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gao_GAO-08-418 | gao_GAO-08-418_0 | The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts
Although the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in specific rotational crewing programs and transform its ship-crewing culture, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts throughout the department. Rotational Crewing Is a Transformational Cultural Change
Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. As a result, the Navy may fail to lead a successful transformation of its ship-crewing culture. The Navy has not developed an overarching directive that provides high-level vision and guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and has been inconsistent in addressing rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. However, the Navy has developed and promulgated crew-exchange instructions that have provided some specific guidance for crew turnovers and increased accountability. While the guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities relied on a concept of operations, other commands supporting operations conducted by rotationally crewed surface ships have not developed or used a concept of operations. The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships
The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its surface ships; however, unlike the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the Navy has not developed a systematic method for data collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting of rotational crewing on current surface ships, including the cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing options. Without comprehensive analysis of alternatives, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. Additionally, by not systematically collecting and using lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations. To ensure that the Navy assesses the potential of different rotational crewing alternatives for improving performance and reducing costs for ship classes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to take the following two actions: develop a standardized, systematic method for data collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts; and require, as part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in development, including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Because DOD disagreed with our recommendations dealing with assigning clear leadership, establishing an implementation team, developing and promulgating overarching guidance, and improving the use of lessons learned, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet; develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts; develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. We have identified several key management practices at the center of implementing transformational programs, which include ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation. However, despite some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned within individual ship communities, the Navy’s efforts in many cases were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. Crew size has not been determined. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to increase a ship's operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1) employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.
What GAO Found
Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished. The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations. |
gao_GAO-09-470 | gao_GAO-09-470_0 | Overall, Job Corps Operated at or Near Capacity for Male Residential Students, but Not for Female Residential Students
The Job Corps program has been operating at or near capacity for male residential students, but under capacity for female residential students during the last 3 program years. During those years, Job Corps overall achieved between 95 and 98 percent of the planned enrollment for male residential students, but achieved about 80 percent or less of the planned enrollment for female residential students (see fig. 6). Moreover, about one-half of the 117 centers that enrolled female residential students in program year 2007 were below 80 percent of their planned enrollment for female residential students. Three Key Factors Affect Job Corps’ Ability to Recruit and Retain Residential Students
Three major factors affect the recruitment and retention of residential students, particularly female residential students, according to Job Corps officials. These key factors include the selection and availability of career training offerings, the availability of complete and accurate preenrollment information, and the quality of center life. Selection and Availability of Career Training Offerings Play a Major Role in Recruiting Students
The selection and availability of career training offerings in occupations of interest to students play a major role in Job Corps’ ability to recruit students, particularly female residential students. Labor Has Taken Some Steps to Address Job Corps’ Recruitment and Retention Issues, but These Efforts Are Limited in Scope
Labor has made some improvements to career training offerings, preenrollment information, and quality of center life in an effort to address issues related to the recruitment and retention of residential students. However, Labor has not reviewed nationally the training options that centers provide for female students or ensured that students receive detailed preenrollment information. Job Corps officials generally agree that an effective way for students to have realistic expectations about life at a Job Corps center is for them to visit the center prior to enrolling. Labor Has Taken Some Steps to Address Issues Related to the Quality of Center Life
Labor has several efforts under way to improve the quality of Job Corps center life for students. Approximately 1 in 10 of the female students in Job Corps in program year 2007 were single parents, and officials noted that these students face an additional barrier to participating in the program due to their need for child care. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand the recruitment and retention of residential students, we were asked to provide information on the (1) extent to which Job Corps centers are operating at or near capacity for residential students; (2) major factors that affect centers’ ability to recruit and retain residential students, particularly female residential students; and (3) steps, if any, the Department of Labor (Labor) has taken to address the recruitment and retention of residential students. | Why GAO Did This Study
Established in 1964, Job Corps is the nation's largest residential, educational, and career training program for economically disadvantaged youths. Administered by the Department of Labor (Labor), Job Corps received about $1.6 billion in program year 2007 and served about 60,000 students. Some have expressed concern that Job Corps centers are not meeting planned enrollment goals, particularly for women. To address these concerns, GAO reviewed the (1) extent to which Job Corps centers are operating at or near capacity for residential students; (2) major factors that affect the recruitment and retention of residential students, particularly females; and (3) steps, if any, Labor has taken to address the recruitment and retention of residential students. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed Labor's enrollment data, surveyed Job Corps recruiters and center directors, and visited seven Job Corps centers.
What GAO Found
Overall, the Job Corps program has been operating at or near capacity for male residential students, but under capacity for female residential students during program years 2005 through 2007. During each of those years, Job Corps achieved between 95 and 98 percent of the planned enrollment for male residential students nationwide, but about 80 percent or less for female residential students. In fact, about one-half of the centers that enrolled female residential students in program year 2007 were below 80 percent of their planned enrollment for that group. Three key factors affect Job Corps' ability to recruit and retain residential students, particularly female residential students--availability of career training options, complete and accurate preenrollment information, and quality of center life. The selection and availability of career training offerings in occupations of interest to students play a major role in Job Corps' ability to recruit students, particularly female residential students, according to officials that we surveyed. A key factor affecting both recruitment and retention is ensuring that students have accurate preenrollment information about Job Corps. Officials noted that having realistic expectations of life at a center is especially important for female students. Finally, center officials said that the quality of life at the centers, including the living conditions and the sense of safety, affects students' willingness to stay in the program. Labor has begun making improvements in career training offerings, preenrollment information, and quality of center life in an effort to address issues related to the recruitment and retention of residential students. While Labor has gradually made more training opportunities available that are likely to appeal to female students, these are typically at a center's request and not part of an overall strategy. In addition, Labor has taken some steps to ensure that students receive detailed preenrollment information, but has not yet expanded these efforts nationally. Finally, Labor has several efforts under way to improve the quality of center life for students, including ensuring a drug-free environment and providing child care facilities for single parents. |
gao_GAO-13-385 | gao_GAO-13-385_0 | EOD Forces Grew to Meet Wartime and Other Demands, but DOD Does Not Have Data Needed to Develop Funding Strategy to Support Future EOD Force Plans
To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased the size of their EOD forces. Based on available data, we determined that the services grew from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012—an almost 72 percent increase. The services anticipate that even as forces withdraw from recent operations the need for EOD forces will continue, so they intend to maintain their larger size. However, the respective services’ abilities to identify and track spending on EOD activities vary, so DOD does not have complete information on EOD spending. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish a consolidated budget justification display fully identifying the services’ baseline EOD budgets, but DOD has not done so. The Navy and Air Force now have program element codes that enable service officials to identify and evaluate the appropriate level of spending on their EOD capabilities. However, the Army’s and Marine Corps’ lack of complete data on the costs of their current EOD forces negatively affects their efforts to develop viable funding plans for supporting their EOD capability into the future. Until the services have information on current spending as well as justification for their future funding needs, service and DOD leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining resources. EOD Forces Have Worked Together in Joint Operations, but DOD Has Not Developed Joint EOD Doctrine to Guide Effective Employment of the Capability
EOD forces have operated jointly in Iraq and Afghanistan to fulfill battlefield requirements, and the services have jointly developed guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for EOD forces, but DOD has not fully institutionalized the guidance through joint EOD doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for and execution of operations, and it establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the capabilities for doing so by providing information on how joint forces can achieve military strategic and operational objectives in support of national strategic objectives. Another study reported on some combat unit commanders’ limited awareness of EOD capabilities during overseas combat operations. Non-EOD personnel in combat units did not always understand EOD protocols or capabilities. Although several organizations have responsibilities for some EOD functions, no one entity has been designated as the focal point on joint doctrine or operational issues. In addition, joint EOD doctrine could provide a basis for planning and identifying capability requirements for future operations. Having joint doctrine that is developed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as authoritative guidance would enhance DOD’s EOD forces’ ability to operate in an effective manner and better position the military services to identify capability gaps in meeting service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs; and to mitigate risks. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
To improve the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to ensure adequate support of their EOD forces within expected budgets, direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on costs associated with supporting their current EOD forces. To enhance the future employment of EOD forces in joint combat operations, direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders’ planning and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities. To determine the extent to which DOD and the services have identified funding to resource EOD forces to meet anticipated future requirements, we collected and analyzed available EOD funding data from each of the services for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD has relied heavily on the critical skills and capabilities of EOD forces to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to submit a report on EOD force structure planning and directed GAO to review DOD's force structure plan. DOD's report provided little detail. GAO examined to what extent (1) DOD and the services have addressed increased demands for the EOD capability and identified funding to meet future requirements; and (2) DOD has developed guidance for employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations. GAO evaluated DOD's report and EOD guidance; analyzed data on EOD missions, personnel, and funding; and interviewed DOD and service officials to gain perspectives from EOD personnel and managers.
What GAO Found
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces grew over the past 10 years to meet wartime and other needs, but the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have the data needed to develop a funding strategy to support future EOD force plans. To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased their EOD forces from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012. Anticipating that the need for EOD will continue as forces withdraw from ongoing operations, the services intend to maintain their larger size. The Navy and Air Force have data on the baseline costs for some or all of their EOD activities, but the Army and Marine Corps do not have complete data on spending for EOD activities. Therefore, DOD does not have complete data on service spending on EOD activities needed to determine the costs of its current EOD capability and to provide a basis for future joint planning. Until all the services have complete information on spending, service and DOD leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs.
EOD forces from all four services have worked together in Iraq and Afghanistan and the services have developed guidance on tactics and procedures for EOD forces, but challenges persist because DOD has not institutionalized joint EOD doctrine through a joint publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for operations and establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the capabilities for doing so. DOD studies have noted commanders' limited awareness of EOD capabilities during combat operations, and EOD personnel reported challenges they attributed to non-EOD forces' lack of understanding of EOD operations. Several DOD organizations have responsibilities for some EOD functions, but no entity has been designated as the focal point for joint EOD doctrine. Joint doctrine could help leaders identify EOD capability requirements and better position combatant commanders in their use of EOD forces in future operations. Joint doctrine that is developed and approved as authoritative guidance would enhance the EOD forces' ability to operate in an effective manner, and would better position the services to identify capability gaps in meeting service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs; and to mitigate risks.
What GAO Recommends
To better enable DOD to plan for funding EOD mission requirements and enhance future use of EOD forces in joint combat operations, GAO recommends that DOD direct (1) the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on current Army and Marine Corps EOD funding, and (2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders' planning and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities. In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GGD-99-42 | gao_GGD-99-42_0 | The NMF Enables IRS to Process Taxpayer Accounts That Cannot Be Processed on the Master File
There are two general reasons why IRS puts accounts on the NMF. Some accounts have features that do not fit with the master file’s configuration; other accounts have to be processed more quickly than the master file processing procedures allow. Overflow accounts: These are accounts that have more transactions than the master file is configured to handle. Master File Configuration and Processing Procedures Make NMF Necessary
As indicated by the information in the previous section, most of the accounts on the NMF are there because of limitations in the master file’s configuration (e.g., the master file’s inability to handle split assessments, large accounts, and employee plan numbers). The NMF process is more streamlined and thus quicker. Despite Some Advantages, NMF System Limitations Contributed to Processing Delays, Incorrect Assessments, and Customer Service Problems
Although the NMF enables IRS to process accounts that cannot be processed on the master file, the NMF also had limitations, at the time of our review, that caused problems for IRS employees and taxpayers. The ability to research NMF accounts was further limited by the absence of any meaningful link between the NMF and IDRS. It Has Been Difficult for IRS Staff to Research NMF Accounts
IRS staff need the ability to research account data. Corrective Actions Have Been Identified; Implementation of Some Has Been Deferred
After the September 1997 Senate Finance Committee hearings, IRS undertook the following reviews of the NMF:
In November 1997, a problem resolution analyst in IRS’ Western Region was tasked with identifying and reviewing all problems and mistakes that occurred in IRS’ handling of the NMF case that was discussed at the hearings. As a result, IRS deferred until at least 2001 the implementation of two recommendations that called for (1) moving many NMF accounts to the master file and (2) consolidating NMF accounts in one service center. These two actions, in concert, were intended to make it easier for IRS staff to identify and access an NMF account. For example, there is nothing in the plan about IRS’ (1) monitoring the NMF to identify any problems that arise in the future and (2) ensuring that timely action is taken to address any such problems. IRS identified major deficiencies with the NMF and compiled a list of corrective actions that, if effectively implemented, should go a long way toward correcting those deficiencies. With that in mind, we believe that IRS’ action plan lacks a key component. IRS noted, however, that “the ultimate solution is the fundamental replacement of the entire master file system and until such time as this occurs, we will continue to be at risk for additional deficiencies to be identified.” IRS pointed out that this ultimate solution is scheduled to be implemented over the next several years and that, until then, it “will continue to monitor the NMF process to identify any problems and take immediate steps to mitigate them.”
With respect to our recommendation, IRS said that it had included provisions to monitor future activity on the NMF in its January 1999 revision of that part of the Internal Revenue Manual dealing with the NMF. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) non-master file (NMF), which IRS established to process taxpayer accounts that cannot be processed on its master file, focusing on: (1) the basic differences between the master file and the NMF; (2) known problems that IRS and taxpayers have been experiencing with the NMF, including the sources of such problems; and (3) recent IRS proposals and actions intended to address these problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS uses the NMF for accounts that either the master file is not configured to process or that must be processed more quickly than can be done through the master file; (2) compared to the master file, the NMF is newer and smaller (about 122,000 NMF accounts scattered among 10 decentralized databases vs. millions of master file accounts in one large centralized system); (3) the NMF is more flexible than the master file, and IRS' procedures for entering data into and processing accounts on the NMF are more streamlined and thus quicker than those for the master file; (4) although the NMF enables IRS to process certain accounts that cannot be handled by the master file, the NMF also had limitations, at the time of GAO's review, that caused problems for IRS staff and taxpayers; (5) GAO's review and IRS' studies revealed that the most significant limitations were: (a) the lack of a central repository of all NMF accounts; (b) the absence of any meaningful link to the automated system that IRS staff use to obtain information about taxpayers' accounts; and (c) the fact that the NMF processing procedures were predominately manual; (6) these limitations made it difficult for IRS staff to identify and access accounts and could cause delays in processing account information in some situations; (7) these access problems and processing delays could cause taxpayers whose accounts were processed on the NMF to receive incorrect information and experience poor customer service; (8) after the September 1997 Senate Finance Committee hearings, IRS undertook several reviews of the NMF and developed a plan that included numerous proposed corrective actions; (9) implementation of some significant proposed actions has been deferred until at least 2001 because those actions involve extensive computer reprogramming that could interfere with IRS' efforts to make sure its computer systems are year 2000 compliant; (10) recognizing the need to make improvements in the near term, however, IRS recently implemented other actions that required fewer resources and little or no reprogramming; (11) if effectively implemented, IRS' near-term actions, in conjunction with the actions that have been deferred, should go a long way toward correcting identified NMF problems; (12) however, IRS' action plan lacks a key component; and (13) there is nothing in the plan about IRS': (a) monitoring the NMF to identify any problems that arise in the future; and (b) ensuring that timely action is taken to address any such problems. |
gao_AIMD-98-182 | gao_AIMD-98-182_0 | The primary goal of the working capital fund is to focus management’s attention on the full costs of carrying out certain critical DOD business operations and the management of those costs. Background
The Defense Information Services business area consists of two components—the Defense megacenters (DMC) and the Communications Information Services Activity (CISA). This is a continuation of DOD efforts to consolidate its computer center operations. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) evaluate DISA’s processes for establishing the prices DMCs and CISA charge for the services provided to customers of the Defense Information Services business area, (2) ascertain if DISA is being reimbursed for all services provided, and (3) ascertain the accuracy of DISA’s financial management information. In order to set prices that will enable the business area to operate on a break-even basis, it is extremely important that the business area accurately estimate the work it will perform and the cost of performing that work. Our review disclosed that the cost of doing business varied considerably from DMC to DMC. Analysis of the reported cost differences would be in accordance with this goal. This profit was approximately 13 percent of the DMCs’ reported revenue of about $682 million. In the case of the DMCs, the higher than anticipated workload in fiscal year 1997 was a primary reason the IBM and UNISYS mainframe services reported a net profit of $90 million in fiscal year 1997. Therefore, for fiscal year 1997, a more accurate workload estimate for the DMCs would have resulted in a lower CPU hourly price for IBM mainframe services and a higher hourly price for UNISYS mainframe service. Telecommunications Prices Do Not Reflect the Full Cost of Operations
In addition to the DMC pricing concerns discussed in chapter 2, our analysis of the Defense Information Services business area also disclosed that DISA was not recovering the full costs incurred in providing telecommunications services. Because the military departments pay for these components, they were not included in DISA’s prices. Yet, DISA has been excluding from its telecommunications prices millions of dollars related to transitioning independent networks to the new common-user network, prior-year losses, and overhead expenses. Using appropriated funds further understates DISA’s WCF prices and undermines business area managers’ abilities to focus on their operating costs and to make fundamental improvements in their operations. As of January 1998, 31 percent of the reported accounts receivable, or about $173 million, was reported outstanding for over 60 days. However, weaknesses within DISA’s internal control and accounting systems have hindered the development of accurate financial reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) price-setting process, focusing on: (1) whether DISA is being reimbursed for the services provided; and (2) the accuracy of DISA's financial management information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DISA has difficulty: (a) setting prices for information technology services that result in the recovery of the full cost of doing business; (b) getting reimbursed for the services it provides; and (c) producing reliable financial information on the Defense Information Services business area; (2) these weaknesses impair the business area's ability to focus management attention on the full costs of carrying out operations and managing those costs effectively; (3) DISA is embarking upon a major effort to consolidate its Defense megacenters (DMC) and increase their efficiency by allowing them to specialize in mainframe processing and thereby lower their prices; (4) by consolidating the mainframe processing from the current 16 DMC sites to 6 and optimizing mainframe operations, DISA anticipates that planned savings will be passed on to its customers through reduced prices; (5) however, the reported cost of doing business varies considerably from computer center to computer center; (6) an analysis of the cost differences would provide management the opportunity to understand the cases of the differences and thereby help identify inefficiencies and make improvements in the services provided; (7) the DMCs have difficulty estimating future workload; in fiscal year 1997, the Department of Defense's (DOD) records showed that the estimated versus actual workload varied from 15 percent to 174 percent for individual centers; (8) because the DMCs underestimated the amount of work they would perform in fiscal year 1997 for IBM and UNISYS mainframe services, they reported a net profit of $90 million, which is 13 percent of the reported fiscal year 1997 revenue of approximately $682 million; (9) in setting prices for telecommunications services, the Communications Information Services Activity did not incorporate about $137 million of costs related to transitioning independent networks to DISA's new common-user network, prior-year losses, and overhead expenses; (10) because these costs were not included, the prices charged for services were not based on the full costs incurred; (11) since business area costs were offset by appropriations, its prices were further understated; (12) as of January 1998, DISA reports showed that 31 percent of the business area's receivables, or about $173 million, had been outstanding for more than 60 days; and (13) weaknesses within DISA's internal control and accounting systems have hindered the development of accurate financial reports. |
gao_RCED-98-102 | gao_RCED-98-102_0 | FAA is responsible for implementing most of the aviation security mandates in the Reauthorization Act. No single agency is responsible for monitoring all of the agencies’ implementation efforts and ensuring coordination of interagency issues. FAA Has Established a Computerized System for Tracking Its Implementation of the Commission’s Recommendations
FAA’s Office of Aviation Policy and Plans developed a computerized system to track and monitor the status of all 57 recommendations contained in the Commission’s report. Work Remains on Most Recommendations That Were Scheduled for Completion in Fiscal Year 1997
FAA planned to implement three of the Commission’s aviation security recommendations in fiscal year 1997; it fully implemented one of them. The agency has substantially implemented the second recommendation; progress is being made on the third, although it has fallen 15 months behind schedule. Table 1 identifies the three recommendations that FAA expected to complete in fiscal year 1997. For example, one of the directives establishes procedures for positively identifying passengers by requiring them to provide a valid form of identification at the check-in counter. (months) (months)
9 10 11 12 1 Similarly, although consortia—a partnership between airport and air carrier officials and law enforcement agencies to review security issues—were formed at 41 airports in 1996, shortly after the Commission issued its initial report, FAA has not expanded the voluntary consortia program called for in the Commission’s final report. FAA Is Making Progress, but Delays Have Occurred
FAA has made progress in implementing the five recommendations we reviewed, but it has not met its target dates because, among other reasons, implementation involved relatively new and untested technologies. Although the Office of the Secretary of Transportation provides quarterly reports to the National Security Council and annual reports to the Office of the Vice President on the implementation of all 57 of the Commission’s recommendations, no single federal agency is responsible for tracking, monitoring, and coordinating the activities associated with implementing the recommendations. Consequently, issues that arise between agencies may go unresolved. These recommendations were contained in the initial report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. Give properly cleared airline and airport security personnel access to classified information they need to know. FAA considers this recommendation completed. Status of Five Aviation Security Recommendations, Implementation Issues, and Field Observations
The following provides additional information on the status of five aviation security recommendations made by the Commission and authorized under the Reauthorization Act, implementation issues, and our field observations during visits to airports. Scope and Methodology
To determine how federal agencies track, monitor, and coordinate activities designed to implement the Commission’s aviation security recommendations and the Reauthorization Act’s mandates, we obtained and analyzed the status reports that FAA’s computerized tracking systems generated between May 1997 and February 1998, as well as the quarterly status reports covering all the Commission’s aviation security recommendations made to federal agencies, which the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of the Secretary compiled and sent to the National Security Council for the same period. To determine the progress FAA had made in implementing the key recommendations that were both recommended by the Commission and mandated by the Congress in 1996 and the major issues that needed to be addressed before these recommendations could be fully implemented, we used the requesters’ criteria to determine which of the Commission’s recommendations and the act’s mandates covered the same issues. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the tracking, monitoring, and coordinating activities undertaken by the agencies responsible for implementing recommendations made by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) progress in implementing eight of these recommendations, focusing on: (1) how federal agencies responsible for implementing aviation security recommendations track, monitor, and coordinate their activities; (2) the progress that FAA has made in implementing three of the Commission's aviation security recommendations that were scheduled to be completed in fiscal year (FY) 1997 and whether all implementation issues been resolved; and (3) the progress that FAA has made in implementing five recommendations that were both recommended by the Commission and mandated by Congress in 1996, and what major issues need to be addressed before they can be fully implemented.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA is responsible for implementing 21 of the Commission's 31 aviation security recommendations and most of the Reauthorization Act's aviation security mandates; (2) FAA developed a computerized system to track its progress in implementing each of the Commission's recommendations; (3) in addition, FAA's Office of the Chief Counsel established a separate computerized system for tracking the activities required of the agency under the Reauthorization Act; (4) eight other federal agencies, each of which is responsible for implementing the Commission's other aviation security recommendations, track progress through the operations of their program and budget offices; (5) although the Department of Transportation's Office of the Secretary provides quarterly reports to the National Security Council and sends an annual report to the Vice President, neither the Security Council nor any other agency is responsible for monitoring all of the agencies' implementation efforts or ensuring coordination between agencies; (6) without such oversight and coordination, issues that arise between agencies may go unresolved; (7) of the three recommendations GAO reviewed that FAA planned to complete in FY 1997, FAA has totally implemented only one; (8) this recommendation--to give properly cleared air carrier and airport security personnel access to classified information they need to know--was completed on schedule; (9) FAA has largely implemented the second recommendation--to establish procedures for identifying passengers before they board an aircraft--through a series of directives, one of which requires that passengers provide a valid form of identification at the check-in counter; (10) the third recommendation--to voluntarily establish a partnership between airport and air carrier officials and law enforcement agencies to implement security enhancements--has not been expanded to an additional 200 airports beyond the 41 established as a result of the Commission's initial report and is 15 months behind schedule; (11) FAA has made progress but encountered delays in implementing the five recommendations made by the Commission and the similar mandates contained in the Reauthorization Act; and (12) these delays have occurred, in large part, because the recommendations involve new technologies and, in some cases, require FAA to issue regulations. |
gao_GAO-17-612T | gao_GAO-17-612T_0 | Challenges to Gathering New Information about Zika Virus Epidemiology
Surveillance and research conducted during the recent Zika virus disease outbreaks around the world have established some new knowledge about the epidemiology of the Zika virus, including information about the incidence of the disease and the distribution of cases, and its associated adverse health outcomes. Most of the 5,197 Zika virus disease cases reported by April 5, 2017 across 49 states in the United States were associated with travel to affected areas outside the continental United States; only two states—Florida and Texas—reported local mosquito- borne transmission—216 were in Florida and 6 in Texas. Most of the 36,504 cases reported in U.S. territories have been acquired through presumed local, mosquito-borne transmission in Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, many unknowns about the Zika virus remain, including (1) the total number of people with symptomatic and asymptomatic infections, (2) the biological mechanisms, risks, reasons for geographic differences, and the full spectrum of outcomes associated with maternal- fetal transmission, (3) the presence and duration of the virus in different bodily fluids, and (4) the role of prior exposure to Zika and other closely related viruses in risk and severity of Zika virus disease outbreaks, and (5) the full spectrum of outcomes associated with Zika virus infection. When the outbreak started in the United States, CDC, and state and local public health agencies, and public health organizations, faced some challenges in establishing and implementing surveillance systems for Zika virus disease and infection and its associated health outcomes. Characteristics of Different Diagnostic Tests Varied, Manufacturers and Users Faced Several Challenges, and FDA and CDC Did Not Consistently Communicate Sufficient Information
By April 12, 2017, FDA had authorized 16 diagnostic tests for the Zika virus under EUAs, following a public health emergency declaration. We found that authorized diagnostic tests used for the recent Zika virus outbreak varied in their performance and operational characteristics. The first challenge manufacturers faced was uncertainty at the beginning of the outbreak about which sample type to use for molecular testing. We also found that some diagnostic test users faced challenges complying with equipment requirements to perform tests as specified in the EUA labels, and determining the most accurate test. We also recommend that CDC establish a transparent process to provide CDC diagnostic tests, on request, to manufacturers that are in the final stages of diagnostic test authorization, and include information on CDC-developed tests, including laboratory developed tests. Mosquito Control Methods Have Strengths and Limitations, and Federal Agencies Are Challenged in Assisting These Efforts
Different types of mosquito control methods are available in the United States and each has strengths and limitations. Federal agencies may support such control entities with funding, subject matter expertise, and may regulate some control methods such as pesticides. According to CDC documentation, the agency developed technical guidance and provided funding and technical assistance to support state and local mosquito control activities. We identified four challenges the federal government faced in supporting these mosquito control efforts during the Zika virus outbreaks: (1) timing of the availability of resources and sustaining expertise, (2) communicating information about current mosquito distribution, (3) linking the effects of mosquito control to disease outcomes, and (4) having limited information about mosquito control entities. HHS agreed with this recommendation. This variability makes it more challenging for CDC to determine the status of mosquito control efforts in different regions of the United States and to identify regions that may need technical guidance or assistance. In conclusion, federal agencies can provide important information that can help users compare diagnostic tests and assist mosquito control efforts implemented at the state and local levels. Information on performance characteristics presented in each diagnostic test product label was not consolidated across available tests, were not consistently reported for diagnostic tests, and the identity of the comparator test was not listed on some labels, making it difficult for users to make informed decisions about which test to use or recommend to patients. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Zika virus disease can cause adverse health outcomes. This statement summarizes the findings of GAO’s May 2017 report that is being released concurrently on progress made and challenges faced by federal agencies in responding to the Zika virus outbreak in the United States.
GAO examined (1) information on what is known and not known about the epidemiology of the Zika virus and challenges with conducting surveillance and epidemiological studies, (2) characteristics of different authorized diagnostic tests, challenges test manufacturers and users faced, and the extent to which FDA and CDC followed their own communication guidance, and (3) the strengths and limitations of available mosquito control methods, and challenges federal agencies faced.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials about the Zika virus response. GAO also convened an expert meeting with the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss various issues related to Zika virus.
What GAO Found
Since Zika virus disease was a newly emerging disease threat in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the states were not fully equipped with needed information and resources at the beginning of the outbreak. This presented several challenges for surveillance and research efforts, such as establishing a national definition for reporting cases. Knowledge about Zika virus epidemiology has increased in the past year, for example, its associated adverse health outcomes, and various modes of transmission. Most of the 5,197 Zika virus disease cases reported by April 5, 2017 across 49 states in the United States were associated with travel to affected areas outside the continental United States; only two states—Florida and Texas—reported local mosquito-borne transmission—216 were in Florida and 6 in Texas. The vast majority of the 36,504 cases reported in U.S. territories have been acquired through presumed local, mosquito-borne transmission in Puerto Rico. While much has been learned about the epidemiology of the Zika virus, many unknowns remain, including the actual number of infections in the United States and the full spectrum of short-term and long-term outcomes.
The 16 Zika virus diagnostic tests authorized during the outbreak varied in their performance and operational characteristics. For example, they varied in their ability to detect the virus and provide accurate results. In developing the diagnostic tests, manufacturers faced challenges in several areas, including access to clinical samples and other authorized diagnostic tests for comparison purposes. Users of the tests also encountered challenges, including determining the most accurate test to use, having access to different tests, and obtaining equipment needed to conduct the tests. Some manufacturers raised concerns about the difficulty in developing diagnostic tests that met the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) requirements for Emergency Use Authorization and some users expressed concerns about selecting tests amongst those authorized. GAO also determined that CDC and FDA did not consistently communicate sufficient information about diagnostic tests, including providing clear information that would have enabled users to more easily compare performance across different tests.
Mosquito control programs in the United States are implemented at state and local levels and are critical to mitigating the risks associated with the Zika virus. Control methods include applying pesticides, reducing available water sources for breeding, and using personal protection. Each method has its strengths and limitations. For example, some control methods are more effective at reducing mosquito populations while others help prevent individuals from mosquito bites. Similarly, each method has some limitations, for example, there is varied public opposition to the use of certain pesticides. CDC supports state and local mosquito control activities primarily by providing guidance on mosquito control methods and funding to support certain mosquito control efforts. Challenges federal agencies identified in supporting these activities include sustaining staff expertise in mosquito control during periods when there are no outbreaks, funding constraints, and effectively communicating information about the geographical distribution of mosquitoes that transmit the Zika virus.
What GAO Recommends
In its May report GAO made five recommendations to FDA and CDC, including that CDC establish a transparent process for providing test manufacturers access to diagnostic tests for comparison purposes and FDA and CDC provide information to help ensure that users of diagnostic tests can compare performance. The agencies agreed with four recommendations and partially with the fifth and identified actions to implement them. |
gao_GAO-05-163 | gao_GAO-05-163_0 | EPA’s institutional controls project manager believed that some of these deviations from EPA’s guidance may have occurred because, during the period between the completion of the cleanup and site deletion, site managers may have inadvertently overlooked the need to implement the institutional controls. For example, the documents may have discussed the duration of the institutional controls but not when they will be implemented, or the documents may have discussed who will implement only one of the controls required. Relying on institutional controls as a major component of a selected remedy without carefully considering all of the applicable factors—including whether they can be implemented in a reliable and enforceable manner—could jeopardize the effectiveness of the entire site remedy. EPA Faces Challenges in Implementing, Monitoring, and Enforcing Institutional Controls
At the Superfund sites we reviewed, institutional controls often were not implemented before site deletion, as EPA requires. Ability to Enforce Institutional Controls Depends on the Nature of the Control Selected and State Laws
In addition to potentially inadequate monitoring, EPA may have difficulties enforcing the terms of certain institutional controls currently in place, or planned, for some Superfund and RCRA sites. Some institutional controls selected for sites are purely informational and do not limit or restrict use of the property. States have legislative options available to help ensure that institutional controls can be enforced. To improve its ability to ensure the long-term effectiveness of these controls, EPA has recently begun implementing tracking systems for its Superfund and RCRA corrective action programs. These systems currently track only minimal information on the institutional controls—as currently configured, they do not include information on long-term monitoring or enforcement of the controls. EPA Is Making Progress in Developing Tracking Systems
EPA has recently begun implementing institutional control tracking systems for the Superfund and RCRA corrective action programs. As such, these data reflect the planned use of institutional controls, which may or may not reflect the controls as actually implemented. While EPA currently plans to review the actual use of controls at all Superfund sites with residual waste, such reviews may take up to 5 years to complete. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure the long-term effectiveness of institutional controls, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA: clarify agency guidance on institutional controls to help EPA site managers and other decision makers understand in what cases institutional controls are or are not necessary at sites where contamination remains in place after cleanup; ensure that, in selecting institutional controls, adequate consideration is given to their objectives; the specific control mechanisms to be used; the timing of implementation and duration; and the parties responsible for implementing, monitoring, and enforcing them; ensure that the frequency and scope of monitoring at deleted Superfund sites and closed RCRA facilities where contamination has been left in place are sufficient to maintain the protectiveness of any institutional controls at these sites; and ensure that the information on institutional controls reported in the Superfund and RCRA corrective action tracking systems accurately reflects actual conditions and not just what is called for in site decision documents. However, our report does not suggest that the information should be included in the remedy decision document, but should be included in some cleanup-related documentation. Specifically, we reviewed (1) the extent to which institutional controls are used at sites addressed by EPA’s Superfund and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action programs; (2) the extent to which EPA ensures that institutional controls at these sites are implemented, monitored, and enforced; and (3) EPA’s challenges in implementing systems to track these controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) programs were established to clean up hazardous waste sites. Because some sites cannot be cleaned up to allow unrestricted use, institutional controls--legal or administrative restrictions on land or resource use to protect against exposure to the residual contamination--are placed on them. GAO was asked to review the extent to which (1) institutional controls are used at Superfund and RCRA sites and (2) EPA ensures that these controls are implemented, monitored, and enforced. GAO also reviewed EPA's challenges in implementing control tracking systems. To address these issues, GAO examined the use, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of controls at a sample of 268 sites.
What GAO Found
Institutional controls were applied at most of the Superfund and RCRA sites GAO examined where waste was left in place after cleanup, but documentation of remedy decisions often did not discuss key factors called for in EPA's guidance. For example, while documents usually discussed the controls' objectives, in many cases, they did not adequately address when the controls should be implemented, how long they would be needed, or who would be responsible for monitoring or enforcing them. According to EPA, the documents' incomplete discussion of the key factors suggests that site managers may not have given them adequate consideration. Relying on institutional controls as a major component of a site's remedy without carefully considering all of the key factors--particularly whether they can be implemented in a reliable and enforceable manner--could jeopardize the effectiveness of the remedy. EPA faces challenges in ensuring that institutional controls are adequately implemented, monitored, and enforced. Institutional controls at the Superfund sites GAO reviewed, for example, were often not implemented before the cleanup was completed, as EPA requires. EPA officials indicated that this may have occurred because, over time, site managers may have inadvertently overlooked the need to implement the controls. EPA's monitoring of Superfund sites where cleanup has been completed but residual contamination remains often does not include verification that institutional controls are in place. Moreover, the RCRA corrective action program does not include a requirement to monitor sites after cleanups have been completed. In addition, EPA may have difficulties ensuring that the terms of institutional controls can be enforced at some Superfund and RCRA sites: that is, some controls are informational in nature and do not legally limit or restrict use of the property, and, in some cases, state laws may limit the options available to enforce institutional controls. To improve its ability to ensure the long-term effectiveness of institutional controls, EPA has recently begun implementing institutional control tracking systems for its Superfund and RCRA corrective action programs. The agency, however, faces significant obstacles in implementing such systems. The institutional control tracking systems being implemented track only minimal information on the institutional controls. Moreover, as currently configured, the systems do not include information on long-term monitoring or enforcement of the controls. In addition, the tracking systems include data essentially derived from file reviews, which may or may not reflect institutional controls as actually implemented. While EPA has plans to improve the data quality for the Superfund tracking system--ensuring that the data accurately reflects institutional controls as implemented and adding information on monitoring and enforcement--the first step, data verification, could take 5 years to complete. Regarding the RCRA tracking system, the agency has no current plans to verify the accuracy of the data or expand on the data being tracked. |
gao_GAO-07-489T | gao_GAO-07-489T_0 | The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under two broad missions—homeland security and non-homeland security. Overall Budget Request Is 3.3 Percent Higher than Previous Year’s
The Coast Guard’s budget request in fiscal year 2008 is $8.73 billion, approximately $275 million, or 3.3 percent, more than in fiscal year 2007 (see fig. The Coast Guard’s budget request for homeland security missions represents approximately 35 percent of the overall budget. No new funds have been requested for this initiative. In fiscal year 2006, the agency narrowly missed performance targets for 3 programs—Search and Rescue, Living Marine Resources, and Aids to Navigation. However, the Coast Guard’s performance on its non-homeland security indicators has not changed substantially over the past 5 years. Framework for analyzing risk, readiness, and performance. Three efforts are of note here—reorganizing shore-based forces into sector commands, placing all deployable specialized forces under a single nationwide command, and consolidating acquisitions management programs. The goals of this consolidation are to improve Coast Guard oversight of acquisitions, better balance contracting officers and acquisition professionals among its major acquisition projects, and address staff retention and shortage problems associated with the acquisitions management program. Installation of equipment for the initial phase of NAIS, an acquisition that is designed to allow the Coast Guard to monitor and track vessels as far as 2,000 nautical miles off the U.S. coast, is currently under way, but without changes to existing regulations, some vessels will be able to avoid taking part in the system. First, the Coast Guard is still in the early phases of the 25-year Deepwater acquisition program and the potential for changes in the program over such a lengthy period of time make it difficult to forecast the ability of the Coast Guard to acquire future Deepwater assets according to its published schedule. These performance problems have had operational consequences for the Coast Guard. Specifically, in recent testimony, the Commandant of the Coast Guard stated that the Coast Guard has taken the following actions: multicrewing eight of the 110-foot patrol boats with crews from the 123-foot patrol boats that have been removed from service so that patrol hours for these vessels can be increased; deploying other Coast Guard vessels to assist in missions formerly performed by the 123-foot patrol boats; securing permission from the U.S. Navy to continue using three 179- foot cutters on loan from the Navy (these were originally to be returned to the Navy in 2008) to supplement the Coast Guard’s patrol craft; and compressing the maintenance and upgrades on the remaining 110-foot patrol boats. Initial Deployment of Nationwide Automatic Identification System Is Under Way, with Decisions Still to Come about Extending Coverage to Additional Vessels
Outside Deepwater, one acquisition project included in the fiscal year 2008 budget is the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, a system designed to of identify, track, and communicate with vessels bound for or within U.S. waters and forwarding that information for additional analysis. We have examined two of these areas in recent work—vessels for aids to navigation and domestic icebreaking activity, and vessels for icebreaking in polar areas. More than half of these assets have reached or will be approaching the end of their designed service lives. GAO/RCED-99-6. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U. S. Coast Guard is a multimission agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship. It performs these missions, relating to homeland security and non-homeland security in U.S. ports and inland waterways, along the coasts, and on international waters. The President's budget request, including the request for the Coast Guard, was transmitted to Congress on February 5, 2007. This testimony, which is based on current and past GAO work, synthesizes the results of this work as it pertains to the following: budget requests and performance goals, organizational changes and related management initiatives, current acquisition efforts and challenges, and challenges related to performing traditional legacy missions.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2008 budget request totals $8.7 billion, an increase of 3 percent over the enacted budget for fiscal year 2007 and a slowing of the agency's budget increases over the past 3 fiscal years. The Coast Guard expects to meet its performance goals in 6 of 11 mission areas in fiscal year 2006, down from 8 in 2005. Trends indicate increased homeland security activities have not prevented meeting non-homeland security goals. Two new reorganization efforts are under way. One creates a single command for all specialized deployable units, such as those for responding to pollution or terrorist incidents. However, experience with an effort to reorganize field units suggests there may be challenges in such matters as merging different operating approaches and addressing resource issues. The other effort merges the Coast Guard's various acquisition management efforts under a single Chief Acquisition Officer. The reorganization of acquisition management is in part a response to past troubled acquisition efforts. This change in the acquisition structure is too new to assess. Current major acquisitions include Deepwater for cutters and aircraft, the Rescue 21 communication system, and the National Automatic Identification System for vessel tracking. Deepwater and Rescue 21 have had schedule delays and performance reductions in the past, but the Coast Guard has been taking actions to improve oversight. Installation of equipment for the first phase of the National Automatic Identification System is under way, but the Coast Guard is still determining which types of vessels will have to participate. All three programs have also accumulated sizeable carryover balances of unspent moneys from previous years. Competing funding priorities have placed aging polar icebreakers and aids-to-navigation assets at risk. Many aids-to-navigation vessels are near the end of their service lives. The Coast Guard is exploring alternatives for replacement or extending their service. Similarly, high maintenance costs prompted the Coast Guard to take one of two Antarctic icebreakers out of service, increasing reliance on the remaining one. |
gao_GAO-08-118T | gao_GAO-08-118T_0 | The NFIP was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 to provide policyholders with some insurance coverage for flood damage, as an alternative to disaster assistance, and to try to reduce the escalating costs of repairing flood damage. In creating the NFIP, Congress found that a flood insurance program with the “large-scale participation of the Federal Government and carried out to the maximum extent practicable by the private insurance industry is feasible and can be initiated.” In keeping with this purpose, 92 private insurance companies were participating in the WYO program as of September 2007. FEMA, which is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for the oversight and management of the NFIP. FEMA’s current debt to the Treasury—over $17.5 billion—is almost entirely for payment of claims from the 2005 hurricanes. As we have testified previously, it is unlikely that FEMA will be able to repay a debt of this size and cover future claims, given that the program generates premium income of about $2 billion a year, which must first cover ongoing loss and expenses. These policyholders typically pay premiums that represent about 35 to 40 percent of the true risk premium. Although these properties account for only about 1 percent of NFIP-covered properties, they account for between 25 and 30 percent of claims. Remapping Is Creating A New Generation of Properties That May Not Pay Risk-based Premiums
FEMA is also creating a new generation of properties that may not pay risk-based premiums. Moreover, these grandfathered rates can be permanent. Although this option is a major selling point of encouraging broader participation in the program, such actions may further erode the actuarial soundness and financial stability of the program. However, a FEMA-commissioned study of compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement estimated that compliance with purchase requirements, under plausible assumptions, was 75 to 80 percent in special flood hazard areas for single-family homes that had a high probability of having a mortgage. The 2006 study also found that while one-third of NFIP policies were written outside of special flood hazard areas, the market penetration rate was only about 1 percent. Yet according to FEMA about half of all flood damage occurs outside of high risk areas. In October 2003, FEMA contracted for a new integrated mass marketing campaign called “FloodSmart” to educate the public about the risks of flooding and to encourage the purchase of flood insurance. FEMA Faces Challenges in Producing Accurate, Updated Flood Maps
Accurate flood maps that identify the areas that are at greatest risk of flooding are the foundation of the NFIP. The maps are principally used by (1) the communities participating in the NFIP, to adopt and enforce the program’s minimum building standards for new construction within the maps’ identified floodplains; (2) FEMA, to develop flood insurance policy rates based on flood risk; and (3) federal regulated mortgage lenders, to identify those property owners who are statutorily required to purchase federal flood insurance. As of September 2007 FEMA had remapped 34 percent of its maps. FEMA faces challenges in providing effective oversight of the insurance companies and thousands of insurance agents and claims adjusters that are primarily responsible for the day-to-day process of selling and servicing flood insurance policies. In response to our recommendations, FEMA has agreed to take steps to ensure that it has reasonable estimates of the actual expenses that WYO insurance companies incurred to help determine whether payments for services are appropriate and that required financial audits are performed. Its interim report, issued in July 2007, was generally inconclusive. As we noted when we placed the NFIP on the high-risk list in 2006, comprehensive reform will likely be needed to stabilize the long-term finances of this program. Our ongoing work is designed to provide FEMA and Congress with useful information to help assess ways to improve the sufficiency of NFIP’s financial resources and its current funding mechanism, mitigate expenses from repetitive loss properties, increase compliance with mandatory purchase requirements, and expedite FEMA’s flood map modernization efforts. As you well know, placing the program on more sound financial footing involves a set of highly complex, interrelated issues that are likely to involve many trade-offs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides property owners with some insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing the NFIP. Given the challenges facing the NFIP and the need for legislative reform to ensure the financial stability and ongoing viability of this program, GAO placed the NFIP on its high-risk list in March 2006. This testimony updates past work and provides information about ongoing GAO work on issues including (1) NFIP's financial structure, (2) the extent of compliance with mandatory requirements, (3) the status of map modernization efforts, and (4) FEMA's oversight of the NFIP. Building on our previous and ongoing work on the NFIP, GAO collected data from FEMA to update efforts, including information about claims, policies, repetitive loss properties, and mitigation efforts.
What GAO Found
The most significant challenge facing the NFIP is the actuarial soundness of the program. As of August 2007, FEMA owed over $17.5 billion to the U.S. Treasury. FEMA is unlikely to be able to pay this debt, primarily because the program's premium rates have been set to cover an average loss year, which until 2005 did not include any catastrophic losses. This challenge is compounded by the fact that some policyholders with structures that were built before floodplain management regulations were established in their communities generally pay premiums that represent about 35 to 40 percent of the true risk premium. Moreover, about 1 percent of NFIP-insured properties that suffer repetitive losses account for between 25 and 30 percent of all flood claims. FEMA is also creating a new generation of "grandfathered" properties--properties that are mapped into higher-risk areas but may be eligible to receive a discounted premium rate equal to the nonsubsidized rate for their old risk designation. Placing the program on a more sound financial footing will involve trade-offs, such as charging more risk-based premiums and expanding participation in the program. The NFIP also faces challenges expanding its policyholder base by enforcing compliance with mandatory purchase requirements and promoting voluntary purchase by homeowners who live in areas that are at less risk. One recent study estimated that compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement was about 75 to 80 percent but that penetration elsewhere in the market was only 1 percent. Since 2004, FEMA has implemented a massive media campaign called "FloodSmart" to increase awareness of flooding risk nationwide by educating everyone about the risks of flooding and encouraging the purchase of flood insurance. While the numbers of policyholders increased following Hurricane Katrina, it is unclear whether these participants will remain in the program as time goes on. The impact of the 2005 hurricanes highlighted the importance of up-to-date flood maps that accurately identify areas at greatest risk of flooding. These maps are the foundation of the NFIP. In 2004 FEMA began its map modernization efforts, and according to FEMA, about 34 percent of maps have been remapped. Completing the map modernization effort and keeping these maps current is also going to be an ongoing challenge for FEMA. Finally, FEMA also faces significant challenges in providing effective oversight over the insurance companies and thousands of insurance agents and claims adjusters who are primarily responsible for the day-to-day process of selling and servicing flood insurance policies. As GAO recommended in a an interim report issued in September 2007, FEMA needs to take steps to ensure that it has a reasonable estimate of actual expenses that the insurance companies incur to help determine whether payments for services are appropriate and that required financial audits are performed. GAO, in its ongoing work, plans to further explore FEMA oversight of the private insurance companies and the cost of selling and servicing NFIP flood policies. |
gao_GGD-95-117 | gao_GGD-95-117_0 | Salmon is one of the four principal aquaculture products in the United States. Canadian Farmed Salmon Production
Canada is the principal supplier of farmed salmon to the United States. British Columbia accounted for about 66 percent of total Canadian production. To determine what opportunities existed for U.S. producers to increase exports of salmon eggs and smolts to British Columbia, we interviewed representatives of the Washington Fish Growers Association and major Washington State exporters of fertilized salmon eggs and smolts. Elements of British Columbia’s Import Policy for Salmon Eggs and Smolts
Since 1985, DFO, in coordination with the British Columbian Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, has required extended quarantine for imports of fertilized Atlantic salmon eggs. DFO, however, did not lift its ban on imports of Atlantic salmon smolts. As noted earlier, under Canadian fish health protection regulations, such facilities must be certified to be disease free after four consecutive inspections over a period of 18 months. According to DFO’s own data, in 9 years of testing, no pathogens have been found among hatchlings from imported fertilized eggs. Finally, industry spokesmen, U.S. state and federal officials, and academicians we interviewed argued that DFO officials should have conducted a comprehensive risk analysis before adopting the strict sanitary measures called for in the Canadian policy. Opportunities for U.S. Exports to British Columbia
When DFO’s policy on imports of Atlantic salmon eggs and smolts was established in 1985, the commercial salmon farming industry in British Columbia was developing into an international business, and the market for eggs and smolts was beginning to expand. Major salmon egg exporters from Washington State agreed that there would be great market potential for their Atlantic salmon eggs in British Columbia if existing import restrictions were removed. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Canada's policy regarding the import of fertilized salmon eggs and smolts, focusing on: (1) the reasons Canada implemented its policy; (2) whether concerned parties view Canada's policy as reasonable; and (3) whether opportunities exist for U.S. producers to increase their salmon egg and smolt exports.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1985, Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has maintained a policy that requires a quarantine of imports of fertilized Atlantic salmon eggs and bans imports of Atlantic salmon smolts into British Columbia; (2) hatchery facilities must be certified by DFO that they are free of certain diseases over a period of 18 months in order for them to export fertilized salmon eggs; (3) according to DFO officials, the salmon policy was developed to protect British Columbia's valuable fishery resources from pathogens that could be inadvertently destructive; (4) Atlantic salmon is the principal salmon species used in worldwide aquaculture production and accounts for about 60 percent of farmed salmon production in British Columbia; (5) salmon hatchery producers in the United States and Canada have questioned whether the Canadian policy is necessary, since in 9 years of testing, none of the hatchlings from imported eggs have been found to carry pathogens; (6) Washington state and federal officials have questioned the need for a ban on U.S. hatchery smolts, since both British Columbian and Washington salmon share the same watershed and have equal chances of acquiring pathogens; and (7) if Canada's import restrictions were relaxed, there would be great market potential for U.S. hatchery salmon eggs and smolts. |
gao_GAO-15-301 | gao_GAO-15-301_0 | In 2010, PPACA authorized the establishment of PCORI as a nonprofit corporation aimed at advancing the quality and relevance of evidence through CER to help patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making informed health care decisions. PCORI Has Established Priorities and Processes for Funding Comparative Clinical Effectiveness Research and Is Developing Dissemination Plans, Consistent with Its Legislative Requirements
PCORI has developed five broad research priorities and developed a research agenda to identify how each priority will be addressed. The institute has established a multi-step merit review process to score and identify applications for funding and a process for monitoring contractors. PCORI Has Established Research Priorities and a Research Agenda
In 2012, PCORI established five broad research priorities: (1) assessment of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment options; (2) improving health care systems; (3) communication and dissemination research; (4) addressing disparities; and (5) accelerating patient-centered outcomes research and methodological research. PCORI also developed a research agenda to identify how each priority would be addressed. PCORI established its research priorities and agenda consistent with PPACA requirements. PCORI has established a multi-step research funding process, which includes merit review, that is designed to select high quality research that has the best potential to improve patient outcomes, according to PCORI officials. Once funded, PCORI contractors are monitored by PCORI staff. PCORI officials stated that they are currently developing a peer review assessment process, as required by law, to review final reports submitted by contractors at the conclusion of a project. PCORI Is Developing Dissemination Plans and Coordinating Dissemination Activities with AHRQ
PCORI is currently developing a plan for the dissemination of the research it funds, as required by PPACA, and expects to begin disseminating research results as early as 2015. PCORI Has Started Awarding Contracts for Research, and Plans to Award Additional Contracts through 2019
As of October 2014, PCORI has awarded 360 contracts to fund research projects across 12 funding areas. PCORI made a total of $670.8 million in commitments to fund these contracts. Overall, PCORI expects to receive an estimated total of $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2019 from the PCORTF to fund its work.$2.6 billion of its $3.5 billion on contracts for research and research infrastructure, with the remaining amounts spent on research support activities and administrative expenses. According to PCORI officials, approximately $106 million in commitments to date are for the PCORnet data research network, the aim of which is to improve the capacity for and speed of conducting CER. PCORI officials stated that they expect to spend a total of $271 million on PCORnet through 2019. Officials stated that limited amounts of data will be available through PCORnet for queries by researchers after September 2015, with the amount of available data increasing over time. PCORI Has Established an Evaluation Plan and Anticipates Developing Efforts to Measure Outcomes
PCORI’s evaluation group—a body composed of members from its Board of Governors, methodology committee, advisory panel on patient engagement, external experts, and PCORI staff —has developed initial plans for evaluating PCORI’s efforts against its three strategic goals, which are to increase information, speed implementation, and influence research. To do so, PCORI identified primary outcome measures for each of its strategic goals. In its strategic plan, PCORI notes that these are meant to be long-term measures because research typically requires several years to complete and additional years for the results to be disseminated and implemented. Therefore, since 2013, PCORI has been using early and intermediate process and output measures as a way to monitor its progress toward its strategic goals. PCORI anticipates having some early results related to its primary outcome measures starting in 2017 after the first CER studies are completed and their findings released, although full evaluation of the results of these outcome measures will not be possible until around 2020, after a large number of CER studies have been completed and a few years have elapsed, allowing time for study results to be taken up. PCORI provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, PPACA authorized the establishment of PCORI as a federally funded, nonprofit corporation to improve the quality and relevance of CER. PCORI, which began operation in 2010, is required to identify research priorities, establish a research project agenda, fund research consistent with its research agenda, and disseminate research results, among other things. To fund PCORI, PPACA established the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund, through which the institute is expected to receive an estimated $3.5 billion from fiscal years 2010 through 2019.
PPACA mandated that GAO review PCORI's activities by 2015 and 2018. This report examines (1) the extent to which PCORI established priorities and processes for funding and disseminating comparative clinical effectiveness research consistent with its legislative requirements; (2) the status of PCORI's efforts to fund comparative clinical effectiveness research; and (3) PCORI's plans, if any, to evaluate the effectiveness of its work. GAO reviewed relevant legislative requirements and PCORI documentation, including funding data, and interviewed PCORI officials. GAO also interviewed relevant stakeholders, including health policy experts and PCORI contractors. PCORI provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) has established priorities and processes for funding comparative clinical effectiveness research (CER)—which is research that evaluates and compares health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of two or more medical treatments, services, or items such as health care interventions—and is developing dissemination plans, consistent with the legislative requirements of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). In 2012, PCORI established five broad research priorities: (1) assessment of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment options; (2) improving health care systems; (3) researching communication and dissemination strategies; (4) comparing interventions to reduce health disparities; and (5) accelerating patient-centered outcomes research and methodological research. PCORI also developed a research agenda to identify how each priority would be addressed. PCORI has established a multi-step research funding process designed to assess and select contract applications for funding. Funded contracts are monitored by PCORI staff. Per legislative requirement, PCORI is developing a peer review assessment process to review final reports submitted by contract awardees and is in the process of developing a plan for the dissemination of funded research potentially beginning in 2015, in coordination with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
PCORI has started awarding contracts for research and plans to award additional contracts through 2019. As of October 2014, PCORI has awarded 360 contracts to fund research projects, committing a total of $670.8 million to them. PCORI expects to commit about $2.6 billion to research contracts, out of $3.5 billion in total estimated spending. Approximately $106 million in commitments to date are for PCORnet, a data research network aimed at improving the capacity for and speed of conducting CER. PCORI officials stated that they expect to spend a total of $271 million on PCORnet through fiscal year 2019. PCORI officials stated that limited amounts of data will be available through PCORnet for researchers to use after September 2015 with the amount of available data increasing over time.
PCORI has established an evaluation plan and is developing efforts to measure outcomes. PCORI has developed initial plans for evaluating the institute's efforts against its three strategic goals, which are to increase information, speed implementation, and influence research. To do so, PCORI has developed primary outcome measures for assessing PCORI's progress related to these strategic goals. In its strategic plan, PCORI notes that these are meant to be long-term measures because research typically requires several years to complete and additional years for the results to be disseminated and implemented. Therefore, since 2013, PCORI has been using early and intermediate process and output measures—such as the number of people accessing or referencing PCORI information—as a way to monitor its progress toward its strategic goals. PCORI anticipates having some early results related to its primary outcome measures starting in 2017 after the first CER studies are completed and their findings released, although full evaluation of the results of these outcome measures will not be possible until around 2020. |
gao_HEHS-99-10 | gao_HEHS-99-10_0 | As a result of the 1996 changes, the Goals 2000 program is essentially a funding-stream grant program with fiscal objectives. Goals 2000 Funds Support a Broad Range of Education Reform Efforts at the State and Local Levels
Goals 2000 funds, totaling about $1.25 billion for fiscal years 1994 through 1997, have supported a broad range of education reform activities at both the state and local levels. Contract services and consultant fees constituted about 28 percent of state-retained funds. More than 34 percent of the 14,367 school districts nationwide that provide instructional services received at least one Goals 2000 subgrant during the 4-year period reviewed. Over the 4-year period reviewed, Goals 2000 subgrants funded several general categories of activities: local education reform projects, professional development, computer equipment and training, preservice training, and standards and assessments. Crosscutting and Other Initiatives
These subgrant activities associated with education reform, reflecting districts’ crosscutting approaches to meeting education reform goals, accounted for the remaining 12 percent of subgrant funding. Almost all state and local officials said Goals 2000 funds provided valuable assistance to education reform efforts at both the state and local levels and that, without this funding, some reform efforts either would not have been accomplished or would not have been accomplished as quickly. In several cases, state officials reported that Goals 2000 had served as a catalyst for a certain aspect of their reform efforts, such as the development of standards and assessments. Almost every state official told us that flexibility is key to Goals 2000’s usefulness in promoting state education reform because states could direct these funds toward their state’s chosen education reform priorities. While a program such as this, which entails great latitude in the use of funds and requires little in the way of reporting requirements, reduces some of the states’ accountability for process and results, Goals 2000 appears to be accomplishing what the Congress intended—providing an additional and flexible funding source to promote coordinated improvements to state and local education systems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) review the purposes for which Goals 2000 state-retained funds have been used, (2) determine what local projects have been funded using Goals 2000 funds, (3) determine state officials’ views about how Goals 2000 relates to state reform, (4) ascertain how much of Goals 2000 funds have been used for developing standards and assessments and what future support is needed for these purposes, and (5) find to what extent Goals 2000 funds have been used for health education activities. For reporting purposes, we combined these questions into two broader objectives: (1) how Goals 2000 funds have been spent at both the state and local levels, including the levels of funding for developing standards and assessments as well as health education, and (2) how state and local officials view Goals 2000 as a means to promote education reform efforts. The smallest allocation was $370,124 to Wyoming in 1994; the largest was $54,659,343 to California in 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Goals 2000 Program, focusing on determining how: (1) its funds have been spent at both the state and local levels, including the levels of funding for developing standards and assessments as well as health education; and (2) state and local officials view Goals 2000 as a means to promote education reform efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Goals 2000 funds are being used to support a broad range of education reform activities at the state and local levels; (2) grants to states in the 4 fiscal years (FY) that GAO reviewed ranged from $370,000 to Wyoming in FY 1994 to $54.7 million to California in FY 1997; (3) over the 4-year period reviewed, Goals 2000 funds have been broadly disseminated: more than one-third of the 14,367 school districts nationwide that provide instructional services have received at least one Goals 2000 subgrant funded with fiscal years 1994 through 1997 funds; (4) state-retained funds were spent primarily for personnel, contracting services, and consultants involved in fund related activities; (5) districts used Goals 2000 subgrant funds to pay for education reform initiatives centered around several major categories: local education reform; professional development; and technology acquisition and training; (6) other uses included preservice training for college students who plan on becoming teachers; the development of education standards and assessments; and crosscutting and other activities; (7) most states had begun their state education reform efforts prior to receiving Goals 2000 funds, thus Goals 2000 funds have generally served as an additional resource for ongoing state reform efforts; (8) the districts' Goals 2000 activities appear to be aligned with state education reform initiatives; (9) many state officials reported that Goals 2000 has been a significant factor in promoting their education reform efforts and, in several cases, was a catalyst for some aspect of the state's reform movement; (10) state and local officials said that Goals 2000 funding provided valuable assistance and that, without this funding, some reform efforts would not have been accomplished so quickly if at all; (11) state officials told GAO they supported the flexible funding design of the Goals 2000 state grants program as a way of helping them reach their own state's education reform goals, and the program was achieving its purpose of supporting systemic education reform in states and districts; (12) a number of state officials noted that Congress' discussions about combining Goals 2000 funding with other federal funding in block grant approach caused them concern, as they believe the increased flexibility of a block grant could increase the risk that the funds would not be spent on education reform; (13) however, Goals 2000 appears to be accomplishing what Congress intended; and (14) it is providing an additional and flexible funding source to promote coordinated improvements to state and local education systems. |
gao_GAO-07-1098T | gao_GAO-07-1098T_0 | Separating Wants from Needs
Given the current fiscal environment, agencies need to learn to separate wants from needs to ensure that programs and investments provide the best return within fiscal constraints. Our work has shown that agencies sometimes budget and allocate resources incrementally, largely based on historical precedents, rather than conduct bottom-up reviews and allocate resources based on the broader goals and objectives of agency strategic plans. We have also seen examples of agencies having fragmented decision- making processes for acquisition investments, failing to consider agencywide needs and resource limitations. Such spending can circumvent careful planning and divert resources from more critical needs. This can also serve to exacerbate our serious long-range fiscal imbalance. Establishing and Supporting Realistic Program Requirements
After differentiating their unlimited wants from their true needs, agencies need to translate their needs into appropriate, executable programs. They also need to ensure that programs proceed through the acquisition process based on having requisite knowledge and that programs are funded adequately. I believe that even if more funding were provided, it would not be a solution because wants will usually exceed the funding available. Although U.S. weapon systems are the best in the world, the programs to acquire them often take significantly longer and cost significantly more than promised and often deliver smaller quantities and different capabilities than planned. Using Contractors in Appropriate Circumstances and Contracts as a Management Tool
The next set of systemic acquisition challenges relate to those faced at the contract management level. Once the decision to contract has been made, we have observed challenges in setting contract requirements, using the appropriate contract with the right incentives given the circumstances, and ensuring proper oversight of these arrangements—especially considering the evolving and enlarging role of contractors in federal acquisitions. The failure to adequately address these challenges explains, in part, why agencies continue to experience poor acquisition outcomes in buying major systems, goods, and services. Compounding this risk is the growing reliance on contractors to perform functions previously carried out by government personnel. Creating a Capable Workforce and Holding It Accountable
The last set of challenges I will discuss relate to having a capable acquisition workforce and holding it accountable. The acquisition workforce’s workload and complexity of responsibilities have been increasing without adequate agency attention to the workforce’s size, skills and knowledge, and succession planning. At the same time that the federal acquisition workforce has decreased in numbers and the size of its investments in goods and services has increased significantly, the nature of the role of the acquisition workforce has been changing and, as a result, so have the skills and knowledge needed in that workforce to manage more complex contracting approaches. 2. 4. Illustrative examples of waste could include the following: unreasonable, unrealistic, inadequate, or frequently changing proceeding with development or production of systems without achieving an adequate maturity of related technologies in situations where there is no compelling national security interest to do so; the failure to use competitive bidding in appropriate circumstances; an over-reliance on cost-plus contracting arrangements where reasonable alternatives are available; the payment of incentive and award fees in circumstances where the contractor’s performance, in terms of costs, schedule, and quality outcomes, does not justify such fees; the failure to engage in selected pre-contracting activities for contingent events; and congressional directions (e.g., earmarks) and agency spending actions where the action would not otherwise be taken based on an objective value and risk assessment and considering available resources. Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to Effective Financial and Business Management Transformation. Contract Management: DOD Vulnerabilities to Contracting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2006, the federal government spent over $400 billion for a wide variety of goods and services, with the Department of Defense (DOD) being the largest purchaser. Given the large and growing structural deficit, the government must get the best return it can on its investment in goods and services. For decades, GAO has reported on a number of systemic challenges in agencies' acquisition of goods and services. These challenges are so significant and wide-ranging that GAO has designated four areas of contract management across the government to be high-risk. This testimony highlights four key acquisition challenges agencies face: (1) separating wants from needs, (2) establishing and supporting realistic program requirements, (3) using contractors in appropriate circumstances and contracts as a management tool, and (4) creating a capable workforce and holding it accountable.
