id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
gao_GAO-07-1142T | gao_GAO-07-1142T_0 | While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, whose details are discussed later. Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas. Logistics. Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used appropriately. Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional Attention
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight. He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and (5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance. DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post- Katrina Reform Act
On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulated major changes to FEMA that were intended to enhance its preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for continued congressional attention.
What GAO Found
Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed--particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be ready for the 2007 hurricane season. The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. |
gao_GAO-07-678 | gao_GAO-07-678_0 | Financial Regulators Generally Have Linked Pay to Performance, but Two Regulators Still Provided Increases to Performers at All Levels
All of the regulators awarded some performance-based increases during the appraisal cycles we reviewed that were linked to employees’ performance ratings, although two financial regulators also provided annual pay adjustments to employees, regardless of performance, during the appraisal cycles we reviewed. Some Financial Regulators Did Not Fully Implement the Safeguard of Providing Overall Ratings and Pay Increase Results to All Employees, Which Would Increase Transparency in Their Performance-Based Pay Systems
The extent to which the financial regulators shared the overall results of performance ratings and pay increase decisions with all employees varied, and some agencies did not make this information widely available to employees. We have previously reported that the safeguard of communicating the overall results of performance appraisal and pay increase decisions while protecting individual confidentiality can improve transparency by letting employees know where they stand in the organization. Agencies Have Taken Various Actions to Seek to Maintain Pay and Benefits Comparability
Financial regulators have hired external compensation consultants to conduct individual, formal comparability surveys, exchanged pay and benefits information, explored the feasibility of conducting a common survey, and adjusted pay and benefits to seek to maintain pay and benefits comparability. Finally, partly on the basis of the results of the comparability surveys and discussions among the agencies, the financial regulators have adjusted their pay and benefits policies in their efforts to seek to maintain comparability. According to agency officials, factors such as the year an agency first became subject to comparability provisions, budget constraints, the needs and preferences of different workforces, and ways to attract and retain workforces play a role in compensation decisions and contribute to the variations in pay ranges and benefits. The number of employees who moved to another financial regulator ranged from a low of 16 of 1,362 who moved or resigned in fiscal year 1997 to a high of 97 of 1,229 who moved or resigned in fiscal year 1991. The total number of financial regulator employees was 15,400 and 19,796 during those 2 years, respectively. Although the regulators have incorporated many of the key practices for effective performance management systems, opportunities exist for a number of them to make improvements as they continue to refine their systems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) review how the performance- based pay systems of 10 federal financial regulatory agencies are aligned with six key practices for effective performance management systems, (2) review actions these 10 agencies have taken to assess and implement comparability in compensation, and (3) review the extent to which individuals in selected occupations have moved between or left any of the agencies. We also analyzed agency data on performance ratings to determine the distribution of employee performance ratings at each agency. The four additional practices are: Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals. Use competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance. Involve employees and stakeholders to gain ownership of performance management systems. The specific ways in which the financial regulatory agencies have connected performance expectations to crosscutting goals vary. Agency officials emphasized that it was not their goal to have identical pay and benefits packages; rather, they considered pay and benefits as a total package when seeking to maintain pay and benefits comparability and when setting pay and benefits policies aimed at recruiting and retaining employees. We found that the movement of employees among the financial regulators was very low and presented no discernible trend, but that 86 percent (13,433 of the 15,627) of employees leaving the regulators voluntarily (i.e., moving or resigning) resigned from the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress granted financial regulators flexibility to establish their own compensation systems and required certain agencies to seek to maintain comparability with each other in pay and benefits to help the agencies overcome impediments to recruiting and retaining employees and avoid competing for the same employees. In response to a request, this report reviews (1) how the performance-based pay systems of 10 financial regulators are aligned with six key practices for effective performance management systems, (2) the actions these agencies have taken to assess and implement comparability in pay and benefits, and (3) the extent to which employees in selected occupations have moved between or left any of the agencies. GAO analyzed agency guidance and policies, agency data on performance ratings and pay increases, agency pay and benefits surveys, data from the Central Personnel Data File, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The 10 federal financial regulatory agencies have generally implemented key practices for effective performance management but could improve implementation of certain practices as they continue to refine their systems. All of the financial regulators awarded some pay increases during the appraisal cycles we reviewed that were linked to employees' performance ratings, although two also provided across-the-board pay adjustments, even to employees who had not received acceptable performance ratings, weakening the linkage of pay to performance. Both agencies have indicated in the future annual pay adjustments will not be awarded to unsuccessful performers. The agencies have generally aligned individual performance expectations and organizational goals, connected performance expectations to crosscutting goals, used competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance, and involved employees and stakeholders in the process. All of the agencies built safeguards into their performance management systems to enhance credibility and fairness. However, the extent to which the agencies communicated overall results of performance rating and pay increase decisions to all employees varied, and some could increase transparency by letting employees know where they stand relative to their peers in the organization, while protecting individual confidentiality. Financial regulators have hired external compensation consultants to conduct pay and benefits comparability surveys, exchanged pay and benefits information, explored the feasibility of conducting a common survey, and adjusted pay and benefits to seek to maintain comparability with each other. Although financial regulators have adjusted pay and benefits partly based on the results of their comparability efforts, there is some variation in pay ranges and benefit packages among the agencies. According to agency officials, factors such as the year the agencies first became subject to comparability provisions, budget constraints, and the needs and preferences of workforces play a role in compensation decisions and contribute to this variation. Furthermore, agency officials emphasized that it was not their goal to have identical pay and benefits packages; rather, they considered pay and benefits as a total package when seeking to maintain comparability and when setting pay policies aimed at recruiting and retaining employees. Between fiscal years 1990 and 2006, few employees moved among financial regulators and the movement among these agencies presented no discernible trend. Specifically, 86 percent (13,433) of the 15,627 employees that left during this period (i.e., moving or resigning but not retiring), resigned from federal employment. Annually, the percentage of employees who moved to another financial regulator ranged from a low of 1 percent in fiscal year 1997 (16 out of the 1,362 who moved or resigned) to a high of 8 percent in fiscal year 1991 (97 out of the 1,229 who moved or resigned). The total number of financial regulatory employees was 15,400 and 19,796 during those 2 years, respectively. |
gao_GAO-09-206 | gao_GAO-09-206_0 | We and others have highlighted the need to hire and retain older workers to address the challenges associated with an aging workforce. The Proportion of Federal Employees Eligible to Retire Is Growing
Across the federal government, the proportion of older and retirement- eligible workers is growing. For example, within 5 years, 20 percent of employees at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be able to retire, while 46 percent of employees at HUD and Transportation will be eligible. In 2007, federal agencies hired almost 14,000 new workers aged 55 and older. For example, although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a low proportion—20 percent—of workers eligible to retire by 2012, the proportion of workers eligible to retire now or by 2012 in its Federal Emergency Management Agency is currently about 33 percent, and agency projections indicate that about 58 percent of the senior executives in this agency will be eligible to retire by 2012. Selected Agencies Face Common Challenges and Have a Variety of Strategies to Tap Older Workers to Meet Workforce Needs
The growing proportion of federal workers who are eligible to retire now or in the near future presents challenges and opportunities for federal agencies. Also, according to agency officials, all three agencies have relatively few staff at midlevel positions to help pass down institutional knowledge and skills to less experienced employees due to past budget cuts and hiring freezes. Finally, they are all challenged in their efforts to attract qualified staff with specialized skills. To address these challenges, these agencies rely on older workers in different ways and use selected governmentwide human capital flexibilities in addition to their own strategies, to hire and retain older workers. Like the federal government as a whole, HUD, SSA, and USAID have large portions of their workforces nearing retirement, and these older, experienced workers may leave behind gaps in leadership, skills, and institutional knowledge. While all three agencies rely on older workers to pass down institutional knowledge and critical skills to less experienced staff, HUD officials told us this is the primary way they actively involve older workers. Agency officials told us that USAID tends to bring back its retirees as contractors to fill short-term job assignments and to help train and develop the agency’s growing number of newly hired staff. Other Federal Agencies Have Developed Their Own Promising Practices to Hire and Retain Older Workers to Meet Their Workforce Needs
We interviewed officials in several agencies that have developed other approaches to hiring and engaging older workers. State has developed two databases to match interested foreign service and civil service retirees with short-term or intermittent job assignments that require their skill sets or experiences. First, it has begun to streamline the complex federal job application process. OPM Has Taken Actions That Could Address Three Areas of Concern but Could Do More to Help Agencies Share Promising Strategies in Hiring and Retaining Older Workers
By reducing the burden associated with the federal hiring process and by proposing legislation to make it easier to rehire annuitants and to allow certain employees to work part-time at the end of their careers, OPM has taken steps that would address problems in three areas that have caused difficulties for older workers. And, while OPM has other methods available—such as its human capital and electronic government practices Web sites—that could be used to efficiently package and broadly disseminate this information to a much larger and diversified audience, it currently has no plans to do so. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe the (1) age and retirement eligibility trends of the current federal workforce and the extent to which agencies hire and retain older workers; (2) workforce challenges that federal agencies face and the strategies they use to recruit and retain older workers to help meet these challenges; and (3) actions the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as the federal government’s human capital manager, has taken to help agencies hire and retain an experienced, skilled workforce. Strategies Available to Federal Agencies
To report on how agencies make use of governmentwide flexibilities, we conducted in-depth reviews of three agencies—the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal workforce, like the nation's workforce as a whole, is aging, and increasingly large percentages are becoming eligible to retire. Eventually baby boomers will leave the workforce and when they do, they will leave behind gaps in leadership, skills, and knowledge due to the slower-growing pool of younger workers. GAO and others have emphasized the need for federal agencies to hire and retain older workers to help address these shortages. Building upon earlier testimony, GAO was asked to examine (1) age and retirement eligibility trends of the current federal workforce and the extent to which agencies hire and retain older workers; (2) workforce challenges selected agencies face and the strategies they use to hire and retain older workers; and (3) actions taken by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to help agencies hire and retain experienced workers. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data from OPM's Central Personal Data File, interviewed officials at three agencies with high proportions of workers eligible to retire, and identified agencies' promising practices to hire and retain older workers. What GAO Recommends
What GAO Found
The proportion of federal employees eligible to retire is growing. While this proportion varies across agencies, in four agencies--the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Small Business Administration, and the Department of Transportation--46 percent of the workforce will be eligible to retire by 2012, well above the governmentwide average of 33 percent. While these eligibility rates suggest that many will retire, the federal government has historically enjoyed relatively high retention rates, with 40 percent or more of federal employees remaining in the workforce for at least 5 years after becoming eligible. Beyond retaining older workers, in fiscal year 2007, federal agencies hired almost 14,000 new workers who were 55 years of age or older and brought back about 5,400 federal retirees to address workforce needs. The increasing numbers of retirement-eligible federal workers present challenges and opportunities. The three agencies we reviewed (HUD, SSA, and USAID) share common challenges. All have large proportions of employees nearing retirement, and according to officials, due to past hiring freezes all have relatively few midlevel staff to help pass down knowledge and skills to less experienced employees. Officials from all three agencies also told us that they have difficulty attracting qualified staff with specialized skills. To address these challenges, the three agencies rely on older workers in different ways. USAID brings back its knowledgeable and skilled retirees as contractors to fill short-term job assignments and to help train and develop the agency's growing number of newly hired staff. SSA uses complex statistical models to project potential retirements in mission critical occupations and uses these data to develop recruitment efforts targeted at a broad pool of candidates, including older workers. While all three agencies rely on older workers to pass down knowledge and skills to junior staff, HUD officials told us this is the primary way they involve older workers, due in part to the agency's focus on recruiting entry-level staff. In addition, some federal agencies have developed practices that other agencies might find useful in tapping older workers to meet short-term needs. For example, the Department of State has developed databases to match interested retirees with short-term assignments requiring particular skills. To help agencies hire and retain an experienced workforce, OPM provides guidance, including support tools and training, and has taken steps to address areas of concern to older workers. For example, OPM has initiated actions to streamline the federal application process and to eliminate barriers that deter some federal retirees from returning to federal service or from working part-time at the end of their careers. However, although some federal agencies have developed strategies that could be used effectively by other agencies to hire and retain experienced workers to meet workforce needs, this information is not widely available. And, while OPM has other methods available--such as its human capital and electronic government practices Web sites--that could be used to efficiently package and broadly disseminate this information to a much larger audience, it currently has no plans to do so. |
gao_GAO-17-407T | gao_GAO-17-407T_0 | High-Risk Areas Making Progress
Since our last high-risk update, while progress has varied, many of the 32 high-risk areas on our 2015 list have shown solid progress. As shown in table 1, 23 high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from our High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. In two other areas, enough progress was made that we removed a segment of the high-risk area—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management. The other eight areas improved in at least one criterion rating by either moving from “not met” to “partially met” or from “partially met” to “met.”
One High-Risk Designation Removed
We removed the area of Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland from the High-Risk List because the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and key departments and agencies have made significant progress to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well as other information (collectively referred to in this section as terrorism-related information), is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Accordingly, there is sufficient progress to remove this segment from the high-risk area. The IRIS program has made some progress on the capacity, monitoring, and demonstrated progress criteria. Effective implementation of FITARA is central to making progress in the Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations government-wide area we added to the High-Risk List in 2015. High-Risk Areas Highlighted for Significant Attention
In the 2 years since the last high-risk update, two areas—Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data and Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources—have expanded in scope because of emerging challenges related to these overall high-risk areas. DOD Financial Management. The effects of DOD’s financial management problems extend beyond financial reporting and negatively affect DOD’s ability to manage the department and make sound decisions on mission and operations. Resolving the role of the federal government in housing finance will require leadership commitment and action by Congress and the administration. Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information. New High-Risk Areas
For 2017, we are adding three new areas to the High-Risk List. Improving Federal Management of Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members
We, along with inspectors general, special commissions, and others, have reported that federal agencies have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs, and inefficiently fulfilled their responsibilities for managing the development of Indian energy resources. In particular, we have found numerous challenges facing Interior’s Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS) in administering education and health care services, which put the health and safety of American Indians served by these programs at risk. For fiscal year 2016, the federal government’s estimated environmental liability was $447 billion—up from $212 billion for fiscal year 1997. Since 1994, we have made at least 28 recommendations related to addressing the federal government’s environmental liability. Of these, 13 recommendations remain unimplemented. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. This recommendation has not been implemented. This recommendation has not been implemented. Over the past 3 years, we have made 30 recommendations to help the Bureau design and implement a more cost-effective census for 2020; however, only 6 of them had been fully implemented as of January 2017. The cost of the census, in terms of cost for counting each housing unit, has been escalating over the last several decennials. The 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, and was about 31 percent more costly than the $9.4 billion cost of the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The Bureau plans to implement several new innovations in its design of the 2020 Census. What Needs to Be Done
To help the Bureau mitigate the risks associated with its fundamentally new and complex innovations for the 2020 Census, the commitment of top leadership is needed to ensure the Bureau’s management, culture, and business practices align with a cost-effective enumeration. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities: about $3.9 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2016 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO's high-risk program identifies government operations with greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2015 and actions that are still needed to assure further progress, and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems potentially save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability.
GAO uses five criteria to assess progress in addressing high-risk areas: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's last high-risk update, many of the 32 high-risk areas on the 2015 list have shown solid progress. Twenty-three high-risk areas, or two-thirds of all the areas, have met or partially met all five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List; 15 of these areas fully met at least one criterion. Progress has been possible through the concerted efforts of Congress and leadership and staff in agencies. For example, Congress enacted over a dozen laws since GAO's last report in February 2015 to help address high-risk issues.
GAO removed 1 high-risk area on managing terrorism-related information, because significant progress had been made to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private sector partners. Sufficient progress was made to remove segments of 2 areas related to supply chain management at the Department of Defense (DOD) and gaps in geostationary weather satellite data.
Two high-risk areas expanded—DOD's polar-orbiting weather satellites and the Department of the Interior's restructuring of offshore oil and gas oversight. Several other areas need substantive attention including VA health care, DOD financial management, ensuring the security of federal information systems and cyber critical infrastructure, resolving the federal role in housing finance, and improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations.
GAO is adding 3 areas to the High-Risk List, bringing the total to 34:
Management of Federal Programs That Serve Tribes and Their Members. GAO has reported that federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior's Bureaus of Indian Education and Indian Affairs and the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service, have ineffectively administered Indian education and health care programs and inefficiently developed Indian energy resources. Thirty-nine of 41 GAO recommendations on this issue remain unimplemented.
U.S. Government's Environmental Liabilities. In fiscal year 2016 this liability was estimated at $447 billion (up from $212 billion in 1997). The Department of Energy is responsible for 83 percent of these liabilities and DOD for 14 percent. Agencies spend billions each year on environmental cleanup efforts but the estimated environmental liability continues to rise. Since 1994, GAO has made at least 28 recommendations related to this area; 13 are unimplemented.
The 2020 Decennial Census. The cost of the census has been escalating over the last several decennials; the 2010 Census was the costliest U.S. Census in history at about $12.3 billion, about 31 percent more than the 2000 Census (in 2020 dollars). The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) plans to implement several innovations—including IT systems—for the 2020 Census. Successfully implementing these innovations, along with other challenges, risk the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective census. Since 2014, GAO has made 30 recommendations related to this area; however, only 6 have been fully implemented.
GAO's 2017 High-Risk List
What GAO Recommends
This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress. |
gao_GAO-10-505 | gao_GAO-10-505_0 | The Roadmap, among other things, obligates the PA and Israel to undertake specific actions to improve security as part of the ongoing Middle East peace process. As a result, the United States decided to re-engage with the PA directly and increased the amount of U.S. assistance aimed at improving the economic and security climate in the West Bank and increasing the capacity of the PA.
As described by USSC and State officials, the USSC’s current mission is to (1) facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the PASF; (2) lead and coordinate international assistance for the PASF provided by the United States and other international donors to eliminate duplication of effort; and (3) help the PA rightsize, reform, and professionalize its security sector by advising the PA and by training and equipping the PASF to meet the Palestinians’ obligations outlined in the Roadmap. State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional INCLE funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011, including $56 million for training activities, $33 million for equipping, $53 million for infrastructure activities, and $3 million for strategic capacity building activities. USSC Supports Renovation and Construction of PASF Installations
Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $99 million to renovate or construct PASF installations. 4). Jenin NSF Operations Camp. State has allocated about $9 million to construct this facility. USSC and State officials attributed the lack of clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and their associated targets for their programs to three factors—(1) changing force requirements, (2) the early stages of PA planning and its limited capacity to rebuild and sustain its security forces, and (3) lack of detailed guidance from State about USSC program objectives, time frames, and reporting requirements. Despite these factors, deriving indicators to measure and manage performance against an agency’s results-oriented goals has been identified by GAO as good management practice because it would help provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities. State and USSC officials noted that USSC was developing a campaign plan for release in mid-2010 to help the Palestinians implement their own revised security strategy—which was still not released as of March 2010–and expected the plan to incorporate performance indicators to the extent possible. U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and Outpace Development of the Rule of Law
Logistical constraints on personnel movement and access, equipment delivery, and acquisition of land for infrastructure projects challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. In addition, State, USSC, and international officials and documents note that programs to develop the capacity of the civil police and the justice sector are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security sector reform programs. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West Bank and is progressing faster than PA civil police and justice sector reforms, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess and report on the progress of their security assistance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., in the West Bank, at the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Amman, Jordan. To assess State’s efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance programs, we examined whether its approach identified and applied measurable performance indicators necessary to gauge results—as called for in a number of GAO products listed at the end of this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the parties meet these obligations. GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan.
What GAO Found
State has allocated about $392million to train and equip the PA security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than $160 million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA's National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately $89 million to provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about $99 million to renovate or construct several PA installations, including two of the operations camps it plans to provide; and (4) about $22 million to build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning Directorate. State also requested $150 million for its programs for fiscal year 2011. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such performance indicators to a number of factors, including the relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming, rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-based indicators to measure and manage performance against program goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign plan to be released in mid-2010. The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects. State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other international donors have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms, although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the security assistance programs. |
gao_RCED-98-258 | gao_RCED-98-258_0 | 1). Common services: Covers nonpersonnel costs associated with providing space and a working environment for employees. Factors Identified by the Forest Service
According to the Forest Service, the four factors contributing most to indirect cost increases during the 5-year review period were the implementation of the emergency salvage timber sale program, employee buyouts, the late assignment of costs, and a new computer system. Of this amount, the Forest Service’s accounting records show that $211,423 was the result of the head tax. However, over our 5-year review period, the instructions explaining how to account for indirect costs changed several times. The regional supplement to the Forest Service Manual supports this decision by saying that “Contributors do not need to be assessed for overhead charges if the contributors are unwilling to accept them.”
Since fiscal year 1995, the Rocky Mountain Region has classified rent charged to the Brush Disposal Fund entirely as an indirect cost, whereas the Southwestern Region has classified rent charged to the same fund both as a direct and an indirect cost. Actions Taken to Control Costs
Overall, the Forest Service reduced its permanent staff by 14 percent during the 5-year period of our review, and individual offices implemented additional measures designed to reduce costs. Most of these efforts have been aimed at reducing costs generally and have not been targeted specifically at indirect expenditures. The congressional appropriations committees also reduced the budget line item for general administration during the period, but one way the Forest Service responded to the decrease was by reclassifying some general administration activities as benefiting function activities. One way that the Forest Service has been able to comply with the reduction was by reclassifying costs previously considered general administration costs to other indirect cost categories. Actions Essential in Controlling Indirect Costs
In an effort to reduce overall costs, the Forest Service has closed and consolidated offices, downsized, and centralized certain administrative functions. An essential first step for the Forest Service in controlling indirect costs is to know clearly what these costs are from year to year and office to office. A starting point for this effort involves establishing clear definitions for indirect costs and applying them consistently over time. In July 1995, the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Board, the group that recommends accounting principles for the federal government, released Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 4 would go a long way towards producing cost data that are consistent and reliable. Once these problems are solved and indirect costs from year to year and office to office are clearly known, there is the opportunity for informed decisions about indirect costs and how to reduce them. 4 into the Forest Service’s cost accounting system. 498)
Cooperative Work—Knutson- Vandenberg Fund
A trust fund that uses deposits made by timber purchasers to reforest timber sale areas. In phase one, we provided information on the amount of indirect expenditures charged to these five funds between fiscal years 1993 and 1997. This second phase has the three objectives of identifying (1) the reasons why indirect costs rose, (2) actions taken by the Forest Service and others to control these expenditures, and (3) other actions that may help the Forest Service control such expenditures in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on overhead costs for the Forest Service's Brush Disposal Fund, Salvage Sale Fund, Reforestation Trust Fund, Cooperative Work--Other Fund, and Cooperative Work--Knutson-Vandenberg Fund, focusing on: (1) the reasons why indirect costs rose; (2) actions taken by the Forest Service and others to control these costs; and (3) other actions that may help the Forest Service control these costs in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) inconsistencies in the Forest Service's accounting system make it difficult to ascertain specifically why indirect costs rose for these five funds during fiscal years 1993-97; (2) according to the Forest Service, indirect costs rose for four main reasons: the implementation of a congressionally established program to increase the amount of salvage timber offered for sale, additional costs associated with downsizing, the allocation of costs incurred in previous years but not charged against the funds at the time, and computer modernization; (3) however, during this same time period, the Forest Service was changing its policies about how to account for indirect costs, and individual regions and forests were implementing these policies in markedly different ways; (4) as a result, the accounting system produced information that was not consistent from year to year or location to location; (5) neither GAO nor the Forest Service is able to say how much indirect costs increased as a result of the factors the Forest Service cites and how much they changed because of these accounting inconsistencies; (6) to control costs, the Forest Service took a number of actions, most of which were aimed at reducing costs generally and not targeted specifically at indirect costs; (7) in particular, the agency reduced its permanent staff by 14 percent, and individual regions used a variety of other measures, including closing some district offices, consolidating others, and centralizing certain administrative functions, such as contracting and procurement; (8) for their part, congressional appropriation committees reduced the budget line item for some indirect costs; (9) one way the Forest Service responded to the reductions was to reclassify some indirect costs to other accounts; (10) an essential step for controlling indirect costs is establishing clear definitions for them and applying the definitions consistently over time and across locations; (11) if implemented properly, a new accounting standard released by the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Board, which recommends accounting principles for the federal government, will go a long way towards providing consistent and reliable data on the Forest Service's indirect costs; and (12) once the problems with the Forest Service's accounting system are solved and the agency's indirect costs are clearly known, there is the opportunity for informed decisions to be made on how to control them. |
gao_GAO-04-630 | gao_GAO-04-630_0 | Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to assess the effectiveness of FDIC’s information system general controls, including the progress the corporation had made in correcting or mitigating weaknesses reported in our financial statement audits for calendar years 2001 and 2002. In addition, we reviewed FDIC’s corrective actions taken to address vulnerabilities identified in our audits for calendar years 2001 and 2002. Although FDIC has made significant progress in correcting these weaknesses and has taken other steps to improve security, our testing in our calendar year 2003 audit identified additional control weaknesses. Substantial Progress Was Made in Implementing a Computer Security Program, but a Key Element Was Incomplete
A key reason for FDIC’s continuing weaknesses in information system controls is that it has not yet fully established a comprehensive security management program to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained and that information security receives significant management attention. Although FDIC has made substantial progress in each of the elements discussed above, it only recently established a program to test and evaluate its computer control environment, but this program was incomplete. Information security weaknesses detected are analyzed for systemic solutions. However, we identified additional computer control weaknesses that place critical FDIC financial and sensitive personnel and bank examination information at risk of unauthorized disclosure, disruption of operations, or loss of assets. Specifically, the test and evaluation program does not include adequate provisions to ensure that (1) all key computer resources supporting FDIC’s financial environment are routinely reviewed and tested, (2) weaknesses detected are analyzed for systemic solutions, (3) corrective actions are independently tested, and (4) newly identified weaknesses or emerging security threats are incorporated into the test and evaluation process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Effective controls over information systems are essential to ensuring the protection of financial and personnel information and the security and reliability of bank examination data maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). As part of our calendar year 2003 financial statement audits of three FDIC Funds, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the corporation's general controls on its information systems. Our assessment included follow up on the progress that FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating computer security weaknesses identified in our audits for calendar years 2001 and 2002.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made significant progress in correcting prior year information security weaknesses. The corporation addressed almost all the computer security weaknesses we previously identified in our audits for calendar years 2001 and 2002. Nonetheless, testing in our calendar year 2003 audit identified additional computer control weaknesses in FDIC's information systems. These weaknesses place critical FDIC financial and sensitive examination information at risk of unauthorized disclosure, disruption of operations, or loss of assets. A key reason for FDIC's continuing weaknesses in information system controls is that it has not yet fully established a comprehensive security management program to ensure that effective controls are established and maintained and that information security receives significant management attention. The corporation only recently established a program to test and evaluate its computer control environment, and this program does not yet include adequate provisions to ensure that (1) all key computer resources supporting FDIC's financial environment are routinely reviewed and tested, (2) weaknesses detected are analyzed for systemic solutions, (3) corrective actions are independently tested, and (4) newly identified weaknesses or emerging security threats are incorporated into the test and evaluation process. |
gao_GAO-15-591 | gao_GAO-15-591_0 | The Dodd-Frank Act also required SEC to issue regulations imposing new requirements on NRSROs related to qualification standards for credit rating analysts. Views Varied on the Merits of a Professional Organization for Credit Rating Analysts
Views varied on the merits of a professional organization for credit rating analysts of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, but most concluded it was too early to tell if one was needed. Finally, some NRSRO representatives, a few experts and analysts, and SEC officials said that it was too early to determine whether a professional organization might add to or complement the quality or oversight of analysts’ work, particularly in light of SEC’s new requirements designed to enhance the standards of training, experience, and competence for credit rating analysts at NRSROs. As we stated earlier, the new rules, which became effective in June 2015, require NRSROs to ensure that analysts meet additional quality standards to produce accurate ratings and are periodically tested on their knowledge of the NRSRO’s credit rating process. Most analysts and representatives of NRSROs and some experts and stakeholders (including academics, investors, advocacy groups, and international regulators) told us that putting these components in place for an organization for NRSRO credit rating analysts could be challenging. According to some NRSRO representatives, experts, and a few analysts, defining a clear purpose and mission for an organization for credit rating analysts would be difficult at this time because of the new SEC regulations. Some representatives of NRSROs and existing professional organizations, experts, and analysts with whom we spoke stated that the relatively small population of credit rating analysts—as of December 2014, NRSROs employed approximately 4,500 analysts— suggests it might be challenging to obtain adequate funding to create and operate the organization, at least initially. As an alternative to receiving direct funding from NRSROs, the organization could be partly funded through transactions fees paid to NRSROs. Meaningful Activities
Creating and operating any professional organization requires developing core activities and services, such as professional standards, education and training curricula, certification tests, and structures to oversee member compliance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 939E of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) required us to study the feasibility and merits of creating an independent professional organization for rating analysts employed by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) that would be responsible for establishing independent standards for governing the profession of rating analysts, establishing a code of ethical conduct, and overseeing the profession of rating analysts. We also analyzed the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies as well as SEC’s new rule requiring NRSROs to establish standards for training, experience, and competence of credit rating analysts. To gather a diverse set of perspectives, we interviewed SEC officials; NRSRO representatives; industry experts and stakeholders—including investors, academics, representatives of credit rating and analysis firms not registered with SEC, representatives of the Software and Information Industry Association, representatives of a research institute, and officials with the European Securities and Markets Authority and IOSCO—and leadership or governing bodies of existing professional organizations.We obtained their views about (1) the advantages and disadvantages (for regulators, credit rating agencies, rating analysts, investors, and the public) of creating a professional organization for credit rating analysts, and (2) how a professional organization would fit within the existing structure of regulation and oversight of credit rating agencies and credit rating analysts. In facilitating each focus group, we focused our discussions on the following topics: current training received and any certifications held by credit rating analysts; extent to which credit rating analysts currently have access to the services typically offered by a professional organization, such as education, professional standards and a code of ethical conduct for governing the profession, professional certification or license, oversight, and public education, outreach, or advocacy; extent to which there is a need for a professional organization for credit rating analysts and any potential challenges in operating an organization for analysts; potential advantages and disadvantages of creating a professional organization for credit rating analysts based on the three models we developed; and feasibility of developing and overseeing professional standards for credit rating analysts. The 2015 membership fee was $430 for active members. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2007–2009 financial crisis renewed concerns about the integrity of the credit rating industry. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) imposed new requirements on NRSROs and required SEC to implement regulations for training, experience, and competence of credit rating analysts. The Dodd-Frank Act also included a provision for GAO to conduct a study on the merits and feasibility of creating a professional organization for rating analysts employed by NRSROs.
This report describes views on (1) the potential merits of and need for a professional organization for credit rating analysts, and (2) any challenges associated with creating and operating such an organization. For this report, GAO reviewed SEC documentation and academic literature; held focus groups with approximately 100 credit rating analysts from different-sized firms who had a range of experience and skills; and interviewed SEC staff, representatives from all 10 NRSROs, and experts and stakeholders (including, academics, investors, advocacy groups, and international regulators). GAO also analyzed the structure and activities of six professional organizations that develop and oversee professional standards and a code of conduct, and interviewed representatives of the organizations.
What GAO Found
Views varied on the merits of a professional organization for credit rating analysts of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO), but some concluded it was too early to tell if one was needed, in part because of new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements on NRSROs to establish standards for their analysts. The analysts, representatives of NRSROs and existing professional organizations, and experts and stakeholders (including academics, investors, advocacy groups, and international regulators) with whom GAO spoke said the merits of such an organization included improving the industry's reputation, enhancing the quality of work done by the professionals, and supplementing existing oversight. However, some said creating such an organization could duplicate existing standards, codes of conduct, or the services provided by other professional organizations. Some said that establishing a professional organization without evaluating the effectiveness of SEC's new regulations (which became effective in June 2015) would be premature. These rules require each NRSRO to establish training, experience, and competence standards to ensure analysts produce accurate ratings and to periodically test analysts' knowledge of the NRSRO's procedures and methodologies. Thus, some held the view that it was too early to determine in what areas a professional organization might add value—that is, add to or complement (rather than duplicate) standards, codes of conduct, training, or oversight—or if one was needed at all.
Creating and operating a professional organization for NRSRO credit rating analysts would not be without certain challenges. According to most analysts and representatives of NRSROs and some experts and stakeholders, the challenges primarily would relate to achieving the following aims:
Clearly delineated purpose . Delineating the mission or purposes of an organization would be difficult at the present time because the effects of the new SEC regulations were unknown.
Adequate funding. Obtaining sufficient funding through membership fees also might be difficult because of the relatively small population of analysts (about 4,500 as of 2014) to provide the fees.
Balanced representation. Creating an organizational structure that would provide equitable representation for all members, including from smaller NRSROs, could be challenging because of industry concentration (88 percent of analysts work for 3 of the 10 NRSROs).
Meaningful activities. Developing core activities and services, including professional standards, education and training curricula, certification tests, and structures to oversee member compliance could be challenging because of differences in NRSRO methodologies, concerns about sharing confidential information, and analyst specialization in specific rating classes (such as insurance or asset-backed securities). |
gao_GAO-08-709T | gao_GAO-08-709T_0 | The NSTC is managed by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), who also serves as the Science Advisor to the President. In 2003, the NSET subcommittee further established a Nanotechnology Environmental and Health Implications (NEHI) working group. The NNI’s annual Supplement to the President’s Budget, prepared by the NSTC, includes EHS research figures from the agencies and a general description of the research conducted by the agencies in each of the areas. Eight of the 13 agencies that funded nanotechnology research in fiscal year 2006 reported having devoted some of those resources to research that had a primary focus on potential EHS risks. Almost One-Fifth of Reported EHS Research Projects Were Not Primarily Focused on Studying the EHS Risks of Nanotechnology
About 18 percent of the total research dollars reported by the agencies as being primarily focused on the study of nanotechnology-related EHS risks in fiscal year 2006 cannot actually be attributed to this purpose. Specifically, we found that 22 of the 119 projects funded by five federal agencies were not primarily related to studying EHS risks. We found that the primary purpose of many of these 22 projects was to explore ways to use nanotechnology to remediate environmental damage or to identify environmental, chemical, or biological hazards not related to nanotechnology. We found that the miscategorization of these 22 projects resulted largely from a reporting structure for nanotechnology research that does not easily allow agencies to recognize projects that use nanotechnology to improve the environment or enhance the detection of environmental contaminants, and from the limited guidance available to the agencies on how to consistently report EHS research. In addition to research reported to the NNI as being primarily focused on the EHS risks of nanotechnology, some agencies conduct research that is not reflected in the EHS totals provided by the NNI either because they are not considered federal research agencies or because the primary purpose of the research was not to study EHS risks. This type of research provides information that is needed to understand and measure nanomaterials to ensure safe handling and protection against potential health or environmental hazards; however, such research is captured under other PCAs, such as instrumentation, metrology, and standards. Processes to Identify and Prioritize Needed EHS Research Appear Reasonable and Are Ongoing but a Comprehensive Research Strategy Has Not Yet Been Developed
All eight agencies in our review have processes in place to identify and prioritize the research they need related to the potential EHS risks of nanotechnology. In addition to the efforts of individual agencies, the NSET subcommittee has engaged in an iterative prioritization process through its NEHI working group. NEHI issued a report summarizing the results of this analysis in February 2008. Although a comprehensive research strategy for EHS research had not been finalized at the time of our review, the prioritization processes taking place within individual agencies and the NNI appeared to be reasonable. In addition, we found that the primary purposes of agency projects underway in fiscal year 2006 were generally consistent with both agency priorities and the NEHI working group’s research categories. These two general research categories accounted for 70 percent of all projects focused on EHS risks. Coordination Processes Have Fostered Interagency Collaboration and Information-Sharing
Agency and NNI processes to coordinate research and other activities related to the potential EHS risks of nanotechnology have been generally effective, and have resulted in numerous interagency collaborations. Furthermore, the NEHI working group has adopted a number of practices GAO has previously identified as essential to helping enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. Finally, all agency officials we spoke with expressed satisfaction with their agency’s participation in the NEHI working group, specifically, the coordination and collaboration on EHS risk research and other activities that have occurred as a result of their participation. A number of the members have served on the body for several years, providing stability and continuity that contributes to a collegial and productive working atmosphere. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2008, GAO issued a report entitled Nanotechnology: Better Guidance Is Needed to Ensure Accurate Reporting of Federal Research Focused on Environmental, Health, and Safety Risks (GAO-08-402). In this report, GAO reviewed the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a multiagency effort administered by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). The NNI coordinates the nanotechnology-related activities of 25 federal agencies that fund nanoscale research or have a stake in the results. A key research area funded by some agencies related to studying the potential environmental, health, and safety (EHS) risks that may result from exposure to nanoscale materials. For this testimony statement, GAO was asked to summarize the findings of its March 2008 report, focusing on (1) the extent to which selected agencies conducted EHS research in fiscal year 2006; (2) the reasonableness of the agencies' and the NNI's processes to identify and prioritize EHS research; and (3) the effectiveness of the agencies' and the NNI's process to coordinate EHS research.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2006, federal agencies devoted $37.7 million--or 3 percent of the $1.3 billion total nanotechnology research funding--to research that was primarily focused on the EHS risks of nanotechnology, according to the NNI. However, about 20 percent of this total cannot actually be attributed to this purpose. GAO found that 22 of the 119 projects identified as EHS in fiscal year 2006 were not primarily related to understanding the extent to which nanotechnology may pose an EHS risk. Instead, many of these projects were focused on how to use nanotechnology to remediate environmental damage or detect hazards not related to nanotechnology. GAO determined that this mischaracterization is rooted in the current reporting structure that does not allow these types of projects to be easily categorized and the lack of guidance for agencies on how to apportion research funding across multiple topics, when appropriate. In addition to the EHS funding reported by the NNI, federal agencies conduct other research that is not captured in the EHS totals. This research was not captured by the NNI because either the research was funded by an agency not considered to be a research agency or because the primary purpose of the research was not to study EHS risks. Federal agencies and the NNI, at the time of GAO's review, were in the process of identifying and prioritizing EHS risk research needs and the overall process they were using appeared reasonable. For example, identification and prioritization of EHS research needs was being done by the agencies and the NNI collaboratively. The NNI also was engaged in an iterative prioritization effort through its Nanotechnology Environmental and Health Implications (NEHI) working group. Through this process, NEHI identified five general research categories as a priority for federally funded research. GAO found that most of the research projects that were underway in fiscal year 2006 were generally consistent with agency and NEHI priorities. NEHI released its new EHS research strategy on February 13, 2008. Agency and NNI processes to coordinate activities related to potential EHS risks of nanotechnology have been generally effective. The NEHI working group has convened frequent meetings that have helped agencies identify opportunities to collaborate on EHS risk issues, such as joint sponsorship of research and workshops to advance knowledge and facilitate information-sharing among the agencies. NEHI also has incorporated several practices that GAO has previously identified as key to enhancing and sustaining interagency collaborative efforts, such as defining a common outcome and leveraging resources. Finally, all agency officials GAO spoke with expressed satisfaction with the coordination and collaboration on EHS risk research that has occurred through NEHI. They cited several factors they believe contribute to the group's effectiveness, including the stability of the working group membership and the expertise and dedication of its members. Furthermore, according to these officials, this stability, combined with common research needs and general excitement about the new science, has resulted in a collegial, productive working environment. |
gao_GAO-02-622T | gao_GAO-02-622T_0 | This provision would make federal agencies with real property holdings accountable for the management and oversight of their real property assets. We envision that the senior real property officers would work together with three other senior agency officials—the chief financial officer (CFO), the chief information officer (CIO), and the head of human resources—to integrate the strategic planning and management of facilities, financial management, technology, and human capital to ensure that the agencies’ asset management plans are linked to the agencies’ overall missions and strategic plans. 3947 would require the GSA administrator to establish and maintain a single, comprehensive, and descriptive inventory database of all real property interests under the custody and control of each federal agency. This week we reported that GSA’s worldwide inventory of federal real property contained data that were unreliable and of limited usefulness. Without quality data, decisionmakers have difficulty strategically managing and budgeting for such significant real property management issues as deteriorating federal buildings, disposal of underutilized and unneeded properties, and the protection of people and facilities. The proposed enhanced asset management tools and other asset management tools currently available for real property management will also need to be carefully evaluated to ensure that they provide the best economic value and outcome for the government. Under the bill, agencies would be authorized reimbursement for their costs of disposing of their property. In considering whether to allow federal agencies to retain the proceeds from real property transactions, it is important for Congress to ensure that it retains appropriate control and oversight over these funds, including the ability to redistribute the funds to accommodate changing needs if necessary. | What GAO Found
The Federal Property Asset Management Reform Act of 2002, will enhance federal real and personal property management and bring the policies and business practices of federal agencies into the 21st century. Available data show that the federal government owns hundreds of thousands of properties worldwide, including military installations, office buildings, laboratories, courthouses, embassies, postal facilities, national parks, forests, and other public lands, estimated to be worth billions of dollars. Most of this government-owned real property is under the custody and control of eight agencies--the Department of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs; General Services Administration; the Tennessee Valley Authority; and the U.S. Postal Service. Federal property managers have a large deferred maintenance backlog, obsolete and underutilized properties, and changing facility needs due to rapid advances in technology. It is important that real property-holding agencies link their real property strategic plans to their missions and related capital management and performance plans; ensure that senior real property officers have the knowledge, skills, and expertise needed to effectively perform their duties; are accountable for the reliability, usefulness, and timeliness of their data; and adopt an effective process to monitor and evaluate any management tool authorized by the bill. It is equally important that GSA provides written guidance to agencies on the development of their business and asset management plans and that Congress provide appropriate control and oversight of intended and actual use of the funds retained from real property transactions. |
gao_HEHS-95-27 | gao_HEHS-95-27_0 | This review also incorporates information from our 1993 review of German health care reforms and from current and past work using other international studies. However, even if pharmaceuticals and dentures are removed, outlays per member of the Statutory Health Care System rose only about 3 percent, easily meeting the Health Care Structure Reform Act’s goal of restraining growth to the rate of growth of income of members of the system subject to the contribution rate. Pharmaceuticals and Dentures
The largest rates of decrease in expenditures were seen in the sectors of pharmaceuticals and dentures, which had negative growth rates of 19.6 and 26.9 percent, respectively. Little Evidence of Impaired Access to Appropriate Care
Despite the introduction of stringent budgeting in most major sectors of the German Statutory Health Insurance System, access of patients to appropriate care was not impaired. In particular, fears had been raised that physicians might not prescribe needed pharmaceuticals to their patients; physicians might seek to hospitalize costly patients to transfer these costs to the hospital’s budget rather than treat them on the outpatient budget where they might affect future payments; and hospitals might transfer (dump) costly patients to other hospitals, usually tertiary care hospitals, to move these costs from the transferring hospital’s budget to the receiving hospital’s budget, which is usually higher. Will German Reforms Control Cost Growth in 1994? Long-Term Cost Control Through Structural Reforms
The Health Care Reform Act of 1993 set up the temporary global budgets to control health care expenditures while structural reforms intended to control costs over the longer term could be worked out and put into place. Others have not been in place long enough to have a significant impact. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the German health care system, focusing on the: (1) effects of nonnegotiable budgets on health care cost and access to care; and (2) status of some of the structural changes intended to control costs over the longer term.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) during 1993, the German health care sectors generally succeeded in controlling the growth of health care costs, with outlays per member falling more than one percent from 1992 levels; (2) the largest decrease in expenditures occurred in the pharmaceutical and denture sectors; (3) the negative growth rate allowed participants' insurance premiums to decline slightly, but expenditure growth could resume in the future; (4) there was little evidence that the low cost growth rate limited participants' access to appropriate care; (5) there was no evidence that German physicians failed to prescribe needed drugs or unnecessarily admitted patients to hospitals in order to shift them from the physician budget to the hospital budget; (6) it was not known how many community hospitals unnecessarily transferred patients to tertiary care facilities to remove them from their budgets; (7) there was insufficient data to predict the future success of German health care reforms; and (8) some structural reforms have not been implemented and others have not been in place long enough to determine their impact. |
gao_GAO-13-14 | gao_GAO-13-14_0 | Agencies Attributed Benefits of EULs to Their EUL Programs, but Did Not Always Do the Same with All Costs
Agencies Cited Various EUL Benefits
Agency officials told us that EULs provide a variety of benefits to the government in addition to better utilization of underutilized federal property. The commonly cited benefits include enhanced mission activities, cash rent revenue, and value received through in-kind consideration. All four agencies we reviewed reported cash benefits from EULs. Agencies’ Experiences in Using EULs Provide Illustrative Examples about EUL Use
Based on recent agency experiences, EULs may be a viable option for redeveloping underutilized federal real property when disposal is not possible or desirable, but agencies raised issues pertaining to EULs that affect their use or budgetary treatment. First, NASA has reported that the limitation on its authority to accept in-kind consideration has limited its ability to encourage use of EULs and investments in underutilized NASA property. In particular, according to the NASA officials, prospective lessees are reluctant to make capital improvements that will have to be conveyed to the government at the end of the lease without receiving other compensation, such as a reduction in cash rent. Budget Impacts of EULs
VA officials said that assessing and recognizing the budget impacts of EULs is complicated and maybe interpreted differently by agencies with EUL authority. In particular, VA EULs can include long-term commitments that are recognized in the federal budget in different ways. VA’s leaseback costs are nearly $16 million annually (see table 3), but VA and CBO disagree on the extent to which VA should account for the budget impacts for EULs that could include long-term government commitments. For example, the average VA EUL earned about $25,000 in cash revenue last year— financial benefits that could be outweighed by consultant, termination, and leaseback costs, which agencies have not consistently attributed to their EUL programs. Recommendation
To promote transparency about EULs, improve decision-making regarding EULs, and ensure more accurate accounting of EUL net benefits, we recommend that OMB work with VA, NASA, State, and USDA, and any other agencies with EUL authority, to ensure that agencies consistently attribute all costs associated with EULs (such as consulting, termination, and leaseback costs) to their EUL programs, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) To what extent do agencies attribute the full benefits and costs of their EULs in their assessments of their EUL programs? (2) What have been the experiences of agencies in using their EUL authority? To address these both of these objectives we reviewed prior GAO reports on enhanced use leasing and capital financing, and contacted the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and 11 agencies: (1) Veterans Affairs (VA), (2) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), (3) Department of State (State), (4) Department of Agriculture (USDA), (5) General Services Administration (GSA), (6) Department of Energy (Energy), (7) Department of Interior (Interior), (8) Department of Justice (DOJ), (9) United States Postal Service (USPS), (10) St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC), and (11) Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) based on size or evidence of EUL authority. We continue to believe that VA should report all EUL costs as part of its EUL program specifically, including consultant costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government owns underutilized properties that are costly to operate, yet challenges exist to closing and disposing of them. To obtain value from these properties, some agencies have used EULs, which are generally long-term agreements to lease property from the federal government in exchange for cash or non-cash consideration. However, agencies also incur costs for EUL programs. We have previously reported that agencies should include all costs associated with programs activities when assessing their values. This report addresses (1) the extent to which agencies attribute the full benefits and costs of their EULs in their assessments of their EUL programs and (2) the experiences of agencies in using their EUL authority.
GAO reviewed property data and documents from the largest civilian including four agencies that use federal real property agencies EULsVA, NASA, the Department of State, and the Department of Agricultureand applicable laws, and regulations and guidance. GAO visited nine sites where agencies were using EULs.
What GAO Found
Agency officials told us that enhanced use leases (EUL) help them utilize their underutilized property better; commonly cited benefits include enhanced mission activities, cash rent revenue, and value received through in-kind consideration. However, some agencies we reviewed do not include all costs associated with their EULs when they assess the performance of their EUL programs. Guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) does not specify what costs agencies should include in their EUL evaluations, resulting in variance among agencies. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of State do not consistently attribute EUL-related costs of consultant staff who administer the leases, and VA does not attribute various administrative costs that offset EUL benefits. Without fully accounting for all EUL costs, agencies may overstate the net benefits of their EUL programs.
Based on recent agency experiences, EULs may be a viable option for redeveloping underutilized federal real property when disposal is not possible or desirable, but two agencies raised issues pertaining to EUL use that affect their use or budgetary treatment. First, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials said that the limit on its authority to receive in-kind consideration as part of its EUL program has limited its ability to encourage the use of EULs for underutilized NASA property. Specifically, NASA officials said prospective lessees are reluctant to make costly capital improvements to a property that will have to be returned to the government at the end of the lease without other compensation, such as a reduction in cash rent. Second, VA and CBO disagree on the extent to which VA should account for the budget impacts for EULs that could include long-term government commitments. VA has made multi-year commitments with certain EULs without fully reporting them in its budget. Assessing and recognizing the budget impacts of EULs is complicated and may be interpreted differently by agencies with EUL authority. In particular, VA EULs can include long-term commitments that are recognized in the federal budget in different ways.
What GAO Recommends
To promote transparency about EULs, improve decision-making regarding EULs and ensure more accurate accounting of EUL benefits, GAO recommends that OMB coordinate with affected agencies to ensure that agencies consistently attribute all relevant costs associated with EULs to their EUL programs. Agencies generally agreed with our findings and recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-35 | gao_GAO-02-35_0 | Conclusions
Many of the issues presented throughout this report have existed for several years, and IRS has noted that the ultimate solution to many of these issues is modernization of its systems. As part of this modernization initiative, IRS plans to implement a new financial system that includes a cost accounting module as well as integrated administrative and custodial general ledgers that are supported by subsidiary ledgers containing the transactional details for key accounts such as taxes receivable and property and equipment. IRS continues to make progress in addressing its financial management challenges. The strong commitment and dedication to financial management reform by IRS senior management has played a crucial role in the progress the agency has made to date and is critical for future improvements. IRS has developed many workaround processes that resulted in its ability to produce reliable financial statements for fiscal year 2000. However, these processes take considerable time, effort, and expense and do not fix many of the fundamental financial management issues that continue to plague the agency. IRS made these adjustments to its fiscal year 2000 financial statements. | What GAO Found
This is a follow-on to GAO's report on its audit of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) fiscal year 2000 financial statements. Many of the issues raised in this report have persisted for years. IRS believes that the solution to many of these issues may lie in systems modernization. IRS plans to implement a new financial system that includes a cost accounting module as well as integrated administrative and custodial general ledgers that are supported by subsidiary ledgers containing the transactional details for key accounts, such as taxes receivable and property and equipment. IRS continues to make progress in addressing its financial management challenges. The strong commitment by IRS senior management to financial management reform has played a crucial role in the agency's progress so far and is critical for future improvements. IRS has developed many workaround processes that allowed it to produce reliable financial statements for fiscal year 2000. However, these processes take considerable time, effort, and expense and do not fix many of the fundamental financial management issues that continue to plague IRS. |
gao_GAO-01-158 | gao_GAO-01-158_0 | According to the Internal Revenue Manual, “ . Except for a few relatively minor glitches, which were not unexpected given the enormity of IRS’ processing task, the processing systems worked well. On the other hand, although taxpayers were better able to reach IRS over the telephone compared to 1999, IRS’ performance was still well below the level achieved in 1998. In some respects, such as with the volunteer assistance programs and the assistance provided by IRS’ walk-in sites and area distribution centers, the opportunities centered around performance measures. In those areas, unlike the situation with respect to IRS’ telephone service, it was not easy to assess IRS’ performance because either IRS did not have good measures or there were problems with the data behind the measures. Other improvement opportunities we identified centered around management oversight—the kind of oversight that would enhance the level of service provided by better ensuring that (1) training materials and computer equipment were delivered to the volunteer assistance sites on time and in working condition and (2) data being entered on the Web site by various offices within IRS are current and consistent. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) performance during the 2000 tax filing season.
What GAO Found
Except for a few relatively minor glitches, which were not unexpected given the enormity of the IRS processing task, the processing systems worked well. On the other hand, although taxpayers had an easier time reaching IRS by telephone compared to 1999, IRS' performance was still well below the level achieved in 1998. GAO identified several opportunities for improvement. In some areas, such as with the volunteer assistance programs and the assistance provided by IRS' walk-in sites and area distribution centers, the opportunities centered around performance measures. In those areas, it was not easy to assess the agency's performance because either IRS lacked good measures or there were problems with the data behind the measures. Other improvement opportunities centered around management oversight-the kind of oversight that would enhance the level of service provided by better ensuring that (1) training materials and computer equipment were delivered to the volunteer assistance sites on time and in working condition and (2) data being entered on the website by various IRS offices are current and consistent. |
gao_GAO-02-9 | gao_GAO-02-9_0 | Currently, DLA is in the process of acquiring two systems: Business Systems Modernization (BSM) and Fuels Automated System (FAS). SEI’s SA-CMM is used to measure an organization’s capability to manage the acquisition of software. DLA Lacks Effective Software Process Improvement
The quality of the processes involved in developing, acquiring, and engineering software and systems has a significant effect on the quality of the resulting products. It will also have to commit the resources needed to implement a software process improvement program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has the effective software acquisition processes necessary to modernize and maintain systems and (2) what actions DLA has planned or in place to improve these processes. | What GAO Found
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) plays a critical role in supporting America's military forces worldwide. DLA relies on software-intensive systems to support its work. An important determinant of the quality of software-intensive systems, and thus DLA's mission performance, is the quality of the processes used to acquire these systems. DLA lacks mature software acquisition processes across the agency, as seen in the wide disparity in the rigor and discipline of processes between the two systems GAO evaluated. DLA also lacks a software process improvement program to effectively strengthen its corporate software acquisition processes. |
gao_GAO-11-500 | gao_GAO-11-500_0 | However the access standards do not apply to beneficiaries using options other than TRICARE Prime, such as TRICARE Standard or Extra. 2.) Reimbursement Rates and Provider Shortages Hinder Access to Civilian Providers; TMA Can Increase Reimbursement Rates When Needed, but Has Only Limited Means to Address Shortages
Reimbursement rates have been cited as the primary impediment that hinders beneficiaries’ access to civilian health care and mental health care providers under TRICARE Standard and Extra. More recent studies by TMA and others have cited TRICARE’s reimbursement rates as the primary reason civilian providers may be unwilling to accept these beneficiaries as patients, for example: TMA’s first multiyear survey of civilian providers (2005 through 2007) showed that TRICARE’s reimbursement rates were the primary reason cited by providers for not accepting TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries as new patients. Ultimately, the TRICARE Regional Office director reviews and analyzes the requests. National and Local Shortages of Certain Provider Specialties Impede Beneficiaries’ Access to Civilian Providers, and TMA Is Limited in Its Ability to Address Them
Another main impediment to TRICARE beneficiaries’ access to civilian providers is a shortage of certain provider specialties, both at the national and local levels. TMA is Limited in How it Can Address Provider Shortages
TMA has attempted to address civilian provider shortages, but because these shortages are not specific to the TRICARE program, there are limitations in what TMA can do. However, in the same report, DOD noted that TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries reported more problems finding civilian mental health care providers than beneficiaries who use other health care coverage, and that psychiatrists have the lowest acceptance rates of new TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries compared with other providers. Although TMA Has Typically Used Feedback Mechanisms to Gauge TRICARE Standard and Extra Beneficiaries’ Access to Civilian Providers, It Is Developing a New Method for Monitoring Access
TMA and its contractors have used various feedback mechanisms, such as surveys, to gauge beneficiaries’ access to care under TRICARE Standard and Extra. TMA Has Initiated Steps to Establish a Method for Routinely Monitoring Access to Civilian Providers for TRICARE Standard and Extra Beneficiaries
TMA has recently initiated steps to establish an approach to routinely monitor beneficiaries’ access to both network and nonnetwork providers under the TRICARE Standard and Extra options. In recognition that the military health system had no established measures for determining the adequacy of network and nonnetwork providers for these beneficiaries, in February 2010, TMA’s Office of Policy and Operations directed the TRICARE Regional Offices to develop a model to identify geographic areas where they may experience access problems as well as areas of provider shortages for the general population. However, because the regional models were recently developed, it is too early to determine their effectiveness. TMA’s Contractors Educate Civilian Providers about TRICARE and Surveys Indicate That Providers Are Generally Aware of the Program
TMA’s contractors educate civilian providers about TRICARE program requirements, policies, and procedures. Contractors also conduct outreach to increase providers’ awareness of TRICARE, and TMA’s provider survey results indicate providers are generally aware of the program. However, providers’ awareness of TRICARE does not necessarily signify that they have an accurate understanding of it. TMA’s Contractors Educate Beneficiaries on All TRICARE Options and Provide Information on Network Providers; New Contracts Will Also Require Information about Nonnetwork Providers
Under the second generation of TRICARE contracts, TMA’s contractors have beneficiary education programs that contain information on all of the TRICARE options; contractors also maintain directories of network providers. Under its third generation of contracts, TMA will also require contractors to include information on nonnetwork providers in their directories. Agency Comments
We received comments on a draft of this report from DOD. Defense Health Care: Access to Care for Beneficiaries Who Have Not Enrolled in TRICARE’s Managed Care Option. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides health care through its TRICARE program, which is managed by the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA). TRICARE offers three basic options. Beneficiaries who choose TRICARE Prime, an option that uses civilian provider networks, must enroll. TRICARE beneficiaries who do not enroll in this option may obtain care from nonnetwork providers under TRICARE Standard or from network providers under TRICARE Extra. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed GAO to evaluate various aspects of beneficiaries' access to care under the TRICARE Standard and Extra options. This report examines (1) impediments to TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries' access to civilian health care and mental health care providers and TMA's actions to address the impediments; (2) TMA's efforts to monitor access to civilian providers for TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries; (3) how TMA informs network and nonnetwork civilian providers about TRICARE Standard and Extra; and (4) how TMA informs TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries about their options. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed TMA and TRICARE contractor data and documents. GAO also interviewed TMA officials, including those in its regional offices, as well as its contractors.
