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gao_GAO-10-848 | gao_GAO-10-848_0 | In September 2009 we described this peer review system as two sequential levels of peer review by panels of experts in various fields of research that help NIH identify the most promising extramural grant applications to fund, as defined primarily by an assessment of the applications’ scientific merit. The ICs award administrative supplements using an administrative review process at the IC level. NIH Used Standard Review Processes and Applied Standard and Recovery Act– Specific Criteria to Make Extramural Grant Awards with Recovery Act Funding
NIH used its standard review processes—peer review or administrative review—to make extramural grant awards with its Recovery Act funding. These standard processes were used to review three categories of applications for Recovery Act–funded extramural grants, namely (1) new grant applications received from Recovery Act funding announcements; (2) existing grant applications that NIH received prior to the Recovery Act, but did not fund; and (3) applications for administrative supplements and competitive revisions to current active grants. NIH Awarded Recovery Act Funds Based on Standard NIH Criteria, Such as Scientific Merit and Relevance to IC Scientific Priorities, as Well as Criteria for Recovery Act Grants
NIH based funding decisions for all Recovery Act extramural grant awards in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 on the three standard criteria NIH uses to award extramural grants, plus three additional criteria established by NIH. In addition to the three standard NIH criteria, the three ICs we reviewed considered three additional criteria established by NIH—geographic distribution of Recovery Act funds, the potential for job creation, and the potential for scientific progress within 2 years. NIH’s Recovery Act Grant Awards Varied across Grant Categories and Other Characteristics, and NIH Made Information about the Grants and Grantees Publicly Available
NIH’s Recovery Act extramural grant awards varied across three categories—awards for applications that had previously been reviewed but had not received funding, awards for new grant applications, and awards for administrative supplements and competitive revisions to current active grants. NIH and the ICs communicated a variety of information to the public about the grant awards—including information about grantees—through NIH’s Web sites. As of April 2010, NIH used about $7 billion of its $8.6 billion in Recovery Act scientific research funds and CER funds to make over 14,000 extramural grants awards. Specifically, NIH used nearly $2.7 billion of Recovery Act funding for grant applications that had previously been peer reviewed by NIH but had not received NIH funding; slightly over $2.4 billion for new grant applications received from Recovery Act funding announcements; and about $1.9 billion for administrative supplements and competitive revisions to current active grants. The distribution of Recovery Act awards among the three categories of extramural grants varied significantly across the three ICs we reviewed. For example, we found that as of April 2010, NIAID used 69 percent of its Recovery Act funds for existing grant applications that had not previously received NIH funding, while NCI used 31 percent of its Recovery Act funds for existing grant applications that had not previously received NIH funding. Grant Award Size: As of April 2010, we found that the average Recovery Act extramural grant award was slightly more than $492,000, while about 25 percent of grants were awarded $623,000 or more. NIH Posted a Variety of Information about Recovery Act Extramural Grants and Grantees on Its Web Site
NIH communicated various information to the public about the extramural grant awards it made using Recovery Act funds. For example, the site includes reports, analysis, and data on NIH research activities, such as the fiscal year of the award, the location of grantee, and awarding IC. Agency Comments
A draft of this report was provided to HHS for review and comment. HHS provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. This report will also be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix I: Illustrative Examples of NIH Recovery Act Extramural Grants
The 45 grants presented below include a sample of 15 extramural grants awarded with American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds from each of the three Institutes and Centers (IC) we reviewed—National Cancer Institute (NCI), National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). 2. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) included $10.4 billion in funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Of the NIH Recovery Act funding, $8.2 billion was to be used to support additional scientific research and $400 million for comparative effectiveness research, including extramural research at universities and research institutions. NIH is comprised of the Office of the Director (OD) and 27 Institutes and Centers (IC), 24 of which make grant funding decisions. GAO was asked to report on how NIH awarded Recovery Act funds for scientific research and the information that NIH made available about the award of these funds. This report describes the (1) process and criteria NIH used to award extramural grants using Recovery Act funding, and (2) characteristics of Recovery Act extramural grants and the information made publicly available about these grants. GAO interviewed NIH officials in the OD and the three ICs that received the largest proportion of Recovery Act funds, and reviewed related documents, such as NIH guidance on awarding grants using Recovery Act funds. GAO also obtained and analyzed NIH data on all Recovery Act grants awarded as of April 2010.
What GAO Found
NIH used its standard review processes--peer review, which comprises two sequential levels of review by panels of experts in various fields of research, or administrative review--to award extramural grants using Recovery Act funds. These standard review processes were used for three categories of extramural grant applications: (1) new grant applications from Recovery Act funding announcements; (2) existing grant applications that had not previously received NIH funding; and (3) administrative supplements and competitive revisions to current active grants. For new grant applications submitted in response to Recovery Act funding announcements, NIH followed its standard peer review process. For existing grant applications, which had already undergone the peer review process, each of the three ICs GAO reviewed--National Cancer Institute (NCI), National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), and National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)--selected additional applications for Recovery Act funding based in part on the amount of this funding available to each IC. To award administrative supplements, NIH conducted its standard administrative review at the IC level, and for competitive revisions NIH followed its standard peer review process. In reviewing applications, NIH used its standard criteria--scientific merit, availability of funds, and relevance to scientific priorities--plus three criteria for Recovery Act grants. These criteria were the geographic distribution of Recovery Act funds, the potential for job creation, and the potential for making scientific progress within a 2-year period. NIH's Recovery Act grant awards varied across three grant categories and other characteristics, and NIH made a variety of information about the grants publicly available. NIH data show that as of April 2010, about $7 billion of the $8.6 billion in Recovery Act scientific research and comparative effectiveness research funds had been awarded for 14,152 extramural grants. NIH awarded nearly $2.7 billion to make extramural grants for existing grant applications that had not previously received funding, slightly over $2.4 billion for new grant applications, and about $1.9 billion for administrative supplements and competitive revisions. NIH officials reported that the remaining Recovery Act scientific research funds will be awarded by the end of fiscal year 2010. At the three ICs GAO reviewed, the distribution of Recovery Act funds to the three categories of Recovery Act extramural grants varied significantly. For example, GAO found that as of April 2010, NIAID used 69 percent of its Recovery Act funds for existing grant applications that had not previously received NIH funding, while NCI used 31 percent for these existing grant applications. The average NIH Recovery Act extramural grant award was about half a million dollars, and about 25 percent of grantees were awarded $623,000 or more. Through NIH's Web sites, NIH and the ICs communicated a variety of information to the public about Recovery Act extramural grant awards, such as information about grantees and awarding ICs. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-738T | gao_GAO-07-738T_0 | SES Participation Has Increased as Districts Have Taken Actions to Ease Access, but Challenges Remain
Nationally, the SES participation rate increased substantially from 12 percent of eligible students receiving SES in 2003-2004 to 19 percent in 2004-2005. 1). Providers Have Taken Steps to Deliver Quality Services, but Local Implementation Challenges Include Contracting and Coordination
To promote improved student academic achievement and service delivery, providers took steps to gather information on district curriculum and student needs. Specifically, providers aligned their curriculum with district instruction primarily by hiring district teachers and communicating with the teachers of participating students. However, when providers did not hire district teachers, the frequency of contact between tutors and teachers varied, and we estimate that some providers did not contact teachers in almost 40 percent of districts in 2004-2005. In part because SES is often delivered in school facilities, providers and officials in the districts and schools we visited reported that involvement of school administrators and teachers can improve SES delivery and coordination. State and District SES Monitoring Is Increasing Though It Remains a Challenge, and Many States Continue to Struggle with Developing Evaluations
While monitoring of SES had been limited, more states reported taking steps to monitor both district and provider efforts to implement SES in 2005-2006. In addition to state efforts to monitor providers, districts have also taken a direct oversight role, and their monitoring activities similarly increased during this time. However, because of the limitations of these two evaluations, neither provided a conclusive assessment of SES providers’ effect on student academic achievement. Education conducts SES monitoring in part through reviews of policy issues brought to the department’s attention and structured compliance reviews of states and districts, and provides SES support through guidance, grants, research, and technical assistance. While Education’s policy letter and monitoring actions reflect the department’s concern that SES implementation has been uneven throughout the country, many states and districts reported needing clearer guidance or additional assistance with certain SES provisions to improve implementation. For example, several state and district SES coordinators expressed interest in Education’s pilot program that allowed two districts in needs improvement status to act as SES providers. The other SES pilot allowed four districts in Virginia to offer SES instead of school choice in schools that have missed state performance goals for 2 years and are in their first year of needs improvement. Prior Recommendations
Our August report recommended that Education clarify guidance and provide additional assistance to states and districts to help them comply with the federal requirements for parental notification letters and ensure that letters are easy for parents to understand, collect and disseminate information on promising practices used by districts to attract providers for certain areas and groups, and collaborate with school officials to coordinate local SES implementation. Finally, we also recommended that Education require states to collect and submit information on the amount spent by districts to provide SES and the percentage of districts’ Title I funds that this amount represents and provide states with technical assistance and additional guidance on how to evaluate the effect of SES on student academic achievement. No Child Left Behind Act: Education Actions Needed to Improve Local Implementation and State Evaluation of Supplemental Educational Services. GAO-06-758. | Why GAO Did This Study
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) requires districts with schools that receive Title I funds and that have not met state performance goals for 3 consecutive years to offer low-income students supplemental educational services (SES), such as tutoring. This testimony discusses early implementation of SES, including how (1) SES participation changed in recent years; (2) providers work with districts to deliver services; (3) states monitor and evaluate SES; and (4) the U.S. Department of Education (Education) monitors and supports SES implementation. This testimony is based on an August 2006 report (GAO-06-758) and also provides information on actions Education has taken that respond to our recommendations. For the report, GAO surveyed all states and a nationally representative sample of districts with schools required to offer SES, visited four school districts, and interviewed SES providers.
What GAO Found
SES participation increased from 12 to 19 percent between school years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. District actions to increase participation have included greater efforts to notify parents. However, timely and effective notification of parents remains a challenge, as does attracting providers to serve certain areas and students, such as rural districts and students with disabilities. To promote improved student academic achievement and service delivery, SES providers took steps to align their curriculum with district instruction and communicate with teachers and parents. However, the extent of these efforts varied, as some providers did not have any contact with teachers in almost 40 percent of districts or with parents in about 30 percent of districts. Both providers and district officials experienced challenges related to contracting and coordination of service delivery. In part because SES is often delivered in school facilities, providers and district and school officials reported that greater involvement of schools can improve SES delivery. While states' monitoring of district and provider efforts to implement SES had been limited in past years, more states reported conducting on-site reviews and other monitoring activities during 2005-2006. Districts also increased their oversight role. However, many states continue to struggle with how to evaluate whether SES providers are improving student achievement. While a few states have completed evaluations, none provides a conclusive assessment of SES providers' effect on student academic achievement. Education conducts SES monitoring in part through policy oversight and compliance reviews of states and districts, and provides SES support through written guidance, grants, and technical assistance. Education monitoring found uneven implementation and compliance with SES provisions, and states and districts reported needing SES policy clarification and assistance in certain areas, such as evaluating SES. Many states also voiced interest in Education's pilot programs that increase SES flexibility, including the recently expanded pilot allowing certain districts identified as in need of improvement to act as providers. Since GAO's report was published, Education has taken several actions to help improve SES implementation and monitoring, such as disseminating promising practices and guidance, and meeting with states, districts, and providers. |
gao_GAO-08-993T | gao_GAO-08-993T_0 | Results of Investigation
We substantiated the allegations and auditor concerns made on each of the 13 cases we investigated, involving 14 audits at two locations and forward pricing audit issues at a third location. In the 12 cases at locations 1 and 2, we substantiated the allegations and auditor concerns that (1) workpapers did not support reported opinions, (2) DCAA supervisors dropped findings and changed audit opinions without adequate audit evidence for their changes, and (3) sufficient audit work was not performed to support audit opinions and conclusions. We also found that contractor officials and the DOD contracting community improperly influenced the audit scope, conclusions, and opinions of some audits—a serious independence issue. We also substantiated allegations of problems with the audit environment and inadequate supervision of certain forward pricing audits at location 3. DCAA states that its audits are performed according to professional standards (GAGAS). However, in substantiating the allegations, we found numerous failures to comply with these standards in all 13 cases we investigated. This audit did not meet GAGAS for auditor objectivity and independence because of the up-front agreement, and it did not meet standards related to adequate support for audit opinions. Throughout our investigation, auditors at each of the three DCAA locations told us that the limited number of hours approved for their audits directly affected the sufficiency of audit testing. During the DOD IG and GAO investigations, we identified a pattern of frequent management actions that served to intimidate the auditors and create an abusive environment at two of the three locations covered in our investigation. DCAA Response to Investigation
In response to our investigation, DCAA rescinded two audit reports and removed a contractor’s direct billing authorization related to a third audit. Reports issued with unqualified opinions before supervisory review was completed due to pressure from contracting officers. The working papers did not contain audit evidence to support the change in opinion. An internal DCAA Region audit quality review found audits where the audit working papers did not support the final audit report, working paper files were lost, and working paper files were not archived in the DCAA-required time period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) under the Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller plays a critical role in contractor oversight by providing auditing, accounting, and financial advisory services in connection with DOD and other federal agency contracts and subcontracts. DCAA has elected to follow generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). These standards provide guidelines to help government auditors maintain competence, integrity, objectivity, and independence in their work. GAO investigated hotline complaints it received related to alleged failures to comply with GAGAS on 14 DCAA audits. Specifically, it was alleged that (1) working papers did not support reported opinions, (2) supervisors dropped findings and changed audit opinions without adequate evidence, and (3) sufficient work was not performed to support audit conclusions and opinions. GAO also investigated issues related to the quality of certain forward pricing audit reports. GAO investigators interviewed over 50 individuals, reviewed working papers and related documents for 14 audits issued from 2003 through 2007 by two DCAA offices, and reviewed documentation on audit issues at a third DCAA office. GAO did not reperform the audits to validate the completeness and accuracy of DCAA's findings. DCAA did not agree with the "totality" of GAO's findings, but it did acknowledge shortcomings with some audits and agreed to take certain corrective actions.
What GAO Found
GAO substantiated the allegations. Although DCAA policy states that its audits are performed according to GAGAS, GAO found numerous examples where DCAA failed to comply with GAGAS in all 13 cases. For example, contractor officials and the DOD contracting community improperly influenced the audit scope, conclusions, and opinions on three cases--a serious independence issue. At two DCAA locations, GAO found evidence that (1) working papers did not support reported opinions, (2) DCAA supervisors dropped findings and changed audit opinions without adequate evidence for their changes, and (3) sufficient audit work was not performed to support audit opinions and conclusions. GAO also substantiated allegations of inadequate supervision of certain audits at a third DCAA location. The table below contains selected details about three cases GAO investigated. Throughout GAO's investigation, auditors at each of the three DCAA locations told us that the limited number of hours approved for their audits directly affected the sufficiency of audit testing. Moreover, GAO's investigation identified a pattern of frequent management actions at two locations that served to intimidate auditors, discourage them from speaking with investigators, and create a generally abusive work environment. |
gao_GAO-09-566 | gao_GAO-09-566_0 | Selecting projects involves identifying and analyzing projects’ risks and returns before committing any significant funds to them and selecting those that will best support the agency’s mission needs; overseeing projects involves reviewing the progress of projects against expectations and taking corrective action when these expectations are not being met. However, while all of the agencies had department- level IRBs, the board membership for two agencies did not include business unit (i.e., mission) representation. Specifically, 12 of the 24 projects identified by OMB as being poorly planned in 2007 (accounting for about $4.9 billion) did not receive a selection review, and 13 of 28 poorly performing projects in 2007 (amounting to about $4.4 billion) did not receive an oversight review by the department-level IRB. Furthermore, 6 of the 11 projects identified as being both poorly planned and poorly performing, with nearly $3.7 billion in funding in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, received neither a selection review nor an oversight review. The President’s requested fiscal year 2008 funding for the 28 projects totaled approximately $4.7 billion. Agencies provided several reasons why the 13 projects did not receive oversight reviews, including some which were not consistent with sound management practices: One Defense project’s funding was below the financial threshold required for a review by the department-level IRB, consistent with the agency’s guidance. About Half of the Projects That Were Both Poorly Planned and Poorly Performing Received Neither a Selection Review Nor an Oversight Review
Six of the 11 projects that were identified as being both poorly planned and poorly performing in 2007 did not receive a selection or an oversight review by the departmental-level IRB. Without consistent involvement of department-level IRBs in selecting and overseeing projects that have been identified as poorly planned or poorly performing, agencies incur the risk that these projects will not improve, which could lead to potentially billions of federal taxpayer dollars being wasted. Conclusions
Department-level investment review boards’ involvement in selecting and overseeing their agencies’ IT projects is critical to ensuring that these projects meet mission needs and that federal funds are not wasted. To their credit, the 24 major federal agencies have established guidance calling for department-level boards to perform project selection and oversight reviews. However, department-level boards for two agencies did not include representation from their business units and therefore did not have assurance that the board included all of the executives who are in the best position to make the full range of decisions needed to enable the agency to carry out its mission most effectively. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether (1) federal departments/agencies have guidance on the role of their department-level investment review boards (IRB) in selecting and overseeing information technology (IT) projects and (2) these boards are performing selection and oversight reviews of poorly planned and performing projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government expects to spend about $71 billion for information technology (IT) projects for fiscal year 2009. Given the amount of money at stake, it is critical that these projects be planned and managed effectively to ensure that the public's resources are being invested wisely. This includes ensuring that they receive appropriate selection and oversight reviews. Selection involves identifying and analyzing projects' risks and returns and selecting those that will best support the agency's mission needs; oversight includes reviewing the progress of projects against expectations and taking corrective action when these expectations are not being met. GAO was asked to determine whether (1) federal departments and agencies have guidance on the role of their department-level investment review boards in selecting and overseeing IT projects and (2) these boards are performing reviews of poorly planned and poorly performing projects. In preparing this report, GAO reviewed the guidance of 24 major agencies and requested evidence of department-level board reviews for a sample of 41 projects that were identified as being poorly planned or poorly performing.
What GAO Found
The 24 major federal agencies have guidance calling for department-level investment review boards to select and oversee IT investments. However, while all of the agencies had department-level boards, the board membership for the Departments of Commerce and Labor did not include business unit (i.e., mission) representation as called for by IT investment management best practices. Without business unit representation on their department-level boards, these agencies will not have assurance that the boards include those executives who are in the best position to make the full range of investment decisions necessary for them to carry out their missions most effectively. About half of the projects GAO examined did not receive selection or oversight reviews. Specifically, 12 of the 24 projects GAO reviewed that were identified by OMB as being poorly planned (accounting for $4.9 billion in the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request or two-thirds of the funding represented by the 24 projects) did not receive a selection review, and 13 of 28 poorly performing projects GAO reviewed (amounting to about $4.4 billion or 93 percent of the funding represented by the 28 projects) did not receive an oversight review by a department-level board. Agencies provided several reasons for not performing department-level board reviews, including some which were not consistent with sound management practices. Furthermore, 6 of the 11 projects in the sample identified as being both poorly planned and poorly performing, with over $3.7 billion in funding in the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request, received neither a selection review nor an oversight review. Without consistent involvement of department-level review boards in selecting and overseeing projects that have been identified as poorly planned or poorly performing, agencies incur the risk that these projects will not improve, potentially leading to billions of federal taxpayer dollars being wasted. |
gao_GAO-05-303T | gao_GAO-05-303T_0 | Social Security’s Long-term Financing Problem Is More Urgent than It May Appear
Today, the Social Security program does not face an immediate crisis, but it does face a long-range financing problem driven primarily by known demographic trends that is growing rapidly. Acting soon to address these problems reduces the likelihood that the Congress will have to choose between imposing severe benefit cuts and unfairly burdening future generations with the program’s rising costs. To the extent that people choose to work longer as they live longer, the increase in the amount of time spent in retirement could be diminished. Some of the benefits of early action—and the costs of delay—can be seen in figure 4. If we did nothing until 2042—the year SSA estimates the Trust Funds will be exhausted— achieving actuarial balance would require changes in benefits of 30 percent or changes in taxes of 43 percent. If you look ahead in the federal budget, the Social Security programs (Old- Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance), together with the rapidly growing health programs (Medicare and Medicaid), will dominate the federal government’s future fiscal outlook. Absent reform, the nation will ultimately have to choose among persistent, escalating federal deficits and debt, huge tax increases and/or dramatic budget cuts. GAO’s long-term budget simulations show that to move into the future with no changes in federal retirement and health programs is to envision a very different role for the federal government. Social Security remains the foundation of the nation’s retirement system. It is also much more than just a retirement program; it pays benefits to disabled workers and their dependents, spouses and children of retired workers, and survivors of deceased workers. Thus, GAO has developed a broad framework for evaluating reform proposals that considers not only solvency but other aspects of the program as well. Reform plans that lead to sustainable solvency would be those that consider the broader issues of fiscal sustainability and affordability over the long term. The current Social Security system’s benefit structure attempts to strike a balance between the goals of retirement income adequacy and individual equity. Social Security Reform Should Be Considered in the Context of Broader Challenges
Another important consideration for Social Security reform is assessing a proposal’s effect on national saving. Finally, the effort to reform Social Security is occurring as our nation’s private pension system is also facing serious challenges. In addition, our Social Security challenge is only part of a much broader challenge that includes, among other things, the need to reform Medicare, Medicaid and our overall health care system. We at GAO look forward to continuing to work with this Committee and the Congress in addressing this and other important issues facing our nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security is the foundation of the nation's retirement income system, helping to protect the vast majority of American workers and their families from poverty in old age. However, it is much more than a retirement program and also provides millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. Over the long term, as the baby boom generation retires and as Americans continue to live longer and have fewer children, Social Security's financing shortfall presents a major program solvency and sustainability challenge that is growing as time passes. The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to discuss the future of the Social Security program. This testimony will address the nature of Social Security's long-term financing problem and why it is preferable for Congress to take action sooner rather than later, as well as the broader context in which reform proposals should be considered.
What GAO Found
Although the Social Security system in not in crisis today, it faces serious and growing solvency and sustainability challenges. Furthermore, Social Security's problems are a subset of our nation's overall fiscal challenge. Absent reform, the nation will ultimately have to choose among escalating federal deficits and debt, huge tax increases and/or dramatic budget cuts. GAO's long-term budget simulations show that to move into the future with no changes in federal retirement and health programs is to envision a very different role for the federal government. With regard to Social Security, if we did nothing until 2042, achieving actuarial balance would require a reduction in benefits of 30 percent or an increase in payroll taxes of 43 percent. In contrast, taking action soon will serve to reduce the amount of change needed to ensure that Social Security is solvent, sustainable, and secure for current and future generations. Acting sooner will also serve to improve the federal government's credibility with the markets and the confidence of the American people in the government's ability to address long-range challenges before they reach crisis proportions. However, financial stability should not be the only consideration when evaluating reform proposals. Other important objectives, such as balancing the adequacy and equity of the benefits structure need to be considered. Furthermore, any changes to Social Security should be considered in the context of the broader challenges facing our nation, such as the changing nature of the private pension system, escalating health care costs, and the need to reform Medicare and Medicaid. |
gao_GAO-12-24 | gao_GAO-12-24_0 | 1). 2). By contrast, no complete data are collected for incidents in ramp areas. FAA Has Taken Actions to Reduce Risk in the Terminal Area
Procedural and Technological Changes to Improve Runway Safety
FAA has taken several steps since 2007 to further improve surface safety at airports, focusing most notably on efforts to reduce the number and severity of runway incursions—the agency’s key performance measures for this area. The first proposed rule, issued in October 2010, would require airports to establish safety management systems for ramps areas, as well as other parts of the airfield, including runways and taxiways. Data Collection and Risk- Based Analysis of Airborne Aviation Safety Information
Controllers are required to report any occurrence that may be an operational deviation, operational error, proximity event, or air traffic incident if the reported issue is known only to the employee and occurs while the employee is directly providing air traffic services to aircraft or vehicles or first level watch supervision. As a result, they said the agency will be better equipped to identify systemic issues in air traffic safety and to issue related corrective action requests. Reported Surface and Airborne Incidents Have Increased, and Several Key Factors Likely Contribute to Trends
Rate of Reported Runway Incursions Has Increased since 2004, but Serious Incidents Have Significantly Declined
In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the agency met its interim goals toward reducing the total number of runway incursions at towered airports, but the rate of incursions per million operations continued to increase (see fig. 11). Rate and Number of Reported Airborne Operational Errors Increased since 2007, Including the Most Serious Incidents
The rate of reported airborne operational errors in the terminal area increased considerably in recent years. From the second quarter of fiscal year 2008 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2011, the rate and number of reported airborne operational errors increased significantly. Changes to reporting processes and policies at FAA may explain in part the recent upward trend in reported runway incursions and airborne operational errors. Enhanced Oversight and Additional Information about Incidents Could Help Improve Safety in the Terminal Area
FAA has taken steps to improve safety in the terminal area since 2007 and has both reduced the number of serious incursions and undertaken successful efforts to increase reporting of incidents, but we identified two areas in which FAA could further improve management of data and technology in order to take a more proactive, systemic approach to improving terminal area safety. FAA Data for Risk Assessment May Not Be Complete, Meaningful, or Available to Decision Makers
Impact of Changes in Reporting Policies and Processes on Measures of Incidents and Risk Is Unclear
Multiple changes to reporting policies and processes in recent years make it difficult to know the extent to which the recent increases in some terminal area incidents are due to more accurate reporting or an increase in the occurrence of safety incidents or both. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance oversight of terminal area safety to include the range of incidents that pose risks to aircraft and passengers, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following three actions: develop and implement plans to track and assess runway excursions and extend oversight to ramp safety; develop separate risk-based assessment processes, measures, and performance goals for runway safety incidents (including both incursions and excursions) involving commercial aircraft and general aviation and expand the existing risk-based process for assessing airborne losses of separation to include incidents beyond those that occur between two or more radar-tracked aircraft; and develop plans to ensure that information about terminal area safety incidents, causes, and risk assessment is meaningful, complete, and available to appropriate decision makers. The Department of Transportation agreed to consider our recommendations and provided clarifying information about efforts made to improve runway safety, which we incorporated. To do so, we addressed the following questions: (1) What actions has the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) taken to improve safety in the terminal area since 2007? To identify actions FAA has taken since 2007 to improve safety in the terminal area and to identify additional actions FAA could take to improve safety, we reviewed our prior reports, as well as documents and reports from FAA, the Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and others; FAA orders, advisory circulars, and regulations; and applicable laws. To identify and describe recent trends in terminal area safety and the factors contributing to these trends, we obtained and analyzed data from FAA, NTSB, and OSHA on safety incidents in the terminal area. | Why GAO Did This Study
Takeoffs, landings, and movement around the surface areas of airports (the terminal area) are critical to the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. The nation's aviation system is arguably the safest in the world, but close calls involving aircraft or other vehicles at or near airports are common, occurring almost daily. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides oversight of the terminal area and has taken action to improve safety, but has been called upon by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and others to take additional steps to improve its oversight. As requested, this report addresses (1) recent actions FAA has taken to improve safety in the terminal area, (2) recent trends in terminal area safety and factors contributing to those trends, and (3) any additional actions FAA could take to improve safety in the terminal area. To address these issues, GAO analyzed data from FAA data; reviewed reports and FAA documents; and interviewed federal and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, FAA has taken several steps to further improve safety at and around airports, including implementing procedural and technological changes to improve runway safety, proposing a rule that would require airports to establish risk-management plans that include the ramp areas where aircraft are serviced, collecting more data on safety incidents, and shifting toward risk-based analysis of airborne aviation safety information. Several of these initiatives are intended to better identify systemic issues in air traffic safety. Rates of reported safety incidents in the terminal area continue to increase. FAA met its interim goals toward reducing the total number of runway incursions--the unauthorized presence of an airplane, vehicle, or person on the runway--in 2009 and 2010, but the overall rate of incursions at towered airports has trended steadily upward. In fiscal year 2004, there were 11 incursions per million operations at these airports; by fiscal year 2010, the rate increased to 18 incursions per million operations. The rate and number of airborne operational errors--errors made by air traffic controllers--have increased considerably in recent years, with the rate nearly doubling from the second quarter of fiscal 2008 to the same period of 2011. FAA has not met its related performance goals. Comprehensive data are not available for some safety incidents, including runway overruns or incidents in ramp areas. Recent increases in reported runway incursions and airborne operational errors can be somewhat attributed to several changes in reporting policies and procedures at FAA; however, trends may also indicate an increase in the actual occurrence of incidents. Enhanced oversight and additional information about surface and airborne incidents could help improve safety in the terminal area. FAA oversight in the terminal area is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions and certain airborne incidents, and does not include runway overruns or incidents in ramp areas. In addition, the agency lacks data collection processes, risk-based metrics, and assessment frameworks for analyzing other safety incidents such as runway overruns, incidents in ramp areas, or a wider range of airborne errors. Further, changes to reporting processes and procedures make it difficult to assess safety trends, and existing data may not be readily available to decision makers, including those at the regional and local levels. As a result, FAA may have difficulty assessing recent trends in safety incidents, the risks posed to aircraft or passengers in the terminal area, and the impact of the agency's efforts to improve safety.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA (1) extend oversight of terminal area safety to include runway overruns and ramp areas, (2) develop risk-based measures for runway safety incidents, and (3) improve information sharing about incidents. The Department of Transportation agreed to consider the recommendations and provided clarifying information about efforts made to improve runway safety, which GAO incorporated. |
gao_GAO-09-362T | gao_GAO-09-362T_0 | Several underlying systemic problems at the strategic level and at the program level continue to contribute to poor weapon system program outcomes. At the strategic level, DOD does not prioritize weapon system investments and the department’s processes for matching warfighter needs with resources are fragmented and broken. DOD largely continues to define warfighting needs and make investment decisions on a service- by-service basis and assess these requirements and their funding implications under separate decision-making processes. Invariably, DOD and the Congress end up continually shifting funds to and from programs—undermining well- performing programs to pay for poorly performing ones. In the absence of such knowledge, managers rely heavily on assumptions about system requirements, technology, and design maturity, which are consistently too optimistic. This exposes programs to significant and unnecessary technology, design, and production risks, and ultimately damaging cost growth and schedule delays. We have previously raised concerns, however, with DOD’s implementation of guidance on weapon systems acquisition. DOD Continues to Face Long-standing Challenges Managing Service Contracts and Contractors
DOD Has Yet to Fully Assess Which Functions and Activities Should be Performed by Contractors, Limiting Its Ability to Mitigate Risks
DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to support its missions and operations, due in part to such factors as the reductions in DOD’s civilian and military personnel following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increasing complexity of weapons systems, and more recently, the increased demands related to the global war on terrorism, such as the need for large numbers of Arabic speakers. In that regard, DOD estimated that more than 230,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as of October 2008. Our previous work has highlighted several examples of the risks inherent to using contractors, including ethics concerns, diminished institutional capacity, potentially greater costs, and mission risks. Between fiscal years 2001 and 2008, DOD obligations on contracts when measured in real terms, have more than doubled to over $387 billion in total, and to more than $200 billion just for services. We are currently assessing DOD’s ability to determine the sufficiency of its acquisition workforce and its efforts to improve its workforce management and oversight and will be issuing a report in the spring. DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Address Service Contract Management and Oversight Challenges in Response to GAO Recommendations
GAO’s body of work on contract management and the use of contractors to support deployed forces has resulted in numerous recommendations over the last several years. In response, DOD has issued guidance to address contracting weaknesses and promote the use of sound business arrangements. GAO has made numerous recommendations over the past 10 years aimed at improving DOD’s management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces, including the need for (1) DOD-wide guidance on how to manage contractors that support deployed forces, (2) improved training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel, and (3) a focal point within DOD dedicated to leading DOD’s efforts to improve the management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. DOD has also taken steps to improve the training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel. Concluding Observations
DOD has recognized it faces challenges with weapons systems acquisition and contract management and the department has taken steps to address these challenges, including those outlined in this testimony. At the departmentwide level, DOD has yet to conduct the type of fundamental reexamination of its reliance on contractors that we called for in 2008. | Why GAO Did This Study
Today's testimony addresses the challenges DOD faces to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its weapon systems acquisition and contract management. GAO has designated both areas as high risk areas since the early 1990s. DOD's major weapon systems programs continue to take longer to develop, cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned. DOD also continues to face long-standing challenges managing service contracts and contractors. For example, the oversight of service contracts has been recognized as a material weakness in the Army. The current fiscal environment combined with the current operational demands elevates the need to improve weapon systems acquisition and contract management. DOD has taken steps in response to recommendations GAO has made over the past decade. Taken collectively, these actions reflect the commitment of DOD senior leadership. However, to fully address these challenges the department needs to (1) translate policy into practice, (2) ensure steps undertaken result in intended outcomes, and (3) conduct a fundamental reexamination of its reliance on contractors. In preparing this testimony, GAO drew from issued reports, containing statements of scope and methodology used, and testimonies.
What GAO Found
Several underlying systemic problems at the strategic level and at the program level continue to contribute to poor weapon systems acquisition. The total acquisition cost of DOD's 2007 portfolio of major programs has grown by 26 percent over initial estimates. At the strategic level, DOD does not prioritize weapon system investments, and its processes for matching warfighter needs with resources are fragmented and broken. DOD largely continues to define warfighting needs and make investment decisions on a service-by-service basis and assesses these requirements and their funding implications under separate decision-making processes. Invariably, DOD and the Congress end up continually shifting funds to and from programs--undermining well-performing programs to pay for poorly performing ones. At the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about requirements, technology, and design maturity. Instead, managers rely on assumptions that are consistently too optimistic, exposing programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays. In December 2008, DOD revised its guidance to improve its acquisition of major weapon systems, consistent with recommendations GAO has made. We have previously raised concerns, however, with DOD's implementation of guidance on weapon systems acquisition. In fiscal year 2008, DOD obligated about $200 billion for contractor-provided services, more than doubling the amount it spent a decade ago when measured in real terms. GAO's previous work has highlighted several examples of the risks inherent in using contractors, including ethics concerns, diminished institutional capacity, potentially greater costs, and mission risks. Further, the lack of well-defined requirements, difficulties employing sound business practices, and workforce and training issues hinder efforts to effectively manage and oversee contracts and contractors. These factors ultimately contribute to higher costs, schedule delays, unmet goals, and negative operational impacts. These issues take on a heightened significance in Iraq and Afghanistan, where DOD estimated that more than 200,000 contractor personnel were engaged as of July 2008, exceeding the number of uniformed military personnel there. As of October 2008, the number of contractor personnel in both countries had increased to over 230,000. DOD has taken several steps in response to GAO's recommendations aimed at improving management and oversight of contractors. These include issuing policy and guidance addressing contract management, identifying skill gaps in DOD's acquisition workforce, improving training for military commanders and contract oversight personnel, and creating a focal point within the department for issues associated with the use of contractors to support deployed forces. DOD, however, has not conducted a comprehensive assessment to determine the appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. |
gao_GAO-07-558T | gao_GAO-07-558T_0 | SCHIP Allotments to States
SCHIP allotments to states are based on an allocation formula that uses (1) the number of children, which is expressed as a combination of two estimates—the number of low-income children without health insurance and the number of all low-income children, and (2) a factor representing state variation in health care costs. Under federal SCHIP law and subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each fiscal year’s allocation, after which any remaining funds are redistributed among the states that had used all of that fiscal year’s allocation. SCHIP Enrollment Has Grown Rapidly; States’ Rates of Uninsured Children Vary Significantly
SCHIP enrollment increased rapidly over the first years of the program, and has stabilized for the past several years. Of these 6.1 million enrollees, 639,000 were adults. Many states adopted innovative outreach strategies and simplified and streamlined their enrollment processes in order to reach as many eligible children as possible. States’ SCHIP Programs Reflect a Variety of Approaches to Providing Health Care Coverage
States’ SCHIP programs reflect the flexibility allowed in structuring approaches to providing health care coverage, including their choice among three program designs—Medicaid expansions, separate child health programs, and combination programs, which have both a Medicaid expansion and a separate child health program component. In fiscal year 2005, 41 states used SCHIP funding to cover children in families with incomes up to 200 percent of FPL or higher, including 7 states that covered children in families with incomes up to 300 percent of FPL or higher. Most SCHIP Programs Require Cost-Sharing, but Amounts Charged Vary Considerably
In 2005, most states’ SCHIP programs required families to contribute to the cost of care with some kind of cost-sharing requirement. As of February 2007, we identified 14 states with approved waivers to cover at least one of three categories of adults: parents of eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children, pregnant women, and childless adults. States’ SCHIP Spending Was Initially Low but Now Threatens to Exceed Available Funding
SCHIP program spending was low initially, as many states did not implement their programs or report expenditures until 1999 or later, but spending was much higher in the program’s later years and now threatens to exceed available funding. But as spending has grown, the pool of funds available for redistribution has shrunk. To cover projected shortfalls that several states faced, Congress appropriated an additional $283 million for fiscal year 2006. States that have outspent their annual allotments over the 3-year period of availability have also relied on redistributed SCHIP funds to cover excess expenditures. In fiscal years 2000 and 2003, Congress amended statutory provisions for the redistribution and availability of unused SCHIP allotments from fiscal years 1998 through 2001, reducing the amounts available for redistribution and allowing states that had not exhausted their allotments by the end of the 3-year period of availability to retain some of these funds for additional years. Some States Consistently Spent More than Their Allotted Funds
Some states consistently spent more than their allotted funds, while other states consistently spent less. Moreover, 18 states were projected to face shortfalls—that is, they were expected to exhaust available funds, including current and prior-year allotments—in at least 1 of the final 3 years of the program. In contrast, none of the 4 states that began covering adults with SCHIP funds in the period from fiscal year 2004 through 2006 faced shortfalls. These include the following: Maintaining flexibility without compromising the goals of SCHIP. Considering the federal financing strategy, including the financial sustainability of public commitments. Assessing issues associated with equity. Appendix I: SCHIP Upper Income Eligibility by State, Fiscal Year 2005
Appendix I: SCHIP Upper Income Eligibility by State, Fiscal Year 2005 expressed as a percentage of FPL 200 expressed as a percentage of FPL While Tennessee has not had a SCHIP program since October 2002, in January 2007, CMS approved Tennessee’s SCHIP plan, which covers pregnant women and children in families with incomes up to 250 percent of FPL. Related GAO Products
Children’s Health Insurance: State Experiences in Implementing SCHIP and Considerations for Reauthorization. GAO-07-447T. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
In August 1997, Congress created the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) with the goal of significantly reducing the number of low-income uninsured children, especially those who lived in families with incomes exceeding Medicaid eligibility requirements. Unlike Medicaid, SCHIP is not an entitlement to services for beneficiaries but a capped allotment to states. Congress provided a fixed amount--approximately $40 billion from fiscal years 1998 through 2007--to states with approved SCHIP plans. Funds are allocated to states annually. Subject to certain exceptions, states have 3 years to use each year's allocation, after which unspent funds may be redistributed to states that have already spent all of that year's allocation. GAO's testimony addresses trends in SCHIP enrollment and the current composition of SCHIP programs across the states, states' spending experiences under SCHIP, and considerations GAO has identified for SCHIP reauthorization. GAO's testimony is based on its prior work, particularly testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on February 1, 2007 (see GAO-07-447T). GAO updated this work with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) January 2007 approval of Tennessee's SCHIP program.
What GAO Found
SCHIP enrollment increased rapidly during the program's early years but has stabilized over the past several years. As of fiscal year 2005, the latest year for which data are available, SCHIP covered approximately 6 million enrollees, including about 639,000 adults, with about 4 million enrollees in June of that year. Many states adopted innovative outreach strategies and simplified and streamlined their enrollment processes in order to reach as many eligible children as possible. States' SCHIP programs reflect the flexibility federal law allows in structuring approaches to providing health care coverage. As of July 2006, states had opted for the following from among their choices of program structures allowed: a separate child health program (18 states), an expansion of a state's Medicaid program (11), or a combination of the two (21). In addition, 41 states opted to cover children in families with incomes at 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) or higher, with 7 of these states covering children in families with incomes at 300 percent of FPL or higher. Thirty-nine states required families to contribute to the cost of their children's care in SCHIP programs through a cost-sharing requirement, such as a premium or copayment; 11 states charged no cost-sharing. As of February 2007, GAO identified 14 states that had waivers in place to cover adults in their programs; these included parents and caretaker relatives of eligible Medicaid and SCHIP children, pregnant women, and childless adults. SCHIP spending was initially low, but now threatens to exceed available funding. Since 1998, some states have consistently spent more than their allotments, while others spent consistently less. States that earlier overspent their annual allotments over the 3-year period of availability could rely on other states' unspent SCHIP funds, a portion of which were redistributed to cover other states' excess expenditures. By fiscal year 2002, however, states' aggregate annual spending began to exceed annual allotments. As spending has grown, the pool of funds available for redistribution has shrunk. As a result, 18 states were projected to have "shortfalls" of SCHIP funds--meaning they had exhausted all available funds--in at least one of the final 3 years of the program. To cover projected shortfalls faced by several states, Congress appropriated an additional $283 million for fiscal year 2006. SCHIP reauthorization occurs in the context of debate on broader national health care reform and competing budgetary priorities, highlighting the tension between the desire to provide affordable health insurance coverage to uninsured individuals, including low-income children, and the recognition of the growing strain of health care coverage on federal and state budgets. As Congress addresses reauthorization, issues to consider include (1) maintaining flexibility within the program without compromising the primary goal to cover children, (2) considering the program's financing strategy, including the financial sustainability of public commitments, and (3) assessing issues associated with equity, including better targeting SCHIP funds to achieve certain policy goals more consistently nationwide. |
gao_GAO-16-64 | gao_GAO-16-64_0 | Loan guarantees: OPIC provides loan guarantees to third-party lenders. In fiscal years 2008 through 2014, OPIC committed the majority of its new financing support to projects in two regions: Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa. In fiscal years 2008 through 2014, OPIC’s new commitments for projects in low per capita income countries represented 34 percent of the total number of new commitments and 25 percent of the total value. OPIC Policies Guide Project Selection, and OPIC Recently Adopted Additional Guidance to Enhance the Policy Clearance Process
OPIC’s Policies Guide the Project Selection Process
OPIC has established policies that guide its project selection process, which includes a review of projects’ eligibility against OPIC policy and statutory requirements and due diligence reviews, among other evaluations. OIP officials are to conduct these reviews, based on applications, responses to questionnaires, other client- provided documentation, and other information. In reviewing the clearances for 21 projects, we identified 2 projects for which OPIC did not document its review of human rights issues in the environmental and social clearance or the worker rights clearance. In response, OPIC developed additional guidance establishing roles and responsibilities for human rights reviews. OPIC Monitors Projects, but Site Visit Reports Are Not Always Timely, and Use of Client- Reported Data Involves Risks OPIC Uses Several Tools to Monitor Policy Compliance and Development Impacts of Its Projects
OPIC is required to monitor ongoing projects’ compliance with environmental, social, labor, and human rights requirements, and assesses U.S. economic impact and host-country development impact. Two of the 3 site visit reports we reviewed were written several years after the site visits occurred. OPIC policy does not require that site visit reports be completed and submitted to management in a designated period of time. Officials stated that these reports provide additional information on policy compliance. OPIC has established policies and processes for reviewing, selecting, and monitoring projects, and in our review of a sample of projects we found that OPIC generally followed these policies. In addition, OPIC has recently sought to enhance its process for assessing cumulative environmental and social impacts by adopting new guidelines that may support more systematic analyses. Thus, OPIC’s current monitoring processes may not provide adequate information on projects’ annual policy compliance and development impact status to support program goals. Assess the current monitoring processes to ensure that the risk associated with the use of client-reported data and limited site visits for monitoring is acceptable for meeting OPIC’s program goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the amounts and types of Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s (OPIC) global financing support from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2014, (2) how OPIC selects projects, and (3) how OPIC monitors projects. To analyze the amounts and types of OPIC’s global financing support, we reviewed data provided by OPIC about its new commitments for fiscal years 2008 through 2014 to reflect recent activity. We also visited two of the four focus countries, Honduras and Pakistan, to augment information we obtained from OPIC and other sources. Status: Active. | Why GAO Did This Study
OPIC helps mobilize private capital to address development challenges globally and advance U.S. development assistance objectives.
GAO was asked to provide information on OPIC's financing commitments and its project selection and monitoring practices. This report examines (1) the amounts and types of OPIC financing support for fiscal years 2008 through 2014, (2) how OPIC selects projects, and (3) how OPIC monitors projects.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed OPIC data for its commitments made in fiscal years 2008 through 2014, to reflect recent activity. GAO also reviewed OPIC policies, annual reports, and selection and monitoring documents for a nongeneralizable sample of 21 projects in four countries. The country and project selections were based on several factors, including OPIC financing amounts, ease of doing business ratings, and project sector. GAO interviewed officials from OPIC and other organizations as well as officials and clients in Honduras and Pakistan, two countries with particularly challenging business climates.
What GAO Found
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) provides loans, loan guarantees, and political risk insurance to private entities to support development in over 150 countries. In fiscal years 2008 through 2014, OPIC made 718 commitments worldwide valued at about $20 billion. OPIC committed the majority of this financing support to projects in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 25 percent to countries with low per capita incomes.
OPIC has policies to guide its project selection process, including confirming a connection to the United States and reviewing potential environmental and social, worker rights, and human rights impacts. In its review of a nongeneralizable sample of projects, GAO found that OPIC generally followed these policies. While GAO found that OPIC completed required human rights reviews, the responsibility for reviewing human rights-related information is spread across groups, and OPIC lacked clear guidance for conducting these reviews. OPIC recently developed new guidance that identifies roles and responsibilities for these reviews. GAO also found that OPIC has recently adopted additional guidelines which may support more systematic cumulative environmental and social impact analyses.
OPIC monitors ongoing projects but may lack adequate information about some projects' policy compliance and impacts. OPIC uses annual client-reported data, a limited number of site visits, and independent consultant reports, among other things, to monitor projects' policy compliance and impacts. OPIC policy does not designate time frames for submitting site visit reports, and some reports GAO reviewed were written several years after the visits. OPIC's policy teams visit about one-tenth of active projects each year. Site visit reports GAO reviewed identified compliance issues that clients had not reported, indicating that OPIC may lack complete and accurate information on the status of some projects. Thus, OPIC's current monitoring processes may not provide adequate information on projects' annual policy compliance and development impact status to support program goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPIC (1) establish time frames for submitting site visit reports and (2) assess its monitoring processes to ensure risks associated with current practices are acceptable for meeting OPIC's program goals. OPIC concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-206 | gao_GAO-11-206_0 | As such, the military population on Guam is expected to grow by over 160 percent, from 15,000 to over 39,000 by 2020. The Navy Plans to Replace the Current Hospital and Construct Two New Branch Health Clinics to Meet Increased Health Care Demand on Guam
To accommodate the additional inpatient and outpatient requirements resulting from the expected increase in the military population on Guam, the Navy plans to expand inpatient and outpatient care in the replacement hospital and move primary outpatient and dental care to the two new branch health clinics. According to Navy officials, the development of the requirements for the clinics allowed the Navy to retain the size and footprint of the initially planned version of the replacement hospital, which was already programmed and approved by TRICARE Management Activity in 2004, prior to the announcement of the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The hospital will be funded through DOD military construction appropriations, while the two outpatient primary care clinics are to be funded through a special Department of the Treasury account established to hold funds contributed by the government of Japan as part of the agreement to realign military units from Japan to Guam. The replacement hospital will be located on the site of the current hospital, while a new branch health clinic will replace the medical and dental clinics currently in operation on Naval Base Guam, and a new branch health clinic will be located in North Finegayan. The Navy’s proposed military treatment facility solution on Guam expands on the health care services currently offered on Guam, but in instances when patients require care not offered on Guam, the Navy determined that it will continue to medically evacuate them to other military treatment facilities, such as Naval Hospital Okinawa, Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii, or Naval Medical Center San Diego. However, although the Navy’s health care requirements analysis accounts for the expected increase in health care workload by multiplying the health care utilization rates observed in a base year for different types of beneficiaries and health care services by the anticipated beneficiary population, it does not show how this workload translates into the size and configuration of the Navy’s proposed facilities because it omits documentation on the methods and criteria for how the Navy reached staffing decisions for its proposed facilities and does not show the workload expected to be performed at each facility. The health care analysis also estimates the overall health care workload for the services the Navy intends to offer on Guam following the realignment. Therefore it is unclear how this number is supported. Since the Navy’s health care requirements analysis is not sufficiently documented, specifically with regard to health care and staffing requirements, both the Navy and TRICARE Management Activity may not be sufficiently assured that (1) Navy’s military treatment facility solution of the replacement hospital and two branch health clinics will be adequate to meet the demand of the military population on Guam and (2) result in the most cost-effective facility solution that will meet the expected increase in military population on Guam. However, the Navy’s health care requirements analysis report does not clearly document the analyses and assumptions used by the Navy to determine its military treatment facility requirements, including forecasting health care demand and determining health care workload and staffing requirements nor could Navy officials adequately explain their analyses or assumptions. Without such documentation, the Navy cannot fully demonstrate to TRICARE Management Activity and other stakeholders that its conclusions about the size and configuration of its military treatment facility solution result in the most cost-effective solution in meeting the health care needs of the expected increase in military population on Guam. As stated in our report, we believe that the Navy’s documentation used to support its recommended military treatment facility solution for Guam does not clearly demonstrate how the Navy determined the size and configuration of the proposed branch health clinics. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Navy’s plans for developing a military treatment facility solution to meet the expected increases in the military population on Guam, and (2) examine the extent to which the Navy is assured that its proposed military treatment facility solution on Guam will adequately meet the requirements for the expected increase in military population. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy determined that its current hospital on Guam does not meet modern facility standards. Moreover, the military population on Guam is expected to grow from 15,000 to over 39,000 due to DOD plans to move Marine Corps units from Okinawa, Japan to Guam and expand other on- island capabilities. The Navy plans to construct a new hospital and two outpatient clinics as part of its facility solution to replace the current hospital and accommodate additional health care requirements. This report (1) describes the Navy's plans for developing its military treatment facility solution to meet the expected increases in the military population on Guam, and (2) examines the extent to which the Navy is assured that its proposed military treatment facility solution on Guam will sufficiently meet the requirements for the expected increase in military population. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation including the Navy's plans for its military treatment facility solution and interviewed key officials within the Military Health System
What GAO Found
To accommodate the additional inpatient and outpatient requirements resulting from the expected increase in military population to Guam, the Navy plans to expand inpatient and outpatient care in the replacement hospital and move primary outpatient and dental care to two new branch health clinics. Primary outpatient care generally includes caring for acute and chronic illnesses, disease prevention, screening, patient education and follow-up care from hospitalization. The replacement hospital will be located on the site of the current hospital, while one of the new branch health clinics will replace medical and dental clinics currently in operation on Naval Base Guam, and the other clinic will be located in North Finegayan on the site of a proposed Marine Corps base. According to Navy officials, the development of the requirements for the clinics allowed the Navy to retain the size and footprint of an initially planned version of the replacement hospital, which was already programmed and approved prior to the announcement of the proposed military buildup on Guam. The two outpatient primary care clinics are to be funded by the government of Japan as part of the agreement to realign Marine Corps units from Okinawa, Japan to Guam, and DOD will fund the new hospital. The Navy's proposed military treatment facility solution on Guam expands on the health care services currently offered on Guam, but in instances when patients require care not offered on Guam, the Navy determined that it will continue to medically evacuate them to other military treatment facilities, such as Naval Hospital Okinawa, Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii, or Naval Medical Center San Diego. GAO found that the Navy's documentation used to support its recommended military treatment facility solution for Guam does not clearly demonstrate how the Navy determined the size and configuration of the proposed branch health clinics, nor could Navy officials adequately explain their analyses or assumptions. Navy officials indicated that the Navy's health care requirements analysis report was the basis for decisions regarding the size and configuration of the proposed military treatment facilities. The Navy's health care requirements analysis report estimates the overall health care workload for the services the Navy intends to offer on Guam following the realignment, but does not show how this workload translates into the size and configuration of the Navy's proposed facilities. Therefore, it is difficult for stakeholders to be fully assured that the facility solution will be the most cost- effective solution to meet beneficiary health care needs following the realignment. Without clear documentation of key analyses and identification of risks, the Navy cannot fully demonstrate that it is making the most cost-effective decisions with its proposed military treatment facility solution on Guam.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Navy clearly document the basis for health care workload and staffing on Guam. In commenting, DOD generally concurred and said that more information on the branch health clinics' planning has been developed by the Navy and is under review. |
gao_GAO-05-239 | gao_GAO-05-239_0 | Jurisdictions Have Expended over Four- Fifths of Fiscal Year 2002 Funds and over Half of Fiscal Year 2003 Funds
Jurisdictions had expended a substantial amount of fiscal year 2002 and 2003 program funds as of August 30, 2004. They had expended over four- fifths of the fiscal year 2002 funds awarded through the HHS P accounts for the program’s third budget period and over half of the fourth budget period funds awarded through the HHS P accounts. Few Bioterrorism Funds Remained Unobligated, According to Jurisdiction Reports
At the end of the Bioterrorism program’s third budget period, jurisdictions reported that less than one-sixth of fiscal year 2001 and 2002 funds awarded for that period remained unobligated. Seven jurisdictions reported that all their funds from that period had been obligated, and 44 jurisdictions reported that less than one-quarter of their third budget period funds remained unobligated. Jurisdiction Estimates Indicated That One-Fifth of Fourth Budget Period Funds Remained Unobligated
According to jurisdiction estimates as of August 1, 2004, approximately 20 percent of all Bioterrorism funds awarded for the program’s fourth budget period (August 31, 2003, to August 30, 2004) would remain unobligated as of August 30, 2004. Jurisdictions Identified Administrative Processes and Other Challenges to Obligation and Expenditure, and Some Jurisdictions Described Solutions
Many jurisdictions faced challenges, partly related to state and local administrative processes, that slowed the pace of their obligation and expenditure of bioterrorism funds. Reported challenges included workforce issues, contracting and procurement processes to ensure the prudent use of public funds, and problems stemming from lengthy information technology upgrades. Jurisdictions Reported Challenges to Obligation and Expenditure
State and municipal officials told us that the obligation and expenditure of funds were delayed during the Bioterrorism program’s third and fourth budget periods for a variety of reasons, including issues related to the workforce, contracting and procurement, and information technology upgrades. However, jurisdictions expended and obligated a substantial amount of program funds as of August 30, 2004. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment, and the agency informed us it had no comments on the draft report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism program cooperative agreement, we provide information on the extent to which jurisdictions had expended fiscal year 2002 funds awarded for the third budget period as of August 30, 2003, and August 30, 2004, and had expended fiscal year 2003 funds awarded for the fourth budget period as of August 30, 2004. To describe factors that jurisdictions say contributed to delays in obligating and expending funds and actions some jurisdictions took to address those factors, we contacted selected jurisdictions via e-mail in two phases. Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began funding jurisdictions' efforts to prepare for bioterrorism attacks through the Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism program. After the events of September 11, 2001, and the 2001 anthrax incidents, program funds increased almost twentyfold. Citing jurisdictions' unexpended program funds, HHS reallocated some fiscal year 2004 funds to support other local and national bioterrorism initiatives. Jurisdictions and associations representing jurisdictions disputed HHS's assertion that large amounts of funds remain unused, noting that HHS did not acknowledge obligated funds that had not yet been expended. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the extent to which jurisdictions had expended the fiscal year 2002 funds awarded for the program's third budget period as of August 30, 2003, and August 31, 2004, and the fiscal year 2003 funds awarded for the program's fourth budget period, as of August 30, 2004; (2) the extent to which fiscal year 2001, 2002, and 2003 funds awarded for the third and fourth budget periods remained unobligated as of August 30, 2004; and (3) factors jurisdictions identified as contributing to delays in expending and obligating funds and actions some jurisdictions took to address them.
What GAO Found
Jurisdictions have expended a substantial amount of Bioterrorism program funds. As of August 30, 2004, jurisdictions had expended over four-fifths of the fiscal year 2002 funds awarded during the third budget period through the HHS P accounts--the public assistance accounts that track over 90 percent of all funds awarded. As of that date, they had expended slightly over half of P account funds awarded for the program's fourth budget period. Jurisdictions continued, as authorized, to expend funds beyond the budget period for which they were awarded. For example, some expenditures, such as contract payments, extend beyond one budget period. A t the end of the program's third budget period, jurisdictions reported that less than one-sixth of all bioterrorism funds awarded for that period--including both fiscal year 2001 and 2002 funds--remained unobligated, and some jurisdictions reported that none of their funds remained unobligated. As of August 1, 2004, jurisdictions estimated that less than one-quarter of all funds awarded for the fourth budget period would remain unobligated as of August 30, 2004, and five jurisdictions estimated that they would have no funds remaining unobligated. Many jurisdictions reported facing challenges, partly related to administrative processes, that delayed their obligation and expenditure of bioterrorism funds. These included workforce issues such as hiring freezes; contracting and procurement processes to ensure responsible use of public funds; and lengthy information technology upgrades. Some jurisdictions have simplified these processes to expedite the obligation and expenditure of funds. We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment, and the agency informed us it had no comments on the draft report. |
gao_GAO-13-217 | gao_GAO-13-217_0 | The Export Promotion Cabinet delivered a September 2010 report to the President with recommendations to implement the goals of the NEI. SBA intended that District International Trade Officers only spend about 15 percent of their time on export promotion responsibilities. The NEI identifies these primary activities for U.S. agencies involved in small business promotion, which we classify under four general terms:
Outreach: Identify small businesses that can begin or expand
Counseling and Training: Prepare small businesses to export
Trade Leads: Connect small businesses to export opportunities
Financing: Support small businesses once they have export These activities are dispersed across the six key agencies, as shown in table 3 and explained in further detail below. In addition to conducting outreach, SBA provides counseling and training, primarily through SBDCs, and assists small businesses with export financing through OIT. Other agencies connect clients with trade leads in a variety of ways. SBA Has Taken Steps to Collaborate with Other Agencies, but Further Collaboration Efforts Are Needed
SBA, Commerce, and Ex-Im collaborate on some export promotion activities in headquarters and at field locations, but some services overlap, which can be confusing for small businesses and may not be an optimal use of resources. SBA has collaborated with other agencies to develop a joint strategy for increasing small business exports and to include collaborative efforts in performance evaluations. However, SBA and other agencies have not clearly defined agencies’ roles and responsibilities for export promotion, nor have they fully leveraged resources such as by regularly sharing client information, where possible. SBA and other agencies have developed a joint annual strategy at the headquarters level to work collaboratively toward the NEI goal of doubling U.S. exports by the end of 2014. Agency officials noted that information sharing is limited by certain privacy restrictions. SBA Has Made Some Progress in Increasing Export Training but Experienced Challenges in Meeting Staffing Requirements under the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010
The SBJA expanded SBA’s presence in providing export assistance to small businesses, by requiring an increase in the export training of SBDC staff and an increase in the number of OIT field staff. Citing difficulties with finding qualified staff for the four advertised OIT positions, and not having continued funding to hire more staff, SBA never advertised for the additional eight OIT positions it would have had to fill, in addition to the original four, to meet the SBJA field staffing requirement. SBA developed a plan to increase its OIT staff levels to 30 staff and proposed—in a report submitted to Congress in September 2012—to place the staff in specific USEACs. Moreover, the plan explained SBA’s difficulties in attracting qualified candidates, but the plan did not discuss how SBA would overcome the hiring challenges or discuss the potential for leveraging the resources of other export promotion entities that could provide similar export assistance as that provided by OIT staff. Without clear definition of each entity’s roles and responsibilities, the overlapping export financing products offered by SBA and Ex-Im and the labor-intensive export counseling sessions provided by SBDCs and Commerce may cause confusion for small businesses and could result in duplication of efforts and inefficient use of government resources. 2. To improve collaboration and leverage available resources, consult with Commerce and Ex-Im and identify ways to increase, where possible, sharing of client information deemed useful for SBA, Commerce, and Ex-Im. To more effectively implement SBA’s expansion of OIT field staff as required by the SBJA, update SBA’s plan for additional OIT staff to include funding sources and time frames, as well as possible efficiencies from clearly defining roles and responsibilities and leveraging other entities’ export assistance resources. We incorporated agencies’ technical comments throughout our report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe Small Business Administration’s (SBA) role within federal export promotion efforts; (2) assess the extent to which SBA collaborates with other agencies in its export promotion activities; and (3) assess the extent to which SBA is meeting Small Business Jobs Act (SBJA) requirements to expand export promotion training and staffing. To assess the extent to which SBA collaborates with other agencies in its export promotion activities, we focused our assessment on coordination between SBA entities with Commerce and Ex-Im, the key agencies that provide similar export promotion activities to similar clients and that work together at the headquarters and field level, including at five of the selected field locations that feature all three agencies colocated in the same city. We analyzed government-wide initiatives, strategies, as well as TPCC’s and agencies’ documents, including the National Export Initiative and National Export Strategy. We did not examine the other requirements under the SBJA. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2010, the President announced the goal of doubling U.S. exports over 5 years. The President's plan in the National Export Initiative included prioritizing exports by small businesses and called for improved coordination among agencies involved in federal export promotion activities. Recently, Congress has also directed SBA to expand its export counseling and financing activities. This report (1) describes SBA's role within federal export promotion efforts, (2) assesses the extent to which SBA collaborates with other agencies in its export promotion activities, and (3) assesses the extent to which SBA is meeting requirements under the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 to expand export promotion training and staffing. GAO analyzed agencies' documents and interviewed agency officials, including those in six selected field office locations serving areas with high export potential and where staff from at least two agencies were colocated.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) and five other key agencies provide a variety of export promotion services to small businesses. In addition to outreach, which all six agencies conduct, SBA's primary activities include counseling and training, provided mainly through nonfederal partner entities called Small Business Development Centers, and export financing, provided through SBA's Office of International Trade (OIT).
