-HEHS-98-9_0 | The managed care program, which is funded from both the part A and part B trust funds, consists mostly of risk contract HMOs that enrolled nearly 5 million Medicare beneficiaries as of September 1997. Implementing New Laws Affecting Fee-for-Service Medicare Will Require Sustained Effort to Realize Benefits
The Congress provided important new resources and tools to fight health care fraud and abuse when it enacted HIPAA and BBA. First, HIPAA, enacted over a year ago, grants HCFA the authority to use contractors other than the insurers serving as Medicare intermediaries and carriers to conduct medical and utilization review, audit cost reports, and carry out other program safeguard activities. For example, prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities (SNF) should make it more difficult to increase payments by manipulating Medicare’s billing rules for ancillary services provided to beneficiaries in these facilities, an issue often raised in our reports and testimonies. To meet the requirements of BBA, HCFA will have to develop, concurrently, separate prospective payment systems for services delivered through inpatient rehabilitation facilities, home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and hospital outpatient departments. Conducting demonstration projects and reporting to the Congress constitute another portion of work mandated by the legislation. Medicare’s New Choice Plans Present Unknown Challenges for Program Managers
Among the more challenging of BBA’s provisions to implement are those establishing the Medicare+Choice program, which expands beneficiaries’ private plan options to include preferred provider organizations (PPO), provider sponsored organizations (PSO), and private fee-for-service plans. The reforms the Congress embodied in these provisions are major, helping Medicare adapt to and capitalize on changes in the health care market. Delays in Modernizing Medicare’s Claims Processing Systems Could Hamper Program Integrity Efforts
system for collecting payment and other information related to risk contract HMOs, but the MTS contract has been terminated. HCFA Dedicates Staff to Implement BBA Mandates
Aware of the need for agencywide coordination and planning to implement BBA’s multiple provisions, HCFA has established an infrastructure to track and monitor the tasks associated with BBA mandates. According to a HCFA official, the agency has plans to keep Department officials and the Congress routinely informed of the agency’s progress. Conclusions
With the enactment of HIPAA and BBA, the Congress has provided significant opportunities to strengthen several of Medicare’s areas of vulnerability. Now that many more requirements have been placed on HCFA, we are concerned that the promise of the new legislation to combat health care fraud and abuse could at best be delayed or not be realized at all without sustained efforts at implementation. Medicare: Control Over Fraud and Abuse Remains Elusive (GAO/T-HEHS-97-165, June 26, 1997}. Medicaid Fraud and Abuse: Stronger Action Needed to Remove Excluded Providers From Federal Health Programs (GAO/HEHS-97-63, Mar. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed recent legislative efforts to address fraud and abuse in the Medicare program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) both the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) directly address Medicare fraud and abuse and provide opportunities to improve program management; (2) both acts offer civil and criminal penalties; (3) they also introduce opportunities to deploy new program safeguards; (4) for example, on the fee-for-service side of the program, BBA introduces prospective payment methods for skilled nursing facility and home health services, in part to halt opportunists from overbilling Medicare; (5) these are among Medicare's fastest-growing components: from 1989 to 1996, spending for home health care and skilled nursing facility care averaged, respectively, a 33-percent and 22-percent annual rise; (6) HIPAA also ensures a stable source of funding for anti-fraud-and-abuse activities, authorizes the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to contract for improved claims reviews, enhances law enforcement coordination, and calls for data collection improvements; (7) on the managed care side, BBA's Medicare+Choice program, which broadens beyond health maintenance organizations (HMO) the private health plans available to Medicare beneficiaries, includes several provisions addressing the marketing, enrollment, and quality of care issues raised in GAO's reports and those of the Inspector General; (8) as always, however, the success of any reform legislation is contingent on its implementation; (9) the Congress has provided the Department of Health and Human Resources (HHS) and HCFA, the Department's administrator of the Medicare program, with many new statutory requirements governing traditional fee-for-service Medicare; some require little effort to carry out, whereas others, such as prospective payment system development, will require extensive time and resources to implement effectively; (10) in addition, the Medicare+Choice program will add considerably to HCFA's private plan monitoring workload; (11) the project to modernize Medicare's claims processing systems, which are at the core of many fraud and abuse detection efforts, has recently been halted; (12) this brings into question the ability of HCFA and its contractors to perform expeditiously the data-intensive analyses needed to spot and counteract abusive billing schemes; and (13) HCFA agrees that the tasks associated with implementing HIPAA and BBA mandates are considerable and plans to report routinely to HHS officials and to the Congress on HCFA's progress implementing the legislation. |
gao_RCED-98-154 | gao_RCED-98-154_0 | Moreover, the criteria are intended to help ensure that the projects result in real, measurable net emissions reductions. The U.S. Initiative generally uses more criteria than did certain other countries with similar programs, and the criteria are stricter, in some respects, than the criteria used in other countries’ programs, according to our analysis of a 1996 report prepared for the Agency for International Development. The Evaluation Panel accepted this project. About One-Third of the Proposed Projects Have Been Accepted
Of the 97 proposed projects submitted during six evaluation rounds, 32 projects have been accepted into the program. For example, a project in Costa Rica involves the construction and operation of a privately owned and operated hydroelectric plant. The electricity generated by this plant will displace electricity that would have otherwise been generated by burning fossil fuels, thus reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The other 15 approved projects are designed to capture carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere. Of the First Seven Projects Approved, Five Are in the Process of Being Implemented
Of the seven projects approved in the first round in February 1995, five have been or are being implemented, and two have not yet started. These two projects include one intended to sequester emissions and one intended to reduce emissions. The seven projects accepted during the first round of evaluations had between one and seven U.S. participants. Based on information provided by the projects’ developers, the total estimated greenhouse gas benefits for the 32 projects accepted into the Initiative as of March 1998 is equivalent to about 235 million metric tons of carbon dioxide over a period of up to 60 years. Based on the project developers’ estimates, these 32 projects will reduce greenhouse gases by more than 200 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and 1.3 million metric tons of methane (1.3 million metric tons of methane is equivalent, in terms of global warming potential, to about 31 million metric tons of carbon dioxide). According to the project’s developers, by preventing the conversion of these lands, expected to occur over the next 3 years, to marginal cropland and cattle pasture, the project will result in net greenhouse gas benefits of more than 1 million tons of carbon dioxide. The project developers for another four implemented projects reported to the Initiative staff in March 1998 that their projects were in operation and achieving greenhouse gas benefits but pointed out that the benefit data they provided at that time were estimates because either detailed monitoring results were not available or the monitoring results had not been verified. In the context of the pilot program, additionality refers to project acceptance criteria that are designed to ensure that the financing of a proposed project would not have occurred otherwise, called financial additionality, and that the associated reduction in emissions would likewise not have occurred, called emissions additionality. At EPA, we obtained and reviewed information related to its efforts to develop standard methods for measuring greenhouse gas emissions and for estimating projects’ emissions reduction benefits. Does it involve specific measures to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas emissions initiated as a result of the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation or in reasonable anticipation of the Initiative? 7. 8. 9. 2. Are U.S. participants who are emitting greenhouse gases within the United States taking measures to reduce or sequester those emissions? 4. 2. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, intended to encourage investments by U.S. entities in projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions outside the United States, focusing on the: (1) criteria used to accept proposed projects; (2) number and types of projects accepted; (3) status of the seven projects accepted in the first round of proposals in February 1995; and (4) estimated benefits of pilot projects in terms of emissions reductions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Initiative's Evaluation Panel uses nine criteria to evaluate proposed projects for acceptance into the program; (2) among the criteria are acceptance by the host country, a reduction in greenhouse gases that would result from the proposed project and that would not have occurred otherwise, and a mechanism to verify the project's results; (3) the U.S. program generally has more criteria than similar programs administered by certain other countries; (4) also, the U.S. criteria are stricter in some respects, for example, by requiring that benefits be maintained over time; (5) through March 1998, Initiative officials had reviewed proposals for 97 different projects and accepted 32 of them; (6) of the 32 accepted projects, 17 involve reducing greenhouse gas emissions, for example, by constructing and operating a hydroelectric plant that will provide electricity previously produced by burning fossil fuels; (7) the other 15 involve capturing greenhouse gases already emitted; (8) also, 31 of the 32 projects are intended to reduce emissions of or capture carbon dioxide; the other project is intended to reduce methane emissions; (9) of the seven projects accepted into the Initiative as a result of the first round of evaluations in February 1995, five are in the process of being implemented; (10) this means that land has been acquired or facilities have been built, and the projects are in the process of reducing or capturing greenhouse gas emissions; (11) according to Initiative officials, as of March 1998, the remaining two projects--one that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions and one that would capture these emissions from the atmosphere--had not progressed because their developers had not been able to obtain financing; (12) the projects' developers estimate that, over a period of up to 60 years, the 32 approved projects, if fully funded and implemented, will result in net emissions reductions of about 200 million metric tons of carbon dioxide and 1.3 million metric tons of methane; (13) Initiative staff do not verify or attest to the reliability of the net greenhouse gas benefits estimated by the projects' developers; (14) in part, this is because standard methods for estimating projects' emissions reduction benefits specific to the U.S. Initiative have not been developed; (15) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has funded studies to develop standard methods for calculating projects' benefits; and (16) according to EPA officials, these studies should be completed by the end of fiscal year 1998. |
gao_GAO-10-523 | gao_GAO-10-523_0 | In addition, development and testing activities for the mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare mission packages continue. Ongoing Development of Key Seaframe Systems Could Impede Efficient Construction of Initial Follow-On Ships
The Navy faces technical, design, and construction challenges to completing the first four seaframes within current cost and schedule estimates. The Navy and its shipbuilders have learned lessons from construction of the first two seaframes that can be applied to construction of future vessels. However, technical issues with the first two seaframes have yet to be fully resolved, posing risk of design changes to follow on ships already under construction. Addressing these technical issues has required the Navy to implement design changes at the same time LCS 3 and LCS 4 are being built. Incorporating changes during this phase may disrupt the optimal construction sequence for these ships, requiring additional labor hours beyond current forecasts. Together, these challenges may hinder the ability of shipbuilders to apply lessons learned to follow on ships and could undermine anticipated benefits from recent capital investments in the LCS shipyards. Mission Package Delays Limit Ship Capabilities in the Near Term and Pose Risk to Efficient Execution of Program Acquisition and Test Plans
Challenges developing and procuring mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships’ utility to the fleet during initial deployments. Until these challenges are resolved, it will be difficult for the Navy to align seaframe purchases with mission package procurements and execute planned tests. Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems have encountered technical issues that have delayed their development and fielding. Further, Navy analysis of LCS anti- submarine warfare systems found these capabilities did not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission. These challenges have led to procurement delays for all three mission packages. Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules—a situation exacerbated by decisions to deploy initial ships early, which limit their availability for operational testing. Until mission package performance is proven, the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver promised capability. Mission Package Procurement Delays Could Disrupt Program Plans for Simultaneously Acquiring Seaframes and Mission Packages and Will Limit the Ships’ Utility During Initial Deployments
While the Navy now plans to purchase 17 ships and 13 mission packages between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2015, developmental delays facing key mission package systems have positioned the Navy to acquire significant numbers of seaframes before mission packages are proven. Incomplete Cost Analyses in the LCS Program Have Undermined Program Progress
The Navy entered contract negotiations in 2009 for fiscal year 2010 funded seaframes with an incomplete understanding of LCS program costs. These contract negotiations proved unsuccessful, prompting the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy for the program. The contractors’ proposals for construction of the next three ships exceeded the approximate $1.4 billion in funds the Navy had allocated in its fiscal year 2010 budget. In response, the Navy revised its strategy to construct one seaframe design instead of two for fiscal year 2010 ships and beyond in an effort to improve affordability. Navy cost analyses completed prior to the failed negotiations in 2009 lack several characteristics essential to a high quality cost estimate. These characteristics include the completion of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses and an independent review of the cost estimate. The Navy plans to complete a more comprehensive cost estimate before award of additional ship contracts in 2010. Navy Cost Analyses Completed Ahead of Contract Negotiations in 2009 Lacked Key Elements Needed to Ensure High Quality
Because the Department of Defense has not yet completed a milestone B review of the LCS program—to include development and evaluation of a comprehensive Navy cost estimate and independent cost estimate—the typical mechanisms and processes for assessing program affordability were not carried out ahead of the Navy’s 2009 contract negotiations, which turned out to be unsuccessful. Specifically, we (1) identified technical, design, and construction challenges to completing the first four seaframes within current cost and schedule estimates, (2) assessed the Navy’s progress developing and fielding mission packages, and (3) evaluated the quality of recent Navy cost analyses for seaframes and their effect on program progress. a. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is envisioned as a reconfigurable vessel able to meet three missions: surface warfare, mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare. It consists of the ship (seaframe) and the mission package it carries and deploys. The Navy plans to invest over $25 billion through fiscal year 2035 to acquire LCS. However, recurring cost growth and schedule delays have jeopardized the Navy's ability to deliver promised LCS capabilities. Based on a congressional request, GAO (1) identified technical, design, and construction challenges to completing the first four ships within current cost and schedule estimates, (2) assessed the Navy's progress developing and fielding mission packages, and (3) evaluated the quality of recent Navy cost analyses for seaframes and their effect on program progress. GAO's findings are based on an analysis of government and contractor-generated documents, and discussions with defense officials and key contractors. This product is a public version of a For Official Use Only report, GAO-10-1006SU , also issued in August 2010.
What GAO Found
The Navy faces technical, design, and construction challenges to completing the first four seaframes within current cost and schedule estimates. The Navy and its shipbuilders have learned lessons from construction of the first two seaframes that have positioned them to more effectively construct future vessels. However, technical issues with the first two seaframes have yet to be fully resolved. Addressing these technical issues has required the Navy to implement design changes at the same time LCS 3 and LCS 4 are being built. Incorporating changes during this phase will likely require additional labor hours beyond current forecasts. Together, these challenges may hinder the ability of shipbuilders to apply lessons learned to follow-on ships and could undermine anticipated benefits from recent capital investments in the LCS shipyards. Challenges developing mission packages have delayed the timely fielding of promised capabilities, limiting the ships' utility to the fleet during initial deployments. Until these challenges are resolved, it will be difficult for the Navy to align seaframe purchases with mission package procurements and execute planned tests. Key mine countermeasures and surface warfare systems encountered problems in operational and other testing that delayed their fielding. For example, four of six Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System missiles did not hit their intended targets in recent testing, and the Department of Defense has since canceled the program. Further, Navy analysis of anti-submarine warfare systems has shown the planned systems do not contribute significantly to the anti-submarine warfare mission. These combined challenges have led to procurement delays for all three mission packages. Mission package delays have also disrupted program test schedules--a situation exacerbated by early deployments of initial ships--limiting their availability for operational testing. In addition, these delays could disrupt program plans for simultaneously acquiring seaframes and mission packages. Until mission packages are proven, the Navy risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver promised capability. The Navy entered contract negotiations in 2009 for fiscal year 2010 funded seaframes with an incomplete understanding of LCS program costs. These contract negotiations proved unsuccessful, prompting the Navy to revise its acquisition strategy for the program. The contractors' proposals for construction of the next three ships exceeded the approximate $1.4 billion in funds the Navy had allocated in its fiscal year 2010 budget. In response, the Navy revised its strategy to construct one seaframe design instead of two for fiscal year 2010 ships and beyond in an effort to improve affordability. Navy cost analyses completed prior to the failed negotiations in 2009 lack several characteristics essential to a high-quality cost estimate. These characteristics include the completion of sensitivity and uncertainty analyses and an independent review of the cost estimate. The Navy plans to complete a more comprehensive cost estimate before award of additional ship contracts in 2010.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take actions to ensure more realistic cost estimates, timely incorporation of design changes, and coordination of seaframe and mission package acquisition. The Department of Defense concurred with each of these recommendations. |
gao_T-GGD-98-72 | gao_T-GGD-98-72_0 | Innocent Spouse Provisions
Under the joint and several liability standard, when a married couple files a joint federal income tax return, each spouse becomes individually responsible for paying the entire amount of the tax associated with that return. The provisions allow relief from the joint and several liability standard when the innocent spouse has filed a joint return with the culpable spouse; the innocent spouse did not know and had no reason to know there was a substantial tax understatement (knowledge test); and taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the spouse liable for the additional tax attributable to the substantial understatement of the culpable spouse. IRS denied innocent spouse relief. Estimated Universe of Potential Innocent Spouses
programs. However, our estimate of 587,000 couples represents the maximum number of taxpayers potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief. This is more than would probably actually qualify. Using a 2-percent per year divorce rate, we estimated that 35,000 divorced taxpayers had additional tax assessments of more than $500. Modifying Tax Code Provisions Could Allow More Taxpayers to Qualify for Relief
The current provisions may not ensure that taxpayers receive equitable relief. We estimated that if the dollar thresholds were eliminated, the maximum number of couples filing tax year 1992 returns potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief would have been 1.2 million, which consist of all couples who were assessed additional taxes under IRS’ audit and underreporter programs. Potential Impact of Replacing the Joint and Several Liability Standard With Proportionate Liability
One way to ensure that taxpayers are not held liable for their spouses’ taxes would be to replace the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard. Under proportionate liability, taxpayers would be held responsible only for the taxes generated by their own individual incomes and assets or, for taxpayers living in community property states, for the tax associated with one-half of the community income. We evaluated the potential effects of these options on IRS’ tax administration processes and taxpayers’ burden. We found that a legislative change to bind IRS to divorce decrees appears impractical for two major reasons. Federal tax matters are the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Divorce matters, however, are generally handled by state courts. Thus, providing a legal forum where IRS and the parties to a divorce could resolve issues relating to both tax matters and divorce proceedings would require a fundamental and extensive change in either federal tax law or state domestic relations law. Second, binding IRS to divorce decrees could require IRS to become involved in every divorce settlement or trial. IRS Follows State Property Laws in Collecting Premarital Tax Debts
About 13 million, or 27 percent, of all taxpayers who filed joint returns in 1992 lived in community property states. Because the income, including wages, of taxpayers living in certain community property states is considered community property, IRS can place a levy on the wages or other separate income of either spouse to satisfy an existing tax debt, even if that tax debt was incurred by the other spouse before their marriage. In contrast, IRS cannot place a levy on the separate income of one spouse to pay the taxes due from the other spouse in a common law state. According to IRS officials, the agency does not have specific procedures for placing levies on a spouse’s income for premarital taxes incurred by the other spouse. Treasury’s Report Parallels Our Administrative Recommendations
Treasury’s February 1998 report indicates that IRS is currently undertaking a number of actions to improve the administration of the current innocent spouse provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its report on the innocent spouse provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, focusing on: (1) the universe of taxpayers potentially eligible for innocent spouse relief; (2) the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) practices and procedures for handling requests for such relief; (3) whether the existing innocent spouse provisions provide the same opportunity for relief for all taxpayers; (4) the potential effects of replacing the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard; (5) the potential effects on IRS of requiring it to abide by the terms of divorce decrees that allocate tax liabilities; and (6) the potential effects of limiting IRS' ability to seize community income to satisfy the tax liabilities incurred by one of the spouses before the marriage.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under current law, only about 1 percent of couples who filed joint returns in 1992 had additional tax assessments that potentially met the dollar threshold for innocent spouse relief; (2) if only divorced taxpayers were counted, about 35,000 of the 587,000 couples with additional tax assessments of more than $500 for 1992 may have been eligible for innocent spouse relief; fewer would probably actually qualify; (3) the limited information available indicated that IRS received few requests for innocent spouse relief and denied most of them; (4) the current provisions may not ensure that all deserving taxpayers receive equivalent relief; (5) one way to address concerns with the innocent spouse provisions would be to replace the joint and several liability standard with a proportionate liability standard; (6) under this standard, each spouse becomes individually responsible for the entire amount of the tax associated with a joint return; (7) under a proportionate liability standard, couples would be responsible only for the taxes generated by their individual incomes and assets; (8) requiring IRS to be bound by divorce decrees is impractical for two major reasons; (9) first, federal tax matters are the exclusive jurisdiction of certain federal courts, while divorce matters are generally handled by state courts; (10) thus, there is currently no legal forum where IRS and the parties to a divorce could resolve issues relating to both tax and divorce matters; (11) second, this proposal could require IRS to become involved in every divorce settlement to ensure that the government's interest is protected; (12) in community property states, IRS can levy one spouse's income to satisfy the premarital tax debts of the other spouse because of the joint ownership of property in those states; (13) in contrast, IRS cannot levy the income of one spouse to pay the premarital tax debt of the other spouse in common law states because spouses do not have legal entitlement to each other's property; (14) since IRS does not maintain data on how often it levies community property to settle premarital tax debts, GAO could not assess the potential impact on IRS of changing the law to treat everyone the way it treats taxpayers in common law states; and (15) the Department of Treasury's report parallels GAO's report on identifying ways to improve the administration of the current innocent spouse provisions. |
gao_GAO-06-228T | gao_GAO-06-228T_0 | Prior GAO Work Identified Benefits and Weaknesses of Rulemaking Procedures and Practices
Federal regulation, like taxing and spending, is one of the basic tools of government used to implement public policy. Agencies publish thousands of regulations each year to achieve goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, and food are safe; that the nation’s air, water, and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amounts of taxes are collected. Because regulations affect so many aspects of citizens’ lives, it is crucial that rulemaking procedures and practices be effective and transparent. Over the last decade, at the request of Congress, we have prepared over 60 reports and testimonies reviewing crosscutting aspects of those rulemaking procedures and practices. These include: (1) regulatory analysis and accountability requirements, (2) presidential and congressional oversight of agency rulemaking, and (3) notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Our reviews identified at least four overall benefits associated with existing regulatory analysis and accountability requirements: Encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rulemaking—Some initiatives have encouraged and facilitated greater public participation and consultation in rulemaking. On the other hand, we also identified at least four recurring reasons why the requirements imposed by such initiatives have not been more effective: Lack of clarity and other weaknesses in key terms and definitions— Unclear terms and definitions can affect the applicability and effectiveness of certain requirements. For example, some requirements only apply to rules for which an agency published a notice of proposed rulemaking, but, as I will discuss later, we found that agencies issue many final rules without associated proposed rules. A predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process—More analytical and procedural requirements have focused on agencies’ development of rules than on other phases of the regulatory process, from the underlying statutory authorization, through effective implementation and monitoring of compliance with regulations, to the evaluation and revision of existing rules. In general, efforts to increase presidential influence and authority over the regulatory process, primarily through the mechanism of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review of agencies’ rulemaking, have become more significant and widely used over the years. However, our reviews suggest that mechanisms to increase congressional influence, such as procedures for Congress to disapprove proposed rules, appear to have been less able to influence changes in agencies’ rules to date. Although many of those final actions without proposed rules were minor actions, 11 of the 61 major rules (for example, those with an impact of $100 million or more) did not have NPRMs. At the same time, the number of final rules without proposed rules appears to reflect, at least in part, agencies’ acceptance of procedures for noncontroversial and expedited rulemaking actions known as “direct final” and “interim final” rulemaking that were previously recommended by ACUS. Some Issues and Emerging Trends Merit Attention
The findings and emerging issues reported in our body of work on federal rulemaking suggest a few areas on which the subcommittee might consider taking legislative action or sponsor further study: generally reexamine rulemaking structures and processes, including the address previously identified weaknesses of existing statutory promote additional improvements in the transparency of agencies’ open a broader examination of how developments in information technology might affect the notice and comment rulemaking process. Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in Federal Rulemaking. Highlights
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB and the agencies take steps to improve review processes and compliance with the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal regulation is one of the basic tools of government used to implement public policy. Agencies publish thousands of regulations each year to achieve goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, and food are safe; that the nation's air, water, and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes are collected. Because regulations affect so many aspects of citizens' lives, it is crucial that rulemaking procedures and practices be effective and transparent. GAO, at the request of Congress, has prepared over 60 reports and testimonies during the past decade that review aspects of federal rulemaking procedures and practices. This testimony summarizes some of the general findings and themes that have emerged from GAO's body of work on federal regulatory processes and procedures, including areas on which Congress might consider taking legislative action or sponsoring further study. GAO's prior reports and testimonies contain a variety of recommendations to improve various aspects of rulemaking procedures and practices.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior evaluations highlighted both benefits and weaknesses of rulemaking procedures and practices in areas such as (1) regulatory analysis and accountability requirements, (2) presidential and congressional oversight of agency rulemaking, and (3) notice and comment rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). GAO's reviews identified at least four overall benefits associated with existing regulatory analysis and accountability requirements: encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rulemaking; improving the transparency of the rulemaking process; increasing the attention directed to rules; and increasing expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules. On the other hand, GAO identified at least four recurring reasons why such requirements have not been more effective: unclear key terms and definitions; limited scope and coverage; uneven implementation by agencies; and a predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process. With regard to executive branch and congressional oversight of agencies' rulemaking, GAO has noted that efforts to increase presidential influence and authority over the regulatory process, through mechanisms such as the Office of Management and Budget's reviews of agencies' rulemaking, have become more significant over the years. However, mechanisms intended to increase congressional influence, such as procedures for disapproval of regulations under the Congressional Review Act, appear to have been less able to influence changes in agencies' rules to date. GAO's reviews of agencies' compliance with rulemaking requirements under APA pointed out that agencies often did not published notices of proposed rulemaking (to solicit public comments) before issuing final rules, including some major rules with an impact of $100 million or more on the economy. APA provides exceptions to notice and comment requirements for "good cause" and other reasons, but GAO noted that agencies' explanations for use of such exceptions were sometimes unclear. Also, several analytical requirements for proposed rules do not apply if an agency does not publish a proposed rule. However, some of the growth in final rules without proposed rules appeared to reflect increased use of "direct final" and "interim final" procedures intended for noncontroversial and expedited rulemaking. The findings and emerging issues reported in GAO's body of regulatory work suggested four areas on which Congress might consider taking action or studying further: (1) generally reexamining rulemaking structures and processes, (2) addressing previously identified weaknesses of existing statutory requirements, (3) promoting additional improvements in the transparency of agencies' rulemaking actions, and (4) opening a broader examination of how developments in information technology might affect the notice and comment rulemaking process. |
gao_GAO-12-83 | gao_GAO-12-83_0 | DCMA provides contract administration services and support to combatant commanders during contingency operations. DCMA Is Positioning Itself to Meet Its Missions by Strengthening Its Workforce, Policies, and Procedures
DCMA has undergone significant shifts in its workforce, organizational structure, and policies and procedures over the past 10 years. After its formation in the early 1990s, DCMA’s workforce numbers declined and there was significant erosion of some areas of expertise, such as the cost and pricing function. Ultimately, the workforce became so out of balance with workload after 2000 that the organization could not fulfill all of its oversight functions. A shift to a substantially decentralized, customer- oriented approach was intended to mitigate the impact of this workforce imbalance, but resulted in a number of unintended consequences, such as inefficiencies in how work was done at the CMOs. In light of recent, significant workforce growth, DCMA is rebuilding its expertise in areas that had been bereft, instituting new, centralized policies and procedures and developing agency-wide performance indicators intended to gauge how well the agency is meeting its missions. The agency has steadily increased its numbers since that time and expects to reach about 13,400 total civilian staff by 2015—about a 43 percent increase from its size in 2008. DCMA has taken several steps to rebuild its cost and pricing capabilities: In 2009, DCMA created the Cost and Pricing Center, with a mission of developing and sustaining the agency’s expertise in pricing. The agency currently has 122 indicators in place, addressing contractor supplier-base issues and DCMA processes, workload, and resources. To minimize the impact of civilian deployments, DCMA has established a position for a corps of 250 personnel hired specifically to support the contingency mission, but CMOs report management challenges with using these resources. Nevertheless, several DCMA officials we interviewed believe that CCAS deployments have a definite, constraining impact on the agency’s domestic mission, and CMO officials identified specific examples of how their operations are affected by deployments. They cited delays in quality assurance response times, for example, and noted that audits of a contractor’s processes and contract closeout activities have been delayed or not done. CMOs we visited noted that the impact of CCAS deployments on CMOs varies based on the type of deployment (civilian volunteer or EE), deployment of CMO leadership, and rates of deployment at the CMO. A number of CMO leaders deploy, in part, because a high proportion of them are military. DCMA has taken steps to mitigate the impact of deployments on individual CMOs. The agency has also lengthened deployment time frames to reduce their frequency. We also found that DCMA contracting officers maintained their determination of many contractor business systems as adequate despite the fact that the systems had not been audited by DCAA in a number of years—in many cases well beyond the time frames outlined in DCAA guidance. DCMA Maintains Adequacy Determination for Contractor Business Systems Even When DCAA Audits Are Outdated
Contractor business systems and internal controls are the first line of defense against waste, fraud, and abuse on government contracts, and so the government is at greater risk of overpaying contractors if possible deficiencies exist in the systems. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense work with DCMA and DCAA to identify and execute options, such as hiring external auditors, to assist in conducting audits of contractor business systems as an interim step until DCAA can build its workforce enough to fulfill this responsibility. We recommend that the Director of the DCMA take the following two actions: Identify ways to accurately and transparently reflect the current status of business systems, such as changing the status of a system to “unassessed” when a system has not been audited within DCAA’s time frames. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess how the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is positioning itself to meet its missions; (2) determine the extent to which contingency missions have impacted DCMA’s ability to provide oversight and surveillance domestically; and (3) identify other factors that may affect its capability to conduct oversight and surveillance domestically going forward. We reviewed Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) documentation such as relevant sections of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual and audits related to contractor business systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provides contract administration services for DOD buying activities. Its contract management offices (CMO) work with defense contractors to help ensure that goods and services are delivered on time, at projected cost, and that they meet performance requirements. DCMA also supports combatant commanders during contingency operations. As DCMA recovers from years of significant downsizing, GAO was asked to (1) assess how the agency is positioning itself to meet its missions, (2) determine the extent to which contingency missions affect its oversight domestically, and (3) identify other factors that may affect its domestic missions going forward. GAO reviewed regulations, policies, and guidance, analyzed the status of contractor business systems for 17 defense contractors, and interviewed a wide range of DCMA officials.
What GAO Found
After undergoing significant shifts in its workforce, structure, and policies and procedures over the past 10 years, DCMA has taken steps to rebuild its capacity. As the workforce declined, the agency experienced significant erosion of expertise in some areas, such as the cost and pricing function, such that it could not fulfill all of its oversight functions. A shift to a substantially decentralized, customer-oriented approach in the mid-2000s, intended to mitigate the impact of this workforce imbalance, resulted in unintended consequences such as inefficiencies in how work was done at the CMOs. DCMA has since begun to rebuild workforce expertise and has instituted new, centralized policies and procedures. The agency expects to reach about 13,400 total civilian staff by 2015--a 43 percent increase from about 9,300 staff in 2008. DCMA's military workforce has generally ranged between 500 and 600 in recent years. A growing number of DCMA's new employees have been hired using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. To help gauge progress in meeting its missions, the agency uses performance indicators for contractor supplier base issues and DCMA processes, workload, and resources. Agency staff deployed on contingency missions are small in number--272-- when compared with the number of total DCMA employees, but several DCMA officials told GAO that deployments have a constraining impact on the agency's domestic mission. CMO officials identified examples of how their operations have been affected by deployments, such as delays in conducting timely quality assurance, audits of contractor processes, and contract close-out activities. The impact of deployments depends on the type of deployment or on certain features of the CMO; the timing of military leaders' deployments; and multiple or extended deployments of civilian volunteers. DCMA has noted support for the warfighter is a high priority for the agency, but has taken steps to mitigate the impact of deployments, such as lengthening deployment time frames to reduce their frequency. To minimize the impact of civilian deployments, DCMA established a position for a corps of personnel to support the contingency mission. Several factors may affect DCMA's ability to meet its missions going forward. One significant source of external risk stems from DCMA's reliance on the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to conduct audits of certain contractor business systems. Business systems--such as accounting and estimating systems--are the government's first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse. Because of its own workforce struggles, DCAA has lagged in completing a number of such audits and is currently focusing on other high priority areas. GAO found, however, that DCMA contracting officers maintained their determination of many contractor business systems as adequate despite the fact that the systems had not been audited in a number of years--in many cases well beyond the time frames outlined in DCAA guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD work with DCMA and DCAA to identify and execute options to assist in audits of contractor business systems. GAO also recommends that DCMA clarify for CMOs the agency's plans to continue funding existing workforce positions and that it identify ways to accurately reflect the status of contractor business systems, such as changing the status to unassessed when audits are delayed. DOD concurred with the first two recommendations. DOD partially concurred with the remaining recommendation but discussed several planned actions which, if implemented, should improve the transparency of system assessments. |
gao_GAO-14-61 | gao_GAO-14-61_0 | About Half of Veterans Seeking Employment Are Successful, Although Program Participants Face Many Challenges
About Half of Veterans Find Suitable Jobs, but Time Frames Can Be Lengthy
About half of the veterans who entered the VR&E program in fiscal year 2003 and received employment-related services have obtained suitable jobs. Many others—4,841—had discontinued (stopped participating) and not yet re-applied. A Variety of Challenges May Result in Many Veterans Not Completing the Program
While veterans may discontinue for a variety of reasons, analysis of administrative data, results from a VA customer satisfaction survey, and our interviews with VR&E staff and participants point to several key challenges that may affect veterans at any stage of the rehabilitation process. VA Has Made Limited Progress in Improving VR&E Performance Management, Workload Management, and Training
VA Faces Challenges with Measuring Employment Outcomes and Veteran Satisfaction
VR&E Outcome Measurement Presents a Challenge for VA
VA has identified limitations with its primary measure of VR&E success— the rehabilitation rate—and is considering replacing it with a numeric target for positive outcomes. Some VRCs noted that this can occur when a veteran has a serious mental health condition, for example. In some cases veterans may work with multiple VRCs even if an office does not take a specialization approach. VA Is Addressing Redundancy and Most Gaps in VR&E Staff Training
In the course of our work, we found evidence that staff had experienced redundancy and critical gaps in their training; however, VA had taken recent steps to address the redundancy and most, but not all of the training gaps. Workplace accommodations help ensure veterans with disabilities can successfully perform on the job and maintain their employment. Conclusions
VA has taken steps to improve its management of the VR&E program— ultimately with the goal of helping more veterans with disabilities attain suitable employment—but its ongoing efforts may not sufficiently address certain key management issues. In revisiting VA’s formula for allocating VR&E staff among the regional offices, (a) assess the inclusion of factors related to regional office performance and if warranted remove them from the formula, and (b) assess the exclusion of any factor related to the number of educational counseling cases in each regional office and If warranted add such a factor. Specifically, VA concurred with 5 of our 6 recommendations, and noted steps it plans to take to address them, as follows. With regard to our recommendation to assess regional offices’ workload management approaches, VA said it plans to collect and analyze data on the various approaches and inform the regions about best practices. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the outcomes for veterans seeking employment through the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program, and (2) the progress the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made in addressing critical management issues. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as VA documentation related to the VR&E program and recent management initiatives. We reviewed various criteria for effective program management, including in the areas of performance management and staff training. We analyzed VA administrative data on VR&E participants who applied to the program between fiscal years 2003 and 2012 (see below for more information on our efforts to analyze and ensure the reliability of these data), and interviewed VA central office staff responsible for the VR&E program, VR&E managers and staff in VA regional benefits offices (see below for details on office selection), and representatives of the Disabled American Veterans and the Paralyzed Veterans of America. Finally, veterans could have been diagnosed with one or more disabilities, such as mental health conditions, ear disorders, and/or cardiovascular disorders. Appendix III: Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor Training Gaps Identified by VA in 2010 and the Agency’s Efforts to Address
Training gaps New VRCs How to provide services to veterans recently discharged from the military How to provide services to veterans with severe disabilities How to determine when extended evaluation is necessary and conduct subsequent individualized extended evaluation plan development How to closeout cases for different veteran outcomes (e.g., for veterans who achieved suitable employment or maximum rehabilitation gain)
For new and experienced VRCs How to provide services to veterans with traumatic brain injuries (TBI)
How to provide services to veterans with post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
How to conduct a preliminary and/or comprehensive IL assessment How to input benefit awards into the computer system (e.g., inputting the decision to provide a veteran a subsistence allowance)
2-hour course on VR&E fiscal accuracy and integrity Two 1-hour courses on VR&E processing of subsistence allowance awards 1-hour course on employment adjustment allowances VA added this course to the fiscal year 2013 curriculum to address changes to its guidance for independent living and delivered the training in September, 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans with disabilities face special challenges to finding employment-- resulting, for example, from the veterans' physical or mental health, or negative attitudes or stereotypes on the part of some employers. VA's VR&E program aims to help veterans with disabilities obtain and maintain suitable employment--compatible with their disabilities--through services such as training and job search assistance. The VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 directed GAO to review the program. GAO examined (1) the outcomes for veterans seeking employment through the program, and (2) the progress VA has made in addressing critical management issues. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance as well as recent studies; reviewed various program management criteria; analyzed VA administrative data on veterans who entered the program between fiscal years 2003 and 2012; interviewed staff at the VA central office and 8 regional offices; interviewed a random but nongeneralizable sample of 17 program participants; and analyzed data from a VA survey of participants.
What GAO Found
About half of the almost 17,000 veterans who entered the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program in fiscal year 2003 and received employment-related services were placed in suitable jobs, one-third left the program, and most of the others are still participating. It often took veterans 6 years or more to achieve success, due in part to veterans often leaving the program temporarily. Interviews with VR&E staff and participants and administrative data GAO reviewed suggest veterans face numerous challenges that affect their ability to obtain employment, especially related to mental health conditions, working with multiple VR&E counselors over time, and civilian employers' limited understanding of military work experience.
VA has taken steps to improve VR&E performance management, workload management, and staff training, but weaknesses remain. With regard to performance management, VA has an ongoing initiative to revise its approach for measuring rehabilitation success at the individual employee, regional, and national levels. However, the new approach VA is considering for employees reflects only the number, not the rate of successful outcomes, and therefore would not provide sufficient context for understanding program success. VA has not yet developed its new approaches for assessing rehabilitation success regionally and nationally. Also, VA began surveying participants' satisfaction with the program and plans to use the results to manage performance; while VA has generally followed good survey design practices, the agency has not fully assessed the reliability of early customer satisfaction results. In terms of workload management, VA has taken steps to reduce paperwork burdens on regional offices. However, several offices still reported heavy workloads and noted that VA's formula for allocating staff among offices does not consider other staff duties affecting workloads, such as education counseling. In addition, VA has not studied the relative effectiveness and efficiency of regional offices' approaches for assigning staff to manage workloads. Finally, with respect to training, VA has addressed redundancy and most gaps in training for VR&E staff, but gaps remain in the areas of job placement assistance and workplace accommodations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA reflect success rates in revised performance measures, ensure the reliability of its customer satisfaction survey results, re-visit its staff allocation formula, study staff assignments, and close certain gaps in its training for staff. In its comments, VA generally concurred with these recommendations and noted steps it plans to take to address them. |
gao_GAO-13-110 | gao_GAO-13-110_0 | Table 1 provides some examples. 2). Federal legislation has established a foundation for the federal government to assume a leadership role in combating elder abuse, including elder financial exploitation, and basis for greater coordination across federal agencies in this area. The EJA was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which was signed into law on March 23, 2010. o annually collect and disseminate data regarding elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation of elders in coordination with Justice;o develop and disseminate information on best practices and provide training for carrying out adult protective services; o conduct research related to the provision of adult protective o provide technical assistance to states and others that provide or fund the provision of adult protective services; o establish 10 elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation forensic centers, in consultation with Justice, that would (1) conduct research on forensic markers for elder abuse, neglect, or exploitation, and methodologies for determining when and how health care, emergency, social and protective, and legal service providers should intervene and when these cases should be reported to law enforcement; (2) develop forensic expertise regarding elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation; and (3) use the data they have collected to develop, in coordination with Justice, the capacity of geriatric health care professionals and law enforcement authorities to collect forensic evidence, including evidence needed to determine if elder abuse, neglect, or exploitation has occurred. Currently, the Elder Justice Coordinating Council consists of the following federal agencies: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Corporation for National and Community Service, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs, Federal Trade Commission, Postal Inspection Service, and Social Security Administration. States Identified the Need for More Safeguards and Public Awareness Activities to Prevent Elder Financial Exploitation
States Cited Need for More Safeguards to Prevent Elder Financial Exploitation
According to officials in the four states we visited, financial exploitation of older adults by financial services providers, power of attorney agents, and in-home caregivers is particularly difficult to prevent. In California, law enforcement officials noted that notaries were not always held accountable for their role in signing power of attorney documents. Others have enacted various other power of attorney laws. State and Federal Officials Called for Greater Focus on Public Awareness
Experts and federal, state, and local officials told us that older adults need more information about what constitutes elder financial exploitation in order to know how to avoid it.officials told us that it is difficult for them to reach many older adults with this message and that they have little funding to promote public awareness. However, although the OAA calls for a coordinated federal elder justice system, which includes educating the public, the seven agencies we reviewed do not conduct these activities as part of a broader coordinated approach. State and local officials in the four states we reviewed are attempting to increase their expertise. AoA and Justice have developed some resources that could be used to help state and local agencies build expertise in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting elder financial exploitation (see table 3). Officials we met from state and local social service and criminal justice agencies in three of the four states we reviewed said that while collaboration between their systems is important for combating elder financial exploitation, collaborating can sometimes be difficult because the two systems differ in the way they respond to exploitation and carry out their work. Providing accurate contact information is consistent with Justice’s strategic objective for fiscal years 2012-2016 to strengthen its relationships with state and local law enforcement. Conclusions
Elder financial exploitation is a multi-faceted problem spanning social service, criminal justice and consumer protection systems of government. Each of the seven federal agencies we reviewed is working to solve this problem in ways that are consistent with its own mission. A clearly articulated national strategy is needed to coordinate and optimize such federal efforts to effectively prevent and respond to elder financial exploitation, and the EJCC can be the vehicle for defining and implementing this strategy. In addition to working together to build a national strategy to combat elder financial exploitation, there are a number of ways individual federal agencies could better support state and local APS and law enforcement agencies. The strategy could address, among other things, the need to identify and disseminate promising practices and other information nationwide that can be used by state and local agencies to prevent exploitation, educate the public, and help state and local agencies collaborate, investigate, and prosecute elder financial exploitation; ensure coordination of public awareness activities across federal agencies; and collect and disseminate better data nationwide to inform federal, state, and local decisions regarding prevention of and response to elder financial exploitation. Given the potential for the Consumer Sentinel database to support and enhance state and local law enforcement agencies’ response to elder financial exploitation, particularly interstate and international cases, we continue to believe that FTC should study the feasibility of requiring that all complaints to the Consumer Sentinel database include the victim’s age or another indicator of whether the complaint involves elder financial exploitation. The report is available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
Elder financial exploitation is the illegal or improper use of an older adult's funds or property. It has been described as an epidemic with society-wide repercussions. While combating elder financial exploitation is largely the responsibility of state and local social service, criminal justice, and consumer protection agencies, the federal government has a role to play in this area as well. GAO was asked to review issues related to elder financial exploitation. This report describes the challenges states face in (1) preventing and (2) responding to elder financial exploitation, as well as the actions some federal agencies have taken to help states address these challenges.
To obtain this information, GAO interviewed state and local social service, criminal justice, and consumer protection officials in California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania--states with large elderly populations; officials in seven federal agencies; and various elder abuse experts. GAO also analyzed federal strategic plans and other documents and reviewed relevant research, federal laws and regulations, and state laws.
What GAO Found
Officials in each of the four states GAO contacted identified the need for more safeguards and public awareness activities to help prevent elder financial exploitation. They also noted that it is difficult to prevent exploitation by individuals such as financial services providers, power of attorney agents, guardians, and paid in-home caregivers. Although states have primary responsibility for combating elder financial exploitation, the federal government could disseminate information on model power of attorney legislation, for example, to help states better safeguard against power of attorney abuse--one type of federal activity authorized under the Older Americans Act of 1965. In addition, experts and state and local officials told GAO that many older adults need more information about what constitutes elder financial exploitation in order to report and avoid it. The seven federal agencies GAO reviewed have undertaken activities to increase public awareness of elder financial exploitation. While some experts observed that a nationwide approach to educating the public is needed, federal public awareness activities are not currently conducted as part of a broader coordinated approach, which GAO believes could help ensure the effective use of federal resources. The Elder Justice Coordinating Council, which held its first meeting in 2012, could be the vehicle for developing and implementing a coordinated national strategy. The Council is composed of officials from federal agencies and is charged with developing national priorities and coordinating federal elder justice activities.
Experts and officials in each state GAO reviewed indicated that difficulty 1) gaining expertise, 2) sustaining collaboration between law enforcement and adult protective services agencies, and 3) obtaining data hinders their response to elder financial exploitation. As with prevention, many federal agencies have individually taken steps to address these challenges that are in line with their own missions. For example, the Department of Justice (Justice) has begun to construct a website that contains training and other materials prosecutors can use to build their expertise in investigating and prosecuting elder abuse, which includes elder financial exploitation. However, there are gaps in federal support in some areas. For example, law enforcement officials in each of the four states GAO reviewed indicated that it is not clear how they should obtain the federal support they need to respond to interstate and international cases. Justice can provide this information, in keeping with its priority to strengthen its relationship with state and local law enforcement. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network database compiles incidents of financial exploitation reported to it by many sources around the country but receives incidents from state government agencies in only 12 states. The database would be of greater use if FTC obtained incidents from more of the states and contained an indicator that the incident involved an older adult.
What GAO Recommends
Federal agencies should develop a written national strategy addressing challenges GAO identified, facilitate case investigation and prosecution, and improve data, among other things. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Department of Health and Human Services supported GAO's recommendations. FTC did not believe it is necessary to examine the feasibility of requiring victim's age in complaints. GAO maintains the importance of its recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-360 | gao_GAO-13-360_0 | DOD officials said that they have not been able to estimate U.S.
DOD’s Initial Estimate for the Current Marine Corps Realignment Plan Is Not Reliable
Although DOD has developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate for its current plan to relocate Marines from Okinawa and realign them to Guam and other locations in the Pacific, it is not reliable, because it is missing costs and is based on limited data. According to DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together a more reliable cost estimate for its current plan, because it will not have the information needed to do so until the completion of several key studies, including environmental analyses for Guam and Hawaii. As part of its preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimate, DOD currently estimates that it would cost approximately $12.1 billion to implement the current realignment plan—not including the Australia segment of the realignment. According to DOD officials, specific requirements and their associated costs cannot be developed for each cost component until the necessary analyses and host nation negotiations have been completed. Additionally, DOD based its estimate on several assumptions, but there was no evidence that DOD identified risk impacts or parameters for any of these assumptions. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations. Mobility Support. Unoccupied housing will be discussed in greater detail later in this report. However, until estimates are developed that address the seven cost components described in this report, DOD will not be able to provide Congress and other stakeholders with a reliable cost estimate to make informed funding decisions regarding the realignment of Marines. DOD Has Not Yet Completed an Integrated Master Plan to Synchronize Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific or a Strategy to Support Japanese Construction
In April 2012, DOD announced that it would be revising its previous Marine Corps realignment plan; however, DOD has not yet completed two key planning mechanisms: an integrated master plan that synchronizes the various realignment initiatives with all geographic segments of the realignment and a construction support strategy. However, DOD has not developed and finalized a master plan in support of the realignment. DOD Has Taken Initial Steps but Has Not Fully Identified Sustainment Needs and Costs on Okinawa and Guam
DOD has taken some steps to plan for sustaining its forces on both Okinawa and Guam until the Marine Corps realignment is implemented and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa are complete, but it has not yet fully identified what will need to be done to sustain the facilities at these locations and what it will cost for the immediate future. capture facility requirements and propose solutions to meet those requirements from the options available. Still, we found that DOD did not include some up-front practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate and could have been done despite the fact that the environmental analyses and host nation negotiations are not complete. DOD currently has not developed a strategy to identify the resources it needs to assist with the development and oversight of these projects that may involve a surge in concurrent construction. DOD concurred with our recommendation to conduct an economic analysis to include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on Guam. For this review, we collected DOD plans and cost estimates associated with the original and current Marine realignment plans, DOD budget data on U.S. projects related to the Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Marine realignment, budget data on DPRI and Host Nation Support expenditures provided to DOD by the government of Japan, military base master plans and housing requirements analyses, and other relevant documentation. We collected sustainment planning documentation, base master plans, and historical host nation support and U.S. sustainment cost data for Okinawa and compared them to GAO cost estimating guidance and DOD guidance on installation master planning to determine the extent to which DOD has planned for the sustainment of U.S. forces on Okinawa until realignment efforts are completed. (a) RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS.—Except as provided in subsection (c), notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, and none of the amounts provided by the Government of Japan for military construction activities on land under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, may be obligated to implement the realignment of United States Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam as envisioned in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation issued May 1, 2006, until— (1) the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Commander of the United States Pacific Command, provides the congressional defense committees the Commandant’s preferred force lay-down for the United States Pacific Command Area of Responsibility; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a master plan for the construction of facilities and infrastructure to execute the Commandant’s preferred force lay- down on Guam, including a detailed description of costs and a schedule for such construction; (3) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees that tangible progress has been made regarding the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma; (4) a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is provided to the congressional defense committees detailing descriptions of work, costs, and a schedule for completion of construction, improvements, and repairs to the non-military utilities, facilities, and infrastructure on Guam affected by the realignment of forces; and (5) the Secretary of Defense— (A) submits to the congressional defense committees the report on the assessment of the United States force posture in East Asia and the Pacific region required under section 346 of this Act; or (B) certifies to the congressional defense committees that the deadline established under such section for the submission of such report has not been met. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has stated that it intends to rebalance its defense posture toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts the largest U.S. forward-operating presence in this region; the majority of the U.S. forces in Japan are located in Okinawa. The United States and Japan planned to reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by relocating approximately 9,000 Marines. DOD had originally planned to move the Marines only to Guam, but revised its plans in 2012 to include other locations in the Pacific. Congressional committees have directed GAO to examine DOD's initiatives in the Pacific, focusing on planning and costs. This report discusses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive cost estimate for the realignment of Marines, (2) planned for and synchronized other movements to coincide with the realignment, and (3) identified plans to sustain the force until all initiatives are implemented. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant policies and procedures, reviewed and analyzed cost documents related to the realignment initiatives, interviewed DOD officials, and conducted site visits at U.S. military installations in the Pacific.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) preliminary cost estimate for its current realignment plan is not reliable, because it is missing costs and is based on limited data. According to DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together a more reliable cost estimate because it will not have specific detailed information on the plan's requirements until the completion of environmental analyses and host nation negotiations. Currently, DOD estimates that it would cost approximately $12.1 billion to implement its realignment plan--not including the Australia segment of the realignment. Still, GAO found that DOD did not include some up-front practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate that are not dependent on the completion of the environmental analyses and host nation negotiations. Specifically, DOD omitted any costs associated with mobility support, a critical component of the implementation, from its cost estimate. Furthermore, although DOD based its cost estimate on several assumptions, there was no evidence DOD conducted analysis needed to determine the reliability of those assumptions. Without a reliable estimate, DOD will not be able to provide Congress and other stakeholders with the information Congress needs to make informed decisions regarding the realignment.
DOD has not developed an integrated master plan for its current realignment plan, and it has not developed a strategy to support the development and oversight of the Japanese construction projects associated with other realignment initiatives. DOD has taken initial steps to develop an integrated scheduling document based on currently known data, but indicated that specific requirements, schedules, and costs cannot be formalized in an integrated master plan until several studies and host nation negotiations are completed, which will take several years. Developing a master plan could enhance the management of the realignment by creating a systematic approach to planning, scheduling, and execution. In addition, DOD has not developed a strategy that identifies the resources needed to support the development of and oversight for these projects. According to best practices, a strategy identifies goals and resources and supports the implementation of a program. Without the information contained in an integrated master plan and a construction support strategy, Congress will be unable to make informed decisions about the order in which it needs to provide funding to support the realignment.