What GAO Found
Reimbursement rates and provider shortages have been cited as the main impediments that hinder TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries' access to civilian health care and mental health care providers. Providers' concern about TRICARE's reimbursement rates--which are generally set at Medicare rates--has been a long-standing issue and has more recently been cited as the primary reason civilian providers will not accept TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries as patients, according to TMA's surveys of civilian providers. TMA can increase reimbursement rates in certain instances, such as when it determines that access to care is being affected by the level of reimbursement. Shortages of certain provider specialties, such as mental health care providers, at the national and local levels may also impede access, but these shortages are not specific to the TRICARE program and also affect the general population. As a result, there are limitations as to what TMA can do to address them. TMA has primarily used feedback mechanisms, including surveys of beneficiaries and civilian providers, to gauge TRICARE Standard and Extra beneficiaries' access to civilian providers. More recently, in February 2010, in recognition that TRICARE has had no established measures for monitoring the availability of civilian network and nonnetwork providers for these beneficiaries, TMA directed the TRICARE Regional Offices to develop a model to help identify geographic areas where they may experience access problems. GAO's review of the initial models found their methodology to be reasonable. However, because the regional models were recently developed, it is too early to determine their effectiveness. TMA's contractors educate civilian providers about TRICARE program requirements, policies, and procedures. Contractors also conduct outreach to increase providers' awareness of the program, and while TMA's provider survey results indicate that civilian providers are generally aware of the program, this does not necessarily signify that providers have an accurate understanding of the TRICARE program and its options. Similarly, TMA's contractors educate beneficiaries on all of the TRICARE options and maintain directories of network providers to facilitate beneficiaries' access to care. When the new TRICARE contracts are implemented, TMA will also require its contractors to include information on nonnetwork providers in their provider directories. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO's overall findings. |
gao_GAO-13-63 | gao_GAO-13-63_0 | Background
The Census Bureau’s mission is to collect and provide comprehensive data about the nation’s people and economy. Control Weaknesses Threaten Information and Systems that Support Census Bureau Mission
Although the Census Bureau has taken steps to safeguard the information and systems that support its mission, security control weaknesses pervaded its systems and networks, thereby jeopardizing the bureau’s ability to sufficiently protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and systems. As a result, the bureau has limited assurance that its information and information systems are being adequately protected against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disruption, or loss. However, the bureau did not sufficiently control connectivity to key network devices and servers. Typically, this requires that the key be encrypted using some form of activation data such as a password. Although the Census Bureau had established an access control requirement based on least privilege and need-to-know principles, the bureau did not always limit user access rights and permissions to only those necessary to perform official duties. These controls include policies, procedures, and techniques to (1) manage and implement system configurations, and (2) establish plans for contingencies if normal operations are disrupted. However, the bureau did not always implement configuration management controls. For example, the bureau provided evidence that it had taken steps to actively mitigate disruptions to its primary data center through the implementation of emergency power, fire suppression, and flood mitigation measures. Additionally, the bureau stored backup copies of data for its critical systems off site at a secured location. However, the Census Bureau did not satisfy many of the other practices for contingency planning. Without an effective and complete contingency plan, an agency’s likelihood of recovering important systems in a timely manner is diminished. A key reason for the weaknesses in controls over the Census Bureau’s information and information systems is that it has not yet implemented all elements of its agencywide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. Until the bureau addresses identified control weaknesses and fully implements its information security program, it will have limited assurance that its information and information systems are adequately protected against unauthorized access, disclosure, modification, or loss. 13. In a separate report with limited distribution, we are making 102 recommendations to address the technical weaknesses related to access controls, configuration management, and contingency planning that we identified. In its comments, the Census Bureau expressed broad agreement with the overall theme of the report but did not directly comment on the recommendations. However, it raised concerns about four specific aspects of the summary of findings which GAO addressed as appropriate. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether the Census Bureau effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. reviewed network access paths to determine if boundaries had been adequately protected; reviewed the complexity and expiration of password settings to determine if password management was being enforced; analyzed users’ system authorizations to determine whether they had more permissions than necessary to perform their assigned functions; observed configurations for providing secure data transmissions across the network to determine whether sensitive data were being encrypted; reviewed software security settings to determine if modifications of sensitive or critical system resources had been monitored and logged; reviewed the Census Bureau’s implementation of continuous monitoring and use of automated tools to determine the extent to which it uses these tools to manage IT assets and monitor the security configurations and vulnerabilities for its IT assets; observed physical access controls to determine if computer facilities and resources were being protected from espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft; examined configuration settings and access controls for routers, network management servers, switches, and firewalls; inspected key servers and workstations to determine if critical patches had been installed and/or were up to date; and examined polices, and procedures, and implementation of controls related to segregation of duties. Using the requirements identified by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, which establishes key elements for an effective agencywide information security program, and associated NIST guidelines and bureau requirements, we evaluated the Census Bureau’s information security program by: analyzing processes and documentation that were part of the bureau’s new risk management framework implementation to determine the extent to which it accurately characterized information security risks; analyzing bureau policies, procedures, practices, and standards to determine their effectiveness in providing guidance to personnel responsible for securing information and information systems, including areas such as segregation of duties; examining the security awareness training process for employees and contractors to determine whether they had received training according to federal requirements; examining training records for personnel who have significant responsibilities to determine whether they had received training commensurate with those responsibilities; and reviewing bureau policies and procedures and a selection of information security incidents to determine the extent to which bureau incident handling practices complied with applicable NIST guidelines and federal requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Census Bureau is responsible for collecting and providing data about the people and economy of the United States. The bureau has long used some form of automation to tabulate the data it collects. Critical to the bureaus ability to perform these duties are its information systems and the protection of the information they contain. A data breach could result in the publics loss of confidence in the bureaus and could affect its ability to collect census data.
Because of the importance of protecting information and systems at the bureau, GAO was asked to determine whether the agency has effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and systems that support its mission. To do this, GAO tested security controls over the bureaus key networks and systems; reviewed policies, plans, and reports; and interviewed officials at bureau headquarters and field offices.
What GAO Found
Although the Census Bureau has taken steps to safeguard the information and systems that support its mission, it has not effectively implemented appropriate information security controls to protect those systems. Many of the deficiencies relate to the security controls used to regulate who or what can access the bureau's systems (access controls). For example, the bureau did not adequately: control connectivity to key network devices and servers; identify and authenticate users; limit user access rights and permissions to only those necessary to perform official duties; encrypt data in transmission and at rest; monitor its systems and network; or ensure appropriate physical security controls were in place. Without adequate controls over access to its systems, the bureau cannot be sure that its information and systems are protected from intrusion.
In addition to access controls, implementing other important security controls including policies, procedures, and techniques to implement system configurations and plan for and manage unplanned events (contingency planning) helps to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and systems. While the Census Bureau had documented policies and procedures for managing and implementing configuration management controls, key communication systems were not securely configured and did not have proper encryption. Further, while the bureau has taken steps to implement guidance for contingency planning such as developing plans for mitigating disruptions to its primary data center through the use of emergency power, fire suppression, and storing backup copies of data for its critical systems offsite at a secured location, it only partially satisfied other requirements for contingency planning such as distributing the plan to key personnel and identifying potential weaknesses during disaster testing. Without an effective and complete contingency plan, an agency's likelihood of recovering its information and systems in a timely manner is diminished.
An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that the Census Bureau has not fully implemented a comprehensive information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. Specifically, the Census Bureau had begun implementing a new risk management framework with a goal of better management visibility of information security risks, but the framework did not fully document identified information security risks. Also, the bureau had not updated certain security management program policies, adequately enforced user requirements for security and awareness training, and implemented policies and procedures for incident response. Until the bureau implements a complete and comprehensive security program, it will have limited assurance that its information and systems are being adequately protected against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disruption, or loss.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 13 recommendations to the Census Bureau to enhance its agencywide information security program and, in a separate report with limited distribution, making an additional 102 recommendations. In written comments, the Department of Commerce expressed broad agreement with the overall theme of the report and said it would work to identify the best way to address our recommendations, but did not directly comment on the recommendations. It raised concerns about specific aspects of the reported findings which GAO addressed as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-96-142 | gao_HEHS-96-142_0 | Title I funds are intended to supplement, not supplant, local and state education funding. Although part of title I, this program is funded separately. The 95-percent floor undermines the incentive for low-effort states to increase their effort in funding elementary and secondary education. Conclusions
The definitions of effort and equity in title I’s Education Finance Incentive Program could be improved in a number of ways. The definition of equity used in current law could be improved by (1) more fully considering differences in students’ needs among districts, (2) considering differences in purchasing power among a state’s districts, and (3) rewarding states for improving their level of equity in education spending, not just for already being equitable. Specifically, we believe that the Congress may wish to consider reducing the floor on the effort factor so that low-effort states are rewarded for increased effort; modifying the effort factor to eliminate the penalty on states where a high percentage of the population is school-age; using, in the effort factor, a more comprehensive measure of states’ revenue raising capacity, such as the total taxable resources indicator published by the Secretary of the Treasury; including in the effort and equity factors a bonus for improvement over time; expanding the needs component of the equity factor to include children with limited English proficiency and children with disabilities; adjusting the equity factor for differences in the cost of educational services across each state’s districts; and basing the allocation formula on the number of poor school-age children rather than all school-age children. I). Second, the current effort factor penalizes states with high proportions of school-age children. Development of Alternative Definitions of Equity
To improve the current measures of equity used in the Education Finance Incentive Program, we examined (1) the comprehensiveness of the various measures of equity available, (2) the comprehensiveness of the measures accounting for differences in student needs across districts, (3) the effect of including a measure of purchasing power across districts, and (4) the effect of including a direct incentive for states to improve their levels of equity over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the measures of equity and effort included in the Title I Education Finance Incentive Program, focusing on: (1) several options for improving these measures; (2) the characteristics of states with higher levels of equity and effort; and (3) alternative ways of using these measures in allocating title I funds.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Education Finance Incentive Program's definition of effort does not include a comprehensive measure of states' funding capacity, penalizes states with a high proportion of school-age children, and provides no incentive for low-effort states to increase their effort in funding elementary and secondary education; (2) the title I definition of equity excludes a comprehensive measure of the differences in students' needs among school districts and the differences in purchasing power among districts; (3) adjustments to the effort factor should include using states' total taxable resources in establishing the states' education funding capacity and eliminating the bias against low-effort states; (4) adjustments to the equity factor should include rewarding states for increasing their level of equity in education spending and considering more fully the differences in educating higher-needs students; and (5) the allocation of title I funds should be based on the number of children in poverty rather than on the states' total number of school-age children. |
gao_GAO-12-289 | gao_GAO-12-289_0 | 1). Performance measures that are aligned with strategic goals can be used to evaluate whether and, if so, how working capital fund activities are contributing to the achievement of agency goals. JMD Effectively Tracks Working Capital Fund Moneys in Accordance with Fiscal Law and Aspects of Key Operating Principles
JMD Effectively Tracks Working Capital Fund Functions to Ensure Adherence to Authorized Purposes and Applicable Fiscal Laws
JMD has well-established policies and procedures for tracking and monitoring each of the four working capital fund functions to adhere to authorized purposes. This ensures that the funds associated with the four working capital fund functions are tracked and managed to ensure that they are used in accordance with its authorities. JMD structures its reimbursable agreements with customers in a way that facilitates adherence to the Economy Act—the statutory authority underlying most of the shared services orders received from customers. This allows customers to know who to contact if they have questions. JMD’s strategy is to recover total cost at the fund level. Customers Noted Positive Benefits of Shared Services but Need More Information on Rates, Costs, and Billing, and More Opportunities for Substantive, Two- way Communication
Customers Noted Some Positive Benefits of the Working Capital Fund’s Shared Services Provision
During our focus groups and interviews, customers said that they find the working capital fund’s shared services to be valuable. For example, customers cited the breadth of services offered as well as the experience and knowledge of shared services staff as key strengths of the fund. JMD officials explained that each working capital fund staff director has his or her own way of communicating and interacting with customers and acknowledged that some may be better at providing customer support than others. JMD officials expressed surprise at these concerns. They said that information sharing on rates and rate structures happens regularly on an informal basis and in forums, such as monthly budget officer meetings, and that information about the shared services rates is available in various places depending on the service. Absent a formal mechanism for customers to provide regular, timely feedback about working capital fund services, JMD cannot sufficiently assess whether customer needs are being met or have changed. JMD Does Not Measure the Cost-effectiveness of Its Shared Services
JMD has not assessed its shared services to know whether they provide a good value to customers, and therefore has not shared information about the cost-effectiveness of its services with customers. For example, JMD tracks workload measures, such as the number of personnel actions completed, number of transactions processed, and computer processing unit hours available. If available, specific working capital fund-level performance information would allow JMD to regularly compare actual performance with planned or expected performance. Making adjustments to the fund management and services, as appropriate, in a corresponding management review process could help JMD achieve the efficiencies that working capital funds were designed to produce, potentially freeing up resources that could be realigned for other departmental initiatives. Performance measures that are aligned with strategic goals can be used to evaluate whether and, if so, how working capital fund activities are contributing to the achievement of agency goals and departmentwide crosscutting initiatives. Justice’s Excess Unobligated Balances Have Been Unavailable for Departmental Priorities in Recent Years
Justice has the authority to capture excess unobligated balances into the working capital fund and AFF to fund various departmental priorities. These balances are available until expended. 1. 2. 3. However, JMD budget officials told us that the UBT has not been available for departmental priorities in recent years. Although JMD tracks and monitors limited performance information for some shared services, it does not have measures to assess how effectively it manages the fund, such as whether managers are responsive to customer inquiries or billing error rates—two areas with which customers have expressed concern. Improve opportunities for two-way substantive communication with shared services customers. Specifically, he noted that JMD will continue to explore ways to address the issues we identified. Table 4 shows working capital fund amounts for services and support for “other services.” Table 5 shows working capital fund amounts for customers under “all other customers.”
Appendix II: Key Operating Principles for Managing Working Capital Funds
Principle Clearly delineate roles and responsibilities Appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities promotes a clear understanding of who will be held accountable for specific tasks or duties, such as authorizing and reviewing transactions, implementing controls over working capital fund management, and helping to ensure that related responsibilities are coordinated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justices (Justice) working capital fund is intended to provide increased efficiencies in how the department funds and offers shared servicessuch as payroll, telecommunications, financial services, mail, and publicationsvalued at over $1 billion annually. Ensuring that the working capital fund is managed as efficiently as possible could allow Justice to use saved resources for other departmental priorities. GAO was asked to determine how Justice (1) manages its working capital fund to promote compliance with applicable fiscal laws and key operating principles, (2) communicates shared services rates with customers, (3) measures performance to evaluate whether fund activities are contributing to agency goals, and (4) ensures that its excess unobligated balances are used in accordance with legal authorities and managed so that Justice can make well-informed funding decisions. GAO reviewed statutory authorities, analyzed Justice policies, interviewed budget and finance officials, and conducted focus groups with some shared services customers.
What GAO Found
The Justice Management Division (JMD), the component responsible for managing the working capital fund, effectively tracks fund functions to ensure adherence to applicable fiscal laws and sound management practices. For example, JMD has well-established policies and procedures for tracking and monitoring the four working capital fund functions so that the fund adheres to authorized purposes. Further, JMD structures its reimbursable agreements with customers to facilitate adherence to the Economy Actthe statutory authority underlying most of JMDs customer orders. JMD also clearly delineates roles and responsibilities, which allows customers to know who to contact with questions and clearly assigns responsibility for obligating and expending funds. Justice also ensures the funds self-sufficiency by recovering total costs for the provided services. These actions are consistent with two of the four key operating principles for working capital funds.Customers noted positive benefits from Justices shared services but seek more information on rate structures and want assurances that fund costs are equitably distributed. For example, customers said they valued the breadth of services offered as well as the experience of fund staff but wanted to better understand the basis for shared services rates and more opportunities to discuss billing concerns and service changes with JMD. Officials expressed surprise at these concerns. They noted that informal information sharing on rates and rate structures happens regularly, but explained that each staff director has his/her own way of communicating with customers and acknowledged that some may be better at providing customer support than others.
JMD does not systematically measure important aspects of shared service provision and working capital fund management. For example, JMD tracks workload measures such as the number of transactions processed, but does not assess customer satisfaction with shared services. It also does not have measures to assess how effectively it manages the fund, such as whether managers are responsive to concerns about shared service rates or billing issuesareas with which customers have expressed concern. Absent a formal mechanism for customers to provide timely and regular feedback, JMD cannot sufficiently assess whether customer needs are met or have changed. JMD also has not assessed its shared services rates to know whether they provide a good value to customers. If available, specific working capital fund-level performance information would allow JMD to regularly compare actual performance with planned or expected performance. Further, a corresponding management review process could help JMD achieve the efficiencies that working capital funds were designed to produce, potentially freeing up resources that could be realigned for other departmental initiatives. Lastly, performance measures aligned with strategic goals can be used to evaluate whether and how working capital fund activities contribute to departmentwide goals and crosscutting initiatives.
Justice has processes to ensure that excess unobligated balances are used in accordance with legal authorities. It also has an established process to make well-informed decisions on how to spend available funds. However, JMD budget officials told us that these balances were unavailable for departmentwide priorities in recent years because they have been used to meet rescissions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to improve the management of the working capital fund, including providing opportunities for two-way substantive communications with customers and developing performance measures for the fund. Justice generally agreed with our findings and recommendations and noted that it will continue to explore ways to address the issues we identified. |
gao_GAO-04-86 | gao_GAO-04-86_0 | The program’s budget has grown from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $734 million in fiscal year 2003—a 138 percent increase after the effect of inflation was held constant (see fig. DOD’s Report Did Not Thoroughly Address Congressional Concerns
DOD’s May 2003 report did not thoroughly address four of the five congressional concerns about effective and efficient management of the SRB program. Second, DOD did not permit us to review the draft guidance, but—based on DOD’s comments on our 2002 SRB report, excerpts of draft criteria contained in DOD’s mandated report, and our discussions with DOD officials—the replacement guidance could expand the SRB program by giving the services more flexibility in designating occupations as critical and either eliminate or weaken the requirement for annual SRB program reviews. Finally, as required by the fifth concern in the mandate, DOD identified the most salient advantages and disadvantages resulting from paying SRBs as lump sums. More recently, a DOD official stated that the new guidance will require periodic reviews, but neither the frequency nor the details of how these reviews would be conducted was explained. In the report, DOD did not agree with the congressional concern that program expenditures needed to match funding levels appropriated specifically for the SRB program. Evaluation of Services’ Processes for Administering the Program Was Limited
DOD’s limited evaluation of the services’ SRB programs relied primarily on program descriptions provided by the services. DOD’s report addressed other potential disadvantages of using a lump sum payment method. Of DOD’s responses to the five congressional concerns, three were incomplete or nonresponsive—those regarding program effectiveness and efficiency in correcting retention shortfalls in critical occupations, DOD actions to match program execution with appropriations, and DOD’s evaluation of the services’ program administration. A fourth response—regarding replacement program guidance—did not provide information essential for us to make an independent determination as to the response’s adequacy. Recommendation for Executive Action
To assist Congress in its efforts to monitor the management of the SRB program and to ensure that DOD is effectively and efficiently targeting retention bonuses to critical occupations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to (1) retain the requirement for an annual review of the SRB program and (2) develop a consistent set of methodologically sound procedures and metrics for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of all aspects of each service’s SRB program administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program to reenlist military personnel in critical specialties. In fiscal years 1997-2003, the program budget rose 138 percent, from $308 million to $734 million. In fiscal year 2003, the House Appropriations Committee directed the Secretary of Defense to reassess program efficiency and report on five concerns: (1) how effective the program is in correcting retention shortfalls in critical occupations, (2) how replacement guidance will ensure targeting critical specialties that impact readiness, (3) how DOD will match program execution with appropriated funding, (4) how well the services' processes for administering the program work, and (5) advantages and disadvantages of paying bonuses in lump sum payments. The committee also directed GAO to review and assess DOD's report.
What GAO Found
Despite congressional concerns about the SRB program, DOD's May 2003 report stated that the program is managed carefully, bonuses are offered sparingly, and the services need flexibility in administering the program. However, DOD's responses did not thoroughly address four of the five SRB program concerns contained in the mandate. As a result, Congress does not have sufficient information to determine if the program is being managed effectively or efficiently. DOD has not issued replacement program guidance and did not allow us to review the guidance that has been drafted. DOD's report focused primarily on criteria for designating occupations as critical, but the report did not address an important change--the potential elimination of the requirement for conducting annual program reviews. In response to our 2002 report, DOD stated that this requirement would be eliminated from future program guidance. DOD recently told us that the new guidance will require periodic reviews, but neither the frequency nor the details of how these reviews would be conducted was explained. DOD conducted a limited evaluation to address the congressional concern about how well the services are administering their programs. The response consisted largely of program descriptions provided by the services. Among other things, DOD did not use a consistent set of procedures and metrics to evaluate each of the services' programs. Consequently, it is difficult to identify best practices, or to gain other insights into ways in which the effectiveness and efficiency of the services' programs could be improved. DOD thoroughly addressed the congressional concern pertaining to the advantages and disadvantages of paying SRBs as lump sums. |
gao_GAO-06-934 | gao_GAO-06-934_0 | Current Repairs to the Hurricane Protection Projects Are Limited to Prestorm or Previously Authorized Levels of Protection
By June 1, 2006, the Corps planned to complete repairs to 169 miles of southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection projects to prestorm conditions—that is, to repair most levees and floodwalls to the condition they were in before Hurricane Katrina. 3). In instances where the Corps determined it could not complete permanent repairs by June 1, 2006, the Corps installed temporary structures or levee supports and developed emergency procedures to protect against flooding in the event of a hurricane. In some instances, to restore prehurricane levels of protection, the Corps decided to change the design of the existing hurricane structure. For example, as of June 1, 2006, construction of one of the three interim gates—the 17th Street canal gate—was behind schedule. The Corps estimated it would be completed by September 15, 2006. If a hurricane threatens before the interim gate is in place, the Corps plans to drive sheet piling in front of the Hammond Highway Bridge that crosses the 17th Street canal to close off the canal from Lake Pontchartrain. Cost Estimates for Restoring Southeastern Louisiana Hurricane Protection Projects to Originally-Designed Levels and Completing Construction of Incomplete Portions Continue to Rise
Beyond the repairs that were to be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps has additional plans to continue repairs, restoration, and construction activities on other portions of the existing five southeastern Louisiana hurricane protection and flood control projects. The Corps plans to (1) repair all damaged pumps, motors, and pump stations by about March 2007; (2) restore sections of the five hurricane protection and flood control projects that have settled over time to their original design elevation; as well as (3) complete construction of previously authorized but incomplete portions of these hurricane protection and flood control projects by September 2007. Although $1.165 billion was originally allocated for this work, the Corps expects actual costs will be greater because the original allocation did not reflect design changes, additional costs to fund the local sponsor’s share, and rapidly escalating construction costs. Further, in June 2006, the Corps shifted $224 million from this allocation to pay for the additional costs to repair damaged levees and floodwalls, leaving only $941 million for this work. Constructing these projects may take years and require billions of dollars in federal funds. In its June 2006 draft final report, the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force also concluded that hurricane protection systems should be deliberately designed and built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent levels of protection. Conclusions
Following Hurricane Katrina—one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history—the Army Corps of Engineers rapidly repaired and restored almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures to prehurricane levels of protection in time for the start of the 2006 hurricane season. Nonetheless, the Corps has been appropriated over $7 billion to continue repairs and construction on five existing hurricane protection projects in the area. However, it does not have a comprehensive strategy to guide these efforts and appears to be simply doing whatever it takes to comply with the requirements placed on it by the Congress and other stakeholders. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to construct a hurricane protection system that provides the appropriate level of protection to southeastern Louisiana and ensures the most efficient use of federal resources, we are making the following two recommendations: The Army Corps of Engineers should develop (1) a comprehensive strategy that includes an integrated approach for all projects and plans for rebuilding and strengthening the system and (2) an implementation plan that will achieve the specific level of protection in a cost-effective manner, within a reasonable time frame. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina's storm surge and floodwaters breached levees and floodwalls causing billions of dollars of property damage, and more than 1,300 deaths. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct reviews on his own initiative, GAO reviewed the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) (1) progress in repairing damage to hurricane protection projects by June 1, 2006; (2) plans and estimated costs to make other repairs and complete five existing hurricane protection projects; and (3) plans and estimated costs to add enhancements and strengthen hurricane protection for the region. GAO reviewed related laws and regulations, Corps planning documents and repair tracking reports, observed ongoing repair work, and met with key agency officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps worked quickly to repair and restore almost 169 miles of damaged levees, floodwalls, and other flood control structures to prehurricane levels of protection. Although the Corps stated that it had restored prehurricane levels of protection to the area by June 1, 2006, it used temporary solutions and developed emergency procedures to protect against flooding, in the event of a hurricane, for sections where permanent repairs could not be completed in time. For example, the Corps constructed interim gates on three canals to prevent storm surges from flooding New Orleans. When construction of one canal gate fell behind schedule and could not be completed by June 1, 2006, the Corps devised an emergency plan to drive sheet piling into the canal and close it off if a hurricane threatened before the gate was completed. More importantly, because these initial repairs were performed only on levees and floodwalls with obvious visual damage, the reliability of those adjacent to them is still unknown. The Corps originally allocated $801 million for initial repairs, but the current allocation has increased to over $1 billion. After completing the initial repairs, the Corps plans to conduct additional repairs and construction on the existing hurricane protection system. These plans include (1) repairing all damaged pumps, motors, and pumping stations by about March 2007; (2) restoring sections of existing hurricane protection projects that have settled over time to their original design elevations; and (3) completing construction of incomplete portions of five previously authorized hurricane and flood control projects by September 2007. An additional $941 million had been allocated for this additional work, but the Corps expects actual costs will be greater because of subsequent decisions to change the design of these projects, cover the local sponsor's share, and because of rapidly escalating construction costs. In addition, the Corps plans to undertake further work to enhance and strengthen the hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana. These projects are estimated to take years and require billions of dollars to complete. Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than $7 billion for some aspects of this work and additional appropriations are expected. According to an external review organization established by the Corps, hurricane protection systems should be deliberately designed and built as integrated systems to enhance reliability and provide consistent levels of protection. However, the Corps does not have a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to integrate the repairs already authorized and planned and that would ensure the efficient use of federal funds. Instead, the Corps appears to be following a piecemeal approach, similar to its past practice of building projects without giving sufficient attention to the interrelationships between various elements of those projects or fully considering whether the projects will provide an integrated level of hurricane protection for the area. |
gao_GAO-15-117 | gao_GAO-15-117_0 | Cyber-based threats are evolving and growing and arise from a wide array of sources. Reports of incidents affecting VA’s systems and information highlight the serious impact that inadequate information security can have on, among other things, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of veterans’ personal information. Previously Identified Information Security Challenges
As we recently testified, VA has faced long-standing challenges in effectively implementing its information security program. Although VA Has Taken Mitigation Actions, Previously Identified Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist
While VA has taken actions to mitigate previously identified security vulnerabilities, they were insufficient to ensure that these weaknesses were fully addressed. Specifically, VA took steps to contain and eradicate an incident involving intrusion of its network, but these activities were not fully effective. Finally, weaknesses identified on VA’s workstations (e.g., laptop computers) had not been corrected in a timely manner. VA’s NSOC had analyzed the scope of the incident and documented actions taken in response. However, VA could not provide sufficient documentation to demonstrate that these actions were effective. For this particular incident at VA, staff could not locate the associated forensic analysis report or other key materials. Without maintaining evidence of incidents, VA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its incident response activities and will be unable to use these records to assist in handling future incidents or aiding law enforcement authorities in investigating and prosecuting crimes. Specifically, VA had planned to implement a solution that would have corrected the weakness in February 2014, but at the time of our review, the solution had not been implemented. VA did take other actions to mitigate the weakness—specifically, limiting the use of the affected system. However, VA’s policies did not define the authority for NSOC’s access to logs of activity on VA’s network that are collected at VA’s data centers. As we reported in April 2014, VA’s incident response policies defined roles and responsibilities but did not include authorities for the incident response team. VA concurred with this recommendation. Implementing this recommendation should include providing the NSOC with appropriate authority to review logs of activity on VA’s network. For example, it is performing an analysis to determine how best to further restrict access to the VA network and is planning to purchase new incident response tools. However, it has not established a time frame for completing these actions. VA Did Not Address All Weaknesses Identified in Key Web Applications
NIST guidance and VA policy both require applications to be tested prior to authorization in order to detect security weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Without plans of action and milestones for correcting high-risk vulnerabilities, VA has less assurance that these weaknesses will be corrected in a timely and effective manner. In addition, a 2012 VA memo requires that critical patches be applied within 30 days. Regarding these missing patches, they had been available for periods ranging from 4 to 31 months; there were multiple occurrences of each of the 10 missing patches, ranging from approximately 9,200 to 286,700; and each patch is intended to mitigate multiple potential known vulnerabilities, ranging from 5 to 51 vulnerabilities, with an average of about 30 and a total of 301 vulnerabilities. In May 2013, it established an organization tasked with overseeing the Service Delivery and Engineering group’s process for identifying, prioritizing, and remediating vulnerabilities on VA information systems; ensuring baseline configurations and security standards are updated as new vulnerabilities are discovered and remediated; ensuring software standards are continually reviewed and updated and that installed software versions comply with these standards; identifying, collecting, analyzing, and reporting performance metrics to measure the effectiveness of the patch and vulnerability management, baseline configuration maintenance, and software standards maintenance processes; and proposing changes to improve these processes. This organization has taken initial steps to carry out its responsibilities. In addition, without fully addressing an underlying vulnerability that allowed a serious intrusion to occur, increased risk exists that such an incident could recur. Further, limitations in VA’s approach to identifying and addressing vulnerabilities in key web applications, such as not developing plans of action and milestones to address identified vulnerabilities and not scanning all application source code for defects, put veterans’ sensitive information at greater risk of compromise. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address previously identified security vulnerabilities, we are recommending that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following eight actions:
Update the department’s standard operating procedure to require evidence associated with security incidents to be maintained for at least 3 years, consistent with NARA guidance. While we acknowledge that VA has efforts underway to address previously identified weaknesses, until it comprehensively and effectively addresses the weaknesses, sensitive personal information entrusted to the department will be at increased risk of unauthorized access, modification, disclosure, or loss. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the extent to which selected, previously identified vulnerabilities continue to exist on Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) computer systems. To address this objective, we reviewed actions taken to address vulnerabilities that had been identified by VA’s Network and Security Operations Center (NSOC). We also reviewed vulnerabilities NSOC had identified in two key VA web applications. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out its mission to ensure the health, welfare, and dignity of the nation's veterans, VA relies extensively on information technology systems that collect, process, and store veterans' sensitive information. Without adequate safeguards, these systems and information are vulnerable to a wide array of cyber-based threats. Moreover, VA has faced long-standing challenges in adequately securing its systems and information, and reports of recent incidents have highlighted the serious impact of inadequate information security on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of veterans' personal information.
GAO was asked to review VA's efforts to address information security vulnerabilities. The objective for this work was to determine the extent to which selected, previously identified vulnerabilities continued to exist on VA computer systems. To do this, GAO reviewed VA actions taken to address previously identified vulnerabilities, including a significant network intrusion, vulnerabilities in two key web-based applications, and security weaknesses on devices connected to VA's network. GAO also reviewed the results of VA security testing; interviewed relevant officials and staff; and reviewed policies, procedures, and other documentation.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken actions to mitigate previously identified vulnerabilities, it has not fully addressed these weaknesses. For example, VA took actions to contain and eradicate a significant incident detected in 2012 involving a network intrusion, but these actions were not fully effective:
The department's Network and Security Operations Center (NSOC) analyzed the incident and documented actions taken in response. However, VA could not produce a report of its forensic analysis of the incident or the digital evidence collected during this analysis to show that the response had been effective. VA's procedures do not require all evidence related to security incidents to be kept for at least 3 years, as called for by federal guidance. As a result, VA cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of its incident response and may be hindered in assisting in related law enforcement activities.
VA has not addressed an underlying vulnerability that allowed the incident to occur. Specifically, the department has taken some steps to limit access to the affected system, but, at the time of GAO's review, VA had not fully implemented a solution for correcting the associated weakness. Without fully addressing the weakness or applying compensating controls, increased risk exists that such an incident could recur.
Further, VA's policies did not provide the NSOC with sufficient authority to access activity logs on VA's networks, hindering its ability to determine if incidents have been adequately addressed. In an April 2014 report, GAO recommended that VA revise its incident response policies to ensure the incident response team had adequate authority, and VA concurred.
Further, VA's actions to address vulnerabilities identified in two key web applications were insufficient. The NSOC identified vulnerabilities in these applications through testing conducted as part of the system authorization process, but VA did not develop plans of action and milestones for correcting the vulnerabilities, resulting in less assurance that these weaknesses would be corrected in a timely and effective manner.
Finally, vulnerabilities identified in VA's workstations (e.g., laptop computers) had not been corrected. Specifically, 10 critical software patches had been available for periods ranging from 4 to 31 months without being applied to workstations, even though VA policy requires critical patches to be applied within 30 days. There were multiple occurrences of each missing patch, ranging from about 9,200 to 286,700, and each patch was to address an average of 30 security vulnerabilities. VA decided not to apply 3 of the 10 patches until it could test their impact on its applications; however, it did not document compensating controls or plans to migrate to systems that support up-to-date security features. While the department has established an organization to improve its vulnerability remediation, it has yet to identify specific actions and milestones for carrying out related responsibilities. Until VA fully addresses previously identified security weaknesses, its information is at heightened risk of unauthorized access, modification, and disclosure and its systems at risk of disruption.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making eight recommendations to VA to address identified weaknesses in incident response, web applications, and patch management. In commenting on a draft of this report, VA stated that it concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-798 | gao_GAO-10-798_0 | Background
FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of drugs marketed within the United States. The Use of Non-Inferiority Trials in Obtaining Evidence of a Drug’s Effectiveness
Once a drug sponsor identifies a promising chemical compound it believes to be capable of curing or treating diseases, the sponsor may decide to conduct clinical trials on humans to gather the evidence necessary to demonstrate to FDA that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. For example, in 1985 FDA substantially revised its regulations including the provision addressing the characteristics of adequate and well-controlled trials and the types of controlled trials that can be used to gather evidence of a new drug’s effectiveness. 1.) This term is used to describe the concern that successive generations of drugs approved based on non-inferiority trials, with the active control changing in each new generation, could lead to the adoption of decreasingly effective drugs and ultimately to the approval of drugs that are no more effective than a placebo. One-Quarter of NDAs Included Evidence from Non-Inferiority Trials and FDA Approved a Majority of These Applications
One-quarter of NDAs submitted to FDA for review from fiscal years 2002 through 2009 included evidence from non-inferiority trials, and many of these applications were for antimicrobial drugs. 2.) FDA approved the remaining 11 applications based on other evidence, such as the superiority of the new drug compared to a placebo or an active control. As of December 31, 2009, FDA had decided not to approve 14 applications that included evidence from dence from non-inferiority trials. 3.) The number of pivotal non- inferiority trials used as primary evidence for these 18 NDAs ranged from one to four, with an average of two pivotal non-inferiority trials supporting the approval of each application. Half of the 18 NDAs FDA approved on the basis of non-inferiority trials tested the effectiveness of the new drug against more than one active control. These trials showed that the confidence interval for the difference in the drugs’ effectiveness was within the non-inferiority margin. FDA’s review therefore minimized the potential for biocreep. Some Non-Inferiority Trials Were Poorly Designed and Did Not Provide Primary Evidence for Approval
While non-inferiority trials provided primary evidence of effectiveness to support the approval of 18 NDAs, other non-inferiority trials were poorly designed and did not provide such evidence. Of the other 25 NDAs that included evidence from non-inferiority trials, FDA identified 9 applications that included poorly designed non-inferiority trials. Some of the concerns FDA identified with sponsors’ non-inferiority trials were inappropriate use of non-inferiority trials for the indication being treated, inappropriate selection of an active control, including cases where the drug was not FDA-approved or the sponsor did not provide an adequate justification, and improper calculation or justification of the non-inferiority margin. FDA informed sponsors of its concerns with all of these applications’ non- inferiority trials prior to the sponsors’ submission of the NDAs. FDA Has Issued Detailed and Comprehensive Guidance on the Use of Non-Inferiority Trials to Establish the Effectiveness of New Drugs
In March 2010, FDA issued draft guidance on non-inferiority trials that provides detailed recommendations on using these trials to provide evidence of a new drug’s effectiveness. This March 2010 draft guidance offers broader and more comprehensive information to supplement other indication-specific guidance documents the agency previously issued. It explains the key principles involved in using a non-inferiority trial to demonstrate the effectiveness of a drug and provides detailed recommendations for such trials, including how to select an active control and how to set the non- inferiority margin (that is, determining the maximum clinically acceptable extent to which the new drug can be less effective than the active control), among other things. FDA’s March 2010 guidance explains when non-inferiority trials may be used to establish a drug’s effectiveness. However, some experts we interviewed noted that such trials are difficult to design and interpret; therefore, additional guidance on this topic may be helpful. Our review of FDA’s indication-specific guidance showed that the agency has become more conservative in allowing evidence from non-inferiority trials to demonstrate the effectiveness of new drugs. Second, FDA has become more rigorous in its review of evidence from non- inferiority trials. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. We received technical comments from HHS, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: New Drug Applications Approved on the Basis of Evidence from Non-Inferiority Trials
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved 18 new drug applications (NDA) that were submitted from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2009 on the basis of evidence from non-inferiority trials. The majority of these were antimicrobial drugs, such as those that treat bacterial, viral, and fungal infections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Before approving a new drug, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)--an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--assesses a drug's effectiveness. To do so, it examines information contained in a new drug application (NDA), including data from clinical trials in humans. Several types of trials may be used to gather this evidence. For example, superiority trials may show that a new drug is more effective than an active control--a drug known to be effective. Non-inferiority trials aim to demonstrate that the difference between the effectiveness of a new drug and an active control is small--small enough to show that the new drug is also effective. Drugs approved on this basis may provide important benefits, such as improved safety. Because non-inferiority trials are difficult to design and interpret, they have received attention within the research community and FDA. FDA has issued guidance on these trials. GAO was asked to examine FDA's use of non-inferiority trial evidence. This report (1) identifies NDAs for new molecular entities--potentially innovative new drugs not FDA-approved in any form--that included evidence from non-inferiority trials, (2) examines the characteristics of these trials, and (3) describes FDA's guidance on these trials. GAO reviewed NDAs submitted to FDA between fiscal year 2002 (the first full year that FDA documentation was available electronically) and fiscal year 2009 (the last full year of submissions), examined FDA's guidance, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Evidence from non-inferiority trials was included in about one-quarter, or 43, of the 175 NDAs for new molecular entities that were submitted to FDA for review from fiscal years 2002 through 2009. Many of these applications were for antimicrobial drugs, such as those treating bacterial, viral, and fungal infections. As of December 31, 2009, FDA approved 18 of the 43 NDAs on the basis of evidence from non-inferiority trials. Of the remaining 25 NDAs, FDA approved 11 based on other evidence, such as proof that the new drug was more effective than a placebo (no treatment), and decided not to approve 14. The non-inferiority trials included in these NDAs varied with respect to their characteristics. FDA generally requires sponsors to provide evidence of a drug's effectiveness as shown in more than one trial. For the 18 NDAs that were approved based on evidence from non-inferiority trials, the number of non-inferiority trials used to provide primary support for approval ranged from one to four, with an average of 2 such trials per NDA. Half of these applications included non-inferiority trials that tested the effectiveness of the new drug against more than one active control. The non-inferiority margins--the maximum clinically acceptable extent to which the new drug can be less effective than the active control and still show evidence of an effect--ranged from 5 to 20 percent among trials that supported approval. Among the other 25, FDA identified nine NDAs that included poorly designed non-inferiority trials which did not provide primary evidence for approval. Some of these problems included an inappropriate selection of an active control and an improper calculation of a non-inferiority margin. FDA notified sponsors of its concerns with the poorly designed trials prior to the sponsors' submissions of all NDAs that included such trials. In March 2010 FDA issued draft guidance which focused solely on the use of non-inferiority trials. This guidance presents detailed and comprehensive recommendations on how non-inferiority trials may be used to provide evidence of a drug's effectiveness. For example, it provides advice on how to select an active control and how to set the non-inferiority margin, as well as how to interpret the trials. This guidance offers broad, generally applicable recommendations to supplement indication-specific guidance documents that FDA had previously issued. These indication-specific guidance documents include FDA's advice on many issues related to the development of drugs for particular indications, some of which are related to the use of non-inferiority trials. GAO's review of FDA's guidance showed that the agency has become more conservative in allowing evidence from non-inferiority trials to demonstrate a drug's effectiveness. First, FDA has limited the indications for which these trials may be used. Second, the agency has also become more rigorous in its review of evidence from non-inferiority trials. We sent a draft of this report to HHS for review. HHS provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-95-139 | gao_NSIAD-95-139_0 | Amendments to these acts enacted within the past year are leading to ongoing changes in reuse planning and implementation at closing bases. Status of Base Disposal
About three fifths of the property at the 37 closing military bases will be retained by the federal government because it is contaminated with unexploded ordnance, has been retained by decisions made by the BRAC commissions or by legislation, or is needed by federal agencies. Communities are planning to acquire about 12 percent of the property under economic development conveyances, and DOD plans to sell about 4 percent of the property either through negotiated sales to state and local jurisdictions or through direct sales to the public. Communities are creating new airport facilities, jobs, education and job training centers, and wildlife habitats. In some instances, these efforts have involved pooled efforts by local schools and state institutions and agencies. In numerous communities, the failure to reach a consensus on reuse issues has caused delays in the development of acceptable reuse plans. Some base conversions involve reuse expectations that may be unrealistic given their rural or relatively unpopulated geographic locations. Environmental cleanup requirements delay the implementation of reuse plans. The Department of Commerce’s Economic Development Administration has awarded $85 million to assist communities with infrastructure improvements, building demolition, and revolving loan funds. The Department of Labor has awarded $46 million to help communities retrain workers adversely affected by closures. We obtained up-to-date federal assistance information from the Federal Aviation Administration, the Economic Development Administration, the Department of Labor, and the Office of Economic Adjustment to determine the amount and type of assistance the federal government provided to the BRAC 1988 and 1991 base closure communities. For each base, the profiles provide (1) a description of size and location; (2) important milestone dates; (3) a reuse plan summary and a golf course reuse plan, which discusses the status of reuse implementation; (4) jobs lost and created; (5) federal assistance; and (6) environmental cleanup status. Estimated cleanup cost: $7 million. DOD has recommended to the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission that the naval shipyard be closed. Pending final environmental clearances, long-term leases will be used to promote immediate reuse on most parcels. The Office of Economic Adjustment has provided about $2 million in planning grants. The remaining 1,648 acres will be an airport public benefit transfer to the port authority. The total more than offsets the jobs lost due to depot closure. The local authorities are planning to request the remaining 466 acres, including housing units, utilities, and property available for commercial development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on reuse planning and implementation at the 37 bases closed in the first two base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds, focusing on: (1) planned disposal and reuse of the properties; (2) successful property conversions; (3) problems that delay reuse planning and implementation; and (4) assistance provided to communities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) under current plans, over half the land will be retained by the federal government because it: (a) is contaminated with unexploded ordinance; (b) has been retained by decisions made by the base realignment and closure commissions or by legislation; and (c) is needed by federal agencies; (2) most of the remaining land will be requested by local reuse authorities under various public benefit transfer authorities or the new economic development conveyance authority; (3) little land will be available for negotiated sale to state and local jurisdictions or for sale to the general public; (4) reuse efforts by numerous communities are yielding successful results; (5) hundreds of jobs are being created at some bases that more than offset the loss in civilian jobs from closures, new educational institutions are being established in former military facilities, and wildlife habitats are being created that meet wildlife preservation goals while reducing the Department of Defense's (DOD) environmental cleanup costs; (6) some communities are experiencing delays in reuse planning and implementation; (7) causes of delays include failure within the local communities to agree on reuse issues, development of reuse plans with unrealistic expectations, and environmental cleanup requirements; (8) the federal government has made available over $350 million in direct financial assistance to communities; (9) DOD's Office of Economic Assistance has provided reuse planning grants, the Department of Labor has provided job training grants, and the Federal Aviation Administration has awarded airport planning and implementation grants; and (10) grants from the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration are assisting communities in rebuilding or upgrading base facilities and utilities and are helping communities set up revolving loan funds that can be used to attract businesses to closed bases. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-82 | gao_T-HEHS-99-82_0 | Furthermore, to reduce the risk a beneficiary faces in trading guaranteed monthly income and subsidized health coverage for the uncertainties of employment, the Congress has established various work incentives intended to safeguard cash and health benefits while a beneficiary tries to return to work. Structural and Operational Weaknesses in DI and SSI Impede Return to Work
In a series of reports, we have discussed how DI and SSI design and operational weaknesses do not encourage beneficiaries to maximize their work potential. As a result, the work capacity of DI and SSI beneficiaries may be understated. Beneficiaries have generally been uninformed about the availability of VR services and have been given little encouragement to seek them. Work incentive provisions that are complex, difficult to understand, and poorly implemented further impede return-to-work efforts. Encouragement to work from family, friends, health professionals, and coworkers was also critical, according to respondents. impairments cited these factors as helpful to being employed. Difficult Challenges and Trade-Offs Involved in Improving Work Incentives
Because the current work incentives have either impeded or played a limited role in helping beneficiaries return to work, the Congress and others have recognized the need to reform the current work incentives, particularly those in the DI program. In addition, changing work incentives may or may not increase the work effort of current beneficiaries, depending on their behavior in response to the type of change and their capacity for work and earnings. This point is emphasized by economists who have noted that improving work incentives may make the program attractive to those not currently in it. Social Security: Federal Disability Programs Face Major Issues (GAO/T-HEHS-95-97, Mar. 2, 1995). Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed return-to-work issues facing the Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, focusing on: (1) structural and operational weaknesses in the current DI and SSI programs that impede return to work; (2) factors that working beneficiaries believe are helpful in becoming and staying employed; and (3) challenges that exist in improving program incentives to work.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) program eligibility requirements and the application process encourage people to focus on their inabilities, not their abilities; (2) moreover, work incentives offered by the programs do not overcome the risk of returning to work for many beneficiaries, and the complexities of work incentives can make them difficult to understand and challenging to implement; (3) also, there is little encouragement to use rehabilitation services, which are relatively inaccessible to beneficiaries seeking them; (4) some DI beneficiaries who work despite these program weaknesses cited improved ability to function in the work place, resulting from successful health care, and encouragement from family, friends, health care providers, and coworkers as the most important factors helping them find and maintain work; (5) GAO's analysis of some of the proposed changes to work incentives--such as gradually reducing the DI cash benefit level as earnings increase--indicates that there will be difficult trade-offs in any attempt to change work incentives; and (6) moreover, determining the effectiveness of any of these proposed policies in increasing work effort and reducing caseloads would require that major gaps in existing research be filled. |
gao_GAO-11-57 | gao_GAO-11-57_0 | Children with Down Syndrome Received Medical Care to Address Special Health Care Needs
Children with Down Syndrome Received More Outpatient and Office- Based Care Than Other Children, with Number of Therapy Services a Key Difference
From birth through early childhood, children with Down syndrome received, on average, five times more outpatient care and over two times more office-based care than children without Down syndrome, according to our analysis of data from a private health insurance company. A key difference in the amount of outpatient and office-based care received by children with Down syndrome and other children was the difference in the amount of therapy services received. Children with Down Syndrome Were Hospitalized More Frequently and Had Longer Hospital Stays Than Other Children
According to our analysis of inpatient care data from a large private health insurance company, from birth through early childhood, children with Down syndrome were hospitalized, on average, nearly twice as often and stayed twice as long as children without Down syndrome. Children with Down Syndrome Had Higher Average Medical Care Expenditures Than Other Children, with Differences Decreasing as Children Aged
In our review, the total average medical expenditures for children with Down syndrome, from birth through early childhood, were an average of five times higher than the expenditures for children without Down syndrome; however, both total expenditures and the difference in expenditures decreased substantially by the time children with Down syndrome were 3 years of age. Families Were More Likely to Receive the Resources Recommended for Time of Diagnosis Than Those Recommended for Early Childhood, and May Face Barriers to Using Available Resources
Families Were Likely to Receive Many, but Not All, of the Resources That Down Syndrome Clinic Specialists Recommended They Receive at Diagnosis
Down syndrome advocacy groups in selected communities told us that families in those communities were likely to receive many, but not all, of the resources that Down syndrome clinic specialists recommended they receive at the time of diagnosis. Advocacy groups reported that families were likely to receive about two- thirds (20 of 32) of the recommended resources; these resources were generally directly related to the health of children with Down syndrome, such as information about the risk of cardiac problems and the need for thyroid screening. The specialists from six Down syndrome clinics we interviewed recommended 23 resources that families should receive through their health care providers after diagnosis and throughout early childhood. Advocacy groups reported that families were likely to receive only about one-quarter (6 of 23) of these resources. Advocacy Groups and National Survey Results Indicate Families May Face Barriers Such as Outdated or Inaccurate Information
According to Down syndrome advocacy groups, families in their communities may face barriers that can prevent them from using available resources, which can have a significant impact on the child and the family. For example, barriers such as outdated or inaccurate information may lead parents to have a limited understanding of their child’s Down syndrome diagnosis and, as a result, underestimate their child’s potential. Results of the 2005-2006 NS-CSHCN also showed that families of children with Down syndrome may have trouble accessing needed services. In addition, 16 percent of families of children with Down syndrome reported that they faced barriers using needed resources in the previous 12 months. Some advocacy groups reported that they and their communities have made efforts to address some of the barriers faced by families related to inaccurate information, financial issues, language, and transportation. To address issues of inaccurate information, one advocacy group initiated an educational outreach program to health care professionals at area hospitals to share important information about Down syndrome, including contact information for local support groups and suggestions for giving a Down syndrome diagnosis to a family. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for comment. In its general comments, HHS indicated that our report “presents a thorough summary of the current practices and the successes and challenges faced by children with Down syndrome and their families.” HHS emphasized the importance of early intervention services in maximizing children’s long-term development. | Why GAO Did This Study
On October 8, 2008, the Prenatally and Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act was signed into law, requiring GAO to submit a report concerning the effectiveness of current health care and family support programs for the families of children with disabilities. In this report, GAO focused on Down syndrome because it is a medical condition that is associated with disabilities and occurs frequently enough to yield a sufficient population size for an analysis. GAO examined (1) what is known about the extent to which children with Down syndrome receive medical care during early childhood and (2) what resources families of children with Down syndrome receive through their health care providers and what barriers families face to using these resources. GAO analyzed fee-for-service claims data from a very large private health insurance company, for the claims representing its experience with one of the largest national employers, and Medicaid claims data from seven states with high Medicaid enrollment and low percentages of enrollees in Medicaid managed care. GAO also interviewed specialists at six prominent Down syndrome clinics and 12 advocacy groups to examine what resources families receive and to identify barriers they face. GAO also analyzed data from the Health Resources and Services Administration-sponsored 2005-2006 National Survey of Children with Special Health Care Needs on barriers to accessing needed services.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of data from a very large private health insurance company showed that from birth through early childhood, children with Down syndrome received medical care to address their special health care needs. Specifically, children with Down syndrome received, on average, five times more outpatient care (such as care in an urgent care facility) and over two times more office-based care (such as care in a physician's office) than children without Down syndrome. Overall, both groups received more office-based care than outpatient care. A key difference in the amount of care received by children with Down syndrome was the difference in the amount of therapy services, with a greater percentage of children with Down syndrome receiving physical, occupational, and speech therapy. In addition, children with Down syndrome have an increased risk of certain medical conditions and were hospitalized, on average, nearly twice as often and stayed twice as long as other children. Not surprisingly, differences were also found in medical care expenditures. The total average medical expenditures for children with Down syndrome were an average of five times higher than those for other children. However, both total expenditures and the difference in expenditures decreased substantially as the two groups of children reached 3 years of age. GAO's analysis of Medicaid claims data found similar differences between the two groups. Down syndrome advocacy groups in selected communities told GAO that families of children with Down syndrome in those communities were more likely to receive the resources recommended for the time of diagnosis than those recommended for early childhood and may face barriers to using available resources. Specifically, advocacy groups reported that families were likely to receive about two-thirds (20 of 32) of the resources that specialists at the six Down syndrome clinics recommended they receive through their health care providers at the time of diagnosis. However, families were likely to receive only about one-quarter (6 of 23) of the resources that specialists recommended they receive through their health care providers after diagnosis and throughout early childhood. In addition, advocacy groups and results from the National Survey of Children with Special Health Care Needs indicate that families may face barriers that can prevent them from using available resources. For example, barriers such as outdated or inaccurate information could lead parents to underestimate their child's potential. Some advocacy groups reported that they and their communities have made efforts to address some of these barriers. For example, to address issues of inaccurate information, one advocacy group initiated an educational outreach program to health care professionals at area hospitals. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for comment. It generally agreed with GAO's findings and noted that the report provides a thorough summary of the current practices and the successes and challenges faced by children with Down syndrome and their families. |
gao_GAO-11-100 | gao_GAO-11-100_0 | To determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, we reviewed NNSA’s tritium production plans as well as requirements documents prepared by DOD and NNSA, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. As the commercial reactor produces power, the TPBARs are irradiated, controlling the nuclear reaction while simultaneously producing tritium. However, to date, these plans have not been actively coordinated with NRC, which ultimately must approve any modifications to reactor operations. Tritium is Still Permeating at Higher-Than-Expected Rates From TPBARs Into the Reactor Coolant at TVA’s Watts Bar 1 Reactor
NNSA has been unable to solve the technical challenges it has been experiencing producing tritium. NNSA and TVA Are Developing Plans to Increase Tritium Production but Have Not Actively Coordinated These Plans With NRC
Faced with significantly lower tritium production than originally planned due to tritium permeation, NNSA and TVA have been developing plans to increase the number of TPBARs being irradiated at Watts Bar 1 during each reactor fueling cycle as well as the number of reactors irradiating TPBARs, according to NNSA and TVA officials. According to NNSA officials, NNSA is meeting current requirements through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled nuclear warheads and producing lower-than-planned amounts of tritium through the irradiation of TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant decrease to tritium requirements. To date, NNSA has not had to use tritium in the reserve it maintains. However, according to NNSA officials, use of some of the tritium reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level of 240 TPBARs being irradiated in a single reactor. Nevertheless, NNSA officials told us that they were confident that NNSA will be able to meet tritium requirements in the future without substantially reducing the nation’s tritium reserve and are not considering alternative ways of producing tritium for the stockpile. NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding
Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of tritium, our review found two problems with NNSA’s management of the Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA was unable to provide us with evidence about its adherence to the appropriate contracting procedures when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness Program. Second, because of, among other things, the contract structure NNSA has entered into with suppliers of components and services for the Tritium Readiness Program, program funds are being expended much more slowly than planned. As a result, the program is accumulating large unexpended funding balances beyond thresholds established by DOE. However, to ensure large amounts of unexpended funding do not accumulate that could be better used for other purposes, DOE has established thresholds of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from one fiscal year to the next. While large unexpended funding balances do not necessarily indicate that the tritium program is being mismanaged, the fact that they have been increasing indicates that NNSA is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual basis—funds that could be appropriated for other purposes. Conclusions
NNSA’s inability to overcome the technical challenges and meet its original tritium production goals has raised serious questions about the agency’s ability to provide a reliable source of tritium to maintain the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase confidence in the nation’s continued ability to produce a reliable supply of tritium in the future and to improve the management of NNSA’s Tritium Readiness Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following four actions: In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to manage releases of tritium from TVA’s Watts Bar 1 and any other reactors chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future. Ensure NNSA’s future budget requests account for the large unexpended balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better reflect the amount of funding the program is able to spend annually. In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with the facts in the report and the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Tritium Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of tritium--a key isotope used in nuclear weapons--in order to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA's efforts to produce tritium have been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things.