While SBA collaborates to some extent with other key agencies on its export promotion activities, additional collaboration could enhance agency efforts and reduce overlap. SBA, Department of Commerce (Commerce), and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im) coordinate some export promotion activities at headquarters and at field locations, but some services overlap. For example, Small Business Development Centers and Commerce both assist companies new to exporting as well as more experienced exporters, despite intentions to divide responsibilities for those types of firms. Additionally, OIT and Ex-Im offer similar financial products for small businesses, such as export working capital loan guarantees. Overlapping services may cause confusion for small businesses and result in inefficient use of government resources. SBA and other agencies developed a joint strategy to increase small business exports and, to varying degrees, the agencies have included collaborative efforts in the performance evaluations of staff with export promotion responsibilities. However, SBA and other agencies have not clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and efforts to leverage resources have not included regularly sharing client information where possible. Such sharing could help agencies improve client services and clarify each agency's impact in promoting U.S. exports. Enhancing collaboration could help agencies ensure they are working toward the goal of increasing exports by small businesses in a way that maximizes limited resources and mitigates overlap.
SBA has made some progress in increasing export training of Small Business Development Center counselors but has experienced challenges in meeting increased OIT staffing requirements under the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010. The law required a certain number or percentage of staff working for the 63 Small Business Development Center networks to obtain export counseling certification. As of the end of September 2012, 73 percent of the networks had met this requirement, for which SBA set a 2013 deadline. To meet another requirement under the law, SBA needed to increase its OIT field staff, who primarily provide export financing assistance, from 18 to 30 staff, by the end of September 2012. However, SBA has only advertised for four temporary positions and filled two of them. SBA officials noted challenges in finding qualified candidates and lack of continued funding for additional OIT field positions. In a recent report to Congress, SBA stated its plans to hire the additional OIT staff but did not include funding plans or updated time frames to fill the positions. Furthermore, the plan did not discuss how SBA would overcome the hiring challenges or discuss the potential to leverage resources of other export promotion entities that also provide export assistance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA (1) consult with Commerce and Ex-Im and clearly define export entities' roles and responsibilities; (2) consult with Commerce and Ex-Im and identify ways to increase, where possible, sharing of client information; and (3) update its plan for meeting mandated staffing requirements to include funding sources and time frames, as well as possible efficiencies from improved collaboration. SBA agreed with our recommendations and noted it is taking steps to address them. We also received technical comments from other key export promotion agencies, which we incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-581 | gao_GAO-17-581_0 | VA sends hundreds of millions of pieces of mail annually as part of its mission to provide care and benefits to veterans and their dependents. SMART data indicate that most of VA’s outgoing mail was sent via USPS in fiscal year 2016, although VA facilities also used UPS and FedEx. VA Is Not Managing Its Mail Program Effectively
VA is not managing its mail program effectively, as it lacks key elements of an effective mail management program, including having reliable data on mail volume and expenditures, agency-wide performance measures, and mail managers with appropriate authority and responsibilities. First, VA does not report reliable data to GSA because VA lacks a system to track mail volume and expenditures consistently and does not have an overall plan to source contracts for the mailing equipment that would provide this capability in a more strategic manner. Second, VA is unable to evaluate the overall efficiency of its mail program because its mail management guidance has not been updated to include agency-wide goals and performance measures for its mail operations. Finally, VA cannot ensure consistent mailing practices in its administrations and facilities because it has not provided mail managers with appropriate authority and responsibilities to oversee mail operations across the agency. Fragmented Process for Procuring Mailing Equipment Has Contributed to VA’s Inability to Track and Report Reliable Mail Cost and Volume Data
The mail data VA reports to GSA in its annual mail management report is unreliable, in part because VA’s fragmented process for procuring mailing equipment prevents VA from tracking mail volume and expenditures consistently across facilities. For example, VA officials reported that facilities with newer mailing equipment may have also purchased enhanced accounting software from the vendor that enables them to track mail expenditures and volume by service provider and individual classes of mail—such as Priority or First- Class Mail. The mail volume and expenditure data from roughly 200 VA facilities are individually entered into SMART by VA personnel. VA’s inconsistent processes for tracking mail data are in part the result of fragmented procurement practices for mailing equipment across the agency in which different components of VHA and VBA make contracting decisions for mailroom equipment independently. Further, VA may be expending unnecessary additional funds on procuring mail equipment and missing opportunities to take advantage of its substantial buying power. VA’s Mail Policy Does Not Include Agency-Wide Goals and Performance Measures
VA’s mail policy does not include agency-wide goals and performance measures for mail operations, and as a result, VA is unable to determine the extent to which its mail operations are efficient and effective. VA Has Not Provided Mail Managers with Appropriate Authority and Responsibilities
Although VA has designated mail managers at the agency and administration levels, these mail managers have limited ability to oversee mail operations across the agency because VA has not provided them with appropriate authority and responsibilities. According to VA officials, the responsibilities of the agency mail manager position are limited to oversight of VA Directive 6340—the policy directive and handbook that cover the mail program—with no operational role in mail management. However, the VHA and VBA mail managers reported that although they advise individual facilities on mail management, they have no authority to direct their mail operations. VA risks being unable to ensure that its facilities are managing their mail costs as effectively as possible, including obtaining available discounts. Because it lacks key elements of an effective mail management program, VA cannot provide assurance that facilities are managing their mail efficiently. Setting goals and measuring performance allows organizations to track progress and provides managers with the crucial performance data needed to make management decisions. Determine and document the authority and responsibilities of the agency and administration-level mail managers to enable them to improve management and oversight of mail operations. Postal Service, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA sends hundreds of millions of pieces of mail to veterans and their dependents, including prescription medications and information about benefits or disability compensation. However, VA's reported mail volume and costs—$355 million in 2016—are among the highest in the federal government. GAO was asked to review VA's mail management practices.
This report examines the extent to which VA manages its outgoing mail effectively. GAO identified key elements of an effective mail management program from federal regulation and internal control standards; reviewed VA-reported mail expenditure and volume data for fiscal years 2015 and 2016; collected information on mailing practices at 10 VA facilities with the highest mail volume in fiscal year 2015; and interviewed representatives of VA, GSA, the U.S. Postal Service, VA's two primary mailing equipment vendors, and two of the nation's largest veterans service organizations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is not managing its outgoing mail effectively as it lacks key elements of an effective mail management program, including reliable data on mail volume and expenditures, agency-wide performance measures for mail operations, and mail managers with appropriate authority and responsibilities.
Reporting reliable mail expenditure and volume data : The mail data VA reports to the General Services Administration (GSA) are unreliable, in part because VA's fragmented process for procuring mailing equipment prevents VA from tracking mail volume and expenditures consistently across facilities. Specifically, each fiscal year, hundreds of VA facilities individually enter their mail expenditure and volume data into a GSA database that collects mail data from federal agencies. These data are collected through inconsistent processes. For example, some facilities use mailing equipment and associated software that can automatically track volume and costs by service provider and mail class, while other facilities' equipment may be too old to have this capability or they use spreadsheets, bills, or receipts to track their costs. These processes are inconsistent because VA's different components and facilities contract for mailroom equipment independently of one another. VA lacks an overall plan to procure mailing equipment strategically. Through such procurement, VA could implement a system that would more consistently track data on mail expenditures and volume. This step would not only improve the reliability of these data but could also allow VA to take advantage of price discounts typically available under broader contracts.
Measuring performance : VA is unable to evaluate the overall efficiency of its mail program because its mail management policy does not include agency-wide goals and performance measures for its mail operations, and it has inconsistent measures across its facilities. For example, of the 10 VA facilities GAO reviewed, some assessed performance using customer service, efficiency, volume, and cost, while others used annual expenditures, among other measures. Updating the policy to include agency-wide goals and performance measures would allow VA to track progress toward consistent goals and provide it with crucial performance information needed to make programmatic decisions.
Mail managers with appropriate authority and responsibilities : VA's ability to oversee mailing practices across its facilities is limited because it has not provided its mail managers with appropriate authority and responsibilities, per federal internal control standards. The agency mail manager's responsibilities are limited to oversight of VA's mail policy, with no operational role in mail management. Additionally, mail managers for the Veterans Health Administration and Veterans Benefits Administration reported that they advise individual facilities on mail management but have no authority to direct their mail operations. Without determining appropriate authority and responsibilities for its mail managers, VA is unable to ensure that its facilities are managing their mail effectively.
What GAO Recommends
To manage its mail program more effectively, VA should develop and document a plan to improve how VA procures mailing equipment, update mail policy to include goals and performance measures, and determine and document the authority and responsibilities of the agency and administration-level mail managers to enable them to better manage and oversee mail operations. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-350 | gao_GAO-12-350_0 | Benefits of Participating in Physical Education and Sports
Research indicates that increased physical activity in general, and physical education (PE) and sports participation in particular, yields a number of important benefits for elementary and secondary students, including:
Health benefits—Research has shown that regular physical activity for youth can benefit them in a number of ways, including helping build and maintain healthy bones, muscles, and joints; helping control weight and reduce fat; and preventing or delaying the development of high blood pressure. initiative aimed at increasing physical activity. While PE Instruction Time Has Decreased, Officials Said School Sports Opportunities Have Generally Increased
PE Instruction Time Has Decreased, but Schools Increasingly Require Some PE in Each Grade
Opportunities
The amount of PE instruction time that schools offer to students generally decreased from 2000 to 2006, according to SHPPS data, and relatively few schools offered students the opportunity to participate in daily PE or its instructional equivalent, as recommended by NASPE (see fig. 1). At the same time, the estimated percentage of schools that required students to take some PE increased at each grade level from 2000 to 2006, particularly for grades at the middle and high school levels, according to SHPPS data (see fig. 2). For example, the estimated percentage of schools that required ninth grade students to take PE increased from 13 percent in 2000 to 55 percent in 2006. Although the amount of PE instruction time has decreased, emphasis on the quality of PE programs appears to have increased, according to SHPPS data and comments from officials we interviewed. In addition, some school and district officials we interviewed said offering students options may increase student participation in PE. As previously stated, national data show that many schools have PE requirements. I).national, state, district, and school officials we interviewed said that opportunities to participate in school sports have generally increased, in part because many schools have added new interscholastic sports teams over the last few years. Schools Cited Resource Challenges to Providing PE and Sports Opportunities but Have Mitigated Some of Them
Officials Said PE Opportunities Have Been Affected by Budget Cuts and Inadequate Facilities
Most officials we spoke with cited budget cuts and inadequate facilities as major challenges for schools to provide physical education opportunities for students. For example, at one school we visited, the gymnasium also served as the cafeteria. Several school officials we spoke with stated that budget cuts and space constraints have affected their ability to provide adequate facilities and equipment for sports opportunities. Some state, district, and other officials cited finding quality coaches as a challenge to providing sports opportunities. Schools have mitigated some of the budgetary challenges related to providing sports opportunities by relying heavily on outside funding sources or charging fees for certain sports activities. The official added that the tax base has remained steady, and the district has not experienced some of the challenges that other school districts face in providing PE and sports opportunities for its students. However, other schools we visited reported relying heavily on booster clubs, gate receipts, private donations, and fundraising to fund their local sports programs. Specifically, according to SHPPS data, the percentage of schools that require students to pay an activity fee to participate in interscholastic sports was an estimated 33 percent in 2006, which did not differ significantly from the 2000 estimate of 29 percent.addition, the percentage of schools with intramural activities or physical activity clubs that required students to pay a fee for these activities increased from an estimated 23 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2006. As the primary social institution where children learn and spend their time, schools can play a pivotal role in increasing students’ physical activity, in part through offering PE classes and opportunities to participate in sports programs. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of the report to the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services for review and comment. Both agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Physical activity is a crucial part of preventing or reducing childhood obesity, and may also yield important academic and social benefits. However, many children do not attain the level of daily physical activity recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Schools are uniquely positioned to provide students opportunities to increase physical activity through physical education (PE) classes and involvement in sports teams. In view of the federal governments role in promoting the health and welfare of children, the Congress is currently considering a number of proposals aimed in part at increasing the physical activity of youth. To assist the Congress as it considers options for increasing physical activity among students, GAO was asked to review (1) the status of opportunities for elementary and secondary school students to participate in school-based physical education or sports activities; and (2) what challenges schools face in providing physical education and sports opportunities. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed federal survey data; interviewed state, district, and school officials in selected states, as well as federal officials and others with relevant expertise; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and reviewed studies on the benefits of physical education and sports for students.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. The Departments of Education and Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
While the most recent national data show instruction time for PE decreased from 2000 to 2006, officials GAO interviewed stated that school sports opportunities have generally increased in recent years. Specifically, the percentage of schools that offered PE at least 3 days a week decreased from 2000 to 2006, but the percentage of schools that required students in each grade to take some PE increased during the same period. For example, the estimated percentage of schools that required PE in ninth grade increased from 13 percent in 2000 to 55 percent in 2006. Moreover, states, districts, and schools appear to have increased emphasis on the quality of PE programs, such as helping students develop lifelong fitness skills, according to national data and GAO interviews. Data on high school students show that participation in PE varies by grade level but not by gender or across racial groups. In addition, most state, district, and school officials GAO interviewed said opportunities to participate in interscholastic sports have increased, particularly for girls, and that many schools have responded to increased demand by adding new sports teams over the last few years.
Schools GAO visited cited several challenges to providing PE and sports opportunities but have found ways to alleviate some of the challenges associated with sports. In particular, school officials said that budget cuts and inadequate facilities have affected their ability to provide PE opportunities. For example, officials from one school district GAO visited reported reducing PE instruction time because of limited funding for instructors. Other schools, such as one where the gym doubled as the cafeteria, lack dedicated space to use for PE. In addition, school officials reported challenges in providing sports opportunities, as issues related to transportation, facilities, and staffing have been compounded by budgetary constraints. For example, officials from some schools said funding to transport students to outside facilities for practices or games was limited. Other school officials cited difficulty in attracting quality coaches because of low pay and the large amount of time involved. Even so, some schools have mitigated some challenges related to sports by relying heavily on outside funding sources such as booster clubs and gate receipts and leveraging community facilities. Additionally, some schools charge student fees for sports activities, which may be a barrier for lower-income students. However, many schools waive such fees. |
gao_GAO-12-339 | gao_GAO-12-339_0 | Within JCIDS, the JROC is supported in its duty to review and validate joint capability needs by the Joint Capabilities Board and six Functional Capabilities Boards. The Joint Staff Has Initiated Efforts to Prioritize Capability Needs, but Implementation Processes Are Not Fully Developed and Clearly Documented
The Joint Staff is undertaking efforts to improve the ability to prioritize capability needs from a joint perspective through JCIDS and to align those needs with available budget resources. We have previously reported that JCIDS’s ability to align resources to balance competing needs could be improved if it had an analytic approach that provided a means to review and validate proposals to ensure that the most important capability needs of the department are being addressed. In addition to validating capability proposals, according to Joint Staff officials, the JROC has begun examining how the services’ existing programs can support joint operations to reduce duplication of capabilities. New JCIDS Processes Are Not Fully Developed and Clearly Documented
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has sought some policy changes and, according to officials, provided other direction to implement changes in the JCIDS process, but the new approach to managing requirements and considering affordability is still evolving and has not been fully developed and clearly documented. However, the guidance does not clearly outline criteria and measures for demonstrating progress toward meeting the goal of aligning needs with available resources or clearly communicate the goals and the analytic approach envisioned to support JROC decision making. However, unless the Joint Staff takes steps to define and institutionalize the new approach by adhering to the key principles of results-oriented management, it is not clear whether the current momentum in implementing an analytic approach through JCIDS will be sustained. JCIDS guidance requires that sponsors of potential major defense acquisition programs include sustainment information in capability development documents, which detail proposed solutions to fulfill capability needs. suggests that gaps in JCIDS guidance requires sponsors of major defense acquisition programs to address sustainment based on four metrics—materiel availability, operational availability, reliability, and ownership cost (renamed operation and support cost in January 2012). Table 2 outlines examples of key review criteria within each of the four sustainment metrics under the guidance in effect through December 2011. Our analysis of six capability development documents found that all of the documents provided information on all of the required sustainment metrics. However, we found that the completeness of information reported for all of the metrics’ key criteria varied. Updated JCIDS guidance issued in January 2012 still does not clearly require program sponsors to report on the individual criteria for each of the sustainment metrics. Without complete and detailed information on each of the individual criteria elements, the JROC may not be in the best position to weigh the costs and benefits of a proposal within a capability portfolio. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help sustain momentum for efforts to bring a capability portfolio approach to the JCIDS process and to improve the quality of sustainment information reported in capability development documents, we recommend that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the JROC Chairman, take the following two actions:
Revise and implement guidance to reflect changes to the JCIDS process as well as to establish criteria and measures for determining the relative importance of capability needs across capability areas and assessing progress. Appendix I: Observations on Reporting Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
Section 862 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the Comptroller General to carry out a comprehensive review of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the review. To assess the extent to which the JROC has considered aspects of the availability and operational support requirements of weapon systems— called sustainment—when validating the requirements of proposed capability solutions, we reviewed relevant DOD and Joint Staff policy documents and related guidance outlining the requirement to develop and report sustainment metrics for capability documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defenses Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is charged with assisting in the prioritization of capability needs from a joint perspective and helping guide investments. The JROC is supported by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. However, a congressional committee and GAO have expressed concerns about the extent to which JCIDS has been effective in prioritizing capability needs. The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 required GAO to provide a report on the effectiveness of JCIDS in several areas. In addition to responding to this direction, GAO has more broadly evaluated the extent to which (1) the Joint Staff has developed and implemented an analytic approach to prioritize capability needs and (2) the JROC has considered aspects of the availability and operational support of weapon systemscalled sustainmentwhen validating the requirements of proposed capability solutions. To do so, GAO analyzed capability documents, reviewed relevant guidance and law, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
After studying the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process since September 2010, the Joint Staff began initiating actions in October 2011 to better prioritize capability needs and align those needs with available budgetary resources. Specifically, according to Joint Staff officials, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has begun to consider the benefits and affordability of new capabilities within the context of joint capability areas and to evaluate possible duplication before validating new capability requirements. The Joint Staff has begun to implement a new approach to support JROC prioritization of capability needs, but the new approach is still evolving and has not been fully developed and clearly documented. New guidance does not clearly outline goals of the new approach, develop and communicate the analytic approach envisioned to support JROC decision making, or set out criteria and accompanying measures of progress. GAO previously reported that JCIDSs ability to prioritize needs could be improved if it had an analytic approach to reviewing and validating proposals that would help ensure that the most important capability needs of the department are addressed. Until the Joint Staff takes steps to fully develop, document, and institutionalize the new analytic approach, it is not clear whether the current momentum for improving the JCIDS process will be sustained.
JCIDS guidance in effect through December 2011 required that sponsors of potential major defense acquisition programs address sustainment information in capability development documents according to four metricsmateriel availability, operational availability, reliability, and ownership cost. Each of these metrics includes a set of potentially reportable criteria or data, which are listed as review criteria and are suggested, but not clearly required by the guidance, to be included in the metric. Based on GAOs analysis of six capability development documents, GAO found that all of the documents provided information on the four required sustainment metrics, but the completeness of information for all of the metrics key criteria varied. Further, in some cases information that should have been included, according to Department of Defense officials, was not provided. The Joint Staff issued updated JCIDS guidance in January 2012, but the guidance still does not clearly require program sponsors to report on the individual criteria for each of the four sustainment metrics. Without complete and detailed information on each of the individual criteria elements, the JROC may not have the information it needs to make the most informed decisions when validating the requirements of proposed solutions intended to mitigate capability gaps.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1) revise and implement JCIDS guidance to reflect recent changes to the process and establish criteria and measures for determining the relative importance of capability needs and (2) require program sponsors to address each criterion in JCIDS guidance related to sustainment in capability documents. DOD partially concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-418 | gao_GAO-12-418_0 | If eligible, a 510(k) is filed when a manufacturer seeks a determination that a new device is substantially equivalent to a legally marketed device known as a predicate device. Under MDUFA, FDA’s goal is to complete the review process for 90 percent of the 510(k)s in a cohort within 90 days of submission (known as the Tier 1 goal) and to complete the review process for 98 percent of the cohort within 150 days (the Tier 2 goal). The PMA review process is the most stringent type of medical device review process required by FDA, and user fees are much higher for PMAs than for 510(k)s. PMAs are designated as either original or expedited. FDA considers a device eligible for expedited review if it is intended to (a) treat or diagnose a life- threatening or irreversibly debilitating disease or condition and (b) address an unmet medical need.submissions to determine which are appropriate for expedited review, regardless of whether a company has identified its device as a potential candidate for this program. FDA’s review of medical device submissions has been discussed in recent congressional hearings, meetings between FDA and stakeholders about the medical device user fee program reauthorization, and published reports. FDA Met All Performance Goals for 510(k)s but the Time to Final Decision Has Increased Substantially in Recent Years
For FYs 2003 through 2010, FDA met all Tier 1 and Tier 2 performance goals for 510(k)s. In addition, FDA review time for 510(k)s decreased slightly during this period, but time to final decision increased substantially. 3). However, when we added off-the- clock time (where FDA waited for the sponsor to provide additional information) to FDA’s on-the-clock review time, the resulting time to final decision decreased slightly from the FY 2003 cohort to the FY 2005 cohort before increasing 61 percent—from 100 days to 161 days—from the FY 2005 cohort through the FY 2010 cohort. Additionally, although the 510(k) cohort for FY 2011 was still incomplete at the time we received FDA’s data, the average FDA review time and time to final decision were lower in FY 2011 for those submissions on which it had taken action. 4). FDA Was Inconsistent in Meeting Performance Goals for PMAs While FDA Review Time and Time to Final Decision Generally Increased
For FYs 2003 through 2010, FDA met most of the goals for original PMAs but fell short on most of the goals for expedited PMAs. In addition, FDA review time and time to final decision for both types of PMAs generally increased during this period. 7.) Specifically, average FDA review time for original PMAs increased from 211 days in the FY 2003 cohort (the first year that user fees were in effect) to 264 days in the FY 2008 cohort, then fell in the FY 2009 cohort to 217 days (see fig. Stakeholders Noted Issues with the Medical Device Review Process; FDA Is Taking Steps That May Address Many of These Issues
The industry groups and consumer advocacy groups we interviewed noted a number of issues related to FDA’s review of medical device submissions. The most commonly mentioned issue raised by industry and consumer advocacy stakeholder groups was insufficient communication between FDA and stakeholders throughout the review process. FDA has taken or plans to take several steps that may address issues with the frequency and quality of its communications with stakeholders, including issuing new guidance documents, improving the guidance development process, and enhancing interactions between FDA and stakeholders during reviews. Industry Stakeholders Report a Lack of Predictability and Consistency in Reviews
The three industry stakeholders that we interviewed also told us that there is a lack of predictability and consistency in FDA’s reviews of device submissions. Consumer Advocacy Group Stakeholders Suggest That FDA Provides Inadequate Assurance of the Safety and Effectiveness of Approved or Cleared Devices
Three of the four consumer advocacy group stakeholders with whom we spoke stated that FDA is not adequately ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the devices it approves or clears for marketing. Concluding Observations
While FDA has met most of the goals for the time frames within which the agency was to review and take action on 510(k) and PMA device submissions, the time that elapses before a final decision has been increasing. It is important for the agency to monitor the impact of those steps in ensuring that safe and effective medical devices are reaching the market in a timely manner. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III. HHS generally agreed with our findings and noted that FDA has identified some of the same performance trends in its annual reports to Congress. Appendix I: FDA Medical Device Review Performance for Fiscal Years (FY) 2000–2011
of the Medical Device
2002 (MDUFMA) (MDUFA)
Cycles that were currently in progress at the time we received FDA’s data were included in this analysis. Fiscal years for which there was no corresponding expedited PMA performance goal are denoted with a dash (—). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of medical devices sold in the United States. New devices are generally subject to FDA review via the 510(k) process, which determines if a device is substantially equivalent to another legally marketed device, or the more stringent premarket approval (PMA) process, which requires evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) authorized FDA to collect user fees from the medical device industry to support the process of reviewing device submissions. FDA also committed to performance goals that include time frames within which FDA is to take action on a proportion of medical device submissions. MDUFMA was reauthorized in 2007.
Questions have been raised as to whether FDA is sufficiently meeting the performance goals and whether devices are reaching the market in a timely manner. In preparation for reauthorization, GAO was asked to (1) examine trends in FDAs 510(k) review performance from fiscal years (FY) 2003-2010, (2) examine trends in FDAs PMA review performance from FYs 2003-2010, and (3) describe stakeholder issues with FDAs review processes and steps FDA is taking that may address these issues. To do this work, GAO examined FDA medical device review data, reviewed FDA user fee data, interviewed FDA staff regarding the medical device review process and FDA data, and interviewed three industry groups and four consumer advocacy groups.
What GAO Found
Even though FDA met all medical device performance goals for 510(k)s, the elapsed time from submission to final decision has increased substantially in recent years. This time to final decision includes the days FDA spends reviewing a submission as well as the days FDA spends waiting for a device sponsor to submit additional information in response to a request by the agency. FDA review time excludes this waiting time, and FDA review time alone is used to determine whether the agency met its performance goals. Each fiscal year since FY 2005 (the first year that 510(k) performance goals were in place), FDA has reviewed over 90 percent of 510(k) submissions within 90 days, thus meeting the first of two 510(k) performance goals. FDA also met the second goal for all 3 fiscal years it was in place by reviewing at least 98 percent of 510(k) submissions within 150 days. Although FDA has not yet completed reviewing all of the FY 2011 submissions, the agency was exceeding both of these performance goals for those submissions on which it had taken action. Although FDA review time decreased slightly from FY 2003 through FY 2010, the time that elapsed before FDAs final decision increased substantially. Specifically, from FY 2005 through FY 2010, the average time to final decision for 510(k)s increased 61 percent, from 100 days to 161 days.
FDA was inconsistent in meeting performance goals for PMA submissions. FDA designates PMAs as either original or expedited; those that FDA considers eligible for expedited review are devices intended to (a) treat or diagnose life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating conditions and (b) address an unmet medical need. While FDA met the performance goals for original PMA submissions for 4 out of 7 years the goals were in place, it met those goals for expedited PMA submissions only twice out of 7 years. FDA review time and time to final decision for both types of PMAs were highly variable but generally increased in recent years. For example, the average time to final decision for original PMAs increased from 462 days for FY 2003 to 627 days for FY 2008 (the most recent year for which complete data are available).
The three industry groups and four consumer advocacy groups GAO interviewed noted a number of issues related to FDAs review of medical device submissions. The four issues most commonly raised by stakeholders included (1) insufficient communication between FDA and stakeholders throughout the review process, (2) a lack of predictability and consistency in reviews, (3) an increase in time to final decision, and (4) inadequate assurance of the safety and effectiveness of approved or cleared devices. FDA is taking stepsincluding issuing new guidance documents, enhancing reviewer training, and developing an electronic system for reporting adverse eventsthat may address many of these issues. It is important for the agency to monitor the impact of those steps in ensuring that safe and effective medical devices are reaching the market in a timely manner.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS generally agreed with GAOs findings and noted that FDA has identified some of the same performance trends in its annual reports to Congress. HHS also called attention to the activities FDA has undertaken to improve the medical device review process. |
gao_GAO-03-313 | gao_GAO-03-313_0 | Therefore, lower interest rate assumptions result in higher current liability and lump-sum amounts. Interest Rate Should Reflect Group Annuity Purchase Rates
Our analysis of the law and related congressional documents, and discussions with PBGC and Treasury officials, indicates that the interest rates used in current liability and lump-sum calculations were to have two characteristics. They were to: (1) reflect group annuity purchase rates and (2) not be vulnerable to manipulation by interested parties. However, the Department of the Treasury stopped issuing new 30-year Treasury bonds in 2001. The 30-year Treasury bond rates that are currently used as an interest rate for pension calculations are published by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) based on rates for the last 30-year Treasury bonds, which were issued in February 2001. Alternative Interest Rates Have Advantages and Disadvantages Compared with Treasury Bond Rates
Actuaries and others have proposed a number of alternatives that could be used to control the selection of interest rates for current liability and lump-sum calculations, including (1) interest rates set in credit markets for various securities, such as long-term Treasury securities; long-term, high- quality corporate bonds; 30-year GSE bonds; and 30-year interest rate swaps; and (2) PBGC interest rate factors based on surveys of insurance company group annuity purchase rates. Several pension experts have suggested using 30-year Fannie Mae bond rates as the basis for the interest rate. However, if the alternative produces a lower interest rate, plan participants would receive larger lump sums, employers would need to increase contributions to their plans, and PBGC may experience an increase in revenue. Each alternative has characteristics that may make it more or less appropriate as an interest rate. If the Congress selects one of the market-based rates as the new mandatory rate, it should consider amending ERISA to require the cognizant regulatory agencies to (1) periodically evaluate the relationship between the rate and the group annuity purchase rates and report to the Congress and (2) provide comments about how any changes to the mandated interest rate they would recommend would likely affect federal revenue, employer pension contributions, plan funding levels, and participants’ lump-sum benefits. We also interviewed officials at the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and other policymakers who played a role in assessing alternative interest rates. To determine how alternative rates might affect employers, plan participants, and PBGC, we created hypothetical examples in which we tested the effect of changes in rate levels on current liabilities and lump- sum payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Employers with defined benefit plans have expressed concern that low interest rates were affecting the reasonableness of their pension calculations used to determine funding requirements under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires employers to use a variation of the 30-year Treasury bond rate for these calculations; however, in 2001 Treasury stopped issuing the 30-year bond. This report provides information on (1) what characteristics of an interest rate make it suitable for determining current liability and lump-sum amounts; (2) what alternatives to the current rate might be considered; and (3) how using an alternative rate might affect plan participants, employers, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
What GAO Found
GAO analysis indicates the Congress intended that the interest rates used in current liability and lump-sum calculations should reflect the interest rate underlying group annuity prices and not be vulnerable to manipulation by interested parties. In 1987, 30-year Treasury bond rates appeared to have both of these characteristics. However, the Department of the Treasury stopped issuing new 30-year Treasury bonds in 2001. Actuaries and other pension experts have proposed a number of alternative interest rates, including alternatives based on interest rates set in various credit markets--including composite rates for long-term Treasury securities, long-term high-quality corporate bond indices, 30-year rates on securities issued by government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae, 30-year interest rate swap rates--and PBGC interest rate factors based on surveys of insurance company group annuity purchase rates. Each alternative has attributes that may make it more or less suitable as an interest rate for the calculation of current liabilities, PBGC premiums, and lump-sum amounts. Additionally, the relationship of any interest rate to the underlying group annuity purchase rates may change over time and, unless the relationship is periodically evaluated, the Congress may be unable to appropriately respond to those changes. If the alternative interest rate selected to replace the current statutory rate immediately results in a higher interest rate level, which is likely, it would generally lower participant lump-sum amounts, lower minimum employer funding requirements, and reduce PBGC premium revenue. However, if the alternative interest rate produces a lower interest rate level, plan participants would generally receive larger lump sums, some employers would need to increase contributions to their plans, and PBGC may experience an increase in revenue. |
gao_GGD-97-32 | gao_GGD-97-32_0 | Variations in Scope or Coverage of Statutes in the Five Study States
According to the FBI, 37 of the 50 states have enacted legislation authorizing use of national fingerprint-based checks of criminal history records for purposes of checking applicants for paid or volunteer positions involving interaction with children. Even When National Fingerprint Checks Have Been Authorized, Few Volunteers Have Been Checked
Three of the five states (California, Tennessee, and Texas) have authority to request national checks of volunteers at nonprofit youth-serving organizations, such as the Boy Scouts of America and Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America. The officials commented that the fact that state statutes permit rather than require national fingerprint-based checks of volunteers may derive from concerns about the fees for such checks. Fees for Fingerprint Checks Varied, and Some States Have Not Calculated Their Actual Costs
A complete check of criminal history records has both FBI and state agency components. Voluntarism Apparently Not Affected by Background Check Laws and Related Fees, Although Concerns Exist
In the states we studied, because nonprofit youth-serving organizations had requested relatively few national fingerprint-based checks on volunteers, the applicable statutes and related fees do not appear to have negatively affected volunteerism. However, officials at the various nonprofit organizations we contacted were concerned about state and FBI fees. On balance, however, the officials said that the deterrent effect of national background checks was largely positive, that is, unsuitable applicants were being deterred from applying for child care-related positions. At that time, according to the FBI, a “small number” of other federal and state users will be selected to implement IAFIS capabilities on a trial basis, which would provide the FBI an opportunity to test the system in an operational environment before accepting all other users in July 1999. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
By letter dated January 3, 1996, the then-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Youth Violence, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, requested that we review certain implementation issues under the National Child Protection Act of 1993 (NCPA) (P.L. Also, what fees are charged for background checks of volunteers, and how do these fees compare with the actual costs in these states? What effects have these states’ laws and related fees had on volunteerism? Have selected state agencies and other organizations found national checks a useful screening tool? More specifically, for selected job or position categories in selected jurisdictions, how often have fingerprint-based background checks identified individuals with criminal histories? What is the status of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) being developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and what are the selected states’ plans for using the system when it becomes available? Department of Health and Human Services: —National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect Department of Justice: —Bureau of Justice Statistics —Criminal Division, Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section —FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services Division —Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law (Washington, DC) Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America (Philadelphia, PA) Boy Scouts of America (Irving, TX) National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations (Washington, DC) National Association of State Directors for Teacher Education and Certification (Seattle, WA) National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (Arlington, VA) National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse (Alexandria, VA) National Collaboration for Youth (Washington, DC) National Committee to Prevent Child Abuse (Chicago, IL) National Conference of State Legislatures (Denver, CO) SEARCH Group, Inc. (Sacramento, CA)
California public organizations (Sacramento): California Commission on Teacher Credentialing Department of Justice —Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information Department of Social Services —Adoptions Services Bureau —Community Care Licensing Division, Criminal Records Clearance Bureau Children’s Receiving Home of Sacramento Sacramento Court Appointed Special Advocate Program Sacramento Student Buddy Program Florida public organizations (Tallahassee): Bureau of Teacher Certification Commission on Community Service Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Division of Children and Family Services —District Two —Florida Abuse Registry Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Criminal Justice Information Systems Leon County School District American Red Cross, Capital Area Chapter (Tallahassee) Boy Scouts of America, South Florida Council (Miami) East Hill Baptist Church (Tallahassee) Florida Recreation and Park Association, Inc. (Tallahassee) Volunteer Center of Tallahassee, Sponsored by the United Way of the Big Bend (Tallahassee) (continued)
Tennessee public organizations (Nashville): Tennessee Bureau of Investigation —Information Systems Division —Records and Identification Unit Department of Human Services Boy Scouts of America, Middle Tennessee Council (Nashville) Buddies of Nashville (an affiliate of Big Brothers/Big Sisters) Volunteer Center of Nashville Texas public organizations (Austin): Department of Protective and Regulatory Services Texas Education Agency Department of Public Safety Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America (Austin) North Texas State Soccer Association (Carrollton) St. Elizabeth Ann Seton Catholic Church (Plano) Tejas Girl Scout Council, Inc. (Dallas) Volunteer Center of Dallas County (Dallas) YMCA of Metropolitan Dallas (Dallas)
Chesterfield County Public Schools (Chesterfield County) Department of Social Services (Richmond) —Child Abuse and Neglect Information Systems Division —Foster Care and Adoptions —Office of Volunteerism Department of State Police, Criminal Records Division (Richmond) Department of Youth and Family Services, Background Investigations Unit (Richmond) Henrico County Public Schools (Henrico County)
Scope and Methodology of Our Work Regarding States’ Statutes and Background Check Fees and Costs
To identify applicable legislation, we contacted the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, which is responsible for approving state statutes that authorize child care-related organizations to request national fingerprint-based background checks. Texas Statutes Authorizing National Fingerprint-Based Background Checks
All the child care-related provisions of Texas law permit rather than require national checks. The background checks are not part of a centralized credentialing process. Of this total, 137 (or 3.6 percent) resulted in identification of applicants with criminal records. Each state can decide the extent to which it wants to be “connected” to and compatible with IAFIS. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed certain implementation issues under the National Child Protection Act of 1993, focusing on: (1) the extent to which selected states have enacted statutes authorizing national background checks of child care providers, the fees charged for background checks of volunteers, and how these fees compare with the actual costs in these states; (2) the effects these states' laws and related fees had on volunteerism; (3) whether selected state agencies and other organizations found national background checks a useful screening tool, and how often fingerprint-based background checks identified individuals with criminal histories; and (4) the status of the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) being developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the selected states' plans for using the system when it becomes available.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although there are considerable differences in scope or coverage, each of the five study states has enacted statutes authorizing national fingerprint-based background checks regarding paid and, or volunteer positions at various types of child care-related organizations; (2) three of the five states, California, Tennessee, and Texas, have authority to request national checks of volunteers at nonprofit youth-serving organizations; (3) however, these states do not require that national checks be done, and few checks have been requested; (4) a complete check of criminal history records has both FBI and state agency components; (5) the FBI's fee for national fingerprint-based background checks of volunteer applicants is $18; (6) the FBI projected that its costs for a national check would average $18 in 1996; (7) state laws and related fees did not appear to have negatively affected volunteerism at the various nonprofit youth-serving organizations GAO contacted, since applicable statutes permitted rather than required fingerprint-based background checks, and few had been requested; (8) officials at the various organizations GAO contacted said that national checks are or could be a useful tool that should supplement rather than supplant other important screening practices; (9) these officials told GAO that they believe the prospect of being subjected to a national background check deters an indeterminate but significant number of individuals with unacceptable criminal histories from even applying for certain positions; (10) for selected job positions, organizations, or local jurisdictions in the five study states, GAO found that national checks detected some applicants with criminal histories who may not have been detected by less comprehensive practices, including state background checks; (11) according to the FBI, in October 1998 IAFIS is scheduled to be available to a few selected states, for the purposes of conducting national fingerprint checks of applicants, with all other states that have appropriate technology coming online by July 1999; and (12) once IAFIS is fully implemented, the FBI expects that the processing time for national fingerprint checks will be reduced from 7 weeks (not including mailing time) under current processes to about 24 hours. |
gao_AIMD-98-85 | gao_AIMD-98-85_0 | The Government and the Nation Face High Risk of Service Disruption Due to the Year 2000 Problem
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. The many interdependencies that exist among governments and within key economic sectors could cause a single failure to have adverse repercussions. While managers in the government and the private sector are taking many actions to mitigate these risks, a significant amount of work remains, and time frames are unrelenting. As discussed below, some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Growing Concern Led to Increased Federal Role
As the Year 2000 has grown nearer and the scope of the problem has become clearer, the federal government’s response to the crisis has grown as well. At the urging of congressional leaders and others, OMB and the federal agencies have dramatically increased the amount of attention and oversight given to this issue in the last year. Moreover, last month the President issued an executive order establishing a President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion and recognizing the national and international aspects of the problem. Accordingly, it is critical that the Executive Branch identify those systems that are of the highest priority. Recommendations
To more effectively oversee the activities of federal agencies to address the Year 2000 crisis, we recommend that the Chairman of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion establish governmentwide priorities, and ensure that agencies set agencywide priorities, for the most mission-critical business processes and supporting systems, using criteria such as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; for the selected priorities, designate a lead agency to be responsible for ensuring that end-to-end operational testing of these processes and supporting systems occurs across organizational boundaries, and that independent verification and validation of such testing has been performed; identify all federal agencies beyond the departments and agencies currently reporting that are central to the success of Year 2000 readiness and require them to provide regular reports to OMB; require, as part of the quarterly reporting requirement, agencies to report to OMB on their progress in implementing systems intended to replace noncompliant systems; identify and publicize expectations on the key activities that should be accomplished for each of the assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation phases, and direct agencies to adhere to these expectations in reporting on the status of their programs; require agencies to develop contingency plans for all critical core business require agencies to develop an independent verification strategy to involve inspectors general or other independent organizations in reviewing agency Year 2000 progress, to include (1) assessing whether the agency has developed and is implementing a comprehensive and effective Year 2000 program, (2) providing an independent assessment of the agency’s quarterly report to OMB, (3) assessing whether the agency has a reasonable and comprehensive testing approach, and (4) assessing the completeness and reasonableness of the agency’s business continuity and contingency planning; ensure that agencies participate in the CIO Council’s Year 2000 Committee and that the CIO Council’s Year 2000 Committee subcommittees establish and publicize plans, milestones, and enforcement mechanisms; and develop a personnel strategy which includes (1) determining the need for various information specialists, (2) identifying any administrative or statutory changes that would be required to waive reemployment penalties for former federal employees, and (3) identifying ways to retain key Year 2000 staff in agencies through the turn of the century. To describe the evolution of the federal government’s Year 2000 strategy and identify additional actions that can be taken to prepare the nation for the Year 2000, we evaluated the Year 2000 efforts of OMB and of the CIO Council, including reviewing OMB’s quarterly reports and other documents. It is available upon request. Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid Disruption of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the year 2000 computing crisis facing the nation, focusing on: (1) the year 2000 risks facing the government and nation; (2) the evolution of the federal government's year 2000 strategy; and (3) additional actions that can be taken by the Executive Branch to prepare the nation for the year 2000.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while progress has been made in addressing the federal government's year 2000 readiness, serious vulnerabilities remain; (2) many agencies are behind schedule; (3) at the current pace, it is clear that not all mission-critical systems will be fixed in time; (4) much more action is needed to ensure that federal agencies satisfactorily mitigate year 2000 risks to avoid debilitating consequences; (5) vital economic sectors of the nation likewise remain vulnerable to problems that the change of century will bring; (6) moreover, a high degree of information and systems interdependence exists among various levels of government and the private sector in each of these sectors; (7) these interdependencies increase the risk that a cascading wave of failures or interruptions of essential services could occur; (8) as the change of century grows closer and the breadth of year 2000 work that remains has become known, the federal government's response to the crisis has increased; (9) originally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) expressed a high degree of confidence about the federal government's ability to meet the year 2000 deadline; (10) more recently, as many agencies have reported their limited progress in solving the year 2000 problem, OMB has become increasingly concerned; (11) accordingly, at the urging of key congressional leaders, OMB has improved its response to the crisis by issuing much needed policies and increasing its monitoring of agencies; (12) most encouraging is the President's recent announcement of the establishment of a President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion to oversee federal efforts and promote public/private relationships; and (13) the establishment of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion provides an opportunity for the Executive Branch to take further key implementation steps to avert disruptions to critical services. |
gao_GAO-01-784 | gao_GAO-01-784_0 | Information on the issues being addressed by the Joint Staff can be found in appendix V.
Observations
The NATO alliance succeeded in achieving the goals of Operation Allied Force–Yugoslavian forces were removed from Kosovo, refugees returned, and a peacekeeping force was put in place, with no allied combat fatalities. Through it all, the NATO allies stayed united and learned much about working together as a combat force. These achievements, though, did not come easily, and the departures from accepted U.S. military doctrine that we described in this report were troubling for many U.S. military commanders and planners involved in the operation. The challenges of dealing with the constraints of working within a multinational environment may not be completely resolved through the development of new joint multinational operations doctrine and revisions to joint and service doctrine. These revisions to doctrine will likely not be able to provide conclusive solutions to these issues because each multinational operation will differ according to the nations that participate and the extent of their interests. Future multinational operations, particularly those where vital interests are not at stake, will likely continue to emphasize avoiding collateral damage and multinational force casualties. These concerns will likely weigh as heavily in the decision-making process as achieving the military objectives, and therefore, military commanders of multinational operations should not expect to always apply decisive military force with a strict adherence to military doctrine. As a result, to balance the variety of interests and concerns that arise during multinational operations, these operations may not be conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations that more closely follow U.S. military doctrine, which may lead to higher costs. | What GAO Found
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance achieved the goals of Operation Allied Force--Yugoslavian forces were removed from Kosovo; refugees returned; and a peacekeeping force was put in place, with no allied combat fatalities. Through it all, the NATO allies stayed united and learned much about working together as a combat force. These achievements did not come easily, however, and the departures from accepted U.S. military doctrine were troubling for many U.S. military commanders and planners. The Department of Defense (DOD) has tried to address these and other issues by changing its doctrine. Nevertheless, GAO has two observations on the nature of conducting military operations in a multinational environment. First, the challenges of dealing with the constraints of working within a multinational environment may not be completely resolved through the development of new joint multinational operations doctrine and revisions to joint and service doctrine. These revisions to doctrine are likely to be unable to provide conclusive solutions to these issues because each multinational operation will differ according to the nations that participate and the extent of their interests. Second, future multinational operations, particularly those in which vital interests are not at stake, are likely to continue to emphasize avoiding collateral damage and multinational force casualties. These concerns will weigh as heavily in the decision-making processes on achieving the military objectives. Therefore, military commanders of multinational operations should not expect to always apply decisive military force with a strict adherence to military doctrine. To balance the variety of interests and concerns that arise during multinational operations, these operations may not be conducted as effectively or efficiently as operations that more closely follow U.S. military doctrine, which may lead to higher costs. |
gao_GAO-03-1166T | gao_GAO-03-1166T_0 | GPRA Provides a Foundation for Results-Oriented Management
GPRA, which was enacted 10 years ago, provides a foundation for examining agency missions, performance goals and objectives, and results. While this building effort is far from complete, it has helped create a governmentwide focus on results by establishing a statutory framework for performance management and accountability. The necessary infrastructure has been built to generate meaningful performance information. For example, through the strategic planning requirement, GPRA has required federal agencies to consult with the Congress and key stakeholders to reassess their missions and long-term goals as well as the strategies and resources they will need to achieve their goals. It also has required agencies to articulate goals for the upcoming fiscal year that are aligned with their long-term strategic goals. Finally, agencies are required to report annually on their progress in achieving their annual performance goals. Therefore, information is available about current missions, goals, and results. The report will be available next month. We are now moving to a more difficult but more important phase of GPRA implementation, that is, using results-oriented performance information as a routine part of agencies’ day-to-day management, and congressional and executive branch decision making. However, much work remains before this framework is effectively implemented across the government, including (1) transforming agencies’ organizational cultures to improve decision making and strengthen performance and accountability, (2) developing meaningful, outcome- oriented performance goals and measures and collecting useful performance data, (3) addressing widespread mission fragmentation and overlap, and (4) using performance information in allocating resources. In addition, we have reported that high-performing organizations seek to shift the focus of management and accountability from activities and processes to contributions and achieving results. Linking planned performance with budget requests and financial reports is an essential step in building a culture of performance management. Such an alignment infuses performance concerns into budgetary deliberations, prompting agencies to reassess their performance goals and strategies and to more clearly understand the cost of performance. Credible outcome-based performance information is absolutely critical to fostering the kind of debate that is needed. Concluding Remarks
In view of the broad trends and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, there is a need to consider how the Congress, OMB, and executive agencies can make better use of GPRA’s planning and accountability framework to maximize the performance of not only individual programs and agencies but also the federal government as whole in addressing these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress asked GAO to discuss the Government Performance and Results Act's (GPRA) success in shifting the focus of government operations from process to results and to evaluate the extent to which agency managers have embraced GPRA as a management tool. Further, Congress was interested in any recommendations GAO may have to improve the effectiveness of GPRA. GAO is conducting a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of GPRA since its enactment, including updating the results of our federal managers survey. The results of this review will be available next month.
What GAO Found
GPRA, which was enacted in 1993, provides a foundation for examining agency missions, performance goals and objectives, and results. While this building effort is far from complete, it has helped create a government-wide focus on results by establishing a statutory framework for management and accountability. This framework can improve the performance and accountability of the executive branch and enhance executive branch and congressional decisionmaking. In view of the broad trends and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, there is a need to consider how the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and executive agencies can make better use of GPRA's planning and accountability framework to maximize the performance of not only individual programs and agencies, but also of the federal government as whole in addressing these challenges. The necessary infrastructure has been built to generate meaningful performance information. For example, through the strategic planning requirement, GPRA has required federal agencies to consult with the Congress and key stakeholders to reassess their missions and long-term goals as well as the strategies and resources they will need to achieve their goals. It also has required agencies to articulate goals for the upcoming fiscal year that are aligned with their long-term strategic goals. Finally, agencies are required to report annually on their progress in achieving their annual performance goals. Therefore, information is available about current missions, goals, and results. We are now moving to a more difficult but more important phase of GPRA implementation, that is, using results-oriented performance information as a part of agencies' day-to-day management, and congressional and executive branch decision-making. However, much work remains before this framework is effectively implemented across the government, including (1) transforming agencies' organizational cultures to improve decisionmaking and strengthen performance and accountability, (2) developing meaningful, outcome-oriented performance goals and measures and collecting useful performance data, and (3) addressing widespread mission fragmentation and overlap. Furthermore, linking planned performance with budget requests and financial reports is an essential step in building a culture of performance management. Such an alignment can help to infuse performance concerns into budgetary deliberations. However, credible outcome-based performance information is critical to foster the kind of debate that is needed. |
gao_NSIAD-95-112 | gao_NSIAD-95-112_0 | Restructuring Continues Risks
The Army’s restructuring of the Comanche program continues risks (1) associated with making production decisions before knowing whether the aircraft will be able to perform as required and (2) of higher program costs. Under the Army’s restructured program, operational testing will not begin until after the low-rate initial production decision is made, continuing the risks associated with the highly concurrent Comanche program. Because the restructure has provided the additional time and aircraft, the Army has an opportunity to significantly reduce or eliminate program concurrency and its associated risks by completing operational testing before committing funds to any production decisions. However, in reviewing the Army’s restructure proposal, DOD noted some concern over Comanche program costs for fiscal year 2002 and beyond and the large increase in investment programs projected to occur about that time. If the Comanche does not meet this requirement, estimated operating and support costs for the Comanche will be higher than previously predicted. Some Program Goals Are Currently Being Met
Although the program is experiencing technical problems, it is currently meeting its goals of reducing maintenance levels and keeping overall weight growth within acceptable limits for the Comanche. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Army's Comanche helicopter program, focusing on cost and technical issues associated with the restructured program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the past risks associated with the Comanche's development and production will continue under the Army's restructured program; (2) production decisions will be made before operational testing of the Comanche begins and the development phase will be extended beyond fiscal year 2002; (3) the acquisition of six additional aircraft will allow the Army to conduct operational testing before committing funds to any further production decisions; (4) the Comanche's unit costs have tripled in the last 10 years due to program restructuring and a 74-percent decrease in procurement quantities; (5) the Comanche may not meet its wartime availability and operating cost requirements due to technical problems; and (6) the Comanche program is currently meeting its maintenance requirements and weight growth limits. |
gao_GAO-03-568 | gao_GAO-03-568_0 | Whereas students were more likely to complete a bachelor’s degree within 6 years if, among other things, they had a more rigorous curriculum in high school, attended college full-time, were continuously enrolled, worked less than 20 hours per week, or did not transfer. After controlling for other factors, we found that disadvantaged students were no less likely to complete a bachelor’s degree than other students. For various reasons, not all students who enroll in college will ultimately attain a degree. Students who worked 20 or more hours per week were less likely to complete a bachelor’s degree than students who did not work. However, as we have noted, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to attend college in the first place. Educating students and parents about college. State Efforts to Help Colleges Improve Their Performance in Retaining and Graduating Students
Many states reported efforts to improve the performance of colleges in the areas of retaining and graduating their students. Education Has Identified Priorities for Increasing College Completion and Strengthening Accountability of Institutions
In its 2002-2007 strategic plan, Education has established goals of reducing the gaps in college participation and completion among certain student populations and increasing completion rates overall. While some states have used graduation rates to promote accountability, such measures may not fully reflect an institution’s performance. Education does have some efforts to evaluate and disseminate information related to retention and completion; however, it does not systematically identify and disseminate information on those practices that hold promise for increasing retention and graduation rates across all sectors of higher education. Other contacts and acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
You asked us to determine (1) the extent to which students—including those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds—who enroll in a 4-year college or university complete a bachelor’s degree and the factors that affect bachelor’s degree completion; (2) what states and 4-year colleges and universities are doing to foster bachelor’s degree completion and what is known about the effectiveness of these efforts; and (3) what the U.S. Department of Education is doing to foster bachelor’s degree completion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because of concerns that not enough students who start college are completing a bachelor's degree, we examined (1) the extent to which students who enroll in a 4-year college complete a bachelor's degree and identify the factors that affect completion; (2) what states and 4-year colleges and universities are doing to foster bachelor's degree completion; and (3) what the Department of Education (Education) is doing to foster degree completion.
What GAO Found
More than half of all students who enrolled in a 4-year college completed a bachelor's degree within 6 years. Students were less likely to complete if neither parent had completed a degree, they were black, they worked 20 or more hours per week, or they transferred to another college. Students had a greater likelihood of completing if they were continuously enrolled, attended full-time, or had more rigorous high school curriculum. After controlling for other factors, GAO found that disadvantaged students were no less likely to complete a degree than other students. However, students from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to attend college in the first place. States are beginning to hold colleges accountable for retaining and graduating their students, and Education has been discussing this with the higher education community. Many states are publishing retention and graduation rates for their colleges, and some have tied performance in these areas to funding. According to Education, providing information on colleges' retention and graduation performance can help prospective students make informed decisions. However, the measure used by Education may not fully reflect an institution's performance because institutional goals and missions are not captured in the measure. In its strategic plan, Education has identified goals to reduce gaps in college completion and increase overall completion. It also has some evaluation and dissemination efforts related to retention and completion, however, these efforts do not systematically identify and disseminate promising retention and graduation practices to help states and institutions. |
gao_GAO-16-431T | gao_GAO-16-431T_0 | USCIS Had Taken Some Steps to Assess and Address Fraud Risks, but Regular Risk Assessments and Additional Controls Could Improve Fraud Prevention and Detection
USCIS and Others Had Identified Unique Fraud Risks to the EB-5 Program and Could Benefit from Planning and Conducting Regular Future Risk Assessments
In August 2015, we reported that USCIS had identified fraud and national security risks in the EB-5 Program in various assessments it conducted over time and in collaboration with its interagency partners. For example, in 2012, USCIS met with interagency partners and National Security Staff to assess fraud and national security risks in the EB-5 Program. Although the risk assessments conducted by USCIS and other agencies have helped provide information to USCIS to better understand and manage risks to the EB-5 Program, these assessments were onetime exercises, and, as we reported in August 2015, USCIS did not have documented plans to conduct regular future risk assessments of the program because, according to USCIS officials, the agency would perform them on an “as needed” basis. Given these identified fraud risks, and the constantly evolving nature of risks to the program, we recommended in our August 2015 report that USCIS plan and conduct regular fraud risk assessments of the EB-5 Program to better position it to identify, address, and mitigate emerging fraud risks to the program. In February 2016, USCIS officials stated that they had completed the data collection for their first review, which they estimated completing by September 2016. Specifically, we found that USCIS’s information systems and processes limit its ability to collect and use data on the EB-5 Program to identify fraud related to individual investors or investments or to determine any fraud risk trends across the program. USCIS officials stated that the agency will be able to collect and maintain more complete data on EB-5 Program petitioners and applicants through the deployment of electronic forms in its new system, the Electronic Immigration System (ELIS). Given that information system improvements with the potential to expand USCIS’s fraud mitigation efforts will not take effect until 2017 at the earliest and that gaps exist in USCIS’s other information collection efforts, we concluded that collecting additional information would better position USCIS to identify and mitigate potential fraud. DHS concurred and, as of February 2016, officials reported that USCIS continues to take steps to develop and implement a strategy to expand information collection that includes revisions to the Form I-924, I-924A, I-526, and I-829 applications and petitions to capture more information. USCIS Had Increased Capacity for Verifying Job Creation but Did Not Use a Valid and Reliable Methodology for Reporting Program Outcomes and Economic Benefits
USCIS Strengthened Its Workforce, Guidance, Training, and Process for Verifying Job Creation
We reported in August 2015 that USCIS had taken action to increase its capacity to verify job creation in response to past GAO and DHS OIG reports that found that USCIS did not have staff with the expertise to verify job creation estimates and that the agency’s methodologies for verifying such estimates were not rigorous. USCIS’s May 2013 policy memorandum notes that Congress expressly provided for a reduced investment amount in a rural area or an area of high unemployment in order to spur immigrants to invest in new commercial enterprises that are principally doing business in—and creating jobs in—areas of greatest need. USCIS Did Not Have a Valid and Reliable Methodology for Reporting Program Outcomes and Economic Benefits
In August 2015, we reported that USCIS’s methodology for reporting EB-5 Program outcomes and economic benefits was not valid and reliable because it is based on the minimum program requirements for job creation and investment. For example, USCIS officials stated that 90 percent of immigrant investors reported creating more than the 10-job minimum, and 10 percent of immigrant investors pay $1 million instead of $500,000 because they invest in projects outside of a targeted employment area. However, USCIS officials said that they reported EB-5 Program outcomes using minimum program requirements because these are the required economic benefits stated in law, and that they are not statutorily required to develop a more comprehensive assessment of program benefits. We therefore recommended in our August 2015 report that USCIS track and report data that immigrant investors report, and the agency verifies on its program forms for total investments and jobs created through the EB-5 Program. DHS concurred and, as of February 2016, officials anticipated developing a data system that will enable USCIS to track and report data immigrant investors report in fiscal year 2017. Other contributors to the report on which this statement is based are listed in the report. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created the EB-5 visa category to promote job creation by immigrant investors in exchange for visas providing lawful permanent residency. Participants are required to invest $1 million in a business that is to create at least 10 jobs—or $500,000 for businesses located in an area that is rural or has experienced unemployment of at least 150 percent of the national average rate. Upon meeting program requirements, immigrant investors are eligible for conditional status to live and work in the United States and can apply to remove the conditions for lawful permanent residency after 2 years.
This statement discusses USCIS efforts under the EB-5 Program to (1) work with interagency partners to assess fraud and other related risks and address identified fraud risks, and (2) increase its capacity to verify job creation and use a valid and reliable methodology to report economic benefits. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in August 2015 ( GAO-15-696 ), with selected updates conducted in February 2016 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address the report's recommendations.
What GAO Found
In August 2015, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which administers the Employment-Based Fifth Preference Immigrant Investor Program (EB-5 Program), had collaborated with its interagency partners to assess fraud and national security risks in the program in fiscal years 2012 and 2015. These assessments were onetime efforts; however, USCIS officials noted that fraud risks in the EB-5 Program are constantly evolving, and they continually identify new fraud schemes. USCIS did not have documented plans to conduct regular future risk assessments which could help inform efforts to identify and address evolving program risks. GAO recommended that USCIS plan and conduct regular future fraud risks assessments. DHS agreed, and as of February 2016, USCIS officials stated that they planned to complete an additional risk assessment by September 2016 and a minimum of one annually thereafter. GAO also reported in August 2015 that USCIS had taken steps to address the fraud risks it identified by enhancing its fraud risk management efforts; however, USCIS's information systems and processes limited its ability to collect and use data on EB-5 Program participants to address fraud risks in the program. For example, USCIS did not consistently enter some information it collected on participants in its information systems, such as name and date of birth, and this presented barriers to conducting basic electronic searches that could be analyzed for potential fraud. USCIS planned to collect and maintain more complete data in its new information system; however, the information system improvements with the potential to expand USCIS's fraud mitigation efforts were not to take effect until 2017 at the earliest. Given this time frame and gaps in USCIS's other information collection efforts, GAO recommended that USCIS develop a strategy to expand information collection in order to better position the agency to identify and mitigate potential fraud. DHS concurred, and in February 2016 USCIS officials stated that USCIS plans to develop such a strategy by the end of fiscal year 2016.
In August 2015, GAO reported that USCIS had increased its capacity to verify job creation by increasing the size and expertise of its workforce, among other actions. However, USCIS's methodology for reporting program outcomes and overall economic benefits was not valid and reliable because it may understate or overstate program benefits in certain instances as it is based on the minimum program requirements of 10 jobs and a $500,000 investment per investor instead of the number of jobs and investment amounts collected by USCIS on individual EB-5 Program forms. For example, total investment amounts are not adjusted downward to account for investors who do not complete the program or upward for investments of $1 million instead of $500,000. USCIS officials said they are not statutorily required to develop a more comprehensive assessment. However, tracking and analyzing data on jobs and investments reported on program forms would better position USCIS to more reliably assess and report on the EB-5 Program economic benefits. Accordingly, GAO recommended that USCIS track and report data that investors report and the agency verifies on its program forms for total investments and jobs created through the EB-5 Program. DHS agreed and plans to implement this recommendation by the end of fiscal year 2017.