What GAO Found
Given the current fiscal environment, agencies must separate wants from needs to ensure that programs provide the best return on investments. Our work has shown that some agencies budget and allocate resources incrementally, largely based on historical precedents, rather than conducting bottom-up reviews and allocating resources based on agencywide goals. We have also seen examples of agencies using fragmented decision-making processes for acquisition investments. Agency spending actions that would not otherwise be taken based on an objective value and risk assessment and considering available resources, work against good strategic planning. Such spending can circumvent careful planning and divert resources from more critical needs, and can serve to exacerbate our serious long-range fiscal imbalance. Agencies also need to translate their true needs into executable programs by setting realistic and stable requirements, acquiring requisite knowledge as acquisitions proceed through development, and funding programs adequately. However, agencies too often promise capabilities they cannot deliver and proceed to development without adequate knowledge. As a result, programs take significantly longer, cost more than planned, and deliver fewer quantities and different capabilities than promised. Even if more funding were provided, it would not be a solution because wants will usually exceed the funding available. No less important is the need to examine the appropriate circumstances for using contractors and address contract management challenges. Agencies continue to experience poor acquisition outcomes in buying goods and services in part because of challenges in setting contract requirements, using the appropriate contract with the right incentives, and ensuring sufficient oversight. Exacerbating these challenges is the evolving and enlarging role of contractors in performing functions previously carried out by government personnel. Further, while contract management challenges can jeopardize successful acquisition outcomes in normal times, they also take on heightened importance and significantly increase risks in the context of contingency operations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, or Hurricane Katrina. Finally, it is imperative that the federal government develop an accountable and capable workforce, because the workforce is ultimately responsible for strategic planning and management of individual programs and contracts. Yet much of the acquisition workforce's workload and complexity of responsibilities have been increasing without adequate attention to the workforce's size, skills and knowledge, and succession planning. Sustained high-level leadership is needed to set the right tone at the top in order to address acquisition challenges and ultimately, prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. |
gao_GAO-14-376 | gao_GAO-14-376_0 | Negotiations Were Largely Based on Projected Costs and Remediation Amounts and the Goals for the Cash Payments Were Generally Met
Regulators considered factors such as projected costs and potential remediation amounts associated with the file reviews to negotiate the $3.9 billion total cash payment under the amended consent orders. The final amount of $3.9 billion was negotiated between regulators and servicers and was higher than the estimates regulators used to inform negotiations. As of December 2013, checks had been distributed to approximately 4 million borrowers covered by the 13 servicers that were part of the January 2013 amended consent order announcements. Under the cash payment process, borrowers generally received cash payments of between $300 and $125,000, in line with regulators’ goal of providing those amounts to borrowers. According to regulators, as part of their process to determine the cash payment amounts to be paid to borrowers in each category, they considered the amount that borrowers would have been paid for errors in that category under the file review process, among other considerations. Regulators Did Not Establish Specific Objectives for Foreclosure Prevention Actions, and Oversight Is Limited
Regulators did not establish specific objectives for the $6 billion obligation they negotiated with servicers to provide foreclosure prevention actions. According to most servicers we spoke with, they would be able to meet the required volume of activities using their existing foreclosure prevention activities. However, according to Federal Reserve staff, most of the Federal Reserve examination teams have not conducted their oversight activities related to the foreclosure prevention principles and regulators’ guidance for oversight of the principles does not identify actions examination teams should take to evaluate or test implementation of these principles. Similarly, the guidance requires examination teams to identify the performance measures servicers use to assess the principle related to the sustainability of foreclosure prevention actions, but the guidance does not require examination teams to evaluate how well a servicer’s programs are providing sustainable actions.foreclosure prevention actions are meaningful—one of the principles— examination teams are to collect data on the servicers’ foreclosure prevention actions, including the extent to which those actions resulted in higher or lower monthly payments, but the guidance does not require Finally, to assess whether servicers’ examination teams to evaluate the data to understand what it indicates about servicers’ actions. Without these procedures, regulators may miss opportunities to determine how well servicers’ foreclosure prevention actions provide meaningful relief and help borrowers retain their homes. File Review and Cash Payment Activities Confirmed Previously Identified Servicing Weaknesses
Although consultants generally did not complete the review of 2009 and 2010 foreclosure-related files through the file review process, consultants, servicers, and regulators were able to describe some of the servicing weaknesses they identified based on the work that was completed. CFPB Mortgage Servicing Rules. OCC and Federal Reserve Imminent Foreclosure Standards. Regulators Promoted Transparency about the Status and Results of Cash Payments and Plan to Issue Public Reports
In our March 2013 report, we found that transparency on how files were reviewed under the foreclosure review was generally lacking and that borrowers and the general public received limited information about the progress of reviews.implement a communication strategy to regularly inform borrowers and We recommended that regulators develop and the public about the processes, status, and results of the activities under the amended consent orders and continuing foreclosure reviews. Federal Reserve staff also stated that they anticipate the final report would include information on the terminated reviews. Regulators said that borrowers could obtain additional information from other sources. In addition, federal internal control standards and our prior work highlight the importance of providing relevant, reliable, and timely communications, including providing information about the processes used to realize results, to increase the transparency of activities to stakeholders—in this case, borrowers and the public. To better ensure transparency and public confidence in the amended consent order processes and results, we recommend that the Comptroller of the Currency and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System include in their forthcoming reports or other public documents information on the processes used to determine cash payment amounts, such as the criteria servicers use to place borrowers in various payment categories. We also received technical comments from OCC, the Federal Reserve, and CFPB and incorporated these as appropriate. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to assess: (1) the factors regulators considered in negotiating servicers’ cash payment obligations under the amended consent orders and the extent to which regulators achieved their stated goals for the cash payments; (2) the objectives of the foreclosure prevention actions in the amended consent orders and how well regulators designed and oversaw the actions to achieve those objectives; (3) the extent to which regulators are sharing information from the file review and amended consent order processes; and (4) the extent to which regulators have promoted transparency of the amended consent orders and remaining review. To assess the extent to which regulators are leveraging and sharing information from the file review process, we analyzed consultants’ preliminary findings from the file review process, in particular information they reported to regulators in exit surveys and during exit interviews with regulators. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011 and 2012, OCC and the Federal Reserve signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for errors and remediate harm to borrowers. In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. One servicer continued file review activities. GAO was asked to examine the amended consent order process. This report addresses (1) factors considered during cash payment negotiations between regulators and servicers and regulators' goals for the payments, (2) the objectives of foreclosure prevention actions and how well regulators designed and are overseeing those actions to achieve objectives, and (3) regulators' actions to share information from the file review and amended consent order processes and transparency of the processes. GAO analyzed regulators' negotiation documents, oversight memorandums, and information provided to borrowers and the public about the file review and amended consent orders. GAO also interviewed representatives of regulators, servicers, and consultants.
What GAO Found
To negotiate the $3.9 billion cash payment amount in servicers' amended consent orders, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) considered information from the incomplete foreclosure review, including factors such as projected costs for completing the file reviews and remediation amounts that would have been paid to borrowers. To evaluate the final cash payment amount, GAO tested regulators' major assumptions and found that the final negotiated amount generally fell within a reasonable range. Regulators generally met their goals for timeliness and amount of the cash payments. By December 2013, cash payments of between $300 and $125,000 had been distributed to most eligible borrowers.
Rather than defining specific objectives for the $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions regulators negotiated with servicers, regulators identified broad principles, including that actions be meaningful and that borrowers be kept in their homes. To inform the design of the actions, regulators did not analyze available data, such as servicers' recent volume of foreclosure prevention actions, and did not analyze various approaches by which servicers' actions could be credited toward the total of $6 billion. Most servicers GAO spoke with said they anticipated they would be able to meet their obligation using their existing level of foreclosure prevention activity. In their oversight of the principles, OCC and the Federal Reserve are verifying servicers' foreclosure prevention policies, but are not testing policy implementation. Most Federal Reserve examination teams have not begun their verification activities and the extent to which these activities will incorporate additional evaluation or testing of servicers' implementation of the principles is unclear. Regulators' manuals and federal internal control standards note that policy verification includes targeted testing. Without specific procedures, regulators cannot assess implementation of the principles and may miss opportunities to protect borrowers.
Regulators are sharing findings from the file reviews and amended consent order activities among supervisory staff and plan to issue public reports on results, but they have not determined the content of those reports. The file reviews generally confirmed servicing weaknesses identified by regulators in 2010. Regulators are sharing information among examination teams that oversee servicers, and some regulator staff GAO spoke with are taking steps to address weaknesses identified. Regulators also have promoted transparency by releasing publicly information on the status of cash payments. However, these efforts provided limited information on the processes used, such as how decisions about borrower payments were made. Federal internal control standards and GAO's prior work ( GAO-03-102 and GAO-03-669 ) highlight the importance of providing relevant information on the processes used to obtain results. According to regulators, borrowers could obtain information from other sources, such as the payment administrator, but information on how decisions were made is not available from these sources. In the absence of information on the processes, regulators face risks to public confidence in the mortgage market, the restoration of which was one of the goals of the file review process.
What GAO Recommends
OCC and the Federal Reserve should define testing activities to oversee foreclosure prevention principles and include information on processes in public documents. In their comment letters, the regulators agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-203 | gao_GAO-15-203_0 | Federally Funded Research Projects Mostly Focused on Prevention, Understanding, or Treatment of NAS
From fiscal years 2008 through 2014, federal agencies obligated almost $21.6 million for 18 research projects related to prenatal opioid use or NAS, 14 of which included a focus on prevention and understanding of NAS, treatment of NAS, or both, as individual projects sometimes focused on more than one research area.$13.6 million for eight projects that included a focus on prevention and Federal agencies obligated understanding of NAS and $6 million for seven projects that included a focus on treating NAS. Federal Agencies also Addressed Prenatal Opioid or NAS through Their Health Systems or Other Efforts Outside of Research and Programs
Outside of research and programs, officials from 11 federal agencies— mostly within HHS— reported that their agencies made direct services available through their health systems or engaged in other efforts that addressed prenatal opioid use or NAS during fiscal years 2008 through 2014. Most Commonly Cited Gaps Were Related to Treatment of Prenatal Opioid Use or NAS
The research and program gaps most commonly cited by federal agency officials and other experts were related to treatment of pregnant women with opioid use disorders or newborns with NAS. The program gap most frequently cited was the lack of available treatment programs for both pregnant women and newborns with NAS. The other research gap most frequently cited by agency officials and experts was research on the long-term effects of prenatal drug exposure, which officials and experts said is needed to understand the impact of prenatal exposure to opioids on children through adolescence. The most frequently cited reasons were
Stigma and criminalization of pregnant women who use drugs. Other Gaps Cited Included Lack of Guidance and Coordination of Efforts to Address Prenatal Opioid Use or NAS
In addition to research and program gaps, agency officials and other experts cited other gaps in guidance, particularly around “safe harbor” laws for states, issues of treatment of prenatal opioid use and NAS, prescription drug monitoring programs, and development of Medicaid reimbursement policies. ONDCP and HHS Plan and Coordinate to Address Prenatal Opioid Use and NAS, but More Documentation and a Departmental Focal Point Are Needed
ONDCP plans and coordinates by sharing information and developing national action items to address prenatal opioid use and NAS, but does not document the development of these action items. HHS relies on its agencies to plan and coordinate individual efforts, and has established a council that identifies activities that may influence, but are not targeted specifically at, prenatal opioid use and NAS. However, HHS lacks a focal point to lead planning and coordination of efforts related to prenatal opioid use or NAS across the department. These limitations in planning and coordination by ONDCP and HHS may limit the effectiveness of federal efforts to reduce prenatal opioid use among pregnant women and rates of NAS. Additionally, there is a risk that efforts may be duplicated, overlapping, or fragmented. In order to ensure that efforts to address prenatal opioid use and NAS are systematically and effectively planned and coordinated across HHS’s agencies, the Secretary of HHS should designate a focal point, such as the BHCC or another entity, to lead departmental planning and coordination related to prenatal opioid use and NAS, including consideration of gaps in research, programs, and other efforts. In its written comments, ONDCP noted its efforts in working with federal agencies, states, and other stakeholders to focus attention on opioid addiction and NAS, and concurred with our recommendation that ONDCP document its process for developing action items on prenatal opioid use and NAS. ONDCP and HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) federally funded research, federal programs, and other federal agency efforts related to prenatal opioid use or neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS); (2) gaps identified by federal agency officials and experts in efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS; and (3) how federal efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS are planned and coordinated. We did not independently verify the information provided by agency officials and experts. Appendix III: Federal Programs that Addressed Prenatal Opioid Use or Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
Federal agency officials identified 14 programs that addressed prenatal opioid use or neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS) in fiscal years 2013 or 2014 by making relevant direct services available or conducting other activities as part of broader programs on substance abuse prevention and treatment, maternal and child health, or family and child welfare services.Officials from four of these 14 programs reported specifically addressing prenatal opioid use or NAS as part of their program objectives: (1) the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting Program, run by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA); (2) the Services Grant Program for Residential Treatment for Pregnant and Postpartum Women, run by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); (3) the National Center on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, run by SAMHSA and the Administration for Children and Families (ACF), all within the Department of Health and Human Services; and (4) the Family Drug Court Program within the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The prenatal use of opioids, including heroin and opioids prescribed for pain management, can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as NAS. A recent study found that cases of NAS have tripled over the last decade and that treatment costs for newborns with NAS—most of which are paid by Medicaid—are more than five times the cost of treating other newborns at birth.
GAO was asked to provide information on how federal agencies have addressed prenatal opioid use and NAS. In this report, GAO examines (1) federally funded research, federal programs, and other federal agency efforts related to prenatal opioid use or NAS; (2) gaps identified by federal agency officials and experts in efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS; and (3) how federal efforts to address prenatal opioid use or NAS are planned and coordinated. GAO analyzed information from federal agencies, including documents and data, on research, programs, and other agency efforts; interviewed federal agency officials and experts about gaps; and interviewed federal agency officials about planning and coordination of federal efforts.
What GAO Found
Federally funded research mostly focused on neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), and federal programs and other agency efforts made services available or conducted activities to address prenatal opioid use or NAS. From fiscal years 2008 through 2014, federal agencies obligated almost $21.6 million for 18 research projects related to prenatal opioid use or NAS, most of which focused on preventing, understanding, or treating NAS. Fourteen federal programs on substance abuse, health, and welfare—12 of which were administered by agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—made direct services available (such as screening and referral for treatment) or conducted other activities (such as training or technical assistance) to address prenatal opioid or NAS in fiscal years 2013 or 2014 as part of broader objectives. Outside of research and programs, 11 federal agencies made direct services available through their health systems or engaged in other efforts during fiscal years 2008 through 2014.
The gaps in efforts to address prenatal opioid use and NAS most commonly cited by federal agency officials and experts were related to the treatment of prenatal opioid use and NAS. With regard to research, the most commonly cited gaps were inadequate research on treatment of prenatal opioid use and the long-term effects of prenatal opioid exposure on children. Reasons cited for these research gaps included difficulties in conducting research, such as identifying and retaining pregnant women with substance use disorders for studies, and prenatal opioid use and NAS not being as high a priority as other research areas. With regards to programs, agency officials and experts most commonly cited the lack of available treatment programs for pregnant women and newborns with NAS, including the availability of comprehensive care and enabling services, such as transportation and child care. Reasons cited for these program gaps included the stigmatization and criminalization of pregnant women who use drugs. In addition to research and program gaps, other gaps cited by agency officials and experts included a lack of guidance on criminalization policies for states, screening and treatment practices, and opioid prescribing.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—the agency responsible for coordinating drug control efforts across federal agencies—plans and coordinates with other agencies by sharing information and developing national action items to address prenatal opioid use and NAS. However, ONDCP does not document its process for developing action items, including the information considered or discussions with agency officials. Within HHS—which has nine agencies that address prenatal opioid use or NAS—the department relies on its agencies to plan and coordinate individual efforts, and also has established a council that identifies activities that may influence, but are not targeted specifically at, prenatal opioid use and NAS. However, HHS lacks a focal point to lead planning and coordination of efforts related specifically to prenatal opioid use or NAS across the department. These limitations in planning and coordination by ONDCP and HHS may limit the effectiveness of federal efforts to reduce prenatal opioid use among pregnant women and rates of NAS. Additionally, there is a risk that federal efforts may be duplicated, overlapping, or fragmented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that ONDCP document the process for developing action items on prenatal opioid use and NAS and that HHS designate a focal point to lead departmental planning and coordination on these issues. ONDCP and HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-RCED-98-32 | gao_T-RCED-98-32_0 | Our report also found that substantial regional differences exist in fare and service trends, particularly among small- and medium-sized community airports. Large communities in general, and communities of all sizes in the West and Southwest, had experienced a substantial increase in the number of departures and available seats as well as improvements in such service quality indicators as the number of available nonstop destinations and the amount of jet service. We subsequently reported in October 1996 that operating barriers at key hub airports in the East and upper Midwest, combined with certain marketing strategies of the established carriers, fortified established carriers’ dominance of those hub airports and routes linking those hubs with nearby small- and medium-sized-community airports. In the upper Midwest, there is limited competition in part because two airlines control nearly 90 percent of the takeoff and landing slots at O’Hare, and one airline controls the vast majority of gates at the airports in Minneapolis and Detroit under long-term, exclusive-use leases. As a result, our October 1996 report, which specifically addressed the effects of slot and perimeter rules, recommended that DOT take action to lower those barriers, and highlighted areas for potential congressional action. We also said that if DOT did not choose to do so, the Congress may wish to consider revising the legislative criteria that govern DOT’s exceptional circumstances provision so that DOT could consider competitive benefits as a key criterion in deciding whether or not to grant slots to new entrants. Thus, in our October 1996 report, we suggested that the Congress consider granting DOT the authority to allow exemptions to the perimeter rule at National when proposed service will substantially increase competition. As a result, we concluded that a more prudent course to increasing competition at National would be to examine proposed new services on a case-by-case basis. On Friday, October 24, 1997, DOT issued its decision on some of the requests for slot exemptions and set forth its new policy on slot exemptions, which has been expanded to take into account the need for increased competition at the slot controlled airports. Because some in government and academia believe that slots at some airports may be underutilized, DOT is also evaluating how effectively slots are being used at these airports. This policy is to indicate those factors DOT will consider in pursuing remedies through formal enforcement actions. Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997 Would Address Identified Issues
The proposed Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997 has been drafted to promote domestic competition. The legislation targets three of the barriers to competition: slot controls, the perimeter rule, and predatory behavior by air carriers. Range of Initiatives Will Likely Be Needed to Address Air Service Problems
Because a variety of factors has contributed to higher fares and poorer service that some small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest have experienced since deregulation, a coordinated effort involving federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives may be needed. Domestic Aviation: Barriers to Entry Continue to Limit Benefits of Airline Deregulation (GAO/T-RCED-97-120, May 13, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the barriers that limit aviation competition, focusing on: (1) the actions the Department of Transportation (DOT) has taken to address those barriers; and (2) how the Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997 and other initiatives seek to address those problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a combination of factors continues to limit entry at airports serving small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest; (2) these factors include the dominance of routes to and from those airports by one or two traditional hub-and-spoke airlines and operating barriers, such as slot controls and long-term exclusive-use gate leases at hub airports; (3) in contrast, the more wide-spread entry of new airlines at airports in the West and Southwest since deregulation--and the resulting geographic differences in fare and service trends--has stemmed largely from the greater economic growth in those regions as well as from the absence of dominant market positions of incumbent airlines and barriers to entry; (4) GAO has found that little progress has been achieved in lowering the barriers to entry since GAO first reported on them in 1990; (5) slot controls continue to block entry at key airports in the East and upper Midwest; (6) GAO recommended that DOT take actions to promote competition in regions that have not experienced lower fares as a result of airline deregulation by creating a pool of available slots by periodically withdrawing some grandfathered slots from the major incumbents and redistributing them in a fashion that increases competition; (7) moreover, GAO suggested that, absent action by DOT, Congress may wish to consider revising the legislative criteria that govern DOT's granting slots to new entrants; (8) GAO also suggested that Congress consider granting DOT the authority to allow exemptions on a case-by-case basis to the perimeter rule at National Airport when the proposed service will substantially increase competition; (9) in response to GAO's recommendations, DOT indicated that it would revise its restrictive interpretation of the legislative criteria governing the granting of new slots; (10) on October 24, 1997, DOT announced its decision on some of the pending requests for slot exemptions; (11) DOT also is evaluating how effectively slots are being used and it is formalizing a policy that will identify anticompetitive behavior as a precursor for formal enforcement action; (12) the proposed Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997 addresses three barriers to competition: slot controls, the perimeter rule, and predatory behavior by air barriers; and (13) increasing competition and improving air service at airports serving small and medium-sized communities that have not benefited from fare reductions and/or improved service since deregulation will entail a range of federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives. |
gao_GAO-11-822T | gao_GAO-11-822T_0 | For more than a decade, the agency and its contractors have used automated software tools to analyze data from various sources to detect patterns of unusual activities or financial transactions that indicate payments could have been made for fraudulent charges or improper payments. In addition, data on Medicaid claims are stored by the states in multiple systems and databases, and are not readily available to CMS. Specifically, it intended to incorporate data related to paid claims for all Medicare Part D data by the end of fiscal year 2006, and for Medicare Parts A and B data by the end of fiscal year 2007. CMS’s Initiative to Develop and Implement Analytical Tools for Detecting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Also in 2006, CMS initiated the One PI program with the intention of developing and implementing a portal and software tools that would enable access to and analysis of claims, provider, and beneficiary data from a centralized source. The agency’s goal for One PI was to support the needs of a broad program integrity user community, including agency program integrity personnel and contractors who analyze Medicare claims data, along with state agencies that monitor Medicaid claims. To achieve its goal, agency officials planned to implement a tool set that would provide a single source of information to enable consistent, reliable, and timely analyses and improve the agency’s ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. These tools were to be used to gather data from IDR about beneficiaries, providers, and procedures and, combined with other data, find billing aberrancies or outliers. For example, an analyst could use software tools to identify potentially fraudulent trends in ambulance services by gathering the data about claims for ambulance services and medical treatments, and then use other software to determine associations between the two types of services. If the analyst found claims for ambulance travel costs but no corresponding claims for medical treatment, it might indicate that further investigation could prove that the billings for those services were fraudulent. According to agency program planning documentation, the One PI system was also to be developed incrementally to provide access to IDR data, analytical tools, and portal functionality. CMS planned to implement the One PI portal and two analytical tools for use by program integrity analysts on a widespread basis by the end of fiscal year 2009. The agency engaged contractors to develop the system. The second tool provides users with extended capabilities to perform more complex analyses of data. While CMS has shown some progress toward meeting the programs’ goals of providing a centralized data repository and enhanced analytical capabilities for detecting improper payments due to fraud, waste, and abuse, the current implementation of IDR and One PI does not position the agency to identify, measure, and track financial benefits realized from reductions in improper payments as a result of the implementation of either system. For example, program officials stated that they had developed estimates of financial benefits expected to be realized through the use of IDR. The most recent projection of total financial benefits was reported to be $187 million, based on estimates of the amount of improper payments the agency expected to recover as a result of analyzing data provided by IDR. With estimated life-cycle program costs of $90 million through fiscal year 2018, the resulting net benefit expected from implementing IDR was projected to be $97 million. However, as of March 2011, program officials had not identified actual financial benefits of implementing IDR. Further, until CMS is better positioned to identify and measure financial benefits and establishes outcome-based performance measures to help gauge progress toward meeting program integrity goals, it cannot be assured that the systems will contribute to improvements in CMS’s ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and prevent or recover billions of dollars lost to improper payments of claims. Given the critical need for CMS to improve the management of and reduce improper payments within the Medicare and Medicaid programs, our report being released today recommends a number of actions that we consider vital to helping CMS achieve more widespread use of IDR and One PI for program integrity purposes. Specifically, we are recommending that the Administrator of CMS finalize plans and develop schedules for incorporating additional data into IDR that identify all resources and activities needed to complete tasks and that consider risks and obstacles to the IDR program; implement and manage plans for incorporating data in IDR to meet schedule milestones; establish plans and reliable schedules for training all program integrity analysts intended to use One PI; establish and communicate deadlines for program integrity contractors to complete training and use One PI in their work; conduct training in accordance with plans and established deadlines to ensure schedules are met and program integrity contractors are trained and able to meet requirements for using One PI; define any measurable financial benefits expected from the implementation of IDR and One PI; and with stakeholder input, establish measurable, outcome-based performance measures for IDR and One PI that gauge progress toward meeting program goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) efforts to protect the integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, particularly through the use of information technology to help improve the detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in these programs. CMS is responsible for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs and leading efforts to reduce improper payments of claims for medical treatment, services, and equipment. Improper payments are overpayments or underpayments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount; they may be due to errors, such as the inadvertent submission of duplicate claims for the same service, or misconduct, such as fraud or abuse. The Department of Health and Human Services reported about $70 billion in improper payments in the Medicare and Medicaid programs in fiscal year 2010. Operating within the Department of Health and Human Services, CMS conducts reviews to prevent improper payments before claims are paid and to detect claims that were paid in error. These activities are predominantly carried out by contractors who, along with CMS personnel, use various information technology solutions to consolidate and analyze data to help identify the improper payment of claims. For example, these program integrity analysts may use software tools to access data about claims and then use those data to identify patterns of unusual activities by matching services with patients' diagnoses. In 2006, CMS initiated activities to centralize and make more accessible the data needed to conduct these analyses and to improve the analytical tools available to its own and contractor analysts. At the Subcommittee's request, we have been reviewing two of these initiatives--the Integrated Data Repository (IDR), which is intended to provide a single source of data related to Medicare and Medicaid claims, and the One Program Integrity (One PI) system, a Web-based portal and suite of analytical software tools used to extract data from IDR and enable complex analyses of these data. According to CMS officials responsible for developing and implementing IDR and One PI, the agency had spent approximately $161 million on these initiatives by the end of fiscal year 2010. This testimony, in conjunction with a report that we are releasing today, summarizes the results of our study--which specifically assessed the extent to which IDR and One PI have been developed and implemented and CMS's progress toward achieving its goals and objectives for using these systems to detect fraud, waste, and abuse.
What GAO Found
In 2006, CMS initiated the One PI program with the intention of developing and implementing a portal and software tools that would enable access to and analysis of claims, provider, and beneficiary data from a centralized source. The agency's goal for One PI was to support the needs of a broad program integrity user community, including agency program integrity personnel and contractors who analyze Medicare claims data, along with state agencies that monitor Medicaid claims. To achieve its goal, agency officials planned to implement a tool set that would provide a single source of information to enable consistent, reliable, and timely analyses and improve the agency's ability to detect fraud, waste, and abuse. These tools were to be used to gather data from IDR about beneficiaries, providers, and procedures and, combined with other data, find billing aberrancies or outliers. For example, an analyst could use software tools to identify potentially fraudulent trends in ambulance services by gathering the data about claims for ambulance services and medical treatments, and then use other software to determine associations between the two types of services. If the analyst found claims for ambulance travel costs but no corresponding claims for medical treatment, it might indicate that further investigation could prove that the billings for those services were fraudulent. According to agency program planning documentation, the One PI system was also to be developed incrementally to provide access to IDR data, analytical tools, and portal functionality. CMS planned to implement the One PI portal and two analytical tools for use by program integrity analysts on a widespread basis by the end of fiscal year 2009. The agency engaged contractors to develop the system. While CMS has shown some progress toward meeting the programs' goals of providing a centralized data repository and enhanced analytical capabilities for detecting improper payments due to fraud, waste, and abuse, the current implementation of IDR and One PI does not position the agency to identify, measure, and track financial benefits realized from reductions in improper payments as a result of the implementation of either system. For example, program officials stated that they had developed estimates of financial benefits expected to be realized through the use of IDR. The most recent projection of total financial benefits was reported to be $187 million, based on estimates of the amount of improper payments the agency expected to recover as a result of analyzing data provided by IDR. With estimated life-cycle program costs of $90 million through fiscal year 2018, the resulting net benefit expected from implementing IDR was projected to be $97 million. However, as of March 2011, program officials had not identified actual financial benefits of implementing IDR. |
gao_GAO-17-758T | gao_GAO-17-758T_0 | FEMA Has Developed and Documented Misconduct Policies and Procedures for Most Employees, but Not its Entire Workforce
FEMA has developed a policy and procedures regarding misconduct investigations that apply to all FEMA personnel and has also documented policies and procedures regarding options to address misconduct and appeal rights for Title 5 and CORE employees. However, FEMA has not documented complete misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity Force members or Reservists. According to these officials, FEMA does not suspend Reservists because they are an intermittent, at-will workforce deployed as needed to respond to disasters. Without documented Reservist disciplinary options and appeals policies, supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of the disciplinary and appeals process. Thus, in our July 2017 report, we recommended that FEMA document Reservist disciplinary options and appeals that are currently in practice at the agency. FEMA Records Data on Employee Misconduct Cases and Their Outcomes, but Could Improve the Quality and Usefulness of These Data to Identify and Address Trends
Multiple FEMA Offices Collect Misconduct Data; FEMA OCSO Recorded Approximately 600 Misconduct Complaints from January 2014 through September 30, 2016
The three offices on the AID Committee involved in investigating and adjudicating employee misconduct complaints each maintain separate case tracking spreadsheets with data on employee misconduct to facilitate their respective roles in the misconduct review process. The complaints involved alleged offenses of employee misconduct which may or may not have been substantiated over the course of an investigation. Aspects of FEMA’s Data Limit Their Usefulness for Identifying and Addressing Trends in Employee Misconduct
OCSO, LER, and PLB collect data on employee misconduct and outcomes, but limited standardization of fields and entries within fields, limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry restricts their usefulness for identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. Employee misconduct information is also shared directly with FEMA’s Chief Security Officer and Chief Counsel. FEMA also provides DHS OIG with information on employee misconduct cases on a regular basis through monthly reports on open investigations. FEMA’s Procedures for Tracking DHS OIG Referred Cases Need Improvement
We found that OCSO has not established effective procedures to ensure that all cases referred to FEMA by DHS OIG are accounted for and subsequently reviewed and addressed. We reviewed a non-generalizable random sample of 20 fiscal year 2016 employee misconduct complaints DHS OIG referred to FEMA for review and found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of our inquiry. As a result of our review, FEMA subsequently took action to review the complaints. The AID Committee recommended that OCSO open inquiries in 3 of the 6 cases to determine whether the allegations were against FEMA employees, assigned 2 cases to LER for further review, and closed 1 case for lack of information. The remaining 2 cases were open as of April 2017. The results from our sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA; however, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's July 2017 report, entitled Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Handling of Employee Misconduct Allegations ( GAO-17-613 ).
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed and documented misconduct policies and procedures for most employees, but not its entire workforce. Specifically, FEMA has developed policies and procedures regarding misconduct investigations that apply to all FEMA personnel and has also documented options to address misconduct and appeal rights for Title 5 (generally permanent employees) and Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (temporary employees who support disaster related activities). However, FEMA has not documented misconduct policies and procedures for Surge Capacity Force members, who may augment FEMA's workforce in the event of a catastrophic disaster. Additionally, FEMA's Reservist (intermittent disaster employees) policies and procedures do not outline disciplinary actions or the appeals process currently in practice at the agency. As a result, supervisors and Reservist employees may not be aware of all aspects of the process. Clearly documented policies and procedures for all workforce categories could help to better prepare management to address misconduct and mitigate perceptions that misconduct is handled inconsistently.
FEMA records data on misconduct cases and their outcomes; however, aspects of this data limit their usefulness for identifying and addressing trends. GAO reviewed misconduct complaints recorded by FEMA's Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) from January 2014 through September 30, 2016, and identified 595 complaints involving 799 alleged offenses, the most common of which were integrity and ethics violations. FEMA reported 546 disciplinary actions related to misconduct from calendar year 2014 through 2016. In addition to OCSO, two other FEMA offices involved in investigating and adjudicating misconduct also record data. However, limited standardization of data fields and entries within fields, limited use of unique case identifiers, and a lack of documented guidance on data entry across all three offices restricts the data's usefulness for identifying and addressing trends in employee misconduct. Improved quality control measures could help the agency use the data to better identify potential problem areas and opportunities for training.
FEMA shares misconduct case information internally and with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) on a regular basis; however, FEMA does not have reconciliation procedures in place to track DHS OIG referred cases to ensure that they are reviewed and addressed. GAO reviewed a random sample of 20 cases DHS OIG referred to FEMA in fiscal year 2016 and found that FEMA missed 6 of the 20 complaints during the referral process and had not reviewed them at the time of GAO's inquiry. As a result of GAO's review, FEMA took action to review the complaints and opened inquiries in 5 of the 6 cases (1 case was closed for lack of information). In 3 of these cases, officials determined that the complaints did not involve FEMA employees. The 2 remaining cases were open as of April 2017. While the results from this review are not generalizable to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to FEMA, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of misconduct complaints that FEMA has not reviewed or addressed. Procedures to ensure reconciliation of referred cases across FEMA and DHS OIG records could help ensure that FEMA accounts for all complaints. |
gao_GAO-08-844 | gao_GAO-08-844_0 | FTA’s Project Evaluation Measures Include a Range of Information, but Not All Project Benefits Are Fully Captured
FTA primarily uses the cost-effectiveness and land use criteria to evaluate New Starts projects, but concerns have been raised about the extent to which the measures for these criteria capture total project benefits. For example, some experts and project sponsors we spoke to said that the TSUB measure does not account for benefits for nontransit users or capture any economic development benefits that are not directly correlated to mobility improvements. In these cases, it is unclear the extent to which FTA’s current approach to estimating benefits impacts how projects are ranked in FTA’s evaluation and ratings process. FTA officials acknowledged these limitations, but noted that improvements in local travel models are needed to resolve some of these issues. Experts and Other Program Stakeholders Expressed Concerns That FTA’s Current Evaluation Measures Could Be Underestimating Total Project Benefits
Project sponsors and experts we interviewed raised concerns about how FTA uses and measures different New Starts project justification criteria in the evaluation framework, which could potentially result in certain project benefits being underestimated. FTA Faces Several Systemic Challenges to Improving the New Starts Program
FTA faces several systemic challenges to improving the New Starts program, including addressing multiple program goals, limitations of local travel models, the need to maintain the rigor while minimizing the complexity of the evaluation process, and developing clear and consistent guidance for incorporating qualitative information into the evaluation process. Additionally, models used to generate local travel demand forecasts have limited capabilities and may not provide all of the information needed to properly evaluate transit projects. The presence of multiple program goals within the statute, as articulated by the evaluation criteria, has led to different interpretations by FTA and project sponsors about what project benefits should be emphasized in the New Starts evaluation process. However, FTA and Office of the Secretary officials told us that a significant investment of resources by all levels of government will likely be required to overcome current modeling limitations. Different Options for Evaluating Proposed New Starts Projects Exist, but All Have Limitations
Different options for evaluating proposed transit projects exist. One option is to revise the current evaluation process as proposed by FTA in the August 2007 NPRM and proposed policy guidance. They generally agreed with FTA’s assumption that societal benefits from transit projects generally result from user benefits— that is, reductions in the real and perceived cost of travel. In contrast, benefit-cost analysis would attempt to monetize all benefits and costs, which experts told us would be a more comprehensive approach to evaluating projects. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the New Starts evaluation process and the measures of project benefits, which could change the relative ranking of projects, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following five actions: (1) Seek additional resources to improve local travel models in the next authorizing legislation; (2) Seek a legislative change to allow FTA to consider the dollar value of mobility improvements in evaluating projects, developing regulations, or carrying out any other duties; (3) Direct the Administrator of FTA to establish a timeline for issuing, awarding, and implementing the result of its request for proposals on short- and long-term approaches to measuring highway user benefits from transit improvements; (4) Direct the Administrator of FTA to establish a timeline for initiating and completing its longer-term effort to develop more robust measures of transit projects’ environmental benefits that are practically useful in distinguishing among proposed projects, including consultation with the transit community, and; (5) Direct the Administrators of FTA and FHWA to collaborate in efforts to improve the consistency and reliability of local travel models, including the aforementioned request for proposals on approaches to measuring highway user benefits. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To address our objectives, we reviewed previous GAO reports, FTA’s existing and proposed New Starts policy guidance, FTA’s August 2007 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for New Starts, and the provisions of SAFETEA-LU that address the New Starts program to identify the information captured by the current and proposed New Starts project justification criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the New Starts program, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) evaluates and recommends new fixed guideway transit projects for funding using the evaluation criteria identified in law. In August 2007, FTA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), in part, to incorporate certain provisions within the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) into the evaluation process. SAFETEA-LU requires GAO to annually review FTA's New Starts process. This report discusses (1) the information captured by New Starts project justification criteria, (2) challenges FTA faces as it works to improve the New Starts program, and (3) options for evaluating New Starts projects. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutes, FTA guidance and regulations governing the New Starts program, and interviewed experts, project sponsors, and Department of Transportation (DOT) officials.
What GAO Found
FTA primarily uses cost-effectiveness and land use criteria to evaluate New Starts projects, but concerns have been raised about the extent to which the measures for these criteria capture total project benefits. FTA's current transportation system user benefits measure, which assesses a project's cost effectiveness, focuses on how proposed projects will improve mobility by reducing the real and perceived cost of travel. FTA told GAO that such mobility improvements are a critical goal of all transit projects. While the literature and most experts that GAO consulted with generally agree with this assertion, they also raised concerns that certain benefits are not captured. As a result, FTA may be underestimating transit projects' total benefits, but it is unclear the extent to which this impacts FTA's evaluation and rating process. FTA officials acknowledged many of these limitations but noted that resolving these issues would be difficult without a substantial investment of resources by all levels of government to improve and update local travel models. FTA faces several systemic challenges to improving the New Starts program, including addressing multiple program goals, limitations in local travel models, the need to maintain the rigor while minimizing the complexity of the evaluation process, and developing clear and consistent guidance for incorporating qualitative information. The evaluation criteria identified in the law reflect multiple goals for the program, which has led to varying expectations between FTA and project sponsors about what types of projects should be funded. Also, models that generate local travel demand forecasts are limited and may not provide all of the information needed to properly evaluate transit projects. FTA has taken steps to mitigate the modeling limitations, such as incorporating proxy measures to account for certain project impacts and developing a request for proposals to improve local travel models so that they can better predict changes in highway user benefits. However, according to FTA officials, the request for proposals is only a first step in improving local travel models, and additional resources are needed. Experts and project sponsors GAO interviewed discussed different options for evaluating proposed transit projects but identified significant limitations of each option. One option is to revise the current New Starts evaluation process as proposed by FTA in the August 2007 NPRM. While some experts GAO spoke to appreciated the rigor of the current evaluation process, others noted that the NPRM may still underestimate total project benefits. For example, FTA's measure of mobility improvements does not account for benefits accruing to highway users, and its measures of environmental benefits may not properly distinguish among projects. Experts also discussed other options for evaluating proposed transit projects, including benefit-cost analysis. Unlike FTA's current evaluation process, benefit-cost analysis would attempt to monetize all benefits and costs, which experts told GAO would be a more comprehensive approach to evaluating projects. FTA is currently prohibited by statute from considering the dollar value of mobility improvements in evaluating projects. |
gao_GAO-01-344 | gao_GAO-01-344_0 | Conclusions
The increasing numbers of RJs in operation have provided U.S. air carriers with opportunities to serve new and existing markets. As we have noted, with predominantly 50-seat aircraft, the carriers have initiated service to many large and medium-large communities but have provided less service to smaller communities. Service to small communities—to which the airlines now mostly operate turboprop aircraft—continues to be an important concern, because of the uncertainty about whether those markets may generate enough passenger traffic and revenue to be financially viable to sustain RJ operations. Eventually, smaller RJs (i.e., 32- or 37-seat aircraft) may let carriers serve those smaller communities economically. Other questions also emerge about the impact of how the carriers will use their RJs. For example, the airlines could restrict capacity in a market by reducing service with larger mainline jets but increasing the number of RJ flights in a way that may inhibit entry by new competitors, allowing the airlines to charge fares higher than might exist in a more competitive market. Additionally, the growth in RJs has clearly contributed to an increasing problem with congestion, particularly in some locations like New York’s LaGuardia Airport. But how the expected growth in RJs may continue to contribute to congestion and delay remains to be seen. Depending on how events unfold in the near future, these and other potential impacts of the airlines’ RJ strategies may warrant continued oversight. | What GAO Found
The increasing numbers of regional jets (RJ) in operation have provided U.S. air carriers with opportunities to serve new and existing markets. With predominantly 50-seat aircraft, the carriers have initiated service to many large and medium-large communities but have provided less service to smaller communities. Service to small communities--to which the airlines now mostly operate turboprop aircraft--continues to be an important concern, because of the uncertainty about whether those markets may generate enough passenger traffic and revenue to be financially viable to sustain RJ operations. Eventually, smaller RJs may let carriers serve those smaller communities economically. Other questions also emerge about the impact of how the carriers will use their RJs. For example, the airlines could restrict capacity in a market by reducing service with larger mainline jets but increasing the number of RJ flights in a way that may inhibit entry by new competitors, allowing the airlines to charge fares higher than might exist in a more competitive market. Additionally, the growth in RJs has clearly contributed to an increasing problem with congestion, particularly in some locations like New York's LaGuardia Airport. But how the expected growth in RJs may continue to contribute to congestion and delay remains to be seen. Depending on how events unfold in the near future, these and other potential impacts of the airlines' RJ strategies may warrant continued oversight. |
gao_GAO-14-667 | gao_GAO-14-667_0 | Background
Location of Oil and Gas Development in the United States
Oil and natural gas are found in a variety of geologic formations distributed across the country, such as shale and tight sandstone. Increased Oil and Gas Production Presents Challenges for Transportation Infrastructure That Could Pose Environmental and Safety Risks and Have Economic Implications
Increased oil and gas production presents challenges for transportation infrastructure because some of the growth in production has been in areas with limited transportation linkages to processing facilities. The limited pipeline capacity to transport crude oil has resulted in the increased use of other transportation options, in particular rail, truck, and barge (see fig. The increased use of rail for transporting crude oil is due to the increases in crude oil production in North Dakota, Texas, and other states, which have exceeded the capacity of existing pipelines to move oil from production areas to refineries, according to a number of studies and publications we reviewed. In September 2012, we found that flaring poses a risk to air quality because it emits carbon dioxide—a greenhouse gas linked to climate change—and other air pollutants that can increase ground-level ozone levels and contribute to regional haze. The National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives, an association representing state pipeline safety officials, produced a compendium of state pipeline regulations showing that most states with delegated authority from PHMSA to conduct intrastate inspections do not have expanded regulations that cover increased oversight of gathering pipelines. Historically, federally unregulated gathering pipelines were low pressure, smaller-diameter pipelines and were generally in rural areas where there was less safety risk. PHMSA’s emergency response planning requirements that apply to other pipelines do not apply to rural unregulated gathering pipelines. STB data show that rail moved about 236,000 carloads of crude oil in 2012, which is 24 times more than the approximately 9,700 carloads moved in 2008 (see fig. This has resulted in an increase in demand for tank cars. DOT, primarily through PHMSA and FRA, sometimes jointly, has taken steps to engage the rail and oil and gas shipping industries and emergency responders to address the safety of transporting crude oil by rail, particularly in response to concerns stemming from the July 2013 Lac-Mégantic, Quebec accident: In August 2013, February 2014, and May 2014, DOT issued emergency orders to compel shippers and railroads to address safety risks by taking steps to secure unattended trains, ensure proper testing and packaging of crude oil, and notify emergency responders about crude oil shipments. In particular, flammable gases must be packaged in pressure tank cars, which provide additional safety in the event of an accident. Representatives from railroads and crude oil terminals we spoke to, as well as from the oil and gas industry, have indicated that clarification about the requirements for testing and packaging crude oil is needed. However, PHMSA’s requirements for comprehensive emergency response planning do not apply to unit trains used to transport crude oil, raising concerns about the abilities of responders and other stakeholders to effectively handle potential incidents. DOT began a rulemaking to address this issue in 2011 but did not issue proposed rules. Recommendation
To address the increased risk posed by new gathering pipeline construction in shale development areas, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, in conjunction with the Administrator of PHMSA, move forward with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address gathering pipeline safety that addresses the risks of larger-diameter, higher-pressure gathering pipelines, including subjecting such pipelines to emergency response planning requirements that currently do not apply. Further, the letter stated that PHMSA is developing a rulemaking to revise its pipeline safety regulations and is examining the need to adopt safety requirements for gas gathering pipelines that are not currently subject to regulations. In the version of the draft report we sent to DOT for comment, we had also recommended that PHMSA develop and publish additional guidance on testing, classification and packaging of crude oil for transport by rail and that PHMSA address emergency response planning regulations for transporting oil by rail so that they include shipments of crude oil by unit trains. DOT’s written response stated that PHMSA generally concurred with these recommendations and was taking steps to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses (1) challenges, if any, that increased domestic oil and gas production poses for U.S. transportation infrastructure and examples of associated risks and implications; (2) how pipeline infrastructure has changed as a result of increased oil and gas production, the key related safety risks, and to what extent the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has addressed these risks; and (3) how rail infrastructure has changed as a result of increased oil production, the key related safety risks, and to what extent DOT has addressed these risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Technology advancements such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (pumping water, sand, and chemicals into wells to fracture underground rock formations and allow oil or gas to flow) have allowed companies to extract oil and gas from shale and other tight geological formations. As a result, oil and gas production has increased more than fivefold from 2007 through 2012. DOT oversees the safety of the U.S. transportation system.
GAO was asked to review oil and gas transportation infrastructure issues. This report examines (1) overall challenges that increased oil and gas production may pose for transportation infrastructure, (2) specific pipeline safety risks and how DOT is addressing them, and (3) specific rail safety risks and how DOT is addressing them. GAO analyzed federal transportation infrastructure and safety data generally from 2008 to 2012 or 2013 (as available), reviewed documents, and interviewed agency, industry, and safety stakeholders, as well as state and industry officials in states with large-scale shale oil and gas development.
What GAO Found
Increased oil and gas production presents challenges for transportation infrastructure because some of this increase is in areas with limited transportation linkages. For example, insufficient pipeline capacity to transport crude oil has resulted in the increased use of rail, truck, and barge to move oil to refineries, according to government and industry studies and publications GAO reviewed. These transportation limitations and related effects could pose environmental risks and have economic implications. For instance, natural gas produced as a byproduct of oil is burned—a process called flaring—by operators due, in part, to insufficient pipelines in production areas. In a 2012 report, GAO found that flaring poses a risk to air quality as it emits carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas linked to climate change, and other air pollutants. In addition, flaring results in the loss of a valuable resource and royalty revenue.
Due to the increased oil and gas production, construction of larger, higher-pressure gathering pipelines (pipelines that transport products to processing facilities and other long-distance pipelines) has increased. However, these pipelines, if located in rural areas, are generally not subject to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations that apply to other pipelines, including emergency response requirements. Historically, gathering pipelines were smaller and operated at lower pressure and thus posed less risk than long-distance pipelines. But the recent increase in their size and pressure raises safety concerns because they could affect a greater area in the event of an incident. In 2011, DOT began a regulatory proceeding to address the safety risks of gathering pipelines, but it has not proposed new regulations. Although states may regulate gathering pipelines, an association of state pipeline regulators' report on state pipeline oversight shows that most states do not currently regulate gathering pipelines in rural areas.
Crude oil carloads moved by rail in 2012 increased by 24 times over that moved in 2008. Such an increase raises specific concerns about testing and packaging of crude oil, use of unit trains (trains of about 80 to 120 crude oil cars), and emergency response preparedness. Crude oil shippers are required to identify their product's hazardous properties, including flammability, before packaging the oil in an authorized tank car. DOT has issued safety alerts on the importance of proper testing and packaging of crude oil. However, industry stakeholders said that DOT's guidance on this issue is vague and that clarity about the type and frequency of testing is needed. In July 2014, DOT proposed new regulations for crude oil shippers to develop a product-testing program subject to DOT's review. Additionally, unit trains, which can carry 3 million or more gallons of crude oil and travel to various locations through the country, are not covered under DOT's comprehensive emergency response planning requirements for transporting crude oil by rail because the requirements currently only apply to individual tank cars and not unit trains. This raises concerns about the adequacy of emergency response preparedness, especially in rural areas where there may be fewer resources to respond to a serious incident. Also in July 2014, DOT sought public comment on potential options for addressing this gap in emergency response planning requirements for transporting crude oil by rail.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should move forward with a proposed rulemaking to address safety risks—including emergency response planning—from newer gathering pipelines. DOT generally concurred with the recommendation and stated that it is developing a rulemaking to revise its pipeline safety regulations. |
gao_GAO-09-495 | gao_GAO-09-495_0 | In 2008, FMCSA ordered 6,707 carriers out of service. PRISM Has Helped Keep Unsafe Carriers from Registering, but Its Impact on Safety Is Hard to Measure
PRISM Has Enabled 25 States to Identify and Keep Unsafe Carriers from Obtaining or Maintaining Vehicle Registrations
FMCSA data show that PRISM has resulted in the denial, suspension, or revocation of the commercial motor vehicle registrations of 972 carriers in 2008. Stakeholders Contacted View PRISM Implementation as Worth the Effort, Although Its Impact on Safety Is Difficult to Measure
Officials from each of the 13 states we contacted that deny, suspend, or revoke registrations told us that they believe PRISM is worth the effort to implement because the grant program provides a deterrent against unsafe carriers. Representatives from a safety association we met with told us that PRISM is the only program that establishes a safety connection between a vehicle and the motor carrier company on an up-to-date basis. The overall cost of implementing the program ($5 million per year) is relatively small in comparison to the potential benefit of increased roadway safety as a result of reduced out-of service carriers operating on U.S. roadways, especially as more states deny, suspend, and revoke the registrations of vehicles associated with out-of-service carriers. In 2007, the Volpe Center, which conducted this evaluation, concluded that states with denial, suspension, and revocation capability show some improved safety over time compared with other states, indicating that PRISM, when fully implemented, could have contributed to lower crash rates, although its results were inconclusive in several areas. Because all FMCSA programs are aimed at reducing crash rates and because numerous factors contribute to crash rates, isolating PRISM’s effect is difficult. In our view, applying outcome performance measures such as Volpe’s two measures and measuring the percentage of out-of-service carriers affected by PRISM, while ultimately useful, may be premature at this time. Patchwork Implementation Is One of Several Factors Limiting PRISM’s Effectiveness
According to FMCSA data, 22 states and the District of Columbia are not far enough along in implementing PRISM to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers, and 3 states do not participate in PRISM at all. FMCSA data show that the average time it took states to affect vehicle registrations after the states committed to implementing PRISM was 3 years and 4 months, but it can take as little as 10 months or as long as 7 years and 4 months. Ten states hired a contractor to implement technical aspects of PRISM. Inability to or difficulty in passing enabling legislation needed to deny, suspend, or revoke commercial vehicle registrations based on a federal out-of-service order. According to officials in 12 states and representatives from safety associations we interviewed, Congress should require all states to fully implement PRISM. Conversely, officials in 3 of the 26 states supported keeping PRISM a voluntary program. These officials noted that a mandate was unnecessary, since only 3 states have not committed to PRISM implementation. States with legacy registration systems that do not allow connectivity to FMCSA safety databases, for example, may need substantially more funds to enable them to fully implement PRISM than PRISM grants generally can provide. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to assess PRISM’s effectiveness in keeping unsafe carriers of road, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FMCSA to measure PRISM program effectiveness wh the number of states that have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke registrations to out-of-service carriers is sufficient to make such measurements meaningful. These data are to be reported to FMCSA on a quarterly basis by states that have implemented PRISM to the point where they are denying, suspending, and revoking vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers. We conducted semistructured interviews with state motor vehicle administrations from 13 states that have fully implemented PRISM; 3 states that are implementing the grant program (that is, they are collecting vehicle identification numbers and the DOT numbers of the carriers associated with those vehicles and may be checking the safety status of the carrier at the time of registration) but do not yet have the capability to affect vehicle registrations; 8 states that have entered into an agreement with FMCSA to implement PRISM grants but have not yet moved forward substantially to implement the program; and 2 states that do not participate in PRISM at all. | Why GAO Did This Study
To reduce the number of crashes involving commercial motor carriers, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) within the Department of Transportation orders unsafe carriers out of service. To help keep these carriers off the road, FMCSA's voluntary Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) grant program, a small program funded at $5 million per year, helps states establish information systems connections between state vehicle registration and FMCSA's safety databases. These connections provide states with up-to-date information on carriers' safety status when carriers try to register or renew registrations with the state. For states to deny, suspend, or revoke registrations to out-of service carriers, states must pass legislation enabling them to do so. As directed by a congressional committee, GAO examined (1) PRISM's effectiveness and (2) the potential to fully implement the program nationally. GAO reviewed FMCSA data and discussed PRISM with a wide variety of federal, state, industry, and safety stakeholders
What GAO Found
Twenty-five states have implemented PRISM to the point where they are able to keep carriers that FMCSA has ordered out of service from obtaining or maintaining vehicle registrations. However, PRISM's safety impact is hard to measure. FMCSA data show that vehicles associated with 972 out-of-service carriers in 2008 had registrations denied, suspended, or revoked--about 15 percent of carriers placed out of service that year. However, this is likely an underestimate because the data can be difficult to track. Officials from the 13 states GAO contacted that are denying, suspending, or revoking vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers and representatives from safety and industry associations said PRISM is worth the effort, but its impact on safety is hard to measure. An evaluation of the program sponsored by FMCSA in 2007 concluded that PRISM states show some improved safety over time compared with other states, indicating PRISM could have contributed to lower crash rates. However, because all FMCSA programs are aimed at reducing crash rates, isolating PRISM's effect is difficult. Nonetheless, the evaluation recommended that FMCSA adopt program measures to assess PRISM's effectiveness. FMCSA has not adopted all of these measures for various reasons, including a lack of resources. In GAO's view, applying such measures, while ultimately useful, may be premature since PRISM's success is undercut by the 25 states--including states with the greatest numbers of registered commercial motor vehicles--and the District of Columbia that do not yet have the ability to deny, suspend, or revoke vehicle registrations of out-of-service carriers. National implementation may not occur for years if PRISM continues as a voluntary program. FMCSA data show that, on average, it took states about 3 years and 4 months to get to the point where they could deny, suspend, or revoke registrations once they decided to implement PRISM--a process that took as little as 10 months to more than 7 years. Officials in states GAO contacted said that PRISM implementation was facilitated by such things as hiring a contractor to help with the program's technical components, and was hindered by such things as difficulty in passing state legislation needed to implement the program. According to officials in states GAO met with, FMCSA has been helpful in encouraging states to adopt and implement the program, but can do little in other areas, such as when state legislation is needed. Officials in some states and representatives from safety associations told GAO that Congress should require PRISM implementation so that no state becomes a refuge for registering out-of-service carriers. Other officials said that such a requirement is unnecessary, since only three states have not committed to implementing PRISM. While there are benefits to a congressional requirement that could lead to speedier national implementation, there are several significant potential drawbacks to doing so (for example, some states may require substantial money to adapt their information systems to make PRISM work) that lead GAO not to recommend such a requirement. |
gao_GAO-17-142 | gao_GAO-17-142_0 | Solar systems installed at a customer’s location allow the customer to generate electricity for their own use and send excess electricity to the grid that electricity suppliers can use to meet other customers’ electricity needs. Distributed storage systems—such as batteries located at homes—allow customers to store electricity from the grid or from a distributed generation system for use at a later time. Some states have adopted policies that make it possible for third-party providers to install solar systems, which the providers own and operate, on residential customers’ private homes—thereby allowing solar systems to be deployed on the homes of customers who could not otherwise pay the up-front costs of installing the systems. Incentives. For example, as of October 2016, 14 states provided personal tax credits for installing solar systems, according to the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency. Specifically, the total number of residential electricity customers with solar systems increased sevenfold over this period, according to EIA data. Despite this significant increase, our analysis of EIA data found that only about 0.7 percent of all residential customers nationwide had installed solar systems in 2015. At the state level, every state experienced increases in the number of residential customers with solar systems from 2010 through 2015, but certain states accounted for most of the growth, according to EIA data. In addition to identifying the aforementioned federal and state policies to encourage the deployment of residential solar systems, we identified through our review of reports and discussions with stakeholders that other factors—such as increased efficiency, declining system costs, and high electricity prices—also contributed to the deployment of residential solar systems in some states. Policymakers have implemented or are considering measures to maximize the potential benefits and mitigate the potential challenges associated with the increasing deployment of these technologies. Solar Systems, Advanced Meters, and Other Technologies Could Increase the Efficiency of Grid Operations and Provide Other Benefits
Solar systems, advanced meters, and electricity storage and management technologies have the potential to lead to more efficient grid operations by enabling individual customers to generate, store, and manage their consumption of electricity in response to conditions on the grid, as we found in our analysis of reports and stakeholder interviews. For example, the supply of electricity must constantly be balanced with demand for electricity, and customers can use these technologies to decrease individual consumption of electricity from the grid when demand is high and increase consumption when demand is low. by reducing consumption during these periods of high demand). For example, a customer could program a smart thermostat to reduce electricity consumption when demand for electricity is high. Increasing Deployment of Residential Solar Systems Has Begun To Pose Grid Management and Other Challenges In Some Areas
Several grid operators we interviewed told us they have begun to experience grid management and other challenges in some areas as deployment of residential solar systems increases, but they said these challenges generally have been manageable because overall deployment of these systems has been low. In addition, net metering policies under which electricity suppliers credit customers for the electricity these customers send to the grid can reduce electricity supplier revenues. Policymakers Have Implemented or Are Considering Measures to Maximize the Benefits of Deploying Residential Technologies, While Mitigating the Challenges
Policymakers in some states and the federal government are considering measures designed to maximize the potential benefits of advanced meters, solar systems, and residential electricity storage and management technologies, while mitigating the potential challenges, based on our analysis of reports and the views of stakeholders we interviewed. Several state regulators recently have allowed electricity suppliers to adopt voluntary time- based prices, and regulators in other states are considering this approach. In particular, state regulators in California and New York have developed policies requiring regulated electricity suppliers in their states to analyze the grid and identify areas where customer deployment of solar systems and electricity storage and management technologies could provide the greatest benefit, given local grid conditions. Our objectives were to describe (1) key federal and state policies used to encourage the deployment of these technologies, (2) the extent to which these technologies are being deployed, and (3) the benefits and challenges of deploying these technologies. In addition, we interviewed officials and representatives from 46 government agencies and stakeholder groups. We selected a non-generalizable sample of five states that have been actively addressing issues related to these technologies: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, and New York. Some technologies, such as battery storage and smart devices, did not have readily available, comprehensive data on deployment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traditionally, electricity has moved in one direction—from electricity suppliers to customers. Today, solar systems allow electricity to be generated at a customer's home and sent to the grid for electricity suppliers to use to meet other customers' electricity needs. Storage systems allow residential customers to store electricity from the grid or their own solar system for use at a later time. Furthermore, customers can use smart devices, such as thermostats, to manage their electricity consumption.