What GAO Found
NNSA has been unable to overcome the technical challenges it has experienced producing tritium. To produce tritium, stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate and zirconium --called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)--are irradiated in the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear power reactor. Despite redesigns of several components within the TPBARS, tritium is still leaking--or "permeating"--out of the TPBARs into the reactor's coolant water at higher-than-expected rates. Because the quantities of tritium in the reactor coolant are approaching regulatory limits, TVA has been significantly restricting the number of TPBARs that it will allow NNSA to irradiate in each 18-month reactor fueling cycle, and, consequently, NNSA has not been producing as much tritium as it planned. NNSA and TVA officials are continuing to develop plans to increase the number of TPBARs that will be irradiated, as well as, if necessary, the number of reactors participating in the program. However, these plans have not been coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which ultimately must approve any changes to the operation of the TVA reactors. NNSA currently meets the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, but its ability to do so in the future is in doubt. NNSA officials told us that they will be able to meet future requirements through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled nuclear warheads and irradiating TPBARs. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant decrease of tritium requirements and will not eliminate the need for a reliable source of new tritium because of the need to periodically replenish it in the remaining nuclear weapons stockpile due to tritium's decay. While NNSA has not, to date, been required to use tritium from a reserve that it maintains, use of this reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level. Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of tritium, GAO's review found two problems with NNSA's management of the Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA could not provide us with evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures when purchasing components and services for the program. Second, due to, among other things, the way the program's contracts with its suppliers are structured, the program is spending its funds more slowly than planned and is accumulating large unexpended balances. The program is subject to thresholds established by the Department of Energy of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from one fiscal year to the next. However, the program exceeded these thresholds by more than $48 million in 2008 and by more than $39 million in 2009. While large unexpended balances are not necessarily an indication that the program is being mismanaged, it does indicate that the program is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual basis--funds that could be appropriated for other purposes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the program's large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-1083T | gao_GAO-02-1083T_0 | Effective information security is essential to the expansion of e- government. S. 803 emphasizes that an important goal is using the Internet and other IT to make government information better organized and more accessible to the public. Many agencies across government— including the Postal Service and the Internal Revenue Service—are already using privacy impact assessments and have found them useful. S. 803 addresses this critical issue by requiring that, for IT and information resources management, the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with OMB, the CIO Council, and the General Services Administration, (1) analyze, on an ongoing basis, the government’s personnel needs; (2) oversee the development of curricula, training methods, and training priorities that correspond to the projected personnel needs of the government; and (3) assess the training of federal employees in IT disciplines, as necessary. The bill addresses this issue by requiring the administrator of the proposed Office of Electronic Government to work with the administrator of OIRA on a variety of information technology and management issues. There are various ways to accomplish this; one approach would be to establish a federal CIO whose responsibilities include both e-government and the other major IT challenges facing the government. | What GAO Found
E-government is critical to the government's ability to effectively communicate with the public. Both Congress and current and past administrations have emphasized the importance of e-government and have put forth proposals to address the challenges associated with this issue. Earlier this year, the Senate passed S. 803, the E-government Act of 2002. To accomplish the goal of enhancing the management and promotion of e-government, S. 803 addresses many of the substantive information resource and management challenges facing the government today. Initiatives contained in this bill represent important steps in creating a government that is more efficient, effective, and focused on citizens' needs. Specifically, the bill would (1) secure the transmission of sensitive information in e-government transactions by promoting the development of electronic signatures, (2) protect individuals' privacy by requiring agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments, and (3) make government information more accessible to the public. |
gao_GAO-17-525T | gao_GAO-17-525T_0 | IRS Performed Early W-2 Verification, but Faced Implementation Challenges
IRS Verified Wages and Withholding for Some Returns but Did Not Receive All W-2 Data before Releasing Refunds
Before the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act was enacted, IRS did not receive the majority of W-2 data until after most refunds had been issued. Under this model, rather than holding refunds until completing all compliance checks, IRS issued refunds after conducting selected reviews. However, with the Act’s new reporting deadline, as of February 17, 2017, IRS received over 214 million W-2 forms from SSA, an increase of 125 percent from the same time last year (see fig. For the 2017 filing season, IRS used the W-2 data it had available to verify wages and withholding reported on all tax returns during initial processing. Specifically, we found that:
For returns where the taxpayer claimed the EITC or ACTC, preliminary data show that IRS verified the wage information for over 35 percent of these returns before February 15. Moreover, the refund hold allowed IRS time to check returns using its systemic verification when it received more W-2 data. However, IRS was unable to verify wage information for over 58 percent (7.7 million) of tax returns with refunds claiming the EITC or ACTC—for a total of $38.1 billion—before February 15. On such returns, while IRS also used available W-2 information, it did not hold refunds solely because W-2 information was not available. Preliminary data show that using systemic verification, IRS verified wages of 8.6 million (41 percent) of returns that did not claim the EITC or ACTC before February 15. However, IRS was unable to verify wage information reported on over 58 percent (12.3 million) of these tax returns for a total of $28.1 billion, as not all W-2 data were available and IRS was not required to hold these returns. For EITC/ACTC returns, the law provided an approximate 2-week delay between the W-2 due date (January 31) and the refund release date (February 15), to allow time for IRS to load the data and verify wage information on the returns before releasing the refunds. IRS Continues to Analyze Results of Systemic Verification
As of March 29, IRS officials were still assessing the W-2 systemic verification process and its outcomes. However, as noted earlier, IRS officials reported that the initial review of the W-2 verification process for EITC/ACTC returns showed that IRS identified approximately 162,000 returns worth about $863 million as potentially fraudulent that it would not have identified without the early W-2 data coupled with the refund hold. IRS officials also reported a decrease in the number of IDT cases this filing season compared to last year. IRS Improved Telephone Customer Service, Experienced Few Disruptions Processing Returns, and Added an Online Application While Suspending or Discontinuing Others
Telephone Service Improved in the 2017 Filing Season
While implementing tax law changes, it is important that IRS ensures timely and quality service. During the filing season, IRS enforces tax laws, provides service to tens of millions of taxpayers, and processes over 100 million tax returns. In recent years, IRS has experienced declining resources and an increased workload. The decline in IRS’s budget has contributed to fluctuations in service and longer telephone wait times. In addition, the average wait time to speak to an assistor decreased from 9.7 to 6.8 minutes. IRS Experienced Few Processing Disruptions during the 2017 Filing Season
According to IRS officials, return processing during the 2017 filing season has proceeded as expected with a few minor challenges. In addition to the W-2 systemic verification process, the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act also required taxpayers that filed a U.S. federal tax return containing an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) to renew the number if the ITIN was not used on at least one tax return in the past 3 years or it was issued prior to 2013 and contained certain middle digits. IRS Launched a New Online Application, but Others Were Unavailable or Discontinued
IRS established its new online application in November 2016, but other key applications were unavailable or discontinued. Implementing GAO’s Prior Open Recommendations Could Help IRS Improve Service
IRS is making progress implementing our prior recommendations to improve its service, particularly in the following areas:
Customer service strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS processes over 100 million tax returns during the filing season. In the past several years, IRS has been confronted with the ongoing problem of identity theft refund fraud and improper payments. Wage information that employers report on Form W-2 had not been available to IRS until after it issued most refunds. As GAO previously reported, earlier access to W-2 wage data—as now provided in recent legislation—could allow IRS to more timely match this information to taxpayers' returns and identify discrepancies before issuing billions of dollars of fraudulent refunds.
GAO was asked to review the 2017 filing season to-date (January through late March to mid-April). This testimony describes IRS's (1) implementation of W-2 systemic verification, and (2) performance in providing telephone and other customer service and processing individual income tax returns during the 2017 filing season.
GAO reviewed IRS systemic verification data and documents and interviewed IRS officials. To evaluate IRS's performance during the 2017 filing season, GAO compared data and documents to IRS's prior years' performance and interviewed IRS officials.
What GAO Found
To help combat identify theft refund fraud and improper payments, in 2017 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implemented provisions of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (the Act). Consistent with GAO's prior reporting, the Act advanced the deadline for employers filing Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement (W-2) with the Social Security Administration to January 31, allowing IRS to verify information reported on tax returns (such as wages and withholding) before issuing refunds, a process IRS calls W-2 systemic verification. As of February 17, 2017, IRS received over 214 million W-2 forms (a 125 percent increase over the same time last year). The Act also required IRS to hold refunds until February 15 for taxpayers claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) to provide time to use W-2 data to verify returns. Although IRS applied the verification process to all returns, preliminary data suggest the following:
For returns where the taxpayer claimed the EITC or ACTC, IRS verified the wage information for over 35 percent of these returns before February 15. Moreover, the refund hold allowed IRS time to verify returns when it received more W-2 data, resulting in approximately $863 million in additional refunds being identified as potentially fraudulent. However, since not all W-2 data were available before February 15, IRS was unable to verify wage information for over 58 percent (7.7 million) of tax returns with refunds claiming the EITC or ACTC for a total of $38.1 billion.
IRS did not hold returns that did not claim the EITC or ACTC because it was not required to do so, although those returns were subject to systemic verification and other checks. Preliminary data show that IRS verified wages reported on 8.6 million (41 percent) returns that did not claim the EITC or ACTC before February 15. However, IRS was unable to verify wage information reported on over 58 percent (12.3 million) of tax returns claiming $28.1 billion in refunds, because not all W-2 data were available.
Several issues contributed to delays in availability of W-2 information. IRS processes W-2 electronic data weekly rather than when received due to the age of its computer system, resulting in a lag between when IRS has the data and can use it. In addition, some employers can request and be granted 30-day filing extensions and some file paper W-2s, which take longer to process. IRS continues to analyze the W-2 systemic verification process and its outcomes.
IRS's telephone wait times and level of service—those seeking live assistance and receiving it—improved in the 2017 filing season compared to prior years. Average wait time decreased from 9.7 to 6.8 minutes compared to last year, and telephone level of service was more than 77 percent compared to 74 percent. Further, IRS reduced the number of written correspondence that is late, or “overage,” compared to prior years. IRS also experienced minor disruptions during return processing with two brief electronic filing system interruptions. Finally, IRS launched a new online service, but others were unavailable or discontinued due to security concerns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations but provides a status update on previously recommended actions that IRS could take to further improve service and operations. |
gao_RCED-96-188 | gao_RCED-96-188_0 | Countries’ Progress Toward Meeting the Convention’s Goal Cannot Be Fully Assessed
The incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent data on emissions prevent a complete assessment of Annex I countries’ efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. All 29 countries reported 1990 data on carbon dioxide, and 28 of the 29 reported similar data on methane and nitrous oxide. However, eight countries did not provide projections to 2000 for at least one of those gases. For example, some Annex I countries adjusted their 1990 inventory levels in order to develop what they believed to be a more reasonable starting point for projections to 2000. Economic Factors Make Most Annex I Countries Unlikely to Meet the Convention’s Goal
Although the currently available emissions data prevent a complete assessment of countries’ progress in meeting the Convention’s goal, projections by energy forecasting agencies of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use—which is the largest single category of greenhouse gas emissions—indicate that few Annex I countries will likely be able to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Of the major developed countries, only Germany and the United Kingdom appear likely to reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. III compares in more detail the changes in key economic factors and fuel prices affecting the U.S. efforts.) Reporting guidelines designed to help ensure that complete, reliable, and complete emissions data are provided by countries will also be an essential element of any new agreement. 3. 4. 5. 2. To determine the progress that the United States and other Annex I countries have made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels, we obtained data on each country’s greenhouse gas emissions for 1990 and projections for 2000—from the United Nations Secretariat on the Climate Change Convention and from other groups such as the Energy Information Administration and the International Energy Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the United States and other countries' progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by year 2000.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent data prevent a complete assessment of these countries' efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000; (2) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has compiled data emissions from 29 countries since February 1996; (3) all 29 countries reported 1990 data on carbon dioxide, 28 countries reported similar data for methane and nitrous oxide, and 8 countries did not provide projections to 2000 for at least one of the gases; (4) the level of uncertainty in emissions data is high since some countries adjusted their 1990 inventory levels to develop more reasonable projections for year 2000; (5) the Convention's reporting guidelines do not specify whether emissions' projections should be reported as gross emissions or net emissions; (6) this lack of detail affects the completeness and comparability of emissions inventories; (7) Germany and the United Kingdom are the only major developed countries that are likely to return to 1990 emissions levels by 2000; (8) energy use is the major factor affecting Annex I countries' ability to meet 1990 greenhouse levels by 2000; (9) efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are hampered by changes in key economic variables; and (10) the adoption of revised reporting guidelines will help to ensure that complete and reliable emissions data are reported. |
gao_GAO-06-341 | gao_GAO-06-341_0 | Background
The UI program was established in 1935 and serves two primary objectives: (1) to temporarily replace a portion of earnings for workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own and (2) to help stabilize the economy during recessions by providing an infusion of consumer dollars into the economy. In fiscal year 2004, these programs covered about 129 million wage and salary workers and paid benefits totaling $41.3 billion to about 8.8 million workers. Certain Characteristics Are Associated with UI Benefit Receipt and Unemployment Duration
Earnings, age, education, and most notably past UI benefit receipt are all associated with the likelihood of receiving UI benefits for UI-eligible workers. Unemployed Workers with Higher Earnings, Younger Workers, Workers with More Education, or Those Who Received UI in the Past Are More Likely to Receive UI Benefits
Unemployed workers are more likely to receive UI benefits if they have higher earnings prior to becoming unemployed, are younger or have more years of education, or have a history of past UI benefit receipt, when compared to workers with similar characteristics. We found that past experience with the UI program has a particularly strong effect on the future likelihood of receiving UI benefits. However, some characteristics, such as the weekly UI benefit amount that a worker is eligible to receive, are not associated with a greater likelihood of receiving UI benefits. Specifically, UI-eligible workers are more likely to experience longer unemployment duration if they have lower earnings before becoming unemployed or have fewer years of education. Other characteristics associated with longer unemployment duration, after controlling for other factors, include being African-American or female or not belonging to a union. We found no relationship between past UI benefit receipt and subsequent unemployment duration. Receiving UI Benefits Is Associated with Longer Unemployment Duration
Whether or not an unemployed worker receives UI during a specific period of unemployment has the strongest effect on how long that period of unemployment is likely to last. Certain Industries Are Associated with UI Benefit Receipt and Unemployment Duration
Unemployed workers in certain industries are more likely to receive UI benefits and experience shorter unemployment duration than otherwise similar workers from other industries. Simulations show that first-time unemployed workers from mining and manufacturing are more likely to receive UI than workers from other industries. With respect to unemployment duration, UI-eligible workers from construction and manufacturing have shorter unemployment duration than workers from other industries. Specifically, the likelihood of receiving UI benefits for public administration workers who are unemployed for the first time is 37 percent. Labor applauded GAO’s efforts to determine the extent to which an individual worker’s characteristics are associated with the likelihood of UI benefit receipt and with unemployment duration and noted that the study adds to current knowledge of the UI program, particularly with regard to the impact of past UI benefit receipt on current UI receipt. Prepared for the Department of Labor. Unemployment Insurance: States’ Use of the 2002 Reed Act Distribution. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unemployment Insurance (UI), established in 1935, is a complex system of 53 state programs that in fiscal year 2004 provided $41.3 billion in temporary cash benefits to 8.8 million eligible workers who had become unemployed through no fault of their own. Given the size of the UI program, its importance in helping workers meet their needs when they are unemployed, and the little information available on what factors lead eligible workers to receive benefits over time, GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which an individual worker's characteristics, including past UI benefit receipt, are associated with the likelihood of UI benefit receipt or unemployment duration, and (2) whether an unemployed worker's industry is associated with the likelihood of UI benefit receipt and unemployment duration. Using data from a nationally representative sample of workers born between 1957 and 1964 and spanning the years 1979 through 2002, and information on state UI eligibility rules, GAO used multivariate statistical techniques to identify the key factors associated with UI benefit receipt and unemployment duration. In its comments, the Department of Labor stated that while there are certain qualifications of our findings, the agency applauds our efforts and said that this report adds to our current knowledge of the UI program.
What GAO Found
Certain characteristics are associated with the likelihood of receiving UI benefits and unemployment duration. UI-eligible workers that GAO studied are more likely to receive UI benefits if they have higher earnings prior to becoming unemployed, are younger, have more years of education, or if they have a history of past UI benefit receipt when compared with otherwise similar workers. GAO found that past experience with the UI program has a particularly strong effect on the future likelihood of receiving UI benefits. However, some characteristics, such as receiving a higher maximum weekly UI benefit amount, are not associated with a greater likelihood of receiving UI benefits. UI-eligible workers who receive UI benefits have longer unemployment duration than workers with similar characteristics. Also, UI-eligible workers are more likely to experience longer unemployment duration if they have lower earnings before becoming unemployed or have fewer years of education. Other characteristics associated with longer unemployment duration include being African-American, female, or not belonging to a union. GAO found no relationship between past UI benefit receipt and subsequent unemployment duration. UI-eligible workers from certain industries are more likely than similar workers in other industries to receive UI benefits and experience shorter unemployment duration. Specifically, GAO's simulations show that the likelihood of receiving UI benefits during a first period of unemployment is highest among workers from the mining and manufacturing industries. Furthermore, the likelihood of receiving UI benefits when unemployed increases with each previous period of UI receipt across all industries, and the most notable increase occurs in public administration. First-time unemployed workers from construction and manufacturing experience significantly shorter unemployment duration than workers from other industries. |
gao_NSIAD-98-84 | gao_NSIAD-98-84_0 | Full Extent, Nature, and Cost of Program Are Not Known
DOD officials do not know the full extent of the IRT Program. Using available service and OSD records for fiscal year 1997, we found that most of the projects were engineering, infrastructure, or medical in nature. Supplemental IRT funding spent on the six projects we reviewed amounted to at least $4.6 million. Program Guidance Is Consistent With Statutory Requirements
The legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations governing the provision of assistance under the IRT Program. Although the directive meets the legislation’s requirements, DOD could improve the directive by addressing how it will implement the statutory requirement that the provision of assistance not result in a significant increase in the cost of training. Statutory Requirements for Selected Projects Were Generally Met
The six projects we reviewed as case studies were generally conducted within the statutory requirements. For example, the benefiting organizations were eligible for the assistance, and the provision of assistance did not interfere with units’ or individuals’ military functions. While the statute requires that individuals providing assistance perform tasks directly related to their military specialties, on two of the projects we reviewed, some individuals’ tasks were not directly related to their specialties. Thus, it appeared that the goal of completing a project sometimes took priority over the goal of providing valid military training. In addition, we were unable to determine whether providing the assistance had resulted in a significant increase in the cost of training for any of the six projects because DOD has established no basis for making such a determination. The following paragraphs provide additional information on the conformance of the five projects to statutory requirements. OSD and Service Secretary Oversight of IRT Projects Is Limited and Inconsistent
OSD has provided limited and inconsistent oversight of IRT projects and the delivery of support and services under them. For the most part, oversight is limited to those projects that receive supplemental IRT Program funding. Even within those projects, OSD did not always follow its own processes for ensuring the statutory requirements for civil military projects were met and did not have procedures in place to ensure that military organizations were meeting the statutory requirement not to provide assistance that results in a significant increase in training costs. The service secretaries have not established any additional oversight requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) training projects that support nondefense activities, focusing on the: (1) extent, nature, and cost of civil military projects; (2) consistency of DOD's guidance on the Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) Program with statutory requirements; (3) conformity of selected projects to statutory requirements, especially those dealing with military training; and (4) effectiveness of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) and service secretaries' oversight of such projects.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD does not know the full extent and nature of the IRT program because some project information is not consistently compiled and reported; (2) furthermore, although DOD knows the amount of supplemental funds spent on the program, it does not know the full cost of the program because the services and components do not capture those costs, which are absorbed from their own appropriations; (3) available records indicate that at least 129 projects were conducted in fiscal year (FY) 1997 and that most of these were engineering, infrastructure, or medical projects; (4) the DOD directive for civil military projects is consistent with the statutory requirements for such projects; (5) specifically, it reiterates the statutory requirements and provides further delineation of how the projects are to be selected and implemented; (6) the directive does not, however, provide any additional guidance for military organizations to use in meeting the statutory requirement that the provision of assistance not result in a significant increase in the cost of training; (7) the six projects GAO reviewed generally met the statutory requirements; (8) for example, the benefitting organizations were eligible for the assistance and the provision of assistance did not interfere with units' or individuals' military functions; (9) however, while the statute requires that individuals providing assistance perform tasks directly related to their military specialties, GAO found that in two cases some individuals' tasks were not directly related to their specialties; (10) thus, it appeared that the goal of completing a project took priority over the goal of providing valid military training; (11) in addition, GAO could not determine whether the assistance had resulted in a significant increase in the cost of training for any of the six projects because DOD has established no basis for making such a determination; (12) OSD has provided limited and inconsistent oversight of IRT projects and the delivery of support and services under them; (13) for the most part, OSD limited oversight to those projects that received supplemental program funding; (14) even for those projects, OSD did not always follow its own processes for ensuring that statutory requirements for civil military projects were met and did not have procedures in place to ensure that military organizations were not providing assistance that significantly increased training costs; and (15) the service secretaries have not established any additional formal oversight procedures. |
gao_GAO-04-924 | gao_GAO-04-924_0 | Despite their limited impact on the CTR program, most of these projects can be used to support dismantlement of Russia’s general purpose nuclear submarines, according to DOD officials. One of Eight AMEC Projects Had a Direct Impact on CTR’s Efforts to Dismantle Russia’s Ballistic Nuclear Submarines
Only one of eight AMEC projects established to support and complement CTR’s program for the dismantlement of Russia’s ballistic missile nuclear submarines has directly benefited the program. According to CTR officials, however, only one AMEC project, the development of a prototype 40-metric ton container used to store and transport spent nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian ballistic missile nuclear submarines, was able to meet CTR program objectives. U.S. and foreign officials also asserted that another important aspect of AMEC is that it facilitates military-to-military cooperation with Russia. AMEC Member Countries Have Contributed About $56 Million to the Program
From 1996 to April 2004, AMEC member countries contributed about $56 million to the program. The United States has been the largest contributor, providing about $31 million or about 56 percent of the total, with Russia, Norway, and the United Kingdom contributing the remainder. Program Contributions to AMEC Have Declined
The overall U.S. contribution to AMEC decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004, as U.S.-funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. AMEC’s proposal to improve submarine base security may be contrary to U.S. policy. DOD Has Not Adequately Justified Its Proposed Initiative to Expand Its Technology Development to Submarine Dismantlement Activities into Russia’s Pacific Region
In response to Russia’s request for assistance to address environmental problems resulting from military activities in the Pacific, DOD plans to expand its technology demonstration efforts to that region by developing a program similar to AMEC. However, DOD has neither adequately analyzed the condition of Russia’s radioactive waste problems resulting from, among other things, decommissioned and dismantled nuclear submarines in the Pacific nor their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already being done for the Arctic region. However, in commenting on our draft report, DOD raised several concerns and observations, including: (1) AMEC’s primary role is not to support the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) but to minimize the ecological security risks associated with military activities in the Arctic; (2) DOD’s program plan submitted to the Congress in 1999 did not state that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR program; (3) our report did not adequately capture AMEC’s impact on and relationship to other U.S./multinational programs such as the G-8 Global Partnership initiative; (4) AMEC’s draft plan is a work in progress and is currently undergoing coordination with partner countries; and (5) our report does not capture the trend that shows increased partner country funding. DOD incorrectly asserted in its technical comments that our draft report did not address two aspects of section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 that required us to review AMEC: (1) the extent to which the AMEC program supports the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Initiative and (2) the current and proposed technology development and demonstration role of AMEC in U.S. nonproliferation efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States participate in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program, a multilateral effort that seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of Russia's military activities through technology development projects. AMEC has primarily focused on Russia's aging fleet of nuclear submarines. Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required GAO to review AMEC, including its relationship to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. In accordance with the act, GAO (1) assessed the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2) identified AMEC member countries' financial contributions to the program, (3) assessed AMEC's future program objectives, and (4) evaluated DOD's proposal to expand its technology development activities to Russia's Pacific region.
What GAO Found
In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR program. However, we found that only one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR's objective of dismantling Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines has done so. This project involved development of a prototype 40-metric ton container to store and transport spent (used) nuclear fuel from Russia's dismantled submarines. Despite AMEC's limited contribution to CTR, DOD officials, including CTR representatives, said that most of the projects can be used to support dismantlement of other types of Russian nuclear submarines. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials cited other benefits of U.S. participation in AMEC, including promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with Norway, and facilitating military-to-military cooperation with Russia. From 1996, when the program was established, to April 2004, AMEC member countries had contributed about $56 million to the program. The United States has been the largest contributor, providing about $31 million, or about 56 percent of the total. However, the overall U.S. contribution has decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as U.S. funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future efforts. The plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC partners, proposes improving the security of Russia's nuclear submarine bases and securing spent nuclear fuel from dismantled submarines. However, securing bases could be contrary to U.S. policy, which preclude assistance to most operational Russian military sites that contain nuclear weapons, including certain naval facilities. DOD wants to expand its dismantlement technology development efforts to Russia's Pacific region, but has not adequately analyzed the condition of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Pacific and their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already done in the Arctic region. |
gao_NSIAD-96-83 | gao_NSIAD-96-83_0 | U.S. heroin control programs have the following general objectives: (1) assisting source countries in attacking opium production and heroin refining, trafficking, and use; (2) gaining greater access to opium-producing regions through bilateral and multilateral initiatives; (3) pooling U.S. intelligence resources to assist U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies in targeting and arresting key leaders of major heroin trafficking organizations; and (4) reducing the flow of heroin into the United States. Heroin Poses a Serious Drug Threat to the United States
ONDCP views heroin as a serious danger to the United States, a threat second only to cocaine. Burma Is the Key to Implementing an Effective Southeast Asian Heroin Strategy
The key to effective U.S. heroin control efforts in Southeast Asia is stopping the flow of Burmese heroin into the United States. In 1994, Burma accounted for about 87 percent of the opium cultivated in Southeast Asia and approximately 94 percent of the opium production in the region. Unless the United States addresses opium poppy cultivation and production in Burma, U.S. regional heroin control efforts will have only a marginal impact. Moreover, ethnic insurgent armies that control most of the opium cultivation and heroin-trafficking areas are reliant on proceeds from the drug trade and are unlikely to relinquish this source of income under the current Burmese government. In 1988, the Burmese military violently suppressed antigovernment demonstrations for economic and political reform and began establishing a record of human rights abuses, including politically motivated arrests, torture, and forced labor and relocations. In 1990, the Burmese people voted to replace the government in national elections, but the military regime refused to recognize the results and remained in power. More importantly, because of the complex Burmese political environment, U.S. assistance is unlikely to be effective until the Burmese government demonstrates improvement in its democracy and human rights policies and proves its legitimacy to ethnic minority groups in opium producing areas. The impact of U.S. efforts to interdict regional drug-trafficking routes has been limited by the ability of traffickers to shift their routes into countries with inadequate law enforcement capability. U.S. Efforts Have Achieved Positive Results in Thailand and Hong Kong
While the impact of U.S. heroin control efforts on a regional level in Southeast Asia has been limited, some U.S. counternarcotics assistance programs in countries that possess the political will and capability to engage in counternarcotics activities have achieved positive results. However, we found that the projects have not significantly reduced opium production because (1) the scope of the projects has been too small to have a substantive impact on opium production, (2) the Burmese government has not provided sufficient support to ensure project success, and (3) inadequate planning has reduced project effectiveness. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to prevent heroin trafficking, focusing on the: (1) extent to which heroin poses a threat to the United States; (2) impediments to heroin control efforts in Southeast Asia; and (3) United Nations Drug Control Program's (UNDCP) effectiveness in Burma.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while heroin is not the primary illegal narcotic in use in the United States, heroin production, trafficking, and consumption are growing threats; (2) since the late 1980s, worldwide production of opium has nearly doubled, and U.S. emergency room episodes resulting from heroin overdoses have increased by 50 percent; (3) although U.S. heroin control programs in Southeast Asian countries other than Burma have had some limited success, U.S. efforts have not reduced the flow of heroin from the region because producers and traffickers shift transportation routes and growing areas into countries with inadequate law enforcement capability or political will; (4) in 1994, Burma accounted for about 87 percent of the opium cultivated in Southeast Asia and approximately 94 percent of the opium production in the region, thus, a key to stopping the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia is addressing opium production in Burma; and (5) there are several reasons why achieving this objective will be difficult: (a) since 1988, the U.S. has not provided eradication assistance to the Burmese government because it violently suppressed a pro-democracy movement, began establishing a record of human rights abuses, and refused to recognize the results of national elections in 1990 that removed the military government from power; (b) because of the complex Burmese political environment, U.S. assistance is unlikely to be effective until the Burmese government demonstrates improvement in its democracy and human rights policies and proves its legitimacy to ethnic minority groups in opium-producing areas; (c) the Burmese government is unable or unwilling to make a serious commitment to ending the lucrative drug trade and is unlikely to gain the required political support to control most of the opium cultivation and heroin-trafficking areas within Burma; (d) while heroin control efforts in Thailand and Hong Kong have achieved some positive results, there has been little counternarcotics cooperation with China, where important regional drug-trafficking routes have recently emerged; and (e) UNDCP's crop control, alternative development, and demand reduction projects in Burma are too small in scale to significantly affect opium poppy cultivation and opium production levels. |
gao_GGD-95-99 | gao_GGD-95-99_0 | Despite this initiative, many problems with economic statistics remain unresolved. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to discuss how reported problems with selected statistics produced by the federal government can affect the federal budget and the formulation of the nation’s economic policy. A study by BLS researchers estimated that problems in measuring consumer spending patterns caused CPI to overstate inflation by 0.1 to 0.2 percent annually. Estimates of the Effects of CPI Overstatement on the Federal Budget
The CPI directly affects a significant portion of the budget because many federal benefits as well as individual income taxes are tied, or indexed, to the CPI in an effort to negate the effects of inflation. Statistical Limitations Increase the Uncertainties That Face Policymakers
Economic statistics can also affect the policymaking process. While it is not possible to demonstrate that if the shortcomings of particular statistics were resolved, policymakers would have made different decisions, such shortcomings increase policymakers’ uncertainty about current economic conditions and long-term trends. Measurement of Homeowner Costs in the Consumer Price Index Should Be Changed (PAD-81-12, Apr. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed problems with economic statistics, focusing on how they can affect the federal budget as well as the formulation of economic policy.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) many economists believe that several technical problems limit the Consumer Price Index's (CPI) accuracy in measuring inflation; (2) these technical problems could cause CPI to overstate inflation, although complete information on measurement errors is inconclusive; (3) the extent and direction of inflation measurement is important, since slight misstatements could significantly affect government costs; and (4) statistical limitations can affect the policymaking process by increasing policymakers' uncertainty about current economic conditions and the potential effectiveness of economic policies. |
gao_GGD-95-208 | gao_GGD-95-208_0 | We discussed the results of the Uruguay Round as contained in GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture with officials from the United States, GATT/WTO, and other countries, including the chairmen of the WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises and the WTO Committee on Agriculture. We discussed U.S. efforts to monitor the activities of STEs in other countries with respect to GATT/WTO requirements with officials from USTR, USDA/FAS, the Department of Commerce, and the International Trade Commission. The evidence we obtained suggested the lack of compliance could be attributed to (1) confusion over the definition of STEs, (2) the lack of systematic review of notifications received, (3) the apparent low priority some GATT members assigned to article XVII’s reporting requirement, and (4) the overall burden associated with GATT reporting requirements. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether article XVII has yielded information on the full nature and extent of STE activity in GATT/WTO member countries. 1). Member countries also reported that they maintained state trading in alcoholic beverages and petroleum products. However, our review of STE notifications confirmed what GATT/WTO and member country officials told us—that some member countries continued to struggle with the definition of STEs. The Understanding did not change the questionnaire used to collect information about STEs, but WTO members have agreed to review the questionnaire and the adequacy of information provided about STEs. GATT/WTO members are required to make specific reductions in three types of agricultural support—market access restrictions, export subsidies, and internal support—over a 6-year period beginning in 1995. In addition, the agreement established a WTO Committee on Agriculture to monitor implementation of Uruguay Round commitments. The state has been instrumental in opening China’s economy and implementing market-oriented reforms. USDA/FAS and Foreign Commercial Service staff are also responsible for monitoring STE activities in the countries where they are located as part of their regular reporting responsibilities. For example, USDA/FAS reports on major commodity sectors like wheat and dairy have covered STE activities. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Agriculture and to the U.S. Trade Representative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the activities of other countries' agricultural state trading enterprises (STE), focusing on: (1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members' reporting of STE activities from 1980 to 1994; (2) Uruguay Round commitments relating to STE; (3) the potential increase of STE under GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO); and (4) U.S. efforts to monitor the activities of other countries' STE with respect to GATT and WTO requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) some information on STE in GATT member countries has been obtained through the notification process, but only about 21 percent of the member countries complied with the reporting requirement between 1980 and 1994; (2) GATT and WTO officials attributed the noncompliance to definitional problems, the lack of a systematic review of STE notifications, and the overall burden and the low priority that some member countries assigned to GATT reporting; (3) WTO officials plan to evaluate the questionnaire used to collect information about STE in order to improve member countries' compliance with the reporting requirements; (4) the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture requires member countries to reduce market access restrictions, export subsidies, and internal support and report on how they complied with these commitments, beginning in 1996; (5) while countries like Russia and China are undertaking privatization efforts to move toward more market-oriented economies, the role of STE in GATT and WTO will likely increase if these countries become members of GATT and WTO; and (6) the U.S. Trade Representative is responsible for monitoring STE activities and their compliance with Uruguay Round commitments, while the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Foreign Commercial Service are responsible for monitoring STE activities in the countries where they are located and reporting on STE activities as needed. |
gao_GAO-11-192 | gao_GAO-11-192_0 | DOD and military department officials identified continuing limitations associated with the fiscal year 2009 inventories, including the inability of FPDS-NG, which was to be used by DOD components other than the Army, to provide information for all of the required data elements. The department has stated that it plans to move towards collecting such data from contractors as the basis for future inventories, but it has not issued guidance or a plan of action for doing so. DOD Implemented a More Uniform Approach to Compile Its Fiscal Year 2009 Inventories
In May 2010, AT&L issued guidance that provided more uniform direction to be used by DOD components other than the Army to compile their fiscal year 2009 inventories, while allowing the Army to continue using its existing process that reports manpower data collected directly from its contractors. AT&L noted that the move towards a more uniform approach in fiscal year 2009 was meant to reduce inconsistencies that resulted from DOD components using different approaches in fiscal year 2008 and was an interim measure for circumstances in which actual contractor manpower data have not been collected. However, the changes in DOD’s approach, in particular how DOD reflected research and development services, and the use of a new formula for estimating contractor FTEs, affected the reported changes in inventory data from fiscal years 2008 to 2009. In addition, the guidance stated that AT&L planned to work with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to issue preliminary guidance and a proposed plan of action by August 2010. Military Departments Differ in How They Have Reviewed and Used the Inventories
The military departments differ in their approaches to the required reviews of the activities performed by contractors and in the extent to which they have used the inventories to inform workforce decisions, including in- sourcing. In contrast, the Air Force and Navy have implemented decentralized approaches that rely on their major commands to review the activities performed by contractors listed in their inventories and report the results back to their respective headquarters. These challenges will likely cause its approach to evolve in the future. The Navy issued guidance to its commands in September 2010, but the results of the Navy’s initial review had not yet been reported as of November 2010. The Army Has Implemented a Centralized Approach to Review Contracts and Activities in Its Inventory
The Army has implemented a centralized approach that relies on two processes—a review prior to contract award and a headquarters-level review of all functions performed by contractors—to meet the requirement to annually review the service contracts and activities in its inventory. Conclusions
DOD has acknowledged the need to rebalance its workforce, in part by reducing its reliance on contractors. DOD officials also expressed concern about the type of data that can be obtained through the FPDS-NG to meet the inventory requirements. AT&L’s guidance also authorized the Army to continue using the approach it has put in place to obtain contractor- reported data on direct labor hours. To respond to this mandate, we assessed (1) the approaches used to compile the fiscal year 2009 inventories and how the approaches have changed, and (2) how the inventories have been reviewed and used to inform workforce decisions. We compared this guidance with similar guidance and documents related to the fiscal year 2008 inventories, as well as information from our January 2010 report that assessed DOD’s approach. Similarly, we analyzed the extent to which the change in approach affected the estimated number of contractor FTEs reported in the inventories at either the aggregate level and for specific types of services by (1) applying the formulas used by the Navy and Air Force to estimate the number of contractor FTEs in fiscal year 2008 to the contracts included in their fiscal year 2009 inventories; and (2) comparing that figure with the estimated number of contractor FTEs using the formula prescribed by AT&L in the May 2010 guidance. To conduct our work, we interviewed officials from the following offices: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Requirements and Program and Budget Coordination Directorate; Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Department of the Army: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Office of Force Management, Manpower and Resources; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, Program Analysis Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget, Formulation Division; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Army Force Accounting and Documentation Division; Installation Management Command, Resource Management Directorate; Training and Doctrine Command, Resource Management Department of the Navy: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics Management; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Office of Civilian Human Resources; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller, Office of Budget; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Education and Training, Strategic Resourcing Branch; Naval Air Systems Command, Analysis and Planning Office, Office of the Deputy Assistant Commander for Contracts and Office of Command Strategic Force, Planning and Management; Department of the Air Force: Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Acquisition Integration; Secretary of the Air Force, Program Executive Office for Combat Directorate of Manpower, Organization and Resources, Strategic Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget, Directorate of Budget Operations; Air Force Materiel Command, Strategic Plans and Programs Business Integration Office, Office of Manpower and Personnel; Office of Acquisition Policy and Compliance; Business Operations Directorate, Operations Department; Defense Information Systems Agency: Procurement Directorate, Policy, Quality Assurance and Procedures Manpower, Personnel, and Security Directorate, Manpower and Personnel Systems Support Division; U.S. Special Operations Command: Directorate of Procurement, Procurement Management Division; Assessment and Manpower Validation Branch. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on contractors to perform myriad functions, which can offer benefits and flexibility for DOD. GAO's work has shown that reliance on contractors to support core missions, however, can place the government at risk of transferring government responsibilities to contractors. In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced his intent to reduce the department's reliance on contractors. In 2008, Congress required DOD to compile and review an annual inventory of the number of contractor employees working under service contracts and the functions and activities they performed. The fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report annually on these inventories. GAO assessed (1) the approaches used to compile the fiscal year 2009 inventories and how the approaches have changed, and (2) how the inventories have been reviewed and used to inform workforce decisions. GAO reviewed guidance; compared the approaches used to develop the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 inventories; and interviewed acquisition and manpower officials from DOD, the military departments, and selected defense components.
What GAO Found
DOD implemented a more uniform approach to compile its fiscal year 2009 inventories to reduce inconsistencies that resulted from DOD components using different approaches in fiscal year 2008. To do so, in May 2010 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) issued guidance to the Navy, Air Force, and other components that specified the categories of services to be included in the inventories; instructed them to use the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) as the basis for most of the inventory data requirements; and provided a formula to estimate the number of contractor full-time equivalent personnel working under those contracts. This guidance also authorized the Army to continue to use its existing process, which incorporates contractor-reported data, including direct labor hours, from its Contractor Manpower Reporting Application. The changes in DOD's approach, in particular how DOD reflected research and development services and the use of a new formula for estimating contractor personnel for the Air Force and Navy, as well as better reporting by the Army, affected the reported fiscal year 2009 inventory data. Collectively, these changes make comparing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 inventory data problematic. DOD officials acknowledged several continuing limitations associated with the fiscal year 2009 inventories, including the inability of FPDS-NG to provide information for all of the required data elements, and concerns about AT&L's estimating approach. AT&L's May 2010 guidance indicated that it planned to move towards collecting manpower data from contractors and indicated AT&L would work with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and other organizations to issue preliminary guidance and a proposed plan of action by August 2010. However, DOD has not yet done so. The military departments differ both in their approaches to reviewing the activities performed by contractors and the extent to which they have used the inventories to inform workforce decisions. The Army has implemented a centralized approach to identify and assess the functions being performed by contractors and has used such assessments to inform workforce decisions, including those related to identifying functions being performed by contractors that could be converted to performance by DOD civilian personnel. In contrast, the Air Force and Navy have implemented decentralized approaches that rely on major commands to review their contracted activities and report the results back to their respective headquarters. The Air Force implemented its initial review but experienced challenges, including that it did not obtain adequate information, that will likely cause its approach to evolve in the future. The Navy issued guidance on completing reviews to its commands in September 2010, but the results of the reviews had not been reported as of November 2010. Additionally, Air Force and Navy officials said that to date they have made limited use of the inventories to date to help inform their workforce decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD develop and issue a plan of action to collect manpower data and, in the interim, improve its estimating approach. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-96-109 | gao_AIMD-96-109_0 | Materiel Management Systems Intended to Improve Various Business Processes
Defense wants to develop and deploy materiel management systems to improve business operations and processes nationally for DOD materiel management and reduce the costs associated with inventory, personnel, and inefficient systems. Rather, it now plans to individually deploy each of the nine system applications as they are developed at selected sites from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 1999. Additionally, by not analyzing and anticipating costs and risks associated with the new strategy, JLSC officials told us that they do not know how much it will cost to maintain the legacy systems that will remain under the new strategy and what it will cost to interface the new applications with the legacy systems. In November 1995, JLSC reported that the identification and development of more than 3,000 interfaces to existing legacy systems in support of multiple deployments is the prime technical risk facing the program. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. The original objectives of our review were to determine (1) the mission and the economic and technical basis for selecting MMSS as the migrating system and (2) the extent to which this strategy has or will improve DOD’s materiel management operations. We believe that before these systems are deployed to the services and the agencies, Defense needs to ensure that testing is sufficient. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Since the system’s deployment, users have experienced problems that should have been detected during the system’s testing. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Logistics Systems Center's (JLSC) development and deployment of standard materiel management systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD development of nine integrated materiel management systems will cost more than the $5.3 billion originally estimated; (2) DOD plans to deploy each system individually at a selected site; (3) DOD is embarking on a new materiel management strategy to ensure that the additional funds spent on the systems are well invested; (4) DOD has not conducted economic or risk assessments of the new systems, or incorporated efforts to improve, consolidate, and privatize logistics operations; (5) DOD has failed to define the objectives, costs, and risks of its new materiel management strategy, thus denying DOD decisionmakers the opportunity to review the systems before deployment; (6) DOD is proceeding with its scheduled deployments without allocating necessary time for systems testing; (7) this action will increase the likelihood of DOD experiencing problems during systems testing; and (8) DOD will incur significant costs in operating and maintaining the legacy system due to existing deficiencies within the system. |
gao_GAO-02-184 | gao_GAO-02-184_0 | Scientific Knowledge of the Earth System
NASA revised its strategic goal and most of its objectives for this key outcome in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. Generally, NASA’s fiscal year 2002 annual performance goals for this outcome appear to be objective and help to measure progress toward achieving it. The agency also explains how each performance goal will benefit the public. International Space Station’s Operation, Cost, and Safety
Since the selected key outcome of deploying and operating the space station safely and cost effectively is not included in NASA’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan as a specific strategic goal or objective, we based our assessment of it on a related strategic objective in the plan—to operate the space station to advance science, exploration, engineering, and commerce. First, NASA portrays its planned efforts to verify and validate performance information more comprehensively than in 2001, providing greater confidence that the performance results will be credible. Despite improvements in addressing data verification and validation methods, NASA still does not acknowledge data limitations that could hinder performance measurement. Appendix II: Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the following key outcomes in National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) fiscal year 2002 performance plan: expanding scientific knowledge of the Earth's system, expanding the commercial development of space, and deploying and operating the International Space Station.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NASA has improved its fiscal year 2002 performance plan and responded to recommendations by GAO and others to make its plan more useful--particularly by providing more comprehensive explanations of how it plans to verify and validate performance data and by better explaining how its performance goals will benefit the public. NASA's annual performance goals appear to be objective and should help to measure progress toward the outcomes. However, the plan still does not explain the reasons for changes in performance goals. Not having these explanations could hinder assessments of NASA's performance. |
gao_T-GGD-99-28 | gao_T-GGD-99-28_0 | Resolving Staffing and Operational Issues While Maintaining Independence
The first challenge facing IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate is the need to address staffing and operational issues while ensuring the independence of the Advocate’s Office. A key staffing and operational issue is developing an implementation plan for bringing all caseworkers into the Advocate’s Office that includes operational mechanisms that will give PRP the potential benefits of both a reliance on the functions and a separate operation. Another, but related, staffing and operational issue is capturing information about resource usage that advocates need to manage PRP. Providing appropriate training is also an issue. It is important that caseworkers and other staff receive adequate training if they are going to be able to help taxpayers resolve their problems and effectively work on advocacy efforts. Caseworkers should be trained in both functional responsibilities and PRP operations. It is important for the Advocate’s Office to develop mechanisms to ensure that qualified caseworkers are selected so that program goals are met. As IRS restructures the Advocate’s Office, it must consider how best to handle workload fluctuations. Using Advocacy to Prevent Problems From Recurring
The second challenge facing IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate is to strengthen advocacy efforts within the Advocate’s Office. The Advocate’s Office has taken steps to promote advocacy, such as implementing regional advocacy councils and identifying strategies to increase awareness of advocacy within IRS. The Advocate’s Office has encouraged the functions to play a greater role in assisting taxpayers and improving procedures to reduce taxpayer compliance burden. Developing Measures of Effectiveness
The third challenge facing IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate is to develop performance measures to be used in managing operations and assessing the effectiveness of the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate and PRP. Instead, management must focus on the impact its programs have on its customers. The National Taxpayer Advocate has the formidable task of developing measures that will provide useful data for improving program performance, increasing accountability, and supporting decisionmaking. To be comprehensive, these measures should cover the full range of Advocate Office operations, including taxpayer satisfaction with PRP services and the effectiveness of advocacy efforts in reducing taxpayer compliance burden. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the challenges facing the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, focusing on IRS' need to: (1) address complex staffing and operational issues within the Advocate's Office; (2) strengthen efforts within the Advocate's Office to determine the causes of taxpayer problems; and (3) develop performance measures that the National Taxpayer Advocate needs to manage operations and measure effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate need to address staffing and operational issues while ensuring the independence of the Advocate's Office; (2) a key staffing and operational issue is developing an implementation plan for bringing all caseworkers into the Advocate's Office that includes operational mechanisms that will give the Problem Resolution Program (PRP) the potential benefits of both a reliance on the functions and a separate operation; (3) another staffing and operational issue is capturing information about resource usage that advocates need to manage PRP; (4) providing appropriate training is also an issue; (5) it is important that caseworkers and other staff receive adequate training; (6) caseworkers should be trained in both functional responsibilities and PRP operations; (7) it is important for the Advocate's Office to develop mechanisms to ensure that qualified caseworkers are selected so that the program goals are met; (8) as IRS restructures the Advocate's Office, it must consider how best to handle workload fluctuations; (9) IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate need to strengthen advocacy efforts within the Advocate's Office; (10) the Advocate's Office has taken steps to promote advocacy, such as implementing regional advocacy councils and identifying strategies to increase awareness of advocacy within IRS; (11) the Advocate's Office has encouraged the functions to play a greater role in assisting taxpayers and improving procedures to reduce taxpayer compliance burden; (12) IRS and the National Taxpayer Advocate need to develop performance measures to be used in managing operations and assessing the effectiveness of the Taxpayer Advocate and PRP; (13) management must focus on the impact its programs have on its customers; (14) the National Taxpayer Advocate has the formidable task of developing measures that will provide useful data for improving program performance, increasing accountability, and supporting decisionmaking; and (15) to be comprehensive, these measures should cover the full range of Advocate Office operations, including taxpayer satisfaction with PRP services and the effectiveness of advocacy efforts in reducing taxpayer compliance burden. |
gao_GAO-16-269 | gao_GAO-16-269_0 | As of September 30, 2015, 21 federal agencies reported that they had direct loans or loan guarantees outstanding. Subsidy Cost Estimates and Reestimates
FCRA requires agencies to estimate the net long-term cost to the government of extending or guaranteeing credit. This cost, referred to as subsidy cost, equals the net present value of estimated cash flows from the government minus estimated cash flows to the government, over the life of the loan and excluding administrative costs. Key Elements Agencies Should Consider When Preparing Subsidy Cost Estimates
Agencies develop subsidy cost estimates based on relevant budgeting and accounting guidance. Agencies Addressed Several Key Elements in Their Subsidy Cost Estimation Processes, but FHA and Education Lacked Adequate Documentation Supporting Certain Processes
Based on our review of the subsidy cost estimation processes for USDA’s Credit Commodity Corporation’s (CCC) Export Credit Guarantee (GSM- 102) Program, HUD’s Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund, and Education’s William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct Student Loan Program), we determined that while CCC addressed all key elements of the estimation process, FHA and Education lacked comprehensive documented policies and procedures for determining subsidy cost estimates and did not maintain adequate documentation supporting their implementation of other key elements of the estimation process. Figure 3 illustrates the key elements of the estimation process and the extent to which agencies addressed these key elements for the programs we reviewed. As of September 30, 2015, FHA had approximately $1.1 trillion in forward mortgage loan guarantees outstanding. Without policies and procedures and thorough documentation of the other key elements of the subsidy cost estimation process, FHA and Education have increased the risk that their institutional knowledge may be lost; that subsidy cost estimates might not be consistently prepared or documented; and that the resulting estimates may not be supported, reliable, and reasonable. To help ensure that subsidy cost estimates for the Direct Student Loan Program are supported, reliable, and reasonable, we recommend that the Secretary of Education direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development to take the following three actions:
Develop detailed policies and procedures over the subsidy cost estimation process that address, at a minimum, the documentation that should be prepared and maintained to support subsidy cost estimates and the process to document management review and approval of subsidy cost estimates. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify a list of key elements federal agencies should consider when developing subsidy cost estimates, we reviewed existing guidance and best practices related to budgeting and accounting for subsidy cost estimates. To assess the extent to which certain federal agencies addressed the key elements when estimating the subsidy cost of federal credit programs, we selected three federal credit programs: (1) the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Export Credit Guarantee (GSM- 102) Program, (2) the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund, and (3) the Department of Education’s (Education) William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct Student Loan Program). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal direct loans and loan guarantees outstanding have doubled from $1.5 trillion as of September 30, 2008, to $3.0 trillion as of September 30, 2015, as reported in the financial reports of the U.S. government. In light of the growing portfolio of outstanding direct loans and loan guarantees, questions have been raised about how agencies estimate the subsidy cost of credit programs.
GAO was asked to review the process federal agencies use to develop subsidy cost estimates for credit programs. This report examines (1) the key elements federal agencies should consider when developing subsidy cost estimates and (2) the extent to which certain agencies addressed these key elements when estimating the subsidy costs for selected federal credit programs. GAO analyzed budgeting and accounting guidance to identify a list of key elements agencies should consider when estimating subsidy costs and assessed the subsidy cost estimation processes used for three credit programs against these key elements. The three programs were selected based on average loan amounts and/or loan volume.
What GAO Found
The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 requires agencies to estimate the cost to the government of extending or guaranteeing credit. This cost, referred to as subsidy cost, equals the net present value of estimated cash flows from the government (e.g., loan disbursements and claim payments to lenders) minus estimated cash flows to the government (e.g., loan repayments, interest payments, fees, and recoveries on defaulted loans) over the life of the loan, excluding administrative costs. Agencies use established methods and data to estimate the future costs of a program based on what is known today. Based on budgeting and accounting guidance, GAO determined that agencies' estimation processes should include various key elements to help ensure that estimates are supported, reliable, and reasonable. For example, agency management should compare estimated and actual cash flows to identify potential trends. The figure below lists the key elements GAO identified based on relevance to creating credible cost estimates.
To assess how agencies addressed these key elements in their subsidy cost estimation processes, GAO assessed (1) the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Export Credit Guarantee (GSM-102) Program, (2) the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, and (3) the Department of Education's (Education) William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct Student Loan Program). GAO found that these agencies varied in their implementation of these key elements, as shown below.