DOD has taken some steps to plan for the sustainment of U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam, but it has yet to fully identify sustainment needs and costs for both locations during this period. At several installations on Okinawa, some of the infrastructure has severely deteriorated. DOD facilities planning guidance calls for updated facility master plans that capture requirements and propose solutions. On Guam, DOD has been maintaining an inventory of unoccupied family housing that could potentially be used for Marines relocating to Guam. However, DOD has not determined all the costs and benefits of maintaining this housing or the Marines' potential housing requirements--information needed to perform an economic analysis. Without an estimate of the sustainment requirements for Okinawa, the costs for maintaining housing, and the potential Marine requirements for housing on Guam, DOD will be unable to make informed decisions on whether continued investment in sustaining these facilities is warranted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop more reliable cost estimates and an integrated master plan for the realignment of Marines, develop a mechanism to share annual updates on the status of each, and identify sustainment requirements for affected facilities until realignment initiatives are complete. DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-560T | gao_GAO-04-560T_0 | This raises the question about IRS’s ability to increase enforcement staffing as planned in 2005. IRS is Asking For Significantly More For Enforcement in 2005
IRS’s fiscal year 2005 budget request is $10.7 billion, up $489.8 million or 4.8 percent from the amount appropriated for fiscal year 2004. IRS’s request identifies a total of $750.3 million of new proposed spending— $377.3 million for new initiatives, primarily enforcement, and $373 million to maintain current operations (such as salary increases included in the budget). IRS plans to fund the additional spending from three sources— budget increases, program reductions, and internal savings. The major enforcement initiatives include: $90.2 million and 874 Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) to target noncompliance by small business and self-employed taxpayers by hiring field examination and collection, automated collection and service center- based compliance staff; $65 million and 260 FTEs for additional criminal investigation resources to combat corporate fraud, increase tax enforcement, and enhance criminal investigation capabilities by hiring additional criminal investigators and special agents to focus on corporate financial fraud, general tax enforcement, improve forensic electronic evidence capabilities and increase special agent support staff; $36 million and 207 FTEs to combat corporate abusive tax shelters by devoting more resources to reviewing offshore transactions; $15.5 million and 175 FTEs to increase individual taxpayer compliance by focusing on the full spectrum of individual taxpayer noncompliance, including nonfilers, nonpayers of tax owed, and more tax assessments on underreported income; and $15.1 million and 144 FTEs to combat diversions of charitable assets and stop abusive transactions in the tax-exempt area by focusing on terrorism funding and civil fraud by charities, and targeting tax avoidance strategies by charities. Despite budget requests that were almost fully funded and despite achieving some savings, the number of skilled enforcement staff actually declined. As shown in figure 1, the number of revenue agents (those who audit complex returns), revenue officers, (those who do field collection work), and special agents (those who performed criminal investigations) has decreased over 21 percent between 1998 and 2003. The declines in enforcement staff have been associated with declines in enforcement efforts. Other IRS Priorities Have Consumed Recent Budget Increases and Savings
Priorities other than enforcement, including unbudgeted expenses and taxpayer service, have consumed IRS’s budget increases and savings over the last few years. IRS’s Information Technology Budget Includes Funding For BSM and Information Systems
IRS is requesting about $1.93 billion (including 7,385 staff years) in information technology (IT) resources for fiscal year 2005. This includes (1) $285 million for the agency’s multiyear capital account that funds contractor costs for the Business Systems Modernization (BSM) program and (2) about $1.64 billion for information systems, of which $1.55 billion (including 7,137 staff years) are for operations and maintenance. IRS has made progress in implementing investment management best practices in developing and supporting its information systems budget request. Until IRS implements the capital planning and investment control guidance and the activity- based cost model and incorporates them into the preparation of its information systems budget request, the agency will not be able to ensure that the information systems operations and maintenance request is adequately supported. Interim Results Of IRS’s 2004 Filing Season Show Improvement Except In Telephone Accuracy
IRS’s filing season performance through mid-March has improved in most areas compared to recent years, based on data we reviewed on five key filing season activities—paper and electronic processing, telephone assistance, IRS’s Web site, and walk-in assistance. However, the accuracy of tax law answers provided by IRS telephone staff declined. The following sections will address IRS’s specific performance in key areas. Use of IRS’s Walk-in Assistance Sites Continues to Decline
The number of taxpayers receiving assistance at IRS walk-in sites continued to decline. However, cost overruns and schedule delays associated with on-going BSM projects, along with planned reductions to the BSM project portfolio mean that many of these benefits will not be realized in the short term. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective tax administration requires a combination of quality customer service to help those who want to comply, and effective enforcement measures against those who do not. For the last few years, we have been reporting on improvements in taxpayer service and declines in enforcement. With respect to IRS's fiscal year 2005 budget request, the Subcommittee asked GAO to assess whether (1) IRS will be able to allocate more resources to enforcement, and (2) Business Systems Modernization (BSM) and other technology efforts will deliver cost savings and efficiencies in the immediate future. For the 2004 filing season performance, GAO was asked to assess IRS's performance in processing returns and providing assistance to taxpayers.
What GAO Found
IRS is requesting $10.7 billion in fiscal year 2005, 4.8 percent over 2004. This includes $377.3 million, primarily for additional enforcement staff, and $373 million for increased costs of maintaining current operations--funded from three sources--the budget increase, program reductions and internal savings. The request for more enforcement staff follows similar requests in IRS's past five budgets. Despite budget requests that were almost fully funded and despite realizing some savings in prior years, the number of most skilled enforcement staff declined by over 21 percent between 1998 and 2003 because of other priorities, including unbudgeted expenses. This history, and the expectation of unbudgeted costs in 2005, raises questions about whether IRS will be able to increase enforcement staff as planned. IRS's request also includes about $1.93 billion in information technology-- $285 million for BSM contractor costs and about $1.64 billion for information systems. Most BSM projects have experienced cost overruns and schedule delays postponing benefits expected under BSM. IRS reduced its BSM budget request to focus on fewer projects and is implementing plans to respond to known deficiencies. IRS has made progress in implementing investment management best practices for developing and supporting its information systems budget request. However, until IRS fully implements the improvements, its ability to develop supportable budget requests for information systems operations and maintenance will be limited. IRS's reported 2004 filing season performance in key areas improved, with the exception of the accuracy of tax law responses provided over the telephones to taxpayers, which declined. Also, the number of taxpayers seeking assistance at IRS's walk-in assistance sites declined as did the number of tax returns prepared at those sites. |
gao_GAO-09-334 | gao_GAO-09-334_0 | Background
Influenza pandemic—caused by a novel strain of influenza virus for which there is little resistance and which therefore is highly transmissible among humans—continues to be a real and significant threat facing the United States and the world. As previously mentioned, we have ongoing work assessing the status of implementing this plan. Leadership Roles and Responsibilities Need to Be Clarified and Tested, and Coordination Mechanisms Could Be Better Utilized
Our prior work evaluating catastrophic event preparedness, response, and recovery has shown that in the event of a catastrophic disaster, the leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively communicated to facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early hours and days after the event. However, federal government leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic continue to evolve and will require further clarification and testing before the relationships of the many leadership positions are well understood. Efforts Are Underway to Improve the Surveillance and Detection of Pandemic-Related Threats in Humans and Animals, but Targeting Assistance to Countries at the Greatest Risk Has Been Based on Incomplete Information
International disease surveillance and detection efforts serve to address the threat posed by infectious diseases, such as an influenza pandemic, before they develop into widespread outbreaks. However, we reported that gaps in available information from other countries limited the capacity for comprehensive, well-informed comparisons of risk levels by country. Strong advance planning, both within and among federal, state, and local governments and other organizations, as well as robust training and exercise programs to test these plans in advance of a real disaster, are essential to best position the nation to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major catastrophes such as an influenza pandemic. Further Actions Are Needed to Address the Capacity to Respond to and Recover from an Influenza Pandemic
Improving the nation’s response capability to catastrophic disasters, such as an influenza pandemic, is essential. Over the past several years, we have identified potential information-sharing barriers, critical success factors, and other key management issues that should be considered to facilitate information sharing among and between government entities and the private sector. HHS (including CDC), DHS, and other federal agencies have provided a variety of influenza pandemic information and guidance for states and local communities through Web sites and meetings with states. Performance Monitoring and Accountability for Pandemic Preparedness Needs Strengthening
As indicated earlier, in August 2007 we reported that although the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan identified the overarching goals and objectives for pandemic planning, the documents had some gaps. Most of the implementation plan’s performance measures consist of actions to be completed, such as disseminating guidance, but the measures are not always clearly linked with intended results. There have been some other instances where performance and accountability has been strengthened. Although much has been done, many challenges remain, as is evidenced by the fact that almost half of the recommendations that we have made over the past 3 years have still not been fully implemented. Given the change in administration and the associated transition of senior federal officials, it will be essential for this administration to continue to exercise and test the shared leadership roles that have been established between HHS and DHS, as well as the relative roles, responsibilities, and authorities for a pandemic among the federal government, state and local governments and the private sector. Appendix I: Open Recommendations from GAO’s Work on an Influenza Pandemic as of February 2009
Influenza Pandemic: HHS Needs to Continue Its Actions and Finalize Guidance for Pharmaceutical Interventions, GAO-08-671, September 30, 2008
The Secretary of Health and Human Services should expeditiously finalize guidance to assist state and local jurisdictions to determine how to effectively use limited supplies of antivirals and pre-pandemic vaccine in a pandemic, including prioritizing target groups for pre-pandemic vaccine. (2) HSC did not comment on the recommendation and has not indicated if it plans to implement it. For example the two agencies meet on a regular basis to discuss such coordination. Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy. Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been Made, but Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has conducted a body of work over the past several years to help the nation better prepare for, respond to, and recover from a possible influenza pandemic, which could result from a novel strain of influenza virus for which there is little resistance and which therefore is highly transmissible among humans. GAO's work has pointed out that while the previous administration had taken a number of actions to plan for a pandemic, including developing a national strategy and implementation plan, much more needs to be done. However, national priorities are shifting as a pandemic has yet to occur, and other national issues have become more immediate and pressing. Nevertheless, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to our nation and the world. For this report, GAO synthesized the results of 11 reports and two testimonies issued over the past 3 years using six key thematic areas: (1) leadership, authority, and coordination; (2) detecting threats and managing risks; (3) planning, training, and exercising; (4) capacity to respond and recover; (5) information sharing and communication; and (6) performance and accountability. GAO also updated the status of recommendations in these reports.
What GAO Found
Leadership roles and responsibilities need to be clarified and tested, and coordination mechanisms could be better utilized. Shared leadership roles and responsibilities between the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS) and other entities are evolving, and will require further testing and exercising before they are well understood. Although there are mechanisms in place to facilitate coordination between federal, state, and local governments and the private sector to prepare for an influenza pandemic, these could be more fully utilized. Efforts are underway to improve the surveillance and detection of pandemic-related threats, but targeting assistance to countries at the greatest risk has been based on incomplete information. Steps have been taken to improve international disease surveillance and detection efforts. However, information gaps limit the capacity for comprehensive comparisons of risk levels by country. Pandemic planning and exercising has occurred, but planning gaps remain. The United States and other countries, as well as states and localities, have developed influenza pandemic plans. Yet, additional planning needs still exist. For example, the national strategy and implementation plan omitted some key elements, and HHS found many major gaps in states' pandemic plans. Further actions are needed to address the capacity to respond to and recover from an influenza pandemic. An outbreak will require additional capacity in many areas, including the procurement of additional patient treatment space and the acquisition and distribution of medical and other critical supplies, such as antivirals and vaccines for an influenza pandemic. Federal agencies have provided considerable guidance and pandemicrelated information, but could augment their efforts. Federal agencies, such as HHS and DHS, have shared information in a number of ways, such as through Web sites and guidance, but state and local governments and private sector representatives would welcome additional information on vaccine distribution and other topics. Performance monitoring and accountability for pandemic preparedness needs strengthening. Although certain performance measures have been established in the National Pandemic Implementation Plan to prepare for an influenza pandemic, these measures are not always linked to results. Further, the plan does not contain information on the financial resources needed to implement it.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made 23 recommendations in its reports--13 of these have been implemented and 10 remain outstanding. Continued leadership focus on pandemic preparedness remains vital, as the threat has not diminished. |
gao_GAO-16-374T | gao_GAO-16-374T_0 | As part of the President’s request for funding to provide medical services to veterans, VA develops an annual budget estimate detailing the amount of services it expects to provide as well as the estimated cost of providing those services. Higher-than-Expected Obligations for the CIC Program and Hepatitis C Drugs Accounted for VA’s Fiscal Year 2015 Projected Funding Gap
Higher-than-Expected Obligations for the CIC Program Accounted for 85 Percent of VA’s Projected Fiscal Year 2015 Funding Gap
Our preliminary work suggests that the higher-than-expected obligations identified by VA in April 2015 for VA’s CIC program accounted for $2.34 billion (or 85 percent) of VA’s projected funding gap of $2.75 billion in fiscal year 2015. These higher-than-expected obligations for the CIC program were driven by an increase in utilization of VA medical services across VA, reflecting, in part, VA’s efforts to improve access to care after public disclosure of long wait times at VAMCs. The unexpected increase in CIC obligations in fiscal year 2015 exposed weaknesses in VA’s ability to estimate costs for CIC services and track associated obligations. VA officials told us that they did not determine a projected funding gap until April 2015, because they did not complete their analysis of comparing estimated obligations with estimated costs until then. To address the fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap, on July 31, 2015, VA obtained temporary authority to use up to $3.3 billion in Veterans Choice Program funds for obligations incurred for medical services from non-VA providers, whether authorized under the Veterans Choice Program or CIC, starting May 1, 2015 and ending October 1, 2015. VA officials told us that VA did not anticipate in its budget the obligations for new hepatitis C drugs —which help cure the disease—because the drugs were not approved by the Food and Drug Administration until fiscal year 2014, after VA had already developed its budget estimate for fiscal year 2015. The new drugs costs between $25,000 and $124,000 per treatment regimen, and according to VA officials demand for the treatment was high. Officials told us that about 30,000 veterans received these drugs in fiscal year 2015. VA has Taken Steps to Better Track Obligations and Project Health Care Utilization, but Systems Deficiencies and Budgeting Uncertainties Remain
VA Has Taken Steps to Better Track Obligations, but Deficiencies Remain in the Systems for Tracking Obligations
Our preliminary work indicates that VA has developed new processes to prevent funding gaps for fiscal year 2016 and future years by improving its ability to track obligations for CIC services and hepatitis C drugs. In August 2015, VA issued a standard operating procedure to all VAMCs for recording estimated costs for inpatient and outpatient CIC in FBCS. In November 2015, VA allocated funds for CIC and hepatitis C drugs to each VAMC. Officials from the Office of Finance within the Veterans Health Administration told us that once a VAMC had obligated its CIC and hepatitis C drug funds, it would have to request additional funds from VA. VA would, in turn, evaluate the validity of a VAMC’s request and determine whether additional funds may be made available. VA is Using More Recent Data to More Accurately Project Future Health Care Utilization, but Budgetary Uncertainties Remain
Our preliminary work indicates that VA updated its EHCPM to include data from the first 6 months of fiscal year 2015, reflecting increased health care utilization in that year, which VA officials told us will inform VA’s budget estimate for fiscal year 2017 and advance appropriations request for fiscal year 2018. VA has also taken steps to help increase utilization of the Veterans Choice Program. However, by establishing appropriate internal controls, VA can help reduce the risks associated with the weaknesses in its budgetary projections and monitoring. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA projected a funding gap in its fiscal year 2015 medical services appropriation account and obtained temporary authority to use up to $3.3 billion in Veterans Choice Program funding to close this gap. GAO was asked to examine VA's fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap and changes VA has made to help prevent potential funding gaps in future years. This statement is based on GAO's ongoing work and provides preliminary observations on (1) the activities or programs that accounted for VA's fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap in its medical services appropriation account and (2) changes VA has made to prevent potential funding gaps in future years. GAO reviewed data VA provided on its obligations and related documents to determine what activities accounted for the projected funding gap in its fiscal year 2015 medical services appropriation account, as well as the factors that contributed to the projected funding gap. GAO interviewed VA and Office of Management and Budget officials to identify the steps taken to address the projected funding gap. GAO also examined changes VA made to better track obligations and project future budgetary needs. GAO shared the information provided in this statement with VA and incorporated its comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's ongoing work indicates that two areas accounted for the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) fiscal year 2015 projected funding gap of $2.75 billion. Specifically,
Higher-than-expected obligations for VA's longstanding care in the community (CIC) program—which allows veterans to obtain care from providers outside of VA facilities—accounted for $2.34 billion or 85 percent of VA's projected funding gap. VA officials expected that the new Veterans Choice Program—which was implemented in fiscal year 2015 and also allows veterans to access care from non-VA providers under certain conditions—would absorb veterans' increased demand for care after public disclosure of long wait times. However, administrative weaknesses slowed enrollment into this new program. The unexpected increase in CIC obligations also exposed VA's weaknesses in estimating costs for CIC services and tracking associated obligations. VA officials did not determine that VA faced a projected funding gap until April 2015—6 months into the fiscal year, after they compared estimated authorizations with estimated obligations for CIC.
Unanticipated obligations for hepatitis C drugs accounted for the remaining portion—$408 million—of VA's projected funding gap. VA did not anticipate in its budget the obligations for these costly, new drugs, which can help cure the disease, because the drugs did not gain approval from the Food and Drug Administration until fiscal year 2014—after VA had already developed its budget estimate for fiscal year 2015. VA officials told GAO that in fiscal year 2015 about 30,000 veterans received these drugs, which cost between $25,000 and $124,000 per treatment regimen.
GAO's ongoing work indicates that VA has taken steps to better track obligations and project future healthcare utilization, but systems deficiencies and budgetary uncertainties remain. Specifically, GAO's preliminary results indicate that VA has taken the following steps:
VA issued a standard operating procedure to help VA medical centers (VAMC) more accurately estimate the costs associated with authorizations for CIC.
VA directed VAMCs to compare their estimated costs for CIC authorizations with estimated obligations for CIC on a monthly basis.
VA allocated funds to each VAMC for CIC and hepatitis C drugs and began tracking VAMCs' obligations with monthly reports. Officials told GAO that once a VAMC has obligated its funds, it would have to request additional funds. VA would determine whether additional funds may be made available. These processes are necessary because continued deficiencies in VA's financial systems present challenges in tracking of obligations.
VA updated the model it uses to inform most of its budget estimates for medical services. It now includes more recent data that reflect increased healthcare utilization among veterans in fiscal year 2015. However, VA officials noted uncertainties remain about the forecasted utilization of the Veterans Choice Program and emerging health care treatments, which could affect the accuracy of the health care budget estimates. |
gao_GAO-06-290 | gao_GAO-06-290_0 | However, AOC has not implemented a key recommendation related to communicating with external stakeholders—to develop protocols that establish and clarify service and expectation levels with congressional stakeholders. However, the agency still needs to evaluate the impact of the new performance measures on its current evaluation criteria and make any necessary changes. AOC is working to correct these weaknesses. In August 2004, we found that the plan was not sufficiently detailed to guide and communicate the agency’s performance and progress and recommended that the Architect of the Capitol and the COO consult with members of Congress and key committees on the specific information regarding AOC’s plans, policies, procedures, actions, and proposed organizational changes in order to enhance the usefulness of the COO action plan. For example, AOC has made progress in addressing elements of AOC project management that were recommended to be included in the action plan and has consulted with congressional stakeholders on project management initiatives, such as prioritizing projects and establishing a new project management organization. However, AOC’s major construction projects generally take between 5 and eight years to complete, so it is too early to determine the results of AOC’s initiatives to improve project management. Appendix II provides a more complete summary of AOC’s progress in improving project management. Appendix III provides a more complete summary of AOC’s progress in improving facilities management. We are also sending this report to the Architect of the Capitol. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Summary of AOC’s Progress on General Management Review Recommendations
Under the congressional mandate to monitor the Architect of the Capitol’s (AOC) progress, we evaluated AOC’s response to 54 recommendations in seven areas: strategic management, human capital management, project management, worker safety, recycling, financial management, and information technology (IT) management. AOC has implemented 21 of 54 recommendations and is making progress primarily in the areas of strategic management, human capital management, project management (discussed in detail in app. Many of the recommendations that have not been implemented require significant organizational changes; leadership support for these changes is vital to ensure their success as well as the continued success of initiatives that AOC has in place. The Acting Chief Operating Officer (COO) recognizes the importance of communication with congressional members and staff. AOC is also in the process of hiring a Director of Congressional and External Relations who will be responsible for developing and maintaining positive relations with congressional members and staff. AOC made progress in financial accountability by issuing its initial agencywide accountability reports in December 2004 and February 2006, in which the results of audits covering AOC’s fiscal year 2003 and 2004 balance sheets, respectively, were presented; requesting a full-scope audit of a complete set of its financial statements and related note disclosures for fiscal year 2005; and beginning development of an AOC-wide internal control framework and a cost accounting system. In addition, AOC has established some aspects of an effective information security program, such as issuing a policy and a plan for performing risk assessments; issuing and implementing an IT security training policy; and developing a plan to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of IT security policies and controls. Recommendations in September 2005 Briefing
To improve internal controls related to project management, we recommended that AOC: develop a method to establish and track more accurate budget targets, which could include tracking and reporting on the accuracy of cost estimates compared with bids, the accuracy of project budgets compared with final project costs, the amount of excess project funds and how these funds are used, and cost data for the Construction Branch; expedite the development of a customer satisfaction survey for clarify the roles and responsibilities of staff in the new Project revise project management guidance manuals; and develop or modify information systems to provide needed cost and schedule data on projects and track reasons for changes across all projects. Progress and Challenges in Improving Facilities Management
To evaluate AOC’s efforts to improve facilities management, we reviewed (1) the extent to which AOC tracks facilities management performance and (2) the initiatives AOC is implementing to improve facilities management and the challenges that remain. Conducting facility assessments to develop a comprehensive plan for facility maintenance and building renewal: The Facility Condition Assessment (FCA) initiative establishes an ongoing process for monitoring facility conditions and enables AOC to develop a comprehensive plan for facility maintenance and building renewal. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Architect of the Capitol (AOC) is responsible for the maintenance, renovation, and new construction of the Capitol Hill complex, which comprises more than three dozen facilities and consists of nine jurisdictions, such as the U.S. Capitol and the Senate and House Office Buildings. In 2003, at the request of Congress, GAO issued a management review of AOC that contained recommendations in seven areas to help AOC become more strategic and accountable. GAO reported on AOC's progress in implementing those recommendations in January and August 2004. In 2005 and 2006, GAO briefed Congress on AOC's recent progress in implementing GAO's recommendations and on issues related to AOC's project and facilities management. This report summarizes GAO's (1) assessment of AOC's progress in implementing previous GAO recommendations and in improving project and facilities management and (2) delineation of remaining management challenges.
What GAO Found
Overall, AOC is making progress in implementing GAO's previous recommendations and in improving project and facilities management. For example, AOC has implemented 21 of 54 recommendations, established a central organization for managing major projects, and completed assessments of nearly all of the agency's facilities, for use in developing a comprehensive facility maintenance and building renewal plan. AOC has also begun initiatives to develop meaningful performance measures and to restructure its project management information systems to provide better data for monitoring and reporting. These initiatives, though encouraging, are in their early stages, and it is too early to determine their success. In recent briefings provided to AOC management and congressional staff, GAO made additional recommendations to improve the accountability and effectiveness of AOC's project and facilities management initiatives. AOC has made progress in some areas, but still has a significant amount of work ahead to achieve its ultimate goal of establishing a strong strategic management and accountability framework. Specifically, it has not completed initiatives to address two critical issues--communication with external stakeholders and development of internal controls--identified in previous GAO recommendations or in independent audits of AOC's 2003 and 2004 balance sheets. These issues affect a wide range of AOC operations. For example, communication with congressional stakeholders is essential to establish and clarify service and expectation levels. Internal controls, such as reliable cost account system, sound procurement practices, and a comprehensive information security program, are necessary to, respectively, improve project and facilities management, strengthen the integrity of AOC's procurement processes, and effectively safeguard AOC's data and information access. Leadership support is vital to ensure that needed improvements are given urgent attention; this support is also essential to ensure that improvements that have already been made are continuously evaluated and refined as needed. However, the key leadership positions of Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Administrative Officer, Director of the Capitol Power Plant, Director of Congressional and External Relations, and Director of Planning and Project Management are currently vacant. Furthermore, the term for the current Architect of the Capitol will expire in less than a year. AOC is at a critical juncture in its efforts to become more strategic and accountable. Quickly filling the vacant management positions with qualified people is essential for AOC to sustain and extend its recent improvement and to have a cohesive management team in place in the event of a turnover in the Architect of the Capitol position. AOC is now attempting to fill the vacant leadership positions, and, to mitigate the impact of these vacancies, it recently appointed an Acting Chief Operating Officer--who is also temporarily serving as the Acting Chief Financial Officer--and an Acting Chief Administrative Officer to help guide the agency's improvement efforts. |
gao_GGD-96-163 | gao_GGD-96-163_0 | As a result, Internal Affairs did not provide the necessary safeguard to protect the reputation, operations and organizational effectiveness of the Customs Service.” “Office of Enforcement (OE) activities in the Southwest Region suffer from a lack of national direction and from confused and competing lines of authority that undermine effectiveness. Its responsibilities should include the comprehensive and aggressive internal inspection program recommended by the panel and investigation of matters related to mismanagement, criminal misconduct, and serious noncriminal misconduct. Customs should establish a national recruitment policy and mobility policy for the Office of Enforcement. For example, the panel’s Integrity recommendation 1 (p. 20) states in part that “ll allegations of corruption should be expeditiously investigated by Internal Affairs.” The panel did not define what it meant by “expeditiously.” In our categorization of this recommendation, we did not assess the panel’s recommendation for “expeditiously;” therefore, we did not assess this recommendation on the basis of actions taken “expeditiously.”
Several of the panel’s recommendations referred generally to other recommendations in the panel’s report . Relevant Blue Ribbon Panel issues such as managerial effectiveness, performance indicators, and supervisory, employee, and outside agencies (including U.S. Partially implemented. -Identified performance problems should be dealt with openly. Fully implemented. (See whistleblowers recommendation 4.) Because OSC is an agency external to Customs, Customs cannot ensure that Customs employees’ whistleblower allegations are given priority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Customs Service's implementation of blue ribbon panel recommendations concerning allegations of corruption and mismanagement by Customs employees.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Customs: (1) accepted the findings of the panel and took steps to rectify the problems identified by the panel; (2) restructured its Office of Internal Affairs to address issues of political corruption, mismanagement, and serious noncriminal misconduct; (3) established a direct line of authority in its Office of Enforcement to eliminate confusion among the many competing lines of authority noted by the panel in its recommendations; (4) strengthened its policy on managerial accountability; (5) created internal inspection programs to ensure that employees' ethical conduct is in compliance with the panel's recommendations; and (6) implemented its policy for protecting whistleblowers, as recommended. |
gao_GAO-10-259T | gao_GAO-10-259T_0 | Background
The four major federal land management agencies administer approximately 628 million acres, or about 28 percent of the land area in the United States. Second, the Secretaries can directly use a portion of FLTFA revenue to acquire specific parcels of land at their own discretion. Among other things, FLTFA requires that (1) no more than 20 percent of the revenue can be used for BLM’s administrative and other activities necessary to carry out the land disposal program; (2) of the amount not spent on administrative expenses, at least 80 percent must be expended in the state in which the funds were generated; and (3) at least 80 percent of FLTFA revenue required to be spent on land acquisitions within a state must be used to acquire inholdings (as opposed to adjacent land) within that state. BLM Has Raised Most FLTFA Revenue from Land Sales in Nevada
At the time of our review, BLM had raised $95.7 million in revenue, mostly from selling 16,659 acres. As of May 2007, about 92 percent of the revenue raised, or $88 million, came from land sales in Nevada. As of August 2009, BLM reported raising a total of $113.4 million in revenue for the FLTFA account from the sale of about 29,400 acres. BLM Faces Challenges to Future Sales Under FLTFA
BLM faces several challenges to raising revenue through future FLTFA sales, according to officials in the 10 BLM state offices and 18 BLM field offices we interviewed for our 2008 report. The following lists, in order of most frequently cited, the challenges officials identified and provides examples: The availability of knowledgeable realty staff to conduct the sales. We identified two additional issues hampering land sales activity under FLTFA. First, while BLM had identified land for sale in its land use plans, it had not made the sale of this land a priority during the first 7 years of the program. Furthermore, BLM had not set goals for sales or developed a sales implementation strategy. Second, some of the additional land BLM had identified for sale since FLTFA was enacted would not generate revenue for acquisitions because the act only allows the deposit of revenue from the sale of lands identified for disposal on or before the date of the act. Agencies Had Purchased Few Parcels with FLTFA Revenue
At the time of our review, BLM had reported that the four land management agencies had spent $13.3 million of the $95.7 million in the FLTFA account. The agencies acquired these lands between August 2007 and January 2008—more than 7 years after FLTFA was enacted. Acquisitions had not yet occurred under the state-level process because it took 6 years to complete the interagency agreements needed to implement the program and because relatively little revenue was available for acquisitions outside of Nevada, owing to FLTFA requirements. Of the $66.8 million, agencies spent a total of about $43.8 million to acquire 28 parcels totaling 16,738 acres and the remainder of the approved acquisitions was being processed. Of the $48.6 million nominated through the state- level process, the agencies have acquired 12 parcels with $24.6 million in FLTFA funding. Agencies Face Challenges in Completing Additional Acquisitions
BLM state and field officials we interviewed for our 2008 report cited several challenges to completing additional acquisitions under FLTFA. Time, cost, and complexity of the land acquisition process. And with respect to the national MOU, BLM had not established a procedure to track agreed-upon fund allocations—60 percent for BLM, 20 percent for the Forest Service, and 10 percent each for the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Park Service. However, we believed that BLM’s failure to set goals for FLTFA sales and develop a sales implementation strategy limited the agency’s ability to raise revenue for acquisitions. GAO Recommendations to Improve FLTFA Implementation and Agency Actions, as of November 2009 August 2008. BLM established FLTFA land sale goals for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 of $25 million each, according to agency officials. Specifically, the program makes available up to $300,000 to eligible state and field offices for activities necessary to identify and pre-screen properties for possible sale under FLTFA. November 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service manage about 628 million acres of public land, mostly in 11 western states and Alaska. Under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA) of 2000, revenue raised from selling BLM lands is available to the agencies, primarily to acquire nonfederal land within the boundaries of land they already own--known as inholdings. These inholdings can create significant land management problems. To acquire land, the agencies can nominate parcels under state-level interagency agreements or the Secretaries can use their discretion to initiate acquisitions. FLTFA expires in July 2010. This testimony discusses GAO's 2008 report: Federal Land Management: Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act Restrictions and Management Weaknesses Limit Future Sales and Acquisitions (GAO-08-196). Specifically, the testimony discusses (1) FLTFA revenue generated, (2) challenges to future sales, (3) FLTFA expenditures, (4) challenges to future acquisitions, and (5) agencies' implementation of GAO's recommendations. Among other things, GAO examined the act, agency guidance, and FLTFA sale and acquisition data, interviewed agency officials, and obtained some updated information.
What GAO Found
(1) BLM raised most FLTFA revenue from land sales in Nevada. As of August 2009, BLM reported raising a total of $113.4 million from sale of about 29,400 acres. Since FLTFA was enacted in 2000 through August 2009, about 78 percent of the revenue raised, or about $88 million, has come from land transactions in Nevada. (2) BLM faces challenges to future sales under FLTFA. In particular, BLM state and field officials most frequently cited the limited availability of knowledgeable realty staff to conduct sales. We identified two additional issues hampering land sales activity under FLTFA. First, while BLM had identified land for sale in its land use plans, it had not made these sales a priority during the first 7 years of the FLTFA program. Furthermore, BLM had not set goals for sales or developed a sales implementation strategy. Second, some of the additional land BLM had identified for sale since the act would not generate revenue for acquisitions because the act only allows the deposit of revenue from the sale of lands identified for disposal on or before the date of the act. (3) Agencies had purchased few parcels with FLTFA revenue. In 2008, we reported that between August 2007--7 years after FLTFA was enacted--and January 2008, the four land management agencies had spent $13.3 million of the $95.7 million in revenue raised under FLTFA: $10.1 million using the Secretaries' discretion to acquire nine parcels of land and $3.2 million for administrative expenses to prepare land for FLTFA sales. More recently, as of November 2009, BLM reported spending a total of $43.8 million to acquire 28 parcels, including $24.6 million for 12 parcels through the state-level interagency process. (4) Agencies face challenges to completing additional acquisitions. BLM state and field officials GAO interviewed most commonly cited the time, cost, and complexity of the land acquisition process as a challenge to completing land acquisitions. Furthermore, the act's requirement to spend the majority of funds in the state in which revenue was generated has had the effect of making little revenue available for acquisitions outside of Nevada. The agencies also had not established procedures to track the implementation of the act's requirement that at least 80 percent of FLTFA revenue raised in each state be used to acquire inholdings in that state or to track the extent to which BLM is complying with agreed-upon fund allocations among the four participating agencies. (5) BLM has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendations. Specifically, BLM established FLTFA sale goals for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and established a sales incentive program providing seed funds to state and field offices to identify and pre-screen properties for possible sale under FLTFA. As of November 2009, six states have agreed to participate in the program. |
gao_GAO-02-729T | gao_GAO-02-729T_0 | About 1 percent of the traumatic injury claims were not approved, according to the case files we reviewed, because evidence was not provided for one or more of the requirements. To claim benefits for a disease or illness that the employee believed to be work-related, he or she was also required to give notice of the condition in writing to OWCP using Form CA-2, “Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation.” Both notices, according to OWCP regulations, should be filed with the Postal Service supervisor within 30 days of the injury or the date the employee realized the disease was job-related. Specifically, the performance standard for processing traumatic injuries specified that a decision should be made within 45 days of its receipt in all but the most complex cases. As shown in table 1, the median time taken by Postal Service employees to prepare and submit the claim forms needed to make a determination on their entitlement to WCP benefits for traumatic injuries to the Postal Service supervisor was 2 days from the date of the injury, well within the 30-day time frame set by OWCP regulations. Specifically, the performance standard stated that all payable claims for traumatic injuries– excluding schedule awards–should be processed within 14 days. The case files we reviewed did not contain the information that would have enabled us to determine whether the claims for compensation were prepared and filed by the employees within the time frame set forth by OWCP regulations. | What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2002, U.S. Postal Service employees accounted for one-third of both the federal civilian workforce and the $2.1 billion in overall costs for the Federal Workers' Compensation Program (WCP). Postal workers submitted half of the claims for new work-related injuries that year. Postal Service employees with job-related traumatic injuries or occupational diseases almost always provided the evidence required to make a determination on their entitlement. In two percent of the cases, the Office of Workers' Compensation Program (OWCP) found that evidence was missing for one or more of the required elements. However, the length of time taken to process claims varied widely even though all were subject to the same OWCP processing standards. OWCP claims examiners took 59 days to process traumatic injury claims after receiving the notice of injury claim forms from the Postal Service--a process that should take 45 days for all but the most complex cases, according to OWCP performance standards. The case files lacked the information necessary to determine whether the claims for compensation were prepared and filed by the employees within the time frame set by OWCP regulations. OWCP claims examiners took 23 days to process traumatic injury compensation claims for wage loss and schedule awards. OWCP's performance standard states that all payable claims should be processed within 14 days from the date of receipt. |
gao_GAO-06-420T | gao_GAO-06-420T_0 | Increasing Demand and Tight Supply Have Driven Up Prices and Made Extreme Price Spikes Possible
Since 1999, wholesale prices for natural gas have trended steadily upward due to expanding demand—largely for electricity production—and supply that could not expand as quickly because the industry is already operating at near capacity. This tightness in the demand and supply balance has also made the market susceptible to extreme price changes in times when either demand or supply change unexpectedly. One such period of extreme price changes occurred in late 2005, when two hurricanes hit the Gulf Coast region, disrupting a substantial portion of the domestic supply of natural gas. Prices spiked to high levels and, although they have since dropped, they remain unusually high today. Most recently, in the last half of 2005, prices rose to over $15 per million BTUs, sevenfold higher than prices seen in the early 1990s. The supply of natural gas, however, has not kept pace with the increased demand. Other factors—such as market manipulation—may also have affected wholesale prices. Our ongoing work examining futures trading in natural gas markets will address this issue later this year. Impact on Consumers of Higher Wholesale Natural Gas Prices Depends on the Extent to Which They Buy from Spot Markets and on Other Factors
How higher wholesale natural gas prices are affecting consumers depends largely on the degree to which the consumers or their suppliers may have purchased gas on the spot market—which reflects current wholesale prices—or may have taken steps to reduce their exposure to these prices. Some consumers, such as low-income residents and certain industries, are more sensitive to price changes than others. Furthermore, in a few states, some of the largest natural gas utilities projected they would purchase 70 percent or more of their natural gas supplies for this winter from the spot market. Participants in the market, such as industrial consumers who purchase gas directly from the market or natural gas utilities that purchase gas on behalf of their customers, can hedge against high spot market prices for natural gas in three main ways: (1) by purchasing and storing gas for use during times when prices are high; (2) by signing fixed-price contracts for delivery of the gas in the future; and (3) by purchasing financial instruments, such as options or derivatives, that increase in value as natural gas prices rise. Electricity generators are also sensitive to higher prices because of their dependence on natural gas. A recent survey by a trade association representing large energy consumers showed that more than half of 31 member companies surveyed are decreasing their demand for natural gas an average of 8 percent to 9 percent this winter compared with last winter, leading the association to conclude that higher prices have forced industries to curtail production in the United States. However, three federal agencies—FERC, CFTC, and EIA—play key roles in overseeing and supporting a competitive and informed natural gas marketplace. FERC’s ability to monitor the natural gas markets has been enhanced in several regards recently. Since 2002, FERC has settled a number of investigations involving natural gas market manipulation. In addition, a FERC administrative law judge found that another company exercised market power over natural gas prices in California during the 2001-2002 heating season, and the company subsequently agreed to pay a settlement of $1.6 billion. From 2002 through May 2005, CFTC investigated over 40 energy companies and individuals, filed over 20 actions, and collected over $300 million in penalties. Most of these actions were related to natural gas. | Why GAO Did This Study
In early December 2005, wholesale natural gas prices topped $15 per million BTUs, more than double the prices seen last summer and seven times the prices common during the 1990s. For the 2005-2006 heating season, the U.S. Energy Information Administration predicts that residences heating with gas will pay 35 percent more, on average, than they paid last winter. This testimony addresses the following: (1) the factors causing natural gas price increases, (2) how consumers are affected by these higher prices, and (3) the roles federal government agencies play in ensuring that natural gas prices are determined in a competitive and informed marketplace. This testimony is based on GAO's 2002 published work in this area, updated through interviews, examination of data, and review of relevant publications. GAO's new work was conducted from December 2005 through February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
Since 1999, wholesale prices for natural gas have trended upward because of expanding demand and supply that has not kept pace. The domestic natural gas industry has been producing at near capacity, and the nation's ability to increase imports has been limited. Tight supplies have also made the market susceptible to extreme price spikes when either demand or supply change unexpectedly. Prices spiked in August 2005 when hurricanes hit the Gulf Coast, disrupting a substantial portion of supply and again later when demand was pushed higher because of, among other reasons, colder-than-expected temperatures in early December. Although prices have dropped, they remain higher than last year. Other factors--such as market manipulation--may also have affected wholesale prices. We are currently examining futures trading in natural gas markets for signs of manipulation and expect to report on our results later this year. While most consumers' gas bills are rising, the degree of the increase depends, in part, on how much of their supply is purchased from wholesale spot markets. Consumers who directly, or indirectly, buy their natural gas mainly from spot markets will see prices that reflect both recent price spikes and the longer-term trend toward higher prices. Our work shows that some of the largest natural gas utilities in a few states expect to buy at least 70 percent of their gas at spot market prices this winter. These companies generally pass these prices on to their customers. On the other hand, consumers and suppliers that have reduced exposure to spot market prices because some of their gas has been purchased through a process called hedging may be insulated from price spikes and may postpone their exposure to even gradual price hikes. In this regard, utilities in more than half the states have hedged at least 50 percent of their supply for this winter by entering into long-term fixed-price contracts and other techniques. This will help stabilize prices for their customers. Nonetheless, high gas prices will hit some consumers hard, including lower-income households and companies that depend heavily upon natural gas, such as fertilizer manufacturers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) play key roles in ensuring that natural gas prices are determined in a competitive and informed marketplace. Both agencies monitor natural gas markets and investigate instances of possible market manipulation. Since 2002, FERC has settled a number of investigations involving natural gas market manipulation; for example, one company agreed to pay a settlement of $1.6 billion after FERC found it had exercised market power over natural gas prices in California during the 2001-2002 heating season. From 2002 through May 2005, CFTC investigated over 40 energy companies and individuals, filed over 20 actions, and collected over $300 million in penalties, most of which were natural gas related. |
gao_GAO-13-285 | gao_GAO-13-285_0 | USAID and State Focus on Promoting Cuban Civil Society and Access to Information; Most Funding Goes to Worldwide or Regional Partners and Their Subpartners
USAID and State support democracy for Cuba by providing awards and contracts to partners with objectives related to developing civil society and promoting freedom of information. USAID receives the majority of funding allocated for this assistance, although State has received 32 percent of funding since it started taking part in the program in 2004. Since 2008, USAID and State have awarded more funds to larger organizations with a worldwide or regional presence than to the other two categories of typical awardees: universities, and smaller organizations that focus only on Cuba. Typical program beneficiaries also include Cuban community leaders, independent journalists, independent bloggers, women, and youths. In fiscal years 1996 through 2011, Congress appropriated $205 million for Cuba democracy assistance, appropriating 87 percent of these funds since 2004. We reviewed 29 recent awards and contracts to determine the extent to which partners use subpartners to implement program activities. USAID and State legal officials said that the agencies ensure that program activities directly relate to democracy promotion as broadly illustrated in related program legislation. In addition, they said that organizations are expected to work with agency program officers to determine what activities are permitted or appropriate, and whether Department of Treasury and Commerce authorizations, as required, already exist for delivery of various types of assistance or whether the organization must instead apply for a license. Furthermore, they noted that program partners and subpartners, including subpartners based in other countries, are expected to spend U.S. government funds consistent with U.S. laws and that requirements in primary award agreements and contracts generally flow down to any subpartners. However, we found gaps in State’s financial monitoring efforts. For financial monitoring, USAID has hired an external auditor to perform financial internal controls reviews of its partners, and has used a risk- based approach considering criteria such as award value and prior issues identified to determine the coverage and frequency of the 30 reviews the auditor has conducted. These reviews have identified financial management, procurement, and internal controls weaknesses that USAID has taken steps to address. As a result, State was not provided with the detailed information that officials told us would have been required for State to have approved 91 subawards and subcontracts that were obligated under eight of its recent awards. USAID and State Are Taking Steps to Improve Their Performance Monitoring to Address Weaknesses in Some Partners’ Performance Planning and Reporting
USAID Continues to Take Steps to Improve Performance Monitoring; USAID’s Partners’ Had Some Weaknesses in Performance Planning
USAID has taken steps to improve its ability to monitor its Cuba program partners’ performance, by working with them to improve their performance planning and reporting. In September 2012, State/DRL awarded funding to an external auditor to perform financial internal controls reviews in fiscal year 2013. State did not conduct financial internal controls reviews for more than two-thirds of its awards during fiscal years 2010 through 2012, although State recently awarded funding to an external auditor for this purpose and has taken steps toward implementing a risk-based approach for these reviews. To obtain sufficient information to approve implementing partners’ use of subpartners, provide clear guidance to implementing partners regarding requirements for approval of the use of subpartners, and monitor implementing partners to ensure that they adhere to these requirements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) identifies the types and amounts of democracy assistance that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State) have provided to Cuba and characteristics of implementing partners, subpartners, and program beneficiaries; (2) reviews USAID’s and State’s efforts to implement the program in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and to address program risks; and (3) examines USAID’s and State’s monitoring of the use of program funds. This report is a publicly releasable version of a prior GAO report, issued in December 2012, that USAID and State had designated Sensitive But Unclassified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1996, Congress has appropriated $205 million to USAID and State to support democracy assistance for Cuba. Because of Cuban government restrictions, conditions in Cuba pose security risks to the implementing partnersprimarily NGOsand subpartners that provide U.S. assistance.
For this report, GAO (1) identified current assistance, implementing partners, subpartners, and beneficiaries; (2) reviewed USAIDs and States efforts to implement the program in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations and to address program risks; and (3) examined USAIDs and States monitoring of the use of program funds. This report is a publicly releasable version of a Sensitive But Unclassified Report that GAO issued in December 2012.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) provide democracy assistance for Cuba aimed at developing civil society and promoting freedom of information. Typical program beneficiaries include Cuban community leaders, independent journalists, women, youths, and marginalized groups. USAID receives the majority of funding allocated for this assistance, although State has received 32 percent of funding since 2004. In recent years, both USAID and State have provided more funding for program implementation to for-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) with a worldwide or regional focus than to universities and to NGOs that focus only on Cuba. All types of implementing partners, but worldwide or regional organizations in particular, used subpartners to implement program activities under 21 of the 29 awards and contracts that GAO reviewed.
USAID and State legal officials view the Cuba democracy programs authorizing legislation as allowing the agencies discretion in determining the types of activities that can be funded with program assistance. Agency officials added that the agencies ensure that program activities directly relate to democracy promotion as broadly illustrated in related program legislation. The officials stated that organizations are expected to work with agency program officers to determine what activities are permitted or appropriate. In addition, they said that program partners and subpartners are expected to spend U.S. government funds consistent with U.S. laws, and that requirements in primary award agreements generally flow down to any subpartners.
USAID has improved its performance and financial monitoring of implementing partners use of program funds by implementing new policies and hiring contractors to improve monitoring and evaluation and to conduct financial internal controls reviews, but GAO found gaps in States financial monitoring. While GAO found some gaps in implementing partners performance planning and reporting, both agencies are taking steps to improve performance monitoring. For financial monitoring, USAID performs financial internal controls reviews of its implementing partners with the assistance of an external auditor. Since 2008, USAID has used a risk-based approach to determine the coverage and frequency of the 30 reviews the auditor has conducted, which have identified weaknesses in implementing partners financial management, procurement, and internal controls. However, because of resource constraints, State did not perform financial internal controls reviews for more than two-thirds of its implementing partners during fiscal years 2010 through 2012. State procured an external financial auditor in September 2012 that plans to review more than half of States implementing partners, and has taken steps toward implementing a risk-based approach for scheduling these reviews. Federal regulations generally require agencies to approve the use of subpartners. GAO found that USAID issued specific guidance in 2011 to its implementing partners on requirements for subpartner approval. While State told GAO it has similar requirements, States requirements are not clearly specified in its written guidance. As a result, State was not provided with the information it would have needed to approve at least 91 subawards and subcontracts that were obligated under eight awards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that State take steps to improve its financial monitoring of implementing partners and provide clear guidance for approving subpartners. State concurred with GAOs recommendations and cited steps they are taking to address them. |
gao_GGD-96-166 | gao_GGD-96-166_0 | A comprehensive cost-of-living index would be broader in coverage than an index based on consumer expenditures or consumer budgets. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services asked us to (1) determine if a change made to the housing component in the early 1980s made the CPI either more or less suitable for use as a cost-of-living measure and (2) identify the advantages and disadvantages of changing the current measurement of medical care costs to an approach that more closely matches a cost-of-living measure. Since rent is the ‘price of using,’ rental equivalence enhances the use of the CPI as a proxy for the cost of living.” A few of the experts also noted that additional improvements, such as including environmental costs and taxes in the CPI, would make it more like a cost-of-living index. Medical care expenses paid by third parties, such as employers, which make up about two-thirds of all medical care expenses, are excluded from the CPI. The second kind of data reflects the prices paid for items in the CPI. 3.2). BLS Does Not Plan to Include Third-Party Payments
BLS does not plan to include third-party payments in the medical care component. Observations
According to BLS, the CPI is not a cost-of-living index but a measure of the change in prices of a fixed market basket of goods and services. They all said it made the CPI more suitable as a cost-of-living index. The overall impact of changing the medical care component of the CPI is unknown. The Commissioner said the draft report asserted that incorporating expenditures on medical care goods and services by third-party payers would move the CPI toward “the cost-of-living concept.” According to the Commissioner, this argument implies that there exists one theoretically correct, comprehensive measure of the cost of living and that the CPI deviates from this measure because it lacks a cost-of-living concept as a measurement objective. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined: (1) whether changes made to the housing component of the consumer price index (CPI) made it more or less suitable as a cost-of-living measure; and (2) the advantages and disadvantages of changing the current measurement of medical care costs to a cost of living measurement.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the CPI is not a cost-of-living index, but a measure of the change in prices paid for a fixed market of goods and services; (2) a comprehensive cost-of-living index is broader in coverage than an index based on consumer expenditures and budgets; (3) the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses the rental equivalence method to better measure housing costs within the CPI structure; (4) this method has made the CPI more suitable for measuring cost of living; (5) two-thirds of medical care expenses are excluded from the CPI, since they are paid by third parties payers; (6) including third-party payments in the CPI would move the CPI towards a cost-of-living index; (7) BLS excludes third-party payments from the CPI to better represent direct expenditures by consumers; (8) changing the medical care component of CPI would improve the formulation of health-care-specific policies and macroeconomic policies, but there is little technical feasibility in making such changes; (9) the Stigler committee believes that CPI should better reflect the cost-of-living index; (10) it is difficult to design a cost-of-living index for the federal government because of the additional uses of CPI; and (11) policymakers need to consider how the CPI will be affected by changing the medical care component and whether any single price index can account for such cost-of-living measurements. |
gao_GAO-03-282 | gao_GAO-03-282_0 | The regional office then notifies the veteran of its decision. VBA’s Key Timeliness Measure Does Not Clearly Reflect Its Performance
VBA’s key timeliness measure does not clearly reflect its timeliness in completing claims because it fails to distinguish among its three disability programs—disability compensation, pension, and dependence and indemnity compensation. This one measure does not reflect the differences in the timeliness for the three programs. While VBA’s average fiscal year 2002 timeliness was 223 days, disability compensation decisions (which represented about 83 percent of total decisions) took almost twice as long to complete as pension decisions. Each program has a different claims processing time frame because each has different evidence requirements resulting from their different purposes and eligibility requirements. For example, a major reason why disability compensation claims take longer is that VBA must not only establish that each claimed disability exists, but that each was caused or aggravated by the veteran’s military service. VBA Does Not Have Adequate Data to Measure Timeliness of Claims Processing Teams, but Is Making Progress
VBA does not yet have adequate data to measure timeliness or set goals for its specialized regional office teams but is making progress in obtaining complete and accurate data. VBA expects to be able to obtain more complete and accurate data to measure team performance once it deploys new software applications that should enable it to consistently capture data for all cases and will rely less on manual data entry. VBA expects these applications to be fully deployed by October 2003. VBA has implemented an inventory management system (IMS) that allows it to measure and report team timeliness, nationally and at the regional office level. VBA’s reorganization of its regional office compensation and pension claims processing operations into specialized teams underscores the need for complete and accurate data on the timeliness of the phases of the claims process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, asked GAO to assist the Committee in its oversight of the Veterans Benefits Administration's (VBA) efforts to improve compensation and pension claims processing. As part of this effort, GAO assessed (1) whether VBA's key timeliness measure clearly reflects its performance and (2) whether it has adequate data to measure the timeliness of its newly created specialized claims processing teams.