What GAO Recommends
In its August 2015 report, GAO recommended that USCIS, among other things, conduct regular future risk assessments, develop a strategy to expand information collection, and analyze data collected on program forms to reliably report on economic benefits. DHS concurred with the recommendations and reported actions underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-313 | gao_GAO-14-313_0 | According to a February 2013 DOD report to Congress on government-owned housing for unaccompanied personnel, from fiscal years 1996 through 2012, DOD spent over $20 billion of military construction funds to build and modernize on-installation housing for unaccompanied personnel. The Navy expects to complete this initiative by fiscal year 2016 utilizing both privatization and military construction authorities. Each of the Services Conducted Analyses and Considered Other Factors in Determining Whether to Privatize Housing for Unaccompanied Personnel
From 1997 to 2011, the services conducted several analyses of the costs and suitability of privatization as a financing method for their housing needs for unaccompanied personnel. The Air Force and Marine Corps concluded that privatization was not desirable for housing their unaccompanied personnel. These analyses used different scenarios and data gathered from multiple locations. The Air Force and Marine Corps Analyzed the Feasibility of Privatizing Housing for Unaccompanied Personnel at Selected Installations
The Air Force and Marine Corps analyses of whether to privatize unaccompanied personnel housing reviewed privatization at a few selected locations. Further, the study concluded that since privatization of housing for unaccompanied personnel was suitable only for certain locations, it could be used only to augment traditional military construction funding, not to replace it. Other Factors Influenced the Services’ Decisions Regarding Privatizing Housing for Unaccompanied Personnel
In addition to the three issues of OMB scoring, the life-cycle cost of government construction and operation of housing versus that of privatized construction and operation of housing, and unit integrity, the services’ analyses and our interviews with service officials identified three other factors that influenced the services’ decisions about whether to privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel:
BAH: Most junior unaccompanied personnel without dependents are not eligible to receive a housing allowance (and, in the case of junior shipboard sailors, are not entitled by law to receive a BAH). Without the assurance of a steady stream of income from the BAH, which junior unaccompanied personnel could use to pay rent for privatized housing, private-sector developers would likely be unwilling to participate in privatized housing projects, the Army’s 2005 Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Privatization Task Force Study concluded. The frequency or duration of unit deployments: With privatized family housing, the frequency of deployments of the servicemember generally does not affect the rent received because the servicemember’s family remains behind and maintains the leased property. Status of Military Services’ Projects to Privatize Housing for Unaccompanied Personnel
Between 1996 and 2013, the Army and the Navy implemented seven privatized unaccompanied personnel housing projects. As stated previously in this report, both the Army and Navy have also used military construction funding to upgrade and renovate their housing for unaccompanied personnel The Air Force and the Marine Corps have not used the privatization authorities, and are instead using military construction funds to improve the quality of their unaccompanied personnel housing. Air Force housing officials told us that the Air Force unaccompanied personnel housing inventory generally meets current housing needs. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps intends to eliminate existing housing deficiencies by demolishing inadequate unaccompanied personnel housing, and using military construction funds to replace or renovate such housing by the end of fiscal year 2014. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense and military-service housing officials, none of the services have plans to pursue any future privatized housing projects for unaccompanied personnel. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. Military Housing: Continued Concerns in Implementing the Privatization Initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Partly in response to concerns that inadequate housing might be contributing to servicemembers' decisions to leave the military, Congress enacted the MHPI in 1996. The initiative gave the Department of Defense (DOD) legal authorities to replace or renovate inadequate housing for unaccompanied military personnel (those without dependents) and military families using private-sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance. Certain military personnel receive the BAH, which can be used to pay rent to live in privatized housing. Since 1996, DOD has built and modernized on-installation unaccompanied personnel housing using military construction funds. According to a February 2013 DOD report to Congress, from fiscal years 1996 through 2012, DOD spent over $20 billion of military construction funds to build and modernize on-installation housing for unaccompanied military personnel.
GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to privatize unaccompanied housing. GAO discusses the (1) analyses the military services conducted to make decisions about privatizing housing for unaccompanied personnel and (2) status of housing projects the military services have privatized for unaccompanied personnel. GAO obtained and reviewed fiscal years 1996-2013 housing plans and analyses the services conducted, reviewed information on privatization projects, and interviewed DOD and service officials.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Since Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) in 1996, the military services conducted several analyses and considered other factors to determine whether to privatize housing for unaccompanied personnel. These analyses were conducted between 1997 and 2011. The Army's and the Navy's analyses compared different scenarios--such as whether to rely on privatization or use traditional military construction funding to improve housing quality--and considered information from multiple installations in these analyses. In contrast, the Air Force and Marine Corps analyzed the feasibility of privatizing unaccompanied housing at a few selected installations. For example, the Air Force based its initial analysis on information for two locations, while the Marine Corps based its 2008 analysis on information specific to one installation. The Navy and Army concluded that privatization could be used under a narrow set of circumstances at specific installations, such as where unaccompanied servicemembers were already receiving the basic allowance for housing (BAH). The Air Force and Marine Corps concluded that privatization was not suitable for meeting any of their housing needs. For example, an April 2000 Air Force memorandum indicated that privatization could have a negative effect on building unit cohesion. Other factors also played a role in the four services' decisions about whether to privatize housing, including (1) the limited availability of the BAH for junior unaccompanied personnel, which may result in not having a dedicated stream of income to pay rent for privatized housing; (2) the frequency or duration of unit deployments, which could affect the occupancy rates of unaccompanied housing; and (3) uncertainty about the future size of the military, and whether there would be sufficient demand for privatized housing.
Between 1996 and 2013, the Army and Navy implemented seven privatized unaccompanied personnel housing projects. The Air Force and Marine Corps have not used the privatization authorities, and are instead using military construction funds to improve the quality of their unaccompanied personnel housing. Air Force housing officials told us that Air Force unaccompanied personnel housing inventory generally meets current housing needs. According to Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps intends to eliminate existing housing deficiencies by demolishing inadequate unaccompanied personnel housing and using military construction funds to replace or renovate housing by the end of fiscal year 2014. According to Office of the Secretary of Defense and military service housing officials, none of the services have plans to pursue any future privatized housing projects for unaccompanied personnel.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-895T | gao_GAO-09-895T_0 | VA and DOD Are Required by Law to Establish an Interagency Program Office and Achieve Full Interoperability
As previously noted, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 called for VA and DOD to jointly develop and implement fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities by September 30, 2009, and established an interagency program office to be accountable for the departments’ efforts in this regard. The departments have been working to set up this office since April 2008. However, more work is needed to solidify its leadership and management capabilities if the office is to effectively function as a single point of accountability for achieving interoperable electronic health data. In particular, the departments have completed personnel descriptions and recruited and hired staff for government positions and obtained necessary contractor staff to perform the office’s functions. Nonetheless, VA and DOD continue to fill the office’s key leadership positions—that of director and deputy director—on an interim basis. For example, it submitted its first annual report to Congress that summarized the departments’ efforts toward achieving full interoperability and the status of key activities completed to set up the office. Further, the interagency program office charter identified the development of metrics to monitor the departments’ performance against interoperability objectives as a responsibility of the office. In this regard, the departments have achieved planned capabilities for three of the objectives—refine social history data, share physical exam data, and demonstrate initial network gateway operation. For the remaining three objectives—expand questionnaires and self assessment tools, expand Essentris in DOD, and demonstrate initial document scanning—the departments have partially achieved planned capabilities, with additional work needed to fully meet clinicians’ needs. In conclusion, VA and DOD have continued to increase electronic health information interoperability, and have taken steps to meet the six objectives that they identified as necessary to achieve full interoperability by September 30, 2009. To better improve the management of VA’s and DOD’s efforts to achieve fully interoperable electronic health record systems, our draft report recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs emphasize the interagency program office’s establishment of a project plan and a complete and detailed integrated master schedule. | Why GAO Did This Study
For over a decade, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have been working on initiatives to share electronic health information. To expedite their efforts, Congress mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that VA and DOD establish a joint interagency program office to act as a single point of accountability in the development of electronic health records systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data) by September 30, 2009. In this statement, GAO summarizes findings from its upcoming report, focusing on progress in setting up the interagency program office and the departments' actions to achieve fully interoperable capabilities by September 30, 2009. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documentation on project status and conducted interviews with agency officials.
What GAO Found
VA and DOD have made progress in setting up the interagency program office; however, the office is not yet effectively positioned to be accountable for the departments' efforts to achieve fully interoperable electronic health record systems or capabilities. The departments have taken the important steps of completing personnel descriptions and hiring necessary staff to perform the office's functions, but key leadership positions (for the Director and Deputy Director) continue to be filled on an interim basis. In addition, the office has established a charter and begun to demonstrate responsibilities outlined within this document. Nonetheless, the office is not yet fulfilling key information technology management responsibilities in the areas of performance measurement, project planning, and scheduling--all of which are essential to establishing the office as a single point of accountability for the departments' interoperability efforts. VA and DOD continue to take steps toward achieving full interoperability by the September deadline. In this regard, the departments have achieved planned capabilities for three of six interoperability objectives (see table) that they identified to meet their data sharing needs--refine social history data, share physical exam data, and demonstrate initial network gateway operation. For the remaining three objectives--expand questionnaires and self assessment tools, expand DOD inpatient medical records system, and demonstrate initial document scanning--the departments have partially achieved planned capabilities, with additional work needed to fully meet clinicians' needs for health information. |
gao_GAO-15-724 | gao_GAO-15-724_0 | According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, if ASEAN countries were a single nation, their collective 2014 GDP would represent the seventh largest economy in the world. Goals for Southeast Asia
In late 2011, the President announced that the United States would rebalance its worldwide engagement to include a greater focus on the Asia-Pacific region. China Has Surpassed the United States in Trade in Goods with ASEAN Countries and Trades a Similar Amount of Services, but U.S. Investment Exceeds China’s
Chinese trade in goods with ASEAN countries has grown rapidly since 2001, surpassing U.S. trade in goods since 2007. China’s Total Trade in Goods with ASEAN Countries Surpassed the United States’ in 2007, but Neither Predominates in the Region
Chinese trade in goods with ASEAN countries has surpassed U.S. trade in goods and has grown as a share of China’s total trade in goods, while U.S. trade in goods with ASEAN countries has declined as a share of total U.S. trade in goods. Chinese Goods Trade with ASEAN Countries Has Grown More Rapidly Than U.S. Goods Trade
In 2014, China’s total goods trade with ASEAN countries was more than double that of the United States: $480 billion for China and $220 billion for the United States. However, available data show that from 2007 through 2012, U.S. FDI flows to ASEAN countries totaled about $96 billion, exceeding China’s reported FDI of about $23 billion. The United States and China Engage with ASEAN Countries through Trade Agreements, Support for Firms, and Support for Regional Integration
To further economic engagement with ASEAN countries, the United States and China each have entered into existing trade agreements and are parties to ongoing negotiations. China supports regional economic development and integration through capacity building and has provided billions of dollars for infrastructure development. The United States and China Have Existing and Proposed FTAs with ASEAN Countries
The United States has an FTA with Singapore, while China has free trade and investment agreements with all 10 ASEAN countries as well as a separate FTA with Singapore. China is party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations, which include all ASEAN countries. Unlike the U.S.-Singapore FTA, China’s FTAs with ASEAN and Singapore do not address issues such as protection of intellectual property rights and labor rights. The United States Has Provided More Than $6 Billion in Financing for Exports to, and Investments in, ASEAN Countries since Fiscal Year 2009
According to our analysis of U.S. agency data, from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the United States provided more than $6 billion in financing to support U.S. exports to, and investment in, ASEAN countries (see table 5). No data are publicly available on China Ex-Im financing for specific countries in Southeast Asia. China has promised billions of dollars for infrastructure investment through new funds and multilateral institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. Our objectives were to examine (1) what available data indicate about U.S. and Chinese trade and investment with the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) countries and (2) what actions the U.S. and Chinese governments have taken to further economic engagement with these countries. We also interviewed U.S. officials in Indonesia and Vietnam, officials from private sector business associations, and experts from think tanks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Both the United States and China seek to deepen their economic engagement with the 10 ASEAN members: Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN countries are seeking to further integrate their economies and create an economic community by the end of 2015. According to International Monetary Fund data, if ASEAN countries were a single nation, their collective 2014 GDP would represent the seventh largest economy in the world. In 2011, the President announced a renewed focus—known as the rebalance—on the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development prepared a 5-year strategy for the rebalance.
GAO was asked to examine the United States' and China's economic engagement in the region. This report examines (1) what available data indicate about U.S. and Chinese trade and investment with ASEAN countries and (2) what actions the U.S. and Chinese governments have taken to further economic engagement with these countries. GAO analyzed publicly available economic data and Chinese government documents and reviewed documentation from 10 U.S. agencies. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials and private sector representatives.
Technical comments on a draft of this report from several agencies were incorporated by GAO where appropriate. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
China has surpassed the United States in goods trade with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and trades a similar amount of services, but U.S. investment exceeds reported Chinese investment. China surpassed the United States in goods trade with ASEAN countries in 2007. In 2014, China's total goods trade of $480 billion was more than twice the U.S. total goods trade of $220 billion. Although China is their largest outside trading partner, ASEAN countries trade more with each other. Limited available data indicate that in 2011, the United States and China each traded about $37 billion in services with ASEAN countries. From 2007 through 2012, U.S. foreign direct investment flows to ASEAN countries of $96 billion exceeded China's reported $23 billion.
The United States and China are furthering economic engagement with ASEAN countries in several ways.
Trade agreements. The United States has a free trade agreement (FTA) with one ASEAN country, Singapore, while China has an FTA with all 10 ASEAN countries. The United States and China are each party to separate regional trade agreement negotiations—the United States through the Trans-Pacific Partnership and China through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. China's existing FTAs do not address aspects of trade addressed in the U.S.-Singapore FTA, such as intellectual property, the environment, and labor rights.
Support for firms. From 2009 through 2014, U.S. agencies provided approximately $6 billion in financing for U.S. firms in ASEAN countries. China reports billions of dollars more in financing than the United States worldwide, but data on China's financing in Southeast Asia are unavailable.
Support for regional integration. In fiscal years 2009 through 2013, U.S. agencies provided $536 million in trade capacity building assistance to ASEAN countries. China has promised tens of billions of dollars for infrastructure development through new funds and multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, expected to begin operations in 2015. |
gao_GAO-07-693T | gao_GAO-07-693T_0 | JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face a Number of Challenges
JPDO has continued to make progress in facilitating the collaboration that is central to its mission and in furthering its key planning documents. However, JPDO faces a number of challenges involving its organizational structure, institutionalization of its efforts, research and development activities, and stakeholder participation. Figure 1 illustrates JPDO’s position within FAA and the JPDO structures that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the Institute and the IPTs. Deprtment of Trporttion (chir)
Hrmoniztion (FAA)
Infrastrctre (FAA)
Situationl Awreness (DOD) (DOC)
Mgement (FAA)
In November 2006, we reported that JPDO’s organizational structure incorporated some of the practices that we have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations—an important point given how critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO’s mission. We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. The leadership turnovers at both JPDO and the Institute raise concerns about the stability of JPDO and about the impact of these turnovers on the progress of the NextGen initiative. JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents, although Further Work Remains
JPDO’s authorizing legislation requires the office to create a multi-agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. These documents include a NextGen Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan. Over the next few months, JPDO plans to address the public comments it receives and issue a revised version of the Concept of Operations. Based on our analysis, JPDO is focusing on the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning. Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Continuing Challenge for JPDO
In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO’s ability to facilitate the implementation of NextGen. For example, JPDO is working with FAA to refocus one of FAA’s key planning documents on the implementation of NextGen—an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration and coordination between JPDO and FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO), which has primary responsibility for modernization of the air traffic control system. JPDO has made progress in this area, although further work remains. As we noted in our November report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process that would allow OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. This means that the FAA and the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will eventually share a common, real-time, secure picture of aviation operations across the airspace system. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA’s NextGen investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. Until then, JPDO investment modeling capability will be constrained unless the office or another partner agency can assume the modeling work. JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All Key Stakeholders
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to the success of NextGen. Thus, it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is being chilled by conflict of interest concerns. | Why GAO Did This Study
The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The consensus of opinion is that the current system cannot be expanded to meet projected growth. In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to lead a collaborative effort of federal and nonfederal aviation stakeholders to conceptualize and plan the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a fundamental redesign and modernization of the national airspace system. JPDO operates in conjunction with its partner agencies, which include FAA; the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. GAO's testimony focuses on the progress that JPDO has made in planning the NextGen initiative and some key issues and challenges that JPDO continues to face. This statement is based on GAO's November 2006 report to this subcommittee as well as ongoing work. In our November 2006 report, we recommended that JPDO take actions to institutionalize its collaboration and determine if it had the involvement of all key stakeholders. JPDO said it would consider our recommendations.
What GAO Found
JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however. Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns about the stability of JPDO and the impact of the turnovers on its progress. Additionally, we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from stakeholders about the productivity of some integrated product teams and the pace of the planning effort. In response, JPDO officials are currently proposing several changes to JPDO's organizational structure aimed at improving the organization's effectiveness. JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks including aligning the enterprise architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to establish a cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and working with FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the NextGen effort. JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen, recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. Questions remain, however, over which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA, and which will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For example, JPDO's investment simulation capability, which relies heavily on a NASA modeling platform, may be constrained unless the JPDO or another partner agency can assume the modeling work. JPDO also faces a challenge in addressing questions concerning how human factors issues, such as the changing roles of air traffic controllers in a more automated NextGen environment, will be researched and addressed. Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders, including controllers and technicians. Similarly, issues have arisen over whether conflict of interest issues could chill the participation of industry stakeholders. |
gao_RCED-96-121 | gao_RCED-96-121_0 | This would amount to about 9.3 percent of projected gasoline consumption in the year 2000 and about 9 percent in 2010. The vast majority of USDA’s biofuels research program is focused on developing corn starch as a feedstock for ethanol and, to a lesser extent, research to produce biodiesel from farm crops. EPA also estimated the cost of RFG phase II in removing NOx at about $3,700 per ton and the cost of removing air toxics at about $40,000 per ton for RFG phase I.
EPA has recognized the limitations of the cost-effectiveness information for RFG and specifically the need for additional information that compares the costs of the RFG program with other control measures. RFG is ranked fourth out of the 14 mobile source control measures. This appendix provides additional information on the agencies’ efforts. The appendix also shows the processes for converting corn and biomass to ethanol. Figure V.2 illustrates the process used to convert biomass feedstocks into ethanol. GAO’s Comments
1. 4. 6. 7. 8. Comments From the Department of Agriculture
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Agriculture’s letter dated May 16, 1996. 5. 6. 7. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) summarize the results of federal and other studies on the cost-effectiveness of using RFG compared to other automotive emission control measures and compare estimates of the price of RFG used in such studies with more recent actual experience; (2) summarize the results of studies estimating the potential for oxygenates to reduce the use of petroleum; and (3) summarize the ongoing federal research into biofuels, including any related past or projected cost reduction goals, and any increased demand estimates based on such goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the cost-effectiveness of reformulated gasoline (RFG), focusing on: (1) the potential for oxygenates to reduce petroleum use; and (2) ongoing federal biofuel research.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) RFG is more cost-effective than some automotive emission control measures; (2) the extent and nature of air pollution in any specific area determines whether certain pollution control measures are used individually or in combination with other control measures; (3) about 305,000 barrels of petroleum per day are at risk for displacement by the year 2000; (4) this displacement amounts to nearly 3.7 percent of the estimated gasoline consumption for year 2000 and 3.6 percent for 2010; (5) the Department of Energy is focusing its efforts on reducing the cost of growing and converting biomass feedstocks into ethanol, and the Department of Agriculture is focusing on reducing the cost of growing and converting agricultural feedstock into ethanol; (6) advances in biofuels research has reduced the cost of producing ethanol from biomass crops; (7) further cost reductions in producing corn-based ethanol, and the subsequent demand for it, may be constrained by the price of corn and its many uses; and (8) the demand for ethanol will increase assuming the successful development and commercialization of biofuels technology. |
gao_GGD-98-45 | gao_GGD-98-45_0 | Hence, the presence in Nasdaq of non-complying securities could have a serious deceptive effect.”
SEC’s Statutory Oversight Responsibilities
SEC’s statutory oversight responsibilities regarding Nasdaq’s listing requirements include its authority to (1) review and approve or deny SRO-proposed rule changes, (2) inspect SROs, and (3) review listing decisions either on appeal or by its own initiative. SEC Approved Two Nasdaq Rule Changes
In 1991, and again in 1997, NASD proposed, and SEC approved, rule changes that made listing and maintenance requirements more restrictive for the SmallCap Market. Before OCIE established new procedures, SEC depended primarily on subsequent inspections to follow up on its inspection recommendations. Because SEC had not followed up on its 1986 recommendations until 1997, this disagreement continued for 11 years, and Nasdaq believed it had addressed the issues SEC raised. OCIE officials told us that the reason the Nasdaq Listing Department had not been inspected since 1986 was because SEC must inspect a wide range of exchange programs with limited resources, and SEC had no inspection cycle for listing departments until 1996. However, these procedures do not involve Commissioners, the agency’s highest authorities. Nasdaq Followed Its Listing Requirements for Comparator, but SEC Found the Continued Listing Inappropriate
Although Comparator occasionally had problems complying with Nasdaq’s listing and maintenance requirements, Nasdaq never granted Comparator any exceptions. In May 1996, Nasdaq staff notified the company it was not current in its filings. SEC Criticized Nasdaq’s Handling of Comparator
After its 1997 inspection of Nasdaq’s Listing Department, SEC criticized Nasdaq’s handling of Comparator. SEC recognized that Nasdaq has taken significant steps to address several of its recommendations to improve the Listing Department and the SmallCap Market. Nasdaq Has Taken Actions to Improve Its Listing Department
Nasdaq officials disagreed with some of SEC’s findings, but they generally recognized the merits of SEC’s recommendations and stated their commitment to respond and continue to improve the quality of the SmallCap Market. During the same period the Department identified 972 deficiencies in 640 SmallCap companies. Before 1995, frequent and regular inspections were SEC’s primary method of following up to ensure its recommendations were implemented. We share SEC’s concern that the deficiencies identified in Nasdaq’s Listing Department operations could have had the effect of misleading investors who are entitled to assume that the stocks listed on the Nasdaq SmallCap Stock Market meet the listing and maintenance requirements of that marketplace. Recommendations
We recommend that the Chairman, SEC, require OCIE to periodically report the status of all open, significant recommendations to the Commissioners; and require NASD to develop management reports based on overall program statistics that demonstrate its Listing Department’s operating results, such as the number of companies granted exceptions to listing and maintenance requirements along with their ultimate disposition, and to submit this data periodically to the Commissioners for review. On December 19, 1997, the Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations for SEC, provided written comments. Comments From the Securities and Exchange Commission
Comments From the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Association of Securities Dealers' (NASD) automated quotation (NASDAQ) SmallCap Stock Market and the events surrounding the listing of Comparator Systems Corporation stock.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken actions to meet its oversight responsibilities with respect to the NASDAQ Stock Market Listing Qualifications Department by approving two NASDAQ requests for rule changes to tighten listing standards in 1991 and 1997 and by inspecting the Department's operations in 1979, 1983, 1986, and 1997; (2) it did not follow up on its 1986 recommendations to improve Listing Department operations until 1997, 11 years later; (3) when it did follow up in 1997, SEC reported that some of the same deficiencies it had found in 1986 still existed, and it found additional deficiencies as well; (4) NASDAQ disagreed and stated that it had responded to SEC's 1986 inspection report and that for 11 years it believed it had addressed the issues SEC raised; (5) before the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) established new procedures, SEC used subsequent and follow-up inspections as its primary method for ensuring that its recommendations were implemented; (6) this did not provide systematic recommendation followup when constraints such as limited resources or changing priorities caused long periods of time between inspections, as occurred for the NASDAQ Listing Department; (7) OCIE has instituted a number of procedures to provide more systematic recommendation followup, but these procedures do not involve SEC's Commissioners, who have the authority to require self-regulatory organizations to comply with OCIE's recommendations; (8) the Listing Department followed its listing and maintenance requirements for Comparator and had never granted the company any exceptions to those requirements; (9) SEC criticized NASDAQ's handling of Comparator because the Department had failed to investigate assets that appeared questionable on the company's financial statements; (10) SEC subsequently proved that Comparator officials had inflated those assets to continue the company's NASDAQ listing and facilitate the sale of its stock; (11) SEC made several recommendations to improve NASDAQ's Listing Department operations, which NASDAQ has begun to implement; (12) since the May 1996 run-up in trading of Comparator, NASDAQ has improved its Listing Department operations in response to its own inquiry as well as SEC's; and (13) NASDAQ monitors individual company requests for exceptions to its listing and maintenance requirements through reviews and approvals by the NASDAQ and NASD boards of directors and through information by Listing Department staff. |
gao_GAO-16-48 | gao_GAO-16-48_0 | As part of this effort, the Bureau tested how well administrative records substituted for additional visits to collect information from nonresponding households and from proxies, such as neighbors; compared the cost and productivity of traditional follow-up methods to those relying on an enhanced operational control system, demonstrating the potential benefits of automating the assignment of work, scheduling the time of day for enumerators to conduct follow-up to determine when residents were most likely to be home, as well as efficient sequencing and routing of enumerator daily visits based on administrative records and information from other surveys; and provided ground experience with prototypes of systems with leased smartphone devices on which to collect data, which are not necessarily reflective of the systems it may acquire or develop for 2020. The Bureau has more tests planned including a 2016 Census Test in selected areas within Harris County, Texas and Los Angeles County, California; a large test of address canvassing also in 2016; an additional site test in 2017 at an as yet undetermined location; and a 2018 end-to-end test—the equivalent of prior decennial cycles’ “dress rehearsal.”
Administrative Records Can Reduce 2020 Fieldwork, but the Bureau Will Need to Better Define Milestones and Deadlines to Help Manage Risks
Decennial Uses of Administrative Records Offer the Bureau the Opportunity to Reduce the Fieldwork Needed for the 2020 Census
In key planning documents, the Bureau describes a goal of using administrative records to reduce the field work involved in its NRFU operation. One of the largest potential efficiency gains to the census may come from using administrative records to remove these vacant units from the follow-up workload. The Bureau has identified and obtained access to nearly all of the sources it believes it needs to leverage all of the opportunities it has identified, including the three uses (identify vacant housing units; identify and enumerate nonresponding housing units that are occupied; and predict best times to complete NRFU) the Bureau believes will generate a large portion of its estimated $1.4 billion savings from the cost of traditional methods. The Bureau is Addressing Challenges to Using Administrative Records for the 2020 Census; Implementing Our Previous Recommendations Could Help
The Bureau Has Processes in Place and Is Conducting Research and Testing to Ensure Quality of Records
Although the Bureau has no control over the accuracy of data provided to it by other agencies, it is responsible for ensuring that data it uses for 2020 Census are of sufficient quality for their planned uses. This helps to improve the master list of addresses. Bureau officials said they consider the 2015 Census Test a large success because it allowed them to employ a variety of new methods and advanced technologies that are under consideration for the 2020 Census. During the site test, the Bureau experienced specific implementation issues, and these in turn affected the measurement of the key cost drivers. Bureau officials acknowledged that problems with the implementation of the test likely affected productivity measures to be used in calculating future cost estimates. Reducing the number of field offices. Conclusions
Although administrative records have been discussed and used for the decennial census since the 1970s, the Bureau plans a more significant role for them to reduce the amount of data collection fieldwork to reduce the cost of the decennial census in 2020. Knowing deadlines for when final go/no go decisions need to be made about which records the Bureau will use, how it will use them, and for which purposes will help ensure necessary activities are completed on time. Deadlines regarding still uncertain purposes or those involving records the Bureau is still pursuing, such as NDNH and KidLink, as well as those from some states, will also help the Bureau prioritize which activities—or records—to continue pursuing or to abandon if time becomes a constraint. The Bureau’s early cost savings assumptions related to its use of administrative records are logical, and the Bureau is taking steps to develop further support for them. We plan to review the Bureau’s October 2015 cost estimate and latest estimates of savings from using administrative records after the Bureau makes supporting documentation available. The Department of Commerce also provided minor technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. Specifically, our objectives were to review (1) the Bureau’s plans for using administrative records for 2020 and what opportunities and challenges the Bureau faces in using them; (2) the extent to which the Bureau’s key 2015 test of administrative records were implemented in accordance with its testing objectives and what the Bureau’s experience implementing selected aspects of the test was; and (3) key assumptions supporting the cost savings estimates to be achieved from administrative records. When examining the extent to which implementation issues may have affected measurement of key cost drivers in the 2015 Census Test, we relied on our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide for criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost of the decennial census has steadily increased during the past 40 years, prompting the Bureau to reengineer key census-taking methods for the 2020 Census, including making greater use of information from administrative records. Given the potential cost savings associated with the use of administrative records, GAO reviewed (1) the Bureau's plans for using them and what opportunities and challenges the Bureau faces going forward; (2) the extent to which the Bureau's key 2015 test of them was implemented in accordance with objectives; and (3) the key assumptions supporting estimates of expected cost savings. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed Bureau planning documents and test plans, interviewed Bureau officials, and observed implementation of the 2015 Census Test in Arizona. GAO also relied on its Schedule Assessment Guide.
What GAO Found
Increased reliance on administrative records—information already provided to the government as it administers other programs—has been discussed since the 1970s as a possible way to improve the quality or reduce the cost of the decennial census, and it may finally play a significant role in the decennial census in 2020. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that it can save $1.4 billion using administrative records, compared to relying solely on traditional methods.
The Bureau recently completed its 2015 Census Test in Maricopa County, Arizona—a major test involving administrative records. The Bureau used this census test to demonstrate the feasibility of using administrative records to reduce the cost of its largest decennial field operation, following up door to door to enumerate households that do not respond to the census. Yet turning this estimated savings—and the potential savings from other uses of the records, such as using administrative records to help validate and update the address list rather than having to send temporary workers to every housing unit in the country—into a real cost reduction for the taxpayer will require detailed planning that includes milestones for ensuring outstanding challenges are addressed. This would include preventing disclosure of records and addressing concerns the public may have over their use, and obtaining access to remaining records. The Bureau has not set deadlines for deciding which records it will use and for which purposes, but doing so will help the Bureau complete needed activities on time and prioritize which activities—or records—to abandon if time and resources become a constraint.
Bureau officials said they consider the test a large success because it demonstrated a variety of new methods and advanced technologies that are under consideration for the 2020 Census. The test also demonstrated the feasibility of a prototype system for managing the field operation, yet implementation issues with some of the prototype technology were not systematically reported or tracked, and may have affected the usefulness of test data. Systematic problems arising during test interviews can affect key test measures, such as the number of hours spent going door to door. Knowing which cases experienced such problems can help link cost estimates to specific design features and prioritize future research, development, and acquisition efforts.
Key assumptions the Bureau used in estimating potential cost savings from administrative records are logical, and the Bureau plans to provide additional support for them. For example, the Bureau's assumption that it could reduce its follow-up workload follows clearly from the Bureau's use of administrative records to remove vacant units from among those housing units needing follow-up because people did not respond to the census, reducing that workload by 11.6 percent. This assumption was also validated by the Bureau's experience in its recent test, and the Bureau plans further testing of this assumption during future tests in 2016 and beyond. The Bureau released an updated life cycle cost estimate in October 2015, and GAO anticipates reviewing its reliability after the Bureau makes available support for the estimate.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Census Director ensure that resources focus on activities with promise to reduce cost by documenting milestones related to deciding which records to use for which purposes and by systematically recording better information about implementation issues affecting specific cases in future tests. The Department of Commerce concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations, and provided minor technical comments, which were included in the final report. |
gao_GAO-07-498 | gao_GAO-07-498_0 | NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain To Be Completed
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks leading up to revising and finalizing contract changes remain to be completed. Specifically, the program office has established interim program plans guiding the contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. These approvals are currently over 6 months past due. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure—including establishing a new organizational framework with increased oversight by program executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. Additionally, the program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in Summer 2007 as part of this executive’s natural career progression. Methodology Supporting the June 2006 Cost and Schedule Estimate Was Reliable, but Recent Events Could Increase Program Costs
In June 2006, DOD certified a restructured NPOESS program that was estimated to cost $11.5 billion for the acquisition portion of the program and scheduled to launch the first satellite in 2013. Specifically, the program continues to experience technical problems on key sensors, and costs and schedules will be adjusted during negotiations on contract changes. A new baseline cost will be established once the contract is finalized. Program officials plan to use this revised cost estimate to negotiate contract changes. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the ground-based data processing systems developed, tested, and deployed, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks. However, two critical sensors have experienced problems and are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing and implementing the ground-based data processing system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition; (2) evaluate the program office’s progress in establishing an effective management structure; (3) assess the reliability of the new life cycle cost estimate and proposed schedule; and (4) identify the status and key risks facing the program’s major segments (the launch, space, data processing, and ground control segments) and evaluate the adequacy of the program’s efforts to mitigate these risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--which experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to (1) assess progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluate progress in establishing an effective management structure, (3) assess the reliability of the cost and schedule estimate, and (4) identify the status and key risks facing the program's major segments. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed program officials
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding the contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be completed. Executive approvals of key acquisition documents are about 6 months late--due in part to the complexity of navigating three agencies' approval processes. Delays in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline. The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the program's risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. Until this process is in place the NPOESS program faces increased risk of further delays. The methodology supporting a June 2006 independent cost estimate with the expectation of initial satellite launch in January 2013 was reliable, but recent events could increase program costs and delay schedules. Specifically, the program continues to experience technical problems on key sensors and program costs will likely be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on contract changes. A new baseline cost and schedule reflecting these factors is expected by July 2007. Development and testing of major NPOESS segments--including key sensors and ground systems--are under way, but significant risks remain. For example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them experienced significant problems and are considered high risk. Additionally, while progress has been made in reducing delays in the data processing system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into useable weather products. Given the tight time frames for completing this work, it will be important for program officials and executives to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks. |
gao_GAO-04-317T | gao_GAO-04-317T_0 | Additional Disclosure of Mutual Fund Costs Might Benefit Investors
Although mutual funds already disclose considerable information about the fees they charge, our report recommends that SEC consider requiring that mutual funds make additional disclosures to investors about fees in the account statements that investors receive. Although mutual funds do not disclose their costs to each individual investor in specific dollars, the disclosures that they make do exceed those of many products. A number of alternatives have been proposed for improving the disclosure of mutual fund fees, that could provide additional information to fund investors. However, SEC’s proposal would not require mutual funds to disclose to each investor the specific amount of fees in dollars that are paid on the shares they own. In addition, other less costly alternatives are also available that could increase investor awareness of the fees they are paying on their mutual funds by providing them with information on the fees they pay in the quarterly statements that provide information on an investor’s share balance and account value. Disclosures of Trading Costs Could Benefit Investors
Academics and other industry observers have also called for increased disclosure of mutual fund brokerage commissions and other trading costs that are not currently included in fund expense ratios. Changes in Some Fund Distribution Practices Likely Beneficial But Others Raise Potential Conflicts of Interest
The way that investors pay for the advice of financial professionals about their mutual funds has evolved over time. These fees are called 12b-1 fees after the rule that allows fund assets to be used to pay for fund marketing and distribution expenses. Rule 12b-1 provides investors an alternative way of paying for investment advice and purchases of fund shares. Questions involving funds with 12b-1 fees have also been raised over whether some investors are paying too much for their funds depending on which share class they purchase. Although revenue sharing payments can create conflicts of interest between broker-dealers and their clients, the extent to which broker- dealers disclose to their clients that their firms receive such payments from fund advisers is not clear. When investment advisers buy or sell securities for a fund, they may have to pay the broker- dealers that execute these trades a commission using fund assets. Although the research and brokerage services that fund advisers obtain through the use of soft dollars could benefit a mutual fund investor, this practice also could increase investors’ costs and create potential conflicts of interest that could harm fund investors. As a result, our June 2003 report recommends that SEC evaluate ways to provide additional information to fund directors and investors on their fund advisers’ use of soft dollars. 2420 would require SEC to issue rules mandating disclosure of information about soft dollar arrangements; require fund advisers to submit to the fund’s board of directors an annual report on these arrangements, and require the fund to provide shareholders with a summary of that report in its annual report to shareholders; impose a fiduciary duty on the fund’s board of directors to review soft dollar arrangements; direct SEC to issue rules to require enhanced recordkeeping of soft require SEC to conduct a study of soft-dollar arrangements, including the trends in the average amounts of soft dollar commissions, the types of services provided through these arrangements, the benefits and disadvantages of the use of soft dollar arrangements, the impact of soft dollar arrangements on investors’ ability to compare the expenses of mutual funds, the conflicts of interest created by these arrangements and the effectiveness of the board of directors in managing such conflicts, and the transparency of soft dollar arrangements. In conclusion, GAO believes that various changes to current disclosures and other practices would benefit fund investors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have been raised over whether the disclosures of mutual fund fees and other fund practices are sufficiently fair and transparent to investors. Our June 2003 report, Mutual Funds: Greater Transparency Needed in Disclosures to Investors, GAO-03- 763, reviewed (1) how mutual funds disclose their fees and related trading costs and options for improving these disclosures, (2) changes in how mutual funds pay for the sale of fund shares and how the changes in these practices are affecting investors, and (3) the benefits of and the concerns over mutual funds' use of soft dollars. This testimony summarizes the results of our report and discusses certain events that have occurred since it was issued.
What GAO Found
Although mutual funds disclose considerable information about their costs to investors, the amount of fees and expenses that each investor specifically pays on their mutual fund shares are currently disclosed as percentages of fund assets, whereas most other financial services disclose the actual costs to the purchaser in dollar terms. SEC staff has proposed requiring funds to disclose additional information that could be used to compare fees across funds. However, SEC is not proposing that funds disclose the specific dollar amount of fees paid by each investor nor is it proposing to require that any fee disclosures be made in the account statements that investors receive. Although some of these additional disclosures could be costly and data on their benefits to investors was not generally available, less costly alternatives exist that could increase the transparency and investor awareness of mutual funds fees, making consideration of additional fee disclosures worthwhile. Changes in how mutual funds pay intermediaries to sell fund shares have benefited investors but have also raised concerns. Since 1980, mutual funds, under SEC Rule 12b-1, have been allowed to use fund assets to pay for certain marketing expenses. Over time the use of these fees has evolved to provide investors greater flexibility in choosing how to pay for the services of individual financial professionals that advise them on fund purchases. Another increasingly common marketing practice called revenue sharing involves fund investment advisers making additional payments to the broker-dealers that distribute their funds' shares. However, these payments may cause the broker-dealers receiving them to limit the fund choices they offer to investors and conflict with their obligation to recommend the most suitable funds. Regulators acknowledged that the current disclosure regulations might not always result in complete information about these payments being disclosed to investors. Under soft dollar arrangements, mutual fund investment advisers use part of the brokerage commissions they pay to broker-dealers for executing trades to obtain research and other services. Although industry participants said that soft dollars allow fund advisers access to a wider range of research than may otherwise be available and provide other benefits, these arrangements also can create incentives for investment advisers to trade excessively to obtain more soft dollar services, thereby increasing fund shareholders' costs. SEC staff has recommended various changes that would increase transparency by expanding advisers' disclosure of their use of soft dollars. By acting on the staff's recommendations SEC would provide fund investors and directors with needed information about how their funds' advisers are using soft dollars. |
gao_PEMD-96-4 | gao_PEMD-96-4_0 | The elderly clients who apply for home and community-based care usually undergo cycles of assessment. They are: (1) physical health, (2) mental health, (3) functioning (problems with daily activities), (4) social resources, (5) economic resources, and (6) physical environment. Principal Findings
All Instruments Assess Client’s Health, and Most Assess Other Domains
Programs Use Assessment for Care Planning
All 49 states reported to us that they use an assessment instrument to determine the care plan for each client, including the identification of needed services available both through the waiver program and outside the program. All Instruments Cover the Health Domains
We found that although all instruments gather some information on the broad domains of physical health, mental health, and functioning, not all of them cover the other three domains of a comprehensive assessment of an elderly person (84 percent cover social resources, 69 percent cover economic resources, and 80 percent cover physical environment). Administration Is Not Uniform for Many Instruments
We found that although most assessments are conducted as face-to-face interviews, only 35 percent of the instruments specify the wording of any of the interview questions that assessors ask the clients. Many Programs Do Not Require Assessors to Be Trained in Use of the Instrument
We found that 53 percent of the programs using a single assessor mention a years-of-experience requirement, and 57 percent of the programs using a team of two assessors mention this requirement for their lead assessor (for the second assessor, it is 50 percent). Moreover, most states require assessors to possess specific professional credentials. Programs that do not cover a wide variety of these can increase the comprehensiveness of their assessments by including more of these topics. Second, standardizing the wording and order of questions generally increases the comparability of the clients’ replies. Conclusions
We have drawn three conclusions about the assessment instruments and their administration. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how publicly funded programs assess the need for home and community-based long-term care services for the poor disabled elderly, focusing on the: (1) comprehensiveness of the assessment instruments; (2) uniformity of their administration; and (3) uniformity of training for staff who conduct the assessments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) all 49 states reviewed use an assessment instrument to determine the long-term care needs of the poor disabled elderly and some also use them for other eligibility determinations; (2) 48 of the programs provide information to their clients about services not covered and most give referrals and assistance to obtain those services; (3) all of the assessment instruments covered physical and mental health and functional abilities of the disabled elderly, but inclusion of their social resources, economic resources, and physical environment ranged from 69 percent to 84 percent; (4) dependence on assistance with daily living activities was the only specific topic included in all instruments; (5) most assessments use face-to-face interviews, but only a minority of them specify the wording of questions; (6) most programs have experience and professional credential requirements for their assessors, but most programs do not require standardized training; and (7) experts believe that assessment instruments could be improved by including more topics, standardizing the wording and order of questions, and training assessors in use of the instruments. |
gao_T-RCED-96-166 | gao_T-RCED-96-166_0 | The assistance includes temporary housing and other benefits for individuals as well as public assistance. Following a disaster declaration, FEMA helps survey damaged facilities and prepares damage survey reports (DSRs) that contain estimates of repair costs. Clearer Criteria Are Needed to Determine Eligibility
For disasters declared in fiscal years 1989 through 1994, FEMA projects that public assistance grants for permanent repairs and restorations will total over $5.2 billion. Additionally, without clear criteria, inconsistent or inequitable eligibility determinations and time-consuming appeals by grantees and subgrantees may be more likely to occur. The need for clearer, more definitive criteria dealing with the eligibility for public assistance takes on added importance because of FEMA’s use of temporary personnel with limited training to help prepare and process DSRs, which are used in determining the scope of work eligible for funding. Also, FEMA has recently taken steps to improve policy dissemination. FEMA Relies Largely on States to Ensure Eligibility of Expenditures
To ensure that expenditures are limited to eligible items, FEMA relies largely on states’ (grantees’) certifications. States may also perform audits of specific subgrantees. Options that (1) the FEMA regional officials strongly recommended and (2) the National Emergency Management Association endorsed for further consideration are:
Better define which local authorities govern the standards applicable to the permanent restoration of damaged facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) public disaster assistance program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FEMA program criteria are ambiguous; (2) criteria clarifications are needed to determine which damaged facilities should be restored and the eligibility of nonprofit facilities' services for assistance; (3) inconsistent or inequitable eligibility determinations, time-consuming appeals, and waste are more likely to occur if eligibility criteria are not clear and current; (4) FEMA use of temporary employees with limited training to prepare damage survey reports makes the need for clearer criteria more urgent; (5) FEMA has not systematically updated or disseminated eligibility policy changes to its regional offices, but it plans to do so; (6) although it approves specific subgrantee projects, FEMA relies on states as public assistance grantees to certify that expenditures are limited to eligible items; (7) as an additional, limited control over disbursements, FEMA has independent auditors or its Inspector General Office audit some subgrantees; and (8) options to reduce costs include better defining local authorities that govern establishment of restoration standards, eliminating or restricting eligibility of certain facilities, placing limits on the appeals process, improving insurance requirements, limiting temporary relocation costs, and increasing the damage percentage for facility replacement. |
gao_GAO-06-995 | gao_GAO-06-995_0 | To help ensure the increased use of commercial acquisition, OSD established and the Air Force implemented two commercial acquisition goals to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 2005. In setting these goals, OSD expected that the increased use of commercial acquisition would provide DOD with greater access to commercial markets (products and service types) with increased competition, better prices, and new market entrants and/or technologies. The Air Force Has Increased Commercial Acquisition Spending
As its overall spending has increased, the Air Force has increased spending using commercial acquisition, from $4.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to over $8 billion in fiscal year 2005 (see fig. 2). However, our analysis indicates that for at least one of the expected benefits, attracting new market entrants, the expected benefit has not materialized. Benefits Expected from Commercial Acquisition Have Not Been Measured
OSD has indicated that the increased use of commercial acquisition should bring about the benefits of greater access to commercial markets, including increased competition, getting better prices, and access to new market entrants (contractors) and/or technologies. For example, improperly classifying an acquisition as a commercial acquisition leaves the Air Force vulnerable to accepting prices that may not be the best value for the department because under commercial acquisition regulations, the government is precluded from requesting cost or pricing information. Our review of Air Force contract files and DOD Inspector General reports showed that Air Force officials disagreed about the designation of some acquisitions as commercial. Furthermore, the director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy recently testified before the Federal Acquisition Advisory Panel that he is concerned about some items and services being identified as commercial that are not sold in an existing marketplace because there are no assurances that the price is reasonable. The Air Force use of commercial acquisition has been accompanied by an increased amount of dollars being awarded sole-source. Also, of the 20 new commercial awards for products over $5 million in fiscal year 2004, half were awarded sole-source, with traditional contractors receiving most of those sole-source awards. Furthermore, at least one of the expected benefits of commercial acquisition—attracting new market entrants—has not materialized through the Air Force’s use of sole- source commercial acquisitions for products in fiscal year 2004. For example, the Air Force could measure the number of nontraditional contractors it reaches using commercial acquisition. Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been urged by commissions, legislation, and a panel to make increased use of commercial acquisition to achieve certain benefits. To help ensure the increased use of commercial acquisition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established and the Air Force implemented two commercial acquisition goals to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 2005. In setting these goals, OSD expected that the increased use of commercial acquisition would provide DOD with greater access to commercial markets (products and service types) with increased competition, better prices, and new market entrants and/or technologies. The committee asked GAO to identify (1) the extent to which the Air Force has increased its use of commercial acquisition to obtain expected benefits and (2) the risks that are associated with this use.
What GAO Found
From 2001 to 2005, the Air Force increased spending using commercial acquisition from $4.8 billion to over $8 billion in an effort to provide greater access to commercial markets to increase competition, obtain better prices, and attract new market entrants (nontraditional contractors) and/or technologies. Even though the Air Force has significantly increased this spending, it has not measured the extent to which this increased use resulted in the benefits that were expected. For example, our analysis shows that for at least one of the expected benefits, attracting new market entrants, the expected benefit has not materialized. For the most part, traditional defense contractors received these contracts. Government contracting officials face risks in using commercial acquisition. For example, improperly classifying an acquisition as a commercial acquisition can leave the Air Force vulnerable to accepting prices that may not be the best value for the department. A high-ranking DOD acquisition official testified that he is concerned about items and services being identified as commercial that are not sold in an existing marketplace because under these circumstances, the government lacks assurances that the price is reasonable. At times, Air Force officials have disagreed about the classification of some acquisitions as commercial. The Air Force's use of commercial acquisition has also been accompanied by an increased amount of dollars being awarded for sole-source contracts. Despite DOD policy to avoid sole-source commercial acquisitions because of increased risk, sole-source commercial acquisition dollars awarded by the Air Force have more than doubled from 2000 to 2005. Further, of the 20 larger Air Force commercial product awards in 2004, half were awarded as sole-source. |
gao_GGD-98-181 | gao_GGD-98-181_0 | Is there potential for disruption to the U.S. currency paper supply from BEP’s reliance on a single supplier? We reviewed various indicators of the competitiveness of the currency paper market, such as the number of paper manufacturers who said they were capable of supplying currency paper to BEP, and the factors that make it difficult for them to provide currency paper. Several Factors Resulted in Limited Competition
The optimum circumstances for the procurement of distinctive currency paper would include an active, competitive market for such paper where a number of responsible sources would compete for BEP’s requirements. However, this is currently not the case because of the unique market for currency paper and some statutory restrictions. These changes would require existing statutory limitations to be amended. Twelve of the 20 paper manufacturers responding to our survey of 30 worldwide firms said that they would be interested in supplying currency paper to BEP and are capable now, or would be in the near future, of supplying at least part of BEP’s currency paper needs, but several matters prevent them from competing. In Japan, the Japanese government is responsible for producing the paper and printing banknotes. BEP Has Ensured Quality but Has Not Demonstrated That It Has Obtained Fair and Reasonable Prices
Although the long-term relationship between BEP and Crane has historically provided quality currency paper, BEP did not generally demonstrate that it obtained fair and reasonable prices for the contracts, options, and extensions awarded between 1988 and 1997. In determining whether Crane’s proposed prices were fair and reasonable, BEP relied primarily on audits of Crane’s proposals. For 5 of the 17 contract actions, BEP was unable to determine the prices to be fair and reasonable. BEP Is Now Building an Inventory of Currency Paper as a Contingency
Although there have not been any disruptions in the supply of currency paper for the last 119 years, BEP has not been in a good negotiating position and has been vulnerable because it did not have a second source for currency paper or have a reserve inventory of currency paper. Under the Conte Amendment, if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that no domestic source of currency paper exists in the United States, the requirement for currency paper to be produced in the United States and the prohibition against the purchase of currency paper from a supplier owned or controlled by a foreign entity would not apply. BEP could improve some aspects of its currency paper procurements. However, BEP must acquire currency paper within the existing legal framework. Recommendations to the Secretary of the Treasury
To strengthen BEP’s capacity to ensure fair and reasonable prices, we recommend that the Secretary direct BEP to • ensure that the contractor maintains acceptable cost accounting and estimating systems for future contracts and that they are periodically audited; • arrange for post-award audits of the contractor’s costs; include data and analyses in the currency paper procurement record that demonstrate the benefits the government is to receive when it approves profit levels that are aimed at recognizing or providing an incentive for capital investments; and to the extent possible, make more extensive use of price analysis to determine the fairness and reasonableness of prices, including the collection of data from foreign countries on their currency prices and data on similar supplies purchased by other agencies, such as paper for passports and money orders. Crane & Co. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the: (1) optimum circumstances for the procurement of distinctive currency paper; (2) effectiveness of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing's (BEP) efforts to encourage competition in the procurement of currency paper; (3) fairness and reasonableness of prices paid for currency paper by BEP and the quality of the paper purchased; and (4) potential for disruption to the U.S. currency paper supply from BEP's reliance on a single source.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the optimum circumstances for the procurement of distinctive currency paper would include an active, competitive market for such paper, where a number of responsible sources would compete for BEP's requirements; (2) however, these circumstances have not existed because of the unique market for currency paper and some statutory restrictions; (3) BEP has been aware of the need to increase competition and has made some efforts recently to do so in areas under its control; (4) however, BEP must procure currency paper within the current statutory framework, which limits currency paper contracts to 4 years, prohibits currency paper production outside of the United States, and prohibits purchase of currency paper from foreign-owned or controlled entities; (5) of the 20 paper manufacturers that responded to GAO's survey, 12 said they were interested in and have the capability now, or could be made capable in the near future, of supplying at least part of BEP's currency paper needs if existing statutory requirements and some of BEP's solicitation terms were changed; (6) 7 of the 12 are domestic paper manufacturers, and 5 are located in foreign countries; (7) although the long-term relationship between BEP and Crane & Co., Inc. has historically resulted in quality currency paper, BEP was unable to determine that it had obtained fair and reasonable prices for 13 of the 17 contract actions awarded from 1988 to 1997; (8) BEP sometimes accepted prices even though it was unable to determine that they were fair and reasonable because it had no other source for currency paper; (9) GAO believes that BEP's assessments of the fairness and reasonableness of Crane's proposed prices were hampered by a number of factors, including the lack of market prices for currency paper and the limited analyses of proposed costs and prices it performed; (10) as the government's agent for acquiring currency paper, BEP is responsible for ensuring that the government's supply of paper is not disrupted; (11) although the potential for disruption in the supply of currency paper exists, there have been no such disruptions; (12) however, for many years, because BEP did not maintain a reserve inventory of paper to provide for contingencies, it was more vulnerable to adverse consequences if a disruption had occurred and was at a disadvantage in its contract negotiations because it lacked an alternative source for currency paper; and (13) BEP has recently been purchasing paper to build a 3-month reserve supply and, under the Conte Amendment, could buy paper from a foreign source if no domestic source exists. |
gao_GAO-16-29 | gao_GAO-16-29_0 | Background
Under PPACA, health-care marketplaces were intended to provide a single point of access for individuals to enroll in private health plans, apply for income-based subsidies to offset the cost of these plans—which are paid directly to health-insurance issuers—and, as applicable, obtain an eligibility determination for other health coverage programs, such as Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program. This is known as the advance premium tax credit (APTC). CMS Does Not Analyze Data Hub Responses Used to Verify Applicant Information and Did Not Resolve One- Third of 2014 Federal Marketplace Applicant Inconsistencies
CMS Does Not Analyze the Extent to Which the Data Hub Provides Applicant Verification Information
As noted, PPACA requires that consumer-submitted information in applications for health-care coverage be verified, and CMS uses the data hub to check external data sources when making eligibility determinations. Overall, although the data hub plays a key role in the eligibility and enrollment process, CMS officials said the agency does not track the extent to which the federal agencies deliver responsive information to a request, or, alternatively, whether they report that information was not available. In doing so, CMS foregoes information that could suggest potential program issues or potential vulnerabilities to fraud, as well as information that might be useful for enhancing program management. Meanwhile, our analysis found about 34 percent of inconsistencies, with about $1.7 billion in associated subsidies, remained open, as of April 2015—that is, inconsistencies still open several months following the close of the 2014 coverage year. II), we identified about 35,000 applications having an unresolved Social Security number inconsistency, which were associated with about $154 million in combined subsidies. Specifically, according to IRS officials, Social Security numbers are a key identifier for tax reconciliation under the act. By not using PUPS data in such a fashion, and by relying on applicant attestation in the alternative, CMS may be granting eligibility to, and making subsidy payments on behalf of, individuals who are ineligible to enroll in qualified health plans. Our 11 fictitious enrollees maintained subsidized coverage throughout 2014, even though we sent fictitious documents, or no documents, to resolve application inconsistencies. In addition, according to GAO’s framework for managing fraud risks in federal programs, it is a leading practice for agencies to regularly assess risks to determine a fraud risk profile. Without conducting a fraud risk assessment—as distinct from a more generalized review of the eligibility determination process, as described earlier—CMS is unlikely to know whether existing control activities are suitably designed and implemented to reduce inherent fraud risk to an acceptable level. CMS relies on a contractor charged with document processing to report possible instances of fraud, even though CMS does not require the contractor to have fraud detection capabilities. A comprehensive risk assessment identifying the potential for fraud in the enrollment process— which thus far has not been performed—could inform evaluations of program integrity and the effectiveness of enrollment and eligibility controls. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review are to (1) examine the extent to which information submitted by applicants under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is verified through the federal “data services hub” (data hub)—the primary means for verifying eligibility—and the extent to which the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace) resolved “inconsistencies” where applicant information does not match information from federal data sources available through the data hub; and (2) describe, by means of undercover testing and related work, potential vulnerabilities to fraud in the federal Marketplace’s application, enrollment, and eligibility verification processes, for the act’s first open-enrollment period, for 2014 coverage. To examine outcomes of the data hub applicant verification process, we obtained information from key federal agencies involved in the process— the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Homeland Security—on the nature and extent of their responses to electronic inquiries made through the data hub, for the 2014 and 2015 coverage years. In addition, we obtained applicant data on inconsistencies, subsidies awarded, and submission of required verification documentation, from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Multidimensional Insurance Data Analytics System. To perform our undercover testing of the Marketplace application, enrollment, and eligibility verification processes, we created 12 fictitious identities for the purpose of making applications for individual health-care coverage by telephone or online. They cannot, however, be generalized to the overall population of all applicants or enrollees. Incarceration: About 2 percent (22,000) of applications had an unresolved incarceration inconsistency and were associated with about $68 million in total subsidies. CMS did not terminate any coverage or adjust subsidies for Social Security inconsistencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces where consumers can select private health-insurance plans. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of subsidies and related spending under PPACA at $37 billion for fiscal year 2015. GAO was asked to examine the enrollment process and verification controls of the federal Marketplace. For the act's first open-enrollment period ending in March 2014, this report (1) examines the extent to which applicant information is verified through an electronic system, and the extent to which the federal Marketplace resolved “inconsistencies” where applicant information does not match information from federal data sources and (2) describes, by means of undercover testing and related work, potential vulnerabilities to fraud in the federal Marketplace's application, enrollment, and eligibility verification processes. GAO analyzed 2014 data from the Marketplace and federal agencies, interviewed CMS officials, and conducted undercover testing. To perform the undercover testing, GAO submitted or attempted to submit 12 fictitious Marketplace applications. The undercover results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees.
What GAO Found
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) requires applicant information be verified to determine eligibility for enrollment or income-based subsidies. To implement this verification process, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) created an electronic system called the “data services hub” (data hub), which, among other things, provides a single link to federal sources, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration, to verify consumer application information. Although the data hub plays a key role in the eligibility and enrollment process, CMS does not, according to agency officials, track or analyze aggregate outcomes of data hub queries—either the extent to which a responding agency delivers information responsive to a request, or whether an agency reports that information was not available. In not doing so, CMS foregoes information that could suggest potential program issues or potential vulnerabilities to fraud, as well as information that might be useful for enhancing program management. In addition, PPACA also establishes a process to resolve “inconsistencies”—instances where individual applicant information does not match information from marketplace data sources. GAO found CMS did not have an effective process for resolving inconsistencies for individual applicants for the federal Health Insurance Marketplace (Marketplace). For example, according to GAO analysis of CMS data, about 431,000 applications from the 2014 enrollment period, with about $1.7 billion in associated subsidies for 2014, still had unresolved inconsistencies as of April 2015—several months after close of the coverage year. In addition, CMS did not resolve Social Security number inconsistencies for about 35,000 applications (with about $154 million in associated subsidies) or incarceration inconsistencies for about 22,000 applications (with about $68 million in associated subsidies). With unresolved inconsistencies, CMS is at risk of granting eligibility to, and making subsidy payments on behalf of, individuals who are ineligible to enroll in qualified health plans. In addition, according to the Internal Revenue Service, accurate Social Security numbers are vital for income tax compliance and reconciliation of advance premium tax credits that can lower enrollee costs.
During undercover testing, the federal Marketplace approved subsidized coverage under the act for 11 of 12 fictitious GAO phone or online applicants for 2014. The GAO applicants obtained a total of about $30,000 in annual advance premium tax credits, plus eligibility for lower costs at time of service. The fictitious enrollees maintained subsidized coverage throughout 2014, even though GAO sent fictitious documents, or no documents, to resolve application inconsistencies. While the subsidies, including those granted to GAO's fictitious applicants, are paid to health-care insurers, and not directly to enrolled consumers, they nevertheless represent a benefit to consumers and a cost to the government. GAO found CMS relies upon a contractor charged with document processing to report possible instances of fraud, even though CMS does not require the contractor to have any fraud detection capabilities. CMS has not performed a comprehensive fraud risk assessment—a recommended best practice—of the PPACA enrollment and eligibility process. Until such an assessment is done, CMS is unlikely to know whether existing control activities are suitably designed and implemented to reduce inherent fraud risk to an acceptable level.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes eight recommendations, including that CMS consider analyzing outcomes of the verification system, take steps to resolve inconsistencies, and conduct a risk assessment of the potential for fraud in Marketplace applications. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-675T | gao_GAO-05-675T_0 | For example, in the 10-year period April 1995 through April 2005, the national average price for a gallon of regular grade gasoline has been as low as $0.89 and as high as $2.25 without adjusting for inflation. In addition, gasoline prices vary by location and, in recent years, California has consistently had among the highest prices in the nation. Some analysts have predicted much higher crude oil prices—and as a result, higher prices of petroleum products—while others expect prices to moderate as producers respond to high prices by producing more crude oil and consumers respond by conserving more, and investing in more energy-efficient cars and other products. Gasoline Prices Are Determined by the Price of Crude Oil and a Number of Other Factors
Crude oil prices feed directly into the price of gasoline, because crude oil is the primary raw material from which gasoline is produced. Figure 2 illustrates the importance of crude oil in the price of gasoline. EIA has stated that the world’s surplus crude oil production capacity has fallen to about one million barrels per day, or just over one percent of the world’s current daily consumption, making the balance between world demand and supply of crude oil very tight. This tight balance between world crude oil demand and supply means that any significant supply disruptions will likely cause prices to rise. In addition to the cost of crude oil, gasoline prices are influenced by a variety of other factors, including refining capacity constraints, low inventories, unexpected refinery or pipeline outages, environmental and other regulations, and mergers and market power in the oil industry. A number of reports by government agencies, academics, and private entities have concluded that the proliferation of these special gasoline blends has put stress on the gasoline supply infrastructure and may have led to increased price volatility because areas that use special blends cannot as easily find suitable replacement gasoline in the event of a local supply disruption. California’s Unique Gasoline and Isolation from Other Markets Contribute to its Higher Gasoline Prices
California, and the West Coast states more generally, have consistently had among the highest gasoline prices in the nation. For example, California’s gasoline prices averaged about 21 cents more per gallon than national gasoline prices over the last ten years. In addition, California has at times had more volatile gasoline prices than the rest of the country. For example, California’s high gasoline prices have been attributed, in part, to its cleaner burning gasoline. For example, at about 57 cents per gallon on average, California’s total gasoline tax rate is among the highest, behind only New York and Hawaii, and is 30 percent higher than the national average of 44 cents per gallon, according to a November 2004 survey by the American Petroleum Institute. Future Oil and Gasoline Prices Will Reflect Supply/Demand Balance, but Technological Change and Conservation Will Also Play a Role
Looking into the future, daunting challenges lie ahead in finding, developing, and providing sufficient quantities of oil to meet projected global demand. Developing new oil deposits may be more costly than in the past, which could put upward pressure on crude oil prices and the prices of petroleum products derived from it. On the other hand, technological advances in oil exploration, extraction, and refining could mitigate future price increases. Further, refining advances over the years have also enabled U.S. refiners to increase the yield of gasoline from a given barrel of oil—while the total volume of petroleum products has remained relatively constant, refiners have been able to get more of the more valuable components, such as gasoline, out of each barrel, thereby increasing the supply of these components. Similarly, innovations that reduce the costs of alternative sources of energy could also reduce the demand for crude oil and petroleum products, and thereby ease price pressures. Greater conservation or improved fuel efficiency could also reduce future demand for crude oil and petroleum products, thereby leading to lower prices. Moreover, geopolitical factors will likely continue to have an impact on crude oil and petroleum product prices in the future. Some analysts have recently reported in the popular press that this devaluation can influence long-term prices in two ways. What is true for the nation as a whole is even more dramatically so in California. | Why GAO Did This Study
Gasoline prices have increased dramatically in recent weeks and currently, California has the highest gasoline prices in the nation. Consequently, consumers are expected to spend significantly more on gasoline this year than last. Specifically, EIA recently projected that, because of higher expected gasoline prices, the average American household will spend about $350 more on gasoline in 2005 than they did in 2004. Understandably, the public and the press have focused on these higher gasoline prices and some have questioned why this is happening. Moreover, people are concerned about the future, with some analysts projecting prices of crude oil--the primary raw material from which gasoline is produced--to remain at current high levels or even increase. Other analysts expect prices to fall as new oil supplies are developed and as consumers adjust to the current high prices and adopt more energy-efficient practices. This testimony, as requested, address factors that help explain today's high gasoline prices in the nation as a whole and specifically in California. In addition, potential trends that may impact future prices of crude oil and gasoline are addressed.