While USDA documented the key elements of the estimation process for the GSM-102 program, HUD and Education lacked policies and procedures and adequate documentation for certain other key elements. Until these key elements are fully addressed, HUD and Education have increased the risk that institutional knowledge used in the estimation process may be lost and estimates may not be supported, reliable, and reasonable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HUD and Education develop and document additional procedures related to the subsidy cost estimation process. HUD and Education concurred with GAO's recommendations and described ongoing and planned actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-10-1 | gao_GAO-10-1_0 | SPOT Not Capable of Tracking All Required Information
SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all of the contract data elements as agreed to in the MOU. However, due to limitations with the reported data, we determined the data reported by the agencies should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about the number of contractor personnel in either country. Instead, State bureaus conducted periodic surveys of their contractors; however, each bureau’s survey covered different time periods. Agencies’ Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan Varies
Although USAID, State, and DOD are required to collect data on the total number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded while working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only USAID and State tracked this information during our review period. Absent DOD-wide data and as was the case for our prior report, DOD officials referred us to Defense Base Act (DBA) case data, which are maintained by the Department of Labor, as a means of obtaining information on killed and wounded contractor personnel. Labor DBA Data Are Not a Good Proxy for Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded
Labor’s DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for determining the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts. As a result, the data may include cases for contractor personnel working for agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. Based on our review of 150 randomly selected DBA case files, we estimated that about 11 percent of the deaths and injuries reported to Labor for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 resulted from hostile actions. DOD accounted for the vast majority of both the contracts and obligations. See appendix II for detailed information on each agencies’ Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and obligations during our review period. The agencies reported that 99 percent of the orders issued during our review period were competed. Specifically, there is a lack of consistency as to which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. In response to this mandate, we analyzed agency-reported data for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 regarding (1) the status of the agencies’ implementation of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database, (2) the number of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions, working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) the number of personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the number and value of contracts that were active and awarded during our period of review and the extent of competition for new contract awards. DOD did not collect and could not provide such data. USAID reported that 90 percent of its contracts were competed, including 126 (82 percent) that were awarded using full and open competition. Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and (GAO-10-01, GAO Code 120790)
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report titled, “Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
Recommendation: To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008 requirements, specifically Ensuring that the agencies’ criteria for entering contracts and contractor personnel into the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) are consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 and with the agencies’ respective information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel; Establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and Revising SPOT’s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information needs, such as those related to contractor personnel killed or wounded. However, not all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals, in Iraq need LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel were not being entered into SPOT. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to provide a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as GAO has previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to plan and manage their use of contractors. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data for Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008 and the first half of FY 2009 on the (1) status of agency efforts to track information on contracts and contractor personnel; (2) number of contractor personnel; (3) number of killed and wounded contractors; and (4) number and value of contracts and extent to which they were awarded competitively. GAO reviewed selected contracts and compared personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of agency-reported data.
What GAO Found
In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor oversight, DOD, State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in Afghanistan, the agencies are in the process of implementing the system and require contractor personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. However, the agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are entered, resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track detailed information on all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals. Further, SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all required data elements, such as contract dollar value and the number of personnel killed and wounded. As a result, the agencies rely on other sources for contract and contractor personnel information, such as periodic surveys of contractors. DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel, including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their limitations, the reported data should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we found that the data reported by the three agencies were incomplete. For example, in one quarterly contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000 personnel in Afghanistan, and USAID did not provide personnel data for a $91 million contract. The agencies depend on contractors to report personnel numbers and acknowledge that they cannot validate the reported information. USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed and 159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD officials told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track killed or wounded contractor personnel and referred us to the Department of Labor's Defense Base Act (DBA) case data for this information. However, because DBA is a worker's compensation program, Labor's data include cases such as those resulting from occupational injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis for determining how many contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the data provide insights into contractor casualties. According to Labor, 11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based on our review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11 percent of all FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from hostile actions. DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly 85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations. The agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during our review period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations, were competed. |
gao_GAO-17-766T | gao_GAO-17-766T_0 | In this role, the office is responsible for (1) developing a national drug control policy, (2) developing and applying specific goals and performance measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of national drug control policy and National Drug Control Program agencies’ programs, (3) overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the national drug control policy, and (4) assessing and certifying the adequacy of the budget for National Drug Control Programs. Also, from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 2011, ONDCP managed the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC). In March 2013, we reported that ONDCP and the federal agencies lacked progress on achieving the Strategy goals and were in the process of implementing a new mechanism to monitor progress. As we reported in May 2016, ONDCP and the federal agencies had made moderate progress toward achieving one goal, limited progress on three goals, and no demonstrated progress on the remaining three goals. In many instances, the data used to assess progress, while the most up to date at the time, were several years old. Based on the most recent data available, although some of the sub-measures, such as decreasing tobacco use by eighth graders, were achieved, none of the seven overall goals in the Strategy have been fully achieved as of July 2017. Table 1 shows the 2010 Strategy goals and progress toward meeting them as of July 2017. For example:
Progress was made on the goal to decrease the 30-day prevalence of drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds by 15 percent. The rates of reported marijuana use for this measure increased by 9 percent from 2009 to 2015. For example:
Progress was not made on the goal to reduce drug-induced deaths by 15 percent. Themes from a Comptroller General Forum on Preventing Illicit Drug Use
To advance the national dialogue on preventing illicit drug use, including preventing individuals from using illicit drugs for the first time, we convened and moderated a diverse panel of health care, education, and law enforcement experts, including from ONDCP, on June 22, 2016. The panel focused on (1) common factors related to illicit drug use; (2) strategies in the education, health care, and law enforcement sectors to prevent illicit drug use; and (3) high priority areas for future action to prevent illicit drug use, and our November 2016 report summarized the themes from the forum. Forum participants also noted several strategies available in the education, health care, and law enforcement sectors for preventing illicit drug use:
Education. Forum participants championed the use of school-or community-based prevention programs that research has shown to be successful in preventing illicit drug use and other behaviors. Forum participants also identified several high priority areas for future action to help prevent illicit drug use, including the misuse of prescription drugs. Some examples include: supporting community coalitions comprising the health care, education, and law enforcement sectors that work in concert to prevent illicit drug use at the local level; consolidating federal funding streams for multiple prevention programs into a single fund used to address the risk factors for a range of unhealthy behaviors, including illicit drug use; increasing the use of prevention programs that research has shown to be effective, such as those that are well-designed and deliver persuasive drug prevention messages on a regular basis; identifying and pursuing ways to change perceptions of substance abuse disorders and illicit drug use, such as emphasizing that a substance abuse disorder is a disease of the brain and can be treated like other diseases; supporting drug prevention efforts in primary care settings, such as exploring ways to reimburse providers for conducting preventative drug screenings; and reducing the number of prescriptions issued for opioids. Agencies Have Strengthened Collaboration of Drug- Free Communities Support Program but Could Enhance Grantee Compliance and Performance Monitoring
In February 2017, we issued a report on the Drug-Free Communities Support Program (DFC)—a program that ONDCP and SAMHSA jointly manage. This program aims to support drug abuse prevention efforts that engage schools, law enforcement, and other sectors of a community to target reductions in the use of alcohol, tobacco, marijuana, and the illicit use of prescription drugs. In our February 2017 report, we found that ONDCP and SAMHSA had improved their joint management of the program. We made recommendations that SAMHSA develop an action plan to strengthen the agency’s grant monitoring process and ensure ONDCP gets complete and accurate information, among other things. SAMHSA concurred with our recommendations and reported to us in April 2017 that it is implementing actions to address our recommendations that should be completed by this fall. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, in 2015, the most recent year for which national data are available, over 52,000 Americans died from drug overdoses, or approximately 144 people every day. Policymakers, criminal justice officials, health care providers, and the public at large are turning with renewed attention to the drug epidemic and its impact on our nation. To help reduce illicit drug use and its consequences, ONDCP oversees and coordinates the implementation of national drug control policy across the federal government.
This statement addresses: (1) the federal government's progress in achieving Strategy goals, (2) results from a Comptroller General's Forum on preventing illicit drug use, and (3) the findings of GAO's recent review of ONDCP's DFC Support program.
This statement is based on GAO's prior work issued from May 2016 through February 2017, with selected status updates as of July 2017, and updates from ONDCP's National Drug Control Budget Funding Highlight reports issued from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2018. For the updates, GAO used publically available data sources that ONDCP uses to assess its progress on Strategy goals, and interviewed ONDCP officials.
What GAO Found
The federal government has made mixed progress toward achieving the goals articulated in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy). In the Strategy, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) established seven goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences by 2015. In many instances, the data used to assess progress in 2015 have only recently become available. GAO's review of this updated data indicates that, as of July 2017, the federal government made moderate progress toward achieving two goals, limited progress on two goals, and no progress on the other three goals. However, none of the overall goals in the Strategy were fully achieved. For example, progress had not been made on the goal to reduce drug-induced deaths by 15 percent. Drug-induced deaths instead increased from 2009 to 2015 by 41.5 percent. Although progress was made reducing the 30-day prevalence of drug use among 12- to 17-year-olds from the 10.1 percent reported in 2009, the goal of reducing prevalence to 8.6 percent by 2015 was not achieved. According to ONDCP, as of July 2017, work is currently underway to develop a new strategy.
In June 2016, GAO convened a diverse panel of experts, including from ONDCP to advance the national dialogue on preventing illicit drug use. The panel focused on (1) common factors related to illicit drug use; (2) strategies in the education, health care, and law enforcement sectors to prevent illicit drug use; and (3) high priority areas for future action to prevent illicit drug use. According to forum participants, illicit drug use typically occurs for the first time in adolescence, involves marijuana, and increasingly, legal prescriptions for opioid-based pain relievers. Forum participants also discussed strategies available in the education, health care, and law enforcement sectors for preventing illicit drug use. For example, forum participants championed the use of school- or-community-based prevention programs that research has shown to be successful in preventing illicit drug use and other behaviors. They also identified several high priority areas for future actions to prevent illicit drug use, including: supporting community coalitions, consolidating federal funding streams for prevention programs, and reducing the number of opioid prescriptions.
In February 2017, GAO issued a report on the Drug-Free Communities Support Program (DFC)—a program that ONDCP and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) jointly manage. This program aims to support drug abuse prevention efforts that engage schools, law enforcement, and other sectors of a community to target reductions in the use of alcohol, tobacco, marijuana, and the illicit use of prescription drugs. GAO reported that ONDCP and SAMHSA had strengthened their joint management of the program by employing leading collaboration practices; however, the agencies could enhance DFC grantee compliance and performance monitoring. For example, SAMHSA did not consistently confirm grantees had completed plans to achieve long-term goals after exiting the program. GAO recommended that SAMHSA develop an action plan to strengthen DFC grant monitoring and ensure it sends complete and accurate information to ONDCP. SAMHSA concurred with GAO's recommendations and reported in April 2017 that its actions to address them should be completed by this fall. |
gao_GAO-11-207 | gao_GAO-11-207_0 | Background
Ferries Transport Passengers and Vehicles
According to the 190 ferry operators responding to the 2008 National Census of Ferry Operators, more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles were carried on their vessels in the United States. The Coast Guard Assessed Risk to Ferries and Their Facilities in Accordance with DHS’s Risk Assessment Guidance and Security Concerns Exist
The Coast Guard Adheres to Risk Assessment Guidance from DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan
The Coast Guard uses a tool known as the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model to assess risk to vessels and port infrastructure, including ferries and ferry facilities, in accordance with the guidance from DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. In April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats against ferries and their facilities identified in at least the last 12 months, but noted the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a ferry. In April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials also stated that they have seen a gradual shift in terrorist tactics and procedures overseas that had been seen in attacks against mass transit and other soft targets—characteristics typically shared with ferry systems as well. However, not all ferry systems allow vehicles on board. Stakeholders Have Implemented Ferry Security Measures, but the Coast Guard Has Not Acted on Other Identified Opportunities That May Enhance Security
To secure ferries and their facilities, responsible maritime security stakeholders—including the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, as well as owners and operators of ferries and their facilities—reported having taken various actions to implement applicable federal maritime laws, regulations, and guidance designed to help ensure the security of ferries and their facilities. Ferry Operators Have Taken Action to Enhance Security and Their Ability to Meet Security Standards Has Been Measured through Inspections
Ferry and ferry facility operators develop and implement security plans. Security methods varied across ferry operations. Based on our site visits, screening was performed by a variety of personnel in these locations, including ferry crew members, contracted security screeners, and state or local law enforcement. The Coast Guard May Be Missing Opportunities to Enhance Ferry Security
The Coast Guard has reported taking various actions to help secure ferries, but may be missing opportunities to further enhance ferry security, particularly with respect to enhancing screening measures because it has not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all of the findings and recommendations from several ferry security reports completed in 2005 and 2006. The third report, issued by ABSG Consulting in April 2005, reported on the completed consequence studies that were conducted and included classified findings on the potential consequences of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, but no recommendations resulted from this report. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should have policies and procedures for ensuring that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that they believe the ferry security reports can still provide valuable information and they plan to begin evaluating the reports in fall 2010. Despite Coast Guard documents from 2004 stating that a reassessment of the screening requirements should be conducted when the ferry security studies were completed or if the threat were to change—both of which have occurred—as of May 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that they had not taken action to reassess and update the requirements since the 2004 security directive. Taking action to reassess screening requirements could provide the Coast Guard with key information to help improve its vehicle screening requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Coast Guard considers all known options for securing the ferry transportation system and is not missing opportunities to enhance ferry security, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following two actions: (1) after fully evaluating the findings and recommendations from the Coast Guard’s 2005 and 2006 ferry security reports, take appropriate actions to address the findings and recommendations identified in these reports; and (2) upon review of the reports, ensure that vehicle screening requirements are set at an appropriate level that considers both the risks to and operating requirements of ferry systems, and when warranted, reassess screening requirements for ferries and make changes as appropriate. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Interior for their review and comment. Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ferries are a vital component of the U.S. transportation system and 2008 data show that U.S. ferries carried more than 82 million passengers and over 25 million vehicles. Ferries are also potential targets for terrorism in the United States and have been terrorist targets overseas. GAO was asked to review ferry security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and what risks it identified; and (2) federal agencies, ferry and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect ferries and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements, analyzed 2006 through 2009 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at five domestic and one international locations with varying passenger volumes and relative risk profiles. Site visits provided information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. This is the public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2010. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard assessed the risk--including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--to ferries in accordance with DHS guidance on risk assessment and, along with other maritime stakeholders, identified risks associated with explosive devices, among other things. Although in April 2010, Coast Guard intelligence officials stated that there have been no credible terrorist threats identified against ferries and their facilities in at least the last 12 months, maritime intelligence officials have identified the presence of terrorist groups with the capability of attacking a ferry. Many of the Coast Guard, ferry system and law enforcement officials GAO spoke with generally believe ferries are vulnerable to passenger- or vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, although not all ferry systems transport vehicles. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which could include possible loss of life and negative economic effects. In April 2010, Coast Guard officials stated that the relative risk to ferries is increasing, as evidenced by attacks against land-based mass transit and other targets overseas. Federal agencies--including the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--ferry operators, and law enforcement entities report that they have taken various actions to enhance the security of ferries and facilities and have implemented related laws, regulations, and guidance, but the Coast Guard may be missing opportunities to enhance ferry security. Security measures taken by the Coast Guard have included providing a security presence on ferries during transit. Coast Guard officials also reported that they are revising regulations to improve ferry operator training and developing guidance on screening. Ferry operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans and screening vehicles and passengers, among other things. However, the Coast Guard had not evaluated and, if determined warranted, acted on all findings and recommendations resulting from five agency-contracted studies on ferry security completed in 2005 and 2006. Reports from these studies included several recommendations for standardizing and enhancing screening across ferry operators. Standards for internal control in the federal government state that agencies should ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved, and that managers take action to evaluate and resolve matters identified in these audits and reviews. As a result of our work on ferry security, in August 2010, Coast Guard officials stated they planned to review the reports. Taking action to address the recommendations in these reports, if determined warranted by the Coast Guard's evaluation, could enhance ferry security. Furthermore, Coast Guard documents from 2004 state that the agency should reassess vehicle screening requirements pending the completion of the ferry security reports or if the threat changes. However, no specific plans were in place to reassess these requirements. By taking action to reassess its screening requirements, the agency would be better positioned to determine if changes are warranted.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, after evaluating the completed studies on ferry security, reassess vehicle screening requirements and take further actions to enhance security, if determined warranted. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-292T | gao_GAO-12-292T_0 | For more than a decade, the agency and its contractors have used automated software tools to analyze data from various sources to detect patterns of unusual activities or financial transactions that indicate payments could be made for fraudulent charges or improper payments. The agency’s efforts led to the IDR and One PI programs, which are intended to provide CMS and its program integrity contractors with a centralized source of Medicare and Medicaid data and a web-based portal and set of analytical tools by which these data can be accessed and analyzed to help detect cases of fraud, waste, and abuse. To achieve its goal, CMS officials planned to implement a tool set that would provide a single source of information to enable consistent, reliable, and timely analyses and improve the agency’s ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. IDR and One PI Were in Use, but Lacked Data and Functionality Essential to CMS’s Program Integrity Efforts
IDR had been in use by CMS and its contractors who conduct Medicare program integrity analysis since September 2006 and incorporated data related to claims for reimbursement of services under Medicare Parts A, B, and D. According to program officials, the integration of these data into IDR established a centralized source of data previously accessed from multiple disparate system files. However, although the agency had been incorporating data from various data sources since 2006, our prior report noted that IDR did not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by the end of 2010 and that are needed to support enhanced program integrity initiatives. For example, IDR did not include the Medicaid data that are critical to analysts’ ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in this program. However, program officials had not defined plans and reliable schedules for incorporating these data into IDR. Further, no Medicaid analysts had been trained to use the system. CMS Was Not Yet Positioned to Identify Financial Benefits or to Fully Meet Program Integrity Goals and Objectives through the Use of IDR and One PI
Because IDR and One PI were not being used as planned, CMS officials were not in a position to determine the extent to which the systems were providing financial benefits or supporting the agency’s initiatives to meet program integrity goals and objectives. While CMS had shown some progress toward meeting the programs’ goals of providing a centralized data repository and enhanced analytical capabilities for detecting improper payments due to fraud, waste, and abuse, the implementation of IDR and One PI did not yet position the agency to identify, measure, and track financial benefits realized from reductions in improper payments as a result of the implementation of either system. Further, program officials’ projection of financial benefits expected as a result of implementing One PI was reported to be approximately $21 billion. They explained that, since the program had not met its goal for widespread use of One PI, there were not enough data available to quantify financial benefits attributable to the use of the system. For example, performance measures and targets for One PI included increases in the detection of improper payments for Medicare Parts A and B claims. CMS Needs to Take Actions to Achieve Widespread Use of IDR and One PI
Given the critical need for CMS to reduce improper payments within the Medicare and Medicaid programs, we included in our June 2011 report a number of recommended actions that we consider vital to helping the agency achieve more widespread use of IDR and One PI for program integrity purposes. Specifically, we recommended that the Administrator of CMS finalize plans and develop schedules for incorporating additional data into IDR that identify all resources and activities needed to complete tasks and that consider risks and obstacles to the IDR program; implement and manage plans for incorporating data in IDR to meet schedule milestones; establish plans and reliable schedules for training all program integrity analysts intended to use One PI; establish and communicate deadlines for program integrity contractors to complete training and use One PI in their work; conduct training in accordance with plans and established deadlines to ensure schedules are met and program integrity contractors are trained and able to meet requirements for using One PI; define any measurable financial benefits expected from the implementation of IDR and One PI; and with stakeholder input, establish measurable, outcome-based performance measures for IDR and One PI that gauge progress toward meeting program goals. In conclusion, CMS’s success toward meeting goals to enhance program integrity efforts through the use of IDR and One PI depends upon the incorporation of all needed data into IDR, and effective use of the systems by the agency’s broad community of Medicare and Medicaid program integrity analysts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for administering and safeguarding its programs from loss of funds. As GAO reported in June 2011, CMS utilizes automated systems and tools to help improve the detection of improper payments for fraudulent, wasteful, and abusive claims. To integrate claims information and improve its ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in these programs, CMS initiated two information technology system programs: the Integrated Data Repository (IDR) and One Program Integrity (One PI). GAO was asked to testify on its earlier report that examined CMS's efforts to protect the integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs through the use of information technology. In that prior study, GAO assessed the extent to which IDR and One PI have been developed and implemented, and CMS's progress toward achieving its goals and objectives for using these systems to detect fraud, waste, and abuse.
What GAO Found
GAO previously reported that CMS had developed and begun using both IDR and One PI, but had not incorporated into IDR all data as planned. IDR is intended to be the central repository of Medicare and Medicaid data needed to help CMS and states' program integrity staff and contractors prevent and detect improper payments. Program integrity analysts use these data to identify patterns of unusual activities or transactions that may indicate fraudulent charges or other types of improper payments. IDR has been operational and in use since September 2006 but did not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by fiscal year 2010. For example, IDR included most types of Medicare claims data, but not the Medicaid data needed to help analysts detect improper payments of Medicaid claims. According to program officials, these data were not incorporated because of obstacles introduced by technical issues and delays in funding. Until the agency finalizes plans and develops reliable schedules for efforts to incorporate these data, CMS may face additional delays in making available all the data that are needed to support enhanced Medicare and Medicaid program integrity efforts. Additionally, CMS had not taken steps to ensure widespread use of One PI to enhance efforts to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. One PI is a web-based portal that is to provide CMS staff and contractors, and Medicaid analysts with a single source of access to data contained in IDR, as well as tools for analyzing those data. While One PI had been developed and deployed to users, no Medicaid analysts and only a few Medicare program integrity analysts were trained and using the system. Specifically, One PI program officials planned for 639 program integrity analysts, including 130 Medicaid analysts, to be using the system by the end of fiscal year 2010; however, as of October 2010, only 41--less than 7 percent--were actively using the portal and tools. According to program officials, the agency's initial training plans were insufficient and, as a result, they were not able to train the intended community of users. Until program officials finalize plans and develop reliable schedules for training users and expanding the use of One PI, the agency may continue to experience delays in reaching widespread use of the system. While CMS had made progress toward its goals to provide a single repository of data and enhanced analytical capabilities for program integrity efforts, the agency was not yet positioned to identify, measure, and track benefits realized from its efforts. As a result, it was unknown whether IDR and One PI as implemented had provided financial benefits. According to IDR officials, they did not measure benefits realized from increases in the detection rate for improper payments because they relied on business owners to do so; One PI officials stated that, because of the limited use of that system, there were not enough data to measure and gauge the program's success toward achieving the $21 billion in financial benefits that the agency projected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations at this time. GAO recommended in June 2011 that CMS take actions to finalize plans and schedules for achieving widespread use of IDR and One PI, and to define measurable benefits. CMS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-403 | gao_GAO-08-403_0 | Background
Table 1 lists the 37 research reactors operating in the United States. For example, most U.S. research reactors are located on university campuses; while these research reactors have security systems in place, none are protected with the kind of security or armed security forces that protect nuclear power reactors. DOE Used Its DBT to Develop Security and Emergency Response Requirements for Its Reactors, Which Also Benefit from National Laboratories’ Enhanced Security
To protect its four research reactors, DOE uses the security and emergency requirements developed from its DBT and counts on the security afforded by the reactors’ locations at certain national laboratories that require heightened security. DOE Research Reactors Are Protected by Requirements of the DBT and Their Location at National Laboratories
DOE’s research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where the research reactors are located. DOE Has Established Extensive Plans and Procedures for Safety and Security Incidents
DOE has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, possibly causing radiation to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have established extensive plans and procedures for responding to reactor emergencies, as DOE policies require. NRC’s Security Assessment May Not Adequately Reflect the Potential Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on Its Licensed Research Reactors
Between 2003 and 2006, NRC conducted a security assessment of NRC- licensed research reactors to determine whether existing security and emergency response requirements were sufficient to protect against an attack. In conducting this assessment, NRC established a minimum radiological dosage as the criterion to determine if a full security assessment was necessary. However, NRC’s security assessment may contain important shortcomings. Specifically, NRC made the following assumptions that we have reason to question: NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain weapons and tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios which could be more damaging if carried out successfully. NRC assumed that only a small portion of a research reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack, resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere. However, according to experts at INL and DHS, it is possible that a larger portion of a research reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack. If this occurred, these experts also noted that an attack could result in a release of a larger amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere over neighboring communities. NRC’s reasons for its disagreement, and our analysis of these reasons, are discussed in detail in the classified version of this report. NNSA Has Made Progress in Converting U.S. Research Reactors from HEU to LEU Fuel, but It Faces Challenges in Converting Some Remaining Research Reactors
NNSA has converted 8 currently operating U.S. research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel and has plans to convert 10 remaining reactors by 2014. NNSA is now developing a new fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to convert; according to an NNSA official, this new fuel must be developed by 2011 if NNSA is to meet its 2014 conversion schedule goal. Argonne National Laboratory officials working on the fuel development effort at that time characterized the failures during testing as the worst they had ever experienced. If NRC finds that the consequences of an attack on a research reactor are more severe than previously estimated, we recommended that the Chairman of NRC take the following three actions: ensure that the security requirements for research reactors are commensurate with the consequences of attacks, reexamine emergency response requirements to address whether evacuation plans should be included, and require that first responders to alarms at research reactors be armed. Furthermore, a key finding of our report is that NRC disagreed with the SNL finding that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of terrorist attacks. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
There are 37 research reactors in the United States, mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Four are operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be attractive targets for terrorists. As requested, GAO examined the (1) basis on which DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors and (2) progress that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made in converting U.S. research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the security of research reactors (GAO-08-156C).
What GAO Found
DOE developed the security and emergency response requirements for its research reactors using its Design Basis Threat--a process that establishes a baseline threat for which minimum security measures should be developed. These research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where they are located, which store weapons-usable nuclear materials. DOE also has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, causing radioactivity to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have extensive plans and procedures for responding to security incidents. NRC based its security and emergency response requirements largely on the regulations it had in place before September 2001. NRC decided that the security assessment it conducted between 2003 and 2006 showed that these requirements were sufficient. While it was conducting this assessment, NRC worked with licensees to improve security when weaknesses were detected. However, GAO found that NRC's assessment contains questionable assumptions that create uncertainty about whether the assessment reflects the full range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors. For example, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)--a contractor NRC used to assist in performing its assessment-- found that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of attacks. However, NRC disagreed with SNL's finding. In 2006, NRC concluded that the consequences of attacks would result in minimal radiological exposure to the public. In addition, NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios that could be more damaging. Finally, NRC assumed that a small part of a reactor could be damaged in an attack, resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity. However, according to experts at Idaho National Laboratories and the Department of Homeland Security, it is possible that a larger part of a reactor could be damaged, which could result in the release of larger amounts of radioactivity. NNSA has made progress in changing from HEU to LEU fuel in U.S. research reactors but may face difficulty in converting some of the remaining research reactors. Since 1978, NNSA has converted eight currently operating U.S. research reactors, including two in 2006. In addition, NNSA plans to convert 10 more U.S. research reactors by September 2014--five of which are scheduled for conversion by 2009. However, NNSA faces difficulties in converting the remaining five reactors because these reactors cannot operate with the currently available LEU fuel. NNSA is now developing a new LEU fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to operate. However, according to NNSA, developing this fuel has been problematic, as early efforts experienced failures during testing. NNSA officials acknowledged that further setbacks are likely to delay plans to convert these research reactors. |
gao_GAO-14-225 | gao_GAO-14-225_0 | Changes in the College Affinity Card Market Since the CARD Act
Number of Card Agreements, Cardholders, and Payments Declined in 2009–2012
Since the CARD Act was passed in 2009, the numbers of college affinity card agreements and cardholders have decreased, according to data from the Federal Reserve and CFPB. From 2009 through 2012, the number of card agreements declined from 1,045 to 617 (41 percent). In 2012, 23 credit card issuers offered college affinity cards.issuer—FIA Card Services, N.A., a subsidiary of Bank of America—had 412 of the 617 reported agreements (67 percent of the market). All of the reviewed agreements included provisions allowing the card issuers to use the trademark or logo of the institution of higher education or organization. Payments to Organizations under the Agreements
All but one of the 39 reviewed agreements contained information about the payment arrangement between the issuer and the affiliated organization or institution of higher education. Marketing to Students Appears to Have Declined
According to available data and representatives of card issuers and affiliated organizations, marketing of college affinity cards and college student credit cards directly to students appears to have declined. Four large issuers of affinity cards, representing 91 percent of the market (as measured by 2012 cardholders), said they did not actively market these cards to students— that is, they did not market on campus or specifically target students through direct mail, e-mail, print or broadcast media, or their other marketing venues. Representatives of five affiliated organizations with affinity credit card agreements corroborated these statements; they told us that the card issuers no longer marketed their affinity cards to students, focusing instead on alumni. For example, they noted that issuers no longer conducted on-campus solicitations at sporting events and other university functions, as they had in the past. According to annual surveys of college students conducted by Student Monitor, a market research firm specializing in the college student market, the number of students obtaining a credit card in response to a solicitation through direct mail or on campus has dropped significantly in recent years. The proportion of students reporting that they obtained a credit card as a result of a direct mail solicitation declined from 36 percent in 2000 to 6 percent in 2013 (see fig. Effect of College Affinity and Student Cards on Student Credit Card Debt Largely Is Unknown
Data are not available to definitively determine the effect that affinity cards and college student cards have had on student credit card debt. However, students’ overall use of credit cards appears to have declined in recent years. For example, a 2012 study that examined the effect of the CARD Act reviewed affinity card agreements and surveyed college students on their use of credit cards, but it did not seek to determine the impact of particular types of credit cards. College Affinity Cards
The effect of affinity cards on student credit card debt may be limited because fewer students appear to hold these cards, which generally have not been marketed specifically to college students since at least 2009. Number of Students with Credit Cards
The two studies suggest that the number of students owning credit cards declined in recent years. In 2010, the median credit limit for all bank-type general credit cards was $15,000.contrast, Student Monitor found that more than 60 percent of credit cards owned by students had credit limits of $500 or less, and 80 percent were $1,000 or less. Student Monitor found that 72 percent of students reported paying their outstanding charges in full each month in 2013. One quarter of students in the 2013 Student Monitor study reported paying a late payment fee at least once since acquiring a credit card, with almost half of that group incurring more than one late fee. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the trends associated with and characteristics of college affinity card agreements, (2) the extent of marketing for college affinity and college student credit cards, and (3) what is known about the effect of the use of affinity cards and student credit cards on student credit card debt. To identify the trends and general characteristics associated with college affinity card agreements, we reviewed the 2010 and 2011 Report to the Congress on College Credit Card Agreements, which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) issued, and the 2012 and 2013 College Credit Card Agreements: Annual Report to Congress, which the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (also known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or CFPB) issued. Third, we included the five largest agreements with institutions of higher education, as measured by the number of cardholders under those agreements. We reviewed these agreements and collected information using a data collection instrument (DCI) to gather characteristics such as their effective date, duration, allowed marketing practices and target populations, payments to the organization, consumer protections, and service standards. Lastly, we reviewed provisions of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 related to affinity credit cards and credit card use by those under 21. | Why GAO Did This Study
Institutions of higher education, alumni groups, and other affiliated organizations may enter into agreements with credit card issuers for “college affinity cards,” in which issuers use the institution's name or logo in exchange for payments. Separately, some credit card issuers offer “college student credit cards,” which are expressly targeted to students. Partly in response to concerns about card issuer practices and rising student credit card debt, Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009. The act includes consumer protections and requires disclosures specifically for consumers under the age of 21, including limits to on-campus credit card marketing and requirements for public disclosure of affinity card agreements. The act mandates that GAO review these agreements and assess their effect on student credit card debt.
This report examines (1) trends associated with and characteristics of college affinity card agreements, (2) the extent of marketing for college affinity cards and college student credit cards, and (3) what is known about the effect of use of these cards on student credit card debt. GAO analyzed data from the Federal Reserve and CFPB, including a sample of 39 affinity agreements filed by the issuers. GAO also analyzed data on student credit card use or indebtedness, and interviewed officials from federal agencies, credit card issuers, and affiliated organizations.
What GAO Found
Trends associated with college affinity card agreements include fewer agreements and cardholders and declining payments, according to data GAO analyzed from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB). The number of affinity card agreements declined from 1,045 in 2009 to 617 in 2012 (41 percent). More than 70 percent of the agreements in 2012 were with institutions of higher education or alumni organizations, and one issuer—FIA Card Services, a subsidiary of Bank of America—had 67 percent of all agreements. Affinity card issuers paid $50.4 million to all organizations in 2012, 40 percent less than in 2009. In most cases, payments were based on numbers of cardholders and the amount spent on the cards. The card agreements covered contractual obligations related to such things as marketing practices, target populations, use of the organization's logo or trademark, terms of payment, and, in some cases, service standards.
Student-focused marketing of affinity and student cards on campus appears to have declined. Four large affinity card issuers GAO interviewed (representing 91 percent of cardholders) said that they primarily targeted alumni and no longer marketed affinity cards directly to students. In interviews with GAO, institutions of higher education and affiliated organizations agreed that affinity card marketing directly to students had ceased. In addition, five of the nine largest overall credit card issuers that also issue college student credit cards told GAO they no longer actively marketed these cards (such as through direct mail, e-mail, or on-campus activity), but rather relied upon websites and bank branches. Representatives of five institutions with large affinity card agreements told GAO that they generally noticed a decline in on-campus credit card marketing in recent years. Consistent with these observations, available data show a decline in card solicitations to students in recent years. For example, a survey of students in 2013 by Student Monitor, a research firm, found that 6 percent of students reported obtaining a credit card as a result of a direct mail solicitation, compared with 36 percent in 2000.
Data are not available to definitively determine the effect that affinity cards and college student credit cards have had on student credit card debt. For affinity cards, the effect may be limited because fewer students appear to hold such cards. For college student credit cards, the effect is difficult to determine because data are available for credit cards in general but not for student credit cards in particular. However, students' overall use of credit cards appears to have declined in recent years. For example, Student Monitor reported 33 percent of students owned credit cards in 2013 versus 53 percent in 2004, a trend corroborated by several other studies that GAO identified. But Student Monitor found that students with credit cards in their names increasingly obtained the cards before starting college. In addition, it found that in 2013, students charged an average of $171 monthly on their cards, 80 percent of the cards had a credit limit of $1,000 or less, and 72 percent of students said they paid their outstanding charges in full each month. Student Monitor also reported that one quarter of students in 2013 paid a late payment fee at least once since they acquired the credit card, with almost half of those paying more than once.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-14-145T | gao_GAO-14-145T_0 | Trends in DOD’s Portfolio of Major Acquisitions
There can be little doubt that we can—and must—get better outcomes from our weapon system investments. As seen in table 1, the value of these investments in recent years has been on the order of $1.5 trillion or more, making them a significant part of the federal discretionary budget. Yet, as indicated in table 1, 39 percent of programs have had unit cost growth of 25 percent or more. For example, cost growth has declined between 2011 and 2012.programs have improved their buying power by finding efficiencies in We have also observed that a number of development or production, and requirements changes. On the other hand, cost and schedule growth remain significant when measured against programs’ first full estimates. The body of work we have done on benchmarking best practices Recent, significant changes has also been reflected in acquisition policy.to the policy include those introduced by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and the department’s own “Better Buying Power” initiatives which, when fully implemented, should further strengthen practices that can lead to successful acquisitions. The policy provides a framework for developers of new weapons to gather knowledge that confirms that their technologies are mature, their designs are stable, and their production processes are in control. These improvements do not yet signify a trend or suggest that a corner has been turned. The reforms themselves still face implementation challenges such as staffing and clarity of guidance and will doubtless need refining as experience is gained. In other words, the reforms have not yet been institutionalized within the services. Other programs are significantly at odds with the acquisition process. The question is why aren’t we doing it?” To that point, reforms have been aimed mainly at the “what” versus the “why.” They have championed sound management practices, such as realistic estimating, thorough testing, and accurate reporting. Seen this way, the practices prescribed in policy are only partial remedies. I will now discuss several factors that illustrate the pressures that create incentives to deviate from sound acquisition management practices. Several Factors Create Incentives to Deviate from Sound Acquisition Practices
Conflicting Demands
The process of acquiring new weapons is (1) shaped by its different participants and (2) far more complex than the seemingly straightforward purchase of equipment to defeat an enemy threat. Collectively, as participants’ needs are translated into actions on weapon programs, the purpose of such programs transcends efficiently filling voids in military capability. Take, for example, a decision to start a new program scheduled for August 2016. It is the funding approvals that ultimately define acquisition policy. Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform. Where Do We Go from Here? Drawing on our extensive body of work in weapon systems acquisition, I have four areas of focus regarding where to go from here. These are not intended to be all-encompassing, but rather, practical places to start the hard work of realigning incentives with desired results. Identify significant program risks upfront and resource them: Weapon acquisition programs by their nature involve risks, some much more than others. More closely align budget decisions and program decisions: Because budget decisions are often made years ahead of program decisions, they depend on the promises and projections of program sponsors. Attract, train, and retain acquisition staff and management: Dr. Fox’s book does an excellent job of laying out the flaws in the current ways DOD selects, trains, and provides a career path for program managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's acquisition of major weapon systems has been on GAO's high risk list since 1990. Over the past 50 years, Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes, including reforms that have championed sound management practices, such as realistic cost estimating, prototyping, and systems engineering. Too often, GAO reports on the same kinds of problems today that it did over 20 years ago.
The topic of today's hearing is: "25 Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?" To that end, this testimony discusses (1) the performance of DOD's major defense acquisition program portfolio; (2) the management policies and processes currently in place to guide those acquisitions; (3) the incentives to deviate from otherwise sound acquisition practices; and (4) suggestions to temper these incentives. This statement draws from GAO's extensive body of work on DOD's acquisition of weapon systems.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) must get better outcomes from its weapon system investments, which in recent years have totaled around $1.5 trillion or more. Recently, there have been some improvements, owing in part to reforms. For example, cost growth declined between 2011 and 2012 and a number of programs also improved their buying power by finding efficiencies in development or production and requirements changes. Still, cost and schedule growth remain significant; 39 percent of fiscal 2012 programs have had unit cost growth of 25 percent or more.
DOD's acquisition policy provides a methodological framework for developers to gather knowledge that confirms that their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their production processes are in control. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and DOD's recent "Better Buying Power" initiatives introduced significant changes that, when fully implemented, should further strengthen practices that can lead to successful acquisitions. GAO has also made numerous recommendations to improve the acquisition process, based on its extensive work in the area. While recent reforms have benefited individual programs, it is premature to say there is a trend or a corner has been turned. The reforms still face implementation challenges and have not yet been institutionalized within the services.
Reforms that focus on the methodological procedures of the acquisition process are only partial remedies because they do not address incentives to deviate from sound practices. Weapons acquisition is a complicated enterprise, complete with unintended incentives that encourage moving programs forward by delaying testing and employing other problematic practices. These incentives stem from several factors. For example, the different participants in the acquisition process impose conflicting demands on weapon programs so that their purpose transcends just filling voids in military capability. Also, the budget process forces funding decisions to be made well in advance of program decisions, which encourages undue optimism about program risks and costs. Finally, DOD program managers' short tenures and limitations in experience and training can foster a short-term focus and put them at a disadvantage with their industry counterparts.
Drawing on its extensive body of work in weapon systems acquisition, GAO sees several areas of focus regarding where to go from here:
at the start of new programs, using funding decisions to reinforce desirable principles such as well-informed acquisition strategies;
identifying significant risks up front and resourcing them;
exploring ways to align budget decisions and program decisions more closely; and
attracting, training, and retaining acquisition staff and managers so that they are both empowered and accountable for program outcomes.
These areas are not intended to be all-encompassing, but rather, practical places to start the hard work of realigning incentives with desired results. |
gao_AIMD-98-1 | gao_AIMD-98-1_0 | Building on the CFO Act audits, FFMIA requires, beginning with the fiscal year ended September 30, 1997, that each of the 24 CFO agencies’ financial statement auditors report on whether the agency’s financial management systems substantially comply with federal financial management systems requirements, applicable accounting standards, and the SGL. The U.S. Standard General Ledger
In 1984, OMB tasked an interagency group to develop a standard general ledger chart of accounts for governmentwide use. We have been discussing with OMB some refinements to this bulletin, with particular focus on four areas: (1) clarifying, based on information provided in OMB’s implementation guidance, that the auditor should perform tests of the reporting entity’s compliance with the requirements of FFMIA, (2) including in the reporting entity’s management representation letter a representation about whether the reporting entity’s financial management systems are in substantial compliance with FFMIA requirements, (3) clarifying that the auditor’s report on the reporting entity’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations state that the auditor performed sufficient compliance tests of FFMIA requirements to report whether the entity’s financial management systems comply substantially with FFMIA requirements, and (4) separately stating in the auditor’s report whether such tests disclosed any instances in which the reporting entity’s financial management systems did not comply substantially with FFMIA requirements. Challenges in Implementing the Act
Agencies face significant challenges in achieving substantial compliance with the act’s requirements in the near future. Status of Federal Accounting Standards
Using a due process and consensus building approach, FASAB has successfully provided the federal government with an initial set of accounting standards. To date, FASAB has recommended, and OMB and GAO have issued, two statements of accounting concepts and eight statements of accounting standards with various effective dates ranging from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1998. These concepts and standards, which are listed in table 3, underpin OMB’s guidance to agencies on the form and content of their financial statements. Further, we reviewed fiscal year 1996 audit results for the 24 CFO agencies and applicable federal accounting standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on: (1) the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996; (2) efforts under way to implement the act; (3) challenges that agencies face in achieving full compliance with those requirements; and (4) the status of federal accounting standards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is too early to tell the extent to which the 24 agencies named in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act will be in compliance with FFMIA requirements for fiscal year 1997 because auditor reports discussing the results of the fiscal year 1997 financial statement audits will generally not be available until March 1, 1998, which is the statutory reporting deadline; (2) the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the CFO agencies have initiated efforts to implement the act's requirements and improve financial management systems; (3) although auditors performing financial audits under the CFO Act are not required to report on FFMIA compliance until March 1, 1998, prior audit results and agency self-reporting all point to significant challenges that agencies must meet in fully implementing systems requirements, accounting standards, and the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger; (4) regarding the adequacy of accounting standards, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) has successfully developed a good initial set of accounting standards; (5) to date, FASAB has recommended, and OMB and GAO have issued, two statements of accounting concepts and eight statements of accounting standards tailored to the federal government's unique characteristics and special needs; and (6) OMB has integrated these concepts and standards into its guidance to agencies on the form and content of their financial statements. |
gao_GAO-10-731 | gao_GAO-10-731_0 | Background
USPS’s mail processing network consists of multiple facilities with different functions, as shown in a simplified version of this complex network in figure 1. In its June 2008 Network Plan, USPS determined that it will reexamine its mail processing network on an ongoing basis given changes in mail volume and outlined several initiatives to improve management of its mail processing operations, retail operations, and workforce to increase efficiency and reduce costs. With regard to its mail processing operations specifically, USPS identified three major initiatives to improve efficiency: (1) closing Airport Mail Center (AMC) operations, (2) transforming the Bulk Mail Center (BMC) network, and (3) consolidating AMP operations. USPS’s Network Plan also included criteria for evaluating decisions, the three most important of which were cost, service, and capacity. USPS Has Realigned Part of Its Mail Processing Network and Has Estimated Cost Savings
USPS has realigned parts of its mail processing network and continues to seek additional opportunities to achieve its goal of creating an efficient and flexible network. For fiscal year 2009, USPS realized a cost savings of almost $30 million from eliminating all AMC operating functions and closing nine of these facilities and reorganizing the functions of the BMC to the Network Distribution Centers (NDC). USPS officials told us that they plan to reclassify the 12 remaining facilities and determine whether some of them can be closed. USPS realized a cost savings of about $17.7 million for fiscal year 2009, with a projected cost savings of about $233.8 million from additional reorganization in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. According to officials, USPS also plans to integrate its Surface Transfer Center (STC) functions into the NDC network to further eliminate redundancy and move all mail traveling the same route through the same facilities. Consolidation of AMP operations and facilities. USPS Has Followed Its Guidance and Consistently Applied Criteria in Consolidating Its AMP Facilities
USPS Has Followed Its Process for Consolidating Area Mail Facilities
On the basis of our analysis of 32 AMP proposals that were implemented, approved, or not approved since October 2008, USPS has followed the key steps in the AMP process. Our analysis found that USPS completed each step of the AMP process. It took about 6 months on average to complete the review process from initiating an AMP proposal to making a decision on 27 AMP proposals we analyzed. In our analysis, we found that USPS consistently notified the stakeholders when a feasibility study was initiated and when a final decision was made; we also found that USPS consistently held public meetings and summarized public input for each AMP proposal we reviewed. The last step in the AMP process is completion of two postimplementation reviews to assess the results of the consolidation. For both postimplementation reviews, additional savings have been realized in part because mail volume has continued to decline resulting in further reductions in work hours and transportation costs. According to the AMP guidance, USPS must consider the following four criteria: impacts on the service standards for all classes of mail, issues important to local customers, impacts to USPS staffing, and savings and costs associated with moving mail processing operations. USPS estimated a total annualized cost savings of about $98.5 million for the 29 approved and implemented AMP proposals we reviewed. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to USPS for official review and comment. In response, USPS provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Deteriorating financial conditions and declining mail volume have reinforced the need for the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to increase operational efficiency and reduce expenses in its mail processing network. This network consists of interdependent functions in nearly 600 facilities. USPS developed several initiatives to reduce costs and increase efficiency; however, moving forward on some initiatives has been challenging because of the complexities involved in consolidating operations. In response to a conference report directive, GAO assessed (1) the overall status and results of USPS's efforts to realign its mail processing network and (2) the extent to which USPS has consistently followed its guidance and applied these criteria in reviewing Area Mail Processing (AMP) proposals for consolidation since the beginning of fiscal year 2009. To conduct this assessment, GAO reviewed USPS's Network Plan, area mail processing consolidation guidance and proposals as well as other documents; compared USPS's actions related to consolidation of area mail processing facilities with its guidance, and interviewed officials from USPS, the USPS Office of Inspector General, and employee organizations. GAO provided USPS with a draft of this report for comment. In response, USPS provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
USPS has realigned parts of its mail processing network since the beginning of fiscal year 2009 and continues to seek additional opportunities to achieve its goal of creating an efficient and flexible network and realize cost savings. Specifically, USPS: (1) eliminated all functions of the Airport Mail Centers, closed 9 of these facilities, and now uses the remaining 12 for other purposes, resulting in a realized cost savings of about $12.2 million in fiscal year 2009; (2) reorganized the functions of the 21 Bulk Mail Centers into newly developed Network Distribution Centers, resulting in a realized cost savings of about $17.7 million in fiscal year 2009; and (3) implemented 23 proposals to consolidate AMP operations and facilities and approved another 6 AMP consolidation proposals. USPS estimated an annual cost savings of about $98.5 million for the 29 approved and implemented AMP proposals. Additionally, USPS officials stated that they plan to integrate the Surface Transfer Center functions into the Network Distribution Center network to further eliminate redundancy in transporting mail. USPS has developed specific program targets for the ongoing reorganization efforts of the Network Distribution Centers and estimated a cost savings of about $233.8 million for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 from reduction in work hours and transportation costs. On the basis of GAO's analysis of 32 AMP proposals that were implemented, approved, or not approved since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, USPS has followed its realignment guidance by completing each step of the process and consistently applying its criteria in its reviews. GAO's analysis found that it took about 6 months on average--a month more than USPS's target of 5 months--to complete the review process from initiating an AMP proposal to making a decision. USPS officials noted the importance of the AMP decisions and the need to sometimes take longer than what the guidance suggests to ensure the correct decision. GAO also found that USPS consistently notified stakeholders when key steps of the AMP process were completed, such as when an AMP proposal was initiated, or public meetings were held. For each of the AMP proposals that GAO reviewed, USPS also consistently evaluated its four criteria related to AMP consolidations: (1) impacts on the service standards for all classes of mail, (2) issues important to local customers, (3) impacts to USPS staffing, and (4) savings and costs associated with moving mail processing operations. |
gao_AIMD-95-156 | gao_AIMD-95-156_0 | In late 1986, IRS produced plans for a new modernization effort, known today as Tax Systems Modernization (TSM). IRS has developed a business vision to guide its modernization efforts. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to review the business and technical practices IRS has established to develop, manage, and operate its information systems and, in particular, the TSM initiative. We examined IRS’s business strategy for reducing paper tax return submissions, strategic information management processes, software development capability, systems development accountability and responsibility. We also identified IRS efforts to upgrade skills and training. Information Technology Is Not Managed as an Investment
Currently, IRS does not have a process to manage TSM information systems projects as investments, even though IRS expects the government’s past and future investment in TSM to exceed $8 billion. However, these efforts are not yet complete, and IRS did not assess the actual steps needed to implement these efforts. Realizing that its software development capability needed improvement, IRS initiated process action teams to address software development weaknesses in key process areas. IRS said also that it is planning for its 1996 IRS Information System Architecture to reflect a total system view; is reviewing existing documentation to determine how best to incorporate our security architecture recommendation; is in the process of improving its configuration management process by implementing change control, as well as developing guidance; has initiated a series of assessments for major TSM systems to review and baseline existing requirements for each deliverable, including documented interfaces; will merge integration testing, systems testing, and other testing-related personnel in one facility, and is planning to establish an interim test and control capability; and has developed a release engineering approach to transition from its current environment to one meeting TSM-defined objectives and capabilities. However, below the Commissioner’s Office, the management authority and control needed to modernize tax processing has been fragmented. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to modernize tax processing, focusing on: (1) IRS business and technical practices in the areas of electronic forms, strategic information management, software development, technical infrastructures, and organizational controls; and (2) opportunities to improve IRS information systems management and software development capabilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) despite IRS efforts to improve its tax processing, pervasive management and technical weaknesses still remain that could impede its modernization efforts; (2) IRS does not have a comprehensive business strategy to reduce paper submissions; (3) IRS has not yet fully developed the requisite software and technical infrastructures to successfully implement its modernization efforts; (4) other tax system modernization (TSM) weaknesses include IRS failure to fully implement strategic information management practices, an immature and weak software development capability, and incomplete systems architectures and integration and system planning; (5) IRS does not manage TSM as an investment, systems development is not driven by reengineering efforts, and IRS staff do not have the necessary skills to meet future IRS needs; and (6) IRS has not assigned responsibility, authority, and accountability for managing and controlling systems modernization to one individual or office. |
gao_GAO-13-590T | gao_GAO-13-590T_0 | 2013 Annual Report Identifies 31 New Areas to Achieve Greater Efficiency or Effectiveness
In 17 of the 31 new areas where agencies may be able to achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness, we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among federal programs or activities. We identified fragmentation in multiple programs we reviewed, including the following:
Combat Uniforms: We found that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fragmented approach to developing and acquiring combat uniforms could be more efficient. Among the 14 areas of opportunity to reduce costs or enhance revenue identified in our 2013 annual report are the following examples of opportunities for executive branch agencies or Congress to take action to address the issues we reported:
Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration: We report concerns about CMS’s Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration, which is expected to cost $8.35 billion over 10 years, most of which will be paid to plans with average performance. Although the demonstration is now in its second year, HHS still has an opportunity to achieve significant cost savings—about $2 billion, based on GAO’s analysis of CMS actuaries’ estimates—if it cancels the demonstration for 2014. and other actions we have identified could help the federal government increase revenue collections by billions of dollars. Through our three annual reports, we have identified 162 areas in which there are opportunities to reduce fragmentation, overlap, or duplication or to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue. The Administration and Congress Have Made Some Progress in Addressing the Areas That We Previously Identified
In addition to the new actions identified for our 2013 annual report, we have continued to monitor the progress that the executive branch agencies and Congress have made in addressing the issues we identified in our 2011 and 2012 annual reports. In these reports, we identified approximately 300 actions that the executive branch and Congress could take to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness. As of March 6, 2013, the date we completed our progress update audit work, about 12 percent of the 131 overall areas were addressed; 66 percent were partially addressed; and 21 percent were not addressed. Congress has also taken steps to address some of our suggested actions. The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission proposes eliminating direct payments to farmers. The President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission also states that the President will again seek reorganization authority and use such authority to consolidate the economic and business development activities in the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury, as well as the Small Business Administration, into a new department with a focused mission to foster economic growth and spur job creation. Addressing these issues will require sustained attention by the executive branch agencies and the Congress. However, realizing the intent of the GPRA Modernization Act for assessing government performance and improvement and reducing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication will require sustained oversight of implementation. Additionally, we reported that a total of 31 federal departments and agencies collect, maintain, and use geospatial information—information linked to specific geographic locations that supports many government functions, such as maintaining roads and responding to natural disasters. Better planning and implementation among federal agencies could help reduce duplicative investments and provide the opportunity for potential savings of millions of dollars. Similarly, in our three annual reports, we reported that better evaluation of performance and results is needed for multiple federal programs and activities to help inform decisions about how to address the fragmentation, overlap, or duplication identified or achieve other financial benefits. The regular collection and review of performance information, both within and among federal agencies, could help executive branch agencies and Congress determine whether some of the federal programs or initiatives included in this series are making progress toward addressing the identified issues and could determine the actions that need to be taken to improve results. We have also suggested that Congress consider taking legislative action to consolidate certain programs. In closing, as the fiscal pressures facing the nation continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the fiscal pressures facing the nation continue, so too does the need for executive branch agencies and Congress to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and activities. Opportunities to take such action exist in areas where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.
To highlight these challenges and to inform government decision makers on actions that could be taken to address them, GAO is statutorily required to identify and report annually to Congress on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives, both within departments and government-wide, that have duplicative goals or activities. GAO has also identified additional opportunities to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness by means of cost savings or enhanced revenue collection.
This statement discusses the (1) new areas identified in GAO's 2013 annual report; (2) status of actions taken by the administration and Congress to address the 131 areas identified in GAO's 2011 and 2012 annual reports; (3) President's April Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission and recently introduced legislation; and (4) strategies that can help address the issues GAO identified.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2013 annual report identifies 31 new areas where agencies may be able to achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness. Seventeen areas involve fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO reported that the Department of Defense could realize up to $82 million in cost savings and ensure equivalent levels of performance and protection by taking action to address its fragmented approach to developing and acquiring combat uniforms. Additionally, GAO reported that a total of 31 federal departments and agencies collect, maintain, and use geospatial information. Better planning and implementation could help reduce duplicative investments and save of millions of dollars.
The report also identifies 14 additional areas where opportunities exist to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collections. For example, GAO suggested that Department of Health and Human Services cancel the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration. GAO found most of the bonuses will be paid to plans with average performance and that the demonstration's design precludes a credible evaluation of its effectiveness. Canceling the demonstration for 2014 would save about $2 billion. GAO also noted opportunities to save billions more in areas such as expanding strategic sourcing, providing greater oversight for Medicaid supplemental payments, and reducing subsidies for crop insurance. Additionally, GAO pointed out opportunities for enhancing revenues by reducing the net tax gap of $385 billion, reviewing prices of radioactive isotopes sold by the government, and providing more equity in tobacco taxes for similar types of products.
The executive branch and Congress have made some progress in addressing the areas that GAO identified in its 2011 and 2012 annual reports. Specifically, GAO identified approximately 300 actions among 131 overall areas that the executive branch and Congress could take to reduce or eliminate fragmentation, overlap, or duplication or achieve other potential financial benefits. As of March 6, 2013, the date GAO completed its progress update audit work, about 12 percent of the areas were addressed, 66 percent were partially addressed, and 21 percent were not addressed. More recently, both the administration and Congress have taken additional steps, including proposals in the President's April Fiscal Year 2014 Budget submission.