GAO was asked to provide information on the deployment and use of technologies that give customers the ability to generate, store, and manage electricity. This report describes (1) key federal and state policies used to encourage the deployment of these technologies, (2) the extent to which these technologies are being deployed, and (3) the benefits and challenges of deploying these technologies. GAO analyzed available data on technology deployment from EIA and reviewed relevant reports and regulatory documents. GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 46 government agencies and stakeholder organizations. This sample included state regulators and at least one electricity supplier from each of five states: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Minnesota, and New York, which were selected based on state policies and having high levels of technology deployment.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Federal and state policymakers have used a range of policies to encourage the deployment of solar systems and other technologies that allow residential customers to generate, store, and manage their electricity consumption. For example, federal tax incentives—such as the investment tax credit—have reduced customers' up-front costs of installing solar systems. In addition, a Department of Energy funded database of renewable energy incentives identifies 41 states with net metering policies that require electricity suppliers to credit customers for electricity sent from their solar systems to the grid, providing an additional incentive. Moreover, in 14 states, customers can also receive state tax credits for installing solar systems, according to the database, which further reduces the up-front costs.
According to GAO's analysis of Energy Information Administration (EIA) data, deployment of solar systems has increased significantly in some states, with the total number of residential customers with solar systems increasing sevenfold from 2010 to 2015. However, customers with solar systems represent a very small portion of overall electricity customers—about 0.7 percent of U.S. residential customers in 2015, according to EIA data. Every state experienced growth in the number of customers with residential solar systems, although certain states, such as California and Hawaii, accounted for most of the growth and have had more widespread deployment. For example, about 14 percent of residences in Hawaii have installed a solar system, according to EIA data. Although comprehensive data on the deployment of electricity storage systems and smart devices are not available, the data and information provided by stakeholders GAO interviewed suggest their deployment is limited.
The increasing residential deployment of solar systems and other technologies poses potential benefits and challenges, and some policymakers have implemented or are considering measures to address these, as GAO found in its analysis of reports and stakeholder interviews. Specifically, these technologies can provide potential benefits through more efficient grid operation, for example, if customers use these technologies to reduce their consumption of electricity from the grid during periods of high demand. Nonetheless, grid operators GAO interviewed said they have begun to confront grid management and other challenges in some areas as solar deployment increases. For example, in some areas of Hawaii, solar systems have generated more electricity than the grid was built to handle, which resulted in the need for infrastructure upgrades in these areas. However, grid operators reported that challenges generally have been manageable because overall residential solar deployment has been low. Policymakers in some states have implemented or are considering measures to maximize potential benefits and mitigate potential challenges associated with the increasing deployment of these technologies. For example, two states' regulators have required electricity suppliers to identify areas of the grid where solar and other technologies would be most beneficial to grid operation. In addition, several state regulators recently have allowed electricity suppliers to adopt voluntary time-based electricity prices that increase when demand for electricity is high, providing customers with an incentive to reduce consumption at these times, potentially by using solar, storage, and other technologies. |
gao_T-GGD-99-143 | gao_T-GGD-99-143_0 | Executive Order and UMRA Had Little Effect on Agencies’ Rulemaking Actions
During the past 20 years, state, local, and tribal governments as well as businesses have expressed concerns about congressional and regulatory preemption of traditionally nonfederal functions and the costs of complying with federal regulations. The executive and the legislative branch have each attempted to respond to these concerns by issuing executive orders and enacting statutes requiring rulemaking agencies to take certain actions when they issue regulations with federalism or intergovernmental relations effects. Two prime examples of these responses are Executive Order 12612 (“Federalism”) and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). done to oversee federal agencies’ implementation of the order in the rulemaking process. Agencies Prepared Few Federalism Assessments During Review Timeframe
Our work showed that Executive Order 12612 had relatively little visible effect on federal agencies’ rulemaking actions during this time frame. To summarize the nearly 3 years of data depicted in figure 1, agencies covered by the order mentioned it in the preambles to about 26 percent of the 11,414 final rules they issued between April 1996 and December 1998. Many of the final rules that federal agencies issue are administrative or routine in nature, and therefore unlikely to have significant federalism implications. However, that does not appear to have been the case. As figure 3 shows, of the 117 major final rules issued by covered agencies between April 1996 and December 1998, the preambles indicated that only 1 had a federalism assessment. In response, the agencies said that their rules did not have sufficient federalism implications to trigger the executive order’s requirements. However, the criteria the agencies used to determine whether federalism assessments were needed varied among the agencies. OMB Has Taken Little Recent Action to Ensure Implementation of Executive Order 12612
OMB officials told us that they had taken little specific action to ensure implementation of the executive order, but said the order is considered along with other requirements as part of the regulatory review process under Executive Order 12866. The Results Act already requires agencies developing their strategic plans to “solicit and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially affected by or interested in the plan.” The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee report on the Results Act noted that the strategic plan “is intended to be the principal means for obtaining and reflecting, as appropriate, the views of Congress and those governmental and nongovernmental entities potentially affected by or interested in the agencies’ activities.”
In that regard, we believe that working with state and local governments or their representative organizations to develop goals and performance measures in federal grant-in-aid programs can strengthen the intergovernmental partnerships embodied in those programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed S. 1214, the Federalism Act of 1999, focusing on: (1) how often the preambles to covered agencies' final rules issued between April 1, 1996, and December 31, 1998, mentioned the executive order and how often they indicated the agencies had conducted Federalism assessments under the order; (2) what selected agencies have done to implement the requirements of the order; and (3) what Office of Management and Budget has done to oversee Federal agencies' implementation of the order in the rulemaking process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during the past 20 years, state, local, and tribal governments as well as businesses have expressed concerns about congressional and regulatory preemption of traditionally nonfederal functions and the costs of complying with federal regulations; (2) the executive and the legislative branch have each attempted to respond to these concerns by issuing executive orders and enacting statutes requiring rulemaking agencies to take certain actions when they issue regulations with federalism or intergovernmental relations effects; (3) two prime examples of these responses are Executive Order 12612 and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA); (4) GAO's work showed that Executive Order 12612 had relatively little visible effect on federal agencies' rulemaking actions during this timeframe; (5) agencies covered by the order mentioned it in the preambles to about 26 percent of the 11,414 final rules they issued between April 1996 and December 1998; (6) however, mentioning the order in the preamble to a rule does not mean the agency took any substantive action; (7) the agencies usually just stated that no federalism assessment was conducted because the rules did not have federalism implications; (8) the preambles to only 5 of the 11,414 final rules that the agencies issued between April 1996 and December 1998 indicated that a federalism assessment had been done; (9) many of the final rules that federal agencies issue are administrative or routine in nature and therefore unlikely to have significant federalism implications; (10) the criteria the agencies used to determine whether federalism assessments were needed varied among the agencies; (11) Office of Management and Budget officials told GAO that they had taken little specific action to ensure implementation of the executive order, but said the order is considered along with other requirements as part of the regulatory review process under Executive Order 12866; (12) GAO reported that requirements in title II of UMRA appeared to have had only limited direct impact on agencies' rulemaking actions in the first 2 years of the act's implementation; and (13) GAO believes that working with state and local governments or their representative organizations to develop goals and performance measures in federal grant-in-aid programs can strengthen the intergovernmental partnerships embodied in those programs. |
gao_GAO-15-11 | gao_GAO-15-11_0 | Information on Health Care Cost and Quality
There are multiple ways to assess the cost of health care. Information from Two Selected Consumer Transparency Tools Consistently Demonstrated Substantial Cost Variation Regardless of Quality for Certain Services
The two selected consumer transparency tools we reviewed show that some providers are paid thousands of dollars more than others for the same service in the same geographic area, regardless of the quality of such services. For example, according to information obtained from Castlight, the estimated total cost of maternity care at selected acute care hospitals in the Boston area that rated more highly on several quality indicators ranged between $6,834 and $21,554 (consumers would pay between $2,967 and $5,000 in estimated out-of- pocket costs). Effective Transparency Tools Provide Cost and Quality Information That Is Relevant and Understandable to Consumers
Transparency tools are most effective if they both provide information relevant to consumers and convey that information in a way that consumers can readily understand. 4. Describe key differences in costs, particularly patient out-of- pocket costs. 3. Enable consumers to customize information selected for presentation to focus on what is most relevant to them. CMS Transparency Tools Are Limited in Their Provision of Relevant and Understandable Cost and Quality Information for Consumers
The CMS transparency tools we evaluated are limited in the relevance and understandability of cost and quality information they provide to consumers. CMS Transparency Tools Lack Certain Relevant Information Needed to Make Meaningful Distinctions about the Cost and Quality of Providers
Based on the characteristics we identified concerning information provided to consumers by effective transparency tools, we found that CMS’s tools demonstrate a number of the characteristics of effective transparency tools, such as timeliness of data; however, the tools lack relevant information on cost and key differences in quality of care. These limitations hinder their relevance and usefulness by consumers, particularly consumers’ ability to make meaningful distinctions among providers. Therefore, they do not allow consumers to combine cost and quality information to assess the value of health care services, or anticipate and plan for expenses related to non-emergency procedures. Specifically, the tools have substantial limitations in their use of clear language and symbols, in summarizing and organizing information to highlight patterns for consumers, and in enabling consumers to customize how information is presented. Additionally, the CMS tools also generally do not summarize results for consumers—with the exception of Nursing Home Compare—or organize data to highlight patterns. CMS Has Taken Limited Steps to Expand Access to Cost and Quality Information, but Has Not Established Procedures to Ensure This Information Meets Consumer Needs
CMS has taken limited steps in three key areas to expand information on cost and quality and increase transparency to consumers and others. CMS Has Not Established Procedures to Ensure the Cost and Quality Information It Collects and Reports Meets Consumer Needs
Although HHS has included transparency as part of its strategic plan, and set a specific goal to report on measures that meet consumer needs, it has not established specific procedures or performance metrics to ensure that the cost and quality information that it collects and publicly reports accomplish this goal. Without such specific procedures and performance metrics, CMS cannot ensure that its efforts to make cost and quality information publicly available will meet consumer needs or help them to make meaningful distinctions among providers. In particular, CMS’s process for developing and selecting cost and quality measures for its tools has been heavily influenced by the concerns of providers rather than consumers, which helps to account for the relative lack of cost and quality information in CMS’s tools that consumers would find relevant. HHS also provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Examples of Variation in Cost and Quality Information Available to Consumers for Selected Procedures
We obtained examples of cost and quality information that were available to certain consumers in specific circumstances by obtaining information from selected transparency tools and by contacting providers, acting in the role of a consumer, to ask for cost and quality information. Appendix II: Assessment of CMS Transparency Tools
We assessed the extent to which the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ transparency tools include the 15 characteristics of effective tools we identified through our literature review and interviews with experts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cost and quality of health care services can vary significantly, with high cost not necessarily indicating high quality. As consumers pay for a growing proportion of their care, they have an increased need for cost and quality information before they receive care, so they can plan and make informed decisions. Transparency tools can provide such information to consumers and others.
GAO was asked to study cost and quality information for consumers. This report examines (1) information on cost and quality available to consumers from selected transparency tools, (2) characteristics of effective transparency tools, (3) limitations, if any, in the effectiveness of CMS transparency tools, and (4) CMS efforts to expand cost and quality information available through transparency tools. GAO analyzed information from two private tools—selected because they had both cost and quality information—and CMS's five transparency tools, reviewed research to identify best practices for conveying information to consumers, interviewed CMS and HHS officials and subject matter expects, and reviewed CMS and HHS planning documents and relevant criteria for effective planning in the federal government.
What GAO Found
Results obtained from two selected private consumer transparency tools GAO reviewed—websites with health cost or quality information comparing different health care providers—show that some providers are paid thousands of dollars more than others for the same service in the same geographic area, regardless of the quality of such services. For example, the cost for maternity care at selected acute care hospitals in Boston, all of which rated highly on several quality indicators, ranged between $6,834 and $21,554 in July 2014.
Transparency tools are most effective if they provide information relevant to consumers and convey information in a way that consumers can readily understand. GAO identified key characteristics of effective transparency tools through a literature review and interviews with experts. The information that is most relevant to consumers relates directly to their personal circumstances, such as information on specific procedures they are considering, and allows them to make meaningful distinctions among providers based on their performance. Characteristics of such relevant information include describing key differences in quality of care and costs, particularly for what consumers are likely to pay out of pocket based on their specific circumstances. In addition, effective transparency tools must take specific steps to make the information they present understandable by consumers. For example, tools must enable consumers to discern patterns by summarizing related information and allowing consumers to customize information to focus on what is most relevant to them.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) operates five transparency tools—Nursing Home Compare, Dialysis Facility Compare, Home Health Compare, Hospital Compare and Physician Compare—that are limited in their provision of relevant and understandable cost and quality information for consumers. In particular, GAO found that the tools lack relevant information on cost and provide limited information on key differences in quality of care, which hinders consumers' ability to make meaningful distinctions among providers based on their performance. Because none of the tools contain information on patients' out-of-pocket costs, they do not allow consumers to combine cost and quality information to assess the value of health care services or anticipate the cost of such services in advance. Additionally, GAO found substantial limitations in how the CMS tools present information, such as, in general, not using clear language and symbols, not summarizing and organizing information to highlight patterns, and not enabling consumers to customize how information is presented.
CMS, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has taken some steps to expand access to cost and quality information for consumers, but has not established procedures or metrics to ensure the information it collects and reports meets consumer needs. Both HHS and CMS have set goals to report on measures that meet consumer needs. However, CMS's process for developing and selecting cost and quality measures for its tools has been heavily influenced by the concerns of providers rather than consumers. Without procedures or metrics focusing on consumer needs, CMS cannot ensure that these efforts will produce cost and quality information that is relevant and understandable to consumers seeking to make meaningful distinctions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS's CMS take steps to improve the information in its transparency tools and develop procedures and metrics to ensure that tools address consumers' needs. HHS concurred with the recommendations and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-11-50 | gao_GAO-11-50_0 | Background
DOD operates a worldwide health care program, through which it provides medical care and assistance to 9.6 million active duty service members, their families, and other eligible beneficiaries. Block 2 was to provide automated clinical practice guidelines, optometric documentation, and dental documentation. Speed. Availability. 3. 4. AHLTA Has Limited Capabilities and Continues to Experience Performance Problems
Despite having obligated approximately $2 billion over the 13-year life of its initiatives to acquire and operate an electronic health record system, as of September 2010, DOD continued to experience performance problems with the one block of AHLTA functionality (Block 1) that it had fully deployed and with a second block of functionality (Block 2) that it had partially deployed. DOD is proceeding with what it refers to as a “stabilization effort” to continue making improvements to the system and provide ongoing capabilities until a new system is acquired. DOD Has Initiated Planning Activities for the EHR Way Ahead
Because AHLTA has consistently experienced performance problems and has not delivered the full operational capabilities intended, DOD has initiated plans to develop a new electronic health record system. As with AHLTA, department officials stated that the new electronic health record system is expected to be a comprehensive, real-time health record for active and retired service members, their families, and other eligible beneficiaries. The analysis is currently scheduled to be completed by December 2010. To facilitate the analysis of alternatives, planning officials stated that they had identified system capabilities needed to meet the department’s medical mission. According to planning documents, following completion of the analysis, DOD expects to select a technical solution and to develop and release a delivery schedule. DOD’s fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $302 million for the EHR Way Ahead initiative. AHLTA Performance Was Hindered by Weaknesses in Key Acquisition Management and Planning Processes
The success of a large information technology project such as AHLTA is dependent on an agency possessing capabilities to effectively plan and manage acquisitions, design the associated systems, define and manage system requirements, and use effective measures to gauge user satisfaction. In the case of AHLTA, weaknesses in these key management areas contributed to DOD delivering a system that provided fewer capabilities than originally expected, experienced persistent performance problems, and ultimately, did not fully meet the needs of its intended users. Nonetheless, although the program office recognized these types of system complexities as being part of the electronic health record system design, the office never established a tailored systems engineering plan to guide the acquisition, or to facilitate the resolution of the many performance problems that have plagued the system since its initial deployment. Further, the system requirements were too general and did not adequately reflect user needs. Although the department has collected user feedback, it did not establish a comprehensive plan for improving user satisfaction with the system. As DOD continues to invest significant resources in a stabilization effort to address shortcomings of AHLTA and plan for the acquisition of a new electronic health record system, it is imperative that the department take immediate steps to improve its management of the initiative. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help guide and ensure the successful completion of the AHLTA stabilization effort, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, direct the MHS CIO to take the following six actions: Develop and maintain a comprehensive project plan that includes key elements, such as the project’s scope, cost, schedule, and risks and update the plan to provide key information for stakeholders on the project’s plans and status. In its comments, the department agreed with our six recommendations and described actions planned to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) status in implementing the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA) system, (2) determine the department’s plans for acquiring a new electronic health record system, and (3) evaluate the department’s acquisition management for its electronic health record system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) provides medical care to 9.6 million active duty service members, their families, and other eligible beneficiaries worldwide. DOD's Military Health System has long been engaged in efforts to acquire and deploy an electronic health record system. The latest version of this initiative--the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA)--was expected to give health care providers real-time access to individual and military population health information and facilitate clinical support. However, the system's early performance was problematic, and DOD recently stated that it intended to acquire a new electronic health record system. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of AHLTA, (2) determine DOD's plans for acquiring its new system, and (3) evaluate DOD's acquisition management of the initiative. To do this, GAO reviewed program plans, reports, and other documentation and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
After obligating approximately $2 billion over the 13-year life of its initiative to acquire an electronic health record system, as of September 2010, DOD had delivered various capabilities for outpatient care and dental care documentation. DOD had scaled back other capabilities it had originally planned to deliver, such as replacement of legacy systems and inpatient care management. In addition, users continued to experience significant problems with the performance (speed, usability, and availability) of the portions of the system that have been deployed. DOD has initiated efforts to improve system performance and enhance functionality and plans to continue its efforts to stabilize the AHLTA system through 2015, as a "bridge" to the new electronic health record system it intends to acquire. According to DOD, the planned new electronic health record system--known as the EHR Way Ahead--is to be a comprehensive, real-time health record for service members and their families and beneficiaries. The system is expected to address performance problems, provide unaddressed capabilities such as comprehensive medical documentation, capture and share medical data electronically within DOD, and improve existing information sharing with the Department of Veterans Affairs. As of September 2010, the department had established a planning office, and this office had begun an analysis of alternatives for meeting the new system requirements. Completion of this analysis is currently scheduled for December 2010. Following its completion, DOD expects to select a technical solution for the system and release a delivery schedule. DOD's fiscal year 2011 budget request included $302 million for the EHR Way Ahead initiative. Weaknesses in key acquisition management and planning processes contributed to AHLTA having fewer capabilities than originally expected, experiencing persistent performance problems, and not fully meeting the needs of users. (1) A comprehensive project management plan was not established to guide the department's execution of the system acquisition. (2) A tailored systems engineering plan did not exist to guide the technical development of the system, an effort that was characterized by significant complexity. (3) Requirements were incomplete and did not sufficiently reflect user and operational needs. (4) An effective plan was not used to improve users' satisfaction with the system. DOD has initiated efforts to bring its processes into alignment with industry best practices. However, it has not carried out a planned independent evaluation to ensure it has made these improvements. Until it ensures that these weaknesses are addressed, DOD risks undermining the success of further efforts to acquire electronic health record system capabilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD take six actions to help ensure that it has disciplined and effective processes in place to manage the acquisition of further electronic health record system capabilities. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions planned to address them. |
gao_GAO-15-595T | gao_GAO-15-595T_0 | CBP Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management of and Assess the Effectiveness of Its Border Surveillance Technologies and Fencing, but Additional Actions Are Needed
CBP Plans to Update Program Schedules and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates, but Has Not Yet Provided Complete Information to Reflect It Is Following Best Practices
In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to strengthen its management of the Plan and the Plan’s various programs. The Plan’s seven acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. In addition, in March 2014, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan reflected some, but not all, best practices. More specifically, CBP had identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. However, we also reported that the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance technology to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed under the Plan; however, CBP officials stated that this set of measures was under review as the agency continues to refine the measures to better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts of surveillance technology on its border security mission. CBP officials stated that by the end of fiscal year 2015, baselines for each performance measure will be developed, at which time the agency plans to begin using the data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of specific technology assets deployed under the Plan. DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Address Radio Interoperability Challenges, but Could Better Manage These Efforts
DHS Components Have Taken Steps to Upgrade Tactical Communications Equipment and Infrastructure, but Could Benefit by Developing Performance and Program Plans
To effectively carry out their respective border security missions, CBP and ICE agents and officers require interoperable communications—the capability of different electronic communications systems to readily connect with one another to enable timely communications—with one another and with state and local agencies, as we reported in March 2015. In March 2015, we reported that from 2009 through 2013, CBP completed full modernization projects in 4 of the 9 sectors that constitute the southwest border. We recommended in March 2015 that CBP develop a plan to monitor the performance of its deployed radio systems. DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that it will work to complete a CBP Land Mobile Radio System Performance Monitoring Plan by December 31, 2015. In response to our recommendation, DHS stated that ICE’s Office of the Chief Information Officer will develop a program to facilitate, coordinate, and maintain ICE’s deployed radio systems, and will ensure that the agency establishes the proper documentation of resource needs, defines program goals, and establishes measures to monitor performance by January 31, 2016. OAM Could Benefit from Reassessing Its Mix and Placement of Assets to Better Address Mission Needs and Threats
Our March 2012 report on OAM assets highlighted several areas the agency could address to better ensure the mix and placement of assets is effective and efficient. These areas included: (1) documentation clearly linking deployment decisions to mission needs and threats, (2) documentation on the assessments and analysis used to support decisions on the mix and placement of assets, and (3) consideration of how deployment of border technology will affect customer requirements for air and marine assets across locations. To address the findings of our March 2012 report, we recommended that CBP, to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine assets to include mission requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and technological changes. In September 2014, CBP provided this Plan, approved in May 2012, and updated information on its subsequent efforts to address this recommendation, including a description of actions taken to reassess the mix and placement of OAM’s assets. According to OAM, after consulting with DHS and CBP officials and approval from the DHS Secretary in May 2013, the office began a realignment of personnel, aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to the southern border based on its evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets and available funding to accomplish the transfers. As of April 2015, OAM officials said that they were in the process of providing GAO with the data and analysis used to support this realignment of assets in order to fully document implementation of the recommendation. Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has employed a variety of technology, infrastructure, and other assets to help secure the border. For example, in January 2011, CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which includes seven acquisition programs related to fixed and mobile surveillance systems, agent-portable devices, and ground sensors. CBP has also deployed tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lights--and tactical communications (radio systems) and uses air and marine assets to secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations.
This statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS's efforts to implement the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan and deploy tactical infrastructure, (2) CBP's and ICE's efforts to modernize radio systems, and (3) OAM mix and placement of assets. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September 2009 through April 2015, along with selected updates conducted in April and May 2015 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO reported in March 2014 that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), had made progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan), but that CBP could strengthen its management and assessment of the Plan's programs. Specifically, GAO reported that CBP's schedules and life-cycle cost estimates for the Plan and its three highest-cost programs met some but not all best practices and recommended that CBP ensure that its schedules and estimates more fully address best practices, such as validating its cost estimates with independent estimates. CBP concurred and is taking steps toward addressing GAO's recommendations, such as planning to update cost estimates by the end of calendar year 2015. Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that while CBP had identified mission benefits of technologies to be deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness, the agency had not developed key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies, as GAO recommended. In April 2015, GAO reported that CBP had identified a set of potential key attributes for performance metrics for deployed technologies and CBP officials stated that by the end of fiscal year 2015, baselines for each performance measure will be developed and the agency will begin using the data to evaluate the contributions of specific technology assets.
In March 2015, GAO reported that DHS, CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had taken steps to upgrade tactical communications equipment and infrastructure, such as completing full modernization projects in four of the nine southwest border sectors, but could benefit by developing performance and program plans. Since rolling out upgrades--which include replacing and updating equipment and expanding infrastructure--CBP had not established an ongoing performance monitoring plan to determine whether the systems were working as intended. CBP agreed to develop such a plan, as GAO recommended, and is working to complete the plan by the end of 2015. Further, GAO reported in March 2015 that ICE did not have a program plan to manage its portfolio of modernization projects. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation to develop a plan and stated that ICE will develop a program to facilitate, coordinate, and maintain ICE's radio systems, and document resource needs, define program goals, and establish performance measures by January 2016.
In March 2012, GAO reported that the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) within CBP could benefit from reassessing its mix and placement of assets to better address mission needs and threats. GAO reported that OAM should clearly document the linkage of deployment decisions to mission needs and threat and its analysis and assessments used to support its decisions on the mix and placement of assets. GAO also reported that OAM could consider how border technology deployment will affect customer requirements for OAM assets. GAO recommended that CBP reassess the mix and placement of OAM's assets to include mission requirements, among other things. CBP concurred, and after May 2013, OAM began a realignment of personnel, aircraft, and vessels from the northern border to the southern border based on its evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets and available funding to accomplish the transfers. In April 2015, OAM officials stated that they are working to provide GAO with the data and analysis used to support the realignment of assets.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior work, GAO made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its management of plans and programs, tactical communications, and mix and placement of OAM assets. DHS generally agreed and plans to address the recommendations. Consequently, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-15-34 | gao_GAO-15-34_0 | Key Environmental Laws Allow Deadline Suits and EPA Considers Several Factors in Responding to Those Suits
GAO identified seven key environmental laws that allow individuals to file a deadline suit to compel EPA to issue a statutorily required rule, or perform a statutorily required review of a rule to determine whether to revise the rule. EPA works with DOJ to consider several factors in determining whether or not to settle the deadline suit and the terms of any settlement. Table 1 lists the seven laws. According to EPA and DOJ officials, these factors include: (1) the cost of litigation, (2) the likelihood that EPA will win the case if it goes to trial, and (3) whether EPA and DOJ believe they can negotiate a settlement that will provide EPA with sufficient time to complete a final rule if required to do so. Settlements Resulting in Major Rules Included Rulemaking Schedules, and EPA Received Public Comments on Drafts of Most Settlements
The terms of settlements in deadline suits that resulted in EPA issuing major rules in the last 5 years established a schedule to either promulgate a statutorily required rule or to promulgate a statutorily required rule or make a determination that doing so is not appropriate or necessary pursuant to the relevant statutory provision. They were all Clean Air Act rules. The 9 major rules EPA issued from May 31, 2008 to June 1, 2013 following seven settlements in deadline suits were Clean Air Act rules. EPA received between one and 19 public comments on six of the draft settlements. According to EPA Officials, Settlements in Deadline Suits Primarily Affect Rulemaking Priorities in a Single EPA Office
According to EPA officials, settlements in deadline suits primarily affect a single office within EPA—the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)—because most deadline suits are based on provisions of the Clean Air Act for which that office is responsible. These provisions have recurring deadlines requiring EPA to set standards and to periodically review—and revise as appropriate or necessary—those standards. OAQPS sets these standards through the rulemaking process. The effect of settlements in deadline suits on EPA’s rulemaking priorities is limited. OAQPS officials said that deadline suits impact the timing and order in which rules are issued by the NAAQS program and the Air Toxics program, but not which rules are issued. GAO staff members who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to examine (1) key environmental laws that allow citizens to file deadline suits that may compel the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct a rulemaking and the factors EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) consider in determining whether or not to settle these lawsuits, (2) the terms of settlements in deadline suits that led EPA to promulgate major rules in the last 5 years and the extent to which the public commented on the terms of the settlements, and (3) the extent to which settlements in deadline suits have affected EPA’s rulemaking priorities. To understand the factors that EPA considers in determining whether or not to settle deadline suits, we held discussions with officials from EPA’s Office of General Counsel and DOJ because both agencies are involved in making these determinations. To examine the extent to which the public commented on the terms of the settlements, we obtained from EPA legal memoranda summarizing the number and content of public comments EPA received on drafts of the settlements. Because each of the major rules issued following settlements in deadline suits were Clean Air Act rules, EPA solicited public comments on drafts of the settlements as required by the Clean Air Act. To examine the extent to which settlements in deadline suits have affected EPA’s rulemaking priorities, we obtained from EPA’s Office of General Counsel data on deadline suits it had settled from January 2001 through July 2014 and the EPA office(s) responsible for implementing the terms of the settlements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Laws, such as the Clean Air Act, require EPA to issue rules by specific deadlines. Citizens can sue EPA for not issuing rules on time. These lawsuits are sometimes known as deadline suits. EPA sometimes negotiates a settlement to issue a rule by an agreed upon deadline. Some have expressed concern that the public is not involved in the negotiations and that settlements affect EPA rulemaking priorities. GAO was asked to review EPA settlements in deadline suits. This report examines (1) key environmental laws that allow deadline suits and the factors EPA and DOJ consider in determining whether to settle these suits, (2) the terms of settlements that led EPA to issue major rules in the last 5 years and the extent to which the public commented on the settlements, and (3) the extent to which settlements in deadline suits have affected EPA's rulemaking priorities.
GAO identified key laws allowing deadline suits through legal research and interviewed agency officials to understand the factors considered in determining whether to settle these suits. EPA identified the major rules it issued following settlements and GAO examined the text of those settlements. GAO examined EPA documentation to determine the extent to which the public commented on the settlements. Through data from EPA's Office of General Counsel and discussions with officials, GAO determined the extent to which settlements affected EPA's rulemaking priorities.
What GAO Found
GAO identified seven key environmental laws that allow citizens to file a deadline suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (see table) and EPA and the Department of Justice (DOJ) consider several factors in determining whether or not to settle these suits. The seven key environmental laws include, among others, the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. EPA works with DOJ—which represents EPA in litigation —to decide whether to settle a deadline suit. EPA and DOJ officials stated that the factors they consider include (1) the cost of litigation, (2) the likelihood that EPA will win the case if it goes to trial, and (3) whether EPA and DOJ believe they can negotiate a settlement that will provide EPA with sufficient time to complete a final rule if required to do so.
Of the total number of major rules EPA promulgated from May 31, 2008 to June 1, 2013, nine were issued following seven settlements in deadline lawsuits, all under the Clean Air Act. The terms of the settlements in these deadline suits established a schedule to issue a statutorily required rule(s) or to issue a rule(s) unless EPA determined that doing so was not appropriate or necessary pursuant to the relevant statutory provision. None of the seven settlements included terms that finalized the substantive outcome of a rule. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to solicit public comments on drafts of settlements. The nine major rules were Clean Air Act rules, and EPA solicited public comments on all of the drafts. EPA received between 1 and 19 comments on six of the settlements and no comments on one settlement. EPA determined that none of the comments disclosed facts or other considerations compelling it to withdraw or withhold consent for the settlement.
The effect of settlements in deadline suits on EPA's rulemaking priorities is limited. According to EPA officials, settlements in deadline suits primarily affect a single office within EPA—the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS)—because most deadline suits are based on provisions of the Clean Air Act for which that office is responsible. These provisions have recurring deadlines requiring EPA to set standards and to periodically review—and revise as necessary—those standards. OAQPS sets these standards through the rulemaking process. OAQPS officials said that deadline suits affect the timing and order in which rules are issued but not which rules are issued.
Source: GAO. | GAO-15-34
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOJ and EPA concur with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-16-797 | gao_GAO-16-797_0 | If the President declares a major disaster, the declaration can trigger a variety of federal assistance programs through which the federal government provides disaster assistance to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments, as well as certain nonprofit organizations and individuals. Fire Management Assistance. This estimate constitutes total obligations identifiable to disaster activities across three categories of disaster assistance: the DRF, disaster-specific programs and activities identified across the 17 federal departments and agencies, and disaster- applicable programs and activities identified across the 17 federal departments and agencies. Non-quantifiable Programs and Activities
Our estimate of $277.6 billion in obligations for disaster assistance programs and activities represents a minimum and not the total amount of disaster assistance spending by the federal government during fiscal years 2005 through 2014 because some federal departments and agencies reported that relevant obligations and expenditures for some programs and activities during this time frame are not separately tracked or are not available. Specifically, more than half of the 17 federal departments and agencies in our scope reported that obligations for certain disaster assistance programs or activities during fiscal years 2005 through 2014 are not separately tracked or are not available, for various reasons. At least 5 federal departments and agencies reported that some disaster assistance programs or activities are not separately tracked because spending related to these activities is generally subsumed by a department’s general operating budget or mission-related costs. Another 4 federal departments and agencies reported that obligations and expenditures specific to disaster assistance activities are not tracked or cannot be reliably estimated because there is no requirement for state or other recipients of the financial support to indicate whether or how much of the funding or assistance is used for disasters. Appendix II: Disaster Assistance Obligations and Expenditures For 17 Federal Departments and Agencies
This appendix presents detailed information on (1) federal disaster assistance programs and activities—specifically, disaster-specific and disaster-applicable programs or activities that are or can be used to mitigate (including pre-disaster), respond to, or recover from a disaster incident—and (2) obligations and expenditures, where available, for these programs and activities during fiscal years 2005 through 2014, for each of the 17 federal departments and agencies reviewed.1, 2 Specifically, each departmental overview provides detailed information organized into the following five tables:
Disaster-Specific Programs and Activities during Fiscal Years 2005
Disaster-Specific Obligations and Expenditures during Fiscal Years
Disaster-Applicable Programs and Activities during Fiscal Years 2005
Disaster-Applicable Obligations and Expenditures during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014; and
Mission Assignment Obligations and Expenditures during Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the federal government obligates billions of dollars through programs and activities that provide assistance to state and local governments, tribes, and certain nonprofit organizations and individuals that have suffered injury or damages from major disaster or emergency incidents, such as hurricanes, tornados, or fires. While FEMA tracks DRF spending related to major disasters and emergencies declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, there has not been a systematic effort to account for federal obligations for disaster assistance outside of the DRF.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, includes a provision for GAO to report on disaster assistance expenditures by the federal government. This report identifies federal disaster assistance programs and activities across 17 federal departments and agencies and the obligations for these programs and activities, where available, during fiscal years 2005 through 2014.
To conduct this work, GAO selected 17 federal departments and agencies identified in the National Planning Frameworks as having responsibility for leading or coordinating federal efforts to mitigate, respond to, and recover from domestic disaster incidents. GAO analyzed documents identifying and describing disaster assistance programs and activities, interviewed federal officials, and distributed a data collection instrument to obtain, among other things, obligation amounts associated with each program or activity identified.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2005 through 2014, the federal government obligated at least $277.6 billion across 17 federal departments and agencies for disaster assistance programs and activities. This estimate constitutes total obligations identifiable to disaster activities across three categories: the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), disaster-specific programs and activities identified across the 17 departments and agencies, and disaster-applicable programs and activities across the 17 departments and agencies (see figure).
The estimate of $277.6 billion represents a minimum and not the total amount of disaster assistance spending by the federal government during fiscal years 2005 through 2014 because relevant obligations for some programs and activities are not separately tracked or are not available. Specifically, GAO found that more than half of the 17 departments and agencies in the scope of this review reported that obligations for certain disaster assistance programs or activities during this time frame are not separately tracked or are not available, for various reasons. For example, 5 departments and agencies reported that some disaster assistance programs or activities are not separately tracked because spending related to these activities is generally subsumed by a department's general operating budget or mission-related costs. Another 4 departments and agencies reported that obligations and expenditures specific to disaster assistance activities are not tracked or cannot be reliably estimated because there is no requirement for state or other recipients of the financial support to indicate whether or how much of the funding or assistance is used for disasters. |
gao_GAO-10-102 | gao_GAO-10-102_0 | DOD Continues to Make Progress, but Implementation of Some Safeguards Could Be Improved, and Continued Monitoring of the System’s Implementation, Including the Safeguards, Is Needed
DOD continues to take some steps to implement each of the safeguards we reported on in September 2008. However, while DOD has undertaken efforts to understand employees’ perceptions of its training, the department has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of the training that it provides. By not specifying such steps in its guidance, the components may not follow a consistent approach when investigating barriers, which could hinder their efforts to eliminate them. However, as stated previously, because DOD does not specify what process the components should follow to investigate and eliminate potential barriers, the components may not follow a consistent approach, which could hinder their efforts to ensure fair, consistent, and equitable ratings. Further, in our 2008 assessment of NSPS, we noted that continued monitoring of the safeguards was needed to ensure that DOD’s actions were effective as implementation of NSPS proceeded. Without monitoring the safeguards’ implementation, decision makers in DOD and the Congress lack information that could be used to determine whether the department’s actions are effective and whether the system is being implemented in a fair, equitable, and credible manner. Although DOD Civilian Employees under NSPS Have Mixed Views about the System, DOD Has Not Yet Developed and Implemented a Plan to Address Employees’ Negative Perceptions of Some Aspects of the System
DOD civilian personnel have mixed perceptions about NSPS, and although DOD has taken some steps toward addressing employees’ concerns, it has not yet developed and implemented an action plan to address areas where employees express negative perceptions of the system. Further, the most recent data indicate that the perceptions of those employees who have worked under NSPS the longest appear to have remained largely unchanged from the negative perceptions we reported in 2008. DOD has taken some steps to address employees’ negative perceptions of the system; however, the department has yet to develop and implement an action plan that meets the intent of our prior recommendation because it does not specify such things as the actions DOD intends to take, who will be responsible for taking the action, and the timelines for doing so. NSPS Employees Express Mixed Perceptions about the System
NSPS Employees in All Spirals Have Positive Views of Some Aspects of Performance Management but Negative Views of Other Aspects
According to DOD’s most recent survey data, some NSPS employees recognize that positive aspects of performance management, such as connecting pay to performance, exist under the system. NSPS Employees and Supervisors in Our Discussion Groups Expressed Consistent Concerns
As with our first review of NSPS, DOD civilians in our discussion groups at locations outside the continental United States continue to express wide- ranging but consistent concerns about the NSPS performance management system. Our prior work, as well as that of OPM, has recognized that organizational transformations, such as the adoption of a new performance management system, often entail fundamental and radical changes that require an adjustment period to gain employees’ trust and acceptance. Further, DOD has not monitored how the safeguards specifically are implemented by lower-level organizations across the department. Determining Implementation of Safeguards and Monitoring Their Implementation
To determine the extent to which DOD has implemented safeguards as part of the NSPS performance management system and monitored the implementation of the safeguards, we used the following safeguards, which we also reported on in our 2008 review: Involve employees, their representatives, and other stakeholders in the design of the system, to include employees directly involved in validating any related implementation of the system. Human Capital: DOD Needs to Improve Implementation of and Address Employee Concerns about Its National Security Personnel System. Defense Transformation: Preliminary Observations on DOD’s Proposed Civilian Personnel Reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) began implementing the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)--a human capital system for DOD civilians. NSPS significantly redesigned the way DOD civilians are hired, compensated, and promoted. Pub. L. No. 110-181 mandated that GAO conduct reviews of the NSPS performance management system in calendar years 2008, 2009, and 2010. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD has implemented certain internal safeguards to ensure the fairness, effectiveness, and credibility of NSPS, and monitored their implementation, and (2) how DOD civilian personnel perceive NSPS, and the actions DOD has taken to address those perceptions. GAO analyzed relevant documents and employee survey results, interviewed DOD officials, and conducted discussion groups with DOD employees at eight locations outside of the continental United States. Toward the end of GAO's review, both Houses of Congress passed proposed legislation that, if enacted, would terminate NSPS and require any future performance management system for DOD civilians to include certain internal safeguards
What GAO Found
DOD continues to take steps to implement internal safeguards as part of NSPS, but implementation of some safeguards could still be improved, and continued monitoring of all safeguards' implementation is needed. In general, DOD has taken some steps to meet the intent of each of the safeguards, and it has implemented some of the recommendations from GAO's September 2008 report. However, opportunities exist for DOD to improve implementation of some safeguards. For example, DOD has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of the training employees receive, although doing so could help DOD measure the impact of its training and its progress toward achieving agency goals. In addition, DOD has not specified in its guidance what process the components should follow to investigate and eliminate potential barriers to fair and equitable ratings. Consequently, the components may not follow a consistent approach when investigating potential barriers, which could hinder their efforts to eliminate them. Further, GAO previously noted that continued monitoring of the safeguards was needed to ensure that DOD's actions were effective. While DOD monitors some aspects of the system's implementation, it does not monitor how or the extent to which the safeguards specifically are implemented across the department. As a result, decision makers lack information that could be used to determine whether the department's actions are effective and whether the system is being implemented in a fair, equitable, and credible manner. DOD civilian personnel have mixed perceptions about NSPS, and while the department has taken some steps toward addressing employee concerns, it has not yet developed and implemented an action plan to address areas where employees express negative perceptions of the system, as GAO recommended in 2008. DOD's survey data from 2008 revealed that overall, NSPS employees responded positively about some aspects of performance management, such as connecting pay to performance, and negatively about others, such as the performance appraisal process. According to the most recent survey data, the negative perceptions of employees who worked under NSPS the longest remain largely unchanged from what was reported by GAO in 2008. Further, as GAO reported in 2008, employees and supervisors continue to express negative perceptions in discussion groups about NSPS--for example, voicing concerns about the negative impact of NSPS on employees' motivation and morale, and about the excessive amount of time spent navigating the performance management process. Such negative perceptions are not surprising given that large-scale organizational transformations often require an adjustment period to gain employees' trust and acceptance. DOD has taken some steps to address employees' perceptions of NSPS--for example, by issuing a memorandum with suggested actions the components could take to address employee concerns. However, DOD has not yet developed and implemented an action plan that fully meets the intent of GAO's 2008 recommendation. Specifically, DOD has not yet specified such things as its intended actions, who will be responsible, and the time frames for these actions. GAO continues to believe that implementing such a plan has merit. |
gao_GAO-04-973 | gao_GAO-04-973_0 | The program’s system-level critical design review will be held late in fiscal year 2005 after the lead ship authorization and will assess design maturity. The Conference Report also states that the Navy should complete land-based testing of the advanced gun system and integrated power system prior to the completion of the critical design review. This improves the ability to establish realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives as well as the ability to meet them. In using engineering development models, the Navy seeks to achieve high levels of technology maturity by first defining the requirements and risks of a developmental technology and then executing a series of tests to reduce these risks and prove the utility of a technology in its intended environment. The program’s schedule, however, does not allow most engineering development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions are made. None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering development models were mature at the start of system design and none are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize detailed design and construction of the lead ship. By the end of the critical design review, only three subsystems are expected to have completed testing: the autonomic fire suppression system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups. One example of the consequences of technology and design immaturity already apparent in the DD(X) program is the development of the dual band radar and its impact on the integrated deckhouse. If the weight of the radar increases or if other technical factors cause it to be relocated, a redesign effort may be needed to assure that requirements are met. Four of the 10 engineering development models—the total ship computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups—are progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems. Only two of the engineering development models, the hullform and the integrated power system, have fallback technologies that could be used if current technologies do not meet requirements. Other challenges are highlighted below. Plans for the integrated power system do include the use of a fallback technology. As noted in the draft report, we believe the approach the Navy has taken to demonstrate DD(X) technologies through the engineering development models is both structured and disciplined. Our past work on best practices has shown that technological unknowns discovered later in product development lead to cost increases and schedule delays. While DOD policy allows for technologies to mature up to the point of ship installation, it does not necessarily follow that this is a best practice. DD(X) Engineering Development Models
DD(X)
DD(X)
DD(X)
DD(X)
Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures
DD(X)
DD(X)
Integrated Undersea Warfare
DD(X)
Peripheral Vertical Launch System
• Tests for system will not be completed by lead ship authorization:
Total Ship Computing Environment
DD(X)
Comments from the Department of Defense
GAO Comments
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated August 20, 2004. Our discussion of the technology and design maturity of the dual band radar and the integrated deckhouse deals with the impact of the Navy’s decision to change radar frequency, not the reason for the decision. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DD(X) destroyer--a surface ship intended to expand the Navy's littoral warfare capabilities--depends on the development of a number of new technologies to meet its requirements. The Navy intends to authorize detailed design and construction of the first ship in March 2005. GAO's past work has shown that developing advanced systems that rely heavily on new technologies requires a disciplined, knowledge-based approach to ensure cost, schedule, and performance targets are met. Best practices show, for example, that a program should not be launched before critical technologies are sufficiently matured--that is, the technology has been demonstrated in its intended environment--and that a design should be stabilized by the critical design review. Given the complexity of the DD(X) system and the number of new technologies involved, GAO was asked to describe the Navy's acquisition strategy for DD(X) and how it relates to best practices, and how efforts to mature critical technologies are proceeding.
What GAO Found
To reduce program risk, the Navy plans to build and test 10 developmental subsystems, or engineering development models, that comprise DD(X)'s critical technologies. While using these models represents a structured and disciplined approach, the program's schedule does not provide for the engineering development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions are made. None of the technologies in the 10 engineering development models was proven to be mature when system design began, as best practices advocates. Moreover, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate DD(X) technology maturity and design stability until after the decision to authorize construction of the lead ship, creating risk that cost, schedule, and performance objectives will not be met. With many of the tests to demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is the risk that additional time and money will be needed to address issues discovered in testing. Some of the technologies are progressing according to the Navy's plans, while others have experienced challenges. Four of the 10 engineering development models--the total ship computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups--are progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems. However, four other models--the integrated power system, the autonomic fire suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated deckhouse--have encountered some problems. At this point, the most serious appear to be the schedule delay in the dual band radar resulting from the Navy's decision to change one radar type and the additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining engineering development models--the integrated undersea warfare system and the advanced gun system--are progressing as planned, but will not culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being installed on the first ship. While the Navy has fallback technologies for the hull form and the integrated power system, it does not have such plans for the other eight engineering development models. |
gao_GAO-07-898T | gao_GAO-07-898T_0 | BPCA also provides mechanisms for pediatric drug studies that drug sponsors decline to conduct. FDA cannot extend pediatric exclusivity in response to written requests for any drugs for which the drug sponsors declined to conduct the requested pediatric drug studies. First, when drug sponsors decline written requests for studies of on-patent drugs, BPCA provides for FDA to refer the study of those drugs to FNIH for funding. Second, to further the study of off-patent drugs, NIH—in consultation with FDA and experts in pediatric research—develops a list of drugs, including off-patent drugs, which the agency believes need to be studied in children. FDA may determine that the drug is not approved for use by children, which would then be reflected in any labeling changes. Drug Sponsors Agreed to Study the Majority of On-Patent Drugs with Written Requests under BPCA, but No Studies Were Conducted When Drug Sponsors Declined the Written Requests
Most of the on-patent drugs for which FDA requested pediatric drug studies under BPCA were being studied, but no studies have resulted when the requests were declined by drug sponsors. From January 2002 through December 2005, FDA issued 214 written requests for on-patent drugs to be studied under BPCA, and drug sponsors agreed to conduct pediatric drug studies for 173 (81 percent) of those. Analyses of two national databases shows that about half of the 10 most frequently prescribed drugs for children were studied under BPCA. FDA referred 9 of these 41 written requests (22 percent) to FNIH for funding, but as of December 2005, FNIH had not funded the study of any of these drugs. Few Off-Patent Drugs Have Been Studied under BPCA
Few off-patent drugs identified by NIH as in need of study for pediatric use have been studied. By 2005, NIH had identified 40 off-patent drugs that it believed should be studied for pediatric use. NIH funded pediatric drug studies for 7 of the remaining 15 written requests declined by drug sponsors through December 2005. Most Drugs Granted Pediatric Exclusivity under BPCA Had Labeling Changes, but the Process for Making Changes Was Sometimes Lengthy
Most drugs that have been granted pediatric exclusivity under BPCA— about 87 percent—have had labeling changes as a result of the pediatric drug studies conducted under BPCA. Pediatric drug studies conducted under BPCA showed that children may have been exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffective dosing, overdosing, or side effects that were previously unknown. The labeling for these drugs was changed to reflect these study results. For the remaining 18 drugs (about 40 percent), FDA took from 238 to 1,055 days to complete the scientific review process and approve labeling changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
About two-thirds of drugs that are prescribed for children have not been studied and labeled for pediatric use, placing children at risk of being exposed to ineffective treatment or incorrect dosing. The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA), enacted in 2002, encourages the manufacturers, or sponsors, of drugs that still have marketing exclusivity--that is, are on-patent--to conduct pediatric drug studies, as requested by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). If they do so, FDA may extend for 6 months the period during which no equivalent generic drugs can be marketed. This is referred to as pediatric exclusivity. BPCA also provides for the study of off-patent drugs. GAO was asked to testify on the study and labeling of drugs for pediatric use under BPCA. This testimony is based on Pediatric Drug Research: Studies Conducted under Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, GAO-07-557 (Mar. 22, 2007). GAO assessed (1) the extent to which pediatric drug studies were being conducted under BPCA for on-patent drugs, (2) the extent to which pediatric drug studies were being conducted under BPCA for off-patent drugs, and (3) the impact of BPCA on the labeling of drugs for pediatric use and the process by which the labeling was changed. GAO examined data about the drugs for which FDA requested studies under BPCA from 2002 through 2005 and interviewed relevant federal officials.
What GAO Found
Drug sponsors have initiated pediatric drug studies for most of the on-patent drugs for which FDA has requested such studies under BPCA, but no drugs were studied when sponsors declined these requests. Sponsors agreed to 173 of the 214 written requests for pediatric studies of on-patent drugs. In cases where drug sponsors decline to study the drugs, BPCA provides for FDA to refer the study of these drugs to the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH), a nonprofit corporation. FNIH had not funded studies for any of the nine drugs that FDA referred as of December 2005. Few off-patent drugs identified by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that need to be studied for pediatric use have been studied. BPCA provides for NIH to fund studies when drug sponsors decline written requests for off-patent drugs. While 40 such off-patent drugs were identified by 2005, FDA had issued written requests for 16. One written request was accepted by the drug sponsor. Of the remaining 15, NIH funded studies for 7 through December 2005. Most drugs granted pediatric exclusivity under BPCA (about 87 percent) had labeling changes--often because the pediatric drug studies found that children may have been exposed to ineffective drugs, ineffective dosing, overdosing, or previously unknown side effects. However, the process for approving labeling changes was often lengthy. For 18 drugs that required labeling changes (about 40 percent), it took from 238 to 1,055 days for information to be reviewed and labeling changes to be approved. |
gao_GAO-06-388 | gao_GAO-06-388_0 | NRC’s Process for Revising Its DBT for Nuclear Power Plants Was Generally Logical and Well Defined, but Some Changes Were Not Clearly Linked to an Analysis of the Terrorist Threat
The process that NRC used to revise its DBT for nuclear power plants was generally logical and well defined. However, certain elements of the revised DBT, such as the weapons that attackers could use against a plant, do not correspond to the staff’s original recommendations for two reasons. For example, one of the key elements in the revised DBT, the number of attackers, is based on NRC’s analysis of the group size of previous terrorist attacks worldwide. NEI argued against the inclusion of a number of weapons. However, according to NRC, the agency made a deliberate decision as part of the process for revising the DBT in 2003 to have the threat assessment staff analyze intelligence information and obtain stakeholder feedback simultaneously, rather than sequentially, in order to accelerate the process in response to the increase in the terrorist threat. Nuclear Power Plants Made Substantial Changes to Their Security to Address the Revised DBT, but NRC Inspections Have Uncovered Problems
The four nuclear power plant sites we visited made substantial changes after the September 11, 2001, attacks and in response to the revised DBT, including measures to detect, delay, and respond to the increased number of attackers and to address the increased vehicle bomb size. For example, we had recommended that NRC strengthen the force-on-force inspections by (1) conducting the inspections more frequently at each site, (2) using laser equipment to better simulate attackers’ and security officers’ weapons, and (3) requiring the inspections to make use of the full terrorist capabilities stated in the DBT, including the use of an adversary force trained in terrorist tactics. Nevertheless, in observing three force-on-force inspections and discussing the program with NRC officials, we noted the following issues that continue to warrant NRC’s attention: Problems with laser equipment. At two of the force-on-force inspections we observed, we noted areas in which “operational security”—the protection of information about the planned scenarios for the mock attacks—could be improved. While we recognize that procedures such as safety walk downs and prepositioning of adversary teams are necessary to the proper conduct of the force-on-force inspections, lapses in operational security have the potential to give security officers knowledge that would allow them to perform better than they would otherwise and raise questions about whether the force- on-force inspections are a true test of the sites’ protective strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the process by which NRC makes future revisions to the DBT for nuclear power plants, we recommend that the NRC commissioners take the following two actions: Assign responsibility for obtaining feedback from the nuclear industry and other stakeholders on proposed changes to the DBT to an office within NRC other than the Threat Assessment Section, so that the threat assessment staff is able to assess the terrorist threat to nuclear power plants without creating the potential for or appearance of industry influencing their analysis. The resulting report is substantially the same as the classified version of the report, with the exception that the classified version contains additional details about the DBT and security at nuclear power plants. To review NRC’s progress in strengthening the conduct of force-on-force inspections, we observed a total of three inspections at two sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's commercial nuclear power plants are potential targets for terrorists seeking to cause the release of radioactive material. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency headed by five commissioners, is responsible for regulating and overseeing security at the plants. In April 2003, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC revised the design basis threat (DBT), which describes the threat that plants must be prepared to defend against in terms of the number of attackers and their training, weapons, and tactics. NRC has also restructured its program for testing security at the plants through force-on-force inspections, which consist of mock terrorist attacks. GAO was asked to review (1) the process NRC used to revise the DBT for nuclear power plants, (2) the actions nuclear power plants have taken to enhance security in response to the revised DBT, and (3) NRC's progress in strengthening the conduct of force-on-force inspections at the plants.
What GAO Found
NRC revised the DBT for nuclear power plants using a generally logical and well-defined process in which trained threat assessment staff made recommendations for changes based on an analysis of demonstrated terrorist capabilities. The process resulted in a DBT requiring plants to defend against a larger terrorist threat, including a larger number of attackers, a refined and expanded list of weapons, and an increase in the maximum size of a vehicle bomb. Key elements of the revised DBT, such as the number of attackers, generally correspond to the NRC threat assessment staff's original recommendations, but other important elements do not. For example, the NRC staff made changes to some recommendations after obtaining feedback from stakeholders, including the nuclear industry, which objected to certain proposed changes such as the inclusion of certain weapons. NRC officials said the changes resulted from further analysis of intelligence information. Nevertheless, GAO found that the process used to obtain stakeholder feedback created the appearance that changes were made based on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than on an assessment of the terrorist threat itself. Nuclear power plants made substantial security improvements in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the revised DBT, including security barriers and detection equipment, new protective strategies, and additional security officers. It is too early, however, to conclude that all sites are capable of defending against the DBT because, as of November 1, 2005, NRC had conducted force-on-force inspections at about one-third of the plants. NRC has improved its force-on-force inspections--for example, by conducting inspections more frequently at each site. Nevertheless, in observing three inspections and discussing the program with NRC, GAO noted potential issues in the inspections that warrant NRC's continued attention. For example, a lapse in the protection of information about the planned scenario for a mock attack GAO observed may have given the plant's security officers knowledge that allowed them to perform better than they otherwise would have. A classified version of this report provides additional details about the DBT and security at nuclear power plants. |
gao_AIMD-95-147 | gao_AIMD-95-147_0 | To determine whether other current INS initiatives will allow identification of aliens arrested for aggravated felonies, we interviewed senior managers and information resource management (IRM) officials at INS headquarters and reviewed documentation pertaining to two initiatives—an INS identification system and a project between INS and the California Department of Justice. To determine whether criminal alien information in INS’ databases is complete and accurate, we focused our review on DACS, INS’ repository for information on identified criminal aliens. Of the 920 individuals, the Phoenix investigator estimated that between 5 and 10 percent (46 to 92) of the released aliens had been arrested for aggravated felonies—the population targeted by the mandate. Other INS Initiatives Offer Possibilities for Identifying Aliens Using Fingerprints
Two other INS initiatives use fingerprints as unique identifiers for aliens. Fingerprint information for an additional 20,254 criminal aliens was to be added to the criminal alien data set by August 1, 1995. In California, many individuals deported as criminal aliens reenter the country illegally after deportation and become repeat offenders. Conclusions
Identifying individuals arrested for aggravated felonies as aliens is critical to joint INS and LEA efforts to prevent the release of these individuals before INS can take action. Our draft stated only that INS is limited in its ability to take appropriate enforcement action against aliens who are arrested for aggravated felonies because of the lengthy time required by LESC to conduct the electronic search and by an INS investigator to conclusively identify the arrested individual as an alien. INS itself has acknowledged these same limitations and is, for this reason, developing IDENT, a fingerprint-based identification system to provide quick, accurate identification of individuals who will be processed for either enforcement or benefit purposes. It provides for queries based on biographical, classification, and citizenship data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiatives for identifying arrested individuals that are aliens, focusing on whether: (1) the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) can use existing databases to identify as aliens individuals arrested for aggravated felonies; (2) other INS initiatives will allow identification of aliens arrested for aggravated felonies; and (3) criminal alien information in two INS databases is complete and accurate.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) LESC allows law enforcement agencies continuous access to INS data, but LESC electronic searches cannot conclusively identify aliens arrested for aggravated felonies, since name-based data can be easily falsified; (2) LESC has initiated enforcement actions on 1,935 aliens, but released 920 additional aliens for various reasons; (3) at least 46 of the 920 aliens released had been arrested for aggravated felonies; (4) INS is planning to fully implement its INS Identification System in 1999 to provide a unique and effective identifier for aliens encountered for enforcement or benefit purposes, but it will include only known criminal aliens in INS databases; (5) INS has recently implemented an initiative to identify criminal aliens entering the country illegally, based on fingerprint data for criminal aliens deported from California; and (6) INS omitted important criminal alien information from certain databases, causing them to be incomplete and inaccurate. |
gao_HEHS-96-207 | gao_HEHS-96-207_0 | 2.) Some also believe that shorter stays make it difficult to assess the mother’s ability and readiness to care for her newborn. Second, the studies do not control for factors other than length of hospital stay that may contribute to readmission rates. Finally, most of these studies address only hospital readmissions, an indicator of serious medical morbidity. Professional Guidelines Focus on Discharge Criteria Rather Than Timing
Health plans and some medical experts we contacted assert that a slightly longer hospital stay may not be enough to address newborn risks, because many neonatal medical problems cannot be reliably detected until 72 hours after birth. Integrated Approach to Maternity Care Should Accompany Early Discharge Policies
Increasingly, health care providers believe that the debate over postpartum hospitalization should focus on the provision of a full range of maternity services, rather than on the length of the hospital stay. Studies have shown that a home visit following a 1-day postpartum stay rarely occurs. Many of the programs we visited stressed the importance of flexibility in early discharge decision-making. Nevertheless, many short-stay maternity patients are not receiving recommended follow-up care. Advocates of a proposed federal maternity care law contend that comprehensive legislation that applies to all insurers is necessary to protect patients from unsafe early discharges. Many Health Plans Are Not Covered by State Requirements
Not all health plans are required to comply with state maternity care requirements. We estimate that about 44 million people in the United States have hospital insurance not regulated by state law because they or their spouses are employed by companies that self-insure. Maternity Care Recommendations From Obstetric and Pediatric Providers
Antepartum, intrapartum, and postpartum courses are uncomplicated Single birth at 38 to 42 weeks’ gestation Vital signs are normal and stable Newborn urinating and stooling successfully At least two successful feedings documented No abnormalities that require continued hospitalization No excessive bleeding at circumcision site for at least 2 hours No significant jaundice in the first 24 hours of life Demonstrated knowledge of breast- or bottle-feeding and of cord, skin, and infant genital care Ability to recognize signs of illness and common infant problems, particularly jaundice and dehydration Proper infant safety, for example, car seat use, positioning for sleep Family or other support persons available who are familiar with lactation and newborn care and illnesses Maternal syphilis and hepatitis B surface antigen status Cord or infant blood type and direct Coombs test result as clinically indicated State regulated screening tests—if performed before 24 hours of milk feeding, a system for repeating the test must be ensured during the follow-up visit Hepatitis B vaccine administered or an appointment made within the first week of life for its administration Identified physician-directed source of continuing medical care for both mother and baby If discharged less than 48 hours after birth, definitive appointment made for the baby to be examined within 48 hours of discharge; follow-up can take place in a home or clinic as long as personnel are competent in newborn assessment and the results are reported to the infant’s physician on the day of the visit Evaluation should include general health, hydration, feeding pattern and technique, stool and urine patterns, maternal/infant interaction, review of laboratory test results or screening tests performed as indicated (continued)
States With Maternity Care Requirements as of September 1, 1996
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues surrounding shortened postpartum hospital stays, focusing on: (1) the risks that are attributable to short hospital stays for maternity care; (2) health plan actions to ensure quality postpartum care for short-stay newborns; and (3) state responses to concerns about patient protection.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) many medical personnel are concerned that early hospital discharges for newborns delay detection of serious disorders that are not apparent in the first 24 hours after birth; (2) 24 hours may not be long enough to assess a new mother's abilities and readiness to take care of her newborn child; (3) studies have not shown a definitive correlation between early discharges and increased hospital readmissions of newborns, but many of the studies' methodologies are seriously flawed; (4) medical experts agree that the quality of maternity care is more important than the length of hospitals stays and that a full range of prenatal, delivery, and postpartum services should be provided; (5) some hospitals and health care plans with early discharge policies have developed programs to ensure that maternity patients receive quality services such as prenatal assessment and education, flexibility that allows physicians to make discharge decisions, and direct, professional follow-up care within 72 hours of discharge; (6) other plans may not provide all of these recommended services and their follow-up care may consist only of a telephone hotline number; (7) 30 states have enacted laws or regulations that require insurers to cover minimum maternity stays, but these efforts vary in scope; (8) self-funded employer insurance plans, and some state Medicaid and employee plans are not subject to these state regulations; (9) applicability questions also arise for those employees who live and work in different states; and (10) Congress is considering legislation to make maternity care more consistent and available to all privately insured women. |
gao_GAO-17-449 | gao_GAO-17-449_0 | The OUSD Comptroller establishes the policies and procedures for DOD’s financial management, including the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund. As part of this role, the OUSD Comptroller provides guidance in DOD’s Financial Management Regulation to operate the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund and to set prices for commodities and services that are to reimburse the fund. DLA Has Contributed to Reductions in Costs and Has Maintained Fairly Constant Prices for Commodities since 2009
Since fiscal year 2009, DLA has contributed to reductions in the costs to provide its commodities and has maintained fairly constant prices for them. When developing annual budgets, DLA has also generally underestimated revenue for commodities, which has contributed to gains that were subsequently applied as reductions to future prices. DOD has taken steps to address weaknesses in this forecasting for commodities through the implementation of the department’s Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan. Such revenue gains have contributed to the marginal increases in DLA’s annual prices for commodities by offsetting inflationary increases in material costs and the relatively smaller revenue losses of fiscal years 2013 and 2014, among other things. DLA Has Contributed to Overall Reductions in Costs but Has Often Significantly Increased Prices for Its Distribution Services
Between fiscal years 2011 and 2015, DLA has contributed to reductions by about 25 percent in its overall operating costs for providing distribution services, in part, through the use of existing authorities to reduce infrastructure, while the indirect portion of these costs increased by 9.4 percent. However, DLA has consistently overestimated revenue since fiscal year 2009 for distribution services, which resulted in losses that DLA must eventually recover in future year prices. In addition, according to DLA officials, they found instances where the military departments had moved storage workload from DLA’s distribution centers to their own storage facilities. DOD Could More Efficiently Use Its Distribution Centers, Including Those That DLA Operates
DOD has taken steps to increase the use of its U.S. distribution centers, but additional opportunities exist to more efficiently use this network of distribution centers, including those that DLA operates. In January 2017, the department revised DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, to require that program managers who are responsible for contracts with DOD maintenance depots store government-owned inventory at DLA’s distribution centers when located in the same geographic area as those depots. Specifically, DOD previously identified inefficiencies, including overlapping and duplicative distribution service functions, across its distribution network. In the context of distribution infrastructure, Strategic Network Optimization program officials identified in 2011 that DLA and the military departments provided distribution services—including storage and processing—at 256 distribution centers in the United States that often are in close proximity to one another and, in some cases located on the same installations. In October 2014, DOD discontinued the Strategic Network Optimization program. We found that DOD had not assessed the extent to which it could use existing authorities to minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication and more efficiently use the department’s network of U.S. distribution centers, beyond the actions DLA has already taken. However, other DOD components could assess and implement similar actions as DLA using existing authorities. Further, in discussing the current fiscal pressures and budgetary constraints within the department and the need to reduce lower priority programs to comply with the Bipartisan Budget Act, DOD’s budget overview for fiscal year 2017 states that “the need to reduce unneeded facilities is so critical that in the absence of authorization for a new round of base realignment and closure, the department will explore any and all authorities that Congress has provided to eliminate wasteful infrastructure.” While these actions may not entirely address inefficiencies in its network of U.S. distribution centers, they could achieve efficiencies and potential cost savings. Without maximizing the use of its existing authorities in the absence of a Base Realignment and Closure round, DOD’s network of distribution centers will continue to result in inefficiencies and pose difficulties in minimizing price increases for distribution services. Further, DOD has identified inefficiencies in how it provides distribution services at its network of U.S. distribution centers. Recommendation for Executive Action
To minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication and more efficiently use DOD’s U.S. distribution centers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (or the subsequent Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment), in conjunction with the Director of DLA, and the Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, to assess and direct the implementation of actions, as appropriate, that can be taken using existing authorities to close, realign, or dispose of existing infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2015, DLA generated $23 billion in revenues from supply chain management sales to the military departments and other customers, such as federal agencies. These sales included commodities and distribution services provided through the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund, a revolving fund.