What GAO Found
Crude oil prices and gasoline prices are linked, because gasoline is derived from the refining of crude oil. As a result, crude oil prices and gasoline prices generally follow a similar, albeit not identical, pattern over time. For example, from January 2004 to the present (April 25, 2005), the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil rose by almost $20 per barrel, an increase of almost 60 percent, while over the same period, average gasoline prices rose nationally from $1.49 to $2.20 per gallon, an increase of 48 percent. Explanations for this large increase in crude oil and gasoline prices include rapid growth of world demand for crude oil and petroleum products, instability in the Persian Gulf region, and actions by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to restrict the production of crude oil and thereby increase its price on the world market. In addition to the cost of crude oil, gasoline prices are influenced by a variety of other factors, including refining capacity constraints, low inventories, unexpected refinery or pipeline outages, environmental and other regulations, and mergers and market power in the oil industry. Gasoline prices in California, and in other West Coast states, have consistently been among the highest in the nation and recent experience is no different. For the last week in April, the price of regular grade gasoline in California was $2.63 per gallon, about 43 cents above the national average. Explanations for California's higher than average gasoline prices include (1) California's unique gasoline blend, which is cleaner burning and more expensive to produce than any of the other commonly used gasoline blends; (2) a tight balance between supply and demand in the West Coast, and the long distance to any viable sources of replacement gasoline in the event of local supply disruptions; and (3) California's higher level of gasoline taxes--California currently taxes a gallon of gasoline at 30 cents per gallon more than the state with the lowest taxes, Alaska. Some sources have also attributed high gasoline prices, in part, to the fact that California's refining sector is more concentrated in the hands of fewer companies than in other refining areas, such as the Gulf Coast. Future gasoline prices will, in large part, be determined by the supply and demand for crude oil and its price on the world market. World crude oil demand is projected to rise, so new sources will have to be developed or prices will rise. Technological innovations that reduce the cost of finding or extracting crude oil could reduce prices, other things remaining constant. Greater conservation, or improvements in energy efficient technologies could also mitigate rising demand and reduce upward pressure on prices. In addition, alternative fuel sources may become more economical, thereby supplanting some of the demand for crude oil and gasoline in the future. America faces daunting challenges in meeting future energy demands, and policy makers must choose wisely to ensure that the country can meet these demands, while balancing environmental and quality of life concerns. |
gao_GAO-15-314 | gao_GAO-15-314_0 | Population Potentially Eligible for Teacher Aid Programs Far Exceeds Current Participation, and About One-Third of TEACH Grant Recipients Do Not Satisfy Grant Requirements
More Than 410,000 Students and Teachers Received TEACH Grants or Loan Forgiveness and More Could Be Eligible
About one-fourth of the more than 410,000 teacher aid recipients benefited from TEACH grants. Over the past decade, more than 298,000 teachers have participated in the Stafford Teacher Loan Forgiveness and the Perkins Loan Teacher Cancellation programs. Further, Education has a stated goal to take a data- driven approach to better understand its customers and has made teacher recruitment and retention a priority. Helping students pay for school. Finding and keeping an eligible teaching position. Our review of customer complaint data from the FSA Ombudsman from October 2011 through March 2014 corroborated these concerns. Specifically, of the 212 requests for assistance the Ombudsman received on the TEACH Grant program, the majority of these—64 percent—cited problems submitting annual certification paperwork. For instance, one college administrator said that Education’s early estimates that 75 to 80 percent of TEACH grant recipients would not meet grant requirements influenced their decision not to offer the program.some schools considered this rate, among other things, when deciding not to participate. Education Has Taken Steps to Improve Program Management, but Issues with TEACH Grant-to-Loan Conversions and Communication Remain
Education Provides Oversight of the Contracted Servicer and Tracks Participation, but Erroneous Grant-to-Loan Conversions Remain a Management Challenge
Education monitors the servicer contracted to manage the TEACH Grant program including ensuring the servicer regularly communicates with recipients, tracking recipients’ progress towards satisfying their grant requirements, and ensuring the servicer correctly converts TEACH grants into loans if recipients do not satisfy them, according to Education officials.reports generated by the servicer and addresses recipient complaints including disputes regarding grant-to-loan conversion. As a result of the errors discovered to date, Education officials said they plan to review accounts for all of the approximately 36,000 TEACH grant recipients who had grants converted to loans by the current and previous servicer since the program’s inception. Absent a review examining the underlying cause of the erroneous conversions or plans to conduct such a review, Education cannot provide reasonable assurance it has taken steps to minimize the risk of erroneous conversions from occurring in the future. However, we found that Education and the servicer provide incomplete and inconsistent information to recipients about the availability of and criteria for disputing a grant-to-loan conversion. This incomplete and unclear communication with TEACH grant recipients about the dispute process is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Education Has Not Established Performance Measures for TEACH Grant and Loan Forgiveness Programs
Education collects participation data on the loan forgiveness programs for teachers and the TEACH Grant program and periodically reviews students’ persistence in pursuing an education degree and teaching position, but the agency has not established performance measures for the TEACH Grant or the loan forgiveness programs nor used available data to systematically evaluate them. Absent performance measures and efforts to assess progress towards them, it will be difficult for Education to gauge the programs’ success or use data to improve program administration and participant outcomes. Without a full understanding of why teachers are not able to meet TEACH Grant service requirements, Education is hindered from taking mitigating actions to reduce the number of grant-to-loan conversions and bolster program completion. Review the TEACH grant-to-loan conversion dispute process and disseminate to appropriate audiences clear, consistent information on it, including that recipients have an option to dispute, how to initiate a dispute, and the specific criteria considered in the adjudicating process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine: (1) how many students and teachers are potentially eligible for and participate in the three teacher aid programs, and for the Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant program, the extent to which recipients are satisfying grant requirements; (2) what selected schools, teachers, and students have identified as the benefits of and challenges with program participation; and (3) to what extent the U.S. Department of Education (Education) has taken steps to effectively manage and evaluate these programs. In addition to interviews with agency officials, to assess the extent to which Education has taken steps to effectively manage and evaluate these programs, we interviewed officials from the loan servicing company contracted by Education to administer the TEACH Grant program, the two largest Federal Stafford loan servicers in terms of the number of borrowers, and two of the larger Federal Perkins loan servicers in terms of the number of colleges and universities they serve, according to a higher education association representing schools that offer Perkins loans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Education estimates 430,000 new teachers will be needed by 2020. It administers three programs that may help attract and retain qualified teachers by helping them finance their education. However, little is known about the efficacy of these programs. GAO was asked to examine the TEACH Grant and two loan forgiveness programs.
This report examines (1) the number of current and potential participants in the three teacher aid programs and the extent to which TEACH Grant recipients satisfy grant requirements; (2) what selected schools, teachers, and students identified as benefits and challenges of program participation; and (3) the extent to which Education has taken steps to effectively manage and evaluate these programs. GAO reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, and documents; analyzed participation data for the past decade; and interviewed stakeholders including agency officials, loan servicers, and students. GAO also held eight non-generalizable focus groups with officials from 58 colleges representing a range of sizes. GAO also reviewed Ombudsman data covering the former and current TEACH Grant servicers from October 2011 to March 2014.
What GAO Found
More than 410,000 students and teachers have participated in financial aid programs for teachers over the past decade, though GAO estimates 0.8 and 19 percent of the potentially eligible population participates in the Stafford Teacher Loan Forgiveness and Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant programs, respectively. GAO did not develop an estimate for Perkins Loan Teacher Cancellation because U.S. Department of Education (Education) budget documents indicate that federal funds for cancellations were last appropriated in fiscal year 2009. About 36,000 of the TEACH Grant's more than 112,000 recipients have not fulfilled grant requirements, according to GAO's analysis of servicer data, and have had their grants converted to loans, known as grant-to-loan conversions, as required by regulation. Education has a stated goal to take a data-driven approach to better understand its customers, but does not collect information on why recipients do not meet requirements. Absent this data, Education is hindered in taking steps to reduce grant-to-loan conversions and improve participant outcomes.
Key benefits of the TEACH Grant and the two loan forgiveness programs are helping to recruit needed teachers and helping teachers pay for their education, while key challenges include participants' lack of knowledge about the programs' requirements, according to GAO's focus groups with college officials and interviews with other stakeholders. Regarding challenges, college officials said TEACH recipients may have difficulty finding and keeping an eligible teaching position and that annual certification requirements are confusing. GAO's review of data from Education's Federal Student Aid Ombudsman corroborates these challenges: 64 percent of the 212 requests for TEACH assistance from October 2011 through March 2014 cited problems submitting certification paperwork. Further, some college administrators said a key reason their schools do not participate in the program is the grant-to-loan conversion issue.
Education tracks participation in all three programs, but lacks clear, consistent guidance to help recipients understand the TEACH grant-to-loan conversion dispute process. As of September 2014, GAO's analysis of TEACH servicer data shows that 2,252 grants were erroneously converted to loans. Education officials said they now monitor the servicer more closely and plan to review all of the nearly 36,000 of the program's grant-to-loan conversions, but the agency has not systemically reviewed the cause of the errors. Federal internal control standards emphasize ongoing monitoring and absent a review, Education lacks reasonable assurance that it has taken steps to minimize future erroneous conversions. Education established a dispute process to address concerns about TEACH grants converted to loans in error; however, GAO found that Education and the servicer provide incomplete and inconsistent information to recipients about the availability of and criteria for disputing conversions. This is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that highlight effective external communication. Absent clear and complete information, recipients are unlikely to understand the dispute process. Education also has not established performance measures for the three programs nor used available data to systematically evaluate them. Managing for results includes setting meaningful performance goals and measuring progress toward them. Absent those, Education is unlikely to be able to use data to improve program administration and participant outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that Education assess TEACH Grant participants' failure to meet grant requirements, examine why erroneous TEACH grant-to-loan conversions occurred, disseminate information on the TEACH grant-to-loan dispute process, and establish program performance measures. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-98-168 | gao_GGD-98-168_0 | Former railroad employees who secure federal civilian employment would most likely also be covered by FERS—the federal retirement program nearly all new civilian employees must join. FERS benefits are funded through various agency and employee contributions, which are deposited in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Trust Fund (CSRDF) that is administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). When an employee separates, vested DB benefits can be withdrawn as a lump-sum payment; however, more commonly, plans require that these benefits be deferred until the point at which the separated employee would have become eligible to retire under the plan and begin receiving benefits. Railroad Retirement Benefits Are More Portable Within the Industry Than Outside It
The portability of Railroad Retirement benefits depends on whether an employee changes employers within the industry or leaves the industry for nonrailroad employment. To illustrate, if a railroad worker retired from the railroads with at least 10 years of railroad service, any wage information and service credits earned under Social Security from prior nonrailroad employment would be transferred to RRB and used to compute the employee’s Tier I benefits. Tier II Benefits Are Less Portable Outside the Industry
Outside the industry, Tier II benefits are less portable than Tier I benefits because of Railroad Retirement’s stringent vesting and forfeiture rules and the fact that Tier II service credits are not transferable to nonrailroad employers. Crediting Railroad Service Into FERS Could Enhance Tier II Portability, but Could Increase FERS Costs
Crediting railroad service as federal service under FERS could enhance the portability of Tier II benefits by allowing former railroad workers who secure federal employment to effectively convert their Tier II pension benefits into FERS pension benefits. Although OPM’s illustrations suggest that per-person lifetime costs could be high, the aggregate cost probably would not be if the number of employees involved was small. Policy and Administrative Issues Could Arise
Because they would need to collect and verify the railroad service of each employee who elected the credit, OPM and the agencies that hire former railroad employees could experience some increase in administrative costs if a railroad service credit provision were added to FERS. OPM has consistently objected to proposals to extend service credit for work that was not covered by CSRS and FERS, especially if it was performed in the private sector. The results of their analysis showed that if the vesting requirement was reduced from 10 to 5 years, there would be little difference in trust fund assets, outlays, and receipts. If a service credit provision was added to FERS, it would be cost-neutral from the federal government’s perspective only if the costs were paid in full by the former railroad employees or the railroad industry or a combination of the two. The objectives of our review were to determine which, if any, Railroad Retirement benefits are portable; what changes could be made to the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) that might enhance the portability of Railroad Retirement benefits into FERS for former railroad employees who obtain federal civilian employment and the cost and management implications of those changes for FERS and whether such changes could be made cost-neutral to FERS; and what changes could be made to Railroad Retirement that might enhance the portability of its retirement benefits and the cost and management implications of such program changes for Railroad Retirement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the portability of Railroad Retirement Benefits, focusing on: (1) which, if any, Railroad Retirement benefits are portable; (2) what changes could be made to the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) that might enhance the portability of Railroad Retirement benefits into FERS for former railroad employees who secure federal civilian employment and the cost and administrative implications of those changes for FERS and whether such changes could be made cost-neutral to FERS; and (3) what changes could be made to Railroad Retirement that might enhance the overall portability of its retirement benefits and what are the cost and administrative implications of these changes for Railroad Retirement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under the Railroad Retirement program, Tier I and Tier II benefits are fully portable within the railroad industry; the benefits that employees earn from one railroad employer can be carried to the next employer without any reduction in value; (2) Tier I benefits are also portable outside the industry; railroad employees can convert their Tier I benefits into social security benefits and vice versa; (3) Tier II benefits, however, are less portable outside the industry; railroad employees must have at least 10 years of railroad service to establish their right to Tier II benefits and the receipt of any benefits must be deferred until the time that the employee would have become eligible to retire under the plan; (4) although the Railroad Retirement program provides for indexing wages for inflation that occurred during the pre-retirement period, this provision applies only to former railroad workers who secure employment at selected federal agencies that are responsible for federal railroad policies; (5) for former railroad workers who secure federal civilian employment, the portability of Tier II benefits could be enhanced if they could be converted into FERS pension benefits; (6) the arrangement would be cost-neutral to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Trust Fund only if any increased costs were paid in full by the railroad industry, the former railroad employees, or a combination of the two; (7) according to the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) analysis, per-person lifetime costs could be high; (8) however, its analysis also suggests that the aggregate cost probably would not be high if the number of employees involved was small; (9) according to OPM, the agencies that hire former railroad employees and OPM would both experience modest increases in administrative costs; (10) although it believes the administrative burdens of adding a railroad service credit provision to FERS would be manageable, OPM has consistently objected to proposals that would extend service credit for work that was not covered by the Civil Service Retirement System or FERS; (11) the portability of Tier II benefits could also be enhanced by reducing the required vesting period for railroad employees; and (12) according to a Railroad Retirement Board, the impact on Railroad Retirement trust fund assets, outlays, and receipts would be less if the option applied only to benefits earned by current or future employees. |
gao_GAO-16-594 | gao_GAO-16-594_0 | 1.) Medicare Expenditures on and Administrations of Part B ASP Drugs Were Concentrated in a Small Number of Drugs in 2014 Expenditures on and Administrations of Part B ASP Drugs Were Each Concentrated in a Small Number of Drugs, with Few Drugs among Highest in Both
Medicare expenditures were concentrated in a small number of the 551 Part B drugs that were paid based on ASP in 2014. 2.) In particular, 6 drugs each had expenditures of over $1 billion and collectively accounted for 36 percent of all expenditures on Part B ASP drugs that year. Beyond the 10 drugs with the highest number of administrations, an additional 75 drugs were each administered between 100,000 and 1 million times, and collectively accounted for an additional 51 percent of all administrations of Part B drugs paid based on ASP. Drug Characteristics Associated with the Highest Percentage of Expenditures Generally Differed from Those Associated with the Highest Percentage of Administrations
The characteristics of drugs associated with the majority of expenditures on Part B ASP drugs tended to differ from the characteristics of drugs associated with the majority of administrations. CMS Checks Reported Sales Prices for Potential Data Errors, but Does Not Routinely Verify the Underlying Data or Receive All Relevant Data
CMS Performs Several Electronic Data Checks on Manufacturer-Reported Sales Price Data, but these Checks Do Not Verify the Accuracy of the Underlying Data
CMS takes three main steps to validate that the sales price data reported by drug manufacturers are complete and accurate. CMS’s data checks include checking for missing data or duplicate entries, checking for incorrect product information, and comparing submissions to those of previous quarters. However, CMS does not take sufficient steps to verify the accuracy of the data. CMS Is Unable to Assess the Accuracy of All Sales Price Data because Not All Manufacturers Submit Sales Price Data
CMS is unable to assess the accuracy of all drug manufacturers’ sales price data because not all drug manufacturers submit these data to CMS. As stated previously, only drug manufacturers with Medicaid drug rebate agreements are required to submit ASP data on a quarterly basis. This is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control, which call for management to use quality information to achieve objectives. These officials stated that providers prefer to use drugs with published Medicare payment rates because they know what they will be paid. In contrast, CMS officials told us if a manufacturer did not submit ASP data for a drug that is manufactured by multiple sources, the sales price would still be based on ASP data submitted by the other manufacturers of the drug. Conclusions
In 2014, Medicare spent approximately $21 billion on Part B drugs paid based on ASP. The substantial expenditures for Part B ASP drugs underscore how important it is that CMS ensure that the data on which the agency bases Medicare’s payment rates for these drugs are accurate. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help the Department of Health and Human Services ensure accuracy in Part B drug payment rates, Congress should consider requiring all manufacturers of Part B drugs paid at ASP, not only those with Medicaid drug rebate agreements, to submit sales price data to CMS, and ensure that CMS has authority to request source documentation to periodically validate all such data. Recommendation for Executive Action
CMS should periodically verify the sales price data submitted by a sample of drug manufacturers by requesting source documentation from manufacturers to corroborate the reported data, either directly or by working with OIG as necessary. In its comments, HHS agreed with our recommendation. GAO-16-12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare Part B covers drugs typically administered by a physician. Medicare pays physicians and other providers for these drugs at an amount generally equal to the ASP of the drug plus a fixed percentage. These payment rates are calculated quarterly by CMS based on price and volume data reported by drug manufacturers. Members of Congress and others have questioned the amount that both Medicare and its beneficiaries spend on Part B drugs.
GAO was asked to examine Medicare spending for and utilization of Part B drugs and the accuracy of the sales price data reported by drug manufacturers. This report (1) describes Medicare spending and utilization for Part B drugs that are paid based on ASP, including variations in spending and utilization by provider and drug characteristics, and (2) examines the steps CMS takes to ensure the accuracy of the sales price data reported by drug manufacturers. To describe Medicare spending and utilization for Part B ASP drugs, GAO analyzed 2014 Medicare claims data. To examine the accuracy of ASP data, GAO interviewed CMS, the HHS Office of Inspector General, and drug manufacturers and reviewed related documentation.
What GAO Found
In 2014, the most recent year for which data were available, the Medicare program and its beneficiaries spent about $21 billion on approximately 46 million administrations of 551 Part B drugs paid based on average sales price (ASP). Six drugs—each exceeding $1 billion in expenditures—accounted for 36 percent of all expenditures on Part B ASP drugs, while a different 10 drugs—each administered over 1 million times—accounted for 37 percent of all administrations. Biologics (drugs made from living entities), drugs without generic versions available, and drugs made by a single manufacturer were associated with the vast majority of expenditures on Part B ASP drugs. In contrast, synthetics (drugs produced from chemical ingredients), drugs with generic versions available, and drugs with multiple manufacturers were associated with the vast majority of administrations. Compared with other types of providers, hematology oncologists were associated with the highest percentage of drug expenditures and administrations.
Source: GAO analysis of Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Food and Drug Administration, and RED BOOK data. | GAO-16-594
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), performs several electronic data checks on the sales price data reported by drug manufacturers each quarter, including checking for missing data or incorrect product information. However, CMS does not routinely verify the underlying data, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that call for management to use quality information to achieve its objectives. Without additional verification of the ASP data received from manufacturers, it is possible for the data to be inaccurate, which could result in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. In addition, CMS is unable to use or assess the accuracy of all sales price data because, as directed by statute, only manufacturers with Medicaid drug rebate agreements are required to submit sales price data to CMS. Unless all manufacturers without rebate agreements choose to voluntarily submit sales price data, the payment rates for some drugs will be based on incomplete ASP data or will not be set based on ASP.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring all manufacturers of drugs paid at ASP to submit sales price data to CMS. Further, CMS should periodically verify the data submitted by a sample of drug manufacturers by requesting source documentation. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that CMS would take action as warranted. |
gao_GAO-14-268 | gao_GAO-14-268_0 | Among other components of guidance on the conduct of retrospective analyses, agencies are expected to conduct a quantifiable assessment of the current costs and benefits of any proposed changes to existing regulations to the extent possible, develop plans for how they will measure the performance of regulations in the future, seek the public’s views on retrospective review plans and related analysis, and coordinate the development of the new retrospective plans with other retrospective review requirements. Agency Priority Goals
GPRAMA requires the 24 agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, or as otherwise determined by OMB, to develop agency priority goals (APG) every 2 years. OMB staff agreed with this recommendation. Between January 2011 and the end of August 2013, the agencies completed and had taken at least some final action on 246 of those planned analyses (see table 1). In 225 of the 246 completed analyses we examined (more than 90 percent), the reviews led to agencies amending sections of the CFR to revise, clarify, or eliminate regulatory text. Agencies most commonly identified three categories of expected outcomes from the actions they took in response to completed retrospective analyses: (1) improving the effectiveness of regulations; (2) reducing the burden on regulated entities; and (3) providing clarity on regulations or making other administrative changes. In other cases, agencies identified but did not quantify expected savings. Independent Regulatory Agencies Followed a Different Retrospective Analysis Planning Process than Executive Agencies
Independent regulatory agencies were not required to develop retrospective review plans, but were encouraged to do so in Executive Order 13579 and a related memorandum providing additional guidance. Agency Officials Identified Strategies and Barriers That Affected Their Implementation of Retrospective Analyses
Officials from the nine agencies that we selected to complete questionnaires and participate in our roundtable discussion cited many strategies and practices their agencies used as facilitators, or factors the agencies encountered as barriers, which affected their ability to implement key retrospective analysis requirements or guidance. In some instances, agencies also formed intradepartmental working groups. Leverage Existing Regulatory Activities to Identify Needed Changes
Six of the nine agencies reported that leveraging existing regulatory activities—such as regulatory planning, rulemaking, and enforcement processes—assisted them in implementing the executive orders and related guidance. Other agencies reported having similar feedback mechanisms that they considered to be most useful. The agency implemented retrospective review practices at the same time they were issuing new rules related to the Leahy Smith America Invents Act. Agencies Reported Mixed Experiences Linking Retrospective Analyses to APGs
Agencies’ responses about linkages between retrospective analyses and APGs were mixed. We asked agencies the extent to which they would like to receive more assistance or guidance on incorporating retrospective analyses into measuring and achieving agency goals, including APGs. OMB staff agreed with this recommendation. Opportunities Exist to Better Link Retrospective Analyses and Agency Priority Goals
The focus of retrospective analyses differs from agency performance reviews. Given the specific focus of retrospective regulatory analyses, several agency officials said the staff conducting the analyses often oversee implementation of the regulation and are not involved in, or sometimes aware of, performance discussions that are held at higher levels of the agency. From January 2011 through August 2013, executive agencies identified more than 650 initiatives (planned retrospective regulatory analyses). While OMB has provided a sample template for agencies to use for reporting on the progress and the results of retrospective analyses, it could do more to enhance the transparency and usefulness of the information provided to the public. However, contributing to evaluation of agency priority goals could also be among those reasons. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve agencies’ retrospective regulatory review processes and reporting, and strengthen linkages between retrospective reviews and agency performance management, we recommend the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to take the following three actions: 1. Work with regulatory agencies to implement existing guidance, and update guidance where needed, to improve the reporting of outcomes in their retrospective regulatory review plans by taking actions such as: publishing a link to updated plans, which list recent results and anticipated outcomes, on the White House website; submitting evidence that agencies listed updates of their plans on their “Open Government” web pages; providing more comprehensive information on completed reviews in agencies’ most recent plans and progress reports by (1) ensuring the most recent published plan contains a complete accounting of all completed reviews rather than expecting readers to review multiple plans, and (2) including the supporting analysis and data for results by listing a link or citation to the related documentation. Ensure that the contributions made by regulations toward the achievement of APGs are properly considered and improve how retrospective regulatory reviews can be used to help inform assessments of progress toward these APGs by directing in guidance that agencies take such actions as: identifying whether a regulation contributes to an APG expected to be reviewed by management as one of the criteria for prioritizing retrospective analyses and for the timing of these analyses; and once an agency prioritizes a retrospective analysis based, in part, on its support of an APG, improving the usefulness of that analysis by examining regulations that collectively contribute to the goal in the scope of the review as appropriate. In oral comments received on April 3, 2014, staff from OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) generally agreed with the recommendations in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies issue thousands of regulations annually to address such national goals as public health and safety. Retrospective analysis can help agencies evaluate how existing regulations work in practice. GAO was asked to provide insights on agencies' retrospective analyses. This report identifies for selected agencies (1) the results and anticipated outcomes of retrospective analyses agencies completed, (2) strategies, practices, or factors that affected agencies' ability to implement these analyses, and (3) the extent to which agencies are incorporating the analyses into processes for measuring and achieving agency priority goals. Applying criteria from executive orders, GPRAMA, and related guidance, GAO analyzed documents from 22 executive agencies and 2 independent regulatory agencies that prepared final retrospective review plans. These agencies issued more than 96 percent of all final rules published between 2011 and 2013. GAO also obtained agency officials' views through questionnaires and a roundtable of 9 agencies selected primarily on numbers of completed analyses. The officials' views are not generalizable to all agencies. GAO also interviewed OMB staff.
What GAO Found
Agencies often made changes to regulations in response to completed retrospective regulatory analyses, but could improve the reporting of progress. Executive Orders and related implementation guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) require executive agencies, and encourage independent regulatory agencies, to develop and implement retrospective review plans. Agencies use semiannual updates to report on the progress and results of their analyses. The 22 executive agencies in GAO's scope identified more than 650 planned analyses and reported having completed and taken final actions on 246 of those analyses by August 31, 2013. The two independent regulatory agencies in GAO's scope each chose to develop a final retrospective review plan, although not required to do so. More than 90 percent of the completed analyses led executive agencies to revise, clarify, or eliminate regulatory text. Agencies also took other actions such as updating guidance to the public. Agencies most commonly reported three expected outcomes from actions they took: improving the effectiveness of regulations (112 of 246), reducing regulatory burden (99 of 246), and clarifying regulations or making other administrative changes (93 of 246), such as implementing new procedures. Agencies often reported more than one outcome. Agencies quantified expected savings for 38 of the 246 completed analyses, often attributing savings to reduced information collection burdens. However, agencies did not consistently include citations or links to the supporting analyses and data in their progress reports. While OMB guidance contains transparency requirements for agencies to inform the public, OMB could work with agencies to effectively implement the guidance to improve the usefulness of the information agencies report on the results of their analyses.
Officials from the 9 agencies that participated in GAO's roundtable identified three key strategies and two barriers that most often affected their implementation of retrospective analyses. Strategies that facilitated planning and conducting analyses included: (1) establishing a centrally coordinated review process, (2) leveraging existing regulatory activities such as rulemaking and enforcement processes, and (3) using existing external feedback mechanisms such as advisory committees. The most commonly cited barriers were competing priorities for available staff and difficulty obtaining sufficient data.
Retrospective analysis can also help inform agencies' priority goals (APG). The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires agencies to assess whether regulations, among other activities, are contributing as planned to APGs. Agencies reported mixed experiences linking retrospective analyses to APGs. The seven roundtable agencies with APGs identified regulations contributing to their priority goals, but their retrospective analyses were only sometimes linked to APGs. In some cases, different offices in the same agency had mixed responses about whether such linkages existed. Several agency officials said staff conducting retrospective analyses were not involved in performance discussions at higher levels of the agency. To inform broader performance planning and reviews, retrospective analyses can be another potential data source for APGs. Agencies could strengthen that linkage by taking actions such as considering APGs, to the extent practicable, when planning retrospective analyses and identifying how they will measure the performance of significant new rules related to priority goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB work with agencies to improve reporting on results of retrospective analyses and strengthen links between those analyses and agencies' performance goals by considering APGs when planning retrospective analyses, among other actions. OMB staff generally agreed with the recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-395 | gao_GAO-16-395_0 | Development Has Generally Progressed as Planned
Since the start of development in 2014, the VH-92A program has generally progressed as planned. Through November 2015, Sikorsky has accomplished approximately $239.0 million (22 percent) in development work–leaving about $863.9 million (78 percent) in estimated work to go over the next 5 years. As of December 2015, Sikorsky indicated that, nearly all of the developmental tasks expected to be accomplished by that point had been accomplished at only slightly greater cost than anticipated. In addition, the program is currently on schedule. In the past year, the program successfully conducted its PDR and carried out a number of other significant development activities including continued development of the mission communications system, prime contractor taking custody of two S-92A aircraft, initial testing of one engineering and developmental model (EDM) aircraft, and initiation of S-92A to VH-92A developmental model helicopter conversions. Program is Managing Design, Integration, and Technical Challenges
As to be expected with a major system development effort, as the program has progressed it has faced a number of design, integration, and technical challenges, some preexisting and others realized during the course of development. Examples of the challenges the program is currently managing include design of the passenger doors, incorporation of titanium framing in the two initial aircraft, and meeting requirements relating to electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and cybersecurity. Earned Value Management System and Master Schedule Met Best Practices
An earned value management (EVM) system is a project management tool that integrates the technical scope of work with schedule and cost elements for investment planning and control. We also found that the program’s IMS substantially met the best practices for a reliable schedule. Overall, we found the program’s IMS is reliable as it substantially met all four of the characteristics. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix V. In its written comments, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with our best practices and it will continue to monitor the program and ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. We will also continue to monitor the program as it moves forward. To assess the schedule, we obtained and reviewed documentation, including the work breakdown structure. Appendix II: GAO Reports on the Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program
Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Program Established Knowledge- Based Business Case and Entered System Development with Plans for Managing Challenges (GAO-15-392R, April 14, 2015)
Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Update on Program’s Progress toward Development Start (GAO-14-358R, April 10, 2014)
Department of Defense’s Waiver of Competitive Prototyping Requirement for the VXX Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program (GAO-13-826R, September 6, 2013)
Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Program Makes Progress in Balancing Requirements, Costs, and Schedule (GAO-13-257, April 9, 2013)
Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Effort Delayed as DOD Adopts New Approach to Balance Requirements, Costs, and Schedule (GAO-12-381R, February 27, 2012)
Defense Acquisitions: Application of Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the Presidential Helicopter Program (GAO-11-380R, March 25, 2011)
Appendix III: Summary Assessment of the VH-92A Program’s Earned Value Management (EVM) Data and Practices Compared to Best Practices
Overall assessment Met
Best practice The program has a certified EVM system Substantially Met: The contractor’s EVM An Integrated Baseline Review was conducted to ensure the performance measurement baseline captures all of the work The schedule reflects the work breakdown structure, the logical sequencing of activities, and the necessary resources EVM surveillance is being performed system has been rated acceptable, indicating that it generally complies with EVM system guidelines. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the presidential helicopter fleet is to provide safe, reliable, and timely transportation for the President, Vice President, foreign heads of state, and other official parties as directed by the White House Military Office. The Navy plans to acquire VH-92A helicopters to replace its aging fleet. Initial delivery of VH-92A presidential helicopters is scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2020 with production ending in fiscal year 2023. Total program acquisition cost is estimated to be $5.1 billion.
This is GAO's seventh report on the program since 2011. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO report annually on the acquisition of the VH-92A aircraft. This report discusses (1) the program's cost, schedule, and performance status; (2) challenges it faces in system development; and (3) its adherence to acquisition best practices. To conduct the review, GAO examined program documents, including Navy, contractor, and on-site government program monitor reports. GAO also interviewed officials, reviewed the earned value management system, and assessed the integrated master schedule against GAO best practices.
What GAO Found
Since 2014, the VH-92A presidential helicopter program has generally progressed as planned. Through November 2015, the contractor accomplished approximately $239.0 million (22 percent) in development work—leaving about $863.9 million (78 percent) in estimated work over the next 5 years. As of December 2015, the prime contractor had accomplished nearly all of the expected developmental tasks at only slightly greater cost than anticipated. The program is currently on track to accomplish key development milestones as planned. In the past year, the program successfully conducted its preliminary design review and carried out a number of other significant development activities, including: continued development of the mission communications system, delivery and initial testing of aircraft for risk-reduction activities, and initiation of the conversion of Sikorsky S-92A helicopters into VH-92A developmental models.
As expected with a major system development effort, the program faces a number of design and technical challenges, some preexisting and others realized during the course of development. Those challenges include designing passenger doors, incorporating titanium framing in the two initial aircraft, meeting requirements relating to electromagnetic environmental effects, and cybersecurity. The program took advantage of capability and testing trades that produced cost and schedule savings. For example, the program was able to reduce physical testing by relying on existing information about the aircraft's performance, supplemented by additional information collected during testing and through modeling.
When assessed against best practices, GAO found that the contractor's earned value management system, a project management tool for investment planning and control, fully or substantially met the three characteristics for a reliable earned value management system. Similarly, in assessing the program's integrated master schedule against best practices, GAO found that it substantially met all four of the characteristics required for a reliable schedule.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with GAO's best practices and it will continue to monitor the program and ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. GAO will also continue to monitor the program as it moves forward. |
gao_GAO-03-621T | gao_GAO-03-621T_0 | Currently, over 300 such species are found on military installations. Competition for radio frequency spectrum. Urban growth. Because most encroachment problems are caused by urban development and population growth, these problems are expected to increase in the future. Although the effects vary by service and by individual installation, encroachment has generally limited the extent to which training ranges are available or the types of training that can be conducted. This limits units’ ability to train as they would expect to fight and causes workarounds that may limit the amount or quality of training. At the same time, according to Defense officials, the increased speed and range of weapon systems are expected to increase training range requirements. Effects of Encroachment on Training Readiness and Costs Have Not Been Reflected in Most Service Readiness Reports
Despite the loss of some training range capabilities, service readiness data did not show the impact of encroachment on training readiness. However, DOD’s January 2003 quarterly report to Congress did tie an Air Force training issue directly to encroachment. In fact, it rarely cited training range limitations at all. However, DOD’s most recent quarterly report did indicate a training issue that is tied directly to encroachment. All this makes it extremely difficult for the services to leverage assets that may be available in nearby locations, increasing the risk of inefficiencies, lost time and opportunities, delays, added costs, and reduced training opportunities. While recent efforts show increased activity on the part of the services to assess their training requirements, they do not yet represent a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of encroachments. In addition, while some service officials have reported increasing costs because of workarounds related to encroachment, the services’ data systems do not capture these costs in any comprehensive manner. Progress in Addressing Encroachment Issues Still Evolving
DOD has made some progress in addressing individual encroachment issues, including individual action plans and legislative proposals. But more will be required to put in place a comprehensive plan that clearly identifies steps to be taken, goals and milestones to track progress, and required funding. Some of the short- term actions implemented include the following. Following our reports, DOD issued a range sustainment directive to establish policy and assign responsibilities for the sustainment of test and training ranges, and the Special Operations Command developed a database identifying the training ranges it uses, type of training conducted, and restrictions on training. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD faces growing challenges in carrying out realistic training at installations and training ranges--land, air, and sea--because of encroachment by outside factors. These include urban growth, competition for radio frequencies or airspace, air or noise pollution, unexploded ordnance and munition components, endangered species habitat, and protected marine resources. Building on work reported on in 2002, GAO assessed (1) the impact of encroachment on training ranges, (2) DOD's efforts to document the effect on readiness and cost, and (3) DOD's progress in addressing encroachment.
What GAO Found
Encroachment was reported as having affected some training range capabilities, requiring workarounds--or adjustments to training events--and sometimes limiting training, at all stateside installations and major commands GAO visited. GAO has identified similar effects abroad. Encroachment generally limits the time that training ranges are available and the types of training conducted. This in turn limits units' ability to train as they would fight. Most encroachment issues are caused by population growth and urban development. Because both are expected to increase, as are the speed and range of weapon systems used on training ranges, the problems are also expected to increase. Despite DOD--voiced concerns about encroachment's effects on training, service readiness data in 2002 did not show the impact of encroachment on training readiness or costs, although DOD's most recent quarterly report to Congress on readiness did tie a training issue directly to encroachment. While individual services are making some assessment of training requirements and limitations imposed by encroachment, comprehensive assessments remain to be done. Likewise, complete inventories of training ranges are not yet available to foster sharing of ranges on an interservice or joint basis. This increases the risk of inefficiencies, lost time and opportunities, delays, and added cost. Also, although some services have reported higher costs because of encroachment-related workarounds for training, service data systems do not capture the costs comprehensively. DOD has made some progress in addressing individual encroachment issues, such as implementing some short-term actions, proposing legislation to clarify the relationship between training and conservation statutes, and issuing a range sustainment directive. But more is required for a comprehensive plan, as recommended by GAO earlier, that clearly identifies steps to be taken, goals and milestones to track progress, and required funding. |
gao_GAO-04-167 | gao_GAO-04-167_0 | One issue concerns physician ownership of specialty hospitals and whether such ownership might inappropriately affect physicians’ clinical decision-making and referral behavior. Our April 2003 report provided information on both issues: the extent of physician ownership at specialty hospitals and the relative severity of patients’ illnesses at specialty and general hospitals. 1.) Approximately one-third of specialty hospitals were owned in part by a specialty hospital chain. Specialty Hospitals Clustered in Areas Where State Policy and Local Demographic Conditions Favor Growth
Although 28 states had at least one existing specialty hospital, about two- thirds of the 100 specialty hospitals we identified were located in 7 states. 2.) The specialty hospitals that are planned to open over the next few months or years will tend to reinforce the existing pattern of geographic concentration. 3.) Specialty Hospitals Tend to Locate in States That Do Not Restrict Hospital Growth
The location of specialty hospitals is strongly correlated to whether states allow hospitals to add beds or build new facilities without first obtaining state approval for such health care capacity increases. All of the specialty hospitals that are under development and 96 percent of the specialty hospitals that opened from 1990 to June 2003 are located in such states. The Four Specialty Hospital Types Differed from General Hospitals in Size and Scope but Also Differed from One Another
Relative to general hospitals, specialty hospitals, as a group, were much less likely to have emergency departments, saw fewer patients in their emergency departments, treated smaller percentages of Medicaid patients, and derived a smaller share of their revenues from inpatient services. However, there were important differences among the four specialty hospital types in these and other service indicators, such as the extent to which hospitals’ emergency departments focused on certain medical conditions or procedures. Overall, 45 percent of specialty hospitals had emergency departments, compared with 92 percent of general hospitals. Specialty Hospitals Rivaled General Hospitals in Certain Market Share Measures and Financial Performance
Although a general hospital typically had more beds than a specialty hospital had, the focused mission of a specialty hospital often resulted in its treating more patients with a given condition. When the costs from all lines of business and the revenues from all payers were considered, specialty hospitals tended to outperform general hospitals. Financial Performance of Specialty Hospitals Tended to Equal or Exceed That of General Hospitals
Financially, specialty hospitals tended to perform about as well as general hospitals did on their Medicare inpatient business in fiscal year 2001—the most recent year for which this information is available. The officials generally agreed with the information in our report and offered their views on reasons for key differences between specialty and general hospitals. Critics of specialty hospitals are concerned that such facilities may erode the financial health of general hospitals and impair their ability to provide emergency care and meet other basic community needs, such as stand-by capacity to respond to communitywide disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent growth in specialty hospitals that are largely for-profit and owned, in part, by physicians, has been controversial. Advocates of these hospitals contend that the focused mission and dedicated resources of specialty hospitals both improve quality and reduce costs. Critics contend that specialty hospitals siphon off the most profitable procedures and patient cases, thus eroding the financial health of neighboring general hospitals and impairing their ability to provide emergency care and other essential community services. Critics also contend that physician ownership of specialty hospitals creates financial incentives that may inappropriately affect physicians' clinical and referral behavior. In April 2003, GAO reported on certain aspects of specialty hospitals, including the extent of physician ownership and the relative severity of patients treated (GAO-03-683R). For this report, GAO was asked to examine (1) state policies and local conditions associated with the location of specialty hospitals, (2) how specialty hospitals differ from general hospitals in providing emergency care and serving a community's other medical needs, and (3) how specialty and general hospitals in the same communities compare in terms of market share and financial health.
What GAO Found
The 100 existing specialty hospitals identified by GAO--hospitals that focus on cardiac, orthopedic, or women's medicine or on surgical procedures--are geographically concentrated in areas where state policy facilitates hospital growth. Although 28 states have at least 1 specialty hospital, approximately two-thirds of the 100 specialty hospitals are located in 7 states. At least an additional 26 specialty hospitals were under development in 2003 and will tend to reinforce the existing pattern of geographic concentration. Specialty hospitals are much more likely to be found in states where hospitals are permitted to add beds or build new facilities without first obtaining state approval for such health care capacity increases. Relative to general hospitals, specialty hospitals, as a group, were much less likely to have emergency departments, treated smaller percentages of Medicaid patients, and derived a smaller share of their revenues from inpatient services. For example, 45 percent of specialty hospitals, but 92 percent of general hospitals, had emergency departments. There were, however, important differences among the four specialty hospital types in these and other service indicators. Although general hospitals typically have more beds than specialty hospitals, the focused mission of specialty hospitals often resulted in their treating more patients in their given fields of specialization. Financially, specialty hospitals tended to perform about as well as general hospitals did on their Medicare inpatient business. However, specialty hospitals tended to outperform general hospitals when the costs from all lines of business and the revenues from all payers were considered. Officials from three specialty hospital organizations commented on a draft of this report. They generally agreed with the report's information and commented on key differences between specialty and general hospitals. |
gao_GAO-09-432T | gao_GAO-09-432T_0 | The federal government has developed a strategy to address such cyber threats. Specifically, President Bush issued the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and related policy directives, such as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, that specify key elements of how the nation is to secure key computer-based systems, including both government systems and those that support critical infrastructures owned and operated by the private sector. GAO Has Made Recommendations to Address Shortfalls with Key Aspects of National Cybersecurity Strategy and its Implementation
Over the last several years we have reported on our nation’s efforts to fulfill essential aspects of its cybersecurity strategy. In particular, we have reported consistently since 2005 that DHS has yet to fully satisfy its cybersecurity responsibilities designated by the strategy. To address these shortfalls, we have made about 30 recommendations in key cybersecurity areas including the 5 listed in table 1. DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its cybersecurity responsibilities, but the department still has not fully satisfied our recommendations, and thus further action needs to be taken to address these areas. Cybersecurity Experts Highlighted Key Improvements Needed to Strengthen the Nation’s Cybersecurity Posture
In addition to our recommendations on improving key aspects of the national cybersecurity strategy and its implementation, we also obtained the views of experts (by means of panel discussions) on these and other critical aspects of the strategy, including areas for improvement. These improvements are in large part consistent with our above mentioned reports and extensive research and experience in this area. Until the recommendations are fully addressed and these improvements are considered, our nation’s most critical federal and private sector infrastructure systems remain at unnecessary risk to attack from our adversaries. Consequently, in addition to fully implementing our recommendations, it is essential that the Obama administration consider these improvements as it reviews our nation’s cybersecurity strategy and begins to make decisions on moving forward. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pervasive and sustained computerbased (cyber) attacks against federal and private-sector infrastructures pose a potentially devastating impact to systems and operations and the critical infrastructures that they support. To address these threats, President Bush issued a 2003 national strategy and related policy directives aimed at improving cybersecurity nationwide. Congress and the Executive Branch, including the new administration, have subsequently taken actions to examine the adequacy of the strategy and identify areas for improvement. Nevertheless, GAO has identified this area as high risk and has reported on needed improvements in implementing the national cybersecurity strategy. In this testimony, you asked GAO to summarize (1) key reports and recommendations on the national cybersecurity strategy and (2) the views of experts on how to strengthen the strategy. In doing so, GAO relied on its previous reports related to the strategy and conducted panel discussions with key cybersecurity experts to solicit their views on areas for improvement.
What GAO Found
Over the last several years, GAO has consistently reported that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has yet to fully satisfy its responsibilities designated by the national cybersecurity strategy. To address these shortfalls, GAO has made about 30 recommendations in key cybersecurity areas. While DHS has since developed and implemented certain capabilities to satisfy aspects of its cybersecurity responsibilities, it still has not fully satisfied the recommendations, and thus further action needs to be taken to fully address these areas. In discussing the areas addressed by GAO's recommendations as well as other critical aspects of the strategy, GAO's panel of cybersecurity experts identified 12 key areas requiring improvement. GAO found these to be largely consistent with its reports and its extensive research and experience in the area. Until GAO's recommendations are fully addressed and the above improvements are considered, our nation's federal and private-sector infrastructure systems remain at risk of not being adequately protected. Consequently, in addition to fully implementing GAO's recommendations, it is essential that the improvements be considered by the new administration as it begins to make decisions on our nation's cybersecurity strategy. |
gao_GAO-17-739 | gao_GAO-17-739_0 | Information Architecture Provides a Potential Approach for Developing a Federal Program Inventory
The principles and practices of information architecture—a discipline focused on how information is organized, structured, and presented to users—may offer an overarching approach for developing a useful federal program inventory. Each of these steps is described more fully in the sections following. Such prioritization, for example, could also involve examining costs that agencies might face in collecting information for certain facets. Decision rules for determining what should be identified as a program for purposes of the inventory will need to balance usefulness and costs, if this approach is implemented. For example, Education generally has consistent, program-focused alignment across its organizational structures. However, collecting program information for each facet may pose challenges for agencies. As we developed our hypothetical inventory, we found that a greater range of program information was readily available for some of the selected programs than for others—often depending on the extent to which programs were included by name in the documents we reviewed (e.g., budget documents, performance and strategic plans, and agency websites). In some cases, activities may need to be allocated differently among programs. These examinations can lead to improvements in the inventory over time. This program could be tagged to highlight these and other attributes of the program collected in facets related to activities and services and to eligible beneficiaries. Figure 4 provides an illustrative example of this concept. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Departments of Education and Homeland Security, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the General Services Administration. USAID provided technical corrections, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. OMB agreed to consider this information architecture approach as it develops plans for the next iteration of the federal program inventory. GPRAMA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to present a coherent picture of all federal programs by making information about each program available on a website. For this report, we examined how the principles and practices of information architecture can be applied for the development of a useful federal program inventory. Our analysis included the following: the extent to which consistent and complete lists of agency programs could be identified using budget-related information and the impact of the agency’s organizational structures on these lists; a review of the types of activities that could be characterized as programs within each agency and how activities are grouped into programs or overarching program areas with underlying programs; and a general review of the alignment of possible programs identified by budget documents with other ways agencies organize their efforts, such as performance reports and CFDA programs. Identifying, Compiling, and Organizing Program Information
As part of our effort to apply relevant principles and practices from information architecture to identify, compile, and organize information about federal programs, we identified information that can be included in a useful federal program inventory, tested the collection and organization of that information by developing a hypothetical inventory with selected programs, and used the hypothetical inventory to illustrate aspects of how a federal program inventory could be validated using an information architecture approach. More specifically, our analysis included the following: Identifying needed information: We identified the types of information about programs that could be included in an inventory to make it useful (e.g., budget, performance, and operations information) by examining OMB and GAO guidance for developing program lists, including OMB’s guidance for the first inventory effort; examining state efforts to develop and use inventories; interviewing potential users; and summarizing examples of the types of program information that have been identified in our past work as being useful. Validating the form and content of the hypothetical inventory: To illustrate aspects of the validation step in the information architecture approach to developing an inventory, we developed sample materials to illustrate what the content and structure of an inventory might include, and we presented these materials to congressional staffers with committees overseeing programs providing early education and child care services (i.e., the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Education and Workforce). Appendix II: Recommendations for the Office of Management and Budget from GAO-15-83: Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories (Oct. 31, 2014)
Appendix II: Recommendations for the Office of Management and Budget from GAO-15-83: Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Inconsistent Definitions and Information Limit the Usefulness of Federal Program Inventories (Oct. 31, 2014)
Appendix III: Observations on Using Budget Information to Identify Federal Programs for an Inventory
We examined budget documentation to identify possible programs in three agencies: the Departments of Education (Education) and Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Second, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 requires specific budget information to be included in an inventory. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year the federal government spends trillions of dollars through dozens of agencies and thousands of federal programs. Given its sheer size and scope, providing a clear and complete picture of what the federal government does and how much it costs has been a challenge in the absence of a comprehensive resource describing these programs. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to present a coherent picture of all federal programs by making information about each program available on a website to enhance the transparency of federal government programs.
Congress included a provision in GPRAMA for GAO to review the implementation of the act. GAO has chosen to conduct this study now because OMB has not yet developed an inventory that meets GPRAMA requirements. For this report, GAO addresses how one potential approach for organizing and structuring information—the principles and practices of information architecture—can be applied to develop a useful federal program inventory. To present illustrative examples of what programs and program information could be included in an inventory, GAO examined budget, performance, and other resources that could be used to develop an inventory. These examples were also used to illustrate the potential content and structure of an inventory and to identify any challenges.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Departments of Education and Homeland Security, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the General Services Administration. USAID provided technical corrections, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. OMB agreed to consider this information architecture approach as it develops plans for the next iteration of the federal program inventory.
What GAO Found
A useful federal program inventory would consist of all programs identified, information about each program, and the organizational structure of the programs and information about them. The principles and practices of information architecture—a discipline focused on organizing and structuring information—offer an approach for developing such an inventory to support a variety of uses, including increased transparency for federal programs. GAO identified a series of iterative steps that can be used to develop an inventory and potential benefits of following this approach. GAO also identified potential challenges agencies may face in developing a full program inventory.
To identify potential benefits and challenges to applying these steps, GAO developed a hypothetical inventory, focusing on three case study agencies—the Departments of Education (Education) and Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Potential benefits of using such an approach to develop a federal program inventory include the following:
Stakeholders have the opportunity to provide input into decisions affecting the structure and content of the inventory. For example, congressional staff told GAO that an inventory with 5 years of budgetary trend data on programs would be more useful than 3 years of data.
A range of information through program facets is available for cross-program comparisons, such as budget, performance, beneficiaries, and activities.
An inventory creates the potential to aggregate, disaggregate, sort, and filter information across multiple program facets. For example, the figure below illustrates how program facets could be used to identify programs that provide similar services—in this case, early learning and child care services—and discover budget and other information for each of the programs identified.
An iterative approach to development and governance of the federal program inventory can result in improvements and expansions of the inventory over time.
GAO also identified potential challenges agencies may face when using this approach to develop an inventory, including the following:
Challenges in determining how agencies should identify and structure their programs in an inventory will need to be addressed, including how to treat spending categories not clearly linked to specific programs, such as administrative support. This may occur because agencies vary in their missions and organizational and budget structures and in how they organize their activities.
Challenges in collecting information for each program facet may occur for some agencies and programs. This may happen because a greater range of program information may be more readily available for some programs than others. GAO found that this was often dependent on the extent to which certain programs were included by name in budget documents, strategic plans, and agency websites.
Challenges related to determining what should be identified as a program and the structure and content of the inventory will need to be balanced with usefulness and costs. Agencies may need to weigh the costs that they might face in collecting and reporting program facet information as they establish priorities. |
gao_GAO-11-657 | gao_GAO-11-657_0 | However, internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program’s ability to provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. Specifically, internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC holders have maintained their eligibility. To meet the stated program mission needs, TSA designed TWIC program processes to facilitate the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls designed and in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. Further, internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of selected MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by our investigators. In such cases, these individuals could better position themselves to inappropriately gain unescorted access to secure areas of a MTSA- regulated facility or vessel. Conducting a control assessment of the TWIC program’s processes to address existing weaknesses could enhance the TWIC program’s ability to prevent and detect fraud and positively identify TWIC applicants. Further, our investigators conducted covert tests to assess the use of TWIC as a means for controlling access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities. During covert tests of TWIC at several selected ports, our investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). TWIC’s Effectiveness at Enhancing Security Has Not Been Assessed, and the Coast Guard Lacks the Ability to Assess Trends in TWIC Compliance
The TWIC program is intended to improve maritime security by using a federally sponsored credential to enhance access controls to secure areas at MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels, but DHS has not assessed the program’s effectiveness at enhancing security. However, to date, DHS has not assessed the effectiveness of TWIC at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned with readers, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility specific identity credentials with business cases. However, DHS did not conduct a risk-informed cost-benefit analysis that considered existing security risks. Moreover, these actions could help DHS identify and assess the full costs and benefits of implementing the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks, and help ensure that the TWIC program is more effective and cost-efficient than existing measures or alternatives at enhancing maritime security. Recommendations for Executive Action
To identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting TWIC program objectives, and assist in determining whether the benefits of continuing to implement and operate the TWIC program in its present form and planned use with readers surpass the costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions: Perform an internal control assessment of the TWIC program by (1) analyzing existing controls, (2) identifying related weaknesses and risks, and (3) determining cost-effective actions needed to correct or compensate for those weaknesses so that reasonable assurance of meeting TWIC program objectives can be achieved. Use the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program in a manner that will meet stated mission needs and mitigate existing security risks as part of conducting the regulatory analysis on implementing a new regulation on the use of TWIC with biometric card readers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard manage the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which requires maritime workers to complete background checks and obtain a biometric identification card to gain unescorted access to secure areas of regulated maritime facilities. As requested, GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) TWIC processes for enrollment, background checking, and use are designed to provide reasonable assurance that unescorted access to these facilities is limited to qualified individuals; and (2) the effectiveness of TWIC has been assessed. GAO reviewed program documentation, such as the concept of operations, and conducted site visits to four TWIC centers, conducted covert tests at several selected U.S. ports chosen for their size in terms of cargo volume, and interviewed agency officials. The results of these visits and tests are not generalizable but provide insights and perspective about the TWIC program. This is a public version of a sensitive report. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses governing the enrollment, background checking, and use of TWIC potentially limit the program's ability to provide reasonable assurance that access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)-regulated facilities is restricted to qualified individuals. To meet the stated program purpose, TSA designed TWIC program processes to facilitate the issuance of TWICs to maritime workers. However, TSA did not assess the internal controls designed and in place to determine whether they provided reasonable assurance that the program could meet defined mission needs for limiting access to only qualified individuals. GAO found that internal controls in the enrollment and background checking processes are not designed to provide reasonable assurance that (1) only qualified individuals can acquire TWICs; (2) adjudicators follow a process with clear criteria for applying discretionary authority when applicants are found to have extensive criminal convictions; or (3) once issued a TWIC, TWIC-holders have maintained their eligibility. Further, internal control weaknesses in TWIC enrollment, background checking, and use could have contributed to the breach of MTSA-regulated facilities during covert tests conducted by GAO's investigators. During covert tests of TWIC use at several selected ports, GAO's investigators were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs, authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and false business cases (i.e., reasons for requesting access). Conducting a control assessment of the TWIC program's processes to address existing weaknesses could better position DHS to achieve its objectives in controlling unescorted access to the secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. DHS has not assessed the TWIC program's effectiveness at enhancing security or reducing risk for MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. Further, DHS has not demonstrated that TWIC, as currently implemented and planned, is more effective than prior approaches used to limit access to ports and facilities, such as using facility specific identity credentials with business cases. Conducting an effectiveness assessment that further identifies and assesses TWIC program security risks and benefits could better position DHS and policymakers to determine the impact of TWIC on enhancing maritime security. Further, DHS did not conduct a risk-informed cost-benefit analysis that considered existing security risks, and it has not yet completed a regulatory analysis for the upcoming rule on using TWIC with card readers. Conducting a regulatory analysis using the information from the internal control and effectiveness assessments as the basis for evaluating the costs, benefits, security risks, and corrective actions needed to implement the TWIC program, could help DHS ensure that the TWIC program is more effective and cost-efficient than existing measures or alternatives at enhancing maritime security. Among other things, GAO recommends that DHS assess TWIC program internal controls to identify needed corrective actions, assess TWIC's effectiveness, and use the information to identify effective and cost-efficient methods for meeting program objectives. DHS concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1096 | gao_GAO-08-1096_0 | As part of the Vision, NASA is developing new vehicles under the Constellation program, with an initial operational capability currently scheduled for 2015. According to NASA transition managers, the agency has now accomplished this better definition and plans to include an estimate substantially lower than the earlier $1.8 billion estimate for the total cost of SSP transition and retirement in its fiscal year 2010 budget request. NASA Faces Challenges Defining SSP Transition and Retirement Scope and Costs
NASA faces disparate challenges defining the scope and costs of SSP transition and retirement activities. The Constellation program is finalizing the requirements that will inform the SSP of what real and personal property needs to be retained and what should be declared excess. In addition, NASA faces other challenges that further hamper the agency’s efforts to develop firm estimates of SSP transition and retirement scope and cost, including finalizing plans for safing artifacts. In addition to the issues discussed above, NASA has not yet developed final plans and/or cost estimates for safing artifacts, including the orbiters Atlantis, Discovery, and Endeavour. SSP Transition and Retirement Costs Are Not Transparent in NASA’s Budget
SSP transition and retirement costs are not transparent in NASA’s current budget request and are not expected to be fully reflected in its 2010 request. SSP’s direct transition and retirement costs are included in the SSP budget line. Furthermore, NASA plans to offset some transition costs by utilizing an exchange/sale authority that allows federal agencies to exchange or sell non-excess, non-surplus personal property and apply the proceeds toward acquiring similar replacement property. Conclusions
SSP transition and retirement is an immense undertaking involving numerous actors across government and the aerospace industry. NASA acknowledged that, thus far, it had not included estimates of the full scope and cost of Space Shuttle transition and retirement costs in any of its budget requests and that the agency is still in the process of finalizing the scope and cost of Space Shuttle transition and retirement activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) challenges in transitioning and retiring the Space Shuttle Program’s (SSP) assets and facilities and to determine if the cost of these efforts is transparent in NASA’s budget requests, we obtained and reviewed NASA documents including the Human Space Flight Transition Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition Management Plan, Space Shuttle Program Transition and Retirement Requirements, and the Space Shuttle Program Risk Management Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) is scheduled to retire in 2010, and the transition and retirement of its facilities and assets will be an immense undertaking involving approximately 654 facilities worth an estimated $5.7 billion and equipment with an estimated value of more than $12 billion. NASA plans to retire the SSP in 2010 to make resources available for the Constellation program, which is producing the next generation of space vehicles by 2015. Many of the SSP's resources are expected to transition to Constellation while others will be dispositioned or preserved for their historic value. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 directed GAO to assess NASA's plans and progress in transitioning and retiring the SSP's facilities and equipment. More specifically, GAO examined 1) the challenges NASA faces in defining the scope and costs of transition and retirement activities, and 2) whether the cost of these efforts is transparent in NASA's budget requests. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed SSP plans, budget guidance, and other documents, and interviewed relevant government officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) faces disparate challenges defining the scope and cost of SSP transition and retirement activities. For example, because the Constellation program is still finalizing its requirements, the agency does not yet know what SSP property it needs to retain or the full cost of the transition effort. In addition, NASA faces other challenges that hamper its efforts to manage the transition and develop firm estimates of SSP transition and retirement scope and costs. For example, NASA has not developed final plans and/or cost estimates for making artifacts-- including the orbiters Atlantis, Discovery, and Endeavour--safe for public display. The total cost of SSP transition and retirement is not transparent in NASA's current budget request and is not expected to be reflected in its fiscal year 2010 budget request. This is due in part to delays in estimating costs, but also to where costs are being reflected. For example, although SSP's direct transition and retirement costs are identified in the SSP budget line, indirect costs related to environmental clean-up and restoration, maintenance of required real property facilities during the gap in human spaceflight, and demolition of excess facilities are not. In addition, NASA plans to offset some transition costs by utilizing an "exchange/sale" authority that allows executive agencies to exchange or sell non-excess, non-surplus personal property and apply the proceeds toward acquiring similar replacement property. |
gao_GAO-11-785 | gao_GAO-11-785_0 | The procedures support agencies’ internal program management and provide data for external reporting on PEPFAR results. OGAC, USAID, and CDC Documented Performance Management, but Published Plans and Reports Lack Two Key Elements
Several Documents Have Been Issued to Meet Planning and Reporting Requirements
OGAC, USAID, and CDC have issued several performance management planning and reporting documents in response to the requirements included in the 2008 Leadership Act and practices specified in GPRA. In most cases, these results are also displayed by country or region. According to the 2008 Leadership Act, these reports are to include an assessment of progress toward the achievement of annual goals and, if annual goals are not being met, the reasons for such failures. In addition, GPRA calls for annual performance reports to compare results with previously established targets. Limited Information Is Available on Efforts to Validate PEPFAR Data and Address Data Limitations
OGAC has not publicly provided, consistent with GPRA practices, information on efforts to verify and validate reported performance data. Global AIDS Coordinator to modify the annual report to Congress on PEPFAR performance in the following two ways: (1) include comparisons of annual PEPFAR results with previously established annual targets and (2) include information on efforts to verify and validate PEPFAR performance data and address data limitations. Citing the need to consider various related issues and their consequences in consultation with Congress and other stakeholders, OGAC partially agreed with our first recommendation to include in PEPFAR’s annual report to Congress comparisons of annual PEPFAR results with previously established targets, consistent with a 2008 Leadership Act requirement and a key GPRA practice. OGAC also provided additional background information on PEPFAR indicators and data validation efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to directives in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 and the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (2008 Leadership Act) to review global HIV/AIDS program monitoring, this report (1) describes the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator’s (OGAC), U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) key procedures for planning and reporting on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program performance and (2) examines published PEPFAR performance plans and reports. To examine published PEPFAR performance plans and reports and the extent to which they adhere to established practices, we identified OGAC’s, USAID’s, and CDC’s most recent publicly available annual performance plans and reports: for OGAC, the PEPFAR annual operational plans and annual reports to Congress for fiscal years 2009 and 2010; for USAID, the “Foreign Operations FY 2010 Performance Report, FY 2012 Performance Plan” that it issued with the Department of State as part of their joint congressional budget justification for fiscal year 2012; and for CDC, the “Fiscal Year 2012 Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committees” and “FY 2012 Online Performance Appendix.” We systematically reviewed these documents using a matrix with a series of questions about key performance management practices, as defined by the 2008 Leadership Act, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and previous GAO work. Appendix IV: PEPFAR Program Performance Results Reported by OGAC, USAID, and CDC for Fiscal Year 2010
OGAC provides information on PEPFAR program results in its annual reports to Congress, which are typically published in February. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. assistance through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has helped provide treatment, care, and prevention services overseas to millions affected by HIV/AIDS. In 2008, Congress reauthorized PEPFAR with the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (2008 Leadership Act). The act requires the Department of State's Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) to report to Congress annually on PEPFAR performance. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also report on PEPFAR program performance. Responding to legislative directives, GAO (1) described key procedures for planning and reporting on PEPFAR performance and (2) examined published PEPFAR performance plans and reports. GAO analyzed performance management documents and interviewed officials at OGAC, USAID, and CDC.