What GAO Found
VBA's key claims processing timeliness measure does not clearly reflect how quickly it decides claims by veterans and their families for disability compensation, pension, and dependency and indemnity compensation benefits. Although each program has its own purpose and eligibility requirements, VBA does not set a separate timeliness goal for each in its annual performance plan. This obscures the significant differences in the time required to complete decisions under each program. Fiscal year 2002 timeliness, using VBA's measure, was 223 days; however, disability compensation decisions took significantly longer than decisions under the other two programs. A disability compensation decision requires more evidence, in part because VBA must determine that each claimed disability is related to the veteran's military service. VBA does not yet have adequate data to measure the timeliness of its new specialized regional office claims processing teams but is working to improve its data. VBA's inventory management system, which allows it to report and analyze teams' timeliness, relies on an existing information system that does not provide timeliness data on all cases. VBA is acting to improve the completeness of the data in the existing system. Meanwhile, VBA is deploying new software that it expects should enable it to capture more complete and accurate data. VBA expects to deploy this new software at all regional offices by October 2003. |
gao_NSIAD-98-15 | gao_NSIAD-98-15_0 | The Army planned to acquire 288 of the CHS computers in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to support the MCS training base, and has already acquired 81. Development Problems Continue
Since its reorganization in 1993, MCS program experience indicates continuing problems in the system’s development. Specifically, (1) the MCS initial operational test and evaluation of version 12.01 has slipped twice, (2) interim developmental level tests and a customer test done to support a decision to award a contract to develop follow-on software show that significant problems continue, and (3) development of follow-on version 12.1 was begun despite the results of the customer test and prior program history. In September 1996, the Army awarded a contract for the development of MCS software versions 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 to a different contractor than the developers of MCS version 12.01. However, the contract was awarded before the initial operational test, and the planned 5 month concurrency in the development of versions 12.01 and 12.1 became 18 months when the operational test slipped to March 1998. Instead, it should be viewed as a new effort. MCS program officials said that the computers are needed in the MCS training base before operational testing to adequately support future fielding of MCS and the larger Army Battle Command System, of which the Army Tactical Command and Control System and MCS are key components. Given the program’s prior history and the fact that the training base computers are not needed to satisfy any of the legislated reasons for low-rate initial production, we continue to believe that the Army should not be allowed to buy those computers until MCS has successfully completed its initial operational test and evaluation—the original plan prior to the MCS initial operational test and evaluation’s multiple schedule slips. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's developmental and acquisition plans for the Maneuver Control System (MCS), focusing on whether: (1) the current MCS software development strategy is appropriate to overcome prior development problems; and (2) 207 new computers for MCS-related training should be procured as planned.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since its 1993 reorganization, the MCS has continued to experience development problems; (2) the initial operational test and evaluation of version 12.01 software has slipped 28 months, from November 1995 to March 1998, and interim tests have shown that significant software problems continue; (3) despite these problems, the Army awarded a contract in September 1996 for the concurrent development of the next software versions--12.1, 12.2, and 12.3--which are being developed by a new contractor and may involve substantially different software; (4) if the Army's current development strategy for the MCS is not strengthened, development problems may continue to occur; (5) currently, the Army's strategy allows: (a) less than full operational testing of version 12.1; and (b) development of follow-on versions 12.2 and 12.3 to start about 18 months before the operational testing of each version's predecessor; (6) despite the fact that the MCS has yet to undergo an initial operational test and evaluation or be approved for production, the Army plans to acquire 207 computers in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to increase the number of computers available for system training; (7) program officials stated that they need to acquire the computers before operational testing to provide not only MCS specific training but also training for the larger Army Battle Command System, of which the Army Tactical Command and Control System and the MCS are major components; and (8) the 207 computers, however, are not needed to satisfy any of the three legislated reasons for low-rate initial production before an initial operational test and evaluation. |
gao_GAO-11-795 | gao_GAO-11-795_0 | These copayment charges were related to approximately 9.8 percent of the total of approximately 576 million VHA medical services provided. Statistical Tests of VHA’s Fiscal Year 2010 Copayment Charges Found That an Estimated 96 Percent Were Accurate
Based on our tests of a probability sample of billed copayment charges, we estimate that 96 percent of VHA’s fiscal year 2010 copayment charges were accurate and 4 percent were inaccurate or erroneous. In fiscal year 2010, more than 90 percent of VHA’s medical services did not result in billed copayment charges. Our tests of 100 unbilled medical services found that VHA correctly determined that each of the medical services should not have resulted in a veteran copayment charge—a 100 percent accuracy rate for this probability sample. Copayment errors identified in both the probability sample and the case study test work mostly involved overbillings, including errors resulting from VHA’s incorrect handling of third-party insurance reimbursements. VHA Does Not Monitor Its Systemwide Copayment Error Rates
While various activities performed by VHA staff involve examining or reviewing the accuracy of some individual veteran copayment charges, we found that those activities do not provide VHA with systematic VHA- wide information on the accuracy of copayment charges needed to effectively monitor—over time—the rates of and causes for copayment errors. As a result, it was not clear how the copayment charge error rates we observed in our probability samples would compare to rates of error VHA would consider acceptable or whether corrective action needs to be taken to reduce the error rates to lower levels. In addition, without procedures to periodically assess the accuracy and completeness of its copayment charges, VHA does not have the information needed to determine whether changes in its accuracy rates are occurring over time. Targeted reviews of certain copayment charges. Conclusions
Our tests of a probability sample of VHA copayment charges found copayment errors which we estimate to be 4 percent or approximately 2.3 million of VHA’s 56.5 million fiscal year 2010 copayment charges. We believe that it is important for VHA to establish a performance measure for the copayment accuracy rate it wants to achieve in billing copayment charges to veterans and, once it is established, to periodically assess—on a systematic basis—the accuracy and completeness of its copayment charges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide VHA with the information needed to adequately monitor the accuracy of copayment charges VHA-wide and to assess and respond to the causes of copayment errors, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct VHA to take the following two actions: establish an accuracy performance measure or goal for copayment charges billed to veterans and establish and implement a formal process for periodically assessing— VHA-wide—the accuracy of veteran copayment charges and taking corrective actions as necessary. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to a request from members of the Subcommittee on Health, House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, we reviewed the Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) copayment billing practices to determine (1) the accuracy rate for VHA copayment charges, including causes for any under- and overbilling errors, and (2) whether VHA had systems and processes in place to adequately monitor the accuracy of copayment charges billed to veterans. After checking billing records, we excluded any sampled medical services that resulted in a copayment charge. We did not test the medical determinations (i.e., diagnosis and whether the service was related to a veteran’s service-connected conditions or special treatment authority) of the medical service provider (including the pharmacist, doctor, nurse, or other medical staff); test the determinations made as a result of the adjudication process at VBA to determine the veteran’s service-connected conditions and related disability rating percentages; test VHA’s ability to record all of the medical services in the medical center–level VistA system, or VHA’s ability to transfer all the medical services to the appropriate data warehouse; and confirm through outside sources (including contacting applicable veterans) the accuracy or completeness of veteran-specific information relied on by VHA as part of its decision to not bill for tested medical services. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) billed veterans millions of medical copayment charges totaling more than $1 billon. Witnesses at a 2009 Subcommittee on Health, House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, hearing raised concerns about inappropriate copayment charges, including some associated with veterans' service-connected conditions. As a result, members of the Subcommittee asked GAO to review (1) VHA copayment charge accuracy, including error rates and related causes, and (2) VHA efforts to monitor copayment charge accuracy. To assess the accuracy of VHA's billed copayment charges, GAO evaluated samples of fiscal year 2010 billed and unbilled medical services to determine copayment error rates and related causes. GAO also reviewed VHA practices related to monitoring the accuracy of copayment charges..
What GAO Found
Of the more than 56 million fiscal year 2010 veteran copayment charges billed by VHA, GAO estimates, based on its test of a probability sample of copayment charges, that 96 percent (or approximately 54.2 million) of the copayment charges were accurate and 4 percent (or approximately 2.3 million) were inaccurate. GAO's tests of a separate probability sample of the approximately 519 million VHA medical services that did not result in copayment charges showed that each of those VHA determinations was accurate. These and other estimated percentages are based on test results of probability samples and are subject to sampling error. Appendix I of this report contains additional information on the samples and the 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates contained in this report. (1) Since the errors identified in GAO's probability sample all involved copayment overbilling, GAO estimates that 4 percent of the copayment charges involved overbilling of veterans. The errors GAO found were due to various factors, including inadequate review of previously billed copayment charges following retroactive changes in a veteran's service-connected conditions and the incorrect application of related medical reimbursements received from veterans' third-party insurance. (2) In tests GAO performed on another probability sample to identify underbilling errors in the approximately 519 million medical services that did not result in copayment charges, GAO found that VHA correctly determined that each tested service should not have resulted in a copayment charge. As a result, GAO tests showed that VHA accurately did not bill copayment charges for these services, which made up more than 90 percent of the approximately 576 million medical services provided during fiscal year 2010. While VHA performed various activities that involved reviewing the accuracy of some individual billed copayment charges, these activities do not constitute a systematic process for providing VHA-wide information on the accuracy and completeness of its copayment charges over time. In addition, GAO found that VHA had not established a performance measure for the accuracy level it wants to achieve in billing copayment charges. Without such a measure, it is not clear how the error rates GAO found would compare to error rates that VHA would consider acceptable, or if VHA would determine whether corrective actions need to be taken to reduce the error rates to lower levels. In addition, without a performance measure and periodic, systemwide information on the accuracy of its copayment charges, VHA cannot monitor changes in error rates and related causes over time. VHA also does not have meaningful performance information that it can provide to interested stakeholders when questions or concerns are raised concerning the accuracy of VHA's copayment charges billed to veterans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes two recommendations to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to (1) establish a copayment accuracy performance measure and (2) establish and implement a formal process for periodically assessing the accuracy of veteran copayment charges VHA-wide. In written comments on a draft of this report, VA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-616T | gao_GAO-07-616T_0 | The United States is both the largest overall and in-kind provider of food aid, supplying over one-half of all global food aid. Multiple Challenges Hinder the Efficiency of Delivery of U.S. Food Aid
Multiple challenges reduce the efficiency of U.S. food aid, including logistical constraints that impede food aid delivery and reduce the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. For the largest U.S. food aid program (Title II), approximately 65 percent of expenditures are on inland transportation (to the U.S. port for export), ocean transportation, in-country delivery, associated cargo handling costs, and administration. First, uncertain funding processes for emergencies can result in bunching of food aid purchases, which increases food and transportation costs and lengthens delivery time frames. Over 70 percent of the carriers strongly recommended actions to address contracting practices. However, the long-term cost effectiveness of both initiatives has not yet been measured. Various Challenges Prevent Effective Monitoring of Food Aid
Despite the importance of ensuring the effective use of food aid to alleviate hunger, U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor food aid programs are insufficient. Limited food aid resources make it important for donors and implementers to ensure that food aid reaches the most vulnerable populations, thereby enhancing its effectiveness. However, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, due to limited staff, competing priorities, and legal restrictions in use of food aid resources. In fiscal year 2006, although USAID has some non-Title II staff assigned to monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7 billion in 55 countries. As a result, agencies may not be sufficiently accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. In a draft report that is under review by U.S. agencies, we recommend that to improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of amount, timeliness, and quality—USDA, USAID, and DOT work together and with stakeholders to improve food aid logistical planning through cost-benefit analysis of supply-management options, such as long-term transportation agreements and prepositioning—including consideration of alternative methods, such as those used by WFP; modernize transportation contracting procedures to include, to the extent possible, commercial principles of shared risks, streamlined administration, and expedited payment and claims resolution; seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices, such as prepositioning, and potential costs associated with older vessels or limited foreign-flag participation; and establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality complaints. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is the largest provider of food aid in the world, accounting for over half of all global food aid supplies intended to alleviate hunger. Since the 2002 reauthorization of the Farm Bill, Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year for U.S. food aid programs, which delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of agricultural commodities per year. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising business and transportation costs have contributed to a 43-percent decline in average tonnages delivered over the last 5 years. For the largest U.S. food aid program, these costs represent approximately 65 percent of total food aid expenditures, highlighting the need to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of food aid. To inform Congress as it reauthorizes the 2007 Farm Bill, GAO examined some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of delivery and (2) effective monitoring of U.S. food aid.
What GAO Found
Multiple challenges combine to hinder the efficiency of delivery of U.S. food aid by reducing the amount, quality, and timeliness of food provided. These challenges include (1) funding and planning processes that increase delivery costs and lengthen time frames; (2) transportation contracting practices that create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) legal requirements that can result in the awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders in systematically addressing food delivery problems, such as spoilage. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to address timeliness concerns. USAID has been stocking or prepositioning food commodities domestically and abroad and USDA has implemented a new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these initiatives has not yet been measured. Given limited food aid resources and increasing emergencies, ensuring that food reaches the most vulnerable populations--such as poor women who are pregnant or children who are malnourished--is critical to enhancing its effectiveness. However, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor the effectiveness of food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, due to limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in the use of food aid resources. For example, although USAID has some non-Title II-funded staff assigned to monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7 billion in 55 countries in fiscal year 2006. As a result of such limitations, U.S. agencies may not be sufficiently accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. |
gao_GAO-11-29 | gao_GAO-11-29_0 | The act also designated FDIC as the administrator of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund, which was created to complete the affairs of the former Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation and liquidate the assets and liabilities transferred from the former Resolution Trust Corporation. Information Security Weaknesses Place Financial and Other Sensitive Information at Risk
FDIC did not sufficiently implement access and other controls intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information and other sensitive information. A key reason for these weaknesses is that FDIC did not always fully implement key information security program activities such as effectively developing and implementing security policies, and implementing an effective continuous monitoring program. FDIC did not consistently enforce identification and authentication controls for its users and systems. FDIC did not always ensure that sensitive information transmitted over its network was adequately encrypted. FDIC did not always sufficiently review audit and monitoring of security- relevant events. Until all key elements of its information security program have been fully and consistently implemented, FDIC will not have sufficient assurance that its financial information and assets are adequately safeguarded from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction. FDIC Has Mitigated Previously Reported Weaknesses
Despite the newly identified weaknesses, FDIC has made progress in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses. To its credit, the corporation has made improvements to the configuration management controls and aspects of its security management. For example, it maintained a full and complete requirements baseline for two systems and included key information in a remedial action plan. In addition, FDIC has corrected the FDIC Inspector General findings from the 2009 report. The weaknesses also represent a significant deficiency in internal controls over the information systems and data used for financial reporting. Until FDIC (1) mitigates known information security weaknesses in access controls and other information system controls and (2) fully implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program that includes developing, documenting, and implementing security policies and implementing an effective continuous monitoring program, its financial and other sensitive information will remain at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction, and its management decisions may be based on unreliable or inaccurate information. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the effectiveness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information, and (2) the progress FDIC has made in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses. Using the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), which establishes key elements for an effective agencywide information security program, we evaluated FDIC’s implementation of its security program by reviewing FDIC’s risk assessment process and risk assessments for key FDIC systems that support the preparation of financial statements to determine whether risks and threats were documented consistent with federal guidance; analyzing FDIC’s policies, procedures, practices, and standards to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems; analyzing security plans to determine if management, operational, and technical controls were in place or planned and that security plans were updated; examining training records for personnel with significant security responsibilities to determine if they had received training commensurat with those responsibilities; analyzing configuration management plans and procedures to determine if configurations were being m anaged appropriately; analyzing security testing and evaluation results for four key FDIC system to determine whether management, operational, and technical controls were tested at least annually and based on risk; examining remedial action plans to determine whether they addressed vulnerabilities identified in FDIC’s security testing and evaluations; a examining contingency plans for four key FDIC systems to determine whether those plans had been tested or updated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. Because of the importance of its work, the corporation must employ strong information security controls to ensure that its information systems are adequately protected from inadvertent misuse, fraud, and improper disclosure. As part of its audit of the 2009 financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund administrated by FDIC, GAO assessed (1) the effectiveness of FDIC's controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information and (2) the progress FDIC has made in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses. To perform the audit, GAO examined security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key FDIC personnel.
What GAO Found
FDIC did not sufficiently implement access and other controls intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. For example, it did not always (1) sufficiently restrict user access to systems, (2) ensure strong system boundaries, (3) consistently enforce strong controls for identifying and authenticating users, (5) encrypt sensitive information, or (4) audit and monitor security-relevant events. In addition, FDIC did not have policies, procedures, and controls in place to ensure the appropriate segregation of incompatible duties, adequately manage the configuration of its financial information systems, and update contingency plans. A key reason for these weaknesses is that FDIC did not always fully implement key information security program activities such as effectively developing, documenting, and implementing security policies, and implementing an effective continuous monitoring program. Until these weaknesses and program deficiencies are corrected, the corporation will not have sufficient assurance that its financial information and assets are adequately safeguarded from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction. Despite the newly identified weaknesses, FDIC has mitigated each of the information security weaknesses previously reported by GAO. To its credit, the corporation has made improvements to its configuration management controls and aspects of its security management. For example, it maintained a full and complete requirements baseline for two systems and included key information in a remedial action plan. Nevertheless, GAO concluded that weaknesses in information security controls constituted a significant deficiency in internal controls over the information systems and data used for financial reporting. Until FDIC corrects the security weaknesses identified during this year's audit, it will face an elevated risk of the misuse of federal assets, unauthorized modification or destruction of financial information, inappropriate disclosure of other sensitive information, and disruption of critical operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that FDIC improve key information activities to enhance the corporation's information security program. FDIC generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that it plans to address the identified weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-09-379 | gao_GAO-09-379_0 | The U.S. government seeks to improve global attitudes toward America through diplomatic and development assistance efforts, which include funding higher education for international students in the United States. For example, international students studying in science and technology help advance German research and innovation goals while also advancing public diplomacy goals by returning to their home countries as unofficial ambassadors for Germany. Governments Employ a Number of Approaches to Attract International Students, Such as Marketing Their Higher Education Internationally
To advance public diplomacy, development, and other national goals, the governments we reviewed use a number of approaches to introduce international students to their higher education systems. These marketing strategies include developing a national brand through the use of logos and slogans to promote higher education systems among international communities, much as a corporation would promote a commercial brand, as shown in figure 3. For example, many of the higher education institutions in the United Kingdom use the national brand “Education UK–Innovative.Individual. According to Australian officials, the “Study in Australia” campaign is used to highlight the quality of Australia’s education system, the country’s unique lifestyle, and the personal growth that comes from an international education experience in Australia. Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States also conduct outreach to international students through their overseas information centers. Public Diplomacy and Development Assistance Programs We Studied Share Key Characteristics
The Programs We Reviewed Generally Offer Merit-Based Scholarships Targeted to Graduate Students
The major scholarship programs we reviewed that support public diplomacy and development assistance goals typically select recipients using merit-based criteria, offer graduate-level study, and cover the cost of tuition and some other expenses. However, some public diplomacy programs have a more targeted reach. The U.S. Officials Highlighted Strategies They Say Are Key to the Successful Implementation of Scholarship Programs
Officials that administer both public diplomacy and development assistance programs cite several strategies that they say facilitate program implementation and contribute to successful program outcomes. Some told us that offering preparatory courses or program orientation to all scholarship recipients enhances the students’ chance of success at the host university, and is particularly useful for students who require additional language, cultural, or academic skills. Some development assistance officials also highlighted the importance of aligning the courses of study offered by their programs with the human resource and capacity building needs of the sending country. In Australia, officials work with sending governments to identify the most acute development needs and consider these with the applicant’s proposed field of study when awarding scholarships. The goals of this study were to determine (1) the objectives the United States and selected peer governments seek to advance through higher education for international students and the approaches they employ to attract international students, and (2) the characteristics of major United States and peer government programs that fund higher education for international students in support of public diplomacy and development goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following September 11, 2001, the number of international students coming to the United States dropped for the first time in over 30 years. While enrollments have rebounded, the U.S. image has declined in the Muslim world and elsewhere. To improve global attitudes toward America, the U.S. government funds higher education for international students to facilitate exchanges, promote understanding among peoples in different countries, and build capacity in developing nations. To provide insight on how higher education is used to advance public diplomacy and development assistance goals, we examined (1) the objectives the United States and selected peer governments seek to advance through higher education for international students and the approaches they employ to attract international students, and (2) the characteristics of major U.S. and peer government programs that fund higher education for international students to support public diplomacy and development goals. GAO collected information from the United States, Australia, China, the European Commission, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
What GAO Found
The United States and peer governments we reviewed use higher education for international students to advance diplomatic, development assistance, economic, and other objectives, often concurrently. For example, German officials said that international students studying in science and technology help advance German research and innovation goals while also advancing public diplomacy goals by returning to their home countries as unofficial ambassadors for Germany. Germany as well as other governments we reviewed use a number of approaches to reach and attract overseas students, including marketing their higher education to the international community much as a business would promote a product. For example, many countries promote their higher education systems through national branding, using logos and slogans, such as Australia's "Study in Australia" and the United Kingdom's "Education UK" marketing campaigns. Several countries have also taken steps to improve the quality of the study abroad experience. China, for example, has invested significant resources to modernize its schools and added additional academic programs that are aligned with workforce needs. The scholarship programs we reviewed that support public diplomacy and development assistance goals typically select recipients using merit-based criteria, offer graduate-level study, and cover the cost of tuition and other expenses, such as travel and living expenses. However, programs vary widely in the countries and regions they target, funding levels, and number of scholarships awarded. For example, scholarships for public diplomacy programs tended to be dispersed to a wider area to maximize their geographic reach. In contrast, development assistance programs tend to be more targeted to particular developing countries and regions. In administering and implementing these programs, government officials cited several strategies they believe facilitate program implementation and contribute to successful program outcomes. For example, some told us that offering preparatory courses or program orientation to all scholarship recipients enhances the students' chance of success at the host university, and is particularly useful for students who require additional language, cultural, or academic skills. For development assistance programs, some countries align the course of study paid for by their programs with the human resource and capacity-building needs of the sending country. For example, in Australia, officials work with sending governments to identify the most acute development needs and consider these with the applicant's proposed field of study when awarding scholarships. |
gao_GAO-06-6 | gao_GAO-06-6_0 | Initiated in 2002, the Education’s PBDMI has four goals: to improve the quality of the data Education collects about elementary and secondary education in terms of accuracy, consistency, and timeliness; to reduce the burden that states incur in reporting data to the department; to improve the focus of data analysis on program performance; and to improve Education’s data-sharing relationship with the states. PBDMI Officials Have Worked Extensively with States on Data Preparation and Submissions, but Most States Cannot Produce the Requested Data
PBDMI officials have conducted extensive outreach to the states to help unify their data definitions and upgrade their collection and submission systems. State data providers responding to our survey expressed general satisfaction with the department’s outreach. Despite the extensive outreach, the states were not able to produce enough data during test submissions in 2002-2003 and again in 2003-2004 for the department to validate its quality and consider phasing out its standing collection systems. Education officials said they also made $50,000 grants to all 52 states to offset costs of overhauling information systems or obtaining additional staff. The lack of state data is particularly acute in some programmatic areas. States have also noted competing demands for their time and resources stemming from NCLBA. For example, states that submit data to PBDMI that are also currently collected through the Consolidated State Report—one of many data collections required under the NCLBA—would not have to submit the same data under this data collection. Despite the many obstacles confronting the PBDMI, Education officials said they expect to proceed with implementation of the initiative, albeit with some activities postponed. However, this strategy has not been finalized, and Education has not developed a specific plan of action for how they might (1) help states that are deficient, (2) deal with state expectations for phasing out the multiple data collections, or (3) meet the expectations of their own program offices. In order for PBDMI to be successful, the department must rely on states to provide new information at a time when they are busy implementing large new federal initiatives, such as the No Child Left Behind Act. While some states have been able to provide significant amounts of data, others continue to lag far behind. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objective of our review of the Performance Based Data Management Initiative (PBDMI) was to assess the progress Education has made in its implementation of the initiative, particularly with regard to (1) defining what performance-related data it will collect from states on behalf of the program offices, (2) assisting states in their efforts to submit quality information, and (3) utilizing performance-related data to provide enhanced analytic capacity within the program offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a condition of receiving federal funding for elementary and secondary education programs, states each year provide vast amounts of data to Education. While the need for information that informs evaluation is important (particularly with the No Child Left Behind Act), Education's data gathering has heretofore presented some problems. It has been burdensome to states because there are multiple and redundant requests administered by a number of offices. In addition, the resulting data supplied by states has not been accurate, timely, or conducive to assessing program performance. To improve the information by which it evaluates such programs and also to ease states' reporting burden, Education in 2002 initiated an ambitious, multiyear plan to consolidate elementary and secondary data collections into a single, department-wide system focused on performance. Given its importance, we prepared a study, under the authority of the Comptroller General, to provide Congress with information on its progress.
What GAO Found
Through its Performance-Based Data Management Initiative (PBDMI), Education has consolidated and defined much of the data it anticipates collecting under a unified system. Education reports that many data definitions have been agreed-to and data redundancies eliminated. PBDMI officials also said that to date, however, it has not been able to resolve all remaining differences among the program offices that manage many of the different data collections. PBDMI officials have conducted extensive outreach to the states to advance the initiative. The outreach to states involved regional conferences, two rounds of site visits, and according to officials, $100,000 in grants to most states to help offset their costs. State data providers responding to our survey expressed general satisfaction with the department's outreach, but some were not optimistic that the initiative would ease their reporting burden or enhance their own analytic capacity. The states were not able to produce enough data during test submissions in 2003 and 2004 to enable data quality verification or phasing out the department's multiple data collections. With regard to the lack of sufficient data from many states, Education officials said some lack the technical capacity needed to produce new performance data requirements. State data providers reported having competing demands for their time and resources, given other federal initiatives. Education officials have decided to proceed with the undertaking and have developed a draft interim strategy for moving forward. But they currently have no formal plan for how they would overcome obstacles such as the lack of state data and other technical and training delays to the initiative. |
gao_GAO-02-838 | gao_GAO-02-838_0 | On March 6, 2002, USPS issued its Emergency Preparedness Plan. Without conducting tests that confirm the system’s ability to trap anthrax and not release any into the mail processing environment, the USPS has not proven that its design will meet the intent of protecting its employees and customers. USPS HEPA Design Calls for Additional Requirements
USPS believes that installing HEPA filtration systems will minimize the risks of airborne biohazards in the event of another anthrax attack, reduce dust levels, and lessen workers’ allergy-like symptoms. Therefore, USPS is proposing the use of HEPA filtration technology as a final filtering stage to remove smaller particles that constitute airborne biohazards. However, the design and configuration of the HEPA filtration system calls for additional requirements. Furthermore, USPS has not verified through testing that the HEPA air filtration system will not interfere with the air sampling and detection system. To ensure that USPS is making a sound investment, we recommend that the Postmaster General direct the Vice President of Engineering to complete the following actions before determining whether to proceed with a large-scale rollout of air filtration systems at 300 USPS P&DC/Fs: Perform tests to determine (1) the HEPA air filtration system’s ability to trap released hazards and other contaminants and (2) what level of hazards or contaminants could be released into the mail processing environment as a result of the air filtration system’s design. With regard to the concern about too much emphasis on secondary benefits, USPS noted that the main purpose of adding air filtration systems to the mail processing equipment is to minimize the potential exposure risk to postal employees and customers in the event of another anthrax attack. Postal Service | What GAO Found
Following the anthrax attacks of October 2001, the Unites States Postal Service (USPS) has started to look at various technologies that could be implemented in the event of another bioterror attack. The high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration system is being used as a prototype at two facilities and is planned for implementation throughout the country. HEPA filtering technology is the state-of-the-art technology for the removal of particulate biohazards and other particles of micron-sized range. USPS has not adequately tested the HEPA filtration system to confirm that it will meet its intended purpose of trapping anthrax spores and its secondary purpose of cleaning the mail processing equipment. USPS's testing has not shown conclusively (1) the HEPA filtration system's ability to trap released hazards and other contaminants, and (2) what level of hazards or contaminants could be released into the mail processing environment as a result of the air filtration system's design. Furthermore, USPS has not verified through testing that the air filtration system will not interfere with the air sampling and detection equipment. Even though HEPA filtration systems could reduce the risk of exposure to biohazards, they may negate the benefits of other technologies being considered by USPS to protect its employees and customers in the event of another anthrax attack. Finally, the design and installation of the HEPA filtration system requires custom modification to USPS equipment nationwide and will likely cost more than USPS projected in its Emergency Preparedness Plan. |
gao_GAO-05-371 | gao_GAO-05-371_0 | Federal employees and employees who worked under contract to the U.S. government in Vietnam are not covered by the Agent Orange Act. To obtain benefits under FECA, claimants must show that (1) they were employed by the U.S. government, (2) they were injured (exposed) in the workplace, (3) they have filed a claim in a timely manner, (4) they have a disabling medical condition, and (5) there is a causal link between their medical condition and the injury or exposure. Because Information Is Limited, Our Estimate of the Number of Federal and Contract Employees in Vietnam during Wartime Is Imprecise
Many of the agencies we contacted were unable to locate records on federal and contract workers employed in Vietnam, but on the basis of the limited data available, we estimated that at least 72,000 civilian employees and as many as 171,000 may have worked in Vietnam between 1964 and 1974. For the Few Claims Identified, Claimants Faced Many Obstacles, and to Date, Most Claims Have Been Denied
Although Labor’s claims examiners and the insurance carriers we interviewed had difficulty identifying claims, our review of the claims identified showed that civilians faced difficulty in pursuing them because of difficulty obtaining information about the claims process, their former employers, and their employers’ insurance carriers, and because of processing delays. Most of the claims they identified were filed in the past 10 years. Legislative Options Could Ease Access to Benefits for Civilians
If Congress chooses to address this issue, several legislative options could provide more similar consideration of civilian claims as compared with the claims of their veteran counterparts and improve civilian access to workers’ compensation or other benefits. Congress Could Amend the Agent Orange Act to Include Civilians or Set Up a Separate Program for Civilians Exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam
Congress could amend the Agent Orange Act and related legislation that authorizes benefits for veterans to include civilians. Alternatively, Congress could create a separate program to cover claims for medical conditions that civilians develop as a result of their exposure to Agent Orange. Congress Could Amend an Existing Statute to Grant Military Status to Certain Civilians
Congress could amend the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977, which allows DOD to retroactively grant military status and authorize full VA benefits to certain civilian groups that support the military during armed conflicts. However, with little data available on the actual number of civilians in Vietnam, their exposure levels, and the number of claims that would be filed, it is difficult to estimate the costs of these options. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the handling of civilian Agent Orange claims, the Secretary of Labor should direct OWCP to assign a unique identifying code to Agent Orange claims and develop procedures to ensure that these claims are coded correctly; provide better oversight of licensed DBA insurance carriers by requiring the Office of Longshore and Harbor Workers to track the information it retains on licensed insurance carriers for Vietnam era employers in an easily searchable format, such as in an automated file, and track changes in ownership for each licensed carrier in order to be able to determine liability for payments; and direct the appropriate offices to provide contract employees with the information needed to file Agent Orange claims by taking such measures as posting information on Labor’s Web sites or developing informational brochures that include information on how to file a claim under DBA, such as which forms to use, and information on Vietnam era contractors with the names of their insurance carriers licensed by Labor. VA also expressed concern about the precedent-setting implications these options could have for civilian employees involved in other wars and conflicts since the Vietnam War. As noted in the report, we agree that the cost and policy implications of these options should be carefully considered. As these are historical reports, we were unable to assess the reliability of these data for several reasons: Most records were not computerized in the 1960s or 1970s, most paper records have either been destroyed or were not organized in a way that would facilitate the identification of personnel, and most officials who were knowledgeable about employees in Vietnam are no longer with the agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns about difficulties civilian employees of the U.S. government may have in obtaining workers' compensation benefits for medical conditions they developed as a result of their exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam led to GAO being asked to determine (1) what is known about the number of civilians who served in Vietnam, both those employed directly by the U.S. government and those employed by companies that contracted with the government; (2) what is known about the number, processing, and disposition of claims filed by these civilians; and (3) what options are available if Congress chooses to improve access to benefits for civilians exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam who developed illnesses as a result of their exposure, and what are their cost implications?
What GAO Found
While many federal agencies that were likely employers of civilian federal and contract workers during the Vietnam War had little information on these employees, a few provided us with limited information on federal employees and the amounts of contracts for companies that provided services to the military in Vietnam. We were unable to determine the reliability of the data provided. However, we used these data for the limited purpose of estimating that between 72,000 and 171,000 civilians may have worked for the U.S. government in Vietnam between 1964 and 1974. Our ability to provide more accurate information on the size of this workforce was limited because most agency records maintained during this period were not computerized, and because so much time has elapsed that many paper records have been destroyed and many agency personnel knowledgeable of the period are no longer working at these agencies. For the 32 Agent Orange-related claims identified (12 from federal civilians and 20 from contract employees), we found that these claimants faced many difficulties and delays because of a lack of readily available information on how to file a claim, their Vietnam era employers, and their exposure to Agent Orange, as well as processing delays caused by employers, insurance carriers, and Labor. Both Labor and private insurance carriers had difficulty identifying the number of claims they had received, largely because they do not assign a unique code to Agent Orange claims that would enable easy identification. Most of the claims we identified were filed in the past 10 years, and most have been denied. Denials of the claims stemmed, in part, from the fact that under the laws governing these claims, claimants must demonstrate a causal link between their exposure to Agent Orange and their medical conditions, which is difficult to prove so many years later. If Congress chooses to address this issue, several legislative options could be considered to attempt to improve access to compensation for civilians who were exposed to Agent Orange and developed medical conditions as a result, although they could have significant cost and policy implications. Congress could amend current law authorizing benefits for veterans to cover certain civilians or set up a separate program to cover them. Another option is for Congress to amend the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977, which allows DOD to retroactively grant military status and authorize full VA benefits to certain civilian groups that support the military during armed conflicts. However, it is difficult to assess the potential costs of these options because of the limited data available on the number of civilians and their claims for compensation. Despite the difficulty of assessing the potential costs, before any of these options are pursued, their fiscal impact and the precedent-setting implications for individuals involved in other wars and conflicts since the Vietnam era should be carefully considered. |
gao_GAO-04-542T | gao_GAO-04-542T_0 | Withdrawal liability· Congress enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA) of 1980 to protect the pensions of participants in multiemployer plans by establishing a separate PBGC multiemployer plan insurance program and by requiring any employer wanting to withdraw from a multiemployer plan to be liable for its share of the plan’s unfunded liability. Different premiums and benefit guarantee levels· PBGC operates two distinct insurance programs, one for multiemployer plans and one for single-employer plans, which have separate insurance funds, different benefit guarantee rules, and different insurance coverage rules. In addition, unlike its role in the single-employer program where PBGC trustees weak plans and pays benefits directly to participants, PBGC does not take over the administration of multiemployer plans but instead, provides financial assistance in the form of loans when plans become insolvent. Recently, however, it appears that a combination of stock market declines coupled with low interest rates and poor economic conditions has reduced the assets and increased the liabilities of many multiemployer plans. In PBGC’s 2003 annual report, the agency estimated that total underfunding of underfunded multiemployer plans reached $100 billion by year-end, from $21 billion in 2000, and that its multiemployer program had recorded a year-end 2003 net deficit of $261 million, the first deficit in more than 20 years. By 2000, the majority of multiemployer plans reported assets exceeding 90 percent of total liabilities, with the average plan funded at 105 percent of liabilities. However, distribution of participants by plan size for multiemployer and single-employer plans is more comparable, with over 90 percent of both multiemployer and single-employer participants in large plans, as shown in figure 3. 4.) Multiemployer Plans Experiencing Long-Term Declines in Plan Formation and Worker Participation
Despite their relative financial stability, the multiemployer system has experienced a steady decline in the number of plans and in the number of active participants over the past 2 decades. A Number of Factors Challenge the Long- Term Prospects of the Multiemployer Defined Benefit System
A number of factors pose challenges to the long-term prospects of the multiemployer pension plan system. Experts have identified other challenges to the future prospects of defined benefit plans generally, including multiemployer plans. These include the growing trend among employers to choose defined contribution plans over DB plans, including multiemployer plans; the continued growing life expectancy of American workers, resulting in participants spending more years in retirement, thus increasing pension benefit costs; and increases in employer-provided health insurance costs, which are increasing employers’ compensation costs generally, including pensions. Certain Features of the Current Regulatory Framework and the Decline of Collective Bargaining May Discourage Future Plan Growth
Some factors raise questions about the long-term viability of multiemployer plans are specific to certain features of multiemployer plans themselves, including features of the regulatory framework that some employers may well perceive as less flexible and financially riskier than the features of other types of pension plans. Employers in multiemployer plans may also face greater financial risks than those in other forms of pension plans. Collective bargaining, however, has been declining in the United States since the early 1950s. 7.) This is because, as PBGC officials have noted, the current regulatory framework governing multiemployer plans redistributes financial risk toward employers and workers and away from the government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, which are created by collective bargaining agreements covering more than one employer and generally operated under the joint trusteeship of labor and management, provide coverage to over 9.7 million of the 44 million participants insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The recent termination of several large single-employer plans--plans sponsored by individual firms--has led to millions of dollars in benefit losses for thousands of workers and left PBGC, their public insurer, an $11.2 billion deficit as of September 30, 2003. The serious difficulties experienced by these single-employer plans have prompted questions about the health of multiemployer plans. This testimony provides information on differences between single employer and multiemployer pension plans, recent trends in the funding of multiemployer pension plans and worker participation in those plans, and factors that may pose challenges to the future prospects of multiemployer plans. GAO will soon release a separate report on multiemployer pension issues.
What GAO Found
The framework governing multiemployer plans generally places greater financial risk on employers and participants and less on PBGC than does PBGC's single-employer program. For example, in the event of employer bankruptcy, the remaining employers in the multiemployer plan assume additional funding responsibility. Further, PBGC's guaranteed participant benefit is much lower for multiemployer participants, and PBGC does not provide financial assistance until the multiemployer plan is insolvent. Following two decades of relative financial stability, many multiemployer plans appear to have suffered recent funding losses, while long-term declines in participation and plan formation continue. At the close of the 1990s, the majority of multiemployer plans reported assets exceeding 90 percent of total liabilities. Since then, stock market declines, coupled with low interest rates and poor economic conditions, have reduced assets and increased liabilities for many plans. In its 2003 annual report, PBGC estimated that underfunded multiemployer plans now face an aggregate unfunded liability of $100 billion, up from $21 billion in 2000. PBGC also reported an accumulated net deficit of $261 million for its multiemployer program in 2003, the first since 1981. Meanwhile, since 1980, there has been a steady decline in the number of plans, from over 2,200 plans to fewer than 1,700, and a 1.4 million decline in the number of active workers in plans. The long-term prospects of the multiemployer system face a number of challenges. Some are inherent in the multiemployer design and regulatory framework, such as the greater perceived financial risk and reduced flexibility for employers, compared with other plan types. The long-term decline of collective bargaining also results in fewer participants and employers available to expand or create new plans. Other factors that pose challenges include the growing trend among employers to choose defined contribution plans; the increasing life expectancy of workers, which raises the cost of defined benefit plans; and continuing increases in employer health insurance costs, which compete with pensions for employer funding. |
gao_GAO-08-776T | gao_GAO-08-776T_0 | Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD’s program, our reports have documented clearance-related problems affecting other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Recent events affecting clearance programs across the federal government include the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order 13381, “Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information.” IRTPA included milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements for reciprocity of clearances. Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform the Security Clearance Process
In our prior work, we identified four key factors that should be considered to reform the security clearance process. These include (1) ensuring a strong requirements-determination process, (2) building quality in all clearance processes, (3) developing additional metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) including long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. A change in the level of clearances being requested also increases the investigative and adjudicative workloads. Cost. The cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. In our November 2005 testimony on the previous governmentwide strategic plan to improve the clearance process, we noted that the plan devoted little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance process, and that limited attention and reporting about quality continues. In addition, when OMB issued its February 2007 annual report on security clearances, it documented quality with a single metric in one of the six phases of the security clearance process (i.e., requirements setting, application submission, investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance updating). When OMB issued its February 2008 annual report on security clearances, it did not discuss the percentage of completed investigations that are returned to OPM or the development or existence of any other metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products. We found that OPM provided some incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which the adjudicators then used to determine top secret clearance eligibility. In our September 2006 report, we recommended that regardless of whether the metric on investigations returned for rework continues to be used, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management should require OPM and DOD to develop and report metrics on investigative and adjudicative completeness and other measures of quality. In their absence, reciprocity concerns will continue to exist and Congress will not have sufficient information to perform its oversight function. Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance Processes
As we testified in February 2008, reform efforts should also consider metrics beyond timeliness to evaluate the clearance processes and procedures and to provide a more complete picture of the performance of a reformed clearance process. In February 2008, we noted that including these additional metrics could add value in monitoring clearance processes and provide a more complete picture of the performance of a reformed clearance process. Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More- Informed Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform
In February 2008, we recommended that the Joint Reform Team also provide Congress with long-term funding requirements as it develops plans to reform the security clearance process. In addition, the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes are also needed to enable the executive branch to compare and prioritize alternative proposals for reforming the clearance processes especially as the nation’s fiscal imbalances constrain federal funding. Related GAO Products
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1974, GAO has examined personnel security clearance processes and acquired a historical view of key factors to consider in reform efforts. GAO placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which represents 80 percent of federal government clearances, on its high-risk list in 2005 due to long-standing problems. These problems include incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency primarily responsible for providing clearance investigation services; the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even when required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations; and delays in completing clearance processing. Delays can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of classified information, additional costs and delays in completing related contracts, and problems retaining qualified personnel. DOD has reported on these continuing delays. However, there has been recent high-level governmentwide attention to improving the process, including establishing a team to develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. This statement addresses four key factors that should be considered in personnel security clearance reforms. This statement draws on GAO's past work, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM.
What GAO Found
Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a strong requirements determination process, (2) quality in all clearance processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. Also, changing a position's clearance level from secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold. Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide. However, agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO's 2006 recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) February 2007 report on security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008 report. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Federal agencies' efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to implement reforms would limit decision makers'--in the executive and legislative branches--ability to carry out their budgetary development and oversight functions. |
gao_GAO-05-400T | gao_GAO-05-400T_0 | Weaknesses in Error-Prone, Manual Travel Reimbursement Process Were Exacerbated by Increased Operational Tempo
The paper-intensive process used by DOD to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for their travel expenses was not designed to handle the dramatic increase in travel vouchers since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military activity. To its credit, to address the large volume of vouchers received and the unprocessed backlog, DFAS increased its staffing by over 200 new personnel and reported an average processing time of 8 days for its part of the process in September 2004. As a result, the soldiers were housed off-post in commercial hotels or apartments. Impact That Travel Reimbursement Problems Have Had on Army Guard Soldiers and Their Families
The majority of soldiers in our 10 case study units reported problems related to reimbursements for meal expenses that included late payments, underpayments, and overpayments resulting in debts to some soldiers in excess of $10,000. Furthermore, inappropriate policy and guidance on how to identify and pay soldiers entitled to late payment interest and fees because of late travel reimbursement meant that DOD continued to be noncompliant with TTRA. Lack of Clear Guidance on Travel Entitlements, Including Late Payment Interest and Fees
We found that a key factor contributing to delays and denials of Army Guard reimbursements for out-of-pocket meal expenses was a lack of clearly defined guidance. As a result, many soldiers did not receive their travel payments on time. Training time depended on the individual and type of work. Defense Travel System Deficiencies
Although DOD recognized the need to improve the travel reimbursement process in the 1990s and has been developing and implementing DTS, this system is currently not able to process mobilized travel authorizations (e.g., mobilization orders, TCS orders, and SNAs) and vouchers and, therefore, does not provide an end-to-end solution for paying mobilized Army Guard soldiers for travel entitlements. Actions to Improve Accuracy and Timeliness of Mobilized Army Guard Travel Reimbursements
DOD, the Army, the National Guard Bureau, and DFAS reported several positive actions during the course of our work that, if implemented as reported, should improve the accuracy and timeliness of travel reimbursements to Army Guard soldiers. The process, human capital, and automated systems problems we identified related to Army Guard travel reimbursement are additional examples of the broader, long-standing financial management and business transformation challenges faced by DOD. The problems we identified with DOD’s longer term automated systems initiatives—DIMHRS and DTS— raise serious questions of whether and when mobilized soldiers’ travel reimbursement problems will be resolved. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony outlines (1) the impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements; (3) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve the problems identified; and (4) other DOD actions to improve the accuracy and timeliness of Army Guard travel reimbursements.
What GAO Found
Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses. These weaknesses were more glaring in light of the sustained increase in mobilized Guard soldiers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To its credit, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) hired over 200 new personnel to address travel voucher processing backlogs and recently upgraded their training. However, Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. The soldier bears primary responsibility for travel voucher preparation, including obtaining paper copies of various types of authorizations. DFAS data indicate that it rejected and asked soldiers to resubmit about 18 percent of vouchers during fiscal year 2004--a churning process that added to delays and frustration. Also, existing guidance did not clearly address the sometimes complex travel situations of mobilized Army Guard soldiers, who were often housed off-post due to overcrowding on military installations. Further, DOD continued to be noncompliant with a law that requires payment of late payment interest and fees when soldiers' travel reimbursements are not timely. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training. Automated systems problems, such as nonintegration of key systems involved in authorizing and paying travel expenses and failure to automate key processes, also contributed to the inefficient, error-prone process. DOD has been developing and implementing the Defense Travel System (DTS) to resolve travel-related deficiencies. However, DTS will not address some of the key systems flaws. For example, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized soldier travel authorizations and vouchers and identify and calculate late payment interest and fees. |
gao_T-RCED-97-220 | gao_T-RCED-97-220_0 | It also requires that an agency’s strategic plan contain the following six critical elements: a mission statement; agencywide goals and objectives; the strategies and resources needed to achieve the goals and objectives; the relationship between the long-term goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; the key external factors that could affect the achievement of goals; and a description of how program evaluations were and will be used to establish or revise strategic goals. Though the Act does not include a requirement that the draft strategic plans should contain a description of how the activities of an agency relate and will be coordinated with the activities of other agencies with similar programs, OMB guidance does provide that the letter transmitting the strategic plan include a summary of the general scope and nature of the consultation and the types of entities consulted. National Science Foundation
While NSF addresses five of the six required elements of the Results Act, at least four of them need further development, and the sixth element—key external factors—is not included in its draft strategic plan. The Department is finalizing these elements and expects to include them in the final plan. On the basis of our work, however, we believe that Energy’s broad missions do involve or overlap those of other agencies. Commerce’s draft plan also does not identify crosscutting programs and activities or whether such shared responsibilities were coordinated in the development of the draft plan. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Of the six elements required by the Results Act, NASA includes four in its draft strategic plan. However, the draft plan does note the importance of working with other agencies in achieving its objectives, and NASA officials stated that coordination has occurred at the program level. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA’s draft plan contains four of the six elements required by the Results Act, certain aspects of which could be improved. Although the goals and objectives—one of the completed elements—are generally results-oriented and measurable, some do not clearly define the expected results, and it is unclear how EPA would assess progress toward achieving them. EPA’s draft plan does not discuss the agency’s programs and activities that are crosscutting or similar to those of other federal agencies, but it does address the need for coordination with its stakeholders, which include federal entities. According to EPA officials, the agency is including in its coordination all of the other five science agencies discussed in this testimony. The lack of coordinated performance goals that are results-oriented may be problematic as the Congress begins to evaluate programs and activities that are crosscutting among the science agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act in federal science agencies, focusing on six agencies' fulfillment of the requirements of the Results Act and the interagency crosscutting science programs, activities, or functions that are similar or complementary to those of other federal agencies. The agencies GAO discussed are the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) overall, the six agencies' draft strategic plans show progress toward meeting the purposes of the act; however, only one of the six agencies' plans contains all six of the act's critical elements; (2) in addition, some of the completed elements were insufficient; (3) for example, the goals and objectives were frequently results-oriented, but it was unclear in all of the plans how some of the goals would be measured; (4) developing effective performance measures for these program goals will be a major challenge for science agencies; (5) futhermore, five of the six plans did not include information on past and future program evaluations and the one inclusion could be improved; (6) because the draft plans do not contain all six elements, the Congress is missing critical pieces of information for its consultations with the agencies; (7) under Office of Management and Budget guidance, the agencies' final submission should include a summary of consultation efforts, including crosscutting activities; (8) currently, the agencies' draft plans generally do not address how crosscutting activities correspond with those of other agencies; (9) in addition, the plans generally do not address whether such shared responsibilities were coordinated in the development of the draft plans; (10) however, some of the agencies' missions and goals do involve or overlap those of other agencies; (11) despite the fact that the draft plans do not reflect coordination activities, several agencies have initiated efforts to coordinate crosscutting research programs governmentwide; (12) coordination has occurred primarily at the program level rather than at the senior management level which is necessary to ensure consistency of program objectives among agencies; and (13) in GAO's opinion, recognition of such coordination activities as part of the final submission will be useful to the Congress in making funding decisions that involve similar or complementary science programs. |
gao_GGD-95-101 | gao_GGD-95-101_0 | Under the new regulations, taxpayers have great latitude in establishing transfer prices. IRS’ Examination, Appeals, and Litigation Experiences With Section 482 Were Mixed
IRS’ international examiners continued to propose substantial adjustments to the taxable income of FCCs and USCCs in fiscal years 1993 and 1994, although the total dollar value of the adjustments in 1993 was $1.3 billion less than in 1994. As it was, taxpayers were already using transfer pricing methods other than the three formerly most well-defined methods for a large proportion of their transfer pricing activity reviewed by IRS, including that in APAs. The Majority of FCCs and USCCs Paid No U.S. Income Tax
In each of the 5 years studied, FCCs were less likely than USCCs to pay U.S. income tax, as shown in figure 2 and appendix V. In 1991, 73 percent of FCCs paid no U.S. income tax compared with 62 percent of USCCs. So, the 38 percent of USCCs that paid U.S. income tax in 1991 held 80 percent of the assets and generated 81 percent of all gross receipts. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As mentioned earlier, our objectives for this report were to provide information and analysis to update our 1993 work on (1) IRS’ recent experience in dealing with transfer pricing issues through its examinations, appeals, and litigation functions; (2) IRS’ use of available regulatory and procedural tools; and (3) the extent to which USCCs and FCCs did not pay U.S. income taxes. Finally, we researched 1993 and early 1994 court cases involving transfer pricing issues. IRS’ Use of Certain Procedural Tools
IRS used certain new and existing procedural tools—designated summonses, formal document requests, additional penalties, simultaneous examinations, and arbitration—sparingly. However, advance pricing agreements (APA) were increasingly used. But the very small number of large nontaxpaying corporations accounted for a disproportionately large share of total corporate assets and receipts. Comparing the types of industries represented by the largest foreign- and U.S.-controlled corporations may explain some of the differences between them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information regarding transfer pricing issues and foreign-controlled corporations' (FCC) and U.S.-controlled corporations' (USCC) tax compliance, focusing on: (1) the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) handling of transfer pricing issues through its examinations, appeals, and litigation functions; and (2) IRS use of available regulatory and procedural tools.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) recent IRS experiences with transfer pricing cases have been mixed; (2) although there were as many regulatory violations in 1993 and 1994 as in previous years, the value of the 1994 adjustments increased $1.3 billion over 1993 adjustments; (3) a large number of the 1993 and 1994 cases involved pricing methods other than the three methods specifically described in earlier IRS regulations; (4) the outcomes of IRS appeals and legal processes for the 2 years were similar to those in 1987 and 1988, with a sustention rate of about 30 percent of the proposed adjustments' value; (5) IRS has used certain procedural tools, such as simultaneous examinations and arbitration, as effective deterrents to abusive transfer pricing practices; (6) IRS expects to increase its use of advanced pricing agreements; (7) the success of the new transfer pricing regulations remains to be seen; (8) about 75 percent of FCC and 60 percent of USCC paid no U.S. income tax between 1987 and 1991; (9) the corporations that paid U.S. taxes in 1991 held 80 percent of FCC and USCC assets and generated 81 percent of their receipts; (10) the largest nontaxpaying corporations accounted for most FCC and USCC assets and receipts; and (11) factors other than transfer pricing abuse may contribute to the differences in tax amounts paid by FCC and USCC. |
gao_GAO-10-880T | gao_GAO-10-880T_0 | TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo, but Remaining Challenges Highlight the Need for a Contingency Plan
TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points along the air cargo supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, including those related to industry participation and technology. In 2008, narrow-body flights transported about 24 percent of all cargo on domestic passenger flights. Effective February 1, 2009, pursuant to the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA also required air carriers to ensure the screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all passenger aircraft. TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the air cargo supply chain. Under the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo supply chain, such as shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities, distributors, third-party logistics companies, and freight forwarders that are located in the United States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to become certified cargo screening facilities (CCSF). TSA initiated the CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes of air cargo, and then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in early 2009. TSA is conducting outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders. Challenges Facing TSA
TSA faces industry participation, technology, planning, oversight, and other challenges in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo. As shown in figure 1, TSA officials have estimated that an ideal mix of screening to achieve the 100 percent mandate as it applies to domestic cargo without impeding the flow of commerce would be about one-third of cargo weight screened by air carriers, one-third by freight forwarders, and one-third by shippers and independent CCSFs. At these rates, it is questionable whether TSA’s screening system will achieve 100 percent screening of domestic cargo by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. Effective May 1, 2010, TSA requires that 75 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft be screened. Because of the mandated deadlines, TSA is conducting qualification testing to determine which screening technologies are effective at the same time that air carriers are using these technologies to meet the mandated requirement to screen air cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Reported Screening Data. TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo
TSA has taken steps to increase the percentage of inbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft that is screened, but the agency has not developed a plan, including milestones, for meeting the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. Steps Taken
Steps TSA has taken to increase the percentage of inbound air cargo that is screened include the following: Revising its requirements for foreign and U.S. air carrier security programs, effective May 1, 2010, to generally require air carriers to screen a certain percentage of shrink-wrapped and banded inbound cargo and 100 percent of inbound cargo that is not shrink-wrapped or banded. Obtaining information from foreign countries on their respective air cargo screening levels and practices to help assess the rigor and quality of foreign screening practices. Challenges TSA Faces
According to TSA, screening inbound air cargo poses unique challenges, related, in part, to TSA’s limited ability to regulate foreign entities. As such, TSA officials stated that the agency is focusing its air cargo screening efforts on domestic cargo and on screening elevated-risk inbound cargo as it works to address the challenges it faces in screening 100 percent of inbound cargo. In April 2007, we reported that TSA’s screening exemptions for inbound cargo could pose a risk to the air cargo supply chain and recommended that TSA assess whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if necessary, address these vulnerabilities. Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Act requires the establishment of a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, including inbound cargo. In our June 2010 report, we recommended that TSA develop a plan with milestones for how and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. If implemented effectively, this plan will address the intent of our recommendation. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses air cargo screening. In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S. passenger flights--approximately 58 percent of which was transported domestically (domestic cargo) and 42 percent of which was transported on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location (inbound cargo). The 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device during an international flight bound for Detroit provided a vivid reminder that terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as attractive targets. According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in air cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of such an attack directed at passenger aircraft is high. To help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security. The act also requires that such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of checked baggage. According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the mandate for domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems because of differences in its authority to regulate domestic and international air cargo industry stakeholders. This testimony is based on a report we are publicly releasing today that assesses TSA's progress and related challenges in meeting the air cargo screening mandate. It addresses the following key issues in our report: progress TSA has made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to (1) domestic air cargo and (2) inbound air cargo and related challenges it faces for each. For our report, we reviewed documents such as TSA's air cargo security policies and procedures. We also conducted site visits to four category X U.S. commercial airports and one category I U.S. commercial airport that process domestic and inbound air cargo. We selected these airports based on airport size, passenger and air cargo volumes, location, and participation in TSA's screening program. At these airports, we observed screening operations and technologies and interviewed local TSA officials, airport management officials, and representatives from 7 air carriers, 24 freight forwarders, 3 shippers, and 2 handling agents to obtain their views on TSA's system to implement the screening mandate. We selected these air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and handling agents based on input from TSA and industry stakeholders. More detailed information about our scope and methodology is included in our June 2010 report. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
TSA has taken a number of actions to meet the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, including creating a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain and mandating that, effective May 1, 2010, 75 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. Moreover, TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo, but challenges exist, in part related to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign entities. TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. We made five recommendations to TSA to address these challenges. TSA concurred with three of these recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did not concur with the remaining recommendation, which we discuss in more detail later in this statement. TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points along the air cargo supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, including those related to industry participation and technology. |
gao_GAO-03-549T | gao_GAO-03-549T_0 | Background
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in the way reserve forces have been used. Previously, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that would supplement active forces during a major war. Today, reservists not only supplement but also replace active forces in military operations worldwide. Since September 2001, operational tempos have increased significantly for reservists in all of DOD’s reserve components due to the partial mobilization in effect to support operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. Reservists Have Reported Widely Varying Degrees of Income Loss Or Gain
Preliminary analysis of income changes reported by reservists who mobilized or deployed for past military operations indicates that they experienced widely varying degrees of income loss or gain. The data show that 41 percent of drilling unit members reported income loss during their most recent mobilization or deployment, while 30 percent reported no change and 29 percent reported an increase in income (see table 1). DOD’s preliminary analysis of the survey data show that certain groups reported greater losses of income on average. Far fewer reservists than DOD expected enrolled in the program. This practice varies considerably among employers. Under a 1994 DOD policy, the military services must “ensure National Guard and Reserve members and their families are prepared and adequately served by their services’ family care systems and organizations for the contingencies and stresses incident to military service.”