Senate Report 114-255 and House Report 114-537 included provisions for GAO to evaluate DLA's costs to provide commodities and services using the Defense-wide Working Capital Fund. This report identifies trends in the costs and annual prices that DLA has charged for commodities and distribution services; and evaluates the extent to which DOD has taken steps to more efficiently use its network of U.S. distribution centers. GAO analyzed the most currently available DLA cost data, estimated and actual revenue, and prices for commodities and distribution services since fiscal year 2009; reviewed DOD documentation; and interviewed knowledgeable DOD officials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that since fiscal year 2009, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)—the largest logistics combat support agency for the Department of Defense (DOD)—had reduced costs and maintained fairly constant prices for commodities, such as repair parts, clothing, and food. When developing annual budgets, DLA has generally underestimated revenue from the sales of commodities. The underestimated revenue contributed to gains that were applied to future year prices in the form of reductions, and helped offset inflationary increases in material costs.
GAO also found that since fiscal year 2011, DLA had reduced costs for distribution services (e.g., the processing and storing of inventory) by about 25 percent through the use of existing authorities to reduce infrastructure. However, DLA has often increased annual prices for distribution services by more than 10 percent due, in part, to a declining workload. DLA has generally overestimated revenue from the sales of distribution services. The overestimated revenue contributed to losses as well as to price increases in subsequent years as DLA sought to recover those losses.
DOD has taken steps to increase the use of DLA's 17 U.S. distribution centers to improve efficiency of DLA's operations, but additional opportunities for efficiencies exist across DOD's network of approximately 256 U.S. distribution centers. In January 2017, DOD revised guidance to require storage of government-owned inventory at DLA's distribution centers instead of at privately owned storage when both are located in the same geographic area to reduce costs. DOD has also identified inefficiencies in the provision of its distribution services. Specifically, the military departments, along with DLA, provided distribution services using U.S. distribution centers that often were in close proximity to or located on the same installation. To address inefficiencies, DOD established a program to, among other things, decrease the number of U.S. distribution centers. In October 2014, DOD discontinued the program without implementing its plan to reduce the number of distribution centers. Though DLA has been able to use existing authorities to realign functions and demolish some facilities to gain efficiencies at its distribution centers, DOD officials told us the department needs Base Realignment and Closure authority—a process whereby Congress authorizes an independent federal commission to review and determine whether to forward to the President for approval DOD's proposals to realign and close military installations—to address any additional inefficiencies. GAO found, however, that DOD had not assessed the extent to which the department could further use its existing authorities to minimize unnecessary overlap or duplication in its network of distribution centers. Without assessing the use of its existing authorities, inefficiencies in DOD's network of U.S. distribution centers that the department has previously identified may remain.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD assess and direct the implementation of actions, as appropriate, that can be taken using existing authorities to close, realign, or dispose of existing infrastructure to more efficiently use the department's network of U.S. distribution centers. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-668 | gao_GAO-14-668_0 | Background
Every 4 years, DOD is required to conduct and report on a comprehensive assessment—the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review—of the roles and missions of the armed services and the core competencies and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such roles and missions. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review that resulted in the July 2012 submission occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews that DOD has undertaken over the past 5 years. For more information about the Defense Strategic Guidance and other selected strategy and planning documents, see appendix I.
DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information in Its Report to Congress or Conduct a Comprehensive Process for Assessing Roles and Missions
DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information to Congress
In July 2012, DOD submitted the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report, together with the Defense Strategic Guidance, to Congress to meet the statutory reporting requirement; however, DOD’s submission did not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily required elements of the assessment. Although the statute does not require DOD to report on all elements of the roles and missions assessment, a key principle for information quality indicates that information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently detailed.armed services and some information about core capabilities, but did not, Specifically, we found that DOD provided the missions of the for any of the 10 missions, clearly identify the components within the department responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities, or identify any plans to address any capability gaps or unnecessary duplication. Instead DOD limited its approach to leveraging the results of another review, conducted in 2011, that resulted in the January 2012 release of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Internal stakeholder involvement: The involvement of key internal stakeholders was limited. Time frames: DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for conducting the assessment and completing the report. According to DOD officials, the primary reason that they did not perform a separate effort to examine roles and missions is that the statutory assessment and reporting requirements of the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review are largely duplicative of the review conducted for the Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as other reviews and processes. However, by not conducting a specific, comprehensive roles and missions assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to examine these issues through a broad, department-wide approach, rather than through processes established for other purposes. A comprehensive process that outlined a planned approach for addressing all statutory requirements of the roles and missions assessment; involved key internal stakeholders; offered an opportunity for key external stakeholders, such as Congress, to provide input regarding the department’s approach; and set clear time frames to gauge progress for the assessment, would have helped provide DOD with reasonable assurance that its resulting assessment of roles and missions was comprehensive and that DOD was positioned to provide such a sufficiently detailed report to Congress. Recommendation for Executive Action
To assist DOD in conducting any future comprehensive assessments of roles and missions that reflect appropriate statutory requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive process that includes a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to inform the assessment, that addresses all statutory requirements; the involvement of key DOD stakeholders, such as the armed services, Joint Staff, and other officials within the department; an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment; and time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for reporting on its results. Regarding external stakeholders, the department stated that it did seek limited additional clarification from Congress prior to conducting the roles and missions assessment, but did not seek formal input to the assessment from other federal agencies because it relied on the external stakeholder input obtained during the development of the Defense Strategic Guidance. The department’s approach resulted in a report that was insufficiently detailed, therefore, we continue to believe the recommendation is valid to guide future roles and missions reviews. DOD issued the latest report on this biennial review in April 2013. Sustaining U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is one of the largest organizations in the world, with its budget representing over half of the U.S. federal government's discretionary spending. According to DOD, the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges. Congress requires DOD to assess and report on its roles and missions every 4 years. In July 2012, DOD submitted its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report.
In June 2013, GAO was mandated to review DOD's process for conducting the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and missions. GAO compared DOD's July 2012 report with the statutory requirements for the assessment, and compared DOD's assessment process with key principles derived from a broad selection of principles GAO and other federal agencies have identified.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) July 2012 submission to Congress following its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review did not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily required elements of the assessment. Specifically, DOD's July 2012 submission included the results of a 2011 review that led to the January 2012 release of a new strategic guidance document (hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) as well as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report. Although DOD is not statutorily required to report on all elements of the assessment, the submission that it provided to Congress was lacking key information. A key principle for information quality indicates that information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently detailed; however, neither the Defense Strategic Guidance nor the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review included sufficiently detailed information about certain key elements of the roles and missions assessment. For example, while the submitted documents identify the core missions of the armed services and provide some information on capabilities associated with these missions, neither document provides other information required by the roles and missions assessment—including identifying the DOD components responsible for providing the identified core competencies and capabilities and identifying plans for addressing any unnecessary duplication or capability gaps.
DOD's process for assessing roles and missions missed key principles associated with effective and comprehensive assessments. Specifically, DOD limited its process to leveraging the prior review that resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance; by doing so its process did not include the following:
A planned approach : DOD did not develop or document a planned approach that included the principles or assumptions used to inform the assessment.
Internal stakeholder involvement: DOD included limited internal stakeholder involvement. For example, DOD gave the armed services a limited opportunity to review the draft prior to its release.
Identification and involvement of external stakeholders : DOD obtained limited input from relevant external stakeholders, such as Congress, on the specific guidance and direction they expected of the roles and missions assessment.
Time frames : DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for conducting the assessment and completing the report, which may have contributed to the report being provided to Congress over 5 months late.
DOD officials stated that the primary reason that they did not perform a separate roles and missions review is that the statutory requirements were duplicative of other reviews and processes, such as the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, by not conducting a comprehensive assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to conduct a department-wide examination of roles and missions. Instead, by relying on processes established for other purposes, DOD has limited assurance that it has fully identified all possible cost savings that can be achieved through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and that it has positioned itself to report clear and sufficient information about the statutorily required assessment to Congress.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, in conducting future assessments of roles and missions, DOD develop a comprehensive process that includes a planned approach, involvement of key internal and external stakeholder involvement, and time frames. DOD partially concurred, stating that it had leveraged other processes. GAO maintains that the roles and missions report was insufficiently detailed and continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-403T | gao_GAO-09-403T_0 | Because MDA develops and fields assets continuously, it combines developmental testing with operational testing. Due to the complexity, scale, safety constraints, and cost involved, MDA is unable to conduct a sufficient number of flight tests to fully understand the performance of the system. One such grouping is the annual performance assessment, a system-level end-to-end simulation that assesses the performance of the BMDS configuration as it exists in the field. MDA however was only able to conduct two, as shown in figure 1. GMD was unable to conduct either of its planned intercept attempts during fiscal year 2008 – FTG-04 and FTG-05. According to MDA no more CE-I EKV flight tests have been approved. Poor Target Missile Performance Continues to Hamper BMDS Testing
Problems with the reliability and availability of targets (which are themselves ballistic missiles) have increasingly affected BMDS development and testing since 2006. Specifically, the reduced productivity of testing has delayed understanding the overall performance of BMDS, production and fielding have in some cases gotten ahead of testing, and declarations of capabilities ready for fielding have been made based on fewer tests and less modeling and simulation than planned. Production and Fielding Proceed Despite Delays in Testing and Assessments
Testing problems have contributed to a concurrent development, manufacturing and fielding strategy in which assets are produced and fielded before they are fully demonstrated through testing and modeling. For example, although a test of the ability of the SM-3 Block 1A missile to engage and intercept a long range ballistic target was delayed until the third quarter of fiscal year 2009, MDA purchased 20 of the missiles in fiscal year 2008 ahead of schedule. Review of BMDS Modeling and Testing Holds Promise, but Must Anticipate Contingences
MDA has undertaken a three-phase review of the entire BMDS modeling, simulation, and test program. According to MDA, the three phases involve identifying critical variables that have not been proven to date, determining what test scenarios are needed to collect the data, and developing an affordable and prioritized schedule of flight and ground tests. Nonetheless, the review appears to offer a sound approach for closing the gaps that exist between testing, modeling, and simulation. In addition to linking the critical modeling and simulation variables with test events, the review will have to address the factors that have limited the productivity of the current test approach, such as the availability and performance of targets. An important consideration in this regard is for modeling, simulation, and testing events to be re-synchronized so that they properly inform decisions on producing, fielding, and declaring assets operational. Contingency plans could then be formed for adjusting the pace of these decisions should shortfalls occur in modeling, simulation, or testing. MDA has indicated that this new approach to testing will take time to implement, with partial implementation in fiscal year 2010 and full implementation not occurring until fiscal year 2011. Therefore, MDA must manage the transition to the new testing approach. In particular, the ambitious fiscal year 2009 flight test plan may need to be reassessed with the goal of establishing a robust series of tests that can withstand some delays without causing wholesale changes to the test plan during the transition. In the mean time, MDA will have to be prudent in making decisions to produce and field additional assets. Our annual report on missile defense is in draft and with DOD for comment. It will be issued in final by March 13, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has spent about $56 billion and will spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). This testimony is based on two reviews GAO was directed to conduct in 2008. In addition to our annual review assessing the annual cost, testing, schedule, and performance progress MDA made in developing BMDS, we have also reported on MDA's targets program. In this testimony we discuss (1) the productivity of MDA's recent test program, (2) the consequences of the testing shortfalls, and (3) key factors that should be considered as MDA revises its approach to testing. GAO assessed contractor cost, schedule, and performance; tests completed; and the assets fielded during 2008. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the activities of a new missile defense board.
What GAO Found
The scale, complexity, cost and safety associated with testing the missile defense system constitute a unique challenge for MDA, test agencies and other oversight organizations. This challenge is heightened by the fact that missile defense assets are developed, produced, and fielded concurrently. Overall, during fiscal year 2008, testing has been less productive than planned. While MDA completed several key tests that demonstrated enhanced performance of BMDS, all elements of the system had test delays and shortfalls, in part due to problems with the availability and performance of target missiles. GMD in particular was unable to conduct either of its two planned intercept attempts in fiscal year 2008. While it did subsequently conduct one in December 2008, it was not able to achieve all primary objectives because the target failed to release its countermeasures. As a result, aspects of the fielded ground-launched kill vehicles may not be demonstrated since no more flight tests have been approved. Target missiles continue as a persistent problem in fiscal year 2008 as poor target performance caused several tests to either fail in part or in whole. Testing shortfalls have had several consequences. First, they have delayed the validation of models and simulations, which are needed to assess the system's overall performance. As a result, the performance of the fielded BMDS as a whole cannot yet be determined. Second, the production and fielding of assets has continued and in some cases has gotten ahead of testing. For example, enhanced Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles will now be produced and delivered before they are flight tested. Third, MDA has relied on a reduced basis--fewer test, model, and simulation results--to declare capabilities as operational in the field. MDA has undertaken a three-phase review of the entire BMDS test program that involves identifying critical variables that have not been proven to date, determining what test scenarios are needed to collect the data, and developing an affordable, prioritized schedule of flight and ground tests. This review, as long as it continues to involve test and evaluation organizations, appears to offer a sound approach for closing the gaps that exist between testing, modeling, and simulation. Critical to being able to implement the approach will be addressing the factors that have limited the productivity of the current test approach, such as the availability and performance of targets. An additional consideration in a new testing approach must be to ensure that assets are sufficiently tested before they are produced and fielded. An important consideration in this regard is for modeling, simulation, and testing events to be re-synchronized so that they properly inform decisions on producing, fielding, and declaring assets operational. Contingency plans could then be formed for adjusting the pace of these decisions should shortfalls occur in modeling, simulation, or testing. Because MDA has indicated implementation will take time, managing the transition may need to include reassessing the ambitious fiscal year 2009 test plan. In the mean time, MDA will have to be prudent in making decisions to produce and field assets. |
gao_AIMD-98-77 | gao_AIMD-98-77_0 | Material Weaknesses
During our audit of IRS’ fiscal year 1997 Custodial Financial Statements, we identified six material weaknesses that adversely affected IRS’ ability to safeguard assets from material loss, assure material compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and assure that there were no material misstatements in the financial statements. However, this approach required numerous audit adjustments to produce reliable balances. We also noted that IRS’ financial management systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of FFMIA, which is reportable under OMB Bulletin 98-04. However, we believe that IRS’ internal controls, taken as a whole, were not effective in satisfying the control objectives discussed above during fiscal year 1997 because of the severity of the material weaknesses in internal controls described in this report, which were also cited by IRS in its fiscal year 1997 FIA report. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, we examined, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the Custodial Financial Statements; assessed the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management in the preparation of the Custodial Financial Statements; evaluated the overall presentation of the Custodial Financial Statements; obtained an understanding of internal controls related to safeguarding assets, compliance with laws and regulations, including execution of transactions in accordance with budget authority and financial reporting; tested relevant internal controls over safeguarding, compliance, and financial reporting and evaluated management’s assertion about the effectiveness of internal controls; tested compliance with selected provisions of the following laws and regulations:
Internal Revenue Code (appendix I),
Debt Collection Act, as amended {31 U.S.C. § 3515, 3521 (e)-(f)}, and
Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 {31 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) custodial financial statements for fiscal year (FY) ending September 30, 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the IRS custodial financial statements were reliable in all material respects; (2) IRS management's assertion about the effectiveness of internal controls stated that except for the material weaknesses in internal controls presented in the agency's FY 1997 Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FIA) report, internal controls were effective in satisfying the following objectives: (a) safeguarding assets from material loss; (b) assuring material compliance with laws governing the use of budget authority and with other relevant laws and regulations; and (c) assuring that there were no other material misstatements in the custodial financial statements; (3) however, GAO found that IRS' internal controls, taken as a whole, were not effective in satisfying these objectives; (5) due to the severity of the material weaknesses in IRS' financial accounting and reporting controls, all of which were reported in IRS' FY 1997 FIA report, extensive reliance on ad hoc programming and analysis was needed to develop financial statement line item balances, and the resulting amounts needed material audit adjustments to produce reliable custodial financial statements; and (6) one reportable noncompliance with selected provisions of laws and regulations GAO tested, and that IRS' financial management systems do not substantially comply with the requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. |
gao_HEHS-98-202 | gao_HEHS-98-202_0 | As part of this role, DHS (1) licenses nursing homes to do business in California; (2) certifies to the federal government, by conducting reviews of nursing homes, that the homes are eligible for Medicare and Medicaid payment; and (3) investigates complaints about care provided in the licensed homes. Serious Care Problems Found in Many Nursing Homes Reviewed
The work of our expert nurses indicates that some of California’s nursing home residents who died in 1993 received unacceptable care that, in certain cases, endangered their health and safety. Their deaths were alleged to have been caused by unacceptable nursing home care. State’s Quality Reviews Show Substantial Care Problems Occurring Today
DHS surveyors identified a substantial number of homes with serious care problems through their annual standard surveys of nursing homes and through ad hoc complaint investigations. Surveys’ Predictable Timing Likely Conceals Additional Care Problems
The extent of care problems is likely to be masked because of the predictability of homes’ standard surveys. Studies of nursing home quality cite questionable accuracy of resident medical records as a problem. 8 for examples of such problems in home A.) 9.) In the background to its final regulations, HCFA stated that its system of requirements implementing OBRA 87 reforms “was built on the assumption that all requirements must be met and enforced” and that its enforcement actions will encourage “sustained compliance.” In addition, HCFA noted that “our goal is to promote facility compliance by ensuring that all deficient providers are appropriately sanctioned.” However, our data suggest that current enforcement efforts in California are not reaching the stated goal to ensure that all requirements are met and deficient providers are appropriately sanctioned, and also may not fulfill the OBRA 87 promise to protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights of residents. In the recent past, California’s terminated homes have rarely closed for good. In a number of cases, this responsibility has not been met in California. In addition, DHS surveyors may overlook significant findings because the federal survey protocol they follow does not rely on an adequate sample for detecting potential problems and their prevalence. Federal policies allowing a grace period to correct deficiencies and to accept a home’s report of compliance without an on-site review can be useful policies, given resource constraints, when applied to homes with less serious problems. Recommendations
In order to better protect the health, safety, welfare, and rights of nursing home residents and ensure that nursing homes sustain compliance with federal requirements, we recommend that the HCFA Administrator revise federal guidance and ensure state agency compliance through taking the following actions:
Stagger or otherwise vary the scheduling of standard surveys to effectively reduce the predictability of surveyors’ visits; the variation could include segmenting the standard survey into more than one review throughout the 12- to 15-month period, which would provide more opportunities for surveyors to observe problematic homes and initiate broader reviews when warranted. We believe that basing a conclusion about the predictability of the annual survey primarily on analysis of OSCAR data is problematic, given weaknesses we identified in the classification of surveys entered into the database. DHS officials generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. More specifically, we assessed (1) whether, as alleged, residents who died in 1993 from certain causes had received unacceptable care that could have endangered their health and safety, and whether serious care problems currently exist; (2) the adequacy of federal and state efforts in monitoring nursing home care through annual surveys; and (3) the effectiveness of federal and state efforts to enforce sustained compliance with federal nursing home requirements. Comments From the Health Care Financing Administration
Comments From California’s Department of Health Services
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed allegations that residents in California nursing homes are not receiving acceptable care, focusing on: (1) examining, through a medical record review, whether these allegations had merit and whether serious care problems currently exist; (2) reviewing the adequacy of federal and state efforts in monitoring nursing home care through annual surveys; and (3) assessing the effectiveness of federal and state efforts to enforce sustained compliance with federal nursing home requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite the federal and state oversight infrastructure currently in place, certain California nursing homes have not been and currently are not sufficiently monitored to guarantee the safety and welfare of their residents; (2) GAO reached this conclusion primarily using data from federal surveys and state complaint investigations conducted by California's Department of Health Services (DHS) on 1,370 California homes, supplemented with more in-depth analysis of certain homes and certain residents' care; (3) GAO found that surveyors can miss problems that affect the safety and health of nursing home residents and that even when such problems are identified, enforcement actions do not ensure that they are corrected and do not recur; (4) with regard to allegations made about avoidable deaths in 1993, GAO's expert nurses' review of the 62 resident cases sampled found that residents in 34 cases received care that was unacceptable and that sometimes endangered their health and safety; (5) in the absence of autopsy information or other additional clinical evidence, GAO cannot be conclusive about the extent to which this unacceptable care may have contributed directly to individual deaths; (6) unacceptable care continues to be a problem in many homes; (7) GAO believes that the extent of serious care problems portrayed in federal and state data is likely to be understated; (8) GAO found that homes could generally predict when their annual on-site reviews would occur and, if inclined, could take steps to mask problems otherwise observable during normal operations; (9) GAO found irregularities in the homes' documentation of the care provided to their residents; (10) in visiting homes selected by California DHS officials, GAO found multiple cases in which DHS surveyors did not identify certain serious care problems; (11) surveyors missed these care problems because federal guidance on conducting surveys does not include sampling methods that can enhance the spotting of potential problems and help establish their prevalence; (12) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) enforcement policies have not been effective in ensuring that the deficiencies are corrected and remain corrected; (13) California's DHS grants all noncompliant homes, with some exceptions, a 30- to 45-day grace period, during which they may correct the deficiencies without penalty; (14) a substantial number of California's homes that have been terminated and later reinstated have soon thereafter been cited again for serious deficiencies; and (15) the problems GAO identified are indicative of systemic survey and enforcement weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-11-711 | gao_GAO-11-711_0 | The first set of these data will be submitted to HHS in June 2012, reflecting insurers’ experiences from 2011. Traditional MLRs on Average Generally Exceeded PPACA MLR Standards, but Varied, Particularly among Individual Market and Smaller Insurers
Traditional MLR averages generally exceeded the PPACA MLR standards in each market, even without the changes in the new PPACA MLR formula that will generally further increase MLRs. However, traditional MLRs also varied among insurers, particularly among those in the individual market and smaller insurers. Within this variation in the individual market, a larger proportion of insurers generally had lower MLRs; that is, they spent a lower percentage of their premiums on medical claims, as compared to insurers in the small and large group markets. Traditional MLRs were also more varied for smaller insurers in all three markets from 2006 through 2009. PPACA MLRs Will Be Affected by Changes in the MLR Calculation and Insurers’ Ability to Provide More Precise Data in 2011 and Beyond
The insurers we interviewed said their PPACA MLRs will be affected by changes in the MLR formula, primarily due to the deduction of taxes and fees in the denominator, and to a lesser extent, the addition of expenses for activities to improve health care quality in the numerator. Insurers said they expect the precision of their PPACA MLR data to improve in 2011 and beyond, in part because their 2010 MLRs were based on best estimates. Insurers Reported That Changes in the Way MLRs Are Calculated Will Affect Their PPACA MLRs
Most of the insurers we interviewed reported that the deduction of taxes and fees in the denominator of the PPACA MLR formula would contribute to the largest change in 2010 MLRs compared to the traditional MLR formula, but some insurers said the effect of the deductions vary by state and may vary in 2011 and beyond. Because HHS’s interim final rule on PPACA MLRs was published in late 2010, insurers told us that they used their best estimates to apply the PPACA definition to experiences incurred earlier in the year. For example, one insurer told us that their health IT is a centralized function that is also used for other lines of insurance business, such as Medicare and Medicaid, which they said are not subject to PPACA MLR requirements. Insurers Reported That They Are Making or Considering Changes to Brokers’ Commissions and Premiums, and to Other Business Practices
Almost all of the insurers we interviewed were reducing brokers’ commissions and making adjustments to premiums in response to the PPACA MLR requirements. These insurers said that they have decreased or plan to decrease commissions to brokers in an effort to increase their MLRs. Insurers we interviewed varied on how the PPACA MLR requirements might affect their decisions on activities to improve health care quality. This insurer also said the PPACA MLR requirements provide an incentive to spend more money on quality improvement activities, which will affect their decisions on implementing new activities in the future. Conversely, five other insurers told us that the PPACA MLR requirements are not a factor in decisions about their activities to improve health care quality. Insurers we interviewed also varied on how the PPACA MLR requirements may affect where they do business. For example, one large insurer that operates in multiple states said that they have exited the individual market in one state where they did not have a large market share, in part, because of the MLR requirements, and they are evaluating whether to exit this market in other states where it might be difficult to meet the PPACA MLR requirements. One for-profit insurer told us that they plan to exit or stop issuing new business in the individual market in multiple states as well as consolidating some of their insurance companies in some states in which they did not think they would meet PPACA MLR requirements. Several other insurers said that the PPACA MLR requirements will not affect decisions on where they do business. Additionally, we provided a draft of this report to NAIC for comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help ensure that Americans receive value for their premium dollars, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) established minimum "medical loss ratio" (MLR) standards for health insurers. The MLR is a basic financial indicator, traditionally referring to the percentage of premiums spent on medical claims. The PPACA MLR is defined differently from the traditional MLR. Beginning in 2011, insurers must meet minimum MLR requirements or pay rebates to enrollees. While insurers' first set of data subject to the MLR requirements will be for 2011, and is not due until June 2012, insurers prepared preliminary PPACA MLR data for 2010. GAO examined: (1) what can be learned from the traditional MLR data reported by health insurers prior to PPACA; (2) what factors might affect the MLRs that insurers will report under PPACA; and (3) what changes in business practices, if any, have insurers made or planned to make in response to the PPACA MLR requirements. GAO analyzed premiums, claims, and traditional MLR data for nearly all insurers for 2006- 2009 and interviewed a judgmental sample of seven insurers--selected to provide a range based on their size, profit status, and the number of states in which they operated--about their experiences using the PPACA MLR definition.
What GAO Found
From 2006 through 2009, traditional MLRs on average generally exceeded PPACA MLR standards. This is even without the additional components in the new PPACA MLR that will generally increase MLRs. However, traditional MLRs also varied among insurers. Traditional MLRs within the individual market varied more than those within the small and large group markets, and a larger proportion of individual market insurers generally had lower MLRs. Additionally, traditional MLRs varied more among smaller insurers than among larger insurers in all three markets. Some components of the PPACA MLR requirements may mitigate the implications of some of these variations. The insurers GAO interviewed said their PPACA MLRs will be affected by changes in the MLR formula and their ability to provide more precise data in 2011 and beyond. Most of these insurers reported that the deduction of taxes and fees in the PPACA MLR formula would contribute to the largest change in their 2010 MLRs. Including expenses for activities to improve health care quality was also cited as a factor affecting insurers' MLRs but to a lesser extent. In addition, because insurers had limited time to respond to HHS's interim final rule on PPACA MLRs, which was published in late 2010, they said that their 2010 MLRs were based in part on best estimates. Insurers said they expect their ability to provide more precise PPACA MLR data will improve in 2011 and beyond. Most of the insurers GAO interviewed were reducing brokers' commissions and making adjustments to premiums, as well as making changes to other business practices, in response to the PPACA MLR requirements. Almost all of the insurers said they had decreased or planned to decrease commissions to brokers in an effort to increase their MLRs. Insurers varied on how the PPACA MLR requirements might affect their decisions to implement activities to improve health care quality. While one insurer said that their decision to implement new activities would be affected by whether or not an activity could be included as a quality improvement activity in the PPACA MLR formula, other insurers said that the PPACA MLR requirements are not a factor in such decisions. Insurers also differed on how the PPACA MLR requirement may affect where they do business. One insurer said that they have considered exiting the individual market in some states in which they did not expect to meet the PPACA MLR requirements, while several other insurers said that the PPACA MLR requirements will not affect where they do business. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) said that the MLR provision will increase transparency in the insurance market and value for consumers' premiums. |
gao_NSIAD-96-10 | gao_NSIAD-96-10_0 | Volpe Center contracting is regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. DOD Cost Initiative Expanded Statutory Requirements
In advance of promulgating regulations, the Secretary issued a policy memorandum in February 1994 that imposed limitations on the use of Economy Act orders by DOD activities. The Secretary’s policy, which addressed Economy Act orders released outside of DOD for contract action, was, however, more stringent than either the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 or the Economy Act in the area of cost considerations by requiring a determination that the supplies or services cannot be provided “as conveniently and cheaply” by contracting directly with a private source. Coast Guard Has Initiated Cost Reforms Similar to DOD
The Coast Guard, which is a component of the Department of Transportation, has acquired services from the Volpe Center. In November 1994, the Coast Guard issued an instruction providing guidance on its use of the center. DOD Is Still Adjusting to Contracting Changes
The Air Force, Army, and Navy have each taken a different approach to implementing the Secretary’s policy memorandum. While there is considerable up-to-date guidance available to contracting officials on interagency purchases, not all DOD files on Volpe Center projects we reviewed contained required information. In addition, DOD has not yet implemented a statutorily mandated monitoring system for interagency purchases; the monitoring system is currently scheduled for implementation in October 1995. The D&F must be approved at a level no lower than senior executive service, flag or general officer, or activity commander. However, the more recent declines may be a result of the 1993 Subcommittee hearing, resulting legislation, and the 1994 implementation of a more restrictive contracting environment by the Secretary of Defense. As with the DOD data, it is difficult to identify exact causes for the downward trend. FASA did not require the more stringent “and” language applicable within DOD. Such procedures are consistent with FASA. We performed work at the Department of Transportation’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Headquarters, United States Coast Guard, Washington, D.C. We also contacted policy representatives within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the: (1) impact of the Department of Defense's (DOD) policy changes for interagency orders on the Department of Transportation's Volpe National Transportation Systems Center; and (2) Coast Guard's recent initiatives and legislative changes extending the statutory requirements on interagency orders to other federal agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because of past practices, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 required the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations that strengthened controls over DOD's interagency orders for goods and services; (2) in a February 1994 memorandum, and in advance of the statutorily required regulations, the Secretary took additional steps to increase DOD's interagency transaction controls by requiring, among other things, that DOD's interagency orders be as convenient and cheap as other alternatives and approved at a level no lower than senior executive service, general officer, flag officer, or activity commander; (3) in November 1994, the Coast Guard independently developed reforms that paralleled these DOD initiatives; (4) DOD is still adjusting to the changes introduced by Congress and the Secretary; (5) there is an abundance of guidance available to Air Force, Army, and Navy contracting activities, but a sample of fiscal year (FY) 1995 Volpe Center purchases showed that not all files contained the information required by the Secretary's memorandum; (6) in addition, DOD has not yet implemented a statutorily mandated monitoring system for its interagency purchases; (7) the monitoring system is currently scheduled for implementation in October 1995; (8) DOD contracting with the Volpe Center has been declining since FY 1992; (9) while it is difficult to pinpoint exact causes for the downward trend, more recent declines appear to be a result of DOD's implementation of the more restrictive environment for interagency orders; (10) likewise, a similar recent decline in Coast Guard purchases at the Volpe Center appears to be related to the introduction of the Coast Guard reforms; (11) the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) generally extended the restrictive interagency transaction controls applicable to DOD to other federal agencies; and (12) the implementing draft regulation, while consistent with FASA, is not as stringent as the DOD or Coast Guard cost policies. |
gao_GAO-06-73 | gao_GAO-06-73_0 | 1). D.C. Authorizing Boards Differed in Revenue and Their Use of D.C. Government Services, but Spent Their Financial Resources on Similar Oversight Activities
The two D.C. authorizers’ revenue, staff, and use of available D.C. services differed, but the authorizers spent their funds on similar activities. To help fulfill its oversight responsibilities, the BOE Office of Charter Schools occasionally called upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews and used some D.C. Public School services. Despite these differences, both authorizers used their financial resources similarly. BOE Office of Charter Schools Received Less Funding and Had Fewer Staff to Oversee Fewer Schools Than PCSB, but Used More Available Government Services
The BOE Office of Charter Schools received less funding from its two main sources of revenue—the local funds allocated to it by the BOE and the administrative fees it was permitted to charge the schools it oversaw— than the corresponding amounts received by the PCSB (see table 2). PCSB Received More Funding and Had More Staff to Oversee Schools, and Used Fewer Available Government Services
In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the PCSB received more revenue, had a larger staff and oversaw more schools than the BOE Office of Charter Schools. The BOE Office of Charter Schools used a larger percentage of its total expenses for consultants than the PCSB. Both authorizers provided charter schools with assistance and had similar oversight practices, such as visiting each school at least once annually to assess performance and school operations. The BOE Office of Charter Schools, staffed with only three employees, provided the same level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and in doing so limited its ability to provide additional assistance to those schools needing more help. Moreover, the BOE, which was also responsible for 167 traditional public schools, did not regularly review information collected by its Office of Charter Schools. By contrast, the PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools and those where problems had been identified. The PCSB also integrated technical assistance and monitoring. The PCSB’s targeted monitoring approach also highlighted problems at both of the PCSB’s schools that later closed. Authorizers Undertook a Wide Range of Activities When Schools Closed, but the Process Was Not Well Defined
When charter schools have closed, both authorizers undertook a wide range of activities to ensure student records and public assets were safeguarded, parents informed of their children’s school options, and closing schools received the assistance they needed; however, issues arose during closings that both found difficult to readily address. Managing Student Records Was the Most Challenging Aspect of School Closings
Both authorizers reported managing and safeguarding student records was the most challenging aspect of closing schools. To help alleviate confusion among parents, students and school administrators following the closure of a charter school and to help the D.C. authorizers close schools efficiently, we recommend that the BOE Office of Charter Schools, the PCSB and D.C. Public Schools establish a routine process when schools close, including, among other things, a system for the secure transfer and maintenance of student records. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As required by the D.C. Appropriations Act of 2005, we conducted a review of D.C.’s two charter school authorizers, the Board of Education (BOE) and the Public Charter School Board (PCSB). Charter Schools: Limited Access to Facility Financing. | Why GAO Did This Study
D.C. has a larger percentage of students in charter schools than any state. To help oversee D.C. charter schools, Congress established two authorizers--the Board of Education (BOE), which has an Office of Charter Schools responsible for oversight, and the independent Public Charter School Board (PCSB). Congress required the GAO to conduct a study of the authorizers. This report--which completes GAO's May 2005 study--examines the (1) authorizers' resources, (2) oversight practices, and (3) actions taken once charter schools close. GAO examined BOE and PCSB monitoring reports, revenue and expenditure documents, and closure procedures.
What GAO Found
The two D.C. charter school authorizers differed in revenue, number of staff overseeing schools, and use of D.C. services, but both spent their funds to support oversight activities. The BOE Office of Charter Schools had less revenue and fewer staff overseeing fewer schools than PCSB. It fulfilled its oversight responsibilities by using some D.C. Public School services and also occasionally calling upon D.C. agencies for financial operations reviews. The PCSB had a larger staff that oversaw more schools and had revenue more than two times larger than that of the BOE Office of Charter Schools. The PCSB did not use any D.C. Public Schools services, but did refer one school to a D.C. agency for further examination. Despite these differences, both authorizers used most of their fiscal year 2004 expenses for in-house board operations, such as personnel, and also hired consultants to help monitor charter schools. Both D.C. authorizers provided technical assistance to schools and had similar oversight practices, such as tracking school academics and finances, but took different approaches. The BOE Office of Charter Schools, with only 3 staff, provided the same level of oversight to all of its 16 schools and thereby limited its ability to target additional resources to schools requiring more assistance. Moreover, when the BOE Office of Charter Schools gave its Board monitoring information on its charter schools, the Board--also responsible for the city's 167 traditional schools--did not regularly review that information. In contrast, the PCSB targeted additional oversight on new charter schools and those where problems had been identified. The PCSB also granted more flexibility to well-managed schools. Although problems persisted at some schools, the PCSB's targeted system enabled it to focus more attention on these schools. Once D.C. charter schools closed, both authorizers took a number of actions to safeguard student records and public assets and inform parents of their children's educational options; however, issues arose that both authorizers found difficult to adequately address, particularly when the closed school was insolvent. Managing and safeguarding student records was the most expensive and challenging aspect of closing schools, authorizers reported. Moreover, the authorizers' closure processes were different each of the 9 times charter schools closed, which limited opportunities to build on past experiences. |
gao_GAO-17-238T | gao_GAO-17-238T_0 | Background
With a cost of about $12.3 billion, the 2010 Census was the most expensive population count in U.S. history, costing about 31 percent more than the $9.4 billion 2000 Census (in constant 2020 dollars). 2016 Census Test Highlighted NRFU Challenges
NRFU generally proceeded according to the Bureau’s operational plans. However, our observations and the Bureau’s preliminary data at both test sites found that (1) there were a large number of non-interviews, and (2) enumerators had difficulty implementing new census-taking procedures. According to the Bureau, non-interviews are cases where either no data or insufficient data were collected, in part because the cases reached the maximum number of six attempted visits without success or were not completed due to, for example, language barriers or dangerous situations. According to preliminary 2016 Census Test data, there were 19,721 NRFU cases coded as non-interviews in Harris County, Texas and 14,026 in Los Angeles County, California, or about 30 and 20 percent of the test workload respectively. For the 2010 and earlier decennials, enumerators collected information during NRFU using pencil and paper. Enumerators Faced Challenges Implementing New Procedures
According to the Bureau, its plans to automate the assignment of NRFU cases have the potential to deliver significant efficiency gains. At the same time, refinements to certain enumeration procedures and better communication could produce additional efficiencies by enabling the Bureau to be more responsive to situations enumerators encounter in the course of their follow-up work. Enumerators were unable to access recently closed incomplete cases. In response to problems observed during the Bureau’s 2014 and 2015 Census tests and complaints from property managers about multiple uncoordinated visits by enumerators, the Bureau’s 2016 Census Test introduced specific procedures to conduct initial visits to property managers in large multi-unit apartment buildings. The Bureau Has Fundamentally Re- engineered Address Canvassing for 2020
The Bureau has reengineered its approach to building its master address list for 2020. The Bureau estimates that the two phases of in-office canvassing will result in roughly 25 percent of housing units requiring in-field canvassing, instead of canvassing nearly all housing units in the field as done previously. During this phase, clerks use aerial imagery, street imagery, and data from the U.S. Postal Service, as well as from state, local, and tribal partners when reviewing blocks. The Bureau plans to rely on the in-office part of address canvassing to validate a large part of the addresses added to the list during that program where data are available to permit it. The Bureau is testing its re-engineered address canvassing operation in two sites through December 2016—in Buncombe County, North Carolina, and St. Louis, Missouri. Although the innovations the Bureau is planning with its reengineered address canvassing have the potential to reduce costs, they entail some risks that could affect the cost or quality of the address canvassing operation. According to the Bureau, these risks include:
Locating Hidden Housing Units. Monitoring Change in the Housing Stock. Obtaining Quality Data. Lessons Learned from the 2010 Census Can Be Applied to Preparations for 2020
The Bureau goes to great lengths each decade to improve specific census-taking activities. While preparations for 2020 are still underway, and with testing still occurring, the Bureau’s experience in planning for 2010 can enhance its readiness for 2020. For example, as the Bureau continues its planning efforts for 2020, our prior work indicates that it will be essential for it to address the following three lessons learned:
Ensure key census-taking activities are fully tested
Develop and manage on the basis of reliable cost estimates
Sustain workforce planning Ensure key census-taking activities are fully tested. Recently, we reported in our review of the Bureau’s October 2015 life- cycle cost estimate that in order for the Bureau to improve its ability to control the cost of the 2020 Census, it will be critical for it to have better control over its cost estimation process. Sustain attention to workforce planning. Going forward, once the Bureau has the test results, past experience has also shown the importance of refining operations as needed based on the results of the tests, incorporating lessons learned from 2010 as appropriate, and making needed changes to its design in time to be included in the Bureau’s End-to-End Test scheduled for 2018. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a life-cycle cost of about $12.3 billion, the 2010 Census was the most expensive U.S. census in history. To help control costs and maintain accuracy, the 2020 Census design includes new procedures and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. While these innovations show promise for a more cost-effective head count, they also introduce risks. As a result, it is important to thoroughly test the operations planned for 2020.This testimony focuses on (1) the preliminary results to date of the Bureau's 2016 Census Test in Los Angeles County, California, and Harris County, Texas; (2) the Bureau's plans for the upcoming test of address canvassing procedures in Buncombe County, North Carolina, and St. Louis, Missouri; and (3) the lessons learned from the 2010 Census that can be applied to preparations for 2020.
This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing reviews of the 2016 Census Test and Address Canvassing Test. For these studies, GAO reviewed Bureau documents and preliminary data, interviewed Bureau officials, and made site visits to observe census operations. This testimony is also based on prior GAO work on lessons learned from the 2010 Census.
What GAO Found
GAO preliminarily found that during the 2016 Census Test, nonresponse follow-up (NRFU), where enumerators visit households that did not respond to the census, generally proceeded according to the Census Bureau's (Bureau) operational plans. However, data at both test sites indicate that the Bureau experienced a large number of non-interviews. The Bureau considers non-interviews to be cases where either no data or insufficient data are collected. Bureau officials are not certain why there were so many non-interviews for the test and are researching potential causes. In addition, the Bureau's plan to automate the assignment of NRFU cases to enumerators has the potential to deliver significant efficiency gains as compared to paper-based operations conducted in previous decennial censuses, according to the Bureau. GAO preliminarily found that improvements to certain enumeration procedures and better training could produce additional efficiencies by enabling the Bureau to be more responsive to situations enumerators encounter on the ground. These improvements include providing more flexible access to recently closed, incomplete cases; enumerator interview training with multi-unit property managers; and operational procedures to make use of local data on the best time to attempt interviews.
The Bureau has reengineered its approach to building its master address list for 2020 in part by introducing a two-phase "in-office" process that systematically reviews small geographic areas nationwide. The goal is to limit the more expensive and traditional door-to-door canvassing to those areas most in need of updating, such as areas with recent housing growth. The in-office phases rely on aerial imagery, street imagery, geographic information systems and address file data from state, local, and tribal partners. The Bureau estimates that the new process will result in about 25 percent of housing units requiring field canvassing compared to the traditional process where all housing units were canvassed. The Bureau has identified a series of risks that could affect the cost or quality of the address canvassing operation, including locating hidden housing units such as converted garages, monitoring change in housing stock, and obtaining quality data. The Bureau is testing its reengineered address canvassing operation in two sites through December 2016--in Buncombe County, North Carolina, and St. Louis.
The Bureau's experience in planning for the 2010 decennial can enhance its readiness for 2020. Going forward, GAO's prior work indicates it will be important for the Bureau to address several key lessons learned, including: (1) ensuring key census-taking activities are fully tested, (2) developing and managing on the basis of reliable cost estimates, and (3) sustaining workforce planning efforts to ensure it has the optimal mix of skills to cost-effectively conduct the enumeration.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made several recommendations to the Census Bureau in prior reports on cost estimation and workforce planning. The Bureau has implemented the workforce planning recommendations, and agreed with and plans to implement the cost estimation recommendations. |
gao_T-AIMD-00-181 | gao_T-AIMD-00-181_0 | The ILOVEYOU Worm/Virus
ILOVEYOU is both a “virus” and “worm.” Worms propagate themselves through networks; viruses destroy files and replicate themselves by manipulating files. The damage resulting from this particular hybrid— which includes overwhelmed e-mail systems and lost files–is limited to users of the Microsoft Windows operating system. ILOVEYOU typically comes in the form of an e-mail message from someone the recipient knows with an attachment called LOVE-LETTER- FOR-YOU.TXT.VBS. When opened and allowed to run, however, ILOVEYOU attempts to send copies of itself using Microsoft Outlook (an electronic mail software program) to all entries in all of the recipient’s address books. Soon after initial reports of the worm/virus surfaced in Asia on May 4, ILOVEYOU proliferated rapidly throughout the rest of the world. Despite Efforts to Enhance Federal Response to Computer Attacks, Agencies Were Not Effectively Warned About ILOVEYOU
Recognizing the increasing computer-based risks to our nation’s critical infrastructures, the federal government has taken steps over the past several years to create capabilities for effectively detecting, analyzing, and responding to cyber-based attacks. However, the events and responses spawned by ILOVEYOU demonstrate both the challenge of providing timely warnings against information-based threats and the increasing need for the development of national warning capabilities. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), located in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is responsible for serving as the focal point in the federal government for gathering information on threats as well as facilitating and coordinating the federal government’s response to incidents affecting key infrastructures. Moreover, once an imminent threat is identified, appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated among federal agencies, the private sector, state and local governments, and even other nations. To date, the NIPC has had some success in providing early warning about impending threats. However, the NIPC had less success with the ILOVEYOU virus. Over the next 2 hours, the NIPC checked other sources in attempts to verify the initial information with limited success. NIPC did not issue an alert about ILOVEYOU on its own web page until 11 a.m., May 4—hours after many federal agencies were reportedly hit. For the most part, agencies themselves responded promptly and appropriately once they learned about the virus. Lastly, we found that the few federal components that either discovered or were alerted to the virus early did not effectively warn others. In particular, agencies can teach computer users that e-mail attachments are not always what they seem and that they should be careful when opening them. They can ensure that up-to-date virus detection software has been installed on their systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the ILOVEYOU computer virus, focusing on measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of future attacks.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) ILOVEYOU is both a virus and a worm; (2) worms propagate themselves through networks, and viruses destroy files and replicate themselves by manipulating files; (3) the damage resulting from this hybrid is limited to users of the Microsoft Windows operating system; (4) ILOVEYOU typically comes in the form of an electronic mail (e-mail) message from someone the recipient knows; (5) when opened and allowed to run, the virus attempts to send copies of itself to all entries in all of the recipient's address books; (6) soon after initial reports of the virus surfaced in Asia, the virus proliferated rapidly throughout the rest of the world; (7) recognizing the increasing computer-based risks to the nation's critical infrastructures, the federal government has taken steps over the past several years to create capabilities for effectively detecting, analyzing, and responding to cyber-based attacks; (8) however, the events and responses spawned by ILOVEYOU demonstrate both the challenge of providing timely warnings against information based threats and the increasing need for the development of national warning capabilities; (9) the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) is responsible for serving as the focal point in the federal government for gathering information on threats as well as facilitating and coordinating the federal government's response to incidents impacting key infrastructures; (10) once an imminent threat is identified, appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated among federal agencies, the private sector, state and local governments, and other nations; (11) NIPC has had some success in providing early warnings on threats, but had less success with the ILOVEYOU virus; (12) for over 2 hours after NIPC first learned of the virus, it checked other sources in attempts to verify the initial information, with limited success; (13) NIPC did not issue an alert about ILOVEYOU on its own web page until hours after federal agencies were reportedly hit; (14) agencies themselves responded promptly and appropriately once they learned about the virus; (15) GAO found that the few federal components that either discovered or were alerted to the virus early did not effectively warn others; (16) to prevent future virus attacks, agencies can teach computer users that e-mail attachments are not always what they seem and that they should be careful when opening them; and (17) agencies can ensure that up-to-date virus detection software has been installed on their systems. |
gao_GAO-14-17 | gao_GAO-14-17_0 | Foreclosure Rescue Schemes Remain at High Levels and Have Become More Complex
Since our report in 2010, data collected by federal agencies suggest that foreclosure rescue schemes have increased. These data show an increase each year from 2009 to 2011, and a slight decline in the number of complaints in 2012. Consumer Complaints and Suspicious Activity Reports about Foreclosure Rescue Schemes Increased after 2009
Consumer Complaints Reported by FTC and Lawyers’ Committee
FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network, an online database available to law enforcement agencies, compiles consumer complaints received by FTC and law enforcement and other organizations, including other federal and state agencies and nonprofit organizations. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) receives SARs from financial institutions about suspected violations of financial laws and regulations. More Complex Schemes Have Emerged, and Some Groups Continue to Be Targeted
Several agency officials and representatives of nonprofits told us that foreclosure rescue schemes had become more complex over time. The apparent increase in the prevalence of schemes involving attorneys has created new challenges for law enforcement. Officials we spoke with for this report noted that some populations continued to be the targets of these schemes. Agency officials and representatives of other organizations continued to cite the challenges to combating these schemes that we noted in 2010. FFETF Members Have Focused on Prevention, Detection, and Enforcement to Combat Foreclosure Rescue Schemes
Since we last reported on this issue in 2010, FFETF and its members have undertaken a number of activities intended to enhance coordination among federal, state, and local authorities responsible for combating foreclosure rescue schemes. Examples of MFWG’s outreach and education efforts include holding regional education summits for distressed homeowners, housing counselors, and public advocates and directing more individuals to FFETF’s mortgage fraud information on its website, StopFraud.gov, which FFETF considers a one-stop site for consumers to learn how to protect themselves from becoming victims and to report cases of fraud. In addition, CFPB has begun collecting consumer complaints about these schemes and submits them to the FTC’s Consumer Sentinel Network. MFWG Has Focused on Facilitating Information Sharing and Coordination as Key Efforts to Enhance Enforcement
Multiple representatives of MFWG member agencies that we contacted told us that MFWG had facilitated information sharing and coordination among enforcement agencies on investigations. Between 2009 and 2012, working group members using joint investigations and broad enforcement initiatives coordinated their investigations and successfully filed criminal charges against more than 226 defendants allegedly involved in foreclosure rescue schemes. Cases were also filed against 128 civil defendants in federal courts across the country. In its written comments, Treasury noted that it valued GAO’s insights as it continues to combat foreclosure rescue schemes. SIGTARP in its written comments stated that it concurred with the sections of the report related to SIGTARP’s work and noted that it has made significant progress in combating these schemes and will continue to work with law enforcement partners to investigate them. We also contacted seven member agencies of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s (FFETF) Mortgage Fraud Working Group (MFWG) that were active in combating foreclosure rescue schemes—the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, the Department of Justice, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and its Office of Inspector General, FTC, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and its Office of Inspector General, the Department of the Treasury, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the U.S. We also spoke with a number of nonprofit organizations that are actively addressing these schemes. To determine the status and scope of the federal government’s multiagency effort and other major efforts to combat these schemes, we interviewed officials and obtained relevant documentation from FFETF and MFWG members listed previously. | Why GAO Did This Study
In July 2010, GAO reported on federal efforts to combat foreclosure rescue schemes--schemes that promise but do not deliver foreclosure prevention assistance. Subsequently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to study interagency efforts to crack down on these schemes. This report updates GAO's 2010 report and examines (1) available information about the prevalence and nature of foreclosure rescue schemes, and (2) the status and scope of the federal government's multiagency effort and other major initiatives to combat them. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed consumer complaints, obtained information from federal agencies participating in FFETF, and interviewed representatives of six states with high populations of borrowers at risk of foreclosure, and nonprofit organizations that are also making efforts to combat these schemes.
In its written comments, Treasury noted that it valued GAO's insights as it continues to combat foreclosure rescue schemes. The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program concurred with the findings related to its work and noted that it has made significant progress in combating these schemes and will continue to work with law enforcement partners to investigate them.
What GAO Found
Foreclosure rescue schemes remain at historically high levels and have become more complex. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network--an online database of consumer complaints received by FTC, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations--showed that complaints about these schemes rose from around 9,000 in 2009 to more than 18,000 each year in 2010, 2011, and 2012. In addition, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network reported steady increases over the same period in the number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR)--reports filed by financial institutions about suspected violations of financial laws and regulations--related to these schemes. Agency officials and representatives of nonprofits told GAO that the schemes had become increasingly complex, creating challenges for law enforcement. For example, schemes involving attorneys--which tend to involve greater losses--had become more common in recent years following a regulation that bans upfront fees, but provides an exception for attorneys. These schemes present unique challenges because attorneys typically collect fees upfront and enforcement officials have difficulty trying to determine whether attorneys are providing legitimate services. Furthermore, officials and representatives of nonprofits also noted that some populations, including minorities and the elderly, continued to be targeted.
Since GAO last reported on this issue in 2010, the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) and its members have undertaken a number of actions to educate borrowers on how to avoid being victimized by these schemes. These efforts have also emphasized the need for consumers and institutions to report possible fraudulent schemes and the importance of enhanced information sharing among law enforcement agencies investigating and prosecuting these schemes. Specifically, FFETF members have developed and participated in various outreach efforts, including hosting regional education summits for distressed homeowners, counselors, and law enforcement officials and directing more individuals to resources on FFETF's mortgage fraud webpage, StopFraud.gov. FFETF member agencies' fraud detection efforts have focused on gathering information from SARs and complaints from the FTC Consumer Sentinel Network and sharing this information among members. Member agencies that GAO contacted also indicated that information sharing and coordination on investigations among FFETF members had led to joint investigations and broad enforcement initiatives. For example, one year-long multiagency effort resulted in criminal charges against 107 defendants. Cases were also filed against 128 civil defendants in federal courts across the country. |
gao_GAO-16-341 | gao_GAO-16-341_0 | Resolution Plans
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act requires bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in consolidated assets and nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to periodically submit to FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, and FSOC resolution plans that detail how the companies could be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner in the event of material financial distress or failure. The rule requires companies subject to the rule to file plans annually but implements filing deadlines on a staggered schedule that is generally based on companies’ total nonbank assets (or, in the case of foreign-based companies, their total U.S. nonbank assets). However, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors did not make a similar not credible determination, but instead said that the companies must take meaningful action to improve their resolvability under the Code. U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Financial Companies, and Federal Regulators
Bankruptcy is a federal court procedure conducted under the Code. Both regulators have processes for staffing review teams, determining whether a plan includes all required information, assessing whether a plan’s strategy mitigates obstacles to the company’s orderly resolution, and documenting and vetting team findings and conclusions. Although the regulators’ review processes are separate, the regulators coordinate with each other in various ways, such as in their discussions about review findings and their communications with companies. They also typically prepare memorandums documenting their horizontal reviews. The regulators also have coordinated on the guidance and feedback they provide to companies. FDIC and the Federal Reserve Have Made Progress Assessing Resolution Plans but Have Faced Challenges Providing Transparent and Timely Feedback
FDIC and the Federal Reserve have made progress reviewing the resolution plans that companies submitted each year from 2012 to 2014 but have provided limited disclosures about their reviews and have not always provided companies enough time to incorporate feedback given the annual filing cycle. According to the Office of Management and Budget’s directive on open government, transparency promotes accountability by providing the public with information about government activities. Without more fully disclosing the regulators’ frameworks for reviewing plans and identifying plan deficiencies, the companies lack key information for assessing and improving their plans. Without greater transparency, the lack of a clear understanding of the regulators’ decisions, including the reasons for viewing certain companies as less risky and allowing certain companies to file reduced plans, may weaken public and market confidence in resolution planning and limit the extent to which the regulators can be held accountable for their decisions. As shown in table 4, our analysis of the 2012, 2013, and 2014 resolution plan reviews found that the regulators required around 5 to 13 months (or close to 9 months on average) to review the plans and jointly provide companies with written guidance or feedback. However, the resolution plan rule’s annual filing cycle may not be feasible. Federal Reserve officials attributed their long review time, in part, to the plans’ complexity and said that companies ideally should have 6 months to incorporate regulatory feedback. Stakeholders’ Views on the Usefulness of Resolution Plans Vary
According to companies and stakeholders that we interviewed, resolution planning has improved the resolvability of SIFIs under the Code. The larger filers we interviewed generally said that resolution planning had led to some operational improvements, while the smaller filers we interviewed generally said that they had reaped few benefits from resolution planning. Additionally, regulators are using plans to enhance their supervision of large financial companies. However, uncertainty exists about the plans’ ability to provide for a rapid and orderly resolution of the largest SIFIs, in part because none has used its plan to go through bankruptcy. At the same time, the regulators told us that they were incurring considerable costs to review the plans, and companies said that complying with the rule also had raised their costs. As previously discussed, the regulators have developed and revised their approaches for analyzing and assessing the plans but have publicly disclosed limited information about their reviews. The regulators have not disclosed their assessment frameworks and criteria for confidentiality reasons, which limits the potential for companies to better achieve the Dodd- Frank Act’s objective. Because the resolution plan rule requires companies to file plans annually, some companies may not have sufficient time to fully incorporate such guidance or feedback into their subsequent plans and obtain their board of directors’ approval of the plans by the submission deadline. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the processes used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) (jointly, the regulators) to review resolution plans; (2) the extent to which the regulators have determined whether resolution plans are not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code; and (3) stakeholder views on the usefulness of the resolution plans to companies and other stakeholders. To examine the process used by the regulators to review resolution plans and the extent to which the regulators have determined whether resolution plans are not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the Code, we reviewed Section 165(d) of the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the final resolution plan rule, and FDIC’s and the Federal Reserve’s policies and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires bank holding companies with $50 billion or more in total assets and nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council for supervision by the Federal Reserve to prepare plans for their rapid and orderly resolution under the Code. In 2011, the regulators issued a rule to require companies to annually file a resolution plan. If they jointly found a plan was not credible, the company could be subject to more stringent requirements. GAO was asked to review the regulators' programs for assessing resolution plans. This report examines each regulator's review processes, the progress made in assessing plans, and stakeholder views on the usefulness of the plans.
GAO analyzed FDIC's and the Federal Reserve's policies and procedures, documentation of plan reviews, guidance and feedback provided to companies, and public plans. GAO also interviewed the regulators, a judgmental sample of 25 companies (18 percent of all companies required to file a plan) based on assets, and a variety of market participants and academics based on their expertise, experience working with companies, or use of public plans.
What GAO Found
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) have developed separate but similar review processes for determining whether a resolution plan is “not credible” or would not facilitate a company's orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code). Both regulators have processes for staffing review teams, determining whether a plan includes all required information, assessing whether a plan's strategy mitigates obstacles to the company's orderly resolution, and documenting and vetting team findings and conclusions. Although the regulators' review processes are separate, the regulators coordinate with each other by meeting jointly with companies, working together to discuss and share review findings, and jointly issuing guidance and feedback to companies.