What GAO Found
Officials in several offices and divisions in OGAC, USAID, and CDC coordinate and manage PEPFAR program planning and reporting procedures at headquarters and in PEPFAR countries and regions. These procedures, which include PEPFAR-wide annual operational planning and periodic results reporting, support internal agency-specific program management as well as provide information for external reporting on PEPFAR results. OGAC, USAID, and CDC publicly issued plans and reports on PEPFAR performance in recent years consistent with 2008 Leadership Act requirements and GPRA practices; however, two key elements are lacking. First, although OGAC has internally specified annual performance targets, its most recent annual reports to Congress did not identify these targets or compare annual results with them. According to the 2008 Leadership Act, OGAC's annual reports on PEPFAR program results must include an assessment of progress toward annual goals and reasons for any failure to meet these goals. In addition, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 calls for federal agency performance reports to compare program results with established targets. Performance documents published by USAID, jointly with State, and by CDC report program targets and results for two and four PEPFAR indicators, respectively. Second, OGAC's most recently published performance plans and reports do not provide information on efforts to validate and verify reported data, while USAID's and CDC's published performance documents cite such efforts by OGAC. In addition, none of the plans or reports refers to noted data reliability weaknesses or efforts to address these weaknesses. GPRA and prior GAO work emphasize the importance of providing information in public performance documents on data verification and other efforts to address identified weaknesses.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OGAC include in its annual report to Congress (1) comparisons of annual PEPFAR results with established targets and (2) information on efforts to verify and validate PEPFAR performance data and address data limitations. OGAC partially agreed with the first recommendation, pending discussions with stakeholders about implementation issues and consequences, and agreed with the second recommendation. |
gao_GGD-98-3 | gao_GGD-98-3_0 | As table 1 shows, after taking into account the 4 agencies’ estimates of the major CFR page additions that were made during the same period that pages were eliminated, the agencies’ CFR sections decreased in size by about 926 pages—about 3 percent of their total CFR pages at the start of their initiatives and about 17 percent of the 5,532-page elimination total that had been reported to OIRA by these agencies. EPA and DOT estimated they added more pages to the CFR than they removed during their page elimination initiatives. HUD and OSHA, on the other hand, estimated they deleted more pages than they added during their initiatives, so the size of their CFR sections decreased. EPA officials pointed out that pages are often added to the CFR that permit, not restrict, actions by other entities. Finally, agency officials said that pages are sometimes not eliminated from the CFR as a result of requests from regulated entities. Some CFR Revision Efforts Will Not Reduce Regulatory Burden
As figure 2 shows, about 40 percent of the 422 CFR revision actions in the 4 agencies appeared to substantively reduce the burden felt by regulated entities through such actions as eliminating paperwork requirements and providing compliance flexibility. Another 15 percent were minor burden reductions in that they made regulatory requirements easier to find or to understand but did not change the rules’ underlying requirements or scope of applicability. We were unable to determine what, if any, impact about 9 percent of the actions would have on regulatory burden. Overall, they said that these efforts “have contributed to a more efficient and effective regulatory system.” They also noted that the elimination and revision actions are part of a larger set of initiatives designed to reform the nation’s regulatory system. Therefore, in some ways it is not surprising that the administration does not have a mechanism in place to measure burden reductions as a result of its CFR page elimination and revision initiative. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine whether (1) agencies’ reported Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) page elimination totals take into account the pages added to the CFR during the same period, (2) agencies’ CFR revision efforts will reduce regulatory burden, and (3) the administration has any mechanism in place for measuring burden reductions as a result of its CFR page elimination and revision initiatives. As the requester specified, we limited the scope of our work on the first two objectives to four major regulatory agencies: the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Transportation (DOT), the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). After reading all of the available information, we coded each of the actions into one of the following five categories: (1) substantive burden reduction—actions that appeared to decrease the burden on regulated entities, such as eliminating paperwork requirements, allowing flexibility in how entities can comply with or implement the rule, lowering compliance costs, or exempting certain organizations from the regulations; (2) minor burden reduction—actions that seemed to make regulatory requirements easier to read or understand or to make them easier to find (e.g., combining similar or related sections of the CFR into one section); (3) burden increase—actions that appeared to increase the burden on regulated entities, such as adding reporting requirements, requiring additional training, requiring certain testing procedures, or expanding the scope of a regulation to new entities; (4) no burden change—actions that did not seem to change the burden on the regulated entity or that primarily affected the promulgating agency, such as eliminating obsolete or duplicative regulations, establishing a committee to study an issue (with no specific proposal identified), updating agency organizational charts and/or telephone numbers, and establishing ethics regulations for employees of the promulgating agency; and (5) cannot tell—actions that had multiple parts which potentially could offset each other or were unclear as to their effect on the regulated entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated and expanded its previous review of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) page elimination and revision initiative, focusing on whether: (1) agencies' reported page elimination totals took into account any pages added to the CFR during the same period; (2) agencies' CFR revision efforts would reduce regulatory burden; and (3) the administration has any mechanism in place for measuring burden reductions as a result of its CFR page elimination and revision initiatives. GAO limited the scope of its work on the first two objectives to four agencies: the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Transportation (DOT), the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) officials in each of the four agencies GAO reviewed said that the page elimination totals that their agencies reported to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) did not take into account the pages that their agencies had added to the CFR while the eliminations were taking place; (2) EPA and DOT estimated that they added more pages to the CFR than they removed during their page elimination initiatives; (3) HUD and OSHA, on the other hand, estimated that they deleted more pages than they added; (4) overall, when estimated page additions were counted, the 4 agencies' CFR sections decreased in size by about 926 pages--about 3 percent of the CFR pages at the start of the initiative, or about 17 percent of the amount reported to OIRA; (5) the agencies pointed out that pages are often added to the CFR because of statutory requirements or to clarify requirements placed on regulated entities and that pages are sometimes not eliminated at the request of those entities; (6) GAO's review indicated that about 40 percent of the 422 CFR revision actions in the 4 agencies would substantively reduce the burden felt by regulated entities as a result of such actions as eliminating paperwork requirements and providing compliance flexibility; (7) another 15 percent of the actions appeared to be minor burden reductions in that they seemed to make the regulations easier to find or to understand but would not change the underlying regulatory requirements or scope of applicability; (8) GAO concluded that about 27 percent of the CFR revision actions would have no effect on the burden felt by regulated entities and that about 8 percent could increase regulatory burden; (9) GAO could not determine what effect about 9 percent of the CFR revision actions would have on the regulated entities, either because the actions had multiple parts that potentially could offset each other or because the information available was unclear; (10) OIRA officials said that the administration has no mechanisms in place for measuring burden reductions as a result of the CFR page elimination and revision effort; and (11) however, they believe that the initiative is having a beneficial effect and also pointed out that the CFR page elimination and revision efforts are only part of a larger set of actions the administration is taking to reform the nation's regulatory system. |
gao_GAO-13-657 | gao_GAO-13-657_0 | The FAAC established subcommittees to develop recommendations in the five areas specified in the FAAC charter: environment, financing, competitiveness and viability, labor and workforce, and safety. DOT and FAA officials noted that 3 of the 10 recommendations we reviewed—sustainable alternative fuels, global competitiveness, and a harmonized approach to carbon dioxide emission reductions—continue to be addressed as part of long-term efforts. While officials stated that DOT and FAA have addressed the other seven recommendations, they highlighted ongoing work on issues related to some of these recommendations. FAAC Members Acknowledge DOT’s Actions but Believe That More Work Remains in Responding to the Selected Recommendations
FAAC members acknowledged DOT and FAA efforts to address the 10 recommendations selected for our work; however, a majority of the FAAC subcommittee members believe more work remains to fully address 9 of the 10 recommendations. Similar to DOT and FAA officials, FAAC members stated that some recommendations may not be fully addressed due to the recommendation’s being linked to ongoing or long-term efforts. DOT officials told us that for ongoing recommendations, they will continue work on these recommendations and are determining the extent to which it will continue reporting on the status of the recommendations. Resource Constraints and Stakeholder Collaboration Were Most Frequently Cited as Implementation Challenges for the Selected Recommendations
Resource constraints and the need to collaborate with multiple stakeholders were cited most frequently by DOT and FAA officials, as well as by FAAC members, as implementation challenges. In addition, DOT and FAA officials noted that in some cases they took actions to address the recommendation, but factors beyond DOT’s control, such as the need for legislative action, affected DOT’s ability to fully implement the recommendation. Section 1: Selected FAAC Recommendations and DOT’s and FAA’s Actions to Address Them
This section presents the 10 FAAC recommendations we reviewed and includes detail on DOT and FAA actions to address the recommendations, FAAC members’ assessment of DOT and FAA progress on the recommendations, and challenges in implementing each recommendation. In its report, the FAAC stated that the aviation industry has unique fuel requirements and is well-positioned to be a national and international leader in the use of sustainable renewable alternative fuels. 2. DOT’s and FAA’s Planned Actions
FAA officials stated that addressing this recommendation is a long-term effort and noted their ongoing efforts in this area. 5. Support extending the alternative minimum tax exemption for airport private activity bonds. Promote the global competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry. 23. Appendix II: Future of Aviation Advisory Committee Members
The Department of Transportation (DOT) chartered the Future of Aviation Advisory Committee (FAAC) on April 16, 2010, to develop a manageable, actionable list of recommendations for DOT. | Why GAO Did This Study
The aviation industry is important to the U.S. economy and is a critical link in the nation's transportation infrastructure. However, the industry has faced challenges, such as an outdated national air-traffic management system and an increasingly competitive global market. In 2010, in response to these and other challenges, DOT established the FAAC to develop a manageable, actionable list of recommendations for DOT. In April 2011, the FAAC released a report outlining 23 recommendations in five areas: environment, financing, competitiveness and viability, labor and workforce, and safety.
GAO was asked to review the status of DOT's efforts to implement the FAAC recommendations. GAO examined 10 of the FAAC's 23 recommendations to determine (1) DOT's progress in addressing the selected recommendations, and any planned future actions; (2) the FAAC members' perspective on the extent to which DOT's actions address these recommendations; and (3) the challenges, if any, that DOT faces in addressing the recommendations. The 10 selected recommendations covered each of the 5 areas and allowed GAO to leverage ongoing or recent GAO work. GAO did not analyze the validity of the FAAC's recommendations, and our work does not take a position on, or represent an endorsement of, the recommendations. GAO reviewed agency documents and literature, and interviewed FAAC members and DOT and FAA officials. DOT provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
While the Department of Transportation (DOT) is not required to implement the Future of Aviation Advisory Committee (FAAC) recommendations, DOT and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken actions on the 10 FAAC recommendations that GAO reviewed. DOT and FAA officials noted that they continue to work on three recommendations as part of long-term efforts and have ongoing work related to some of the seven recommendations that they believe are addressed.
FAAC members recognized DOT's actions to address the recommendations. However, a majority of the FAAC subcommittee members believe that more work remains to fully address 9 of the 10 recommendations. FAAC members stated that some recommendations may not be fully addressed because they are linked to ongoing efforts that DOT also identified.
DOT, FAA officials, and FAAC members most frequently identified resource constraints and the need to collaborate with multiple stakeholders as implementation challenges and in some cases, noted efforts to address these challenges. DOT officials noted that fully addressing some recommendations may depend on factors outside of DOT's control, such as extending the alternative minimum tax exemption, which would require legislation, and developing sustainable alternative fuels, which is a long-term, multi-agency effort. |
gao_GAO-11-778 | gao_GAO-11-778_0 | 1.) 2.) For the next reauthorization of federal transit programs, FTA proposes in its fiscal year 2012 budget request to transform the Capital Investment Grant program to further streamline the process for new fixed-guideway and corridor-based bus projects. Small Starts and Very Small Starts History and Types of Projects
Small Starts Was Established to Streamline New Starts and Allowed Funding for Certain Types of Bus Projects
The Small Starts program was created to provide a more streamlined evaluation and rating process for lower-cost and less complex projects. FTA Has Mostly Recommended Bus Rapid Transit Projects for Small Starts and Very Small Starts Funding
Since fiscal year 2007, FTA has approved 29 Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects into project development, and has recommended for funding to Congress all 29 of them, which are mostly BRT projects and a handful of other transit modes. Several other streetcar projects have also received funding through TIGER grants. Within Small Starts and Very Small Starts, the projects FTA recommended to Congress for funding vary in terms of the total project costs and capital investment program contribution. For the 10 Small Starts projects, the total project cost ranges from nearly $40 million to about $232 million, and the median cost is about $143 million. For the 19 Very Small Starts projects, the total project cost ranges from about $5 million to about $48 million and the median cost is about $29 million. The capital investment program contribution to the projects’ costs ranges from nearly $3 million to about $39 million and the median capital investment program contribution is about $20 million. FTA’s Project Development Requirements for Small Starts and Very Small Starts and Stakeholder Views
FTA’s Project Development Requirements
FTA’s project development requirements for Small and Very Small Starts are similar in some respects, but FTA’s submission requirements for Small Starts’ project justification criteria are more extensive. To examine the project development process, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the requirements with a variety of stakeholders, including 10 project sponsors, officials from FTA headquarters and 7 regional offices, and 2 industry groups. Several stakeholders we interviewed—five project sponsors, one industry group, and FTA headquarters and officials from two regions—said that the project development requirements for Very Small Starts projects were straightforward and not overly burdensome and, as a result, that Very Small Starts projects have a streamlined process. Some stakeholders we spoke with also reported disadvantages of FTA’s project development requirements. As described below, stakeholders that have experience with New Starts projects said that the Small Starts project development requirements, which were to be streamlined, are too similar to those for New Starts projects. FTA’s Project Development Requirements for Exempt Projects and Stakeholder Views
Exempt Projects Are Subject to Fewer Requirements Than Small Starts or Very Small Starts Projects
Exempt projects are not evaluated and rated or recommended for funding by FTA; exempt projects receive under $25 million in federal assistance and are typically congressionally designated. For rail projects, one project constructs a new driverless, automated rail system between an existing transit station and an airport; another project builds a new transit station along an existing heavy rail line. The stakeholders with whom we spoke want to continue this category of funding because they said that a key advantage of the exempt category is that it serves as a useful source of funding for “unique” or atypical transit projects. For example, four project sponsors that we spoke with indicated that their projects may not have competed well with other projects if evaluated against the New Starts criteria and in competition with more typical New Starts transit projects, like light rail lines. In its 2012 budget request, FTA proposes to continue the exempt category in the next surface transportation reauthorization. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation for review and comment. This appendix lists those reports and updates the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) progress in implementing these recommendations. To describe the project development requirements for Small Starts and Very Small Starts projects, we collected and summarized relevant laws, such as SAFETEA-LU, as well as FTA circulars and policy guidance for the Small Starts program, including the 2007 Updated Interim Guidance and Instructions, 2010 Reporting Instructions for the Section 5309 Small Starts Criteria, and Side-by-Side of Required Information for New Starts/Small Starts Evaluation and Rating. There were a total of nine exempt projects that entered the New Starts pipeline since 2005. To determine the views of stakeholders on the advantages and disadvantages of the exempt category, we conducted semistructured interviews with FTA officials (headquarters and regional office staff), sponsors of exempt projects that received funding, and transit industry associations. Public Transportation: Preliminary Information on FTA’s Implementation of SAFETEA-LU Changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) Capital Investment Grant program funds, among other things, projects for fixed-guideway systems--often called New Starts projects. In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act-A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) established a category of lower-cost projects--Small Starts--which expands project eligibility and offers streamlined requirements. FTA subsequently created the Very Small Starts category with a further streamlined process for very low-cost projects. Exempt projects, those receiving under $25 million and typically designated by Congress, also have a simplified process. As part of GAO's annual mandate to review New Starts, this report describes (1) the history of Small Starts and Very Small Starts and the type of projects FTA recommended for funding; (2) the project development requirements for Small Starts and Very Small Starts and what stakeholders identify as the advantages and disadvantages of the requirements; and (3) the project development requirements for exempt projects, the projects selected to receive funding, and what stakeholders identify as the advantages and disadvantages of this category. Among other things, GAO analyzed laws, regulations, and agency guidance, and interviewed FTA headquarters staff and stakeholders from 7 FTA regional offices, 15 projects, and 2 industry groups. DOT officials reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
When SAFETEA-LU established the Small Starts program, it streamlined project development requirements and project evaluation and rating criteria, and authorized certain corridor-based bus projects--like bus rapid transit systems-- to receive transit capital funding. Furthermore, FTA created Very Small Starts within Small Starts to further streamline requirements for projects that are simple and low-risk, based on cost and other features. FTA has mostly recommended bus projects for funding but has also recommended light rail, commuter rail, and streetcar projects. Overall, FTA has recommended 10 Small Starts and 19 Very Small Starts projects for funding. These projects' total costs vary from about $5 million to about $232 million, and FTA has recommended capital investment program funds ranging from nearly $3 million to $75 million for these projects. FTA's project development requirements for Small Starts and Very Small Starts include costs and financial summaries. While all sponsors submit similar information in some respects, such as financial summaries, FTA only requires sponsors of Small Starts projects to submit information on a project's expected benefits, like travel forecasts. Some stakeholders GAO spoke with said an advantage of FTA's requirements for Very Small Starts is that they are appropriately scaled and not overly burdensome for smaller projects. For example, about half of the stakeholders experienced with Very Small Starts told GAO that the requirements were straightforward and that project sponsors were able to meet them quickly without many problems. Four project sponsors and an industry group said that a disadvantage of the Small Starts requirements is that they are too similar to those for New Starts, even though Small Starts projects have a lower total cost and are less complex. Generally, stakeholders said that the requirements for both Small Starts and Very Small Starts help project sponsors fully develop and plan projects by helping identify potential problems. Stakeholders' perspectives depend, in part, on their degree of experience with these programs, which ranged from none to several previous New Starts or Small Starts projects. Exempt projects, typically congressionally designated and below the $25 million threshold, are not evaluated and rated. Exempt projects are subject to fewer FTA requirements that mainly focus on the sponsor's ability to carry out its project. Nine exempt projects have entered the New Starts pipeline since the last reauthorization of the New Starts program in 2005. These projects vary in terms of mode and scope. For example, one project extends a bus transitway with dedicated vehicle lanes; and another project builds a new station on an existing rail line. The total costs for these projects vary from about $10 million to about $493 million, and the federal contributions range from about $1 million to nearly $25 million in capital investment program funds. Four project sponsors GAO spoke with said that the exempt category provides a useful source of capital funding for atypical transit projects that solve local transportation problems. In its 2012 budget request, FTA proposes to continue the exempt category, which is set to expire under current law, in the next surface transportation reauthorization. |
gao_GAO-14-712T | gao_GAO-14-712T_0 | Table 1 summarizes several key congressional actions. Addressing payment vulnerabilities already identified could further help prevent or reduce fraud. CMS Has Strengthened Certain Enrollment Screening Procedures since PPACA
PPACA authorized and CMS has implemented new provider and supplier enrollment procedures that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and HHS’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) that allowed entities intent on committing fraud to enroll in Medicare. Specifically, we are assessing the process used to enroll and verify the eligibility of Medicare providers and suppliers in Medicare’s Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS) and the extent to which CMS’s controls are designed to prevent and detect the continued enrollment of potentially ineligible or fraudulent providers and suppliers in PECOS. These actions include issuing a rule to implement surety bonds for certain providers and suppliers, issuing a rule on provider and supplier disclosure requirements, and establishing the core elements for provider and supplier compliance programs. suspension from a federal health care program.indicated that developing the additional disclosure requirements has been complicated by provider and supplier concerns about what types of information will be collected, what CMS will do with it, and how the privacy and security of this information will be maintained. Further Improvements to Prepayment and Postpayment Claims Review May Better Identify or Recover Improper Payments
Medicare uses prepayment review to deny claims that should not be paid and postpayment review to recover improperly paid claims. Increased use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper Medicare payments. Based on an analysis of a limited number of national policies and local coverage determinations (LCD), we identified $14.7 million in payments in fiscal year 2010 that appeared to be inconsistent with four national policies and therefore improper. Our prior work found that postpayment reviews are critical to identifying and recouping overpayments. CMS began the program in March 2009 for Medicare FFS. Our work is reviewing, among other things, whether CMS has a strategy for coordinating these contractors’ postpayment claims review activities. However, as of March 2014, CMS had not established deadlines for program integrity contractors to begin using One PI, as we recommended in 2011. Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities Could Help Reduce Fraud
Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that could lead to improper payments, some of which are potentially fraudulent, is critical to effective program management, but our work has shown weaknesses in CMS’s processes to address such vulnerabilities. We also made recommendations to CMS to address the millions of Medicare cards that display beneficiaries’ Social Security numbers, which In August 2012, we increases beneficiaries’ vulnerability to identity theft.recommended that CMS (1) select an approach for removing Social Security numbers from Medicare cards that best protects beneficiaries from identity theft and minimizes burdens for providers, beneficiaries, and CMS; and (2) develop an accurate, well-documented cost estimate for such an option. Thus, CMS has not yet taken action to address these recommendations. In conclusion, although CMS has taken some important steps to identify and prevent fraud through increased provider and supplier screening and other actions, the agency must continue to improve its efforts to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare program. Notably, we are currently assessing potential use of electronic-card technologies, which can help reduce Medicare fraud. Additionally, we have a study under way examining CMS’s oversight of fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare Part D to determine whether the agency has adopted certain practices for ensuring the integrity of that program. We are also examining CMS’s oversight of some of the contractors that conduct reviews of claims after payment. These studies are focused on additional actions for CMS that could help the agency more systematically reduce potential fraud in the Medicare program. Medicare Program Integrity: Contractors Reported Generating Savings, but CMS Could Improve Its Oversight. High-Risk Series: An Update. Health Care Fraud: Types of Providers Involved in Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program Cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program, in part because the program's size and complexity make it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. In 2013, Medicare financed health care services for approximately 51 million individuals at a cost of about $604 billion. The deceptive nature of fraud makes its extent in the Medicare program difficult to measure in a reliable way, but it is clear that fraud contributes to Medicare's fiscal problems. More broadly, in fiscal year 2013, CMS estimated that improper payments—some of which may be fraudulent—were almost $50 billion.
This statement focuses on the progress made and important steps to be taken by CMS and its program integrity contractors to reduce fraud in Medicare. This statement is based on relevant GAO products and recommendations issued from 2004 through 2014 using a variety of methodologies. Additionally, in June 2014, GAO updated information based on new regulations regarding enrollment of certain providers in Medicare by examining public documents.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that oversees Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key strategies GAO identified or recommended in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from fraud; however, implementing other important actions that GAO recommended could help CMS and its program integrity contractors combat fraud. These strategies are:
Provider and Supplier Enrollment : The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized, and CMS has implemented, actions to strengthen provider and supplier enrollment that address past weaknesses identified by GAO and HHS's Office of Inspector General. For example, CMS has hired contractors to determine whether providers and suppliers have valid licenses and are at legitimate locations. CMS could further strengthen enrollment screening by issuing a rule to require additional provider and supplier disclosures of information, such as any suspension of payments from a federal health care program, and establishing core elements for provider and supplier compliance programs, as authorized by PPACA.
Prepayment and Postpayment Claims Review : Medicare uses prepayment review to deny claims that should not be paid and postpayment review to recover improperly paid claims. GAO has found that increased use of prepayment edits could help prevent improper Medicare payments. For example, prior GAO work identified millions of dollars of payments that appeared to be inconsistent with selected coverage and payment policies and therefore improper. Postpayment reviews are also critical to identifying and recouping overpayments. GAO recommended better oversight of both (1) the information systems analysts use to identify claims for postpayment review, in a 2011 report, and (2) the contractors responsible for these reviews, in a 2013 report. CMS has taken action or has actions under way to address these recommendations.
Addressing Identified Vulnerabilities : Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that could lead to improper payments is critical to effective program management and could help address fraud. However, prior GAO work has shown weaknesses in CMS's processes to address such vulnerabilities. For example, GAO has made multiple recommendations to CMS to remove Social Security numbers from beneficiaries' Medicare cards to help prevent identity theft. HHS agreed with these recommendations, but reported that CMS could not proceed with the changes for a variety of reasons, including funding limitations, and therefore has not taken action.
GAO work under way addressing these key strategies includes examining: (1) how well CMS's information system can prevent and detect the continued enrollment of ineligible or potentially fraudulent providers and suppliers in Medicare, (2) the potential use of electronic-card technologies to help reduce Medicare fraud, (3) CMS's oversight of program integrity efforts for prescription drugs, and (4) CMS's oversight of some of the contractors that conduct reviews of claims after payment. These studies could help CMS more systematically reduce potential fraud in the Medicare program. |
gao_T-GGD-98-75 | gao_T-GGD-98-75_0 | EPA and SBA’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy Disagree Regarding Whether EPA Should Have Convened Additional Advocacy Review Panels
During the first year of the advocacy review panel requirements’ implementation, OSHA convened a panel for one draft rule and published two other proposed rules for which panels were not held. SBA’s Chief Counsel said that EPA should have convened panels for 2 of these 17 proposed rules—the rules setting national ambient air quality standards for ozone and for particulate matter. We could not determine whether EPA should have convened advocacy review panels for the ozone and particulate matter rules because there are no clear governmentwide criteria for determining whether a rule has a “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Specifically, it is unclear whether health standards that an agency establishes by regulation should be considered separable from implementation requirements established by state governments or other entities. In a previous report we noted that agencies had different interpretations regarding how the RFA’s provisions should be interpreted. Panels, Regulatory Agencies, and SBA’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy Generally Followed Statutory Requirements,but Panel Procedures Differed
As of November 1, 1997, EPA and OSHA had convened five advocacy review panels. For example, as required by the statute:
EPA and OSHA notified the SBA Chief Counsel before each of the panels and provided him with information on the potential impacts of the draft rules and the types of small entities that might be affected. Agencies Responded to Panel Recommendations in Proposed Rules
As of November 1, 1997, two of the draft rules for which EPA and OSHA held advocacy review panels had been published as notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register—OSHA’s proposed rule on the occupational exposure to TB and EPA’s proposed rule to control nonroad diesel engine emissions. The panels’ recommendations for these draft rules focused on providing small entities with flexibility in how to comply with the rules and on the need to consider potentially overlapping local, state, and federal regulations and enforcement. OSHA and EPA primarily responded to the panels’ recommendations in the supplementary information sections of the proposed rules, although OSHA also made some changes to the text of its rule. Small Entity Representatives and Agency Officials Offered Suggestions to Improve the Panel Process
Although most of the 32 small entity representatives with whom we spoke said that they thought the review panel process was worthwhile, about three-fourths of them suggested changes to improve that process. The agency officials we interviewed also offered suggestions for improving the panels. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act's (SBREFA) advocacy review panel provisions, focusing on: (1) whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had applied the advocacy review panel requirements to all applicable rules that they proposed in the first year of the panel requirements; (2) whether the EPA and OSHA panels, the regulatory agencies themselves, and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Chief Counsel for Advocacy followed the statute's procedural requirements; (3) identify any changes that EPA and OSHA made to the draft rules as a result of the panels' recommendations; and (4) identify any suggestions that agency officials and small entity representatives had regarding how the advocacy review panel process could be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of November 1, 1997, EPA and OSHA had convened five review panels; (2) EPA and SBA's Chief Counsel for Advocacy disagree regarding the applicability of the panel requirements to two other rules that EPA proposed in December 1996--the national ambient air quality standards for ozone and for particulate matter; (3) specifically, EPA and the Chief Counsel disagree regarding whether the effects of states' implementation of these health standards can be separated from the standards themselves in determining whether EPA's rules may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (4) GAO suggested that Congress resolve this issue by taking steps to clarify the meaning of the term "significant impact"; (5) the agencies and the panels generally met SBREFA's procedural requirements, but there were several differences in how the panels operated; (6) the panels' recommendations regarding the two proposed rules that had been published as of November 1, 1997, focused on various issues, such as providing small entities with greater compliance flexibility and considering the effects of potentially overlapping regulations; (7) the agencies generally responded to those recommendations in the supplementary information sections of the proposed rules; and (8) the small entity representatives with whom GAO spoke and, to a lesser extent, the agency officials GAO interviewed, offered several suggestions to improve the advocacy review panel process. |
gao_GAO-12-240 | gao_GAO-12-240_0 | According to some of the authors of these models, there is little incentive to continue developing these models, as the issue of alternative compensation models for NRSROs and their possible implementation appears unlikely to receive much, if any, attention from regulators or legislators. For example, these authors told us that SEC had not reached out to them to further discuss these models as part of the 939F study. While these models generally are intended to address the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays model, some comment letters to SEC for its section 939F study described a number of perceived disadvantages of these models. Comment Letters to SEC Supported Implementing One Alternative Model or Enhancing Existing Rules
During debate on the Dodd-Frank Act, a system similar to the random selection model was proposed through an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, the Dodd- Frank Act provides that upon completion of the section 939F study, SEC shall, as it determines is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, establish by rule a system for the assignment of NRSROs to determine the initial credit ratings and monitor the credit ratings of structured finance products in a manner that prevents the arranger from selecting the NRSRO that will determine the credit rating. In issuing any rule, the act requires SEC to give thorough consideration to the provisions of section 15E(w) of the Exchange Act, as that provision would have been added by section 939D as passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010, and SEC must implement the system described in such section 939D unless SEC determines that an alternative system would better serve the public interest and the protection of investors. As part of this solicitation of comments, SEC requested that interested parties use the evaluative framework we developed for our 2010 report to evaluate the section 15E(w) and other alternative compensation models. The comment period ended in September 2011. Of the 30 comment letters submitted, our assessments found that 11 generally favored implementing an alternative compensation model, 13 opposed the implementation of an alternative compensation model, and 5 did not comment on the need for an alternative compensation model. Sixteen comment letters either supported or made suggestions for improving existing SEC rules. Generally, these letters highlighted the need to address the conflict of interest inherent in the issuer-pays model. Those opposed to the implementation of an alternative compensation model, including the section 15E(w) model, cited concerns such as replacing one set of conflicts of interest with another and raised issues about the cost of implementation. SEC Is Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act and Reviewing Its Authority to Implement the Alternative Compensation Models
The Dodd-Frank Act requires SEC to take a number of actions regarding its oversight of NRSROs including issuing a number of rulemakings, establishing an Office of Credit Ratings, and studying, among other things, the feasibility of an assignment system for the ratings of structured finance products and alternative means for compensating NRSROs. As of January 2012, SEC has adopted three final rules that implement all or part of certain requirements and proposed rules to implement the remaining requirements. In addition to its work on NRSRO oversight rules, SEC continues to work on other Dodd-Frank Act requirements related to NRSROs. Although the office has yet to be established, NRSRO examination staff from SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), staff from OCIE’s investment adviser/investment company and broker-dealer examination groups, and NRSRO specialists from SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets recently completed the first cycle of annual examinations of each NRSRO as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. As part of this study, SEC solicited comment on its authority to implement various alternative compensation models. Therefore, obtaining as complete information on the models as available, such as by consulting with the models’ authors, will be important for SEC to fully assess each model in order to make its decision and any recommendations for statutory changes SEC determines should be made to implement its findings. However, a few of the comment letters discussed potential legal questions surrounding the implementation of or rulemaking for specific aspects of certain models, or general constitutional questions. The model authors also hold varying opinions on the extent to which statutory changes would be necessary to implement their alternative compensation model. Alternatively, the author of the proposed investor-owned credit rating agency model we interviewed believes that current law, even before the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, provides SEC with the authority to implement the model as a means of managing the conflicts of interest generated by the issuer-pays model. As previously discussed, SEC has not spoken to the authors of the proposed models to solicit additional details about their models—information that could help inform SEC’s analysis of the alternative compensation models and its report to Congress containing any recommendations for regulatory or statutory changes that it determines should be made to implement the findings of its study. As of January 2012, none of these models have been fully developed, and given that NRSROs continue to primarily use the issuer-pays, and to a lesser extent, the subscriber-pays models, the use of any alternative model or models would likely have to be at the direction of SEC or Congress. Currently, the staff is reviewing the comment letters received and evaluating authority issues, however the extent to which SEC’s existing authorities would allow it to implement any of the alternative models by rule largely will depend on the system selected. Recommendation for Executive Action
As SEC continues to study the various alternative means for compensating NRSROs, as well as determine whether a system for the assignment of initial credit ratings for structured finance products is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, SEC should consult with the authors to better ensure it has all available information on the models to make its decision, and include in its report to Congress any recommendations for statutory changes the SEC determines should be made to implement the findings of the study. In its written comments, SEC agreed with our recommendation. The framework can help identify a model’s relative strengths and weaknesses, potential trade-offs (in terms of policy goals), or areas in which further elaboration or clarification would be warranted using the following factors: Independence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, concerns repeatedly have been raised about the accuracy of credit ratings provided by a number of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO). NRSRO critics often point to the conflict of interest created by the industrys predominant compensation model in which issuers of securities pay the rating agencies for their ratings (issuer-pays model). In 2006, Congress established Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight over NRSROs, and recently enhanced this authority through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). This act also requires GAO to study alternative means for compensating NRSROs. This report discusses (1) alternative models for compensating NRSROs and (2) SECs actions to implement the acts requirements specific to its oversight of NRSROs. To do this work, GAO leveraged its 2010 report on NRSROs (GAO-10-782), reviewed comment letters submitted to SEC as part of its study of alternative compensation models, proposed and finalized rules issued under the act; and interviewed SEC staff and authors of alternative compensation models .
What GAO Found
As of January 2012, GAO identified seven alternative models for compensating NRSROs (see table below). These models generally were designed to address the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays model, better align the NRSROs interest with users of ratings, or improve incentives NRSROs have to produce reliable and high-quality ratings. However, the amount of detail currently available for each model varies and none has been implemented. According to some of the authors of the models, there is little incentive to continue developing these models because it appears unlikely they will receive attention from regulators or legislators. For example, these authors noted that SEC had not reached out to them to further discuss these models as part of its ongoing study of alternative compensation models for credit rating agencies.
During debate on the Dodd-Frank Act, a model similar to the random-selection model was proposed through an amendment that would have added a section 15E(w) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15E(w) model). Although the amendment was not included in the final legislation, section 939F of the Dodd- Frank Act requires SEC to study, among other things, alternative means for compensating NRSROs. It also authorizes SEC to, upon completion of the study, establish by rule a system for assigning NRSROs to determine initial credit ratings and monitor the ratings of structured finance products in a manner that prevents the arranger from selecting the NRSRO that will determine the credit rating should SEC conclude that an alternative system is necessary or appropriate. In issuing any rule, SEC also must give thorough consideration to the section 15E(w) model and implement the model unless it determines that an alternative would better serve the public interest and protect investors. As part of its solicitation of comments for its ongoing study of alternative compensation models, SEC requested that interested parties use the framework GAO developed in the 2010 report on NRSROs to evaluate the section 15E(w) and other models. GAO created this evaluative framework to help identify the relative strengths and weaknesses and potential trade offs (in terms of policy goals) of the models. Based on GAOs analysis of comment letters to SEC, while a number of comment letters generally favored implementing the section 15E(w) model, slightly more opposed the implementation of any of the models. Those supporting the 15E(w) model highlighted the need to address the conflict of interests inherent in the issuer-pays model. Those opposed to the alternative compensation models cited concerns of replacing one set of conflicts of interest with another and the costs of implementation. A number of the letters either supported or made suggestions for improving existing SEC rules. A few comment letters also raised legal questions about the implementation or rulemaking for specific aspects of certain models.
In addition to studying alternative compensation models, SEC has begun to implement a number of Dodd-Frank Act requirements pertaining to NRSROs. These requirements include additional rulemakings related to NRSROs disclosures of performance statistics, credit ratings methodologies, third-party due diligence for asset-backed securities, and analyst training and testing standards. Of nine rulemaking requirements, SEC has adopted three final rules that implement all or part of certain requirements and proposed rules for the remaining requirements. SEC also has been working to establish an Office of Credit Ratings as required by the act. Moreover, SEC examination staff completed the first cycle of annual examinations of each NRSRO as required by the Dodd-Frank Act and published their summary report in September 2011. As part of its study on alternative compensation models for NRSROs, SEC solicited comment on SECs authority to implement various alternative compensation models. According to SEC staff, they are reviewing the comment letters received and evaluating authority issues. Any recommendations for regulatory or statutory changes SEC determines should be made to implement the findings of the study are to be included in their report to Congress, due in July 2012. The model authors opinions of the extent to which statutory changes would be needed to implement their alternative compensation models vary, with one stating that current law provides SEC with the necessary authority and another anticipating the need for legislation. Given that NRSROs continue to primarily use the issuer-pays, and to a lesser extent, the subscriber-pays models, the use of any alternative model or models would likely have to be at the direction of SEC or Congress. However, the extent to which SECs existing authorities would allow it to implement any of the alternative models by rule largely will depend on the alternative model or models selected. Obtaining as complete information on the models as available, such as by consulting with the models authors, will be important for SEC to fully assess each model in order to make its decision and any recommendations for statutory changes SEC determines should be made to implement the findings of its section 939Fstudy.
What GAO Recommends
SEC should consult with the authors of the proposed models to obtain all available information as it considers the various alternative compensation models and any recommendations for
statutory changes SEC determines should be made to implement the findings of its section 939F study. SEC agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-1161T | gao_GAO-08-1161T_0 | The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 addresses the responsibilities of two federal agencies—FCC and NTIA—related to the DTV transition. The act directs FCC to require full-power television stations to cease analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009. Private and Federal Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Myriad of Activities Aimed at Increasing the Public’s Awareness of the Transition
Private sector stakeholders, such as broadcasters and cable providers, have undertaken various education efforts to increase public awareness about the DTV transition. The NAB and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association initiated DTV transition consumer education campaigns in late 2007 at an estimated value of $1.4 billion combined. Private sector stakeholders have also produced DTV transition educational programs for broadcast and distribution, developed Web sites that provide information on the transition, and engaged in various other forms of outreach to raise awareness. Additionally, most of the national retailers participating in the NTIA converter box subsidy program are providing materials to help inform their customers of the DTV transition and the subsidy program. FCC and NTIA also have ongoing DTV consumer education efforts, which target populations most likely to be affected by the DTV transition. Specifically, they focused their efforts on 45 areas of the country that have at least 1 of the following population groups: (1) more than 150,000 over- the-air households, (2) more than 20 percent of all households relying on over-the-air broadcasts, or (3) a top 10 city of residence for the largest target demographic groups. The target demographic groups include seniors, low-income, minority and non-English speaking, rural households, and persons with disabilities. Furthermore, FCC and NTIA have developed partnerships with some federal, state, and local organizations that serve the targeted hard-to- reach populations. NTIA is Effectively Implementing the Converter Box Subsidy Program, But Concerns Exist about NTIA’s Ability to Manage a Potential Spike in Demand
NTIA has processed and issued coupons to millions of consumers, but a sharp increase in demand might affect NTIA’s ability to respond to coupon requests in a timely manner. In our consumer survey, we found that 35 percent of U.S. households are at risk of losing some television service because they have at least one television not connected to a subscription service, such as cable or satellite. However, through August 2008, only 13 percent of U.S. households had requested converter box coupons, and less than 5 percent had redeemed these coupons. In fact, in households relying solely on over-the-air broadcasts (approximately 15 percent), of those who intend to purchase a converter box, 100 percent of survey respondents said they were likely to request a coupon. As a result, consumers might incur significant wait time before they receive their coupons and might lose television service during the time they are waiting for the coupons. We analyzed data to compare areas of the country that comprise predominantly minority and elderly populations with the rest of the U.S. population and found some differences in the coupon request, redemption, and expiration rates for Hispanic, black, and senior households compared with the rest of the U.S. population. However, households in predominantly black and Latino or Hispanic zip codes were less likely, compared with households outside these areas, to redeem their coupons once they received them. To determine participation in the converter box subsidy program in the 45 areas of the country receiving targeted outreach by NTIA and FCC, we analyzed NTIA coupon data (including requests, redemptions, and expirations) in the 45 areas compared to the rest of the country not targeted by NTIA and FCC. As the sellers of the converter boxes, retailers play a crucial role in the converter box subsidy program and are counted on to inform consumers about it. As part of our work, we conducted a “mystery shopper” study by visiting 132 randomly selected retail locations in 12 cities across the United States that were listed as participating in the converter box subsidy program. At most retailers (118) we visited, a representative was able to correctly identify that the DTV transition would occur in February 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 requires all full-power television stations in the United States to cease analog broadcasting after February 17, 2009, known as the digital television (DTV) transition. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for implementing a subsidy program to provide households with up to two $40 coupons toward the purchase of converter boxes. In this testimony, which is principally based on a report being issued today, GAO examines (1) what consumer education efforts have been undertaken by private and federal stakeholders and (2) how effective NTIA has been in implementing the converter box subsidy program, and to what extent consumers are participating in the program. To address these issues, GAO analyzed data from NTIA and reviewed legal, agency, and industry documents. Also, GAO interviewed a variety of stakeholders involved with the DTV transition.
What GAO Found
Private sector and federal stakeholders have undertaken various consumer education efforts to raise awareness about the DTV transition. For example, the National Association of Broadcasters and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association have committed over $1.4 billion to educate consumers about the transition. This funding has supported the development of public service announcements, education programs for broadcast, Web sites, and other activities. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA have consumer education plans that target those populations most likely to be affected by the DTV transition. Specifically, they identified 45 areas of the country as high risk that included areas with at least 1 of the following population groups: (1) more than 150,000 over-the-air households, (2) more than 20 percent of all households relying on over-the-air broadcasts, or (3) a top 10 city of residence for the largest target demographic groups. The target demographic groups include seniors, low-income, minority and non-English speaking, rural households, and persons with disabilities. In addition to targeting these 45 areas of the country, FCC and NTIA developed partnerships with organizations that serve these hard-to-reach populations. NTIA is effectively implementing the converter box subsidy program, but its plans to address the likely increase in coupon demand as the transition nears remain unclear. As of August 31, 2008, NTIA had issued almost 24 million coupons and as of that date approximately 13 percent of U.S. households had requested coupons. As found in GAO's recent consumer survey, up to 35 percent of U.S. households could be affected by the transition because they have at least one television not connected to a subscription service, such as cable or satellite. In U.S. households relying solely on over-the-air broadcasts (approximately 15 percent), of those who intend to purchase a converter box, 100 percent of survey respondents said they were likely to request a coupon. With a spike in demand likely as the transition date nears, NTIA has no specific plans to address an increase in demand; therefore, consumers might incur significant wait time to receive their coupons and might lose television service if their wait time lasts beyond February 17, 2009. In terms of participation in the converter box subsidy program, GAO analyzed coupon data in areas of the country comprising predominantly minority and senior populations and found that households in both predominantly black and Hispanic or Latino areas were less likely to redeem their coupons compared with households outside these areas. Additionally, GAO analyzed participation in the converter box subsidy program in the 45 areas of the country on which NTIA and FCC focused their consumer education efforts and found coupon requests to be roughly the same for zip codes within the 45 targeted areas compared with areas that were not targeted. Retailers play an integral role in the converter box subsidy program by selling the converter boxes and helping to inform their customers about the DTV transition. GAO visited 132 randomly selected retail stores in 12 cities. Store representatives at a majority of the retailers GAO visited were able to correctly state that the DTV transition would occur in February 2009 and how to apply for a converter box coupon. |
gao_GAO-14-565 | gao_GAO-14-565_0 | Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 added a requirement for DOD to include specific information on its Financial Management workforce in the department’s strategic workforce plan. With the exception of the first two principles, these principles are similar to elements of DOD’s statutory reporting requirements. In our most recent In our report in September 2012 on the department’s overall civilian strategic workforce plan, we recommended that DOD include in the guidance that it disseminates for developing future strategic workforce plans clearly defined terms and processes for conducting these assessments; conduct competency-gap analyses for DOD’s mission-critical occupations and report the results; establish and adhere to timelines that will ensure issuance of future strategic workforce plans in accordance with statutory time frames; provide guidance for developing future strategic workforce plans that clearly directs the functional communities to collect information that identifies not only the number or percentage of personnel in its military, civilian, and contractor workforces but also the capabilities of the appropriate mix of those three workforces; and enhance the department’s results-oriented performance measures by revising existing measures or developing additional measures that will more clearly align with DOD’s efforts to monitor progress in meeting the strategic workforce-planning requirements in section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code. The plan does not address 5 of the 32 statutory requirements. Section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code requires DOD to develop a strategic workforce plan to shape and improve the civilian employee workforce of the department, to include specific elements such as an assessment of the current critical skills and competencies of the civilian workforce; any gaps in the existing or projected workforce; and the appropriate mix of civilian, military, and contractor capabilities. The Financial Management workforce plan also does not address the requirement to include an assessment of civilian, military, and contractor capabilities. While this practice is not part of DOD’s statutory reporting requirements, key practices in human-capital management identify strategic alignment—which occurs when an agency’s workforce strategies are linked with its mission and goals, and integrated into its strategic plan, performance plan, and budget formulation—as one of six leading principles for effective strategic workforce planning. DOD’s plan identified 31 strategies for addressing workforce gaps, but did not provide specific information on the funding required—an important element in budget planning decisions—to implement most of these strategies. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan in particular indicates that without fully aligning DOD’s strategic workforce plan with the budget process and management workforce initiatives, such as those to address recruiting, retention, and readiness issues associated with declining morale, the department will not be in the best position to make informed management and resource decisions about its workforce. However, until DOD aligns its strategic workforce plan with the budget process and other strategic management initiatives, such as those to address recruitment, retention, and readiness issues, both DOD and congressional decision makers may not have visibility over the areas most in need of attention. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Fiscal Year 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan addressed the statutory requirements of Section 115b of Title 10 of the United States Code, we evaluated DOD’s 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan and supporting documentation to determine the degree to which the plan addresses, partially addresses, or does not address each of the required elements. To determine the extent to which DOD’s strategic workforce plan is consistent with key strategic workforce planning principles, we compared DOD’s 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan to key principles of effective strategic workforce planning.principles—aligning workforce planning with strategic planning and budget formulation and involving stakeholders, among others, in developing, communicating, and implementing the strategic workforce plan—that do not overlap with the statutory requirements. We consider a recommendation open if DOD has not taken or has not completed actions to address a recommendation. Human Capital: Critical Skills and Competency Assessments Should Help Guide DOD Civilian Workforce Decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Strategic workforce planning can help DOD determine whether it has the civilian personnel with the necessary skills and competencies to perform a wide variety of duties and responsibilities, including mission-essential combat-support functions, such as logistics and maintenance, that traditionally have been performed by uniformed military personnel. In 2006, Congress enacted a requirement for DOD to produce strategic workforce plans, and GAO first reported on DOD's plans in 2008. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandates that GAO report to Congress on these plans.
GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD's Fiscal Year 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan addressed statutory requirements; and (2) DOD's plan is consistent with key strategic workforce-planning principles. GAO examined DOD's Fiscal Year 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan and associated documents, relevant legislation, and key strategic workforce-planning principles, and interviewed officials from across the department involved in producing the plan.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Fiscal Year 2013-2018 Strategic Workforce Plan addressed or partially addressed 27 of the 32 statutory reporting requirements and did not address 5 of the requirements. The statute requires DOD, for example, to conduct assessments of critical skills and competencies, to assess gaps in the workforce, and to assess the appropriate mix of civilian, military, and contractor capabilities. DOD has taken steps to address many of its reporting requirements since 2008. However, DOD has not yet addressed the requirement to assess the appropriate mix of civilian, military, and contractor capabilities in its plan, as shown in the table below. GAO previously has made 10 recommendations regarding statutory compliance covering a range of issues. In addition to recommending that DOD conduct the required assessments, GAO also has recommended providing clearer guidance for developing the plan and enhancing performance measures and is not making further recommendations related to statutory compliance at this time.
DOD's strategic workforce plan does not fully incorporate key strategic workforce-planning principles. There are six key strategic workforce-planning principles, and most are similar to elements of the statutory reporting requirements, such as assessing critical skills and competencies. A key principle that is not addressed in the statutory requirements is strategic alignment, which links workforce strategies to an agency's mission and goals, and aligns them with, among other things, budget formulation. DOD's 2013-2018 plan noted the need to integrate the department's plan with the budget process but did not include specific details and, according to officials, DOD does not have actions underway to do so. Further, the plan identified strategies addressing some critical-skill staffing gaps, but did not provide specific information on the funding required to implement most of these strategies. The plan also did not align with recent recruiting, retention, and readiness initiatives to improve the morale of DOD's civilian workforce as reported to congressional defense committees. Without aligning its workforce plan with the budget process and management workforce initiatives, such as those to address recruiting and retention issues associated with declining morale, the department will not be in the best position to make informed management and resource decisions about its workforce.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD align its workforce plans with the budget process and other workforce management initiatives. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_T-GGD-99-10 | gao_T-GGD-99-10_0 | As you know, annual performance plans can be an invaluable tool for making policy decisions, improving program management, enhancing accountability, and communicating to both internal and external audiences on how the long-term direction outlined in strategic plans is translated into the day-to-day activities of managers and staff. Successful implementation of a performance-based management system, as envisioned by the Results Act, represents a significant challenge requiring sustained agency attention. My testimony today focuses on five areas in which CFTC could improve its performance plan to make it a more useful tool for congressional and executive branch decisionmakers. Although opportunities exist to improve CFTC’s fiscal year 2000 performance plan, CFTC actions to date clearly show a good faith effort to comply with the Results Act and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in developing its plan. In our discussions with CFTC staff, we found CFTC fully committed to meeting both the requirements of the Act and congressional expectations that the plan inform Congress and the public about CFTC performance goals, including how the agency will accomplish these goals and measure results. In addition, the areas in which CFTC could improve its plan are some of the same areas in which we found that many other federal agencies, including federal financial regulators, could improve their plans. Specifically, CFTC could improve its plan in the following five areas:
Performance goals, measures, and targets could provide a clearer picture of intended performance. Mission, goals, and activities could be better connected to more fully demonstrate how CFTC will chart annual progress toward achieving its long-term strategic goals. Crosscutting efforts could be addressed more fully if CFTC worked with the affected federal agencies to develop performance goals and measures that reflect the nature and extent of their common efforts. Strategies and resources used to achieve goals could be discussed in greater detail to better enable congressional and other decisionmakers to judge their reasonableness. The means for verifying and validating that performance information is sufficiently complete, accurate, and consistent, as well as the extent to which such information and the means for collecting, maintaining, and analyzing it are reliable, should be discussed. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) fiscal year (FY) 2000 annual performance plan, focusing on five areas in which CFTC could improve its performance plan.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the annual performance plans can be an invaluable tool for making policy decisions, improving program management, enhancing accountability, and communicating to both internal and external audiences on how the long-term strategic directions outlined in strategic plans are translated into the day-to-day activities of managers and staff; (2) successful implementation of a performance-based management system, as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act, represents a significant challenge requiring sustained agency attention; (3) while opportunities exist to improve CFTC's Year 2000 performance plan, actions to date clearly show a good faith effort by CFTC to comply with the Results Act and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance in developing its plan; (4) in GAO's discussions with CFTC staff, it found CFTC fully committed to meeting both the requirements of the Act and congressional expectations that the plan inform Congress and the public about CFTC performance goals, including how the agency will accomplish these goals and measure results; (5) in addition, the areas in which CFTC could improve its plan are the same areas in which GAO found that many other federal agencies, including federal financial regulators, could improve their plans; and (6) specifically, CFTC could improve its plan in the following five areas: (a) performance goals, measures, and targets could provide a clearer picture of intended performance; (b) mission, goals, and activities could be better connected to more fully demonstrate how CFTC will chart annual progress toward achieving its long-term strategic goals; (c) crosscutting efforts could be addressed more fully if CFTC worked with the affected federal agencies to develop performance goals and measures that reflect the nature and extent of their common efforts; (d) strategies and resources used to achieve goals could be discussed in greater detail to better enable congressional and other decisionmakers to judge their reasonableness; and (e) the means for verifying and validating that performance information is sufficiently complete, accurate, and consistent as well as the extent to which such information and the means for collecting, maintaining, and analyzing it are reliable should be discussed. |
gao_GAO-05-744 | gao_GAO-05-744_0 | Businesses perform many different actions to address CSR concerns. For example, a business may require or promote CSR among its business partners. In their facilitating role, governments enable or provide incentives to companies to engage in CSR to obtain social and environmental improvements. Although No Broad Federal CSR Mandate Exists, Federal Agencies Conduct Many Activities Related to Global CSR
While the federal government does not have a formal role in global corporate social responsibility, we identified over 50 programs, policies, and activities at 12 agencies that are related to global CSR using a data collection instrument completed by agency officials. To illustrate, USAID partnered with one U.S. corporation operating in post-war Angola to build up the country’s business sector and equip Angola’s workforce with necessary business skills. Many Federal CSR-Related Programs Are Recent, Focus on a Range of Countries and Sectors, and Have Small Budgets and Staffs
Many of the programs we identified started in the last 5 years. Federal programs and activities assist U.S. companies with their philanthropic efforts, as well as with their efforts to be socially responsible in their core business operations, including their supply chains. None of the programs we identified were specifically designed to monitor company CSR activities. Facilitating
The U.S. government facilitates CSR by providing information, funding or incentives to companies and other players to engage in CSR-related issues. Perspectives on the Appropriate Government Role in CSR Vary with Views of CSR’s Connection to Business Profits
Based on our review of CSR literature, perspectives on the appropriate role of government in CSR vary, but generally correlate with three major perspectives on the connection of CSR to business profits: (1) free-market economic, (2) “business case,” and (3) social issues. Those with a “business case” perspective view a major role of government as supporting business’s voluntary CSR-related efforts. They believe that business is primarily concerned with profit and thus should not be trusted to develop solutions for important social issues on their own. Most respondents generally supported government assistance with voluntary CSR efforts such as endorsing, facilitating, and partnering, while some also expressed an interest in government-mandated CSR, especially to increase disclosure of CSR-related information. For example, the Department of State’s involvement in developing the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights was cited as an example of a positive effort by the U.S. government to convene stakeholders to address a CSR-related issue. In general, these latter groups desired a government role in mandating CSR, especially to increase disclosure and transparency of company CSR activities. This report describes (1) global corporate social responsibility (CSR), (2) federal agency policies and programs relating to global CSR, and (3) different perspectives regarding the appropriate U.S. government role and views on the impact of current federal activities on corporate global CSR efforts. Specifically, we interviewed: Fourteen U.S. multinational corporations that appeared on the Business Ethics Magazine’s Top 100 Corporate Citizens list for each year from 1999 to 2004—Brady Corporation; Coors Brewing Company; Cummins, Inc.; Deere & Company; Herman Miller, Inc.; Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.; International Business Machines Corporation; Intel Corporation; Merck & Co., Inc.; Modine Manufacturing Company; Motorola, Inc.; Procter & Gamble; The Timberland Company; and Whirlpool Corporation; Four business interest groups that have been active in CSR—Business for Social Responsibility; the Conference Board; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Corporate Citizenship; and the U.S. Council for International Business; Four investor groups—Calvert Group, Ltd.; Domini Social Investments, LLC ; Dow Jones Sustainability Index; and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility; Six nongovernmental organizations—Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies; Fair Labor Association; Human Rights Watch; Social Accountability International; World Resources Institute; and Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production; and Four academic institutions—Center for Corporate Citizenship, Boston College; Center for Responsible Business, the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley; the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; the Frank Hawkins Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise, University of North Carolina’s Kenan-Flagler Business School. Foreign Governments, workers and employers. Foreign governments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The trend toward globalization has intensified the debate about the proper role of business and government in global "corporate social responsibility" (CSR),which involves business efforts to address the social and environmental concerns associated with business operations. The growth in global trade and the dramatic increase in foreign direct investment in developing countries raise questions regarding CSR-related issues such as labor, environment, and human rights. U.S. firms with operations in many countries employ millions of foreign workers and conduct a range of CSR activities to address these issues. However, there is controversy as to the proper government role. GAO describes (1) federal agency policies and programs relating to global CSR and (2) different perspectives regarding the appropriate U.S. government role and views on the impact of current federal activities on corporate global CSR efforts.
What GAO Found
Although there is no broad federal CSR mandate, we identified 12 U.S. agencies with over 50 federal programs, policies, and activities that generally fall into four roles of endorsing, facilitating, partnering, or mandating CSR activities. Many of these programs have small budgets and staff and aim to accomplish broader agency mission goals, rather than being specifically designed to facilitate or promote companies' global CSR activities. The U.S. government endorses CSR by providing awards to companies, such as the Department of State's Award for Corporate Excellence. Federal programs facilitate CSR by such activities as providing information or providing funding to engage in CSR. For example, a Department of Commerce program facilitates CSR by providing training on corporate stewardship. Some agencies partner with corporations on specific projects related to their core mission. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered with one U.S. corporation operating in post-war Angola to build up the country's business sector and workforce. Other agencies, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, mandate CSR by requiring companies to meet CSR-related criteria to obtain their services. While perspectives on the government's role are tied to perspectives on CSR and its connection to profit, many we spoke with who are actively involved in global CSR desired a government role supporting business's voluntary CSR efforts. Those with a free-market economic perspective believe corporations should be primarily concerned with earning a profit and government should not promote CSR as it reduces profits. Those with a "business case" perspective often welcome government assistance with their voluntary efforts because they view their CSR efforts as increasing profits and business value. Finally, those with a social issues perspective believe that business should contribute to broader social goals but split on whether business action should be voluntary or mandatory. Most groups we spoke with at U.S. companies and others actively engaged in CSR were generally supportive of U.S. federal agency efforts to endorse and facilitate CSR and partner with companies voluntarily pursuing CSR actions. For example, several groups supported a government role in providing CSR-related information and convening stakeholders to address CSR-related issues. |
gao_GAO-16-795 | gao_GAO-16-795_0 | Background
VA Community Care Programs
PC3 and Choice are among several VA community care programs, each of which has varying eligibility requirements and types of services offered. As stated in VHA’s December 2015 guidance, Choice allows eligible veterans to obtain health care services from community providers if the veteran meets any of the following criteria: the next available medical appointment with a VA provider is more than 30 days from the veteran’s preferred date or the date the veteran’s physician determines he or she should be seen; the veteran lives more than 40 miles driving distance from the nearest VHA medical facility with a full-time primary care physician; the veteran needs to travel by air, boat, or ferry to the VHA medical facility that is closest to his or her home; the veteran faces an unusual or excessive burden in traveling to a VHA medical facility based on geographic challenges, environmental factors, or a medical condition; the veteran’s specific health care needs, including the nature and frequency of care needed, warrants participation in the program; or the veteran lives in a state or territory without a full-service VHA medical facility. VHA began entering into Choice provider agreements in February 2016. VA Contractors Complied with Requirements for Verifying Selected PC3 Physicians’ Credentials, but their Verification of Choice Physicians’ Credentials was Deficient
VA Contractors Complied with Contract Requirements for Verifying Selected PC3 Physicians’ Credentials
We found that both Health Net and TriWest complied with contractual requirements to verify PC3 physicians’ credentials and maintain documentation for our selected sample. We reviewed the credentials files for 50 PC3 physicians and found that Health Net always conducted credentials verification consistent with its policies and procedures, and TriWest almost always did so. VA Contractors’ Verification of Selected Choice Physicians’ Credentials was Deficient
We identified deficiencies in both Health Net’s and TriWest’s verification of credentials for the 50 selected Choice physicians we reviewed. We found that the contractors did not always verify the credentials of Choice physicians in a timely manner and often could not produce documentation to demonstrate that verification occurred. Similarly, TriWest provided insufficient documentation for us to determine whether it verified most of the selected Choice physicians’ credentials. VHA Lacked a Comprehensive Strategy for Overseeing Contractors Responsible for Verifying the Credentials of PC3 and Choice Physicians
We found that VHA lacked a comprehensive strategy for overseeing Health Net’s and TriWest’s compliance with contract requirements for verifying the credentials of PC3 and Choice physicians. VA’s contracts with Health Net and TriWest include a section referred to as the quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP), which specifies that VHA will review the contractors’ credentialing periodically to determine whether the contractors are in full compliance with the terms of the contract. In addition, federal internal control standards call for monitoring, and corresponding guidance suggests an agency consider having a strategy to ensure that monitoring is effective. However, we found that VHA’s monitoring is primarily limited to independent reviews of physicians’ credentials using primary source databases, rather than oversight of the contractors’ verification processes through review of documentation. VHA has conducted only one evaluation of the contractors’ documentation of verifying physicians’ credentials. Additionally, VHA officials provided conflicting information about the scope, frequency, and interpretation of the results of the oversight they do conduct. For example, VHA officials responsible for conducting the reviews were including both PC3 and Choice physicians in the monthly samples. VHA Did Not Require Its Staff to Verify Licenses and Lacked Specific Plans for Oversight of VHA Choice Provider Agreements
VHA Did Not Require Its Staff to Verify Choice Physicians’ Licenses under Choice Provider Agreements
Under VHA Choice provider agreements, staff at VHA medical facilities are not required to verify physicians’ licenses. Federal internal control standards state that management should define risk tolerances and identify potential risk factors, such as the opportunity for fraud due to the absence of controls. Without conducting oversight, VHA cannot ensure that staff at each of its medical facilities are verifying Choice physicians’ credentials consistent with the requirements of the program. However, VHA’s existing oversight approach is insufficient to ensure that Health Net and TriWest are verifying credentials according to contractual requirements, or that VHA’s own staff are reviewing qualifications as appropriate under the recently implemented VHA Choice provider agreements. VHA’s oversight of its contractors generally does not include the review of credentials file documentation, and VHA has conducted only one evaluation of the contractors’ documentation of verifying credentials and has no documented plans for additional reviews in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure that veterans receive quality care from qualified physicians, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following two actions:
Develop and implement a comprehensive oversight strategy that includes ongoing monitoring and evaluations of the contractors’ verification of PC3 and Choice physicians’ credentials, as well as VHA staff’s review of Choice physicians. Assess the risk associated with not verifying Choice physicians’ licenses under VHA Choice provider agreements, and determine whether modifications to VHA’s policy are needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help ensure that veterans are provided timely and accessible health care, VHA purchases care from community physicians. Two community care programs, PC3 and Choice, require physicians to hold certain credentials reflecting their qualifications. Congress included a provision in law for GAO to review VHA's processes for, and oversight of, credentials verification for PC3 and Choice physicians. This report examines (1) whether VA contractors comply with contractual requirements for verifying PC3 and Choice physicians' credentials; (2) the extent to which VHA oversees the contractors responsible for verifying the credentials of PC3 and Choice physicians; and (3) VHA's own processes for, and oversight of, verifying Choice physicians' credentials under recently implemented VHA Choice provider agreements. GAO reviewed PC3 and Choice contracts, VHA and contractor policies, and federal internal control standards. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 50 PC3 and 50 Choice physician credentials files, selected among five types of care across the nation. GAO also interviewed VHA officials and contractor representatives.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) contractors—Health Net Federal Services (Health Net) and TriWest Healthcare Alliance (TriWest)—complied with contractual requirements to verify the credentials of physicians under one community care program, but were deficient in doing so under another program. Based on GAO's review of selected physicians, GAO found that the contractors almost always verified and documented the credentials of physicians in the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Patient-Centered Community Care (PC3) program consistent with the requirements of the contract. In contrast, the contractors did not always verify credentials of the physicians in the Veterans Choice Program (Choice) in a timely manner; and for many physicians, contractors could not produce documentation to support verification consistent with the requirements of the contract. For example, Health Net did not document verification of six Choice physicians' certification to prescribe controlled substances, and TriWest provided insufficient documentation for GAO to determine whether it verified most of the selected Choice physicians' credentials. Both contractors shared plans to address the identified deficiencies.