Although activated reservists and their family members are eligible for the same family support services as their active duty counterparts, they may lack knowledge about or access to certain services. Notwithstanding these efforts, we believe, based on our review to date, that outreach to reservists and their families will likely remain a continuing challenge for DOD. Challenges in Accessing DOD Health Care Benefits Are Magnified for Reservists
Reservists who are mobilized for a contingency operation are confronted with health care choices and circumstances that are more complex than those faced by active component personnel. Unlike active component members, reservists may also transition into and out of TRICARE several times throughout a career. Reservists are also not part of the day-to-day military culture and, according to DOD officials, generally have less incentive to become familiar with TRICARE because it becomes important to them and their families only if they are mobilized. We plan to look at the TRICARE reserve communications plan in more detail as we continue our study. As we continue our study, we plan to review the results of the demonstration project and its impact on improving health care for reservists’ family members. DOD has activities aimed at maintaining and enhancing employers’ support for reservists. Although DOD has numerous outreach efforts, we have found that a sizeable number of reservists and employers were unsure about their rights and responsibilities. For example, a 1999 DOD survey found that 31 percent of employers were not aware of laws protecting reservists. In a recent report, we listed several factors that have hampered DOD’s outreach efforts to both employers and reservists. Most notably, DOD is moving ahead with plans to collect employer data from all of its reserve personnel. Preliminary results from these studies are expected later this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in the way reserve forces have been used. Previously, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that would supplement active forces during a major war. Today, reservists not only supplement but also replace active forces in military operations worldwide. Citing the increased use of the reserves to support military operations, House Report 107-436 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to review compensation and benefits for reservists. In response, GAO is reviewing (1) income protection for reservists called to active duty, (2) family support programs, and (3) health care access. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its preliminary observations. GAO also was asked to discuss the results of its recently completed review concerning employer support for reservists.
What GAO Found
The preliminary results of our review indicate that reservists experience widely varying degrees of income loss or gain when they are called up for a contingency operation. While income loss data for current operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom were not available, data for past military operations show that 41 percent of drilling unit members reported income loss, while 30 percent reported no change and 29 percent reported an increase in income. This information is based on self-reported survey data for mobilizations or deployments of varying lengths of time. As would be expected, the data indicate that certain groups, such as medical professionals in private practice, tend to report much greater income loss than the average estimated for all reservists. Although reservists called up to support a contingency operation are generally eligible for the same family support and health care benefits as active component personnel, reservists and their families face challenges in understanding and accessing their benefits. Among the challenges, reservists typically live farther from military installations than their active duty counterparts, are not part of the day-to-day military culture, and may change benefit eligibility status many times throughout their career. Some of these challenges are unique to reservists; others are also experienced by active component members but may be magnified for reservists. Outreach to reservists and their families is likely to remain a continuing challenge for DOD in the areas of family support and health care, and we expect to look at DOD's outreach efforts in more detail as we continue our study. Outreach is also a critical component of maintaining and enhancing employers' support for reservists. Although DOD has numerous outreach efforts, we found that a sizeable number of reservists and employers were unsure about their rights and responsibilities. For example, a 1999 DOD survey found that 31 percent of employers were not aware of laws protecting reservists. Several factors have hampered DOD's outreach efforts to both employers and reservists. However, DOD is taking positive actions in this area, such as moving ahead with plans to collect employer data from all reserve personnel. |
gao_GAO-17-231 | gao_GAO-17-231_0 | Specifically, the device manufacturer through a 510(k) submission must notify FDA at least 90 days before it intends to market a new device and establish that such device is substantially equivalent to a predicate device. To be substantially equivalent, a device must (1) have the same intended use as the predicate device; and (2) have the same technological characteristics as the predicate device, or have different technological characteristics but submitted information demonstrates the device is as safe and effective as the predicate device, and does not raise different questions of safety or effectiveness. FDA Cleared 25 Power Morcellators; Most Devices Had the Same Intended Use and Technological Characteristics, and Could Be Used for Gynecological Surgeries
FDA documentation shows the agency cleared 25 510(k) submissions for power morcellators to be marketed in the United States between 1991 and 2014. FDA Understood the Risk of an Unsuspected Uterine Cancer That Could Be Spread When Using a Power Morcellator to be Low; Has Taken Actions in Response to Adverse Event Reports
FDA was aware of the potential for spreading tissue when using a power morcellator prior to receiving the first adverse event reports; however, the general understanding was that the risk of an unsuspected cancer that could be spread when using the device was low. In response to adverse event reports, FDA has taken several actions, including estimating cancer risk, warning against certain uses of power morcellators, and recommending new labeling. Prior to Adverse Event Reports, FDA Was Aware of the Potential for Power Morcellators to Spread Tissue, but Understood the Risk of Unsuspected Cancer that Could Be Spread to be Low
FDA officials were aware of the potential for spreading tissue during procedures that involved the use of power morcellators before receiving the first adverse event reports describing the spread of cancerous tissue after the use of a power morcellator to treat uterine fibroids. Specifically, according to FDA officials, the potential for spreading tissue—cancerous or noncancerous—following the use of a power morcellator has been known since the agency cleared the first device in 1991. FDA’s Response to First Adverse Event Reports Included Estimating Cancer Risk, Warning Against the Use of Power Morcellators, and Recommending New Labeling
FDA took several actions after receiving the first adverse event reports in December 2013 describing the spread of cancerous tissue after using a power morcellator to treat uterine fibroids. 3.) Based on this review, FDA estimated that about 1 in 350 women undergoing the surgical procedures of hysterectomy or myomectomy to treat uterine fibroids was at risk for having an unsuspected uterine sarcoma. FDA issued an “immediately in effect” guidance document in November 2014. In December 2015, FDA initiated inspections at selected hospitals to review their compliance with medical device reporting requirements, which specify that hospitals and other user facilities must report certain device-related events to FDA and to manufacturers when the manufacture is known. Questions Remain Regarding the Use of Power Morcellators to Treat Uterine Fibroids, and FDA Continues to Monitor Available Information
Questions remain regarding the use of power morcellators in the treatment of uterine fibroids, which include varying stakeholder opinions regarding the risks related to the use of power morcellators. Professional Societies Provided Guidance Regarding the Use of Power Morcellators, While Device Manufacturers Provided Instructions and Technical Training
The professional societies we contacted did not have any professional standards or training requirements for physicians specifically regarding the use of power morcellators, but some societies issued guidance to physicians related to procedures that could involve the use of power morcellators. Officials from the three health care providers that we interviewed indicated that physicians may receive training in using power morcellators during their medical residency (for example, if their attending physician used the device). Manufacturers Provided Instructions and Offered Technical Training on the Use of Power Morcellators
All of the 25 power morcellators cleared by FDA included instructions from the manufacturers for using the device, and some of the manufacturers offered technical training for physicians. We found the labeling for the 25 power morcellators included instructions for use (submitted by the manufacturers to FDA as part of the agency’s premarket review of the devices), which provided information such as device assembly, use, disassembly, and safety information. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. HHS provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. According to FDA officials, of the 2,185 device inspections conducted in fiscal year 2015, 875 included a review of medical device reporting. Appendix II: History of Predicate Devices for the First Laparoscopic Power Morcellator
In clearing the first laparoscopic power morcellator in 1991 through the 510(k) premarket notification process, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined the device was substantially equivalent to an electromechanical system for cutting tissue during minimally invasive surgeries performed on knees and other joints. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2013, media reports raised concerns regarding the use of power morcellators in the surgical treatment of women with uterine fibroids. These concerns focused on the spread of an unsuspected uterine cancer after such use of the devices.
GAO was asked to review power morcellator medical devices. This report examines (1) the number of 510(k) submissions for power morcellators FDA cleared, and the extent to which the agency determined the devices had new intended uses or new technological characteristics; (2) FDA's understanding of any concerns with the use of power morcellators to treat uterine fibroids prior to receiving adverse event reports, and the actions FDA has taken in response to these reports; and (3) the professional standards and guidance for physicians regarding the use of power morcellators, and the information device manufacturers provided. GAO reviewed documentation of FDA's decision-making and guidance and manufacturers' device labeling, and interviewed FDA officials. In addition, GAO reviewed documents and contacted officials from 10 professional societies and other organizations that have a potential interest in the use of power morcellators, and three health care providers that performed gynecological procedures that could involve the use of the devices. GAO also contacted all 12 manufacturers for the power morcellators FDA cleared for the U.S. market.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Between 1991 and 2014, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—the federal agency responsible for the oversight of medical devices—cleared 25 submissions for laparoscopic power morcellators for the U.S. market. FDA cleared the submissions for these devices, which cut tissue into small pieces to facilitate removal through small incision sites of gynecological and other types of minimally invasive surgeries, through its premarket notification process. Under this process, established under section 510(k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA reviews information submitted by a device manufacturer and determines whether the new device is substantially equivalent to another legally marketed device, known as a predicate device. In making this determination, FDA assesses whether a device has (1) the same intended use; and (2) the same technological characteristics as a predicate device, or has different technological characteristics but submitted information demonstrates the device is as safe and effective as the predicate device, and does not raise different questions of safety or effectiveness. A device determined to be substantially equivalent is cleared to be marketed. For power morcellators, FDA determined the devices in all 25 of the 510(k) submissions had the same intended use as their predicates, while 6 had new technological characteristics.
Prior to receiving adverse event reports, FDA understood the risk of having an unsuspected cancer that could be spread using a power morcellator as low; in response to such reports, the agency has taken several actions. According to FDA officials, the agency was aware of the potential for power morcellators to spread tissue (cancerous and noncancerous) when the agency cleared the first device in 1991. FDA officials noted that, at the time, the risk of having a type of uterine cancer that can resemble noncancerous uterine tumors, called fibroids, was thought to be low based on available information. After receiving reports in December 2013 about the spread of an unsuspected cancer following the use of power morcellators in surgeries to treat fibroids, FDA estimated the cancer risk to women undergoing these surgeries to be about 1 in 350 for one type of cancer. FDA issued a safety communication in November 2014 warning against certain uses of power morcellators—specifically in treating uterine fibroids. The agency also issued guidance recommending that manufacturers add a boxed warning to their device labeling, which all current manufacturers followed, and conducted inspections to review hospitals' compliance with medical device reporting requirements. As questions remain related to the use of power morcellators, FDA has continued to monitor adverse event reports, among other actions.
Professional societies provided some guidance to physicians regarding the use of power morcellators, while manufacturers of the devices provided instructions and some technical training. According to officials at professional societies that GAO contacted, there are no professional standards specific to the use of power morcellators, but some guidance and educational resources are available for surgical procedures to treat uterine fibroids in which the devices may be used. Training requirements for physicians using power morcellators generally occur at hospitals as part of the processes to ensure that physicians have suitable experience and abilities. Manufacturers provide instructions for use, and some offer technical training that demonstrates device set-up, operation, and cleaning. |
gao_GAO-06-209 | gao_GAO-06-209_0 | In addition, DOD policy states that the military services may establish requirements for their inventory control points to provide advance notification of scheduled shipments to repair contractors. Internal Control Weaknesses Impede Army’s Accountability for Inventory Shipments
Internal control weaknesses have impeded the Army’s accountability for assets shipped to repair contractors. Army inventory control points do not consistently record receipts for secondary repair items shipped to repair contractors. A lack of accurate accountability for shipments of secondary repair items and government- furnished materiel places these assets at risk of loss or theft, diminishes asset visibility and can distort on-hand inventory balances, leading to unnecessary procurement of items. In our analysis of fiscal year 2004 shipment data obtained from two Army inventory control points, we could not reconcile shipment records with receipt records for 1,076 (42 percent) of the unclassified secondary repair item shipments, with a value of $481.7 million, or for 30 (37 percent) of the classified secondary repair item shipments, with a value of $8.1 million. These data show that Army inventory control points, on the basis of receipt records maintained in its inventory management systems, cannot confirm that a substantial portion of inventory items shipped to repair contractors were in fact received. Our survey results showed that repair contractors could confirm receipt of most, but not all, of the fiscal year 2004 shipments. On the basis of our analysis of the survey results and follow-up work with contractors and Army item managers, we estimated that about 15 percent of the unclassified secondary repair item shipments in our survey population could not be confirmed as being received. We estimated that these lost or unaccounted for shipments have a value of approximately $68 million. Although required to obtain confirmation of receipt from repair contractors, Army inventory control points lack systematic procedures for obtaining and documenting receipt of shipments of secondary repair items and for following up within 45 days in cases where receipt was not confirmed by the contractors. Army Does Not Confirm Receipt of Government- Furnished Materiel
Army inventory control points are not confirming receipt of government- furnished materiel shipments as required under DOD regulation. For shipments of government-furnished materiel, almost all shipments were reported by the contractors in our survey as being received. These shipments, therefore, are unaccounted for, and thus are vulnerable to loss or theft. Repair contractors confirmed receipt of all 11 shipments of classified government- furnished materiel. As a result, DCMA officials may lack data to corroborate contractor-generated data during their inventory audits. The Army could improve accountability for inventory shipments by strengthening its internal control procedures for receipting secondary repair items and following up in cases where the contractor has not provided notification that items were received, obtaining and documenting receipts for government-furnished materiel, and providing required status reports on government-furnished materiel to DCMA. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the Army’s effectiveness in maintaining accountability of inventory shipped to repair contactors, we analyzed Army inventory shipment data, surveyed repair contractors that were recipients of inventory shipments, and assessed the Army’s adherence to policies for managing and maintaining accountability for inventory shipments. No…………... 3. to exclude major end items. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has previously reported that the lack of control over inventory shipments increases the Department of Defense's (DOD) vulnerability to undetected loss or theft. GAO evaluated the Army's effectiveness in maintaining accountability of inventory shipped to repair contractors. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed shipment data for fiscal year 2004, surveyed repair contractors that were recipients of inventory shipments, and assessed the Army's adherence to internal control procedures. Inventory shipments included both secondary repair items--components, assemblies, and subassemblies, other than major end items, which may be sent to commercial facilities for repair, alteration, or modification--and government-furnished materiel--assemblies, parts, and other items provided in support of this work.
What GAO Found
The Army has not maintained accurate accountability for inventory shipped to repair contractors, thereby placing these assets at risk of loss or theft. Although DOD policy requires the military services to confirm receipt of all assets shipped to contractors, the Army is not consistently recording shipment receipts in its inventory management systems. In an analysis of fiscal year 2004 shipment data obtained from two Army inventory control points, GAO could not reconcile shipment records with receipt records for 42 percent of the unclassified secondary repair item shipments, with a value of $481.7 million, or for 37 percent of the classified secondary repair item shipments, with a value of $8.1 million. These data show that the Army cannot confirm that all inventory items shipped to repair contractors were received. The Army's data contained no receipts for government-furnished materiel. GAO survey results showed that repair contractors could confirm receipt of most, but not all, of the shipments. Specifically, on the basis of its survey results and follow-up work, GAO estimated that about 15 percent of the unclassified secondary repair item shipments in the survey population could not be confirmed as being received. GAO estimated that these lost or unaccounted for shipments have a value of approximately $68 million. All shipments of classified government-furnished materiel and secondary repair items were reported as received by the contractors in our survey. For shipments of unclassified government-furnished materiel, almost all shipments were reported by the contractors in our survey as being received. The Army's accountability for shipments of items sent to repair contractors is impeded by three internal control weaknesses. First, Army inventory control points lack systematic procedures for (1) obtaining and documenting contractor receipt of shipments of secondary repair items, (2) following up in cases where receipt was not confirmed by the contractors, and (3) providing advance notification of shipments to contractors. Second, the Army does not confirm receipt of government-furnished materiel shipments, reflecting a discrepancy between the Army's practices and DOD regulations regarding the need to confirm receipt of these shipments. DOD regulations require receipts for all shipments, including government-furnished materiel. Third, inventory control points do not provide the Defense Contract Management Agency with required quarterly reports that show the status of government-furnished materiel shipments. As a result, Defense Contract Management Agency officials may lack data to corroborate contractor-generated data during their inventory audits. These weaknesses in the Army's ability to account for inventory shipped to repair contractors increase the risk of undetected loss or theft. Moreover, inaccurate receipt records can diminish asset visibility and distort on-hand inventory balances, leading to unnecessary procurement of items. |
gao_GAO-08-1167T | gao_GAO-08-1167T_0 | Historically, undercounts have plagued the census, although, according to the Bureau, they have generally diminished since 1940. Three such efforts that I will highlight in my remarks today are (1) a complete and accurate address list, (2) an Integrated Communications Campaign to increase awareness and encourage participation, and (3) special enumeration programs targeted toward historically undercounted populations. The Bureau develops its address list and maps over the course of the decade using a series of operations that sometimes overlap to increase the accuracy of the list of all housing units are included. These operations include partnerships with the U.S. To help find hidden housing units it might otherwise miss, listers ask if there is more than one residence at a particular address, or to look for clues such as an outbuilding or two mailboxes or utility meters that could indicate additional households. Targeting the Bureau’s communications campaign to hard-to-count populations will help the Bureau use its resources more effectively. The Bureau developed the Service-Based Enumeration program (SBE) for the 2000 Census to provide the homeless and others without conventional housing an opportunity to be included in the census. For example, with respect to address canvassing, the Bureau plans to provide listers with GPS-equipped handheld computers (HHC) to verify and correct addresses. Consequently, the performance of the HHCs is critical to the accurate, timely, and cost-effective completion of address canvassing. The Integrated Communications Campaign faces its own set of challenges, chief among which is the long-standing issue of converting awareness of the census to an actual response. Potential Impact of Undercounts on Federal Funding
Our past work indicates that the accuracy of state and local population estimates may have an effect, though modest, on the allocation of grant funds among the states. Many of the formulas used to allocate grant funds rely upon measures of population, often in combination with other factors. In our June 2006 report, we analyzed the sensitivity of Social Services Block Grants (SSBG) to alternative population estimates, such as those derived by statistical methods that incorporate the number of people that were overcounted and undercounted in the census, rather than the actual census. We selected SSBG for our analysis because the formula for this block grant program, which was based solely on population, and the resulting funding allocations, were particularly sensitive to such alternative population estimates. In short, as shown in figure 6, in 2004, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained $4.2 million and 23 states would have lost $4.2 million of the $1.7 billion in SSBG funding. Concluding Observations
The Bureau’s strategy for reducing the differential undercount appears to be comprehensive, integrated, and based on lessons learned from the 2000 Census. If each of the various components is implemented as planned, they will likely position the Bureau to address the differential undercount. With this in mind, the success of the Bureau’s efforts aimed at the hard-to- count will depend in large part on the extent to which they (1) start and finish on schedule, (2) are implemented in the proper sequence, (3) are adequately tested, and (4) receive appropriate staffing and funding. It will also be important for the Bureau to have a real-time monitoring capability to track the progress of the enumeration, target the Bureau’s resources to where they are most needed, and to quickly respond to various contingencies that could jeopardize the accuracy or cost of the count. 2010 Census: Plans for Decennial Census Operations and Technology Have Progressed, But Much Uncertainty Remains. | Why GAO Did This Study
An accurate decennial census relies on finding and counting people-- only once--in their usual place of residence, and collecting complete and correct information on them. This is a daunting task as the nation's population is growing steadily larger, more diverse, and according to the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau), increasingly difficult to find and reluctant to participate in the census. Historically, undercounts have plagued the census and the differential impact on various subpopulations such as minorities and children is particularly problematic. GAO was asked to describe (1) key activities the Bureau plans to use to help reduce the differential undercount and improve participation, (2) the various challenges and opportunities that might affect the Bureau's ability to improve coverage in 2010, and (3) how different population estimates can impact the allocation of federal grant funds. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's issued work in which it evaluated the performance of various Census Bureau operations.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's strategy for reducing the undercount and improving participation in the 2010 enumeration appears to be comprehensive, integrated, and shaped by the Bureau's experience in the 2000 Census. If implemented as planned, the various activities the Bureau is developing should position the agency to address the undercount. Key operations include building a complete and accurate address list, implementing an Integrated Communications Campaign to increase awareness and encourage participation, and fielding special enumeration programs targeted toward historically undercounted populations. For example, the Bureau develops its address list and maps over the course of a decade using a series of operations that sometimes overlap to ensure all housing units are included. Among other activities, temporary census workers go door to door across the country in an operation called address canvassing to verify addresses. To help find hidden housing units, the Bureau's workers look for clues such as two mailboxes or utility meters that could indicate additional households. Likewise, the Bureau's communications campaign includes paid media, public relations, and partnerships with national and grassroots organizations, among other efforts, some of which will be targeted toward hard-to-count groups. Despite the Bureau's ambitious plans, a number of challenges and uncertainties remain. For example, the performance of the handheld computers that is critical to address canvassing has technical shortcomings, while the communications campaign faces the historical challenge of converting awareness of the census to an actual response. Further, success will depend in large part on the extent to which the various operations (1) start and finish on schedule, (2) are implemented in the proper sequence, (3) are adequately tested and refined, and (4) receive appropriate staffing and funding. It will also be important for the Bureau to have a real-time monitoring capability to track the progress of the enumeration, target its resources to where they are most needed, and to quickly respond to various contingencies that could jeopardize the accuracy or cost of the count. Our past work indicates that the accuracy of state and local population estimates may have an effect, though modest, on the allocation of grant funds among the states. Many of the formulas used to allocate grant funds rely upon measures of the population, often in combination with other factors. For example, we analyzed the sensitivity of Social Services Block Grants (SSBG) to alternative population estimates, rather than the actual census. We selected SSBG for our analysis because the formula, which was based solely on population, and the resulting funding allocations were particularly sensitive to alternative population estimates. Based on our simulation of the funding formula, 27 states and the District of Columbia would have gained $4.2 million and 23 states would have lost $4.2 million of the $1.7 billion in 2004 SSBG funding. |
gao_RCED-98-111 | gao_RCED-98-111_0 | Three Plans’ Approaches to Insuring Revenue Result in Different Levels of Protection and Government Costs
The three government-subsidized revenue insurance plans—Income Protection, Revenue Assurance, and Crop Revenue Coverage—differ in the revenue guarantees they provide to the farmer and in their relative cost to the government. Two of the plans, Income Protection and Revenue Assurance, set the revenue level that is to be protected at the time that crops are being planted, while the third, Crop Revenue Coverage, determines the protected revenue at either planting or at harvest, depending on when prevailing crop prices are higher. Crop Revenue Coverage Is Likely to Cost the Government Significantly More Than Other Plans
Crop Revenue Coverage is likely to be more costly to the government than the other insurance plans because of its higher reimbursements for administrative expenses to participating companies and because of potentially higher total underwriting losses (the excess of claims payments over total premiums). Furthermore, the plan’s promise to base the revenue guarantee on the price at planting or at harvest, whichever is higher, exposes the government to higher claims payments in years when widespread crop losses are coupled with rapidly increased prices. New Insurance Plans Achieving Significant Share of Crop Insurance Market
In their first 2 years, the crop revenue insurance plans, especially Crop Revenue Coverage, have already achieved a significant share of the crop insurance market, accounting for about one-third of crop insurance premiums in the areas where they were offered. However, in 1997, because of the relatively favorable growing conditions in the nation, the crop insurance program had a much lower level of claims—$0.49 per $1 of premium. While favorable weather and stable crop prices generated a very favorable claims experience over the first 2 years that the plans were available to farmers, these shortcomings raise questions about whether the rates established for each plan are actuarially sound over the long term and are appropriate to the risk each farmer presents. Furthermore, while the plans were initially approved on a limited basis only, FCIC approved the substantial expansion of one of these plans—Crop Revenue Coverage—before the initial results of claims experience were available. The yield risk component is based on rates established under traditional multiple-peril crop insurance. In particular, as we reported, the rating method for Crop Revenue Coverage is especially problematic because it does not take into account the relationship between crop prices and yields. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various issues pertaining to the Department of Agriculture's new crop revenue insurance plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the three government-subsidized revenue insurance plans differ in the revenue guarantees they provide to farmers and in their relative cost to the government; (2) two of the plans, Revenue Assurance and Income Protection, set the revenue level that is to be protected at the time that crops are being planted, while the third, Crop Revenue Coverage, determines the protected revenue at either planting or at harvest, depending on when crop prices are higher; (3) in terms of potential government costs, Crop Revenue Coverage is likely to cost the government significantly more than the other two plans because of its higher reimbursement for administrative expenses and because of potentially higher total underwriting losses; (4) furthermore, the plan's promise base the revenue guarantee on the price at planting or the price at harvest, whichever is higher, exposes the government to higher claims payments in the years when widespread crop losses are coupled with rapidly increasing prices; (5) in their first two years of availability to farmers, the crop revenue insurance plans, especially Crop Revenue Coverage, achieved a significant share of the crop insurance market, accounting for about one-third of the total crop insurance sales in the areas where they were offered; (6) in terms of the claims payments for 1997, all types of crop insurance experienced much lower than average levels of claims as a result of favorable growing conditions in most of the country; (7) morever, primarily because revenue insurance plans were often marketed in lower-risk areas, they experienced lower levels of claims payments than did multiple-peril crop insurance; (8) GAO identified shortcomings in each revenue insurance plan's approach to establishing premium rates; (9) Crop Revenue Coverage is especially problematic because its rate structure does not take into account the interrelationship between crop prices and yields--an essential component of actuarially sound rate settings; (10) while good weather and stable crop prices generated very favorable claims experience over the first 2 years of the plans' availability, GAO has doubts about whether the rates established for each plan are actuarially sound over the long term and are appropriate to the risk each farmer presents; and (11) furthermore, while the plans were initially approved on a limited basis only, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, acting within its authority, approved the substantial expansion of one of these plans--Crop Revenue Coverage--before initial results were available. |
gao_GAO-11-510T | gao_GAO-11-510T_0 | Proliferation of Programs That Support Teacher Quality Complicates Federal Efforts to Invest Dollars Effectively
In fiscal year 2009, the federal government spent over $4 billion specifically to improve the quality of our nation’s 3 million teachers through numerous programs across the government. However, there is no governmentwide strategy to minimize fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication among these programs. Specifically, GAO identified 82 distinct programs designed to help improve teacher quality, either as a primary purpose or as an allowable activity, administered across 10 federal agencies. Many of these programs share similar goals. For example, 9 of the 82 programs support improving the quality of teaching in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM subjects) and these programs alone are administered across the Departments of Education, Defense, and Energy; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the National Science Foundation. The proliferation of programs has resulted in fragmentation that can frustrate agency efforts to administer programs in a comprehensive manner, limit the ability to determine which programs are most cost effective, and ultimately increase program costs. GAO previously reported that 23 of the programs administered by Education in fiscal year 2009 had improving teacher quality as a specific focus, which suggested that there may be overlap among these and other programs that have teacher quality improvements as an allowable activity. In addition, our larger body of work on federal education programs has also found a wide array of programs with similar objectives, target populations, and services across multiple federal agencies. This includes a number of efforts to catalogue and determine how much is spent on a wide variety of federally funded education programs. In past work, GAO and Education’s Inspector General have concluded that improved planning and coordination could help Education better leverage expertise and limited resources, and to anticipate and develop options for addressing potential problems among the multitude of programs it administers. However, given the large number of teacher quality programs and the extent of overlap, it is unlikely that improved coordination alone can fully mitigate the effects of the fragmented and overlapping federal effort. Options for Congress to Consider as It Addresses Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication
As this Subcommittee considers its annual spending priorities, it may be an opportune time to consider options for addressing fragmentation and overlap among federal teacher quality programs and what is known about how well these programs are achieving their objectives. As we have reported, many programs, especially smaller programs, have not been evaluated, which can limit the ability of Congress to make informed decisions about which programs to continue, expand, modify, consolidate, or eliminate. Consolidating Existing Programs
Consolidating existing programs is another option for Congress to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Congress has another opportunity to address these issues through the pending reauthorization of the ESEA. Education has already proposed combining 38 programs into 11 programs in its reauthorization proposal, which could allow the agency to dedicate a higher portion of its administrative resources to monitoring programs for results and providing technical assistance. In conclusion, removing and preventing unnecessary duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal teacher quality programs is clearly challenging. Sustained attention and oversight by Congress will also be critical. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication in Federal Teacher Quality and Employment and Training Programs. Department of Education: Improved Oversight and Controls Could Help Education Better Respond to Evolving Priorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the findings from our recent work on fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in federally funded programs that support teacher quality. We recently issued a report addressing fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in federal programs that outlined opportunities to reduce potential duplication across a wide range of federal programs, including teacher quality programs. Our recent work on teacher quality programs builds on a long history of work where we identified a number of education programs with similar goals, beneficiaries, and allowable activities that are administered by multiple federal agencies. This work may help inform congressional deliberations over how to prioritize spending given the rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our nation's government. In recent years, the Department of Education (Education) has faced expanded responsibilities that have challenged the department to strategically allocate resources to balance new duties with ongoing ones. For example, we reported the number of grants Education awarded increased from about 14,000 in 2000 to about 21,000 just 2 years later and has since remained around 18,000, even as the number of full-time equivalent staff decreased by 13 percent from fiscal years 2000 to 2009. New programs often increase Education's workload, requiring staff to develop new guidance and provide technical assistance to program participants. Our work examining fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication can help inform decisions on how to prioritize spending, which could also help Education address these challenges and better allocate scarce resources. In particular, our recent work identified 82 programs supporting teacher quality, which are characterized by fragmentation and overlap. Fragmentation of programs exists when programs serve the same broad area of national need but are administered across different federal agencies or offices. Program overlap exists when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Overlap and fragmentation among government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. Given the challenges associated with fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication, careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address these issues. This testimony draws upon the results of our recently issued report and our past work and addresses (1) what is known about fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication among teacher quality programs; and (2) what are additional ways that Congress could minimize fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among these programs?
What GAO Found
We identified 82 distinct programs designed to help improve teacher quality administered across 10 federal agencies, many of which share similar goals. However, there is no governmentwide strategy to minimize fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication among these programs. The fragmentation and overlap of teacher quality programs can frustrate agency efforts to administer programs in a comprehensive manner, limit the ability to determine which programs are most cost effective, and ultimately increase program costs. In addition, our larger body of work on federal education programs has also found a wide array of programs with similar objectives, target populations, and services across multiple federal agencies. In past work, GAO and Education's Inspector General have concluded that improved planning and coordination could help Education better leverage expertise and limited resources; however, given the large number of teacher quality programs and the extent of overlap, it is unlikely that improved coordination alone can fully mitigate the effects of the fragmented and overlapping federal effort. Sustained congressional oversight can also play a key role in addressing these issues. Congress could address these issues through legislation, particularly through the pending reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), and Education has already proposed combining 38 programs into 11 programs in its reauthorization and fiscal year 2012 budget proposals. Further, actions taken by Congress in the past demonstrate ways this Subcommittee can address these issues. However, effective oversight may be challenging as many of the programs we identified, especially smaller programs, have not been evaluated. |
gao_GAO-17-34 | gao_GAO-17-34_0 | In order for employers in the states to receive certain UI tax benefits, states must follow certain requirements, including that the states have laws generally prohibiting instructional employees of certain educational institutions from collecting UI benefits between academic terms if they have a contract for, or “reasonable assurance” of, employment in the second term. State Officials Reported That State Laws and Policies Can Affect Teacher Eligibility for Unemployment Insurance Benefits All Head Start Teachers are Generally Not Eligible in Some States
In responding to our survey, state UI directors reported having to follow various state laws and policies that may affect whether Head Start and other ECE teachers are allowed to collect benefits during the summer. Specifically, in 2 of the states we surveyed, officials reported that Head Start teachers are generally not eligible for UI benefits over summer breaks but other ECE teachers may be. Officials in some states told us that their laws include certain types of employers in the definition of an educational institution. For example, Kansas officials reported that private for-profit institutions are not considered educational institutions, and California officials reported that non- profits are not considered educational institutions. The Program’s Relationship with a School or Board of Education Can Affect Eligibility
Officials in 17 states reported that UI eligibility for Head Start teachers can be affected by the program’s relationship to a school or board of education, and officials in 11 states reported similar restrictions for ECE teachers. West Virginia officials reported that if a teacher works for a Head Start program that is “under the influence or authority” of a county board of education, and his or her wages are reportedly paid by the board of education, the teacher is generally considered a school employee and is therefore not eligible for UI benefits over the summer break. About Half of All Head Start Teachers May Have Been Eligible for Unemployment Insurance Benefits during Summer Breaks in 2015
We estimated that approximately 44,800 of the nearly 90,400 Head Start teachers across the country may have been eligible for UI benefits during their summer breaks in 2015. We also estimated that about 28,940 Head Start teachers did not have summer breaks long enough to allow them to collect UI benefits. Based on our analysis of available data, about 2,100 of these teachers work in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, where, as mentioned earlier, Head Start teachers are generally not eligible for UI benefits over summer breaks. States Identified Various Communication Efforts with Employees and Employers of Head Start and Early Childhood Education Programs, and Stakeholders Identified a Number of Limitations with These Efforts
States reported using a variety of methods to communicate general UI eligibility information to both Head Start and ECE employers and employees. See figure 2 for more information on communication methods states reported using to employers and figure 3 for communication methods states reported using to employees. Even with the information states reported providing, the Head Start and ECE employer and employee representatives we interviewed said that state UI programs can remain difficult to understand because of the complexity of the various federal and state laws, regulations, and policies governing the programs. To some extent, the concerns raised by stakeholders can be associated with the fact that states do not generally assess the effectiveness of their communication approaches. Thirty-four of 53 states (64 percent) reported that they do not conduct evaluations to assess the effectiveness of their communications with employers. Other states reported making significant changes to their claims processing systems and making the language on the applications more reader friendly and understandable. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the extent to which states have laws or policies that affect whether Head Start and other ECE teachers can claim UI benefits during summer breaks; (2) how many Head Start teachers may have been eligible for UI benefits during their summer breaks in 2015; and (3) what is known about how states communicate information about eligibility for UI benefit payments to Head Start and ECE employees and the effectiveness of these efforts. Survey of State UI Programs
To address all three objectives, we conducted a web-based survey of state UI directors (including all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) from February to April 2016. We analyzed data from the 2014-2015 program year, the most recent available. In our interviews with state officials, we asked about eligibility policies and changes to such policies, improper payments, communication with employers and employees, and other internal controls. GAO-14-737T. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, the Head Start child development program provided federal funds to local grantees that employed over 90,000 teachers. Some of these grantees run programs that do not run during the summer, and some teachers may, in turn, seek UI benefits to help meet expenses during that time. All states have laws generally prohibiting certain employees of educational institutions from collecting UI benefits between terms, though they have flexibility in setting specific eligibility restrictions. GAO was asked to review Head Start and other ECE teachers' eligibility for UI benefits during the summer months.
This report examines (1) the extent to which states have laws or policies that affect whether Head Start and other ECE teachers are eligible for UI benefits during summer breaks; (2) how many Head Start teachers may have been eligible for these benefits during their summer breaks in 2015; and (3) what is known about how states communicate information about eligibility for UI benefit payments to Head Start and ECE employees and the effectiveness of these efforts. GAO surveyed UI directors in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands (with 100 percent responding); analyzed Head Start data from program year 2015; reviewed relevant federal laws; and interviewed federal officials and stakeholders, including employer associations and teacher associations, in five states selected using criteria such as their benefit restrictions.
What GAO Found
In response to GAO's survey, officials from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and two territories reported that they have various laws or policies that may affect whether Head Start and other early childhood education (ECE) teachers are allowed to collect unemployment insurance (UI) benefits during summer breaks. Officials in three states—Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming—reported that Head Start teachers are generally not eligible for UI benefits over summer breaks. In other states, officials outlined various factors that can affect eligibility. Specifically, officials from 30 states said the type of employer—for-profit, non-profit, or municipality—can influence eligibility for Head Start teachers (officials in 28 states reported this for ECE teachers). In addition, officials in 17 states reported that eligibility for Head Start teachers can be affected by the program's relationship to a school or board of education (officials in 11 states reported this for ECE teachers). For example, West Virginia officials reported that Head Start teachers considered under the authority of the board of education are generally not eligible for UI benefits.
In 2015, about half of the 90,000 Head Start teachers (about 44,800) across the country may have been eligible for UI benefits during their summer break, according to GAO's analysis of available data and the information states reported about their laws, regulations, and policies in response to GAO's survey. The remaining teachers and assistant teachers were likely not eligible because they worked for school districts or charter schools (about 14,150); worked in programs with breaks that were too short to allow them to collect benefits (about 28,940); or were generally not eligible under state laws, regulations, or policies (about 2,510).
To communicate UI eligibility rules to both employers and employees, state UI agencies reported using a variety of methods; however, selected stakeholders identified several concerns with these efforts. According to GAO's survey, state directors reported that they use various communication channels to provide general information to both employers and employees on matters, such as how to file a claim in their states. The three most commonly cited methods used by the states included websites, hotlines, and handbooks. Even though most states reported that they are using multiple methods of communication with employers and employees, some Head Start and ECE stakeholders in five selected states told GAO that the complexity of federal and state laws and policies governing state programs continue to make UI eligibility rules difficult to understand, even with information that their states are providing. While some of this confusion can be attributed to the variability and complexities of states' eligibility policies, GAO also found that states are generally not evaluating the effectiveness of their communication approaches. Specifically, over half of the states reported that they have not evaluated the effectiveness of their communication approaches with employees, and about two-thirds reported they have not evaluated the effectiveness of their communication approaches with employers. The states that were conducting evaluations reported that the feedback allowed them to make improvements in their communication materials for both employers and employees. For example, some states reported making their claims processing applications more user friendly and understandable as a result of this feedback.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-658 | gao_GAO-01-658_0 | The two principal precursors of ozone—nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds—have diverse sources. Respiratory Illnesses
Throughout the 1990s, death rates from two respiratory illnesses— (1) chronic lung disease and (2) pneumonia/influenza—in North Carolina and Tennessee were consistently higher than the comparable national rates. TVA’s emissions of nitrogen oxide (an ozone precursor) were relatively stable during the 1990s; however, it estimates that its emissions of nitrogen oxides—during the warm-weather months when ozone levels peak—will decline 70 percent between 1999 and 2005. EPA also told us about this review. Briefing Section I: Overview
Air Pollution and Respiratory Illnesses in and Near the Great Smoky Mountains National Park
Briefings for Chairman Charles H. Taylor Subcommittee on Legislative House of Representatives March 1 and 22, 2001
As directed by House Report 106-1033 and as discussed with Chairman Charles H. Taylor, we focused on four issues: visibility, which is important to people who live near the park, visitors from other areas who travel to enjoy the park’s vistas, and others; ozone, which can harm people, animals, and plants; respiratory illnesses, a manifestation of the harm from ozone and other causes; and Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) plans to reduce its emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. In the east generally, and in the park specifically, most of these particles are sulfates, which are formed in the air from sulfur dioxide gas. 3. To generate electricity TVA relies primarily on coal. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been growing about the air quality, visibility, and respiratory illnesses around the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, which straddles the border between North Carolina and Tennessee. This report analyzes recent trends in and contributing factors to (1) visibility impairments, (2) ground-level ozone, and (3) respiratory illnesses.
What GAO Found
This report also examines the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) plans to reduce its emission of regulated pollutants from generating electricity. Visibility impairments and ozone are largely attributable to the following three types of emissions: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. The counties that border the park generally have slightly higher mortality rates from two types of respiratory illness. The three types of emissions interact in the atmosphere to form ozone gas and sulfate particles, which are linked to respiratory illnesses. In response to federal laws and other factors, TVA is making substantial environment-related investments and expects to reduce its annual emissions of sulfur dioxide by 40 percent and its "ozone-season"' emissions of nitrogen oxides by 70 percent between 1999 and 2005. |
gao_GAO-17-187 | gao_GAO-17-187_0 | The guidance also notes that states and tribes that use the reassignment authority will be directed to submit after-action reports to ASPR within 120 days of the termination of the authorization. ASPR’s Processes for the Reassignment Authority Were Not Well Communicated, and It Does Not Plan to Assess the Authority’s Impact on Emergency Response
HHS’s ASPR has developed processes for HHS agencies and offices to review and approve states’ and tribes’ requests to temporarily reassign federally funded personnel in public health emergencies and to review the after-action reports these entities are required to submit on the effect of the personnel reassignment. ASPR’s initial efforts to communicate information about these processes to states, tribes, and HHS agencies and offices were limited, though the office has begun to improve communication efforts to state and tribal public health officials. While these officials were generally aware of the reassignment authority provided by PAHPRA, none of them were aware that the reassignment guidance had been finalized in April 2016 until we shared this information with them in summer 2016. Officials from three states we reviewed said that they generally anticipated having enough personnel to respond to public health emergencies and would likely not need to request further assistance. The federal internal control standard for information and communication states that effective communication with internal parties is necessary to achieve an entity’s objectives. However, the agency has not created a roster of specific program officials: those grants management and other staff responsible for day-to-day management of eligible funding programs who would be charged with approving reassignment requests. However, without more specific outreach on the part of ASPR about decision making for reassignment requests, reporting requirements, and its process for reviewing after-action reports, HHS officials that administer the funding programs may be unaware of their expected roles in reviewing and approving reassignment requests and reviewing after-action reports, which may negatively affect states’ and tribes’ public health emergency response. ASPR Does Not Plan to Evaluate the Impact of the Reassignment Authority on Public Health Emergency Response
ASPR will not be able to fully assess the impact of personnel reassignment on public health emergency response because it does not plan to conduct its own evaluations of states’ and tribes’ after-action reports. Instead, according to ASPR officials, it plans to assign responsibility for reviewing these reports to the HHS agencies and offices that administer the programs from which personnel were reassigned, because ASPR believes that these other HHS agencies and offices are better able to identify the effect of the reassignment on their funding programs and take corrective action as needed. However, ASPR is the federal office with primary responsibility for overseeing medical and public health preparedness and response. Therefore, HHS and, specifically, ASPR, would benefit from conducting targeted, timely outreach to other HHS agencies and offices to provide information on HHS’s processes, expectations, and requirements for using the authority prior to any further federal public health emergency declarations. Recommendations
To help ensure that HHS agencies and offices fully understand the requirements and processes for the temporary reassignment authority, their responsibilities under the authority, and that ASPR is adequately and comprehensively assessing the effect of the authority on public health emergency response and medical surge, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct ASPR to take the following two actions:
ASPR should conduct outreach to HHS agencies and offices that administer programs eligible for the reassignment authority to inform them of their responsibilities and ASPR’s expected time frames for reviewing and approving states’ and tribes’ requests for personnel reassignments, and inform them of their responsibilities and ASPR’s expectations for reviewing states’ and tribes’ after-action reports. For the first recommendation that ASPR should conduct outreach to HHS agencies and offices that administer the programs eligible for reassignment, HHS told us that ASPR intends to continue to provide information on reassignment procedures through the information posted on its website and sharing language to describe the applicability of the authority to specific grants with HHS agencies and offices that administer the eligible programs. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides funding through Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program cooperative agreements to assist state and local public health agencies in building their public health emergency preparedness and response capabilities, including for medical surge. | Why GAO Did This Study
HHS provides funding to state, local, and territorial entities to help them prepare for and respond to public health emergencies, such as influenza pandemics and other threats. However, states have reported not having sufficient personnel to assist in public health emergencies. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA) authorized HHS to allow states and tribes to temporarily reassign personnel funded, in whole or in part, by HHS programs to aid in public health emergency response.
PAHPRA included a provision for GAO to examine the impact of the reassignment authority. However, the authority has not yet been used. Therefore, this report examines the processes HHS has in place to review states' and tribes' requests for temporary reassignment and evaluate the after-action reports states and tribes are to submit after they have used the authority. GAO reviewed HHS guidance and interviewed officials from HHS and five states selected based on their increased risks for public health emergencies and levels of prior federal grant funding received.
What GAO Found
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has primary federal responsibility for overseeing medical and public health preparedness and response and coordinating the reassignment of personnel in a public health emergency. ASPR has developed processes to review and approve states' and tribes' requests for personnel reassignment. Should ASPR receive a request for personnel reassignment, it would convene relevant officials from the HHS agencies and offices from which states were requesting reassignment, with the goal of the agencies and offices considering requests and ASPR communicating reassignment decisions within four days. However, ASPR's efforts to communicate these processes to the HHS agencies and offices that administer programs eligible for personnel reassignment have been limited.
Program officials—personnel responsible for day-to-day administration of programs eligible for reassignment—from two HHS agencies told GAO that they were generally unaware of the reassignment authority, ASPR's processes and time frames for reviewing and approving requests, or the program officials' expected role in approving requests.
ASPR officials said that the office did not conduct targeted outreach to HHS agencies and offices to inform them of its processes, requirements, or expectations, noting that these entities should be aware of them through other channels, such as during the vetting of guidance on the use of the reassignment authority through HHS. However, officials from one agency said program officials are typically not directly involved in the vetting process.
Conducting outreach to HHS agencies and offices on ASPR's reassignment requests, review processes, and time frames would be consistent with federal internal control standards for information and communication, and would improve HHS agencies' and offices' awareness of expected roles, thereby preventing potential delays in decision making in the event of a public health emergency.
ASPR has assigned responsibility for reviewing after-action reports to HHS agencies and offices—an expectation program officials were also unaware of—and does not plan to conduct its own evaluations of the reports. HHS requires states and tribes that use the authority to submit after-action reports containing information on how the reassignment assisted their emergency response. In assigning report review responsibility to HHS agencies and offices, ASPR officials said that the HHS agencies and offices will be better able to identify the effect of the reassignments on their programs and take corrective actions as needed. However, ASPR's approach does not address the need to comprehensively assess the impact of reassignment on emergency response across HHS. Conducting its own evaluations of the after-action reports would be consistent with the federal internal control standard for monitoring, and would allow ASPR to determine whether the reassignment authority provides helpful resources for states' public health emergency response, as well as assess the effect of the authority across all participating HHS agencies and offices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS direct ASPR to (1) conduct outreach to HHS agencies and offices to inform them of ASPR's processes, expectations, and requirements for the reassignment authority; and (2) develop a plan to evaluate after-action reports to assess the authority's impact on emergency response and medical surge. HHS agreed with both recommendations and provided information on how ASPR plans to implement them. |
gao_NSIAD-98-229 | gao_NSIAD-98-229_0 | 1.2.) Two instruments have been used to reduce the commercial bank debt of some heavily indebted poor countries. Specifically, we focused our review on (1) the implementation of the HIPC initiative and (2) the initiative’s potential to achieve its stated goal. Implementation of the HIPC Initiative Reflects Compromise
The implementation of the HIPC initiative has involved significant negotiation among the major creditors on issues such as the eligibility of a country, the amount of relief to be provided, and the way in which relief is to be shared among creditors. For five of these six countries, the Boards agreed to provide relief at the upper end of what the negotiated framework allows. The HIPC Initiative Will Help Countries, but Many Will Remain Vulnerable to Future Debt Problems
The HIPC initiative will provide benefits to recipient countries; however, many will remain vulnerable to future debt problems, even with sound economic policies. For some countries, those export growth projections may turn out to be overly optimistic. HIPC Recipients Will Need Strong Economic Performance and Continued Economic Assistance
Countries receiving debt relief through the HIPC initiative will need to maintain strong economic performance and, in most cases, continue to receive large amounts of donor assistance in order to service their debt. The HIPC initiative’s projections assume that, after completing the HIPC initiative, countries will maintain sustainable debt levels in part through strong export growth. In addition, for most countries, substantial donor assistance is expected to continue, including balance-of-payments support. For this reason, their export earnings are considered to be particularly vulnerable to adverse economic events. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative; and (2) initiative's potential to achieve its stated goal of bringing poor countries' debts to sustainable levels.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the HIPC initiative will help reduce participating poor countries' debt burdens, in some cases, substantially; however, many will remain vulnerable to future debt problems even with sound economic policies; (2) the implementation of the HIPC initiative reflects compromise among the major official creditors on issues such as countries' eligibility and the total amount of debt relief to be provided; (3) in recognition of countries' economic vulnerablities, creditors have generally agreed on relief amounts that are at or close to the upper bounds of what the negotiated framework allows; (4) nonetheless, in order to avoid further debt problems, countries receiving debt relief through the HIPC initiative are assumed to maintain strong economic performance and continue to receive large amounts of donor assistance; (5) in most cases this assistance includes balance-of-payments support; (6) the HIPC initiative projections assume that countries will maintain sustainable debt levels in part through strong export growth; (7) these export growth assumptions may be optimistic for some countries; and (8) since many HIPC recipients rely upon a few commodities for their export earnings, they are particularly vulnerable to economic events such as a decline in the price or output of a primary export. |
gao_GAO-04-960 | gao_GAO-04-960_0 | Generally, M+C plan types differed by the extent to which they used provider networks. 1.) Examples of such services include skilled nursing and home health, which are covered under FFS Medicare, and dental care and routine physical examinations, which are not covered under FFS Medicare. Demonstration PPOs Did Little to Expand Health Plan Options, and Have Enrolled Relatively Few Beneficiaries
Demonstration PPOs did little to expand access to private Medicare health plans for beneficiaries who lacked such access. About 98 percent of the beneficiaries who lived in counties with demonstration PPOs had other Medicare private health plans available. Of the 10.1 million eligible Medicare beneficiaries living in demonstration PPO counties, about 98,000, or less than 1 percent, had enrolled by October 2003. 3.) Demonstration PPOs Left Beneficiaries Exposed to Relatively High Total Out-of- pocket Costs, but Offered Slightly Better Coverage for Some Benefits
According to CMS estimates available on the Medicare Web site, an average beneficiary aged 65 to 69 enrolled in a demonstration PPO could expect to incur $391 per month in health care expenses for premiums, cost sharing, and utilization of noncovered items and services. Despite the same or higher estimated out-of-pocket costs, demonstration PPOs may have offered slightly better coverage for certain items and services, such as prescription drugs and inpatient hospitalization. 4.) Specifically, OACT projected that the PPO plan in the M+C Alternative Payment Demonstration would increase Medicare spending by a total of $25.2 million over 2002 and 2003 combined, or $750 per enrollee per year, due to higher plan payments and CMS’s sharing in the plan’s financial risk. The Medicare PPO Demonstration was projected to increase Medicare spending by a total of $75 million in 2003, or $652 per enrollee per year, due to plan payments. Actual Spending Due to Demonstration PPOs Cannot Yet be Determined
At present, it is too early to determine the actual costs of the demonstrations in 2002 and 2003. According to the estimates available to beneficiaries on the Medicare Web site, enrollees in demonstration PPOs could expect out-of-pocket costs that were higher than those they would have incurred in FFS Medicare or M+C plans, other than M+C PFFS plans, and no less than those they would have incurred with Medigap plans F and I. We based our evaluation on enrollment in demonstration PPOs, the out-of-pocket costs Medicare beneficiaries could expect in demonstration PPOs relative to other types of coverage, and the effect of demonstration PPOs on Medicare spending. Overall, we found that less than 1 percent of the beneficiaries living in counties where demonstration PPOs operated had enrolled in demonstration PPOs, that most of the enrollees came from M+C plans, and that demonstration PPOs did not offer lower estimated out-of-pocket costs than most other types of Medicare coverage, even if beneficiaries obtained services only from network providers. Fourth, CMS stated that our legal finding—that the agency exceeded its authority by allowing plans in the Medicare PPO Demonstration to cover certain services only if beneficiaries obtained them from the plans’ network providers—should be discussed in the context of the demonstration’s objectives. Appendix I: Analysis of PPO Demonstration Participants’ Restriction on Enrollee Choice of Provider
In 2003, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initiated the Medicare Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) Demonstration. The Social Security Act defines a private-fee-for service plan, in part, as a “Medicare+Choice plan” that “does not restrict the selection of providers among those who are lawfully authorized to provide the covered services.” A “Medicare+Choice plan,” for purposes of the definition of a private fee-for-service plan, is defined, in part, as “health benefits coverage offered under a policy, contract, or plan by a Medicare+Choice organization.” Furthermore, CMS guidance also provides that enrollees in M+C private fee-for-service plans can obtain “plan covered health care services from any entity that is authorized to provide services under parts A and B and who is willing to accept the plan’s terms and conditions of payment.” The act, therefore, does not distinguish between Medicare covered services and other covered services in specifying the private fee-for-service plan’s obligations to cover plan benefits. Third, it describes CMS data sources used to compare 2003 benefits between the six types of coverage. | Why GAO Did This Study
Preferred provider organizations (PPO) are more prevalent than other types of health plans in the private market, but, in 2003, only six PPOs contracted to serve Medicare beneficiaries in Medicare+Choice (M+C), Medicare's private health plan option. In recent years, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare, initiated two demonstrations that include a total of 34 PPOs. GAO (1) described how CMS used its statutory authority to conduct the two demonstrations, (2) assessed the extent to which demonstration PPOs expanded access to Medicare health plans and attracted enrollees in 2003, (3) compared CMS's estimates of out-of-pocket costs beneficiaries incurred in demonstration PPOs with those of other types of coverage, including fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare, M+C plans, and Medigap policies in 2003, and (4) determined the effects of demonstration PPOs on Medicare spending.