Addressing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication will require continued attention by the executive branch agencies and targeted oversight by Congress. In many cases, executive branch agencies have the authority to address the actions that GAO identified. In other cases, such as those involving the elimination or consolidation of programs, Congress will need to take legislative action. Moreover, sustained congressional oversight will be needed in concert with the Administration's efforts to address the identified actions by improving planning, measuring performance, and increasing collaboration. Effective implementation of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 also could help the executive branch and Congress as they work to address these issues over time. |
gao_GAO-15-461 | gao_GAO-15-461_0 | The Army and the Air Force Face Challenges Ensuring that Their UAS Pilots Complete Their Required Training
Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing All of Their Unit Training, and the Army Does Not Have Visibility over Whether UAS Pilots in Units Have Completed Training
Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing Continuation Training
A March 2015 Army review showed that pilots in most Army Shadow units did not complete training in their units in fiscal year 2014, which we corroborated through both discussions with pilots in our focus groups and unit responses to our questionnaires. Similarly, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and responses to questionnaires we administered indicated that Army UAS pilots face challenges to complete training in units. We found that a nongeneralizable sample of training records for seven Air Force UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the continuation training for all of their seven required missions in fiscal year 2014. In particular, we found that the Air Force had operated below its optimum crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for Air Force aviation units, and that the Air Force had not tailored its recruiting and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots. We made four recommendations related to these findings including that the Air Force update crew ratios for UAS units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more accurate understanding of the required number of UAS pilots needed in its units and that the Air Force develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is tailored to the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots to help ensure that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its mission. The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken some actions but has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, a headquarters Air Force official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. The Army and the Air Force Have Taken Actions to Increase the Number of Instructors in UAS Units, but the Army Has Not Fully Addressed Potential Risks that Could Hinder the Success of Its UAS Pilot Training
The Army Has Taken Action to Increase the Number of Instructors, but Its Use of Less Experienced Instructors Could Affect the Quality of UAS Pilot Training
The Army has taken action to increase the number of UAS pilot instructors, but in doing so, it is using less experienced instructors, which could affect the quality of the training provided to UAS pilots. The Army waived the instructor course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less proficient instructors. Although the Army reduced the number of waivers granted so far in fiscal year 2015 by no longer waiving the course prerequisites related to minimum proficiency, the Army can continue to grant waivers for the course prerequisites related to experience, including that UAS pilots have a minimum number of flying hours in a UAS and hold the minimum enlisted rank of sergeant. However, we found that as of March 2015, the Air Force staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels. In December 2014, the commanding general of Air Combat Command stated that the Air Force has not fully staffed the formal training unit due to shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force and as a result “pilot production has been decimated.” An Air Force headquarters official stated that shortages of instructors at the formal training unit are a key reason that the Air Force has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force. Specifically, the Air Force is studying the personnel requirements for the formal training unit, and expects the Air Force to report the results of this study by spring 2016. Conclusions
DOD’s UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival the traditional manned systems. To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest caliber of training to prepare them to successfully accomplish UAS missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its waiver of course prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to become instructors, such as by providing additional preparation for current and future instructors who do not meet one or more course prerequisites to enhance their ability to successfully provide training. In written comments, DOD concurred with each of our three recommendations. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, such as the discussion of the percentage of Army UAS pilots that required a waiver to become a UAS instructor by fiscal year; the overall staffing levels of Air Force UAS pilots; the staffing levels of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at the formal training unit; and the completion of continuation training by a nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units at Creech Air Force Base. The results of this review are not generalizable. We also conducted 18 focus groups with active-duty UAS pilots at these locations to gain their perspectives on their services’ UAS training efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival traditional manned systems, and, as of July 2013, DOD had acquired over 10,000 UAS, according to a 2013 DOD report. Training DOD UAS pilots, most of whom are in the Army or the Air Force, is an integral part of DOD's strategy to accomplish its mission. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to train UAS pilots.
This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Army and the Air Force (1) face challenges ensuring that their UAS pilots complete required training and (2) have taken steps to ensure they have sufficient numbers of UAS instructors. GAO analyzed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots, distributed a questionnaire to Army and Air Force headquarters and units, examined nongeneralizeable training records of seven Air Force UAS units selected because they have the same mission requirements, and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also conducted 18 focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected based on rank and other factors. The results of the questionnaire and focus groups are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
The Army and the Air Force face challenges ensuring that the pilots who remotely operate their unmanned aerial systems (UAS) complete their required training. Specifically, a March 2015 Army review showed that most pilots in certain Army units did not complete fundamental training tasks in fiscal year 2014—a finding that GAO corroborated through discussions with pilots in focus groups and unit responses to questionnaires. In addition, Army unit status reports do not require UAS pilot training information, and as a result, the Army does not know the full extent to which pilots have been trained and are therefore ready to be deployed. In addition, Air Force training records from a nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the training for all of their required missions. Pilots in all of the seven focus groups GAO conducted with Air Force UAS pilots stated that they could not conduct training in units because their units had shortages of UAS pilots.GAO found similar shortages of UAS pilots in April 2014 and in particular, GAO found that the Air Force operated below its crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the number of pilots needed in units. At that time, GAO made four recommendations including that the Air Force update its update crew ratio. The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions underway. For example, an Air Force Headquarters official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study on the crew ratio and expects to update the crew ratio in 2015. However, at this time, the Air Force has not fully implemented any of the recommendations.
The Army and the Air Force are taking actions to increase the number of UAS instructors, but the Army has not fully addressed the risks associated with using less experienced instructors and the Air Force faces instructor shortages. In order to increase the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.The Army originally established these prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours—for UAS pilots volunteering to become instructors to help ensure that instructors were fully trained and ready to instruct UAS pilots. The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less proficient UAS instructors. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the Army no longer grants waivers for course prerequisites related to proficiency. However, the Army can continue to grant waivers for additional course prerequisites related to experience. As a result, the Army risks that its UAS pilots may not be receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform UAS missions. Furthermore, as of March 2015, the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of its planned staffing levels. This shortage is a key reason that the Air Force has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force, according to an Air Force headquarters official. The Air Force is studying the personnel requirements for its school and expects to report the results of this study by spring 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Army require unit status reports to include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots; and the Army take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its waiver of course prerequisites related to experience for pilots attending the course to become instructors. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-913 | gao_GAO-08-913_0 | Background
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 includes tax incentives to assist recovery and economic revitalization for individuals and businesses in designated areas in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005. As mandated by law, this report discusses those tax incentives in the GO Zone Act of 2005 that state and local governments play a role in allocating and overseeing. States with GO Zones Are Responsible for Allocating Four Federal Tax Incentives under the GO Zone Act of 2005
Under the GO Zone Act of 2005, state and local governments are responsible for allocating and overseeing the use of four GO Zone tax incentives. Florida and Texas did not receive allocation authority for the bond provisions, but each received a onetime increase in LIHTC authority of $3.5 million for 2006. GO Zone Tax Credit Bonds
The GO Zone Act of 2005 created a new category of tax credit bonds—GO Zone tax credit bonds—which Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were authorized to issue to provide debt relief to state and local governments. GO Zone additional advance refundings cannot be used in these instances. With Some Variation in Their Processes, States with GO Zones Generally Allocated Bond Authority on a First-Come, First- Served Basis; States Relied on Existing Procedures to Allocate LIHTCs
With some variations in their processes, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi generally allocated the GO Zone bond provisions on a first- come, first-served basis, and all five eligible states used existing processes to award GO Zone LIHTCs. Officials in Louisiana and Mississippi acknowledged that the first-come, first-served approach made it difficult for applicants in some of the most damaged areas to make use of the bond provision at the beginning of the program. While all eligible states followed existing, prehurricane procedures to award LIHTCs and will use existing procedures to monitor for federal compliance, the states exhibited some differences in how they targeted the GO Zone LIHTC authority to the most damaged areas. Both states rely on the state’s bond counsel opinions to ensure that the tax credit bonds are issued in accordance with applicable federal laws. As of those dates, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi used GO Zone private activity bonds to finance a broad range of private facilities, including manufacturing facilities, utilities, housing, retail facilities, hotels, and other facilities. State officials identified some challenges in making use of all four provisions. Gulf Coast States Have Allocated about 87 Percent of Private Activity Bond Authority for a Wide Range of Private Facilities, but Bonds Have Only Been Issued for about Half of the Awarded Authority
As of mid-June 2008, the three eligible states have allocated 87 percent of the $14.9 billion in GO Zone private activity bond authority, and bonds issued amounted to about 44 percent of the total allocation authority (see fig. 2). Comparing the number of planned and in-service GO Zone LIHTC-funded units to the number of rental housing units with major or severe damage shows that about 17 percent of the rental housing units with major or severe damage in the state of Louisiana, and 45 percent of the similarly damaged units in the state of Mississippi, will be addressed by GO Zone LIHTC units. Tax Credits: Opportunities to Improve Oversight of the Low-Income Housing Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma devastated the Gulf Coast, destroying wide swaths of housing, key infrastructure, and numerous private businesses. In response, Congress granted the states a wide range of disaster relief, including billions of dollars of grants and tax incentives to revitalize the Gulf Coast. Specifically, the Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zone Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-135) provided tax incentives to individuals and businesses in certain presidentially declared disaster areas. Congress mandated that GAO review how state and local governments allocated and used federal tax incentives in the act and subsequent legislation. This report (1) identifies tax incentives in the GO Zone Act of 2005 and subsequent legislation for which state and local governments have allocation and oversight responsibilities, (2) describes the procedures state governments use in allocating the tax incentives, including how they plan to monitor compliance with federal laws, and (3) describes how tax incentives have been allocated and for what purposes. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key documentation from GO Zone states and interviewed state officials, selected local officials, and representatives from private and nonprofit entities.
What GAO Found
States with GO Zones are responsible for allocating and overseeing the use of four tax incentives in the GO Zone Act of 2005. Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi received allocation authority for all four provisions. Florida and Texas each received $3.5 million in GO Zone low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) authority, but did not receive allocations under the other incentives. With some process variations, the three eligible states with GO Zones generally allocated bond authority on a first-come, first-served basis without consistently targeting the allocations to assist recovery in the most damaged areas. Officials in Louisiana and Mississippi acknowledged that the first-come, first-served approach led to allocating bond authority to less-damaged areas at the start of the program. The five eligible state housing finance agencies used existing processes to award GO Zone LIHTCs, but differed in how they targeted these credits. For all three bond provisions, state officials and bond issuers said the borrower's bond counsel is generally responsible for ensuring that the bonds are compliant with applicable laws when issued. State housing finance agencies plan to use existing procedures to monitor compliance once units are placed in service. As of mid-June 2008, eligible states had allocated 87 percent of the GO Zone private activity bond authority, but bonds issued amount to about 50 percent of the total awarded allocation authority. The bonds issued will be used to finance a wide range of facilities, including manufacturing facilities, utilities, housing, retail facilities, and hotels. State housing finance authorities have awarded 95 percent of the GO Zone LIHTCs. Although few housing units are currently in service, state housing finance agency officials said planned units will be in service by the mandated deadline. GO Zone LIHTC-funded units will address about 17 and 45 percent of the rental housing units with major or severe damage in the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, respectively. The three eligible states with GO Zones used the tax credit bonds and additional advance refundings to varying degrees to provide debt relief. State officials said current economic conditions pose challenges for using both GO Zone bond and LIHTC financing. |
gao_GAO-05-307T | gao_GAO-05-307T_0 | In 1996, the Coast Guard began developing what came to be known as the Integrated Deepwater System acquisition program as its major effort to replace or modernize these aircraft and cutters. The Deepwater program represents a unique approach to a major acquisition in that the Coast Guard is relying on a prime contractor—the system integrator—to identify and deliver the assets needed to meet a set of mission requirements the Coast Guard has specified. The existing schedule calls for acquisition of new assets under the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program to occur over an approximately 20-year period. Deepwater Legacy Assets Show General Decline in Condition, But Current Measures Do Not Capture True Extent
Coast Guard condition measures show that the deepwater legacy assets generally declined between 2000 and 2004, but the Coast Guard’s available condition measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of precision. This evidence, gleaned from information collected during our site visits and discussions with maintenance personnel, showed deteriorating and obsolete systems and equipment as a major cause of the reduction in mission capabilities for a number of deepwater legacy aircraft and cutters. The Coast Guard has recently recognized the need for improved measures to more accurately capture data on the extent to which its deepwater legacy assets are degraded in their mission capabilities, but as of March 2005, such measures have not yet been finalized or implemented. Actions to Maintain and Upgrade Deepwater Legacy Assets Are Under Way, but Condition Issues Remain
The Coast Guard has taken several actions to address maintenance issues and upgrades for its deepwater legacy assets. These additional efforts are likely helping to prevent a more rapid decline in the condition of these assets, but condition problems continue, and the efforts will likely involve additional costs. So far, the Coast Guard’s budget plans or requests do not address this potential need. Management Challenges Faced in Acquiring New Assets Remain Significant
Since the inception of the Deepwater program, we have expressed concerns about the degree of risk in the acquisition approach and the Coast Guard’s ability to manage and oversee the program. Last year, we reported that, well into the contract’s second year, key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator’s performance had not been effectively implemented. Coast Guard Has Taken Steps to Hold the System Integrator Accountable for Competition
The Coast Guard reported taking steps to address our recommendations concerning cost control through competition. While the Coast Guard lacks measures that clearly demonstrate how this deterioration affects its ability to perform deepwater-related missions, it is clear that the deepwater legacy assets are insufficient for the task. Some of these problems, such as those on the 378-foot cutters, are included in the compendium the Coast Guard uses to set sustainment priorities and plan budgets, but have not been funded because they pertain to assets that are among the first to be replaced. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Coast Guard began a multiyear, $19 billion to $24 billion acquisition program to replace or modernize its fleet of deepwater aircraft and cutters, so called because they are capable of operating many miles off the coast. For several years now, the Coast Guard has been warning that the existing fleet--especially cutters--was failing at an unsustainable rate, and it began studying options for replacing or modernizing the fleet more rapidly. Faster replacement is designed to avoid some of the costs that might be involved in keeping aging assets running for longer periods. This testimony, which is based both on current and past GAO work, addresses several issues related to these considerations: (1) changes in the condition of deepwater legacy assets during fiscal years 2000 through 2004; (2) actions the Coast Guard has taken to maintain and upgrade deepwater legacy assets; and (3) management challenges the Coast Guard faces in acquiring new assets, especially if a more aggressive schedule is adopted.
What GAO Found
Available Coast Guard condition measures indicate that the Coast Guard's deepwater legacy aircraft and cutters are generally declining, but these measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of precision. GAO's field visits and interviews with Coast Guard staff, as well as reviews of other evidence, showed significant problems in a variety of the assets' systems and equipment. The Coast Guard has acknowledged that it needs to develop condition measures that more clearly demonstrate the extent to which asset conditions affect mission capabilities, but such measures have not yet been finalized or implemented. The Coast Guard has taken several types of actions to help keep the deepwater legacy assets operational, but these actions, while helpful, may not fully address mission capability issues and may require additional funding. For example, to help meet mission requirements, Coast Guard staff are performing more extensive maintenance between deployments, but even so, aircraft and cutters continue to lose mission capabilities. One Coast Guard command is using a new approach to help sustain the oldest class of cutters, but this approach will likely require additional funds--something not included thus far in Coast Guard budget plans or requests. If the Coast Guard adopts a more aggressive acquisition schedule, it will likely continue to face a number of challenges that have already affected its ability to effectively manage the Deepwater program. GAO has warned that the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy, which relies on a prime contractor ("system integrator") to identify and deliver the assets needed, carries substantial risks. In 2004, well into the contract's second year, key components for managing the program and overseeing the system integrator's performance had not been effectively implemented. The Coast Guard has begun addressing some problems--for example, putting more emphasis on competition as a way to control costs--but many areas have not been fully addressed. A more aggressive schedule would only heighten the risks. |
gao_NSIAD-98-16 | gao_NSIAD-98-16_0 | In addition, DOD stated that the criteria proposed by the Army for entering low-rate initial production would require the successful completion of multiple system tests with the ATACMS as the carrier. A significant portion of the submunition’s test plan remains uncompleted. The project office has added five development flights to the test program because of technical problems, without extending the time to complete all the tests. All of the submunition’s flight testing will be done using a test aircraft with subsonic deployment rather than the supersonic deployment from its intended carrier, the ATACMS Block II missile. The Army has not included a flight test in its submunition’s test plans to evaluate whether or not the carrier can dispense the final tactical submunition configuration. According to Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in making the submunition’s low-rate initial production decision, since a test to dispense the submunition is not required. According to the former ATACMS Block II product manager, if any problems result from the submunition flight tests, the ATACMS Block II dispense tests would not be done until after the December 1997 low-rate initial production decision. The testing completed to date has uncovered numerous problems that have resulted in design changes, additional testing, and schedule delays. Qualification testing was scheduled to be completed in November 1995. However, under the current schedule, qualification testing is not expected to be complete until November 1997. Thus, the primary objective of the developmental flight tests—to verify design and performance—will not be met. Submunition’s Ambitious Schedule Is Unnecessary
The Army built in 8 months of excess time into the submunition’s production delivery schedule, therefore it is unnecessary to make the low-rate initial production decision in December 1997. However, a review of the program office production lead time and delivery requirements shows that the submunition’s initial production contract can be awarded in August 1998 and still allow sufficient time for the submunition to be integrated into the missile. Delaying the decision would allow the Army additional time to complete its development test program. Recommendation
Given the criticality of the dispense to the brilliant antiarmor submunition program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army require the program office to demonstrate that qualified tactical submunitions can be successfully dispensed from the ATACMS Block II missile before seeking a low-rate initial production decision on the submunition program. Comments From the Department of Defense
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated September 12, 1997. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. These officials maintain that this is an issue for the Block II missile. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided its assessment of the Army's brilliant antiarmor submunition (BAT), for which the Army plans to request authority to start low-rate initial production in December 1997, focusing on the status of its acquisition plans and whether it is technically ready to enter production.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a decision on low-rate initial production of BAT, scheduled for December 1997, appears to be premature because a crucial technical demonstration will not be accomplished by that time; (2) in 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army agreed to relax the performance criteria that BAT was to meet before proceeding into low-rate initial production; (3) under the new criteria, the Army is not required to demonstrate that the submunition can be successfully dispensed from the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II missile; (4) in September 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) noted, in its comments to GAO's draft classified report, that the successful completion of multiple tests of the submunition with ATACMS as the carrier would be required; (5) the submunition's test schedule appears to be extremely ambitious; (6) its development program is almost 3 years behind its original schedule, and a significant portion of the test schedule remains uncompleted; (7) the project office added five development flight tests to the schedule because of technical problems; (8) the Army plans to use a test aircraft for all submunition flight testing with subsonic deployment rather than the supersonic deployment from the ATACMS missile; (9) the testing completed to date has uncovered numerous problems that required design changes, additional testing, and schedule delays; (10) although the submunition test plans do not include an evaluation of whether or not the ATACMS Block II can dispense the submunition, the Block II missile test plans do include a test to dispense tactical submunitions in December 1997, the same month that the decision is to be made on low-rate production of the submunition; (11) according to Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in making the submunition production decision, since the test is not required; (12) any delays in qualifying the submunition's subcomponents and developmental flight testing will likely postpone the date of the Block II dispense test; (13) the submunition's low-rate initial production contract can be awarded 8 months later than currently scheduled and still be delivered in time to be integrated into the missile; (14) the Block II missile's currently scheduled production date is uncertain; and (15) if its production date is delayed, the Army would have even more time to sufficiently complete key submunition developmental testing. |
gao_GAO-06-888T | gao_GAO-06-888T_0 | NRC and the licensees of nuclear power plants share the responsibility for ensuring that commercial nuclear power reactors are operated safely. NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Graded and Risk- Informed Approach to Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
NRC uses various tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power plants, generally consisting of physical plant inspections of equipment and records and objective indicators of plant performance. These tools are risk-informed in that they are focused on the issues considered most important to plant safety. Based on the results of the information it collects through these efforts, NRC takes a graded approach to its oversight, increasing the level of regulatory attention to plants based on the severity of identified performance issues. The majority of these inspection efforts were spent on baseline inspections, which all plants receive on an almost continuous basis. The inspection procedures are risk-informed to focus inspectors’ efforts on the most important areas of plant safety in four ways: 1) areas of inspection are included in the set of baseline procedures based on, in part, their risk importance, 2) risk information is used to help determine the frequency and scope of inspections, 3) the selection of activities to inspect within each procedure is informed with plant-specific risk information, and 4) the inspectors are trained in the use of risk information in planning their inspections. When NRC becomes aware of one or more performance problems at a plant that are assigned a risk color greater-than-green (white, yellow, or red), it conducts supplemental inspections. NRC conducts special inspections when specific events occur at plants that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential safety significance. These objective numeric measures of plant operations are designed to measure plant performance related to safety in various aspects of plant operations. NRC Has Continually Identified Problems at Nuclear Power Plants but Few Have Been Considered Significant to Safe Operation of the Plants
The ROP has identified numerous performance deficiencies as inspection findings at nuclear power plants since it was first implemented, but most of these were considered to be of very low risk to safe plant operations. Of more than 4,000 inspection findings identified between 2001 and 2005, 97 percent were green. In contrast to the many green findings, NRC has identified 12 findings of the highest risk significance (7 yellow and 5 red), accounting for less than 1 percent of the findings since 2001. On the basis of its inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than three quarters of the 103 operating plants to at least some level of increased oversight (beyond the baseline inspections) for varying amounts of time. In assessing the results of the ROP data, we found that all plants subjected to NRC’s highest level of oversight also had a substantive cross-cutting issue open either prior to or during the time that it was subjected to increased oversight inspections. While NRC communicates the results of its oversight process on a plant-specific basis to plant managers, members of the public, and other government agencies through annual public meetings held at or near each site and an internet Web site, it does not publicly summarize the overall results of its oversight process, such as the total number and types of inspection findings and performance indicators falling outside of acceptable performance categories, on a regular basis. It has several mechanisms in place to incorporate feedback from both external and internal stakeholders and is currently working on improvements in key areas of the process, including better focusing inspections on areas most important to safety, improving its timeliness in determining the risk significance of its inspection findings, and modifying the way that it measures some performance indicators. NRC is also working to address what we believe is a significant shortcoming in its oversight process by improving its ability to address plants’ safety culture, allowing it to better identify and address early indications of deteriorating safety at plants before performance problems develop. An audit by the NRC Inspector General, a review by a special task group formed by NRC, and feedback from other stakeholders have pointed to several significant weaknesses with the SDP. Largely as a result of this event, in August 2004, the NRC Commission directed the NRC staff to enhance the ROP by more fully addressing safety culture. For example, the nuclear power industry has expressed concern that the changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC’s oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts. NRC officials view this effort as the beginning step in an incremental approach and acknowledge that continual monitoring, improvements, and oversight will be needed in order to better allow inspectors to detect deteriorating safety conditions at plants before events occur. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the responsibility to provide oversight to ensure that the nation's 103 commercial nuclear power plants are operated safely. While the safety of these plants has always been important, since radioactive release could harm the public and the environment, NRC's oversight has become even more critical as the Congress and the nation consider the potential resurgence of nuclear power in helping to meet the nation's growing energy needs. Prior to 2000, NRC was criticized for having a safety oversight process that was not always focused on the most important safety issues and in some cases, was overly subjective. To address these and other concerns, NRC implemented a new oversight process--the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). NRC continues to modify the ROP to incorporate feedback from stakeholders and in response to other external events. This testimony summarizes information on (1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants, (2) the results of the ROP over the past several years, and (3) the aspects of the ROP that need improvement and the status of NRC's efforts to improve them. This testimony discusses preliminary results of GAO's work. GAO will report in full at a later date. GAO analyzed program-wide information, inspection results covering 5 years of ROP operations, and detailed findings from a sample of 11 plants.
What GAO Found
NRC uses various tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power plants, including physical plant inspections and quantitative measures or indicators of plant performance. To apply these tools, NRC uses a riskinformed and graded approach--that is, one considering safety significance in deciding on the equipment and operating procedures to be inspected and employing increasing levels of regulatory attention to plants based on the severity of identified performance problems. The tools include three types of inspections--baseline, supplemental, and special. All plants receive baseline inspections of plant operations almost continuously by NRC inspectors. When NRC becomes aware of a performance problem at a plant, it conducts supplemental inspections, which expand the scope of baseline inspections. NRC conducts special inspections to investigate specific safety incidents or events that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential significance to safety. The plants also self-report on their safety performance using performance indicators for plant operations related to safety, such as the number of unplanned reactor shutdowns. Since 2001, NRC's ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings concerning nuclear power plant licensees' failure to comply with regulations or other safe operating procedures. About 97 percent of these findings were for actions or failures NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to overall safe operation of the plants. In contrast, 12 of the inspection findings, or less than 1 percent, were of the highest levels of significance to safety. On the basis of its findings and the performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than three-quarters of the 103 operating plants to oversight beyond the baseline inspections for varying amounts of time. NRC has improved several key areas of the ROP, largely in response to independent reviews and feedback from stakeholders. These improvements include better focusing its inspections on those areas most important to safety, reducing the time needed to determine the risk significance of inspection findings, and modifying the way that some performance indicators are measured. NRC also recently undertook a major initiative to improve its ability to address plants' safety culture--that is, the organizational characteristics that ensure that issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO and others have found this to be a significant shortcoming in the ROP. Although some industry officials have expressed concern that its changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC's oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts, other stakeholders believe its approach will provide NRC better tools to address safety culture issues at plants. NRC officials acknowledge that its effort is only a step in an incremental approach and that continual monitoring, improvements, and oversight will be needed to fully detect deteriorating safety conditions before an event occurs. |
gao_RCED-97-39 | gao_RCED-97-39_0 | Process to Review Compliance Has Not Been Finalized
The method to review countries’ compliance with the Convention has not been finalized. Peer Review Process Is Central to the Convention’s Success
The Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but seeks to encourage compliance through peer pressure. State, DOE, and NRC officials have stated that this peer review process is central to the Convention’s success, noting that it will enable the countries’ safety practices to be brought before the “bar of world public opinion.”
The Convention does not specify the form and content of the peer review process but calls on the parties to (1) submit self-assessment reports of the measures they have taken to implement the Convention and (2) hold meetings to review these reports. As the process is currently envisioned, the five countries with the most operating nuclear reactors—the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Russia—would participate in separate groups made up of several other countries that have ratified the Convention. Within this group setting, all countries would critically examine and review how each country is complying with the Convention. The U.S.-favored approach was replaced by the country-grouping model proposed by France and the United Kingdom. Costs to Implement the Convention Have Not Been Fully Determined
To prepare for and attend the first review meeting in 1999, the United States estimates it could spend as much as $1.1 million. IAEA’s costs, which the United States will partially fund, have not been fully identified but could range as high as about $10 million, according to a 1993 estimate. Officials from NRC, State, and DOE told us that the costs associated with the first review meeting are based on (1) participating in four planning meetings held between December 1994 and June 1996 to develop the Convention’s draft policies and procedures, (2) preparing the first U.S. self-assessment report, (3) reviewing other countries’ reports, and (4) participating in the April 1997 preparatory meeting and the first review meeting. NRC officials told us that they believe that IAEA’s actual costs will be significantly less—about $1 million to administer the first review meeting. Countries That Had Signed or Signed and Ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety as of December 1996
Number of operating civil nuclear power reactors(continued)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s, Department of State’s, and Department of Energy’s Estimated Costs to Implement the Convention
This appendix provides information on the costs that have been or may be incurred by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of State, and the Department of Energy (DOE) in implementing the Convention on behalf of the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, focusing on: (1) how compliance with the Convention's terms and obligations will be reviewed by the ratifying countries; and (2) the potential costs to the United States to participate in the Convention.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the method to review compliance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety has not been finalized; (2) the Convention does not impose sanctions for noncompliance but seeks to encourage compliance through peer pressure; (3) the Convention relies on each ratifying country to prepare a self-assessment report of its nuclear power program; (4) these reports will, in turn, be reviewed by other member countries at periodic meetings to determine how each country is complying with the Convention; (5) the level of detail to be included in these reports has not been finalized, nor has the process by which countries will critically review these reports been fully determined; (6) as the method is currently envisioned, groups composed of five or six countries would form the core of the review process; (7) the countries with the greatest number of operating nuclear reactors, the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Russia, would participate in separate review groups made up primarily of several other countries with operating reactors; (8) although U.S. government officials did not originally favor the country-grouping approach, they believe the United States will have adequate opportunities to review the safety programs of all countries through other mechanisms established by the Convention; (9) the costs associated with the United States' participation in the Convention have not been fully determined; (10) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of State, and the Department of Energy have estimated that it could cost as much as $1.1 million to participate in planning meetings to develop the Convention's policies and procedures, prepare the first U.S. self-assessment report, review other countries' reports, and participate in the first review meeting; (11) other costs, a portion of which the United States will incur, associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency's administration of the Convention are less certain but could range up to $10.3 million through the first review meeting, according to a 1993 estimate; (12) NRC officials believe, however, that the actual costs will be significantly less, about $1 million to administer the first review meeting; and (13) the costs for subsequent review meetings have not been estimated. |
gao_GAO-06-415 | gao_GAO-06-415_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2005 and 2004 CFS, we evaluated Treasury’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control, and we followed up on the status of Treasury and OMB corrective actions to address open recommendations regarding the process for preparing the CFS that were in our prior years’ reports. In our disclaimer of opinion on the fiscal year 2005 CFS, which is included in the fiscal year 2005 Financial Report of the United States Government, we discussed material deficiencies relating to Treasury’s preparation of the CFS. In our prior report, we recommended that as Treasury continues to design and further implement its new process for compiling the CFS, the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to modify Treasury’s closing package to (1) require federal agencies to directly link their audited financial statement notes to the CFS notes and (2) provide the necessary information to demonstrate that all of the five principal consolidated financial statements are consistent with the underlying information in federal agencies’ audited financial statements and other financial data. Progress was made during fiscal year 2005. Comparability of Financial Statements
The CFS includes 2 years of financial information. Audit Assurance over Certain Federal Agencies’ Closing Packages
Treasury and OMB did not require closing packages from 4 of the 35 verifying agencies to be audited. Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO’s Prior Year Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
This appendix includes open recommendations from three of our prior reports: Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Improvement, GAO- 04-45 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Needs Further Improvement, GAO-04-866 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2004); and Financial Audit: Process for Preparing the Consolidated Financial Statements of the U.S. Government Continues to Need Improvement, GAO-05-407 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2005). Of the 154 recommendations regarding the process for preparing the CFS that are listed in this appendix, 131 remained open as of December 2, 2005, the end of GAO’s fieldwork for the audit of the fiscal year 2005 CFS. Of these 131 recommendations, 76 relate to specific disclosures required under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Treasury has submitted a proposal to the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) seeking to amend previously issued standards and eliminate or lessen the disclosure requirements for the consolidated financial statements so that GAAP would no longer require certain of the information Treasury has not been reporting. Comments on the exposure draft of a proposed FASAB standard, based on the Treasury proposal, are due March 1, 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 9 years, since our first audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), certain material weaknesses in internal control and in selected accounting and financial reporting practices have resulted in conditions that prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS. Specifically, GAO has reported that the U.S. government did not have adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. Included with GAO's December 2005 disclaimer of opinion on the fiscal year 2005 CFS was its discussion of continuing weaknesses relating to the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) preparation of the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details of those additional weaknesses, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) describe the status of corrective actions on GAO's previous 154 recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO identified weaknesses during its tests of Treasury's process for preparing the fiscal year 2005 CFS. Such weaknesses in the CFS preparation process impair the U.S. government's ability to ensure that the CFS is consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. The weaknesses GAO identified during the fiscal year 2005 CFS audit involved the following areas: (1) directly linking audited federal agency financial statements to the CFS, (2) comparability of financial statements, (3) audit assurance over certain federal agencies' closing packages, (4) internal control monitoring, (5) consolidated reporting guidance to federal agencies, (6) reconciling of intragovernmental activity and balances, and (7) various other internal control weaknesses that were identified in previous years' audits but remained in fiscal year 2005. Of the 154 recommendations GAO reported in May 2005 regarding the process for preparing the CFS, 131 remained open as of December 2, 2005, when GAO completed its fieldwork for the audit of the fiscal year 2005 CFS. However, 76 of these 131 recommendations relate to specific disclosures required under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Treasury has submitted a proposal to the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) seeking to amend previously issued standards and eliminate or lessen the disclosure requirements for the consolidated financial statements so that U.S. generally accepted accounting principles would no longer require certain of the information Treasury has not been reporting. Comments on the exposure draft of a proposed FASAB standard, based on the Treasury proposal, were due March 1, 2006. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions to address open recommendations during its fiscal year 2006 audit of the CFS. |
gao_T-GGD-97-56 | gao_T-GGD-97-56_0 | Managing for Results: Enhancing the Usefulness of GPRA Consultations Between the Executive Branch and Congress
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss ways of enhancing the usefulness of consultations between executive branch agencies and Congress, as the agencies develop their strategic plans. Although GPRA requires congressional consultations, it does not specify what constitutes a consultation, at what point in the development process of a strategic plan the consultation or consultations should take place, or which committees should be involved in consultations. Establishing a set of best practices or reaching a common understanding of what consultations will entail can help ensure that the consultations are as productive as possible. Thus, at this early point, no single set of best practices for consultations has emerged from the preliminary meetings. In summary, Mr. Chairman, both committee staff and agency officials we spoke with recognized that the consultations on strategic planning are important to developing an agency plan that appropriately takes into account the views of Congress. However, as is to be expected during the initial stages of a new effort, all participants are struggling to define how the consultation process can work effectively. In our discussions with committee staff and agency officials, they noted some general approaches, including engaging the right people, addressing differing views of what is to be discussed, and establishing a consultation process that is iterative, that may contribute to the usefulness of consultations. Ultimately, these approaches, along with other practices that may emerge as agency officials and committee staff continue to learn to work together in developing strategic plans, can help create a basic understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies and congressional staff, the limited resources available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed ways to enhance the usefulness of consultations between executive branch agencies and Congress as the agencies develop their strategic plans, as required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although GPRA requires congressional consultations, it does not specify what constitutes a consultation, at what point in the development process of a strategic plan the consultations should take place, or which committees should be involved in consultations; (2) both committee staff and agency officials GAO interviewed recognize that the consultations on strategic planning are important to developing an agency plan that appropriately takes into account the views of Congress; (3) however, as is to expected during the initial stages of a new effort, all participants are struggling to define how the consultation process can work effectively; (4) although the establishment of a set of best practices, or the attainment of common understandings of what consultations will entail, can help ensure that those consultations are as productive as possible, no single set of best practices has yet emerged; (5) instead, GAO's work on preliminary consultations suggested some general approaches that may contribute to the usefulness of future consultations, including: (a) creating shared expectations; (b) engaging the right people; (c) addressing differing views of what is to be discussed; and (d) establishing a consultation process that is iterative; (6) a recent letter to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget from the Speaker of the House, the House Majority Leader, the Senate Majority Leader, and key committee chairmen from both the House and the Senate on GPRA-required consultations should provide a good foundation for successful consultations; (7) ultimately, the guidelines included in the letter, the approaches GAO identified, and other practices that may emerge as agency officials and committee staff continue to learn to work together in developing strategic plans, can help create a set of practices that promote successful consultations; and (8) successful consultations, in turn, can promote a basic understanding among the stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies and congressional staff, the limited resources available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. |
gao_GAO-02-566 | gao_GAO-02-566_0 | According to this policy, FDA relies on companies developing GM foods to voluntarily notify the agency before marketing the foods. To ensure that GM foods do not have decreased nutritional value, scientists also measure the nutrient composition, or “nutrition profile,” of these foods. However, biotechnology experts state that the agency’s overall evaluation process could be enhanced by randomly verifying the test data that companies provide and by increasing the transparency of the evaluation process—including more clearly communicating the scientific rationale for the agency’s final decision on GM food safety assessments. While current tests have been adequate for evaluating the small number of relatively simple compositional changes made so far, some scientists believe that new testing technologies under development may be needed to assess the safety of these more complex GM foods. In addition to increasing nutrients in GM foods, scientists are working to reduce the presence of allergens, toxins, and antinutrients. Experts Maintain That Long-Term Monitoring of GM Foods Is Neither Necessary nor Feasible
Scientists and federal regulatory officials we contacted generally agreed that long-term monitoring of the human health risks of GM foods through epidemiological studies is not necessary because there is no scientific evidence suggesting any long-term harm from these foods. | Why GAO Did This Study
Genetically modified foods pose the same risks to human health as do other foods. These risks include allergens, toxins, and compounds known as antinutrients which inhibit the absorption of nutrients. Before marketing a genetically modified food, company scientists seek to determine whether these foods pose any heightened risks. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published guidelines in 1992 to ensure that companies worked with the agency to assess the safety of genetically modified foods.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FDA's evaluation process could be enhanced by randomly verifying the test data provided and by increasing the transparency of the evaluation process, including communicating more clearly the scientific rationale for FDA's final decision on an assessment of genetically modified food. Scientists expect that genetic modifications will increasingly enhance the nutritional value of genetically modified foods. Although current tests have been adequate for evaluating the few genetically modified foods that have, so far, undergone relatively simple compositional changes, new technologies are being developed to evaluate the increasingly complex compositional changes expected. Monitoring the long-term health risks of genetically modified foods is generally neither necessary nor feasible. No scientific evidence exists, nor is there even a hypothesis, suggesting that long-term harm, such as higher cancer rates, results from these foods. Moreover, technical challenges make long-term monitoring infeasible. |
gao_RCED-95-39 | gao_RCED-95-39_0 | These operators included pipeline companies, local distribution companies, and independent marketers. However, FERC added that it could use its authority to regulate the rates charged by interstate pipeline companies for gathering, transportation, and other services to regulate a gathering affiliate if the affiliate and its parent pipeline company act together in a collusive and anticompetitive manner. This policy has generally been accepted by pipeline companies, local distribution companies, and end-users. Since the early 1990s, several interstate pipeline companies have created affiliates to provide their gathering services. In contrast to other segments of the industry, producers generally believe that it is too early to determine the effects of FERC’s new policy. None of the industry representatives we interviewed expressed concern over FERC’s use of market-based rates in areas where the storage market is competitive. According to a FERC official, storage customers expressed no objections in the six cases in which FERC has approved market-based rates. FERC officials believe that it is too early in the development of hubs to determine what, if any, regulatory role the Commission should play or what rates it should approve. The structure and workings of market hubs are still evolving. DOE and FERC Have Established a Working Group
To carry out the goals of its Domestic Natural Gas and Oil Initiative, DOE established a working group with FERC intended to facilitate discussions between the two agencies and allow a better understanding of the goals and objectives of each other’s programs and policies. In addition, the Chairman asked us to review the Department of Energy’s (DOE) plans to intervene in energy-related regulatory proceedings in the states and the extent to which DOE plans to interact with FERC in carrying out such interventions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how producers, pipeline companies, and end-users view the regulatory changes affecting the collection, storage, and marketing of natural gas, focusing on the: (1) Department of Energy's (DOE) plans to intervene in energy-related regulatory proceedings; and (2) extent to which DOE plans to interact with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in such interventions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FERC will use its authority over pipeline companies to regulate an affiliate if the parent company and the affiliate act together in a collusive manner; (2) interstate pipeline companies, local distribution companies, and end-users find the new FERC policy acceptable, while producers believe that it is too early to determine the effectiveness of the new policy; (3) FERC has determined that competition is sufficient to allow storage operators to charge market-based rates; (4) no segment of the industry has objected to the use of market-based rates in locations where the storage market is competitive; (5) while FERC sets the rates for the services that interstate pipeline companies provide, FERC has agreed to allow some pipeline companies to vary their rates to compete better; (6) according to FERC officials and industry analysts, market hubs are still in the early stages of development, and it is still too early to determine what, if any, regulatory role FERC will have; (7) DOE plans to intervene or participate in energy-related regulatory proceedings when it believes its participation can result in a more comprehensive assessment of energy policy options; and (8) although FERC does not coordinate its regulatory activities with DOE, the two agencies have established a working group to ensure that their staffs interact and are aware of the goals and objectives of each other's programs and policies. |
gao_GAO-06-996 | gao_GAO-06-996_0 | GAO designated management of interagency contracting a governmentwide high-risk area in 2005. Enhanced Guidance and Expertise Could Help DHS Address Interagency Contracting Risks
While DHS has developed guidance on the use of interagency agreements—the largest category of interagency contracting at DHS, which amounted to $5 billion in fiscal year 2005—it does not have specific guidance for other types of interagency contracting, including GSA schedules and GWACs, which accounted for almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2005. Moreover, we found that some DHS users may have lacked expertise in the proper use of interagency contracts. However, our recent work, as well as the work of others, has found that not all interagency contracts provide good value when considering both timeliness and cost. According to DHS contracting officials the benefits of speed and convenience—not total value including cost—have often driven decisions to choose interagency contracting vehicles. Recent Planning Requirement Does Not Include Evaluation Criteria
As of July 2005 DHS has required an analysis of alternatives for all acquisitions, including all types of interagency contracts. DHS Oversight Program Does Not Assess Outcomes of Interagency Contracting
Although DHS’ spending through interagency contracting totals billions of dollars annually and increased by 73 percent in the past year, the department does not systematically monitor its use of these contracts to assess whether this method for acquiring goods and services is being properly managed and provides good outcomes for the department. According to officials, DHS’ acquisition oversight program has been hindered by limited resources and authority. This type of monitoring could provide DHS with useful information to assess its use of this contracting method. As of August 2006, according to OCPO officials, only five staff were assigned to departmentwide oversight responsibilities for $17.5 billion in acquisitions. In March 2005, we recommended that OCPO be provided sufficient enforcement authority and resources to provide effective oversight of DHS’ acquisition policies and procedures. While the use of these types of contracts provides speed and convenience in the procurement process, the agencies that manage the contracts and DHS users have not always adhered to sound contracting practices. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the department’s ability to manage the risks of interagency contracting, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security consider the adequacy of the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer’s resources and implement the following three actions: develop consistent, comprehensive guidance, and related training to reinforce the proper use of all types of interagency contracts to be followed by all components; establish, as part of the department’s planning requirement for an analysis of alternatives, criteria to consider in making the decision to use an interagency contract; and implement oversight procedures to evaluate the outcomes of using interagency contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has some of the most extensive acquisition needs within the federal government. In fiscal year 2005, DHS spent $17.5 billion on contracted purchases, $6.5 billion, or 37 percent, of which was through the use of other agencies' contracts and contracting services, a process known as interagency contracting. While these types of contracts offer the benefits of efficiency and convenience, in January 2005, GAO noted shortcomings and designated the management of interagency contracting as a governmentwide high-risk area. Given the department's critical national security mission and the results of our earlier work, GAO reviewed the extent to which DHS manages the risks of interagency contracting and assessed DHS' guidance, planning, and oversight of interagency contracting.
What GAO Found
DHS has developed guidance on how to manage the risks of some but not all types of interagency contracts. The department has guidance for interagency agreements--the largest category of interagency contracting at the department--but does not have specific guidance for using other types of contracts such as the General Services Administration (GSA) schedules and governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC), which amounted to almost $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2005. Moreover, in some cases we found users may have lacked expertise that could be addressed through guidance and training on the use of these types of contracts. DHS did not always consider alternatives to ensure good value when selecting among interagency contracts. While this contracting method is often chosen because it requires less planning than establishing a new contract, evaluating the selection of an interagency contract is important because not all interagency contracts provide good value when considering timeliness and cost. As of July 2005 DHS has required planning and analysis of alternatives for all acquisitions. In this review, we found that in all four cases for which an analysis of alternatives was required, it was not conducted. DHS officials said benefits of speed and convenience--not total value including cost--have often driven decisions to choose these types of contracts. DHS does not systematically monitor its total spending on interagency contacts and does not assess the outcomes of its use of this contracting method. According to officials, DHS' acquisition oversight program has been hindered by limited resources and authority. As of August 2006, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer had five staff assigned to departmentwide oversight responsibilities for $17.5 billion in acquisitions. In March 2005, GAO recommended that the Chief Procurement Officer be provided sufficient authority to provide effective oversight of DHS' acquisition policies and procedures. Without this authority, DHS cannot be certain that acquisition improvements are made. |
gao_GAO-14-71 | gao_GAO-14-71_0 | These full-time positions—which DOD calls full-time support—in general are more expensive than part-time personnel because they are paid as full-time employees and receive greater compensation and benefits such as retirement, health-care, and education. Funded Positions at Reserve-Component Headquarters Have Grown Overall since 2009
Between fiscal year 2009 and 2013, the total number of positions funded for the 75 reserve-component headquarters we identified grew from about 30,200 to about 31,900—an increase of nearly 6 percent, as shown in figure 4. The number of funded positions also increased at the Army Reserve’s headquarters, which grew by about 15 percent, but decreased at the Air Force Reserve’s headquarters by about 4 percent over the same period. In addition, DOD has not included data on the National Guard Bureau in its required Defense Manpower Requirements Report to Congress. By creating a system whereby an external organization is not independently assessing the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements the bureau has removed an independent check that could help ensure that the bureau is staffed with the appropriate number of personnel needed to execute its assigned missions and workload. . Our analysis of DOD’s reserve-component headquarters found that DOD’s list of its Major DOD Headquarters Activities did not include the National Guard Bureau, even though the bureau meets the headquarters criteria specified in DOD’s instruction and is now commanded by a 4-star General who sits on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This list is the basis for reporting required personnel data to Congress, and because the bureau was not included in DOD’s list, its personnel data were not reported to Congress. DOD Lacks Assurance That the National Guard’s State Joint Force Headquarters Are Sized to Be Efficient
The National Guard has not fully reassessed the personnel requirements of the 54 state Joint Force headquarters or their predecessor organizations—which collectively contain nearly 21,900 funded positions—since the 1980s despite changes in their organization and assigned missions. Our prior work has shown that cost savings may be achieved by consolidating and centralizing overlapping functions and eliminating unnecessary overlap and duplication. In the absence of a process that provides a holistic assessment of the state Joint Force Headquarters, National Guard officials noted that they have begun two efforts that are intended to assess personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters: (1) a National Guard Bureau study evaluating personnel requirements for the Joint staff element at these headquarters and (2) an Army National Guard Directorate evaluation of functions—some of which include both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel—within these headquarters. The Army and Air Force Have Not Consistently Implemented Processes for Reassessing Personnel Requirements of Reserve- Component Headquarters
The Army and Air Force have not consistently implemented processes for ensuring their reserve-component headquarters have the minimum number of personnel, thereby hindering their ability to determine whether these headquarters have been sized to be efficient. In contrast, several of the headquarters that showed significant growth were among those that have not been reassessed including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and Air National Guard Readiness Center. Following this reassessment, the Air Force Reserve shrank the three numbered Air Force headquarters by more than one-third, and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, by more than 10 percent. Finally, for those headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force— specifically 13 Army Reserve headquarters, 5 Air Force Reserve headquarters, the Army National Guard Directorate, and the Air National Guard Readiness Center—DOD has processes in place that if consistently implemented could help ensure that these headquarters are sized and structured appropriately. To minimize the potential for gaps or overlaps at the National Guard’s state Joint Force headquarters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to: develop a process for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to collaborate when determining personnel requirements for joint functions at these headquarters and assess and validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters to include the Army staff element and Air staff element. To ensure that Air Force Reserve headquarters and the Air National Guard Readiness Center are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force’s guidance to require that these headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule for reassessing personnel requirements for its reserve-component headquarters. DOD concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. To evaluate the extent to which DOD established and implemented processes to efficiently size its reserve-component headquarters and provide information for congressional oversight we took the following steps: 1. Manage resources across units. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has sought to reduce costs by assessing headquarters and overhead functions. Both the Army and Air Force have two reserve components--a National Guard and Reserve--that have at least 75 headquarters located throughout the United States, its territories, and overseas that manage subordinate units or perform overhead functions. These headquarters have a mix of full-time and part-time personnel. GAO was asked to review issues related to reserve-component headquarters. This report (1) discusses trends in funded positions at reservecomponent headquarters and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has established and implemented processes to efficiently size its reservecomponent headquarters. To do so, GAO reviewed statutes and DOD guidance, analyzed personnel data and headquarters assessments, and interviewed DOD and state officials.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, the total number of funded positions--both full-time support and part-time--at the Department of Defense's (DOD) 75 Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve (Reserves) component headquarters grew from about 30,200 to 31,900 positions (about 6 percent overall). Some organizations grew more markedly, among them the National Guard Bureau (17 percent); Army National Guard Directorate (44 percent); Air National Guard Readiness Center (21 percent); and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (45 percent). DOD officials attribute growth to the conversion of contractor workload into civilian positions and increased missions assigned at certain headquarters. Over the same period, staff levels at the National Guard's 54 state Joint Force headquarters remained flat and the Air Force Reserve shrank by 4 percent.
DOD has processes in place that are intended to ensure that the number of funded positions at its reserve-component headquarters are set at the minimum level needed to accomplish their mission, but it has not consistently followed those processes at 68 of the 75 headquarters that GAO reviewed. As a result, DOD is unable to determine whether National Guard and Reserve headquarters are sized to be efficient. The National Guard has begun evaluating some personnel requirements, but its efforts do not fully address the management issues GAO identified:
The National Guard Bureau, which may continue to grow to accommodate its Chief's placement on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is determining its own requirements without external validation. This is inconsistent with Joint Staff, Army, and Air Force processes, which generally involve an external review. In addition, Congress's ability to oversee the bureau's size is limited because DOD's annual report on its Major DOD Headquarters Activities does not include data on the bureau and its more than 600 staff.
The National Guard has not fully assessed its 54 state headquarters--which contain nearly 21,900 funded positions--since the 1980s. GAO's prior work shows that agencies can reduce costs by consolidating and centralizing functions and eliminating unneeded duplication. The National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center each assess a portion of the state headquarters, but there is no process to assess the headquarters' personnel requirements in their entirety and ongoing efforts do not provide a holistic review.