VHA lacked a comprehensive strategy for overseeing Health Net's and TriWest's compliance with contract requirements for verifying the credentials of PC3 and Choice physicians. VA's contracts with Health Net and TriWest specify that VHA will review the contractors' credentialing periodically to determine whether the contractors are in full compliance with the terms of the contract. In addition, federal internal control standards call for monitoring, and corresponding guidance suggests that agencies consider having a strategy to ensure that monitoring is effective. However, GAO found that VHA's monitoring is primarily limited to independent reviews of physicians' credentials using primary source databases, rather than oversight of the contractors' processes for verifying physicians' credentials. VHA has evaluated TriWest's documentation of verifying physicians' credentials for PC3 physicians, but not Health Net's, and has not evaluated either contractor for Choice physicians. Additionally, VHA officials provided conflicting information about the scope, frequency, and interpretation of the results of the oversight they do conduct. Without a comprehensive oversight strategy, VHA cannot ensure that Health Net and TriWest are in compliance with the terms of the contract and that veterans are treated by qualified physicians.
In February 2016, VHA began entering into Choice provider agreements with community physicians to provide Choice care to veterans in certain situations. Under these agreements, VHA staff at each medical facility—rather than the contractors—review Choice physicians' credentials. GAO found that VHA did not require its staff to verify licenses submitted by physicians against the issuing source; rather, they review copies of the licenses. Federal internal control standards state that management should identify potential risk factors, such as opportunities for fraud, due to the absence of controls. Without assessing the risk of not verifying physicians' licenses against the issuing source, VHA does not know if a policy change is needed. Furthermore, VHA lacked plans for overseeing staff across each of its medical facilities with the new responsibility of verifying Choice physicians' credentials under the recently implemented VHA Choice provider agreements.
What GAO Recommends
VHA should develop a comprehensive oversight strategy that includes monitoring and evaluations of the contractors' verification of PC3 and Choice physicians' credentials, as well as VHA staff's review of Choice physicians; and assess the risk of not verifying Choice physicians' licenses under VHA Choice provider agreements. VA concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-342 | gao_GAO-08-342_0 | JIEDDO Has Taken Steps to Improve Financial Management Processes but Lacks Effective Internal Controls to Provide Assurances That Its Financial Data Are Accurate and Provide Transparency over Its Operations
JIEDDO has made progress in improving its financial management processes but has not yet reached a point where its processes contain a system of internal control that ensures the accuracy of its financial data related to resources it has used in its operations. According to federal standards, internal control comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives of an organization and help it to achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. JIEDDO Lacks Effective Internal Controls to Provide Assurances That Its Financial Data Are Accurate, and JIEDDO Is Unable to Provide Transparency over Its Operations
JIEDDO does not have an effective internal control system in place to ensure that its financial data are accurate, and without such assurances, JIEDDO is unable to provide adequate transparency over the cost of its operations. Second, JIEDDO’s internal control system does not have adequate funds authorization controls to ensure that transactions are properly authorized before committing funds, which is a fundamental control activity required by government internal control standards. We reviewed 24 initiatives of which 18 had funding transactions totaling $795 million that were not authorized in accordance with the process that JIEDDO officials said should take place in advance of the commitment of funds on initiatives valued at greater than $25 million. Furthermore, the system did not detect, correct, or address this control failure. Overall, of the $1.34 billion in fiscal year 2007 commitments we reviewed, JIEDDO inaccurately recorded at least 83 percent of the dollars committed—involving 15 of the 24 initiatives we reviewed—as management and professional support services, when other categorizations should have been applied by JIEDDO financial managers. Fourth, JIEDDO’s internal process to monitor and review the efficacy of its internal controls is inadequate. As evidenced by these four weaknesses, in the absence of an adequate system of internal control the objectives of the agency may not be fully achieved and its use of resources may not be fully consistent with DOD priorities. Furthermore, decision makers may be basing their decisions on inaccurate financial data and reports. In discussing these internal control findings at the end of our fieldwork, JIEDDO managers said that they have taken several actions to address and correct these weaknesses, which we noted previously. JIEDDO Does Not Comprehensively Identify, Track, and Report All Government and Contractor Personnel as Described by DOD
JIEDDO does not fully identify, track, and report all government and contractor personnel as provided for in DOD Directive 1100.4. Identifying all government and contractor personnel is important to JIEDDO’s management and oversight responsibilities and contributes to its ability to effectively plan for its future workforce needs. The Senate Appropriations Committee directed JIEDDO to provide a comprehensive report of all of its personnel by May 2007, and because JIEDDO does not have a comprehensive process to track all personnel, it relied on an ad hoc process to develop the report. Although JIEDDO has not routinely tracked all of its contractors, it has relied heavily on contractor support to accomplish its mission since its creation in February 2006. Conclusions
As IEDs continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, defeating the threat continues to be a high defense priority. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s (JIEDDO) financial management processes, controls, and data, we collected data on the $1.9 billion in funds available to JIEDDO for the first half of fiscal year 2007 and analyzed associated financial management and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) initiative data available for management and external reporting of JIEDDO’s activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improvised explosive devices (IED) have been and continue to be a significant threat to U.S. forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) expanded efforts to defeat IEDs with the establishment of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in January 2006. GAO was asked to review JIEDDO's management and operations. For this second report in its series, GAO determined (1) the extent to which JIEDDO's management processes provide adequate assurances that its financial information is accurate and provides transparency over its operations and (2) the extent to which JIEDDO identifies, records, tracks, and reports numbers of all personnel, including contractors. GAO analyzed data for the first half of fiscal year 2007, which included 47 funding transactions totaling $1.34 billion for 24 initiatives to address these objectives.
What GAO Found
JIEDDO's financial management processes do not provide adequate assurances that its financial information is accurate, and as a result, JIEDDO is unable to provide full transparency over the cost of its operations. While JIEDDO has improved its financial management processes, it has not yet reached a point where those processes contain an effective system of internal control. According to federal standards, internal control comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives of an organization and help it to achieve desired results through effective stewardship of its resources. GAO identified four internal control weaknesses that affect JIEDDO's financial management processes. First, JIEDDO has not comprehensively documented its administrative policies and operating manuals, which affects the consistency of how its financial management personnel perform their duties. Second, JIEDDO does not have adequate funds authorization controls to ensure that transactions are properly authorized before funds are committed. In reviewing funding transactions totaling $795 million, 18 of 24 initiatives were not properly authorized in accordance with internal control standards. As a result, funds may be used without proper scrutiny and without a mechanism to detect, correct, or address this control failure. Third, JIEDDO does not have controls to ensure that transactions are properly categorized. For example, of the $1.34 billion in fiscal year 2007 commitments reviewed, JIEDDO inaccurately categorized at least 83 percent of these dollars under one category that should have been applied to others. This could distort information used in assessing trends and prioritizing funds. Fourth, JIEDDO does not have an adequate internal process to monitor and review the efficacy of its internal controls. In the absence of an adequate system of internal control, the agency may not achieve all of its objectives and its use of resources may not be consistent with DOD priorities. Furthermore, decision makers may be basing their decisions on inaccurate financial data and reports. At the end of this review, JIEDDO managers said that they had corrected these weaknesses; however, because these actions occurred after audit completion, GAO could not determine their effectiveness. JIEDDO does not fully identify, track, and report all government and contractor personnel as provided for in DOD Directive 1100.4. Identifying all government and contractor personnel is important to JIEDDO's management and oversight responsibilities and contributes to its ability to effectively plan for its future workforce needs. While JIEDDO has a system in place for routinely tracking and reporting numbers of personnel JIEDDO regards as staff, this system is limited because it does not track all government and contractor personnel performing work for JIEDDO. However, since its creation in February 2006, JIEDDO has relied heavily on contractor support to accomplish its mission, which is not fully reflected in JIEDDO's system. When the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that JIEDDO provide a comprehensive accounting of all of its personnel, including contractors, by May 2007, JIEDDO had to rely on an ad hoc process to develop the report, which resulted in several inaccuracies and inconsistencies. |
gao_RCED-98-100 | gao_RCED-98-100_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about how well the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers was implementing its Columbia River Fish Mitigation program at its dams on the lower Columbia and Snake rivers in the Pacific Northwest, Senators Max S. Baucus, Patty Murray, and Harry M. Reid asked that we provide information on (1) the Corps’ decision-making process for identifying, setting priorities for, and funding fish mitigation actions and (2) whether the Corps has completed its fish mitigation actions on schedule and within budget. Of these 58 actions, Corps officials identified 19 projects and studies that experienced delays, cost increases, or both. NMFS’ 1995 Biological Opinion and the Regional Forum Guide the Corps’ Fish Mitigation Actions
Since 1995, the Corps’ efforts to mitigate the decline of salmon stocks on the lower Columbia and Snake rivers have been guided by NMFS’ 1995 Biological Opinion. Many of the monitoring, evaluation, research, design, and construction projects and studies identified in the Biological Opinion are included in the Corps’ Columbia River Fish Mitigation program. The Corps’ decision-making process for selecting, setting priorities for, and funding specific fish mitigation projects and studies is a cooperative effort between the Corps and regional interests and is known as the Regional Forum process. The Regional Forum is a group with broad regional representation, including federal agencies, states, and Native American tribes from the Columbia River Basin. The Forum, which includes the Corps, tries to reach consensus among its members in making decisions on fish mitigation actions. Annually, the Corps, with input from the Regional Forum, estimates the costs of its fish mitigation actions and requests funding for their implementation as part of its normal budget process. If the Congress appropriates less money than the Corps requests, the Corps seeks recommendations from the Regional Forum to help the Corps make its decisions on which projects and studies should be funded, at what levels, and in which years. However, if consensus cannot be reached, the Corps makes the decisions on actions contained in its fish mitigation program. In other cases, delays and cost increases have resulted from decisions by the Regional Forum that changed fish mitigation priorities. These changes were often necessitated by such factors as funding limitations, the need for additional biological data, or the desire to test new technology. While the Corps coordinates its fish mitigation actions with the Regional Forum, the overall effectiveness of the Forum has been questioned because, among other things, members do not agree on how to pursue salmon recovery efforts and do not uniformly support the actions required by the Biological Opinion. In addition, other difficulties, such as problems with engineering designs, were the result of the Corps’ by-passing standard procedures for project management in an effort to implement required actions in the time frames established by the Biological Opinion. In some cases, the problems the Corps has experienced in implementing its fish mitigation actions have had significant impacts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) Army Corps of Engineers' decisionmaking process for identifying, setting priorities for, and funding actions to help the recovery of salmon runs in the Columbia River Basin; and (2) difficulties in implementing these actions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since 1995, the Corps' efforts to mitigate the decline of salmon stocks on the lower Columbia and Snake rivers have been guided by the National Marine Fisheries Service's 1995 Biological Opinion; (2) many of the monitoring, evaluation, research, design, and construction projects identified in the Biological Opinion are included in the Corps' Columbia River Fish Mitigation program; (3) the Corps' decisionmaking process for selecting, setting priorities for, and funding specific projects and studies in its fish mitigation program is a cooperative effort between the Corps and regional interests and is known as the Regional Forum process; (4) the Regional Forum is a group with a broad regional representation, including federal agencies, states, and Native American Tribes located in the Columbia River Basin; (5) the Forum, which includes the Corps, tries to reach consensus among its members in making decisions about fish mitigation actions; (6) if consensus cannot be reached, the Corps is the decisionmaker on actions that affect its eight dams; (7) annually, the Corps, with input from the Regional Forum, estimates the costs of its fish mitigation actions and requests funding as a part of its normal budget process; (8) if Congress appropriates less funding than the Corps requests, the Corps seeks recommendations from the Regional Forum to help it decide on which actions should be funded; (9) the majority of Corps fish mitigation actions are being completed on time and within budget; however the Corps identified 19 actions that were delayed, experienced cost increases, or both; (10) in at least four projects and three studies, delays and cost increases were the result of decisions by the Regional Forum that changed fish mitigation priorities; (11) these changes were often necessitated by such factors as limited funding, the need for additional biological data, or the desire to test new technology; (12) in three projects, difficulties, including problems with engineering designs, were the result of the Corps' bypassing standard procedures for managing the project in an effort to implement required actions in the timeframes established by the Biological Opinion; (13) the problems the Corps has experienced in implementing its fish mitigation actions have had significant impacts; and (14) there are ongoing concerns about the overall effectiveness of the Regional Forum because, among other things, its members do not agree on how to pursue salmon recovery efforts. |
gao_GAO-14-630 | gao_GAO-14-630_0 | DOD Has Outlined the Responsibilities of the New Directorate, but Has Not Conducted a Business Case Analysis to Demonstrate How It Will Achieve Cost Savings
DOD has outlined the areas of responsibility for its Education and Training Directorate, including consolidation and management of a number of activities currently performed by the services. However, in its plans, DOD has not demonstrated through a fully developed business case analysis how creating a shared service for education and training will result in cost savings. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required DOD to develop business case analyses for its shared service proposals as part of its submissions on its plans for the implementation of the DHA, including, among other things, the purpose of the shared service and the anticipated cost savings. DOD does not have a fully developed business case analysis for medical education and training because it has not yet completed the first step of that analysis, which is to identify specific problems, which, given the stated purpose of shared services, should be directed toward the achievement of cost savings. Several of DOD’s other shared service projects present a clear linkage between (1) a stated problem, (2) proposed process changes, and (3) an estimate of benefits, costs, and risks. In contrast, DOD listed the new processes the Directorate will employ, but it did not explain the problem its proposed new processes will address, and how they will achieve cost savings. However, senior service officials stated that the Directorate was unlikely to achieve significant savings and that its creation serves more as a functional realignment than a cost savings endeavor. Without a business case analysis that links (1) a stated problem, (2) proposed process changes, and (3) an estimate of benefits, costs, and risks, the role of the Directorate remains ambiguous, and it is unclear how DOD will measure its accomplishments and hold the Directorate accountable for achieving cost savings by sharing training and education services. DOD Cannot Determine Whether the Consolidation of Training at METC Has Resulted in Cost Savings but Is Taking Action to Improve Some Processes for Evaluating Training Effectiveness
DOD established METC as part of the 2005 BRAC process to provide interservice training for enlisted service members and to achieve cost savings. However, DOD is unable to determine whether the consolidation of medical education and training for enlisted personnel at METC has resulted in cost savings because it did not establish a baseline for spending on education and training prior to METC’s establishment. DOD Officials Cannot Demonstrate Whether the Consolidation of Training at METC Has Resulted in Cost Savings
DOD cannot demonstrate whether the consolidation of training at METC has resulted in cost savings. However, some officials stated they are unsure whether the services’ transfers were representative of their true costs for the transferred programs prior to the creation of METC. Additionally, the funding transfers from the services were not sufficient to fund training at METC, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs provided additional funding to cover this shortfall. DOD did not establish and monitor baseline cost information as part of its metrics to assess performance to ensure that the establishment of METC provided costs savings. DOD Has Designed Processes for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Training and Is Taking Action to Address Accreditation and Survey Response Issues
METC has designed quality assurance processes to provide continuous, evaluative feedback related to improvements in education and training support, and is taking action to address issues regarding course accreditation and the post-graduation survey process. To improve the level of feedback received from these surveys, METC officials have begun a pilot process to conduct their own post-graduation surveys, using an online survey program that can be sent directly to the students’ and supervisors’ personal email addresses. Conclusions
DHA’s Education and Training Directorate is scheduled to begin operations in August 2014 to oversee medical education and training reform, but DOD does not have key information necessary to assess its progress in realizing the reform effort’s goal of achieving cost savings. In addition, without baseline cost information prior to future course consolidation of training at METC and within the Education and Training Directorate, DOD will be unable to assess potential cost savings. To help ensure that DOD has the necessary information to determine the extent to which cost savings result from any future consolidation of training within METC or the Education and Training Directorate, we recommend that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs direct the Director of the DHA to develop baseline cost information as part of its metrics to assess achievement of cost savings. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to DOD for comment. Defense Health Care Reform: Additional Implementation Details Would Increase Transparency of DOD’s Plans and Enhance Accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help address DOD's escalating health care costs, in 2013 DOD established the DHA to, among other things, combine common medical services such as medical education and training. DOD trains its servicemembers for a wide variety of medical positions, such as physicians, nurses, therapists, and pharmacists. DHA's Education and Training Directorate is to oversee many aspects of DOD's medical education and training and is now expected to begin operations in August 2014. GAO was mandated to review DOD's efforts to consolidate medical education and training.
GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted analysis to reform medical education and training to achieve cost savings and (2) determined whether the consolidation of training at METC has resulted in cost savings and designed processes to assess its effectiveness. GAO compared DHA implementation plans and METC budget information from fiscal years 2010 through 2012 with best practices and interviewed officials from the DHA, METC, and military services' Surgeons General offices.
What GAO Found
In its 2013 plans for the implementation of the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the Department of Defense (DOD) outlined the responsibilities of a new Education and Training Directorate, but has not demonstrated how its proposed reforms will result in cost savings. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required DOD to develop business case analyses for its shared service proposals as part of its submissions on its plans for the implementation of DHA, including, among other things, the purpose of the shared service and the anticipated cost savings. Although DOD has stated that the Directorate is a shared service that combines common services and that it will result in cost savings, DOD has not fully developed the required business case analysis for the medical education and training reforms. This is because DOD has not yet completed the first step of the process, which includes identifying the specific problems that the reform is intended to address and thereby achieve cost savings. Unlike the medical education and training reforms, other DOD shared service projects present a clear linkage between (1) a stated problem, (2) proposed process changes, and (3) an estimate of benefits, costs, and risks. For the Directorate, DOD has identified the new processes it will employ, but has not identified the concerns the proposed new processes are intended to address and how they will achieve cost savings. In addition, some officials are unconvinced that the potential cost savings will be achieved, and stated that the creation of the Directorate serves more as a functional realignment than a cost savings endeavor. Without a fully developed business case analysis, it is unclear how DOD will measure any accomplishments and hold the Directorate accountable for achieving cost savings.
DOD is unable to determine whether the consolidation of training at the Medical Education and Training Campus (METC) resulted in cost savings; however, DOD is taking action to improve some of the processes for evaluating the effectiveness of training at METC. DOD co-located medical training for enlisted medical servicemembers at METC as part of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) process to achieve cost savings, and subsequently, the services decided to consolidate their training. However, some officials stated they were unsure whether all funds were transferred to METC. Furthermore, due to a shortage of military service funds, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs provided funding for METC in addition to the services' transfers. DOD is unable to determine whether the consolidation of training at METC resulted in cost savings because it did not develop baseline cost information as part of its metrics to assess METC's success. Baseline cost information is a key characteristic of performance metrics critical to ensuring that processes achieve the desired results. Without baseline cost information prior to future course consolidation of training at METC and within the Education and Training Directorate, DOD will be unable to assess potential cost savings. DOD has designed processes to evaluate the quality of training at METC—including processes related to certification rates, accreditation, and surveys. Further, DOD has taken action to improve some processes. For example, to improve the level of feedback received from METC surveys, METC officials have begun a pilot process to conduct their own post-graduation surveys.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD conduct a fully developed business case analysis for the Education and Training Directorate and develop baseline cost information as part of its metrics to assess cost savings for future consolidation efforts. In comments to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-21 | gao_GAO-11-21_0 | The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 required the SBA, after consultation with certain agencies, to establish a policy directive for the three-phase structure (see table 1) to include, among other things, timing for receipt and review of proposals and funding guidelines. DOD Is Commercializing Space-Related SBIR Technologies but Lacks Complete Data on These Efforts
DOD is working to commercialize technologies under its space-related SBIR program to deliver warfighter capabilities, but lacks complete data on its commercialization efforts and therefore has limited insight into the program’s effectiveness. DOD invests about 11 percent of its SBIR budget in R&D and is soliciting more space-related research proposals from small businesses. Further, there are challenges to executing the SBIR program that DOD officials acknowledge the agency needs to address, such as the lack of overarching guidance for the management of the DOD SBIR Program. The number of space-related Phase I research topics submitted by DOD services and components has increased from less than 8 percent in 2005 to nearly 14 percent in 2009 (see fig. DOD Has Implemented Efforts to Increase Commercialization
There are a variety of programs and initiatives within DOD designed to increase the commercialization of SBIR technologies. Although these efforts are not specific to space technology development, they are intended to accelerate the commercialization of technologies through their transition into DOD acquisition programs or commercial-sector products or services. Air Force officials described the commercialization of some space-related technologies that range from software training solutions to hardware that supports multiple payloads aboard a single launch vehicle, and various DOD officials highlighted the potential value of developing space-related technologies through the SBIR program. Various DOD officials stated that data are hard to track and there are inconsistencies in recording and defining commercialization. Of the roughly 500 Phase II space-related contracts awarded in fiscal year 2005 through 2009, DOD officials could not determine or specify the total number of space-related Phase III contract awards. Stakeholders Perceive That Small Businesses Face Challenges to Participating in the Space Industrial Base
Most stakeholders in the space industrial base that we spoke with—DOD, prime contractors, and small businesses—generally agreed that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program face difficulties transitioning their space-related technologies into a DOD acquisition program. Small Businesses Identified Other Challenges to Participating in the DOD Space System Acquisitions Environment
Small businesses participating in the SBIR program identified other challenges they believe inhibit their ability to participate in DOD space system and weapon acquisitions, such as the potential for the loss of intellectual property and a lack of technology “pull” from DOD acquisition programs. Complete efforts to develop and issue SBIR program guidance to ensure DOD military service and component-level SBIR officials are managing the program in a manner intended to meet the full intent of the SBIR Policy Directive. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD, in the near term, should consider collecting data on all SBIR technologies that transition into DOD acquisitions or commercial-sector products or services, as well as ensure that these data are defined and recorded consistently. However, given the fact that most stakeholders in the space industrial base that we spoke with—DOD, prime contractors, and small businesses—generally agreed that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program face difficulties transitioning their space-related technologies into DOD acquisition programs, it would still be in DOD’s best interest to assess the extent to which there are cost-effective improvements that could be made to address these difficulties. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is utilizing the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program to develop and transition space-related technologies, we reviewed DOD acquisition policies, memorandums, and other guidance concerning the SBIR Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
To be competitive in the global economy, the United States relies heavily on innovation through research and development (R&D). The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 established the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program to stimulate technological innovation among small businesses. SBIR offers one avenue for introducing technological innovation in the Department of Defense (DOD) space sector. GAO was asked to assess (1) the extent to which DOD is utilizing the SBIR program to develop and transition space-related technologies; and (2) whether small businesses face challenges to participating in the space industrial base. To do this, GAO analyzed program documentation and DOD data on the SBIR program and interviewed key officials.
What GAO Found
DOD is working to commercialize space-related technologies under its SBIR program by transitioning these technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector, but has limited insight into the program's effectiveness. DOD has invested about 11 percent of its fiscal years 2005-2009 R&D funds through its SBIR program to address space-related technology needs. Also, DOD is soliciting more space-related research proposals from small businesses. For example, the number of space-related research requests submitted by the military services and DOD components has increased from less than 8 percent in 2005 to nearly 14 percent in 2009. Further, DOD has implemented a variety of programs and initiatives to increase the commercialization of SBIR technologies and has identified instances where it has transitioned space-related technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. For example, a small business developed an aluminum ring that enables multiple payloads to attach to a single launch vehicle. However, DOD lacks complete commercialization data to determine the effectiveness of the program in transitioning space-related technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Of the nearly 500 space-related contracts awarded in fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD officials could not, for various reasons, identify the total number of technologies that transitioned into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. For example, there are inconsistencies in recording and defining commercialization. Further, there are challenges to executing the SBIR program that DOD officials acknowledge and are planning to address, such as the lack of overarching guidance for managing the DOD SBIR Program. Most stakeholders GAO spoke with in the space industrial base--DOD, prime contractors, and small-business officials--generally agreed that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program face difficulties transitioning their space-related technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Although GAO did not assess the validity of the concerns cited, stakeholders GAO spoke with identified challenges inherent to developing space technologies, challenges because of the SBIR program's administration, timing, and funding issues and other challenges related to participating in the DOD space acquisitions environment. For example, some small-business officials said that working in the space community is challenging because the technologies often require more expensive materials and testing than other technologies. They also mentioned that delayed contract awards and slow contract disbursements have caused financial hardships. Additionally, several small businesses cited concerns with safeguarding their intellectual property.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD consider collecting data on all SBIR technologies that transition into DOD acquisitions or the commercial sector and ensure these data are defined and recorded consistently; complete efforts to develop and issue SBIR program guidance; and review the challenges identified by stakeholders in this report to assess the extent to which there are improvements that could be made to address them. DOD partially concurred to collect data, and concurred to develop and issue guidance. DOD did not agree to review the challenges identified by stakeholders. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid. |
gao_GAO-09-275 | gao_GAO-09-275_0 | The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation Concerns
Neither the United States nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit or deny TC assistance to countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism, even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. The United States has designated four countries—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—as state sponsors of terrorism, pursuant to several U.S. laws. However, states that are not party to the NPT—India, Israel, and Pakistan—received approximately $24.6 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. IAEA Does Not Condition TC Assistance on the Basis of the Recipient Country’s Safeguards Status
While U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA as soon as possible, neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to limit TC funding to countries that have not implemented such agreements. The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns
The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several reasons. First, while State has implemented an interagency process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, consistent with the recommendation in our 1997 report, the effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Specifically, we found that national laboratory officials received only the title of proposed projects for 97 percent—or for 1,519 of 1,565—of proposed TC projects they reviewed from 1998 through 2006. Specifically, IAEA has not been able to accurately portray the TC program’s achievements in meeting the development and other needs of member states in a meaningful way because it has not updated and revised the metrics for assessing program results. In addition, the program’s impact is limited by financial resource constraints, including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to the TCF. Finally, the TC program’s long-term effectiveness could be undermined by shortcomings in IAEA efforts to monitor how TC projects have been sustained and in recent efforts to sustain the TC program overall by reaching out to new partners and donors. Specifically, the TCF experienced a funding shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget because 62 member states did not pay their full contributions. Of these 62 countries, 47 states made no payment at all. The United States is the largest donor to the TC program, providing approximately 25 percent of the TCF annual budget, and is not a beneficiary of TC assistance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Technical Cooperation (TC) program we assessed the (1) extent to which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) limitations and challenges in IAEA’s management of the TC program. We interviewed key officials and analyzed documentation, such as cables, presentations, financial information, and reports and analyses of TC program issues from the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). IAEA member state? | Why GAO Did This Study
A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program's annual budget. This report addresses the (1) extent to which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed relevant officials at the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed IAEA, DOE, and national laboratory data; and assessed State and IAEA policies toward the TC program.
What GAO Found
Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. In addition, TC funding has been provided to states that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)--India, Israel, and Pakistan--and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude these countriesfrom participating in the TC program. Finally, IAEA member statesare not required to complete comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA--which allow IAEA to monitor declared nuclear activities and detect clandestine nuclear programs--to be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into force as soon as possible. The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several reasons. While State has implemented an interagency process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the U.S. national laboratories for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only project titles. IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing the TC program. First, the TC program's impact in meeting development and other needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not updated and revised the program's performance metrics since 2002. Second, the TC program is limited by financial constraints, including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to the program's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2007, the TCF experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay their full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment at all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining when countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance, including those defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally, the TC program's long-term viability is uncertain because of limitations in IAEA efforts to track how project results are sustained and because of shortcomings in strategies to develop new TC program partners and donors. |
gao_GAO-10-819 | gao_GAO-10-819_0 | 1). The degree of cost sharing required varies by, among other things, project purpose. The Corps Has Had Mixed Results in Modifying Its Organizational Alignment in Response to Changes in Its Mission, Budget, Staffing, and Workload
The Corps has faced significant changes in its mission, budget, staffing, and workload over the last several decades. While the agency’s fundamental structure has remained the same since 1893, it has made efforts to realign its organization within its three-tiered structure—some of which have been implemented, but others were not. 2). Past Efforts to Realign the Corps’ Organizational Structure
The Corps’ three-tiered structure—headquarters, divisions, and districts— has remained the same since 1893. Also, because of its expanding mission, the Corps realigned its district offices in the 1970s by, for example, hiring environmental specialists. In response, the Corps expanded its district roles and responsibilities and implemented a project management process in 1989 to improve relationships with nonfederal partners and improve project costs and timelines. Specifically, from 1994 to 2003, the Corps experienced a period of static administrative funding levels. In response to this situation, the Corps launched an organizational initiative in 2003—called USACE 2012—to realign the roles, functions, and processes of the three tiers with the goal of improving the efficiency of the Civil Works Program. Congress did not approve this proposal, and it was not implemented. The Corps Has Faced and Will Likely Continue to Face Challenges If It Undertakes Organizational Realignment in the Future
Inability to obtain congressional support has been and will continue to be the primary challenge to any organizational realignment, according to the officials and stakeholders we interviewed, as well as our analysis of records of past realignment attempts. These include the Corps’ funding structure and the autonomous culture of its districts. However, some officials said that sponsors may be reluctant to fund such a study because it will not necessarily result in a project in their district. Officials and Stakeholders Agree That the Corps’ Three- Tiered Structure Is Appropriate, but Some Changes to Alignment Could Enhance Its Effectiveness
While many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders generally agreed that the Corps’ three-tiered structure was appropriate to meet its mission, some believe that the number of districts could be reduced as part of a comprehensive organizational realignment. Specifically, according to the officials and stakeholders we spoke with, the Corps’ three-tiered structure allows each tier to focus on the client and stakeholder needs at that level. Current and Former Officials Identified the Need for Updated Guidance to Improve the Corps’ Effectiveness
In addition to identifying ways of improving the use of expertise, the majority of current division and district commanders we interviewed, as well as a former senior Corps official, said that the Corps’ technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. According to some Corps division and district commanders, on average Corps technical guidance is between 10 and 15 years out of date, and some guidance dates back to the 1970s. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of the Corps’ Civil Works Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following four actions: Review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of each component level of the organization and ensure that they are clearly articulated in agency guidance; re-evaluate the Centers of Expertise and develop a process to help ensure that they are consistently used across the agency; determine the extent to which the agency’s technical guidance needs to be updated, create a schedule for completing these updates, and if additional funding is needed to accomplish these updates, provide this information to Congress; and work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding approach that facilitates project implementation and that provides more efficient and effective use of funds. The department agreed that the Centers of Expertise need to be periodically reviewed and that the agency should improve its guidance and information on the types of services available and qualifications of the experts in the Centers. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We were asked to examine (1) how, over time, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has modified its organizational alignment to take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges the Corps has faced in realigning its organization and the extent to which these or other challenges are still relevant; and (3) what changes to the Corps’ organizational alignment, if any, do officials and stakeholders believe could enhance the effectiveness of the civil works mission. During these interviews, we discussed whether the Corps was aligned to accomplish its mission, opportunities to realign roles and responsibilities of the three-tiers, advantages and disadvantages to the number and location of districts and divisions, opportunities to realign expertise and the sharing of best practices, realignment of and challenges associated with the way in which the Corps is funded, and challenges associated with past and any future realignment of the Corps’ Civil Works Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers' (Corps) civil works mission has grown over the years, while its three-tiered headquarters, division, and district structure has remained the same since it was created in 1893. GAO was asked to examine for the Civil Works Program (1) over time, how the Corps has realigned its organization to take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges that the Corps has faced in realigning its organization; and (3) areas where officials and stakeholders believe changes to organizational alignment, if any, could enhance the Corps' civil works mission. Organizational alignment refers to, among other things, changes in structure, roles and responsibilities, and technical and policy guidance. GAO completed a historical and legislative review of the Corps' mission and past realignment efforts, reviewed budget, staffing, and workload data, and interviewed current and former officials and stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Since 1893, the Corps has had mixed results in modifying its organizational alignment in response to its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload, but the fundamental structure has remained the same. For example, the Corps has added capacity and staff in response to its expanding mission, which now includes nine functional areas. Additionally, from 1994 to 2003, the Corps experienced static funding levels and responded by launching an effort that realigned the agency roles, functions, and processes to improve the efficiency of the Civil Works Program. In contrast to these efforts, other past proposals for realignment have not been implemented. For example, in 1992, the Corps proposed reducing the number of district offices in response to a diminished workload and budget. However, Congress did not support the closing of any districts, and therefore, this, as well as other similar proposals, have not been implemented. The Corps has faced and will likely continue to face three challenges to any realignment effort: (1) inability to gain congressional support, (2) limitations of its funding structure, and (3) the autonomous culture of its districts. Most current and former officials told GAO that past attempts to realign district offices have failed because of a lack of congressional support. They said that the perceived risk of service reductions and job losses has and will continue to generate congressional resistance to such realignment efforts. In addition, they said the Corps' annual incremental project-based appropriations and cost-sharing requirements create an impediment to realignment. For example, funding projects in increments hinders project efficiency by increasing costs and timelines. Finally, they said the autonomous culture of the districts has created a culture where they are reluctant to share resources and workload. This has impeded the Corps' efforts to realign its work and resources more efficiently. Although many officials and stakeholders that GAO spoke with generally agreed that the Corps' structure is appropriate because it allows each level to focus on client and stakeholder needs at that level, some said that the current workload did not justify 38 districts. Officials and stakeholders also identified three areas where changes could result in enhanced effectiveness. First, they identified the need to redefine and clarify roles and responsibilities within the three levels so that Corps staff and managers are clear about the extent of their responsibilities. Second, there are opportunities to make better use of the Corps' Centers of Expertise, which were created to consolidate key skills and knowledge and improve the effectiveness of the overall Civil Works Program. Areas in which the centers could be improved include better information on the types of services available and qualifications of the experts in the centers. Finally, the majority of division and district commanders we interviewed said that the Corps' technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. Some of this technical guidance is between 10 and 15 years out of date and may result in divisions and districts executing projects differently. To improve the effectiveness of the Corps, GAO recommends, among other things, that the Department of Defense direct the Corps to review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of component levels of the organization, and determine the extent to which the agency's technical guidance needs to be updated. The Department of Defense generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-96 | gao_GAO-12-96_0 | Working with GSA, the FBI has studied a number of alternatives for consolidation. FBI Headquarters Facilities Present Security, Space, and Condition Challenges
The Hoover Building Does Not Meet the FBI’s Long- Term Security Requirements
According to FBI officials, the Hoover Building does not meet the FBI’s long-term security requirements. FBI Has Implemented Several Countermeasures to Improve the Security of the Hoover Building
Over the past several years, the FBI has implemented countermeasures at the Hoover Building to improve security, including upgrading the building’s exterior windows; moving and upgrading the security of the FBI business visitor center so that it now provides internal queuing for identification checks, an X- ray screening area, a badge office, and a secure waiting area; strengthening barriers to prevent unauthorized access; installing new doors to the building to meet the FBI’s requirements for protection against forced entry; securing air intakes to keep airborne contaminants out of the building; and paying the District of Columbia government to restrict public metered parking along one side of the building in order to prevent unscreened vehicles from parking or idling near the building. As the FBI determines its response to the recommendations, it is important that it document decisions because of their budget implications and effect on the planning for its long-term facility needs. The Hoover Building Is Aging and Showing Signs of Deterioration, but Needed Repairs and Recapitalization Projects Have Been Deferred
Although the Hoover Building is nearing its life-cycle age and exhibiting signs of deterioration, GSA has decided to limit major repair and recapitalization investments to those systems or components that affect life safety and building functionality until it is determined whether the FBI will remain a long-term occupant of the building. GSA officials told us these repairs have been deferred. In its technical comments on our draft law enforcement sensitive report, GSA reported that it has recently recategorized the Hoover Building as a transition asset to reflect the FBI’s concerns about the building’s security, condition, and efficiency, as well as GSA’s own decision to limit investments in the building. Consistent with Leading Practices Thus Far, the FBI and GSA Have Identified Alternatives for Better Meeting the FBI’s Facility Needs and Are Developing an Approach for Moving Forward
FBI and GSA Planning Actions Have Been Generally Consistent with Applicable Leading Practices in Capital Decision Making
Over the past decade, the FBI and GSA have conducted a number of studies (see fig. In 2007, GSA and the FBI found that the need to colocate certain FBI programs—to better enable collaboration and facilitate information sharing—could not be met in the Hoover Building and the annexes and that the FBI’s operations in the Hoover Building and 21 of its annexes in the National Capital Region should be consolidated. These alternatives fall into three categories: (1) modernizing the Hoover Building; (2) demolishing the building and constructing a new facility on the existing site; and (3) acquiring a new consolidated headquarters facility—through federal construction or lease— on a new site. The cost estimates in figures 6 and 7 cannot be compared because the studies and estimates were completed at different times, for different purposes, by different consultants, using different methodologies and facility specifications. III for a description of some of the financing strategies that GSA may consider.) Any alternative will take years to implement and is likely to cost over a billion dollars. For the FBI, documentation of decisions to implement recommendations— whether made in its 2011 security assessment of the Hoover Building or in future assessments of its headquarters annexes against the 2010 ISC standards—could inform decisions on how best to meet the FBI’s long- term headquarters facility needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that complete, current security information is being used to minimize risks to FBI facilities, operations, and personnel and to inform a final decision on how best to meet the FBI’s long-term facility requirements, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the FBI Director to take the following two actions: Document whether any recommendations from the FBI’s 2011 security assessment will be implemented at the Hoover Building. This is reasonable given the short period of time since our report and the FBI’s ensuing analysis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Congress directed us, in the explanatory statement accompanying the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, to review the J. Edgar Hoover Building (Hoover Building)—the main headquarters building for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—and the FBI’s off-site locations (annexes), which support headquarters and are dispersed throughout the National Capital Region. We conducted our review to examine (1) the extent to which the Hoover Building and annexes support the FBI’s operational requirements for security, space, and building condition and (2) the extent to which the FBI and the General Services Administration (GSA) have followed leading capital decision-making practices in identifying alternatives for meeting the FBI’s operational requirements and the extent to which each alternative would address these requirements. In our July 2011 law enforcement sensitive report, we recommended that the FBI conduct a new security assessment in accordance with updated security standards issued in 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) mission and workforce have expanded, and the FBI has outgrown its aging headquarters, the J. Edgar Hoover Building (Hoover Building). As a result, the FBI also operates in over 40 annexes, the majority located in the National Capital Region. In the explanatory statement accompanying the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, GAO was directed to examine the FBI's headquarters facilities. In response, GAO examined the extent to which (1) these facilities support the FBI's security, space, and building condition requirements and (2) the FBI and the General Services Administration (GSA)--the real property steward for the Hoover Building--have followed leading capital decision-making practices in identifying alternatives for meeting the FBI's facility needs. GAO reviewed security, space, and condition assessments and planning studies; visited FBI facilities; and interviewed FBI and GSA officials.
What GAO Found
According to FBI and GSA assessments, the FBI's headquarters facilities--the Hoover Building and the headquarters annexes--do not fully support the FBI's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. The FBI has addressed many security concerns at the Hoover Building by implementing protective measures. Furthermore, in response to a recommendation GAO made in a law enforcement sensitive version of this report issued in July 2011, the FBI has updated its security assessment of the Hoover Building in accordance with security standards issued in 2010. The assessment includes recommendations but does not indicate whether recommended actions will be implemented. While this is reasonable given the short period of time since GAO's July 2011 report, documentation of decisions on the recommendations and tracking implementation is important because of facility planning and budget implications--for both the Hoover Building and a new headquarters--and time needed to coordinate with GSA. FBI officials told GAO that the annexes will be assessed against the 2010 security standards. The officials noted, though, that the dispersion of staff in annexes creates security challenges. The Hoover Building's original design is inefficient, according to GSA assessments, making it difficult to reconfigure space to promote staff collaboration. Staff dispersion across annexes likewise hampers collaboration and the performance of some classified work. Furthermore, the condition of the Hoover Building is deteriorating, and GSA assessments have identified significant recapitalization needs. However, GSA has decided to limit investments in the Hoover Building to those necessary to protect health and safety and keep building systems functioning while GSA assesses the FBI's facility needs. This decision increases the potential for building system failures and disruption to the FBI's operations. Through studies conducted over the past decade, the FBI and GSA have considered three broad alternatives, each with variations, to try to meet the FBI's facility needs--(1) modernize the Hoover Building, (2) demolish the Hoover Building and construct a new headquarters on the existing site, and (3) acquire a new headquarters on a new site. In doing so, the FBI and GSA thus far have generally followed leading practices for capital decision making. To varying degrees, these alternatives would improve security, space, and building conditions, but each would take several years to implement. Estimates of the alternatives' costs, developed in the studies, are not comparable because they were prepared at different times and for different purposes. The FBI and GSA plan to discuss the FBI's facility needs with the Office of Management and Budget, and GSA and the FBI will need to present a business case, including current, comparable cost estimates, to support the choice of a preferred alternative and financing strategy. The FBI's 2011 security assessment of the Hoover Building, as well as information on any security improvements that may be needed at the annexes, could inform the agencies' decisions and help ensure that limited budgetary resources are allocated effectively. This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011, which has been updated, including a modification to a recommendation, to reflect recent FBI actions. Information that the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security deemed sensitive has been omitted. The FBI should document decisions about, and track its implementation of, all security recommendations for the Hoover Building and the FBI's headquarters annexes. GSA should reassess its decision to limit recapitalization investments in the Hoover Building, since the FBI is likely to stay in it for several more years while its long-term facility needs are being planned. The FBI agreed with these recommendations. GSA indicated it is working to implement GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-600T | gao_GAO-04-600T_0 | Reported incidence rates for most types of assaults have increased since Peace Corps began collecting data in 1990, but have stabilized in recent years. Peace Corps’ system for gathering and analyzing data on crime against volunteers has produced useful insights, but we reported in 2002 that steps could be taken to enhance the system. The full extent of crime against volunteers, however, is unknown because of significant underreporting. In 2002, we observed that opportunities for additional analyses existed that could help Peace Corps develop better-informed intervention and prevention strategies. The agency has hired an analyst responsible for maintaining the agency’s crime data collection system, analyzing the information collected, and publishing the results for the purpose of influencing volunteer safety and security policies. However, these new systems have not yet been put into operation. We previously reported that volunteers were generally satisfied with the agency’s training programs. However, recent Inspector General reports continued to find significant shortcomings at some posts, including difficulties in developing safe and secure sites and preparing adequate emergency action plans. In 2002, we reported that, while all posts had tested their emergency action plan, many of the plans had shortcomings, and tests of the plans varied in quality and comprehensiveness. Also, our analysis showed improvement in the quality of information forwarded to headquarters. Underlying Factors Contributed to Uneven Field Implementation, but Agency Has Taken Steps to Improve Performance
In our 2002 report, we identified a number of factors that hampered Peace Corps efforts to ensure that this framework produced high-quality performance for the agency as a whole. These included high staff turnover, uneven application of supervision and oversight mechanisms, and unclear guidance. The agency has made some progress but has not completed implementation of these initiatives. The Peace Corps Director has employed his authority under this law to designate 23 positions as exempt from the 5-year rule. In addition, Peace Corps has appointed six additional field-based safety and security officers, bringing the number of such individuals on duty to nine (with three more positions to be added by the end of 2004); authorized each post to appoint a safety and security coordinator to provide a point of contact for the field-based safety and security officers and to assist country directors in ensuring their post’s compliance with agency policies, including policies pertaining to monitoring volunteers and responding to their safety and security concerns (all but one post have filled this position); appointed safety and security desk officers in each of Peace Corps’ three regional directorates in Washington, D.C., to monitor post compliance in conjunction with each region’s country desk officers; and appointed a compliance officer, reporting to the Peace Corps Director, to independently examine post practices and to follow up on Inspector General recommendations on safety and security. To clarify agency guidance, Peace Corps has created a “compliance tool” or checklist that provides a fairly detailed and explicit framework for headquarters staff to employ in monitoring post efforts to put Peace Corps’ safety and security guidance into practice in their countries, strengthened guidance on volunteer site selection and development, developed standard operating procedures for post emergency action plans, concluded a protocol clarifying that the Inspector General’s staff has responsibility for coordinating the agency’s response to crimes against volunteers. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 7,500 Peace Corps volunteers currently serve in 70 countries. The administration intends to increase this number to about 14,000. Volunteers often live in areas with limited access to reliable communications, police, or medical services. As Americans, they may be viewed as relatively wealthy and, hence, good targets for crime. In this testimony, GAO summarizes findings from its 2002 report Peace Corps: Initiatives for Addressing Safety and Security Challenges Hold Promise, but Progress Should be Assessed, GAO- 02-818, on (1) trends in crime against volunteers and Peace Corps' system for generating information, (2) the agency's field implementation of its safety and security framework, and (3) the underlying factors contributing to the quality of these practices.
What GAO Found
The full extent of crime against Peace Corps volunteers is unclear due to significant under-reporting. However, Peace Corps' reported rates for most types of assaults have increased since the agency began collecting data in 1990. The agency's data analysis has produced useful insights, but additional analyses could help improve anti-crime strategies. Peace Corps has hired an analyst to enhance data collection and analysis to help the agency develop better-informed intervention and prevention strategies. In 2002, we reported that Peace Corps had developed safety and security policies but that efforts to implement these policies in the field had produced varying results. Some posts complied, but others fell short. Volunteers were generally satisfied with training. However, some housing did not meet standards and, while all posts had prepared and tested emergency action plans, many plans had shortcomings. Evidence suggests that agency initiatives have not yet eliminated this unevenness. The inspector general continues to find shortcomings at some posts. However, recent emergency action plan tests show an improved ability to contact volunteers in a timely manner. In 2002, we found that uneven supervision and oversight, staff turnover, and unclear guidance hindered efforts to ensure quality practices. The agency has taken action to address these problems. To strengthen supervision and oversight, it established an office of safety and security, supported by three senior staff at headquarters, nine field-based safety and security officers, and a compliance officer. In response to our recommendations, Peace Corps was granted authority to exempt 23 safety and security positions from the "5- year rule"--a statutory restriction on tenure. It also adopted a framework for monitoring post compliance and quantifiable performance indicators. However, the agency is still clarifying guidance, revising indicators, and establishing a performance baseline. |
gao_GAO-03-804 | gao_GAO-03-804_0 | NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on Numbers of Sealed Sources
The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is unknown primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual sealed sources. Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998
Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned in the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these lost devices were subsequently recovered. Security for devices containing sealed sources varied among facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC’s licensing process to obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities before the issuance of a license. NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been Limited and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the States
Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions. Additional orders to licensees that possess high-risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by agreement states. However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to our survey feel they should be responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and safety. Conclusions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the focus of radioactive sealed sources regulation. Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments’ efforts to provide additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated and evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of NRC: determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can participate in the development and implementation of additional security measures and include criteria and performance measures of the NRC’s and the agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in NRC’s periodic evaluations of its and agreement states’ effectiveness. Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC’s security order to large irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. However, other sealed radioactive sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon. 2. 4. To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in their responses to our survey. Why? September 11, 2001, to improve the controls over radiological sources? 3. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources.
What GAO Found
The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has been difficult. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned. The majority of these lost devices were recovered. Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10 states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC's licensing process to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12 months before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but have not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees that possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and states disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by states. However, over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures. |
gao_GAO-02-311 | gao_GAO-02-311_0 | To determine whether IRS is fulfilling the requirements of the Restructuring Act in terms of independently reviewing all proposed offer rejections, considering the facts and circumstances of each case, and not rejecting offers from low-income taxpayers solely on the basis of the amount offered, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and program guidance; studies by TIGTA; and reports by the OIC quality review program, IRS’s appeals office, and the National Taxpayer Advocate. Program changes, some initiated by IRS and some mandated by the Restructuring Act, contributed to increases in the demand for offers, the number of processing steps, and the number of staff hours needed to process a case. The Extent to Which IRS’s Current Initiatives Would Reduce Offer Inventory and Processing Time Is Uncertain
IRS has begun implementing a new strategy for processing offers, consisting of several separate initiatives intended to reduce inventory and processing time. Less complex offers will be processed centrally using standardized procedures intended to reduce staff hours per case and allow processing by lower-grade staff, while more complex offers will continue to be processed by higher-grade professional staff. IRS expects to stabilize inventory and keep up with the flow of new cases by the end of fiscal year 2002. IRS Lacked Data on the Effect of Prohibiting Partial Payment Installment Agreements
In April 1998, IRS counsel determined that IRS did not have the authority to enter into installment agreements that would not provide for full payment of the taxpayer’s liability before the collection statute expired. According to IRS officials, this policy change created a situation in which some taxpayers who were willing to pay some amount would not qualify for either an installment agreement or an offer. However, a continued increase in the inventory of cases, processing time, and costs would put the effectiveness of the OIC Program at risk. | What GAO Found
A growing backlog of cases and longer processing times have prompted concern about the management of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Offer in Compromise (OIC) Program. OIC inventory and processing time have grown despite significant increases in program staff. Program changes increased the demand for offers, the number of processing steps, and the number of staff hours needed to process the case. Yet, the demand for offers exceeded staff's capacity to process them. The extent to which IRS' current initiatives would reduce the OIC Program inventory and processing time is uncertain. The current initiatives are intended to separate the processing of less complex and more complex offers, with lower-grade staff using standardized procedures to process less complex offers and higher-grade staff specializing in more complex offers. IRS projects that the initiatives will stabilize the inventory and keep up with the flow of new offers by the end of fiscal year 2002. IRS met the requirements of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 by independently reviewing all proposed offer rejections, considering the facts and circumstances of each taxpayer when determining allowances for monthly living expenses, and not rejecting offers from low-income taxpayers solely on the basis of the amount offered. IRS lacks data on the effect on taxpayers of its 1998 decision that the agency lacked the authority to enter into partial payment installment agreements. IRS officials said the policy change created a situation in which taxpayers who were willing to pay some of their tax liability might not qualify for either an installment agreement or an offer. According to these officials, the only other option was to put such taxpayers' accounts into inactive status. |
gao_GAO-04-780 | gao_GAO-04-780_0 | The ISACs and the ISAC Council identified challenges that would require federal action. DHS Has Not Developed an Overall Information Sharing Plan
Although DHS has taken a number of actions to develop relationships with the private sector and enhance information sharing capabilities, it has not developed a plan that describes how it will carry out its information-sharing responsibilities and/or how it will address the many identified challenges that exist in building a public/private information-sharing partnership. This official indicated that a specific time frame for completing the plan had not yet been established but that DHS intends to develop a time frame this summer. Rather, the department plans to develop policies and procedures to ensure effective coordination and sharing of ISAC-provided information among the appropriate DHS components. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
GAO’s April 21, 2004, Testimony
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities that are called for in federal policy and law are intended to enhance the security of the cyber and physical public and private infrastructures that are essential to our nation’s security, economic security, and public health and safety. Effective information-sharing partnerships between industry sectors and government can contribute to CIP efforts. Federal awareness of the importance of securing the nation’s critical infrastructures—and the federal government’s strategy to encourage cooperative efforts among state and local governments and the private sector to protect these infrastructures—have been evolving since the mid- 1990s. Federal policy has encouraged the voluntary creation of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to facilitate the private sector’s participation in CIP by serving as mechanisms for gathering and analyzing information and sharing it among the infrastructure sectors and between the private sector and government. These challenges include increasing the percentage of entities within each sector that are members of its ISAC; building trusted relationships and processes to facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to information sharing, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various government and private sector entities that are involved in protecting critical infrastructures; and funding ISAC operations and activities. Subsequent federal CIP policy, including several national strategies, has continued to emphasize the importance of the ISACs and their information-sharing functions.Further, CIP policy has established specific responsibilities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies with respect to public/private collaboration to help protect private infrastructure sectors. DHS Actions to Improve Information-Sharing Relationships
specific agencies to implement the public/private partnership called for by federal CIP policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities called for in federal policy and law are intended to enhance the security of the public and private infrastructures that are essential to our nation's security, economic security, and public health and safety. Effective information-sharing partnerships between industry sectors and government can contribute to CIP efforts. Federal policy has encouraged the voluntary creation of information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC) to facilitate infrastructure sector participation in CIP information sharing efforts. GAO was asked to identify actions that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could take to improve the effectiveness of CIP information-sharing efforts.
What GAO Found
Federal awareness of the importance of securing the nation's critical infrastructures--and the federal government's strategy to encourage cooperative efforts among state and local governments and the private sector to protect these infrastructures--have been evolving since the mid-1990s. Federal policy continues to emphasize the importance of the ISACs and their information-sharing functions. In addition, federal policy established specific responsibilities for DHS and other federal agencies involved with the CIP sectors. The ISACs have identified challenges requiring further federal action, including building trusted relationships; developing processes to facilitate information sharing; overcoming barriers to information sharing; clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the various government and private-sector entities that are involved in protecting critical infrastructures; and funding ISAC operations and activities. A lthough DHS has taken a number of actions to implement the public/private partnership called for by federal CIP policy, it has not yet developed a plan that describes how it will carry out its information-sharing responsibilities and relationships. Such a plan could encourage improved information sharing among the ISACs, other CIP entities, and the department by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of all the entities involved and clearly articulating actions to address the challenges that remain. DHS officials indicated that they intend to develop an information-sharing plan, but no specific time frame for completing the plan has been established. The department also lacks policies and procedures to ensure effective coordination and sharing of ISAC-provided information among the appropriate components within the department. Developing policies and procedures would help ensure that information is effectively and efficiently shared among its components and with other government and private-sector CIP entities. |
gao_GAO-07-754T | gao_GAO-07-754T_0 | Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Challenges Remain
Port security in general has improved as a result of the development of organizations and programs such as Area Maritime Security Committees (area committees), Area Maritime Security Plans (area plans), maritime security exercises, and the International Port Security Program, but challenges to successful implementation of these efforts remain. Additionally, management of these programs will need to address additional requirements directed by the SAFE Port Act. The SAFE Port Act called for an expansion of interagency operational centers, directing the Secretary of DHS to establish such centers at all high-risk priority ports no later than 3 years after the Act’s enactment. These challenges include: Obtaining security clearances for port security stakeholders. The Coast Guard has seen improvements based on its efforts to sponsor security clearances for members of area committees. While the SAFE Port Act does not call for expanding area plans in this manner, it does contain a requirement that natural disasters and other emergencies be included in the scenarios to be tested in the Port Security Exercise Program. Coast Guard Is in Process of Evaluating the Security of Foreign Ports
The security of domestic ports is also dependent on security at foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. However, our previous work showed the Coast Guard faces challenges in carrying out its strategy to review and inspect facilities for compliance with their security plans, and these challenges could be amplified with the additional requirements called for by the SAFE Port Act. Given the differences among the facilities and locations where the technology is to be implemented, it may be difficult to test all scenarios. From our findings and the further changes to the program enacted by the SAFE Port Act, we identified the following challenge faced by CBP: Implementing the program while internal controls are being developed. To fulfill these requirements, DHS and DOE jointly announced the formation of a pilot program called the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) in December 2006, as an effort to build upon existing port security measures by enhancing the U.S. government’s ability to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials overseas and better assess the risk of inbound containers. We recently completed this study, in which we found three key weaknesses related to CBP’s performance of customs revenue functions (1) CBP failed to maintain the legislatively mandated staffing levels for performing customs revenue functions, (2) CBP lacks a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it has a sufficient number of staff with the necessary skills and competencies to effectively perform customs revenue functions, and (3) CBP does not publicly report on its performance of customs revenue functions, which would help ensure accountability. Related GAO Products:
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world's waterways and ports. In an effort to further the progress made through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed and became effective in October 2006. This testimony, which is based on past GAO work, synthesizes the results of this work as it pertains to the following: (1) overall port security, (2) facility security at U.S. ports, (3) the international supply chain and cargo container security, and (4) customs revenue collection efforts.