What GAO Found
CMS used its statutory authority to offer health-care organizations financial incentives to participate in the two demonstrations. CMS, however, exceeded its authority when it allowed 29 of the 33 plans in the second demonstration, the Medicare PPO Demonstration, to cover certain services, such as skilled nursing, home health, and routine physical examinations, only if beneficiaries obtained them from the plans' network providers. In general, beneficiaries in Medicare PPO Demonstration plans who received care from non-network providers for these services were liable for the full cost of their care. The demonstration PPOs attracted relatively few enrollees and did little to expand Medicare beneficiaries' access to private health plans. About 98,000, or less than 1 percent, of the 10.1 million eligible Medicare beneficiaries living in counties where demonstration PPOs operated had enrolled in the demonstration PPOs by October 2003. Further, although one of the goals of the Medicare PPO Demonstration was to attract beneficiaries from traditional FFS Medicare and Medigap plans, only 26 percent of enrollees in its plans came from FFS Medicare, with all others coming from M+C plans. About 9.9 million, or 98 percent, of the 10.1 million eligible Medicare beneficiaries also had M+C plans available in their counties. Virtually no enrollment occurred in counties where only demonstration PPOs operated. According to CMS's 2003 estimates, on average demonstration PPO enrollees could have expected to incur total out-of-pocket costs--expenses for premiums, cost sharing and noncovered items and services--that were the same or higher than those they would have incurred with nearly all other types of Medicare coverage. However, relative costs by type of coverage varied somewhat depending on beneficiary health status. For certain services and items, such as prescription drugs and inpatient hospitalization, demonstration plans provided better benefits relative to some other types of Medicare coverage. Although it is too early to determine the actual program costs of the two demonstrations, CMS originally projected that the first demonstration would increase Medicare spending by $750 per enrollee per year and the second demonstration would increase Medicare spending by $652 per enrollee per year. Based on the agency's original enrollment projections, which exceed 2003 actual enrollment, CMS estimated the demonstration PPOs would increase program spending by $100 million for 2002 and 2003 combined. |
gao_RCED-98-161 | gao_RCED-98-161_0 | Without a car, welfare recipients must rely on existing public transportation systems to move them from their inner-city homes to suburban jobs. However, recent studies show important gaps between existing transit system routes and the location of entry-level jobs. Primarily through FTA’s demonstration programs and seminars and HUD’s Bridges to Work program, these agencies have provided limited funding for programs that support transportation research and demonstration programs aimed at helping the poor move from welfare to work. While the number of welfare recipients moved into jobs has been low, the programs have identified programmatic and demographic factors that local transportation and welfare officials should consider to ensure that the most effective transportation strategies are employed to support welfare reform. FTA has also helped state and local transportation agencies develop plans for addressing the transportation needs of their welfare recipients. HUD’s Bridges to Work Project Is in Early Stages of Implementation
HUD’s Bridges to Work program is a 4-year research demonstration program that began in late 1996 with $17 million in public and private funding. Preliminary results show that the following factors appear to support a program’s success: (1) collaboration among transportation, employment, and other human services organizations; (2) an understanding of local job markets; and (3) flexible transportation systems. Accordingly, it is difficult to evaluate how funds provided for an Access to Jobs program would effectively support national welfare reform goals. However, the lack of specific information on the program’s purpose, objectives, performance criteria, and evaluation approach makes it difficult to assess how the program would improve mobility for low-income workers and contribute to overall welfare reform objectives. An Access to Jobs program would authorize significant funding ($900 million) to support the transportation element of welfare reform. Recommendations
If the Congress authorizes an Access to Jobs program, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation (1) establish specific objectives, performance criteria, and measurable goals for the program when the Department prepares its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan; (2) require that grant recipients coordinate transportation strategies with local job placement and other social service agencies; and (3) work with other federal agencies, such as the departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development, to coordinate welfare-to-work activities and to ensure that program funds complement and do not duplicate other welfare-to-work funds available for transportation services. Finally, DOT disagreed with our assessment that an Access to Jobs program will require the Federal Transit Administration to undergo a cultural change—a change whereby the agency may have to accept nontraditional transportation solutions to address barriers to welfare-to-work programs. Nonetheless, the DOT and HUD studies cited in this report consistently emphasized the limitations of existing mass transit systems as the transportation solution to welfare-to-work barriers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) whether current studies and research demonstrate the importance of transportation services in implementing welfare reform; (2) the preliminary results of the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) current welfare-to-work programs and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Bridges to Work program; and (3) how an Access to Jobs program would support welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) transportation and welfare studies show that without adequate transportation, welfare recipients face significant barriers in trying to move from welfare to work; (2) existing public transportation systems cannot always bridge the gap between where the poor live and where jobs are located; (3) the majority of entry-level jobs that the welfare recipients and the poor would be likely to fill are located in suburbs that have limited or no accessibility through existing public transportation systems; (4) FTA has funded welfare-to-work demonstration projects, planning grants, and regional seminars, while HUD's Bridges to Work research program is in the early stages of placing inner-city participants in suburban jobs; (5) although these programs began recently and have limited funding, they have identified programmatic and demographic factors that state and local officials should consider when they select the best transportation strategies for their welfare-to-work programs; (6) these factors include: (a) collaboration among transportation providers and employment and human services organizations; (b) analyses of local labor markets to help design transportation strategies that link employees to specific jobs; and (c) flexible transportation strategies that may not always rely on existing mass transit systems; (7) if authorized, an Access to Jobs program would bring additional resources and attention to the transportation element of welfare reform; (8) however, limited information about the program's objectives or expected outcomes makes it difficult to evaluate how the program would improve mobility for low-income workers or support national welfare-to-work goals; (9) the new program may require FTA and local transit agencies to undergo a cultural change whereby they are willing to accept nontraditional approaches for addressing welfare-to-work barriers; (10) the agency must ensure that the millions of dollars it contributes to welfare reform support rather than duplicate the transportation funds provided through other federal and state agencies; and (11) while FTA has begun to consider some of these important issues, addressing all of them before the program is established would help ensure that the transportation funds provided for an Access to Jobs program would be used efficiently and effectively in support of national welfare goals. |
gao_GAO-08-391 | gao_GAO-08-391_0 | Uncollected AD/CV Duties Are Substantial and Highly Concentrated
Uncollected AD/CV duties from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 amount to over $613 million and are highly concentrated among a few industries, products, countries of origin, and importers. In addition, a relatively small number of large AD/CV duty bills and unresolved legal protests accounts for a sizeable portion of the uncollected AD/CV duties. However, the law generating this reporting has been repealed. By product. However, a relatively small number of bills for more than $1 million increased the average (mean) bill amount to more than $26,000. According to private sector representatives and congressional staff, such reporting has been critical to oversight of CBP’s efforts to collect AD/CV duties. First, the retrospective component of the U.S. AD/CV duty system creates the risk of uncollected duties because the final amount of AD/CV duties an importer owes can exceed the amount it paid when goods entered the country. Congress addressed one of these risks by temporarily suspending importers’ ability to post bonds and requiring a cash payment to cover the estimated AD/CV duties owed at the time of importation when purchasing from a new shipper. Third, all importers must provide a general bond to secure the payment of duties, but CBP’s standard bond formula provides little protection of AD/CV duty revenue because it sets bond amounts at a low level. CBP addressed this by revising its standard bond formula for imports subject to AD/CV duties, but the revision has only been applied to one product and faces challenges in domestic courts and internationally. Fourth, CBP collects minimal information regarding importers and does not conduct background or financial checks, which creates challenges to locating and collecting AD/CV duties. However, in some cases, final duty rates are significantly higher. New Shipper Reviews Enhance Risk for Uncollected AD/CV Duties; Congress Has Partially Addressed This Risk
U.S. law pertaining to the application of AD/CV duties to “new shippers” poses two types of risks related to the collection of these duties. For example, a new shipper can purposely make one commercial shipment to the United States at a relatively high price for which the importer would pay a relatively high AD/CV duty rate, then request a review of that shipment. CBP’s Standard Bond Formula Provides Little Protection of AD/CV Duty Revenue; CBP Has Taken Steps to Address This Risk, but Faces Challenges
CBP’s standard bond setting formula provides little protection for securing AD/CV duty revenue when the final amount of AD/CV duties owed exceeds the amount paid at the time of importation. Each set has both potential advantages and disadvantages. Congress Could Eliminate the Retrospective Component of the U.S. AD/CV Duty System
U.S. law could be changed to eliminate the retrospective component of the U.S. AD/CV duty system and, instead, treat AD/CV duties assessed at the time the product enters the country essentially as final. Under a prospective AD/CV duty system, the amount of duties assessed may not match the amount of actual dumping or subsidization. Under a retrospective AD/CV duty system, the amount of duties assessed reflects the actual amount of dumping by the exporter for the period of review. However, in practice, a substantial amount of retrospective AD/CV duty bills are not collected. This gap between the amount of duties assessed and the amount collected means that the government is not fully remedying the unfair trade practice. Conclusions
The existence of a substantial amount of uncollected AD/CV duties undermines the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s efforts to deter unfair foreign trade practices and reduces the amount of revenue available to the U.S. government. With more than $600 million in AD/CV duties currently uncollected, a large portion of which is likely to be written off, the U.S. government’s efforts to remedy injurious unfair trade practices also has been seriously compromised. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent and nature of uncollected AD/CV duties, (2) the key factors contributing to risks for uncollected AD/CV duties and the steps taken to improve the collection of AD/CV duties, (3) interagency communications that affect the processing of AD/CV duties, and (4) potential options for improving AD/CV duty collections. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been unable to collect hundreds of millions of dollars in antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties. The Department of Commerce imposes these duties to remedy injurious unfair foreign trade practices (unfairly low prices or subsidies). The noncollection of AD/CV duties means that the U.S. government has not fully remedied the unfair trade practices and bears a substantial loss of revenue. GAO was asked to examine the (1) nature and extent of uncollected AD/CV duties, (2) factors contributing to uncollected AD/CV duties and steps taken to address these factors, and (3) options for aiding duty collections. To analyze these issues, GAO reviewed CBP data for fiscal years 2001 through 2007, agency documents and reports, and interviewed government officials and private sector representatives
What GAO Found
While over $600 million in AD/CV duties dating back to 2001 remain uncollected, they are highly concentrated among a few products, countries of origin, and importers. For example, four products account for about 84 percent of the total amount of uncollected AD/CV duties. Also, a relatively small number of importers owe the vast majority of these uncollected duties. In addition, half of the 23,000 unpaid AD/CV duty bills are less than $309, but the average duty bill is more than $26,000 due to a relatively small number of very large bills. According to CBP officials, prospects for collecting a sizeable portion of these bills are slim, because many of the importers have disappeared, have no assets, or have declared bankruptcy. CBP reporting on uncollected AD/CV duties has been critical to congressional and public oversight of CBP's efforts to collect AD/CV duties. However, the law generating this reporting has been repealed. Four key factors contribute to uncollected AD/CV duties, a few of which the U.S. government has partially addressed. First, because the U.S. AD/CV duty system involves the retrospective assessment of duties, the final amount of AD/CV duties an importer owes can significantly exceed the initial amount paid when the goods entered the country. Second, companies that did not previously export products subject to AD/CV duties, i.e., "new shippers," pose two types of risks for collections. For example, new shippers can be assigned an AD/CV duty rate based on as few as one shipment, which can significantly underestimate the final duty rate. Also, importers purchasing from new shippers were able to provide a bond in lieu of a cash payment to cover the initial AD/CV duties assessed. Congress addressed this risk by temporarily requiring all importers to pay initial AD/CV duties in cash. Third, all importers must provide a general bond to secure the payment of all types of duties, but CBP's standard practice for setting the amount of this bond inadequately protects AD/CV duty revenue. CBP addressed this by revising its bonding formula for products subject to AD/CV duties, but the revision has been tested on only one product and faces domestic and international legal challenges. Fourth, CBP collects minimal information regarding importers and does not conduct background or financial checks, which creates challenges to locating importers and collecting AD/CV duties. Two sets of options exist for improving AD/CV duty collection, each of which involves potential advantages and disadvantages. One set of options involves revising U.S. law to eliminate the retrospective component of the U.S. AD/CV duty system by assessing final duties when the product arrives in the United States (i.e., a prospective system). But there would be trade-offs. For example, under a retrospective system, the amount of duties finally assessed reflects the actual amount of dumping by the exporter for the period of review. Under a prospective system, the amount of duties assessed may not match the amount of actual dumping or subsidization. However, in practice, a substantial amount of AD/CV duty bills are not collected under the U.S. retrospective system. The second set of options involves making adjustments within the existing system. For example, Congress could revise the standards for new shipper reviews and CBP could examine the option of revising bonding requirements to protect additional AD/CV duty revenue. |
gao_GAO-05-997 | gao_GAO-05-997_0 | Selected Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Processing Voter Registration Applications and Various Steps They Took to Address Them
In our survey of election officials, all but one of the jurisdictions reported that they faced challenges receiving and processing voter registration applications and that they took various steps to address them. Election officials reported taking steps to address these challenges by hiring extra staff, among other things. Over the past few years, our work and the work of others have found that challenges processing voter registration applications can result in eligible citizens not being registered to vote on Election Day. Election Officials in Half of the 14 Jurisdictions Reported Challenges Checking Voter Registration Applications for Completeness, Accuracy, or Duplicates
Election officials representing 7 of the 14 jurisdictions also reported that their staff experienced challenges, to some extent or a great extent, checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates. Our June 2005 report identified list maintenance challenges faced by election officials in the 14 jurisdictions because of problems using felony, death, and other information from existing data sources to verify the accuracy of voter registration data. In addition, election officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions reported that their jurisdictions offered certain first- time voters—those who had registered by mail after January 1, 2003, but did not provide a copy of required identification when they applied to register to vote—the opportunity to cast provisional ballots even if they were unable to provide identification at the polling place. Local election officials in 8 of the 14 jurisdictions said that they experienced challenges implementing provisional voting for the November 2004 election. In these jurisdictions, the election officials said that they viewed provisional voting as a challenge for various reasons, including some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or, in one jurisdiction representing a large number of precincts, staff reported not having sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, the officials reported that they provided additional training to poll workers and hired additional staff to count provisional ballots within the time frames allowed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe election officials’ characterization of their experiences in 14 jurisdictions within 7 states with regard to the November 2004 election: (1) managing the voter registration process and any challenges related to receiving voter registration applications, checking them for completeness, accuracy, and duplication; and entering information into voter registration lists; (2) removing voter names from voter registration lists and ensuring that the names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing provisional voting and identification requirements in accordance with HAVA and addressing any challenges encountered. Consistent with our objectives, our survey focused primarily on (1) challenges, if any, processing voter registration applications, specifically, challenges receiving voter registration applications from MVAs, other NVRA agencies, and voter registration drives sponsored by non- governmental organizations; checking voter registration applications for completeness, accuracy, and duplicates; and entering voter information into registration lists or systems; (2) whether voters names were removed from voter registration lists, reasons why names were removed, and steps taken to ensure that voters names were not inadvertently removed; and (3) HAVA’s provisional voting and first-time voter identification requirements, specifically, the number of provisional ballots cast and counted, including reasons, if any, why jurisdictions did not count provisional ballots; how voters were informed about provisional voting and its outcome; and whether first-time voters who registered by mail were allowed to cast provisional ballots if they did not provide identification. These challenges occurred due to incomplete applications. Postal Service showed that the voter had moved to another jurisdiction or felony records identified the voter as ineligible due to a felony conviction; sent a letter or postcard to the voter to confirm that the voter wanted his/her name removed from the voter registration list as requested; sent a letter to the voter notifying of removal because court records identified the voter as ineligible due to mental incompetence; sent a letter to the deceased voter’s next of kin notifying of removal and asking for confirmation of the voter’s death; contacted the funeral home to obtain the deceased voter’s identifying information (such as name, date of birth, and address); matched information from a newspaper obituary with information from the state/county vital statistics offices; and matched the voter’s identifying information (such as name, address, date of birth, and social security number) contained in the voter registration list with information received from various sources on changes of address (i.e., the U.S. No state or local election officials contacted the MVA office. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's past work and the work of others has shown that challenges processing voter registration applications and maintaining voter registration lists can result in individuals arriving at polls on Election Day to find they were not listed as registered. GAO surveyed local election officials in 14 jurisdictions in 7 states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to obtain their views on managing voter registration for the 2004 election. GAO selected the 7 states considering characteristics relevant to voter registration, such as whether a statewide voter registration list existed prior to the enactment of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002. Locations were selected within each state to represent one small and one large election jurisdiction. This report discusses election officials' characterization of (1) challenges receiving voter registration applications, including checking them for completeness; (2) removing voters' names from voter registration lists and ensuring that names were not inadvertently removed; and (3) implementing HAVA's provisional voting and identification requirements. HAVA, in part, requires that states offer provisional ballots to voters not listed as registered who declare eligibility and first-time voters who registered by mail after January 1, 2003, and could not provide identification. GAO offered election officials the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses used to prepare this report.
What GAO Found
Local election officials representing all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions GAO surveyed after the November 2004 election reported facing some challenges processing voter registration applications and took steps to address them. Processing applications received from voter registration drives sponsored by non-governmental organizations posed a challenge to election officials in 12 of the 14 jurisdictions, while half of the officials reported challenges receiving applications from other external sources, such as motor vehicle agencies. Challenges occurred in processing these applications for reasons such as incomplete or inaccurate information on voter registration applications. Half of the officials reported that their offices faced challenges checking applications for completeness, accuracy, or duplicates, citing, among other things, insufficient staffing to check the applications. Steps taken by election officials to address these and other challenges included hiring additional staff to handle the volume of applications received and contacting applicants to get correct information. All but 1 of the 14 election officials reported that, using various sources of information, they removed names from voter registration lists during 2004 if, for example, voters had moved, were deceased, or were ineligible due to a felony conviction. To help ensure names of eligible voters were not inadvertently removed from voter registration lists, officials reported contacting voters to confirm removal, matched voters' identifying information (such as name and address) with address changes provided by the U.S. Postal Service, and matched voter registration records with felony or death records. GAO reported in June 2005 about problems officials in these same jurisdictions experienced verifying voter information with death or felony information from existing data sources. GAO's survey showed that all 14 election jurisdictions permitted citizens to cast provisional ballots during the November 2004 election. HAVA gives states discretion to implement provisional voting based on state voter eligibility requirements. According to the election officials surveyed, about 423,000 provisional ballots were cast in 13 of the 14 jurisdictions, and 70 percent of those votes were counted. Also, 8 of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges implementing provisional voting, in part, because some poll workers were not familiar with provisional voting or staff did not have sufficient time to process provisional ballots. To address these challenges, election officials in these jurisdictions said they hired extra staff or provided training to poll workers. |
gao_GAO-10-1029T | gao_GAO-10-1029T_0 | Background
To process claims accurately, consistently, and in a timely manner, Veterans Service Representatives (VSR) and Rating Veterans Service Representatives (RVSR) must perform a complex set of tasks. Experienced Claims Processors Had Concerns with Various Aspects of the Training They Received
Experienced staff responding to our survey expressed concerns with the amount of training they were required to take and their ability to meet those requirements. An estimated 45 percent of supervisors of experienced RVSRs and 53 percent of supervisors of experienced VSRs thought that only some or few, if any, of the experienced staff they supervise need 80 hours of training. Our survey results also indicated that it was challenging for many experienced claims processors, in general, to meet the 80-hour annual training requirement, given their workload. While many experienced claims processors thought that 80 hours of training per year was too much and difficult to complete, they had mixed views on the amount of training they received on specific topics. For example, an estimated 47 percent thought they received less than sufficient training in developing appeals and remands, and 42 percent thought they received less than needed in how to rate claims involving special monthly compensation. On the other hand, in each case, about one-third thought they received more than enough training in records management, rating disability compensation claims, and calculating payment amounts based on disability ratings. Experienced claims processors’ views on the helpfulness of various training modes and the timing of training also varied. An estimated 39 percent of all experienced claims processors felt that the formal training, in general, they received in the last 12 months was delivered too late to help them effectively perform their job duties. VBA Did Little to Systematically Monitor or Assess Training for Experienced Claims Processors but Has Begun to Take Steps to Do So
VBA headquarters does not ensure that experienced claims processors receive all required training. While each regional office is responsible for recording completed training hours for each claims processor in VA’s Web-based Learning Management System (LMS), VBA officials told us that VBA headquarters did not use it to centrally monitor the specific types of training individual claims processors have completed. To improve VBA headquarters’ ability to systematically monitor regional office compliance with its annual training requirements, we recommended that it adopt procedures to routinely do so, including more fully utilizing its LMS to ensure that claims processors received required CTTR and ad hoc training on emerging issues. In addition, we found that VBA lacked controls to ensure that regional offices record completed training in a consistent manner. Each regional office has considerable discretion in determining what activities qualify as training and we noted that they were not all defining training consistently. We recommended that VBA develop clear written guidance on the types of activities all regional offices should and should not count toward completion of annual training requirements. VBA also has not systematically assessed the appropriateness or consistency of training regional offices provide to experienced claims processors. In prior work, we have noted that federal agencies should have mechanisms in place to ensure that training for employees is appropriate and consistent. As a result, we recommended that VBA develop and implement a written strategy to systematically assess the appropriateness (content, mode and timing) of all training for experienced claims processors. VBA says it is assessing the feasibility of requiring staff to complete an evaluation tool for all training and expects to complete this assessment by September 30, 2010. Furthermore, there are questions about the reliability of the training data regional offices record in VA’s LMS. GAO-10-445. Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to present its views on the training requirements and procedures for VA personnel responsible for processing compensation and pension claims. This statement is based primarily upon an April 2010 GAO report on VA's training for experienced disability claims processors (GAO-10-445) and includes information on actions VBA says it has taken in response to our recommendations. This statement focuses on (1) experienced disability claims processors' views regarding training, and (2) VBA's efforts to monitor and assess training for experienced disability claims processors.
What GAO Found
Experienced claims processors had concerns about the amount of training they were required to complete and their ability to meet that requirement. In addition, they had mixed views on the amount of training received on specific topics, the way in which training was delivered and the timing of training. GAO's survey results indicated that 60 percent of experienced claims processors found it difficult to meet the 80 hour annual training requirement given their workload. In addition, based on its survey, GAO estimates that 45 percent of supervisors of experienced Rating Veterans Service Representatives (RVSR) and 53 percent of supervisors of experienced Veterans Service Representatives (VSR) thought that only some or few, if any, of the experienced staff they supervise need 80 hours of training annually to perform their job duties effectively. Many experienced staff also thought they received too little training on some topics and too much on others. For example, 47 percent thought they received less training than needed in how to develop appeals and remands and 34 percent thought they received more than enough training on records management. Finally, opinions varied on how helpful the various modes of training were. Nearly all claims processors, in general, considered on-the-job experience to be the method of training best suited to their needs. An estimated 39 percent of all experienced claims processors, in general, felt that the training they received was delivered too late, suggesting that regional offices may not always deliver the training needed by experienced claims processors in a timely manner. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, federal agencies must have control mechanisms in place to help ensure that all employees receive appropriate and consistent training. Under its current annual training requirements, VBA delegates considerable responsibility for training experienced claims processors to each of its 57 regional offices. In particular, regional offices are responsible for ensuring that claims processors complete annual training requirements. Each office also determines what topics are covered for half of the required training hours, what material to provide on each of these topics, and how and when the training should occur. Regional offices also have considerable discretion in determining what activities qualify as training. However, at the time of GAO's review, VBA lacked controls to ensure that regional offices deliver required training and record completed training in a consistent manner, and did little to assess the appropriateness or consistency of all training for experienced claims processors. During the course of our review and in response to our recommendations, VBA has taken steps to improve its monitoring and assessment of training. VBA reports that they are developing guidance on what activities qualify as training, have begun to require staff to complete course evaluations for some training and are exploring the feasibility of requiring evaluations for all training. In its April report, GAO recommended that VBA (1) adopt procedures for routinely monitoring and ensuring compliance with annual training requirements, including more fully using its Web-based learning management system to ensure training requirements are met, (2) develop clear written guidance on the types of activities all regional offices should and should not count toward completion of annual training requirements, and (3) develop and implement a written strategy for systematically assessing the appropriateness of the training regional offices provide to experienced claims processors. VA concurred with these recommendations and has taken some actions in response. |
gao_GAO-14-159 | gao_GAO-14-159_0 | According to TSA’s strategic plan and other program guidance for the BDA program released in December 2012, the goal of the agency’s behavior detection activities, including the SPOT program, is to identify high-risk passengers based on behavioral indicators that indicate “mal-intent.” For example, the strategic plan notes that in concert with other security measures, behavior detection activities “must be dedicated to finding individuals with the intent to do harm, as well as individuals with connections to terrorist networks that may be involved in criminal activity supporting terrorism.”
TSA developed its primary behavior detection activity, the SPOT program, in 2003 as an added layer of security to identify potentially high- risk passengers through behavior observation and analysis techniques. From fiscal year 2007—when the SPOT program began deployment nationwide—through fiscal year 2012, about $900 million has been expended on the program, as shown in figure 2. While the April 2011 SPOT validation study was a useful initial step and, in part, addressed issues raised in our May 2010 report, it does not demonstrate the effectiveness of the SPOT indicators because of methodological weaknesses in the study. Further, TSA program officials and BDOs we interviewed agree that some of the behavioral indicators used to identify passengers for additional screening are subjective. The meta- analyses, or reviews that synthesize the findings of other studies, we reviewed collectively included research from more than 400 separate studies on detecting deception, and found that the ability of human observers to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral cues or indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance (54 percent). Subjective Interpretation of Behavioral Indicators and Variation in Referral Rates Raise Questions about the Use of Indicators; TSA Plans to Study Indicators
BDO Interpretation of Some Behavioral Indicators Is Subjective; TSA Plans Study
BDA officials at headquarters and BDOs we interviewed in four airports said that some of the behavioral indicators are subjective, and TSA has not demonstrated that BDOs can consistently interpret behavioral indicators, though the agency has efforts under way to reduce subjectivity in the interpretation by BDOs. Our analysis of SPOT referral data from fiscal years 2011 and 2012 indicates that SPOT and LEO referral rates vary significantly across BDOs at some airports, which raises questions about the use of behavioral indicators by BDOs. TSA Has Limited Information to Evaluate SPOT Program Effectiveness but Plans to Collect Additional Performance Data
TSA has limited information to evaluate SPOT program effectiveness because the findings from the April 2011 validation comparison study are inconclusive because of methodological weaknesses in the study’s overall design and data collection. Specifically, in December 2009, TSA initially began collecting data from 24 airports whose participation in the study was determined by the local TSA officials. More than 7 months later, TSA added another 18 airports to the study when it determined that enough data were not being collected on the randomly selected passengers at participating airports to reach the study’s required sample size. Because commercial aviation activity and the demographics of the traveling public are not constant throughout the year, this uneven data collection may have conflated the effect of random versus SPOT selection methods with differences in the rates of high-risk passengers when TSA used either method. In response to an additional recommendation in our May 2010 report to develop a plan for outcome-based performance measures, TSA completed a performance metrics plan in November 2012, which details the performance measures required for TSA to determine whether the agency’s behavior detection activities are effective, and identifies the gaps that exist in its current data collection efforts. Until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security, the agency risks funding activities that have not been determined to be effective. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure that security-related funding is directed to programs that have demonstrated their effectiveness, Congress should consider the findings in this report regarding the absence of scientifically validated evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify aviation security threats when assessing the potential benefits of behavior detection activities relative to their cost when making future funding decisions related to aviation security. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that security-related funding is directed to programs that have demonstrated their effectiveness, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA Administrator to limit future funding support for the agency’s behavior detection activities until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence that demonstrates that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security. However, we disagree with this statement. We did not substantiate these specific claims. To what extent does available evidence support the use of behavioral indicators to identify aviation security threats? We selected this nonprobability sample based on the airports’ size and participation in behavior detection programs. Data to Assess Effectiveness of SPOT
To determine the extent to which TSA has data necessary to assess the effectiveness of the SPOT program in identifying threats to aviation security, we reviewed the validation study’s findings comparing passengers selected by SPOT with randomly selected passengers, analyzed TSA plans and analyses designed to measure SPOT’s effectiveness, and analyzed data on SPOT referrals and LEO arrests. These responses are not generalizable to the entire BDO population at SPOT airports. We did not substantiate these specific claims. | Why GAO Did This Study
TSA began deploying the SPOT program in fiscal year 2007--and has since spent about $900 million--to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security through the observation of behavioral indicators. In May 2010, GAO concluded, among other things, that TSA deployed SPOT without validating its scientific basis and SPOT lacked performance measures. GAO was asked to update its assessment. This report addresses the extent to which (1) available evidence supports the use of behavioral indicators to identify aviation security threats and (2) TSA has the data necessary to assess the SPOT program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 and 2012 SPOT program data. GAO visited four SPOT airports, chosen on the basis of size, among other things, and interviewed TSA officials and a nonprobability sample of 25 randomly selected BDOs. These results are not generalizable, but provided insights.
What GAO Found
Available evidence does not support whether behavioral indicators, which are used in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. GAO reviewed four meta-analyses (reviews that analyze other studies and synthesize their findings) that included over 400 studies from the past 60 years and found that the human ability to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance. Further, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) April 2011 study conducted to validate SPOT's behavioral indicators did not demonstrate their effectiveness because of study limitations, including the use of unreliable data. Twenty-one of the 25 behavior detection officers (BDO) GAO interviewed at four airports said that some behavioral indicators are subjective. TSA officials agree, and said they are working to better define them. GAO analyzed data from fiscal years 2011 and 2012 on the rates at which BDOs referred passengers for additional screening based on behavioral indicators and found that BDOs' referral rates varied significantly across airports, raising questions about the use of behavioral indicators by BDOs. To help ensure consistency, TSA officials said they deployed teams nationally to verify compliance with SPOT procedures in August 2013. However, these teams are not designed to help ensure BDOs consistently interpret SPOT indicators.
TSA has limited information to evaluate SPOT's effectiveness, but plans to collect additional performance data. The April 2011 study found that SPOT was more likely to correctly identify outcomes representing a high-risk passenger--such as possession of a fraudulent document--than through a random selection process. However, the study results are inconclusive because of limitations in the design and data collection and cannot be used to demonstrate the effectiveness of SPOT. For example, TSA collected the study data unevenly. In December 2009, TSA began collecting data from 24 airports, added 1 airport after 3 months, and an additional 18 airports more than 7 months later when it determined that the airports were not collecting enough data to reach the study's required sample size. Since aviation activity and passenger demographics are not constant throughout the year, this uneven data collection may have conflated the effect of random versus SPOT selection methods. Further, BDOs knew if passengers they screened were selected using the random selection protocol or SPOT procedures, a fact that may have introduced bias into the study. TSA completed a performance metrics plan in November 2012 that details the performance measures required for TSA to determine whether its behavior detection activities are effective, as GAO recommended in May 2010. However, the plan notes that it will be 3 years before TSA can begin to report on the effectiveness of its behavior detection activities. Until TSA can provide scientifically validated evidence demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security, the agency risks funding activities that have not been determined to be effective. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2013. Information that TSA deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider the absence of scientifically validated evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify threats to aviation security when assessing the potential benefits and cost in making future funding decisions for aviation security. GAO included this matter because DHS did not concur with GAOs recommendation that TSA limit future funding for these activities until it can provide such evidence, in part because DHS disagreed with GAOs analysis of indicators. GAO continues to believe the report findings and recommendation are valid. |
gao_GAO-08-590 | gao_GAO-08-590_0 | Private sector pension plans are classified either as defined benefit (DB) or as defined contribution (DC) plans. The second role was to give retiring workers or individuals changing jobs a way to preserve assets in employer-sponsored retirement plans by allowing them to roll over or transfer plan balances into IRAs. We also found that IRA ownership is associated with higher education and higher income levels. As shown in figure 1, in 2004, IRA assets totaled about $3.5 trillion compared to DC assets of $2.6 trillion and DB assets of $1.9 trillion. Most assets flowing into IRAs come from the transfer of retirement assets between IRAs or from other retirement plans, including 401(k) plans, not from contributions. Similar Percentages of Households Own IRAs and Participate in 401(k) Plans, but IRA Contributions Are Lower Than Contributions to 401(k) Plans
The percentage of households that own IRAs is similar to the percentage that own 401(k)s, but IRA contributions are less than 401(k) contributions. 401(k) plans are sponsored by employers, whereas most households with IRAs own traditional IRAs established outside of the workplace. Although employer-sponsored IRAs were designed with fewer reporting requirements to encourage small employers to offer them, few employers appear to do so. Several barriers, including costs, may discourage employers from offering them; however, information is lacking on the actual costs to employers. Barriers May Discourage Small Employers from Offering IRAs to Employees, and Many of These Employees Lack Access to Workplace Retirement Savings
Employees of small firms are more likely to lack access to a retirement plan at work than employees of larger firms, and several barriers may limit small employers from offering payroll-deduction programs and employer- sponsored IRAs to their employees. Although IRAs have been largely successful at helping individuals preserve their retirement savings through rollovers, experts told us that IRA participation falls short of Congress’ first goal for creating IRAs—to provide a tax-preferred account for workers without employer-sponsored retirement plans to save for their retirement. However, other experts reported that costs to employers may be significant. Flexibility to Promote Payroll-Deduction IRAs. IRS is responsible for tax rules on establishing and maintaining IRAs, while Labor is responsible for oversight of fiduciary standards for employer-sponsored IRAs. Labor does not have processes in place to identify all employers offering IRAs, numbers of employees participating, and employers not in compliance with the law. Obtaining information about employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs is also important to determine whether these vehicles help workers without pensions and 401(k) plans build retirement savings. Although IRS publishes some IRA data, IRS has not consistently produced IRA reports. Consequently, Labor does not have information on employer-sponsored IRAs. Labor Has No Process in Place to Monitor Employer-Sponsored and Payroll-Deduction IRAs
Given the limited reporting requirements for employer-sponsored IRAs and the absence of requirements for payroll-deduction IRAs, as well as Labor’s role in overseeing these IRAs, a minimum level of oversight is important to ensure that employers are acting in accordance with the law. Since IRS is the only agency that has data on all IRA participants, consistent reporting of these data could give policymakers and others a comprehensive look at the IRA landscape. To increase retirement plan coverage for the millions of workers not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan and the possibility that payroll-deduction IRAs can help bridge the coverage gap, examine ways to better encourage employers to offer and employees to participate in these IRAs that could include: examining and determining the financial and administrative costs to employers for establishing payroll-deduction IRA programs, especially for those employers that do not have an automatic payroll system in place; developing policy options to help employers defray the costs associated with establishing payroll-deduction IRA programs, while taking into consideration the potential costs to taxpayers and small employers; and evaluating whether modifications or clarifications to its guidance on payroll-deduction IRAs are needed to encourage employers to establish payroll-deduction IRA programs. 2. To improve the federal government’s ability to better assess ways to improve retirement plan coverage for workers who do not have access to an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and to provide Congress, federal agencies, and the public with more usable and relevant information on all IRAs, evaluate ways to collect additional information on employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs, such as adding questions to the Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation Survey that provide: information sufficient to identify employers that offer payroll- deduction and employer-sponsored IRAs and the distribution by employer of the number of employees that contribute to payroll-deduction and employer-sponsored IRAs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
During our review, our objectives were to (1) compare individual retirement account (IRA) assets to assets in pension plans, (2) describe the barriers that may discourage small employers from offering employer- sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs to their employees, and (3) describe how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of Labor (Labor) oversee IRAs and assess the adequacy of oversight and information of employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created individual retirement accounts (IRAs) with two goals: (1) to provide a retirement savings vehicle for workers without employer-sponsored retirement plans, and (2) to preserve individuals' savings in employer-sponsored retirement plans. However, questions remain about IRAs' effectiveness in facilitating new, or additional, retirement savings. GAO was asked to report on (1) how IRA assets compare to assets in other retirement plans, (2) what barriers may discourage small employers from offering IRAs to employees, and (3) the adequacy of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) and the Department of Labor's (Labor) oversight of and information on IRAs. GAO reviewed reports from government and financial industry sources and interviewed experts and federal agency officials.
What GAO Found
Individual retirement accounts, or IRAs, hold more assets than any other type of retirement vehicle. In 2004, IRAs held about $3.5 trillion in assets compared to $2.6 trillion in defined contribution (DC) plans, including 401(k) plans, and $1.9 trillion in defined benefit (DB), or pension plans. Similar percentages of households own IRAs and participate in 401(k) plans, and IRA ownership is associated with higher educational and income levels. Congress created IRAs to provide a way for individuals without employer plans to save for retirement, and to give retiring workers or those changing jobs a way to preserve retirement assets by rolling over, or transferring, plan balances into IRAs. Rollovers into IRAs significantly outpace IRA contributions and account for most assets flowing into IRAs. Given the total assets held in IRAs, they may appear to be comparable to 401(k) plans. However, 401(k) plans are employer-sponsored while most households with IRAs own traditional IRAs established outside the workplace. Several barriers may discourage employers from establishing employer-sponsored IRAs and offering payroll-deduction IRAs to their employees. Although employer-sponsored IRAs were designed with fewer reporting requirements to encourage participation by small employers and payroll-deduction IRAs have none, millions of employees of small firms lack access to a workplace retirement plan. Retirement and savings experts and others told GAO that barriers discouraging employers from offering these IRAs include costs that small businesses may incur for managing IRA plans, a lack of flexibility for employers seeking to promote payroll-deduction IRAs to their employees, and certain contribution requirements of some IRAs. Information is lacking, however, on what the actual costs to employers may be for providing payroll-deduction IRAs and questions remain on the effect that expanded access to these IRAs may have on employees. Experts noted that several proposals exist to encourage employers to offer and employees to participate in employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs, however limited government actions have been taken. The Internal Revenue Service and Labor share oversight for all types of IRAs, but gaps exist within Labor's area of responsibility. IRS is responsible for tax rules on establishing and maintaining IRAs, while Labor is responsible for oversight of fiduciary standards for employer-sponsored IRAs and provides certain guidance on payroll-deduction IRAs, although Labor does not have jurisdiction. Oversight ensures the interests of the employee participants are protected, that their retirement savings are properly handled, and any applicable guidance and laws are being followed. Because there are very limited reporting requirements for employer-sponsored IRAs and none for payroll-deduction IRAs, Labor does not have processes in place to identify all employers offering IRAs, numbers of employees participating, and employers not in compliance with the law. Obtaining information about employer-sponsored and payroll-deduction IRAs is also important to determine whether these vehicles help workers without DC or DB plans build retirement savings. Although IRS collects and publishes some data on IRAs, IRS has not consistently produced reports on IRAs nor shared such information with other agencies, such as Labor. Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation Survey surveys employer-sponsored benefit plans but collects limited information on employer-sponsored IRAs and no information on payroll-deduction IRAs. Since IRS is the only agency that has data on all IRA participants, consistent reporting of these data could give Labor and others valuable information on IRAs. |
gao_T-AIMD-97-85 | gao_T-AIMD-97-85_0 | To enhance its ability to deliver weather services, NWS determined some 15 years ago to use the power of technology to “do more with less.” To reach the goal of better forecasting and earlier warnings with a smaller, downsized operation, the Weather Service has been acquiring new observing systems—including radars, satellites, and ground-based sensors—as well as powerful forecaster workstations. The Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS)
This program integrates, for the first time, satellite, radar, and other data to support weather forecaster decision-making and communications; it is the linchpin of the NWS modernization. Operating under a $550-million funding cap, the system is expected to be fully deployed in 1999. AWIPS development systems have been delivered to 16 locations nationwide; this represents the first two of six modules, or “builds.” AWIPS is planned for a total of 152 locations once fully deployed. The Next Generation Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-Next)
This is a program to acquire, launch, and control five satellites for identifying and tracking severe weather events, such as hurricanes. The first satellite was launched in 1994, and the second in 1995. Three more satellites are planned for launch between now and 2002. The Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD)
This is a program to acquire 163 Doppler radars. Scheduled for completion this year, 121 of a planned 123 NWS NEXRAD radars have been delivered to operational locations. The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS)
This is a program to automate and enhance methods for collecting, processing, and displaying surface weather conditions, such as temperature and precipitation, and to replace human weather observers. Scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1998, the system has been installed at 265 of 314 planned NWS operational locations. Important Successes Achieved, Yet Problems Have Hindered the Modernization
The Weather Service has generated better data—particularly with the new radars and satellites—and greatly improved forecasts and warnings. Minutes
Notwithstanding such successes, however, each of the four programs has experienced cost increases and schedule delays. Some of these increases and delays can be attributed to changes in requirements; others were caused by program management and development problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the National Weather Service's (NWS) systems modernization program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to reach the goal of better forecasting and earlier warnings with a smaller, downsized operation, the Weather Service has been acquiring new observing systems, including radars, satellites, and ground-based sensors, as well as powerful forecaster workstations; (2) the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS) integrates, for the first time, satellite, radar, and other data to support weather forecaster decision-making and communications, and it is the linchpin of the NWS modernization; (3) operating under a $550-million funding cap, the system is expected to be fully deployed in 1999; (4) AWIPS development systems have been delivered to 16 locations nationwide, which represents the first two of six modules, or "builds"; (5) AWIPS is planned for a total of 152 locations once fully deployed; (6) the Next Generation Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite is a program to acquire, launch, and control five satellites for identifying and tracking severe weather events, such as hurricanes; (7) the first satellite was launched in 1994, and the second in 1995; (8) three more satellites are planned for launch between now and 2002; (9) the Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) is a program to acquire 163 Doppler radars; (10) scheduled for completion this year, 121 of the planned 123 NWS NEXRAD radars have been delivered to operational locations; (11) the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) is a program to automate and enhance methods for collecting, processing, and displaying surface weather conditions, such as temperature and precipitation, and to replace human weather observers; (12) scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1998, the ASOS system has been installed at 265 of the 314 planned NWS operational locations; (13) the Weather Service has generated better data, particularly with the new radars and satellites, and greatly improved forecasts and warnings; (14) notwithstanding such successes, however, each of the four programs has experienced cost increases and schedule delays; and (15) some of these delays can be attributed to changes in requirements; others were caused by program management and development problems. |
gao_GAO-10-375 | gao_GAO-10-375_0 | The statistics are based primarily on data filed by exporters and their agents into the electronic Automated Export System (AES) database. Exporters who knowingly ship U.S. goods to Iran via other countries without a Treasury license are subject to prosecution by the Department of Justice. U.S. Export Statistics for Iran Erroneously Include Goods Not Exported to Iran
The U.S. government’s official statistics for U.S. exports to Iran erroneously include many types of goods that U.S. firms did not export to Iran. The misidentification of Iran as the recipient country in the statistics is the result of export data filing errors that Census did not detect or correct. Census officials stated that, as a result of our review, Census has begun manually checking new export filings reporting exports to Iran. U.S. Treasury Is Licensi Exports to Iran in Accordance with Trade Ban but Cannot Provide Complete and Timely Inform ation on Its Licensing Decisions
Treasury is licensing exports to Iran in accordance with the trade ban but cannot provide other agencies or Congress with complete and timely licensing information. Treasury is planning to upgrade it system for tracking licenses for agricultural and medical exports to Iran, which are permitted by TSRA. It cannot do so because it relies on paper-based information systems that cannot be searched to identify licenses for the export of goods to Iran. For example, a Treasury official informed U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials in 2009 that Treasury’s information systems could not provide CBP with complete and timely information on licenses issued for the export of goods to Iran. Given Treasury’s central role in licensing exports to Iran, its inability to provide complete and timely licensing information weakens government efforts to determine whether dual-use and other goods exported to Iran have been properly licensed and to assess compliance with the trade ban. Iran Is Obtaining Illegal Transshipments of U.S. Military and Dual-Use Goods through Other Countries
According to U.S. officials, Iran is obtaining U.S. military and dual-use goods that are being illegally transshipped by firms and individuals through locations in numerous countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Singapore. Conclusions
While the United States government has severely restricted U.S. exports to Iran, it cannot readily determine the extent to which it has issued licenses for such exports or the extent to which goods marked for Iran are leaving U.S. ports. Key contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the extent to which U.S. statistics accurately depict U.S. exports to Iran, we analyzed the results of a Census Bureau review of records regarding all types of goods reportedly shipped to Iran from 2004 through 2008 to determine the specific destinations of those goods. We also interviewed relevant Treasury licensing, information technology, and enforcement officials. U.S.C. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the United States banned exports to Iran of most U.S. goods without a Treasury Department license. In 2008, the U.S. media, citing U.S. government statistics, reported that U.S. firms were exporting numerous goods to Iran. The statistics are maintained by the Census Bureau and are based on data filed by exporters or their agents. The United States has also generally banned unlicensed transshipments of U.S. goods to Iran via other nations. In this report, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) U.S. trade statistics accurately depict exports to Iran, (2) Treasury licenses exports to Iran in accordance with the trade restrictions and provides licensing data to enforcement agencies and Congress, and (3) Iran obtains U.S. military and dual-use goods through transshipment. GAO analyzed Census export data, a randomly selected sample of Treasury export licenses, Treasury licensing information systems, and U.S. government transshipment data. It also interviewed relevant U.S. government officials.
What GAO Found
U.S. trade statistics for exports to Iran erroneously include goods that were not exported to Iran. While the statistics indicate that U.S. firms exported 278 types of goods to Iran from 2004 to 2008, 97 of these types of goods were instead exported to Ireland, Iraq, and other countries. The misidentification of Iran as the recipient resulted from errors in export data filings that Census did not detect or correct. As a result of our review, Census officials stated, Census has begun manually checking all new filings of exports to Iran and posting corrections to a Census Web page. While Treasury is licensing exports to Iran in accordance with export restrictions, it cannot provide complete and timely information about the licenses it has issued. Its paper-based licensing information systems cannot be searched to quickly identify licenses for exports of goods to Iran. For example, Treasury was unable to address a 2009 request from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials for complete and timely licensing data to support CBP inspectors at U.S. ports. Treasury's information systems weaken the ability of the government to assess compliance with Iran sanctions. Treasury plans to upgrade its licensing information system for agricultural and medical exports to Iran. However, the upgrade would not address its inability to readily identify licenses for other goods, including civilian items with potential military uses. A wide range of U.S. military and dual-use goods are illegally transshipped to Iran through the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries, according to U.S. officials. The Justice Department has prosecuted several individuals for efforts to transship military aircraft parts to Iran. |
gao_GAO-14-473 | gao_GAO-14-473_0 | States are responsible for assessing applicants’ financial eligibility for Medicaid. States’ Determination of Applicants’ Financial Eligibility
To assess applicants’ financial eligibility for Medicaid coverage for long- term care, including nursing home care, and to determine whether they transferred assets for less than FMV, states generally require applicants to submit applications and to provide documentation of certain assets reported on the applications. Files Reviewed Showed 41 Percent of Approved Applicants Had Total Resources at or below $2,500, and 5 Percent Transferred Assets
Forty-one percent of the 294 approved applicants whose Medicaid nursing home application files we reviewed had total resources—both countable and not countable resources—of $2,500 or less; and nearly 75 percent of the approved applicants owned at least some resources that were not countable in their financial eligibility determination. Applicants Used Four Main Methods to Reduce Countable Assets and Qualify for Medicaid
We identified four main methods used by applicants—or described by eligibility workers, state officials, attorneys, or other representatives from law practices—to reduce countable assets and qualify for Medicaid coverage for nursing home care. These four methods are: (1) spending countable resources on goods and services that are not countable, (2) converting countable resources into noncountable resources that generate an income stream, (3) giving away countable assets, and (4) increasing the amount of assets the community spouse retains. Giving Away Some or All Countable Assets
Applicants may reduce their countable assets by giving some or all of their assets as a gift to another individual, such as an adult child. Another “reverse half-a-loaf” mechanism involves an applicant gifting a portion of their countable resources, incurring a penalty, and converting other countable resources into an income stream for the applicant—such as through an annuity or promissory note—to pay for nursing home care during the penalty period. Eligibility Workers Considered Bank Statements the Most Useful Source to Identify and Verify Applicants’ Financial Eligibility
Eligibility workers from all 12 counties in which we conducted interviews stated that bank statements were the most useful source of information for identifying and verifying applicants’ financial eligibility. Eligibility workers also reported that reviews of bank statements could lead to the identification of unreported assets or accounts. Life insurance policies that have a cash value could affect an applicant’s eligibility. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. HHS had no general comments but provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. The median age of applicants was 84 years old. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To examine the financial characteristics of applicants approved for Medicaid nursing home coverage, we reviewed a random sample of Medicaid nursing home application files in selected counties in three states. To select states, we used information from a 2011 GAO web- based survey of Medicaid officials from each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In 2012, Medicaid spending for institutional long- term care was $3.3 billion in Florida, $11.5 billion in New York, and $801 million in South Carolina. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid paid for nearly one-third of the nation's $158 billion in nursing home expenditures in 2012. To be financially eligible for Medicaid, individuals cannot have assets above certain limits. Not all assets are countable in determining Medicaid eligibility; federal law discourages individuals from reducing their countable assets, for example by transferring them to family members, to qualify for Medicaid. Although Congress has acted multiple times to address financial eligibility requirements for Medicaid coverage of nursing home care, methods exist through which individuals, sometimes with the help of attorneys, can reduce their assets and qualify for Medicaid.