The regulators have made progress assessing resolution plans but have provided limited disclosures about their reviews. Following their 2012, 2013, and 2014 plan reviews, the regulators clarified and expanded their expectations for the plans—jointly providing companies with guidance or feedback. The regulators did not jointly make any not-credible determinations but reported they may do so for the 2015 plans. However, they have not disclosed their frameworks for determining whether a plan is not credible. They also developed but have not disclosed their criteria for reducing plan requirements for many smaller companies. Without greater disclosure, companies lack information they could use to assess and enhance their plans. The regulators view such information as confidential, but a federal directive on open government recognizes that transparency promotes accountability by providing more information on government activities. A lack of information on how the regulators assess plans and allow some companies to file reduced plans could undermine public and market confidence in resolution plans.
In addition, the resolution plan rule requires companies to annually submit plans approved by their board of directors. However, the annual filing cycle may not be feasible. GAO found that the regulators took 9 months, on average, to complete their reviews. FDIC said companies can take up to 3 months to obtain internal approval of their plans. The regulators attributed their long review time in part to the plans' complexity, and one regulator said that companies ideally should have 6 months to incorporate feedback. Absent a longer filing cycle, companies may not have sufficient time to revise their plans to incorporate regulatory feedback intended to enhance their resolvability under the Code.
According to companies and stakeholders that GAO interviewed, resolution planning has improved the resolvability of large financial companies under the Code. Companies with $100 billion or more in nonbank assets generally said that resolution planning also had led to some operational improvements, but companies with less than $100 billion in nonbank assets generally said that they had reaped few benefits from resolution planning. However, whether the plans of the largest companies actually would facilitate their rapid and orderly resolution under the Code is uncertain, in part because none has used its plan to go through bankruptcy. At the same time, the regulators told GAO that they were incurring costs to review the plans, and companies said that complying with the rule also had raised their costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDIC and the Federal Reserve publicly disclose information about their assessment frameworks and reduced plan criteria for smaller companies and revise the annual filing requirement. The regulators agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GGD-96-9 | gao_GGD-96-9_0 | He said that restoring aircraft is not needed to preserve them. NASM commits relatively few resources to aircraft restoration, compared to other museum activities and another federally funded air museum. Once NASM’s mission is clarified, NASM would be better able to develop criteria for what constitutes historically and technologically significant aircraft and, in the context of such criteria, which aircraft it should have in its collection to fulfill its mission, considering available resources and the adequacy of storage facilities. Using additional second-party restorations would help preserve NASM’s collection, alleviate its storage capacity problems, and share its collection with the public. The planned extension at Dulles Airport should help alleviate NASM’s storage facility problems, but funding is uncertain and the extension may take several years to complete. One option that may be available to reduce costs would be to limit the new space to the same size of current storage facilities. In addition to storing aircraft in substandard space, NASM does not have a management plan for each aircraft that describes (1) whether and how the aircraft will be used in future exhibits, (2) to what extent and when it will be restored, and (3) who is responsible for monitoring its condition. We further recommend that the new Director of NASM develop a management plan for those aircraft that are to remain in the NASM collection that includes (1) whether and how exhibits will be developed for purposes of displaying the collection, (2) the extent to which each aircraft will be restored and when such restoration will be done, and (3) which organization will be responsible for monitoring each aircraft; develop a plan to increase the interaction of the curators and collections management staff; and further explore private funding alternatives and the feasibility of options to better care for aircraft, such as constructing a smaller, environmentally controlled facility to house those aircraft that will remain in the collection and are currently in inadequate storage facilities, as an initial phase of the Dulles Airport extension. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed aircraft restoration at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum (NASM), focusing on: (1) the adequacy of facilities for preserving aircraft; and (2) options to improve NASM aircraft restoration efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NASM: (1) commits fewer resources to aircraft restoration than it does to its other museum activities; (2) lacks adequate space to properly display or store restored aircraft; (3) must determine how to better preserve its aircraft collection despite its limited financial resources and lack of space; (4) needs to develop criteria for what constitutes historically significant aircraft and consider which aircraft should be kept in its collection; (5) could help preserve its aircraft collection, alleviate its storage capacity problems, and share its collection with the public by using second-party restorations; (6) expansion plans at Dulles Airport could help alleviate storage facility problems, but funding is uncertain and the extension could take years to complete; (7) could reduce short-term costs by limiting the new storage space to the same size as current storage facilities; and (8) does not have a management plan describing how each aircraft will be used in future exhibits, the extent that each aircraft will be restored, and who is responsible for monitoring the condition of each aircraft. |
gao_GAO-03-1134T | gao_GAO-03-1134T_0 | Cumulatively, these weaknesses and the efforts needed to resolve them to achieve sound financial management and business processes are an important reason for amending the CFO Act to include DHS and measuring DHS’s financial management systems and internal control against the same important financial reform legislation and performance expectations as other federal departments and agencies. In fiscal year 2002 FEMA’s auditors reported six material internal control weaknesses and that FEMA’s financial management systems were not in substantial compliance with the requirements of FFMIA. In addition, like INS, Customs faces additional financial management challenges because it was split into various components. Steps for Establishing Sound Financial Management and Business Processes
Successful financial management of DHS will depend on the department producing financial information that provides useful information for executive decision making. After studying the financial management practices and improvement efforts of nine leading private and public sector finance organizations, we identified several success factors, practices, and outcomes associated with world- class financial management. First and foremost, establishing the following goals is key to developing a world-class finance organization with sound financial management and business processes: (1) make financial management an entitywide priority, (2) redefine the role of the finance organization, (3) provide meaningful information to decision makers, and (4) build a team that delivers results. As you know, DHS is not currently subject to the provisions of the CFO Act, and thus has no legal requirement to comply with its provisions. DHS should adopt these success factors in building a financial management team that delivers results. Though creating and maintaining these structures will be demanding and time consuming, it is necessary to effectively implement the national homeland security strategy. We are committed to working in a coordinated effort with the Congress, DHS, and its auditors to provide advice to DHS on developing a sound financial management structure that will facilitate, and not hamper, its mission of securing the homeland. We believe that passage of H.R. 2886 will further assist DHS in meeting this goal. Comments on H.R. 2886 as introduced on July 24, 2003 would amend the CFO Act to (1) add DHS as a CFO Act agency and remove FEMA as a CFO Act agency, (2) require DHS to obtain an audit opinion on its internal controls, and (3) require DHS to include program performance information in its performance and accountability reports. In addition, H.R. 2886 as introduced would have provided a waiver allowing DHS to forego a financial statement audit for fiscal year 2003. We understand an agreement has been reached to remove this waiver from the proposed legislation. The waiver option is, therefore, no longer needed, and we support dropping the provision from H.R. 2886. Inclusion of DHS as a CFO Act Agency
We supported passage of the CFO Act in 1990 and continue to strongly support its objectives of (1) giving the Congress and agency decision makers reliable financial, cost, and performance information both annually and, most important, as needed throughout the year to assist in managing programs and making difficult spending decisions, (2) dramatically improving financial management systems, controls, and operations to eliminate fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and properly safeguard and manage the government’s assets, and (3) establishing effective financial organizational structures to provide strong leadership. Appointment of the CFO by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, is one way to help ensure that the goals of the CFO Act are met and that has proven itself over time. Under the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002, DHS, as an executive branch agency with budget authority greater than $25 million, would be required to obtain annual financial statement audits; however, its auditors would not have to report on compliance with FFMIA. Auditor reporting on internal control is a critical component of monitoring the effectiveness of an organization’s accountability. GAO strongly believes that this is especially important for very large, complex, or challenged entities. We fully support having DHS, as well as all CFO Act agencies, obtain an opinion on its internal control. We strongly encourage DHS to consolidate this information in its accountability report beginning with fiscal year 2003. High-Risk Series: An Update. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. Executive Guide: Creating Value Through World-class Financial Management. GAO/AMID-00-134. | Why GAO Did This Study
Based on its budget, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the largest entity in the federal government that is not subject to the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990. The department, with an estimated $39 billion in assets, an almost $40 billion fiscal year 2004 budget request, and more than 170,000 employees, does not have a presidentially appointed CFO subject to Senate confirmation and is not required to comply with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996. In addition, we designated implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk based on three factors: (1) the implementation and transformation of DHS is an enormous undertaking that will take time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner, (2) components to be merged into DHS already face a wide array of existing challenges, and (3) failure to effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially very serious consequences. In light of these conditions, Congress asked GAO to testify on the financial management challenges facing DHS, steps for establishing sound financial management and business processes at DHS, and GAO's comments on H.R. 2886, The Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act.
What GAO Found
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 brought together 22 agencies to create a new cabinet-level department focusing on reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and minimizing damages and assisting in recovery from attacks that do occur. Meeting this mission will require a results-oriented environment with a strong financial management infrastructure. Creating strong financial management at DHS is particularly challenging because most of the entities brought together to form the department have their own financial management systems, processes, and in some cases, deficiencies. Four of the seven major agencies that transferred to DHS reported 18 material weaknesses in internal control for fiscal year 2002 and five of the seven major agencies had financial management systems that were not in substantial compliance with FFMIA. For DHS to develop a strong financial management infrastructure, it will need to address these and many other financial management issues. Through the study of several leading private and public sector finance organizations (Creating Value Through World-class Financial Management, GAO/AIMD-00-134), GAO has identified success factors, practices, and outcomes associated with world-class financial management. Four steps DHS can take to begin developing sound financial management and business processes are to: (1) make financial management an entity-wide priority, (2) redefine the role of the finance organization, (3) provide meaningful information to decision makers; and (4) build a team that delivers results. H.R. 2886 can help facilitate the creation of a first-rate financial management architecture at DHS by providing the necessary tools and setting high expectations. The bill would (1) make DHS a CFO Act agency, (2) require DHS to obtain an opinion on its internal controls, and (3) require DHS to include program performance information in its performance and accountability reports. GAO fully supports the objectives of the CFO Act to provide reliable financial information and improve financial management systems and controls and believes DHS should be included under the act and therefore also subject to FFMIA. Further, GAO strongly believes that auditor reporting on internal control can be a critical component of monitoring the effectiveness and accountability of an organization and supports DHS, as well as other CFO Act agencies, obtaining such opinions. In addition, GAO supports agencies including program performance information in their performance and accountability reports and strongly encourages DHS to report this information voluntarily. Finally, as introduced, H.R. 2886 provided a waiver allowing DHS to forego a financial statement audit for fiscal year 2003. We understand an agreement has been reached to remove this waiver from the proposed legislation. DHS has committed to a 2003 financial statement audit, which is already underway. GAO supports dropping this provision from H.R. 2886. |
gao_GAO-16-142 | gao_GAO-16-142_0 | According to DIV officials, the program does not outline specific problems to be solved or propose specific solutions but is intentionally open-ended, funding grants on the basis of three core principles:
Evidence: rigorous evaluation of what works and what does not, scaling up only those solutions proven to produce demonstrable impact
Cost-effectiveness: potential to deliver greater development impacts per dollar than traditional development assistance
Potential to scale up: a plan to deliver and maintain widespread impact by increasing the geographic scope of operations and reaching financial sustainability beyond DIV’s support through private or public funding Managed at USAID headquarters, DIV takes a venture capital approach to investing in innovations, by awarding grants through a three-stage funding model. DIV Has Funded Innovation Projects across Nine Sectors and Has Concentrated Funding Largely in Two Countries and among Four Grantees
In fiscal years 2010 through 2015, DIV obligated approximately $72.5 million for innovation projects across nine sectors, including energy, economic growth, health, and education. 1). Lack of DIV Performance Targets Makes It Difficult to Determine Progress
DIV has developed and is collecting data for several program-level performance measures, which show some positive outcomes, but has not established specific targets for these measures, making it difficult to assess DIV’s progress. For example, applications that DIV funded in India generally met the program’s evidence requirements, such as including evaluation plans. DIV also has recently taken action to ensure that the final reports and evaluations of its projects are publicly disseminated, as generally required by USAID policy. DIV Grantees in India Provided Final Reports and Evaluations That Generally Met DIV’s Requirements
Based on our review of DIV documents, we found that most DIV grantees in India provided final reports and evaluations that met DIV’s requirements. DIV’s Limited Collaboration with Similar Innovation Programs in India Has Contributed to Missed Opportunities to Share Information and Leverage Resources
DIV and other U.S.-funded innovation programs in India support similar objectives and beneficiaries, and in several cases these programs have funded the same types of innovations. Without such an approach, USAID may not be capitalizing on opportunities to gain efficiencies and maximize the impact of its innovation programs. According to these officials, there is a vast need for innovations, such as clean energy and off-grid electricity, which improve the lives of the poor in that country. Although USAID’s mission in India prioritized innovation and modeled one of its programs after DIV, DIV and the mission collaborated to a limited extent during the implementation of DIV’s projects. Establish performance targets that will allow periodic assessment of DIV’s progress toward achieving its goal. 2. Establish a joint approach to collaboration reflecting agreement with the USAID mission in India and with other related U.S. agency programs in India, and consider where such a joint approach would be beneficial in other countries. USAID also discussed steps it is taking to respond to the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) program. In this report, we examine the DIV program’s (1) distribution of funding and (2) efforts to measure progress toward achieving its goals, and for DIV’s activities in India, we examine (3) the extent to which DIV uses evidence to make funding decisions and assess results and (4) DIV’s collaboration with other similar U.S. development assistance innovation programs. To examine the distribution of DIV funding, we obtained and analyzed funding data for projects from fiscal years 2010 to 2015. Based on our analysis of USAID project data, we selected India as a nongeneralizable case study for two objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
USAID established the DIV program in 2010 with a goal of creating a portfolio of innovations that contribute to reducing global poverty. Borrowing from the venture capital model, DIV seeks to identify and test innovative development solutions based on three core principles: rigorous evidence, cost-effectiveness, and potential to scale up. As of 2014, India was the largest recipient of DIV funding, representing approximately one-third of the program's portfolio.
In this report, GAO examines the DIV program's (1) distribution of funding and (2) efforts to measure progress toward achieving its goals, and for DIV's activities in India, GAO examines (3) the extent to which DIV uses evidence to make funding decisions and assess results and (4) DIV's collaboration with similar U.S. development assistance innovation programs. GAO reviewed and analyzed DIV documents and data for fiscal year 2010 to 2015, and interviewed agency officials and grant recipients. GAO selected India as a nongeneralizable case study and conducted fieldwork in that country.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2010 to 2015, the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) program obligated approximately $72.5 million for innovation projects to reduce poverty across a range of sectors, including energy, health, and education. In India, for example, DIV funded intensive learning camps that group children by reading and math abilities rather than by grade level, and a solar micro-grid service providing lighting to off-grid customers for approximately $0.27 per week. While DIV has a global focus and is open to applications regardless of source, approximately 52 percent of its funding is concentrated in two countries, India and Kenya, and 40 percent of its funding is concentrated with four grantees.
DIV is collecting data for several program-level performance measures, which show some positive outcomes, but has not established targets for these measures, making it difficult to assess DIV's progress. GAO's review of DIV's draft framework indicates that it does not include performance targets.
DIV has applied evidence-based requirements for awarding grants and assessing results, emphasizing rigorous evaluations. Specifically, applications that DIV funded in India have generally met the program's evidence requirements, such as including evaluation plans. DIV grantees in India have also provided final reports and evaluations that generally met DIV's requirements. In addition, DIV recently has taken action to ensure that the final reports and evaluations of its projects are publicly disseminated, as generally required by USAID policy.
DIV's limited collaboration with similar U.S.-funded innovation programs in India has contributed to missed opportunities to share information and leverage resources. DIV and several other U.S.-funded programs in India support similar objectives and beneficiaries. For example, the strategy of the USAID mission in India focuses, in part, on innovation and modeled its Millennium Alliance program after DIV. Such programs have funded some similar innovations, such as “clean” cook stoves and low-cost eyewear. Although DIV has begun implementing a plan to improve collaboration, it does not yet reflect a joint approach among similar programs, including those of other agencies. Without such an approach, DIV may not be capitalizing on opportunities to gain efficiencies and maximize the impact of its innovation programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID establish (1) performance targets to assess DIV's progress toward its goal and (2) a joint approach to collaboration for similar programs in India, while considering such an approach in other countries, as appropriate. USAID agreed with these recommendations and noted steps it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-06-846 | gao_GAO-06-846_0 | DOD and the Services Have Limited Visibility over Recruiter Irregularities
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. Accordingly, the services use different terminology, which makes it difficult to compare and analyze data across the services. DOD Lacks an Oversight Framework to Provide Guidance on Recruiter Irregularities, and Has Not Established Criteria to Characterize Irregularities
Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide accountability and to assure that they are well designed and operated, appropriately updated to meet changing conditions, and achieving program objectives. Without an oversight framework to provide complete and reliable data, DOD and the services are not in a position to gauge the extent of recruiter irregularities or when corrective action is needed, nor is the department in a sound position to give Congress and the general public assurance that recruiter irregularities are being addressed. Many Factors May Affect the Recruiting Environment
A number of factors within the current recruiting environment may contribute to recruiting irregularities. These factors, coupled with the typical difficulties of the job and pressure to meet monthly recruiting goals, challenge the recruiter and can lead to recruiter irregularities in the recruiting process. In fiscal year 2005, three of the eight active and reserve components we reviewed—the Army, Army Reserve, and Navy Reserve—failed to meet their recruiting goals. Recruiters also believe that the ongoing hostilities in Iraq have made their job harder. Almost three-quarters of active duty recruiters who responded to DOD’s survey stated that they worked more than 60 hours a week on recruiting or recruiting-related duties. In addition to performance evaluations, the services provide awards to recruiters that are generally based on the number of contracts that a recruiter writes, rather than on the number of applicants that graduate from basic training and join the military. The department concurred with our recommendations in order to enhance recruiter success and help recruiters focus on DOD’s strategic retention goal, and it indicated that the Secretary of Defense would instruct the services to link recruiter awards more closely to recruits’ successful completion of basic training. Services Have Standard Procedures in Place for Administering Military Justice to Address Recruiter Irregularities
The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and procedures. DOD concurred with our recommendations to establish an oversight framework to assess recruiter irregularities and provide overall guidance to the services; to establish criteria and common definitions across the services for maintaining data on recruiter irregularities; and for the services to develop internal systems and processes that better capture and integrate data on recruiter irregularities. As we stated in our report, data that the services reported to us show that the number of allegations, substantiated cases, and criminal violations all increased from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005. While we did conclude from the data services provided to us that recruiter wrongdoing did not appear to be widespread, we also stated our belief that service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities, and further concluded that DOD is not in a position to answer questions about these allegations and service-identified incidents because it does not know the full extent to which the services are tracking recruiter irregularities or addressing them. Finally, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command and two military entrance processing stations regarding recruiter irregularities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The viability of the All Volunteer Force depends, in large measure, on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to recruit several hundred thousand individuals each year. Since the involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq in March 2003, several DOD components have been challenged in meeting their recruiting goals. In fiscal year 2005 alone, three of the eight active and reserve components missed their goals. Some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly aggressive tactics, which can adversely affect DOD's ability to recruit and erode public confidence in the recruiting process. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities; what factors may contribute to recruiter irregularities; and what procedures are in place to address them. GAO performed its work primarily at the service recruiting commands and DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command; examined recruiting policies, regulations, and directives; and analyzed service data on recruiter irregularities.
What GAO Found
DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. DOD, for example, has not established an oversight framework that includes guidance requiring the services to maintain and report data on recruiter irregularities and criteria for characterizing irregularities and establishing common terminology. The absence of guidance and criteria makes it difficult to compare and analyze data across services and limits DOD's ability to determine when corrective action is needed. Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide accountability and assurance that program objectives are being achieved. Additionally, the services do not track all allegations of recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, available service data show that between fiscal years 2004 and 2005, allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased, collectively, from 4,400 cases to 6,500 cases; substantiated cases increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases. The department, however, is not in a sound position to assure Congress and the general public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. A number of factors within the recruiting environment may contribute to irregularities. Service recruiting officials stated that the economy has been the most important factor affecting recruiting success. Almost three-quarters of active duty recruiters responding to DOD's internal survey also believed that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard to achieve their goals. These factors, in addition to the typical challenges of the job, such as demanding work hours and pressure to meet monthly goals, may lead to recruiter irregularities. The recruiters' performance evaluation and reward systems are generally based on the number of contracts they write for applicants to enter the military. The Marine Corps is the only service that uses basic training attrition rates as a key component of the recruiter's evaluation. GAO previously recommended that the services link recruiter awards and incentives more closely to applicants' successful completion of basic training. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation, but has not made this a requirement across the services. The services have standard procedures in place, provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and service regulations, to investigate allegations of recruiter irregularities and to prosecute and discipline recruiters found guilty of violating recruiting policies and procedures. In addition, to help recruiters better understand the nature and consequences of committing irregularities in the recruitment process, all services use available information on recruiter wrongdoing to update their training. |
gao_GAO-13-704T | gao_GAO-13-704T_0 | Background
Ten states concentrated in the western, midwestern, and southeastern United States—all areas where the housing market had experienced strong growth in the prior decade—experienced 10 or more bank failures between 2008 and 2011 (see fig.1). Within these 10 states, 86 percent (257) of the failed banks were small institutions with assets of less than $1 billion at the time of failure, and 52 percent (155) had assets of less than $250 million. Bank Failures Were Largely Related to Nonperforming Real Estate Loans, but Also Highlighted the Impact of Impairment Accounting and Loan Loss Provisioning
In the 10 states with 10 or more failures between 2008 and 2011, failures of small and medium-size banks were largely associated with high concentrations of commercial real estate (CRE) loans, in particular the subset of acquisition, development, and construction (ADC) loans, and with inadequate management of the risks associated with these high concentrations. Our analysis showed that small failed banks in the 10 states had often pursued aggressive growth strategies using nontraditional and riskier funding sources such as brokered deposits. Among other things, the IG found that these banks exhibited strong management, sound credit administration and underwriting practices, and adequate capital. But in general fair value-related losses contributed little to the decline in net interest income and regulatory capital that failed banks experienced overall once the financial crisis began. Current Accounting Practices for Loss Provisioning May Have Delayed Reporting of Credit Losses during the Recent Crisis
A loan loss provision is the money a bank sets aside to cover potential credit losses on loans. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Financial Stability Forum’s Working Group on Loss Provisioning (Working Group) have observed that the current accounting model for estimating credit losses is based on historical loss rates, which were low in the years before the financial crisis. Treasury and the Working Group noted that earlier recognition of loan losses could have reduced the need for banks to recognize increases in their incurred credit losses through a sudden series of loan loss provisions that reduced earnings and regulatory capital. To address this issue, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued a proposal for public comment for a loan loss provisioning model that is more forward-looking and focuses on expected losses. This proposal would allow banks to establish a means of recognizing potential losses earlier on the loans they underwrite and could incentivize prudent risk management practices. Moreover, the proposal is designed to help address the cycle of losses and failures that emerged in the recent crisis as banks were forced to increase loan loss allowances and raise capital when they were least able to do so (procyclicality). FDIC Used Shared Loss Agreements to Attract Bidders at Least Cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund
FDIC is required to resolve a bank failure in a manner that results in the least cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). During the most recent financial crisis, FDIC facilitated these sales by including a loss share agreement, under which FDIC absorbed a portion of the loss on specified assets purchased by the acquiring bank. From January 2008 through December 31, 2011, FDIC was appointed as receiver for the 414 failed banks, with $662 billion in book value of failed bank assets. 2). By comparing the estimated cost of the shared loss agreements with the estimated cost of directly liquidating the failed banks’ assets, FDIC has estimated that using shared loss agreements has saved the DIF over $40 billion. FDIC officials stated that the acquiring banks were being monitored for compliance with the terms and conditions of the shared loss agreements. The Impact of Bank Failures on Local Communities Was Mixed
The acquisitions of failed banks by healthy banks appear to have mitigated the potentially negative effects of bank failures on communities, although the focus of local lending and philanthropy may have shifted. However, the effects could be potentially significant for those limited areas that had been serviced by one bank or where only a few banks remain. For example, several bank officials noted that in the wake of the bank failures, underwriting standards had tightened, making it harder for some borrowers who might have been able to obtain loans prior to the bank failures to obtain them afterward. | Why GAO Did This Study
Between January 2008 and December 2011--a period of economic downturn in the United States--414 insured U.S. banks failed. Of these, 85 percent (353) were small institutions with less than $1 billion in assets. Small banks often specialize in small business lending and are associated with local community development and philanthropy. The failures of these banks have raised questions about contributing factors. Further, the failures have raised concerns about the accounting and regulatory requirements needed to maintain reserves large enough to absorb expected loan losses (loan loss allowances)--for example, when borrowers are unable to repay a loan (credit losses).
This statement is based on findings from GAO's 2013 report on recent bank failures ( GAO-13-71 ) required by Pub. L. No 112-88. This testimony discusses (1) the factors that contributed to the bank failures in states with the most failed institutions between 2008 and 2011; (2) the use of shared loss agreements in resolving troubled banks; and (3) the effect of recent bank failures on local communities. To do this work, GAO relied on issued report GAO-13-71 and updated data as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Ten states concentrated in the western, midwestern, and southeastern United States--areas where the housing market had experienced strong growth in the prior decade--each experienced 10 or more commercial bank or thrift (bank) failures between 2008 and 2011. The failures of small banks (those with less than $1 billion in assets) in these states were largely driven by credit losses on commercial real estate (CRE) loans, particularly loans secured by real estate to finance land development and construction. Many of the failed banks had often pursued aggressive growth strategies using nontraditional, riskier funding sources and exhibited weak underwriting and credit administration practices. The Department of the Treasury and the Financial Stability Forum's Working Group on Loss Provisioning observed that earlier recognition of credit losses could have potentially lessened the impact of the crisis. The accounting model used for estimating credit losses is based on historical loss rates, which were low in the prefinancial crisis years. In part due to these accounting rules, loan loss allowances were not adequate to absorb the wave of credit losses that occurred once the financial crisis began. Banks had to recognize these losses through a sudden series of increases (provisions) to the loan loss allowance that reduced earnings and regulatory capital. In December 2012, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued a proposal for public comment for a loan loss provisioning model that is more forward looking and would incorporate a broader range of credit information. This would result in banks establishing earlier recognition of loan losses for the loans they underwrite and could incentivize prudent risk management practices. It should also help address the cycle of losses and failures that emerged in the recent crisis as banks were forced to increase loan loss allowances and raise capital when they were least able to do so.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) used shared loss agreements to help resolve 281 of the 414 bank failures during the recent financial crisis to minimize the impact on the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). Under a shared loss agreement, FDIC absorbs a portion of the loss on specified assets of a failed bank that are purchased by an acquiring bank. FDIC officials, state bank regulators, community banking associations, and acquiring banks of failed institutions GAO interviewed said that shared loss agreements helped to attract potential bidders for failed banks during the financial crisis. FDIC compared the estimated cost of the shared loss agreements to the estimated cost of directly liquidating the failed banks' assets and estimated that the use of shared loss agreements saved the DIF over $40 billion.
GAO analysis of metropolitan and rural areas where bank failures occurred and econometric analysis of bank income and condition data suggested that the acquisitions of failed banks by healthy banks mitigated the potentially negative effects of failures on communities. However, the focus of local lending and philanthropy may have shifted. Also, bank officials whom GAO interviewed noted that in the wake of the bank failures, underwriting standards had tightened. As a result, credit was generally most available for small business owners with good credit histories and strong financials. Further, the effects of bank failures could potentially be significant for communities that had been serviced by only one bank or where only a few banks remain. |
gao_GAO-06-453T | gao_GAO-06-453T_0 | Long-term Fiscal Challenge Provides Impetus to Reexamine Tax Policies and Compliance
The federal government’s financial condition and long-term fiscal outlook present enormous challenges to the nation’s ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American society, the United States’ place in the world, and the future role of the federal government. Absent policy changes on the spending and/or revenue sides of the budget, a growing imbalance between expected federal spending and tax revenues will mean escalating and eventually unsustainable federal deficits and debt that will threaten our future economy, standard of living, and, ultimately, our national security. GAO’s long-term simulations illustrate the magnitude of the fiscal challenges associated with an aging society and the significance of the related challenges the government will be called upon to address. Underreporting Accounted for Most of the Tax Gap Estimate
The tax gap is an estimate of the difference between the taxes—including individual income, corporate income, employment, estate, and excise taxes—that should have been timely and accurately paid and what was actually paid for a specific year. The estimate is an aggregate of estimates for the three primary types of noncompliance: (1) underreporting of tax liabilities on tax returns; (2) underpayment of taxes due from filed returns; and (3) nonfiling, which refers to the failure to file a required tax return altogether or timely. Employment tax underreporting accounted for an estimated $54 billion, or about 16 percent, of the 2001 tax gap and included several taxes that must be paid by self-employed individuals and employers. IRS’s overall approach to reducing the tax gap consists of improving service to taxpayers and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws. Reducing the Tax Gap Will Require Expanding Existing Approaches and Considering New Legislative Actions
Given its persistence and size, we need not only to consider expanding current approaches but also explore new legislation to help IRS in reducing the tax gap. For example, based on IRS’s most recent estimate, each 1 percent reduction in the net tax gap would likely yield nearly $3 billion annually. However, reducing the tax gap will be challenging and it must be attacked on multiple fronts and with multiple strategies, some of which follow. Simplify the Tax Code
Efforts to simplify the tax code and otherwise alter current tax policies may help reduce the tax gap by making it easier for individuals and businesses to understand and voluntarily comply with their tax obligations. Requiring more data on information returns dealing with capital gain income. However, continued reexamination of opportunities to expand information reporting and tax withholding could increase the transparency of the tax system. Optimize Resource Allocation
Sound resource allocation is another tool for addressing the tax gap. Chairman Gregg, Senator Conrad and members of the committee, this concludes my testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) most recent estimate of the difference between what taxpayers timely and accurately paid in taxes and what they owed was $345 billion. IRS estimates it will eventually recover some of this tax gap, resulting in an estimated net tax gap of $290 billion. The tax gap arises when taxpayers fail to comply with the tax laws by underreporting tax liabilities on tax returns; underpaying taxes due from filed returns; or nonfiling, which refers to the failure to file a required tax return altogether or in a timely manner. The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on the Budget asked GAO to present information on the causes of and possible solutions to the tax gap. This testimony addresses the nature and extent of the tax gap and the significance of reducing the tax gap, including some steps that may assist with this challenging task. For context, this testimony also addressed GAO's most recent simulations of the long-term fiscal outlook and the need for a fundamental reexamination of major spending and tax policies and priorities.
What GAO Found
Our nation's fiscal policy is on an imprudent and unsustainable course. As long-term budget simulations by GAO show, over the long term we face a large and growing structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends, rising health care costs, and lower federal revenues as a percentage of the economy. GAO's simulations indicate that the long-term fiscal challenge is too big to be solved by economic growth alone or by making modest changes to existing spending and tax policies. Rather, a fundamental reexamination of major policies and priorities will be important to recapture our future fiscal flexibility. Underreporting of income by businesses and individuals accounted for most of the estimated $345 billion tax gap for 2001, with individual income tax underreporting alone accounting for $197 billion, or over half of the total gap. Corporate income tax and employment tax underreporting accounted for an additional $84 billion of the gap. Reducing the tax gap would help improve fiscal sustainability. Given the tax gap's persistence and size, it will require considering not only options that have been previously proposed but also new administrative and legislative actions. Even modest progress would yield significant revenue; each 1 percent reduction would likely yield nearly $3 billion annually. Reducing the tax gap will be a challenging long-term task, and progress will require attacking the gap with multiple strategies over a sustained period. These strategies could include efforts to regularly obtain data on the extent of, and reasons for, noncompliance; simplify the tax code; provide quality service to taxpayers; enhance enforcement of tax laws by utilizing enforcement tools such as tax withholding, information reporting, and penalties; leverage technology; and optimize resource allocation. |
gao_HEHS-98-168 | gao_HEHS-98-168_0 | The program’s original purpose was to strengthen state and local efforts for obtaining child support for families receiving AFDC and for any non-AFDC individuals who apply for child support services. Most Families Whose Aid Was Terminated Lacked Child Support
In the first three states to enforce time limits, most families who reached their 21-month to 3-year time limits did not have any child support collected for them during the 12 months before their welfare termination. Most Families Left Assistance Without Child Support
Only about 20 to 30 percent of families reaching their time limits had any child support collected for them in the 12 months before termination. For families with child support collected, median child support collections ranged from $581 to $1,348 and mean collections ranged from $1,065 to $1,388 for the 12-month period. In these states, we reviewed new AFDC child support cases that were first opened in 1992 and remained open for 5 years—the maximum length of time a family may receive federal TANF aid. Yet, despite the greater success rate of these states, about one-third of their child support clients would have reached the end of a 5-year time limit without any child support, as shown in figure 6. Some Child Support Was Collected for Most Cases Within 5 Years
About two-thirds of the cases that remained open for 5 years had some child support collected for them in the last 12 months. For cases with collections, the median child support collections ranged from $1,875 to $2,118 and mean collections ranged from $2,211 to $2,316 in the last 12 months. Implications for States and Families Facing Time-Limited Welfare
Time limits are being implemented on the two different sets of families represented in our study: those already receiving aid before time limits began and those whose assistance will begin under time limits. A state’s success in obtaining child support can provide an important supplement to a family’s earnings. States Must Improve Their Performance in Locating Noncustodial Parents for Families Already Receiving Welfare
Our findings from the three states that implemented time limits under waivers indicate that many welfare families that did not get child support before the time limits began may be unlikely to obtain it before their welfare benefits expire unless states can locate noncustodial parents. One-half to three-quarters of the cases that needed a support order or paternity established could not get these services because the state could not or did not locate the noncustodial parent. Our analysis of cases that first opened in 1992 and remained open for 5 years in two states showed that more than 70 percent of the paternities and support orders ever established on these cases were obtained within the first 2 years after opening. In addition, state officials told us that noncustodial parent information has to be pursued early and aggressively to achieve successful outcomes. We then identified the child support cases associated with the families whose welfare benefits expired. We focused on states with strong performance in these areas, with the rationale that outcome data from these states could show how high-performing states have been able to meet the child support needs of their clients in a 5-year period. Support order establishment involves the development of a support order that legally obliges the noncustodial parent to pay child support and provide medical insurance coverage when it is available at reasonable cost. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how successful states are likely to be in obtaining child support for families whose benefits are subject to time limits, focusing on: (1) how successful states that experimented with time-limited benefits before welfare reform have been in obtaining child support for families who reach their limits; (2) how successful states have been in obtaining child support for families within a 5-year period, the maximum time a family may receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits; and (3) the implications time limits have for states and families.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) many TANF families may not be able to count on child support as a steady source of income when their time-limited welfare benefits expire; (2) in the first three states to enforce welfare benefit time limits--Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia--only about 20 to 30 percent of families had any child support collected for them in the 12 months before their welfare benefits were terminated; (3) about one-half or more of the child support cases without collections lacked a child support order legally obligating a noncustodial parent to pay child support at the time the families' assistance was terminated, despite having a long history in the child support program before time limits were implemented; (4) for families whose child support was secured, the median collections among the three states ranged from a total of $581 to $1,348 for the 12-month period; (5) in two high-performing child support states, Minnesota and Washington, GAO observed better outcomes for a sample of Aid to Families with Dependent Children child support cases that first opened in 1992 and remained open for 5 years; (6) about two-thirds of the families received some child support in the last 12 months of that period; (7) support order establishment rates were higher for these cases as well: in both states, orders were established within 5 years for more than 80 percent of the cases that needed them; (8) the median amounts of child support collected for these families ranged from $1,875 to $2,118 for the 12-month period; (9) despite these outcomes, about one-third of the child support clients in these states reached the end of the 5-year period without any child support; (10) to better ensure that child support is available for families in a time-limited welfare system, states will need to improve their child support performance for families already in the welfare system and for those who enter it for the first time; (11) in the three states GAO studied that had imposed time limits on families already receiving aid, from one-half to three-quarters of the families could not get child support because the state did not or could not locate the noncustodial parent; (12) it is also important for states to move quickly to pursue child support for families that have just begun receiving aid; (13) state officials told GAO that information on noncustodial parents is best pursued early and aggressively to achieve successful outcomes; and (14) GAO's analysis showed that successful outcomes are most likely within 2 years after a family begins receiving child support services. |
gao_GAO-16-630 | gao_GAO-16-630_0 | However, the upfront costs of online registration are generally modest and quickly surpassed by the savings generated after implementation. Efficiencies and Other Benefits
According to literature we reviewed and state and local election officials we spoke with, the benefits of implementing an online registration system include administrative efficiencies that can result in improved registration accuracy and cost savings, including cost savings to voters in the form of greater convenience. For instance, the majority of studies we reviewed that assessed the effect of same day registration and all vote-by-mail on voter turnout found that these policies increased turnout. As a result, distinguishing the unique effects of a policy from the effects of other factors that affect turnout can be challenging. Moreover, the development and implementation of various election administration policies are informed by a variety of factors at the state and local level, and thus research findings on turnout may not be the only considerations for election officials in deciding whether to implement changes to election administration policies. Vote centers (polling places where registrants can vote regardless of assigned precinct) and the sending of text messages to provide information about registration and elections have not been studied as much as some of the other policies, but almost all of the studies we reviewed on these policies (with the exception of one study on vote centers) reported increased turnout. Some studies of mailings to provide information and no-excuse absentee voting policies also found that these policies increased turnout, while other studies associated with these policies reported mixed evidence or no evidence of an effect. Most studies that examined e-mail and robocalls used to provide information reported no evidence of an effect on turnout. Election Activities Result in Various Costs, and These Costs Can Be Difficult to Quantify
States and local election jurisdictions incur a variety of costs associated with administering elections, and the types and magnitude of costs can vary by state and jurisdiction. Special elections can also affect the total costs for conducting elections by increasing the number of elections. Election Costs are Difficult to Quantify
Quantifying the costs for all election activities is difficult for several reasons, including that multiple parties incur costs associated with elections and these parties may track costs differently. Although some parties’ costs can be easily identified in state and local budgets or other cost-tracking documents, other costs may be difficult to break out or attribute to election activities. We incorporated technical comments received from other parties in the report as appropriate. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following questions: 1. What are the reported benefits and challenges of efforts to collect and share voter registration information electronically? What is known about the effect of selected policies and practices on voter turnout? What is known about the costs of elections? For all three questions, we (1) reviewed and analyzed relevant literature and (2) conducted interviews with state and local jurisdiction election officials from five selected states, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, and Rhode Island. The following is a list of the election jurisdictions we visited in our five selected states:
Colorado: Denver City and County, Grand County
Delaware: Kent County, New Castle County, and Sussex County Illinois: City of Chicago, Sangamon County
Oregon: Multnomah County, Yamhill County
Rhode Island: City of Pawtucket, Town of Scituate While our selected states and local jurisdictions are not representative of all states and jurisdictions nationwide and their responses cannot be generalized to other states and local election jurisdictions, officials in these locations provided a range of perspectives on efforts to collect and share voter registration information electronically, the effect of selected policies and practices on voter turnout, and elections-related costs. Appendix IV: Review of Research on Effects of Eleven Selected Election Administration Policies on Voter Turnout
From more than 400 publications we initially identified related to voter turnout, we identified and reviewed 118 studies within 53 publications that (1) assessed policies that have been or could be implemented by a state or local government (11 such policies in total across the 118 studies), (2) contained quantitative analyses of the effect of a given policy on turnout, and (3) used sufficiently sound methodologies for conducting such analyses. We found that 11 studies reported an increase in turnout, 3 studies reported no evidence of an effect on turnout, 4 studies reported a combination of these (increases and non-significant findings), 1 study reported a combination of a decrease in turnout and no evidence of an effect on turnout, and 2 studies reported decreases in turnout. (Study 11)
Early In-Person Voting
Fitzgerald, Mary. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, there have been notable changes in how states and local election jurisdictions conduct key election activities, such as registration and voting. States regulate some aspects of elections, but the combinations of election administration policies can vary widely across the country's approximately 10,500 local election jurisdictions.
GAO was asked to examine the benefits, challenges, and other considerations of various election administration policies. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What are the reported benefits and challenges of efforts to collect and share voter registration information electronically? (2) What is known about the effect of selected policies on voter turnout? (3) What is known about the costs of elections?
To address these three questions, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant literature from 2002 through 2015. GAO identified 118 studies that examined the effect of selected policies that have been or could be implemented by state or local governments on voter turnout. GAO reviewed the studies' analyses, and determined that the studies were sufficiently sound to support their results and conclusions. In addition, GAO conducted visits and interviewed state and local election officials from five states that had implemented efforts and policies relevant to GAO's research questions to varying degrees, and provided geographic diversity. The results from these five states are not generalizable, but provide insight into state and local perspectives.
What GAO Found
According to GAO's literature review and election officials interviewed, the benefits of collecting and sharing voter registration information electronically include improved accuracy and cost savings; while challenges include upfront investments and ongoing maintenance, among other things. For example, establishing infrastructure for online registration requires time and money, but can generate savings and enhance accuracy by, for instance, reducing the need for local election officials to manually process paper registration forms. The upfront costs of online registration are generally modest and quickly surpassed by savings generated after implementation.
GAO reviewed research to identify 11 election administration policies that had each been studied multiple times in connection with voter turnout and found varying effects. For example:
The majority of studies on same day registration and all vote-by-mail found that these policies increased turnout.
Vote centers (polling places where registrants can vote regardless of assigned precinct) and the sending of text messages to provide information about registration and elections have not been studied as much as some of the other policies, but almost all of the studies reviewed on these policies reported increases in turnout.
Some studies of mailings to provide information and no-excuse absentee voting also found that these policies increased turnout, while other studies reported mixed evidence or no evidence of an effect.
Most studies of e-mail and robocalls to provide information reported no evidence of an effect on turnout.
Most studies of early in-person voting reported no evidence of an effect on turnout or found decreases in turnout, while the remaining studies reported mixed evidence.
Distinguishing the unique effects of a policy from the effects of other factors that affect turnout can be challenging, and even sufficiently sound studies cannot account for all unobserved factors that potentially impact the results. Additionally, research findings on turnout are only one of many considerations for election officials as they decide whether or not to implement selected policies.
States and local election jurisdictions incur a variety of costs associated with administering elections, and the types and magnitude of costs can vary by state and jurisdiction. Further, quantifying the total costs for all election activities is difficult for several reasons, including that multiple parties incur costs associated with elections and may track costs differently. Although some parties' costs can be easily identified in cost-tracking documents, other costs may be difficult to attribute to election activities. Additionally, voters' costs can also be difficult to quantify because each voter's costs vary based on factors such as method of voting, or time required to travel to polling places, among other things.
The Election Assistance Commission did not have any comments on this report, and GAO incorporated technical comments provided by state and local election officials and DMV officials as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-17-596T | gao_GAO-17-596T_0 | The current student survey contains 49 questions on various aspects of the Job Corps program, including career development services, interactions between students and staff, access to alcohol and drugs, and overall satisfaction with the program. The survey includes 12 questions on students’ perceptions of safety at centers. Job Corps Centers Reported a Variety of Types of Incidents between January 2007 and June 2016, Many of Which Occurred Onsite
The Most Common Types of Reported Onsite and Offsite Incidents Included Serious Illnesses or Injuries, Assaults, and Drug-Related Incidents
Our preliminary analysis of ETA’s SIRS data shows that Job Corps centers reported 49,836 safety and security incidents, including those that occurred both onsite and offsite, from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2016. During this time period, approximately 539,000 students were enrolled in the program, according to ETA officials. Most Reported Incidents Occurred Onsite at Job Corps Centers, but the Majority of Reported Deaths Occurred Offsite
Our preliminary analysis showed that from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2016, 76 percent of the reported safety and security incidents occurred onsite at Job Corps centers, and 24 percent occurred at offsite locations (see fig.2). Most Reported Onsite and Offsite Violent Incidents Involved Job Corps Students, and Considerably Fewer Involved Program Staff
Our preliminary analysis showed that from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2016, most reported violent incidents—specifically assaults, homicides, and sexual assaults that occurred both onsite and offsite— involved Job Corps students, and considerably fewer of these incidents involved program staff. Students were victims in 72 percent of these reported violent incidents, while staff were victims in 8 percent of these incidents. Each of these reported violent incidents involved at least one victim or perpetrator who was a Job Corps student or staff member, but some of these incidents also involved victims or perpetrators who were not associated with the Job Corps program. Students Generally Reported Feeling Safe, but Reported Feeling Less Safe on Certain Safety and Security Issues
Our preliminary analysis of ETA’s student satisfaction survey data from March 2007 to March 2017 showed that while students generally reported feeling safe at Job Corps centers, they reported feeling less safe on certain safety and security issues. Overall, across all 12 of the safety- related survey questions, an average of 72 percent of students reported feeling safe during this time period. However, the average percentage of students who reported feeling safe on each individual survey question ranged from 44 percent to 91 percent. For example, an average of 44 percent of students reported that they had never heard students threaten each other, or had not heard such threats within the last month. The remaining 56 percent of students, on average, reported hearing such threats at least once in the last month. Throughout the period of March 2007 through March 2017, the national safety rating remained above 82 percent, according to ETA data. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The deaths of two Job Corps students in 2015 raised concerns about the safety and security of students in this program. The Job Corps program serves approximately 50,000 students each year at 125 centers nationwide.
Multiple DOL Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits have found deficiencies in the Office of Job Corps' efforts to oversee student safety. ETA and the Office of Job Corps have taken steps to address these concerns, but in March 2017, the DOL OIG raised new safety and security concerns, including some underreporting of incident data, and made related recommendations.
This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work on these issues and provides preliminary observations on (1) the number and types of reported safety and security incidents involving Job Corps students, and (2) student perceptions of safety at Job Corps centers.
GAO analyzed ETA's reported incident data from January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2016. GAO's preliminary analysis summarizes reported incidents in the aggregate over this time period but the actual number is likely greater. GAO also analyzed student survey data from March 2007 through March 2017, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed ETA officials and DOL OIG officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's preliminary analysis of the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration's (ETA) incident data found that Job Corps centers reported 49,836 safety and security incidents of various types that occurred both onsite and offsite between January 1, 2007 and June 30, 2016. During this time period, approximately 539,000 students were enrolled in the program, according to ETA officials. ETA's Office of Job Corps is responsible for administering the Job Corps program, which is the nation's largest residential, educational, and career and technical training program for low-income youth generally between the ages of 16 and 24. As shown in the figure, the three most common types of reported incidents were serious illnesses or injuries, assaults, and drug-related incidents.
More than three-quarters of the reported incidents occurred onsite at Job Corps centers, and the rest occurred offsite. Most reported violent incidents—specifically assaults, homicides, and sexual assaults that occurred onsite and offsite—involved Job Corps students. For example, students were victims in 72 percent of these reported incidents, while staff were victims in 8 percent, and the remaining incidents involved victims who were not associated with Job Corps.
GAO's preliminary analysis of ETA's student survey data from March 2007 through March 2017 found that students generally reported feeling safe, but they reported feeling less safe with respect to certain issues. The student survey contains 49 questions about students' experiences in the Job Corps program, including 12 questions related to safety at centers. Across all 12 of these safety-related survey questions, an average of 72 percent of students reported feeling safe over this 10-year period. However, the average percentage of students who reported feeling safe on each individual survey question ranged from 44 percent to 91 percent. For example, an average of 44 percent of students reported that they had never heard students threaten each other, or had not heard such threats within the last month. The remaining 56 percent of students, on average, reported hearing such threats at least once in the last month.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony but will consider recommendations, as appropriate, when ongoing work is finished. GAO incorporated comments from ETA as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-976T | gao_GAO-06-976T_0 | Southern Border Crossings
The following information provides details about our agents’ experiences and observations entering the United States from Mexico at border crossings in California and Texas and at two crossings in Arizona. The CBP officers did not request any other documents to prove citizenship, and allowed both agents to enter the United States. Texas: On February 23, 2006, two agents crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. One of the agents carried a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit West Virginia birth certificate. When asked for identification by the CBP officer on duty, the agents presented a counterfeit West Virginia driver’s license and a counterfeit Virginia driver’s license. The CBP officer asked for the agents’ country of citizenship and the agents responded that they were from the United States. We conducted a corrective action briefing with officials from CBP on June 9, 2006, about the results of our investigation. CBP agreed its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings. We did not assess whether this initiative would be fully implemented by either the January 2008 or June 2009 deadline or whether it would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States. Conclusion
The results of our current work indicate that (1) CBP officers at the nine land border crossings tested did not detect the counterfeit identification we used and (2) people who enter the United States via land crossings are not always asked to present identification. Furthermore, our periodic tests since 2002 clearly show that CBP officers are unable to effectively identify counterfeit driver’s licenses, birth certificates, and other documents. This vulnerability potentially allows terrorists or others involved in criminal activity to pass freely into the United States from Canada or Mexico with little or no chance of being detected. It will be critical that the new initiative requiring travelers within the Western Hemisphere to present passports or other accepted documents to enter the United States address the vulnerabilities shown by our work. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Currently, U.S. citizens are not required to present a passport when entering the United States from countries in the Western Hemisphere. However, U.S. citizens are required to establish citizenship to a CBP officer's satisfaction. On its Web site, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) advises U.S. citizens that an officer may ask for identification documents as proof of citizenship, including birth certificates or baptismal records and a photo identification document. In 2003, we testified that CBP officers were not readily capable of identifying whether individuals seeking entry into the United States were using counterfeit identification to prove citizenship. Specifically, our agents were able to easily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico using fictitious names and counterfeit driver's licenses and birth certificates. Later in 2003 and 2004, we continued to be able to successfully enter the United States using counterfeit identification at land border crossings, but were denied entry on one occasion. Because of Congress's concerns that these weaknesses could possibly be exploited by terrorists or others involved in criminal activity, Congress requested that we assess the current status of security at the nation's borders. Specifically, Congress requested that we conduct a follow-up investigation to determine whether the vulnerabilities exposed in our prior work continue to exist.
What GAO Found
Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking for or inspecting any identification documents. After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown by our work. |
gao_GAO-06-437 | gao_GAO-06-437_0 | Background
Egypt is currently among the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance, along with Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These interests include building friendly nations’ capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, strengthening military support for containing transnational threats, protecting democratically elected governments, and fostering closer military ties between U.S. and recipient nations.According to State, the objectives of the FMF program worldwide include: assisting friendly foreign militaries in procuring U.S. defense articles and services for their countries’ self defense and other security needs; promoting coalition efforts in regional conflicts and the global war on improving capabilities of friendly foreign militaries to assist in international crisis response operations; contributing to the professionalism of military forces; enhancing rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of friendly foreign military forces; maintaining support for democratically elected governments; and supporting the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services. The United States Has Provided $1.3 Billion in Military Assistance to Egypt Annually to Purchase Defense Articles and Services
Since 1979, Egypt has received about $34 billion in FMF assistance which the United States has generally appropriated in annual amounts of approximately $1.3 billion. Over the life of the FMF program, Egypt has purchased 36 Apache helicopters, 220 F-16 aircraft, 880 M1A1 tanks, and the accompanying training and maintenance to support these systems, among other items (see fig. 2). Cash flow financing enables Egypt to purchase more defense goods and services than under other financing arrangements and to better plan its military purchases over a number of years. As of March 22, 2006, the value of LOAs anticipating future funding totaled approximately $2 billion, some of which are not due for full payment until 2011. State and DOD have not conducted an assessment to identify the impacts of a potential reduction in FMF funding below the levels that are planned to be requested. Goals, but State and DOD Do Not Evaluate the Program’s Contributions to Key Goals
U.S. officials and several experts we consulted assert that FMF assistance to Egypt has supported U.S. strategic goals such as regional stability, the war on terrorism, and Egyptian-Israeli peace. Egyptian and U.S. officials cited several examples of Egypt’s support for U.S. goals. Achieving interoperability in Egypt is complicated by both the lack of a common definition of interoperability and limitations on some types of sensitive equipment transfers. Currently, the Egyptian benchmark is based on a percentage of U.S.-versus-Soviet equipment in Egypt’s inventory, as reported by the Egyptian military. Most of the FMF assistance has been in the form of cash grants that Egypt has used to purchase U.S. military goods and services. Evaluating the degree to which the program meets its goals would be important information for congressional oversight, particularly as Congress assesses the balance between economic and military assistance to Egypt, as well as the impact on U.S. foreign policy interests. Specifically, we interviewed U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officials. In addition, we interviewed Egyptian military officials in Cairo and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials at the Egyptian embassy in Washington, D.C.
To assess the financing arrangements used to provide FMF assistance to Egypt, and determine how undisbursed balances accumulated in the Egypt FMF program accounts, we examined data from DSCA’s Credit System Database and interviewed officials from the DSCA Middle East and South Asia Division and Comptroller’s Office, as well as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. We did not examine or assess U.S. economic assistance to Egypt. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1979, Egypt has received about $60 billion in military and economic assistance with about $34 billion in the form of foreign military financing (FMF) grants that enable Egypt to purchase U.S.-manufactured military goods and services. In this report, GAO (1) describes the types and amounts of FMF assistance provided to Egypt; (2) assesses the financing arrangements used to provide FMF assistance to Egypt; and (3) evaluates how the U.S. assesses the program's contribution to U.S. foreign policy and security goals.
What GAO Found
Egypt is currently among the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance, along with Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Egypt has received about $1.3 billion annually in U.S. foreign military financing (FMF) assistance and has purchased a variety of U.S.-manufactured military goods and services such as Apache helicopters, F-16 aircraft, and M1A1 tanks, as well as the training and maintenance to support these systems. The United States has provided Egypt with FMF assistance through a statutory cash flow financing arrangement that permits flexibility in how Egypt acquires defense goods and services from the United States. In the past, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) accumulated large undisbursed balances in this program. Because the flexibilities of cash flow financing permit Egypt to pay for its purchases over time, Egypt currently has agreements for U.S. defense articles and services worth over $2 billion--some of which are not due for full payment until 2011. The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have not conducted an assessment to identify the risks and impacts of a potential shift in FMF funding. Officials and many experts assert that the FMF program to Egypt supports U.S. foreign policy and security goals; however, State and DOD do not assess how the program specifically contributes to these goals. U.S. and Egyptian officials cited examples of Egypt's support for U.S. interests, such as maintaining Egyptian-Israeli peace and providing access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. DOD has not determined how it will measure progress in achieving key goals such as interoperability and modernizing Egypt's military. For example, the U.S. Central Command, the responsible military authority, defines modernization as the ratio of U.S.-to-Soviet equipment in Egypt's inventory and does not include other potentially relevant factors, such as readiness or military capabilities. Achieving interoperability in Egypt is complicated by the lack of a common definition of interoperability and limitations on some types of sensitive equipment transfers. Given the longevity and magnitude of FMF assistance to Egypt, evaluating the degree to which the program meets its goals would be important information for congressional oversight, particularly as Congress assesses the balance between economic and military assistance to Egypt as well as the impact on U.S. foreign policy interests. |
gao_GAO-13-708T | gao_GAO-13-708T_0 | The program provides nutritionally balanced low-cost or free lunches in participating schools to about 31 million children each month. In fiscal year 2012, the federal government spent over $11 billion on the National School Lunch Program. Regarding the lunch components— fruits, vegetables, grains, meats, and milk—the Institute recommended offering both fruits and vegetables daily, increasing whole grain-rich foods, offering only fat-free and low-fat milk, and limiting the amount of grains and meats/meat alternates served each week. The Eight SFAs We Visited Faced Several Challenges Implementing the New Lunch Requirements
All Were Challenged by Meat and Grain Limits
Because regulations issued in January 2012 by USDA placed limits on the amounts of meats/meat alternates and grains that can be included in a school lunch, all eight SFAs we visited modified or eliminated some popular menu items, leading to negative student reactions in some districts. The grain maximums also affected popular lunch items, such as sandwiches. For example, four SFAs we visited said they met regularly with vendors during school year 2012-2013 as vendors worked to bring their products into compliance. In response to feedback from states and SFAs regarding operational challenges caused by the meat and grain maximums, USDA lifted the maximums temporarily. A few months later, in February 2013, USDA provided the same flexibility for school year 2013-2014, acknowledging that SFAs needed guidance to help with meal planning and food procurement for the coming school year, as SFAs often plan menus and order or contract for food beginning in the winter of the previous school year. In May 2013, USDA officials told us that the Department wanted to be responsive to the challenges they had heard about, and they did not see a problem making the temporary change to help with implementation because the meat and grain maximums and the calorie maximums both accomplish the goal of addressing portion size, making them somewhat redundant. SFA directors, food manufacturers, and other relevant industry representatives indicated the need for a timely and permanent federal decision on these maximums. Calorie Requirements for Middle and High Schools Also Challenged Some SFAs
Because the required calorie ranges for grades 6-8 and 9-12 do not overlap, schools with students in both these grade groups faced challenges complying with the calorie requirements. This creates a challenge for schools that include students from both grade groups, including schools in two of the districts we visited. One SFA director, whose district includes schools serving 7th through 12th graders, noted that complying with both of the calorie range requirements is particularly difficult when students in different grades use the same serving lines and share a lunch period. USDA’s response to this issue, provided in part through the Department’s guidance on menu planning under the new lunch requirements, has been limited. Student Acceptance Has Been a Challenge to Some Extent
While all eight SFAs we visited expressed support for the goal of improving the nutritional quality of lunches and felt the new requirements were moving in that direction, all eight experienced various challenges related to student acceptance of some of the foods served to comply with the requirements. For example, six districts mentioned student acceptance of whole grain breads or pasta as being a challenge. Student participation in lunch has decreased to some extent in school year 2012-2013, which is another indicator that student acceptance of school lunches may have declined since the changes. SFAs Noted Concerns about the Proposed Competitive Foods Changes
In addition to the school lunch changes, the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 required that USDA specify and require nutrition standards for all foods and beverages sold outside the school meals programs on the school campus during the school day, which are commonly referred to as competitive foods because they compete with school meal programs. Many students’ positive comments on healthy foods, their views that school lunches generally provide such foods, and their consumption of sizeable quantities of fruits and vegetables in the majority of schools we visited indicate that acceptance of the new lunch requirements will improve over time. While some of the challenges SFAs faced this year have been addressed and others may become less difficult as time elapses, those caused by the required weekly maximum amounts of meats and grains permitted in lunches and the lack of overlap in the allowable calorie ranges for grades 6-8 and 9-12 likely will not. However, although USDA has acknowledged the need for a permanent decision on the maximums, they have yet to provide one, hindering the ability of school districts to plan menus, food purchases, budgets, staff training, and student education because they do not know whether the meat and grain restrictions will be reinstated in the future or not. In addition, the requirements that lunches served to students in grades 6-8 provide different amounts of calories than lunches served to students in grades 9-12—even in schools that serve students in both grade groups— is inconsistent with past practices, expert recommendations, and USDA’s intent of simplifying the administration and operations of the school lunch program. Recommendations
To improve SFAs’ ability to design menus that comply with the new lunch requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture: permanently remove the weekly meat/meat alternate and grain maximums for school lunch defined in federal regulations, and modify federal regulations or guidance to allow school districts flexibility in complying with the defined calorie ranges for schools with students in both the grades 6-8 and 9-12 groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National School Lunch Program served 31.6 million children in fiscal year 2012, in part through $11.6 billion in federal supports. The most recent reauthorization of the program, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 required that nutrition standards for school lunches be updated. As a result, USDA issued final regulations aimed at providing lunches high in nutrients and low in calories that better meet the dietary needs of school children and required that they be implemented beginning in school year 2012-2013. The new rules provide detailed requirements for meal components--fruits, vegetables, grains, meats, and milk; update requirements for calories, sodium, and fats; and require that each student's lunch contain a fruit or vegetable. To provide information on challenges that school districts have faced, this testimony draws on work GAO conducted as part of its ongoing study of implementation of the changes. Specifically, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, as well as USDA regulations, guidance, and studies; interviewed USDA officials and groups of food service officials and relevant industry representatives; and visited eight school districts. The districts varied by geographic location, size, and certain student and food services characteristics.
What GAO Found
School districts faced several challenges implementing the new lunch requirements in school year 2012-2013, according to the eight districts GAO visited and food service and industry officials GAO interviewed from across the country; and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) response to some of these challenges has been limited. For example, because USDA regulations restrict the amounts of meats and grains that can be served in school lunches each week, all eight districts GAO visited needed to modify or eliminate popular menu items. These changes sometimes led to negative student reactions. The meat and grain restrictions also led to smaller lunch entrees, making it difficult for some schools to meet minimum calorie requirements for lunches without adding items, such as gelatin, that generally do not improve the nutritional quality of lunches. In response to feedback from states and districts regarding operational challenges caused by the meat and grain restrictions, USDA lifted the limits temporarily, first for the remainder of school year 2012-2013 and then for school year 2013-2014. USDA officials said they did not see a problem making the temporary changes to help with implementation because the limits on meats and grains and the limits on the calories in lunches are somewhat redundant, as both address portion size. However, because the change was seen as temporary, the eight districts GAO visited made only marginal changes to their menus. Rather, several district food services officials, as well as relevant industry representatives, indicated the need for a permanent federal decision on these restrictions, which USDA has also acknowledged.