What GAO Found
With the Coast Guard generally implementing earlier port security requirements, the SAFE Port Act called for changes to several ongoing programs. For example, it called for interagency operational centers at high-risk ports within 3 years. Three centers currently operate, but agency coordination will pose a challenge. Also, the act established a port security exercise program, but more exercises could challenge stakeholders' ability to maintain coordination and quickly report results. Additionally, an expansion of foreign port security assessments may be challenged by greater workloads and the need for additional staff. Many port facility security requirements are being implemented, but not always on schedule. While the Coast Guard has approved, and verified through inspection, facility security plans, the SAFE Port Act requires inspections more often and some without notice. The Coast Guard will be challenged by the number of trained inspectors it needs. Worker credentialing programs were also modified by the act. One such program has seen substantial delays in the past, but is receiving more support. Efforts to avoid duplication in these programs will be challenged by the need for extensive coordination within and among federal departments. The SAFE Port Act codified existing major container security programs and also added guidance for these programs. It also required programs to test new technologies or combine existing technologies for scanning containers. While more container security activity is occurring overseas, challenges remain in the continued implementation of these efforts. These challenges include the inability to directly test the security measures used by different companies in their supply chains, particularly overseas. Since its formation, the Department of Homeland Security has faced challenges in maintaining its customs revenue functions. For example, the Department failed to maintain the legislatively mandated staffing levels, lacks a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it has a sufficient number of skilled staff to effectively perform customs revenue functions, and does not publicly report on its performance of customs revenue functions, which would help ensure accountability. |
gao_RCED-96-123 | gao_RCED-96-123_0 | The primary mortgage insurers are private mortgage insurers (PMI), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA). VA’s single-family mortgage guaranty program does require federal funds each year. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To obtain more information about the role of FHA’s single-family program in today’s housing finance system, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, asked us to provide information on (1) the terms of products available through FHA’s Section 203(b) program in comparison with the terms of products available through the programs of the PMIs and VA; (2) FHA’s share of the home purchase mortgage market, the characteristics of home buyers using FHA mortgage insurance in comparison with other home buyers, and the portion of FHA borrowers who met certain qualifying ratios for private mortgage insurance; and (3) other federal programs and activities, besides FHA and VA, that promote affordable homeownership. FHA’s maximum loan amount for a single family home is legislatively set at the lesser of 95 percent of the median house price in the area or 75 percent of the conforming loan limit for Freddie Mac. Table 2.3 summarizes the housing-expense-to-income ratios and total debt-to-income ratios acceptable to the three organizations. In addition, up to 95 percent of the closing costs on an FHA loan can be financed through the mortgage. Of these loans, FHA insured 15 percent (686,487). 3.7). For the Federal Home Loan Banks’ Affordable Housing Program and the HOPE 3 program, all homeowners assisted must have incomes no greater than 80 percent of the area’s median income. The lender selects a mortgage insurer from those that are approved by the GSEs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) role in helping people to obtain home mortgages.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FHA and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) programs allow borrowers to make smaller downpayments and accumulate higher total debt to income ratios than private mortgage insurers (PMI); (2) FHA programs finance closing costs as a part of the mortgage, insure loans up to $155,250, and provide full insurance coverage to lenders; (3) FHA insured 15 percent of the single-family housing market in 1994; (4) FHA insures low-income homebuyers with incomes no greater than 80 percent of the median income of the metropolitan statistical area; (5) FHA insures more home purchase mortgages than PMI or VA; (6) two-thirds of FHA approved loans would not have qualified for PMI; (7) the maximum loan amount for a FHA single-family home mortgage is the lesser of 95 percent of the median house price or 75 percent of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's loan limit; (8) the federal government promotes affordable homeownership through several HUD and other Federal programs; (9) these programs require federal funds and assist homebuyers in combining their assistance with FHA mortgage insurance; and (10) FHA programs promote homeownership among home buyers that are typically underserved by other agencies and PMI. |
gao_GAO-12-648 | gao_GAO-12-648_0 | PPACA defined eligibility criteria for the new premium tax credit, which will apply in all states. PPACA’s Private Health Insurance Market Provisions
Although not the focus of this report, PPACA also contained provisions to facilitate children’s access to private health insurance, apart from the provision of the premium tax credit. IRS finalized its proposed rule in May 2012 with minimal change to these methods. Under PPACA, CHIP is not funded beyond 2015, and, even if federal funding is extended, states may opt to reduce eligibility levels for CHIP or eliminate Without CHIP- CHIP programs altogether beginning in fiscal year 2020.funded Medicaid expansion or separate CHIP programs, we estimate that an additional 1.9 million children who would otherwise be eligible for CHIP would be considered to have access to affordable insurance under this proposed standard and would be ineligible for the premium tax credit. In commenting on IRS’s proposed rule on eligibility for the premium tax credit, some states and other organizations noted that IRS’s proposed interpretation of access to affordable employer-sponsored insurance— defining affordability on the basis of the cost of a self-only plan, and not on the cost of a family plan—could result in some children remaining uninsured. An Estimated 14 Percent of Children Eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or the Premium Tax Credit under PPACA Would Experience a Change in Eligibility within 1 Year
Applying final CMS and proposed IRS 2014 PPACA eligibility rules to children in 2009, we estimate that nationally, 9 percent of children eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or the premium tax credit experienced a change in household income within 6 months that would affect their eligibility for a specific form of assistance, and 14 percent of these children experienced (See table 2.) CMS Has Provided States with Tools to Increase Enrollment, and States Express a Need for Further Guidance and Note Budget Constraints
CMS has provided states with incentives and guidance to implement current initiatives to improve enrollment policies and has made progress assisting states in implementing PPACA requirements aimed at further simplifying Medicaid and CHIP enrollment. State officials reported ongoing challenges with regard to enrolling eligible children, including the need for timely guidance to implement PPACA provisions, concerns about enrolling family members who are not eligible for the same program, and state budget constraints. Recommendation for Executive Action
In the Department of the Treasury’s future rule making, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, consider the impact of the proposed standard for determining affordability of employer-sponsored insurance on children and other family members who are eligible to enroll, and whether it would be consistent with the goals of PPACA to adopt an alternative approach that would consider the cost of insuring eligible family members, or as necessary, seek clarification from Congress regarding its intent with respect to this standard. Department of the Treasury officials provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology of the Survey of Income and Program Participation Analysis
Our first two objectives were to assess the extent to which uninsured children would be eligible for Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or the premium tax credit available under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the extent to which they would experience a change in eligibility among these forms of assistance because of changes in household income during a year. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA sought to increase access to affordable health insurance, and major provisions, such as a tax credit to offset the cost of private insurance premiums, will become effective in 2014. GAO estimated the extent to which (1) uninsured children would be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or the premium tax credit under PPACA, and (2) children would experience a change in eligibility among Medicaid, CHIP, and the premium tax credit under PPACA because of income changes. GAO also assessed CMS steps thus far to help states enroll children and related state challenges. GAO applied proposed and final 2014 PPACA eligibility rules to nationally representative 2009 data from the U.S. Census Bureau and interviewed officials from CMS and IRS, two federal agencies responsible for implementing relevant PPACA provisions, and six states that received federal funds for enrollment efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), about three-quarters of approximately 7 million children who were uninsured in January 2009 would be eligible for Medicaid, the State Childrens Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or the new premium tax credit. The remaining children had family incomes too high to be eligible, were noncitizens, or would be ineligible for the premium tax credit because they would be considered to have access to affordable employer-sponsored insurance per the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) proposed affordability standard, in which IRS interpreted PPACA as defining affordability for an employees eligible family members based on the cost of an employee-only plan. Some commenters raised concerns that IRSs interpretation was inconsistent with PPACAs goal of increasing access to affordable health insurance as it does not consider the higher cost of family insurance and could result in some children remaining uninsured. Under PPACA, CHIP is not funded beyond 2015, and states may opt to reduce CHIP eligibility or eliminate programs in fiscal year 2020. Without CHIP, more children could become uninsured. In May 2012, IRS finalized its rule but deferred finalizing the proposed affordability standard.
GAO estimates that about 14 percent of children in January 2009 who met 2014 PPACA eligibility criteria for these programs experienced a change in household income that would affect eligibility within 1 year. Changes in eligibility among children in states without policies allowing them to remain eligible for Medicaid and CHIP for a full year were estimated to be higher than in states with such policies. Frequent eligibility changes could deter enrollment if the process for changing enrollment is burdensome.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has provided states with financial incentives and technical guidance to improve enrollment and to implement PPACA provisions. States reported challenges to enrolling eligible children, including the need for guidance to implement certain provisionswhich CMS indicated was forthcomingand state budget constraints.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that in future rule making, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, consider the impact of the proposed standard for determining affordability of employer-sponsored insurance on eligible family members, and whether it would be consistent with PPACA to adopt an approach that would consider the cost of insuring eligible family members, or as necessary, seek clarification from Congress regarding its intent with respect to this standard. HHS and Treasury were given a draft of this report for review, but neither provided formal comments. Treasury provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-140T | gao_GAO-05-140T_0 | Moreover, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across DOD’s major business areas results in billions of dollars of wasted resources annually at a time of growing fiscal constraints. These problems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on the status of DOD activities, including accountability of assets, through financial and other reports to Congress and DOD decision makers, (2) hindered its operational efficiency, (3) adversely affected mission performance, and (4) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse, of which I have a few examples. (GAO-04-344, Feb. 9, 2004)
These examples clearly demonstrate not only the severity of DOD’s current problems, but also the importance of reforming the department’s business operations to more effectively support DOD’s core mission, to improve the economy and efficiency of its operations, and to provide for transparency and accountability to Congress and American taxpayers. Underlying Causes of Financial and Related Business Process Transformation Challenges
The underlying causes of DOD’s financial management and related business process and system weaknesses are generally the same ones I have outlined in my prior testimonies before this Subcommittee over the last 3 years. Furthermore, I would like to reiterate two suggestions for legislative consideration that I believe are essential in order for DOD to be successful in its overall business transformation effort. These elements, which we believe are key to any successful approach to transforming the department’s business addressing the department’s financial management and related business operational challenges as part of a comprehensive, integrated, DOD- wide strategic plan for business reform; providing for sustained, committed, and focused leadership by top management, including but not limited to the Secretary of Defense; establishing resource control over business systems investments; establishing clear lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability; incorporating results-oriented performance measures that link key institutional, unit, and individual personnel transformation objectives and expectations, and monitoring progress; addressing human capital issues, such as the adequacy of staff levels, skills, and experience available to achieve the institutional, unit, and individual personnel performance goals and expectations; providing appropriate incentives or consequences for action or inaction; establishing an enterprise architecture to guide and direct business systems modernization investments; and ensuring effective oversight and monitoring. A modern, effective, credible, and integrated performance management system can help improve DOD's business operations. Business Management Modernization Program
While BMMP is vital to the department’s efforts to transform its business operations, DOD has not effectively addressed many of the impediments to successful reform that I mentioned earlier, including (1) a lack of sustained, effective, and focused leadership, (2) a lack of results-oriented goals and performance measures, and (3) long-standing cultural resistance and parochialism. As a result, the program has yielded very little, if any, tangible improvements in DOD’s business operations. Accordingly, we plan to continue working constructively with the department to strengthen the program and will report to this Subcommittee on DOD’s progress and challenges in the spring of 2005. Interim Initiatives
In contrast to its broad-based initiatives, DOD has incorporated many of the key elements for successful reform in its interim initiatives. Given that DOD spends billions on business systems and related infrastructure each year, we believe it is critical that funds for DOD business systems be appropriated to those responsible and accountable for business system improvements. However, DOD’s transformation efforts and legislation to date have not adequately addressed key underlying causes of past reform failures. Absent this leadership, authority, and control of funding, the current transformation efforts are likely to fail. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2004, GAO testified before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services on the impact and causes of financial and related business weaknesses on the Department of Defense's (DOD) operations and the status of DOD reform efforts. GAO's reports continue to show that fundamental problems with DOD's financial management and related business operations result in substantial waste and inefficiency, adversely impact mission performance, and result in a lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all major business areas. Over the years, DOD leaders have initiated a number of efforts to address these weaknesses and transform the department. For years, GAO has reported that DOD is challenged in its efforts to effect fundamental financial and business management reform, and GAO's ongoing work continues to raise serious questions about DOD's chances of success. The Subcommittee asked GAO to provide a current status report on DOD's progress to date and suggestions for improvement. Specifically, GAO was asked to provide (1) an overview of the impact and causes of weaknesses in DOD's business operations, (2) the status of DOD reform efforts, (3) the impact of recent legislation pertaining to DOD's transformation and financial improvement initiatives, and (4) suggestions for improving DOD's efforts to improve the reliability of its financial information.
What GAO Found
Although senior DOD leaders have shown commitment to transformation as evidenced by key initiatives such as human capital reform, the Business Management Modernization Program, and the Financial Improvement Initiative, little tangible evidence of improvement has been seen in DOD's business operations. Overhauling the business operations of one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world represents a huge management challenge, especially given the increased demands on our military forces. However, this challenge can be met if DOD employs key elements, such as a comprehensive and integrated business transformation plan. Six DOD program areas are on GAO's high-risk list, and the department shares responsibility for three other governmentwide high-risk areas. Substantial weaknesses in DOD business operations adversely affect its ability to provide timely, reliable management information for DOD and Congress to use in making informed decisions. Further, the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across all of DOD's major business areas results in billions of dollars annually in wasted resources in a time of increasing fiscal challenges. Four underlying causes impede reform: (1) lack of clear and sustained leadership for overall business transformation efforts, (2) cultural resistance to change, (3) lack of meaningful metrics and ongoing monitoring, and (4) inadequate incentives and accountability mechanisms. To address these issues, GAO reiterates the key elements to successful reform that are embodied in our prior recommendations and two suggestions for legislative action. First, GAO suggests that a senior management position be established to provide strong and sustained leadership over all major transformation efforts. Second, GAO proposes that business systems modernization money be appropriated to designated approval authorities responsible and accountable for system investments within DOD business areas. Absent this unified responsibility, authority, accountability, and control of funding, the current transformation efforts are likely to fail. |
gao_AIMD-95-81 | gao_AIMD-95-81_0 | Introduction
The National Weather Service (NWS) is a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), within the Department of Commerce. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) what ASOS problems exist and how effectively NWS is resolving them, (2) the cost of resolving these problems, and (3) whether NWS’ plans for implementing ASOS make sense in light of these problems. If not caught and corrected by weather observers, these observations could adversely impact aviation operations, climate research, and the general public. To NWS’ credit, it has historically been effective at eventually resolving ASOS shortfalls in meeting specifications. Thus, promised capabilities have not been delivered on six of eight ASOS sensors. While NWS has recently started assessing these user concerns and plans to decide whether or not to enhance or supplement the system to address them, NWS’ track record in effectively resolving ASOS reported problems that it deems to be outside the scope of the specification is poor. NWS Has Yet to Decide How to Address User Concerns That ASOS, as Specified, Does Not Satisfy
In our 1994 report on how leading organizations improved mission performance through strategic management of information and technology, we reported that the success and value of a system is largely measured by the extent to which it meets users’ needs. However, ASOS does not meet this need. NWS does not have a complete estimate of what it will cost to address all user concerns with ASOS. While NWS plans for ensuring that ASOS meets user needs effectively involve ASOS’ aviation users, they do not ensure that other ASOS users will be adequately involved. Recommendations
Given the criticality of accurate and timely weather observations, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Assistant Administrator for Weather Services to define and prioritize, in conjunction with ASOS’ users, all system corrections, enhancements, and supplements that must occur to meet valid user needs; reestimate ASOS’ costs in light of planned system corrections, enhancements, and supplements; formulate, in conjunction with ASOS users, explicit system performance and cost/benefit criteria governing the release of human observers; and certify to the Secretary that (1) the cost/benefit criteria have been satisfied before investing in ASOS corrections, enhancements, and supplements and (2) the system performance criteria have been satisfied before releasing human observers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Weather Service's (NWS) Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), focusing on: (1) the extent to which NWS has addressed ASOS operational problems; (2) the costs of resolving these operational problems; and (3) whether NWS plans for enhancing ASOS are reasonable.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) six of the eight sensors in the ASOS system do not meet key performance specifications; (2) ASOS shortfalls are caused by contractor failure to deliver products that meet specifications and government failure to furnish sufficient equipment; (3) ASOS reliability problems surfaced after deployment because NWS did not perform reliability testing prior to deployment; (4) NWS does not have adequate personnel or integrated information systems for it to isolate and correct ASOS failures at Federal Aviation Administration sites; (5) ASOS does not satisfy the weather observation needs of many users; (6) ASOS users state that incorrect ASOS observations could risk aviation efficiency and safety, and skew national climate research; (7) in March 1995, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) resumed the commissioning of observers on the basis of expected system and equipment improvements; (8) although NWS has recently begun to recognize user needs that go beyond ASOS specifications, it has not yet determined how it will enhance or supplement ASOS to address user needs; (9) NWS cannot reliably assess whether system enhancements will continue to be cost beneficial without a complete cost estimate; (10) ASOS problems have delayed NWS plans for releasing human weather observers; and (11) although ASOS officials stated that user needs will be met before observers are released, NWS does not have a strategy to ensure that the information needs of all users will be met. |
gao_GAO-06-390 | gao_GAO-06-390_0 | Wastewater treatment facilities may possess certain characteristics that terrorists could exploit either to impair the wastewater treatment process or to damage surrounding communities and infrastructure. Federal Laws and Directives Related to Wastewater Security Are Limited
Federal law does not address wastewater security as comprehensively as it does drinking water security. The directive designated EPA as the lead agency to oversee the security of the water sector, including both drinking water and wastewater critical infrastructures. However, the legislation did not become law and, consequently, no such requirement or specific funding exists for wastewater facilities. Under HSPD-7, EPA is responsible for (1) identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating infrastructure protection activities for the nation's drinking water and water treatment systems; (2) working with federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to facilitate vulnerability assessments; (3) encouraging the development of risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the effects of potential attacks on critical resources; and (4) developing mechanisms for information sharing and analysis. Many Large Wastewater Facilities Have Made Security Improvements but Efforts to Protect Collection Systems Have Been Limited
Our survey of large wastewater facilities indicates that many have taken steps to improve security. Many facilities reported that taking other measures to protect their treatment plants, including converting from gaseous chlorine to a safer disinfection process, took priority over protecting infrastructure in their collection systems. Most Facilities Have Conducted or Plan to Conduct Some Type of Security Assessment
Seventy-four percent of facilities that responded to our survey reported they completed, were in the process of completing, or planned to complete some type of security assessment—either a vulnerability assessment, similar to that which was required of drinking water facilities under the Bioterrorism Act, or another type of security assessment. The figure shows that security enhancements made or planned by large wastewater facilities after 9/11 generally focus on controlling access to the treatment plant. Other managers cited the difficulty and expense in securing collection systems that, by nature, cover a large area and have many, often remote, access points. While EPA and DHS have these wastewater security-related initiatives under way, the Congress has expressed concerns that EPA’s homeland security responsibilities are not well articulated in relation to DHS’ responsibilities. Multiple Efforts to Provide Critical and Threat-Related Information to the Water Sector Need Additional Coordination
In December 2002, the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) received a grant from EPA to establish a communication system to share security information with water sector utilities, known as the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (WaterISAC). A Water Sector Coordinating Council was also established by the water sector with representative members of the water sector community and charged with identifying information and other needs of the sector, including the appropriate use of and the relationship among Water ISAC, the Water Security Channel, and HSIN. Using funding from the supporting grant from EPA, the WaterISAC is currently examining options for coordination between the WaterISAC, the Water Security Channel, and HSIN. However, the scope of the preliminary review is not clear, nor is a time frame set to complete the review. Conclusions
Many of the nation’s large wastewater facilities have made security improvements since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Specifically, a substantial part of the $2 million annual EPA grant that funds WaterISAC goes to support a computer platform that may be available at no cost through HSIN. Scope and Methodology
To identify federal statutory authorities and directives that govern protection of wastewater treatment facilities, we reviewed applicable laws, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and policies, guidance, and regulations related to wastewater security from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To determine what steps EPA and DHS have taken to help wastewater facilities in their efforts to address vulnerabilities, we took several approaches. 9. 11. 3. Information Technology (IT) Security Measures 46. Network protection, such as a firewall, an 47. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wastewater facilities provide essential services to residential, commercial, and industrial users, yet they may possess certain characteristics that terrorists could exploit to impair the wastewater treatment process or to damage surrounding infrastructure. For example, large underground collector sewers could be accessed by terrorists for purposes of placing destructive devices beneath buildings or city streets. GAO was asked to determine (1) what federal statutory authorities and directives govern the protection of wastewater treatment facilities from terrorist attack, (2) what steps critical wastewater facilities have taken since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, (9/11) to ensure that potential vulnerabilities are addressed, and (3) what steps the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have taken to help these facilities in their efforts to address such vulnerabilities.
What GAO Found
Federal law does not address wastewater security as comprehensively as it does drinking water security. For example, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 required drinking water facilities serving populations greater than 3,300 to complete vulnerability assessments, but no such requirement exists for wastewater facilities. While federal law governing wastewater security is limited, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 designated EPA as the lead agency to oversee the security of the water sector, including both drinking water and wastewater. The directive tasked EPA with several responsibilities, including the development of mechanisms for information sharing and analysis within the water sector. Our survey of over 200 of the nation's large wastewater facilities shows that many have made security improvements since 9/11. Most facilities indicated they have completed, have under way, or plan to complete some type of security assessment. Similarly, more than half of responding facilities indicated they did not use potentially dangerous gaseous chlorine as a wastewater disinfectant. Survey responses show that other security measures taken after 9/11 have generally focused on controlling access to the treatment plant through improvements in visual surveillance, security lighting, and employee and visitor identification. Little effort, however, has been made to address collection system vulnerabilities, as many facilities cited the technical complexity and expense involved in securing collection systems that cover large areas and have many access points. Others reported that taking other measures, such as converting from gaseous chlorine, took priority over collection system protections. While EPA and DHS have initiatives to address wastewater facility security, efforts to provide critical and threat-related information would benefit from closer coordination. EPA and DHS fund multiple information services designed to communicate information to the water sector--specifically, EPA funds the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (WaterISAC) and its Water Security Channel, while DHS funds the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). EPA, DHS, and other industry experts are concerned that these multiple information services may overlap and produce inefficiencies. For example, a substantial part of the $2 million annual grant EPA uses to fund the WaterISAC is dedicated to purchasing computer services likely available through DHS and HSIN at no cost. A Water Sector Coordinating Council was established by the water sector to help determine the appropriate relationship among these information services. A preliminary review is under way to examine options for improving coordination between the WaterISAC, the Water Security Channel, and HSIN; however, the scope and time frame for completion of this review is unclear. |
gao_GAO-02-935 | gao_GAO-02-935_0 | DOD’s Benefits Reflect Demographic Changes in the Active Force
The active duty force has undergone several demographic changes since the end of the draft and the advent of an all-volunteer force in 1973. Congress and DOD Have Responded Positively to Demographic Changes
Congress and DOD have responded positively to the growth in the proportion of service members with family obligations by authorizing and implementing a number of family-friendly benefits. Research has shown that family satisfaction with military life can influence a service member’s decision whether to remain in the military. Opportunities Exist to Further Improve Benefits
Although a number of family-friendly benefits are available to active duty service members, opportunities exist to improve current benefits in this area that could aid in the retention of military personnel. Most important, DOD offers all four of the core benefits that are offered by most private-sector firms. These benefits are retirement, health care, life insurance, and paid time off. We did not make direct analytical comparisons between individual benefits offered by the military and those offered by the private sector to assess whether military benefits are more or less lucrative than those offered by private-sector employers. The active duty force has undergone several demographic changes since the military became an all-volunteer force in 1973. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses employee benefits--that is, indirect compensation above and beyond a service member's basic pay--as a tool to recruit and retain personnel. DOD has instituted a number of benefits that reflect demographic changes in the active duty force since the draft ended and the military became an all-volunteer force in 1973. Many of these benefits address one of the most significant demographic changes--an increase in service members with family obligations. A second major demographic change in the active military has been a growing proportion of female service members. DOD has responded positively to most demographic changes by incorporating a number of family-friendly benefits; however, opportunities exist to improve current benefits in this area. In comparing the types of benefits offered by the military with those offered in the private sector, GAO did not identify significant gaps in the benefits available to military personnel. GAO did not make direct comparisons between individual military and private-sector benefits but did determine that all the core benefits offered by most private-sector firms--retirement pay, health care, life insurance, and paid time off--are offered by the military. |
gao_RCED-97-68 | gao_RCED-97-68_0 | Out-Of-Service Rates Averaged About 45 Percent in 1996
From January 1996 (the first full month of detailed records of inspections) through December 1996 (the most recent month for which data were available as of March 1997), federal and state safety inspectors conducted over 25,000 safety inspections of about 3 million Mexican trucks crossing into the United States. The monthly out-of-service rates ranged from 39 percent to 50 percent, with no consistent trend (see fig. 2). However, because inspectors target for inspection vehicles and drivers that appear to have safety deficiencies, their selections are not random. As a result, the out-of-service rates may not necessarily reflect the general condition of all vehicles. In their opinion, trucks from Mexico are safer now than they were in late 1995. 4.) In the past year, California opened two permanent truck inspection facilities at its major border crossings, where it aims to inspect and certify the trucks entering the state from Mexico once every 3 months. Texas, with about two-thirds of the truck traffic from Mexico, and Arizona, with about 10 percent of the traffic, have no permanent truck inspection facilities at any of their border locations. The Number of State and Federal Inspectors Has Increased, and Most Are Working at Major Border Crossings
As of January 1997, the three border states in our review had 93 truck inspectors stationed at border crossing locations (see table 1). California Facilities and Inspectors
California, with about 24 percent of truck traffic from Mexico, has the most rigorous border state truck inspection program and has been inspecting trucks from Mexico in its commercial zones for several years. 5). 7). Several of the specific initiatives under this strategy are developing a “safety assessment process” that the Mexican government can use to determine the extent to which Mexican operators (1) understand their obligations and the processes the United States uses in truck safety enforcement and (2) comply with U.S. requirements; providing more than $1 million annually since fiscal year 1995 in grants to the four border states to prepare for enforcement activities related to NAFTA, such as increasing the number of state inspectors stationed at the border; conducting educational campaigns on U.S. safety standards, including training seminars and leaflets, for Mexican drivers and truck companies; approving 13 DOT truck inspector positions for 2 years to demonstrate a federal commitment to truck safety; working with CVSA and state truck enforcement agencies to train inspectors in Mexico in an attempt to increase truck safety overall in that country; contracting with the International Association of Chiefs of Police to conduct a series of truck safety forums in the U.S. border states to allow U.S. and Mexican enforcement officials to discuss strategies and other truck safety issues of mutual concern; and participating with the Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee, established under NAFTA, to develop compatible safety and operating standards in all three NAFTA countries. In February 1997 DOT announced that its program that provides grants for statewide safety enforcement activities will incorporate performance-based goals to increase truck and driver safety. Also, in March 1997, DOT submitted a legislative proposal, as part of the reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, that would incorporate this performance-based, results-oriented approach. While Mexican trucks entering the United States continue to exhibit high out-of-service rates for serious safety violations, federal and state officials believe that their efforts have had a positive effect and that Mexican trucks are now safer than they were in 1995. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the results of federal and state inspections of Mexican trucks entering the United States in 1996, focusing on: (1) actions by the federal government and border states to increase truck safety enforcement at the border; and (2) the federal enforcement strategy to ensure that trucks from Mexico comply with safety standards when entering the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) from January through December 1996, federal and state officials conducted more than 25,000 inspections of trucks from Mexico; (2) on average each month, about 45 percent of the vehicles were placed out of service for serious safety violations, such as for having substandard tires or for being loaded unsafely; (3) this rate compares unfavorably to the 28 percent out-of-service rate for U.S. trucks inspected across the United States in fiscal year 1995; (4) however, because inspectors target for inspection those vehicles and drivers that appear to have safety deficiencies, their selections are not random; (5) as a result, the out-of-service rates may not necessarily reflect the general condition of all vehicles; (6) although border inspection officials believe that trucks from Mexico are safer than they were in late 1995, the monthly out-of-service rates for trucks from Mexico in 1996 ranged from 39 percent to 50 percent, with no consistent trend; (7) the border states of Arizona, California, and Texas have increased their capability to inspect trucks at major border locations; (8) collectively, the three states had 93 state truck inspectors assigned to border crossing locations as of January 1997; (9) in addition, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) approved 13 new temporary positions (2-year appointments) to place federal safety inspectors at major border crossing locations; (10) California, with about 24 percent of the truck traffic from Mexico, opened two large permanent inspection facilities; (11) it has the most rigorous inspection program, with the goal of inspecting, at least once every 90 days, every truck entering the state from Mexico; (12) while both Texas and Arizona, collectively with more than three-quarters of the truck traffic from Mexico, have more than doubled the number of inspectors at border crossing locations, their efforts are less comprehensive; (13) under a broad strategy to help create a "compliance mind-set" for Mexican trucks crossing into U.S. commercial zones, DOT has undertaken a number of activities to promote truck safety; (14) in February 1997, DOT announced that its program that provides grants for statewide safety enforcement activities will incorporate performance-based goals to increase truck and driver safety; and (15) also, in March 1997, DOT submitted a legislative proposal to the Congress as part of the reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act that would incorporate this initiative. |
gao_GAO-05-772T | gao_GAO-05-772T_0 | According to PBGC’s 2004 annual report, PBGC provides insurance protection for over 29,000 single-employer pension plans, which cover 34.6 million workers, retirees, and their beneficiaries. In fiscal year 2004, the single-employer program incurred a net loss of $12.1 billion, and its accumulated deficit increased to $23.3 billion, up from $11.2 billion a year earlier. In defined benefit plans, formulas set by the employer determine employee benefits. PBGC’S Problems Stem from Recent Events, Long-Term Structural Trends, and Weaknesses in the Legal Framework Governing DB Pensions
A combination of recent events, long-term structural problems, and weaknesses in the legal framework governing the DB system has left PBGC with a significant long-term deficit and many large plans badly underfunded. Lower interest rates and equity prices since 2000 have combined to significantly increase pension underfunding through an increase in the present value of pension liabilities, and decreases in the value of pension plan assets. This competitive restructuring has occurred simultaneously with a long term decline in defined benefit plan participation that threatens PBGC’s revenue base. In addition, the basic legal framework governing pension insurance and plan funding has failed to safeguard the benefit security of American workers and retirees and the PBGC’s financial condition. PBGC’s current premium structure does not properly reflect the risks to its insurance program and facilitates moral hazard by plan sponsors. Further, current pension funding rules have not provided sufficient incentives, transparency, and accountability mechanisms for plan sponsors to properly fund their benefit obligations and deliver on their promises. As a result, bankrupt plan sponsors, acting rationally and within the rules, have transferred the obligations of their large and significantly underfunded plans to PBGC. These weaknesses contribute to and are exacerbated by a lack of transparent information that makes it difficult for plan participants, investors, and others to have a clear understanding of their plan’s financial condition. 4). 3. Retirement Income Security Requires Meaningful and Comprehensive Reform
In light of the intrinsic problems facing the defined benefit system, meaningful and comprehensive pension reform is required to ensure that workers and retirees receive the benefits promised to them and to secure PBGC’s financial future. Ideally, effective reform would improve the accuracy of plan funding measures while minimizing complexity and maintaining contribution flexibility; revise the current funding rules to create incentives for plan sponsors to adequately finance promised benefits; develop a more risk-based PBGC insurance premium structure and provides incentives for sponsors to fund plans adequately; address the issue of underfunded plans paying lump sums and granting modify PBGC guarantees of certain plan benefits (e.g., shutdown benefits); resolve outstanding controversies concerning hybrid plans by safeguarding the benefits of workers regardless of age; and improve plan information transparency for pension plan stakeholders without overburdening plan sponsors. However, it is also necessary to keep in mind that pension reform is only part of the broader fiscal, economic, workforce, and retirement security challenges facing our nation. If you look ahead in the federal budget, Social Security, together with the rapidly growing health programs (Medicare and Medicaid), will dominate the federal government’s future fiscal outlook. Furthermore, pension reform should be considered in the context of the problems facing our nation's Social Security system. This also means that acting sooner rather than later will make reform less costly and more feasible. Finally, as with Social Security, it is also important to evaluate pension reform proposals as comprehensive packages. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 34 million workers and retirees in over 29,000 single-employer defined benefit plans rely on a federal insurance program managed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to protect their pension benefits. However, the single-employer insurance program's long-term viability is in doubt, and this may have significant implications for the federal budget. In fiscal year 2004, PBGC's single-employer pension insurance program incurred a net loss of $12.1 billion, and the program's accumulated deficit increased to $23.3 billion. Further, PBGC has estimated that it is exposed to almost $100 billion of underfunding in plans sponsored by companies with credit ratings below investment grade. This testimony provides GAO's observations on the nature of the challenges facing PBGC and why it is preferable for Congress to act sooner rather than later. This testimony also notes the broader context in which reform proposals should be considered and the criteria that GAO has suggested for reform.
What GAO Found
A combination of recent events, long-term structural problems, and weaknesses in the legal framework governing the defined benefit system has left PBGC with a significant long-term deficit and many large plans badly underfunded. Lower interest rates and equity prices since 2000 have increased the present value of pension liabilities and lowered the value of significant portions of pension plan assets. Meanwhile, PBGC is exposed to significant risk from underfunded plans in key industries at the same time that its revenue base is threatened by the long-term decline in defined benefit plan participation. In addition, the basic legal framework governing pension insurance and plan funding has failed to help ensure that plan sponsors deliver on their pension promises and safeguard the PBGC's financial condition. PBGC's current premium structure does not properly reflect the risks to its insurance program and facilitates moral hazard behavior by plan sponsors. Further, current pension funding rules have not provided sufficient incentives for plan sponsors to properly fund their benefit obligations. As a result, bankrupt plan sponsors, acting rationally and within the rules, have transferred the obligations of their large and significantly underfunded plans to PBGC. These weaknesses contribute to and are exacerbated by a lack of timely, accurate and transparent information that make it difficult for participants, investors, and others to have a clear understanding of the true financial condition of pension plans. Comprehensive reform is required to ensure that workers and retirees receive the benefits promised to them. Ideally, effective reform would (1) improve the accuracy of plan funding measures while minimizing complexity and maintaining contribution flexibility; (2) revise the current funding rules to create incentives for plan sponsors to adequately finance promised benefits; (3) develop a more risk-based PBGC insurance premium structure and provides incentives for sponsors to fund plans adequately; (4) address the issue of underfunded plans paying lump sums and granting benefit increases; (5) modify PBGC guarantees of certain plan benefits (6) resolve outstanding controversies concerning hybrid plans by safeguarding the benefits of workers regardless of age; and (7) improve plan information transparency for pension plan stakeholders without overburdening plan sponsors. Pension reform is only part of a broader fiscal, economic and retirement security challenge. Looking ahead in the federal budget, Social Security, together with Medicare and Medicaid, will dominate the federal government's future fiscal outlook. Reform should also be considered in the context of the problems currently facing our nation's Social Security system. Importantly, as is the case with Social Security, acting sooner rather than later will make comprehensive pension reform less costly and more feasible. |
gao_GAO-17-425 | gao_GAO-17-425_0 | In 1968, Congress created NFIP to help reduce escalating costs of providing federal flood assistance to repair damaged homes and businesses. In January 2017, FEMA borrowed an additional $1.6 billion, increasing the total debt to $24.6 billion. For example, it required FEMA to increase rates at 25 percent per year until full-risk rates were reached for certain subsidized properties, including secondary residences, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties; increase rates over a 5-year period to phase out grandfathered policy rates; prohibit subsidized rates for properties purchased after, or not insured, as of July 6, 2012; create a reserve fund that would maintain at least 1 percent of the total annual potential loss exposure faced by NFIP based on outstanding flood insurance policies in force in the prior fiscal year; improve flood risk mapping; and develop new methods related to compensation for companies that sell, write, and service flood insurance policies; that is, Write Your Own (WYO) insurers. Potential Comprehensive Reform of NFIP Would Require Actions in Six Key Areas
Our review of literature and prior GAO reports and interviews, a questionnaire, and roundtable discussions with industry and nonindustry stakeholders identified a number of potential reform actions that can be considered to improve NFIP’s solvency and enhance the nation’s resilience to flood risk. These potential reform actions fall into the following six areas: (1) outstanding debt, (2) premium rates, (3) affordability, (4) consumer participation, (5) barriers to private-sector involvement, and (6) NFIP flood resilience efforts. However, we reported that FEMA is unlikely to be able to repay this debt, and some industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom we spoke said that Congress should eliminate it, as Congress has done when FEMA accrued NFIP debt in the past. That is, in addition to charging policyholders enough to pay for their current risk of flood losses (provisions subsequently revised under HFIAA), FEMA also must collect a surcharge from all NFIP policyholders to help repay program debt, among other things. According to one industry stakeholder, any shortfall in premiums needed to pay claims would be made up by using funds from the insurance company’s surplus. While actuarially sound premium rates that reflect the full risk of loss would reduce the likelihood of future borrowing, they would not fully eliminate it. We also have previously concluded, and many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom we spoke affirmed, that because NFIP premium rates do not reflect the full risk of loss, consumers may not understand the risk of flood loss associated with a particular property. Some industry and nonindustry stakeholders told us that the surcharges could cause certain NFIP policyholders to discontinue their NFIP policies, and they might or might not purchase private flood insurance instead. The cost of obtaining elevation certificates could be burdensome for some policyholders, but could be considered as part of an affordability assistance program (see following section) and also could help some policyholders reduce their premium rates. Creating an Affordability Assistance Program That Is Funded with Appropriations, Means- Based, and Prioritized to Mitigate Risk
Industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom we spoke said that rate increases associated with the transition to full-risk premium rates can raise affordability concerns for some policyholders and create a risk that fewer consumers would purchase flood insurance. Reducing flood risk through mitigation also could reduce the need for federal disaster assistance, further deceasing federal fiscal exposure. Potential Reform Actions
Building on what we previously recommended, Congress could create an affordability assistance program that (1) is funded through an appropriation rather than through discounted premiums, (2) is means- tested, (3) considers making any premium assistance temporary, (4) considers allowing assistance to be used for private policies, (5) prioritizes investments in mitigation efforts over premium assistance whenever economically feasible, and (6) prioritizes mitigation loans over mitigation grants. Prioritizing mitigation over premium assistance could address the policy goal of enhancing resilience because it would involve taking steps to reduce the risk of the property, thus reducing the likelihood of future flood claims and potentially reducing long-term federal fiscal exposure. If the mandatory purchase requirement were expanded to more (or all) mortgage loans made by federally regulated lending institutions for properties in communities participating in NFIP, consumer participation could increase, more consumers would have some protection from the financial effects of flooding, and private insurers would have a greater incentive to offer flood insurance coverage. Some of these stakeholders acknowledged that flood insurance coverage, and therefore a purchase requirement, might not be as necessary for some consumers with properties at an extremely low risk of flooding but noted that in those situations, the premium rate should be extremely low to reflect the low flood risk of the property. A 2012 study found that public perception of federal post-disaster assistance creates a moral hazard that not only discourages consumers from purchasing flood insurance but also discourages flood risk mitigation and encourages people to live in high-risk areas. In our previous work, industry and nonindustry stakeholders said that access to such data would allow private insurance companies to better estimate losses, price flood insurance premiums, and determine which properties they might be willing to insure. According to FEMA officials, the agency would need to address privacy concerns to provide property-level information to insurers, because the Privacy Act of 1974 prohibits the agency from releasing detailed NFIP policy and claims data. A requirement for a fee on private flood insurance policies could face resistance from insurers, and creating a federal appropriation to pay for mitigation and mapping would be a new cost. There also could be implementation costs and challenges associated with administering a fee on private insurers. Taking these actions in concert with other actions mentioned in this report would be important because doing so could ensure that efforts to increase private-sector involvement in flood insurance would not harm resilience efforts, particularly funding for mitigation and mapping, and community participation in NFIP. Conclusions
NFIP has experienced significant challenges because FEMA is tasked with pursuing competing programmatic goals—keeping flood insurance affordable while keeping the program fiscally solvent. In turn, this has transferred some of the financial burden of flood risk from individual property owners to taxpayers as a whole and resulted in the program owing $24.6 billion to Treasury. Actions in six areas could advance programmatic goals, mitigate some of the trade-offs resulting from the competing goals, and reform the flood insurance program by (1) promoting flood risk resilience, (2) minimizing fiscal exposure to the federal government, (3) requiring transparency of the federal fiscal exposure, (4) encouraging consumer participation in the flood insurance market, and (5) minimizing transition and implementation challenges. We recognize that many of the potential reforms, in and of themselves, involve competing goals, and that taking some actions in isolation could create challenges for some property owners. As such, they could face resistance because they could create new costs for the federal government, the private sector, or property owners. Nevertheless, taking actions on multiple fronts represents the best opportunity to help address the spectrum of challenges confronting NFIP, advance private-sector participation, reduce federal fiscal exposure, and enhance resilience to flood risk. Matter for Congressional Consideration
As Congress considers reauthorizing NFIP, it should consider comprehensive reform to improve the program’s solvency and enhance the nation’s resilience to flood risk, which could include actions in six areas: (1) addressing the current debt, (2) removing existing legislative barriers to FEMA’s revising premium rates to reflect the full risk of loss, (3) addressing affordability, (4) increasing consumer participation, (5) removing barriers to private-sector involvement, and (6) protecting NFIP flood resilience efforts. This report examines potential reform actions Congress and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) could take to reduce federal fiscal exposure and improve resilience to flood damage. Many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom we spoke believed that as the private sector enters the flood insurance market, NFIP could naturally become the insurer of last resort, or residual insurer, and that this would be a more appropriate role for the federal government in the long term than the current program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created NFIP to reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood damage, but also prioritized keeping flood insurance affordable, which transferred the financial burden of flood risk from property owners to the federal government. In many cases, premium rates have not reflected the full risk of loss, so NFIP has not had sufficient funds to pay claims. As of March 2017, NFIP owed $24.6 billion to Treasury. NFIP's current authorization expires in September 2017.
In this report, GAO focuses on potential actions that can help reduce federal fiscal exposure and improve resilience to flood risk. GAO reviewed laws, GAO reports, and other studies. GAO interviewed officials from FEMA and other agencies. GAO also solicited input from industry stakeholders (including insurers, reinsurers, and actuaries) and nonindustry stakeholders (including academics, consumer groups, and real estate and environmental associations) through interviews, a nongeneralizable questionnaire, and four roundtable discussions.
What GAO Found
Based on discussions with stakeholders and GAO's past work, reducing federal exposure and improving resilience to flooding will require comprehensive reform of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) that will need to include potential actions in six key areas (see figure below). Comprehensive reform will be essential to help balance competing programmatic goals, such as keeping flood insurance affordable while keeping the program fiscally solvent. Taking actions in isolation may create challenges for some property owners (for example, by reducing the affordability of NFIP policies) and therefore these consequences also will need to be considered. Some of the potential reform options also could be challenging to start or complete, and could face resistance, because they could create new costs for the federal government, the private sector, or property owners. Nevertheless, GAO's work suggests that taking actions on multiple fronts represents the best opportunity to help address the spectrum of challenges confronting NFIP.
Through its work, GAO identified the following interrelationships and potential benefits and challenges associated with potential actions that could be taken to reform NFIP in the six areas:
Outstanding debt. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administers NFIP, owed $24.6 billion as of March 2017 to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for money borrowed to pay claims and other expenses, including $1.6 billion borrowed following a series of floods in 2016. FEMA is unlikely to collect enough in premiums to repay this debt. Eliminating the debt could reduce the need to raise rates to pay interest and principal on existing debt. However, additional premiums still would be needed to reduce the likelihood of future borrowing in the long term. Raising premium rates could create affordability issues for some property owners and discourage them from purchasing flood insurance, and would require other potential actions to help mitigate these challenges.
Premium rates. NFIP premiums do not reflect the full risk of loss, which increases the federal fiscal exposure created by the program, obscures that exposure from Congress and taxpayers, contributes to policyholder misperception of flood risk (they may not fully understand the risk of flooding), and discourages private insurers from selling flood insurance (they cannot compete on rates). Eliminating rate subsidies by requiring all rates to reflect the full risk of loss would address an underlying cause of NFIP's debt and minimize federal fiscal exposure. It also would improve policyholder understanding of flood risk and encourage private-sector involvement. However, raising rates makes policies less affordable and could reduce consumer participation. The decreases in affordability could be offset by other actions such as providing means-based assistance.
Affordability. Addressing the affordability issues that some consumers currently face, or might face if premium rates were raised, could help ensure more consumers purchase insurance to protect themselves from flood losses. GAO previously recommended that any affordability assistance should be funded with a federal appropriation (rather than through discounted premiums) and should be means-tested. Means-testing the assistance could help control potential costs to the federal government, and funding with an appropriation would increase transparency of the federal fiscal exposure to Congress. Many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke said affordability assistance should focus on helping to pay for mitigation—such as elevating buildings—because mitigation permanently reduces flood risk (thus reducing premium rates). Mitigation efforts can have high up-front costs, and may not be feasible in all cases, but many stakeholders suggested that federal loans could be used to spread consumer costs over time.
Consumer participation. According to many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke, some consumers might not purchase flood insurance because they misperceive their flood risk. For example, consumers located outside of the highest-risk areas, who are not required to purchase flood insurance, may mistakenly perceive they are not at risk of flood loss. Consumers also may choose not to purchase flood insurance because they overestimate the adequacy of federal assistance they would expect to receive after a disaster. Expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond properties in the highest-risk areas is one option for encouraging consumer participation in flood insurance. However, doing so could face public resistance and create affordability challenges for some, highlighting the importance of an accompanying affordability assistance program. Increasing consumer participation could help ensure more consumers would be better protected from the financial risk of flooding.
Other barriers to private-sector involvement. Industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke cited regulatory uncertainty and lack of data as barriers to their ability to sell flood insurance, in addition to the less than full-risk rates charged by FEMA. For example, some industry and nonindustry stakeholders told GAO that while lenders must enforce requirements that certain mortgages have flood insurance, some lenders are uncertain whether private policies meet the requirements. Clarifying the types of policies and coverage that would do so could reduce this uncertainty and encourage the use of private flood insurance. In addition, some stakeholders said that access to NFIP claims data by the insurance industry could allow private insurers to better estimate losses and price policies. FEMA officials said they would need to address privacy concerns to provide such information but have been exploring ways to facilitate more data sharing.
NFIP flood resilience efforts. Some industry and nonindustry stakeholders told GAO that greater involvement by private insurers could reduce funding available for some NFIP flood resilience efforts (mitigation, mapping, and community participation). For example, some of these stakeholders said that as the number of NFIP policies decreased, the policy fees FEMA used to help fund mitigation and flood mapping activities also would decrease. Potential actions to offset such a decrease could include appropriating funds for these activities or adding a fee to private policies. This would allow NFIP flood resilience efforts to continue at their current levels as private-sector involvement increased.
What GAO Recommends
To improve NFIP solvency and enhance national resilience to floods, Congress should consider comprehensive reform covering six areas: (1) outstanding debt, (2) premium rates, (3) affordability, (4) consumer participation, (5) barriers to private-sector involvement, and (6) NFIP flood resilience efforts. |
gao_GAO-12-157 | gao_GAO-12-157_0 | Until February 2009, the LGP was working exclusively under section 1703 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which authorized loan guarantees for new or innovative energy technologies that had not yet been commercialized. DOE estimated that the funding would be sufficient to provide about $18 billion in guarantees under section 1705. DOE Has Made $15.1 Billion in Loan Guarantees but Does Not Maintain Consolidated Data on Status of Applications
For 460 applications to the LGP from its nine solicitations, DOE has made $15.1 billion in loan guarantees and conditionally committed to an additional $15 billion, representing $30 billion of the $34 billion in loan guarantees authorized for the LGP. However, when we requested data from the LGP on the status of the applications to its nine solicitations, the LGP did not have consolidated data readily available but had to assemble them from various sources. The elapsed time for LGP to process loan applications generally decreased over the course of the program, according to LGP data. Because it took months to assemble the information required for our review, it is also clear that the LGP could not be conducting timely oversight of the program. Thus, providing managers with access to aggregated, updated data could facilitate more efficient management of the LGP. Furthermore, without consolidated data about applicants, LGP actions, and application status, LGP staff may not be able to identify weaknesses, if any, in the program’s application review process and approval procedures. In March 2011, the LGP acknowledged the need for such a system. In October 2011, LGP officials stated that while the LGP has not maintained a consolidated application tracking database across all solicitations, the program has started to develop a more comprehensive business management system that includes a records management system called “iPortal” that also could be used to track the status of applications. The LGP followed most of its established review process, but the LGP’s actual process differed from this established process at least once on 11 of the 13 applications we reviewed, in part because the process was outdated. The LGP Did Not Consistently Follow Its Established Review Process, in Part Because the Process Was Outdated
We identified 43 key steps in the LGP credit policies and procedures manual and its other guidance that establish the LGP’s review process for assessing and approving loan guarantee applications. According to private lenders we contacted who finance energy projects, the LGP’s established review process is generally as stringent as or more stringent than those lenders’ own due diligence processes. The version of the manual in use at the time of GAO’s review was dated March 5, 2009, even though the manual states that it was meant to be updated at least on an annual basis and more frequently if needed. We reviewed the revised manual and found that the revisions addressed many of the differences that we identified between the LGP’s established and actual review processes. The LGP Did Not Always Fully Document Review Steps
In addition to the differences between the actual and established review processes, in another 18 cases, we could not determine whether the LGP had performed a given review step. In some of these cases, the documentation did not demonstrate that the LGP had applied the required criteria. First, it reduces the LGP’s assurance that it has treated applications consistently and equitably. As DOE continues to implement section 1703 of the LGP, it is even more important that it fully implement a consolidated system for overseeing the application review process and that LGP adhere to its review process and document decisions made under updated policies and procedures. Furthermore, the absence of adequate documentation may make it difficult for DOE to defend its decisions on loan guarantees as sound and fair if it is questioned about the justification for and equity of those decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that LGP managers, DOE, and Congress have access to timely and accurate information on applications and reviews necessary to manage the program effectively and to mitigate risks, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Executive Director of the Loan Programs Office to take the following three actions:
Commit to a timetable to fully implement a consolidated system that enables the tracking of the status of applications and that measures overall program performance. Because of questions regarding inconsistent treatment of applications raised by the most recent report in this mandated series, this report, also in response to the mandate, assesses (1) the status of the applications to the LGP’s nine solicitations and (2) the extent to which the LGP has adhered to its process for reviewing applications for loans that the LGP has committed to or closed. These data were to provide a current snapshot of the program by solicitation and allow analysis of various characteristics. 2. DOE disagrees with the recommendation to implement an application tracking system. Department Of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Improve DOE’s Ability to Evaluate and Implement the Loan Guarantee Program. Recovery Act: Factors Affecting the Department of Energy’s Program Implementation. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: GAO’s Role in Helping to Ensure Accountability and Transparency for Science Funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energys (DOE) Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) was created by section 1703 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to guarantee loans for innovative energy projects. Currently, DOE is authorized to make up to $34 billion in section 1703 loan guarantees. In February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act added section 1705, making certain commercial technologies that could start construction by September 30, 2011, eligible for loan guarantees. It provided $6 billion in appropriations that were later reduced by transfer and rescission to $2.5 billion. The funds could cover DOEs costs for an estimated $18 billion in additional loan guarantees. GAO has an ongoing mandate to review the programs implementation. Because of concerns raised in prior work, GAO assessed (1) the status of the applications to the LGP and (2) for loans that the LGP has committed to, or made, the extent to which the program has adhered to its process for reviewing applications. GAO analyzed relevant legislation, regulations, and guidance; prior audits; and LGP data, documents, and applications. GAO also interviewed DOE officials and private lenders with experience in energy project lending.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has made $15 billion in loan guarantees and conditionally committed to an additional $15 billion, but the program does not have the consolidated data on application status needed to facilitate efficient management and program oversight. For the 460 applications to the Loan Guarantee Program (LGP), DOE has made loan guarantees for 7 percent and committed to an additional 2 percent. The time the LGP took to review loan applications decreased over the course of the program, according to GAOs analysis of LGP data. However, when GAO requested data from the LGP on the status of these applications, the LGP did not have consolidated data readily available and had to assemble these data over several months from various sources. Without consolidated data on applicants, LGP managers do not have readily accessible information that would facilitate more efficient program management, and LGP staff may not be able to identify weaknesses, if any, in the programs application review process and approval procedures. Furthermore, because it took months to assemble the data required for GAOs review, it is also clear that the data were not readily available to conduct timely oversight of the program. LGP officials have acknowledged the need for a consolidated system and said that the program has begun developing a comprehensive business management system that could also be used to track the status of LGP applications. However, the LGP has not committed to a timetable to fully implement this system.
The LGP adhered to most of its established process for reviewing applications, but its actual process differed from its established process at least once on 11 of the 13 applications GAO reviewed. Private lenders who finance energy projects that GAO interviewed found that the LGPs established review process was generally as stringent as or more stringent than their own. However, GAO found that the reviews that the LGP conducted sometimes differed from its established process in that, for example, actual reviews skipped applicable review steps. In other cases, GAO could not determine whether the LGP had performed some established review steps because of poor documentation. Omitting or poorly documenting reviews reduces the LGPs assurance that it has treated applicants consistently and equitably and, in some cases, may affect the LGPs ability to fully assess and mitigate project risks. Furthermore, the absence of adequate documentation may make it difficult for DOE to defend its decisions on loan guarantees as sound and fair if it is questioned about the justification for and equity of those decisions. One cause of the differences between established and actual processes was that, according to LGP staff, they were following procedures that had been revised but were not yet updated in the credit policies and procedures manual, which governs much of the LGPs established review process. In particular, the version of the manual in use at the time of GAOs review was dated March 5, 2009, even though the manual states it was meant to be updated at least annually, and more frequently as needed. The updated manual dated October 6, 2011, addresses many of the differences GAO identified. Officials also demonstrated that LGP had taken steps to address the documentation issues by beginning to implement its new document management system. However, by the close of GAOs review, LGP could not provide sufficient documentation to resolve the issues identified in the review.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy establish a timetable for, and fully implement, a consolidated system to provide information on LGP applications and reviews and regularly update program policies and procedures. DOE disagreed with the first of GAOs three recommendations; GAO continues to believe that a consolidated system would enhance program management. |
gao_GAO-15-631 | gao_GAO-15-631_0 | These services include providing detailed insurance data to help regulators understand insurance sales and practices; maintaining a range of databases useful to regulators; and coordinating state regulatory efforts by providing guidance, model laws and regulation, and information- sharing tools. The rules: prohibit servicers from charging borrowers for homeowners LPI unless they have a reasonable basis for believing that the borrower has not maintained homeowners insurance as required by the loan contract; require all charges to be bona fide and reasonable (does not cover charges subject to state regulation as the “business of insurance” and those authorized by the Flood Disaster Protection Act); require servicers to send two notices to borrowers before placing LPI; specify the content of the notices with model forms; generally prohibit servicers from obtaining homeowners LPI for borrowers with escrow accounts for the payment of hazard insurance whose mortgage payments are more than 30 days overdue unless the servicer is unable to disburse funds from the borrower’s escrow account to ensure that the borrower’s hazard insurance premiums are paid on time. Servicers and insurers said that they use the tracking and notification systems to ensure that LPI placement is as accurate as possible, but that they must refund premiums when the borrower provides proof of coverage, which occurs on about 10 percent of policies. Finally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offers flood LPI through its Mortgage Portfolio Protection Program (MPPP), but servicers generally said that they prefer private flood LPI coverage for a number of reasons, including more comprehensive coverage and lower premium rates. Industry officials said that placement rates increased as borrowers stopped paying their homeowners or flood insurance premiums along with their mortgage payments. By the end of this process, the insurer is generally able to confirm borrower-purchased coverage for most of the mortgages in a servicer’s portfolio, but servicers ultimately place new coverage on the approximately 1 percent to 2 percent of borrowers who do not respond to the notifications. FEMA Offers Flood LPI, but Servicers Prefer Private Coverage
LPI is also used when mandatory flood insurance policies lapse. Some Consumer Advocates and State Regulators Said Several Factors Resulted in Higher Rates and Other Practices That Harmed Consumers, but Industry Officials Disagreed
Consumer advocates said that the primary cause of higher LPI rates was reverse competition—a market structure that drives up prices for consumers because insurers compete for mortgage servicers’ business rather than consumers’ business—by providing financial incentives to the servicer. They also said that some insurers have paid commissions to servicers or servicers’ agents and that the servicers and agents did little work to justify them. One industry official, however, said that commissions were a standard industry practice and that their costs were within reasonable ranges. This limited competition, they said, could contribute to higher premium rates. Some State and Federal Regulators Have Taken Actions Related to LPI, but Incomplete Data Limit Oversight
State Oversight of LPI Varies
Oversight of homeowners LPI varied across selected states in terms of requirements, reviews of LPI practices, and the rate filing process. The settlements required the LPI insurers to refile premium rates with a permissible loss ratio of 62 percent; to refile rates every 3 years; to annually refile any rates that have an actual loss ratio of less than 40 percent; to have separate rates for LPI and borrower-purchased insurance; and prohibited certain practices, including the payment of commissions. NAIC and state regulators are responsible for reviewing and analyzing data from insurers, including the CIEE. Without more comprehensive and reliable data and adequate policies and procedures to ensure the usefulness of the data, NAIC is limited in its ability to coordinate LPI regulation nationwide, and state and federal regulators lack reliable data about the industry. Without more comprehensive and reliable data, state and federal regulators are lacking an important tool to help them fully evaluate the LPI industry and ensure that consumers are adequately protected. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that adequate data collection efforts by state insurance regulators produce sufficient, reliable data to oversee the LPI market, we recommend that NAIC: work with the state insurance regulators to develop and implement more robust policies and procedures for the collection of annual data from LPI insurers to ensure they are complete and reliable; and work with the state insurance regulators to complete efforts to obtain more detailed national data from LPI insurers. This report (1) describes the extent to which LPI is used, (2) discusses stakeholder views on the cost of LPI, and (3) describes state and federal oversight of LPI. We interviewed the same consumer advocates, industry associations, and a selection of state insurance regulators, insurers, and mortgage servicers to better understand how each party is involved in LPI and the circumstances surrounding its use. To discuss stakeholder views on the cost of LPI, we interviewed state insurance regulators, consumer advocates, and industry officials about their opinions on the reasons for differences in premium rates between LPI and borrower-purchased insurance and their opinions on the effects on consumers. However, the total number of LPI insurers as well as the total LPI premium volume are unclear because of a lack of comprehensive national data on the LPI industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mortgage servicers use LPI to protect the collateral on mortgages when borrower-purchased homeowners or flood insurance coverage lapses. The 2007-2009 financial crisis resulted in an increased prevalence of LPI. Because LPI premiums are generally higher than those for borrower-purchased coverage, state insurance regulators and consumer groups have raised concerns about costs to consumers.
This report addresses (1) the extent to which LPI is used; (2) stakeholder views on the cost of LPI; and (3) state and federal oversight of LPI. GAO examined documentation, studies, and laws and regulations related to LPI, and interviewed stakeholders including state insurance and federal financial regulators, consumer advocates, insurers, servicers, and industry associations. GAO selected interviewees based on their involvement in the LPI market and other factors to obtain a diverse range of perspectives. GAO selected the seven state insurance regulators to interview based on a number of factors including LPI premium volume and involvement in the LPI market.
What GAO Found
Mortgage servicers purchase lender-placed insurance (LPI) for mortgages whose borrower-purchased insurance coverage lapses, most often because of nonpayment by the borrower or cancellation or nonrenewal by the original insurer. The limited information available indicates that LPI generally affects 1 percent to 2 percent of all mortgaged properties annually and has become less prevalent since the 2007-2009 financial crisis as foreclosures have declined. Although used more often when borrowers without escrow accounts (about 25 percent to 40 percent of borrowers) stop paying their insurance premiums, servicers also use LPI when an insurer declines to renew a policy. LPI insurers often provide services such as tracking properties to help servicers identify those without insurance and confirming coverage. LPI insurers said they must refund premiums if a borrower provides evidence of coverage, which occurs on about 10 percent of policies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency offers flood LPI, but industry officials said most servicers prefer private coverage because of more comprehensive coverage and lower rates, among other things.
LPI premium rates are higher than rates for borrower-purchased insurance, and stakeholders disagreed about whether the difference is justified. Insurers pointed out that they provide coverage for any property in a servicer's portfolio without a rigorous underwriting process, and the limited information requires higher rates. They added that LPI properties tended to have higher risk characteristics, such as higher-risk locations (along the coast) and higher vacancy rates because of foreclosures. But some consumer advocates and state regulators said that the factors that insurers cite for higher rates, as well as the insurers' limited loss histories, do not justify the magnitude of the premium differences. They also said borrowers have little influence over the price of LPI and that some insurers competed for the servicers' business by providing commissions to the servicer that passed the costs on to the borrower through higher premium rates. Insurers, however, said that LPI premium rates were filed with and approved by state regulators and that commissions were a standard industry practice, but their use had decreased.
State insurance regulators have primary responsibility for overseeing LPI insurers, but federal financial regulators generally oversee the servicers that purchase LPI coverage for their portfolios. However, a lack of comprehensive data at the state and national levels limits effective oversight of the LPI industry. For example, regulators lack reliable data that would allow them to evaluate the cost of LPI or the appropriateness of its use. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which helps coordinate state insurance regulation, requires insurers to annually submit state-level LPI data, but the data were incomplete and unreliable. NAIC provides guidance for the reporting of these data and shares responsibility with state regulators for reviewing and analyzing the data, but neither has developed policies and procedures sufficient for ensuring their reliability. State and federal regulators have coordinated to collect more detailed national data to better understand the LPI industry, but insurers failed to provide them all of the requested information, and whether and when they will is unknown. Without more comprehensive and reliable data, state and federal regulators lack an important tool to fully evaluate LPI premium rates and industry practices and ensure that consumers are adequately protected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NAIC work with state insurance regulators to collect sufficient, reliable data to oversee the LPI market. This includes working with state insurance regulators to develop and implement more robust policies and procedures for LPI data collected annually from insurers and to complete efforts to obtain more detailed national data from insurers. NAIC said it would consider the recommendations as part of its ongoing work in the area. |
gao_GAO-14-59 | gao_GAO-14-59_0 | In the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide,four characteristics of a reliable schedule. Well Constructed– Minimally Met
In both of the schedules, the Bureau logically linked many of the activities in a sequence. Yet in both schedules, the Bureau did not identify the preceding and following activity for a number of activities (20 percent for the GSS-I schedule and 9 percent for the 2020 Research and Testing schedule). Without this logic, the effect of a change in one activity on future activities cannot be seen in the schedule. For those activities that lack predecessors in the schedule, the real effects of changes or delays in preceding activities would not be visible in the schedule, potentially resulting in unforeseen delays in the recommendation report. More importantly, though, the Bureau is not in a position to carry out systematic quantitative risk analysis on its schedule. Geography Division managers also stressed to us their commitment to schedule management. By conducting a workforce planning process that includes an analysis of skills and training needed, such as what the Bureau describes for its scheduling staff in the future, and the identification of gaps to be addressed, the Bureau can better ensure that staff who manage the schedules understand the leading practices and the importance of adhering to them. The Bureau Generally Documented Leading Practices for Collaboration in Its Master Address File Plans
Several divisions are involved in efforts to build the 2020 MAF, making collaboration critical to ensuring that participating divisions work together to achieve the Bureau’s goals. For example, the MAF error model research team has representation from the Geography Division, the Decennial Statistical Studies Division, and the Field Division, among others. These agreements are not limited to MAF building efforts, but they provide the broad framework for working together and defining coordination. Continued management attention to follow leading practices for collaboration will help to ensure that collaboration across units is occurring as the Bureau strives to achieve its goal of a more cost- effective 2020 MAF and Census. With its planning documents, memorandums of understanding, and various charters, the Bureau has put in place a framework to support collaborative efforts following leading practices, particularly in recent months, which will aid the efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help maintain a more thorough and insightful 2020 Census development schedule in order to better manage risks to a successful 2020 Census, the Secretary of Commerce and Undersecretary of Economic Affairs should direct the U.S. Census Bureau to improve its scheduling practices in three areas: the comprehensiveness of schedules, including ensuring that all relevant activities are included in the schedule; the construction of schedules, including ensuring complete logic is in place to identify the preceding and subsequent activities as well as a critical path that can be used to make decisions; and the credibility of schedules, including conducting a quantitative risk assessment. In addition, we recommend that the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau initiate a robust workforce planning process for those working on schedules related to the Master Address File, including actions such as an analysis of skills needed, to identify and address gaps in scheduling skills. The Department of Commerce concurred with our findings and recommendations and provided several clarifications, which are reflected in this report as appropriate. The GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) assesses the reliability of the schedules for two key Master Address File (MAF) development programs, and (2) examines the extent to which the Census Bureau (Bureau) is following leading practices for collaboration for its MAF development work. We scored each scheduling best practice on a five-point scale ranging from “not met” to “fully met.” To determine the extent to which the Bureau’s key efforts to build a cost-effective MAF/Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (MAF/TIGER) incorporate leading practices for collaboration, we identified leading practices to apply to intra-agency collaborative efforts based on our past work on leading collaboration We identified organizational units and activities relevant to practices.building a cost-effective MAF in consultation with the Bureau. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Bureau, it is committed to limiting its per household cost for the 2020 Census to that of the 2010 Census, and believes that reducing the cost of updating the MAF can be of significant help. Because of tight deadlines and the involvement of several different Bureau units in this effort, effective scheduling and collaboration practices are important for the entire process to stay on track.