GAO was asked for information on the extent to which individuals may be using available methods to qualify for Medicaid coverage. GAO (1) examined financial characteristics of applicants approved for Medicaid nursing home coverage in selected states; (2) identified methods used to reduce countable assets to qualify for Medicaid; and (3) identified information eligibility workers consider the most useful in assessing applicants' financial eligibility. GAO analyzed a random, but nongeneralizeable, sample of Medicaid nursing home applications in two counties in each of three states (Florida, New York, and South Carolina), selected based on several factors including states' asset verification efforts and demographics. GAO also interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, state Medicaid officials, county-based Medicaid eligibility workers, and attorneys.
What GAO Found
GAO's review of 294 approved Medicaid nursing home applications in three states showed that 41 percent of applicants had total resources—both countable and not countable as part of financial eligibility determination—of $2,500 or less and 14 percent had over $100,000 in total resources.
Nearly 75 percent of applicants owned some noncountable resources, such as burial contracts; the median amount of noncountable resources was $12,530.
GAO identified four main methods used by applicants to reduce their countable assets—income or resources—and qualify for Medicaid coverage:
1. spending countable resources on goods and services that are not countable towards financial eligibility, such as prepaid funeral arrangements;
2. converting countable resources into noncountable resources that generate an income stream for the applicant, such as an annuity or promissory note;
3. giving away countable assets as a gift to another individual—such gifts could lead to a penalty period that delays Medicaid nursing home coverage; and
4. for married applicants, increasing the amount of assets a spouse remaining in the community can retain, such as through the purchase of an annuity.
Eligibility workers GAO spoke with identified bank statements as the most useful source of information for assessing financial eligibility. They explained that bank statements could lead to the identification of unreported assets, such as life insurance policies, or show patterns of withdrawals that prompt further inquiry.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-373 | gao_GAO-01-373_0 | The Congress has mandated preference in the sale of electricity by federal agencies in a number of power-marketing and land reclamation statutes. Other statutes give geographic preference to entire states or portions of states for purchases of electricity generated in those areas. In some instances, the courts have directed a PMA to provide power to preference customers, and in other instances, they have supported a PMA’s denial of power to such customers. Restructuring of Electricity Industry Provides Another Opportunity for the Congress to Reassess Preference in PMA Marketing
The characteristics of the electricity industry on a national and regional basis have changed over time and continue to change. Over the last 20 years, competition has been replacing regulation in major sectors of the U.S. economy. In our testimony, we noted that as the restructuring of the electricity industry proceeds, the Congress has an opportunity to consider how the existing federal system of generating, transmitting, and marketing electricity is managed, including the role of preference in federal power sales. The preference provisions determine the priority of different customers when there are competing applications for power that can be allocated administratively. The investor-owned utility's arrangement with preference customers does not violate the preference provision of the Flood Control Act. | What GAO Found
Congress has enacted many statutes that designate types of customers or geographic areas for preference and priority in purchasing electricity from federal agencies. In general, the preference has been intended to (1) direct the benefits of public resources--relatively inexpensive hydropower--to portions of the public through nonprofit entities, (2) spread the benefits of federally generated hydropower widely and encourage the development of rural areas, (3) prevent private interests from exerting control over the full development of electric power on public lands, and (4) provide a yardstick against which the rates of investor-owned utilities can be measured. The applications of various preference provisions have been challenged several times in the courts, which have directed a power marketing administration (PMA) to provide power to preference customers. In other instances, they have supported the denial of power to such customers. The characteristics of the electricity industry have changed. During the last 20 years, competition has been replacing regulation in major sectors of the U.S. economy. Several proposals have come before Congress to restructure the electrical industry, including some that would encourage the states to allow retail customers a choice in selecting their electricity supplier. As it debates these proposals, Congress has continued to consider the role of preference in the PMA's sale of electricity. |
gao_GAO-09-488 | gao_GAO-09-488_0 | Since 2005, OMB’s former Deputy Director for Management has taken several actions to improve the security clearance process. 2.) In accordance with Executive Order 13467, the Performance Accountability Council is accountable to the President to achieve reform goals, drive implementation, and oversee clearance reform. Initial Reform Efforts Have Partially Aligned with Key Practices but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework with Outcome-Focused Performance Measures to Show Progress
Although initial reform efforts have, in part, aligned with established key practices for organizational transformation, it is difficult to assess the progress of reform or determine if corrective action is needed. Consistent with some of these key practices, the Performance Accountability Council’s membership currently includes senior executive leaders from 11 federal agencies. However, because the reform efforts are missing important elements of a strategic framew that are also consistent with the Government Performance and Results of 1993 (GPRA), such as long-term goals with related outcome-fo cused performance measures that show progress or identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies, the reform effort is not able to demonstrate incremental progress toward strategic goals, and the effort runs the risk of losing momentum and governmentwide buy-in. Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. In designing a new personnel security clearance system, GPRA may be a useful resource for both the team designing the system and the congressional committees overseeing the design and implementation. Our prior work identified factors key to reforming the clearance process, and IRTPA identified two additional criteria, that are also essential to reforming the clearance process. These factors include (1) a sound requirements determination process, (2) governmentwide reciprocity, (3) the building of quality into every step of the process, (4) consolidated information technology, and (5) the identification and reporting of long-term funding requirements. Key reports from the Joint Reform Team begin to address four of these essential factors for reform, although they do not contain any information on roles and responsibilities for the information technology strategy or long-term funding requirements. As table 1 shows, the reform reports show that the Joint Reform Team is in the process of addressing four out of five of these factors critical to reforming the security clearance process: Establish a sound requirement determination process: The key reform reports begin to address the need for agencies to request the appropriate number of clearances at the appropriate levels; however, the reports do not provide a mechanism for ensuring that the number and level of clearances being requested reflect the mission needs of the requesting agencies. In addition, this strategy is intended to establish a new end-to-end governmentwide capability to support the reformed 7-step security and suitability process. Our prior work has stressed the importance of defining clear roles and responsibilities before the implementation of information processing systems. Because the Joint Reform Team has not established clear roles and responsibilities for the agencies involved, it will be difficult to hold agency leadership accountable and achieve a joint vision. Further, the April 2008, December 2008, and March 2009 reform reports collectively are a step forward. Recommendation for Executive Action
To further align the reform effort with key practices for organizational transformations and better address the long-standing problems, we recommend that the OMB Deputy Director of Management in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team—take the following action: Establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include a mission and strategic goals; outcome-focused performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long- standing problems with the security clearance process; a formal, comprehensive communication strategy that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key stakeholders; clear roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology strategy, for example, by establishing memorandums of understanding delineating the roles and responsibilities of all agencies responsible for developing and implementing components of the information technology strategy; and long-term funding requirements for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings from the reformed process, to be provided to decision makers in Congress and the executive branch. Although timeliness was not the focus of this review, we acknowledge this in our report. To determine the extent to which the Joint Reform Team’s key security clearance reports address factors essential to reforming the security clearance process, we collected and analyzed reports and documents related to the reform effort produced by the Joint Reform Team and the Performance Accountability Council. We reviewed key legislation and executive policies, including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 and Executive Order 13467. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
Personnel security clearances are used to verify that national security information--which in some cases could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security if disclosed--is entrusted only to those who have proven reliability and loyalty to the nation. In response to long-standing problems with timeliness and backlogs, Congress mandated clearance reforms as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and since 2005 the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has remained on GAO's high-risk list despite improvements in timeliness. In 2007, a Joint Reform Team, led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), was established to improve the clearance process across the government. GAO was asked to review the extent to which reform efforts (1) align with key practices for organizational transformations and (2) address identified factors for reforming the personnel security clearance process. To assess these objectives, GAO compared joint reform reports to key transformation practices and essential factors for reform.
What GAO Found
Initial joint reform efforts have, in part, aligned with key practices for organizational transformation, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with related outcome-focused performance measures to show progress, or identify obstacles to progress and possible remedies. To communicate plans of the reform efforts, the Joint Reform Team issued three reports, including an initial reform report in April 2008 that presented a new 7-step process design, a December 2008 update, and a March 2009 Enterprise Information Technology Strategy. Consistent with practices that GAO has previously identified, the executive branch established a Performance Accountability Council to achieve reform goals, drive implementation, and oversee the reform. Membership on this council currently includes senior executive leaders from 11 federal agencies. Further, an executive order designates OMB's Deputy Director for Management as the chair of this council. However, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the reform efforts. In the absence of a strategic framework that is outcome focused, with clearly defined performance measures, the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes. The personnel security clearance joint reform reports that GAO reviewed collectively do begin to address essential factors for reforming the security clearance process, which represents positive steps. GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include (1) developing a sound requirements determination process, (2) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (3) building of quality into every step of the process, (4) consolidating information technology, and (5) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform Team's informationtechnology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. GAO's prior work has stressed the importance of defining these roles and responsibilities when initiating cross-agency initiatives. Also, the joint reform reports do not contain any information on initiatives that will require funding, determine how much they will cost, or identify potential funding sources. Without long-term fundingrequirements, decision makers in both the executive and legislative branches will lack important information for comparing and prioritizing proposals for reforming the clearance processes. The reform effort's success will be dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. |
gao_GAO-07-442T | gao_GAO-07-442T_0 | DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but Has Not Completed a Strategy for Securing the Transportation Sector
DHS has made progress in assessing the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system, but has not completed a plan based on that risk assessment for securing the entire transportation sector and supporting plans for each mode of transportation, including passenger rail. Further, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of the entire passenger rail system. We also reported in September 2005 that DHS was developing, but had not yet completed, a framework intended to help TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. Until TSA issues the TSSP and modal plans, the agency lacks a clear strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail Security, Improve Federal Coordination, and Develop Industry Partnerships
In addition to ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail security conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 2001, TSA issued security directives to passenger rail operators after the March 2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. For example, TSA tested rail security technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT regarding rail security roles and responsibilities and has worked to develop more effective partnerships with industry stakeholders. In addition, TSA established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode of transportation to develop security policies and partnerships with industry stakeholders, including passenger rail and other surface modes. TSA Has Reported Taking Additional Actions to Strengthen Passenger Rail Security, Improve Coordination with DOT, and Develop Industry Partnerships
In January 2007, TSA identified additional actions they had taken to strengthen passenger rail security. Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Were Not Used in the United States
While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are implementing, we identified three foreign practices that were not currently in use among the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted as of September 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government- sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of the differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Conclusions
In conclusion, Madam Chairwoman, the 2005 London rail bombings and the 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlight the inherent vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack. Moreover, securing rail and other surface transportation systems is a daunting task, requiring that the federal government develop clear strategies that are based on an assessment of the risks to the security of the systems, including goals and objectives, for strengthening the security of these systems. TSA has also taken steps improve coordination with federal, state, and local governments, and has reported taking steps to strengthen partnerships with passenger rail industry stakeholders to enhance the security of the passenger rail system. We will continue to assess DHS and DOT’s efforts to secure the U.S. passenger rail system during follow-on work to be initiated later this year. Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 London subway bombings and 2006 rail attacks in Mumbai, India highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail and other surface transportation systems to terrorist attack and demonstrated the need for greater focus on securing these systems. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 passenger rail security report and selected program updates obtained in January 2007. Specifically, it addressees (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system and developed a strategy based on risk assessment for securing all modes of transportation, including passenger rail; (2) the actions that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal agencies have taken to enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system, improve federal coordination, and develop industry partnerships; and (3) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail operators have implemented to enhance security.
What GAO Found
The DHS Office of Grants and Training and TSA have begun to assess the risks facing the U.S. passenger rail system. However, we reported in September 2005 that TSA had not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of passenger rail assets. We found that, until TSA does so, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail assets and help guide security investments. We also reported that DHS had begun, but not yet completed, a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and across various critical sectors. Since that time, TSA has reported taking additional steps to assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, TSA has not yet issued the required Transportation Sector Specific Plan and supporting plans that address passenger rail and other surface transportation modes, based on a risk assessment. Until TSA does so, the agency lacks a clear strategy with goals and objectives for securing the overall transportation sector, including passenger rail. After September 11, DOT initiated efforts to strengthen passenger rail security. TSA has also taken actions to strengthen rail security, including issuing security directives, testing security technologies, developing security training, and issuing a proposed rule for passenger and freight rail security, among other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent to which TSA's directives were based on industry best practices. TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT and develop partnerships with industry stakeholders. DHS and DOT have updated their memorandum of understanding to clarify their respective security-related roles and responsibilities for passenger rail. TSA also established an Office of Transportation Sector Network Management and offices for each mode of transportation to develop security policies and work to strengthen partnerships with industry stakeholders for passenger rail and other surface modes. U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best practices for rail security. |
gao_GAO-15-421 | gao_GAO-15-421_0 | DOD Uses a Competitive and Merit-Based Process to Select RIP Projects, with Most Awards Going to Small Businesses
DOD has established a competitive, merit-based solicitation process to select and award RIP contracts that address military needs. The process is somewhat lengthy, taking about 18 months to implement and award contracts, but interest from contractors has been high. Between fiscal year 2011 and 2015, the military departments and defense components received more than 11,000 white papers from interested contractors and will have awarded contracts for about 435 projects when the fiscal year 2014 solicitation is completed, with the vast majority going to small business. DOD Uses a Variety of Practices and Tools to Manage and Oversee Projects
The military departments and defense components used management practices and tools to manage RIP projects similar to those they use for other science and technology projects. ASD/R&E conducted another in- process review in October 2014 and found that 85 percent of the fiscal year 2011 projects and 78 percent of the fiscal year 2012 projects were likely to meet 80 percent or more of their key performance parameters or goals (see figure 4). DOD reported that half of all fiscal year 2011 projects (88 of 175) had funding commitments from military users, which indicates a likelihood they will transition. We also found that half of the fiscal year 2011 completed projects we reviewed (22 of 44) had technology that actually transitioned to an acquisition program, another military user, a prime contractor, or was commercialized. These transition rates are lower than what we found in our prior review of other DOD technology transition programs that reported transition rates ranging from about 55 to 85 percent.assess the overall success of RIP due to the limited number of completed projects and lack of established metrics to track whether projects have successfully transitioned to users. We also found several factors that can contribute to the transition success of RIP projects, such as user commitment and mature technology at the beginning of projects, which were not consistently emphasized by all the defense components in the program. Half of Completed Projects We Reviewed Successfully Transitioned
To gain additional insights into the range of transition outcomes for RIP projects, we assessed all 52 fiscal year 2011 projects scheduled for completion through July 2014, to determine their transition results. In general, however, at the DOD level there has not been an effort to understand the extent to which these factors may be contributing to differences in transition and to communicate lessons learned from military departments or defense components with a higher percentage of transition success. Technology Maturity
GAO-13-286. DOD components are capitalizing on these success factors to varying degrees. Recommendations for Executive Action
If Congress re-authorizes RIP then, to improve visibility and management of DOD’s ability to transition technologies through the program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to take the following two actions:
Establish an overall technology transition goal for RIP; and Identify and apply factors that contribute to the likelihood of technology transition success more consistently across the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to assess the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) has established a competitive and merit based process to solicit and award Rapid Innovation Program (RIP) contracts, (2) DOD has established practices to manage and oversee the execution of RIP projects, and (3) RIP is meeting its objective of rapidly inserting innovative technologies in defense acquisition programs. To assess whether DOD has established practices to manage and oversee the execution of RIP projects, we reviewed a nongeneralizable random sample of 40 RIP projects across DOD that were awarded with fiscal year 2011 and 2012 funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on technology innovation to maintain superior weapon systems. However, a long-standing challenge has been ensuring that high value technologies are mature and available for military users. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 required DOD to establish RIP to facilitate the transition of innovative technologies into acquisition programs, and over $1.3 billion has been appropriated to the program since its inception.
Senate Report No. 113-44 included a provision that GAO review the execution of RIP. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD has established a competitive, merit-based process to award RIP contracts; (2) DOD has established practices to manage the execution of RIP projects; and (3) RIP is meeting its objective of rapidly inserting innovative technologies in defense acquisition programs. GAO reviewed RIP documentation, interviewed DOD and military department officials, and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 40 projects awarded with fiscal year 2011 and 2012 funding to assess DOD management practices as well as 52 fiscal year 2011 funded projects scheduled for completion through July 2014 to assess transition outcomes.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has established a competitive, merit-based process to solicit proposals from interested contractors, review and select projects based on military needs and standardized evaluation criteria, and award contracts to execute Rapid Innovation Program (RIP) projects. To date, the process has been lengthy, taking about 18 months to implement, but interest from contractors has been high. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2015, the military services and defense agency components received more than 11,000 white papers on proposed technologies from contractors and will have awarded contracts for about 435 projects—primarily to small businesses—when the fiscal year 2014 solicitation is completed.
The military services and defense components have practices and tools in place to manage and monitor the execution of projects, which are similar to those they use for other science and technology projects. For example, project officials review contractor reports, conduct system reviews, and engage in regular communications with contractors to determine the progress of projects. Also, DOD's 2014 annual review found that 85 percent of the fiscal year 2011 funded projects and 78 percent of the fiscal year 2012 funded projects were likely to meet 80 percent or more of their technical performance goals.
Some completed projects have successfully transitioned technology to acquisition programs and other military users. DOD officials estimate that 50 percent of all fiscal year 2011 funded projects (88 of 175) have out-year funding commitments from military users, indicating the likelihood they will transition technologies. GAO assessed 44 projects completed in July 2014, and found that 50 percent successfully transitioned to acquisition programs or other users. However, it is too soon to accurately assess the overall success of RIP due to the limited number of completed projects as well as the lack of an overall program transition goal and effective metrics to track the degree to which projects have actually transitioned. GAO found that several factors can contribute to transition success of RIP projects, such as having military user commitment and mature technology when projects are started. However, DOD has not made an effort to understand how these factors may be contributing to differences in transition success from defense components with a higher rate of transition.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish a program transition goal, and identify and apply factors that lead to transition success. DOD disagreed on the need for a goal, stating it would impede RIP flexibility, but agreed to identify transition success factors. GAO believes having a goal would improve DOD's ability to transition technologies. |
gao_T-NSIAD-98-183 | gao_T-NSIAD-98-183_0 | Formal campaigns were initiated for dracunculiasis and leprosy in 1991, and for polio and lymphatic filariasis in 1988 and 1997, respectively. Soundness of Estimates Varies by Disease
WHO’s cost and time frame estimates, with the exception of measles, addressed all five of the relevant factors. Generally, estimates for those diseases with long-standing eradication or elimination campaigns are more complete, as the underlying data are based on actual experience in endemic countries. For the other diseases, WHO is still gathering data and refining its assumptions. Dracunculiasis (Guinea Worm Disease)
WHO’s cost estimate of $40 million for eradicating dracunculiasis included data on each of the five key factors and appears to be sound. Experts also point to the need for continued national and donor support. Polio
WHO’s cost estimate of $1.6 billion for eradicating polio is generally sound. However, experts generally agreed that WHO’s cost and time frame estimates appeared reasonable. Essentially, data are incomplete regarding the number of children to be vaccinated, administrative costs, the number of mass campaigns that may be needed, and the costs of surveillance in less developed countries. WHO officials noted that they used information from their previous experience with polio eradication in developing the measles estimate. WHO and CDC estimate the cost of eradicating measles in less developed countries at up to $1.8 billion. It incorporates data on all key cost elements, but data on the size of the target population are incomplete. U.S. Spending on These Diseases and Potential U.S. Savings Associated With Their Eradication or Elimination
The United States currently spends about $391 million a year on these diseases. This includes about $300 million on polio and measles prevention programs and leprosy treatment in the United States and about another $91 million abroad for all the diseases under discussion except leprosy. Most of this amount would be saved if eradication and elimination goals were met and efforts to combat the diseases were ceased or reduced. The overall savings to the United States as a result of eradicating measles are estimated at about $61.7 million a year, including about $50 million for domestic vaccine costs and about $11.7 million for global measles efforts. The United States does not currently track domestic costs related to Chagas’ disease. Other Diseases as Possible Eradication Candidates
International public health experts identified several diseases that pose health threats to the United States and that are technically possible to eradicate with existing vaccines: rubella, mumps, hepatitis B, and Hib. The major barrier to an eradication initiative is that some people are chronic carriers and would have to die before the disease could be considered eradicated. WHO told us that rubella, hepatitis B, and Hib could be eventual candidates for eradication due to their associated public health burdens and the success in controlling these diseases in some parts of the world. For the United States, cumulative savings from smallpox eradication are estimated at almost $17 billion. Smallpox had characteristics that experts consider desirable for eradication. However, certain differences exist that may limit the usefulness of smallpox as a model for other eradication efforts. Dracunculiasis differs from smallpox in that is a parasitic disease and not vaccine preventable. World Health Organization Estimated Target Dates and Costs for Eradicating or Eliminating Selected Diseases as of December 1997
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the World Health Organization's (WHO) estimates for eradicating or eliminating seven infectious diseases--dracunculiasis, polio, leprosy, measles, onchoceriasis, Chagas' disease, and lymphatic filariasis--worldwide, focusing on: (1) the soundness of WHO's cost and timeframe estimates; (2) U.S. spending related to these diseases in fiscal year 1997 and any potential cost savings to the United States as a result of eradication or elimination; (3) other diseases that international health experts believe pose a risk to Americans and could be eventual candidates for eradication; and (4) U.S. costs and savings from smallpox eradication and whether experts view smallpox eradication as a model for other diseases.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) WHO and other experts it contacted generally agreed on five factors necessary to estimate the cost of eradicating or eliminating a disease: (a) product costs; (b) information on disease incidence, prevalence, and the size of the target populations; (c) administrative and delivery costs; (d) disease monitoring and surveillance costs; and (e) primarily for eradication, the costs of certifying that countries are free of the disease; (2) GAO focused its assessment on the accuracy and completeness of the underlying data for these five factors; (3) WHO's estimates and GAO's analysis did not include an assessment of opportunity or indirect costs that may be incurred as a result of eradication campaigns; (4) the soundness of WHO's cost and timeframes varied by disease; (5) generally, the estimates were most sound for those diseases closest to meeting eradication or elimination goals, including dracunculiasis, polio, and leprosy; (6) estimates for these three diseases were based on firm data about target populations and intervention costs from ongoing initiatives; (7) for the other diseases, WHO's estimates are more speculative because underlying data are incomplete or unavailable; (8) WHO officials acknowledged this fact and said that estimates are continuously revised as better data become available; (9) the United States spent about $391 million in 1997 to combat these diseases; (10) the United States spent $300 million on polio and measles prevention and on leprosy treatment in this country; (11) about another $91 million went for overseas programs, primarily the polio eradication campaign; (12) savings to the United States from eradicating or eliminating these diseases would result primarily from not having to vaccinate U.S. children against polio and measles; (13) experts GAO contacted identified four other diseases that pose health threats to the United states and could be possible candidates for eradication; (14) WHO told GAO that, while it may be technically possible to eradicate these diseases with existing vaccines, the international community cannot support too many eradication initiatives at one time; (15) the United States has saved almost $17 billion as a result of the eradication of smallpox in 1977; (16) the savings were due to the cessation of vaccinations and related costs of surveillance and treatment; (17) experts generally agreed that the primary lesson from smallpox is that a disease can actually be eradicated; and (18) however, smallpox had unique characteristics that made it particularly vulnerable to eradication and therefore has limitations as a model for current efforts. |
gao_GAO-15-513 | gao_GAO-15-513_0 | Most Small Businesses are Individuals, but Most Small Business Income is Earned by Partnerships and Corporations
As shown in figure 1, using data from researchers at Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), most small businesses (approximately 69 percent or 16 million) are individual taxpayers who report business income on their Form 1040, using Schedule C (sole proprietor), Schedule E-Part I (landlords), or Schedule F (farmers). The remaining 31 percent of small businesses (or roughly 7.3 million) are partnerships, S corporations, or C corporations. About 99 Percent of Businesses Report Total Income and Deductions of Less Than $10 Million
Small businesses (as defined as reporting total income and deductions of less than $10 million) make up 99 percent of the taxpayers identified as For being engaged in substantial and substantive business activity.each type of filer, small businesses account for at least 95 percent of businesses. Employers make up about 20 percent of all small businesses. Tax Compliance Burdens Vary Depending on a Small Business’s Size, Number of Employees, Entity Type, Industry, and Other Characteristics
Small businesses undertake a number of tax compliance-related activities that create burden. These activities can be grouped into general categories: employer-related tax activities, and third-party information reporting and industry-specific tax activities. The tax compliance burden associated with these activities varies by characteristics of the small business. Estimated Recordkeeping and Filing Burdens Vary with Characteristics of Businesses and Complexity of Returns
Estimates of business compliance burdens that IRS’s models have produced over the years indicate that burdens increase with the size of businesses, whether measured in terms of assets, receipts, or employment; however burden per dollar of assets or receipts or per employee decline with size due to economies of scale. IRS measured money and time burden as a portion of total business receipts, total assets, and burden per employee. Across all three measures, IRS results are consistent with the assumption that small businesses face significant fixed compliance costs combined with decreasing marginal costs as the business grows (see appendix III, tables 9 through 11).businesses, estimated total monetized business compliance costs by business entity type varied depending on the type of entity and the entity’s gross receipts. IRS’s Decision- Making Framework Includes Consideration of Small Business Compliance Burden
IRS’s Strategic Goals and Internal Revenue Manual Describe the Agency-wide Approach to Taxpayer Burden Reduction
One of IRS’s goals in its strategic plan is to deliver high quality and timely service to reduce taxpayer burden and encourage voluntary compliance. IRS Has Worked with Internal and External Stakeholders to Identify and Reduce Small Business Tax Compliance Burden
IRS officials provided examples of efforts made to engage with internal and external stakeholders to reduce small business tax compliance burden. One notable example of a burden reduction initiative at IRS was developing a simplified method for determining the Office in the Home tax deduction. Payment card reporting also provides IRS with an information source it can use to compare against the income reported by small business taxpayers on their tax returns. IRS’s Evaluation Plan Enabled It to Rapidly Test, Learn from, and Adapt Pilot Activities, but Does Not Include Key Elements for Assessing Overall Pilot Performance
To assess IRS’s plan for evaluating the payment card pilot we used our previously developed guidance to identify key elements for designing quality evaluations. While IRS has defined high-level pilot goals, such as improving voluntary compliance and reducing the tax gap, it did not establish performance measures for these goals and has not decided on a time frame for developing them. According to IRS officials, one of the evaluation goals was to learn why some compliant taxpayers were identified as potential underreporters of income. IRS did not have evaluative questions and criteria to assess whether the overall pilot or the pilot activities achieved the intended goals or produced the intended results. Recommendations
To improve the evaluation of the payment card pilot, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should take the following actions:
Clearly define the stages of the payment card pilot and establish measurable goals for determining when the pilot advances from one stage to the next. Develop an evaluation plan for the overall pilot and building on pilot activities to inform decisions about whether, how, and when to integrate pilot activities into overall enforcement efforts. This plan should include evaluation questions, evidence-based evaluative criteria, an analysis plan, a complete description of data to be collected, a data reliability assessment, and documentation of evaluation limitations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to: (1) describe the characteristics of the small business population; (2) describe how characteristics of a small business affect compliance burden; (3) describe how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) integrates small business compliance burden considerations in decision making; and (4) assess IRS’s plan for evaluating its payment card pilot. Open recommendations goals on ensuring compliance in a cost-effective way while minimizing taxpayer burden. Supporting documentation from IRS is pending. | Why GAO Did This Study
A challenge IRS faces is balancing efforts to minimize taxpayer burden with efforts to ensure compliance with the tax code. Small businesses are a vital source of economic growth in the United States. Reducing their costs for complying with the tax code may free up resources to expand, hire new employees, and contribute to the growth of the U.S. economy. GAO was asked to examine small business tax compliance burden and IRS's payment card pilot that addresses taxpayer non-compliance. This report: (1) describes characteristics of the small business population (2) describes how characteristics of a small business affect compliance burden; (3) describes how IRS integrates small business compliance burden considerations in decision-making; and (4) assesses IRS's plan for evaluating its payment card pilot. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed Treasury and IRS data, research, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials. GAO used its guidance on program design evaluation to assess IRS's payment card pilot evaluation plan.
What GAO Found
According to estimates produced by government tax researchers using 2010 taxpayer data, small businesses (defined in the research as individuals or entities with substantive business activity but with less than $10 million in total income and deductions) make up 99 percent of all businesses. Approximately 69 percent of small businesses (about 16 million) are individual taxpayers who report business income and the remaining 31 percent (or roughly 7.3 million) are partnerships or corporations. Small businesses with at least one employee make up about 20 percent of the small business population, but produce about 71 percent of total small business income.
Small businesses undertake a number of tax compliance-related activities that create burden. These activities can be grouped into general categories such as income tax activities, employer-related tax activities, and third-party information reporting activities. The tax compliance burden associated with these activities varies depending on the businesses' asset size, filing entity type (e.g., sole proprietor, partnership), number of employees, and industry type. According to IRS research, compliance burden increases with the size of businesses, whether measured in terms of assets, receipts, or employment. IRS also measured money and time burden as a portion of total business receipts, total assets, and burden per employee. Across all three measures, IRS results were consistent with the assumption that small businesses face significant fixed compliance costs combined with decreasing marginal costs as the business grows.
IRS's decision-making framework for administering the tax system includes consideration of small business compliance burden. For example, IRS's strategic plan identifies reducing taxpayer burden as a strategic goal. IRS provided examples of how it works with internal and external stakeholders to reduce taxpayer burden on small businesses. For example, IRS collaborated with Treasury and external stakeholders to develop a simplified method for some small businesses to calculate a home office deduction, which was introduced in January 2013. Previously, businesses had to complete a complex property depreciation calculation.
To improve tax compliance among small businesses, in 2012, IRS began piloting a program that compares payment data from payment settlement entities (such as credit card companies) with income reported by small businesses. IRS is testing ways to use payment data to detect underreporting of taxable income while minimizing small business taxpayer burden. While IRS's plans for evaluating the pilot include many key evaluation elements that GAO identified, other elements are missing. For example, IRS has defined high level pilot goals such as improving voluntary compliance and reducing the tax gap, but has not established measures for determining progress against these goals. Additionally, the plan did not adequately document evaluative questions, data collection needs, or the evaluative criteria necessary to assess whether pilot activities produced the intended results. Without these and other elements, IRS cannot ensure it is making evidence-based decisions about expanding and integrating pilot activities into broader small business compliance improvement efforts.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the evaluation of the payment card pilot, GAO recommends that IRS clearly define the stages of the pilot and establish measurable goals for determining when the pilot progresses from one stage to the next and develop an evaluation plan for the overall pilot that includes evaluation questions, complete descriptions of needed data, and evaluation criteria. IRS agreed to take the recommended actions. |
gao_RCED-96-80 | gao_RCED-96-80_0 | From 1989 through 1995, the program has lost over $6.1 billion in debt forgiveness. Future Losses Could Be Significant
Although FSA has forgiven billions of dollars in emergency loans to borrowers who have had problems repaying their debt, the portfolio continues to present a high risk of substantial losses to the government. Furthermore, borrowers have already had difficulty repaying recent loans, which reflect the most current changes to the agency’s emergency lending policies and practices. When this principal is combined with the principal owed by delinquent borrowers, about $2.5 billion, or 80.4 percent, of the outstanding emergency loan principal is held by borrowers who are at risk. Weak Lending Policies and Practices Add to Inherent Risk of Emergency Loans
The likelihood that farmers will repay emergency loan debt is diminished by the nature of the loans. Few Borrowers Use Insurance to Protect Their Property
We have previously reported that subsidized crop insurance, compared to other forms of federal assistance such as loans and direct payments, is an efficient and equitable method of providing disaster assistance. 1. 3. 3. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO analyzed the financial condition of the Department of Agriculture's multi-billion dollar farm loan portfolio, focusing on: (1) the factors that contribute to the financial risk associated with these loans; and (2) the extent to which farmers attempted to minimize the need for farm loans by purchasing insurance to protect their farming operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1989, the Farm Service Agency (FSA) has forgiven over $6 billion in emergency disaster farm loans and interest; (2) additional losses should be expected because 80 percent of the $3 billion in loan debt is held by borrowers who are already delinquent or have had difficulty repaying their loans; (3) weak FSA lending policies and practices add to the inherent risk of emergency loans; (4) FSA does not consistently implement lending safeguards to protect federal financial interests; and (5) few borrowers purchase insurance to protect their property, preferring to rely on government assistance. |
gao_GAO-11-845 | gao_GAO-11-845_0 | In addition, TRADOC has not conducted a personnel mix assessment to determine the optimum mix of military, Army civilian, and contractor personnel. TRADOC Personnel Requirements Remain Relatively Steady and Student Workload Is Increasing
TRADOC’s stated personnel requirements for instructors, training developers, and training support personnel have remained relatively steady from fiscal years 2005 through 2011, as shown in figure 2. The figure also shows that over the same time period, TRADOC’s student workload has increased by about 185,000, or about one-third (399,371 to 584,299), as a result of factors such as increases in the Army’s end strength to support ongoing operations, which have led to a larger number of soldiers who need TRADOC training. In his 2010 memorandum, the TRADOC Commander raised concerns that manning shortfalls were putting TRADOC’s ability to successfully perform its core competencies and functions at risk. In determining instructor personnel requirements, TRADOC uses an instructor model based on a formula that relies on assumptions and inputs. However, we found that the instructor personnel requirements model has not been updated since 1998, and the assumptions and inputs used in the model may not reflect changes in how training is currently provided. As a result, since 2009, TRADOC has used the same estimated number, with minor modifications, for training developer requirements from one fiscal year to the next. TRADOC officials recognize that this is not a valid approach and that they need to use an updated model to determine training developer requirements. School officials we interviewed stated that their preference would be to solely use military personnel to provide training because military personnel have the knowledge and credibility gained from combat experience to teach and mentor soldiers; however, they recognize that this is impossible because of constraints on the availability of military personnel. Quality Assurance Program Does Not Enable TRADOC to Evaluate the Impact of Workforce Management Actions on the Quality of Training
TRADOC has taken various workforce management actions in order to execute its training mission, but its quality assurance program does not capture the level of detail needed to evaluate the impact of these steps on the quality of training provided to soldiers. The Army Audit Agency in its 2010 study identified these issues and others associated with the student to instructor ratios. TRADOC’s quality assurance program does not systematically collect the data needed to evaluate the impact of the type of instructor on the quality of training. However, when doctrine and training developers are being used as instructors, developers are not available to perform their primary task of developing, reviewing, and updating Army doctrine and curricula for TRADOC courses, which could affect the quality of training. From doctrine, curricula are developed that provide a general description of course content, among other things. School officials stated that they try to update one- third of their curricula each year, but a number of factors, including using training developers to serve as instructors, have led to a backlog in updating curricula. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that TRADOC is requesting the appropriate number and mix of personnel to serve as instructors, training developers, and training support personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct TRADOC to take the following three actions: Develop a plan with specific implementation milestones to update its personnel requirements models for training personnel, including (1) updating models for instructors and training developers and (2) developing models for field training and classroom setup personnel not covered in the training support personnel model, and adjust requirements accordingly. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army direct TRADOC to establish metrics within its quality assurance program to enable TRADOC to evaluate how its workforce management actions— such as increasing reliance on contractors—impact the quality of training and use the data collected from these metrics to make adjustments to training as needed. 5136), we examined the extent to which U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has (1) identified the number and type of personnel it needs for instructors, training developers, and training support personnel to carry out its training mission and (2) evaluated the impact of its workforce management actions on the quality of training. To determine the extent to which TRADOC has evaluated the impact of workforce management actions it has taken to execute its training mission on the quality of training provided, we met with TRADOC personnel and operations and training officials, including quality assurance, doctrine, and training development officials, at TRADOC schools and headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
To support ongoing operations, the Army gives priority to providing personnel to its operating forces over its support organizations, including Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).TRADOC performs various functions, such as developing warfighting doctrine and providing training. To help manage its workforce, TRADOC has taken certain actions, such as relying more on contractors and reassigning other staff to be instructors. In a February 2010 memorandum, the TRADOC Commander stated that because of various factors TRADOC's ability to successfully perform its core competencies and functions was increasingly at risk. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO to evaluate the availability of Army trainers. GAO assessed the extent to which TRADOC has (1) identified the number and type of personnel needed to carry out its training mission and (2) evaluated the impact of its workforce management actions on the quality of training. GAO interviewed key Army and TRADOC officials and reviewed relevant doctrine, guidance, curricula, personnel requirements data, and training survey results.
What GAO Found
TRADOC annually determines its requirements for key training positions, but limitations exist in its underlying approach, such as the use of outdated personnel requirements models. From fiscal years 2005 through 2011, TRADOC's requirements for instructors, training developers, and training support personnel have remained relatively steady while the student workload has increased by about a third. To determine personnel requirements, TRADOC uses various models involving formulas that rely on a range of assumptions and inputs. Army guidance requires Army commands to update models at least every 3 years, but TRADOC has not updated its model for determining the number of instructors it needs since 1998. As a result, assumptions and inputs used in the model may not reflect changes in how training is currently provided, such as the greater use of self-paced computerized learning in place of classroom instruction. Such changes could affect the number of instructors required to teach a course. In addition, TRADOC has used the same number, with minor modifications, for training developer requirements for the last 3 fiscal years. TRADOC officials recognize that using the same number for training developer requirements is not a valid approach and that an updated model is needed; however, they are unsure when they will be able to update the model. Lastly, TRADOC has not conducted an assessment to determine the optimum mix of military, Army civilian, and contractor personnel to use to execute its training mission. Without the benefit of models that are updated to more closely reflect current training conditions and without conducting a mix analysis, TRADOC does not have a sound basis for accurately identifying the number and types of personnel needed for key training personnel and making the most cost-effective use of training resources. TRADOC has taken various workforce management actions in order to execute its training mission, but its quality assurance program does not collect certain information needed to evaluate the impact of these actions on the quality of training. Among other things, TRADOC has increased the number of students that an instructor teaches, relied on more contractors as instructors, and reassigned doctrine and training developers to serve as instructors. Through surveys and other tools, TRADOC evaluates factors such as students' knowledge of course materials and whether an instructor is teaching from the curriculum, but it does not systematically collect the data needed to evaluate the impact of changing the student to instructor ratio or the type of instructor on the quality of training. TRADOC officials expressed mixed views about the impact of using contractors on the quality of training. Some believed that more military trainers are needed because these personnel have the knowledge and credibility gained from combat experience to teach soldiers. While others stated that contractors provide the same quality of training as military personnel. GAO noted that TRADOC's use of doctrine and training developers to serve as instructors is among the factors that have led to a backlog in updating doctrine and curricula, which could affect the quality of training.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TRADOC establish a plan to (1) update its personnel requirements models, doctrine, and curricula; (2) complete a personnel mix assessment; and (3) establish metrics to evaluate its workforce management actions. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-41 | gao_GAO-08-41_0 | To obtain information needed to align access to retail services with customer needs, the Postal Service indicated that it would establish a national facility database and develop a criteria-based methodology to determine which facilities to close. FDB Does Not Meet the Postal Service’s Goal or Leading Federal Practices for Capturing and Maintaining Accurate Facility Management Data
Developed in 2003, FDB has not achieved the Postal Service’s anticipated goal or conformed to a leading federal practice that calls for a consolidated source of accurate facility data because the data entered into FDB are not reliable. The Postal Service has taken steps to improve the database, but systemic problems remain. The Postal Service’s Facility Data Do Not Meet Leading Federal Practices for Tracking Facility Management Performance and Trends
Even if the data in FDB were reliable, they would not meet leading federal practices for facility data because FDB (1) does not contain fields for the four performance measures recommended by the Federal Council—a facility’s importance, utilization rate, condition, and annual operating costs—and (2) does not allow for tracking trends. The Postal Service Has Initiated Actions to Assess the Condition of Its Facilities but Lacks a Strategic Approach for Prioritizing Maintenance Projects
The Postal Service has initiated actions to assess the condition of its facilities, but has not yet assessed the magnitude of its maintenance backlog or strategically prioritized its maintenance projects—a leading federal practice. According to this assessment, two-thirds of the facilities were in less than “acceptable” condition, including 22 percent that were in “poor” condition. Postal officials told us that this insufficient funding has caused the Postal Service to focus exclusively on reactive maintenance—that is, “emergency” and “urgent” repairs—at the expense of routine repairs. The Postal Service Has Expanded Alternative Access to Its Services but Lacks Performance Data to Identify Potentially Unneeded Retail Facilities for Closure
To address the challenge of aligning retail access with customer needs, the Postal Service has expanded alternative access to its services in underserved areas but has done less to curtail services in overserved areas. Our analysis shows wide variation in the number of postal retail facilities among counties of similar population, land area, and degree of urbanization—demonstrating the Postal Service’s challenge of placing facilities where they are needed. While considering these criteria is essential for rightsizing a facility network, the Postal Service cannot consider them because it does not capture the data needed to do so. During our review, we visited a number of postal facilities that appeared to merit consideration for closure based on one or more of these criteria. Consequently, it is imperative that the Postal Service manage its facilities as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our overall objectives were to identify the Postal Service’s efforts to address three key facility challenges related to (1) capturing and maintaining accurate facility data, (2) adequately maintaining postal facilities, and (3) aligning access to retail services with customer needs. Specifically, this report identifies the Postal Service’s goals and actions for managing each of these challenges and assesses its progress in overcoming the challenges and, as applicable, in implementing leading federal practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Continued financial challenges and increased competition call for the U.S. Postal Service to manage its 34,000 facilities as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. GAO and others have identified key facility management challenges, including the need to (1) capture and maintain accurate facility data, (2) adequately maintain facilities, and (3) align retail access with customer needs. This report assesses Postal Service efforts to overcome these challenges and implement leading federal practices. To conduct this study, GAO analyzed postal data and documents, visited 58 facilities, and interviewed postal officials.
What GAO Found
To address the challenge of capturing and maintaining accurate facility management data, the Postal Service developed the Facility Database, but the database does not conform to the Postal Service's goals or to leading federal practices; specifically, it does not include data needed to measure performance on managing facilities or have the capacity to track such data over time. Further, a database analysis by GAO revealed data reliability problems, including duplicative and contradictory data. In addition, major Postal Service departments do not use the database as a consolidated data source for managing postal facilities. The Postal Service has attempted to improve the database, but many problems remain. To address the challenge of maintaining its facilities, the Postal Service has begun assessing the condition of the facilities but has neither determined the extent of its maintenance projects nor strategically prioritized the projects. A Postal Service inspection of 651 randomly selected postal facilities revealed that two-thirds were in less than "acceptable" condition, but the Postal Service had not documented the full extent of its maintenance projects backlog. After the inspection, the Postal Service initiated a program to assess the condition of all of its facilities--a necessary first step to improving their condition. In addition, the Postal Service lacks the data needed to implement leading federal practices, such as considering a facility's importance and value when prioritizing its maintenance projects. Due to funding constraints, the Postal Service currently focuses exclusively on emergency and urgent repairs--at the expense of a less costly preventive maintenance approach. To address the challenge of aligning access to postal retail services with customer needs, the Postal Service has expanded access in underserved areas but has done less to address overserved areas. Leading federal practices identify criteria for "rightsizing" facility networks--such as considering facilities' importance and utilization--but the Postal Service does not consider these criteria. GAO's analysis shows wide variation in the number of postal retail facilities among comparable counties, and a number of facilities GAO visited appeared to merit consideration for closure based on one or more of the federal criteria. If the Postal Service begins collecting data that reflects criteria based on leading federal practices, it may be able to close facilities and adjust access to retail services according to customer needs. |
gao_GAO-14-736 | gao_GAO-14-736_0 | The Scope and Severity of Ocean Acidification’s Effects Are Potentially Significant but Not Fully Known
Ocean acidification could have a variety of potentially significant effects on marine species, ecosystems, and coastal communities, according to the six summary reports we reviewed. However, the scientific understanding of these effects is still developing, and there remains uncertainty about their scope and severity. For example:
Mollusks. Since January 2010, the One of the primary tasks of the interagency working group has been to guide the development of a research and monitoring plan, which FOARAM required to be developed by March 2011. was approved by the Office of Science and Technology Policy and released to the public in March 2014, outlines key efforts identified by the interagency working group that need to be taken over the next 10 years to advance the nation’s understanding of, and ability to respond to, ocean acidification. Agencies Have Yet to Take Action to Implement Several FOARAM Requirements
The agencies have yet to implement the following FOARAM requirements: (1) establish each agency’s role in implementing the research and monitoring plan and outline the budget requirements for implementing the plan, (2) establish an ocean acidification information exchange, and (3) develop adaptation and mitigation strategies to conserve marine organisms and ecosystems. Some of the officials expressed concern that excluding budget estimates from the research and monitoring plan has prevented the agencies and Congress from accurately understanding the funding needed to implement the plan and how it compares with current funding levels. The research and monitoring plan identified two approaches to mitigate the causes of ocean acidification: (1) reducing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere and (2) reducing the impact of other environmental stressors—such as nutrient runoff pollution—that can exacerbate the effects of acidification.however, did not provide a strategy for addressing these issues. Designating an Entity to Coordinate the Next Steps Could Bolster Federal Efforts to Implement FOARAM and Respond to Ocean Acidification
Further action could be taken to advance the federal response to ocean acidification. Our previous work on interagency collaboration has found that the federal government has used a variety of mechanisms to implement collaborative efforts involving multiple agencies. The working group has recommended that an independent national ocean acidification program office be established to coordinate the next steps in the federal response. According to the former chair of the interagency working group, such an office has not been established because the working group has been unable to reach agreement on how it should be funded. Regardless of the option chosen, until there is greater clarity on which entity is responsible for coordinating the next steps in the federal response to ocean acidification, completing important actions, such as implementing the research and monitoring plan, will be difficult. Without designating such an entity, federal agencies may struggle to advance the federal response to ocean acidification. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the federal response to ocean acidification, we recommend that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President, including the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology, in consultation with the agencies in the interagency working group, take the following four actions:
Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each agency with regard to implementing the Strategic Plan for Federal Research and Monitoring of Ocean Acidification. Estimate the funding that would be needed to implement the Strategic Plan for Federal Research and Monitoring of Ocean Acidification. Designate the entity responsible for coordinating the next steps in the federal response to ocean acidification. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Executive Office of the President; Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, the Interior, and State; EPA; NASA; and National Science Foundation. None of the agencies commented on our recommendations or findings. NOAA, on behalf of the Department of Commerce, and the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere and oceans are resulting in chemical changes referred to as ocean acidification. These changes may pose risks for some marine species and ecosystems, as well as for the coastal communities that rely on them for food and commerce. FOARAM requires various federal entities to take specific actions related to ocean acidification.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to address ocean acidification. This report discusses (1) the scientific understanding of the effects of ocean acidification; (2) the extent to which federal agencies have implemented FOARAM; and (3) additional actions, if any, that could be taken to advance the federal response to ocean acidification. To address these issues, GAO reviewed six summary reports on ocean acidification, other scientific studies, and agency documents, and interviewed key agency officials.
What GAO Found
Ocean acidification could have a variety of potentially significant effects on marine species, ecosystems, and coastal communities, according to six summary reports that GAO reviewed. The reports were developed by federal agencies and others and were based on extensive reviews of the scientific literature. The scientific understanding of these effects, however, is still developing, and uncertainty remains about their scope and severity. Potential effects of ocean acidification include:
Reducing the ability of some marine species, such as oysters, to form shells or altering their physiology or behavior. These impacts could affect some species' growth and survival.
Altering marine ecosystems, for example, by disrupting predator and prey relationships in food webs and altering habitats.
Disrupting the economy or culture of some communities, for example, by harming coastal fishing and tourism industries.
The National Science and Technology Council's Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology, in the Executive Office of the President, and several federal agencies have taken steps to implement the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act of 2009 (FOARAM) but have yet to complete some of the act's requirements. For example, an interagency working group, which includes representatives from 11 agencies and is chaired by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, has been established. The working group has developed a research and monitoring plan outlining steps to advance the nation's understanding of, and ability to respond to, ocean acidification. However, the agencies involved have yet to implement several FOARAM requirements, including outlining the budget requirements for implementing the research and monitoring plan. Some agency officials told GAO that not providing budget estimates has prevented the agencies and Congress from accurately understanding the funding needed to implement the plan and how it compares with current funding levels.