The calorie range requirements for lunches also challenged some districts, particularly those with schools that include students from both grades 6-8 and 9-12. Because the required lunch calorie ranges for these two grade groups do not overlap, districts with such schools face difficulties planning menus and serving lunches that comply with both requirements. For example, one food services official, whose district includes schools serving 7th through 12th graders, developed menus with calorie counts between the grades 6-8 maximum and the grades 9-12 minimum, leaving the lunches out of compliance with both sets of restrictions. Although USDA has acknowledged that menu planning in such schools can be challenging, USDA's current guidance does not provide these districts flexibility to assist their efforts to comply. Rather, guidance suggests that students from different grades be provided with different lunches, a solution that may be impractical in schools in which students of different grades share lunch periods and serving lines.
Although the eight districts GAO visited expressed support for the improvements to the nutritional quality of school lunch, they reported additional challenges meeting the new requirements, such as student acceptance, food waste, costs, and participation. For example, USDA requires that meals include whole grain-rich products and certain vegetables, but most districts noted that obtaining student acceptance of foods like whole grain pasta and beans has been challenging. If students do not accept these items, the result may be increased food waste or decreased participation in the lunch program, which were concerns in most districts GAO visited. However, student acceptance of the changes will likely improve over time, as indicated by their positive comments about healthy food and consumption of fruits and vegetables in most districts GAO visited.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USDA permanently remove the meat and grain maximum requirements and allow flexibility to help districts comply with the lack of overlap in the calorie ranges for grades 6-8 and 9-12 lunches. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-283 | gao_GAO-08-283_0 | CDC Has 13 Infection Control and Prevention Guidelines Containing Almost 1,200 Recommended Practices, but Activities across HHS to Promote Implementation Are Not Guided by Prioritization of Practices
CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, and in these guidelines CDC recommends almost 1,200 specific clinical practices for implementation to prevent HAIs and related adverse events. The practices generally are sorted into five categories—from strongly recommended for implementation to not recommended—primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for each practice. Over 500 practices are strongly recommended. Within HHS, CDC and AHRQ conduct some activities to promote the implementation of recommended practices, but the activities are not based on clear prioritization of the practices, which may consider not only the strength of the evidence, but also other factors that can affect implementation, such as cost or organizational obstacles. In addition to CDC, AHRQ has reviewed scientific evidence for certain practices related to HAIs, but the efforts of the two agencies have not been coordinated. CMS’s and Accrediting Organizations’ Required Hospital Standards Describe Components of Infection Control Programs, and Compliance with These Standards Is Assessed through On- Site Surveys
The infection control standards that CMS, the Joint Commission, and AOA require as part of the hospital certification and accreditation processes vary in number and content among the organizations, and generally describe the fundamental components of a hospital infection control program, that is, the active prevention, control, and investigation of infections. CMS, the Joint Commission, and AOA standards generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC’s infection control and prevention guidelines. CMS, the Joint Commission, and AOA assess compliance with their infection control standards through direct observation of hospital activities and review of hospital policy documents during on-site surveys. Multiple HHS Programs Collect Data on HAIs, but Lack of Integration of Available Data and Other Problems Limit Utility of the Data
Three agencies within HHS—CDC, CMS, and AHRQ—currently collect HAI-related data for a variety of purposes in four separate databases, but each of these databases presents only a partial view of the extent of the HAI problem. Each database focuses its data collection on selected types of HAIs and collects data from a different subset of hospital patients across the country. Although officials from the various HHS agencies discuss HAI data collection with each other, we did not find that the agencies were taking steps to integrate any of the existing data by creating linkages across the databases such as standardizing patient identifiers or other data items. Creating linkages across the HAI-related databases could enhance the availability of information to better understand where and how HAIs occur. These are the databases associated with CDC’s National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), CMS’s Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System (MPSMS), CMS’s Annual Payment Update (APU) program, and AHRQ’s Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP). CDC officials have produced national estimates of HAIs, but those estimates derive from assumptions and extrapolations that raise questions about the reliability of those estimates. 2. Appendix I: Other CDC Activities Designed to Reduce or Prevent Health-Care-Associated Infections
In addition to developing infection control and prevention guidelines and recommendations, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides leadership in outbreak investigations, surveillance, and laboratory research and prevention of health-care-associated infections (HAI). | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), health-care-associated infections (HAI) are estimated to be 1 of the top 10 causes of death in the United States. HAIs are infections that patients acquire while receiving treatment for other conditions. GAO was asked to examine (1) CDC's guidelines for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs and what the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) does to promote their implementation, (2) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) and hospital accrediting organizations' required standards for hospitals to reduce or prevent HAIs and how compliance is assessed, and (3) HHS programs that collect data related to HAIs and integration of the data across HHS. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from CDC, CMS, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and accrediting organizations.
What GAO Found
CDC has 13 guidelines for hospitals on infection control and prevention, which cover a variety of topics, and in these guidelines CDC recommends almost 1,200 practices for implementation to prevent HAIs and related adverse events. Most of the practices are sorted into five categories--from strongly recommended for implementation to not recommended--primarily on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence for each practice. Over 500 practices are strongly recommended. CDC and AHRQ have conducted some activities to promote implementation of recommended practices, but these activities are not based on a clear prioritization of the practices. Prioritization may consider not only the strength of the evidence, but also other factors that can affect implementation, such as cost and organizational obstacles. In addition to CDC, AHRQ has reviewed scientific evidence for certain HAI-related practices, but the efforts of the two agencies have not been coordinated. The infection control standards required by CMS and hospital-accrediting organizations--the Joint Commission and the Healthcare Facilities Accreditation Program of the American Osteopathic Association (AOA)--describe the fundamental components of a hospital's infection control program. These components include the active prevention, control, and investigation of infections. The standards are far fewer in number than the recommended practices in CDC's guidelines and generally do not require that hospitals implement all recommended practices in CDC's infection control and prevention guidelines. CMS, the Joint Commission, and AOA assess compliance with their infection control standards through direct observation of hospital activities and review hospital policy documents during on-site surveys. Multiple HHS programs collect data on HAIs, but limitations in the scope of information they collect and a lack of integration across the databases maintained by these separate programs constrain the utility of the data. Three agencies within HHS currently collect HAI-related data for a variety of purposes in databases maintained by four separate programs: CDC's National Healthcare Safety Network program, CMS's Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System, CMS's Annual Payment Update program, and AHRQ's Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. Each of the four databases presents only a partial view of the extent of the HAI problem because each focuses its data collection on selected types of HAIs and collects data from a different subset of hospital patients across the country. GAO did not find that the agencies were taking steps to integrate data across the four databases by creating linkages across the databases, such as creating common patient identifiers. Creating linkages across the HAI-related databases could enhance the availability of information to better understand where and how HAIs occur. Although CDC officials have produced national estimates of HAIs, those estimates derive from assumptions and extrapolations that raise questions about the reliability of those estimates. |
gao_GAO-06-135T | gao_GAO-06-135T_0 | Background
The Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act, enacted in 1988, authorized the President to investigate the impact of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies on national security and to suspend or prohibit acquisitions that might threaten national security. The President delegated the investigative authority to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an interagency group established in 1975 to monitor and coordinate U.S. policy on foreign investment in the United States. The law and regulations establish a four-step process for reviewing foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies: (1) voluntary notice by the companies; (2) a 30-day review to determine whether the acquisition could pose a threat to national security; (3) a 45- day investigation to determine whether those concerns require a recommendation to the President for possible action; and (4) a presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition. Differing Views of What Defines A National Security Threat and When to Initiate an Investigation May Weaken Exon-Florio’s Effectiveness
Lack of agreement among Committee members on what defines a threat to national security and what criteria should be used to initiate an investigation may be limiting the Committee’s analyses of proposed and completed foreign acquisitions. If a review cannot be completed within 30 days and more time is needed to determine whether a problem exists or identify actions that would mitigate concerns, the Committee can initiate a 45-day investigation of the acquisition or allow companies to withdraw their notifications and refile at a later date. According to Treasury officials, the Committee’s interest is to ensure that the implementation of Exon-Florio does not undermine U.S. open investment policy. Between 1997 and 2004, companies involved in 18 acquisitions have withdrawn their notification and refiled 19 times. In each case, the company has yet to refile. Lack of Reporting Contributes to the Opaqueness of the Committee’s Process
In enacting Exon-Florio, the Congress, while recognizing the need for confidentiality, indicated a desire for insight into the process by requiring the President to report to the Congress on any transaction that the President prohibited. Since 1997, only two cases— both involving telecommunications systems—resulted in a presidential decision and a subsequent report to the Congress. While Exon-Florio provides the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States the latitude to address new emerging threats, the more traditional interpretation of what constitutes a threat to national security fails to fully consider the factors currently embodied in the law. Further, we are suggesting that, when withdrawal is allowed for a transaction that has been completed, the Committee establish interim protections where specific concerns have been raised, specific time frames for refiling, and a process for tracking any actions being taken during a withdrawal period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 1988 Exon-Florio amendment to the Defense Production Act authorizes the President to suspend or prohibit foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies that may harm national security, an action the President has taken only once. Implementing Exon-Florio can pose a significant challenge because of the need to weigh security concerns against U.S. open investment policy--which requires equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors. Exon-Florio's investigative authority was delegated to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (Committee)--an interagency committee established in 1975 to monitor and coordinate U.S. policy on foreign investments. In September 2002, GAO reported on weaknesses in the Committee's implementation of Exon-Florio. This review further examined the Committee's implementation of Exon-Florio.
What GAO Found
Several aspects of the process for implementing Exon-Florio could be enhanced thereby strengthening the law's effectiveness. First, in light of differing views among Committee members about the scope of Exon-Florio--specifically, what defines a threat to national security, we have suggested that Congress should consider amending Exon-Florio to more clearly emphasize the factors that should be considered in determining potential harm to national security. Second, to provide additional time for analyzing transactions when necessary, while avoiding the perceived negative connotation of investigation on foreign investment in the United States we have suggested that the Congress eliminate the distinction between the 30-day review and the 45-day investigation and make the entire 75-day period available for review. Third, the Committee's current approach to provide additional time for analysis or to resolve concerns while avoiding the potential negative impacts of an investigation on foreign investment in the United Stated is to encourage companies to withdraw their notifications of proposed or completed acquisitions and refile them at a later date. Since 1997, companies involved in 18 acquisitions have been allowed to withdraw their notification to refile at a later time. The new filing is considered a new case and restarts the 30-day clock. While withdrawing and refiling provides additional time while minimizing the risk of chilling foreign investment, withdrawal may also heighten the risk to national security in transactions where there are concerns and the acquisition has been completed or is likely to be completed during the withdrawal period. We are therefore suggesting that the Congress consider requiring the Committee Chair to (1) establish interim protections where specific concerns have been raised, (2) specify time frames for refiling, and (3) establish a process for tracking any actions being taken during the withdrawal period. Finally, to provide more transparency and facilitate congressional oversight, we are suggesting that the Congress may want to revisit the criterion for reporting circumstances surrounding cases to the Congress. Currently, the criterion is a presidential decision. However, there have only been two such decisions since 1997 and thus only two reports to Congress. |
gao_NSIAD-95-171 | gao_NSIAD-95-171_0 | Launches to higher inclinations such as those needed for the space station lose some of this advantage, with a resulting loss in lift capability. The current plan includes about 30 individual actions that involve hardware redesign, improved navigational or flight design techniques, and new operational procedures. The super lightweight tank program has experienced some early development problems that could affect its performance. In its report, the team (1) concluded that the new tank had the potential for problems during development and manufacturing and (2) questioned using the improved engines for increased thrust capability. To support the first shuttle space station launch, all of the enhancement programs must be integrated and recertified into the shuttle system within a demanding schedule. Shuttle’s Ability to Support Station’s Assembly Schedule Is Questionable
Based on its launch history and projected budget, the shuttle may not be able to meet the demanding launch requirements of the space station’s assembly schedule. To meet the station’s “assembly complete” milestone, shuttle officials have designed a very compressed launch schedule. NASA currently plans to assess the impact of the new environments on these components based on the design rather than the actual hardware. Recommendation
We recommend that the Administrator of NASA establish an independent review team to (1) assess NASA’s systems integration plan for the lift-increasing enhancements, (2) identify the associated technical and programmatic risks, and (3) weigh the costs and benefits of NASA’s tight scheduling of shuttle flights to assemble the space station. In addition, we interviewed officials from NASA Headquarters, the shuttle program, and the space station program regarding issues related to NASA’s plan to support space station assembly. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the extent to which the space shuttle program can support the space station's assembly requirements, focusing on the: (1) impacts of the declining shuttle budget; and (2) demanding schedule to support the space station.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans for increasing the shuttle's lift capability are complex and involve about 30 individual actions such as hardware redesigns, improved flight design techniques, and new operational procedures; (2) some of the hardware redesign programs have experienced early development problems, and the potential exists for additional problems; (3) the NASA schedule for meeting the space station's launch requirements appears questionable in the declining budget environment; (4) NASA must successfully complete numerous shuttle-related development programs on a tight schedule to support the first space station launch; (5) the remaining launch schedule is compressed and will be difficult to achieve without additional funding or more efficient processing methods; (6) delays in the launch schedule could substantially increase the station's cost; (7) NASA plans to forgo some of the shuttle's recertification activities and full integration testing of the propulsion system until the first launch of station components; (8) NASA plans to assess the implications of the design changes through a combination of tanking and component tests and systems analyses; and (9) NASA must ensure that the implications of integrating numerous individual design changes are fully understood and safety is not compromised. |
gao_GAO-02-556 | gao_GAO-02-556_0 | The Chemical Warfare Service used a portion of American University and other areas that became part of the Spring Valley neighborhood to operate a large research facility to develop and test chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. The U.S. Army used the remaining part of the area as a camp to house and train engineer troops. Through fiscal year 2001 (the latest figure available), the Corps had spent about $53.4 million on cleanup activities at Spring Valley. Government Entities Have Identified and Removed a Large Number of Hazards, but the Extent of Hazards Remaining Is Unknown
The Corps, in partnership with EPA and the District of Columbia, has identified and removed a large number of hazards from areas within the Spring Valley site. This area contained concrete shell pits or bunkers that were used during World War I to test explosives and chemical warfare agents. In contrast, exposure to arsenic-contaminated soil poses a long-term health risk and the partners have, in the past, disagreed about the level and extent of the risk at Spring Valley. The Corps’ Estimated Cost and Cleanup Schedule May Change as More Information about the Site Is Known
As of April 2002, the Corps estimated that the Spring Valley cleanup would cost another $71.7 million, including fiscal year 2002, and take 5 years beyond fiscal year 2002 to complete, but these estimates are uncertain. Most sites are active Department of Defense (Defense) installations or formerly used defense sites (FUDS). | What GAO Found
During World War I, the U.S. Army operated a large research facility to develop and test chemical weapons and explosives in the area that became the Spring Valley neighborhood in Washington, D.C. Buried ordnance, discovered there in 1993, led to the designation by the Department of Defense (DOD) of 61 acres as a formerly used defense site. Through fiscal year 2001, DOD had spent over $50 million to identify and remove hazards at the site. The government entities involved have identified and removed a large number of hazards, but the number remaining is unknown. The health risks influencing cleanup activities at Spring Valley are the possibility of injury or death from exploding or leaking ordnance and containers of chemical warfare agents and potential long-term health problems from exposure to arsenic-contaminated soil. As of April 2002, the U.S. Army estimated that the remaining cleanup activities would cost $7.1 million and take 5 years. But these estimates are unreliable. GAO summarized this report in congressional testimony (See GAO-02-836T). |
gao_NSIAD-98-189 | gao_NSIAD-98-189_0 | On the basis of this and other concerns, the Secretary of Defense directed in May 1997 that the number of CJCS exercise man-days be decreased by 15 percent between fiscal year 1996 and 1998 to reduce the potential impact of the exercise program on deployment rates. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. Exercises Are Conducted for Various CINC Mission Requirements
The regional CINCs use the CJCS Exercise Program largely to ensure that their forces are trained to conduct missions contained in contingency plans, provide joint training, and project a military presence worldwide to shape the international environment. Some exercises focus on just one of these objectives, whereas others, such as war-fighting training, focus on more than one objective (i.e., contingency plans and joint training). On average, about 37 percent of these exercises have or will train forces to implement the CINCs’ existing contingency plans; about 60 percent are designed to prepare U.S. forces for joint operations; and approximately 44 percent are designed primarily for engagement purposes, such as projecting U.S. military presence abroad or fostering relations with foreign military forces. The percentage of exercises intended to provide joint training at the regional CINCs has increased over the past 3 to 4 years. Of the 1,405 CJCS exercises conducted or planned to be conducted during fiscal years 1995-2002, 625, or about 44 percent, were directed toward engagement activities. However, the Joint Staff estimated that the CJCS Exercise Program would cost about $400 million to $500 million annually during fiscal years 1995-2000. The Joint Staff’s estimate was derived from a combination of actual and estimated costs; therefore, we were unable to independently verify the estimate. Costs Associated With CJCS Exercises
A variety of costs are directly associated with conducting CJCS exercises. DOD Lacks the Data to Assess the Program’s Impact on Service Deployment Rates
The services use various methods to track the time individuals or units spend engaged in operations and time deployed away from their home stations because there is no DOD-wide requirement to collect and maintain specific personnel deployment rate data. The Joint Staff Does Not Track the Impact of CJCS Exercises on Overall Personnel Deployment Rates
The readiness staff at Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps headquarters, which monitor data systems, currently do not track the impact of CJCS exercise participation on overall personnel or unit deployment rates. The cost data in DOD’s February 1998 report to Congress is incomplete because some service participation costs are not included. Because DOD does not consistently track information on deployments, the impact of the exercise program on overall deployment rates cannot be precisely determined. As our report points out, without such cost information, DOD cannot determine total program costs. DOD acknowledged that the services’ ability to measure overall personnel and unit deployment rates is still evolving and is not yet robust enough to allow the agency to determine the share attributable to the CJCS Exercise Program. We determined the systems the Joint Staff, CINCs, services, and major commands use to track military personnel and unit deployments by contacting the following organizations: the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7); the U.S. Atlantic, Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands; the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the Air Force Operations Support Center, Training Division; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations; and the Marine Corps Current Operations Branch Exercise Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Exercise Program, focusing on the: (1) number and type of CJCS exercises conducted and planned from 1995 to 2002; (2) basis for the Department of Defense's (DOD) estimates of exercise costs for the same time period; and (3) availability of DOD data to estimate the impact of CJCS exercises on deployment rates.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD cannot determine the impact of the CJCS Exercise Program on overall deployment rates because DOD does not have a system that accurately and consistently measures overall deployment rates across the services; (2) without such a system, DOD cannot objectively assess the extent to which the program contributes to deployment rate concerns; (3) from fiscal year (FY) 1995 to 2002, 1,405 exercises were or are planned to be conducted as part of the program at the 5 regional commands; (4) the objectives of these exercises are to: (a) ensure that U.S. forces are trained to conduct their highest-priority mission contained in regional command contingency plans; (b) provide joint training for commanders, staff, and forces; and (c) project a military presence worldwide and support commitments to U.S. allies; (5) some exercises focus on just one of these objectives, whereas others focus on more; (6) about 37 percent of the exercises during FY 1995 through 2002 are directly related to executing contingency plans, 60 percent are intended to provide joint training benefits, and about 44 percent are primarily directed toward engagement activities with foreign nations' military forces and U.S. allies; (7) the Joint Staff maintains data on transportation-related expenses but does not monitor and track the complete costs of the program; (8) before the FY 1998 National Defense Authorization Act, DOD was not required to determine total program costs; (9) in DOD's February 1998 mandated report to Congress, the Joint Staff used a combination of actual and estimated costs to estimate that the total program would cost between $400 million and $500 million annually from FY 1995 to 2000; (10) DOD does not maintain the data that would enable it to determine the extent to which military personnel deployments associated with the program contribute to overall DOD-wide personnel or unit deployment rates; (11) the services use various methods to track individual or unit deployments and collect some data on the numbers of personnel or units that participate in CJCS exercises and the length of personnel deployments associated with the exercises; and (12) the services' ability to measure overall personnel or unit deployment rates is still evolving; as a result, the impact of the CJCS Exercise Program on deployment rates remains unknown. |
gao_HEHS-98-167 | gao_HEHS-98-167_0 | In 1995, HRSA exercised that option, and the contract now requires that the evaluation cover all 5 years of the originally planned demonstration. The national evaluation has two major components: an impact evaluation and a process evaluation. The impact evaluation is used to determine whether the infant mortality rates in Healthy Start communities have declined and whether related outcomes have improved. The process evaluation describes how the program actually operates. In its final evaluation report, MPR intends to synthesize these two components, linking outcomes with processes to determine why Healthy Start has or has not succeeded in communities and which strategies are likely to be successful elsewhere. MPR’s Preliminary Evaluation Results Were Not Conclusive
In the fall of 1997, MPR reported some preliminary evaluation results, including a draft interim report on its impact evaluation, which led to press accounts suggesting a variety of interpretations about the success of the Healthy Start program. Although the impact evaluation suggested that Healthy Start has not reduced infant mortality, such conclusions about the program would be premature because the impact evaluation does not include data from all the program sites or data from all the years of the program. Two detailed reports on specific interventions are available only in draft form. MPR’s Final Report Will Be Based on Fewer Years of Impact Data and Program Operation Than Originally Planned
The final report as currently planned will not be the final evaluation of Healthy Start. Conclusions
Since the national evaluation of the Healthy Start program has yet to be completed, preliminary results should not be used to conclude that the program has or has not achieved its goals. HRSA and MPR plan for the “final” report of the national evaluation to include an extensive description of the program, indicate whether it has reduced infant mortality rates at Healthy Start sites, and provide an analysis of how program characteristics have influenced outcomes. However, the final report will analyze infant mortality data from only 4 years of the demonstration. Primarily because implementation of the projects was slower than anticipated, data from the first 4 years of the demonstration may be insufficient for judging the success of Healthy Start in lowering infant mortality. Thus, even the final report will be inconclusive. Thus, at a relatively modest cost, MPR’s evaluation would be further strengthened by including data from the sixth and final year of the demonstration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the preliminary results of a national evaluation of the Healthy Start program, focusing on: (1) the plan for national evaluation; (2) what Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.'s (MPR) preliminary evaluation results indicate; and (3) what is expected from the final evaluation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) MPR's preliminary reports from the national evaluation of Healthy Start do not provide a complete assessment of the program and, therefore, should not be used to judge the program's success; (2) even the final report will not contain all the data expected to be analyzed for the national evaluation; (3) if the evaluation plan were expanded to include data from the sixth and final year of the demonstration, conclusions about whether the program has met its goals of reducing infant mortality could be strengthened; (4) the national evaluation of the Healthy Start program had two major components: (a) an impact evaluation, to determine whether the infant mortality rates in Healthy Start communities have declined; and (b) a process evaluation to describe how the program actually operates; (5) once these evaluations are completed, MPR plans to link outcomes with processes in its final report to determine why Healthy Start has or has not succeeded and what would be required for a similar intervention elsewhere; (6) while MPR's draft report on its impact evaluation suggests that Healthy Start has little effect in reducing infant morality in targeted communities, drawing such a conclusion at this time would be premature for several reasons; (7) the process evaluation is also incomplete; (8) only some of the reports that it comprises are available; (9) eventually, MPR plans to cover program implementation at all sites, the characteristics of program participants, and details about some of the most important strategies used by the program; (10) with these two major components of the evaluation in preliminary stages or incomplete, MPR cannot yet relate process to impact; (11) the final evaluation is expected to include an analysis of infant morality data from the original 5 years of the demonstration for all 15 sites; (12) however, the final report on the evaluation, now planned for early 1999, will include data from only the first 4 years; and (13) further, because implementation of the program was slower than anticipated, and the program was mature for fewer years of the original demonstration period than planned for in the evaluation, even results from the final report are likely to be inconclusive and should be considered preliminary. |
gao_T-RCED-99-159 | gao_T-RCED-99-159_0 | Security concerns and problems have existed since these facilities were created. These reports have included nearly 50 recommendations for improving programs for controlling foreign visitor access, protecting classified and sensitive information, maintaining physical security over facilities and property, ensuring the trustworthiness of employees, and accounting for nuclear materials. While DOE has often agreed to take corrective actions, we have found that the implementation has often not been successful and that problems recur over the years. Consequently, DOE has had procedures to control these visits as well as other lines of defense—such as access controls and counterintelligence programs—to protect its information and technology from loss to foreign visitors. These programs lacked comprehensive threat assessments, which are needed to identify the threats against DOE and the facilities most at risk, and lacked performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of these programs in neutralizing or deterring foreign espionage efforts. Physical Security
Physical security controls involve the protection, primarily through security personnel and fences, of facilities and property. Personnel Security
DOE’s personnel security clearance program is intended to provide assurance that personnel with access to classified material and information are trustworthy. Key Factors Contributing to Security Problems
As you can see, Mr. Chairman, our work over the years has identified a wide variety of specific security problems at DOE facilities. While each individual security problem is a concern, when looked at collectively over an extended period of time, a more serious situation becomes apparent that stems from systemic causes. In our view, there are two overall systemic causes of the security problems. Second, and probably most importantly, there is a serious lack of accountability among DOE and its contractors for their actions. Lack of Attention and Priority to Security
The lack of attention and priority given by DOE management and its contractors to security matters can be seen in many areas. . . .” DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board also reported in 1997 on DOE’s organizational problems, noting that there were inefficiencies due to DOE’s complicated management structure. Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking System Makes Success Unlikely (GAO/AIMD-95-165, Aug. 3, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its past work involving security at Department of Energy's (DOE) facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's work has identified security-related problems with controlling foreign visitors, protecting classified and sensitive information, maintaining physical security over facilities and property, ensuring the trustworthiness of employees, and accounting for nuclear materials; (2) these problems include: (a) ineffective controls over foreign visitors to DOE's most sensitive facilities; (b) weaknesses in efforts to control and protect classified and sensitive information; (c) lax physical security controls, such as security personnel and fences, to protect facilities and property; (d) ineffective management of personnel security clearance programs; and (e) weaknesses in DOE's ability to track and control nuclear materials; (3) the recent revelations about espionage bring to light how ingrained security problems are at DOE; (4) although each individual security problem is a concern, when these problems are looked at collectively over time, a more serious situation becomes apparent; (5) while a number of investigations are under way to determine the status of these security problems, GAO has found that DOE has often agreed to take corrective action but the implementation has not been successful and the problems reoccur; (6) there are two overall systemic causes for this situation; (7) DOE managers and contractors have shown a lack of attention and priority to security matters; (8) there is a serious lack of accountability at DOE; (9) efforts to address security problems have languished for years without resolution or repercussions to those organizations responsible; (10) security in today's environment is even more challenging, given the greater openness that now exists at DOE's facilities and the international cooperation associated with some of DOE's research; (11) even when more stringent security measures were in place than there are today, problems have arisen and secrets can be, and were, lost; and (12) consequently, continual vigilance, as well as more sophisticated security strategies, will be needed to meet the threats that exist today. |
gao_GAO-10-901 | gao_GAO-10-901_0 | FPS Faces Challenges in Protecting Federal Facilities and Is Taking Some Actions to Address Them
FPS Has Begun to Develop a Risk Management Approach to Protecting Federal Facilities
In 2008, we reported that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS’s security goals, there is only limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing a new system referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP). This system is designed to be a central database for capturing and managing facility security information, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the countermeasures in place to mitigate risk. FPS Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program
We reported in July 2009 and April 2010 that FPS faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 contract security guards that FPS relies on to help protect federal facilities have the required training and certification to be deployed at federal facilities. We also identified substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS’s guard program. FPS also took a number of immediate actions to address concerns raised about contract guard management in our July 2009 contract guard report. For example, since July 2009, FPS has increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS agreed with this recommendation but has not yet implemented it. While FPS has recently increased the size of its workforce as mandated by Congress, we reported in our 2009 report that FPS has operated without a human capital plan. We recommended that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. We have identified human capital management as a high-risk issue throughout the federal government, including within DHS. FPS concurred with this recommendation and has drafted a workforce analysis plan but has not yet fully developed or implemented a human capital plan. FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance
We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Facility Security Committee Structure Hampers Protection of Federal Facilities
FPS’s ability to protect federal facilities under the control or custody of GSA is further complicated by the FSC structure. For example, FSCs have operated since 1995 without guidelines, policies, or procedures that outline how they should operate, make decisions, or establish accountability. Each FSC consists of a representative from each of the tenant agencies in the facility and is responsible for addressing security issues at its respective facility and approving the implementation of security countermeasures recommended by FPS. However, we reported in November 2009 that the tenant agency representatives generally do not have any security knowledge or experience but are expected to make security decisions for their respective agencies. We also reported that some of the FSC tenant agency representatives also do not have the authority to commit their respective organizations to fund security countermeasures. Moreover, no actions have been taken on these issues since we identified them in our November 2009 report. As such, these weaknesses continue to result in ad hoc security and increased risk at some federal facilities. Recommendation for Executive Action
GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to work in consultation with GSA and ISC to develop and implement procedures that, among other things, outline the FSCs’ organizational structure, operations, decision-making authority, and accountability. DHS concurred with the recommendation in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. However, protecting federal facilities and their occupants from a potential terrorist attack or other acts of violence remains a daunting challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service. GAO has issued numerous reports on FPS's efforts to protect the General Services Administration's (GSA) facilities. This report (1) recaps the major challenges we reported that FPS faces in protecting federal facilities and discusses FPS's efforts to address them and (2) identifies an additional challenge that FPS faces related to the facility security committees (FSC), which are responsible for addressing security issues at federal facilities. This report is based primarily on our previous work and recent FPS interviews.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, we have reported that FPS faces significant challenges with protecting federal facilities, and in response FPS has recently started to take steps to address some of them. In 2008, we reported that FPS does not use a risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's security goals, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. FPS recently began implementing a new system referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP). This system is designed to be a central database for capturing and managing facility security information, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. FPS expects that RAMP will enhance its approach to assessing risk, managing human capital, and measuring performance. Our July 2009 report on FPS's contract guard program also identified a number of challenges that the agency faces in managing its contract guard program, including ensuring that the 15,000 guards that are responsible for helping to protect federal facilities have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In response to our report, FPS took a number of immediate actions with respect to contract guard management. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas and revised its guard training. We have not reviewed whether these actions are sufficient to fulfill our recommendations. Another area of continuing concern is that FPS continues to operate without a human capital plan and does not have an accurate estimate of its current and future workforce needs. In our July 2009 report, we recommended that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. While FPS agreed with this recommendation, it has not yet fully developed or implemented a human capital plan. As we reported in 2009, FPS's ability to protect GSA facilities is further complicated by the FSC structure. Each FSC includes FPS, GSA, and a tenant agency representative and is responsible for addressing security issues at its respective facility and approving the funding and implementation of security countermeasures recommended by FPS. However, there are several weaknesses with the FSC. First, FSCs have operated since 1995 without procedures that outline how they should operate or make decisions, or that establish accountability. Second, the tenant agency representatives to the FSC generally do not have any security knowledge or experience but are expected to make security decisions for their respective agencies. Third, many of the FSC tenant agency representatives also do not have the authority to commit their respective organizations to fund security countermeasures. No actions have been taken on these issues since our 2009 report, and thus these weaknesses continue to result in ad hoc security and increased risk at some federal facilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct the Director of FPS to work in consultation with other representatives of the FSC to develop and implement procedures that, among other things, outline the committees' organization structure, operations, and accountability. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-479 | gao_GAO-15-479_0 | USAID Missions in Five Selected Countries Are Implementing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Reading Programs Consistent with USAID Guidance
In the five countries where we conducted fieldwork, the USAID missions had implemented primary grade reading programs that included intervention elements recommended in USAID’s guidance related to its education strategy. In several of the countries, the need to develop new reading materials in mother-tongue languages and train classroom teachers in the use of these materials (see fig. As a result, portions of targeted student populations in four countries are not expected to benefit from the programs in time to contribute to USAID’s strategic goal of 100 million students with improved reading skills by December 2015. Agency officials attributed the incomplete data and information to a lack of timely guidance, among other factors. Fourth, the education strategy did not set interim targets for measuring progress toward USAID’s reading goal in comparison to planned performance, as suggested by leading performance management practices. Without a methodology and interim targets, USAID officials cannot determine USAID’s progress toward its goal or identify a realistic goal for a future education strategy. About Two-Thirds of Missions with Primary Grade Reading Programs Are Expected to Have Data for Assessing Overall Progress toward USAID’s Reading Goal by 2015
Because it took some missions longer to implement primary grade reading programs than USAID estimated in its implementation guidance to the education strategy, USAID expects only about two-thirds of missions with funding for such programs to provide baseline and midline or endline assessment data in time for the data to be used in estimating As figure 8 the agency’s progress toward its primary grade reading goal.shows, 26 missions (62 percent) of the 42 with funding for such programs had implemented them by the end of fiscal year 2012, the target date established in the education strategy’s implementation guidance to allow at least 3 years of implementation. USAID Lacks Complete Data and Information Needed to Aggregate and Analyze Reading Assessment Results
Although the USAID contractor responsible for aggregating and analyzing missions’ reading assessment results has begun to collect available data, as of April 2015, only a small number of the missions with completed reading assessments had provided both complete data and the supporting information that the contractor needs. USAID Has Not Selected a Methodology for Estimating Total Numbers of Children with Improved Reading, Limiting Its Ability to Measure Progress toward Its Reading Goal
As of April 2015, USAID had not yet selected and documented a methodology for using missions’ assessment data and supporting information to estimate progress toward its goal of improved reading skills for 100 million children by 2015. Gain score methodology. To help ensure that USAID reports a reliable estimate of the results of its efforts to achieve the goal of improving reading skills of 100 million children, we recommend that the Acting Administrator select a methodology for estimating the total numbers of children with improved reading skills as a result of exposure to primary grade reading programs and document a description of the selected methodology as well as the information necessary to evaluate the estimate (i.e., sampling designs, sample sizes, and modes of data collection) when reporting progress toward the reading goal. This report (1) examines five USAID missions’ implementation, performance monitoring, and evaluation of primary grade reading programs and (2) assesses USAID’s efforts to estimate progress toward the 2011-2015 education strategy’s primary grade reading goal. In addition, we conducted fieldwork in five countries—Ethiopia, Malawi, Peru, the Philippines, and Uganda—which we selected because they are geographically diverse and received relatively large levels of U.S. funding for basic education in fiscal year 2013. To assess USAID’s efforts to estimate progress toward the education strategy’s primary grade reading goal—our second objective—we reviewed the USAID education strategy, guidance for implementing the strategy, technical notes to the strategy, and the strategy’s reporting guidance to identify the agency’s policies and guidelines for completing reading assessments at USAID missions and for analyzing the data and supporting information. | Why GAO Did This Study
While many developing countries have achieved important gains in primary school enrollment, students' reading skills remain very low. In response, USAID's 2011-2015 Education Strategy set a goal of improved reading skills for 100 million primary grade children by the end of 2015 (Goal 1). The 42 missions with funding for primary grade reading programs were to start programs aligned with the strategy by the end of fiscal year 2012 to allow time to assess results by 2015.
GAO was asked to review USAID's efforts to implement primary grade reading programs—Goal 1 of its education strategy. This report (1) examines five USAID missions' implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of reading programs and (2) assesses USAID's efforts to estimate progress toward its reading goal. GAO analyzed USAID's education strategy and other guidance, reading assessment data and methodologies, performance monitoring plans and reports, and program evaluations, and conducted fieldwork in five countries selected based on geographic diversity, funding for basic education, and availability of reading assessment data.
What GAO Found
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions in all five countries where GAO conducted fieldwork were implementing primary grade reading interventions recommended in USAID's education strategy guidance. A key intervention in four of these countries is developing new reading instruction materials in mother-tongue languages—in some instances, multiple languages. In Ethiopia, for example, USAID's reading program developed new student textbooks and teacher's guides for each of eight grades and seven languages and involved teams of local teachers, language experts, and story writers, among others. The complexity of these interventions in Ethiopia, Malawi, the Philippines, and Uganda increased the time before they could be introduced in classrooms. As a result, some targeted student populations are not expected to benefit from improved reading instruction until late 2015 or 2016, too late to be measured to contribute to USAID's strategic goal of 100 million students with improved reading skills by the end of 2015. In addition, the missions were monitoring their reading programs and planned to conduct program evaluations consistent with USAID guidance.
USAID is currently unable to estimate progress toward the education strategy's reading goal because of four factors. First, because it took some missions longer to implement reading programs than USAID estimated, only about two-thirds of missions are expected to have data to estimate progress toward the goal by the end of 2015. Second, only a small number of missions provided USAID the complete data and supporting information that it needs to aggregate and analyze reading assessment results. Agency officials attributed the lack of complete data and information to an absence of timely guidance. In 2014, USAID issued updated reporting guidance. Third, USAID has not selected a methodology for calculating percentages of assessed children demonstrating improved reading skills, and extrapolating the results to estimate the total numbers of children with improved reading skills. Along with incomplete data and information, other factors contributed to a delay in identifying a methodology—for example, USAID did not ask its contractor to examine the methodology proposed in 2012 and explore alternatives until 2014. Fourth, the education strategy did not set interim targets for assessing progress toward the reading goal as suggested by leading performance management practices. Without a methodology and interim targets, USAID officials and others lack aggregate information about progress toward the goal to assess the current strategy and plan a realistic goal for a future strategy.
What GAO Recommends
USAID should select a methodology for estimating total numbers of children with improved reading skills, document a description of the methodology when reporting results, and set interim targets to assess progress toward a reading goal in any future education strategy. USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-612T | gao_GAO-09-612T_0 | NORAD Had Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach
Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not conducted similar assessments since 2006. The Air Force Had Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and Guidance
Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example, in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission. Readiness of ASA Units Was Not Fully Assessed by the Air Force
NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically, the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements that identify the unit’s mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type a However, the Air Force has not identified ASA number of personnel). Temporary Status of ASA Operations Creates Difficulties for Units and Hampers Cost Visibility
Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors affecting ASA operations. The Air Force Had Not Developed a Plan to Address Fighter Aircraft Challenges for Units Conducting Both ASA Operations and Expeditionary Missions
Of the 18 ASA sites, 13 sites are currently equipped with F-16s, which, according to ANG estimates, will reach the end of their useful service lives between fiscal years 2015 and 2020. Extend the service life of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. In summary, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct The Commander of the U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's recently issued report on the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. According to the National Strategy for Aviation Security, issued in March 2007, and officials from U.S. intelligence agencies with whom we met, air attacks are still a threat to the United States and its people. To address this threat, NORAD and DOD have fully fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18 ASA sites across the United States. Of the 18 sites, 16 are maintained by Air National Guard (ANG) units and 2 are maintained by active duty Air Force units. If warranted, NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites based on changes in threat conditions. The Air Force provides NORAD with personnel and equipment, including F-15 and F-16 aircraft, for these operations. ASA units are tasked to conduct and train for both expeditionary missions (e.g., military operations in Iraq) and ASA operations. This testimony will discuss whether (1) NORAD routinely conducts risk assessments to determine the appropriate operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission, which would require programming funding and measuring readiness, in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance; and (3) the Air Force has developed a plan to address the recapitalization challenges to sustaining ASA operations for the future.
What GAO Found
Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not conducted similar assessments since 2006. Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example, in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission. NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically, the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements that identify the unit's mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type anumber of personnel). Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors affecting ASA operations. |
gao_GAO-14-285T | gao_GAO-14-285T_0 | The 2012 Act included several provisions that address some of the issues that we have identified in our work, including incentivizing aircraft operators to equip with NextGen technologies, developing performance measures, and involving stakeholders in NextGen development.progress in implementing NextGen has highlighted ongoing challenges in Our recent work on FAA’s three areas: improving leadership, demonstrating near-term benefits, and balancing the needs of the current system while implementing NextGen systems. Improving NextGen Leadership
Our work has found that complex organizational transformations, such as NextGen, involving technology, systems, and retraining key personnel require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period, and that leaders must be empowered to make critical decisions and held accountable for results. In June 2013, FAA appointed a new Deputy Administrator and designated a Chief NextGen Officer, in response to Section 204 of the 2012 Act. With these positions now filled, FAA should be in a better position to resolve its NextGen leadership challenges. Demonstrating Near-Term Benefits
To convince operators to make investments in NextGen equipment, FAA must continue to deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities that demonstrate near-term benefits and a return on an operator’s investments. In particular, a large percentage of the current U.S. air carrier fleet is equipped to fly more precise performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures, such as following precise routes that use the Global Positioning System or glide descent paths, which can save airlines and other aircraft operators money through reduced fuel burn and flight time. The 2012 Act included a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the creation of PBN procedures. As of January 2014, PBN procedures had been implemented at two of the five selected airports. The 2012 Act contained a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the implementation of NextGen systems. However, we found in August 2013 that FAA’s budget planning does not fully account for the potential impact of NextGen systems that will be deployed and the need for continued operations and maintenance of existing systems and facilities. These, and other cost estimates for maintaining existing systems and facilities, along with implementing NextGen exceed anticipated funding levels. In addition, section 804 of the 2012 Act directed FAA to complete a study on the consolidation and realignment of FAA services and facilities to support the transition to NextGen. Improved budget planning and accurate and reliable data on infrastructure condition could help Congress better understand the funding requirements of existing systems and facilities and facilitate FAA’s efforts to support the agency’s mission of continuing to safely operate the NAS along with the longer-term goal of transitioning to NextGen. FAA Is Continuously Working to Improve Safety and Has Made Progress in Improving Its Certification Processes
The U.S. air transportation system remains one of the safest in the world. 2). Subsequently, the 2012 Act required FAA to work with industry to assess the certification process, including reviewing our previous work and developing recommendations to address the concerns that we and others have raised. In July 2013, FAA released its plan to implement these recommendations. III for an update of all the 2012 Act’s requirements with respect to UAS). While progress has been made implementing some of the key milestones established in the 2012 Act, integrating UAS into the NAS continues to challenge FAA leading to uncertainty about when UAS integration will be achieved. Although FAA has had efforts under way since 2008 supporting a rulemaking on small UAS, it is unlikely that FAA will meet the August 2014 final rule deadline required by the 2012 Act. For example, FAA has not yet issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for small UAS, and recently estimated that one will not be released until November 2014. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation Challenges. Appendix III: Status of Requirements for UAS Integration under the 2012 Act as of January 2014
Appendix III: Status of Requirements for UAS Integration under the 2012 Act as of January 2014 Deadline 05/14/2012 Enter into agreements with appropriate government agencies to simplify the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 requirement process for issuing Certificates of waiver or authorizations (COAs) or waivers for public UAS. 08/12/2012 Establish a program to integrate UAS into the national airspace at six test ranges. 09/30/2015 Achieve safe integration of civil UAS into the national airspace. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. air transportation system is the busiest and among the safest in the world. Even so, maintaining and improving the extraordinary level of connectivity and mobility the system affords us, and the safety record that has been achieved to date requires continued attention and effort. In the 2012 Act, Congress directed FAA to take various actions to improve the safety and efficiency of the current NAS while transitioning to NextGen. In addition, given the potential and opportunities afforded by new UAS technologies, the 2012 Act included several provisions with respect to FAA safely integrating UAS into the NAS.
Based on work GAO has conducted for this Committee since the passage of the 2012 Act, this testimony discusses FAA's challenges and progress in
1) implementing NextGen,
2) improving aviation safety, and
3) integrating UAS into the national airspace system.
This statement is drawn from several GAO reports completed since the 2012 Act, as well as additional reports from prior to the 2012 Act on these topics. To update information in those reports, GAO conducted interviews with officials from FAA and industry, and reviewed agency documents.
What GAO Found
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the 2012 Act) contained several provisions related to implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a complex, long-term initiative to incrementally modernize and transform the national airspace system (NAS). GAO's recent work on NextGen has highlighted three key implementation issues:
Improving NextGen Leadership: Complex transformations, such as NextGen, require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period, and leaders must both be empowered to make critical decisions and be held accountable for results. The 2012 Act created a Chief NextGen Officer that FAA appointed in June 2013, and FAA has recently filled other key NextGen leadership positions. With these positions filled, FAA should be in a better position to resolve its NextGen leadership challenges.
Demonstrating Near-Term Benefits: The 2012 Act included a number of provisions aimed at accelerating the creation of performance-based navigation (PBN) procedures, such as following precise routes that use the Global Positioning System, which can save airlines and other aircraft operators money through reduced fuel burn and flight time. FAA must continue to deliver PBN capabilities and begin to demonstrate a return on operator's investments. As of January 2014, FAA has implemented PBN procedures at two of the five airports selected for early deployment.
Balancing the Needs of the Current Air–Traffic Control System and NextGen: While the 2012 Act contained a number of provisions aimed at accelerating NextGen implementation, GAO found that FAA's budget planning does not fully account for the impact on the agency's operating costs of the NextGen systems that will be deployed in future years, along with the need for continued operation and maintenance of existing systems and facilities. Cost estimates for maintaining existing systems and facilities coupled with implementing NextGen exceed anticipated funding levels. GAO recommended improvements to FAA's budget–planning and infrastructure-condition data, which FAA is working to implement.
Safety in the aviation industry is achieved in part through adherence to various certification standards. The 2012 Act required FAA to work with industry to assess the certification process. GAO's work has found that while FAA has made progress developing its plan to implement these recommendations, FAA continues to lack performance measures to track its progress.
For unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), FAA has implemented 7 of the 17 requirements established in the 2012 Act, representing progress since GAO's last update in January 2013. However, FAA continues to experience challenges implementing the provisions in the 2012 Act and integrating UAS into the NAS. For example, although FAA has had efforts under way since 2008 supporting a rulemaking on small UAS, it is unlikely that FAA will meet the August 2014 final rule deadline required by the 2012 Act since it has not yet issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In addition, while FAA created the UAS Integration Office in 2013 to lead UAS integration, as of January 2014, the program lacks an operations budget. |
gao_GAO-11-530 | gao_GAO-11-530_0 | Specifically, VISN and VHA Central Office officials did not receive reports of all sexual assault incidents reported to VA police in VA medical facilities within the four VISNs we reviewed. To examine whether VA medical facilities were accurately reporting sexual assault incidents involving rape allegations to the VA OIG, we reviewed both the 67 rape allegations reported to the VA police from January 2007 through July 2010 and all investigation documentation provided by the VA OIG for the same period. Following their review, these investigators also found that several of these rape allegations were not appropriately reported to the VA OIG as required by federal regulation. Several Factors May Contribute to the Underreporting of Sexual Assault Incidents
There are several factors that may contribute to the underreporting of sexual assault incidents to VISNs, VHA Central Office, and the VA OIG— including VHA’s lack of a consistent sexual assault definition for reporting purposes; limited and unclear expectations for sexual assault incident reporting at the VHA Central Office, VISN, and VA medical facility levels; and deficiencies in VHA Central Office oversight of sexual assault incidents. Self-Reported Legal Histories Are Commonly Used to Inform Clinicians of Sexual Assault- Related Risks, but Guidance on Information Collection Is Limited
VA does not have risk assessment tools specifically designed to examine sexual assault-related risks that some veterans may pose while they are being treated at VA medical facilities. Instead, VA clinicians working in the residential programs and inpatient mental health units at medical facilities we visited said they rely mainly on information about veterans’ legal histories, including a veteran’s history of violence, which are examined as part of a multidisciplinary admission assessment process to assess these and other risks veterans pose to themselves and others. Clinicians also reported that they generally rely on veterans’ self-reported information, though this information is not always complete or accurate. VA Residential and Inpatient Mental Health Settings Use a Variety of Precautions to Prevent Sexual Assaults and Other Safety Incidents, but Serious Weaknesses Were Observed at Selected Facilities
The residential programs and inpatient mental health units at the five VA medical facilities we visited reported using several types of patient- oriented and physical precautions to prevent safety incidents, such as sexual assaults, from occurring in their programs. However, at the facilities we visited, we found serious deficiencies in the use and implementation of certain physical security precautions, such as alarm system malfunctions and monitoring of security cameras. Generally, these precautions were not specifically geared toward preventing sexual assaults, but were used to prevent a broad range of safety incidents, including sexual assaults. Inadequate monitoring of closed-circuit surveillance cameras. Deficiencies like these at VA medical facilities could lead to delayed response times and seriously erode efforts to prevent or mitigate sexual assaults and other safety incidents. Inadequate documentation or review of alarm system testing. Alarms failed to alert both police and unit staff. At most medical facilities we visited, VA police forces and police command and control centers were understaffed, according to medical facility officials. To help identify risks and address vulnerabilities in physical security precautions at VA medical facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following four actions: Establish guidance specifying what should be included in legal history discussions with veterans and how this information should be documented in veterans’ biopsychosocial assessments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes the information and methods we used to examine: (1) VA’s processes for reporting sexual assault incidents and the volume of these incidents reported in recent years; (2) the extent to which sexual assault incidents are fully reported and what factors may contribute to any observed underreporting; (3) how medical facility staff determine sexual assault-related risks veterans may pose in residential and inpatient mental health settings; and (4) the precautions in place in residential and inpatient mental health settings to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents and any weaknesses in these precautions. In addition, we spoke with officials from the four Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) responsible for managing these medical facilities to discuss their expectations, policies, and procedures for reporting sexual assault incidents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Changes in patient demographics present unique challenges for VA in providing safe environments for all veterans treated in Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facilities. GAO was asked to examine whether or not sexual assault incidents are fully reported and what factors may contribute to any observed underreporting, how facility staff determine sexual assault-related risks veterans may pose in residential and inpatient mental health settings, and precautions facilities take to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents. GAO reviewed relevant laws, VA policies, and sexual assault incident documentation from January 2007 through July 2010 provided by VA officials and the VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In addition, GAO visited and reviewed portions of selected veterans' medical records at five judgmentally selected VA medical facilities chosen to ensure the residential and inpatient mental health units at the facilities varied in size and complexity. Finally, GAO spoke with the four Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) that oversee these VA medical facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that many of the nearly 300 sexual assault incidents reported to the VA police were not reported to VA leadership officials and the VA OIG. Specifically, for the four VISNs GAO spoke with, VISN and VA Central Office officials did not receive reports of most sexual assault incidents reported to the VA police. Also, nearly two-thirds of sexual assault incidents involving rape allegations originating in VA facilities were not reported to the VA OIG, as required by VA regulation. In addition, GAO identified several factors that may contribute to the underreporting of sexual assault incidents including unclear guidance and deficiencies in VA's oversight. VA does not have risk assessment tools designed to examine sexual assaultrelated risks veterans may pose. Instead, VA staff at the residential programs and inpatient mental health units GAO visited said they examine information about veterans' legal histories along with other personal information as part of a multidisciplinary assessment process. VA clinicians reported that they obtain legal history information directly from veterans, but these self-reported data are not always complete or accurate. In reviewing selected veterans' medical records, GAO found that complete legal history information was not always documented. In addition, VA has not provided clear guidance on how such legal history information should be collected or documented. VA facilities GAO visited used a variety of precautions intended to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents; however, GAO found some of these measures were deficient, compromising facilities' efforts to prevent sexual assaults and other safety incidents. For example, facilities often used patientoriented precautions, such as placing electronic flags on high-risk veterans' medical records or increasing staff observation of veterans who posed risks to others. These VA facilities also used physical security precautions--such as closed-circuit surveillance cameras to actively monitor units, locks and alarms to secure key areas, and police assistance when incidents occurred. These physical precautions were intended to prevent a broad range of safety incidents, including sexual assaults, through monitoring patients and activities, securing residential programs and inpatient mental health units, and educating staff about security issues and ways to deal with them. However, GAO found significant weaknesses in the implementation of these physical security precautions at these VA facilities, including poor monitoring of surveillance cameras, alarm system malfunctions, and the failure of alarms to alert both VA police and clinical staff when triggered. Inadequate system installation and testing procedures contributed to these weaknesses. Further, facility officials at most of the locations GAO visited said the VA police were understaffed. Such weaknesses could lead to delayed response times to incidents and seriously erode efforts to prevent or mitigate sexual assaults and other safety incidents.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA improve both the reporting and monitoring of sexual assault incidents and the tools used to identify risks and address vulnerabilities at VA facilities. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided an action plan to address them. |
gao_HEHS-98-160 | gao_HEHS-98-160_0 | In fiscal year 1997, contractors processed about 900 million Medicare claims. In 1994, HHS proposed a program safeguard funding arrangement similar to that in HIPAA, saying that it would improve program safeguards by creating “a stable level of funding from year to year so that HCFA and its contractors could plan and manage the function on a multi-year basis.” HHS went on to say that “ast fluctuations in funding have made it difficult to retain experienced staff who understand the complexities of the program.” Appendix II summarizes program safeguard funding for fiscal years 1994 through 1998, by type of program safeguard activity. That delay has hindered contractors’ ability to expand their program safeguard activities. Despite HCFA’s concerns, its contractors are required to use Medicare Integrity Program funding only for program safeguard activities. HIPAA Provides New Contracting Authority
In addition to providing an assured and increasing source of funding for HCFA’s program safeguard activities, HIPAA directs HHS to contract for program safeguard activities separately from claims processing and payment activities to better ensure the integrity of the Medicare benefit payments. The benefits that can be achieved through these contracts include the following: enabling the review, by a single entity, of all services to a beneficiary by centralizing program safeguard activities now divided among several types of contracts: carriers, intermediaries, durable medical equipment regional carriers, and regional home health intermediaries; eliminating the competing interests of timely payment of claims and achieving better price and contractor performance through competition; reducing the number of program safeguard units from the current level of more than 60 to simplify oversight, achieve more consistent contractor performance, and achieve economies of scale; and allowing HCFA to more aggressively mitigate conflicts of interest arising when contractors enter into new health care lines of business. HCFA plans to contract with one program safeguard specialist by January 1999. However, this contract will be very limited in scope and will not provide many of the important benefits envisioned for such a contractor. It will also not reduce HCFA’s reliance on its current contractors for program safeguard activities. Initially, the first contract will not cover all of the tasks in HCFA’s statement of work. HCFA officials do not know when the scope of the first contract might be expanded or when additional specialist contracts might be awarded. Scope and Methodology
To determine what additional resources and authorities the Congress provided to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) through the Medicare Integrity Program, we reviewed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). To determine how HCFA has used these resources and authorities to improve the protection of Medicare funds, we reviewed HCFA data on the distribution of funding. To determine how HCFA plans to use these authorities and resources in the future, we reviewed relevant documentation, including the draft statement of work for program safeguard contracts, HCFA’s Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 performance plan, and HCFA’s annual work plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed: (1) the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) progress in implementing the Medicare Integrity Program; (2) what additional resources and authorities Congress provided to HCFA through the Medicare Integrity Program; (3) how HCFA has made use of these resources and authorities to improve the protection of Medicare funds; and (4) how HCFA plans to use these authorities and resources in the future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established the Medicare Integrity Program to subsume the program safeguard activities of HCFA and its current claims processing contractors; (2) rather than fund safeguard activities as part of HCFA's annual administrative budget appropriation, HIPAA appropriates safeguard funding for each year beginning in fiscal year (FY) 1997; (3) the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) proposed this type of funding arrangement in 1994 so that HCFA and its contractors could better plan and manage program safeguard efforts; (4) the Medicare Integrity Program also provides HCFA the authority to contract with specialists in program safeguards, to separate these functions from current claims processing and payment contracts; (5) the new contracts with program safeguard specialists are intended to make important improvements in HCFA's program safeguard efforts; (6) these improvements will make it possible to review all of the claims for a single beneficiary in one place, reduce the number of contractor safeguard units to increase consistency and simplify HCFA's oversight, and better manage the conflicts of interest that develop when Medicare contractors expand into new health care businesses; (7) for FY 1998, HIPAA significantly increased program safeguard funding over the FY 1997 level; (8) although this funding increase for 1998 was assured when HIPAA became law, HCFA did not notify contractors of their funding until one-third of FY 1998 was past; (9) contractors reported that, because of this delayed notification, they delayed plans to increase their program safeguard staff; (10) HCFA is progressing slowly in contracting with safeguard specialists; (11) the first contract, to be awarded by January 1999, will be limited in scope, covering only part of the work envisioned for program safeguard contracts; (12) this first contract will therefore not provide many of the benefits ultimately expected, nor will it reduce HCFA's reliance on its current contractors for program safeguards; and (13) HCFA has no firm plans regarding when it will expand the scope of this contract or award a second safeguard specialist contract. |
gao_GAO-07-542T | gao_GAO-07-542T_0 | Progress Made and the Key Challenges that Remain in Improving Federal Financial Management Practices
The federal government has made substantial progress in financial management. Financial management systems and internal control have been strengthened. Therefore, the Congress passed additional management reform legislation to improve the general and financial management of the federal government. The combination of reforms ushered in by these laws, if successfully implemented, provides a solid foundation to improve the accountability of government programs and operations as well as to routinely produce valuable cost and operating performance information. The principal challenges remaining are (1) transforming financial management and business practices at DOD, (2) improving financial and performance reporting, (3) modernizing financial management systems, (4) tackling long-standing internal control weaknesses, (5) building a financial management workforce for the future, and (6) strengthening consolidated financial reporting. Fully meeting these challenges will enable the federal government to provide the world-class financial management anticipated by the CFO Act and other management reform legislation. The federal government’s financial condition and fiscal outlook are worse than many may understand. We are currently experiencing strong economic growth and yet running large on-budget (operating) deficits that are largely unrelated to the Global War on Terrorism. The federal government faces large and growing structural deficits in the future due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs. If, for example, as shown in figure 2, it is assumed that recent tax reductions are made permanent and discretionary spending keeps pace with the growth of our economy, our long-term simulations suggest that by 2040 federal revenues may be adequate to pay little more than interest on debt held by the public and some Social Security benefits. Neither slowing the growth in discretionary spending nor allowing the tax provisions, including the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003, to expire—nor both together—would eliminate the imbalance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The foundation laid by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and other management reform legislation provided a much needed statutory basis to improve the accountability of government programs and operations. Such reforms were intended to produce reliable, timely, and useful financial information to help manage day-to- day operations and exercise oversight and promote fiscal stewardship. This testimony, based on GAO's prior work, addresses (1) the progress made and challenges remaining to improve federal financial management practices, and (2) the serious challenges posed by the government's deteriorating long-range fiscal condition and the Comptroller General's views on a possible way forward.
What GAO Found
Since the enactment of key financial management reforms, the federal government has made substantial progress in improving financial management activities and practices. Federal financial systems requirements have been developed, and internal control has been strengthened. Nonetheless, the federal government still has a long way to go to address the six principal challenges to fully realizing strong federal financial management: (1) transforming financial management and business practices at DOD, (2) improving agency financial and performance reporting, (3) modernizing financial management systems, (4) addressing key remaining internal control weaknesses, (5) building a financial management workforce for the future, and (6) strengthening consolidated financial reporting. From a broad financial management perspective, the federal government's financial condition and fiscal outlook are worse than many understand. We are currently experiencing strong economic growth and yet running large on-budget (operating) deficits that are largely unrelated to the Global War on Terrorism. The federal government faces large and growing structural deficits in future years due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs. If it is assumed that recent tax reductions are made permanent and discretionary spending keeps pace with the growth of our economy, GAO's long-term simulations suggest that by 2040, federal revenues may be adequate to pay little more than interest on debt held by the public and some Social Security benefits. Neither slowing the discretionary spending growth nor allowing certain tax provisions to expire--nor both together--would eliminate the imbalance. |
gao_GAO-07-854 | gao_GAO-07-854_0 | States activated EMAC in response to a variety of emergencies, including hurricanes; floods; wildfires; and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In recent years, the volume and types of resources deployed under EMAC have also increased. EMAC Membership Has Increased to 52
EMAC membership has grown from a handful of members in 1995 to 52 today. For example, of the estimated 40,000 people who responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York, New York officials requested only 26 emergency management personnel under EMAC to supplement state emergency management efforts. EMAC provides a framework that helps its members to overcome differences in missions, organizational cultures, and established ways of doing business in order to achieve a common outcome—streamlining and expediting the delivery of resources among members during emergencies. The Lack of Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities in Some Areas Limits EMAC’s Effectiveness
While the compact and its accompanying protocols establish roles and responsibilities that have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they have not kept pace with the growing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in delays and limiting EMAC’s overall effectiveness. We identified challenges in five areas: (1) gaps in EMAC protocols with regard to communicating resource needs sometimes yielded deployment delays and confusion among requesting state officials and resource providers; (2) the lack of a comprehensive system to support the tracking of resource requests from initial offers of assistance through mission completion in 2005 caused delays, duplications of effort, and frustration; (3) existing reimbursement standards are not designed to facilitate timely reimbursement following catastrophic disasters; (4) the lack of federal guidance to obtain advance funding resulted in delaying some state-to-state reimbursements under EMAC; and (5) deployment of National Guard troops under two different authorities resulted in delays in reimbursement and additional administrative burdens. Following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the EMAC network has taken steps to address some of the concerns associated with the reimbursement process and standards. EMAC Network Has Developed a Basic Administrative Capacity, but Opportunities Exist to Further Support Its Mission
The EMAC network has begun to develop a basic administrative capacity to support its operations; however, improvements in how it plans, tracks, and reports on its performance, along with a consistent source of funding, would help the network achieve its mission. Although the EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using a structured approach to learn from past deployments and developing a 5- year strategic plan, opportunities exist to further enhance these efforts by considering the experience of leading organizations in results-oriented performance measurement. In addition, the EMAC network and FEMA entered into a cooperative agreement that provided some federal funding to help build the EMAC network’s administrative capacity, but this agreement has recently expired. In May 2007, Congress appropriated $2.5 million to FEMA for interstate mutual aid agreements, and according to FEMA officials, FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a 3-year cooperative agreement to improve the use and awareness of resource typing among its members, and develop training programs to improve awareness of EMAC at the federal, state, and local levels. At the same time, we found that opportunities exist for the EMAC network—as well as individual members—to make improvements in several areas, such as (1) developing member roles and responsibilities regarding how first responders are received and integrated into impacted areas; (2) continuing to develop electronic systems that enable the EMAC network to track resources, from request through mission completion; (3) continuing to improve understanding of reimbursement guidelines and standards among member states, especially following large-scale deployments; (4) promoting good practices across the EMAC network that improve members’ abilities to leverage resources; and (5) enhancing the EMAC network’s strategic and management planning efforts by considering more robust performance measures. In addition to helping states assist one another, EMAC has shown that it plays a critical role in our nation’s disaster response. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Emergency Management Assistance Compact’s (EMAC) membership and its use have grown since its inception in 1995, we reviewed a number of disaster responses for which the EMAC process was activated based on the type, scale, and time frame of the event from information provided by EMAC officials. We performed similar reviews of state and federal after-action reports for 2004 through 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a collaborative arrangement among member states that provides a legal framework for requesting resources. Working alongside federal players, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Guard Bureau, EMAC members deployed an unprecedented level of assistance in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although EMAC played a critical role in our nation's response to these hurricanes, the magnitude of these events revealed limitations. GAO was asked to (1) examine how the use of EMAC has changed since its inception; (2) assess how well existing policies, procedures, and practices facilitate collaboration; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of the EMAC network's administrative capacity to achieve its mission. GAO examined documents and interviewed officials from 45 federal, state, and local agencies and offices.