The Army and Air Force have not fully reassessed 13 of the 20 reserve component headquarters for which they are responsible. The Army has a reassessment backlog, and the Air Force does not require periodic reassessments and reassesses its headquarters on an ad hoc basis. Some headquarters with significant growth are among those that have not been reassessed, including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Air National Guard Readiness Center. In contrast, 5 of the 7 reassessed organizations subsequently reduced their staff levels such as the Air Force Reserve's three numbered air forces, which have shrunk by more than a third since 2009. The Army and Air Force agree their headquarters should be reassessed, but they have not scheduled reassessments across their reserve components.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD externally validate the National Guard Bureaus personnel requirements and include the bureau in its annual report to Congress; reassess requirements for the 54 state Joint Force headquarters; and develop schedules for reassessing headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force. DOD concurred with recommendations to report data to Congress and establish schedules for reassessing headquarters and partially concurred with recommendations to externally validate the bureaus personnel requirements and assess requirements for the state Joint Force headquarters. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-03-586 | gao_GAO-03-586_0 | Federal agencies’ information collection activities are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) is one of the most important nonfederal entities that collect data from the electricity industry. Agencies Collect, Use, and Share Electricity-Related Information to Meet Missions
Federal agencies collect three types of electricity-related information for widely varying purposes in accordance with their different missions. As a result, the information usually does not reflect current market conditions. To meet their missions, agencies collect a wide variety of electricity-related information. In addition, EIA collects end-user information such as residential, commercial, and industrial usage. Restructuring Has Exposed Gaps in Agencies’ Electricity Information and Has Affected How This Information Is Shared
Of the eight federal agencies included in our review, we found that restructuring has significantly affected FERC while other agencies were affected to a lesser extent. However, FERC is limited in the information it is allowed to collect, primarily because of limitations in its authority. Price and transaction information, as well as operational information, is important in order for FERC to be able to detect changes in the market, determine the legitimacy of market outcomes, and if needed, take corrective action. This authority does not generally extend to nonjurisdictional entities such as the power marketing administrations, other nonutilities, and NERC. FERC plans to use the market monitors, created as part of ISOs, to perform up-to-the-minute market monitoring activities and routinely collect information on their electricity markets. FERC and Other Nonfederal Sources of Information Face Challenges that Affect Both Information Collection and Sharing
FERC recognizes the need of utilities to compete in the electric market and understands their desire to keep confidential some of the information it collects through its forms. Consequently, FERC is currently missing some of these key pieces of information or is relying on third parties such as energy news services for related information to assist in meeting its market monitoring and oversight responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given that effective oversight of evolving electricity markets requires the acquisition of and access to timely, reliable, and complete information, we recommend that the Chairman, FERC (1) demonstrate what information FERC needs, (2) describe the limitations resulting from not having this information, and (3) ask the Congress for sufficient authority to meet its information collection needs and responsibilities. The complete text of DOE’s written comments is included in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine what electricity information is collected, used, and shared by key federal agencies in meeting their primary responsibilities, we first identified federal agencies using specific forms and form-like surveys for collecting electricity information. To determine the effect of restructuring on federal agencies’ collection, use, and sharing of this information, we focused primarily on FERC because it bears the main responsibility for monitoring electricity markets, is undergoing major organizational changes caused by restructuring, and has shown serious deficiencies in responding to restructuring. To understand how restructuring has affected the way in which federal agencies share this information, we examined concerns about confidentiality, particularly as they related to EIA’s development of its current confidentiality policy and FERC’s lack of access to NERC information because of NERC’s concerns about the potential sensitivity of the information. These sections authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC):
Used to monitor markets to ensure that rates are just and reasonable, and services are offered in a nondiscriminatory manner. (DOE) Energy Information Administration publishes Form 1 data in aggregate form. Publicly available, excluding information on stocks at end of reporting period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ongoing transition (or restructuring) of electricity markets from regulated monopolies to competitive markets is one of the largest single industrial reorganizations in the history of the world. While information is becoming more critical for understanding how well restructuring is working, there are troubling indications that some market participants deliberately misreported information to manipulate prices. GAO was asked to describe (1) the electricity information collected, used, and shared by key federal agencies in meeting their primary responsibilities and (2) the effect of restructuring on these federal agencies' collection, use, and sharing of this information.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies collect, use, and share a wide variety of electricity-related information to carry out their respective missions. Federal agencies have three principal sources of information: (1) routine formal data collection instruments sent to industry participants to report on operations and other industry-related activities, (2) third parties such as energy news services that package federally collected information as well as collect original information some of which reflects current market conditions, and (3) individual companies under investigation. Agencies use the information that they collect to carry out their respective missions--ranging from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) monitoring of electricity markets to Energy Information Administration's dissemination of information about the electricity sector and Environmental Protection Agency's pollution monitoring. Agencies share electricity-related information through a variety of means, such as using the Internet to distribute published reports and access their databases, interagency meetings, and other means. In addition, most federally collected information is made publicly available, although it is sometimes subject to delayed release or released in aggregated form in order to protect business-sensitive information. Restructuring has substantially changed the collection, use, and sharing of electricity information at some agencies and has exposed gaps in the federal government's collection of this information. Restructuring has affected FERC dramatically by changing how FERC performs its mission of assuring just and reasonable prices and by shifting its focus from periodic review of cost information to monitoring current market conditions. To monitor these conditions, FERC needs to access market information on wholesale transactions; however, no federal agency, including FERC, has access to complete and timely information on electricity markets and market participants, exposing gaps in key information. Such information gaps exist primarily because FERC is limited in its authority to collect information for full and effective market oversight and it lacks specific authority to collect current information which may lead to market participants challenging these collection activities. For example, FERC authority does not generally extend to non-jurisdictional entities such as the power marketing administrations, other non-utilities, and North American Electric Reliability Council. As long as these information gaps persist, FERC will be unable to oversee electricity markets in a comprehensive manner. Restructuring's effects on the sharing of electricity information, coupled with recent national security concerns, have highlighted the sensitive nature of some information that federal agencies collect or need. Because of the importance of having timely, reliable, and complete information, we are recommending that FERC take action to resolve its information gaps. As part of this action, we are recommending that FERC present its findings to the Congress because information-related issues--raised by restructuring--may require Congressional action to ultimately resolve. |
gao_NSIAD-98-135 | gao_NSIAD-98-135_0 | Research and Development Investment Has Not Yet Paid Dividends
Since 1992, the Navy has invested about $1.2 billion in RDT&E funds to improve its mine warfare capabilities. The Navy plans to spend an additional $1.5 billion for RDT&E over the next 6 years. So far, according to a Navy official, this investment has not produced any systems that are ready to transition to production. Other systems, such as communications data links for the MH-53 helicopters and the airborne laser mine-detection system (Magic Lantern Deployment Contingency), were not produced because the Navy never funded their procurement. Delays experienced in a number of MCM development programs result from the same kinds of problems that are found in other DOD acquisitions such as funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth, and unanticipated technical problems. Certification Requirement Has Had a Positive Impact
A majority of officials we interviewed said that the annual certification requirement was useful because it served to increase the visibility of MCM requirements within DOD and the Navy. However, as currently prepared, the annual certification does not address the adequacy of overall resources for this mission, nor does it provide for objective measures against which progress can be evaluated. Moreover, since the Joint Staff’s review has occurred after, rather than before, the Navy’s budget proposals for MCM programs have been formalized, it has had no impact on specific Navy acquisition programs or overall resource decisions. This decision will assist in prioritizing and disciplining its research, development, and procurement efforts. As with other mission areas, the types and quantities of systems to be procured and their platform integration will most likely be driven by the level of resources the Navy allocates to the MCM mission in the future. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy, determine the mix of on-board and special purpose forces DOD plans to maintain in the future and commit the funding deemed necessary for the development and sustainment of these desired capabilities. Matters for Congressional Consideration
The certification process has increased DOD’s and the Navy’s attention to the MCM mission. It is to be an on-board mine countermeasures asset and capable of night operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's mine countermeasures efforts, focusing on the: (1) Navy's plans for improving mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities; (2) status of current research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs; and (3) process the Department of Defense (DOD) used to prepare the annual certification required by Public Law 102-190.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy has not decided on the mix of on-board and special purpose forces it wants to maintain in the future and committed the funding needed for developing and sustaining those capabilities; (2) this decision will determine the types and quantities of systems to be developed and their priority; (3) it also affects the schedule and cost of those developments and the design and cost of the platforms on which they will operate; (4) a final force structure decision will likely be determined by the level of resources the Navy decides to dedicate to the MCM mission in the future; (5) a few systems are scheduled for production decisions within the next 2 to 3 years, while other systems were not produced because the Navy never funded their procurement; (6) since 1992, the Navy has spent about $1.2 billion in RDT&E funds to improve its mine warfare capabilities; (7) however, this investment has not produced any systems that are ready to transition to production; (8) delaying factors include funding instability, changing requirements, cost growth, and unanticipated technical problems; (9) the Navy plans to spend an additional $1.5 billion for RDT&E over the next 6 years; (10) most officials interviewed said the annual certification process has served to increase the visibility of MCM requirements within DOD and the Navy, with positive results and should continue to be required; (11) however, as currently conducted, the annual certification process does not address the adequacy of overall resources for this mission, nor does it contain any measures against which the Navy's progress in enhancing its MCM capabilities can be evaluated; (12) the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staffs' review for resource sufficiency occurs after the Navy's budget proposals for its MCM program have been formalized; and (13) the review does not affect specific Navy MCM acquisition programs or overall MCM resource decisions. |
gao_GAO-02-893T | gao_GAO-02-893T_0 | The President’s proposal transfers control over many of the programs that provide preparedness and response support for the state and local governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Transfer of Certain Public Health Programs Has Potential to Improve Coordination
The transfer of federal assets and resources in the President’s proposed legislation has the potential to improve coordination of public health preparedness and response activities at the federal, state, and local levels. New Department’s Control of Essential Public Health Capacities Raises Concern
The President’s proposal to shift the responsibility for all programs assisting state and local agencies in public health emergency preparedness and response from HHS to the new department raises concern because of the dual-purpose nature of these activities. These programs include essential public health functions that, while important for homeland security, are critical to basic public health core capacities. Therefore, we are concerned about the transfer of control over the programs, including priority setting, that the proposal would give to the new department. We recognize the need for coordination of these activities with other homeland security functions, but the President’s proposal is not clear on how the public health and homeland security objectives would be balanced. Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. | What GAO Found
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has been concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for and coordinate an effective public health response given the broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the federal level. More then 20 federal departments and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness and response. The President's proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring many of these federal entities with homeland security responsibilities--including public health preparedness and response--into one department to mobilize and focus assets and resources at all levels of government. The proposed reorganization has the potential to assist in the coordination of public health preparedness and response programs at the federal, state, and local levels. There are concerns, however, about the proposed transfer of control of public health assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland security functions from Health and Human Services to the new department. Transferring control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs critical to basic public health responsibilities. The President's proposal is unclear on how both the homeland security and the public health objectives would be accomplished. |
gao_GAO-15-327T | gao_GAO-15-327T_0 | FAA Has Made Progress in Addressing the Certification Process and Regulatory Consistency Committees’ Recommendations
FAA Reports that Most of the Initiatives to Improve Its Aircraft Certification Processes Have Been Implemented, but It Is Too Early to Assess Whether Expected Outcomes Will Be Achieved
Aircraft Certification is implementing and has set milestones for completing 14 initiatives in response to May 2012 recommendations of the Certification Process Committee. Although we reported in 2013 that the Certification Process Committee’s recommendations were relevant, clear, and actionable, it is too soon for us to determine whether FAA’s 14 initiatives adequately address the recommendations. According to an update prepared by FAA in January 2015, eight initiatives have been completed, and two are on track to be completed within 3 years. However, according to this update, one initiative was at risk of not meeting planned milestones, and three initiatives will not meet planned milestones, including the update to 14 C.F.R. FAA Has Developed Plans to Address Recommendations to Improve the Consistency of Its Regulatory Interpretations, but Progress Has Been Slow
Flight Standards has also developed initiatives in response to the six November 2012 recommendations of the Regulatory Consistency Committee, but the planned initiatives have not yet been released officially. However, according to an October 2014 draft version of the plan that FAA provided to us, despite not having yet officially released the plan, FAA noted that it had closed 2 of the 6 recommendations and plans to complete the remaining four by July 1, 2016. Table 1 provides a summary of the recommendations and FAA’s plans for addressing them, based on the October 2014 draft plan that FAA provided to us. Further, industry representatives have continued to indicate a lack of communication with and involvement of stakeholders as a primary challenge for FAA in implementing the committees’ recommendations, particularly the regulatory consistency recommendations. Selected U.S. Companies Report Challenges in Obtaining Foreign Approvals, Which FAA Is Taking Steps to Address within Sovereignty Constraints
U.S. Companies Reported that they Experienced FCAA-Related Process, Communications, and Cost Challenges and FAA is Attempting to Address These Challenges
Representatives of the selected 15 U.S. aviation companies we interviewed, as part of our ongoing work on foreign approvals, reported that their companies faced challenges related to process, communications, and cost in obtaining approvals from FCAAs. FAA is making some efforts to address these challenges, such as by holding regular meetings with some bilateral partners and setting up forums in anticipation of issues arising. applications submitted to the top ten and other markets for foreign approvals from January 2012 through November 2014. Reported Issues Related to Some BASAs
Although representatives from 11 of the 15 U.S. companies and the 3 foreign companies we interviewed reported being satisfied with the overall effectiveness of having BASAs in place or with various aspects of the current BASAs, representatives of 10 U.S. companies reported challenges related to some BASAs lacking specificity and flexibility, 2 raised concerns that there is a lack of a formal dispute resolution process, and 1 noted a lack of a distinction between approvals of simple and complex aircraft. FAA has taken action to improve some BASAs to better streamline the approval process that those countries apply to imported U.S. aviation products. For instance, according to FAA officials, they meet regularly with bilateral partners to address approval process issues and are working with these partners on developing a common set of approval principles. They specifically cited EASA and the Federal Aviation Authority of Russia (FAAR). U.S. Companies Also Reported FAA-Related Challenges Which FAA Is Taking Actions to Address
Reported Challenges Related to FAA
As mentioned previously, FAA provides assistance to U.S. companies by facilitating the application process for foreign approvals of aviation products. These cited issues included limited experience on the part of FAA staff in dispute resolution as well as limited expertise related to intellectual property and export control laws. FAA Initiatives to Address Challenges
FAA has initiatives under way aimed at improving its process for supporting foreign approvals that may help address some of the challenges raised by the U.S. companies in our review. Specifically, FAA’s current efforts to increase the efficiency of its foreign approval process could help address reported challenges related to FAA’s process and its limited staff and financial resources. For example, FAA is planning to address its resource limitations by focusing on improving the efficiency of its process with such actions as increasing international activities to support U.S. interests in global aviation, and by implementing its 2018 strategic plan, which includes the possibility of allocating more resources to strengthening international relationships. In conclusion, to its credit, FAA has made some progress in addressing the Certification Process and Regulatory Consistency Committees’ recommendations, as well as in taking steps to address challenges faced by U.S. aviation companies in obtaining foreign approvals of their products. | Why GAO Did This Study
FAA issues certificates for new U.S.-manufactured aviation products, based on federal aviation regulations. GAO and industry stakeholders have questioned the efficiency of FAA's certification process and the consistency of its regulatory interpretations. As required by the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act, FAA chartered two committees--one to improve certification processes and another to address regulatory consistency--that recommended improvements in 2012. FAA also assists U.S. aviation companies seeking approval of their FAA-certificated products in foreign markets. FAA has negotiated BASAs with many FCAAs to provide a framework for the reciprocal approval of aviation products. However, U.S. industry stakeholders have raised concerns that some countries conduct lengthy processes for approving U.S. products.
This testimony focuses on (1) FAA's progress in implementing the certification process and regulatory consistency recommendations and (2) challenges selected U.S. companies face in obtaining foreign approvals. It is based on GAO products issued from 2010 to 2014, updated in January 2015 based on FAA documents, and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work on foreign approvals. This ongoing work includes an analysis of FAA data on approval applications submitted January 2012 through November 2014 and interviews of a nongeneralizable sample of 15 U.S. companies seeking foreign approvals, selected on the basis of the number of applications submitted and aviation product types manufactured.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made progress in addressing the Certification Process and the Regulatory Consistency committees' recommendations, but challenges remain and could affect successful implementation of the committees' recommendations.
FAA is implementing its plan for completing 14 initiatives for addressing the 6 certification process recommendations. According to a January 2015 FAA update, 10 initiatives have been completed or are on track to be completed, whereas the rest are at risk of not meeting or will not meet planned milestones.
FAA has developed plans for addressing the six regulatory consistency recommendations. In late December 2014, FAA officials indicated that the final plan to implement the recommendations is under agency review and is expected to be published in January 2015. According to a draft version of the plan, FAA closed two recommendations--one as not implemented and one as implemented in 2013--and plans to complete the remaining 4 by July 2016.
While FAA has made some progress, it is too soon for GAO to determine whether FAA's planned actions adequately address the recommendations. However, industry stakeholders continue to indicate concerns regarding FAA's efforts. These concerns include a lack of communication with and involvement of stakeholders as FAA implements the two committees' recommendations.
As part of its ongoing work, representatives of 15 selected U.S. aviation companies GAO interviewed reported facing various challenges in obtaining foreign approvals of their products, including challenges related to foreign civil aviation authorities (FCAA) as well as challenges related to FAA.
Reported FCAA-related challenges related to (1) the length and uncertainty of some FCAA approval processes, (2) the lack of specificity and flexibility in some of FAA's bilateral aviation safety agreements (BASA) negotiated with FCAAs, (3) difficulty with or lack of FCAA communications, and (4) high fees charged by some FCAAs. Although FAA's authority to address some of these challenges related to FCAAs is limited, FAA has been addressing many of them. For example, FAA has created a certification management team with its three major bilateral partners to provide a forum for addressing approval process challenges, among other issues. FAA has also taken action to mitigate the challenges related to some BASAs by holding regular meetings with bilateral partners and adding dispute resolution procedures to some BASAs.
Reported FAA-related challenges primarily involved (1) FAA's process for facilitating approval applications, which sometimes delayed the submission of applications to FCAAs; (2) limited availability of FAA staff for facilitating approval applications; and (3) lack of FAA staff expertise in issues unique to foreign approvals, such as intellectual property concerns and export control laws. FAA has initiatives under way to improve its process that may help resolve some of these challenges raised by U.S. companies. For example, FAA is making its approvals-related data more robust to better evaluate its relationships with bilateral partners. FAA is also addressing its resource limitations by taking actions to improve the efficiency of its process. |
gao_GAO-02-1056 | gao_GAO-02-1056_0 | The 30 commitment areas included market access, investment measures, fundamental market, and rule of law-related reforms. At least three quarters of respondents selected intellectual property rights; consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices; and transparency most frequently when asked to rate the importance of individual commitment areas to their companies (based on a list of 30 WTO-related commitment areas that we specified in the survey). Furthermore, companies generally expected that their business activities in China would increase as a result of China’s implementation of its WTO commitments, including their volume of exports to China, market share in China, and distribution of products there. Some companies had already experienced an impact, and most companies expected to begin to experience an impact within the next few years. When asked what impact they expected China’s WTO commitments would have on their companies, most survey respondents reported that they expected a positive or very positive impact. Company Views on Impact
Company representatives that we interviewed in China made comments that lend support to the general expectation that change will be positive, but many believed that China’s implementation would be incremental and would be tempered by China’s desire to protect its workers. Respondents also expected some non rule-of-law-related commitment areas to be relatively difficult for Chinese officials to implement. Specifically, our analysis identified rule of law-related commitment areas as the commitment areas of greatest importance to respondents’ companies and also showed that respondents expected these reforms to be the most difficult for China to implement, as shown in table 5. Concluding Observations
If implemented, China’s commitments will open China’s economy and reform its trading activities, thereby expanding U.S. companies’ opportunities for investing in China and for exporting goods, agricultural products, and services to China. Understanding U.S. companies’ expectations is fundamental for policymakers to judge the degree to which the benefits of China’s WTO membership are being realized. Our objectives for this initial preparatory survey were to assess U.S. businesses’ (1) views about the importance of WTO-related commitments to their business operations in China, (2) views about the anticipated effects of China’s WTO-related reforms on their businesses, and (3) opinions regarding China’s prospects for implementing these reforms. To respond to our objectives, we mailed surveys to 551 selected chief executive officers (CEO) or presidents of U.S. companies with a presence in China; conducted structured interviews in China with representatives of 48 U.S. companies, two foreign-owned companies with operations in the United States and China, and representatives of two U.S. trade associations with representative offices in China; met with representatives of other U.S. business associations in China and the United States; and considered other surveys of U.S. businesses in China. World Trade Organization (WTO)
Please designate one person to have overall commitments. Immediately/ Has already occurred 1. Why? 2. Transparency of laws, regulations, & practices (publishing and making publicly available) 26. | Why GAO Did This Study
China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, brought the world's seventh largest economy under global trade liberalizing rules. If implemented, China's commitments will open China's economy and reform its trading activities, thereby expanding U.S. companies' opportunities for investing in China and for exporting goods, agricultural products, and services to China. Understanding U.S. companies' expectations is fundamental for policymakers to judge the degree to which the benefits of China's WTO membership are being realized. GAO analyzed U.S. companies' views about (1) the importance of, (2) the anticipated effects of, and (3) prospects for China implementing its WTO commitments. GAO surveyed a random sample of 551 U.S. companies and interviewed 48 judgmentally selected companies in four cities in China. Survey results reflect responses from 191 companies--a response rate of 38 percent--and may not reflect the views of all U.S. companies with activities in China.
What GAO Found
U.S. companies that responded to the GAO survey reported that most of China's WTO commitments are important to them. These companies, which already have a presence in China, identified rule of law--related reforms as more important than other reforms to increase market access, to liberalize foreign investment measures, and to make fundamental changes to continue China's transition to a market economy. Specifically, WTO commitments in the areas of intellectual property rights; consistent application of laws, regulations, and practices; and transparency of laws, regulations, and practices emerged as the most important areas in which China made commitments. Most companies responding to GAO's survey expected that China's WTO commitments would have a positive impact on their business operations, that the impact has already begun or would begin within 2 years and that it would lead to an increase in their volume of exports to China, market share in China, and distribution of products there. However, some company representatives whom GAO interviewed in China believed that China's implementation would be incremental. Survey respondents expected that most of the WTO--related commitment areas listed in GAO's survey would be difficult for Chinese officials to implement. Companies expected the important rule of law--related commitment areas to be the most difficult commitments to carry out and had mixed expectations about implementation for different government levels and geographic areas across China. Besides rule of law--related reforms, company representatives described how they expect that China's need to protect its domestic interests and China's culture with regards to business relationships might create impediments to implementation. |
gao_GAO-14-531 | gao_GAO-14-531_0 | Secure Flight Initially Identified Passengers on Terrorist Watchlists and Now Also Differentiates Passengers Based on Risk
Since January 2009, the Secure Flight program has changed from one that identifies high-risk passengers by matching them against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk.passengers as high risk if they are matched to watchlists of known or suspected terrorists or other lists developed using certain high-risk criteria, as low risk if they are deemed eligible for expedited screening through TSA PreTM—a 2011 initiative to preapprove passengers for expedited screening—or through the application of low-risk rules, and as unknown risk if they do not fall within the other two risk categories. Through Secure Flight screening, TSA designates passengers matching either rules-based list as selectees for enhanced screening. Specifically, in April 2011, TSA began conducting watchlist matching against an Expanded Selectee List that includes all records in the TSDB with a full name (first name and surname) and full date of birth that meet the Terrorist Screening Center’s reasonable suspicion standard to be considered a known or suspected terrorist, but that are not already included on the No Fly or Selectee List. TSA began using the Expanded Selectee List in response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, as another measure to secure civil aviation. In October 2013, TSA expanded the use of these assessments to all passengers, not just frequent fliers, and also began using other travel-related data to assess passengers. TSOs Have Made Errors in Implementing Secure Flight Screening Determinations at the Screening Checkpoint, and Additional Actions Could Reduce the Number of Screening Errors
Our analysis of TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 found that TSOs have made errors in implementing Secure Flight risk determinations at the screening checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a systematic process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports and target nationwide efforts to address these issues. TDCs would no longer need to examine passengers’ boarding passes to identify those who should receive enhanced screening, which could reduce the potential for error. TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight Program Is Achieving Its Goals
Secure Flight Measures Do Not Fully Assess Progress toward Goals
Secure Flight has six program goals that are relevant to the results of screening performed by the Secure Flight computer system and the program analysts who review computer-generated matches, including the following: goal 1: prevent individuals on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, goal 2: identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced goal 3: support TSA’s risk-based security mission by identifying high- risk passengers for appropriate security measures/actions and identifying low-risk passengers for expedited screening, goal 4: minimize misidentification of individuals as potential threats to goal 5: incorporate additional risk-based security capabilities to streamline processes and accommodate additional aviation populations, and goal 6: protect passengers’ personal information from unauthorized use and disclosure. However, Secure Flight has no measures to address the extent to which Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists (see table 1). Likewise, with respect to its privacy-related goal, additional measures that address other key points in the Secure Flight process in which passenger records could be inappropriately accessed would allow Secure Flight to more fully assess the extent to which it is meeting its goal of protecting passenger information. all potential causes of these errors, and identify and implement sufficient corrective actions. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s Administrator take the following four actions: to further improve the implementation of Secure Flight risk determinations at the screening checkpoint, develop a process for regularly evaluating the root causes of screening errors across airports so that corrective measures can be identified; to address the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint, thereby strengthening checkpoint operations, implement the corrective measures TSA identifies through a root cause evaluation process; to assess the progress of the Secure Flight program toward achieving its goals, develop additional measures to address key performance aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these measures clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve progress toward the goal; and to provide Secure Flight program managers with timely and reliable information on cases in which TSA learns of Secure Flight system matching errors, develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of such cases, for the purpose of improving program performance. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of Justice for their review and comment. DHS also concurred with our fourth recommendation, that TSA develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of cases in which TSA learns that the Secure Flight system has made a matching error. To what extent does the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) ensure that Secure Flight screening determinations for passengers are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints? In addition, to understand new initiatives involving Secure Flight screening to identify low-risk travelers, we spoke with Secure Flight program officials and with officials in TSA’s Office of Risk Based Security who oversee TSA PreTM, a 2011 program that allows TSA to designate preapproved passengers as low risk, and TSA Pre✓™ risk assessments, another initiative to identify passengers as low risk for a specific flight. We evaluated TSA’s efforts to document system matching errors against standards for information and communications identified in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, DHS's TSA began using Secure Flight to screen passengers against high-risk lists. These lists, subsets of the TSDB—the U.S. government's consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—included the No Fly List, to identify those who should be prohibited from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, to identify those who should receive enhanced screening at airport checkpoints.
GAO was asked to assess the current status of the program. This report examines (1) changes to the Secure Flight program since 2009, (2) TSA's efforts to ensure that Secure Flight's screening determinations for passengers are implemented at airport checkpoints, and (3) the extent to which program performance measures assess progress toward goals. GAO analyzed TSA data and documents—including checkpoint data from 2012 through 2014 and Secure Flight performance measures—and interviewed relevant DHS officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. In 2010, following the December 2009 attempted attack of a U.S.-bound flight, which exposed gaps in how agencies used watchlists to screen individuals, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began using risk-based criteria to identify additional high-risk passengers who may not be in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), but who should be designated as selectees for enhanced screening. Further, in 2011, TSA began screening against additional identities in the TSDB that are not already included on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. In addition, as part of TSA PreüTM, a 2011 program through which TSA designates passengers as low risk for expedited screening, TSA began screening against several new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers. TSA also began conducting TSA Pre✓™ risk assessments, an activity distinct from matching against lists that uses the Secure Flight system to assign passengers scores based upon travel-related data, for the purpose of identifying them as low risk for a specific flight.
TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these screening errors. GAO's interviews with TSA officials at airports yielded examples of root causes TSA could identify and address. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports.
Since 2009, Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect new program functions to identify additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For example, Secure Flight does not have measures to assess the extent of system matching errors. Establishing additional performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward goals would allow Secure Flight to more fully assess the extent to which it is meeting program goals. Furthermore, TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors. More systematic documentation of the number and causes of these cases, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would help TSA ensure Secure Flight is functioning as intended.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been removed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TSA develop a process to regularly evaluate the root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement measures to address these causes. GAO also recommends that TSA develop measures to address all aspects of performance related to program goals and develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-18 | gao_GAO-01-18_0 | Conclusion
The Department is working to ensure that the requirements determination process results in accurate numbers and types of munitions necessary to defeat threats as specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. While the Department has made progress and has identified specific areas still requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been updated, nor have decisions been made regarding more detailed warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the reliability of the services’ munitions requirements remain uncertain and could adversely affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain. Specific areas needing attention include completing target templates, publishing the updated munitions effectiveness data, resolving the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense Planning Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the warfighting scenarios, incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement process in a revised Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements instruction, and establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions requirements once all improvements have been implemented. | What GAO Found
To determine the number and type of munitions needed, the military annually evaluates its munition requirements using a multiphase analytical process. The Department of Defense (DOD) is working to ensure that the requirements determination process yields accurate numbers and the types of munitions needed to defeat threats specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. Although DOD has made progress and has identified specific areas still requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been updated, nor have decisions been made on more detailed warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the reliability of the services' munitions requirements remain uncertain and could affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain. |
gao_GAO-15-416 | gao_GAO-15-416_0 | Background
PSDA, Advance Directives, and Advance Care Planning
As amended, the PSDA requires Medicare and Medicaid funded hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, HHAs, and managed care plans— including MA and Medicaid health maintenance organizations—to maintain written policies and procedures related to advance directives. The most common forms of advance directives are living wills and health care powers of attorney. During the last 6 months of life, many individuals receive care from one or more covered providers, including hospitals and nursing homes, and having an advance directive that specifies an individual’s treatment preferences to covered providers in preparation for difficult medical decisions that may arise at the end of life may be useful. The accreditation organization subsequently recommends to CMS certification of providers meeting such standards. CMS Oversees Covered Providers’ Implementation of the Advance Directive Requirement by Providing Guidance and Monitoring Implementation
CMS Provides Guidance to Help Covered Providers Implement the Advance Directive Requirement to Maintain Written Policies and Procedures
CMS develops and disseminates guidance through operations manuals, memoranda, or model documents to five of the six covered provider types—hospitals, nursing homes, HHAs, hospices, and MA plans—to inform these providers of the requirement to maintain written policies and procedures about advance directives and to describe how the agency will monitor providers’ implementation. As a result, CMS does not issue guidance to Medicaid managed care plans. CMS relies on states to provide guidance to Medicaid managed care plans—the sixth provider type—because states are responsible for administering contracts with these plans. CMS Monitors Covered Providers’ Implementation of the Advance Directive Requirement
CMS’s activities to monitor covered providers’ implementation of the advance directive requirement vary across the six covered provider types and include periodic surveys, contract reviews, and the collection of certain related data. CMS enters into agreements with state survey agencies to conduct most surveys. Specifically, CMS reviews MA and Medicaid managed care plan contract provisions addressing compliance with applicable requirements, including the advance directive requirement. For Medicaid managed care plans, CMS officials reported that CMS staff review contracts between the plan and individual states prior to implementation of a new plan contract or when revisions are made to an existing approved contract to ensure that the contract addresses provisions related to advance directives. Approaches Used to Inform Individuals about Advance Directives Vary by Provider Type, but Providers Face Similar Challenges
Providers use various approaches to inform individuals about their right to have an advance directive, either as part of the admission or the enrollment process depending on the type of covered provider, according to CMS and stakeholder officials, and the limited amount of information found in the literature about certain types of providers. The challenges to informing individuals about advance directives include discomfort talking about end-of-life issues, confusion about which staff should have the discussions with individuals, and lack of staff time to have the discussions. In addition to the challenges with informing individuals about advance directives, providers face similar challenges documenting this information, such as errors in individuals’ medical records and challenges related to access or updates to advance directives, according to the literature and stakeholder officials. Providers may better address challenges to inform individuals about advance directives and document them by using leading practices, according to the literature and stakeholders. Many Adults Have Advance Directives, but the Prevalence Varies by Provider Type, Demographics, and Over Time
Many adults in the United States have advance directives. In 2013, about 47 percent of adults over the age of 40 had an advance directive, according to IOM’s report Dying in America. The prevalence of individuals with advance directives varies by the type of provider that individuals are served by—hospitals, nursing homes, HHAs, and hospices—according to the literature. For three of these four provider types (hospice, nursing homes, and HHAs), a 2011 National Center for Health Statistics report found that 88 percent of discharged hospice patients in 2007 had advance directives, compared to 65 percent of nursing home patients in 2004, and 28 percent of HHA patients in 2007. 1.) 2.) Older individuals were more likely to have advance directives than younger individuals. In addition to this study, 36 studies found variations in the prevalence of advance directives by age, race, income, education, or gender. 3.) Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this product from HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advance directives, such as living wills or health care powers of attorney, specify—consistent with applicable state law—how individuals want medical decisions to be made for them should they become unable to communicate their wishes. Many individuals receive medical care from Medicare and Medicaid funded providers during the last 6 months of life, and may benefit from having advance directives that specify treatment preferences. According to IOM, advance directives are most effective when part of a comprehensive approach to end-of-life care called advanced care planning.
GAO was asked to review information related to advance directives. This report examines (1) how CMS oversees providers' implementation of the PSDA requirement; (2) what is known about the approaches providers use and challenges they face to inform individuals about advance directives; and (3) what is known about the prevalence of advance directives and how it varies across provider types and individuals' demographic characteristics. To do this work, GAO reviewed CMS documents and survey data reported by state survey agencies into CMS's Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced Reporting system about covered providers' implementation of the PSDA requirement. GAO also conducted a literature review of peer reviewed articles and federal government reports. In addition, GAO interviewed CMS officials and stakeholders representing providers and individuals likely to benefit from advance directives.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversees providers' implementation of the advance directive requirement in the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA) to maintain written policies and procedures to inform individuals about advance directives, and document information about individuals' advance directives in the medical record by providing guidance and monitoring covered providers. Covered providers include hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies (HHAs), hospices, and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans that receive Medicare and Medicaid payments. CMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides operations manuals, memoranda, and model documents to these providers to inform them about the advance directive requirement and describe how the agency will monitor providers' implementation. Because individual states are responsible for administering contracts with and providing guidance to Medicaid managed care plans, also specified in the PSDA, CMS ensures that the contracts include the advance directive requirement, but does not issue guidance to these plans. To monitor providers' implementation of the advance directive requirement, CMS primarily relies on other entities. CMS enters into agreements with state survey agencies to periodically survey and report data, which CMS collects, on deficiencies related to advance directives for hospitals, nursing homes, HHAs, and hospices. CMS also relies on accrediting organizations to survey providers that participate in the Medicare program through accreditation and subsequently make recommendations to CMS regarding providers' participation in Medicare. In addition, CMS reported reviewing MA and Medicaid managed care plans' contracts to determine that they include the advance directive requirement.
Approaches used to inform individuals about advanced directives vary by type of provider, but providers face similar challenges, according to stakeholders interviewed and literature GAO reviewed. For example, hospitals, nursing homes, HHAs, and hospices inform individuals about advance directives during the admission process, while MA plans and Medicaid managed care plans inform individuals during enrollment. Challenges in informing individuals about advance directives include discomfort talking about end-of-life issues and lack of staff time for such discussions. Providers may address these challenges by using leading practices, such as patient education or population specific materials.
Many adults have advance directives, but estimated prevalence varies by provider type and an individual's demographic characteristics. In 2013, 47 percent of adults over the age of 40 had an advance directive, according to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, Dying in America . However, the prevalence of individuals with advance directives varies by type of provider and demographic characteristic. For example, a National Center for Health Statistics report found that 88 percent of discharged hospice patients had advance directives in 2007 compared to 65 percent of nursing home patients in 2004. Studies GAO reviewed found that individuals who were older, white, had higher education or incomes, or were women were more likely to have advance directives than others.
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_AIMD-98-173 | gao_AIMD-98-173_0 | Interior’s Performance Plan Needs to Be Strengthened in Several Areas
Interior’s performance plan is not user friendly. It consists of nine components—a Departmental Overview and eight individual plans for each of Interior’s major agencies. The nine component performance plans and their respective subagency budget justifications account for about 3,500 pages of material. On a more substantive level, we reviewed Interior’s performance plan to determine whether it met the requirements of the Results Act and its related guidance. To do this, we collapsed the requirements for annual performance plans in the Results Act and related guidance into three core questions: (1) To what extent does the agency’s performance plan provide a clear picture of intended performance across the agency? (2) How well does the performance plan discuss the strategies and resources the agency will use to achieve its performance goals? (3) To what extent does the agency’s performance plan provide confidence that its performance information will be credible? Some Major Management Problems Are Not Adequately Discussed in Interior’s Performance Plan
Our past work at Interior has identified a number of major management problems. Among these are Interior’s need to (1) more effectively manage Indian trust funds and assets; (2) better coordinate crosscutting activities to avoid duplication and overlap; (3) adequately assess NPS’ employee housing needs; (4) provide adequate oversight and accountability over its field offices; and (5) have better information available for making decisions about the resources that Interior manages. The Results Act provides Interior with an opportunity to address these concerns through the development and implementation of its performance plan. We found, however, that while Interior has addressed some of these major management problems, it has not addressed all of them. Over the past 5 years, Interior’s subagencies have made steady progress in preparing reliable financial statements. However, even though most subagencies received clean audit opinions in fiscal year 1997, accounting and internal control weaknesses persist at several subagencies. These weaknesses include (1) accounting and internal controls over accounts receivable (BIA and USGS), revenue (BIA), and real and personal property (BIA and NPS), and (2) controls over computer systems for BIA, BOR, BLM, FWS, and MMS. Actions Under Way to Address Financial Management Problems
Interior has efforts under way to address many of these problem areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its views on several important management issues facing the Department of the Interior, focusing on: (1) Interior's plans for measuring its performance as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; (2) whether major management problems GAO has reported on are being addressed in the agency's performance plan; and (3) financial management issues at Interior.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Interior's performance plan is not user-friendly; (2) it consists of nine-components--a departmental overview and eight subagency plans which have to be reviewed in conjunction with the budget justifications; (3) understanding the totality of what the plans contain is an overwhelming and time-consuming task involving a review of about 3,500 pages of material; (4) on a more substantive level, the plan does not adequately provide a clear picture of intended performance across the Department, sufficiently discuss the strategies and resources that it will use to achieve its performance goals, or provide sufficient confidence that its performance information will be credible; (5) GAO's past work at Interior has identified a number of major management problems; (6) among these are Interior's need to: (a) more effectively manage Indian trust funds and assets; (b) better coordinate crosscutting activities to avoid duplication and overlap; (c) adequately assess the National Park Service's (NPS) employee housing needs; (d) provide adequate oversight and accountability over its field offices; and (e) have better information available for managing the nation's natural resources; (7) the Results Act provides Interior with an opportunity to address these concerns through the development and implementation of its performance plan; (8) GAO found, however, that while Interior has addressed some of GAO's concerns, it has not addressed all of them; (9) over the past five years, Interior's subagencies have made steady progress in preparing reliable financial statements; (10) however, even though most subagencies received clean audit opinions, accounting and internal control weaknesses persist at several subagencies; (11) these weaknesses relate to accounting and internal controls over accounts receivable, revenue, real and personal property, and controls over computer systems; and (12) Interior has efforts under way to address many of these problem areas. |
gao_GAO-03-928 | gao_GAO-03-928_0 | DOD has delegated oversight of the civilian provider network to regional TRICARE lead agents. DOD requires that contractors have a sufficient number and mix of providers, both primary care and specialists, to satisfy the needs of beneficiaries enrolled in the Prime option. In addition, DOD has access-to-care standards that are designed to ensure that Prime beneficiaries receive timely care from providers. DOD’s Oversight of the Civilian Provider Network Has Weaknesses, But Additional Tools May Help
DOD’s ability to effectively oversee the TRICARE civilian provider network is hindered by (1) flaws in its required provider-to-beneficiary ratios, (2) incomplete reporting on beneficiaries’ access to providers, and (3) the absence of a systematic assessment of complaints. However, DOD has existing surveys and automated reporting systems that, while not designed specifically for monitoring the civilian provider network, could provide valuable information and potentially improve DOD’s ability to oversee the civilian provider network. Specifically, for the network adequacy reports we reviewed from 5 of the 11 TRICARE regions, we found that contractors reported less than half of the required information on access standards for appointment wait, office wait, and travel times. DOD and Contractors Report Three Factors That May Contribute to Civilian Provider Network Inadequacy
DOD and its contractors have reported three factors that may contribute to potential civilian provider network inadequacy: lack of providers in certain geographic locations, low reimbursement rates, and administrative requirements. In 2000, DOD increased reimbursement rates in rural Alaska in an attempt to entice more providers to join the network. On the other hand, DOD officials told us that with the 2002 increase in Alaska and the 2003 increase in Idaho, contractors were experiencing some success in recruiting providers in those areas. In addition, there have been reported instances in which groups of providers have banded together and refused to accept TRICARE Prime patients due to their concerns with low reimbursement rates. However, while TRICARE’s reimbursement rates may have created dissatisfaction among providers, it is not clear how much this has affected civilian provider network adequacy except in limited geographic locations, because the information contractors provide to DOD is not sufficient to measure network adequacy. Incorporating data on the numbers and types of providers in the MTFs and the total number of beneficiaries enrolled in TRICARE Prime would give DOD a more accurate and comprehensive report of the potential workload the civilian provider network faces in a prime service area and the adequacy of the number of PCMs and specialists to deliver that care. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DOD’s oversight of the civilian provider network, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to ensure that MTF capabilities and all enrolled Prime beneficiaries in prime service areas are accounted for when assessing and documenting the adequacy of the civilian provider network; ensure that the information reported on the required access standards is explore ways to ensure that beneficiary complaints are systematically evaluated and used to oversee the civilian provider network; and explore options for improving the civilian provider surveys so that the results of the surveys could be useful to DOD and the contractors in identifying civilian provider concerns and developing actions that might mitigate concerns and help ensure the adequacy of the civilian provider network. Finally, we reviewed DOD’s request for proposals for the future contracts and interviewed DOD and contractor officials to describe how the new contracts might affect network adequacy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Testifying before Congress in 2002, military beneficiary groups described problems accessing care from TRICARE's civilian medical providers. Providers also testified on their dissatisfaction with the TRICARE program, specifying low reimbursement rates and administrative burdens. The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 required GAO to review the oversight of the TRICARE network of civilian providers. Specifically, GAO describes how the Department of Defense (DOD) oversees the adequacy of the civilian provider network, evaluates DOD's oversight of the civilian provider network, and describes the factors that have been reported to contribute to network inadequacy. GAO analyzed TRICARE Prime--the managed care component of TRICARE. To describe and evaluate DOD's oversight, GAO reviewed and analyzed information from reports on network adequacy and interviewed DOD and contractor officials in 5 of 11 TRICARE regions.
What GAO Found
For the 8.7 million TRICARE beneficiaries, DOD relies on the civilian provider network to supplement health care delivered by its military treatment facilities. To ensure the adequacy of the civilian provider network, DOD has standards for the number and mix of providers, both primary care and specialists, necessary to satisfy TRICARE Prime beneficiaries' needs. In addition, DOD has standards for appointment wait, office wait, and travel times to ensure that TRICARE Prime beneficiaries have timely access to care. DOD has delegated oversight of the civilian provider network to the local level through regional TRICARE lead agents. DOD's ability to effectively oversee the TRICARE civilian provider network is hindered in several ways. First, the measurement used to determine if there is a sufficient number and mix of providers in a geographic area does not always account for the total number of beneficiaries who may seek care or the availability of providers. This may result in an underestimation of the number of providers needed in an area. Second, incomplete contractor reporting on access to care makes it difficult for DOD to assess compliance with these standards. Finally, DOD does not systematically collect and analyze beneficiary complaints, which might assist in identifying inadequacies in the civilian provider network. However, DOD has tools, such as surveys of network providers and automated reporting systems which, while not designed specifically for monitoring the civilian provider network, could, if modified, improve DOD's ability to oversee the network. DOD and its contractors have reported that a lack of providers in certain geographic locations, low reimbursement rates, and administrative requirements contribute to potential civilian provider network inadequacy. DOD and contractors have reported long-standing provider shortages in some geographic areas. In areas where DOD determines that access to care is severely impaired, DOD has the authority to increase reimbursement rates. Since 2002, DOD has used its reimbursement authority to increase rates in Alaska and Idaho in an attempt to entice more providers to join the network. DOD officials told us that the contractors have achieved some success in recruiting additional providers by using this authority. Additionally, civilian providers have expressed concerns that TRICARE's reimbursement rates are generally too low and administrative requirements too cumbersome. However, while reimbursement rates and administrative requirements may have created provider dissatisfaction, it is not clear how much this has affected civilian provider network adequacy except in limited geographic locations, because the information contractors provide to DOD is not sufficient to measure network adequacy. |
gao_GAO-06-283T | gao_GAO-06-283T_0 | In January 2003, we designated modernizing VA’s disability programs, along with other federal disability programs, as high-risk. VA Continues to Face Significant Challenges in Processing Disability Compensation Claims
VA continues to experience challenges processing veterans’ disability compensation and pension claims. These include large numbers of pending claims and lengthy processing times. While VA made progress in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 in reducing the size and age of its inventory of pending claims, it has lost ground since the end of fiscal year 2003. As shown in figure 1, pending claims increased by over one-third from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2005, from about 254,000 to about 346,000. VA also faces continuing questions about its ability to ensure that veterans receive consistent decisions—that is, comparable decisions on benefit entitlement and rating percentage regardless of the regional offices making the decisions. In May 2000 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, we underscored the conclusion made by the National Academy of Public Administration in 1997 that VA needed to study the consistency of decisions made by different regional offices, identify the degree of subjectivity expected for various medical issues, and then set consistency standards for those issues. We concluded that VA needed to systematically assess decision-making consistency to provide a foundation for identifying acceptable levels of variation and to reduce variations found to be unacceptable. Recent history has shown that VA’s claims processing workload and performance are being affected by several factors, including the impacts of laws and court decisions and the filing behavior of veterans. Opportunities for Improvement May Lie in More Fundamental Reform
While VA is taking a number of actions to address its claims processing challenges, there are opportunities for more fundamental reform, that could dramatically improve decision making and processing. These include reexamining program design and the context in which decisions are made as well as the structure and division of labor among field offices. For example, in designating federal disability programs as high risk in 2003, GAO noted that VA’s and the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) disability programs have not been updated to reflect the current state of science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions. In addition, our work has shown that about one-third of newly compensated veterans could be interested in receiving a lump sum payment, potentially saving VA time and money associated with reopening cases over time. Moreover, VA and other organizations have identified potential changes to field operations that could enhance productivity and accuracy in processing disability claims. For example, advances in medicine and technology have reduced the severity of some medical conditions and have allowed individuals to live with greater independence and function in work settings. We also recommended that VA study and report to the Congress on the effects that a comprehensive consideration of medical treatment and assistive technologies would have on its disability programs’ eligibility criteria and benefits package. While reexamining claims processing challenges in a larger context may be daunting, there are mechanisms for undertaking such an effort, including the congressionally chartered commission currently studying veterans’ disability benefits. Veterans’ Benefits: Improvements Needed in the Reporting and Use of Data on the Accuracy of Disability Claims Decisions. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, asked GAO to report on the claims processing challenges and opportunities facing the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation and pension program. For years, the claims process has been the subject of concern and attention within VA and by the Congress and veterans service organizations. Their concerns include long waits for decisions, large claims backlogs, and inaccurate decisions. Our work and media reports of significant discrepancies in average disability payments from state to state have also highlighted concerns over the consistency of decision making within VA. In January 2003, we designated federal disability programs, including VA's compensation and pension programs, as a high-risk area because of continuing challenges to improving the timeliness and consistency of its disability decisions and the need to modernize programs. VA's outdated disability determination process does not reflect a current view of the relationship between impairments and work capacity. Advances in medicine and technology have allowed some individuals with disabilities to live more independently and work more effectively.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs continues to experience challenges processing veterans' disability compensation and pension claims including large numbers of pending claims and lengthy processing times. While VA made progress in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 reducing the size and age of its inventory of pending claims, it has lost ground since the end of fiscal year 2003. For example, pending claims increased by over one-third from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of fiscal year 2005. Meanwhile, VA faces continuing questions about its ability to ensure that veterans get consistent decisions across its 57 regional offices. GAO recommended in August 2002 that VA study the consistency of decisions made by different regional offices, identify acceptable levels of decision-making variation, and reduce variations found to be unacceptable. Several factors may impede VA's ability to significantly improve its claims processing performance. These include the potential impacts of laws, court decisions, and increases in the number and complexity of claims received. Opportunities for improvement may lie in more fundamental reform in the design and operation of disability compensation and pension claims programs. This would include reexamining program design and the context in which decisions are made as well as the structure and division of labor among field offices. For example, in recent years, GAO has found that VA and other federal disability programs have not been updated to reflect the current state of science, medicine, technology, and labor market conditions. The schedule on which disability decisions are made within VA, for example, is based primarily on estimates made in 1945 about the effect service-connected impairments have on the average individual's ability to perform jobs requiring manual or physical labor. In addition, our work has shown that about one-third of newly compensated veterans could be interested in receiving a lump sum payment, potentially saving VA time and money associated with reopening cases over time. In addition, VA and other organizations have identified potential changes to field operations that could enhance productivity and accuracy in processing disability claims. While reexamining claims processing challenges in a larger context may be daunting, there are mechanisms for undertaking such an effort, including the congressionally chartered commission currently studying veterans' disability benefits. |
gao_GAO-08-568T | gao_GAO-08-568T_0 | The scale of contractor support DOD relies on today in locations such Iraq and elsewhere amounts to billions of dollars worth of goods and services each year, underscoring the need to effectively manage and oversee contractor efforts. Further, we found that unclear DOD guidance resulted in poor accountability over 190,000 weapons provided to the Iraqi security forces. At the contract level, the lack of well-defined requirements resulted in schedule delays and the United States potentially paying more than necessary. These circumstances influenced DOD’s decision to pay nearly all of the $221 million in questioned costs. Three factors contributed to this lapse in accountability. In our July 2007 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) determine which DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program, and (2) after defining the required accountability procedures, ensure that sufficient staff, functioning distribution networks, standard operating procedures, and proper technology are available to meet the new requirements. DOD concurred with our recommendations but, as of March 3, 2008, had not determined which accountability procedures apply to the program. Long-standing Problems Hinder DOD’s Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces
Several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD’s management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate number of military and civilian contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and the lack of comprehensive training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel. In prior reports, we made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD’s management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, our prior work has found that DOD has made limited progress implementing some key recommendations. Our work on contracts to support deployed forces in Iraq has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts. Lack of Adequate Strategic Planning Impedes U.S. Efforts to Develop Capacity in Iraqi Ministries and Improve Outcomes in Iraq’s Energy Sector
U.S. efforts to increase the Iraqi government’s capacity to invest in its own rebuilding are undermined by strategic planning shortfalls in two critical areas—developing the capacity of the Iraqi ministries to effectively execute their responsibilities and integrating oil and electricity development into a unified plan. In the energy sector, developing a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan is essential to meeting energy production and export goals, which in turn will help Iraq meet its future financial needs. Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts, and shifting time frames and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. State commented, however, that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, is responsible for taking action on GAO’s recommendations. We believe that the recommendations are still valid given the billions of dollars made available for Iraq’s energy sector, the limited capacity of the Iraqi ministries, and the U.S. government’s influence in overseeing Iraq’s rebuilding efforts. However, nation building is costly, particularly in the absence of a permissive security environment. Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $700 billion for military and diplomatic activities in support of the global war on terrorism; the majority of this amount has supported U.S. actions in Iraq. In prior reports, GAO recommended that, to improve accountability and minimize opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S. funds, (1) DOD adopt sound business processes in its acquisition strategies, such as definitizing contracts in a timely fashion and strengthening accountability procedures; (2) DOD leadership ensure implementation of and compliance with existing guidance to improve its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces; and (3) U.S. agencies work with Iraq to develop strategic plans for key sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated nearly $700 billion for the global war on terrorism. The majority of these funds have supported U.S. efforts in Iraq. Congressional oversight is crucial to improve performance, ensure accountability, and protect U.S. programs from fraud, waste, and abuse. Since 2003, GAO has issued nearly 130 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. This testimony addresses (1) factors contributing to poor contracting outcomes and accountability, (2) long-standing issues in the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, and (3) efforts to improve the capacity of the Iraqi government. GAO reviewed U.S. agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies; the United Nations (UN); and the Iraqi government. We also made multiple trips to Iraq.
What GAO Found
U.S. efforts in Iraq have relied extensively on contractors to undertake reconstruction projects and provide support to U.S. forces. However, a lack of well-defined requirements, poor business arrangements, and inadequate oversight and accountability have negatively affected reconstruction and support efforts. For example, in a July 2007 report, GAO found that DOD completed negotiation for task orders on an oil contract more than 6 months after the work commenced and most costs were incurred. DOD paid nearly all of the $221 million in costs questioned by auditors. Also in July 2007, GAO found that unclear DOD guidance, inadequate staff, and insufficient technology resulted in poor accountability over more than 190,000 weapons provided to Iraqi forces. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to determine what DOD accountability procedures apply or should apply to the program. However, as of March 2008, DOD had not made a determination. The need to effectively manage and oversee contractors supporting deployed forces is equally important. DOD pays billions of dollars each year for contracted goods and services in locations such as Iraq and elsewhere. However, several long-standing and systemic problems continue to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations, including the failure to follow planning guidance, provide an adequate number of contract oversight personnel, systematically collect and distribute lessons learned, and provide predeployment training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the use and role of contractors. GAO's work has identified instances where poor oversight and management of contractors led to negative financial and operational impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of those recommendations. However, GAO has found that DOD has made limited progress in implementing some key recommendations. The United States has made available nearly $6 billion to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and $300 million to develop its government ministries but lacks integrated strategic plans for both efforts. Building the capacity of the ministries is critical to ensure that Iraq can effectively govern, rebuild, and stabilize the country. Rebuilding Iraq's energy sector is necessary to ensure that Iraq can pay for these tasks and provide essential services to the Iraqi people. However, in the absence of a comprehensive and integrated strategic plan, U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Iraqi government have been hindered by multiple U.S. agencies pursuing individual efforts without overarching direction. The creation of a plan for the energy sector is also essential for Iraq to meet energy production and export goals. GAO recommended that State work with Iraqi ministries to develop an integrated energy plan. State commented that the Iraqi government, not the U.S. government, should act on GAO's recommendations. Given the billions of dollars provided to rebuild Iraq's energy sector and the limited capacity of Iraqi ministries, GAO believes that its recommendations are still valid. |
gao_GAO-02-539T | gao_GAO-02-539T_0 | If the site is approved, then NRC, upon accepting a license application from DOE, has 3 to 4 years to review the application and decide whether to issue a license to construct, and then to operate, a repository at the site. DOE Will Not Be Ready to Submit a License Application within the Statutory Time Frame
DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the site is approved. DOE does not expect the results of the additional work to change its current performance assessment of a repository at Yucca Mountain. In implementing the act, DOE’s guidelines provide that the site will be suitable as a waste repository if the site is likely to meet the radiation protection standards that NRC would use to reach a licensing decision on the proposed repository. DOE Is Unlikely to Open a Repository in 2010 As Planned
DOE states that it may be able to open a repository at Yucca Mountain in 2010. Bechtel anticipates a 5-year period of construction between the receipt of a construction authorization from NRC and the opening of the repository. The 2003 date was not formally approved by DOE’s senior managers or incorporated into the program’s cost and schedule baseline, as required by the management procedures that were in effect for the program. The baseline describes the program’s mission—in this case, the safe disposal of highly radioactive waste in a geologic repository—and the expected technical requirements, schedule, and cost to complete the program. | What GAO Found
As required by law, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been investigating a site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its suitability for disposing of highly radioactive wastes in a mined geologic repository. If the site is approved, DOE must apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for authorization to construct a repository. If the site is not approved for a license application, or if NRC denies a license to construct a repository, the administration and Congress will have to consider other options for the long-term management of existing and future nuclear wastes. DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to the NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the site is approved. DOE is unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository at Yucca Mountain by 2010. Sufficient time would not be available for DOE to obtain a license from NRC and construct enough of the repository to open it in 2010. Another key factor is whether DOE will be able to obtain the increases in annual funding that would be required to open the repository by 2010. DOE currently does not have a reliable estimate of when, and at what cost, a license application can be submitted or a repository can be opened because DOE stopped using its cost and schedule baselines to manage the site investigation in 1997. |
gao_GAO-10-188T | gao_GAO-10-188T_0 | FAA Faces Challenges in Directing Resources and Addressing Environmental Issues to Ensure Timely Implementation
Developing Navigation Procedures with Significant Benefits in a Timely Manner
Developing Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) procedures, often called performance-based navigation procedures, with significant benefits is one way to leverage existing technology in the near term and provide immediate benefits to industry, but developing these procedures expeditiously will be a challenge for FAA. Benefits of RNAV and RNP can also include reduced fuel usage, reduced carbon emissions, reduced noise, shorter flights, fewer delays, less congestion, and improved safety. While private sector development may be one way to accelerate procedure development, issues related to FAA’s capacity to approve these procedures remain, according to some stakeholders. Completing Timely Environmental Reviews and Addressing Local Concerns
As FAA develops new procedures to make more efficient use of airspace in congested metropolitan areas, it will be challenged to complete the necessary environmental reviews quickly and address local concerns about the development of new procedures and airspace redesign. 2. 3. The 2009 FAA reauthorization legislation includes language that may expedite the environmental review process. FAA Faces Challenges in Changing Its Culture and Business Practices in Order to Respond Effectively to the Task Force’s Recommendations
Changing from an Organization and Culture Focused on System Acquisition to an Emphasis on Integration and Coordination
According to stakeholders and Task Force members, and as we have previously reported, FAA faces organizational and cultural challenges in implementing NextGen operational capabilities. Reprioritizing or Changing Some Aspects of Plans and Programs to Implement the Task Force’s Recommendations
While many of the operational improvements identified by the Task Force align with FAA’s current plans, a senior FAA official indicated that in several instances, FAA may need to adjust its plans, budgets, and priorities as it decides how it will respond to the Task Force’s recommendations. Responding to the Task Force’s recommendations will require a willingness to change and reprioritize current plans and programs. Stakeholders, including airlines and general aviation groups, including one that represents avionics manufacturers, as well as the Task Force, have said that these processes take too long and impose costs on industry that discourage the stakeholders from investing in NextGen aircraft equipment. The Task Force recommended the creation of a NextGen Implementation Workgroup under the RTCA Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee (ATMAC). In addition, FAA will need to continue to work toward changing the nature of its relationship with controllers and the controllers’ union to create more effective engagement and collaboration. FAA Faces Challenges to Provide Incentives to Accelerate New Equipage as NextGen Progresses
The Task Force’s focus was on making better use of the equipment that has already been installed or is available for installation. Mandating Equipage
The first option is mandating the installation of equipment. Our prior work has identified a variety of other disincentives to early investment. Making the Best Use of Equipment that Is Widely Deployed
A second option to accelerate equipage is to develop operational improvements that make use of equipment that is already widely deployed to produce benefits for operators to justify the costs of equipage. Early success in implementing some of the Task Force’s near-term recommendations will help build trust between FAA and operators that FAA will provide operational improvements that allow operators to take advantage of the required equipment and realize benefits. However, designing such incentives and analyzing how they will work in practice is a major challenge and has only begun to move forward. Providing Financial Incentives
A fourth option is to provide financial incentives where operators do not have a clear and timely return on investment for equipping aircraft. For example, mechanisms for financial assistance should be designed so as to effectively target parts of the fleet and geographical locations where benefits are deemed to be greatest, avoid unnecessarily equipping aircraft (e.g., those that are about to be retired), and not displace private investment that would otherwise occur. | Why GAO Did This Study
On September 9, 2009, the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) Midterm Implementation Task Force (Task Force) issued its final report and recommendations. The Task Force was to reach a consensus on the operational improvements to the air transportation system that should be implemented between now and 2018. Its recommendations call for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop improvements that allow operators to take advantage of equipment that has been widely deployed or is available for installation in existing aircraft. FAA is now considering how to modify its existing plans and programs in response to the Task Force's recommendations and must do so in a way that retains safety as the highest priority. This testimony highlights the NextGen challenges previously identified by GAO and others that affect FAA's response to the Task Force's recommendations. GAO groups these challenges into three areas: (1) directing resources and addressing environmental issues, (2) adjusting its culture and business practices, and (3) developing and implementing options to encourage airlines and general aviation to equip aircraft with new technologies. GAO's testimony updates prior GAO work with interviews with agency officials and industry stakeholders and includes an analysis of the Task Force report.