GAO was asked to examine scheduling and collaboration in the Bureau's efforts to develop a more cost-effective MAF. GAO (1) assessed the reliability of the schedules for two key MAF development programs, and (2) examined the extent to which the Bureau is following leading practices for collaboration for its MAF development work. GAO analyzed the schedules for the two programs most relevant to developing the address list, and reviewed strategic plans and other documents establishing coordination mechanisms and compared them to leading practices for intra-agency collaborative efforts.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau (Bureau) is not producing reliable schedules for the two programs most relevant to building the Master Address File (MAF)--the 2020 Research and Testing program and the Geographic Support System Initiative.
The Bureau did not include all activities in either schedule. The schedules appeared to have reasonable durations for most activities, but they did not include information about required resources.
For both schedules, the Bureau logically linked many activities in a sequence. Yet in both schedules the Bureau did not identify the preceding and following activity for a significant number of activities. Without this logic, the effect of a change in one activity on future activities cannot be seen in the schedule, potentially resulting in unforeseen delays.
The Bureau is not in a position to carry out a quantitative risk analysis on the schedules.
As a result of these issues, the schedules are producing inaccurate dates, which could mislead Bureau managers to falsely conclude that all of the work is on schedule when it may not be. Without reliable schedule information, such as valid forecasted dates and the amount of flexibility remaining in the schedule, management faces challenges in assessing the progress of MAF development efforts and determining what activities most need attention. Staff managing the schedules said that they had not received thorough training or certification on scheduling best practices, and, according to schedule managers, staff turnover contributed to the issues GAO identified. Workforce planning and training can help the Bureau have the skills in place to ensure that characteristics of a reliable schedule are met to support key management decisions.
The Bureau has documented collaboration activities that follow many leading practices for collaboration. Because several divisions are involved in efforts to develop the MAF, collaboration across these divisions is critical. In recent months, the Bureau has put in place a variety of mechanisms to aid coordination, such as crosscutting task teams. For example, research projects relevant to developing the MAF have representation from multiple divisions. The Bureau has also established memorandums of understanding across divisions to provide a broad framework for working together. Continued management attention to collaboration practices will help to ensure that collaboration across units is occurring as MAF development continues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Census Director take a number of actions to improve the reliability of its schedules, including steps to ensure that all relevant activities are included in the schedules, complete scheduling logic is in place, and a quantitative risk assessment is conducted. In addition, GAO recommends a robust workforce planning effort to identify and address gaps in scheduling skills for staff that work on schedules. The Department of Commerce concurred and suggested several clarifications, which GAO included in the report as appropriate. |
gao_T-RCED-98-217 | gao_T-RCED-98-217_0 | While most of these mortgages were not insured, about 39 percent, or about 1.5 million, were insured. FHA’s share of the home purchase mortgage market was 16 percent in fiscal year 1996, the private mortgage insurers’ (PMIs) share was 17 percent, and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) share was 5 percent. A primary goal of FHA’s single-family programs is to assist households that may be underserved by the private market. In addition, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) establish their own guidelines for the loans they will purchase in the secondary mortgage market. FHA Is an Important Source of Mortgage Insurance in Certain Markets
In our report on FHA’s role, we found that in 1994, FHA-insured home purchase loans were concentrated to a greater extent on low-income and minority borrowers, first-time home buyers, and borrowers with higher LTV ratios than those with loans insured by private mortgage-insurers. In addition, solely on the basis of our analysis of the LTV and qualifying ratios of borrowers who obtained loans in 1995, 66 percent of FHA’s borrowers might not have qualified for private mortgage insurance for the loans they received. FHA insured 30 percent of all loans made to minority home buyers, and such home buyers represented about 31 percent of FHA-insured loans. FHA’s Insurance Fund Exceeds Statutory Reserve Targets
Another major achievement of FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance program has been to restore the financial health of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (the Fund)—the insurance fund supporting 91 percent of the dollar value of FHA-insured single-family mortgages outstanding as of the end of fiscal year 1997. However, both FHA and VA allow borrowers to finance their insurance premiums. The Federal Government Promotes Affordable Homeownership in Many Other Ways
Besides FHA’s Section 203(b) and VA’s single-family loan programs, the federal government is involved in many other efforts to make homeownership affordable. The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, through its network of local development organizations and its secondary market organization, promotes affordable homeownership primarily through second mortgages and home buyer education. Several of the other federal programs assist low- and moderate-income home buyers by combining their assistance with FHA mortgage insurance. A substantial portion of the mortgages made through state housing finance agencies and HUD’s Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere program were insured by FHA in 1994. Similarly, private mortgage insurance may also be combined with assistance from federal housing programs. Challenges Faced by FHA’s Single-Family Mortgage Insurance Fund
While FHA’s Fund is financially healthy and has surpassed the legislative target for reserves, there are challenges facing FHA today, including reducing the losses it incurs on foreclosed properties, maintaining financial self-sufficiency in the face of economic and other factors that could adversely affect future program costs, and resolving year 2000 computing risks. In particular, by lowering the required down payment, PMIs and others might attract some borrowers who might have otherwise insured their mortgages with FHA. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the achievements of the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) home mortgage insurance program, including the extent that home buyers use FHA insurance, the characteristics of these home buyers--including whether they were first-time home buyers--and how many of them might also qualify for private mortgage insurance; (2) how the insurance terms available through FHA's principal single-family mortgage insurance program compare with private mortgage insurance and guaranties from the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA); (3) other federal activities that promote affordable homeownership; and (4) challenges faced by FHA in ensuring the financial health of its Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund--the insurance fund supporting most FHA-insured single-family mortgages.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FHA is a major participant in the single-family housing market; (2) of the approximately 3.8 million home purchase loans made in fiscal year 1996, FHA insured 16 percent; (3) while most of these mortgages were not insured, about 39 percent were; (4) FHA insured 42 percent of all home purchase loans in 1996 and fulfilled a larger role in some specific market segments, particularly low-income home buyers and minorities; (5) most borrowers were able to obtain a home purchase mortgage without insurance by either FHA, the private mortgage insurers, or VA; (6) while a third of the loans FHA insured in 1995 might have qualified for private mortgage insurance, the other two-thirds probably would not have qualified, on the basis of the loan-to-value and qualifying ratios of the loans FHA insured; (7) FHA and VA programs permit borrowers to make smaller down payments and have higher total-debt-to-income ratios than allowed by private mortgage insurers; (8) FHA's program differs from private mortgage insurers' and VA's programs in that it allows closing costs to be financed in the mortgage; (9) in addition to FHA and VA, the federal government promotes affordable homeownership through programs run by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, state housing finance agencies, and Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation; (10) although these other federal programs share FHA's mission to assist households who may be underserved by the private mortgage market, none reach as many households as FHA; (11) several of these other programs assist home buyers by combining their assistance with FHA mortgage insurance; (12) the federal government promotes homeownership among buyers who might otherwise by underserved through requirements placed upon the Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and certain lenders; and (13) although FHA's single-family program is financially self-sufficient, there are challenges facing FHA today, including reducing the losses it incurs on foreclosed properties, maintaining financial self-sufficiency in the face of economic and other factors that could adversely affect future program costs, and resolving year 2000 computing risks. |
gao_GAO-16-657 | gao_GAO-16-657_0 | Background
FTR Amendments and GSA Travel Bulletins
To help federal agencies manage their respective travel programs and achieve travel cost savings, GSA issues and revises the FTR. According to the FTR website, GSA promulgates the FTR to: (1) interpret statutory and other policy requirements in a manner that balances the need to ensure that official travel is conducted responsibly with the need to minimize administrative costs, and (2) clearly communicate the resulting requirements to federal agencies and employees. In 2015, GSA also established the Senior Travel Official Council to assist in the administration’s efforts to promote efficient spending. Cost-Saving Efforts at Selected Agencies Generally Aligned with Regulations and Guidance
Selected Agencies Already Had Travel Policies in Place Prior to the Issuance of Regulations or Guidance
Officials at each of the six selected agencies stated that, while their respective agencies pursued a wide range of cost-saving efforts to address the GSA cost-saving provisions, all of them had policies in place that addressed these provisions prior to GSA issuance of either an amendment or travel bulletin. However, because the bulletins served to reinforce existing policy, these actions resulted in these agencies’ officials taking further actions—either developing new travel policy or issuing a memorandum to staff reminding them of existing agency travel policy—to highlight the policy. This was a cost- saving effort that the agency had not pursued prior to the amendment. Selected Agencies Advised and Reminded Employees to Continue Following the FTR in a Variety of Additional Ways
Officials at five of the six selected agencies described a few cases where their respective agencies took no specific policy action, but either: 1) advised employees to follow the FTR; 2) asked individual components to create unique policies that ensured FTR compliance; or 3) provided approving officials with the discretion to oversee employees’ compliance with the FTR as appropriate, and determine whether or how to adopt promising practices from the GSA travel bulletins. The Senior Travel Official Council Encouraged Cost- Saving Efforts among the Agencies, but More Information Sharing Needed
The Senior Travel Official Council (STOC) brings travel officials from all federal agencies together to share information and best practices to further cost-saving efforts. Such practices could help agencies to develop and implement cost-saving efforts, and quantify those efforts when possible. Most Efforts to Reduce Agency Travel-Related Spending Could Not Be Quantified
Only four cost-saving efforts at two of the selected agencies—DOJ and DOD—could be quantified. Travel Data System Limitations Hinder Agencies’ Ability to Identify Cost Savings
According to officials at five of the six selected agencies, a number of limitations in the travel data system designed by GSA and maintained by the agencies affected their ability to identify cost savings related to implementation of cost-saving provisions in FTR amendments and GSA travel bulletins. GSA officials stated that while most agencies have the capability via ETS2 to track, monitor, and report on cost savings, this reporting capability is not being leveraged consistently across the federal agencies to manage their travel costs. Agencies’ abilities to customize their reporting options without also meeting standard reporting requirements hinder GSA’s ability to establish a common metric for tracking and monitoring federal travel spending. Conclusions
The six selected agencies that accounted for more than three-quarters of federal travel dollars (Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs) did pursue a variety of efforts aimed at reducing travel costs that generally aligned with GSA’s amendments to the FTR and travel bulletins. However, these agencies generally lacked data to track these efforts. GSA created the STOC to identify efficiencies and discuss practices for achieving travel cost savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
The Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the STOC, should develop a travel data management approach, including common reporting formats that would provide GSA with more consistent travel cost data allowing GSA to compare travel costs across federal agencies. The Administrator of GSA, as chair of the STOC, should work with the STOC to identify promising opportunities and implement leading practices to help agencies leverage their travel resources and implement travel cost-saving efforts. Appendix I: Travel Cost-Saving Provisions Contained in Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) Amendments and General Services Administration (GSA) Travel Bulletins Issued between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2015
FTR Amendments Lodging Reimbursement
76 Fed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies rely on travel to achieve a broad range of missions. GSA helps agencies develop travel policy by providing guidance to agencies, including issuing and revising the FTR. The administration and GSA have encouraged agencies to take steps to adopt cost-savings efforts and promote efficient travel spending.
House Report 112-136 included a provision for GAO to report on whether FTR revisions resulted in measurable reductions in travel costs. This report: 1) describes selected agencies' actions taken to address FTR revisions; 2) determines the extent to which FTR revisions led to cost savings; and 3) determines any cost savings achieved during fiscal years 2012 to 2015. GAO reviewed information from six selected federal agencies with the largest amount of travel spending in fiscal year 2015. GAO also reviewed how these agencies responded to GSA's FTR amendments and travel bulletins to achieve cost savings.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs, the six federal agencies with the largest travel spending in fiscal year 2015, pursued a variety of cost-saving efforts that generally aligned with regulations and guidance issued in either Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) amendments or General Services Administration (GSA) travel bulletins from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2015. GSA administers and revises the FTR—which interprets statutory and other policy requirements to ensure that official travel is conducted responsibly—and minimizes administrative costs. Although GSA does not have the authority to enforce the FTR, it issues FTR amendments and travel bulletins to help federal agencies manage their respective travel programs and achieve travel cost savings through the provisions contained in the amendments and travel bulletins. GSA FTR amendments and travel bulletins issued between fiscal years 2011 and 2015 contained a total of 27 cost-saving provisions. Agency officials at each of the six selected agencies stated that their respective agencies either had policies in place that already addressed the cost-saving provisions; developed new travel policies or issued guidance that reinforced the provisions or updated existing policies related to the provisions; or advised employees to follow the FTR without implementing an agency-specific policy.
The six agencies reported that GSA's review of the FTR to revise obsolete and outdated policies influenced their actions and resulted in cost savings. However, most of these savings could not be quantified. Only four cost-saving efforts at two agencies—the Departments of Defense and Justice—could be quantified. These agencies reported that a wide range of factors influenced their cost-saving efforts. In addition to FTR-compliance efforts, these agencies reported that administration actions on reducing travel costs, cutting waste, and promoting efficient spending influenced their approaches to managing travel costs. Agency officials also reported that broader efforts to improve operational efficiency, and efforts to responsibly use resources, also influenced their agency-specific policies and practices to promote efficient travel spending.
According to GSA and officials from the six selected agencies, data limitations existed both within the selected agencies in terms of their ability to quantify travel-related cost savings, and government-wide in terms of comparing and aggregating travel data across agencies. Without standardized reporting practices, the federal government lacks common metrics for identifying, comparing and evaluating travel spending across federal agencies. The Senior Travel Official Council (STOC) was formed in 2015 to identify efficiencies and discuss best practices related to travel cost savings. According to its charter, the STOC allows agencies to work toward more consistent reporting of travel data and share information on cost-saving efforts. Although the STOC has taken some initial action to bring agencies together, additional efforts to facilitate agencies' information sharing and identification of promising practices could further enhance these efforts to encourage and achieve travel cost-saving across the federal government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Administrator of GSA should work with the STOC to: 1) develop a travel data management approach that would provide GSA with more consistent travel cost data; and 2) as chair of the STOC, identify and implement promising practices to help agencies leverage travel resources and achieve cost savings. |
gao_GGD-96-129A | gao_GGD-96-129A_0 | Represents estimated mail volume not protected by the Private Express Statutes (PES). Also in response to this pressure, the Service has not initiated a compliance audit against any mailer since 1994. Authority to Suspend the Statutes Has Been Questioned
At times, the Service has yielded to pressure from competitors and mailers to allow more private letter delivery by issuing regulations to suspend the Statutes for certain types of letters. Moreover, their numbers have increased, as have the volumes and variety of mail they deliver. We estimated that the Service’s five principal competitors accounted for more than 85 percent of all U.S. domestic expedited and parcel delivery revenues, compared to about 15 percent for the Postal Service. However, restrictions on mailbox access make delivery of First-Class mail by private firms less likely than delivery of third-class mail. The rate would need to increase to only 42 cents in 2005, assuming a 25-percent loss of Priority Mail volume or third-class volume. 5.) 6.) 4.) Comparisons are difficult to make given the greater size of the U.S. Issues Relevant to Proposed Changes to the Statutes
As it now operates, the Service has assumed two distinct roles as (1) a competitor with private delivery firms and (2) a federal entity established to provide universal mail service. Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission. In summary, it is unclear as to exactly how removing or relaxing the Statutes might affect private mail delivery. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the effects of certain statutory restrictions on private letter mail delivery.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) believes that private express statutes are necessary to protect its mail volume and revenue base; (2) it is difficult to enforce the statutes due to complaints from mailers and competitors; (3) USPS has not initiated any audits to determine mailer compliance since 1994; (4) USPS has issued regulations suspending the statutes to allow private firms to deliver urgent and international mail; (5) there is considerable debate as to whether USPS is the only organization capable of providing efficient and economical mail service; (6) USPS competitors account for more than 85 percent of all U.S. domestic expedited letter and parcel delivery revenues; (7) four USPS competitors could deliver USPS priority mail if given the opportunity; (8) private delivery firms are increasing their capacity to deliver USPS third-class mail by participating in national alliances that broaden their delivery networks; (9) several countries encourage private delivery firms to enter into agreements with postal administrations to increase mail delivery competition; and (10) USPS needs to determine how changes in private express statutes will affect universal mail service and postal rates. |
gao_GAO-08-588 | gao_GAO-08-588_0 | US-CERT’s Capabilities Include Some but Not All Aspects of Key Attributes
US-CERT has established cyber analysis and warning capabilities that include aspects of each of the key attributes. However, they do not fully incorporate all of them. For example, it has not established a baseline of our nation’s critical infrastructure information systems. However, according to customers, these warning products are not consistently actionable and timely. US-CERT Faces New and Ongoing Challenges to Fulfilling Its Mission
US-CERT faces a number of newly identified and ongoing challenges that impede it from fully implementing the key attributes and in turn establishing cyber analysis and warning capabilities essential to coordinating the national effort to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats. The new challenge is creating warnings that are actionable and timely—it does not consistently issue warning and other notifications that its customers find useful. In addition, US-CERT continues to face four challenges that we previously identified: (1) employing predictive cyber analysis, (2) developing more trusted relationships to encourage information sharing, (3) having sufficient analytical and technical capabilities, and (4) operating without organizational stability and leadership within DHS. Until DHS addresses these challenges and fully incorporates all key attributes into its capabilities, it will not have the full complement of cyber analysis and warning capabilities essential to effectively performing its national mission. However, according to the Acting Director of US-CERT, its efforts are limited by other federal entities’ abilities to determine specific cyber threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure. In addition, we recommended that performance measures and milestones for performing activities to address these challenges be identified. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify key attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities, (2) compare these attributes with the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-CERT) current analysis and warning capabilities to identify whether there are gaps, and (3) identify US-CERT’s challenges to developing and implementing key attributes and a successful national cyber analysis and warning capability. We also interviewed the Deputy Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity Center to obtain information about its concept-of-operations document. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber analysis and warning capabilities are critical to thwarting computer-based (cyber) threats and attacks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to, among other things, coordinate the nation's efforts to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats to systems and communications networks. GAO's objectives were to (1) identify key attributes of cyber analysis and warning capabilities, (2) compare these attributes with US-CERT's current capabilities to identify whether there are gaps, and (3) identify US-CERT's challenges to developing and implementing key attributes and a successful national cyber analysis and warning capability. To address these objectives, GAO identified and analyzed related documents, observed operations at numerous entities, and interviewed responsible officials and experts.
What GAO Found
Cyber analysis and warning capabilities include (1) monitoring network activity to detect anomalies, (2) analyzing information and investigating anomalies to determine whether they are threats, (3) warning appropriate officials with timely and actionable threat and mitigation information, and (4) responding to the threat. GAO identified 15 key attributes associated with these capabilities. While US-CERT's cyber analysis and warning capabilities include aspects of each of the key attributes, they do not fully incorporate all of them. For example, as part of its monitoring, US-CERT obtains information from numerous external information sources; however, it has not established a baseline of our nation's critical network assets and operations. In addition, while it investigates if identified anomalies constitute actual cyber threats or attacks as part of its analysis, it does not integrate its work into predictive analyses. Further, it provides warnings by developing and distributing a wide array of notifications; however, these notifications are not consistently actionable or timely. US-CERT faces a number of newly identified and ongoing challenges that impede it from fully incorporating the key attributes and thus being able to coordinate the national efforts to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats. The newly identified challenge is creating warnings that are consistently actionable and timely. Ongoing challenges that GAO previously identified, and made recommendations to address, include employing predictive analysis and operating without organizational stability and leadership within DHS, including possible overlapping roles and responsibilities. Until US-CERT addresses these challenges and fully incorporates all key attributes, it will not have the full complement of cyber analysis and warning capabilities essential to effectively performing its national mission. |
gao_GAO-14-155 | gao_GAO-14-155_0 | USPS’s Conformance to Leading Practices Varies by Capital Investment Phase
In summary, we determined that USPS’s conformance to leading practices is medium for planning, selecting, and managing capital investment projects, and low for evaluating them, based on our review of USPS policy and the practices employed for the five selected projects. These various sources comprise USPS’s framework for selecting its investments. Such transparency would establish crucial accountability for limited resources. Until USPS modifies its policies to require such consideration, USPS may not be placing itself in a position to identify the best option for reducing costs and increasing the quality of its capital investments. However, with the exception of the DRIVE initiative, USPS develops its business cases for approval and allocates resources by project rather than by portfolio. Furthermore, modifying USPS’s policies to require a comprehensive portfolio approach would enable USPS to consider proposed projects alongside those that have been funded to select the mix of investments that best meets its mission needs. For Managing Capital Investments, USPS’s Conformance to Leading Practices is Medium
USPS substantially conformed to two, and partially conformed to two, of four leading practices for managing capital investments (see fig. However, USPS officials could only verify that a reassessment decision to continue, amend, or terminate an investment occurred for one of the five projects we reviewed. Examining the extent to which managers regularly reassess projects to continue, amend, or stop a project, would help manage risk, given limited resources. Therefore, examining the extent to which managers identify problems and implement corrective actions can better position USPS to make the best use of its resources. Specifically, we found that USPS partially conformed to the leading practice of:
Evaluating cost, schedule, and performance results of implemented investments: USPS policy calls for a comparison of the actual return- on-investment and performance data for completed projects, against the expected return-on-investment and performance results in the business case. However, the detailed capital investment reports for four of the five projects we reviewed did not have observed return-on- investment data that could be compared to expected return on investment, and two projects did not have actual performance metrics compared to their expected results. Incorporating best practices and lessons learned into the investment process: USPS does not require developing or updating best practices after project completion. The absence of documented best practices and lessons learned that could be incorporated into the capital investments process limits opportunities for USPS to improve its process in a way that could benefit future investments. Modify capital investment policies to more closely align with the following leading practices, including: for planning capital investments, consider whether an external entity could better support all or part of a desired function when evaluating alternative capital investment options; for selecting capital investments, use a portfolio approach for developing business cases and finalizing and allocating resources; and for evaluating capital investments, seek and leverage external oversight and review, from a consultant or peer reviewer, and require that best practices and lessons learned be incorporated into the review process; and 3. We continue to believe that USPS should modify its investment polices as recommended. Postal Service (USPS) follows leading practices, we compared USPS’s process for planning, selecting, managing, and evaluating capital investments to leading practices. We identified leading practices for the four phases—planning, selecting, managing, and evaluating capital investments—through analysis and review of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Capital Programming Guide supplement to Circular A-11, which identified leading practices from government agencies and the private sector, and examples of executive agency implementation of the Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) process. We also met with USPS officials responsible for the Delivering Results, Innovation, Value and Efficiency (DRIVE) strategic initiatives to assess the extent to which USPS conformed to the leading practice of linking its capital investments to its strategic plans. To gather more detailed information about how USPS policies were applied in specific cases, and to determine whether USPS policies were consistently followed for a selection of high-cost capital investment projects, we selected 5 of 28 projects that were approved for over $25 million and were approved for funding after USPS experienced net losses in fiscal year 2007. Partial: Either (1) USPS policy conformed to some elements; or (2) USPS policy conformed substantially, but we identified instances in the five projects we reviewed where the policies were not consistently applied. Then, for each investment phase, we assessed USPS’s level of conformance, as follows:
High: USPS substantially conformed to all or almost all of the leading practices. Medium: USPS substantially conformed to multiple leading practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS has reached its statutory borrowing limit and has projected unsustainable losses. GAO's prior work has stated USPS's financial challenges hinder its ability to make capital investments. GAO was asked to review USPS's capital investment process.
This report addresses the extent to which USPS follows leading practices for four phases of capital investments: planning, selecting, managing, and evaluating. GAO identified the phases and leading practices primarily by analyzing the Office of Management and Budget's capital investment guide and compared them with USPS's policies and practices. External stakeholders with both public and private-sector experience reviewed the leading practices and found them to be reasonable for USPS. To examine how USPS policies were applied in specific cases, GAO reviewed 5 of 28 capital investments greater than $25 million that were approved for funding since fiscal year 2007.
What GAO Found
For each of the four phases of capital investments, USPS's conformance with leading practices varied. There are several practices within each of the phases. GAO assessed conformance as "substantial" if USPS's policy conformed to all or almost all elements of the practice, and as "partial" if USPS's policy conformed to some elements, or GAO identified cases in the five projects reviewed where the policies were not consistently applied.
capital investments, USPS substantially conformed to most of the leading practices, such as identifying mission needs and gaps in services, reviewing and approving a framework for selecting its investments, and developing a long-term capital investment plan. However, USPS did not substantially conform to other practices such as evaluating alternative investments by considering whether an external entity could perform all or part of a function because USPS's investment policies do not require such evaluations. However, USPS is not precluded from conducting such evaluations. Modifying its policies to require such evaluations could place USPS in a better position to ensure the evaluations are completed and to identify the best option for reducing costs and increasing the quality of investments.
For selecting capital investments, USPS substantially conformed to most of the leading practices, such as ranking and prioritizing, and linking its investments with budget considerations. However, consistent with its investment policy, USPS developed business cases for approval by project rather than following leading practices that call for using a portfolio approach of allocating resources based on overall organizational goals linked to the agency's mission. Modifying policies to require a comprehensive portfolio approach would better enable USPS to consider projects alongside those that have been funded to select the mix of investments that best meets its mission needs.
For managing capital investments, USPS conformance with leading practices was mixed. For example, consistent with leading practices, USPS established oversight for its capital investments and tracks cost, schedule, and performance data for initiatives. USPS policy requires comparing the planned-investment timeline and performance metrics to actual results to reassess and determine whether to continue, amend, or terminate a project, consistent with leading practices. USPS managers, however, could only verify that such a reassessment occurred for one of the five projects GAO reviewed. Examining the extent to which managers regularly reassess projects to continue, amend, or stop a project would help to establish crucial accountability for limited resources.
For evaluating capital investments, USPS conformance with leading practices was partial. USPS policy calls for a comparison of actual return-on-investment and performance data for completed projects against expected results, consistent with leading practices. However, four of the five projects GAO reviewed did not have comparable return-on-investment data, thereby limiting the ability of managers to assess the investment's impact, identify modifications to potentially improve performance, and revise the investment process. Finally, USPS policy does not require incorporating best practices or lessons learned after project completion--another leading practice--which limits opportunities for USPS to improve its process in a way that could benefit future investments.
What GAO Recommends
USPS should, among other recommendations, modify some of its capital investment policies to more closely align with leading practices, particularly for planning, selecting, and evaluating capital investments and regularly examine the extent to which managers reassess projects. USPS partially concurred or concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations. GAO continues to believe that all of its recommendations are valid and implementation will help to improve USPS’s capital investment process as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-14-697 | gao_GAO-14-697_0 | However, CMS also used funding provided by other legislation that was not specifically dedicated to the private health insurance and health insurance exchange provisions of PPACA and thus was also available to fund other CMS activities. Limitations in CMS’s Policies and Procedures Impeded Efforts to Determine the Reliability of Most of the CCIIO-Related Resources That CMS Reported It Received and Used
CMS provided most of the CCIIO-related information we requested, but limitations in its policies and procedures made the process of obtaining it difficult and time consuming, and we could not determine the reliability of most of the amounts CMS provided. For several reasons, CMS’s core financial system—HIGLAS—did not produce CCIIO-specific totals for much of the financial information we requested, and CMS did not have an efficient alternate approach for identifying the information. In addition, information regarding staff reassignments to CCIIO from other CMS and HHS units was not readily available, and the related information CMS provided was incomplete and not supported by documentary evidence. In addition, CMS’s procedures for identifying and obtaining the information and its review and approval were not documented, so we also could not verify that these procedures had been properly performed. Because CMS was not able to provide timely CCIIO-related information whose reliability could be independently determined, Congress and other decision makers may not have timely and reliable CCIIO-related financial management information, which could hamper efforts to make informed resource allocation decisions and assessment of program performance. CMS Provided Most of the Requested Information
CMS provided most of the CCIIO-related financial management information we requested, which consisted of (1) total CCIIO-related obligations and expenditures from the enactment of PPACA through fiscal year 2013; (2) estimates of total CCIIO-related obligations for expenditures for fiscal year 2014; (3) the number of full-time CCIIO staff as of September 30, 2013; and (4) total CCIIO-related expenditures from the enactment of PPACA through fiscal year 2013 for salaries, travel, advertising and other public relations activities, polling and focus groups, and conferences. CMS did not provide estimates of fiscal year 2014 obligations for these specific categories because it did not prepare related estimates at this level of detail. As noted above, total salary expenditures of $79.8 million from March 2010 through fiscal year 2013 were determined to be reliable. The largely manual, ad hoc process CMS employed was labor intensive and time consuming, and it often required an extended period of time to respond to our requests, in some cases several months. As discussed above, this information was not complete. Consequently, we were unable to independently verify that these reviews and approvals had taken place. However, CMS does not have documented policies and procedures governing responses to nonroutine information requests, such as those that may originate from oversight bodies. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to take the following actions: identify and evaluate options to facilitate more timely and independently verifiable reporting of CCIIO-related financial management information, such as enhancing HIGLAS’s standard reporting or custom reporting capabilities, and develop and implement policies and procedures for responding to nonroutine CCIIO-related financial management information requests, including procedures for documenting the preparation process and the review and approval of the results. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix II, HHS did not concur with our two recommendations. For example, as discussed in the report, CMS did not have a policy or procedures that required documented review and approval of the information provided in response to nonroutine requests. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to identify the resources related to the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) received, used, and expects to use from enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) though fiscal year 2014, including certain categories of expenditures; the source of the funding; the number of CCIIO staff as of September 30, 2013; and the number of staff reassigned from other units. The scope of our review encompassed the financial and staff resources provided to and used by CMS to help implement the private health insurance and health insurance exchange provisions of PPACA from enactment in March 2010 through fiscal year 2013 and the amounts CMS estimates it will use for fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA makes significant changes in the way health insurance in the United States is provided, including changes to private health insurance coverage. GAO was asked to examine the resources that CCIIO used and expects to use in implementing the private health insurance provisions of PPACA. GAO's objective was to identify resources that CCIIO received, used, and expects to use from enactment of PPACA through fiscal year 2014, including certain categories of expenditures, the sources of funding, and the total number of staff, along with the number of staff reassigned from other units.
To perform this work GAO obtained the information requested and compared it to available supporting documentation, reviewed available related policies and procedures, and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Service's (HHS) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provided GAO with most of the requested data regarding financial resources that the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO) and other CMS offices received, used, and expect to use to implement the private health insurance and health insurance exchange provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) for which CCIIO is responsible from its enactment in March 2010 through fiscal year 2014. However, CMS did not provide estimates of fiscal year 2014 obligations for certain categories of CCIIO-related transactions, such as advertising and other public relations activities. In addition, CMS provided data on CCIIO's staffing levels as of September 30, 2013, but did not provide complete staffing reassignment data.
GAO was unable to consistently verify the reliability of the data received from CMS. Specifically:
GAO was able to determine the reliability of CMS's estimates for total obligations for fiscal year 2014, which was $3.7 billion; the number of staff as of September 30, 2013, which was 347; and total salary expenditures from March 2010 through fiscal year 2013, which were $79.8 million.
GAO could not determine the reliability of any of the other financial information CMS provided because CMS's core financial system did not produce totals for much of the CCIIO-related information requested. For example, the system did not produce expenditure totals for CCIIO-related polling, focus groups, or advertising and other public relations activities because of how these activities are captured in the system. Similarly, information related to reassignment of staff to CCIIO from other CMS and HHS units was not readily available. Consequently, the staff reassignment information provided to GAO was not complete, was not supported by documentary evidence, and could not be verified.
GAO identified several issues that contributed to CMS's inability to provide complete information that is independently verifiable in a timely manner. First, CMS does not have an effective means of identifying CCIIO-related information. While CMS had policies and procedures for its standard financial operations, it did not have documented policies and procedures for responding to nonroutine information requests. Instead, CMS relied on ad hoc manual procedures that were labor intensive and time consuming. As a result, CMS required an extended period of time to provide most of the information GAO requested, in some cases taking several months. Second, CMS does not have documented procedures to ensure that data requests are reviewed and approved for accuracy. CMS officials told GAO that the information they provided had been subject to review and approval at several levels, including review by subject matter experts. However, these procedures were not documented. Consequently, GAO was not able to independently verify that they had been properly performed. Because CMS's processes are inconsistent with certain federal accounting and internal control standards, Congress and other decision makers may not have access to timely and reliable CCIIO-related information that they may need to make resource allocation decisions and assessments of program performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS identify and evaluate options to facilitate reporting CCIIO-related financial management information that is independently verifiable in a timely manner, and develop and implement policies and procedures to document the preparation, review, and approval of information produced for nonroutine requests.
HHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations. In its view, CMS's existing procedures are adequate to respond to nonroutine information requests. However, as discussed in this report, GAO continues to believe that enhancements to CMS's procedures are needed and that the recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-02-178T | gao_GAO-02-178T_0 | Employer Sponsorship of Retiree Health Benefits Has Declined
The availability of employer-sponsored retiree health benefits has declined during the last decade. Two widely cited surveys—by William M. Mercer, Incorporated, and the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (Kaiser/HRET)—indicated that nearly half of large employers offered retiree health benefits in the early 1990s, but their most recent surveys reported that this proportion has declined to about one-third of large employers. The decline in large employers offering retiree health benefits has continued in recent years, despite several years during the latter part of the 1990s experiencing a strong economy and relatively small premium increases. Thus, paying for these services may present a significant and growing financial burden for many individuals and for public health care programs. Therefore, even in retirement, over half of those aged 55 to 64 in 1999 continued to rely on health insurance either from their former employer or their spouse’s employer. The individual insurance market may be an option for some retirees until they become eligible for Medicare, but this alternative can be costly as well. Nearly one-third of Medicare-eligible retirees obtain this supplemental coverage from an employer, and most other Medicare beneficiaries seek other sources of supplemental coverage, such as Medigap or Medicaid, or participate in Medicare+Choice plans, which typically have low cost-sharing requirements and cover services such as prescription drugs that traditional Medicare does not cover. Whether they include prescription drug coverage or not, Medigap policies can be expensive—the average annual Medigap premium per covered life was more than $1,300 in 1999— and still leave retirees with significant out-of-pocket costs. Less than 10 percent of individuals 65 or older and an even lower percentage of those younger than 65 have purchased long-term care insurance. | What GAO Found
In 1999, about 10 million Americans aged 55 and older relied on employer-sponsored health benefits until they became eligible for Medicare or to pay for out-of-pocket expenses not covered by Medicare. However, the number of employers offering these benefits has declined considerably during the past decade. Despite the recent strong economy and the relatively low increases in health insurance premiums during the late 1990's, the availability of employer-sponsored health benefits for retirees has declined. Two widely cited surveys found that only about one-third of large employers and less than 10 percent of small employers offer such benefits. Alternative sources of health care coverage for retirees may be costly, limited, or unavailable. Retirees not yet 65 may be eligible for coverage from a spouse's employer or from their former employer. Other retirees not yet 65 may seek coverage in the individual insurance market, but these policies can be expensive or may offer more limited coverage, especially for those with existing health problems. Nearly one-third of retirees eligible for Medicare have employer-sponsored supplemental coverage, but many others buy private supplemental coverage known as "Medigap." It can cost upwards of $1,300 per year for Medigap policies that include prescription drug coverage. Neither Medicare nor private insurance covers a significant share of long-term care expenses. |
gao_GAO-02-636 | gao_GAO-02-636_0 | To those ends, TVA erected dams and hydropower facilities on the Tennessee River and its tributaries. To increase its financial flexibility and future competitiveness by generating cash that could be used to reduce debt, TVA increased its electricity rates beginning in 1998, and planned to reduce expenses and limit capital expenditures. These studies initially assessed the staffing levels of TVA’s nuclear program and, in 1998, TVA began to assess its non-nuclear business units as well. Recent benchmarking studies performed by Navigant have indicated that TVA’s nuclear and transmission units are close to the industry’s best in terms of staffing efficiency, but that opportunities for improvement exist in all four of the business units most recently benchmarked—Fossil Power Group, Transmission Power Supply, Nuclear, and River System Operations & Environment. TVA continues to utilize benchmarking to assist in identifying potential areas for improvement. TVA’s Electricity Rates are Relatively Low Compared to Likely Competitors
TVA has the statutory authority to raise its electricity rates, is legislatively protected from most competition, and has current rates that are low when compared to likely competitors. If TVA were to choose to raise electricity rates selectively and use the additional cash generated to pay down debt, it could reduce its financing costs (interest expense), thereby strengthening its ability to respond to future challenges (as discussed in previous GAO reports). TVA is, however, currently subject to some level of competition. TVA officials told us that they believe an increase in electricity rates could result in the loss of customers, lower power sales, and possibly less overall revenue. Another potential negative consequence is the impact a rate increase could have on the regional economy as a whole. A rate increase could also affect the distributors’ perception of TVA just before they may be given the choice of selecting their suppliers. As suggested by the data in table 2, any decision to raise electricity rates would need to be considered differently for each rate category because the difference between TVA’s rates and those of its likely competitors varies by rate category. | What GAO Found
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) declared its intent to become competitive by reducing its cost of power and becoming more financially flexible by reducing debt from $27.4 billion to $13.2 billion by 2007. Since the 1980s, TVA has used benchmarking to assess staffing levels for its nuclear program and it began to use benchmarking studies for its non-nuclear business units in 1998. Recent studies indicate that TVA's nuclear and transmission power supply units are close to the industry's best in terms of staffing efficiency. TVA has taken several actions to improve performance and efficiency, including reorganizing its human resources and business services organizations and automating its hydropower production facilities to reduce future staffing. TVA continues to utilize benchmarking to assist in identifying opportunities for improvement. TVA's current electricity rates are low when compared to 12 likely competitors and to national averages. Although TVA's electricity rates are relatively low, it is legislatively protected from most competition, and it has the statutory authority to raise rates. If TVA were to choose to raise electricity rates selectively and use the additional cash generated to repay debt, it could accelerate debt repayment and reduce fixed interest costs. Doing so would enhance TVA's ability to respond to future competitive pressures. But TVA is already subject to some competitive pressures and a decision to raise electricity rates could result in potential long-term negative consequences on power sales. TVA also is concerned that a a rate increase could affect distrubutors' perception of TVA before the they may be given the choice of selecting their suppliers. Increasing electricity rates could result in the loss of some customers, lower power sales, and possibly reduce revenue. Increased rates also could have an impact on the regional economy. Increased rates should be considered differently for each rate category because the difference between TVA's rates and the rates of other utilities varies by rate category. |
gao_T-RCED-99-84 | gao_T-RCED-99-84_0 | Funding Sources Vary Depending on Airports’ Size
In 1996, tax-exempt bonds, the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), and passenger facility charges (PFC) together provided about $6.6 billion of the $7 billion in airport funding. State grants and airport revenue contributed the remaining funding for airports. The amount and type of funding varies with airports’ size. The nation’s 71 largest airports (classified by FAA as large hubs and medium hubs), which accounted for almost 90 percent of all passenger traffic, received more than $5.5 billion in funding in 1996, while the 3,233 other national system airports received about $1.5 billion. Funding Levels Fall Short of Plans for Development
Airports’ planned capital development over the period 1997 through 2001 may cost as much as $10 billion per year, or $3 billion more per year than in 1996. Figure 2 compares airports’ total funding for capital development in 1996 with their annual planned spending for development. Planned spending for future years, the bar on the right, is shown by the relative priority FAA has assigned to the projects, as follows:
Reconstruction and mandated projects, FAA’s highest priorities, total $1.4 billion per year and are for projects to maintain existing infrastructure (reconstruction) or to meet federal mandates, including safety, security, and environmental requirements, including noise mitigation requirements. Other high-priority projects, primarily adding capacity, account for another $1.4 billion per year. Other AIP-eligible projects, a lower priority for FAA, such as bringing airports up to FAA’s design standards, add another $3.3 billion per year for a total of $6.1 billion per year. Finally, airports anticipate spending another $3.9 billion per year on projects that are not eligible for AIP funding, such as expanding commercial space in terminals and constructing parking garages. Funding Difference at Smaller Airports Is More Significant Than at Larger Airports
The difference between current and planned funding for development is bigger, in percentage terms, for smaller airports than for larger ones. 3). 4). Larger airports potential shortfall of $1.5 billion represents 21 percent of their planned development costs, while smaller airports’ potential shortfall of $1.4 billion represents 48 percent of their development costs. Planned development 1997 through 2001 (annualized)
Effect of Proposals to Increase and Better Use Airport Funding Is Mixed
Proposals to increase airport funding or make better use of existing funding vary in the extent to which they would help different types of airports and close the gap between funding and the costs of planned development. For example, increasing AIP funding would help smaller airports more because current funding formulas would channel an increasing proportion of AIP to smaller airports. The program allows FAA to award AIP funds in the form of block grants to designated states, that, in turn, select and fund AIP projects at small airports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed airport funding issues, focusing on: (1) the amount airports are spending on capital development and the sources of those funds; (2) comparing airports' plans for development with current funding levels; and (3) what effect will various proposals to increase or make better use of existing funding have on airports' ability to fulfill their capital development plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) 3,304 airports that make up the federally supported national airport system obtained about $7 billion from federal and private sources for capital development; (2) more than 90 percent of this funding came from three sources: tax-exempt bonds issued by states and local airport authorities, federal grants from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airport Improvement Program (AIP), and passenger facility charges paid on airline tickets; (3) the magnitude and type of funding varies with airports' size; (4) the nation's 71 largest airports accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total funding; (5) airports planned to spend as much as $10 billion per year for capital development for the years 1997 through 2001, or $3 billion per year more than they were able to fund in 1996; (6) the difference between funding and the costs of planned development is greater for smaller commercial and general aviation airports than for their larger counterparts; (7) smaller airports' funding would cover only about half the costs of their planned development, while larger airports' funding would cover about 4/5 of their planned development; (8) airports' planned development can be divided into four main categories based on the funding priorities of AIP; (9) about $1.4 billion per year was planned for safety, security, environmental, and reconstruction projects, FAA's highest priorities for AIP funding; (10) another $1.4 billion per year was planned for projects FAA regards as the next highest priority, primarily adding airport capacity; (11) other projects FAA considers to be lower in priority, such as bringing airports up to FAA's design standards, add another $3.3 billion per year; (12) airports anticipated spending another $3.9 billion per year on projects that are not eligible for AIP funding, such as expanding commercial space in terminals and constructing parking garages; (13) several proposals to increase or make better use of existing funding have emerged in recent years, including the amount of AIP funding and raising the maximum amount airports can levy in passenger facility charges; (14) under current formulas, increasing the amount of AIP funding would help small airports more than larger airports, while raising passenger facility charges would help larger airports more; and (15) other initiatives, such as AIP block grants to states, have had varied success, but none appears to offer a major breakthrough in reducing the shortfall between funding and airports' plans for development. |
gao_T-GGD-99-76 | gao_T-GGD-99-76_0 | My remarks today concern (1) the federal filing, reporting, and deposit requirements that apply to small businesses; (2) the actual experience of small businesses in meeting these requirements, including their involvement in IRS’ enforcement processes; (3) the burden small businesses can face in complying; and (4) IRS’ efforts to reduce small businesses’ compliance burden and improve customer service, especially IRS’ planned reorganization. To develop the information, we reviewed IRS forms, publications, manuals, and related Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions; collected and analyzed relevant data; and interviewed agency officials who were cognizant of small business tax issues and IRS’ efforts to improve small business customer service and reduce compliance burden. Small Businesses Face Multiple Layers of Tax Requirements
Small businesses, like large businesses, are subject to multiple layers of filing, reporting, and deposit requirements that reflect how the business is organized, whether it has employees, and the nature of its business operations. In contemplating the significance of the total number, it is important to know that many of the requirements apply to businesses generally and that it is highly unlikely that any business would need to complete all 200 requirements. We identified more than 10 different federal employment tax requirements that potentially apply to small businesses. Small Businesses’ Experience in Filing and Enforcement Processes Could Not Be Fully Determined
Limitations in IRS’ information systems prevented us from fully determining the extent to which small businesses actually filed various required forms and schedules and which businesses made deposits, or determine the extent of small businesses’ involvement in IRS’ enforcement processes. As we discuss in detail in the final section of this statement, the data limitations currently hinder IRS’ ability to effectively manage its activities and serve small businesses and, as IRS has acknowledged, will continue to be a serious impediment until the systems are improved. IRS has dozens of discrete databases -- so many that it is difficult to determine what data are in them, what the data mean, how the files are structured, or even how many files there might be. Second, many of the IRS datasets do not allow for a detailed analysis of the information they contain. These processes are basically the same for small businesses as for other taxpayers. Compliance Burden Is Hard to Measure, but Significant
Although IRS does not have a reliable way to measure tax compliance burden or the portion attributable to small business tax requirements, there is common agreement that the burden is significant. By integrating results-oriented management into the day-to-day activities and culture of the organization and holding managers accountable for doing the same, leaders can help to avoid that danger. Success Will Also Depend on Implementation of Information Systems to Support Customer Service and Management Needs
As IRS has recognized, the information systems that it uses to keep records on taxpayers’ accounts are fundamentally deficient and thwart IRS’ ability to provide high-quality customer service. In the interim, the limitations will make it more difficult to manage and improve customer service, even in a reorganized environment. One of the most visible signs that IRS may be changing is its establishment of four new operating units. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed small business tax issues, focusing on the: (1) federal filing, reporting, and deposit requirements that apply to small businesses; (2) actual experience of small businesses in meeting these requirements, including their involvement in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) enforcement processes; (3) burden small businesses can face in complying; and (4) IRS' efforts to reduce small businesses' compliance burden and improve customer service, especially IRS' planned reorganization.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) small businesses are subject to multiple layers of filing, reporting, and deposit requirements; (2) GAO identified more than 200 different Internal Revenue Code (IRC) requirements that potentially apply to small businesses; (3) the requirements reflect IRS' administration of a variety of tax and other policies; (4) GAO also found that it is highly unlikely that any business would need to comply with all or even most of these requirements; (5) those that apply would depend on how the small business is organized; (6) limitations in IRS information systems prevented GAO from fully determining the extent to which small businesses filed the various forms and schedules or their involvement in key stages of IRS' enforcement processes; (7) IRS has dozens of discrete databases, so many that it is difficult to determine what data are in them; (8) many of the IRS databases do not allow for a detailed analysis of the information they contain; (9) the limitations hinder IRS' ability to effectively manage its activities and serve small businesses and, as IRS has acknowledged, will continue to be a serious impediment until the systems are improved; (10) although IRS does not have a reliable method to measure compliance burden, there is common agreement that the burden is significant for small businesses; (11) past GAO surveys and case studies illustrate that much of the burden can be traced to the IRC itself; (12) IRS has long tried to reduce small businesses' compliance burden and improve customer service to these taxpayers; (13) IRS also has worked to make filing and reporting easier and to increase IRS employees' expertise and understanding of small business tax issues and practices; (14) most recently, IRS has begun an extensive modernization effort that is intended to substantially improve customer service, thereby making it less burdensome for small businesses and other taxpayers to meet their tax obligations; (15) one of the most visible signs of IRS' commitment to improve its services to small businesses is the establishment of a separate operating unit dedicated to this group of taxpayers; (16) IRS will need to consistently follow results-oriented management principles, integrate the principles into its day-to-day activities and culture, and hold managers at every level accountable for doing the same; and (17) IRS must develop and use organizational and individual performance systems that support IRS' new mission statement and implement information systems that support customer service management in a reorganized environment. |
gao_GAO-08-727 | gao_GAO-08-727_0 | IHS Has Had Millions of Dollars in Property Lost or Stolen and Has Made Wasteful Purchases
We substantiated the allegation of gross mismanagement of property at IHS. IHS Records Indicate at Least $15.8 Million of Property Has Been Lost or Stolen
Our analysis of Report of Survey records from IHS headquarters and field offices shows that from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007, IHS property managers identified over 5,000 lost or stolen property items worth about $15.8 million. First, IHS does not consistently document lost or stolen property items. These items, valued at around $2 million, included computers, computer servers, video projectors, and digital cameras. We are referring these cases where there was a potential release of sensitive data including employee social security numbers to the HHS OIG for further investigation. Specifically, we estimate that for the seven locations, about 1,200 equipment items, with a value of $2.6 million were lost or stolen. An IHS official stated that IHS purchased new computers using “end of the year dollars.” Some examples of wasteful spending that we observed during our audit of headquarters and field offices include the following: Approximately 10 pieces of IT equipment, on average, are issued for every one employee at IHS headquarters. Computers and other IT equipment were often assigned to vacant offices. Weak Tone at the Top and Other Control Weaknesses Leave IHS Highly Vulnerable to Loss, Theft, and Waste
The lost or stolen property and waste we detected at IHS can be attributed to the agency’s weak internal control environment and its ineffective implementation of numerous property policies. Consequently, the extent of missing property at IHS is unknown. IHS did not establish proper safeguards for storing IT equipment in IHS facilities or employees’ offices. Because equipment was not protected against damage or destruction, IHS had to dispose over $700,000 worth of equipment because it was “infested with bat dung.”
Failure to use accountable property management system: HHS policy requires that all accountable property with a value of $5,000 or greater and all sensitive items with a value of $500 or greater be tracked by the PMIS property management system. As a result, IHS cannot account for its physical property and is vulnerable to the loss and theft of IT equipment and sensitive personal data. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To substantiate the allegation of lost or stolen property and wasteful spending at the Indian Health Service (IHS), we analyzed IHS documents of lost or stolen property from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007. We also conducted a full physical inventory of property at IHS headquarters and statistically tested information technology (IT) equipment inventory at seven selected IHS field locations. We performed appropriate data reliability procedures for our physical inventory testing at IHS Headquarters and sample testing at the seven case study locations including (1) testing the existence of items in the database by observing the physical existence of all items at IHS headquarters and IT equipment selected in our sample, and (2) testing the completeness of the database by performing a 100 percent floor-to-book inventory at IHS headquarters and judgmentally selecting inventory items in our sample to determine if these items were maintained in IHS inventory records. We conducted our forensic audit and related investigations from June 2007 to May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2007, GAO received information from a whistleblower through GAO's FraudNET hotline alleging millions of dollars in lost and stolen property and gross mismanagement of property at Indian Health Service (IHS), an operating division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). GAO was asked to conduct a forensic audit and related investigations to (1) determine whether GAO could substantiate the allegation of lost and stolen property at IHS and identify examples of wasteful purchases and (2) identify the key causes of any loss, theft, or waste. GAO analyzed IHS property records from fiscal years 2004- 2007, conducted a full physical inventory at IHS headquarters, and statistically tested inventory of information technology (IT) equipment at 7 IHS field locations in 2007 and 2008. GAO also examined IHS policies, conducted interviews with IHS officials, and assessed the security of property.
What GAO Found
Millions of dollars worth of IHS property has been lost or stolen over the past several years. Specifically, (1) IHS identified over 5,000 lost or stolen property items, worth about $15.8 million, from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. These missing items included all-terrain vehicles and tractors; Jaws of Life equipment; and a computer containing sensitive data, including social security numbers. (2) GAO's physical inventory identified that over 1,100 IT items, worth about $2 million, were missing from IHS headquarters. These items represented about 36 percent of all IT equipment on the books at headquarters in 2007 and included laptops and digital cameras. Further, IHS staff attempted to obstruct GAO's investigation by fabricating hundreds of documents. (3) GAO also estimates that IHS had about 1,200 missing IT equipment items at seven field office locations worth approximately $2.6 million. This represented about 17 percent of all IT equipment at these locations. However, the dollar value of lost or stolen items and the extent of compromised data are unknown because IHS does not consistently document lost or stolen property and GAO only tested a limited number of IHS locations. Information related to cases where GAO identified fabrication of documents and potential release of sensitive data is being referred to the HHS Inspector General for further investigation. GAO also found evidence of wasteful spending, including identifying that there are about 10 pieces of IT equipment for every one employee at headquarters. GAO's investigation also found computers and other IT equipment were often assigned to vacant offices. GAO identified that the loss, theft, and waste can be attributed to IHS's weak internal control environment. IHS management has failed to establish a strong "tone at the top," allowing property management problems to continue for more than a decade with little or no improvement or accountability for lost and stolen property and compromise of sensitive personal data. In addition, IHS has not effectively implemented numerous property policies, including the proper safeguards for its expensive IT equipment. For example, IHS disposed over $700,000 worth of equipment because it was "infested with bat dung." |
gao_GAO-07-256 | gao_GAO-07-256_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the status of SEC’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of the commission’s information system controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. In addition, we conducted tests and observations of controls in operation using federal guidance, checklists and vendor best practices. SEC Has Made Important Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
SEC has corrected or mitigated 58 of the 71 security control weaknesses previously reported as unresolved at the conclusion of our 2005 audit. Specifically, the commission resolved all of the previously reported weaknesses in security related activities and contingency planning, and it has made significant progress in resolving access control weaknesses. A key reason for its progress was that SEC’s senior management was actively engaged in implementing information security related activities and mitigating the previously reported weaknesses. Key Controls Were Not Consistently Implemented
SEC has not consistently implemented certain key controls to effectively safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to 13 previously identified weaknesses that remain unresolved, we identified 15 new information security weaknesses in access controls and configuration management. By the conclusion of our review, SEC had taken action to address 11 of the 15 new weaknesses. A primary reason for these control weaknesses is that SEC had not consistently implemented elements of its information security program. SEC did not sufficiently test and evaluate the effectiveness of controls for a major system as required by its certification and accreditation process. Although SEC developed remedial action plans to mitigate identified weaknesses in its systems and developed a mechanism to track the progress of actions to correct deficiencies, it did not consistently take effective and timely action to do so. As a result, SEC will have limited assurance that all known information security weaknesses are mitigated or corrected in an effective and timely manner. Because SEC relies heavily on computerized systems to maintain fair, orderly, and efficient securities markets, the security of its financial and sensitive data is paramount. | Why GAO Did This Study
In carrying out its mission to ensure that securities markets are fair, orderly, and efficiently maintained, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies extensively on computerized systems. Integrating effective information security controls into a layered control strategy is essential to ensure that SEC's financial and sensitive information is protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, disclosure, or destruction. As part of its audit of SEC's financial statements, GAO assessed (1) SEC's actions to correct previously reported information security weaknesses and (2) the effectiveness of controls for ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SEC's information systems and information. To do this, GAO examined security policies and artifacts, interviewed pertinent officials, and conducted tests and observations of controls in operation.
What GAO Found
SEC has made important progress toward correcting previously reported information security control weaknesses. Specifically, it has corrected or mitigated 58 of the 71 weaknesses previously reported as unresolved at the conclusion of GAO's 2005 audit. The commission resolved all of the previously reported weaknesses in security related activities and contingency planning, and made significant progress in resolving access control weaknesses. A key reason for its progress was that SEC's senior management was actively engaged in implementing information security related activities. Despite this progress, SEC has not consistently implemented certain key controls to effectively safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to 13 previously identified weaknesses that remain unresolved, 15 new information security weaknesses were identified. By the conclusion of GAO's review, SEC took action to address 11 of the 15 new weaknesses. A primary reason for these control weaknesses is that SEC had not consistently implemented elements of its information security program. This included inconsistent implementation of agency policies and procedures, not sufficiently testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls for a major system as required by its certification and accreditation process, and not consistently taking effective and timely action to correct deficiencies identified in remedial action plans. Until SEC does, it will have limited assurance that it will be able to manage risks and protect sensitive information on an ongoing basis. |
gao_GAO-11-273 | gao_GAO-11-273_0 | The Department’s Processes to Fulfill Urgent Needs Have Evolved
Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a set of complex processes—within the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each of the military services, as well as the combatant commands—to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. In addition, our analysis identified multiple entities with a role in responding to similar types of urgently needed capabilities, such as ISR and counter- IED, resulting in the potential for duplication of efforts. On the basis of DOD’s and our analysis, we have identified at least 31 entities that play a significant role in the various urgent needs processes. For example: Both the Army and the Marine Corps continue to develop their own counter-IED mine rollers with full or partial JIEDDO funding. DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs
DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and oversight of its urgent needs. DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy for Guiding All Parts of the Process for Addressing Warfighters’ Urgent Needs Requests
Despite these actions, DOD does not have departmentwide guidance that provides a common departmentwide approach for how all urgent needs are to be addressed. According to federal best practices reported in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, management is responsible for developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. At present, the department has not established a senior-level focal point to (1) lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements, (2) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (3) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and Entities
In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to identify opportunities for consolidation. DOD Has Not Comprehensively Evaluated Opportunities for Consolidation across the Department
Despite various reports by the Defense Science Board, GAO, and others— that raised concerns about the numbers and roles of the various entities and processes involved and the potential of overlap and duplication—DOD has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across the department. Until the department comprehensively evaluates its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for consolidation across the department as well as opportunities for improved coordination, or other actions to achieve savings or increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs. Furthermore, GAO’s Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should include a performance-based, risk- adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. Without DOD-wide guidance on the department’s urgent needs processes and a focal point to lead its overall efforts on urgent operational needs and to act as an advocate within the department for issues related to the department’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs, DOD is likely to continue to risk duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which contributes to inefficiency and loss of potential financial savings. Recommendations for Executive Action
To promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management, and oversight of the department’s fulfillment of urgent operational needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent operational needs; clearly defines common terms as well as the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and military services for all phases of the urgent needs process, including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding, execution, tracking, and management of the transition, termination, or transfer process and that incorporates all available expedited acquisition procedures; designates a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (such as the Rapid Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed appropriate) with the appropriate authority and resources, dedicated to leading the department’s urgent needs efforts, including, but not limited to: (1) acting as an advocate within the department for issues related to DOD’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (2) improving visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; and (3) ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and manage the status of urgent needs, from validation through the transition, including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for military services to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs; and directs the DOD Components to establish minimum processes and requirements for each of the above phases of the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of DOD's various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD's urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent needs entities.
What GAO Found
Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31 entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint Staff and each military service. Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers. DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO's analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point to lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which can result in avoidable costs. DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across the department. GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-287T | gao_GAO-12-287T_0 | Further Steps Are Needed to Address Potential Risks in the Visa Waiver Program
As we reported in May 2011, DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval. DHS requires applicants for Visa Waiver Program travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS took several steps to minimize the burden associated with ESTA use. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of the Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent— about 364,000 travelers— traveled under the Visa Waiver Program without verified ESTA approval. As we reported in May 2011, DHS had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program. In May 2011, we recommended that DHS establish time frames for the regular review and documentation of cases of Visa Waiver Program passengers traveling to a U.S. port of entry without verified ESTA approval. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has established procedures to review quarterly a sample of noncompliant passengers to evaluate potential security risks associated with the ESTA program. Further, in May 2011 we reported that to meet certain statutory requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, only half of the countries had fully complied with this requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. The 9/11 Act requires Visa Waiver Program countries to enter into an agreement with the United States to report, or make available to the United States through Interpol or other means as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, information about the theft or loss of passports. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, established a compliance schedule requiring the last of the Visa Waiver Program countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. DHS, in coordination with the Department of State and the Department of Justice, developed measures short of termination that could be applied to countries not meeting their compliance date. According to officials, DHS plans to decide which measures to apply on a case-by-case basis. Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population
ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning
As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to, among other things, ICE’s competing priorities; however, these efforts could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE indicated it may allocate more resources to overstay enforcement efforts moving forward, and that it planned to focus primarily on suspected overstays who ICE has identified as high risk or who recently overstayed their authorized periods of admission. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United States. We reported in April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing the assessment. DHS officials agreed with our recommendation and stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning process. The 9/11 Act required that DHS certify that a system is in place that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports in order for DHS to expand the Visa Waiver Program. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages the Visa Waiver Program, which allows nationals from 36 member countries to apply for admission to the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without a visa. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010, over 98 million visitors were admitted to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. During that time period, the Department of State issued more than 36 million nonimmigrant visas to other foreign nationals for temporary travel to the United States. DHS is also responsible for investigating overstays--unauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally (with or without visas) on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required DHS, in consultation with the Department of State, to take steps to enhance the security of the program. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in September 2008, April 2011, and May 2011. As requested, it addresses the following issues: (1) challenges in the Visa Waiver Program, and (2) overstay enforcement efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported on actions that DHS has taken in recent years to improve the security of the Visa Waiver Program; however, additional risks remain. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), required by the 9/11 Act, and took steps to minimize the burden associated with this new program requirement. DHS requires applicants for Visa Waiver Program travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by the new requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a Visa Waiver Program application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. However, GAO reported that DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of Visa Waiver Program passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent--about 364,000 travelers--traveled under the program without verified ESTA approval. In May 2011, GAO reported that DHS had not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program and recommended that it establish timeframes for regular review. DHS concurred and has since established procedures to review a sample of noncompliant passengers on a quarterly basis. Further, to meet 9/11 Act requirements, DHS requires that Visa Waiver Program countries enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, only 21 of the 36 countries had fully complied with this requirement as of November 2011, and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, has established a compliance schedule requiring the remaining member countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Moreover, DHS, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, has developed measures short of termination that could be applied on a case-by-case basis to countries not meeting their compliance date. Federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the estimated overstay population, but strengthening planning could improve overstay enforcement. ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the lead agency responsible for overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated 4 to 5.5 million overstays in the United States because of, among other things, competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported that by developing a time frame for assessing needed resources and using the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts. DHS concurred and stated that ICE planned to identify resources needed to transition this responsibility to ERO as part of its fiscal year 2013 resource planning process. GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, strengthen plans to address certain risks of the Visa Waiver Program and for overstay enforcement efforts. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them. |
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