What GAO Found
Since its inception in 1995, the EMAC network has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides. EMAC's membership has increased from a handful of states in 1995 to 52 states and territories today, and EMAC members have used the compact to obtain support for several types of disasters including hurricanes, floods, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The volume and variety of resources states have requested under EMAC have also grown significantly. For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, New York requested 26 support staff under EMAC to assist in emergency management operations; whereas, in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, approximately 66,000 personnel--about 46,500 National Guard and 19,500 civilian responders-- were deployed under EMAC from a wide variety of specialties, most of whom went to areas directly impacted by the storms. EMAC, along with its accompanying policies, procedures, and practices, enables its members to overcome differences to achieve a common mission--streamlining and expediting the delivery of resources among members during disasters. While these policies, procedures, and practices have worked well for smaller-scale deployments, they have not kept pace with the changing use of EMAC, sometimes resulting in confusion and deployment delays. The EMAC network has taken steps to address several of these challenges, but additional improvements can be made in a number of areas including clarifying roles and responsibilities of EMAC members and improving existing systems that track resources deployed under EMAC. In addition, a lack of sufficiently detailed federal standards and policies has led to some reimbursement delays and additional administrative burdens. While the EMAC network has developed a basic administrative capacity, opportunities exist for it to further build on and sustain these efforts. The EMAC network has adopted several good management practices, such as using after-action reports to learn from experiences and developing a 5-year strategic plan. However, the EMAC network can enhance its administrative capacity by improving how it plans, measures, and reports on its performance. FEMA provided $2 million to help build this capacity in 2003, but the agreement has recently expired. FEMA and EMAC leadership are in the process of finalizing a new 3-year cooperative agreement. Such an agreement would enhance the EMAC network's ability to support its collaborative efforts. |
gao_GAO-10-826 | gao_GAO-10-826_0 | Broadcast Radio Benefits from the Use of Sound Recordings to Generate Advertising Revenue and the Recording Industry May Benefit from Airplay that Can Promote Sales
The broadcast radio industry benefits from its relationship with the recording industry by using sound recordings to attract listeners which, in turn, generates advertising revenue for commercial radio stations. Industry stakeholders believe that radio airplay can promote sales, and past and current business practices support this conclusion. As shown in table 4, a music station with a coverage population of approximately 313,000 or more individuals (representing the top quartile of stations based on coverage population), will generate, on average, approximately $826,000 more in annual revenues than a nonmusic station, while a music radio station with a coverage population of approximately 26,000 individuals or less (representing the smallest quartile of stations based on coverage population), will earn on average approximately $206,000 more in annual revenues than a nonmusic station. The Recording Industry May Benefit from Airplay That Can Promote Album Sales, but the Extent of the Benefit is Unclear
Stakeholders from both the recording and broadcast radio industries agree that broadcast radio airplay can promote music sales, and past and current industry practices support this conclusion. To assess the relationship between broadcast radio airplay and music sales, we conducted several empirical analyses, and found the relationship to be unclear. Other outlets. The Proposed Performance Rights Act Would Result in Additional Costs for Most Broadcast Radio Stations
The proposed act would result in both financial costs, in the form of royalty payments for the use of sound recordings, and administrative costs, in the form of potential reporting requirements. Although the total cost to the broadcast radio industry is unknown, if the 25 percent of radio stations with revenues at or above $1.25 million pay a royalty equal to 2.35 percent of their annual revenue, their payments would account for more than 90 percent of all royalty payments. According to broadcast industry stakeholders, these financial and administrative costs may lead some stations to make adjustments, such as discontinuing operations, reducing staff, or changing to nonmusic formats. Broadcast Radio Stations Would Pay Different Royalties, but Radio Stations with Revenues of $1.25 Million or More Would Pay the Most
Under the proposed act, the statutory royalty paid by broadcast radio stations would vary according to the station’s gross annual revenues and status as commercial or noncommercial. The total royalties paid by the broadcast radio industry would vary, but radio stations with revenues greater than $1.25 million would pay the majority of the total royalty if the rate is set as a percentage of annual revenues. According to broadcast radio stakeholders, broadcast radio stations might switch from a music format to a nonmusic format, such as talk or news, to avoid the additional costs of a royalty. The Proposed Performance Rights Act Would Result in Additional Revenue for Copyright Holders, Musicians, and Performers
The proposed act would result in additional revenue for the recording industry. However, we estimated that most featured performers and musicians would receive less than $100 per year from airplay in the top 10 markets. As we mentioned earlier, for stations with revenue of $1.25 million or more, the royalty rate will be determined through negotiation or by the copyright royalty judges; therefore, total royalties paid by the broadcast radio industry are unknown at this time. Further, less than 6 percent of performers would receive over $10,000 or more annually in royalties for all sound recordings. Copyright Office both indicated that this revenue could contribute to additional investments in music and help keep record companies operating. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to FCC and the U.S. In its letter, FCC noted that it has a substantial interest in any proposed legislation that might have an adverse impact on radio stations. In its letter, the Copyright Office addressed certain methodological approaches and findings in our draft report. Appendix II: Analysis of the Effect on the Broadcast Radio Industry of the Senate Version of the Performance Rights Act
The Senate version of the proposed Performance Rights Act would expand the public performance right of sound recordings for copyright holders in a manner similar to the House version; however, some differences exist between the two versions. Because these royalties will be negotiated or determined subsequent to passage of the proposed act, we cannot determine the total cost to the radio industry at this time. Copyright Office of the Library of Congress
The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recording and broadcast radio industries touch the lives of most Americans through the development and distribution of music. Congress is considering legislation, the proposed Performance Rights Act (H.R. 848), that would expand copyright protection for the public performance of sound recordings. The proposed act would require AM/FM radio stations that broadcast music to pay a royalty, and this royalty would be distributed to the copyright holder, performers, and musicians. This report addresses (1) the benefits received by the recording and broadcast radio industries from their current relationship, (2) the possible effects of the proposed act on the broadcast radio industry, and (3) the possible effects of the proposed act on the recording industry. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed data on music sales, broadcast radio airplay, and broadcast radio stations' revenues; calculated potential royalty payments; and interviewed stakeholders from both industries as well as experts and government officials. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the U.S. Copyright Office of the Library of Congress reviewed a draft of this report. FCC noted that it has an interest in legislation that might have an adverse impact on radio stations. The Copyright Office addressed certain methodological approaches and findings in our draft report.
What GAO Found
Broadcast radio benefits from the use of sound recordings to generate advertising revenue and the recording industry may benefit from radio airplay that can promote sales. Radio stations use sound recordings to attract listeners and generate revenue from advertisers. GAO found that, on average, radio stations with a music format generate $225,000 more in annual revenues than nonmusic stations, such as talk or sports stations. Stations serving large populations receive more revenue from music content compared to stations serving a small population. Most industry stakeholders believe that radio airplay promotes sales for the recording industry, and past and current business practices support this conclusion. However, GAO found the relationship between airplay and music sales to be unclear. The presence of other promotional outlets, such as the Internet and special events, and growth of music piracy create a more nuanced environment wherein the relationship between airplay and music sales is less clear than in the past. The proposed act would result in additional costs for the broadcast radio industry. Under the proposed act, the royalty paid by a radio station would vary according to the station's gross annual revenues and status as commercial or noncommercial. Because the royalty paid by some radio stations would be negotiated or determined subsequent to passage of the proposed act, the total cost to the broadcast radio industry, including the costs to minority and female radio station owners, cannot be determined at this time. If broadcast radio stations with revenues of $1.25 million or more pay a royalty based on a percentage of station revenues, every 1 percentage point would cost the broadcast radio industry $101 million per year. For example, a 2.35 percent rate paid by these stations would entail total annual costs to the radio industry of over $258 million. GAO also estimated that with a 2.35 percent rate, the 25 percent of stations with revenues of $1.25 million or more would pay over 90 percent of the total royalties. According to broadcast industry stakeholders, these costs could lead some stations to reduce staff, switch to a nonmusic format, or discontinue operations. The proposed act would result in additional revenue for recording industry stakeholders. Several factors would influence the revenues a stakeholder receives, including the total royalty payments, the stakeholder's role (copyright holder, performer, or musician), and the amount of airplay the stakeholder's music receives. Since the total royalty payments cannot be determined at this time, the additional revenue for recording industry stakeholders is also unknown. However, assuming a 2.35 percent royalty rate, GAO estimated that 56 percent of performers would receive $100 or less per year, and fewer than 6 percent of performers would receive $10,000 or more per year in royalties from airplay in the top 10 markets; music radio stations in these markets generate about 21 percent of industry revenues. Some experts and the Copyright Office believe that the additional revenue would promote investment in music and greater employment, although this opinion is not universally held. |
gao_GAO-10-895 | gao_GAO-10-895_0 | PT-ISAC and HSIN-PT Were Established to Serve as the Primary Security Information- Sharing Mechanisms for Public Transit Agencies
According to APTA and TSA officials, the PT-ISAC and the public transit subportal on DHS’s HSIN (HSIN-PT) were designed to serve as the primary mechanisms for sharing security-related information with public transit agencies. HSIN-PT is also focused on providing security-related information pertaining to the public transit industry. Public Transit Agencies We Surveyed Were Generally Satisfied with Federal Efforts to Share Security- Related Information, but Opportunities Exist to Improve These Efforts
Large Transit Agencies and Rail Agencies Were Generally More Satisfied with Information-Sharing Efforts Than Midsized Agencies and Non-Rail Agencies
Our survey results indicate that public transit agencies’ satisfaction with the security-related information they received varied with the type of transportation service provided and whether the agency was large or midsized. Among the 12 most frequently cited mechanisms, public transit agencies were the least satisfied with HSIN, both in terms of overall general satisfaction (19 of 33) and for each of the six dimensions of quality. While TSA, through the working group, is assessing, among other things, the extent to which information-sharing mechanisms can be streamlined, there are no time frames established for completing these efforts. DHS’s Information- Sharing Efforts Could be Enhanced by Developing More Specific Goals and Measures and Obtaining Additional Industry Feedback
DHS and TSA Have Established Goals and Measures Related to Information Sharing, but Their Goals Are Not Specific to Public Transit and Existing Measures May Limit Program Assessment
DHS and TSA have established goals and output-oriented performance measures for their information-sharing activities to help gauge the effectiveness of their overall information-sharing efforts with security stakeholders. TSA officials recognize the importance of establishing specific goals and developing outcome-oriented measures, but they are in the beginning stages of doing so and could not provide time frames for when they plan to complete these efforts. Once the SCC/GCC Information Sharing Working Group has developed options for improving information sharing with public transit agencies, establishing time frames for developing goals and related, outcome-oriented measures for the PT- ISAC, HSIN-PT, and TS-ISAC could assist TSA in obtaining more meaningful information from which to gauge the effectiveness of these information-sharing mechanisms. Specifically, until DHS establishes time frames for developing goals and related outcome-oriented performance measures for the PT-ISAC, HSIN-PT, and TS-ISAC, the department will be limited in its ability to gauge the effectiveness of its information-sharing efforts with the public transit industry. Such a process could help DHS and TSA assess the effectiveness of their efforts to share security-related information with public transit agencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help strengthen information sharing with public transit agencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following action in coordination with FTA and public transit agencies: Establish time frames for the SCC/GCC Information Sharing Working Group to develop options for improving information sharing to public transit agencies and complete this effort, including the Working Group’s efforts to: assess opportunities to streamline existing information-sharing mechanisms that target similar user groups with similar information to reduce overlap, where appropriate; and conduct targeted outreach efforts to increase awareness of the PT- ISAC and HSIN among agencies that are not currently using or aware of these systems. To identify the mechanisms established or funded by the federal government to serve as primary information sources for public transit agencies, we reviewed and assessed relevant documentation, such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Program Management Plan, and interviewed officials from DHS components including the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as well as officials from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to discuss the mechanisms they use to share security-related information with public transit agencies. The 96 public transit agencies surveyed represent about 91 percent of total 2008 ridership. The final instrument, reproduced in an e-supplement we are issuing concurrent with this report—GAO-10-896SP—displays the counts of responses received for each question. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is committed to sharing information with public transit agencies. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directed GAO to report on public transit information sharing. This report describes (1) the primary mechanisms used to share security information with public transit agencies; and evaluates (2) public transit agencies' satisfaction with federal efforts to share security-related information (e.g., security threats) and opportunities to improve these efforts; and (3) the extent to which DHS has identified goals and measures for sharing information. GAO surveyed 96 of the 694 U.S. public transit agencies based on 2008 ridership and received 80 responses. The 96 public transit agencies surveyed represent about 91 percent of total 2008 ridership. GAO also reviewed documents, such as DHS's Information Sharing Strategy, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
According to the American Public Transportation Association (APTA)--which represents the public transit industry--and TSA officials, the Public Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC) and the public transit subportal on DHS's Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN-PT) were established as primary mechanisms for sharing security-related information with public transit agencies. The public transit agencies GAO surveyed also cited additional mechanisms for obtaining such information, including other public transit agencies. Further, in March 2010 TSA introduced the Transportation Security Information Sharing and Analysis Center (TS-ISAC), which is a subportal on HSIN focused on sharing security-related information with transportation stakeholders. Seventy-five percent of the public transit agencies GAO surveyed reported being generally satisfied with the security-related information they received; however, federal efforts to share security-related information could be improved. Specifically, three-fourths of public transit agencies reported being either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the information they received. Public transit agencies also reported that among the 12 most frequently cited mechanisms, they were the least satisfied with HSIN in terms of general satisfaction (19 of 33) and for each of six dimensions of quality--relevance, validity, timeliness, completeness, actionability, and ease of use. Twenty-four survey respondents also cited the need to streamline the information they received. GAO identified the potential for overlap between the PT-ISAC, the HSIN-PT, and the TS-ISAC, which all communicate similar unclassified and security-related information to public transit agencies. Federal and transit industry officials that GAO interviewed reported the need to streamline information sharing. Moreover, a greater proportion of survey respondents who were unaware of the PT-ISAC or HSIN were from midsize agencies, nonrail agencies, and those without their own police department. Federal and industry officials formed a working group to assess the effectiveness of information-sharing mechanisms, including developing options for streamlining these mechanisms. TSA officials stated that these options will also impact future outreach activities; however, no time frame has been established for completing this effort. Establishing such a time frame could help to ensure that this effort is completed. DHS and TSA have established goals and performance measures for some of their information-sharing activities to help gauge the effectiveness of their overall information-sharing efforts; however, they have not developed goals and outcome-oriented measures of results of activities for the mechanisms established as primary information sources for the public transit industry. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of establishing such goals and measures, but were unable to provide time frames for doing so. Establishing time frames for developing goals and outcome measures, once the working group effort is complete, could assist TSA in gauging the effectiveness of its efforts to share information with public transit agencies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS, among other things, (1) establish time frames for its working group to develop options for improving information sharing, including assessing opportunities to streamline mechanisms and conducting targeted outreach; and (2) establish time frames for developing goals and outcome-oriented measures of results. DHS concurred. GAO is issuing an electronic supplement with this report--GAO-10-896SP--which provides survey results. |
gao_AIMD-95-76 | gao_AIMD-95-76_0 | AOUSC officials have (1) established a process for centralizing and maintaining federal criminal debt accounts, (2) developed a formal training program for judicial district staff, (3) selected an off-the-shelf accounting system which became operational in April 1995, (4) installed an inexpensive interim software package that was used through March 1995 until the selected system became operational, (5) begun processing new criminal debt information for 25 of the smaller judicial districts, and (6) begun converting criminal debt information from the interim to the off-the-shelf system. Currently, only a small fraction of criminal debt accounts are on the NFC system. Further, while AOUSC has indicated that it will enhance the system to increase user access to NFC information and improve management reporting during phase II, it has not yet determined what specific enhancements will be made to NFC or how it intends to accomplish them. Recommendations
As part of its efforts to complete the planned implementation of the NFC system, including enhancements such as the one needed to perform interest and penalty calculations, and various interfaces to facilitate the exchange of information between NFC and its users, we recommend that the Director, AOUSC, work with DOJ to finalize a reconciliation strategy to include time frames and resources for reconciling existing criminal debt accounts at judicial districts and entering the reconciled information into the NFC system and fully define a strategy for addressing additional actions needed to enable the NFC system to (1) provide a repository for national criminal debt statistical information, (2) produce reports to accommodate management information needs, (3) facilitate communication between NFC and its users, and (4) account for bail bond and collateral forfeiture actions. Nonetheless, progress is being made to enhance the reliability of accounting and reporting of criminal debt information. 2. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Fine Center (NFC), focusing on the: (1) Administrative Office of the United States Courts' (AOUSC) efforts to establish NFC and centralize criminal debt accounting and reporting within NFC; and (2) additional actions AOUSC needs to take to complete implementation of the NFC automated accounting system.
What GAO Found
GAO found that AOUSC has: (1) established a process for centralizing and maintaining federal criminal debt accounts; (2) developed a formal training program for judicial district staff; (3) selected an off-the-shelf accounting system and inexpensive interim software until the selected system becomes operational; (4) begun processing new criminal debt information for 25 small judicial districts; and (5) begun converting criminal debt information from the interim system to the off-the-shelf system. In addition, GAO found that: (1) AOUSC is slightly ahead of schedule in establishing NFC and centralizing federal criminal debt, but much planning and implementation effort remains; (2) many enhancements to the selected accounting system will be required to automate certain manual processes before NFC can begin receiving new criminal debt information from larger judicial districts; (3) AOUSC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) still must ensure the reliability of the existing criminal debt accounting data before entering the information into the NFC system; and (4) although AOUSC plans to further enhance the system to increase user access to NFC information within the next 5 years, it must first identify the specific enhancements required and determine how to accomplish them. |
gao_NSIAD-98-100 | gao_NSIAD-98-100_0 | Personnel Cuts Are Based on DOD’s Goal to Increase Modernization Funding
The level of personnel cuts called for in the QDR was based on DOD’s plan to achieve dollar savings that would (1) reduce the possibility that procurement funds would be used for unplanned expenses and (2) enable DOD to increase and maintain procurement funding at $60 billion annually.In March and April 1997, DOD officials concluded that a 10-percent force structure cut would result in an unacceptable risk in implementing the national military strategy and that the potential savings from infrastructure initiatives identified during the QDR process would not be sufficient to ensure that procurement funding would not be used for unplanned expenses. As a result, senior civilian officials and the service chiefs agreed that the services needed to eliminate the equivalent of about 150,000 active military personnel, which Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials estimated would save between $4 billion and $6 billion annually by fiscal year 2003. In May 1997, the Secretary of Defense approved the services’ proposals to eliminate about 175,000 active, reserve, and civilian personnel and save an estimated $3.7 billion by 2003, as shown in table 1. In developing their plans, the services made different assumptions about the personnel cuts that could be achieved through these competitions. Almost one-half of the active military cuts will involve replacing military personnel with reserve forces, civilian employees, or contractors rather than eliminating functions outright. Moreover, on the basis of past experience, the Air Force expects that 75 percent of these personnel will be replaced by either civilian employees or contractors. However, DOD may not achieve all the personnel cuts and associated savings. With the exception of the Air Force, the services have plans that should enable them to achieve the majority of the active military cuts by the end of fiscal year 1999. There is considerable risk that the active military cuts in the Air Force, the reserve component cuts in the Army, and the civilian cuts in all the services may not be achieved by fiscal year 2003 because the services’ plans are not complete and depend on outsourcing and reengineering initiatives that are based on optimistic assumptions or largely undefined to date. Therefore, it is critical that DOD monitor the services’ progress in achieving the personnel cuts and savings. To obtain information on how the services plan to achieve the cuts and how these cuts will impact the services’ ability to execute the national military strategy, we interviewed officials who were involved in developing and refining the individual service plans and reviewed service studies and analyses that supported the proposed cuts. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) estimated these cuts would save $1.5 billion by fiscal year 2003. The Army plans to cut 1,000 positions as part of a plan to reduce and relocate some of the positions that are currently in Panama. Air Force Has Not Programmed All Active Military QDR Cuts
The Air Force has not included about 5,600 of the 26,900 active military cuts directed by the QDR in the fiscal year 1999 FYDP because (1) it found problems with the outsourcing estimates it had used in May 1997 as input for the QDR cuts and (2) OSD deferred the majority of Air Force plans to restructure some fighter and bomber squadrons. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), focusing on the: (1) basis for the personnel cuts; (2) services' plans to implement personnel cuts; (3) extent that the services believe cuts will impact their ability to execute the national military strategy; and (4) Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to monitor the services' progress in implementing the cuts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's decision to reduce personnel as part of the QDR was driven largely by the objective of identifying dollar savings that could be used to increase modernization funding; (2) DOD officials concluded that a 10-percent force structure cut would result in unacceptable risk in implementing the national military strategy and determined that the review process had not identified sufficient infrastructure savings to meet DOD's $60-billion modernization goal; (3) thus, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to develop plans to cut the equivalent of 150,000 active military personnel to save between $4 billion and $6 billion in recurring savings by fiscal year (FY) 2003; (4) the services proposed initiatives to eliminate about 175,000 personnel and save an estimated $3.7 billion; (5) although the services relied on some ongoing studies to develop proposals to achieve the cuts, some of the analyses were limited; (6) moreover, variations existed in the services' plans; (7) considerable risk remains in some of the services' plans to cut 175,000 personnel and save $3.7 billion annually by FY 2003; (8) with the exception of the Air Force, the services have plans that should enable them to achieve the majority of the active military cuts by the end of FY 1999; (9) however, the FY 1999 future years defense program, which is the first to incorporate the QDR decisions, does not include all of the personnel cuts because the Office of the Secretary of Defense determined that some of the Air Force's active military cuts announced in May 1997 are not politically executable at this time, according to service officials; (10) moreover, plans for some cuts are still incomplete or based on optimistic assumptions about the potential to achieve savings through outsourcing and reengineering and may not be implemented by FY 2003 as originally anticipated; (11) the Air Force made an assumption that all military positions planned to be competed would be replaced by contractors rather than relying on historical experience that the civilian workforce wins 40 percent of all competitions; (12) the Air Force military personnel cuts will focus primarily on personnel assigned to infrastructure activities rather than mission forces and will involve replacing personnel with less costly civilians or contractors rather than eliminating functions; and (13) because some aspects of DOD's plan to reduce personnel will not occur or will be delayed, it is critical that the Office of the Secretary of Defense monitor the services' progress in achieving the personnel cuts and associated savings. |
gao_HEHS-95-167 | gao_HEHS-95-167_0 | The courts continue to delineate what state actions are allowed or preempted under ERISA. 1). The number of individuals enrolled in self-funded plans appears to be growing. With these changes, states are concerned that they cannot provide consumer protections to self-funded health plan participants and that their ability to tax and collect data on health plans is eroding. ERISA Restricts State Efforts Regarding Employer Health Plans
In addition to states’ concerns about the loss of regulatory oversight due to the increase in self-funded plans, states view ERISA as an obstacle to enacting comprehensive reforms and to adopting the more modest administrative simplification and insurance regulation proposals on which many states are focusing. Employers View ERISA as Critical to Their Ability to Efficiently Provide Health Care Coverage
Many employers, particularly larger self-funded firms, view ERISA preemption of state regulation of employer health plans very differently from the states: they view it as a fundamental strength of a voluntary employer-based health care system. Employers Concerned That ERISA Changes May Reduce Their Cost-Containment Ability
Employers maintain that ERISA preemption provides the framework for them to manage the cost of their employees’ health care coverage. They believe that their increased reliance on managed care has been integral to lowering their health care costs. ERISA History and Court Interpretations
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and its implications for health plans are often misunderstood. All employers with at least 100 employees that provide employee benefits are required to report to the Department of Labor, using a Form 5500.Unfortunately, the Department of Labor acknowledges that the data from this form are of limited value in estimating the number of self-funded health plan participants because the form is primarily designed for pension plans, the data are not reported consistently, and the data may be prone to filer errors and errors introduced in the data processing.Despite these limitations, an analysis of the Form 5500 filings by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., for the Congressional Research Service estimated that, for employers with more than 100 employees in 1991, 42 percent of participants were in fully insured plans, 26 percent of participants were in partly self-funded plans, and 32 percent of participants were in fully self-insured plans. This represents about 16 percent of the U.S. population. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO provided information on the: (1) Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA) relationship to the current system of employer-based health coverage; (2) implications of the trend toward employer self-funding on the oversight of employees' health care coverage; (3) kinds of state actions preempted by ERISA; and (4) advantages of ERISA preemption to employers that offer health care coverage to their workers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although courts have historically interpreted ERISA to broadly restrict state regulation of employer health plans, recent Supreme Court decisions may allow states greater flexibility under general health care regulation provisions; (2) self-funded employer health plans appear to be increasing, but many employers are moderating their risks by using stop-loss coverage or managed care arrangements; (3) about 40 percent of ERISA plans, which cover about 44 million people, are employer self-funded plans which states are preempted from regulating and taxing because they are not considered to be insurance; (4) other ERISA plans cover an additional 27 percent of the U.S. population; (5) states believe that ERISA impedes their ability to ensure adequate consumer protections and enact health cost reduction reforms; (6) states also believe that they should be able to tax and collect data on all health plan participants uniformly; (6) employers believe that ERISA has made it possible for them to offer their employees health care coverage tailored to their needs and thus reduce their costs; and (7) employers fear that changes to ERISA that would give states greater regulatory flexibility would increase their costs and jeopardize their ability to provide employee health coverage. |
gao_GAO-07-1160 | gao_GAO-07-1160_0 | As a result, IRS will be relying on paper case files for some years. IRS Does Not Have an Effective Process to Ensure That Paper Case Files Can Be Located Timely
Case files should be readily available for examination. Missing case files can result in lost revenue, create unnecessary taxpayer burden, make cases unavailable for other units such as quality review groups or advisory groups, and hinder congressional oversight. IRS had this information in the case file, but could not locate it. IRS has acknowledged its historic difficulties in locating and retrieving case files. IRS Incurs Cost and Some Taxpayers May Experience Unnecessary Taxpayer Burden to Re-create Case Files
When IRS staff request paper case files, several attempts may be made to locate them. This process can result in unnecessary taxpayer burden. Lacking Data, IRS Cannot Assess Case Management Performance and Develop Plans for Improvement
IRS has not developed the data needed to measure the performance of its case file processes, such as whether all of the paper case files it requests are located or received timely. Furthermore, these officials added that IRS does not track the reasons case files cannot be located. In the three previously mentioned GAO audits, we asked IRS staff who requested our case files why the case files could not be located. Managers can use performance information to identify problems in existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and/or to develop corrective actions. When we asked program managers who had overall responsibility for case file management across IRS’s compliance programs, the program managers said they did not know. Without overall responsibility for case file management being clearly defined, IRS may not be able to develop performance information across all of its programs to determine how well paper case files are managed to achieve performance targets and whether its case file management processes are in accordance with FRA and internal control standards. However, IRS does not have data to determine which of the improvements are the most cost effective for IRS. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this assignment were to review the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) case file storage, tracking, and documentation process to determine whether IRS has (1) an effective process to ensure that paper case files can be located timely and (2) sufficient data to assess the performance of its paper case file processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Proper paper case file management is a significant issue for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) because its staff investigate and close millions of case files every year. In addition, IRS employees depend heavily on case files when pursuing enforcement actions. GAO was asked to review IRS's case file storage, tracking, and documentation processes to determine whether IRS has (1) an effective process to ensure that paper case files can be located timely and (2) sufficient data to assess the performance of its paper case file processes. To review these processes, GAO interviewed staff who request case files and case file managers.
What GAO Found
IRS does not have an effective process to ensure that paper case files can be located within the requesters' time frames. Missing case files can result in lost revenue, create unnecessary taxpayer burden, and make case files unavailable for other units such as quality review groups or advisory groups. IRS has acknowledged its historic difficulties in locating and retrieving case files. When IRS cannot locate paper case files, it may attempt to re-create them by requesting information from taxpayers, which can result in unnecessary taxpayer burden. Difficulties in locating case files can also hinder congressional oversight. When GAO requested case files in two prior audits, IRS could not locate all of the case files requested. IRS does not have sufficient data to assess the performance of its paper case file management processes. Having such data would enable IRS to assess whether its case management processes are in accordance with FRA and internal control standards. IRS does not track whether all of the case files it requests are located or received timely, or the reasons why case files cannot be located. If IRS developed this type of data, officials could use this data to identify problems in existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and/or to develop corrective actions. Records management officials have recently instituted some performance measures, but these measures do not specifically address paper case files. IRS program managers also have not developed performance measures or data to determine how well paper case files are managed to achieve performance targets. Program managers do not know who has overall responsibility for case file management so performance information cannot be developed across IRS's compliance programs. GAO identified some potential improvements that IRS can consider, but IRS will need to determine which improvements are the most cost effective. |
gao_T-RCED-98-129 | gao_T-RCED-98-129_0 | Airports’ Funding Sources Vary
In 1996, bonds, AIP, and passenger facility charges provided about $6.6 billion of the $7 billion in airport funding. The amount and type of funding vary considerably by the type of airport. The nation’s 71 largest (large and medium hub) airports, which accounted for almost 90 percent of all passenger traffic, had more than $5.5 billion in funding in 1996, while the 3,233 other national system airports had about $1.5 billion. By contrast, the other 3,233 smaller national system airports obtained just 14 percent of their funding from bonds. Past Funding Levels Are Less Than Planned Development
Airports’ planned capital development over the next 5 years may total as much as $10 billion per year, or $3 billion more per year than their 1996 funding. Planned spending for future years is shown by the relative priority of the projects, as follows:
FAA’s highest priorities (shown as reconstruction and mandates) total $1.4 billion per year and are for projects to meet safety, security, and environmental requirements, including noise mitigation, and for projects that maintain the existing infrastructure (reconstruction). Other high-priority projects—primarily, those adding capacity—add another $1.4 billion per year. Other projects of a relatively lower priority—such as those bringing airports up to FAA’s design standards—add another $3.3 billion per year, for a total of $6.1 billion per year. Finally, airports anticipate another $3.9 billion per year in projects that are not eligible for AIP—such as those expanding commercial space in terminals and constructing parking garages. Current funding at the 3,233 small, nonhub, other commercial service and at general aviation airports is a little over half of the estimated cost of their planned development, thus producing a difference of about $1.4 billion. Effect of Proposals to Increase Airport Funding Varies
Evaluating the various proposals to provide additional funding for airport development involves the consideration of the trade-offs among the various funding types as well as the potential effect that each proposal would have on airports. For the other 3,233 smaller national system airports, however, current funding is only about half of their planned development and even less for some categories of these airports. The Airport Improvement Program is a more significant source of funding for smaller airports than for larger ones. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed airport funding issues, focusing on: (1) how much airports are spending on capital development, and where the money is coming from; (2) whether current funding levels will be sufficient to meet airports' planned development; and (3) what effect will various proposals to increase airport funding have on airports' ability to fulfill capital development plans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1996, the 3,304 airports that make up the national airport system obtained about $7 billion for capital development; (2) more than 90 percent of this funding came from three sources: (a) airport and special facility bonds; (b) the Airport Improvement Program (AIP); and (c) passenger facility charges paid on each airline ticket; (3) the magnitude and type of funding varies with each airport's size; (4) the nation's 71 largest airports accounted for nearly 80 percent of this funding; (5) as a group, these airports received only about 10 percent of their funding from AIP; (6) by contrast, the remaining 3,233 smaller airports that complete the national system rely on AIP for half of their funding; (7) airports planned as much as $10 billion per year in development for the years 1997 through 2001, or $3 billion per year more than they spent in 1996; (8) about $1.4 billion per year of that development is planned for safety, security, environmental, and reconstruction projects--the Federal Aviation Administration's highest priorities; (9) another $1.4 billion per year of that development is planned for other high-priority projects, primarily adding airport capacity; (10) other projects of a relatively lower priority, such as bringing airports up to FAA's design standards, add another $3.3 billion per year; (11) airports anticipate another $3.9 billion per year for projects that are not eligible for funding from AIP, such as expanding commercial space in terminals and constructing parking garages; (12) the difference between current funding and planned development is especially acute for smaller commercial and general aviation airports; (13) their 1996 funding would cover only about half of their total planned development; (14) several proposals to increase airport funding have emerged in recent years; (15) these include increasing the amount of funding for AIP, raising or eliminating the ceiling on passenger facility charges, and better leveraging of existing funding sources; and (16) these proposals vary in the degree to which they help specific types of airports. |
gao_NSIAD-98-204 | gao_NSIAD-98-204_0 | DOD’s Plans to Address Risk
A principal objective of the QDR was to understand and devise ways to manage the financial risk in DOD’s program. DOD refers to this as migration of funds. To address this financial instability, the QDR directed DOD to cut some force structure and personnel, eliminate additional excess facilities through more base closures and realignments, streamline infrastructure, and reduce quantities of some new weapon systems. Infrastructure Reductions Are Critical to Achieving DOD’s Modernization Plans
In 1997, infrastructure spending was 59 percent of DOD’s total budget, the same percentage that was reported in DOD’s bottom-up review report for 1994. DOD’s Program Continues to Have Substantial Risk
Although DOD made adjustments in the 1999 FYDP to decrease the risk that funds would migrate from procurement to unplanned operating expenses, we continue to see risks that DOD’s program may not be executable as planned. These risks involve unrealized savings and other program needs. In addition, DOD projected savings of about $2.8 billion as a result of lower projected fuel costs and favorable foreign currency exchange rates. DOD said that with these assumed savings, it can fund additional procurement items and civilian and military pay raises, which account for $15 billion of the $24.1 billion. However, if those savings do not materialize, DOD will have to adjust its future budgets by cutting programs and/or requesting additional budget authority from the President and Congress. Specifically, DOD procurement spending rises and falls in nearly direct proportion to movements in its total budget; however, in the 1998 FYDP, DOD projected an increase in procurement of about 43 percent but a relatively flat total DOD budget. The 1999 FYDP procurement projections continue to run counter to the historical trend, although DOD has moderated its position. Specifically, DOD projects that procurement funding will rise in real terms during 1998-2003 by approximately 29 percent while the total DOD budget will remain relatively flat. Figure 4 shows the historical relationship between the total DOD budget and procurement spending and DOD’s 1999 FYDP projections. Program Demands and Cost Growth
The QDR report cited cost growth of complex, technologically advanced programs and new program demands as two areas contributing to the migration of funds from procurement. Furthermore, as long as the national defense funding levels agreed to in the balanced budget agreement remain unaltered, solutions to DOD’s funding issues must be found within its current and projected budget. DOD noted that our report does not acknowledge that the risks in achieving these objectives have been substantially reduced in the 1999 FYDP and the Department’s program is on a sounder financial footing. Moreover, it has plans to reduce infrastructure. DOD believes that its assumptions of the savings rates for outsourcing personnel are conservative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for fiscal year 1999, focusing on: (1) DOD's plans to address the financial and programmatic risk areas that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) found in DOD's program; (2) comparing DOD's 1999 FYDP with its 1998 FYDP to identify major changes and adjustments to address these risks areas; and (3) whether there were risk areas in DOD's 1999 program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although DOD has reduced military and civilian personnel, force structure, and facilities over several years, DOD has been unable to shift funds from infrastructure to modernization; (2) in 1997, infrastructure spending was 59 percent of DOD's total budget, the same percentage as in 1994; (3) DOD acknowledged in the QDR that it has postponed procurement plans because funds were redirected to pay for underestimated operating costs and new program demands, and projected savings from outsourcing and other initiatives had not materialized; (4) to address this diversion of funds, the QDR directed DOD to cut some force structure and personnel, eliminate additional excess facilities through more base closures and realignments, streamline infrastructure, and reduce quantities of some new weapon systems; (5) DOD made adjustments in the 1999 FYDP to decrease the risk that funds would migrate from procurement to unplanned operating expenses; (6) DOD has programmed additional funds for new programs and has moderated its procurement plans; (7) as a result of these and other changes, DOD believes that its 1999 program is on a sounder financial footing; (8) although DOD made adjustments to the 1999 FYDP, GAO continues to see risks that DOD's program may not be executable as planned; (9) for example, DOD projects savings of $24.1 billion as a result of lower projected inflation rates and fuel costs and favorable foreign currency exchange rates; (10) if these rates and costs do not hold true to DOD's assumptions, projected savings will not materialize, and DOD will have to adjust future budgets by cutting programs and/or requesting additional budget authority; (11) further indication of risk can be found in DOD's procurement plans and additional proposed initiatives to reduce facilities; (12) DOD's estimates for procurement spending, in relation to DOD's total budget, run counter to DOD's experience over the last 32 years; (13) DOD procurement spending rises and falls in nearly direct proportion to movements in its total budget; (14) DOD projects that procurement funding will rise in real terms during 1998-2003 by approximately 29 percent while the total DOD budget will remain relatively flat; (15) on some important proposed initiatives, DOD will need congressional approval; and (16) as long as the funding levels agreed to in the balanced budget agreement for national defense remain unaltered, DOD must solve its funding issues within its current and projected total budget. |
gao_GAO-06-1003 | gao_GAO-06-1003_0 | Sufficient Staffed Beds Existed for All Types of Inpatient Care Except Psychiatric Care; High Demand Existed for Emergency Department Services
In the greater New Orleans area, a sufficient number of staffed hospital inpatient beds existed for all types of care except psychiatric care; there was also a high demand for emergency department services. While hospitals were able to maintain a sufficient number of staffed beds, hospital officials also reported that recruiting, hiring, and retaining nurses and support staff, such as nursing aids, housekeepers, and food service workers, to staff the available beds constituted a great challenge. The number of staffed hospital inpatient beds on hand to serve the people of the greater New Orleans area was 3,958, or about 4.0 staffed beds per 1,000 population, as compared with the national average of 2.8 staffed beds per 1,000 population reported in 2006. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated the February 2006 population of the four parishes (Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard) to be 578,000, and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals reported estimates of about 569,000 for January 2006 and 588,000 for April 2006. Furthermore, the population of the greater New Orleans area would have to increase by 325,000 or about 55 percent, to 913,000, by December 2006 before staffed beds per 1,000 population dropped to the national average of 2.8. Hospital officials also told us that inpatient psychiatric care beds were frequently not available in the greater New Orleans area and that psychiatric patients were the only type of patients that had to be transferred out of the greater New Orleans area because of a lack of beds. For example, the Institute of Medicine reported in June 2006 that emergency department crowding was a nationwide problem, with numbers of visits having grown by 26 percent from 1993 to 2003. Steps Have Been Taken to Reopen University Hospital, but LSU Has No Plans to Reopen Charity Hospital
FEMA and LSU have prepared damage assessments and cost estimates for University and Charity hospitals. While repairs are under way to reopen portions of University Hospital beginning this fall, as of July 2006, LSU had no plans to reopen Charity Hospital. In contrast, FEMA’s estimates for Charity and University hospitals cover the repair costs for damage from flooding and wind only, since these are the only repair costs eligible for federal reimbursement under the Public Assistance program. Repairs to University Hospital Are Under Way, and LSU Is Pursuing the Possibility of a New Facility to Replace Both Charity and University Hospitals in the Future
At the time of our visit in May 2006, repairs to University Hospital were under way, and portions of the facility were expected to reopen by late September or early October 2006, with the remainder of the facility expected to open by the end of the year. HHS plans to provide technical assistance to the Louisiana Healthcare Redesign Collaborative (Collaborative), a state and locally led effort to redesign the health care delivery system in Louisiana, including the existing hospital system. For example, certain Medicare billing and other requirements were waived or modified to accelerate Medicare payments in the hurricane-affected states, including Louisiana. DHS also responded by email and informed us that it had no formal comments on the draft report. DHS, HHS, and VA also provided technical comments, as did Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals through an e-mail response. LSU did not provide comments. To examine the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Louisiana State University (LSU) efforts to reopen Charity and University hospitals, we reviewed LSU and FEMA damage assessments and cost estimates for the facilities, FEMA regulations and guidance, and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) damage assessment of its medical center in New Orleans. We interviewed officials from FEMA; LSU (including LSU’s Health Care Services Division that manages the public hospitals in the greater New Orleans area); VA because it is considering building a joint hospital complex with LSU in New Orleans; the Louisiana Recovery Authority because it is the planning and coordinating body that was created in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by the Governor of Louisiana to plan for recovery and rebuilding efforts; and Louisiana’s Office of Facility Planning and Control because it is administering the design and construction of all Louisiana state-owned facilities damaged by Hurricane Katrina. To determine the activities that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has undertaken to help hospitals recover in the greater New Orleans area, we interviewed officials in various HHS agencies, including officials in the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services headquarters and Dallas and Atlanta regional offices, the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Administration for Children and Families, and the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness. Additionally, we reviewed documents and summaries outlining HHS programs and activities related to helping restore hospital inpatient care and emergency department services after a disaster. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, questions remain concerning the availability of hospital inpatient care and emergency department services in the greater New Orleans area--which consists of Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes. Because of broad-based congressional interest, GAO, under the Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations, assessed efforts to restore the area's hospitals by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); and the Louisiana State University (LSU) public hospital system, which operated Charity and University hospitals in New Orleans. GAO examined (1) the availability of hospital inpatient care and the demand for emergency department services, (2) steps taken to reopen Charity and University hospitals, and (3) the activities that HHS has undertaken to help hospitals recover. To fulfill these objectives, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed federal officials and hospital, state, and local officials in the greater New Orleans area. GAO also obtained information on the number of inpatient beds for April 2006, which was the most recent data available when GAO did its work. GAO's work did not include other issues related to hospitals such as outpatient services or financial condition.
What GAO Found
While New Orleans continues to face a range of health care challenges, hospital officials in the greater New Orleans area reported in April 2006 that a sufficient number of staffed inpatient beds existed for all services except for psychiatric care--some psychiatric patients had to be transferred out of the area because of a lack of beds. Overall, GAO determined that the area had about 3.2 staffed beds per 1,000 population, compared with a national average of 2.8 staffed beds per 1,000 population. Hospital officials told GAO they planned to open an additional 674 staffed beds by the end of 2006, although they reported that recruiting, hiring, and retaining nurses and support staff was a great challenge. With these additional beds, the population would have to increase from 588,000 in April 2006 to 913,000 by December 2006 before staffed beds would drop to the national average. Hospitals also reported a high demand for emergency services, consistent with a June 2006 Institute of Medicine report, which found that emergency department crowding is a nationwide problem. Steps have been taken to reopen University Hospital, but as of July 2006, LSU had no plans to reopen Charity Hospital. LSU plans to open portions of University Hospital in fall 2006 and would like to replace both hospitals with a new one. LSU and FEMA have prepared cost estimates to repair these hospitals. For Charity Hospital, FEMA's estimate of $27 million is much lower than LSU's estimate of $258 million, which covers, for example, repairing hurricane damage and correcting many prestorm deficiencies. In contrast, FEMA's estimate covers repairs for hurricane damage only--the only repair costs eligible for federal reimbursement. HHS provided financial assistance and waived certain program requirements to help hospitals recover in the area. For example, HHS included $221 million in hurricane relief funds designated for Louisiana through Social Services Block Grants, which may be used in part to reconstruct health care facilities. HHS also waived certain Medicare billing and other requirements and accelerated Medicare payments to providers, including hospitals, in the hurricane-affected states. Rebuilding the health care infrastructure of the greater New Orleans area will depend on many factors, including the health care needs of the population that returns to the city and the state's vision for its future health care system. In light of the current sufficiency of hospital beds for most inpatient services, GAO believes a major challenge facing the greater New Orleans area is attracting and retaining enough nurses and support staff. HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) agreed with the draft report. DHS said it had no formal comments on the draft. HHS, VA, DHS, and Louisiana's Department of Health and Hospitals provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. LSU did not provide comments. |
gao_GAO-03-1146T | gao_GAO-03-1146T_0 | Background
The Council on Foreign Relations study sets the stage for rethinking the federal role in assisting communities prepare for homeland security. Although acknowledging that the nation’s preparedness has improved, the Council’s report highlights some of the significant gaps in preparedness including shortfalls in personnel, equipment, communications, and other critical capabilities in local services. The 108th Congress faces the challenge to redesign the nation’s homeland security grant programs in light of the events of September 11, 2001 and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In so doing, Congress must balance the needs of our state and local partners in their call for both additional resources and more flexibility with the nation’s goals of attaining the highest levels of preparedness. At the same time, we need to design and build in appropriate accountability and targeting features to ensure that the funds provided have the best chance of enhancing preparedness. The fragmented delivery of federal assistance can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels. Consolidating Grants
Addressing the underlying fragmentation of grant programs remains a challenge for our federal system in the homeland security area. Several alternatives have been pursued in the past to overcome problems fostered by fragmentation in the federal aid structure. I will discuss three briefly here – block grants, performance partnerships, and streamlining planning and administrative requirements. Under block grants, state and local officials bear the primary responsibility for monitoring and overseeing the planning, management, and implementation of activities financed with federal grant funds. While block grants devolve authority for decisions, they can and have been designed to facilitate some accountability for national goals and objectives. Congress might instead choose a hybrid approach—what we might call a “consolidated categorical” grant which would consolidate a number of narrower categorical programs while retaining strong standards and accountability for discrete federal performance goals. One example of this model involves what became known as “performance partnerships,” exemplified by the initiative of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Under this initiative, states may voluntarily enter Performance Partnership Agreements with EPA regional offices covering the major federal environmental grant programs. Whatever approach is chosen, it is important that grants be designed to (1) target the funds to states and localities with the greatest need, (2) discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly referred to as “supplantation,” with a maintenance-of-effort requirement that recipients maintain their level of previous funding, and (3) strike a balance between accountability and flexibility. The federal government may be able to provide incentives through the grant system to encourage regional planning and coordination for homeland security. | Why GAO Did This Study
The challenges posed in strengthening homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation calls for a truly integrated approach bringing together the resources of all levels of government. The Council on Foreign Relations study--Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared--states that in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States must prepare based on the assumption that terrorists will strike again. Although it acknowledges the nation's preparedness has improved, the Council's report highlights gaps in preparedness including shortfalls in personnel, equipment, communications, and other critical capabilities. Given the many needs and high stakes, it is critical that the design of federal grants be geared to fund the highest priority projects with the greatest potential impact for improving homeland security. This testimony discusses possible ways in which the grant system for first responders might be reformed.
What GAO Found
The federal grant system for first responders is highly fragmented, which can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels. In light of the events of September 11, 2001 and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the 108th Congress faces the challenge of redesigning the homeland security grant system. In so doing, Congress must balance the needs of our state and local partners in their call for both additional resources and more flexibility with the nation's goals of attaining the highest levels of preparedness. Given scarce federal resources, appropriate accountability and targeting features need to be designed into grants to ensure that the funds provided have the best chance of enhancing preparedness. Addressing the underlying fragmentation of grant programs remains a challenge for our federal system in the homeland security area. Several alternatives might be employed to overcome problems fostered by fragmentation in the federal aid structure, including consolidating grant programs through block grants, establishing performance partnerships, and streamlining planning and administrative requirements. Grant programs might be consolidated using a block grant approach, in which state and local officials bear the primary responsibility for monitoring and overseeing the planning, management, and implementation of activities financed with federal grant funds. While block grants devolve authority for decisions, they can be designed to facilitate accountability for national goals and objectives. Congress could also choose to take a more hybrid approach that would consolidate a number of narrowly focused categorical programs while retaining strong standards and accountability for discrete federal performance goals. One example of this model involves establishing performance partnerships, exemplified by the initiative of the Environmental Protection Agency in which states may voluntarily enter into performance agreements with the agency's regional offices covering the major federal environmental grant programs. Another option would be to simplify and streamline planning and administrative requirements for the grant programs. Whatever approach is chosen, it is important that grants be designed to target funds to states and localities with the greatest need, discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, and strike the appropriate balance between accountability and flexibility. |
gao_GAO-06-412T | gao_GAO-06-412T_0 | Crude Oil Prices and Other Factors Affect Gasoline Prices
Crude oil prices are the fundamental determinant of gasoline prices. Refinery capacity in the United States has not expanded at the same pace as demand for gasoline and other petroleum products in recent years. Gasoline inventories maintained by refiners or marketers of gasoline can also have an impact on prices. As have a number of other industries, the petroleum products industry has adopted so-called “just-in-time” delivery processes to reduce costs leading to a downward trend in the level of gasoline inventories in the United States. Regulatory factors also play a role. Finally, the structure of the gasoline market can play a role in determining prices. For example, mergers raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects because mergers could result in greater market power for the merged companies, potentially allowing them to increase prices above competitive levels. Mergers Occurred in All Segments of the U.S. Petroleum Industry in Recent Years for Several Reasons
During the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, several of them between large oil companies that had previously competed with each other for the sale of petroleum products. More than 2,600 merger transactions have occurred since 1991 involving all three segments of the U.S. petroleum industry. Almost 85 percent of the mergers occurred in the upstream segment (exploration and production), while the downstream segment (refining and marketing of petroleum) accounted for about 13 percent, and the midstream segment (transportation) accounted for about 2 percent. Since 2000, we found that at least 8 large mergers have occurred. Independent oil companies have also been involved in mergers. Petroleum industry officials and experts we contacted cited several reasons for the industry’s wave of mergers since the 1990s, including increasing growth, diversifying assets, and reducing costs. Mergers in the 1990s Increased Market Concentration and Led to Small Increases in Wholesale Gasoline Prices, but the Impact of More Recent Mergers is Unknown
Mergers in the 1990s contributed to increases in market concentration in the refining and marketing segments of the U.S. petroleum industry, while the exploration and production segment experienced little change in concentration. Econometric modeling we performed of eight mergers that occurred in the 1990s showed that the majority resulted in small wholesale gasoline price increases. While we have not performed modeling on mergers that occurred since 2000, and thus cannot comment on any potential additional effect on wholesale gasoline prices, these mergers would further increase market concentration nationwide since there are now fewer oil companies. According to FTC officials, FTC generally reviews proposed mergers involving the petroleum industry because of the agency’s expertise in that industry. The increases were for branded gasoline only and were about 7 cents per gallon, on average. In addition, merger activity can influence gasoline prices. During the 1990s, mergers decreased the number of oil companies and refiners and our findings suggest that this change caused wholesale prices to rise. Regardless of the causes, high gasoline prices specifically, and high energy prices in general are a challenge for the nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Soaring retail gasoline prices, increased oil company profits, and mergers of large oil companies have garnered extensive media attention and generated considerable public concern. Gasoline prices impact the economy because of our heavy reliance on motor vehicles. According to the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA), each additional ten cents per gallon of gasoline adds about $14 billion to America's annual gasoline bill. Given the importance of gasoline for the nation's economy, it is essential to understand the market for gasoline and how prices are determined. In this context, this testimony addresses the following questions: (1) What factors affect gasoline prices? (2) What has been the pattern of oil company mergers in the United States in recent years? (3) What effects have mergers had on market concentration and wholesale gasoline prices? To address these questions, GAO relied on previous reports, including (1) a 2005 GAO primer on gasoline prices, (2) a 2005 GAO report on the proliferation of special gasoline blends, and (3) a 2004 GAO report on mergers in the U.S. petroleum industry. GAO also collected updated data from a number of sources that we deemed reliable. This work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
Crude oil prices are the major determinant of gasoline prices. A number of other factors also affect gasoline prices including (1) refinery capacity in the United States, which has not expanded at the same pace as demand for gasoline and other petroleum products in recent years; (2) gasoline inventories maintained by refiners or marketers of gasoline, which as with trends in a number of other industries, have seen a general downward trend in recent years; and (3) regulatory factors, such as national air quality standards, that have induced some states to switch to special gasoline blends that have been linked to higher gasoline prices. Finally, the structure of the gasoline market can play a role in determining prices. For example, mergers raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects because mergers could result in greater market power for the merged companies, potentially allowing them to increase prices above competitive levels. During the 1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, several of them between large oil companies that had previously competed with each other for the sale of petroleum products. During this period, more than 2,600 merger transactions occurred--almost 85 percent of the mergers occurred in the upstream segment (exploration and production), while the downstream segment (refining and marketing of petroleum) accounted for about 13 percent, and the midstream segment (transportation) accounted for about 2 percent. Since 2000, we found that at least 8 additional mergers have occurred, involving different segments of the industry. Petroleum industry officials and experts we contacted cited several reasons for the industry's wave of mergers since the 1990s, including increasing growth, diversifying assets, and reducing costs. Mergers in the 1990s contributed to increases in market concentration in the refining and marketing segments of the U.S. petroleum industry, while the exploration and production segment experienced little change in concentration. GAO evaluated eight mergers that occurred in the 1990s after they had been reviewed by the FTC--the FTC generally reviews proposed mergers involving the petroleum industry and only approves such mergers if they are deemed not to have anticompetitive effects. GAO's econometric modeling of these mergers showed that the majority resulted in small wholesale gasoline price increases. While mergers since 2000 also increased market concentration, we have not performed modeling on more recent mergers and thus cannot comment on any potential additional effect on wholesale gasoline prices. |
gao_GAO-14-579 | gao_GAO-14-579_0 | All institutions participating in CDCI are required to make quarterly dividend or interest payments to Treasury. Treasury’s Estimated Lifetime Cost for CDCI Has Decreased as Participants Have Begun Exiting the Program
As of April 30, 2014, 68 of the original 84 CDCI institutions remained in the program. CDCI participants have also paid $38.3 million in dividends and interest. As of November 2010, Treasury estimated the program’s lifetime cost at about $290 million. As of February 28, 2014, Treasury estimated the program’s lifetime cost at $80 million. Representatives of a few of the CDCI institutions, as well as representatives of two organizations representing CDCIs, said that CDCI had been one of the few sources of external capital for small community banks and credit unions since the financial crisis and economic downturn. The scheduled increase in the CDCI dividend rate (from 2 percent to 9 percent) that will take effect in 2018 is a key factor for institutions in deciding when to exit. Treasury officials stated that they had not yet determined an exit strategy for CDCI but were studying various alternatives and would need to consider the interests of participating institutions and taxpayers. In addition, Treasury officials said that they would meet with the federal financial regulators to discuss options. In addition, few of the remaining CDCI banks and credit unions are considered troubled by FDIC or NCUA. Moreover, remaining CDCI banks generally are financially stronger than certified CDFI banks that did not participate in the program, but remaining CDCI credit unions are generally weaker than nonparticipating CDFI credit unions. Banks Remaining in CDCI Were Generally Financially Stronger Than Non-CDCI Banks, but Remaining Credit Unions Were Generally Weaker Than Non-CDCI Credit Unions
The financial health of remaining banks and credit unions differed relative to institutions that did not participate in CDCI. Finally, remaining CDCI banks had higher reserves for covering losses compared with non-CDCI banks. Remaining CDCI credit unions were less profitable than non-CDCI credit unions and held slightly more poorly performing assets. For purposes of capital adequacy, a net worth of 7 percent or greater of total assets is considered well-capitalized. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to Treasury, FDIC, and NCUA for their review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the financial status of the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI), including repayments and other proceeds, investments outstanding, and the estimated lifetime cost of the program; (2) factors affecting participants’ decisions to remain in or leave the program and Treasury’s exit strategy; and (3) the financial condition of institutions remaining in CDCI. To examine factors affecting participants’ decisions to remain in or leave the program and Treasury’s exit strategy, we selected and attempted to contact a nonprobability, judgmental sample of 9 of the 29 banks and 12 of the 40 credit unions remaining in CDCI as of March 31, 2014. We also interviewed officials from the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), associations that represent banks and credit unions that received CDCI capital, and an organization that invests in some of the CDCI banks, to obtain their observations on the same topics. We determined that the financial information used in this report, including the CDCI program data from Treasury and the financial data on banks and credit unions from SNL Financial, was sufficiently reliable to assess the status and condition of CDCI and institutions that participated in the program. For the data from Treasury, we tested Treasury’s internal controls over financial reporting as they related to our annual audit of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) financial statements and found the information to be sufficiently reliable based on the results of our audits of fiscal years 2010 through 2013 financial statements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury established CDCI under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in February 2010 to help banks and credit unions certified as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) maintain their services to underserved communities in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Treasury invested a total of $570 million in 84 eligible institutions by September 2010.
TARP's authorizing legislation mandates that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities, including CDCI. This report examines (1) the financial status of CDCI; (2) factors affecting participants' decisions to remain in or leave the program and Treasury's exit strategy; and (3) the financial condition of institutions remaining in the program.
To assess the program's status, GAO reviewed Treasury reports on CDCI. GAO also used regulatory financial data to compare the financial condition of banks and credit unions remaining in CDCI with those that would have been eligible but did not participate. In addition, GAO interviewed staff from Treasury and NCUA, associations representing CDCI participants, and representatives of a nonprobability sample of CDFI banks and credit unions that participated in CDCI. GAO selected banks and credit unions based on asset size and geography.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. In comments on a draft of this report, Treasury and NCUA concurred with our findings.
What GAO Found
As of April 30, 2014, 82 percent of the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) $570 million total investment in eligible banks and credit unions through the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) was still outstanding. Sixteen institutions have exited the program, leaving 29 banks and 39 credit unions, respectively, in the program. Treasury had received repayments and investment income of $134.3 million, but has also recorded a $6.7 million write-off based on the failure of one participant's subsidiary. As of February 28, 2014 (most recent information available), Treasury estimated a lifetime cost of $80 million for CDCI, down from an estimated cost of $290 million in November 2010.
Representatives of participant banks and credit unions GAO interviewed said that access—or lack thereof—to similar forms of capital was a key factor in institutions' willingness or ability to exit the program. They noted that CDCI continued to be one of the few sources of capital for small banks and credit unions. In addition, they listed program terms, such as the scheduled increase in the dividend or interest rate from 2 percent to 9 percent in 2018, as considerations. Treasury has not yet announced an exit strategy for CDCI but said it will consider the interests of the financial institutions and taxpayers as they consider options for winding down the program. For example, they noted that any strategy would need to take into account how the wind down of the program may impact the community development mission of the remaining participants.
The financial health of the remaining CDCI banks and credit unions is mixed. For example, few CDCI institutions have missed their dividend or interest payments to Treasury since 2010. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) had identified very few of the remaining banks and credit unions as exhibiting serious financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses as of March 2014. GAO's analysis of financial data found that banks remaining in CDCI tended to be more profitable, held stronger assets, and had higher capital and reserve levels when compared to non-CDCI banks that were eligible for the program but did not participate. However, remaining credit unions were less profitable, held slightly more poorly performing assets, and had lower capital levels and less protection against losses than non-CDCI credit unions that were eligible for the program but did not participate. |
gao_GAO-06-620 | gao_GAO-06-620_0 | The corporation relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial operations and store the sensitive information it collects. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the progress FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating remaining information system control weaknesses reported as unresolved at the time of our prior review in 2004 and (2) the effectiveness of the corporation’s information system controls for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computerized data. FDIC Has Made Progress Correcting Previously Reported Weaknesses
FDIC has taken steps to address security control weaknesses. The corporation has corrected or mitigated 18 of the 24 weaknesses that we previously reported as unresolved. Control Weaknesses Place Financial and Sensitive Data at Risk
FDIC has not effectively implemented information security controls to properly protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to the 6 previously reported weaknesses that remain uncorrected, we identified 20 new information security weaknesses during this review. Most of the identified weaknesses pertain to access controls. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, and information. Access controls include (1) user accounts and passwords, (2) access rights and permissions, (3) network services, (4) configuration assurance, (5) audit and monitoring of security- related events, and (6) physical security. As reported in calendar year 2004, and once again recurring this year, the corporation did not consistently implement effective application change controls. However, a key reason for the weaknesses in FDIC’s information system controls is that the corporation has not fully implemented elements of its information security program. As a result, FDIC has less assurance that its systems and information are sufficiently protected. The severity of these weaknesses was such that we reported information system control weaknesses to be a reportable condition in our 2005 financial audit report since financial and sensitive information are at increased risk of unauthorized access, modification, and/or disclosure, possibly without detection. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help fully implement the corporation’s information security program, we recommend that the FDIC Chairman take the following five actions: consistently implement the corporation’s documented policies and procedures related to information security, include security plans or requirements for nonmajor applications into the plans for general support systems, provide specialized training to individuals with significant security report weaknesses as closed in remedial action plans only when corrective actions have been completed, and update continuity of operations plans and test them for the New Financial Environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. The corporation relies extensively on computerized systems to support and carry out its financial and mission-related operations. As part of the audit of the calendar year 2005 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the progress FDIC has made in correcting or mitigating information security weaknesses previously reported and (2) the effectiveness of the corporation's information system controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its key financial information and information systems.