What GAO Found
Directing resources and addressing environmental issues. Allocating resources for advanced navigational procedures and airspace redesign requires FAA to balance benefits to operators against resource limits and other challenges to the timely implementation of NextGen. Procedures that allow more direct flights--versus those that overlay existing routes--and redesigned airspace in congested metropolitan areas can save operators time, fuel, and costs, and reduce congestion, delays, and emissions. However, FAA does not have the capacity to expedite progress towards its current procedure development targets. While FAA has begun to explore the use of the private sector to help develop procedures, issues related to public use of these procedures and oversight of developers remain. In addition, required environmental reviews can be lengthy, especially when planned changes in noise patterns create community concerns during reviews. Challenges to FAA include deciding whether to start in more or less complex metropolitan areas, and finding ways to expedite the environmental review process and proactively ameliorate community concerns. Changing FAA's culture and business practices. According to stakeholders and Task Force members, and as GAO has previously reported, FAA faces cultural and organizational challenges in implementing NextGen capabilities. Whereas FAA's culture and organization formerly supported the acquisition of individual air traffic control systems, FAA will now have to integrate and coordinate activities across multiple lines of business, as well as reprioritize some of its plans and programs, to implement near-term and midterm capabilities. FAA is currently analyzing what changes may be required to respond to the recommendations. StreamliningFAA's certification, operational approval, and procedure design processes, as a prior task force recommended, will also be essential for timely implementation. And sustaining a high level of involvement and collaboration with stakeholders--including operators, air traffic controllers, and others--will also be necessary to ensure progress. Developing and implementing options to encourage equipage. The Task Force focused on making better use of equipment that has already been widely deployed in aircraft, but as NextGen progresses, new equipment will have to be installed to implement future capabilities and FAA may have to offer incentives for operators to accelerate their installation of equipment that may not yield an immediate return on investment. While FAA could mandate equipage, mandates take time to implement and can impose costs, risks, and other disincentives on operators that discourage early investment in equipment. The Task Force identified several options to encourage equipage, including offering operational or financial benefits to early equippers. Challenges to implementing these options include defining how operational incentives would work in practice, designing financial incentives so as not to displace private investment that would otherwise occur, and targeting incentives where benefits are greatest. |
gao_GAO-09-620T | gao_GAO-09-620T_0 | Coast Guard Has Assumed the Role of Systems Integrator But Lags In Applying Disciplined Asset- Level Processes as It Continues with Procurements
The Coast Guard has taken three major steps to become the systems integrator for the Deepwater Program. While the Coast Guard has made progress in applying the disciplined MSAM acquisition process to its Deepwater assets, it did not meet its goal of being fully compliant by the second quarter of fiscal year 2009. In 2008, the Coast Guard acknowledged that in order to assume the role of systems integrator, it needed to define systems integrator functions and assign them to Coast Guard stakeholders. According to an official, the results of this analysis are expected in the summer of 2009. In conjunction with its assuming the role of systems integrator, the Coast Guard has significantly reduced the scope of work on contract with ICGS. According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard intends to have an approved operational requirements document before procuring additional ships. Coast Guard Developing More Realistic Cost Estimates for Deepwater Assets, but Cost Reporting May Not Keep Congress Fully Informed
Since the establishment of the $24.2 billion baseline for the Deepwater program in 2007, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many of the Deepwater assets have changed, in part due to the Coast Guard’s increased insight into what it is buying. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. Better-informed Baselines Suggest Deepwater Costs Could Exceed $24.2 Billion
As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines for Deepwater assets, it has become apparent that some of the assets it is procuring will likely cost more than anticipated. While the Coast Guard is still in the process of communicating the effect and origin of these cost issues to DHS, information available to date for assets shows that the total cost of the program will likely exceed $24.2 billion, with potential cost growth of approximately $2.1 billion through the life of the Deepwater Program. As more baselines are approved by DHS, further cost growth may become apparent. The Coast Guard’s reevaluation of baselines has also changed its understanding of the delivery schedules and capabilities of Deepwater assets. Current Budget Reporting Lacks Detail at Asset Level, and May Not Adequately Inform Congress
While the Coast Guard plans to update its annual budget requests with asset-based cost information, the current structure of its budget submission could limit Congress’s understanding of details at the asset level. For example, while the justification of the NSC request includes an account of the capabilities the asset is expected to provide, how these capabilities link to the Coast Guard’s missions, and details on what activities past appropriations have funded, it does not include estimates of total program cost, future award or delivery dates of remaining assets, or even the total number of assets to be procured. Coast Guard Having Difficulty Staffing Government Acquisition Positions but Working To Improve Processes
One reason the Coast Guard originally sought a systems integrator was because it recognized that it lacked the experience and depth in its workforce to manage the acquisition internally. Now that the Coast Guard has taken control of the Deepwater acquisition, it acknowledges that it faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009, the acquisition branch had funding for 855 military and civilian personnel and had filled 717 of these positions— leaving 16 percent unfilled. Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly by the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition to third party experts, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors. Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Identifying and Mitigating Acquisition Workforce Challenges
While the Coast Guard may be hard-pressed to fill the government acquisition positions it has identified both now and in the future, it has made progress in identifying the broader challenges it faces and is working to mitigate them. Coast Guard: Observations on Changes to Management and Oversight of the Deepwater Program. Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management and Address Operational Challenges. Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deepwater Program is intended to recapitalize the Coast Guard's fleet and includes efforts to build or modernize five classes each of ships and aircraft, and procure other key capabilities. In 2002, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) to manage the acquisition as systems integrator. After the program experienced a series of failures, the Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would take over the lead role, with future work on individual assets to be potentially bid competitively outside of the existing contract. A program baseline of $24.2 billion was set as well. In June 2008, GAO reported on the new approach and concluded that while these steps were beneficial, continued oversight and improvement was necessary. The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the recommendations in that report. This testimony updates key issues from prior work: (1) Coast Guard program management at the overall Deepwater Program and asset levels; (2) how cost, schedules, and capabilities have changed from the 2007 baseline and how well costs are communicated to Congress; and (3) Coast Guard efforts to manage and build its acquisition workforce. GAO reviewed Coast Guard acquisition program baselines, human capital plans and other documents, and interviewed officials. For information not previously reported, GAO obtained Coast Guard views. The Coast Guard generally concurred with the findings.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard has assumed the role of systems integrator for the overall Deepwater Program by reducing the scope of work on contract with ICGS and assigning these functions to Coast Guard stakeholders. As part of its systems integration responsibilities, the Coast Guard has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities, number, and mix of assets it needs; according to an official, it expects to complete this analysis by the summer of 2009. At the individual Deepwater asset level, the Coast Guard has improved and begun to apply the disciplined management process found in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual, but did not meet its goal of complete adherence to this process for all Deepwater assets by the second quarter of fiscal year 2009. For example, key acquisition management activities--such as operational requirements documents and test plans--are not in place for assets with contracts recently awarded or in production, placing the Coast Guard at risk of cost overruns or schedule slips. Due in part to the Coast Guard's increased insight into what it is buying, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many of the Deepwater assets have changed since the establishment of the $24.2 billion baseline in 2007. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines for some assets, it has become apparent that some of the assets it is procuring will likely cost more than anticipated. Information to date shows that the total cost of the program may grow by $2.1 billion. As more cost baselines are developed and approved, further cost growth may become apparent. In addition, while the Coast Guard plans to update its annual budget requests with asset-based cost information, the current structure of its budget submission to Congress does not include certain details at the asset level, such as estimates of total costs and total numbers to be procured. The Coast Guard's reevaluation of baselines has also changed its understanding of the delivery schedules and capabilities of Deepwater assets. One reason the Coast Guard sought a systems integrator from outside the Coast Guard was because it recognized that it lacked the experience and depth in workforce to manage the acquisition internally. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009, the acquisition branch had 16 percent of positions unfilled, including key jobs such as contracting officers and systems engineers. Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly by the end of fiscal year 2011. While the Coast Guard may be hard-pressed to fill these positions, it has made progress in identifying the broader challenges it faces and is working to mitigate them. In the meantime, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors. |
gao_GAO-14-295 | gao_GAO-14-295_0 | NNSA has recently decided to: (1) delay later UPF phases, (2) assess options other than the UPF for enriched uranium operations at the Y-12 plant, (3) change a key technological requirement for the UPF, and (4) develop a strategy for how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s uranium capabilities into the future. In late January 2014, NNSA decided to consider alternatives from its baseline uranium purification technology—which was to be part of UPF Phase I scope and had been under development since 2005—to a new technology, according to the UPF Federal Project Director. NNSA believes the new technology will require less space in the UPF and be more efficient to operate. Key aspects that are to be considered during the strategy’s development include, among other things: (1) an evaluation of the uranium purification capabilities and the throughput needed to support requirements for life extension programs and nuclear fuel for the U.S. Navy; (2) an evaluation of the alternatives to the UPF that prioritizes replacement capabilities by risk to nuclear safety, security, and mission continuity; (3) an identification of existing infrastructure as a bridging strategy until replacement capability is available in new infrastructure. A draft of the strategy is due to the Deputy Administrator by early April 2014. DOE took this action in response to our March 2007 report that recommended that DOE develop a consistent approach to assess the extent to which new technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended in a project before starting construction.which is the least mature; through TRL 4, in which the technology is validated in a laboratory environment; to TRL 9—the highest maturity level, where the technology as a total system is fully developed, integrated, and functioning successfully in project operations. New Technologies Planned for the UPF Face Five Additional Risks
Since our November 2010 report, we identified five additional risks associated with using new technologies in the UPF. The August 2013 independent peer review team report raised concerns with microwave casting—a process that uses microwave energy to melt and cast uranium metal into various shapes—as it is planned to be integrated in the UPF’s casting system.official, the casting system planned for the UPF will employ uranium processing technology, equipment, and steps that are substantially different than the casting system currently used at the Y-12 plant. As such, the independent review team concluded that microwave casting has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment—a key requirement to reach TRL 6. However, a key insulation material planned for use in the entombment control failed an important series of performance tests in fiscal year 2013. According to UPF contractor representatives, this failure and the need to identify and test an alternative insulation material is now the project’s most significant technology development risk and the primary reason why the special casting technology is currently assessed to be at TRL 3. Transition risks if NNSA switches to a new uranium purification technology. For example, NNSA officials said that changing to DER/ER would require a complete redesign of the processing areas and their equipment and may require adding new support utilities and that the UPF facility would have to revise its nuclear safety analysis. Assurance risks that the agile machining technology will work as intended before making key project decisions. According to NNSA officials and UPF contractor representatives, NNSA has primarily funded UPF technology development activities from the Y-12 plant-directed research and development (PDRD) program, which requires projects from every part of the Y-12 plant to compete for funding. For fiscal year 2014, 19 projects were considered priority by the UPF project team, but NNSA did not fund 7 of these projects. NNSA Is Taking Some Actions to Address Identified Risks
NNSA is currently taking some actions to address three of the five UPF technology risks we have identified. However, NNSA officials said that this June 2014 date is optimistic and may not be met. It is too soon to determine if the Uranium Infrastructure Strategy that NNSA is currently developing and scheduled to issue in draft form in early April 2014 will address this issue. As part of this corrective action plan, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for Technology is responsible for determining which technology development activities should be funded directly with UPF project funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those activities. If NNSA completes these planned actions, we believe that the agency may have taken appropriate actions to address this risk. We will continue to monitor NNSA’s progress in addressing these risks as part of our UPF critical decisions reviews as directed by the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, NNSA has not taken action to address the two recommendations related to UPF technology development we made in our November 2010 report: (1) that NNSA ensure that new technologies reach the level of maturity called for by best practices prior to CDs being made on the UPF project and (2) that the agency report to Congress any decisions to approve cost and schedule performance baselines or to begin construction of UPF without first having ensured that project technologies are sufficiently mature. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We are not making any new recommendations in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA conducts enriched uranium activities—including producing components for nuclear warheads and processing nuclear fuel for the U.S. Navy—at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. NNSA has identified key shortcomings in the Y-12 plant's current uranium operations, including rising costs due to the facility's age. In 2004, NNSA decided to build a more modern facility—the UPF—which will use nine new technologies that may make enriched uranium activities safer and more efficient.
In November 2010, GAO reported on the UPF and identified risks associated with the use of new technologies ( GAO-11-103 ). The Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO assess the UPF quarterly. This is the third report, and it assesses (1) additional technology risks, if any, since GAO's November 2010 report and (2) NNSA's actions to address any risks. GAO reviewed NNSA and contractor documents and interviewed NNSA officials and contractor personnel.
GAO is not making any new recommendations. However, NNSA should continue actions to address the two recommendations—which NNSA generally agreed with—in GAO's November 2010 report related to ensuring that technologies reach optimal levels of maturity prior to critical project decisions. In commenting on a draft of this report, NNSA said its current technology maturation guidance is adequate.
What GAO Found
GAO has identified five additional risks since its November 2010 report ( GAO-11-103 ) associated with using new technologies in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which is to be built in three interrelated phases. These risks and the steps that NNSA is taking to address them include the following:
Technology integration risks . An August 2013 UPF independent peer review team concluded that the microwave casting technology—a process that uses microwave energy to melt and form uranium into various shapes—has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment, which is a requirement to reach a key technology maturity milestone. To address this risk, NNSA officials said they plan to accelerate the procurement and environmental testing of a microwave casting prototype.
Technology development risks . A key insulation material planned as a nuclear safety control during uranium casting failed a series of performance tests in fiscal year 2013. According to UPF contractor representatives, this risk is now the project's most significant technological risk. To address this risk, these representatives said they are trying to identify a replacement insulation material and exploring the use of a different safety control.
Technology transition risks . NNSA is currently evaluating an alternative technology to the UPF's baseline uranium purification technology, which has been under development since 2005. The alternative technology may generate less radioactive waste and may be more efficient to operate than the baseline technology. If NNSA switches technologies, NNSA officials said that the UPF contractor (1) will have to redesign the processing area and equipment; (2) may have to add utilities; and (3) will have to revise the UPF's nuclear safety analysis, creating the potential for further project risks.
Performance assurance risks . NNSA stopped development efforts on a key machining technology, which is part of the UPF's second phase. As a result, NNSA may not have optimal assurance that the technology will work as intended before starting construction. However, in January 2014, NNSA began (1) reevaluating alternatives to the UPF that may not include machining operations and (2) developing a uranium infrastructure strategy, which is a framework for how NNSA will maintain all uranium capabilities into the future. It is too soon to determine if the draft uranium strategy, scheduled to be issued in April 2014, will outline actions to address this risk.
Funding risk . Instead of using UPF project funds, NNSA has primarily funded UPF technology development activities from a limited research and development program. As a result of budget constraints in this program, for fiscal year 2014, 7 of the 19 technology projects the UPF contractor considered priority were not funded. Per a corrective action plan recently developed, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for Technology is responsible for determining which technology development activities should be funded directly with UPF project funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those activities. This official said he expects to complete these estimates in March 2014. |
gao_GAO-10-898 | gao_GAO-10-898_0 | According to passenger rail operators, the openness of passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable to terrorist attack. Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail Systems
Securing the nation’s passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; and passengers who ride these systems. A Variety of Explosives Detection Technologies Are Available or in Development That Could Help Secure Passenger Rail Systems—If Tailored to the Needs of Individual Rail Systems—but Limitations Exist
Several different types of explosives detection technologies could be applied to help secure passenger rail, although operational constraints of rail exist that would be important considerations. Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) portals are becoming available but, as with trace portals, will likely have only limited applicability in passenger rail. These systems, while they may be used to detect explosive material, are also often used to detect other parts of a bomb. Detection performance varies across the different technologies with more established technologies such as handheld, desktop, kit-based trace detection systems, x-ray imaging systems, and canines having demonstrated good performance against many conventional explosives threats while newer technologies such as ETPs, AIT, and standoff detection systems are in various stages of maturity. Important characteristics of the technologies such as screening throughput, mobility, and durability, as well as physical space constraints in rail stations may limit deployment options for explosives detection technologies in passenger rail. Several Overarching Operational and Policy Factors Could Impact the Role of Explosives Detection Technologies in the Passenger Rail Environment
In addition to how well technologies work in detecting explosives and their applicability in the passenger rail environment, there are several overarching operational and policy considerations impacting the role that these technologies can play in securing the passenger rail environment, such as who is paying for them and what to do when they apparently detect explosives. Specifically, 1) the roles and responsibilities of multiple federal and local stakeholders could impact how explosives detection technologies are funded and implemented in passenger rail; 2) implementation of technology or any security investment could be undertaken in accordance with risk management principles, to ensure limited security funding is allocated to those areas at greatest risk; 3) explosives detection technologies are one component of a layered approach to security, where multiple security measures combine to form the overall security environment; 4) a well-defined and designed concept of operations for the use of these technologies is important to ensure that they work effectively in the rail environment; and 5) cost and potential legal implications are important policy considerations when determining whether and how to use these technologies. The Roles and Responsibilities of Multiple Federal and Local Stakeholders Could Impact How Explosives Detection Technologies are Funded and Implemented in Passenger Rail
Although there is a shared responsibility for securing the passenger rail environment, the federal government and rail operators have differing roles, which could complicate decisions to fund and implement technologies. Additionally, Amtrak officials stated that they conducted a risk assessment of all of their systems. A Concept of Operations For Explosives Detection Technologies Could Enable Passenger Rail Operators to Better Balance Security with the Movement of Passengers
In deploying explosives detection technologies, it is important to develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for both using these technologies to screen passengers and their belongings and for responding to identified threats. DHS’s TSA and the Department of Transportation provided technical comments which we have incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what explosives detection technologies are available and their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment, we met with experts and officials on explosives detection research, development, and testing, and reviewed test, evaluation, and pilot reports and other documentation from several components within the Department of Homeland Security including the Science and Technology Directorate, the Transportation Security Laboratory; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); the Office of Bombing Prevention; and the United States Secret Service; several Department of Defense (DOD) components including the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV), the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO); several Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories involved in explosives detection testing, research and development including Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Idaho National Laboratory (INL); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), because of its expertise in explosives detection. | Why GAO Did This Study
Passenger rail systems are vital to the nation's transportation infrastructure, providing approximately 14 million passenger trips each weekday. Recent terrorist attacks on these systems around the world--such as in Moscow, Russia in 2010--highlight the vulnerability of these systems. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal entity responsible for securing passenger rail systems. In response to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008, GAO conducted a technology assessment that reviews 1) the availability of explosives detection technologies and their ability to help secure the passenger rail environment, and 2) key operational and policy factors that impact the role of explosives detection technologies in the passenger rail environment. GAO analyzed test reports on various explosives detection technologies and convened a panel of experts comprised of a broad mix of federal, technology, and passenger rail industry officials. GAO also interviewed officials from DHS and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Justice to discuss the effectiveness of these technologies and their applicability to passenger rail. GAO provided a draft of this report these departments for comment. Four departments provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
A variety of explosives detection technologies are available or in development that could help secure passenger rail systems. While these technologies show promise in certain environments, their potential limitations in the rail environment need to be considered and their use tailored to individual rail systems. The established technologies, such as handheld, desktop, and kitbased trace detection systems, and x-ray imaging systems, as well as canines, have demonstrated good detection capability with many conventional explosive threats and some are in use in passenger rail today. Newer technologies, such as explosive trace portals, advanced imaging technology, and standoff detection systems, while available, are in various stages of maturity and more operational experience would be required to determine their likely performance if deployed in passenger rail. When deploying any of these technologies to secure passenger rail, it is important to take into account the inherent limitations of the underlying technologies as well as other considerations such as screening throughput, mobility, and durability, and physical space limitations in stations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations, but is raising various policy considerations. For example, in addition to how well technologies detect explosives, GAO's work, in consultation with rail and technology experts, identified several key operational and policy considerations impacting the role that these technologies can play in securing the passenger rail environment. Specifically, while there is a shared responsibility for securing the passenger rail environment, the federal government, including TSA, and passenger rail operators have differing roles, which could complicate decisions to fund and implement explosives detection technologies. For example, TSA provides guidance and some funding for passenger rail security, but rail operators themselves provide day-to-day-security of their systems. In addition, risk management principles could be used to guide decision-making related to technology and other security measures and target limited resources to those areas at greatest risk. Moreover, securing passenger rail involves multiple security measures, with explosives detection technologies just one of several components that policymakers can consider as part of the overall security environment. Furthermore, developing a concept of operations for using these technologies and responding to threats that they may identify would help balance security with the need to maintain the efficient and free flowing movement of people. A concept of operations could include a response plan for how rail employees should react to an alarm when a particular technology detects an explosive. Lastly, in determining whether and how to implement these technologies, federal agencies and rail operators will likely be confronted with challenges related to the costs and potential privacy and legal implications of using explosives detection technologies. |
gao_GAO-04-3 | gao_GAO-04-3_0 | Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
Congress added section 106 to the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970 to address concerns that an expansion in the range of activities permissible for bank holding companies might give them an unfair competitive advantage because of the unique role their bank subsidiaries served as credit providers.Section 106 makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, for a bank to extend credit or furnish any product or service, or vary the price of any product or service (the “tying product”) on the “condition or requirement” that the customer obtains some additional product or service from the bank or its affiliate (the “tied product”). Also, section 106 generally does not prohibit a bank from conditioning its relationship with a customer on the total profitability of its relationship with the customer. According to the Board’s proposed interpretation, a bank can legally condition the availability of a bank product, such as credit, on the customer’s selection from a mix of traditional and nontraditional products or services—a mixed-product arrangement—only if the bank offered the customer a “meaningful choice” of products that includes one or more traditional bank products and did not require the customer to purchase any specific product or service. Some Corporate Borrowers Alleged That Unlawful Tying Occurs, but Available Evidence Did Not Substantiate These Allegations
Some corporate borrowers alleged that commercial banks unlawfully tie the availability of credit to the borrower’s purchase of other financial services, including debt underwriting services from their banks’ investment affiliates. Although customer information could have an important role in helping regulators enforce section 106, regulators do not have a specific mechanism to solicit information from corporate bank customers on an ongoing basis. Moreover, with few exceptions, complaints have not been brought to the attention of the banking regulators. Because documentary evidence demonstrating unlawful tying might not be available in bank records, regulators might have to look for other forms of indirect evidence, such as testimonial evidence, to assess whether banks unlawfully tie products and services. In response to recent allegations of unlawful tying at large commercial banks, the Federal Reserve and OCC conducted a special targeted review of antitying policies and procedures at several large commercial banks and their holding companies. The banking regulators found that banks covered in the review generally had adequate controls in place. Investment Affiliates of Commercial Banks Have Gained Market Share in Underwriting
In recent years, the market share of the fees earned from debt and equity underwriting has declined at investment banks and grown at investment affiliates of commercial banks. Further, as discussed in an earlier section, it is not clear that commercial banks underprice loan commitments. Regulatory guidance has noted that some tying arrangements involving corporate credit are clearly lawful, particularly those involving ties between credit and traditional bank products. Customers have a key role in providing information that is needed to enforce section 106. However, the Federal Reserve and OCC have little information on customers’ understanding of lawful and unlawful tying under section 106 or on customers’ knowledge of the circumstances of specific transactions. The Comptroller of the Currency and the General Counsel of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System replied that they generally agreed with the findings of the report and concurred in our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Investment affiliates of large commercial banks have made competitive inroads in the annual $1.3 trillion debt-underwriting market. Some corporate borrowers and officials from an unaffiliated investment bank have alleged that commercial banks helped their investment affiliates gain market share by illegally tying and underpricing corporate credit. This report discusses these allegations, the available evidence related to the allegations, and federal bank regulatory agencies' efforts to enforce the antitying provisions.
What GAO Found
Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 prohibits commercial banks from "tying," a practice which includes conditioning the availability or terms of loans or other credit products on the purchase of certain other products and services. The law permits banks to tie credit and traditional banking products, such as cash management, and does not prohibit banks from considering the profitability of their full relationship with customers in managing those relationships. Some corporate customers and officials from an investment bank not affiliated with a commercial bank have alleged that commercial banks illegally tie the availability or terms, including price, of credit to customers' purchase of other services. However, with few exceptions, formal complaints have not been brought to the attention of the regulatory agencies and little documentary evidence surrounding these allegations exists, in part, because credit negotiations are conducted orally. Further, our review found that some corporate customers' claims involved lawful ties between traditional banking products rather than unlawful ties. These findings illustrate a key challenge for banking regulators in enforcing this law: while regulators need to carefully consider the circumstances of specific transactions to determine whether the customers' acceptance of an unlawfully tied product (that is, one that is not a traditional banking product) was made a condition of obtaining credit, documentary evidence on those circumstances might not be available. Therefore, regulators may have to look for indirect evidence to assess whether banks unlawfully tie products and services. Although customer information could have an important role in helping regulators enforce section 106, regulators generally have not solicited information from corporate bank customers. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently reviewed antitying policies and procedures of several large commercial banks. The Federal Reserve and OCC, however, did not analyze a broadly-based selection of transactions or generally solicit additional information from corporate borrowers about their knowledge of transactions. The agencies generally found no unlawful tying arrangements and concluded that these banks generally had adequate policies and procedures intended to prevent and detect tying practices. The agencies found variation among the banks in interpretation of the tying law and its exceptions. As a result, in August 2003, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, working with OCC, released for public comment new draft guidance, with a goal of better informing banks and their customers about the requirements of the antitying provision. |
gao_NSIAD-98-35 | gao_NSIAD-98-35_0 | The Air Force decided to privatize-in-place the remaining AGMC workloads. Air Force Interim Study Indicates That Contract Costs Exceed Costs of AGMC Operations
The Air Force’s July 1997 interim study projected that the privatization-in-place of guidance repair and metrology workloads at BGRC will result in fiscal year 1997 costs being from $3 million to $32 million more than the costs of performing the same work when the facility was operated as an Air Force depot. Air Force officials said the Boeing analysis was not comprehensive because it (1) did not include contract administration and oversight costs and (2) overstated AGMC costs prior to privatization-in-place. The later projection indicated that the privatized-in-place repair and metrology operations during the first year of the contract would cost from $3.4 to $32 million more than the historical AGMC cost—a 3.8- to 39-percent increase—with a most likely increase of $14.1 million, or about 16 percent. As a result, they are concerned that AFMC miscalculated the cost of privatization-in-place. The methodology was analytically sound and used the best available data. Reasons for Increased Contractor Cost
AFMC’s interim study does not include a variable-by-variable comparison between historical and current costs of operations. However, the study provides sufficient data to identify three factors that increased costs at the facility: (1) material cost, (2) contract administration and oversight, and (3) contractor award fee. Conclusions
The Air Force’s interim comparison estimates that BGRC’s first year privatization-in-place costs will be higher than AGMC’s historical costs for similar work. The methodology used in the comparison is analytically sound and appears reasonable given the status of the program; however, until actual cost data is available, it is premature to reach a final conclusion on the cost issue. Three factors significantly influenced the increased cost at the facility—estimated increased material cost, contract oversight, and contractor award fee. As with any successful privatization, improved contractor process efficiencies and operating cost reductions are needed to offset such cost factors. The contractor disagrees with the Air Force study and is working with AFMC to resolve their differences. Further, the Air Force will continue to monitor these contracts as actual cost data becomes available. AGMC provided the Air Force with depot-level repair for inertial guidance and inertial navigation systems and displacement gyroscopes for the Minuteman and Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles and most of the Air Force’s aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Air Force's interim cost comparison of operating its former Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) prior to its closure with the current privatized-in-place cost as the Boeing Guidance Repair Center (BGRC).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force's interim comparison estimates that BGRC's first-year privatization-in-place costs will be higher than AGMC's historical costs for similar work; (2) the methodology used in the comparison is analytically sound and appears reasonable given the status of the program; however, until actual cost data is available, it is premature to reach a final conclusion on the cost issue; (3) three factors significantly influenced the increased cost at the facility--estimated increased material cost, contract oversight, and contractor award fee; (4) as with any successful privatization, improved contractor process efficiencies and operating cost reductions are needed to offset such cost factors; (5) the contractor disagrees with the Air Force study and is working with the Air Force to resolve their differences; (6) the Air Force will continue to monitor these contracts as actual cost data becomes available; (7) the Air Force performed an interim analysis comparing both actual and estimated aircraft and missile inertial navigation system repair and metrology costs at BGRC to actual historic costs for comparable workloads prior to privatization-in-place and estimated that the first full year of operations at the privatized-in-place BGRC will likely cost $14.1 million more than it would have if the facility had continued to operate as a public activity; a 16-percent cost increase; (8) Boeing questioned the assessment, saying that its own estimate indicates that costs are about $6.8 million lower than before privatization-in-place; (9) Boeing also noted that it is exceeding contract quality requirements and minimum delivery schedules; (10) Air Force officials stated that Boeing's cost analysis is not complete and comprehensive; (11) the Air Force cost study methodology is analytically sound and used the best available data; (12) based on the available data, the methodology provides a reasonable interim estimate of costs for similar workloads performed by the Air Force depot and during the first year of privatization-in-place; (13) the Air Force's interim study does not include a variable-by-variable comparison between historical and current costs of operations, but it does identify three cost factors contributing to the increased costs at the facility: (a) estimated increased material cost of $3.4 million; (b) contract administration and oversight costs of $5.5 million; and (c) estimated contractor award fees of $5.2 million. |
gao_GAO-17-662 | gao_GAO-17-662_0 | TSA and airport operators have oversight responsibilities for the identification badges that are issued. TSA Generally Made Progress in Addressing the Applicable Requirements of the Aviation Security Act of 2016
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has generally made progress addressing the 69 applicable requirements within the Aviation Security Act of 2016 (2016 ASA). As of June 2017, TSA officials stated it had implemented 48 of the requirements; it plans no further action on these. In accordance with this requirement, TSA developed a list of measures for airport operators to perform—such as an airport rebadging if the percent of unaccounted for badges exceeds a certain threshold— and published them on DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) for airport operators to access. For example, TSA officials stated that Transportation Security Inspector guidance is updated yearly to incorporate additional inspection guidelines, as is TSA’s Compliance Manual, which includes updated methods for inspections and additional airport access control measures to be tested. In response to this requirement, TSA coordinated with the FBI to implement the FBI’s Rap Back Service, which uses the FBI fingerprint-based criminal records repository to provide recurrent fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for aviation workers who have been initially vetted and already received airport-issued identification badge credentials. Develop and Implement Access Control Metrics (Section 3406)
TSA made progress by taking action on the 6 requirements in Section 3406 of the 2016 ASA. In accordance with this requirement, TSA developed and implemented a metric that determines the percentage of TSA SIDA inspections that were found to be in compliance with the airport security program. Develop a Tool for Unescorted Access Security (Section 3407)
TSA made progress on the 18 requirements in Section 3407 of the 2016 ASA. While officials stated they plan no further actions to implement the requirements in section 3407(a) to develop a model, officials stated they had conducted pilot assessments of the ATLAS tool in fiscal year 2015 at three airports, at one airport in fiscal year 2016, and plan to pilot the tool in additional airports before expanding its use in phases to all airports by fiscal year 2018, according to TSA officials. TSA stated these working groups consider, among other things, security directives within airport security programs and the need for revocation or revision of current security directives and TSA plans no further action to address this requirement. First, in accordance with section 3404(a) of the Act, TSA plans to issue a security directive to require airport operators to match the expiration date of an identification badge of an aviation worker that possesses a temporary immigration status with the individual’s U.S. work authorization expiration date. TSA officials stated that implementing the requirement to recurrently vet aviation workers may also reduce vulnerabilities associated with the insider threat. For 18 requirements, TSA officials took initial actions and plans further action. TSA officials stated they have yet to take action on 2 requirements and plan to address them in the near future. TSA officials took no action on 1 requirement regarding access control rules because it plans to address this through mechanisms other than formal rulemaking, such as drafting a national amendment to airport operator security programs. Section 3403 of the 2016 ASA required TSA to take actions related to enhancing its oversight activities of aviation workers. Section 3408 of the 2016 ASA requires TSA to, among other things, increase the use of red-team covert testing of access controls to any secure areas of an airport. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent incidents involving aviation workers conducting criminal activity in the nation's commercial airports have led to interest in the measures TSA and airport operators use to control access to secure areas of airports. The 2016 ASA required TSA to take several actions related to oversight of access control security at airports. The Act also contains a provision for GAO to report on progress made by TSA.
This report examines, among other issues, progress TSA has made in addressing the applicable requirements of the 2016 ASA. GAO compared information obtained from TSA policies, reports, and interviews with TSA officials to the requirements in the 2016 ASA. GAO also visited three airports to observe their use of access controls and interviewed TSA personnel. The non-generalizable group of airports was selected to reflect different types of access control measures and airport categories.
GAO is not making any recommendations. In its formal response, DHS stated that it continues to implement the 2016 ASA requirements.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has generally made progress addressing the 69 applicable requirements within the Aviation Security Act of 2016 (2016 ASA). As of June 2017, TSA had implemented 48 of the requirements; it plans no further action on these. For 18 requirements, TSA officials took initial actions and plans further action. TSA officials stated they have yet to take action on 2 requirements and plan to address them in the near future. TSA officials took no action on 1 requirement regarding access control rules because it plans to address this through mechanisms other than formal rulemaking, such as drafting a national amendment to airport operator security programs. Key examples of TSA's progress in implementing the requirements in the eight relevant sections of the Act are shown below:
Conduct a Threat Assessment : TSA conducted a threat assessment that analyzed vulnerabilities related to the insider threat—that is, the threat posed by aviation workers who exploit their access privileges to secure areas of an airport for personal gain or to inflict damage.
Enhance Oversight Activities : Among other things, TSA developed a list of measures for airport operators to perform, such as an airport rebadging if the percent of badges unaccounted for exceeds a certain threshold.
Update Airport Employee Credential Guidance : TSA issued guidance to airport operators to match the expiration date of a non-U.S. citizen aviation worker's identification badge to the individual's U.S. work authorization status.
Vet Airport Employees : In addition to making progress on updating employee vetting rules, TSA coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to implement the FBI's Rap Back service for providing recurrent fingerprint-based criminal history record checks for aviation workers.
Develop and Implement Access Control Metrics: TSA developed and implemented a metric that determines the percentage of TSA secure area inspections found to be in compliance with the airport security program.
Develop a Tool for Unescorted Access Security: According to TSA officials , they developed a tool designed to ensure that aviation workers with unescorted access are randomly screened for prohibited items, such as firearms and explosives, and to check for proper identification.
Increase Covert Testing : TSA plans to increase the number of covert tests of access controls it will perform in 2017.
Review Security Directives : Security directives are issued by TSA when, for example, additional measures are required to respond to a threat. TSA officials stated they review all security directives annually to consider the need for revocation or revision, and brief Congress when new directives are to be issued. |
gao_GAO-06-247 | gao_GAO-06-247_0 | Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things, mandated that each state establish a computerized statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for conducting elections for federal office in each state. Voter registration information is to be matched with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social Security Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information provided by the applicant. Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported Having Such a List Prior to HAVA
Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of actions in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration list requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no actions were taken because the state had such a system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; officials from Minnesota said the existing computerized voter registration system was replaced; and officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states created computerized statewide voter registration systems for the first time. However, the systems were not interconnected to create statewide databases of legally registered voters. States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of Some Lists
State election officials reported taking required steps to verify information provided on voter registration applications and to maintain accurate computerized voter lists. All nine states conducted regular voter list maintenance activities to purge duplicates and remove names of persons ineligible to vote, such as deceased registrants, as required by HAVA, officials also reported. Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1. HAVA requires states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies’ records on felony status to verify voters’ eligibility. Most states obtained a waiver from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to postpone implementation of this HAVA requirement until January 1, 2006. However, these nine states did not obtain a waiver and, therefore, were to implement these HAVA requirements by the original deadline, January 1, 2004. Among other things, we asked election officials in the nine states to describe when their computerized systems had been developed; the capabilities of their systems; what actions, if any, their states took to implement the HAVA requirements for a computerized list; what level of effort was required to make any HAVA-related modifications; what effect implementing these changes, if any, might have had on the accuracy of their statewide voter lists; and what challenges they faced and lessons they learned while implementing these HAVA requirements. Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions
This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials reported taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate statewide voter lists. Challenges and Lessons Learned
implementation of the new system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted in part to help ensure that only eligible persons are registered to vote. Under HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states were to create computerized statewide voter registration lists to serve as official rosters of legally registered voters for elections for federal office. States, however, were given the option to seek a waiver to postpone implementation of HAVA provisions until 2006. All but nine states did so. This report discusses the experiences of the nine states that were subject to the original HAVA deadline--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia. The report describes actions election officials in these states reported taking to meet specific HAVA requirements--as applicable to their states--for (1) establishing computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verifying the accuracy of information on voter registration applications and maintaining accurate computerized voter lists. GAO is also reporting what states said about challenges they faced and lessons learned implementing the requirements. Draft sections of this report were reviewed by the nine states; the Election Assistance Commission, which was responsible for coordinating HAVA waivers; and the Department of Justice. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide voter registration systems for the first time, according to election officials. Officials from the ninth state reported no actions were taken because the state had such a registration list in place prior to HAVA. State election officials reported they took steps to verify information provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists as required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of completing the required matches of voter registration information with state motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration (SSA) records. Officials from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance activities required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and coordinating the voter list with state agency records on felons and the deceased to identify and remove the names of ineligible registrants. According to officials from four states, implementing HAVA improved the accuracy of the voter lists, for example, by correcting errors in voter information before they were entered into the statewide list. Officials from the other five states reported little to no improvements to the accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they had established systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the enactment of the law. State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned lessons while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials from seven states reported their experiences taught them that collaborating with local officials to develop the computerized statewide systems later helped them successfully implement the systems. |
gao_GAO-04-647 | gao_GAO-04-647_0 | RUS’ Electricity Loans Are Often Made to Distribution Borrowers Serving Highly Populated Metropolitan Areas
Although the RE Act requires that borrowers serve rural areas, RUS borrowers serve not only rural areas but also highly populated metropolitan areas. This situation results from RUS applying its “once a borrower, always a borrower” standard, which allows borrowers to continuously receive RUS assistance regardless of the extent of population increases within their service territories. Since the electricity program began in the 1930s, substantial population growth has occurred in the areas served by many RUS borrowers. About 29 percent, or 581 of the 1,988 counties served partly or completely by RUS borrowers, are in metropolitan areas; and, in fact, 9.4 percent, or 187 of the 1,988 counties, are in metropolitan areas with populations of 1 million or more. Three cooperatives that received loans during the fiscal year 1999 through 2003 period provide electricity in the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, Georgia. RUS officials believe that while risks are involved, losses are unlikely given the past stability of both the electricity market and the lender that might receive the guarantees. In return for taxpayers assuming the risks of guaranteeing payment on $3 billion of debt, we estimated that the fees paid on the guarantees would only fund $15 million in rural economic development loans and grants annually. The one cooperative lender that is currently qualified and interested in obtaining a guarantee on its debt generally has had a favorable financial history going back over 30 years. However, the lender faces risk associated with the electricity and telecommunications markets. Recognizing risks to taxpayers, RUS proposed to add certain risk mitigation requirements, but the lender commented that these requirements would make the guarantees unworkable. Financial Losses Estimated by RUS. In addition, one ratings service stated that competition from wireless carriers is a longer-term threat to rural telecommunications systems. They agreed that the alternative option we raised is consistent with the loan-origination fees USDA places on some other loans, would be a feasible way to fund rural economic development loans and grants, and would likely have a very small effect on the customers of borrowers that receive RUS loans. In addition, to provide additional funds for rural economic development loans and grants without risk to taxpayers, Congress may wish to consider amending the RE Act to authorize a small loan-origination fee on RUS’ electricity and telecommunication loans and direct that fees collected on such loans be used for rural economic development loans and grants, and simultaneously repeal the new lender debt guarantee requirement. Finally, USDA commented that it is important to recognize, and not criticize, RUS’ efforts to implement the 2002 Farm Bill provision to guarantee the bonds and notes that lenders could use to raise funds for making loans for electricity and telecommunications services. It does, however, provide an alternative for funding rural economic development that avoids risk. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, House Committee on Government Reform asked that we report to him on (1) the extent to which RUS distribution borrowers provide electricity service to nonrural areas and (2) the potential financial risk to taxpayers of the 2002 Farm Bill requirement to guarantee lenders’ debts, and the amount of rural economic development loans and grants that could be funded by fees on the guarantees. To determine whether an alternative mechanism might be available to fund the rural economic development program with less risk, we analyzed RUS’ fiscal year 2005 budget request for electricity and telecommunications loans and the Rural Business-Cooperative Service’s request for rural economic development loans and grants to determine what level of fees would be needed to cover the costs of the Rural Business-Cooperative Service’s program. Contrary to USDA’s assertion, we do not challenge RUS’ practice of determining eligibility when a borrower first applies for a loan to provide electricity service in a rural area. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Agriculture Department's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) makes loans and provides loan guarantees to improve electric service to rural areas. Beyond guaranteeing loans, under a yet-to-be-implemented provision of the 2002 Farm Bill, RUS is also to guarantee the bonds and notes that lenders use to raise funds for making loans for electric and telecommunications services. Fees on these latter guarantees are to be used for funding rural economic development loans and grants. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which RUS' borrowers provide electricity service to nonrural areas and (2) the potential financial risk to taxpayers and amount of loans and grants that the guarantee fees will fund. GAO also identified an alternative for funding rural economic development.
What GAO Found
While the Rural Electrification Act authorizes RUS' lending only in rural areas, borrowers that receive RUS loans and loan guarantees serve not only rural areas but also highly populated metropolitan areas. This condition stems from RUS' loan approval practices. RUS requires that borrowers serve rural areas when they apply for their first loans, but it approves subsequent loans without applying this criterion. Thus, RUS applies a "once a borrower, always a borrower" standard. Since the 1930s when the program began, substantial population growth has occurred in areas served by many RUS borrowers; 187 of the counties in which RUS borrowers provide service are in metropolitan areas with populations of 1 million or more. For example, three borrowers that received over $400 million in loans in fiscal years 1999 through 2003 distribute electricity in the immediate vicinity of Atlanta, Georgia. In contrast, about 24 percent of the counties served by RUS borrowers are completely rural, while the remainder have a mix of rural and urban populations. RUS estimates, in a worst-case scenario, that the requirement to guarantee lenders' debt could lead to taxpayer losses of $1.5 billion--and GAO estimated that in return for this risk, fees on the guarantees would add about $15 million per year in rural economic development loans and grants. RUS officials believe that while risks are involved, losses are unlikely given the past stability of both the electricity market and the lender that might receive the guarantees. Only one lender is both qualified and interested in obtaining these guarantees. According to financial rating services, that lender is well regarded, but worked through financial concerns in 2002 and 2003, and faces longer-term risks associated with the changes taking place in the electricity and telecommunications markets that it serves. Recognizing the risks of guaranteeing this lender's debt, RUS proposed certain risk mitigation requirements, such as a reserve against losses. However, the lender's officials have stated that RUS' proposed requirements would make the program unattractive. GAO identified an alternative with no additional taxpayer risk to add funds for rural economic development loans and grants. If RUS were authorized to charge borrowers a small loan-origination fee of one-fourth of 1 percent on loans it expects to make and guarantee in fiscal year 2005, $24 million in rural economic development loans and grants might be made available. This amount is almost equal to the level provided by USDA's 2005 budget request for rural economic development loans and grants, and would likely have a minimal cost impact on customers of distribution borrowers. This alternative would not include guarantees of lenders' debt. Furthermore, the lender expected to use the guarantees has indicated that, even without such guarantees, it expects to continue being very successful at accessing capital for lending. |
gao_GGD-96-223 | gao_GGD-96-223_0 | Concessioners operating under these agreements generated about $2.2 billion in revenues, and paid the government about $65 million in fees and about $23 million in other forms of compensation. Within the six land management agencies, concession agreements in the National Park Service accounted for about 30 percent of the gross revenues and the return to the government. Factors Affecting the Rate of Return
Our analysis of rates of return throughout the federal government indicated that there are three key factors that affect the rate of return to the government. These are (1) whether the return from a concession agreement was established through a competitive bidding process, (2) whether the incumbent concessioner had a preferential right of renewal in the award of a follow-on concession agreement, and (3) whether the agency had the authority to retain a majority of the fees generated from the concession agreement. Based on this body of work, it is our view that any efforts at reforming concessions should consider (1) encouraging greater competition in the awarding of concession agreements, including eliminating preferential rights of renewal; and (2) promoting more consistency by including all of the land management agencies as part of concessions reform. In addition, Congress may also wish to consider providing opportunities for the land management agencies to retain at least a portion of their concession fees. The use of concessioner special account funds has increased over the past few years. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its work on concessions issues, concession reform, and the National Park Service's (NPS) use of concessioner special accounts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1994, there were 11,000 concession agreements throughout the federal government; (2) the agreements generated over $2.2 billion in revenue for concessioners; (3) while concessioners in land management agencies paid the government an average of 3 percent of their gross revenues, concessioners in other agencies paid an average of 9 percent of their gross revenues; (4) key factors affecting the government's rate of return include whether the concession is established competitively, whether the agency can retain concessions fees, and whether incumbent concessioners had a preferential right of renewal; and (5) Congress may wish to consider encouraging competition, eliminating preferential rights of renewal for incumbents, promoting consistency among land management agencies, and providing greater opportunities for land management agencies to retain concession fees. |
gao_RCED-98-99 | gao_RCED-98-99_0 | Pipelines Have Inherent Cost Advantages That Historically Have Led Them to Be Regulated
Historically, the federal government has regulated the rates charged by interstate pipelines because these pipelines have the characteristics of natural monopolies and associated cost advantages that make it difficult for other pipelines or other transportation modes to compete. In addition, the act eliminated the requirement for pipeline carriers to file the rates they charge to transport goods—which was the sole reporting requirement under ICC—and does not provide STB with any authority to regulate a pipeline carrier’s decision to enter or abandon markets. According to STB officials, over the past 10 years, only five cases concerning pipeline issues have come before STB or its predecessor, ICC.One case concerned a pipeline’s status as a common carrier and the obligation to file its rates in response to the request of an independent shipper. The ICC Termination Act specifies that the rates charged for the transportation of most commodities provided under contract by rail carriers are not subject to STB’s jurisdiction. Ability of Alternatives to Compete With Anhydrous Ammonia Pipelines Varies Across the Midwest
The ability of alternatives to anhydrous ammonia pipelines—local production within the Midwest, as well as barge and rail transport from other areas of the United States—to compete with pipelines within local market areas in the Midwest depends on two factors. Considering these factors, alternatives to pipelines may not offer effective competition because they may not have access to all the market areas served by the pipelines and because they have limited ability to increase their supply of anhydrous ammonia without additional investments in capital. Pipeline transport rates account for about 10 percent of the cost of anhydrous ammonia to farmers. Issues Before the Congress in Deciding the Future of STB’s Regulation of Pipelines
No clear conclusions can be reached on whether the continued economic regulation of pipelines under STB’s jurisdiction is needed because such a determination requires the examination of competition in numerous local markets along 21 pipelines. However, there will be several issues before the Congress as it decides whether to extend, modify, or rescind STB’s authority to regulate pipelines carrying products other than gas, oil, or water. The issues before the Congress include the following:
Do pipelines under STB’s jurisdiction lack effective competition in a significant number of market areas and subsequently have the ability to charge unreasonably high rates? Instead, Justice concluded that the number of markets along a pipeline that do not have competitive alternatives—and therefore require regulation—should be balanced against the societal burden of regulating that pipeline. Does the limited number of pipeline cases under ICC and STB indicate there is no need for continued regulation? It is possible that the limited number of rate cases brought before STB and its predecessor in the last 10 years is evidence of effective competition, and therefore there is no need to continue pipeline regulation. Would shippers have recourse if STB’s economic regulation of pipelines were eliminated? This pipeline is the only interstate phosphate slurry pipeline in the nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on the impact of the Surface Transportation Board's (STB) regulation on pipeline competitiveness and the transportation of anhydrous ammonia, focusing on: (1) the historical reasons for regulating pipelines; (2) STB's role in regulating pipelines, including the number of pipelines regulated by STB; (3) the ability of alternatives to compete with pipelines that transport anhydrous ammonia to the Midwest; and (4) issues before Congress as it examines whether to extend, modify, or rescind STB's authority to regulate pipelines.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) historically, the federal government has regulated the rates charged by interstate pipelines because these pipelines have the characteristics of natural monopolies and associated cost advantages that make it difficult for other pipelines or other transportation modes to compete; (2) the regulation of pipelines has been imposed to ensure that all shippers have access to pipeline transportation services and that the rates charged by pipeline carriers for these services are reasonable and nondiscriminatory; (3) the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 limited STB's role in regulating pipelines by specifying that the Board can investigate pipeline issues only in response to a complaint by a shipper or other interested party; (4) the act also eliminated the requirement for pipeline carriers to file the rates they charge to transport commodities, which was the sole reporting requirement for pipelines under the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) regulations; (5) over the last 10 years, only five cases concerning pipeline issues have come before ICC or STB; (6) one factor that may have limited the number of cases is the use of multiyear contracts, which makes it less likely that shippers will be dissatisfied with the rates charged by a pipeline; (7) the ability of alternatives to pipelines to compete with the two anhydrous ammonia pipelines in the Midwest varies; (8) while some market areas currently served by the pipelines also have access to alternatives, other market areas may not; (9) because of the large number of local markets that exist along the two midwestern anhydrous ammonia pipelines, GAO was not able to definitively determine the number of market areas that do or do not have competitive alternatives to the pipelines; (10) no clear conclusions can be reached on whether the continued economic regulation of pipelines under STB's jurisdiction is needed because such a determination requires the examination of competition in numerous local markets along 21 pipelines; and (11) however, as Congress considers reauthorizing STB, issues to consider include: (a) whether pipelines lack effective competition in a significant number of market areas, and subsequently have the potential to charge unreasonably high rates; (b) what are the costs of regulating pipelines; (c) whether the limited number of pipeline cases in the history of STB and its predecessor indicates that there is no need for continued regulation; and (d) whether shippers would have any recourse if SBT's economic regulation of pipelines were eliminated. |
gao_GAO-10-799 | gao_GAO-10-799_0 | The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned for launch beginning in 2015. 3). As a result, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing satellite fails prematurely. In addition to planning for the continuity of its ground systems, NOAA has established a policy to ensure the continuity of its geostationary satellites—and high-level plans if that policy is not met. However, this group only includes membership from NOAA offices, such as NWS and NESDIS, and does not include membership from other federal agencies. The lack of involvement by federal agencies in GOES-R requirements definition and prioritization is due to weaknesses in NOAA’s processes for defining and prioritizing satellite data requirements. However, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes over the course of its acquisition lifecycle, and these changes have not been communicated to GOES data users outside of NOAA. While the GOES-R program has awarded most development contracts, two instruments have experienced technical challenges that led to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on the program’s flight and ground projects. In addition, continued delays in the launch date of the first two satellites in the GOES-R series have endangered satellite continuity because these delays extend the time in which there will not be a backup satellite in orbit. The risk of a gap in coverage is further exacerbated because NOAA has not established adequate continuity plans. Finally, NOAA has taken steps to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate program changes, but has not adequately involved or communicated with key external users. For example, while NOAA involved internal users in its process for defining and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, improvements are needed in these processes to ensure that other federal agencies that rely on GOES data have a means to provide documented input to the requirements and the prioritization of those requirements. Until these improvements are made, important GOES users may lose access to critical data products and future GOES acquisitions may not meet the mission requirements of these users. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve NOAA’s ability to maintain geostationary satellites continuity and improve efforts to involve key GOES data users, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that the following three actions are taken: Develop and document continuity plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that include the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and timetables needed to transition to a single satellite, an international satellite, or other solution. Agency Comments
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. The department agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series acquisition, including cost, schedule, and performance trends; (2) evaluate whether the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA’s efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate with them about the program’s status. We also interviewed agency officials from NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to determine key dates for future GOES-R acquisition efforts and milestones and progress made on current development efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), with the aid of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is to procure the next generation of geostationary operational environmental satellites, called Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2015. This new series is considered critical to the United States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting through the year 2028. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the GOES-R acquisition; (2) evaluate whether NOAA has established adequate contingency plans in the event of delays; and (3) assess NOAA's efforts to identify GOES data users, prioritize their data needs, and communicate with them about the program's status. To do so, GAO analyzed contractor and program data and interviewed officials from NOAA, NASA, and other federal agencies that rely on GOES data.