Further action could be taken to advance the federal response to ocean acidification. GAO's previous work on interagency collaboration has found that a variety of mechanisms can be used to implement efforts involving multiple federal agencies by helping to facilitate collaboration. One possible approach, recommended by the interagency working group, is to establish an independent national ocean acidification program office to coordinate the next steps in the federal response. The working group, however, has not established such an office because it has been unable to reach agreement on how it should be funded. Until greater clarity is provided on the entity responsible for coordinating the next steps in the federal response to ocean acidification, completing important actions, such as implementing the research and monitoring plan, will be difficult.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the President take steps to improve the federal response to ocean acidification, including estimating the funding that would be needed to implement the research and monitoring plan and designating the entity responsible for coordinating the next steps in the federal response. GAO provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Executive Office of the President and the departments and agencies reviewed. None of the agencies commented on GAO's recommendations; several provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-96-14 | gao_AIMD-96-14_0 | Examples are detailed under one of four strategies for better targeting the intended beneficiaries: revise grant formulas, change eligibility rules, target fees and charges, and narrow tax preferences. We have issued many reports over the past decade showing that the allocation of federal grants to state and local governments is not well targeted. If the Congress decides to reduce funding for these grants, a revised formula could better target Title I LEA grants to those counties with the greatest overall need. Target Fees and Charges to Beneficiaries for Business-type Government Activities
Adjusting fees and charges to the beneficiaries of some business-type federal programs and services offers a third targeting strategy to reduce the deficit. Industrial Development Bonds
For example, tax-exempt industrial development bonds (IDBs) are poorly targeted. Targeting Can Allow for Deficit Reduction While Improving Programs and Services
As the examples from our published work show, more effective targeting is one of several available approaches that can allow for reducing spending while improving federal programs and services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO summarized its previous work suggesting better targeting of federal programs and services as a strategy for downsizing government and reducing the deficit.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) better targeting can reduce spending and improve federal programs and services, but poor targeting can result in overspending; (2) Congress must decide how to reduce funding for certain programs and alter the allocation of resources to meet its deficit reduction goals; and (3) options for better targeting include revising formula grants to states and localities to reflect differences in fiscal capacity, altering eligibility rules for federal benefit programs to restrict certain benefits, instituting fees for those that consume certain government-provided, business-type services, and limiting or eliminating tax preferences given to state and local governments that issue industrial development bonds. |
gao_GAO-11-245T | gao_GAO-11-245T_0 | U.S. State Fund Managers and Investment Companies Have Sold Sudan-Related Assets for Varying Reasons
We found that several states have divested or frozen assets primarily related to Sudan and that the value of U.S. investment companies’ Sudan- related asset holdings has declined considerably since March 2007. Our survey responses show that state fund managers have divested or frozen about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related to Sudan (see table 1). All of the states that reported having divested or frozen Sudan-related assets had laws or policies regarding their Sudan-related assets, and the state fund managers who responded to our survey cited compliance with these laws and policies as their primary reason for divestment. Thirty-five U.S. states have enacted legislation, adopted policies, or both, affecting their Sudan-related investments. This decline cannot be accounted for solely by changes in share price, indicating that U.S. investors, on net, chose to sell shares of these companies. Most commonly, investors stated that they bought and sold Sudan-related assets for normal business reasons, such as maximizing shareholder value consistent with the guidelines in each fund’s prospectus, as well as in response to specific client instructions. U.S. Investors Have Often Considered Three Factors When Determining Whether and How to Divest from Companies Tied to Sudan
We found that U.S. investors have often considered three factors when determining whether and how to divest from companies tied to Sudan: fiduciary responsibility, the difficulty identifying operating companies with ties to Sudan, and the possible effects of divestment on operating companies and the Sudanese people. Fiduciary Responsibility
Both state fund managers and private investment companies we contacted told us that they consider whether a decision to divest Sudan-related assets is consistent with fiduciary responsibility—generally the duty to act solely and prudently in the best interests of the client. Private investment companies expressed differing perspectives on whether divesting from Sudan is consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities. However, our analysis of available lists indicates that they differ significantly from one another. However, the federal securities laws do not require companies specifically to disclose operations in countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. The company did not provide a response to the request. The SEC also has the discretionary authority to adopt a specific disclosure requirement for companies that trade on U.S. exchanges (such as requiring disclosure of any operations in state sponsors of terrorism). Although the SEC has not done so, it could exercise this authority by issuing an interim rule for comment and a final rule in the Federal Register. Our Analysis Indicates That the U.S. Government Has Complied with the Federal Contract Prohibition Provision of SADA
Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has complied with SADA’s federal contract prohibition. SADA seeks to prohibit the U.S. government from contracting with companies that conduct certain business operations in Sudan. In addition to the purchase orders with this company, we found that from June 12, 2008 to March 1, 2010, the U.S. government awarded 756 contracts to 29 affiliates and subsidiaries of the companies identified in the list as having prohibited business ties to Sudan. Our review of a nonrandom selection of contracts awarded to these affiliates and subsidiaries indicates that the contractors provided the necessary certification, when required. Therefore, for these specific contracts, the U.S. government has complied with the contract prohibition section of SADA. Additionally, they must identify and evaluate conflicting sources of information about which companies have Sudan-related business operations. GAO Recommends That SEC Consider More Complete Disclosure by Companies with Business Operations Related to Sudan
In our report released today, we recommend that, in order to enhance the investing public’s access to information needed to make well-informed decisions when determining whether and how to divest Sudan-related assets, the SEC consider issuing a rule requiring companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to disclose their business operations related to Sudan, as well as possibly other U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recognizing the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan, Congress enacted the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act (SADA) in 2007. This law supports U.S. states' and investment companies' decisions to divest from companies with certain business ties to Sudan. It also seeks to prohibit federal contracting with these companies. This testimony (1) identifies actions that U.S. state fund managers and investment companies took regarding Sudan-related assets, (2) describes the factors that these entities considered in determining whether and how to divest, and (3) determines whether the U.S. government has contracted with companies identified as having certain Sudan-related business operations and assesses compliance with SADA's federal contract prohibition provision. This testimony is based on a GAO report (GAO-10-742), for which GAO surveyed states, analyzed investment data, assessed federal contracts, and interviewed government officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, U.S. state treasurers and public pension fund managers have divested or frozen about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related to Sudan in response to their states' laws and policies; U.S. investment companies, which also sold Sudan-related assets, most commonly cited normal business reasons for changes in their holdings. State fund managers GAO surveyed indicated that their primary reason for divesting or freezing Sudan-related assets was to comply with their states' laws or policies. Thirty-five U.S. states have enacted legislation or adopted policies affecting their investments related to Sudan, primarily in response to the Darfur crisis and Sudan's designation by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism. GAO also found that the value of U.S. shares invested in six key foreign companies with Sudan-related business operations declined by almost 60 percent from March 2007 to December 2009. The decline cannot be accounted for solely by lower stock prices for these companies, indicating that U.S. investors, on net, decided to sell shares in these companies. Investors indicated that they bought and sold Sudan-related assets for normal business reasons, such as maximizing shareholder value. U.S. states and investment companies have often considered three factors when determining whether and how to divest. First, they have considered whether divesting from Sudan is consistent with fiduciary responsibility--generally the duty to act solely and prudently in the interest of a beneficiary or plan participant. Second, they have considered the difficulty in identifying authoritative and consistent information about companies with Sudan-related business operations. GAO analyzed three available lists of these companies and found that they differed significantly from one another. Although information directly provided by companies through public documents, such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosures, is a particularly reliable source of information, federal securities laws do not require companies specifically to disclose business operations in state sponsors of terrorism. The SEC has the discretionary authority to adopt a specific disclosure requirement for this information but has not exercised this authority. Third, investors have considered the effect that divestment might have on operating companies with Sudan-related business activities, such as prompting companies interested in promoting social responsibility to leave Sudan, creating room for companies that do not share that interest to enter the Sudanese market. GAO's analysis, including a review of a nonrandom selection of contracts, indicates that the U.S. government has complied with SADA's contract prohibition provision. Specifically, the U.S. government has contracted with only one company identified on a widely used list of companies with business ties to Sudan, and the contracts awarded to this company did not violate SADA. The U.S. government has contracted with subsidiaries and affiliates of companies with business ties to Sudan, as SADA permits. The related GAO report recommends that the SEC consider issuing a rule requiring companies that trade on U.S. exchanges to disclose their business operations tied to Sudan, as well as possibly other state sponsors of terrorism. The SEC's Division of Corporation Finance agreed to present GAO's recommendation to the commission. |
gao_NSIAD-98-203 | gao_NSIAD-98-203_0 | Apache Longbow Will Be Fielded Without Required Communication Capability
At initial operational capability in October 1998, the Apache Longbow will not be able to meet the requirement to transfer target data to other helicopters when out of line of sight, as required. The 50-percent reduction in planned radio procurement quantities will result in decreased lethality of the Apache Longbow fleet due to the inability to transfer target data between Apache Longbow helicopters. Also, the fleet’s survivability will be decreased because of the helicopter’s greater exposure to hostile forces. Conclusions
The Army’s 227 radar-equipped Apache Longbow helicopters will be too heavy to achieve the validated VROC requirement of 450 feet per minute in the combat mission configuration when carrying a full fuel load and 12 missiles. According to the ORD, if the VROC requirement is not met, the helicopters will not have acceptable levels of maneuverability and agility to successfully operate in combat. Army plans to modify the system will add weight and therefore exacerbate this problem. The impact of increased weight on the ability of non-radar-equipped Apache Longbow helicopters to achieve VROC performance requirements is even greater because of their less-powerful engines. At initial operational capability, the Apache Longbow will not have a radio that will allow it to transfer target data between helicopters when concealed or not in the line of sight. Unresolved technical issues have delayed the radio’s development. More importantly, the Army plans to install the non-line-of-sight radio on only one-half of the total Apache Longbow helicopter fleet. The Army has identified VROC and Hellfire missile load among the most critical Apache Longbow performance characteristics—key performance parameters. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's Apache Longbow helicopter program to determine if its operational requirements will be met, focusing on whether the Apache Longbow will meet: (1) the validated key performance requirement for vertical rate of climb (VROC); and (2) the requirement to transfer target data between Apache Longbow helicopters.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Apache Longbow program needs to be reassessed because the helicopter does not meet two key user requirements; (2) the Army's 227 radar-equipped Apache Longbow helicopters will be too heavy to achieve the validated VROC requirement of 450 feet per minute in the combat mission configuration when carrying the required 12 Longbow Hellfire missiles and a full fuel load; (3) as a result, the helicopters will not have acceptable levels of maneuverability and agility to successfully operate in combat; (4) even though the Apache Longbow is reported to have significantly greater overall capability than the original Apache, its VROC and corresponding maneuverability will be less than that of the original Apache; (5) Army plans to modify the system will add weight and therefore exacerbate this problem; (6) the impact of weight on the ability of non-radar-equipped Apache Longbow helicopters to achieve VROC performance requirements is even greater because of the less-powerful engines used in these helicopters; (7) at initial operational capability, the Apache Longbow will not have a radio that will allow it to transfer target data between helicopters when concealed or not in the line of sight; (8) unresolved technical issues have delayed the radio's development; (9) the Army plans to install the non-line-of-sight radio on only one-half of the total Apache Longbow helicopter fleet; and (10) the lack of this capability throughout the fleet results in an overall reduction in lethality due to the inability to transfer target data between Apache Longbow helicopters and decreased survivability caused by the greater exposure to hostile forces. |
gao_GAO-16-880T | gao_GAO-16-880T_0 | In 2014, people 39 years old and younger represented 44.8 percent of the U.S. employed civilian labor force and 29.6 percent of the total civilian federal government workforce (see figure 1). According to results from OPM’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS), government-wide levels of employee engagement declined from an estimated 67 percent in 2011, to an estimated 63 percent in 2014, and increased to 64 percent in 2015, as measured by a score OPM derived from the FEVS beginning in 2010—the Employee Engagement Index (EEI). As with retirement eligibility, the percent of millennials in the workforce varies by agency. Agencies that have high rates of retirement eligibility, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, also tend to have low percentages of millennials in the workforce. Millennial EEI scores were 0.4 percentage points lower than non-millennials in 2015, at 63.8 and 64.2 respectively. Key findings from our analysis include the following:
Millennials 25 years old and younger had the highest estimated EEI score across all age groups and were 7.6 percentage points higher than the age group with the lowest score, the 30 to 39 age group. In comparison, employees 30 to 39 years old comprised 21.4 percent of the federal workforce in fiscal year 2014 (see figure 5). Despite low EEI scores for millennials, as shown above in figure 4, DHS has the highest percentage (39.2 percent) of employees 39 years old and younger in their workforce, compared to other CFO Act agencies. Millennials Ranked Supervisors Higher than Non-Millennials, But Scored Lower in Intrinsic Work Experience
Among all employees, millennials had similar perceptions of leaders as non-millennials, but, as shown in table 2, employees’ perceptions of leaders consistently received the lowest score of the three components that comprise the EEI. As we have shown in the analysis above, the employee-supervisor relationship is an important aspect of employee engagement. Lessons Learned for Driving Engagement Could Help Improve Recruitment and Retention
Overall we found that the drivers of engagement were similar for millennials and non-millennials. At the Department of Education (Education), one case study agency from our 2015 report on employee engagement, the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) implemented a process to help ensure that constructive performance conversations regularly occur. Career development and training. For the remaining 4 drivers, we found that government-wide, controlling for other factors, someone who answered “strongly agree” to those questions would have on average an engagement score that was between 10 and 14 percentage points higher than someone who answered “strongly disagree.” Those four drivers are work-life balance (“My supervisor supports my need to balance work and other life issues”), inclusive work environment (“Supervisors work well with employees of different backgrounds”), employee involvement (“How satisfied are you with your involvement in decisions that affect your work”), and communication from management (“How satisfied are you with the information you receive from management on what’s going on in your organization”). Employee involvement. These key drivers can help agencies develop a culture of engagement as agencies embed them into the fabric of everyday management practices, rather than simply reacting to the results of the most recent FEVS. Employee outreach. Moreover, while our analysis and the experience of our case study agencies suggests that developing a culture of engagement does not necessarily require expensive programs or technology, it does necessitate effective management strategies such as leadership involvement, strong interpersonal skills on the part of supervisors, and thoughtful use of data. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's prior work found that skills gaps in government-wide fields such as cybersecurity are threatening the ability of agencies to carry out their missions. At the same time, government-wide trends in federal workforce retirement threaten to aggravate the problem. To help ensure agencies have the capacity to address complex national challenges, agencies need to be competitive for top talent, including those in the millennial generation.
This testimony examines (1) recent employment trends of millennials in the federal workforce and how they compare to other employee cohorts; (2) trends in engagement levels of millennials versus other employee groups; and (3) the drivers of federal employee engagement and the key lessons learned for building a culture of engagement.
This statement is based on GAO's 2015 review of the trends and drivers of government-wide employee engagement and our larger body of work on federal human capital, issued primarily between January 2014 and September 2016, and is updated with more recent information. Millennials are commonly considered as those born between the early 1980s and 2000. However, for the purposes of this statement GAO is including all employees 39 years old and younger as millennials in order to provide a consistent definition across datasets.
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. We have previously made recommendations to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to improve engagement government-wide, which OPM has implemented.
What GAO Found
Employees 39 years of age and younger represented approximately 45 percent of the United States employed civilian labor force and about 30 percent of the civilian federal workforce in fiscal year 2014. This group includes the millennial generation. The percent of millennials within the federal workforce varies by agency and agencies that have high rates of retirement eligibility also tend to have low percentages of millennials in the workforce.
In 2015, millennial employees in the federal government had an estimated Employee Engagement Index (EEI) score of 63.8 – as derived from the Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey – which is less than one percentage point lower than non-millennials. Engagement is usually defined as the sense of purpose and commitment employees feel towards their employer and its mission. As shown in the figure below, millennial subgroups had both the highest and lowest EEI scores among all age groups in 2015—employees 25 and younger had the highest EEI score (70.8), while employees 30 to 39 years old had the lowest EEI score (63.3).
Key drivers of engagement can help agencies develop a culture of engagement. GAO's regression analysis identified six practices as key drivers of the EEI, which were similar for both millennials and non-millennials: (1) constructive performance conversations, (2) career development and training, (3) work-life balance, (4) inclusive work environment, (5) employee involvement, and (6) communication from management. As GAO found in a 2015 report on employee engagement, building a culture of engagement involves effective management strategies such as leadership involvement, strong interpersonal skills of supervisors, and thoughtful use of data. |
gao_HEHS-95-113 | gao_HEHS-95-113_0 | To help the Congress as it considers welfare reform, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance requested us to provide information on (1) examples of county or local programs that stressed job placement, subsidized employment, or work-experience positions for welfare recipients; (2) the extent to which county JOBS programs nationwide emphasized these employment-focused activities; and (3) factors that hinder program administrators’ efforts to move welfare recipients into jobs. This prospect poses a formidable challenge for many AFDC recipients who have limited education, job skills, and work experience. Examples of Employment-Focused Programs
Some local welfare-to-work programs are well-focused on employment, working closely with employers to help participants find jobs or using subsidized employment or work experience to promote work for welfare recipients. The programs in these places vary in their costs per participant and other features. Researchers who have studied the CET program believe that its strong focus on employment and integrated training design are important features. A majority of county JOBS programs do not work closely with employers to help their participants find work. Lack of Jobs That Support Families
While the lack of jobs is a problem in many areas, the low-wage work that is available to many AFDC recipients discourages their movement off AFDC. Most programs appear to emphasize preparing participants for employment without also making strong efforts to help place their participants in jobs. IV), HHS’ Administration for Children and Families (ACF) disagreed with our conclusion that JOBS programs do not have a strong employment focus. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on employment-focused welfare-to-work programs, focusing on: (1) the extent to which county and local Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) programs focus on employment; and (2) factors that hinder administrators' efforts to move Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients into jobs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) some welfare-to-work programs stress employment and work closely with employers in promoting work among welfare recipients; (2) although the programs reviewed keep participants focused on the importance of work and help program participants find jobs or work-experience positions, they vary in their approach; (3) many county JOBS programs do not have a strong employment focus and many county administrators do not work with employers to find jobs for participants or use work-experience programs; (4) many local program administrators believe that insufficient staffing and resources hinder their work with employers and more flexibility in federal rules governing work-experience programs would facilitate their use; (5) the low-wage work available to many AFDC recipients discourages their movement into the work force; and (6) AFDC programs may emphasize preparing participants for employment without also making strong efforts to help them get jobs, since states are not required to track the number of AFDC recipients who get jobs or earn their way off AFDC. |
gao_AIMD-00-100 | gao_AIMD-00-100_0 | In 1996, almost one third of beneficiaries had employer- sponsored health coverage, as retirees, that included drug benefits. More than 10 percent of beneficiaries received coverage through Medicaid or other public programs. To protect against drug costs, the remainder of Medicare beneficiaries can choose to enroll in a Medicare+Choice plan with drug coverage if one is available in their area or purchase a Medigap policy. 3 The availability, breadth, and price of such coverage is changing as the costs of expanded prescription drug use drives employers, insurers, and managed care plans to adopt new approaches to control the expenditures for this benefit. Rise in Prescription Drug Spending
Over the past 5 years, prescription drug expenditures have grown substantially, both in total and as a share of all health care outlays. Prescription drug spending grew an average of 12.4 percent per year from 1993 to 1998, compared with a 5 percent average annual growth rate for health care expenditures overall. Prescription Drugs: Increasing Medicare Beneficiary Access and Related Implications Prescription drug expenditures (in billions)
Annual growth in prescription drug expenditures (percent)
Annual growth in all health care expenditures (percent)
Total drug expenditures have been driven up by both greater utilization of drugs and the substitution of higher-priced new drugs for lower-priced existing drugs. 1.) Similarly, biotechnology advances and a growing knowledge of the human immune system are significantly shaping the discovery, design, and production of drugs. All of these factors suggest the need for effective cost control mechanisms to be in place under any option to increase access to prescription drugs. 2.) A common technique to manage pharmacy care and control costs is to use a formulary. The inclusion of a drug in a formulary and its cost can affect how frequently it is prescribed and purchased and, therefore, can affect its market share. Another way in which the market has been transformed is through the use of pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) by health plans and insurers to administer and manage prescription drug benefits. Expanding Access to Prescription Drugs Involves Difficult Design Decisions
Expanding access to more affordable prescription drugs could involve either subsidizing prescription drug coverage or allowing beneficiaries access to discounted pharmaceutical prices. The design of a drug coverage option, that is, the scope of the benefit, the covered population, and the mechanisms used to contain costs, as well as its implementation will determine the effect of the option on beneficiaries, Medicare or federal spending, and the pharmaceutical market. A new benefit would need to be crafted to balance competing concerns about the sustainability of Medicare, federal obligations, and the hardship faced by some beneficiaries. Similarly, the effect of granting some beneficiaries access to discounted prices will hinge on details such as the price of the drugs after the discount, how discounts are determined and secured, and which beneficiaries are eligible. 5.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed options for increasing Medicare beneficiaries' access to prescription drugs, focusing on the: (1) factors contributing to the growth in prescription drug spending and efforts to control that growth; and (2) design and implementation issues to be considered regarding proposals to improve seniors' access to affordable prescription drugs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Medicare benefit package provides virtually no coverage; (2) in 1996, almost one third of beneficiaries had employer-sponsored health coverage, as retirees, that included drug benefits; (3) more than 10 percent of beneficiaries received coverage through Medicaid or other public programs; (4) to protect themselves against drug costs, the remainder of Medicare beneficiaries can choose to enroll in a Medicare Choice plan with drug coverage or purchase a Medigap policy; (5) however, the availability, breadth, and price of such coverage is changing as the costs of expanded prescription drug use drives employers, insurers, and managed care plans to adopt new approaches to control the expenditures for this benefit; (6) over the past 5 years, prescription drug expenditures have grown substantially, both in total and as a share of all health care outlays; (7) prescription drug spending grew an average of 12.4 percent per year from 1993 to 1998, compared with a 5 percent annual growth rate for health care expenditures overall; (8) total drug expenditures have been driven up by the following factors: (a) both greater utilization of drugs and the substitution of higher-priced new drugs for lower-priced existing drugs; (b) private insurance coverage for drugs; (c) biotechnology advances and a growing knowledge of the human immune system; and (d) advertising of drugs; (9) all of these factors suggest the need for effective cost control mechanisms; (10) a common technique to manage pharmacy care and control costs is to use a formulary, which can affect how frequently a drug is prescribed and purchased and, therefore, can affect its market share; (11) another way in which the market has been transformed is through the use of pharmacy benefit managers by health plans and insurers to administer and manage prescription drug benefits; (12) expanding access to more affordable prescription drugs could involve either subsidizing prescription drug coverage or allowing beneficiaries access to discounted pharmaceutical prices; (13) the design of a drug coverage option, as well as its implementation, will determine the effect of the option on beneficiaries, Medicare or federal spending, and the pharmaceutical market; (14) a new benefit would need to be crafted to balance competing concerns about the sustainability of Medicare, federal obligations, and the hardship faced by some beneficiaries; and (15) the effect of granting some beneficiaries access to discounted prices will hinge on details such as the price of the drugs after the discount, how discounts are determined and secured, and which beneficiaries are eligible. |
gao_T-RCED-96-93 | gao_T-RCED-96-93_0 | The Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992 reauthorized the SBIR Program and established the STTR Program, closely modeled on the SBIR Program. This increase will effectively double the funding for the program to nearly $1 billion in fiscal year 1997. In general, we believe the quality of the winning SBIR and STTR proposals is favorable. In addition, agencies deemed many more SBIR proposals worthy of award than they were able to fund. Accordingly, we made several recommendations to the Administrator of SBA, who has taken steps to implement them. The relative roles of the research institution and the small business as the source of the technology bear directly on the need for the STTR Program. Second, if the program is effective in moving ideas from research institutions to small businesses, then the next logical question concerns whether their collaboration is effective in moving them to the marketplace. Third, because one important difference between the two programs is that STTR makes a small business/research institution collaboration mandatory, the question arises whether the SBIR Program could accomplish the objective of transferring technology from research institutions to the private sector without mandatory collaboration. In addition, the agencies have taken steps to address other concerns such as duplicate funding of SBIR projects and potential conflicts of interest in the STTR Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Pilot Program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the quality of winning SBIR and STTR proposals appears to be good, but it is too early to assess the programs' actual results; (2) the increase in available SBIR funding did not appear to affect the program, since the competition for SBIR funding was high and the agencies' ratios of awards to proposals remained essentially constant; (3) despite the increased funding, many SBIR proposals that were deemed worthy did not receive funding; (4) the Small Business Administration is taking steps to implement recommendations to reduce duplicate funding of similar research; (5) the five agencies responsible for STTR programs are taking steps to prevent entities that submit proposals from evaluating their own and other proposals; (6) there is no consensus on the need for and effect of the STTR program on agency research and development and it will take years before its effectiveness in transferring technology from research institutions to the marketplace can be assessed; and (7) assessments of STTR programs must determine whether innovative ideas are originating with the research institutions more than the small businesses, their collaboration is effective in moving technology to the marketplace, and the SBIR program could accomplish the technology transfers without mandatory collaboration. |
gao_GAO-10-66 | gao_GAO-10-66_0 | Weaknesses in NFIP Transaction Controls and Processing Limited Accountability and Financial Reporting
Control weaknesses impaired FEMA’s ability to maintain effective transaction-level accountability. At the WYO level, WYO companies did not adhere to policies and procedures regarding required claims file documentation, and therefore almost one third of the claims loss files we reviewed were missing supporting documents. Further, incomplete BSA premium data files, such as missing insureds’ names and addresses, prevented our assessment of the reliability of reported premium amounts. BSA-level controls were ineffective in verifying the accuracy of WYO- submitted data. At the FEMA level, financial reporting process controls were not based on transaction-level data—instead FEMA relied primarily on summary data compiled using error-prone manual data entry. Similarly, almost 71 percent (125 out of 177) of the statistically sampled claim losses paid files we reviewed failed at least one internal control test. The Design of FEMA’s Financial Reporting for NFIP Activity Increases Risk
Along with the internal control weaknesses discussed previously, the design of FEMA’s NFIP financial reporting process increased the risk of inaccurate or incomplete data because it did not include a process of analyzing the detailed data for accuracy or analyzing the financial reports in relation to the transaction-level data currently submitted by WYO companies for statistical purposes. Weaknesses in FEMA’s Oversight Structures Limited Effectiveness in Monitoring NFIP Financial Activity
Weaknesses in the broad oversight structures that FEMA relies on to monitor NFIP financial activity in three key areas limited the effectiveness of FEMA’s oversight: (1) FEMA did not have processes to monitor WYO company audits by independent public accountants and other parties, including required biennial audits, state insurance department audits, and audits for cause; (2) FEMA did not perform triennial operational reviews of all WYO insurance companies; and (3) FEMA’s claims reinspection program used flawed sampling procedures. As a result of these oversight deficiencies, FEMA’s ability to identify and address NFIP financial transaction control breakdowns when processing transactions related to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes was limited. Therefore, we expected that FEMA would have done an operational review of all the WYO companies during the 3-year period covering 2005 to 2007. However, we found that FEMA did not use a statistical sampling basis for selecting claims for reinspection. These findings are consistent with findings from previous audits. FEMA has a system development and implementation effort, referred to as NextGen, under way. This effort has experienced delays and it is too soon to determine whether planned program efficiencies—such as confirmation of insured’s property address—will be achieved under the new system. Revise required internal control activities for the BSA to provide for verifying and validating the reliability of WYO-reported financial information based upon a review of a sample of the underlying transactions or events, or obtain verification that these objectives have been met through independent audits of the WYO companies. Because reinspections are conducted principally on open claims files to document the appropriateness of the original claims adjuster’s work, the lack of a statistically representative sample not only precludes FEMA from projecting the results of these reinspections to determine the overall accuracy of claims, it also limits FEMA’s ability to continuously assess the overall performance of insurance companies and adjusters in fulfilling their NFIP responsibilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether controls were effective in providing accountability and reliable financial reporting for National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) transactions during the 2005 to 2007 time frame, we obtained and reviewed available transaction data and financial reports for NFIP for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA contractors, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) officials to document and obtain an understanding of the financial reporting process and related internal controls for NFIP transactions. To assess whether recent and planned actions to improve NFIP controls and the overall control environment are likely to address identified financial control weaknesses, we reviewed NFIP policy and procedural guidance that has been issued subsequent to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to the federal government's role as guarantor, floods impose an enormous potential financial burden on the federal government. Consequently, decision makers at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Congress need accurate and timely financial information to assess the effectiveness of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This report assesses whether controls in place during the 2005 to 2007 time frame were effective and whether actions to improve controls are likely to address identified weaknesses. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed and analyzed FEMA/NFIP guidance, data, and financial reports, reviewed prior audit reports, interviewed FEMA officials and contractors, and selected a sample of claim losses paid to determine whether claim files contained key documents.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in internal controls impaired FEMA's ability to maintain effective transaction-level accountability. These weaknesses limited FEMA's ability to assure accurate NFIP financial data during the 3-year period from fiscal year 2005 through 2007, which included the financial activity related to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. FEMA relies heavily on Write Your Own (WYO) insurance companies to carry out NFIP financial activities such as documenting and maintaining claim files. FEMA's Bureau and Statistical Agent (BSA) serves as a liaison between the government and WYO insurance companies. GAO identified weaknesses at three levels of the NFIP transaction accountability and financial reporting process. First, at the WYO level, our internal control testing of a statistical sample determined that almost 71 percent of WYO company claims loss files did not have the necessary documents to support the claims, or reports were filed late. Second, incomplete BSA-level premium data files (lacking key information such as insureds' names and addresses) prevented an assessment of the reliability of reported NFIP premium amounts. Further, BSA-level internal control activities were ineffective in verifying the accuracy of WYO-submitted data. Lastly, FEMA's financial reporting process uses summary data that is overly reliant on error-prone manual data entry. GAO found that FEMA's broader oversight structures were also of limited effectiveness. Specifically, GAO found weaknesses in three key structures FEMA relies on to provide oversight over NFIP and monitor financial activity: (1) WYO company audits--specifically, we found that FEMA did not collect the results of state insurance department audits related to flood insurance activity and did not perform any audits for cause; (2) triennial operational reviews of WYO insurance companies--we found that FEMA did not perform operational reviews at almost one third of all WYO companies over the 3-year period; and (3) FEMA's claims reinspection program--we found that FEMA used flawed sampling procedures in the claims reinspection program. These findings are consistent with weaknesses GAO has previously identified. These oversight weaknesses limited FEMA's ability to identify and address financial transaction control breakdowns resulting from the 2005 hurricanes. FEMA's initiatives to improve specific internal control weaknesses and the overall NFIP control environment since the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes have done little to address many of the NFIP financial data deficiencies highlighted by these catastrophic events. FEMA has made improvements such as revising its claim reinspection selection methodology to provide for review of a random selection of a statistically representative sample of claim files. However, the modified reinspection methodology still does not include all claims. FEMA has also implemented a tracking system to monitor the number of WYO biennial audits obtained and reviewed. Further, FEMA has a system modernization development and implementation effort under way. It is too soon to determine the extent to which these efforts will achieve program efficiencies. |
gao_GAO-02-842T | gao_GAO-02-842T_0 | Product Approval Reforms Use Both Centralized and State- Based Approaches
Through NAIC’s Speed to Market initiative, state insurance regulators are trying to streamline regulatory processes associated with insurance product approvals to make products available to consumers more quickly. A principal aspect of this initiative is to develop a more centralized product filing and approval process for certain types of insurance products that are sold on a multistate or nationwide basis. NAIC has also developed a model law aimed at streamlining the product approval process for commercial property and casualty insurance. This initiative and others were highlighted in NAIC’s Statement of Intent: The Future of Insurance Regulation, endorsed by NAIC in March 2000 in response to GLBA and changes in the financial services sector. Activity on this initiative is now focused on streamlining existing state-based company licensing processes for the benefit of insurers that wish to conduct business in multiple states. Conclusions
In this statement, we have discussed three of the initiatives outlined in NAIC’s Statement of Intent for regulatory modernization—licensing nonresident producers (Producer Licensing Reciprocity and Uniformity), approving new products (Speed to Market), and coordinating the oversight of companies that operate in multiple states (National Treatment of Companies). | What GAO Found
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), through its Accreditation Program, has made considerable progress in achieving uniformity among state insurance regulators. In addition, competitive pressures from further consolidation in the financial services sector and enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has focused attention on regulator reforms in the insurance industry. NAIC's Producer Licensing Reciprocity and Uniformity initiative aims to streamline the licensing process for selling insurance in multiple states. State regulators are also trying to streamline regulatory processes to bring new insurance products to market more quickly. NAIC's Speed to Market initiative focuses both on developing a more centralized filing and approval process for life and health insurance products and on improving existing state-based approval processes for other types of products. Finally, NAIC's National Treatment of Companies initiative aims to facilitate the licensing process for conducting business on a multistate basis. However, NAIC and the states face significant challenges in implementing their initiatives. |
gao_GAO-09-983 | gao_GAO-09-983_0 | Furthermore, although icon and park officials have acquired a variety of technologies to enhance security, they do not have guidance to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of proposed or actual countermeasures. The Park Service Lacks a Systematic Approach for Allocating Resources Using Risk Management
Park Service officials at the national, regional, icon, and park levels told us that security awareness has increased throughout the organization, largely because of Interior’s initiative to assess security risks at the icons, and the resources the Park Service has allocated to address these concerns; yet the Park Service has not formally applied risk management principles for the rest of its national parks inventory. Hence, efforts in the other key practice areas—leveraging technology, information sharing and coordination, performance measurement and testing, and human capital management—are diminished if they are not part of a risk management approach which can be the vehicle for using these practices. The Park Service Lacks a Servicewide Approach to Sharing Information Internally and Measuring Performance
The Park Service has information sharing and coordination arrangements with external organizations at the national, regional, icon, and park levels, but lacks comparable arrangements for internal security communications that would allow icon and park officials to share information with one another on common security problems and solutions. Because the Park Service’s performance management and testing capability is limited, the agency has little information on the status and performance of security activities at the icons and parks it can use to manage day-to-day activities or that Park Service management can use to strategize security efforts throughout the organization. As a result, there is little assurance that staff are equipped to effectively identify and mitigate risks at icons and parks. The Interior IG and OLES officials are also concerned about the Park Service’s management of security operations at individual icons. Specifically, the Secretary should instruct the Director of the National Park Service, in consultation with OLES, to develop and implement 1. a more comprehensive, routine risk management approach for security that encompasses the Park Service’s vast inventory of icons and parks, including developing guidance, standards, and procedures for conducting risk assessments at the icon and park level and for using the results to inform resource allocation decisions at the national, regional, icon, and park levels; 2. guidance and standards for leveraging security technology, including how to assess the costs and benefits of countermeasure alternatives while taking into account risk management results; 3. an internal communications strategy for security to address coordination gaps, including a timeline for the development of a servicewide Web portal for security; 4. a servicewide performance management and testing program that includes specific measures and an evaluation component, which can be used to inform broader risk management decision-making and to assess security performance; 5. a strategy for more clearly defining security roles and responsibilities within the Park Service, which should, among other things, ensure that the Park Service is well equipped at the national and regional levels to oversee security improvements; and 6. a servicewide security training program and related curriculum to provide staff with the knowledge, skills, and awareness needed to improve Park Service security practices. Furthermore, as we reported, the Park Service does not have a special training curriculum for its designated physical security coordinators. Of the six key practices, we used the following as criteria: Allocating resources using risk management. Strategic management of human capital. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11 terrorist attacks have heightened concerns about the security of the nation's icons and parks, which millions of people visit every year. The National Park Service (Park Service) within the Department of the Interior (Interior) is responsible for securing nearly 400 park units that include icons and other parks. In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices that include: allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information sharing and coordination, performance measurement and testing, and strategic management of human capital. As requested, GAO determined whether the Park Service's security efforts for national icons and parks reflected key practices. To meet this objective, GAO used its key practices as criteria, reviewed five icons and parks to gain firsthand knowledge, analyzed Interior documents, and interviewed Interior officials.
What GAO Found
The Park Service has implemented a range of security improvements since the September 11 terrorist attacks and has worked to integrate security into its primary mission to preserve national icons and parks for the public's enjoyment. For example, it has established a senior-level security manager position and taken steps to strengthen security at the icons, and is developing a risk management program for small parks. These efforts exhibit some aspects of the key protection practices, but GAO found limitations in each of the areas. The Park Service does not allocate resources using risk management servicewide or cost-effectively leverage technology. While the Park Service, with assistance from Interior, has conducted risk assessments and implemented countermeasures to enhance security at the icons, some critical vulnerabilities remain. Moreover, the Park Service has not advanced this risk management approach for icons to the rest of its national parks. Without a servicewide risk management approach, the Park Service lacks assurance that security efforts are focused where they are needed. Furthermore, while icons and parks may use a variety of security technologies and other countermeasures, they do not have guidance for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of these investments, thus limiting assurances of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Additionally, the Park Service faces limitations with sharing and coordinating information internally and lacks a servicewide approach for routine performance measurement and testing. Although the Park Service collaborates with external organizations, it lacks comparable arrangements for internal security communications and, as a result, parks are not equipped to share information with one another on common security problems and solutions. Furthermore, the Park Service has not established security performance measures and lacks an analysis tool that could be used to evaluate program effectiveness and inform an overall risk management strategy. Thus, icons and parks have little information on the status and performance of security that they can use to manage daily activities or that Park Service management can use to manage security throughout the organization. Finally, strategic human capital management is an area of concern because of the Park Service's lack of clearly defined security roles and a security training curriculum. For example, staff that are assigned security duties are generally not required to meet qualifications or undergo specialized training. Absent a security training curriculum, there is less assurance that staff are well-equipped to effectively identify and mitigate risks at national icons and parks. |
gao_GAO-16-353 | gao_GAO-16-353_0 | VHA’s Fiscal Year 2015 Claims Processing Was Significantly Less Timely Than Medicare’s and TRICARE’s, and VHA Has Generally Not Paid Interest Penalties on Late Payments
VHA’s Claims Processing and Payments Were Significantly Less Timely Than Medicare’s and TRICARE’s in Fiscal Year 2015, and VHA’s Data Likely Overstate VHA’s Performance
In fiscal year 2015, VHA’s processing of claims for VA care in the community services was significantly less timely than Medicare’s and TRICARE’s claims processing. VHA officials told us that the agency’s fiscal year 2015 data show that VHA processed about 66 percent of claims within the agency’s required timeframe of 30 days or less. In contrast, CMS and DHA data show that in fiscal year 2015, Medicare’s and TRICARE’s claims processing contractors processed about 99 percent of claims within 30 or fewer days of receipt. Specifically, VHA’s data likely overstate the agency’s claims processing timeliness because they do not account for delays in scanning paper claims, and VHA officials told us that paper claims account for approximately 60 percent of claims for VA care in the community services. However, our analysis of the non-generalizable sample of 156 claims for VA care in the community services from the four VHA claims processing locations we visited suggests that it may have taken about 2 weeks, on average, for staff to scan the paper claims in our sample into FBCS. However, the observations from our most recent review of a new sample of claims at four other claims processing locations suggest that VHA had not monitored the operational effectiveness of their corrective actions to address our recommendation. VHA officials said that when they became aware of our more recent findings, they began requiring managers at their claims processing locations to periodically certify in writing that all incoming paper claims have been date-stamped and scanned on the day of receipt. As a result, this documentation must be scanned into FBCS, which delays claims processing, according to VHA staff. FBCS cannot automatically adjudicate claims. In addition to the technological issues described above, VHA officials and staff also told us that staffing shortages have adversely affected VHA’s claims processing timeliness. VA Care in the Community Providers Cite Administrative Burden, Lack of Notification, and Problems with Poor Customer Service
The 12 community providers and 12 state hospital association respondents who participated in our review told us about various issues they had experienced with VHA’s claims processing system. Almost all of the community providers we interviewed (11 out of 12) and all of the state hospital association respondents that participated in our review described the administrative burden of submitting claims and medical documentation to their respective VHA claims processing locations. Issues with telephone-based provider customer service. While VHA Has Implemented Interim Measures, the Agency Does Not Expect to Address All Claims Processing Challenges until Fiscal Year 2018 or Later
VHA Has Recently Eliminated Certain Medical Documentation Requirements, Filled Staff Vacancies, and Taken Other Steps to Improve Claims Processing Timeliness
In the course of our work, VHA officials reported that they implemented several measures in fiscal year 2015 and early fiscal year 2016 that were intended to improve the timeliness of VHA’s payments to community providers and the TPAs. In its October 2015 plan, VHA stated that it expects it will significantly increase its reliance on community providers to deliver care to veterans in the coming years. To date, VHA has not communicated to Congress or other external stakeholders a plan for modernizing its claims processing system that clearly addresses the components of a sound plan identified above. That VHA has not yet communicated a detailed plan but has stated that it expects to deploy a modernized claims processing system as early as fiscal year 2018 is cause for concern, especially given VA’s past failed attempts to modernize key information technology systems. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help provide reasonable assurance that VHA achieves its long-term goal of modernizing its claims processing system, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should direct the Under Secretary for Health to ensure that the agency develops a sound written plan that includes the following elements: a detailed schedule for when VHA intends to complete development and implementation of each major aspect of its new claims processing system; the estimated costs for implementing each major aspect of the system; and the performance goals, measures, and interim milestones that VHA will use to evaluate progress, hold staff accountable for achieving desired results, and report to stakeholders the agency’s progress in modernizing its claims processing system. Condition meets the prudent layperson standard of an emergency A VA or other federal medical facility was not feasibly available to provide the needed care, and an attempt to use either would not have been considered reasonable by a prudent layperson The services were rendered before the veteran was stable enough for transfer to a VA or other federal medical facility and before the VA or other federal medical facility agreed to accept the transfer Veteran was enrolled in the VA health care system Veteran had received care from a VA clinician within the 24 months preceding the emergency care episode Veteran is financially liable to the community provider of the emergency care Veteran has no entitlement under another health plan contract (such as Medicare or a private health insurance plan)
Veteran has no recourse against a third party that would wholly extinguish his or her liability to the community provider (e.g., motor vehicle insurance or workers’ compensation)
Appendix III: Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) Steps for Processing Claims for the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Care in the Community Services as of March 2016
Appendix III: Veterans Health Administration’s (VHA) Steps for Processing Claims for the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Care in the Community Services as of March 2016 VHA has numerous programs through which it purchases VA care in the community services, and these programs have varying rules governing payment rates and requirements for claims processing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to recent increases in utilization of VA care in the community, VHA has had difficulty processing claims in a timely manner.
Congress included a provision in law for GAO to review VHA's payment timeliness and to compare it to that of Medicare and TRICARE. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) VHA's, Medicare's, and TRICARE's claims processing timeliness; (2) factors that have impeded VHA's claims processing timeliness and community providers' experiences; and (3) VHA's recent actions and plans to improve its claims processing timeliness. GAO obtained fiscal year 2015 data on VHA's, Medicare's, and TRICARE's claims processing timeliness. GAO also visited 4 of 95 VHA claims processing locations (selected based on variation in geographic location, performance, and workload); reviewed VHA documents and 156 claims from the 4 locations; and interviewed officials from VHA, Medicare, TRICARE, and selected community providers and state hospital associations. Results from GAO's analysis cannot be generalized to all VHA claims processing locations or community providers.
What GAO Found
To help ensure that veterans are provided timely and accessible health care services, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has purchased care from non-VA community providers through its care in the community programs since as early as 1945. VHA's agency-wide data show that in fiscal year 2015, it processed about 66 percent of claims within the agency's required time frame of 30 days or less, whereas data from Medicare and TRICARE (the Department of Defense's health care system) show that their contractors processed about 99 percent of claims within 30 days or less. However, VHA's data likely overstate its performance because they do not account for delays in scanning paper claims, which officials say account for approximately 60 percent of claims. GAO's analysis of 156 claims from four VHA claims processing locations indicated that it took an average of 2 weeks for VHA staff to scan paper claims into VHA's claims processing system, and GAO observed multiple bins of paper claims that had been awaiting scanning at one site for over a month. In a 2014 report, GAO recommended that VHA take action to ensure that all of its claims processing locations comply with its policy of scanning claims into VHA's claims processing system upon receipt. While VHA agreed with this recommendation and attempted to reiterate the policy through various means, GAO's more recent findings suggest that VHA did not monitor the operational effectiveness of these corrective actions. VHA officials said that they have since begun requiring managers at their claims processing locations to periodically certify in writing that all incoming paper claims have been date-stamped and scanned on the day of receipt.
VHA officials and claims processing staff from the four locations GAO visited indicated that technology limitations, manual processes, and staffing shortages have delayed VHA's claims processing. For example, VHA's claims processing system lacks the capacity to automatically adjudicate claims. VHA staff instead must rely on manual processes, which they say delay payments to community providers. In addition, community providers and state hospital association respondents who participated in GAO's review said they had experienced various issues with VHA's claims processing system. For example, almost all providers described the administrative burden of submitting claims and related medical documentation to VHA and a lack of responsiveness from VHA's claims processing locations when the providers contacted them to follow up on claims.
While VHA has recently implemented interim measures to address challenges that have delayed claims processing—such as eliminating certain medical documentation requirements and filling staff vacancies—the agency does not expect to deploy solutions to address all challenges until fiscal year 2018 or later. VHA is currently examining options for modernizing its claims processing system but has not yet communicated to Congress or other external stakeholders a sound plan that clearly addresses the components identified in past GAO work (such as a detailed schedule, estimated costs, and measures of progress). This is concerning, given VA's past failed attempts to modernize key information technology systems. While the agency expects to significantly increase its reliance on community providers to deliver care to veterans in the future, it risks losing their cooperation if it does not improve its payment timeliness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA develop a written plan for modernizing its claims processing system that includes a detailed schedule, costs, and performance measures. VA concurred with this recommendation and plans to address it through the planned consolidation of its VA care in the community programs. |
gao_GAO-11-335 | gao_GAO-11-335_0 | VWP Requirements
To qualify for the VWP a country must offer reciprocal visa-free travel privileges to U.S. citizens; have had a refusal rate of less than 3 percent for the previous fiscal year for its nationals who apply for business and tourism visas; issue machine-readable passports to its citizens; enter into an agreement with the United States to report or make available through Interpol or other means as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security information about the theft or loss of passports; accept the repatriation of any citizen, former citizen, or national against whom a final order of removal is issued no later than 3 weeks after the order is issued; enter into an agreement with the United States to share information regarding whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the United States represents a threat to U.S. security or welfare; and be determined not to compromise the law enforcement (including immigration enforcement) or security interests of the United States by its inclusion in the program. To be eligible to travel without a visa under the program, nationals of VWP countries must have received an authorization to travel under the VWP through ESTA; have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a national seek entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for business or have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States; have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the program (for example, individuals must not have overstayed the 90-day limit during prior visits under the VWP); if entering by air or sea, possess a return trip ticket to any foreign destination issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. government to participate in the program, and must have arrived in the United States aboard such a carrier; and if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile abroad to which they intend to return. DHS Implemented ESTA to Meet Mandated Requirement but Has Not Fully Analyzed Risks from Noncompliance
DHS has implemented ESTA to meet the 9/11 Act requirement intended to enhance program security and has taken steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement, but it has not fully analyzed the risks of carrier and passenger noncompliance with the requirement. Moreover, most travel industry officials we interviewed in six VWP countries praised DHS’s widespread ESTA outreach efforts, reasonable implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback but expressed dissatisfaction over ESTA fees. Also, although carriers complied with the ESTA requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of VWP passengers before boarding them in 2010, DHS does not have a target completion date for a review to identify potential security risks associated with the small percentage of cases of traveler and carrier noncompliance with the ESTA requirement. When an applicant submits an ESTA application, DHS systems evaluate the applicant’s biographical information and responses to VWP eligibility questions. DHS Made Efforts to Minimize Burden of ESTA Requirement
In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS has taken steps to minimize the burden associated with ESTA’s use. ESTA approval for program participants generally remains valid for 2 years. According to travel industry officials in the six VWP countries we visited, this change has simplified travel for many travelers, especially business travelers who travel several times each year. In 2010, about 2 percent—364,086 VWP passengers—were boarded without verified ESTA approval. Only Half of VWP Countries Have Entered Into All Required Information- Sharing Agreements
Although DHS and partners at State and Justice have made progress in negotiating information-sharing agreements with VWP countries, required by the 9/11 Act, only half of the countries have entered into all required agreements. In coordination with State and Justice, DHS also outlined measures short of termination that may be applied to VWP countries not meeting their compliance date. HSPD-6 Agreement
HSPD-6 agreements establish a procedure between the United States and partner countries to share watchlist information about known or suspected terrorists. Our current review shows that DHS has not completed the latest biennial reports for 50 percent, or 18 of the 36 VWP countries in a timely manner. Also, over half of those reports are more than 1 year overdue. In the case of two countries, DHS was unable to demonstrate that they had completed reports in over 4 years. DHS cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays, including a lack of resources needed to complete timely reports. In addition, DHS officials said that they sometimes intentionally delayed report completion for two reasons: (1) because they frequently did not receive DNI intelligence assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before completing VWP country biennial reports or (2) in order to incorporate anticipated developments in the status of information-sharing agreement negotiations with a VWP country. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that DHS can identify and mitigate potential security risks associated with the VWP, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: establish time frames for the regular review and documentation of cases of VWP passengers traveling to a U.S. port of entry without verified ESTA approval, and take steps to address delays in the biennial country review process so that the mandated country reports can be completed on time. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the implementation of the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), we reviewed relevant documentation, including 2006 and 2008 GAO reports evaluating the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and statistics on program applicants and travelers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows eligible nationals from 36 member countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without a visa. In 2007, Congress required the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to implement an automated electronic travel authorization system to determine, prior to travel, applicants' eligibility to travel to the United States under the VWP. Congress also required all VWP member countries to enter into an agreement with the United States to share information on whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the United States represent a security threat. In 2002, Congress mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) review, at least every 2 years, the security risks posed by each VWP country's participation in the program. In this report, GAO evaluates (1) DHS's implementation of an electronic system for travel authorization; (2) U.S. agencies' progress in negotiating informationsharing agreements; and (3) DHS's timeliness in issuing biennial reports. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed U.S., foreign government, and travel industry officials in six VWP countries.
What GAO Found
DHS has implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and has taken steps to minimize the burden associated with the new program requirement. However, DHS has not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of VWP travelers without verified ESTA approval. DHS requires applicants for VWP travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. Travelers whose ESTA applications are denied can apply for a U.S. visa. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS has made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by the new requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a VWP application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. Most travel industry officials GAO interviewed in six VWP countries praised DHS's widespread ESTA outreach efforts, reasonable implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback, but expressed dissatisfaction with the costs associated with ESTA. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of VWP passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent-- about 364,000 travelers--traveled under the VWP without verified ESTA approval. DHS has not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program. To meet the legislative requirement, DHS requires that VWP countries enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, only half of the countries have fully complied with this requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. Half of the countries have entered into agreements to share watchlist information about known or suspected terrorists and to provide access to biographical, biometric, and criminal history data. By contrast, almost all of the 36 VWP countries have entered into an agreement to report lost and stolen passports. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, has established a compliance schedule requiring the last of the VWP countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Although termination from the VWP is one potential consequence for countries not complying with the information-sharing agreement requirement, U.S. officials have described it as undesirable. DHS, in coordination with State and Justice, has developed measures short of termination that could be applied to countries not meeting their compliance date. DHS has not completed half of the most recent biennial reports on VWP countries' security risks in a timely manner. According to officials, DHS assesses, among other things, counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs. However, DHS has not completed the latest biennial reports for 18 of the 36 VWP countries in a timely manner, and over half of these reports are more than 1 year overdue. Further, in the case of two countries, DHS was unable to demonstrate that it had completed reports in the last 4 years. DHS cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays. For example, DHS officials said that they intentionally delayed report completion because they frequently did not receive mandated intelligence assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before completing VWP country biennial reports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS establish time frames for the regular review of cases of ESTA noncompliance and take steps to address delays in the biennial review process. DHS concurred with the report's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-345 | gao_GAO-04-345_0 | CBP Uses a Targeting Process to Identify Potential Textile Transshipment
CBP’s process for identifying potential illegal textile transshipments depends on targeting suspicious activity by analyzing available data and intelligence. With the expiration of the WTO global textile quota regime in 2005, CBP will lose its authority to conduct TPVTs in the former quota countries, and supplementing the enforcement information provided to the ports will be important. Information from overseas Customs Attaché offices and cooperative efforts with foreign governments can provide additional important information for port inspections. However, while the TPVT reports are an important part of the targeting process, they are not always provided in a timely manner to CBP ports, CITA, and the foreign governments. Weak Internal Controls Hinder Effectiveness of CBP’s In-bond System
CBP uses its in-bond system to monitor cargo, including foreign textiles, transiting the U.S. commerce or being exported to a foreign country. However, weak internal controls in this system enable cargo to be illegally diverted from the supposed destination, thus circumventing U.S. quota restrictions and duties. This is merchandise “in transit” through the United States. Seizure of the textile shipment. Moreover, CBP’s system for assessing liquidated damages does not provide a strong deterrent against in-bond diversion. 107-210, Aug. 6, 2002), Congress directed GAO to review U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) system for monitoring and enforcing textile transshipment and make recommendations for improvements, as needed, to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means. As discussed with Committee representatives, we have focused on answering the following questions: (1) how CBP identifies potential textile transshipment, (2) how well CBP’s textile review process works to prevent illegal textile transshipment, (3) how effectively CBP monitors foreign textiles transiting the United States in its in-bond system before entering U.S. commerce or being exported, and (4) what challenges CBP experienced in using penalties and other means to deter illegal textile transshipment. To review CBP’s foreign factory visits, we observed a Textile Production Verification Team (TPVT) visit in El Salvador. Also, as quotas are removed, a more competitive market may place increasing pressure on the U.S. textile and apparel industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. policymakers and industry groups are concerned that some foreign textile and apparel imports are entering the United States fraudulently and displacing U.S. textile and apparel industry workers. Congress mandated GAO to assess U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) system for monitoring and enforcing textile transshipment and make recommendations for improvements, as needed. Therefore, GAO reviewed (1) how CBP identifies potential illegal textile transshipment, (2) how well CBP's textile review process works to prevent illegal textile transshipment, and (3) how effectively CBP uses its in-bond system to monitor foreign textiles transiting the United States.