What GAO Found
FDIC has made progress in correcting previously reported weaknesses. Specifically, the corporation has corrected or mitigated 18 of the 24 weaknesses that GAO previously reported as unresolved at the time of the last review. Among actions FDIC has taken are developing and implementing procedures to comply with its computer file naming convention standards and developing and implementing automated procedures for limiting access to sensitive information. Nevertheless, FDIC has not consistently implemented information security controls to properly protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information and information systems. In addition to the remaining six previously reported weaknesses for which FDIC has not completed corrective actions, GAO identified 20 new information security weaknesses. Most identified weaknesses pertain to access controls over (1) user accounts and passwords; (2) access rights and permissions; (3) network services; (4) configuration assurance; (5) audit and monitoring of security-related events; and (6) physical security that are to prevent, limit, or detect access to its critical financial and sensitive systems and information. In addition, weaknesses exist in other information security controls relating to segregation of duties and application change controls. A key reason for these weaknesses is that FDIC has not fully implemented elements of its information security program. For example, it has not consistently implemented its security-related policies, addressed security plans for certain applications, provided specialized training to individuals with significant security responsibilities, implemented remedial action plans for resolving known weaknesses, and updated or tested continuity plans in light of its implementation of the new financial environment. As a result, financial and sensitive information are at increased risk of unauthorized access, modification, and/or disclosure, possibly without detection. Because of this, GAO reported information system control weaknesses to be a reportable condition in 2005. |
gao_GAO-15-211 | gao_GAO-15-211_0 | Experts also noted that additional research is needed to develop effective interventions. Approximately 33 Percent of Older Adult Medicare Part D Enrollees with Dementia Who Resided in a Nursing Home, and 14 Percent Outside of a Nursing Home, Were Prescribed Antipsychotic Drugs in 2012
About one-third of older adult Medicare Part D enrollees with dementia who spent over 100 days in a nursing home were prescribed an antipsychotic drug in 2012. 1.) 2.) Experts and Research Commonly Cited Certain Patient and Setting-Specific Factors Contributing to the Prescribing of Antipsychotic Drugs to Older Adults
Experts we spoke with and research we reviewed commonly identified certain factors that are specific to the patient that contribute to antipsychotic prescribing, such as patient agitation or delusions. These experts agreed that antipsychotic drugs are often initiated in hospital settings and carried over to nursing home settings. HHS Agencies’ Actions Focused on Reducing Antipsychotic Drug Use by Older Adults with Dementia Target Nursing Home Residents, Not Those in Other Settings
HHS agencies, including CMS, AHRQ, and NIH, have taken actions to address antipsychotic drug use by older adults with dementia in nursing homes. However, HHS has done little to address antipsychotic drug use among older adults with dementia living in settings outside of the nursing home. To reach this goal, HHS outlined several actions, including monitoring, reporting, and reducing the use of antipsychotics drugs by older adults in nursing homes. HHS Has Taken Little Action to Educate and Provide Outreach to Reduce Antipsychotic Drug Use among Older Adults Residing Outside of Nursing Homes
While the National Alzheimer’s Plan was established to improve care for all individuals with dementia regardless of the setting where they reside, HHS efforts related to reducing antipsychotic drug use among older adults have primarily focused on those living in nursing homes with less activity geared toward those living outside of nursing homes. Stakeholder groups we spoke to indicated that educational efforts similar to those provided under the National Partnership should be extended to those providing care to older adults in other settings, such as hospitals and assisted living facilities. Extending educational efforts to caregivers and providers outside of the nursing home could help lower the use of antipsychotics among older adults with dementia living both inside and outside of nursing homes. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of HHS expand its outreach and educational efforts aimed at reducing antipsychotic drug use among older adults with dementia to include those residing outside of nursing homes by updating the National Alzheimer’s Plan. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Analyses of Antipsychotic Drug Prescribing for Older Adults with Dementia
We used two primary data sources to examine antipsychotic drug prescribing for older adults with dementia: the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Event (PDE) data to identify antipsychotic drug prescribing for Medicare Part D enrollees in and outside of the nursing home, and the Long Term Care Minimum Data Set (MDS) to identify antipsychotic drug prescribing for all nursing home residents, regardless of Medicare Part D enrollment. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dementia affects millions of older adults, causing behavioral symptoms such as mood changes, loss of communication, and agitation. Concerns have been raised about the use of antipsychotic drugs to address the behavioral symptoms of the disease, primarily due to the FDA's boxed warning that these drugs may cause an increased risk of death when used by older adults with dementia and the drugs are not approved for this use.
GAO was asked to examine psychotropic drug prescribing for older adult nursing home residents. In this report, GAO examined (1) to what extent antipsychotic drugs are prescribed for older adults with dementia living inside and outside nursing homes, (2) what is known from selected experts and published research about factors contributing to the such prescribing, and (3) to what extent HHS has taken action to reduce the use of antipsychotic drugs by older adults with dementia. GAO analyzed multiple data sources including 2012 Medicare Part D drug event claims and nursing home assessment data; reviewed research and relevant federal guidance and regulations; and interviewed experts and HHS officials.
What GAO Found
Antipsychotic drugs are frequently prescribed to older adults with dementia. GAO's analysis found that about one-third of older adults with dementia who spent more than 100 days in a nursing home in 2012 were prescribed an antipsychotic, according to data from Medicare's prescription drug program, also known as Medicare Part D. Among Medicare Part D enrollees with dementia living outside of a nursing home that same year, about 14 percent were prescribed an antipsychotic. (See figure.)
Experts and research identified patient agitation or delusions, as well as certain setting-specific characteristics, as factors contributing to the prescribing of antipsychotics to older adults. For example, experts GAO spoke with noted that antipsychotic drugs are often initiated in hospital settings and carried over when older adults are admitted to a nursing home. In addition, experts and research have reported that nursing home staff levels, particularly low staff levels, lead to higher antipsychotic drug use.
Agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have taken several actions to address antipsychotic drug use by older adults in nursing homes, as described in HHS's National Alzheimer's Plan; however, none have been directed to settings outside of nursing homes, such as assisted living facilities or individuals' homes. While the National Alzheimer's Plan has a goal to improve dementia care for all individuals regardless of residence, HHS officials said that efforts to reduce antipsychotic use have not focused on care settings outside nursing homes, though HHS has done work to support family caregivers in general. Stakeholders GAO spoke to indicated that educational efforts similar to those provided for nursing homes should be extended to other settings. Extending educational efforts to caregivers and providers outside of the nursing home could help lower the use of antipsychotics among older adults with dementia living both inside and outside of nursing homes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS expand its outreach and educational efforts aimed at reducing antipsychotic drug use among older adults with dementia to include those residing outside of nursing homes by updating the National Alzheimer's Plan. HHS concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-634 | gao_GAO-17-634_0 | Six Federal Agencies Did Not Publish Initial Catch-up Inflation Adjustments through IFRs in the Federal Register as of December 31, 2016
Of the 52 federal agencies reviewed, we determined that 49 federal agencies were required to publish IFRs with the initial catch-up inflation adjustment amounts in the Federal Register. The remaining 6 agencies subject to the Inflation Adjustment Act that did not publish IFRs with the initial catch-up inflation adjustment amounts by December 31, 2016, in the Federal Register were the 1. Three Federal Agencies Did Not Report Civil Monetary Penalty Information, Including the Catch- up Inflation Adjustment of the Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts, in 2016 AFRs
Under the Inflation Adjustment Act and OMB Circular A-136, section II.5.11, Civil Monetary Penalty Adjustment for Inflation, federal agencies are directed to report in the 2016 AFRs information about the civil monetary penalties within agencies’ jurisdiction, including the catch-up inflation adjustment of the civil monetary penalty amounts, and federal agencies must report this information if the agencies, or their subbureaus or divisions, enforce any civil monetary penalties. Accordingly, it is important that agencies report such information in the AFRs. While most federal agencies subject to the Inflation Adjustment Act have followed the act’s requirements and OMB’s guidance, some agencies did not timely publish their civil monetary penalty catch-up inflation adjustments in the Federal Register or report their civil monetary penalty information in the 2016 AFRs. In addition, agencies had differing interpretations of OMB’s guidance related to civil monetary penalty inflation adjustment implementation that could result in inconsistent AFR reporting of civil monetary penalty adjustment information. OMB staff generally agreed with our recommendation; however, they suggested that we revise the recommendation to use more broad terms. We agreed with this suggestion and modified the report accordingly to allow OMB more flexibility to meet the intent of our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses to what extent federal agencies subject to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended (Inflation Adjustment Act), have complied with the requirement to (1) publish their initial catch-up inflation adjustments in the Federal Register and (2) report in the 2016 agency financial reports (AFR) information about the civil monetary penalties within the agencies’ jurisdiction, including the inflation adjustment of the penalty amounts, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidance. To address our first objective, we obtained the population of 52 federal agencies that could be subject to the applicable provisions of the Inflation Adjustment Act from OMB’s summary list. We categorized federal agencies for our first objective by determining (1) whether the agency complied with the Inflation Adjustment Act to publish its initial catch-up inflation adjustments by July 1, 2016, and to take effect no later than August 1, 2016; (2) whether the agency published its initial catch-up inflation adjustments in calendar year 2016 (i.e., no later than December 31, 2016); (3) whether the agency is subject to the catch-up adjustment provisions of the Inflation Adjustment Act; and (4) whether the agency had applicable civil monetary penalties to assess or enforce. As a result, we did not make any determination on these 8 federal agencies regarding compliance with the AFR reporting requirement provisions of the Inflation Adjustment Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The IAA includes a provision for GAO to annually submit to Congress a report assessing the compliance of agencies with the inflation adjustments required by the act. Specifically, GAO’s objectives were to determine to what extent federal agencies subject to the IAA have complied with the requirements to (1) publish in the Federal Register their initial catch-up inflation adjustments and (2) report in the 2016 AFRs information about civil monetary penalties, including the catch-up inflation adjustment of the civil monetary penalty amounts. GAO obtained the population of 52 federal agencies identified by OMB that could be subject to the applicable provisions of the IAA and, for those subject to the requirements, electronically searched the Federal Register and reviewed the 2016 AFRs.
What GAO Found
The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended (the IAA) calls for federal agencies to (1) adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation with an initial catch-up inflation adjustment published in the Federal Register and (2) report in the 2016 agency financial reports (AFR) civil monetary penalty information, including the catch-up inflation adjustment. The act also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue implementation guidance.
Most federal agencies subject to the IAA complied with the provisions of the act to publish their initial catch-up inflation adjustments in the Federal Register no later than July 1, 2016. However, certain federal agencies with civil monetary penalties covered by the IAA did not comply with the statutory requirement. GAO found that six federal agencies did not publish their civil monetary penalty initial catch-up inflation adjustment amounts by December 31, 2016. As a result of GAO inquiries, three of these six subsequently published their catch-up adjustments for inflation in the Federal Register .
In addition, most federal agencies subject to the IAA complied with the provisions of the act to report civil monetary penalty information in the 2016 AFRs, including the catch-up inflation adjustment. However, certain federal agencies with civil monetary penalties covered by the IAA did not comply with the statutory requirements. Specifically, three federal agencies did not report, in the 2016 AFRs, required information about the civil monetary penalty catch-up inflation adjustment in the 2016 AFRs.
GAO also found that OMB had not provided clear guidance regarding federal agencies' reporting on civil monetary penalty information in the AFRs. As a result, officials from federal agencies had different interpretations, which could result in inconsistent AFR reporting of such information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) six federal agencies take the necessary actions to meet IAA requirements and (2) OMB clarify its guidance regarding federal agencies' reporting on civil monetary penalties in AFRs. Two of the agencies did not comment on their respective recommendations, while the remaining four all indicated that they were taking actions to address the recommendations made to them. OMB generally agreed with the recommendation addressed to it but suggested a revision to use more broad terms. GAO modified the recommendation accordingly to allow OMB flexibility to meet the intent of the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-11 | gao_GAO-08-11_0 | OPM 2006 Survey Results Show Improvement in Employees’ Perceptions of Leadership: Challenges Exist in Talent Management and Perceptions of DOD Investigative Service Transfers
Compared to its 2004 results, OPM’s 2006 FHCS results indicate strong improvement in employee perceptions on key questions relating to leadership, mixed results in performance culture and accountability, and continuing challenges in talent management. The purpose of the groups was to understand the factors contributing to the 2004 responses and report employee ideas for addressing top priority improvement areas. OPM’s Workforce and Succession Plans Align with Selected Leading Practices, but the Agency Lacks a Well-Documented Process of Evaluation of Some of These Efforts
OPM’s workforce and succession plans are consistent with selected strategic workforce planning practices and principles relevant to OPM’s capacity to fulfill its strategic goals. OPM Has Assessed Gaps in Numbers and Competencies and Created Gap Closure Plans for Its Mission Critical and Leadership Workforce
We have previously reported that an agency needs to define the critical skills and competencies that it will require in the future to meet its strategic program goals and then develop strategies to address gaps and human capital conditions in critical skills and competencies. During the past year, OPM has taken positive actions to address specific concerns raised by employees and managers in the surveys, such as placing more emphasis on information sharing with employees at all levels on the strategic goals and objectives of the agency. It is also important to acknowledge that OPM’s 2006 FHCS results, without the DOD investigative service transfers, would have been, in many cases, significantly more positive than in 2004. The responses from the investigative services division, however, are an area of concern that OPM will need to continue to focus attention on. In a relatively short time there will be a Presidential transition, and well-documented processes can help to ensure a seamless transition that builds on the current momentum. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has addressed key internal human capital management issues identified by examining employee responses to the 2004 and 2006 Federal Human Capital Surveys (FHCS) and determine the extent to which OPM has strategies in place to ensure it has the mission critical talent it needs to meet current and future strategic goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Given the importance of the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) role in managing the nation's federal workforce, GAO assessed OPM's internal capacity for human capital management. This report--the third in the series--extends prior work and (1) looks at the extent to which OPM has addressed key internal human capital management issues identified by examining employee responses to the 2004 and 2006 Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) and (2) has strategies in place to ensure it has the mission critical talent it needs to meet current and future strategic goals. To address our objectives, GAO analyzed 2004 and 2006 FHCS results, summaries of OPM employee focus groups, and analyzed OPM strategic and human capital planning documents.
What GAO Found
OPM has taken positive actions to address specific concerns raised by employees and managers in the 2004 and 2006 FHCS responses. OPM conducted employee focus groups to understand factors contributing to the low 2004 survey scores and took actions, such as trying to improve communication throughout the agency. The 2006 survey results showed improvement in the area of leadership, with mixed results in the performance culture and accountability area, and continued concern in the talent management area. Without the responses from the investigative service employees who transferred from the Department of Defense in early 2005, OPM's 2006 FHCS results would have been, in many cases, significantly more positive than in 2004. The perceptions of the investigative service employees, however, will need continued attention. OPM has strategies in place, such as workforce and succession management plans, that are aligned with selected leading practices relevant to the agency's capacity to fulfill its strategic goals. For example, OPM's top leadership is involved in these efforts, and the agency has assessed gaps in numbers and competencies and created gap closure plans for its mission critical and leadership workforce. OPM lacks, however, a well-documented agencywide evaluation process of some of its workforce planning efforts. In particular, OPM's implementation of division-level training plans could make it difficult for the agency to identify and address reasons for shortfalls in meeting its talent management goals. In a relatively short time, there will also be a Presidential transition, and well-documented processes can help to ensure a seamless transition that builds on the current momentum. |
gao_GAO-05-651T | gao_GAO-05-651T_0 | In 1996, the Coast Guard began developing what came to be known as the Integrated Deepwater System acquisition program as its major effort to replace or modernize these aircraft and cutters. The Deepwater program represents a unique approach to a major acquisition in that the Coast Guard is relying on a prime contractor—the system integrator—to identify and deliver the assets needed to meet a set of mission requirements the Coast Guard has specified. We have been reviewing the Deepwater program for several years. The existing schedule calls for acquisition of new assets under the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program to occur over an approximately 20-year period. Deepwater Legacy Assets Show General Decline in Condition, but Current Measures Do Not Capture True Extent
Coast Guard condition measures show that the deepwater legacy assets generally declined between 2000 and 2004, but the Coast Guard’s available condition measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of precision. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it needs better condition measures but has not yet finalized or implemented such measures. This evidence, gleaned from information collected during our site visits and discussions with maintenance personnel, indicated deteriorating and obsolete systems and equipment as a major cause of the reduction in mission capabilities for a number of deepwater legacy aircraft and cutters. The Coast Guard has recently recognized the need for improved measures to more accurately capture data on the extent to which its deepwater legacy assets are degraded in their mission capabilities, but as of April 2005, such measures had not yet been finalized or implemented. These additional efforts are likely helping to prevent a more rapid decline in the condition of these assets, but condition problems continue, and the efforts will likely involve additional costs. For example, during this fiscal year, the Coast Guard is to begin a maintenance effectiveness project on the 210 foot and 270-foot cutters. So far, the Coast Guard’s budget plans or requests do not address this potential need. Management Challenges Faced in Acquiring New Assets Remain Significant
Since the inception of the Deepwater program, we have expressed concerns about the degree of risk in the acquisition approach and the Coast Guard’s ability to manage and oversee the program. Last year, we reported that, well into the contract’s second year, key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator’s performance had not been effectively implemented. While the Coast Guard is making progress on developing (1) measures that better demonstrate how the deteriorating condition of the legacy assets impact on mission capabilities and (2) a strategy to better prioritize upgrades and maximize capabilities, it is clear that the deepwater legacy assets are insufficient for meeting all of the Coast Guard’s missions. The cost increases and schedule slippages that have already occurred are warning signs. Some of these problems, such as those on the 378-foot cutters, are included in the compendium the Coast Guard uses to set sustainment priorities and plan budgets, but the Coast Guard has not allocated funds because the problems pertain to assets that are among the first to be replaced. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, the Coast Guard began a multiyear, $19 billion to $24 billion acquisition program to replace or modernize its fleet of deepwater aircraft and cutters, so called because they are capable of operating many miles off the coast. For several years now, the Coast Guard has been warning that the existing fleet--especially cutters--was failing at an unsustainable rate, and it began studying options for replacing or modernizing the fleet more rapidly. Faster replacement is designed to avoid some of the costs that might be involved in keeping aging assets running for longer periods. This testimony, which is based both on current and past GAO work, addresses several issues related to these considerations: (1) changes in the condition of deepwater legacy assets during fiscal years 2000 through 2004; (2) actions the Coast Guard has taken to maintain and upgrade deepwater legacy assets; and (3) management challenges the Coast Guard faces in acquiring new assets, especially if a more aggressive schedule is adopted.
What GAO Found
Available Coast Guard condition measures indicate that the Coast Guard's deepwater legacy aircraft and cutters are generally declining, but these measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of precision. GAO's field visits and interviews with Coast Guard staff, as well as reviews of other evidence, showed significant problems in a variety of the assets' systems and equipment. The Coast Guard has acknowledged that it needs to develop condition measures that more clearly demonstrate the extent to which asset conditions affect mission capabilities, but such measures have not yet been finalized or implemented. The Coast Guard has taken several types of actions to help keep the deepwater legacy assets operational, but these actions, while helpful, may not fully address mission capability issues and may require additional funding. For example, to help meet mission requirements, Coast Guard staff are performing more extensive maintenance between deployments, but even so, aircraft and cutters continue to lose mission capabilities. One Coast Guard command is using a new approach to help sustain the oldest class of cutters, but this approach will likely require additional funds--something not included thus far in Coast Guard budget plans or requests. If the Coast Guard adopts a more aggressive acquisition schedule, it will likely continue to face a number of challenges that have already affected its ability to effectively manage the Deepwater program. GAO has warned that the Coast Guard's acquisition strategy, which relies on a prime contractor ("system integrator") to identify and deliver the assets needed, carries substantial risks. In 2004, well into the contract's second year, key components for managing the program and overseeing the system integrator's performance had not been effectively implemented. While the Coast Guard has been addressing these problems--for example, putting more emphasis on competition as a means to control costs--many areas have not been fully addressed. A more aggressive acquisition schedule would only heighten the risks. |
gao_GAO-06-1004T | gao_GAO-06-1004T_0 | Some of these have been effective, particularly the Special 301 process that identifies inadequate IP protection in other countries and the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Training Coordination Group. NIPLECC members are from five agencies and consist of: (1) Commerce’s Undersecretary for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office; (2) Commerce’s Undersecretary of International Trade; (3) the Department of Justice’s Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division; (4) the Department of State’s Undersecretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs; (5) the Deputy United States Trade Representative; and (6) the Department of Homeland Security’s Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Coordination efforts involving IP law enforcement through NIPLECC have not been as successful as other efforts. The IP Coordinator is also serving as the coordinator for STOP. STOP Has Energized U.S. Efforts, but Its Impact and Long- Term Viability Are Uncertain
STOP has energized U.S. efforts to protect and enforce IP and has initiated some new efforts, however its long-term role is uncertain. One area where STOP has increased efforts is outreach to foreign governments. Industry representatives generally had positive views on STOP, although some thought that STOP was a compilation of new and on-going U.S. agency activities that would have occurred anyway. STOP’s lack of permanent status as a presidential initiative and lack of accountability mechanisms could limit its long-term impact. For example, the United States and the European Union (EU) have formed the U.S.-EU Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, and in June 2006, the United States and European Union announced an EU-U.S. Action Strategy for Enforcement of IP Rights meant to strengthen cooperation in border enforcement and encourage third countries to enforce and combat counterfeiting and piracy. We believe that accountability mechanisms are important to oversight of federal agency efforts and can contribute to better performance on issues such as IP protection. IP Enforcement Efforts at the Border Illustrate Challenges Facing STOP
One of STOP’s five goals is to increase federal efforts to seize counterfeit goods at the border, but work we are conducting for this Subcommittee illustrates the kind of challenges that STOP faces in achieving its goals. CBP and ICE are responsible for border enforcement efforts, but their top priority is national security. CBP IP Seizures Have Increased in Number but the Estimated Value Has Fluctuated
STOP documents cite increases in IP-related seizures as a positive indicator of its efforts to stop counterfeit goods at the border. In-Bond System Faces Persistent Control Weaknesses and Has Been Used to Circumvent IP Laws
The in-bond system has been identified by CBP and ICE officials as a mechanism that has been used to circumvent import and IP laws and regulations, presenting an enforcement challenge. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. goods are subject to substantial counterfeiting and piracy, creating health and safety hazards for consumers, damaging victimized companies, and threatening the U.S. economy. In 2004, the Bush administration launched the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP)--a multi-agency effort to better protect intellectual property (IP) by combating piracy and counterfeiting. This testimony, based on a prior GAO report as well as from observations from on-going work, describes (1) the range and effectiveness of multi-agency efforts on IP protection preceding STOP, (2) initial observations on the organization and efforts of STOP, and (3) initial observations on the efforts of U.S. agencies to prevent counterfeit and pirated goods from entering the United States, which relate to one of STOP's goals.
What GAO Found
STOP is the most recent in a number of efforts to coordinate interagency activity targeted at intellectual property (IP) protection. Some of these efforts have been effective and others less so. For example, the Special 301 process--the U.S. Trade Representative's process for identifying foreign countries that lack adequate IP protection--has been seen as effective because it compiles input from multiple agencies and serves to identify IP issues of concern in particular countries. Other interagency efforts, such as the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC), are viewed as being less effective because little has been produced beyond summarizing agencies' actions in the IP arena. While STOP has energized IP protection and enforcement efforts domestically and abroad, our initial work indicates that its long-term role is uncertain. STOP has been successful in fostering coordination, such as reaching out to foreign governments and private sector groups. Private sector views on STOP were generally positive; however, some stated that it emphasizes IP protection and enforcement efforts that would have occurred regardless of STOP's existence. STOP's lack of permanent status and accountability mechanisms pose challenges for its long-term impact and Congressional oversight. STOP faces challenges in meeting some of its objectives, such as increasing efforts to seize counterfeit goods at the border--an effort for which the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are responsible. CBP has certain steps underway, but our initial work indicates that resources for IP enforcement at certain ports have declined as attention has shifted to national security concerns. In addition, prior GAO work found internal control weaknesses in an import mechanism through which a significant portion of imports flow, and which has been used to smuggle counterfeit goods. |
gao_GGD-98-73 | gao_GGD-98-73_0 | The letter automation program suffered initial slippages, which caused DPS implementation to fall behind schedule. In its 1992 Plan, the Service scheduled DPS implementation for completion by fiscal-year-end 1995. The 1992 Plan included DPS goals and benchmarks for (1) deploying all needed barcode sorters, (2) barcoding virtually all letter mail, and (3) implementing DPS for specific delivery zones and carrier routes. Then, in April 1994, the Postmaster General announced that the barcoding goal would have to slip from 1995 to the end of fiscal year 1997. In its 1996 Plan, the Service extended the DPS completion date to the end of fiscal year 1998 and revised associated goals and benchmarks. Service officials said this unanticipated increase in workhours was due to a national level arbitrator finding in favor of NALC in a case regarding the Service’s establishment of city carrier routes that required more than 8 hours to complete, which the arbitrator determined violated the parties’ labor agreement. DPS implementation has been one of the contentious issues between the Service and NALC and its city carriers. The Service also acknowledged that it and NALC have had numerous disagreements regarding DPS implementation, but that the disputes over DPS have either been resolved or are in the process of being resolved, and that the parties are engaged in a number of cooperative ventures that they expect will have a beneficial effect on labor-management relationships. Postal Service’s efforts to implement Delivery Point Sequencing (DPS). Postal Service goals for DPS implementation, its projected letter carrier workhour savings, and the extent to which the Service has achieved these; and (2) identify any remaining issues that the Service and others believe must be addressed for the Service to achieve its 1998 DPS goals and the actions, if any, that the Service has taken to address these issues. Operational Issues Affecting Achievement of Fiscal Year 1998 DPS Goals
The Service was addressing operational issues that it believed impeded its efforts to achieve DPS goals and benchmarks and maximize DPS savings. Decline in City Carrier Street Efficiency Affects DPS Savings
The Service has achieved in-office carrier workhour savings with DPS implementation. Although most grievances were resolved through settlement, three went to national level arbitration. 1992 Joint Agreements Set Stage for DPS
In 1992, the Service and NALC published six Memoranda of Understanding, or joint agreements, which were to resolve past disputes and set a joint course for the future. Many City Carriers Raised Concerns About DPS Work Methods
In addition to their concerns about the Service’s noncompliance with national NALC-Service labor agreements, many city letter carriers said that they believe DPS work methods—particularly not being able to manually sort DPS letters to (1) combine them with the non-DPS bundle and (2) identify DPS sort errors and undeliverable letters—adversely affected their efficiency and, in some cases, service to their customers. Comments From the Postal Service
Comments From the National Association of Letter Carriers
GAO Comments
1. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the status of the Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to implement Delivery Point Sequencing (DPS), focusing on: (1) USPS goals for DPS implementation, its projected letter carrier workhour savings, and the extent to which the Service has achieved these; and (2) issues that may affect USPS's ability to achieve its 1998 DPS goals, including any actions that USPS has taken to address these issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in its 1992 Corporate Automation Plan, USPS initially scheduled DPS implementation to be completed by fiscal-year-end 1995; (2) the 1992 Plan included DPS goals and benchmarks for: (a) DPS equipment deployment; (b) barcoded letter volume; and (c) delivery zone and carrier route implementation nationwide through fiscal year (FY) 1995; (3) in addition, USPS based its analyses that supported investments in DPS sorting equipment on achieving: (a) a certain DPS letter volume to carrier routes; and (b) specific carrier workhour savings; (4) however, implementation fell behind schedule, and USPS acknowledged that it had been overly optimistic in its DPS expectations; (5) in April 1994, the Postmaster General announced that the barcoding goal had slipped from 1995 to fiscal-year-end 1997; (6) in its 1996 Plan, USPS extended the DPS completion date to the end of FY 1998 and revised associated goals and benchmarks; (7) USPS has identified and was addressing several issues that have affected its efforts to achieve its DPS implementation goals, benchmarks, and carrier workhour savings; (8) to increase volumes of barcoded letters and letters sorted in delivery sequence, USPS has taken several actions; (9) while USPS has achieved some success in addressing issues affecting DPS implementation and achievement of DPS goals, it has been less successful in resolving its disagreements with the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), the labor union representing city carriers, regarding DPS implementation; (10) in 1992, USPS and NALC agreed to work together to implement DPS and signed six memoranda of understanding, which were to resolve past disputes and provided a plan for DPS implementation; (11) not long after the memoranda were signed, disagreements developed between USPS and NALC regarding certain aspects of the memoranda; (12) NALC filed national level grievances regarding DPS implementation instructions, and the parties settled most of their disagreements; (13) however, one disagreement went to national arbitration, and the arbitrator decided in NALC's favor and instructed the parties to work together to resolve their differences; (14) in addition, many city carriers GAO spoke with said that although they generally saw benefits in DPS, they were concerned about its effect on their daily work; and (15) in contrast, USPS officials said that while DPS has changed the way carriers deliver mail, the changes have not adversely affected customer service. |
gao_GAO-14-304 | gao_GAO-14-304_0 | An agency may also award a contract noncompetitively when the need for goods and services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the federal government faces the risk of serious financial or other injury. Agencies Used the Urgency Exception to a Limited Extent and Procured a Range of Goods and Services, but Data Reliability Is Questionable
DOD’s, State’s, and USAID’s Use of the Urgency Exception Is Small Compared to Other Exceptions to Competition
Based on data from FPDS-NG, DOD, State, and USAID obligations for contracts and task orders reported as using the urgency exception during fiscal years 2010 through 2012 were small relative to other exceptions to Of the $998 billion that DOD obligated for all full and open competition.contracts during this period, $432 billion or 43 percent were awarded noncompetitively; however, only about $12.5 billion—or about 3 percent— of DOD’s noncompetitive obligations were awarded under the urgency exception. We note that our sample is not representative of all dollars obligated for federal contracts. Such inaccurate reporting adds to existing concerns about the reliability of some data elements in FPDS-NG which GAO has reported on previously. Ensuring contracts are correctly coded in FPDS-NG is critical as the data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate congressional oversight. Agencies Cited a Range of Urgent Circumstances to Award Noncompetitive Contracts and Justifications Generally Contained Required Elements
After excluding the contracts we identified with data errors, we found that 34 contracts were awarded noncompetitively using the unusual and compelling urgency exception to competition to meet a range of urgent Our sample included DOD contracts that were awarded to situations.meet urgent operational needs for combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, including two contracts that highlight the risk of using the urgency exception for research and development initiatives to immediately field capabilities for combat operations. Justifications Generally Contained the Required Elements and Provided Varied Levels of Insight about the Risks that Led to Use of the Urgency Exception
Justifications in our sample generally contained the required information; however, some fell short of the FAR requirements and did not obtain the necessary signatures, among other things. The remaining eight contracts were extended beyond 1 year through subsequent modifications, which contracting officials considered separate contract actions that, in their view, would not require a determination by the head of the agency. In addition, contracts may not exceed more than 1 year unless the head of agency, or their designee, determines that exceptional circumstances apply. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for organizations to maintain proper controls that ensure transparency and accountability for stewardship of government resources. Some Urgent Contracts Achieved Limited Competition, While Lack of Access to Technical Data Rights and Reliance on Contractor Expertise Thwarted Competition in Others
Even in urgent situations, agencies are required to seek offers from as many potential sources as practicable given the circumstances and some programs in our sample were able to use the prior expertise or market knowledge to hold limited competitions. In light of this, having OFPP provide guidance to clarify when determinations are needed when extending the period of performance on an urgency contract could help achieve consistent implementation of the duration requirement across the government. To help ensure consistent implementation of the FAR requirement to limit the period of performance for noncompetitive contracts using the unusual and compelling urgency exception, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, take the following action:
Provide guidance to clarify when determinations of exceptional circumstances are needed when a noncompetitive contract awarded on the basis of unusual and compelling urgency exceeds 1 year, either at time of award or modified after contract award. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this review were to examine (1) the pattern of use of the unusual and compelling urgency exception, including the range of goods and services acquired by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and US Agency for International Development’s (USAID); (2) the reasons that agencies awarded noncompetitive contracts on the basis of urgency and the extent to which justifications met requirements in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); and (3) the extent to which agencies limited the duration of the contract and achieved competition. We interviewed contracting and acquisition policy officials, procurement attorneys, program officials, and competition advocates at DOD, State, and USAID to discuss the facts and circumstances regarding use of the urgency exception and agency policies and procedures to implement FAR requirements for publicly posting justifications To determine the extent to which agencies complied with the FAR requirement to limit the total period of performance of a contract awarded using the urgency exception to no more than a year unless the head of the agency makes a determination of exceptional circumstances, we reviewed contract file documents for 34 selected contracts that we identified were awarded using the urgency exception. | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government's investment. Federal agencies are generally required to award contracts competitively but are permitted to award noncompetitive contracts under certain circumstances, such as when requirements are of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would suffer serious financial or other injury. Contracts that use the urgency exception to competition must generally be no longer than one year in duration.
The conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to examine DOD's, State's, and USAID's use of this exception. For the three agencies, GAO assessed (1) the pattern of use, (2) the reasons agencies awarded urgent noncompetitive contracts and the extent to which justifications met FAR requirements; and (3) the extent to which agencies limited the duration. GAO analyzed federal procurement data, interviewed contracting officials, and analyzed a non-generalizable sample of 62 contracts with a mix of obligation levels and types of goods and services procured across the three agencies.
What GAO Found
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) used the urgency exception to a limited extent, but the reliability of some federal procurement data elements is questionable. For fiscal years 2010 through 2012, obligations reported under urgent noncompetitive contracts ranged from less than 1 percent to about 12 percent of all noncompetitive contract obligations. During that time, DOD obligated $12.5 billion noncompetitively to procure goods and services using the urgency exception, while State and USAID obligated $582 million and about $20 million respectively, almost exclusively to procure services. Among the items procured were personal armor, guard services and communications equipment to support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO found coding errors that raise concerns about the reliability of federal procurement data on the use of the urgency exception. Nearly half—28 of the 62 contracts in GAO's sample—were incorrectly coded as having used the urgency exception when they did not. GAO found that 20 of the 28 miscoded contracts were awarded using procedures that are more simple and separate from the requirements related to the use of the urgency exception. Ensuring reliability of procurement data is critical as these data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate oversight.
For the 34 contracts in GAO's sample that were properly coded as having used the urgency exception, agencies cited a range of urgent circumstances, primarily to meet urgent needs for combat operations or to avoid unanticipated gaps in program support. The justifications and approvals—which are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to contain certain facts and rationale to justify use of the urgency exception to competition—generally contained the required elements; however, some were ambiguous about the specific risks to the government if the acquisition was delayed.
Ten of the 34 contracts in GAO's sample had a period of performance of more than one year—8 of which were modified after award to extend the period of performance beyond 1 year. The FAR limits contracts using the urgency exception to one year in duration unless the head of the agency or a designee determines that exceptional circumstances apply. Agencies did not make this determination for the 10 contracts. The FAR is not clear about what steps agencies should take when a contract is modified after award to extend the period of performance over 1 year. Some contracting officials noted that these modifications are treated as separate contract actions and would not require the determination by the head of the agency or designee. Others considered them cumulative actions requiring the determination. Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government calls for organizations to maintain proper controls that ensure transparency and accountability for stewardship of government resources. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)—which provides governmentwide policy on federal contracting procedures—is in a position to clarify when the determination of exceptional circumstances is needed to help achieve consistent implementation of this requirement across the federal government. Further, under the urgency exception, the FAR requires agencies to seek offers from as many vendors as practicable given the circumstances. For some contracts in GAO's sample, lack of access to technical data rights and reliance on contractor expertise prevented agencies from obtaining competition.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD, State and USAID provide guidance to improve data reliability and oversight for contracts awarded using the urgency exception. GAO also recommends that OFPP provide clarifying guidance to ensure consistent implementation of regulations. Agencies generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-513 | gao_GAO-11-513_0 | The RFS generally requires that U.S. transportation fuels in 2022 contain 36 billion gallons of biofuels. At the terminals, most ethanol is currently blended as an additive in gasoline to make E10 fuel blends. Challenges to Transporting Additional Volumes of Ethanol to Wholesale Markets May Require Large Investments in Infrastructure over the Next Decade
Existing ethanol infrastructure should be sufficient to transport the nation’s ethanol production through 2015, according to DOT officials and industry representatives, but large investments in transportation infrastructure may be needed to meet 2022 projected consumption, according to EPA documentation. This volume represents roughly a 2.4 billion gallon increase from 2011 RFS consumption targets for corn ethanol. EPA estimated that approximately $87 million would be needed for an additional 480 tank trucks. We and others have reported that congestion is constraining the capacity and increasing the costs of U.S. rail and highway transportation. The Compatibility of Many UST Systems with Intermediate Blends Is Unclear
According to our discussions with knowledgeable federal officials and several industry association representatives, the compatibility of many existing UST systems with intermediate ethanol blends is unclear for two main reasons—many fuel retailers have older equipment and lack records, and recent federally sponsored research indicates potential problems with the use of intermediate blends. However, important gaps exist in current federal research efforts in this area. However, to date EPA has not developed a plan to undertake such research. According to EPA and industry estimates, the total cost of installing a new single-tank UST system compatible with intermediate ethanol blends is more than $100,000. However, since EPA has only allowed E15 for use in model year 2001 and newer automobiles, these retailers would not be able to sell fuel to consumers for use in older automobiles and nonroad engines. For example, some industry association representatives stated that some consumers will not understand the label, or the label might get lost among the other labels commonly found on dispensers. Federally Sponsored Studies Are Evaluating Effects of Using Intermediate Ethanol Blends in Automobiles and Nonroad Engines
With the possibility of introducing intermediate ethanol blends in the nation’s motor-fuel supply, DOE began to study the effects of these fuels in automobiles and nonroad engines in 2007. DOE, EPA, and CRC have provided about $51 million in funding (for fiscal years 2007 through 2010) for ten research projects (see table 2). Fuel economy. Catalyst temperatures. Three handheld trimmers had higher idle speeds and experienced unintentional clutch engagement, which DOE laboratory officials identified as a potential safety concern that can be mitigated in some engines by adjusting the carburetor. Conclusions
The RFS calls for increasing amounts of biofuels to be blended in the nation’s transportation fuel supply, including up to 15 billion gallons of ethanol made from corn starch and potentially billions of gallons of additional ethanol made from cellulosic sources. However, the effects of intermediate ethanol blends on key components of the nation’s retail fueling infrastructure—such as gaskets and seals in dispensing equipment and UST systems—are not fully understood. While DOE is conducting studies on the compatibility of UST materials with intermediate blends, and while EPA plans to conduct a study limited to experts’ views on the subject, EPA officials have acknowledged that additional research, including research on the suitability of specific UST components with intermediate blends, will be needed to facilitate a transition to storing intermediate ethanol blends. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the challenges associated with transporting additional volumes of ethanol to wholesale markets to meet Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requirements, we interviewed relevant government, industry, academic, and research officials. In particular, we asked a nonprobability sample of knowledgeable stakeholders, among other things, to discuss the challenges, if any, associated with transporting additional volumes of ethanol to wholesale markets. We also conducted site visits to the research centers responsible for coordinating federal studies on the effects of intermediate ethanol blends on materials and components used in retail fuel storage and dispensing equipment. Due to ongoing litigation over EPA’s decision to allow ethanol blends with 15 percent ethanol (E15) for use with certain automobiles, we did not evaluate any research by federal agencies and others into the effects of intermediate ethanol blends on automobiles and nonroad engines. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. transportation relies largely on oil for fuel. Biofuels can be an alternative to oil and are produced from renewable sources, like corn. In 2005, Congress created the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which requires transportation fuel to contain 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022. The most common U.S. biofuel is ethanol, typically produced from corn in the Midwest, transported by rail, and blended with gasoline as E10 (10 percent ethanol). Use of intermediate blends, such as E15 (15 percent ethanol), would increase the amount of ethanol used in transportation fuel to meet the RFS. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently allowed E15 for use with certain automobiles. GAO was asked to examine (1) challenges, if any, to transporting additional ethanol to meet the RFS, (2) challenges, if any, to selling intermediate blends, and (3) studies on the effects of intermediate blends in automobiles and nonroad engines. GAO examined government, industry, and academic reports; interviewed Department of Energy (DOE), EPA, and other government and industry officials; and visited research centers.
What GAO Found
According to government and industry officials, the nation's existing rail, truck, and barge infrastructure should be able to transport an additional 2.4 billion gallons of ethanol to wholesale markets by 2015--enough to meet RFS requirements. Later in the decade, however, a number of challenges and costs are projected for transporting additional volumes of ethanol to wholesale markets to meet peak RFS requirements. According to EPA estimates, if an additional 9.4 billion gallons of ethanol are consumed domestically by 2022, several billion dollars would be needed to upgrade rail, truck, and barge infrastructure to transport ethanol to wholesale markets. GAO identified three key challenges to the retail sale of intermediate blends: (1) Compatibility. Federally sponsored research indicates that intermediate blends may degrade or damage some materials used in existing underground storage tank (UST) systems and dispensing equipment, potentially causing leaks. However, important gaps exist in current research efforts--none of the planned or ongoing studies on UST systems will test actual components and equipment, such as valves and tanks. While EPA officials have stated that additional research will be needed to more fully understand the effects of intermediate blends on UST systems, no such research is currently planned. (2) Cost. Due to concerns over compatibility, new storage and dispensing equipment may be needed to sell intermediate blends at retail outlets. The cost of installing a single-tank UST system compatible with intermediate blends is more than $100,000. In addition, the cost of installing a single compatible fuel dispenser is over $20,000. (3) Liability. Since EPA has only allowed E15 for use in model year 2001 and newer automobiles, many fuel retailers are concerned about potential liability issues if consumers misfuel their older automobiles or nonroad engines with E15. Among other things, EPA has issued a proposed rule on labeling to mitigate misfueling. DOE, EPA, and a nonfederal organization have provided about $51 million in funding for ten studies on the effects of intermediate blends on automobiles and nonroad engines--such as weed trimmers, generators, marine engines, and snowmobiles--including effects on performance, emissions, and durability. Of these studies, five will not be completed until later in 2011. Results from a completed study indicate that such blends reduce a vehicle's fuel economy (i.e., fewer miles per gallon) and may cause older automobiles to experience higher emissions of some pollutants and higher catalyst temperatures. Results from another completed study indicate that such blends may cause some nonroad engines to run at higher temperatures and experience unintentional clutch engagement, which could pose safety hazards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that EPA determine what additional research is needed on the effects of intermediate blends on UST systems. EPA agreed with the recommendation after GAO revised it to clarify EPA's planned approach. |
gao_GAO-02-573 | gao_GAO-02-573_0 | The program’s management is complex because these business units are individually responsible, among other things, for identifying research needs, developing strategies to address transportation problems, and managing research and technology activities that support the agency’s strategic goals. FHWA Processes for Developing Research Agendas and Evaluating Research Outcomes Do Not Always Follow Best Practices for Federal Research Programs
Leading organizations that conduct scientific and engineering research, other federal agencies with research programs, and experts in research and technology have identified and use best practices for developing research agendas and evaluating research outcomes. As a result, this approach is used inconsistently. Similarly, the agency uses external stakeholders to provide merit review of research projects on an ad hoc basis. FHWA acknowledges that the agency lacks a consistent, transparent, and systematic approach for engaging stakeholders in setting research agendas. According to agency officials, the designations made by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century and conference reports accompanying recent appropriations acts have represented significant proportions of the agency’s research budget. Conclusions
With millions of dollars for its research, FHWA’s research and technology program has the potential to significantly improve the nation’s highway system. In addition, because FHWA does not systematically evaluate its research and technology program, it is unclear whether the research is having the intended results or whether some refocusing of the research would be justified. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that FHWA’s research agenda and approach to evaluation are identifying research with the highest value to the surface transportation community and monitoring the outcomes of that research, we are recommending that the secretary of transportation direct the FHWA administrator to develop a systematic approach for obtaining input from external stakeholders in determining the research and technology program’s agendas; develop a systematic process for evaluating significant ongoing and completed research that incorporates peer review or other best practices in use at federal agencies that conduct research; and develop specific plans for implementing these recommendations, including time frames and estimates of their cost. Since fiscal year 1998, the majority of the agency’s research and technology program funds have continued to support the intelligent transportation systems program as well as the surface transportation research program. | What GAO Found
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has received hundreds of millions of dollars for its surface transportation research and technology program during the past decade. For example, in 1998 the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, included over $447 million for fiscal year 2002 for FHWA's transportation research and technology efforts for six-year period of 1998 through 2003. FHWA's research and technology program is complex because each of the program offices within the agency are responsible for identifying research needs, formulating strategies to address transportation problems, and setting goals that support the agency's strategic goals. One business unit at FHWA's research laboratory provides support for administering the overall program and conducts some of the research. The agency's leadership team provides periodic oversight of the overall program. FHWA's processes for managing the research and technology program, and in particular for developing research agendas and evaluating research outcomes against intended results, do not always align with the best practices for similar federal research and technology programs. FHWA acknowledges that its approach for developing research agenda and involving external stakeholders in determining the direction of the program's research lacks a consistent, transparent, and systematic process. Instead, most external stakeholder involvement is ad hoc through technical committees and professional societies. The agency primarily uses a "success story" approach to evaluate its research outcomes. While this approach shows some benefits, it cannot be used as the primary method to evaluate the outcomes of the research because these stories represent only a fraction of the program's completed research projects. As a result of its relatively varied processes, it is unclear whether the organization is selecting research projects that have the highest potential value, or what is the extent to which these projects have achieved their objectives. |
gao_AIMD-98-175 | gao_AIMD-98-175_0 | As of July 1, 1997, 26 percent of the nation’s population—approximately 70 million persons who are veterans, veterans’ dependents, or survivors of deceased veterans—was potentially eligible for VA benefits and services, such as health care delivery, benefit payments, life insurance protection, and home mortgage loan guarantees. As a result, VA’s computer systems, programs, and data are at risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, and unauthorized alteration or destruction occurring without detection. We also found that VA had not adequately protected its systems from unauthorized access from remote locations or through the VA network. Access Authority Is Not Appropriately Limited for Authorized VA Users
A key weakness in VA’s internal controls was that the department was not adequately limiting the access of VA employees. The VBA CIO also said that a task force established to address control weaknesses had evaluated the inappropriate access that we identified at the Hines and Philadelphia benefits delivery centers and made recommendations for corrective measures. The directors of the Austin Automation Center and the Dallas Medical Center told us that they planned to periodically review system access. The director of the Austin Automation Center told us that actions had been taken to address the reported weaknesses. Computer Security Planning and Management Program Is Not Adequate
A key reason for VA’s general computer control problems was that the department did not have a comprehensive computer security planning and management program in place to ensure that effective controls were established and maintained and that computer security received adequate attention. The Dallas Medical Center has upgraded its computer hardware and added network capabilities since 1994. Conclusions
VA’s access control problems, as well as other general computer control weaknesses, are placing sensitive veteran medical and benefit information at risk of disclosure, critical financial and benefit delivery operations at risk of disruption, and assets at risk of loss. Recommendations
We recommend that you direct the VA CIO to work in conjunction with the VBA and VHA CIOs and the facility directors as appropriate to limit access authority to only those computer programs and data needed to perform job responsibilities and review access authority periodically to identify and correct inappropriate access; implement ID and password management controls across all computer platforms to maintain individual accountability and protect password confidentiality and test these controls periodically to ensure that they are operating effectively; develop targeted monitoring programs to routinely identify and investigate unusual or suspicious system and user access activity; restrict access to computer rooms based on job responsibility and periodically review this access to determine if it is still appropriate; separate incompatible computer responsibilities, such as system programming and security administration, and ensure that access controls enforce segregation of duties principles; require operating system software changes to be documented, authorized, tested, independently reviewed, and implemented by a third party; and establish controls to ensure that disaster recovery plans are comprehensive, current, fully tested, and maintained at the off-site storage facility. VA also informed us that the CIO will report periodically to the OIG on VA’s progress in correcting computer control weaknesses throughout the department. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on weaknesses in general computer controls that support key financial management and benefit delivery operations of the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) general computer control weaknesses place critical VA operations, such as financial management, health care delivery, benefit payments, life insurance services, and home mortgage loan guarantees, and the assets associated with these operations, at risk of misuse and disruption; (2) sensitive information contained in VA's systems, including financial transaction data and personal information on veteran medical records and benefit payments, is vulnerable to inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or destruction, possibly occurring without detection; (3) the general control weaknesses GAO identified could also diminish the reliability of the department's financial statements and other management information derived from VA's systems; (4) GAO found significant problems related to the department's control and oversight of access to its systems; (5) VA did not adequately limit the access of authorized users or effectively manage user identifications (ID) and passwords; (6) VA also had not established effective controls to prevent individuals, both internal and external, from gaining unauthorized access to VA systems; (7) VA's access control weaknesses were further compounded by ineffective procedures for overseeing and monitoring systems for unusual or suspicious access activities; (8) VA was not providing adequate physical security for its computer facilities, assigning duties in such a way as to segregate incompatible functions, controlling changes to powerful operating system software, or updating and testing disaster recovery plans to prepare its computer operations to maintain or regain critical functions in emergency situations; (9) a primary reason for VA's continuing general computer control problems is that it does not have a comprehensive computer security planning and management program; (10) the VA facilities that GAO visited plan to address all of the specific computer control weaknesses identified; (11) the director of the Dallas Medical Center and the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) Chief Information Officer (CIO) also said that specific actions had been taken to correct the computer control weaknesses that GAO identified at the Dallas Medical Center and the Hines and Philadelphia benefits delivery centers; and (12) VA plans to develop a comprehensive security plan and management program. |
gao_GAO-16-885T | gao_GAO-16-885T_0 | Federal Law and Policy Establish a Framework for Protecting Federal Systems and Information
Several federal laws and policies—predominantly the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and its predecessor, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (both referred to as FISMA)—provide a framework for protecting federal information and IT assets. More recently, OMB issued the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Federal Civilian Government in October 2015, which aims to strengthen federal civilian cybersecurity by (1) identifying and protecting high- value information and assets, (2) detecting and responding to cyber incidents in a timely manner, (3) recovering rapidly from incidents when they occur and accelerating the adoption of lessons learned, (4) recruiting and retaining a highly qualified cybersecurity workforce, and (5) efficiently acquiring and deploying existing and emerging technology. Each agency is also required to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security program that involves an ongoing cycle of activity including (1) assessing risks, (2) developing and implementing risk-based policies and procedures for cost-effectively reducing information security risk to an acceptable level, (3) providing awareness training to personnel and specialized training to those with significant security responsibilities, (4) testing and evaluating effectiveness of security controls, (5) remedying known weaknesses, and (6) detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. As discussed later, our work has shown that agencies have not fully or effectively implemented these programs and activities on a consistent basis. While the administration and agencies have acted to improve the protections over their information and information systems, additional actions are needed. Since FISMA was enacted in 2002, agencies have been challenged to fully and effectively develop, document, and implement agency-wide programs to secure the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency or contractor. Enhance capabilities to effectively identify cyber threats to agency systems and information. Implement sustainable processes for securely configuring operating systems, applications, workstations, servers, and network devices. Patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software. Even agencies or organizations with strong security can fall victim to information security incidents due to previously unknown vulnerabilities that are exploited by attackers to intrude into an agency’s information systems. DHS needs to expand capabilities, improve planning, and support wider adoption of its government-wide intrusion detection and prevention system. In addition, adoption of these capabilities at federal agencies was limited. Improve cyber incident response practices at federal agencies. Update federal guidance on reporting data breaches and develop consistent responses to breaches of personally identifiable information (PII). The federal government needs to expand its cyber workforce planning and training efforts. Ensuring that the government has a sufficient number of cybersecurity professionals with the right skills and that its overall workforce is aware of information security responsibilities remains an ongoing challenge. This has been a long-standing dilemma for the federal government. However, implementation of this framework has been inconsistent, and additional action is needed to address ongoing challenges. Specifically, agencies need to address control deficiencies and fully implement organization-wide information security programs, cyber incident response and mitigation efforts need to be improved across the government, and establishing and maintaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce needs to be a priority. | Why GAO Did This Study
The dependence of federal agencies on computerized information systems and electronic data makes them potentially vulnerable to a wide and evolving array of cyber-based threats. Securing these systems and data is vital to the nation's safety, prosperity, and well-being.
Because of the significance of these risks and long-standing challenges in effectively implementing information security protections, GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997. In 2003 this area was expanded to include computerized systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure, and again in February 2015 to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information collected, maintained, and shared by both federal and nonfederal entities.
GAO was asked to provide a statement on laws and policies shaping the federal IT security landscape and actions needed for addressing long-standing challenges to improving the nation's cybersecurity posture. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work.
Over the past several years, GAO has made about 2,500 recommendations to federal agencies to enhance their information security programs and controls. As of September 16, 2016, about 1,000 have not been implemented.
What GAO Found
Cyber incidents affecting federal agencies have continued to grow, increasing about 1,300 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2015.
Several laws and policies establish a framework for the federal government's information security and assign implementation and oversight responsibilities to key federal entities, including the Office of Management and Budget, executive branch agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
However, implementation of this framework has been inconsistent, and additional actions are needed:
Effectively implement risk-based information security programs. Agencies have been challenged to fully and effectively establish and implement information security programs. They need to enhance capabilities to identify cyber threats, implement sustainable processes for securely configuring their computer assets, patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software, ensure comprehensive testing and evaluation of their security on a regular basis, and strengthen oversight of IT contractors.
Improve capabilities for detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents. Even with strong security, organizations can continue to be victimized by attacks exploiting previously unknown vulnerabilities. To address this, DHS needs to expand the capabilities and adoption of its intrusion detection and prevention system, and agencies need to improve their practices for responding to cyber incidents and data breaches.
Expand cyber workforce and training efforts. Ensuring that the government has a sufficient cybersecurity workforce with the right skills and training remains an ongoing challenge. Government-wide efforts are needed to better recruit and retain a qualified cybersecurity workforce and to improve workforce planning activities at agencies. |
gao_GAO-16-614 | gao_GAO-16-614_0 | At this time, the act required the Federal Reserve to begin charging all institutions for such services. Federal Reserve Uses a Detailed System for Accounting for the Full Costs Associated with Its Payment Services
The Federal Reserve Banks use a detailed cost accounting system that helps them meet several requirements relating to how to set the fees charged for payment services and account for and recover the costs incurred in providing them. In addition, our analysis indicated that the Federal Reserve’s cost accounting practices aligned with broad cost accounting standards for federal entities. As previously discussed, the Monetary Control Act requires the Federal Reserve to establish fees on the basis of direct and indirect costs, including an allocation of imputed costs which takes into account the taxes that would have been paid and the return on capital that would have been provided if a private firm had provided the services. Federal Reserve’s Process for Capturing Its Payment Services Costs Has Not Been Externally Reviewed in Decades
Although the Federal Reserve appears to have a sound system for capturing its payment services costs, it has not obtained an independent review involving detailed testing of the accuracy of its cost accounting process in more than 30 years. Although staff from the independent public accounting firm that conducted the Federal Reserve’s financial audit in 2014 told us that the Federal Reserve Banks have thorough processes, their audits did not include steps to review payment services costs and revenues because these costs were not in the scope of the audit. Customers Generally Were Satisfied with Federal Reserve Services, but Some Competitors Questioned the Fairness of Some Practices
Reserve Bank customers with whom we spoke generally were satisfied with the services and pricing they received, but some competitors raised concerns about the fairness of a number of pricing practices. Representatives from one institution said that the Federal Reserve and private-sector pricing was similar for checks and wire payments, but not for ACH payments, where they said the Federal Reserve had better prices. Federal Reserve staff and some market participants cited the Federal Reserve’s role in multiple market innovations. Representatives from TCH said that increased regulatory costs along with what they see as the unfair way that the Federal Reserve is competing in payment services is creating difficulties for the long-term viability of private-sector operators. While the Monetary Control Act requires the Federal Reserve to give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an adequate level of such services nationwide when pricing its payment services, the act does not address the preferred type or extent of private-sector competition in the payments industry. The Federal Reserve also has a process for addressing complaints about its payment system activities. These entities included:
12 financial institutions and nonbank entities that compete with the Reserve Banks to provide payment services; and
12 banks and credit unions that were end-user customers of private- sector providers, the Reserve Banks, or both (including 6 also supervised by the Federal Reserve). Market participants also generally supported having the Federal Reserve continue to play multiple roles in the payment system. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that the Federal Reserve is complying with the Monetary Control Act’s requirement to establish fees on the basis of costs actually incurred and an allocation of imputed private-sector costs, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System should:
Consider ways to incorporate the costs related to integrated planning for recovery and wind down and compliance with antimoney- laundering requirements, to the extent practicable, in its imputed private-sector cost methodology. Periodically obtain independent testing of the methods the Federal Reserve uses to capture its actual costs and simulate those of the private sector. This report examined (1) how effectively the Federal Reserve captures and recovers its payment services costs; (2) the effect of the Federal Reserve’s practices on competition in the payment services market; (3) how the Federal Reserve mitigates the inherent conflicts posed by its various roles in the payments system; and (4) market participant viewpoints on the future role of the Federal Reserve in the payments system. We also analyzed Federal Reserve pricing and revenue data for each of these services, including examining trends in service prices over time. We also reviewed additional guidance the Federal Reserve provided to its staff on the conduct of its payment services activities. To help ensure that it is complying with its pricing policies and effectively assessing its competitive impact, the Federal Reserve conducts various internal reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal Reserve Banks compete with private-sector entities to provide services while Federal Reserve Board staff also supervise the Reserve Banks and other service providers and financial institution users of these services. The Monetary Control Act requires the Federal Reserve to establish fees for its services on the basis of costs, including certain imputed private-sector costs. GAO was asked to review issues regarding the Federal Reserve's role in providing payment services. Among other objectives, GAO examined (1) how well the Federal Reserve calculates and recovers its costs, (2) the effect of the Federal Reserve on competition in the market, and (3) market participant views on the Federal Reserve's role in the payments system.
GAO analyzed cost and price data trends; reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance related to Federal Reserve oversight and provision of payment services; and interviewed Federal Reserve officials, relevant trade associations, randomly selected payment service providers, customer financial institutions, and other market participants.
What GAO Found
The Federal Reserve Banks are authorized to provide payment services—such as check clearing and wire transfers—to ensure continuous and equitable access to all institutions. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Monetary Control Act) requires the Federal Reserve to establish prices for its payment services on the basis of the costs incurred in providing the services and give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an adequate level of services nationwide. GAO found the Federal Reserve had a detailed cost accounting system for capturing these costs that generally aligned with federal cost accounting standards. Although this system was evaluated and found effective by a public accounting firm in the 1980s, it has not undergone a detailed independent evaluation since then. In addition to the actual costs it incurs in providing services, the Federal Reserve also must include an allocation of imputed costs which takes into account the taxes that would have been paid and the return on capital that would have been provided if the services had been furnished by a private firm. Although its processes for simulating the imputed costs generally were reasonable, the Federal Reserve did not impute certain compliance costs private-sector firms can face—such as for planning for recovery and orderly wind down after financial or other difficulties. Including additional simulated costs competitors can incur and obtaining periodic external evaluations of its cost accounting practices would provide greater assurance that the Federal Reserve fully includes appropriate costs when pricing its services.
Since the mid-2000s, the effects of Federal Reserve participation in the payment services market have included lower prices for many customers; overall market share for competitors also increased. Although some competitors raised concerns about some Federal Reserve pricing practices, customers GAO interviewed generally were satisfied with its services and prices. The Federal Reserve also has a process for assessing its pricing and products to help ensure it is not unfairly leveraging any legal advantages. Since 2005, the Federal Reserve lowered prices for checks and smaller electronic payments while increasing prices for wire transfers. During this time, private-sector competitors' market share expanded overall. But the Federal Reserve's only competitor in small electronic payments and wire transfers told GAO that increased regulatory costs and competitive pressure from the Federal Reserve creates difficulties for the long-term viability of private-sector operators.
Most market participants GAO interviewed were satisfied with how the Federal Reserve performed various regulatory and service provider roles in the payments system. Most of the 24 participants GAO interviewed had no concerns over how the Federal Reserve separated its supervisory activities from its payment services activities. The Federal Reserve also has begun collaborating with market participants to pursue improvements to the safety, speed, and efficiency of the payment system. Although some competitors said the Federal Reserve should reduce its payment services role, many participants supported having the Federal Reserve remain an active provider. Federal Reserve staff indicated that these activities provide the Federal Reserve with sufficient revenue to enable it to provide ubiquitous access at affordable prices.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Federal Reserve consider ways to incorporate, where appropriate, additional costs faced by private-sector competitors in its simulated cost recoveries and periodically obtain an external audit that tests the accuracy of the methods it uses to capture and simulate its costs. The Federal Reserve noted steps they will take to address GAO's recommendations. |
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