What GAO Found
NOAA has made progress on the GOES-R acquisition, but key instruments have experienced challenges and important milestones have been delayed. The GOES-R program awarded key contracts for its flight and ground projects, and these are in development. However, two instruments have experienced technical issues that led to contract cost increases, and significant work remains on other development efforts. In addition, since 2006, the launch dates of the first two satellites in the series have been delayed by about 3 years. As a result, NOAA may not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, which could lead to a gap in coverage if GOES-14 or GOES-15 fails prematurely. Even though there may be a gap in backup coverage, NOAA has not established adequate continuity plans for its geostationary satellites. To its credit, NOAA has established a policy to always have a backup satellite available and high-level plans if that policy is not met. Specifically, in the event of a satellite failure with no backup available, NOAA plans to reduce to a single satellite and, if available, rely on a satellite from an international partner. However, NOAA does not have plans that include processes, procedures, and resources needed to transition to a single or an international satellite. Without such plans, NOAA faces an increased risk that users will lose access to critical data. While NOAA has identified GOES data users and involved internal users in developing and prioritizing the GOES-R requirements, it has not adequately involved other federal users that rely on GOES data. Specifically, NOAA's processes for developing and prioritizing satellite requirements do not include documented input from other federal agencies. Further, since 2006, the GOES-R program has undergone significant changes (such as the removal of certain satellite data products), but these have not been communicated to federal agencies. Until improvements are made in NOAA's processes for involving key federal users, these users may not be able to meet mission requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that NOAA address weaknesses in its continuity plans and improve its processes for involving other federal agencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Secretary of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans for implementing them. |
gao_GAO-11-802 | gao_GAO-11-802_0 | The Federal Leadership Committee published the Strategy in May 2010. Specifically, it includes 4 broad goals, 12 measurable goals with deadlines, and 116 actions to restore the bay by 2025. These actions describe activities to be taken by federal agencies, often in collaboration with the watershed states and other entities. The watershed states are critical partners in the effort to restore the bay, but officials from each of the states told us that even though their states are conducting bay restoration work, their states are not working toward the Strategy goals, in some cases because they view the Strategy as a federal document. Federal and state officials told us that Strategy and Chesapeake 2000 Agreement goals are similar to some degree. However, the goals also differ in some ways. For example, both the Strategy and the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement call for managing fish species, but the Strategy identifies brook trout as a key species for targeted restoration efforts and the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement does not. Federal and State Officials Identified Three Key Factors That May Reduce the Likelihood of Achieving Strategy Goals and Actions
Officials we surveyed from the 11 federal agencies responsible for the Strategy identified three key factors that may reduce the likelihood of achieving Strategy goals and actions, and state officials and subject matter experts we interviewed raised similar concerns. They reported that some form of collaboration is necessary to accomplish all of the Strategy’s measurable goals and the vast majority of its actions. In particular, federal- state collaboration is crucial to accomplishing the Strategy’s goals and actions. In their survey responses, federal officials indicated that collaboration with at least one state is necessary to accomplish 96 of the 116 actions in all 12 of the measurable goals. Funding constraints. External phenomena. Specifically, federal officials reported that external phenomena could reduce the likelihood that 8 of the measurable goals will be achieved even if all of the actions in those measurable goals were accomplished. Agency Plans for Assessing Progress on Implementing the Strategy and Restoring Bay Health Are Limited or Not Fully Developed, and It Is Unclear What Indicators Will Be Used to Assess Progress on Bay Health
The Strategy calls for the federal agencies to, among other things, develop 2-year milestones, an adaptive management process, and annual progress reports to assess progress made in implementing the Strategy and restoring the health of the bay. Per the Strategy, the agencies plan to create milestones every 2 years for measuring progress made toward the measurable goals, with the first set of 2-year milestones to cover calendar years 2012 and 2013. The Strategy states that the Federal Leadership Committee will develop a process for implementing adaptive management, but officials from EPA and other committee agencies told us that they are still developing this process. It Is Unclear What Indicators Will Be Used to Assess Bay Health
There are now two groups—the Federal Leadership Committee and the Bay Program—that plan to assess bay health. The Strategy calls for the Federal Leadership Committee to coordinate with the watershed states to align the annual progress report with the Bay Barometer, but, according to EPA officials, the status of this alignment is unclear. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the likelihood that bay restoration is attained, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA work collaboratively with federal and state bay restoration stakeholders to take the following four actions: develop common bay restoration goals to help ensure that federal and state restoration stakeholders are working toward the same goals, establish milestones for gauging progress toward measurable goals for the entire restoration effort, develop an adaptive management process that will allow restoration stakeholders to evaluate progress made in restoring the bay and adjust actions as needed, and identify the indicators that will be used for assessing progress made in improving bay health and clarify how the entities responsible for assessing this progress will coordinate their efforts. We also reported that establishing milestones for an entire effort can improve the chances the effort can be accomplished efficiently and on time and provide decision makers with an indication of the incremental progress the agency expects to make in achieving results. The Strategy provides specific outcomes to be achieved by the federal agencies, but the watershed states have not committed to the Strategy, and most watershed state officials told us that their bay restoration work is conducted according to their commitments to the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to determine (1) the extent to which the Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (the Strategy) includes measurable goals for restoring the Chesapeake Bay that are shared by stakeholders and actions to attain these goals; (2) the key factors, if any, federal and state officials identified that may reduce the likelihood of achieving Strategy goals and actions; and (3) agency plans for assessing progress made in implementing the Strategy and restoring bay health. Assess performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chesapeake Bay, with its watershed in parts of six states and the District of Columbia (watershed states), is an important economic and natural resource that has been in decline. Over decades, federal agencies and watershed states have entered into several agreements to restore the bay, but its health remains impaired. In May 2009, Executive Order 13508 established a Federal Leadership Committee, led by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and directed the committee to issue a strategy by May 2010 to protect and restore the Chesapeake Bay (the Strategy). GAO was directed by the explanatory statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, to conduct performance assessments of progress made on bay restoration, and this first assessment examines (1) the extent to which the Strategy includes measurable goals for restoring the bay that are shared by stakeholders and actions to attain these goals; (2) the key factors, if any, federal and state officials identified that may reduce the likelihood of achieving Strategy goals and actions; and (3) agency plans for assessing progress made in implementing the Strategy and restoring bay health. GAO reviewed the Strategy, surveyed federal officials, and interviewed watershed state officials and subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
The Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Watershed includes 4 broad goals, 12 specific measurable goals with deadlines, and 116 actions to restore the bay by 2025. To achieve the broad and measurable goals, federal agencies, often in collaboration with the watershed states and other entities, are responsible for accomplishing the actions. However, not all stakeholders are working toward achieving the Strategy goals. The watershed states are critical partners in the effort to restore the bay, but state officials told GAO that they are not working toward the Strategy goals, in part because they view the Strategy as a federal document. Instead, most state bay restoration work is conducted according to state commitments made in a previous bay restoration agreement, the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement. Even though Strategy and Chesapeake 2000 Agreement goals are similar to some degree, they also differ in some ways. For example, both call for managing fish species, but the Strategy identifies brook trout as a key species for restoration and the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement does not. Federal and state officials said it is critical that all stakeholders work toward the same goals. The Federal Leadership Committee and the Chesapeake Bay Program--a restoration group established in 1983 that includes federal agencies and watershed states--created an action team in June 2010 to work toward aligning bay restoration goals. Officials from the 11 agencies responsible for the Strategy that GAO surveyed identified three key factors that may reduce the likelihood of achieving Strategy goals and actions: a potential lack of collaboration among stakeholders; funding constraints; and external phenomena, such as climate change. State officials and subject matter experts that GAO interviewed raised similar concerns. Federal officials reported that some form of collaboration is needed to accomplish the Strategy's measurable goals and the vast majority of its actions. In particular, federal-state collaboration is crucial, with federal officials indicating that collaboration with at least one state is necessary to accomplish 96 of the 116 actions in the 12 measurable goals. Federal officials also reported that funding constraints could reduce the likelihood of accomplishing 69 of the actions in 11 of the measurable goals. Furthermore, federal officials reported that external phenomena could reduce the likelihood that 8 of the measurable goals will be achieved. The federal agencies have plans for assessing progress made in implementing the Strategy and restoring bay health, but these plans are limited or not fully developed, and it is unclear what indicators will be used to assess bay health. Per the Strategy, the agencies plan to create 2-year milestones for measuring progress made toward the measurable goals, with the first milestones covering 2012 and 2013. However, establishing milestones for an entire effort can improve the chances the effort can be accomplished efficiently and on time. Also, the Strategy states that the Federal Leadership Committee will develop a process for implementing adaptive management--in which agencies evaluate the impacts of restoration efforts and use the results to adjust future actions--but agency officials told GAO they are still developing this process. Moreover, there are now two groups that plan to assess bay health. The Strategy calls for the Federal Leadership Committee to coordinate with the watershed states to align these assessments. However, the status of this alignment is unclear, and if these groups use different indicators to assess bay health, confusion could result about the overall message of progress made.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA work with federal and state stakeholders to develop common goals and clarify plans for assessing progress. |
gao_GAO-07-388 | gao_GAO-07-388_0 | This approach, known as portfolio management, requires companies to view each of their investments from an enterprise level as contributing to the collective whole, rather than as independent and unrelated. This type of approach depends on strong governance with committed leadership, clearly aligned responsibility, and effective accountability at all levels of the organization. Companies Follow a Disciplined Process to Identify New Products and Achieve a Balanced Portfolio
Once companies have identified and prioritized their market opportunities, they follow a disciplined process to assess the costs, benefits, and risks of potential product alternatives and allocate resources to achieve a balanced portfolio that spreads risk across products, aligns with the company’s strategic goals and objectives, and maximizes the company’s return on investment. Lacking an Integrated, Portfolio-Based Approach, DOD Has Too Many Programs Competing for Limited Resources
Although the military services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, they do not identify warfighting needs and make weapon system investment decisions together. DOD has taken steps to identify warfighting needs through a more joint requirements process, but the department’s service-centric structure and fragmented decision-making processes are at odds with the integrated, portfolio management approach used by successful commercial companies to make enterprise-level investment decisions. Consequently, DOD has less assurance that its weapon system investment decisions address its most important warfighting needs and are affordable in the context of its overall fiscal resources. In addition, DOD commits to products earlier than the companies we reviewed and with far less knowledge about their cost and feasibility. These practices have contributed to the department starting more programs than its resources can support. If this trend goes unchecked, Congress will likely be faced with a difficult choice: pull funds from other high-priority federal programs to support DOD’s acquisitions or accept less warfighting capability than originally promised. In addition, the Secretary should ensure that the following commercial best practices, identified in this report, are incorporated: implement a review process in which needs and resources are integrated early and in which resources are committed incrementally based on the achievement of specific levels of knowledge at established decision points; prioritize programs based on the relative costs, benefits, and risks of each investment to ensure a balanced portfolio; require increasingly precise cost, schedule, and performance information for each alternative that meets specified levels of confidence and allowable deviations at each decision point leading up to the start of product development; establish portfolio managers who are empowered to prioritize needs, make early go/no-go decisions about alternative solutions, and allocate resources within fiscal constraints; and hold officials at all levels accountable for achieving and maintaining a balanced, joint portfolio of weapon system investments that meet the needs of the warfighter within resource constraints. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) identify best practices of successful commercial companies for ensuring that they pursue the right mix of programs to meet the needs of their customers within resource constraints and (2) compare DOD’s enterprise-level processes for investing in weapon systems to those practices. Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $1.4 trillion in major weapons programs. While DOD produces superior weapons, GAO has found that the department has failed to deliver weapon systems on time, within budget, and with desired capabilities. While recent changes to DOD's acquisition policy held the potential to improve outcomes, programs continue to experience significant cost and schedule overruns. GAO was asked to examine how DOD's processes for determining needs and allocating resources can better support weapon system program stability. Specifically, GAO compared DOD's processes for investing in weapon systems to the best practices that successful commercial companies use to achieve a balanced mix of new products, and identified areas where DOD can do better. In conducting its work, GAO identified the best practices of: Caterpillar, Eli Lilly, IBM, Motorola, and Procter and Gamble.
What GAO Found
To achieve a balanced mix of executable development programs and ensure a good return on their investments, the successful commercial companies GAO reviewed take an integrated, portfolio management approach to product development. Through this approach, companies assess product investments collectively from an enterprise level, rather than as independent and unrelated initiatives. They weigh the relative costs, benefits, and risks of proposed products using established criteria and methods, and select those products that can exploit promising market opportunities within resource constraints and move the company toward meeting its strategic goals and objectives. Investment decisions are frequently revisited, and if a product falls short of expectations, companies make tough go/no-go decisions. The companies GAO reviewed have found that effective portfolio management requires a governance structure with committed leadership, clearly aligned roles and responsibilities, portfolio managers who are empowered to make investment decisions, and accountability at all levels of the organization. In contrast, DOD approves proposed programs with much less consideration of its overall portfolio and commits to them earlier and with less knowledge of cost and feasibility. Although the military services fight together on the battlefield as a joint force, they identify needs and allocate resources separately, using fragmented decision-making processes that do not allow for an integrated, portfolio management approach like that used by successful commercial companies. Consequently, DOD has less assurance that its investment decisions address the right mix of warfighting needs, and, as seen in the figure below, it starts more programs than current and likely future resources can support, a practice that has created a fiscal bow wave. If this trend goes unchecked, Congress will be faced with a difficult choice: pull dollars from other high-priority federal programs to fund DOD's acquisitions or accept gaps in warfighting capabilities. |
gao_GAO-13-99 | gao_GAO-13-99_0 | Background
NTIS’s basic statutory function is to collect research reports, maintain a bibliographic record and permanent repository of these reports, and disseminate them to the public. NTIS charges user fees for the sale of its products to the public and services to federal agencies. To carry out its statutory functions of collecting and maintaining a permanent repository and bibliographic record of research reports, and to disseminate them, the agency offers a variety of products, such as fee-based access to the reports in its repository. In addition, NTIS offers information-related services to federal agencies, such as distribution and order fulfillment, web hosting, and e- training, that are less directly related to its basic statutory function. NTIS operates as a unit within Commerce and receives oversight from the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, the Director of NIST,advisory board. In this regard, the NTIS Director communicates progress toward agency goals to the Deputy Secretary of Commerce. Further, NTIS receives guidance on its operations from the NTIS Advisory Board, which was established by law policies and operations of NTIS, including policies related to fees and charges for its products and services. The board, comprised of a chairperson and four members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, is required to meet at least every 6 months to discuss NTIS’s activities. in 1988 to review the general As of late October 2012, NTIS was supported by 181 staff, all except 6 of which held full-time positions. For example, for fiscal year 2011, the agency reported that net earned revenues from all its functions (products and services) totaled about $1.5 million. However, over most of the last decade, the agency has incurred net costs for its products. In contrast, NTIS’s overall financial performance has been supported by revenues from its service offerings. Improve NTIS’s utilization by other agencies by increasing the breadth and depth of its own collection and enhancing the suite of information management services that it can provide. Additions to NTIS’s Repository Have Mostly Included Older Reports, but Demand for More Recent Reports Is Greater
From fiscal year 1990 through 2011,repository were older reports published in the year 2000 or before; however, the greater demand was for more recently published reports. Of these 419,657 reports, approximately 78 percent were distributed through a subscription only. For example, we estimate that between 96 and 100 percent of the reports published from 2001 through 2011 had been distributed, while only about 21 percent of reports published in 1989 or earlier were distributed during this time period. Most Reports Added Since 1990 Are Freely Available from Other Websites
Based on our sample, we estimate that most (about 74 percent) of the reports added to NTIS’s repository during fiscal years 1990 through 2011 were readily available from other public websites, and nearly all of these (95 percent) could be obtained for free. Specifically, we estimate that approximately 621,917, or about 74 percent, of the 841,502 reports added to NTIS’s repository from fiscal years 1990 through 2011 are readily available from one of the other four publicly available sources we searched (i.e., the issuing organization’s website; the Government Printing Office’s Federal Digital System website; the U.S. government’s official web portal, USA.gov; or from another website located through a Google search).searching for was another website located through http://www.Google.com The source that most often had the report we were . Conclusions
NTIS serves as a permanent repository and disseminator of technical information, and by statute, is required to be financially self-sustaining, to the fullest extent feasible, by charging fees for its products and services. While the agency had cumulative net earned revenues as of September 30, 2011, its costs exceeded revenue by an average of about $1.3 million over the last 11 years from the sale of technical information. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In light of the agency’s declining revenue associated with its basic statutory function and the charging for information that is often freely available elsewhere, Congress should consider examining the appropriateness and viability of the fee-based model under which NTIS currently operates for disseminating technical information to determine whether the use of this model should be continued. However, the department said NTIS did not believe our conclusions (that the fee-based model under which it operates for disseminating technical information may no longer be viable or appropriate) fully reflect the additional value that NTIS provides with the work that it performs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) how the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) is currently organized and operates, including its various functions, current staffing level, reported cost of operations, and revenue sources; (2) the age of and demand trends for reports added to NTIS’s repository; and (3) the extent to which these reports are readily available from other public sources. We supplemented our analyses with interviews of the Director of NTIS and other relevant agency officials; we also interviewed officials of the Department of Commerce and its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which have specific reporting relationships with NTIS. | Why GAO Did This Study
NTIS was established by statute in 1950 to collect scientific and technical research reports, maintain a bibliographic record and repository of these reports, and disseminate them to the public. NTIS charges fees for its products and services and is required by law to be financially self-sustaining to the fullest extent possible.
GAO was mandated by Congress to update its 2001 report on aspects of NTIS's operations and the reports in its collection. Specifically, GAO's objectives were to determine (1) how NTIS is currently organized and operates, including its functions, current staffing level, reported cost of operations, and revenue sources; (2) the age of and demand trends for reports added to NTIS's repository; and (3) the extent to which these reports are readily available from other public sources. To do this, GAO reviewed agency documentation, analyzed a sample of reports added to NTIS's collection from fiscal years 1990 through 2011 (reports from the period since GAO's last study and other older reports), and interviewed relevant agency officials.
What GAO Found
As a component of the Department of Commerce, the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) is organized into five primary offices that offer the public and federal agencies a variety of products and services. As of late October 2012, NTIS was supported by 181 staff, all except 6 of which held full-time positions. NTIS reports its progress toward agency goals to the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of NTIS reports to the Director of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology. In addition, NTIS receives oversight of its functions and strategic direction from an advisory board with members appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. NTIS's product and service offerings include, among other things, subscription access to reports contained in its repository in both print and electronic formats, distribution of print-based informational materials to federal agencies' constituents, and digitization and scanning services.
NTIS revenues are generated exclusively from direct sales or subscriptions for its products and services. NTIS reported that net revenues from all its functions (products and services) totaled about $1.5 million in fiscal year 2011. However, over most of the last 11 years, its costs have exceeded revenues by an average of about $1.3 million for its products. While NTIS has not recovered all of its costs for products through subscriptions and other fees, it has been able to remain financially self-sustaining because of revenues generated from its services such as distribution and order fulfillment, web hosting, and e-training. The NTIS strategic plan states that the electronic dissemination of government technical information by other federal agencies has contributed to reduced demand for NTIS's products. As a result, the agency is taking steps to reduce its net costs, such as improving business processes and increasing the breadth and depth of its collection.
NTIS's repository has been growing with mostly older reports, but the demand for more recent reports is greater. Specifically, NTIS added approximately 841,500 reports to its repository during fiscal years 1990 through 2011, and approximately 62 percent of these had publication dates of 2000 or earlier. However, the agency was more likely to distribute (by direct sale or through a subscription) reports published more recently. For example, GAO estimated that 100 percent of the reports published from 2009 through 2011 had been distributed at least once, while only about 21 percent of reports published more than 20 years ago had been.
Of the reports added to NTIS's repository during fiscal years 1990 through 2011, GAO estimates that approximately 74 percent were readily available from other public sources. These reports were often available either from the issuing organization's website, the federal Internet portal (http://www.USA.gov), or from another source located through a web search. Reports published from 1990 to 2011 were more likely to be readily available elsewhere than those published in 1989 or earlier. Further, GAO estimated that 95 percent of the reports available from sources other than NTIS were available free of charge. NTIS's declining revenue associated with its basic statutory function and the charging for information that is often freely available elsewhere suggests that the fee-based model under which NTIS currently operates for disseminating technical information may no longer be viable and appropriate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is suggesting that Congress reassess the appropriateness and viability of the fee-based model under which NTIS currently operates for disseminating technical information to determine whether the use of this model should be continued. In comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce stated that NTIS believes GAO's conclusions do not fully reflect the value that the agency provides. However, GAO maintains that its conclusions and suggestion to Congress are warranted. |
gao_GAO-12-660T | gao_GAO-12-660T_0 | FAA Uses Reactive and Proactive Data Analysis to Prevent Accidents and Manage Risk
For decades, FAA, other federal regulators, and the aviation industry have used data in a reactive fashion—that is, to identify the causes of aviation accidents and incidents and take actions to prevent their recurrence. Aviation accident data are collected by NTSB, but FAA also collects some accident data and uses various databases and voluntary reporting programs to collect incident data, such as for runway incursions—the unauthorized presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway. Since 1998, FAA has partnered with the airline industry through the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) to identify precursors and contributing factors and ensure that efforts to improve safety focus on the most prevalent categories of accidents. CAST analyzes accident and incident data to identify precipitating conditions and causes, and then formulates an intervention strategy designed to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence. Although FAA will continue using data in a reactive manner to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, it is shifting emphasis to a proactive approach in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks to prevent future accidents as part of its adoption of SMS. FAA uses the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), a risk-based data-driven system, to oversee maintenance and operations at all air carriers. FAA Has Various Processes in Place to Help Ensure Data Quality
Implementing systems and processes that capture accurate and complete data is critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them. FAA has furthermore put in place data quality controls that we consider good practices for handling data, although weaknesses remain in some areas. This quality control is important because it could affect accuracy and completeness.controls in place and is taking steps to address its data weaknesses; FAA has however, vulnerabilities remain that potentially limit the usefulness of FAA’s data for some of the safety analyses planned to support SMS. Although FAA concurred with our recommendations, it has not fully implemented them. Data Limitations and Lack of Data Challenge FAA’s Ability to Manage Safety Risks
FAA has put in place various quality controls for its data, but it continues to experience data challenges—including limitations with the analysis it conducts and data it collects, as well as the absence of data in some areas. 3.) Lack of ramp incident data means FAA is unable to assess the risk of catastrophic accidents in this area. In 2007, we reported that efforts to address the occurrence of safety incidents in ramp areas were hindered by the lack of data on the nature, extent, and cost of ramp incidents and accidents. FAA still collects no comprehensive data on incidents in the ramp area and NTSB does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. We recommended in FAA agreed with 2011 that FAA extend oversight to the ramp areas.our recommendation but noted that it already oversees ramps through its oversight of airlines. FAA expects to further enhance that oversight through its proposed ruling to require airports with air carrier operations to establish a safety management system. Lack of a process to track and assess runway excursions denies FAA the ability to assess the risks of these incidents. Runway excursions can be as dangerous as incursions; according to the Flight Safety Foundation, excursions have resulted in more fatalities than incursions globally. FAA does not have a process to track excursions, unlike for runway incursions. We recommended in 2011 that FAA develop and implement plans to track and assess runway excursions. FAA agreed and will be developing a program to collect and analyze runway excursion data and is drafting an order to set out the definitions and risk assessment processes for categorizing and analyzing the data. However, according to our review of FAA’s plans, it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough detailed information about these incidents in order to assess risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, but fatal accidents, though rare, continue to occur. As a result of recent accidents and related NTSB findings, FAA announced a Call to Action Plan in June 2009 to, among other things, increase air carrier participation in voluntary safety programs. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in part, called for FAA to better manage safety risks. As a result, FAA developed a concerted strategy to implement new safety programs, including increasing air carrier use of voluntary safety programs and advancing the use of SMS.
FAA is implementing SMSa data-driven, risk-based safety approach that involves establishing the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures. The implementation of SMS heightens the importance of obtaining and using high-quality aviation safety data.
This statement is based on GAOs previous work and focuses on (1) how FAA uses data to manage safety risks, (2) how FAA ensures it has quality data to manage risk, and (3) the challenges FAA faces in using data to better manage safety risks.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses data reactively and proactively to prevent accidents and manage safety risks. For instance, since 1998, FAA has partnered with the airline industry to identify precursors and contributing factors, and ensure that efforts to improve safety focus on the most prevalent categories of accidents and formulate an intervention strategy designed to reduce recurrences. Although FAA plans to continue using data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, as part of its adoption of Safety Management Systems (SMS), it is shifting to a proactive approach in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents.
Implementing systems and processes that capture accurate and complete data are critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them. Though FAA has put in place data quality controls, weaknesses remain in some areas. In particular, several FAA databases GAO reviewed in 2010 did not have a managerial review process prior to data entryan important control that helps ensure data accuracy and completeness. In response to GAOs recommendations, FAA is taking steps to address its data weaknesses, but vulnerabilities that remain potentially limit the datas usefulness for safety analysis.
FAA also continues to experience data-related challenges, including limitations with the analysis it conducts and the data it collects and the absence of data in some areas. For example, FAA does not have a process to track or assess runway excursions, which occur when an aircraft veers off or overruns a runway. Runway excursions can be as dangerous as runway incursions, which occur when an unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, or person is on a runway, and FAA has tracked runway incursions for years. GAO previously recommended that FAA develop and implement plans to track and assess runway excursions. FAA agreed and is currently developing a program to collect and analyze runway excursion data and is drafting an order to set out the definitions and risk assessment processes for categorizing and analyzing the data. However, according to GAOs review of FAAs plans, it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough detailed information about these incidents to assess risks. Similarly, GAO has found that efforts to address the occurrence of safety incidents in ramp areas were hindered by the lack of data on the nature, extent, and cost of such incidents and accidents. FAA collects no comprehensive data on incidents in ramp areas, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. FAAs lack of ramp incident data means that FAA is unable to assess the risk of catastrophic accidents in this area. FAA agreed with GAOs recommendation to extend oversight to ramp areas but noted that it already provides oversight through its oversight of airlines. FAA expects to further enhance that oversight through its proposed ruling to require airports with air carrier operations to establish a safety management system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations to address data quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations and in some cases has taken steps toward addressing them. |
gao_GAO-07-216 | gao_GAO-07-216_0 | Background
The E-Gov Act created ITEP to improve the skills of the federal workforce in using information technology. The opportunity to begin exchanges is due to end in December 2007. In addition to OMB, OPM worked with the Department of Justice and the Office of Government Ethics to finalize the regulations. In the ITEP regulations, OPM established a requirement that each participating agency develop an ITEP plan. Seven Agencies Are Initiating Programs, but No Exchanges Have Taken Place
With only 1 year to go before the opportunity to begin exchanges ends, the seven agencies participating are still initiating their programs, and no exchanges have taken place. All seven agencies have drafted plans, but only three—DHS, DOD, and Commerce—have finalized them. The skills most frequently identified by agency officials were enterprise architecture, project management, and information security. In its last two semiannual reports, in April and October 2006, OPM has reported on the status of agency plans but has not reported that no exchanges have taken place. Agencies Face Implementation Challenges
OPM, agencies, and others have identified key challenges that will confront agencies as they finish their plans and implement ITEP programs, including limited availability of private-sector employees with the skills agencies want, concern that sending employees to agencies may hinder companies’ ability to bid on future contracts, possible reluctance of private-sector employees to be subject to federal ethics rules, and more effectively marketing the program. Desired Skills Are in Short Supply in Both the Federal Government and the Private Sector
Federal agencies face a challenge in finding employees from the private sector with the skills they are most interested in pursuing. For example, although this has not yet occurred, agencies and IAC agreed that the need to file a financial disclosure statement could discourage some potential private company participants. IAC has actively marketed ITEP to its member companies and other federal IT associations; however, marketing efforts through OPM’s USAJOBS Web site, have not been productive, according to federal agencies. OPM and the participating agencies are aware of the challenges and acknowledge that they need to be addressed. However, given the short time remaining for beginning exchanges, it will be essential to expeditiously address the challenges to enable a significant number of successful exchanges. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that, as part of OPM’s responsibilities under the E-Gov Act, the Director of OPM include in its semiannual reports to the Congress (1) the number of exchanges that have occurred, as required by law, and (2) the status of efforts to address challenges facing agencies in implementing ITEP exchanges and whether these efforts are leading to exchanges. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the (1) status of the Information Technology Exchange Program and (2) challenges facing the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recognizing the importance of human capital to information technology (IT) and the need to improve the skills of federal IT workers, Congress created the Information Technology Exchange Program (ITEP) as part of the E-Government Act of 2002. ITEP aims to improve federal IT skills through exchanges of staff between the government and the private sector. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was required to issue implementing regulations, which it did in September 2005, and to report semiannually to the Congress. OPM's regulations require that each participating agency develop an ITEP plan before proceeding with exchanges. Agencies' opportunity to begin exchanges ends in December 2007. GAO is required to evaluate the program by December 2006. As agreed, GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the status of the program and (2) challenges facing agencies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key documents and interviewed OPM, participating agencies, and others.
What GAO Found
With only 1 year remaining to begin exchanges under the ITEP program, the seven agencies that volunteered to participate are still initiating their programs, and no exchanges have taken place. All participating agencies have drafted plans, but only three--Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and Department of Commerce--have finalized them. Further, only Homeland Security has attempted to negotiate an exchange, but it was unsuccessful. In its last two semiannual reports, OPM has reported on the status of agency plans, but has not reported that no exchanges have taken place to date. OPM, agencies, and others have identified key challenges that will confront agencies as they finish their plans and begin to implement ITEP programs. First, employees with desired skills are in short supply in both the federal government and the private sector, particularly in enterprise architecture, project management, and information security, according to industry representatives. Second, companies are concerned that employee exchanges could hinder future business, since a company with an employee at an agency might be seen as having an unfair advantage in bidding on agency procurements. Third, federal ethics requirements, especially financial disclosure, could discourage private-sector employees from participating. And lastly, Federal agencies' current marketing through a Web site has not been productive, according to participating agencies; suggested improvements include using the media and making personal contacts with companies. OPM and the participating agencies are aware of the challenges and acknowledge that they need to be addressed. However, given the short time remaining before authority to begin new exchanges ends (see figure), it will be essential to expeditiously address the challenges to enable a significant number of successful exchanges. |
gao_GAO-15-752T | gao_GAO-15-752T_0 | OMB and Treasury have proposed standardizing 57 data elements for reporting under the act. They released 15 elements in May 2015, a year after the passage of the act, and have since released 12 more. Eight of these were new elements required under the DATA Act; the balance of the first 15 data elements were required under the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA). As the examples illustrate, OMB and Treasury will need to build on the program activity structure and provide agencies with guidance if they are to meet the stated purpose of the DATA Act to “link federal contract, loan, and grant spending information to federal programs to enable taxpayers and policy makers to track federal spending more effectively.” To underscore the differences between program activities and programs, our September 2005 Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process defines a program as “an organized set of activities directed toward a common purpose or goal that an agency undertakes or proposes to carry out its responsibilities.”
The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), among other things, requires OMB to make publicly available, on a central government-wide website, a list of all federal programs identified by agencies. Until these steps are taken and linked to the appropriate program activity data element, OMB and Treasury will be unable to provide a complete picture of spending by federal programs as required under the act. Data Standards and Elements Proposed by OMB and Treasury May Not Yet Represent All That Are Necessary to Fully Capture and Reliably Report on Federal Spending
The DATA Act requires Treasury, in consultation with OMB, to publish a report of funds made available to, or expended by, federal agencies and their components on USAspending.gov or an alternative system. OMB and Treasury Established a Framework for Developing Data Standards, but Action Is Needed to Ensure the Integrity of the Standards Is Maintained over Time
OMB and Treasury Established a Governance Structure for Overall Implementation of the DATA Act
The DATA Act designates OMB and Treasury to lead government-wide implementation efforts. Toward that end, OMB and Treasury have established a governance framework that includes structures for both project management and data governance. OMB and Treasury have made progress in developing a governance structure for government-wide implementation. Recognizing the importance of engaging on data standards, OMB and Treasury have taken the following steps: convened a town hall meeting on data transparency in late September 2014 to, in part, allow stakeholders to share their views and recommendations; published a Federal Register notice seeking public comment on the establishment of financial data standards by November 25, 2014; presented periodic updates on the status of DATA Act implementation to federal and non-federal stakeholders at meetings and conferences; solicited public comment on data standards using GitHub, an online collaboration space, including the posing of general questions in December 2014 and subsequently seeking public comment on proposed data standards beginning in March 2015; and collaborated with federal agencies on the development of data standards and the technical schema through MAX.gov, an OMB- supported website. Additional policies and procedures that address the whole lifecycle of standards development will be needed to ensure the integrity of government-wide financial data standards is maintained over time. These policies and procedures could also provide an opportunity for OMB and Treasury to establish effective two-way communication with a broad representation of federal fund recipients to ensure all interested parties’ concerns are addressed as this important work continues. As a result we are making the following recommendation: To ensure that interested parties’ concerns are addressed as implementation efforts continue, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Treasury, build on existing efforts and put in place policies and procedures to foster ongoing and effective two-way dialogue with stakeholders including timely and substantive responses to feedback received on the Federal Spending Transparency GitHub website. In May 2015, Treasury officials told us that the agency does not plan to transfer any of the ROC’s assets, identifying the following challenges to assuming ROC’s assets:
Hardware. Because of these challenges, Treasury focused on facilitating information sharing through meetings between the ROC and Treasury’s Do Not Pay (DNP) initiative, which assists agencies in preventing improper payments. We plan to issue a report on the ROC later this year. OMB Has Launched a Pilot to Develop Recommendations for Reducing Recipient Reporting Burden
The DATA Act requires OMB to establish a 2-year pilot program to develop recommendations for standardizing financial data elements, eliminating unnecessary duplication, and reducing compliance costs for recipients of federal awards. Our work to date has centered on the grants-related part of the pilot. The pilot was launched this May with three activities: (1) a national dialogue on reducing the reporting burden faced by recipients of federal funds; (2) an online repository of common data elements; and (3) a new section on Grants.gov with information about the grants lifecycle. Providing grants-related resources. OMB staff, Treasury officials, HHS, the Recovery Board, and the CIGIE provided technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. Additional members of GAO’s DATA Act Working Group also contributed to the development of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DATA Act directs OMB and Treasury to establish government-wide data standards by May 2015. The act also requires agencies to begin reporting financial spending data using these standards by May 2017 and to post spending data in machine- readable formats by May 2018. This statement is part of a series of products that GAO will provide the Congress as the DATA Act is implemented.
This statement discusses four DATA Act implementation areas to date: (1) establishment of government-wide data standards; (2) OMB and Treasury's effort to establish a governance structure and obtain stakeholder input; (3) the status of the potential transfer of the ROC's assets to Treasury; and (4) the pilot program to reduce reporting burden. GAO reviewed the first 15 data elements finalized under the act; analyzed key documents, technical specifications and applicable guidance; interviewed OMB, Treasury, HHS, and other staff as well as officials from organizations representing non-federal stakeholders; and reviewed literature.
What GAO Found
Since the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act) became law in May 2014, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have taken significant steps towards implementing key provisions. These steps include the release of 27 data standards, draft technical documentation, and implementation guidance to help federal agencies meet their responsibilities under the act. However, given the complexity and government-wide scale of activities required by the DATA Act, much more remains to be done.
Data standards. OMB and Treasury have proposed standardizing 57 data elements for reporting under the act. They released 15 elements on May 8, 2015, a year after the passage of the act, and have since released 12 more. Eight of the first 15 were new elements required under the DATA Act; the balance were required under the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006. GAO identified several issues that may impact the quality and ability to aggregate federal spending data. For example, GAO found: (1) the data standards may not provide a complete picture of spending by program unless OMB accelerates its efforts to produce an inventory of federal programs as required under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA); (2) the data standards and elements may not yet represent all that are necessary to fully capture and reliably report on federal spending; and (3) the draft technical specifications GAO reviewed may result in the reporting of inconsistent information. GAO shared its observations with officials who are considering revisions and updating their technical documentation.
Governance and stakeholder engagement. OMB and Treasury have made progress in initial implementation activities by developing structures for project management and data governance as well as for obtaining stakeholder input. However, GAO found that additional effort to address the whole lifecycle of standards development will be needed to ensure that the integrity of data standards is maintained over time. Establishing these policies and procedures now could provide an opportunity for OMB and Treasury to build on existing efforts to reach out to stakeholders by taking steps to foster effective two-way communication to help ensure that the concerns of interested parties are responded to and addressed as appropriate on an ongoing and timely basis.
Recovery Operations Center (ROC). GAO's review of the potential transfer of the ROC's assets found that Treasury does not plan to assume these assets because of a number of impediments. Instead, Treasury has focused on facilitating information sharing between the ROC and Treasury's Do Not Pay initiative, which assists agencies in preventing improper payments. GAO has ongoing work on this issue and plans to issue a report later this year.
Reporting burden pilot. The DATA Act requires OMB to establish a 2-year pilot program to develop recommendations for reducing reporting burden for recipients of federal awards. The pilot was launched this May with the initiation of a national dialogue on reducing reporting burden, building of an online repository of common grants-related data elements, and addition of grants-related resources on Grants.gov. GAO also has ongoing work focusing on this pilot.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB accelerate efforts to merge DATA Act purposes with the production of a federal program inventory under GPRAMA, and that OMB and Treasury (1) establish policies and processes for a governance structure to maintain the integrity of data standards over time and (2) enhance policies and procedures to provide for ongoing and effective two-way dialogue with stakeholders. OMB staff, Treasury officials, and others provided technical comments which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-14 | gao_GAO-07-14_0 | In addition, the Secretary-General submits proposals to the General Assembly. Management Reform Proposals in Five Areas Are Awaiting General Assembly Review or Have Been Recently Approved
The UN has initiated reforms in five key areas: (1) modernizing the management operations of the Secretariat, (2) improving oversight, (3) promoting ethical conduct, (4) reviewing and updating programs and activities, and (5) creating a Human Rights Council. In addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. In July 2006, member states approved a resolution that, according to UN officials and member state representatives, was a positive step toward addressing several management reform initiatives. Some of the proposed or approved reforms to improve the operations of the Secretariat do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. Oversight Reform Proposals Awaiting General Assembly Review in Fall 2006
Reforms proposed to create an independent oversight advisory committee and to strengthen the capacity of OIOS are awaiting review by the General Assembly in fall 2006. Ethics Office Established, but It Is Too Early to Assess Its Impact
The UN established an ethics office in January 2006 but, as of September 2006 it continues to operate with interim staff, and some experts, including a panel commissioned by a UN staff union to review the UN’s internal justice system, have questioned the sufficiency of the number of staff in the office. As the office is new and in the process of hiring permanent staff, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully carry out its mandate. The U.S. Various Factors May Impede Full Implementation of UN Management Reforms
We identified several factors that may impede the UN’s progress toward full implementation of management reforms: (1) considerable disagreement within the General Assembly over their overall implications; (2) absence of an implementation plan for each reform that includes time frames and cost estimates; and (3) administrative guidance that may complicate the process of implementing certain human resource initiatives. Disagreement within the General Assembly Has Limited the Implementation of Reforms
Disagreement between G-77 and developed countries over the broader implications of management reforms may affect the UN’s ability to fully implement them. According to UN and member state officials, the G-77 is concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing the G-77’s influence over UN operations. Member states disagree on some of the specifics of the reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the details for creating the Human Rights Council, as discussed earlier, as well as the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. Without establishing deadlines, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts. Without determining cost estimates, it is difficult to ensure that financing will be available when needed. According to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has taken a leadership role in calling for improved management processes. However, progress in management reform efforts has been slow. Appendix II: Status of UN Management Reform Initiatives
We identified and tracked the status of management reform initiatives in five key areas—management of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights—and identified disagreements among member states that may affect their implementation. United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite various reform efforts, significant inefficiencies in United Nations (UN) management operations persist. In September 2005, heads of UN member states approved a resolution that called for a series of reforms to strengthen the organization. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has a strong interest in the progress of UN reform initiatives. GAO was asked to (1) identify and track the status of UN management reforms in five key areas and (2) identify factors that may affect the implementation of these reform initiatives. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents proposing UN management reform and interviewed U.S. and UN officials.
What GAO Found
Most of the UN management reforms in the five areas GAO examined--management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethical conduct, review of programs and activities, and human rights--are either awaiting General Assembly review or have been recently approved. In addition, many proposed or approved reforms do not have an implementation plan that establishes time frames and cost estimates. First, in July 2006, the General Assembly approved proposals to improve the management operations of the Secretariat, such as upgrading information technology systems and giving the Secretary-General some flexibility in spending authority. In addition, in fall 2006, the General Assembly will review other proposals, such as procurement and human resource reforms. Second, implementation of proposals to improve the UN's oversight capabilities, such as strengthening the capacity of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and establishing the Independent Audit Advisory Committee, are pending General Assembly review in fall 2006. Third, the UN established an ethics office with temporary staff in January 2006 that has developed an internal timetable for implementing key initiatives. However, it is too early to determine whether the office will be able to fully carry out its mandate. Fourth, UN member states agreed to complete a review of UN programs and activities in 2006, but progress has been slow and the results and time line for completion remain uncertain. Fifth, the General Assembly created a new Human Rights Council in April 2006, but significant concerns remain about the council's structure. GAO identified several factors that may affect the UN's ability to fully implement management reforms. First, although all UN member states agree that UN management reforms are needed, disagreements about the overall implications of the reforms could significantly affect their progress. Most member states are concerned that some of the reforms could increase the authority of the Secretariat at the expense of the General Assembly, thus decreasing their influence over UN operations. Member states also disagree on some of the specifics of the reforms in areas such as the review of programs and activities and the role of the Deputy Secretary-General. Second, the general absence of an implementation plan for each reform that establishes time frames and cost estimates could affect the UN's ability to implement the reform initiatives. Without establishing deadlines or determining cost estimates, it is difficult to hold managers accountable for completing reform efforts and ensure that financing will be available when needed. Third, administrative guidance, such as staff regulations and rules that implement General Assembly resolutions, could complicate the process of implementing certain human resource reform proposals. For example, according to the Secretary-General, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated. |
gao_GAO-14-649T | gao_GAO-14-649T_0 | Background
Consumers may access location-based services through smartphones or from in-car location-based services. Companies can obtain location data in various ways. Several agencies have responsibility to address consumers’ privacy and create related guidance. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has authority to enforce action against unfair or deceptive acts or practices of companies; the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has regulatory and enforcement authority over mobile carriers; and the Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) advises the President on telecommunications and information policy issues. Companies Primarily Collect and Share Location Data to Provide and Improve Consumer Services
Representatives from mobile industry companies we spoke to for the September 2012 report and in-car navigation service companies we spoke to for the December 2013 report told us they primarily collect and share location data to provide location services and to improve those services. Mobile carriers and application developers offer a diverse array of services that use location information, such as services providing navigation and social networking services that are linked to consumers’ locations. Location data can also be used to enhance the functionality of other services that do not need to know the consumer’s location to operate. Search engines, for example, can use location data as a frame of reference to return results that might be more relevant. In- car location services use location data to provide services such as turn- by-turn directions or roadside assistance. Companies’ Collection and Sharing of Location Data May Put Consumers’ Privacy at Risk
Although consumers can benefit from location-based services designed to make their lives easier, consumers also expose themselves to privacy risks when they allow companies to access their location data. As we stated in our September 2012 and December 2013 reports, these privacy risks include, but are not limited to the following: Disclosure to Unknown Third Parties for Unspecified Uses: According to privacy advocates, when a consumer agrees to use a service that accesses location data, the consumer is unlikely to know how his or her location data may be used in ways beyond enabling the service itself. Amassing such data over time allows companies to create a richly detailed profile of individual behavior, including habits, preferences, and routines—private information that could be exploited. Identity Theft: Criminals can use location data to steal identities when location data are disclosed, particularly when they are combined with other personal information. Selected Companies Have Not Consistently Implemented Practices to Protect Consumers’ Location Privacy; Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions but Federal Privacy Law Is Not Comprehensive
Private Sector Entities Have Implemented Some Recommended Practices to Protect Consumers’ Location Privacy, but Not Consistently
Industry and privacy advocacy groups have recommended practices for companies to follow in order to better protect consumers’ privacy while using their personal information. For the September 2012 report, we examined 14 mobile industry companies, and the for December 2013 report, we examined 10 in-car navigation services companies. However, some companies have not consistently or clearly disclosed to consumers what they are doing with these data or which third parties they may share them with. As we reported in 2013, companies may safeguard location data that they use or share, in part, by de-identifying them, but companies we examined used different de-identification methods. 1). Accountability: We reported in 2012 and 2013 that companies’ accountability practices varied. For example, all 10 of the in-car navigation services companies we examined for the 2013 report stated in their disclosures or in interviews with us that they take steps to protect location data that they share with third parties. Lacking clear information about how companies use and share consumers’ location data, consumers deciding whether to allow companies to collect, use, and share data on their location would be unable to effectively judge whether their privacy might be violated. Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Protect Consumer Privacy
In our September 2012 report on mobile device location data, we reported that federal agencies that have responsibility for consumer data privacy protection have taken steps to promote awareness of privacy issues, such as providing educational outreach and recommending actions aimed at improving consumer privacy. For example, we found that NTIA had not defined specific goals, milestones, or performance measures for its proposed multistakeholder process, which consists of different groups involved with consumer privacy coming together to discuss relevant issues with the goal of developing codes of conduct for consumer privacy. Therefore, it was unclear whether the process would address location privacy. In a December 2012 response to our report, the Department of Commerce (NTIA is an agency of Commerce) said it disagreed with this recommendation, stating that it is the role of the stakeholders, not the agency, to develop goals, time frames, and performance measures for the multistakeholder process. We will continue to monitor NTIA’s efforts in this area. Doing so could inform companies of FTC’s views on the appropriate actions companies should take to protect consumers’ mobile location privacy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Smartphones and in-car navigation systems give consumers access to useful location-based services, such as mapping services. However, questions about privacy can arise if companies use or share consumers' location data without their knowledge.
Several agencies have responsibility to address consumers' privacy issues, including FTC, which has authority to take enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and NTIA, which advises the President on telecommunications and information policy issues.
This testimony addresses (1) companies' use and sharing of consumers' location data, (2) consumers' location privacy risks, and (3) actions taken by selected companies and federal agencies to protect consumers' location privacy.
This testimony is based on GAO's September 2012 and December 2013 reports on mobile device location data and in-car location-based services and December 2012 and May 2013 updates from FTC and NTIA on their actions to respond to the 2012 report's recommendations.
What GAO Found
Fourteen mobile industry companies and 10 in-car navigation providers that GAO examined in its 2012 and 2013 reports—including mobile carriers and auto manufacturers with the largest market share and popular application developers—collect location data and use or share them to provide consumers with location-based services and improve consumer services. For example, mobile carriers and application developers use location data to provide social networking services that are linked to consumers' locations. In-car navigation services use location data to provide services such as turn-by-turn directions or roadside assistance. Location data can also be used and shared to enhance the functionality of other services, such as search engines, to make search results more relevant by, for example, returning results of nearby businesses.
While consumers can benefit from location-based services, their privacy may be at risk when companies collect and share location data. For example, in both reports, GAO found that when consumers are unaware their location data are shared and for what purpose data might be shared, they may be unable to judge whether location data are shared with trustworthy third parties. Furthermore, when location data are amassed over time, they can create a detailed profile of individual behavior, including habits, preferences, and routes traveled—private information that could be exploited. Additionally, consumers could be at higher risk of identity theft or threats to personal safety when companies retain location data for long periods or in a way that links the data to individual consumers. Companies can anonymize location data that they use or share, in part, by removing personally identifying information; however, in its 2013 report, GAO found that in-car navigation providers that GAO examined use different de-identification methods that may lead to varying levels of protection for consumers.
Companies GAO examined in both reports have not consistently implemented practices to protect consumers' location privacy. The companies have taken some steps that align with recommended practices for better protecting consumers' privacy. For example, all of the companies examined in both reports used privacy policies or other disclosures to inform consumers about the collection of location data and other information. However, companies did not consistently or clearly disclose to consumers what the companies do with these data or the third parties with which they might share the data, leaving consumers unable to effectively judge whether such uses of their location data might violate their privacy. In its 2012 report, GAO found that federal agencies have taken steps to address location data privacy through educational outreach events, reports with recommendations to protect consumer privacy, and guidance for industry. For example, the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) brought stakeholders together to develop codes of conduct for industry, but GAO found this effort lacked specific goals, milestones, and performance measures, making it unclear whether the effort would address location privacy. Additionally, in response to a recommendation in GAO's 2012 report, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued guidance in 2013 to inform companies of the Commission's views on the appropriate actions mobile industry companies should take to disclose their privacy practices and obtain consumers' consent.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations to enhance consumer protections in its 2012 report. GAO recommended, for example, that NTIA develop goals, milestones, and measures for its stakeholder initiative. NTIA stated that taking such actions is the role of the stakeholders and that its stakeholders had made progress in setting goals, milestones, and performance measures. GAO will continue to monitor this effort. |
gao_GAO-09-871 | gao_GAO-09-871_0 | Transit-Oriented Developments Can Affect the Availability of Affordable Housing but Conclusions Are Complicated by Limited Research and Data
Characteristics of Transit- Oriented Developments Can Increase Nearby Land and Housing Values
According to most of the literature we reviewed, plans for the existence of transit stations and amenities commonly found in transit-oriented developments generally increase nearby land and housing values, but the magnitude of the increase varies greatly depending upon several other characteristics. A few studies we looked at found that retail presence near transit stations affected land and housing values near transit positively. According to local officials and transit and housing stakeholders we spoke with, higher land and housing values have the potential to limit the affordable housing units that are market rate, government subsidized, or incentivized. 2). Limited Research and Data Complicate Conclusions about the Effect of Transit- Oriented Developments on the Availability of Affordable Housing
A lack of direct research, incomplete data, and factors unique to each transit station limit the conclusions that can be made about how transit- oriented developments affect the availability of affordable housing. Local, State, and Federal Affordable Housing Programs and Policies Support, but Generally Do Not Require, Affordable Housing in Transit- Oriented Developments
Few Local and State Programs Are Specifically Targeted to Affordable Housing in Transit- Oriented Developments, and Most Are Incentive Based
Few local and state programs are targeted to assist local housing and transit providers develop affordable housing in transit-oriented developments; the few targeted programs that do exist mainly provide financial incentives to developers if they include affordable housing in new residential developments in transit-oriented developments. HUD and FTA Programs Allow Local and State Agencies to Promote Affordable Housing near Transit, but Rarely Provide Direct Incentives to Target Affordable Housing in Transit-Oriented Developments
Local housing providers have used HUD programs in a number of cases to support affordable housing in transit-oriented developments, however, these programs support affordable housing in any location. DOT, HUD, and FTA Have Collaborated on Interagency Efforts to Promote Affordable Housing in Transit- Oriented Developments, However, Implementation Has Been Limited, and Additional Steps to Enhance Collaboration Could Be Taken
HUD and FTA, and More Recently DOT, Have Collaborated on Interagency Efforts to Promote Affordable Housing in Transit- Oriented Developments
Starting in 2005, HUD and FTA, and more recently DOT, have collaborated to promote affordable housing in transit-oriented developments through three interagency efforts, which are summarized below. While these practices can facilitate greater collaboration among federal agencies, we recognize that other practices may also help to foster greater collaboration. In comparing the agencies’ collaboration—through the interagency agreement, the HUD-FTA action plan and the Partnership for Sustainable Communities—to these key practices, we found that the agencies have taken some initial actions that are consistent with some of the key practices; however, these actions have not been fully formalized. This is in line with a key practice to develop a mechanism to monitor, evaluate, and report results. Without an implementation plan for each strategy, however, DOT and HUD run the risk of losing momentum. To identify how local, state, and federal agencies have worked to ensure that affordable housing, including housing subsidized through Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs, is available in and near transit-oriented developments, we interviewed Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Transit Administration (FTA) officials, and HUD officials. To identify to what extent do HUD, DOT, and FTA work together to ensure that transportation and affordable housing objectives are integrated in transit-oriented development projects, we reviewed documentation describing the collaborative efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has increasingly focused on linking affordable housing to transit-oriented developments--compact, walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods located near transit--through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) housing programs and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) transit programs. GAO was asked to review (1) what is known about how transit-oriented developments affect the availability of affordable housing; (2) how local, state, and federal agencies have worked to ensure that affordable housing is available in transit-oriented developments; and (3) the extent to which HUD and FTA have worked together to ensure that transportation and affordable housing objectives are integrated in transit-oriented developments. To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant literature, conducted site visits, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Characteristics of transit-oriented developments can increase nearby land and housing values, however determining transit-oriented development's effects on the availability of affordable housing in these developments are complicated by a lack of direct research and data. Specifically, the presence of transit stations, retail, and other desirable amenities such as schools and parks generally increases land and housing values nearby. However, the extent to which land and housing values increase--or in the rare case, decrease--near a transit station depends on a number of characteristics, some of which are commonly found in transit-oriented developments. According to transit and housing stakeholders GAO spoke with, higher land and housing values have the potential to limit the availability of affordable housing near transit, but other factors--such as transit routing decisions and local commitment to affordable housing--can also affect availability. Few local, state, and federal programs are targeted to assisting local housing and transit providers develop affordable housing in transit-oriented developments. The few targeted programs that exist primarily focus on financial incentives that state and local agencies provide to developers if affordable housing is included in residential developments in transit-oriented developments. However, GAO found that housing developers who develop affordable housing in transit-oriented developments generally rely on local and state programs and policies that have incentives for developing affordable housing in any location. HUD and FTA programs allow local and state agencies to promote affordable housing near transit, but rarely provide direct incentives to target affordable housing in transit-oriented developments. Since 2005, HUD and FTA, and more recently DOT, have collaborated on three interagency efforts to promote affordable housing in transit-oriented developments including (1) an interagency agreement, (2) a HUD-FTA action plan, and (3) a new DOT-HUD partnership. While these interagency efforts have produced numerous strategies, local housing and transit officials told GAO that these strategies had little impact, in part, because they have yet to be implemented. However, the agencies have not yet developed a comprehensive, integrated plan to implement all efforts, and without such a plan, the agencies risk losing momentum. GAO has previously identified key practices that could enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies; when compared to these practices, GAO found that HUD, FTA, and DOT have taken some actions consistent with some of these practices--such as defining a common outcome. However, weaknesses in agency housing data and analytical transportation planning methods will limit these agencies' ability to effectively monitor, evaluate, and report results--another key collaboration practice. GAO found that other collaboration practices, such as establishing compatible policies and procedures, could be taken to strengthen |
gao_GAO-03-883 | gao_GAO-03-883_0 | On the other hand, associations representing employers argue that H-1B workers were not treated differently than U.S. workers during the economic downturn, and that use of the H-1B program by employers has decreased substantially. H-1B Beneficiaries Were Approved to Fill a Broad Range of Occupations, and as U.S. Citizen Employment Generally Declined with the Recent Economic Downturn, So Did the Number of H-1B Petition Approvals
H-1B beneficiaries were approved to fill a wide variety of occupations, and the number of H-1B petition approvals in certain occupations has generally declined with the economic downturn, along with the employment levels of U.S. citizen workers in these occupations. In contrast with patterns in 2000, most H-1B beneficiaries in 2002 were approved for positions that were not related to IT. Both the number of H-1B petition approvals and U.S. citizens employed in certain occupations decreased from 2001 to 2002. Despite increases in unemployment among highly skilled U.S. workers, about two-thirds of employers said that finding workers with the skills needed in certain engineering and other science- related occupations remains difficult. We contacted 145 employers to discuss issues related to the H-1B program, and 36, or 25 percent, of the employers agreed to speak with us. The Extent to Which Wage Is a Factor in Employment Decisions Is Unknown
While a number of employers acknowledged that some H-1B workers might accept lower salaries than U.S. workers, the extent to which wage is a factor in employment decisions is unknown. In addition to information systems issues, we also determined that DHS’s ability to provide information on H-1B workers is limited because it has not issued consistent guidance or any regulations on the legal status of unemployed H-1B workers who remain in the United States while seeking new jobs. DHS Has Incomplete Information on H-1B Worker Entries, Departures, and Changes of Visa Status
DHS cannot account for all the H-1B worker entries, departures, and changes of visa status using its current tracking systems, because NIIS and CLAIMS 3 data are not integrated, and data for certain fields in each of these systems are not consistently collected and entered. As a result, DHS is not able to provide some key information needed to oversee the H-1B program and assess its effects on the U.S. workforce. This includes information on the number of H-1B workers in the United States at any time, the extent to which these workers become unemployed, the extent to which H-1B workers become long-term members of the labor force through other immigration statuses, and the occupations they fill as permanent members of the labor force. While DHS has long-term plans for providing better information on H-1B workers, policymakers in the interim need data to inform discussions of program changes. Employers were selected based on their number of H-1B petition approvals and occupations for which they requested H-1B workers in fiscal year 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
The continuing use of H-1B visas, which allow employers to fill specialty occupations with highly skilled foreign workers, has been a contentious issue between U.S. workers and employers during the recent economic downturn. The H- 1B program is of particular concern to these groups because employment has substantially decreased within information technology occupations, for which employers often requested H-1B workers. In light of these concerns, GAO sought to determine (1) what major occupational categories H- 1B beneficiaries were approved to fill and what is known about H-1B petition approvals and U.S. citizen employment from 2000-2002; (2) what factors affect employers' decisions about the employment of H-1B workers and U.S. workers; and (3) what is known about H-1B workers' entries, departures, and changes in visa status.
What GAO Found
H-1B beneficiaries were approved to fill a variety of positions in 2002, and the number of approved petitions (i.e., employer requests to hire H-1B beneficiaries) in certain occupations has generally declined along with the economic downturn, as have U.S. citizen employment levels in these occupations. In contrast with 2000, most H-1B beneficiaries in 2002 were approved to fill positions in fields not directly related to information technology, such as economics, accounting, and biology. Both the number of H-1B petition approvals and U.S. citizens employed in certain occupations, such as systems analysts and electrical engineers, decreased from 2001 to 2002. GAO contacted 145 H-1B employers, and the majority of the 36 employers that agreed to speak with GAO said that they recruited, hired, and retained workers based on the skills needed, rather than the applicant's citizenship or visa status. Despite increases in unemployment, most employers said that finding workers with the skills needed in certain science-related occupations remains difficult. Although some employers acknowledged that H-1B workers might work for lower wages than their U.S. counterparts, the extent to which wage is a factor in employment decisions is unknown. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has incomplete information on H-1B worker entries, departures, and changes in visa status. As a result, DHS is not able to provide key information needed to oversee the H-1B program and its effects on the U.S. workforce, including data on the number of H-1B workers in the United States at any time. GAO also found that DHS's ability to provide information on H-1B workers is limited because it has not issued consistent guidance or any regulations on the legal status of unemployed H- 1B workers seeking new jobs. Allowing unemployed H-1B workers to remain in the United States may have implications for the labor force competition faced by U.S. workers. While DHS has long-term plans for providing better information on H-1B workers, policymakers in the interim need data to inform discussions on program changes. |
gao_GAO-01-577 | gao_GAO-01-577_0 | Background
FQHCs and RHCs operate under separate programs, both of which were established to increase access to care for low-income people in medically underserved areas. FQHCs include community health centers, migrant health centers, public housing programs, health care for the homeless, and other centers and clinics. With regard to the first provision, most states did not choose to modify their payment practices and reduce the percentage of reasonable costs reimbursed. Because of their heightened reliance on Medicaid, FQHCs are likely to be more affected than RHCs by the new payment system. Concluding Observations
In part because of their mandate to preserve and expand necessary primary care health services, FQHCs and RHCs have received reimbursement based on their costs in an effort to ensure adequate payment. However, this approach does little to encourage efficiency. The new payment system mandated by BIPA attempts to ensure adequacy by basing payments on historical rates while promoting efficiency by limiting increases. However, the combination of reimbursement limits imposed historically by many states and the inflation adjustments in the new PPS may constrain future Medicaid payment to some FQHCs and RHCs. Finding a mechanism to strike the proper balance between payment adequacy and incentives for efficiency has been, and will likely be, a challenge. | What GAO Found
To increase the accessibility of primary and preventive health services for low-income people living in medically underserved areas, Congress made federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics eligible for Medicaid payments. Since 1989, federal law has required Medicaid to reimburse both the centers and the clinics on the basis of reasonable costs they incurred in providing services to beneficiaries. Cost-based reimbursement can ensure that service providers are reimbursed for necessary costs; it is also regarded as inflationary because providers can increase their payments by raising their costs. In part because of their mandate to preserve and expand necessary primary health care services, the centers and the clinics have traditionally been reimbursed on the basis of their costs in an effort to ensure adequate payment. However, this approach does little to encourage efficiency. The new payment system mandated by the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act attempts to ensure adequacy by basing payments on historical rates while promoting efficiency by limiting increases. However, the combination of reimbursement limits imposed historically by most states and the inflation adjustments in the new prospective payment system may contain future Medicaid payment to some centers and clinics. Finding a way to strike the proper balance between payment adequacy and incentives for efficiency has been, and will likely be, a challenge. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.