What GAO Found
To identify potential illegal textile transshipments, CBP uses a targeting process that relies on analyzing available trade data to focus limited inspection and enforcement resources on the most high-risk activity. In 2002, CBP targeted about 2,500 textile shipments out of more than 3 million processed, or less than 0.01 percent. Given resource constraints at CBP ports, CBP's textile review process for preventing illegal textile transshipment increasingly depends on information from foreign factory visits that CBP conducts, based on the targeting results. However, CBP's foreign factory visit reports are not always finalized and provided to ports, other agencies, or the foreign governments for timely follow-up. Further, after the global textile quotas end in 2005, CBP will lose its authority to conduct foreign factory visits in former quota countries. U.S. overseas Attache offices and cooperative efforts by foreign governments can supplement information provided to the ports. Under CBP's in-bond system, foreign textiles and apparel can travel through the United States before formally entering U.S. commerce or being exported to a foreign country. However, weak internal controls in this system enable cargo to be illegally diverted from its supposed destination, thus circumventing quota restrictions and payment of duties. Moreover, CBP's penalties do not deter in-bond diversion. Bond amounts can be set considerably lower than the value of the cargo, and violators may not view the low payments as a deterrent against diverting their cargo. |
gao_GAO-14-135 | gao_GAO-14-135_0 | If the qualifying institution had assets of more than $1 billion but less than $10 billion, it was eligible for funding that equaled up to 3 percent of its risk-weighted assets. Total qualified small business lending for SBLF participants—banks and CDLFs—increased by almost $10.4 billion over their aggregate baseline of about $36.5 billion. Several Factors Help Explain Variation in Small Business Lending Growth
Factors that help to explain the variation in qualified small business lending across SBLF banks include the condition of banks’ loan portfolios, amount of net capital received from SBLF, and demand for credit, among others. As shown in figure 2, SBLF banks in the first quartile increased qualified small business lending 114.1 percent over their baseline, compared to 47.6 percent for banks in the second quartile, 25 percent for banks in the third quartile, and 9.1 percent for banks in the fourth quartile, as of June 30, 2013. By conducting an impact evaluation, Treasury could more effectively inform the public and Congress on how SBLF has affected the participants’ lending compared to other factors, such as economic conditions, and could better assist Congress in making future decisions about similar capital investment programs or alternatives to such programs that support small businesses’ access to capital. Treasury Has Taken Steps to Assess SBLF Participants’ Lending
Treasury has taken steps to assess SBLF program performance (participants’ lending patterns) by including a peer-group analysis in the Lending Growth Reports and collecting additional performance information through annual surveys of program participants. For example, they have included information on increases in lending following investment, increases in lending by financial condition, and additional loans based on annual survey results. Treasury Is Exploring Evaluation Methods but Has Not Yet Provided a Plan to Evaluate and Isolate the Program’s Impact
Although Treasury has taken actions to improve its reporting and analysis of SBLF program performance, Treasury officials told us they recently started to review additional methods for evaluating the effectiveness of the program and its impact on participants’ small business lending, but have not yet provided us with a plan to evaluate the program’s impact or selected an approach for conducting the evaluation. According to GAO guidance on program evaluation, when a program is influenced by outside factors, as is the SBLF program, impact evaluations are usually required to assess the net effect of a program (or its actual effectiveness) by comparing the observed outcomes to an estimate of what would have happened in the program’s absence. Conclusions
Treasury has continued to develop and refine its approach to assessing the performance of SBLF and measuring the extent to which SBLF participants have increased small business lending. Treasury officials have told us that they are exploring various approaches to evaluating the program and have a firm under contract that is helping to identify different statistical analyses that could be used. Nevertheless, Treasury has not yet developed a written evaluation plan committed to a specific approach that would show that their evaluation assesses the net impact of SBLF apart from other factors. In such an evaluation, Treasury should ensure that the analytical approaches identified by its contractor will isolate the role of SBLF from other factors that could affect small business lending to show the net impact of the program. FDIC, Federal Reserve, and OCC did not provide written comments on the draft report. Reasons for Variation in Small Business Lending
To determine reasons for variation in growth of qualified small business lending at SBLF banks, we used the most current level of qualified small business lending as of June 30, 2013, reported in Treasury’s October 2013 Lending Growth Report, to divide 265 banks into four quartiles based on their level of qualified small business lending and compared the four quartiles to one another using financial and regulatory data. We also relied on the results report of Treasury’s first SBLF annual survey. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 aimed to stimulate job growth by, among other things, establishing the SBLF program within Treasury. SBLF was authorized to make up to $30 billion in capital investments to encourage banks and community development loan funds with assets of less than $10 billion to increase their small business lending. The act generally defined "small business lending" as loans not more than $10 million originally. Under the act, GAO is mandated to conduct an audit of SBLF annually. GAO's first and second reports were on the program's implementation and performance reporting and made recommendations on management oversight, program evaluation, and performance reporting. This third report examines (1) the growth in qualified small business lending and reasons for variations in the growth at SBLF banks and (2) actions Treasury has taken to evaluate participant lending patterns. GAO analyzed the most recent available performance and financial information on SBLF participants; reviewed government and private sector surveys on small business credit conditions; and interviewed officials from Treasury and representatives from SBLF participants.
What GAO Found
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as of June 30, 2013, Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) participants had increased their qualified small business lending by $10.4 billion over their aggregate 2010 baseline of $36.5 billion. However, SBLF participants varied greatly in the extent to which they had increased small business lending. GAO analysis for the quarter ending June 30, 2013, showed that the median SBLF bank in the top (first) quartile had over a 100 percent increase over the baseline, compared to a 9.1 percent increase for the median SBLF bank in the bottom (fourth) quartile. Several factors GAO analyzed could help explain this variation. For example, the median bank in the bottom quartile had more troubled loans than banks in the top quartile, which could affect a bank's lending capacity. Also, a majority of banks in the bottom lending quartile used much of their SBLF funds to repay investments received from Treasury's Capital Purchase Program, leaving them with a much smaller net increase in available capital. Several banks GAO interviewed said that they have seen increased demand for credit as the economy improved. In addition, publicly reported surveys indicate that credit conditions have improved, but some small businesses continue to face challenges securing credit.
Treasury has taken steps to assess SBLF participants' lending patterns, including conducting a peer-group analysis and collecting performance data through an annual survey of SBLF participants. However, these steps are not sufficient to isolate the net impact of SBLF on participants' lending. Treasury officials said that they are exploring evaluation approaches and have a firm under contract to help identify statistical analyses that could be used, but have not provided documentation of its evaluation plan committing to an approach. GAO guidance on program evaluation suggests that impact evaluations are usually required to assess the net impact of a program by comparing the observed outcomes to an estimate of what would have happened in the program's absence. By conducting an evaluation that includes methods to assess the net impact of SBLF, Treasury could more effectively inform the public and Congress on how SBLF has affected the participants' lending compared to other factors, such as economic conditions, and could better assist Congress in making future decisions about similar capital investment programs or alternative programs that support small business access to capital.
What GAO Recommends
Treasury should follow through in conducting an impact evaluation that includes methods to isolate the effect of SBLF from other factors on participants' small business lending. In written comments on a draft of this report, Treasury agreed to implement the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-450T | gao_GAO-11-450T_0 | JSF Restructuring Improves Program, but Affordability Is Challenged by Rising Costs and Delays
Over the past year, DOD has substantially restructured the JSF program, taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences—higher development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Key restructuring changes include the following: The total system development cost estimate rose to $56.4 billion and its schedule was extended to 2018. This represents a 26 percent increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current approved program baseline established in 2007. Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered; and the full-rate production decision moved to 2018, a 5-year slip from the current baseline. To address technical problems and test deficiencies for the short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant, the Department significantly scaled back its procurement quantities and directed a 2-year period for evaluating and engineering technical solutions to inform future decisions on this variant. The net effect was increased development funding and decreased procurement funding in the near term. Also, the estimated average unit procurement price for the JSF has about doubled since program start and current forecasts indicate that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it replaces. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many aircraft as planned. Going forward, the JSF will require unprecedented demands for funding in a period of more austere defense budgets where it will have to annually compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the discretionary federal dollar. Progress In Achieving the JSF Program’s 2010 Goals Was Mixed
The JSF program established 12 clearly stated goals in testing, contracting, and manufacturing for completion in calendar year 2010. It had mixed success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of progress on the other 6. Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to testing sites, the development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test flights as the previous 3 years combined. Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production
After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the manufacturing process ready for greater levels of annual production. Specifically, the program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs—engineering changes continue at higher than expected rates long after critical design reviews and well into procurement, and more changes are expected as testing accelerates. Also, manufacturing cost increases and delays in delivering test and production aircraft indicate need for substantial improvements in factory throughput and performance of the global supply chain. Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Wil in Its Intended
Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, both. Furthermore, only a small portion of the extensive network of ground te labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent is significantly behind schedule as it enters its of the JSF functionality— most challenging phase. Officials underestimated the time and effort needed to develop and integrate the software, substantially nd contributing to the program’s overall cost and schedule problems a testing delays, and requiring the retention of engineers for longer periods Significant learning and development work remains before the program can demonstrate the mature software capabilities needed to meet warfighter requirements. Flight testing and production activities are increasing and contractors are improving supply and manufacturing processes, but deliveries are still lagging. Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is currently about $385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes, defense leadership over the past year has directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing. This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on the JSF, including the current annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 244 (2009). Our draft report is being reviewed by the Department and we expect to issue it early next month. That report and this testimony discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive, substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft bought in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets. The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions. After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed. Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase. |
gao_GAO-05-789 | gao_GAO-05-789_0 | The 12 IHS areas include all or part of 35 states (see fig. Within the 12 areas, direct care services are generally delivered through IHS-funded hospitals, health centers, and health stations. Services Funded by IHS
IHS funds a range of health care services for Native Americans. The Availability of Primary Care Depended on Native Americans’ Ability to Access Services at IHS-Funded Facilities
The availability of primary care—medical, dental, and vision—services largely depended on the extent to which Native Americans were able to gain access to the services offered at IHS-funded facilities. The 13 facilities we visited generally offered primary care—medical, dental, and vision— services; however, Native Americans’ access to these services was not always assured. Although primary care services were offered, facility and tribal officials identified several factors that affected access to these services, such as wait times between scheduling an appointment and receiving services, travel distances to facilities, and a lack of transportation. Transportation challenges also affected the extent to which access to care was assured for some Native Americans. Certain Ancillary and Specialty Services Were Generally Offered, but Gaps in Other Services Were Common
Certain ancillary and specialty services were not always available to Native Americans, primarily due to gaps in services offered at nearly all of the 13 facilities. We found significant gaps in both dental and inpatient behavioral health care services offered at IHS-funded facilities or through contract care. Facilities Lacked Staff, Equipment, and Contract Care Funds to Offer Certain Ancillary and Specialty Services
Most of the facilities we visited lacked the equipment necessary for certain ancillary services and had few medical specialists on site. Most facilities did not regularly refer patients to other IHS-funded facilities for care they could not offer on site. Ancillary and specialty services that were unavailable on site or at other IHS-funded facilities could be obtained only through contract care, which was rationed by 12 of the 13 facilities on the basis of relative medical need. Five facilities reported that they were unable to pay for any services that were not deemed emergent or acutely urgent (services categorized as priority level I services in IHS headquarters’ guidance), and two others paid for only a few additional services, such as cancer screenings. Factors Associated with Variations in Service Availability Included Facility Structure, Location, and Funding
From our visits to facilities and interviews with IHS area officials, we found that differences in the availability of services among facilities were associated primarily with three distinct factors: how a facility was structured, where it was located, and the amount of reimbursements and tribal contributions it received. Facilities located in remote areas faced challenges in recruiting and retaining staff, which reduced the services these facilities were able to offer. Facility Structure Was Associated with Variations in Service Availability
From our visits to facilities, we found that the broader array of on-site services at hospitals compared with health centers increased the overall availability of services (see fig. Service Availability Was Associated with the Amount of Reimbursements and Tribal Contributions Facilities Received
At all of the 13 facilities we visited, reimbursements from private health insurance and federal health insurance programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, were an important source of funding for the services each facility offered. Facilities Used a Variety of Strategies to Increase the Availability of Services
Facilities reported having implemented at least one of six strategies to increase the availability of services funded by IHS. Some of the strategies were not available to, or effective for, every facility. For example, four facilities reported that while hospitals generally agreed to offer discounted rates for contract care, physicians were not always willing do so. We received written comments from IHS. In the first tier, we selected 3 of the 12 IHS areas to represent a mix in the size of the population served in the areas, geographic location, health status of Native Americans in the areas, the entities operating the facilities (tribal or federal), and the contract care dollars as a percentage of total clinical care dollars (table 8 compares the selected areas to the range across all 12 areas). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Indian Health Service (IHS), located within the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for arranging health care services for Native Americans (American Indians and Alaska Natives). IHS services include primary care (medical, dental, and vision); ancillary services, such as laboratory and pharmacy; and specialty care, including services provided by physician specialists. IHS provides some services through direct care at hospitals, health centers, and health stations, which may be federally or tribally operated. When services are not available--that is, both offered and accessible--on site, IHS offers them, as funds permit, through contract care furnished by outside providers. Concerns persist that some Native Americans are experiencing gaps in necessary health care. GAO was asked to examine the availability of (1) primary care services and (2) ancillary and specialty services for Native Americans. Additionally, GAO examined the underlying factors associated with variations in the availability of services and strategies used by facilities to increase service availability. GAO conducted site visits to 13 facilities and interviewed IHS officials from all 12 IHS areas, which cover all or part of 35 states. GAO received written comments from IHS. IHS substantially agreed with the findings and conclusions of this report.
What GAO Found
The availability of primary care--medical, dental, and vision--services was largely dependent on the extent to which Native Americans living in IHS areas were able to gain access to the services offered at IHS-funded facilities. All of the 13 facilities GAO visited offered medical services, such as physical examinations, while 12 facilities offered dental and 12 facilities offered vision services. However, access to these services was not always assured because of factors such as the amount of waiting time between the call to make an appointment and the delivery of a service, travel distances to facilities, or a lack of transportation. Certain ancillary and specialty services were not always available to the Native Americans served by the 13 facilities, primarily because of gaps in the services offered by the facilities. While some ancillary and specialty services were offered to all patients, GAO also identified gaps in other services, including services to diagnose and treat nonurgent conditions--such as arthritis and knee injuries--specialty dental care, and behavioral health care. Most facilities lacked the staff or equipment to offer these services on site and thus had to purchase them with contract care funds, which were rationed on the basis of relative medical need at 12 of the 13 facilities. Five of the 12 facilities were unable to pay for any contract care services that were not deemed emergent or acutely urgent. GAO identified three distinct factors that were associated with variations in the availability of services, namely a facility's structure, location, and funding from sources other than IHS. A facility's structure was associated with the overall amount and range of services available. For example, hospitals offered a broader array of services on site for more hours per week compared with other facilities. Location was a factor in recruiting and retaining staff for geographically remote facilities and in the cost of certain types of services, most notably transportation. Finally, a facility's funding from two types of sources--reimbursements from private and federal health insurance programs for care offered on site and any tribal contributions made--affected the extent to which the facility was able to offer services. The amount of these funds varied across facilities. Facilities reported using at least one of six strategies to increase the availability of services. These strategies included bringing specialists on site and negotiating discounts for contract care. According to officials, the strategies were not available to, or effective for, every facility. For example, four facilities reported that while hospitals generally offered discounted rates for contract care, physicians were not always willing to do so. |
gao_RCED-99-1 | gao_RCED-99-1_0 | DOE’s Plans Have Changed and Are Still Evolving
DOE has made important changes in the plans for its pit-manufacturing mission. In December 1996, DOE’s goals for the mission were to (1) reestablish the Department’s capability to produce War Reserve pits for one weapons system by fiscal year 2001 and to demonstrate the capability to produce all pit types for the enduring stockpile, (2) establish a manufacturing capacity of 10 pits per year by fiscal year 2001 and expand to a capacity of up to 50 pits per year by fiscal 2005, and (3) develop a contingency plan for the large-scale manufacturing of pits at some other DOE site or sites. What the final production capacity at Los Alamos will be is uncertain. DOE has done little to pursue this goal. Such a capacity would be necessary if a systemwide problem were identified with pits in the stockpile. A DOE study found that Los Alamos is not an option for large-scale pit manufacturing because of space limitations that exist at PF-4. Estimated Costs Will Total Over $1.1 Billion
According to information from DOE, the total cost for establishing and operating the pit-manufacturing mission under its new plan will be over $1.1 billion from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal 2007. This estimate does not include over $490 million in costs for other activities that are not directly attributable to pit production but are needed to support a wide variety of activities, including the pit-manufacturing mission. Some key controls related to the mission are either in the formative stages of development or do not cover the mission in its entirety. First, officials from various DOD organizations have concerns about changes in the manufacturing processes that will be used to produce pits at Los Alamos. Second, on the basis of preliminary analyses by various DOD organizations, some representatives of these organizations are not satisfied that DOE’s planned capacity will meet the anticipated stockpile needs. Officials from various DOD organizations are concerned that Los Alamos’s pits will be fabricated by some processes that are different from those employed previously at Rocky Flats. However, DOD officials said that they will be unable to give detailed pit-manufacturing requirements until the lifetime of pits is specified more clearly through DOE’s ongoing research on how long a pit can be expected to function after its initial manufacture. Various DOD organizations have performed preliminary analyses of the capacity needed to support the stockpile. These analyses indicate that neither the 20-pits-per-year capacity nor the 50-pits-per-year capacity will be sufficient to meet the needs of the stockpile. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information about the Department of Energy’s (DOE) plans and schedules for reestablishing the manufacturing of pits, we gathered and analyzed various documents, including DOE’s (1) Record of Decision for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, (2) guidance for stockpile management and the pit-manufacturing mission, and (3) the draft Integrated Plan for pit manufacturing and certification. This information was compiled by DOE with the assistance of Los Alamos officials. These costs were only recently prepared by DOE and Los Alamos. To understand unresolved issues between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE regarding the manufacturing of pits, we spoke with representatives from DOD, DOE, and Los Alamos. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to manufacture war reserve nuclear weapon triggers, or pits, at its Los Alamos National Laboratory, focusing on: (1) DOE's plans and schedules for reestablishing the manufacturing of pits at Los Alamos; (2) the costs associated with these efforts; and (3) unresolved issues regarding the manufacturing of pits between the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOE's plans for reestablishing the production of pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory have changed and are still evolving; (2) DOE expects to have only a limited capacity online by fiscal year (FY) 2007; (3) specifically, DOE plans to reestablish its capability to produce war reserve pits for one weapons system by FY 2001 and plans to have an interim capacity of 20 pits per year online by FY 2007; (4) this planned capacity differs from the goal that DOE established in FY 1996 to produce up to 50 pits per year by fiscal 2005; (5) DOE has not decided what the final production capacity at Los Alamos will be; (6) DOE has done little to develop a contingency plan for the large-scale manufacturing of pits (150-500 pits per year); (7) large-scale manufacturing would be necessary if a systemwide problem were identified with pits in the stockpile; (8) the current estimated costs for establishing and operating DOE's pit-manufacturing mission total over $1.1 billion from FY 1996 through fiscal 2007; (9) this estimate does not include over $490 million in costs for other activities that are not directly attributable to the mission but are needed to support a wide variety of defense-related activities; (10) GAO also noted that some key cost and managerial controls related to DOE's pit-manufacturing mission are either in the formative stages of development or do not cover the mission in its entirety; (11) DOD and DOE have discussed, but not resolved, important issues regarding: (a) changes in the manufacturing processes that will be used to produce pits at Los Alamos; and (b) the pit-manufacturing capacity planned by DOE; (12) officials from various DOD organizations have expressed concerns about the equivalence of Los Alamo's pits to the pits previously manufactured at Rocky Flats because some manufacturing processes will be new at Los Alamos and are different from those previously used by Rocky Flats; (13) also, officials from various DOD organizations are not satisfied that DOE's current or future capacity plans will be sufficient to meet the stockpile's needs; (14) various DOD organizations have performed preliminary analyses of the capacity needed to support the stockpile; (15) on the basis of these analyses, some of these officials believe that the stockpile's needs exceed the 20-pits-per-year capacity that DOE may establish in the future; (16) however, DOD officials said that they will be unable to give detailed pit-manufacturing requirements until the lifetime of pits is more clearly specified by DOE; and (17) DOE is currently studying this issue. |
gao_GAO-04-303 | gao_GAO-04-303_0 | IRS Has Not Collected Information on the Policies, but Federal Revenue Estimators Have Estimated the Forgone Tax Revenues
IRS officials told us that the agency has not generally required businesses to report on the value of, earnings on, or death benefit income from business-owned life insurance policies. Of these, 11 provided information on the intended use of their business-owned life insurance policies. The insurance regulators of the four states we contacted described limited oversight of business-owned life insurance sales, and the four state regulators and NAIC generally did not have concerns about the policies. Federal Bank Regulators Examined Some Institutions’ Purchases of Business-Owned Life Insurance and Have Not Had Major Supervisory Concerns
Federal bank regulators have issued guidelines for purchases of business- owned life insurance that they have used in overseeing banks and thrifts’ holdings of such policies. SEC officials said that, to date, no such problems have arisen, and the agency has not had investor-protection concerns about public companies holding business-owned life insurance. The insurance department officials told us that they conduct limited oversight to test compliance with their states’ insurable interest and consent laws. More Comprehensive Data Could Be Useful to Congress; Costs Would Be Incurred in Obtaining the Data
More comprehensive data on the prevalence and use of business-owned life insurance could be useful to Congress in assessing the potential effects of legislative proposals that address the tax-favored treatment of this insurance. Data would be most useful if reported separately for business continuation and broad-based policies because legislative proposals that would further limit the tax-favored treatment of business-owned life insurance generally have treated the policies differently—they have applied primarily to broad-based policies. Useful data that are not available include the amount of tax-free income received from the death benefit payments on business continuation and broad-based policies—data that could help Congress better understand the potential effect of changes to the tax treatment of these policies on tax revenues. Should Congress conclude that such data would facilitate its ongoing deliberations on the appropriate tax treatment of business-owned life insurance, decisions would be required on what data are needed, who should provide the data (insurance buyers or sellers), who should collect the data (SEC, Treasury, NAIC, or another organization), how to collect the data (additional reporting or a survey), what it would cost to collect the data, and whether the benefits of collecting additional data warrant the cost of doing so. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress decides that it needs more comprehensive data on the prevalence and use of business-owned life insurance, such as the tax-free income from death benefit payments and/or other select data reported separately for business continuation and broad-based policies, Congress could, among other alternatives, obtain the data by assigning responsibility to SEC or Treasury to (1) require purchasers of business-owned life insurance or insurers to report the data in their financial statements or federal tax returns, respectively, or (2) conduct a survey of the purchasers or insurers to obtain the data; or encouraging NAIC to (1) require insurers to report the data in the annual reports they file with NAIC or (2) conduct a survey of insurers to obtain the data. In addition, we reviewed the Joint Committee on Taxation’s and the Office of Management and Budget’s reported estimates of forgone tax revenues attributable to business-owned life insurance and obtained information from officials of both entities about the development of these estimates. We also discussed these topics with officials at SEC and IRS and reviewed their regulations, reporting requirements, and applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Ms. Davi M. D’Agostino Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment fund employee benefits and some state laws require that the policies be segregated into a trust for that purpose. | Why GAO Did This Study
Business-owned life insurance is permanent insurance held by employers on the lives of their employees, and the employer is the beneficiary of these policies. Its attractive features, common to all permanent life insurance, generally include both tax-deferred accumulation of earnings on the policies' cash value and tax-free receipt of the death benefit. Legislators have expressed concerns about the ability of employers to receive tax-favored treatment from insuring their employees' lives. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the prevalence and use of business-owned life insurance, (2) federal and state regulation and oversight of these policies, and (3) the potential usefulness of and costs associated with obtaining more comprehensive data on business-owned life insurance.
What GAO Found
Limited data are available on the prevalence and use of business-owned life insurance. Federal bank regulators have financial reporting requirements, but not all institutions holding policies meet reporting thresholds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and state insurance regulators told GAO that they generally have not collected comprehensive policy data because they have not had a need for such data in fulfilling their regulatory missions. GAO found, however, that some insurers have disclosed information about policy sales. Also, the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office of Management and Budget have reported estimates of forgone tax revenues from these policies as $7.3 billion to $13 billion for the period 2004-2008, excluding forgone tax revenues on additional income from death benefit payments. Regulators said that they do not generally collect data on the intended use of policies, but that businesses can, for example, use business continuation policies to insure against the loss of a key employee or broad-based policies to fund employee benefits. The federal bank regulators told GAO that they have reviewed the holdings of institutions with significant amounts of business-owned life insurance against their guidelines and concluded that no major supervisory concerns exist. SEC officials said that the agency has relied on its broadly applicable requirement that public companies disclose information material to investors in their financial statements, which would include any material information related to business-owned life insurance; SEC did not have investor protection concerns about public firms' ownership of the insurance. IRS had some requirements related to the tax treatment of the insurance and is reviewing compliance with these requirements. State laws governing the insurance differed; the four states' regulators that GAO contacted described limited oversight of the policies, and these regulators and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) generally reported no problems with the policies. More comprehensive data could be useful to Congress in assessing the potential effects of legislative proposals that address the tax-favored treatment of business-owned life insurance. Costs would be incurred in obtaining the data. Such data would be most useful if reported separately for business continuation and broad-based policies because legislative proposals have generally treated these policies differently. Data on the amount of tax-free income that businesses received from death benefits could help explain the potential effect of changes to the tax treatment of policies on tax revenues. Businesses holding the policies or insurance companies that sold them could provide this and other data. SEC, Department of the Treasury (Treasury), and NAIC already collect financial information from businesses and insurers and could be required or asked to collect the data. Should Congress decide that the data would be useful, decisions would be required on, among other things, whether the benefits of collecting the data outweigh the costs of doing so. |
gao_GAO-08-477 | gao_GAO-08-477_0 | Two primary behaviors related to fatal crashes are failure to use safety belts and driving while impaired by alcohol. An HVE campaign combines intensive enforcement of a specific traffic safety law with extensive communication, education, and outreach informing the public about the enforcement activity. NHTSA uses available funding to purchase national media time and conduct evaluations for the campaigns (see table 1). NHTSA Has Implemented the HVE Program but Could Improve the Annual Evaluations of Campaign Effectiveness
NHTSA has implemented the HVE program, including two high-visibility traffic safety law enforcement campaigns to improve safety belt use and reduce impaired driving. Specifically, to meet the requirements in place since SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA has (1) developed and disseminated advertisements, (2) coordinated with states to conduct the HVE campaigns, and (3) evaluated the results of the campaigns. However, the evaluations have shortcomings that limit NHTSA’s ability to assess the level of state activity and the overall effectiveness of the campaigns. Since 2005, NHTSA has annually developed a National Communications Plan that sets forth a national HVE campaign advertising strategy. For example, the plan specifies goals, dates, target audiences, and core campaign messages for the campaigns. State Officials Report That NHTSA’s Coordination Efforts Help Them Conduct Successful Campaigns
NHTSA coordinates with the states and provides resources to help states carry out the campaigns through several means, including the National Communications Plan, guidance on conducting HVE campaigns, technical assistance on advertisements, and collateral advertising materials. Officials in selected states reported that NHTSA’s coordination efforts provided the support and interaction needed to successfully conduct HVE campaigns. NHTSA also provides collateral materials such as posters, Web banners, talking points, and model press releases. NHTSA’s Annual Evaluations Are Limited by Inconsistent and Incomplete Data
NHTSA’s annual evaluations of the HVE campaigns include information on the level of enforcement activity and the results of the campaigns based on performance measures, such as message awareness, earned media activity, safety belt use, and fatality and injury statistics. However, the data on HVE campaign activity—such as the number of agencies participating in the campaigns, hours worked by law enforcement officers, citations issued, DUI enforcement actions, and advertisements purchased by states—that states report to NHTSA are not complete or consistent; this situation limits NHTSA’s ability to evaluate the overall level of state enforcement and advertising activity and the extent to which states use federal funding—through traffic safety grants— to support HVE campaigns. Due to these inconsistencies, NHTSA has reported that it is not possible to provide meaningful analyses and comparisons of state activities to conduct HVE campaigns. For example, while NHTSA measures the change in daytime safety belt use for the driver and right front passenger in passenger cars, vans, sports utility vehicles, and pickup trucks, it does not directly measure nighttime safety belt use, despite recent efforts to increase the use of safety belts at night. Selected State Officials Report That HVE Campaigns Are Contributing to Increased Safety Belt Use and Reduced Fatalities, but Several Challenges Hinder Further Progress
According to officials in selected states we visited, HVE campaigns are contributing to increased safety belt use and reduced alcohol-involved fatalities. From 1997 to 2006, all of the selected states experienced a decrease in alcohol-involved fatality rates. Challenge in Increasing Safety Belt Use and Reducing Impaired Driving among Resistant Populations
Officials in selected states face the challenge of increasing safety belt use and reducing impaired driving among resistant populations, such as drivers in rural areas, pickup truck drivers, and hardcore drinking drivers. For example, NHTSA provides funds that states can use to provide equipment, such as breath-testing units, that are used as incentives to improve participation. NHTSA has fulfilled the requirements for implementing an HVE program by developing advertising, coordinating with states, and evaluating the effectiveness of the campaigns. Develop and include additional performance measures—such as a measure for nighttime safety belt use and additional measures of media effectiveness—in the agency’s annual evaluations of the effectiveness of the two campaigns. To determine the impact of the high-visibility enforcement campaigns and what challenges exist, we interviewed officials from state highway traffic safety offices, state police, and local police in the seven selected states. | Why GAO Did This Study
Two primary risk behaviors related to fatal traffic crashes are failure to use safety belts and driving while impaired by alcohol. High-visibility enforcement (HVE) campaigns that combine enforcement of a traffic safety law with media to inform the public about the campaign are effective in reducing these behaviors. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users authorized funding of an HVE program, including safety belt and impaired-driving campaigns. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) provides media and coordinates with states to provide enforcement activities for the campaigns. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NHTSA has implemented the HVE program and (2) for selected states, the impact of the campaigns and challenges that exist in conducting the campaigns. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed fatality data, plans, and evaluations and interviewed officials from DOT and seven selected states.
What GAO Found
NHTSA has fully implemented the high-visibility enforcement program by (1) developing and disseminating advertising, (2) coordinating with states on media and enforcement activities, and (3) annually evaluating the effectiveness of the two HVE campaigns; however, NHTSA's evaluations have shortcomings that limit the agency's ability to determine the effectiveness of the campaigns. Regarding advertising, NHTSA introduced an annual plan in 2005 that sets forth a strategy for the campaign advertisements, developed advertisements, and purchased national media time for the advertisements. To coordinate with states, NHTSA provides an overall strategy and guidance to assist states in conducting the campaigns, as well as technical assistance and collateral materials, such as posters and model press releases. Officials in selected states reported that NHTSA's coordination efforts provided the support and interaction needed to conduct HVE campaigns. Although NHTSA's annual evaluations of campaign effectiveness indicate that the campaigns are helping to improve safety belt use and reduce impaired driving, the evaluations have shortcomings that limit NHTSA's ability to assess the level of state and local activity--a key component of the campaigns--and the overall effectiveness of the campaigns. For example, the information that NHTSA has on states' activities is inconsistent and incomplete because reporting of such data is generally voluntary for local law enforcement agencies. As a result, NHTSA has reported that it cannot provide meaningful analyses and comparisons of state activities. NHTSA's ability to measure the campaigns' overall effectiveness is also hindered because the performance measures used to evaluate the campaigns are not comprehensive. For example, while NHTSA measures daytime safety belt use, it does not directly measure nighttime safety belt use, despite recent efforts to increase safety belt use at night. In addition, NHTSA's evaluations do not include measures of the effectiveness of the campaigns at reaching all target audiences. NHTSA is working to develop more comprehensive performance measures. According to officials in selected states GAO visited, the campaigns are contributing to increased safety belt use and reduced alcohol-involved fatalities, but these states face challenges in conducting the campaigns and achieving desired results. From 1997 to 2006, safety belt use increased in all seven of the selected states, and each state experienced a decrease in the alcohol fatality rate. Officials in the selected states said that the campaigns provide additional benefits, such as apprehending suspects involved in other crimes. However, officials in those selected states identified several challenges, such as increasing safety belt use and reducing impaired driving among resistant populations; insufficient staff to conduct the campaigns; and weak prosecution of impaired-driving arrests. NHTSA has initiatives under way to help states address some of these challenges. For example, NHTSA has sponsored a campaign to increase safety belt use in rural areas. In addition, NHTSA provides funds that can be used by states to purchase equipment for local law enforcement agencies, such as breath-testing units, to encourage the agencies to participate in campaigns. |
gao_GAO-12-1018T | gao_GAO-12-1018T_0 | Not all spectrum has equal value. NTIA’s Processes for Managing Federal Spectrum Lack Governmentwide Focus and Accountability
NTIA’s Spectrum Management Efforts
As the federal agency authorized to develop national spectrum policy, NTIA has been directed to conduct several projects focused on reforming governmentwide federal spectrum management and promoting efficiency among federal users of spectrum; however, we reported in 2011 that its efforts in this area had resulted in limited progress toward improved spectrum management. For example, the plan does not identify or include quantitative governmentwide data on federal spectrum needs. NTIA Focuses on Interference Mitigation Rather than on Best Use of Spectrum across Government
NTIA’s primary spectrum management operations include authorizing federal frequency assignments and certifying spectrum-dependent equipment for federal users; however, these processes are primarily focused on interference mitigation as determined by IRAC and do not focus on ensuring the best use of spectrum across the federal government. NTIA’s Current Data Management System Is of Limited Usefulness
NTIA’s data management system is antiquated and lacks transparency and internal controls. NTIA Has Taken Steps to Identify Spectrum for Future Wireless Broadband Use
NTIA Efforts to Identify Spectrum for Broadband
In response to the government initiatives to make a total of 500 MHz of spectrum available for wireless broadband, in 2010 NTIA (1) identified 115 MHz of federally allocated spectrum to be made available for wireless broadband use within the next 5 years, referred to as the Fast Track Evaluation, and (2) developed an initial plan and timetable for repurposing additional spectrum for broadband, referred to as the 10-Year Plan. For each of these bands, NTIA reviewed the number of federal frequency assignments within the band, the types of federal operations and functions that the assignments support, and the geographic location of federal use. Additionally, NTIA will collaborate with FCC to analyze 835 MHz of spectrum that is currently located in bands that are shared by federal and nonfederal users. Some Users Lack Incentives and Face Several Barriers to Sharing Spectrum, and Cannot Easily Identify Available Spectrum to Share
Some Users Lack Economic Incentives to Share Spectrum
While federal spectrum users often share spectrum among themselves, they may have little economic incentive to otherwise use spectrum efficiently, including sharing it with nonfederal users. In the case of federal spectrum users, obtaining new spectrum assignments may be difficult, so an agency may have an incentive to conserve and use the spectrum it currently has assigned to it or currently shares efficiently, but the extent of that incentive is likely weaker than if the agency had had to pay a market price for the all of their spectrum needs. In addition to that time, NTIA officials said that IRAC’s evaluation of potential harmful interference could take months. Users May Be Unable to Easily Identify Spectrum Suitable for Sharing
Besides lacking incentives and overcoming other barriers, users may also have difficulty identifying spectrum suitable for sharing because data on available spectrum is incomplete or inaccurate, and information on some federal spectrum usage is not publicly available. Federal advisors and experts we talked to identified several options that could provide incentives and opportunities for more efficient spectrum use and spectrum sharing by federal and nonfederal users, which include, among others: (1) assessing spectrum usage fees; (2) expanding the availability of spectrum for unlicensed uses; and (3) increasing the federal focus on research and development of technologies that can enable spectrum sharing and improve spectral efficiency. In our April 2011 report, we recommended that NTIA (1) develop an updated plan that includes key elements of a strategic plan, as well as information on how spectrum is being used across the federal government, opportunities to increase efficient use of federally allocated spectrum and infrastructure, an assessment of future spectrum needs, and plans to incorporate these needs in the frequency assignment, equipment certification, and review processes; (2) examine the assignment review processes and consider best practices to determine if the current approach for collecting and validating data from federal agencies can be streamlined or improved; and (3) establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy and completeness of currently reported agency data. Options to address these issues in turn create new challenges, and may require further study. | Why GAO Did This Study
Demand for spectrum is increasing rapidly with the widespread use of wireless broadband devices and services. However, nearly all usable spectrum has been allocated either by NTIA for federal use or by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for commercial and nonfederal use. Federal initiatives are under way to identify federal spectrum that could be repurposed or possibly shared by federal users or wireless broadband providers and other nonfederal users. This statement discusses how NTIA manages spectrum to address governmentwide spectrum needs and the steps NTIA has taken to repurpose spectrum for broadband. As part of an ongoing review, the statement also discusses preliminary information on the factors that prevent spectrum sharing and actions that can encourage sharing and efficient spectrum use. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work on federal spectrum management and ongoing work on spectrum sharing. GAO analyzed NTIA processes, policies and procedures, and interviewed relevant government officials, experts, and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for governmentwide federal spectrum management, but GAO reported in 2011 that NTIAs efforts in this area had been limited. In 2003, the President directed NTIA to develop plans identifying federal and nonfederal spectrum needs, and in 2008, NTIA issued the federal plan. GAO found it did not identify governmentwide spectrum needs and did not contain key elements and conform to best practices for strategic planning. Furthermore, NTIAs primary spectrum management operations do not focus on governmentwide needs. Instead, NTIA depends on agency self-evaluation of spectrum needs and focuses on mitigating interference among spectrum users, with limited emphasis on overall spectrum management. Additionally, NTIAs data management system is antiquated and lacks internal controls to ensure the accuracy of agency-reported data, making it unclear if reliable data inform decisions about federal spectrum use. NTIA is developing a new data management system, but implementation is years away.
Despite these limitations, NTIA has taken steps to identify spectrum that could potentially be made available for broadband use. For example, in 2010 NTIA evaluated various spectrum bands and identified 115 megahertz of spectrum that could be repurposed within the next 5 years. In doing so, NTIA worked with a special steering group consisting of the Assistant Secretaries with spectrum management oversight in agencies that were the major stakeholders in the spectrum bands under consideration. For each of the identified bands, NTIA reviewed the number of federal frequency assignments within the band, the types of federal operations and functions that the assignments support, and the geographic location of federal use.
In addition to efforts to repurpose spectrum, industry stakeholders have also suggested that sharing spectrum between federal and nonfederal users be considered to help make spectrum available for broadband. Our ongoing work has identified several barriers that limit sharing. Primarily, many users may lack incentives to share assigned spectrum. Typically, paying the market price for a good or service helps to inform users of the value of the good and provides an incentive for efficient use. But federal agencies pay only a small fee to NTIA for spectrum assignments, and may, in some contexts, have little incentive to conserve or share it. Federal agencies may also have limited budgets to upgrade to more spectrally-efficient equipment that would better enable sharing. Nonfederal users are also reluctant to share spectrum. For instance, license holders may be reluctant because of concerns that spectrum sharing could encourage competition. A lack of information on federal spectrum use may limit users ability to easily identify spectrum suitable for sharing.
GAOs ongoing work suggests that some actions might provide greater incentives and opportunities for more efficient spectrum use and sharing. These actions could include assessing spectrum usage fees to provide economic incentive for more efficient use and sharing, expanding the availability of unlicensed spectrum, and increasing the federal focus on research and development of technologies that can enable spectrum sharing and improve spectral efficiency. However, all of these actions also involve challenges and may require further study. |
gao_GAO-10-23 | gao_GAO-10-23_0 | Climate change may also result in changes in local precipitation and water availability, as well as more and longer droughts in some areas of the country. Advanced Cooling Technologies and Alternative Water Sources Can Reduce the Use of Freshwater at Power Plants, but Their Adoption Poses Certain Drawbacks
Advanced cooling technologies and alternative water sources can reduce freshwater use by thermoelectric power plants, leading to a number of benefits for plant developers; however, incorporating each of these options for reducing freshwater use into thermoelectric power plants also poses certain drawbacks. Benefits of reducing freshwater use may include social and environmental benefits, minimizing water-related costs, as well as increasing a developer’s flexibility in determining where to locate a new plant. Regulatory Compliance Issues
Power plant developers using alternative water sources may face additional regulatory challenges. States We Contacted Have Other Regulatory Policies That Influence the Extent of Water Use Oversight for Proposed Power Plants
Oversight of water use by proposed power plants in the selected states may be influenced by regulatory policies and requirements that formally emphasize minimizing freshwater use by power plants and other new industrial users. In contrast to California and Arizona, water supply and public utility commission officials in the other 5 selected states told us their states had not developed official state policies regarding water use by power plants. In contrast, state water regulators do not routinely rely on federal data on water use when evaluating power plant applications, although these data are used by water and industry experts, federal agencies, and others to analyze trends in the industry. Water Experts, Federal Agencies, and Others Value Federal Data on Water Use for Analyzing Industry Trends but Identified Limitations In These Data
Unlike federal data on water availability, federal data on water use is not routinely relied upon by state officials we spoke with to make regulatory decisions; but, instead is used by a variety of data users to identify trends in the industry. Currently, EIA does not systematically collect information on power plants’ use of advanced cooling technologies. Lack of comprehensive data on the use of alternative water sources. According to data users we spoke with, this is a significant limitation in the federal data on water use and makes it more difficult for them to monitor trends in the industry. Discontinued distribution of thermoelectric power plant water consumption data. Specifically, to improve the usefulness of the data collected by EIA and better inform the nation’s understanding of power plant water use and how it affects water availability, we recommend that the Administrator of EIA consider taking the following four actions as part of its ongoing review of the data it collects about power plants: add cooling technology reporting codes for alternative cooling technologies, such as dry and hybrid cooling, or take equivalent steps to ensure these cooling technologies can be identified in EIA’s database; expand reporting of water use and cooling technology data to include all significant types of thermoelectric power plants, particularly by reinstating data collection for nuclear plants and initiating collection of data for all combined cycle natural gas plants; collect and report data on the use of alternative water sources, such as treated effluent and groundwater that is not suitable for drinking or irrigation, by individual power plants; and include USGS and other key users of power plant water use and cooling system data as part of EIA’s triennial review process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
At the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Technology, we reviewed (1) technologies and other approaches that can help reduce freshwater use by power plants and what, if any, drawbacks there are to implementation; (2) the extent to which selected states consider water impacts of power plants when reviewing power plant development proposals; and (3) the usefulness of federal water data to experts and state regulators who evaluate power plant development proposals. California imports 27 percent of its electricity from other states. Other data sources include their own and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) groundwater data, USGS streamflow data, and existing water use permits. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, thermoelectric power plants accounted for 39 percent of total U.S. freshwater withdrawals. Traditionally, power plants have withdrawn water from rivers and other water sources to cool the steam used to produce electricity, so that it may be reused to produce more electricity. Some of this water is consumed, and some is discharged back to a water source. In the context of growing demands for both water and electricity, this report discusses (1) approaches to reduce freshwater use by power plants and their drawbacks, (2) states' consideration of water use when reviewing proposals to build power plants, and (3) the usefulness of federal water data to experts and state regulators. GAO reviewed federal water data and studies on cooling technologies. GAO interviewed federal officials, as well as officials from seven selected states.
What GAO Found
Advanced cooling technologies that rely on air to cool part or all of the steam used in generating electricity and alternative water sources such as treated effluent can reduce freshwater use by thermoelectric power plants. Use of such approaches may lead to environmental benefits from reduced freshwater use, as well as increase developer flexibility in locating a plant. However, these approaches also present certain drawbacks. For example, the use of advanced cooling technologies may result in energy production penalties and higher costs. Similarly, the use of alternative water sources may result in adverse effects on cooling equipment or regulatory compliance issues. Power plant developers must weigh these drawbacks with the benefits of reduced freshwater use when determining which approaches to pursue. Consideration of water use by proposed power plants varies in the states GAO contacted, but the extent of state oversight is influenced by state water laws, related state regulatory policies, and additional layers of state regulatory review. For example, California and Arizona--states that historically faced constrained water supplies, have taken formal steps aimed at minimizing freshwater use at power plants. In contrast, officials in five other states GAO contacted said that their states had not developed official policies regarding water use by power plants and, in some cases, did not require a state permit for water use by new power plants. Federal agencies collect national data on water availability and water use; however, of these data, state water agencies rely on federal water availability data when evaluating power plants' proposals to use freshwater more than federal water use data. Water availability data are collected by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) through stream flow gauges, groundwater studies, and monitoring stations. In contrast, federal data on water use are primarily used by experts, federal agencies, and others to identify industry trends. However, these data users identified limitations with the federal water use data that make them less useful for conducting trend analyses and tracking industry changes. For example, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA) does not systematically collect information on the use of advanced cooling technologies and other data it collects are incomplete. Similarly, USGS discontinued distribution of data on water consumption by power plants and now only provides information on water withdrawals. Finally, neither EIA nor USGS collect data on power plant developers' use of alternative water sources, which some experts believe is a growing trend in the industry. Because federal data sources are a primary source of national data on water use by various sectors, data users told GAO that without improvements to these data, it becomes more difficult for them to conduct comprehensive analyses of industry trends and limits understanding of changes in the industry. |
gao_AIMD-00-103 | gao_AIMD-00-103_0 | 2.) Today’s Medicare Program
The elements of restructuring of Medicare as proposed by the President and Breaux-Frist are best understood in light of Medicare’s current structure. From the perspective of the program’s benefit package, most beneficiaries have two broad choices: they can receive health care coverage through Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service program or through its managed care component, called Medicare+Choice. Differences Between Traditional Medicare and Medicare+Choice
The choice between traditional Medicare and a Medicare+Choice plan typically involves certain trade-offs related to selection of providers, services covered, and out-of-pocket costs. President’s Plan and Breaux-Frist Proposal: Two Versions of Competitive Premium Approach
the President’s Plan And The Breaux-Frist Proposal Are Similar In Three Key Areas But Contain Two Major Differences. To Varying Degrees, Both Proposals introduce a competitive premium model, similar in concept to the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program (FEHBP), to achieve cost efficiencies; preserve the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program with enhanced opportunities to adopt prudent purchasing strategies; and modernize Medicare’s benefit package by making coverage available for prescription drug and catastrophic Medicare costs. The proposals differ, however, in the extent to which traditional Medicare could face competitive pressure from private plans. In addition, under the President’s plan, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) would administer the program, whereas under the Breaux-Frist proposal, an independent Medicare board would perform that function. 4.) 5.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed two leading proposals on Medicare reform: (1) the President's Plan to Modernize and Strengthen Medicare for the 21st Century; and (2) S. 1895, entitled the Medicare Preservation and Improvement Act of 1999, which is commonly referred to as the Breax-Frist proposal.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the elements of restructuring of Medicare as proposed by the President and Breaux-Frist are best understood in light of Medicare's current structure; (2) from the perspective of the program's benefit package, most beneficiaries have two broad choices: they can receive health care coverage through Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program or through its managed care component, called Medicare Choice; (3) the choice between traditional Medicare and a Medicare Choice plan typically involves certain trade-offs related to selection of providers, services covered, and out-of-pocket costs; (4) the President's plan and the Breaux-Frist proposal are similar in three key areas but contain two major differences; (5) to varying degrees, both proposals: (a) introduce a competitive premium model, similar in concept to the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program, to achieve cost efficiencies; (b) preserve the traditional fee-for-service Medicare program with enhanced opportunities to adopt prudent purchasing strategies; and (c) modernize Medicare's benefit package by making coverage available for prescription drug and catastrophic Medicare costs; (6) the proposals differ, however, in the extent to which traditional Medicare could face competitive pressure from private plans; and (7) under the President's plan, the Health Care Financing Administration would administer the program, whereas under the Breaux-Frist proposal, an independent Medicare board would perform that function. |
gao_GAO-16-196T | gao_GAO-16-196T_0 | Lack of FSA Guidance and Instructions to Servicers Results in Inconsistent and Inefficient Services to Borrowers
Some FSA guidance and instructions to servicers is inadequate, resulting in inconsistent and inefficient services to borrowers. While FSA has taken some steps to provide more Direct Loan program guidance and instructions to servicers, six out of the seven servicers we interviewed reported various issues resulting from absent, unclear, and inconsistent guidance and instructions from FSA. For example, in a white paper to FSA, three servicers suggested ways FSA could improve how it provides instructions on program changes. This servicer also said that FSA has not communicated with them on how to standardize application of such payments. However, this protocol does not provide additional guidance on how servicers should interpret income documentation. FSA is not consistently sharing all clarifications on Direct Loan program instructions with all servicers. One of FSA’s strategic goals is to “develop efficient processes and effective capabilities that are among the best in the private and public sectors,” and federal internal control standards state that information should be communicated to those who need it, in a form and within a timeframe that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. FSA’s Monitoring of Calls between Servicers and Borrowers Has Methodological Weaknesses and Is Poorly Documented
Key weaknesses limit FSA’s ability to monitor servicers’ interaction with borrowers and ensure servicers provide accurate information and good customer service. However, one servicer told us it participates in over 60 times more outbound calls than inbound calls, and all seven servicers we spoke to said outbound calls were a primary method of contacting borrowers in delinquency and approaching default. Furthermore, the results of FSA’s call monitoring are poorly documented, limiting their usefulness for management purposes. For example, one month’s summary did not include the total number of calls monitored or the number of calls that did not pass the review. Because not all errors identified in call monitoring are captured in FSA’s monthly reports, the reports do not reflect the actual prevalence of particular problems in the calls the agency monitors, and consequently, are insufficient for FSA to analyze the results of its call monitoring over time to inform its management activities. FSA Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Oversight of Loan Rehabilitation
FSA has taken some steps to improve its oversight of loan rehabilitation in response to our March 2014 report. In March 2014, we found that, because of limited planning and oversight, FSA was unable to provide most borrowers who completed loan rehabilitation with timely benefits for more than a year following the October 2011 upgrade of its defaulted loan information system. As a result, borrowers who made a good faith effort to rehabilitate their loans experienced delays in having the defaults removed from their credit reports and reinstating their federal student aid eligibility. As a result of the system challenges, no loan rehabilitations were processed from September 2011 through March 2012, and FSA officials said they needed until January 2013 to clear the resulting backlog (see fig. 1). FSA established procedures in November 2011 to assist eligible borrowers by removing defaults from their credit reports or reinstating their eligibility for student aid. To strengthen FSA’s oversight of the defaulted student loan information system contract, in our March 2014 report we recommended that FSA take steps to ensure that the final monitoring plan for the new contract identified risks and the oversight activities planned to address them. To address this issue, we recommended that FSA develop an approach for tracking loan rehabilitation performance. Conclusions
Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid faces challenges in the management of the Direct Loan program that affect its ability to function effectively as a performance-based organization. Furthermore, without a robust, systematic process for monitoring and documenting calls between borrowers and servicers, FSA may miss opportunities to ensure program integrity and improve services to borrowers. Recommendations
To strengthen management of the Direct Loan Program and ensure good customer service for borrowers, we recommend the Secretary of Education direct the Office of Federal Student Aid’s Chief Operating Officer to take the following three actions: 1. Review its methods of providing instructions and guidance to servicers, identifying areas to improve clarity and sufficiency, and ensure consistent delivery of instructions and guidance to ensure program integrity and improve service to borrowers. 2. Implement a more rigorous methodology for selecting recorded calls between servicers and borrowers to review, including a clearer definition of the sample servicers should select, a sample that targets more critical and more frequent types of calls, and a verification process to ensure integrity of the call selection process. | Why GAO Did This Study
During fiscal year 2014, Education issued more than $99 billion in Direct Loans to 9.4 million borrowers. Education contracts with and monitors the performance of servicers that handle billing and other services for borrowers, and entities that support rehabilitation of defaulted loans. In 1998, federal law established FSA as a performance-based organization, giving it more flexibility to manage operations, including Direct Loans.
GAO's testimony focuses on: (1) how effective FSA's instructions and guidance to servicers are, (2) how well FSA monitors and documents calls between Direct Loan borrowers and servicers, and (3) the status of FSA's oversight of the defaulted loan rehabilitation process. The first two questions address recently completed GAO work on FSA's oversight of servicers and communications with borrowers. The third question reflects results of GAO's previously issued work. GAO reviewed FSA's contracts, policies, procedures, instructions, and guidance; analyzed its monitoring reports and processes; and reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. GAO also interviewed federal officials, including officials from FSA, servicers, and representatives from higher education associations. We shared our findings with FSA officials and incorporated their comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid's (FSA) instructions and guidance to loan servicers are sometimes lacking, resulting in inconsistent and inefficient services to borrowers. While FSA has taken some steps to improve program instructions and guidance, six of the seven servicers GAO interviewed reported various issues resulting from absent, unclear and inconsistent guidance and instructions from FSA. For example, one servicer said there are no instructions for how to apply over- or underpayments to borrower accounts. In other cases, guidance is unclear; for example, according to one servicer, there is insufficient guidance on how to handle reporting certain types of adverse credit history to credit bureaus. Furthermore, in certain instances when FSA provided additional guidance or clarifications, it did not consistently share them with all servicers. Federal internal control standards state that information should be communicated in a form that enables entities to carry out responsibilities. Without improved guidance and instructions to servicers, borrower finances or the integrity of the Direct Loan program could be negatively affected. FSA monitors calls between servicers and borrowers, but there are weaknesses in the processes for selecting calls to be monitored and for documenting results. For example, FSA monitors far fewer outbound than inbound calls, even though one servicer said it makes 60 times more outbound calls than it receives inbound calls, and outbound calls are often made to borrowers who are delinquent and at risk of default. Also, the methodology for selecting recorded calls for review is not well-defined and relies on servicers to implement, with no verification from FSA to ensure its integrity. This does not align with the Office of Management and Budget's best practices for developing sample designs. In addition, the overall results of the call monitoring are poorly documented. For example, summaries of monitored calls did not consistently track errors over time. FSA's Strategic Plan calls for enhancing customer-facing processes, but FSA's call monitoring leaves management without complete information it needs to understand how well servicers interact with borrowers.
FSA has taken some steps to improve its oversight of the defaulted loan rehabilitation process in response to GAO's March 2014 report. Loan rehabilitation allows eligible borrowers who make nine on-time monthly payments within 10 months to have the default removed from their credit reports. In March 2014, GAO found that FSA was unable to provide most eligible borrowers who completed loan rehabilitation with timely benefits, such as removing defaults from their credit reports, for more than a year after upgrading the information system it uses to manage defaulted loans. As a result of limited planning and oversight of its system contractor, no rehabilitations were processed from October 2011 until April 2012, and FSA officials said they needed until January 2013 to clear the resulting backlog. GAO recommended that FSA take steps to track loan rehabilitation performance and improve oversight of its system contractor. FSA agreed with the recommendations and has begun taking action to address them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that FSA (1) review and improve how it provides instructions and guidance to servicers, (2) improve its methodology for monitoring calls between servicers and borrowers, and (3) improve documentation of its call monitoring. |
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