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gao_GAO-03-1045 | gao_GAO-03-1045_0 | Accuracy Declined in Fiscal Year 2002
From fiscal years 2001 to 2002, VBA’s accuracy of decision making in the compensation and pension programs declined from 89 percent to 81 percent. However, the agency reported that it had improved its accuracy for that period. VBA officials attributed the decline in accuracy during this period to several factors. We were not able to quantify the relative contribution of these factors. These factors included headquarters emphasis on production, the specific processing requirements of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, and the relative inexperience of VBA’s claims processing staff. In fiscal year 2002, VBA made progress in increasing production of claims decisions and reducing inventory. VBA reported that accuracy improved from 78 percent in fiscal 2001 to 80 percent in fiscal 2002. For example, VBA did not require regional offices that failed to meet the national accuracy goal of 85 percent to prepare strategies for improvement. Because VBA did not report comparable accuracy rates for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 in its performance and accountability report, Members of Congress, Department of Veterans Affairs management, and claimants did not know of this decline in accuracy. While VBA has made progress in measuring regional office accuracy, it has not made full use of the results to reward high performing offices or to improve poorly performing offices. However, VBA’s accuracy has declined. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Benefits to report the accuracy of VBA disability compensation and pension claims decisions to the Congress and other stakeholders in a manner that allows for valid comparisons of accuracy across fiscal years and better hold regional offices accountable for the accuracy of their claims decisions, by increasing the use of its regional office accuracy data, while at the same time maintaining an appropriate emphasis on production. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) has a large inventory of claims for benefits under its compensation and pension programs. The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs has pledged to substantially reduce this inventory in order to improve timeliness. In response, VBA emphasized producing more claims decisions per year. GAO was asked to ascertain how accuracy has changed since VBA increased its emphasis on production and to report on the agency's efforts to ensure the accuracy of its decisions.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2001 to 2002, VBA's accuracy of decision-making in the disability compensation and pension benefit programs declined from 89 percent to 81 percent. The agency had reported a slight improvement in accuracy between fiscal years 2001 and 2002--from 78 percent to 80 percent. However, we found that these two annual figures were not comparable because the agency had substantially changed the way it measured accuracy for fiscal year 2002. Although VBA acknowledged a change in its accuracy measure in its annual report to the Congress, the agency did not revise its 2001 figure to allow for an appropriate comparison with 2002. VBA officials GAO spoke with suggested several factors that may have contributed to the decline in accuracy. We were not able to quantify the relative contribution of these factors. These factors included VBA's emphasis on increasing claims decisions, the specific processing requirements of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) of 2000, and the relative inexperience of VBA's claims processing staff. To help ensure accountability for accuracy, VBA set accuracy standards for its regional offices. Although VBA has regional office-level accuracy data, it has not made full use of this information to encourage better performance from regional offices with low accuracy scores. For example, in fiscal year 2002, VBA did not require offices with poor accuracy to prepare improvement plans and gave performance awards to two offices that clearly failed to meet VBA's accuracy goal. |
gao_GAO-13-831 | gao_GAO-13-831_0 | DOD Has Identified Potential Minuteman III Follow-on Options but DOD and NNSA Are Not Preparing Complete Cost Estimates or Effectively Involving the Nuclear Weapons Council
DOD has identified capability requirements and potential basing options for the Minuteman III follow-on ICBM; however, neither the Air Force nor NNSA are required to estimate the total system costs for both the missile and warhead for the Nuclear Weapons Council to review; moreover, the Air Force does not identify the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the Minuteman III follow-on study with the W78/88-1 life-extension program. Although the Nuclear Weapons Council is responsible for coordinating budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between DOD and DOE, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize warhead life-extension programs with delivery system modernization efforts, it has not requested that either the Air Force or NNSA estimate the total system costs of the missile and warhead. Without timely and relevant information on the projected costs and findings of the Minuteman III follow-on study, the Nuclear Weapons Council may be unable to provide guidance to the Air Force on the study, or consider the study’s implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons modernization efforts as it revises its baseline plan. GAO’s work on cost estimating has found that a reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program because it provides the basis for informed decision making. DOD and DOE’s Long- Term Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Incorporates Interoperable Warheads, but the Navy’s Participation in the Warhead Feasibility Study Has Been Limited
DOD and DOE, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, have prepared a long-term, baseline plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise that incorporates interoperable warheads, and the Air Force and NNSA have begun examining the feasibility of designing such a warhead, but the modernization of existing weapons is a higher Navy priority and has limited the Navy’s participation in the warhead feasibility study. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons Council study options for extending the life of the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on Navy SLBMs, and in June 2012 the Nuclear Weapons Council requested the Air Force, Navy, and NNSA to commit resources to the W78/88-1 life- extension program study. Lastly, if the guidance governing life-extension programs is not updated, the services may not be prepared to align their programs and resources in support of joint interoperable warhead studies. The Navy has concerns about changing the warhead design. In the longer term, the Navy has not identified the resources needed to support the life-extension program, should the Nuclear Weapons Council approve of an interoperable design once the warhead feasibility study is completed. Additionally, DOD’s instruction currently states that the military departments are to develop procedures for certain joint DOD-DOE activities. Both DOD and DOE have requirements to review and, as needed, update their respective guidance regularly. However, unless the Navy identifies the long-term resources needed for the W78/88-1 life-extension program, it may be poorly positioned to undertake the more-detailed analyses needed to validate the interoperable warhead on Navy systems, resulting in further program delays and potentially costly modifications. To ensure that the services are able to support the consideration of interoperable warhead concepts during future life-extension programs, we recommend the following two actions: the Secretaries of Defense and Energy direct the Nuclear Weapons Council to revise the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process to require the services to align their programs and resources before beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service; and the Secretary of Defense issue or revise existing guidance to require the services to align their programs and resources before beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service. DOD concurred with all seven recommendations, and DOE concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between the departments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For this review, we addressed the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) has assessed the capability requirements, potential basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); and (2) DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have explored the feasibility of incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term nuclear weapons stockpile plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. nuclear weapons--both the bombs and warheads and their delivery systems--are aging beyond their intended service lives. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons Council study options for extending the life of ICBM warheads, including the potential for developing a warhead that is interoperable on both Air Force and Navy missiles. In 2013 DOD will initiate a study to identify a replacement for the Minuteman III missile. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed the capability requirements, potential basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM; and (2) DOD and DOE have explored the feasibility of incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term nuclear weapons stockpile plan. GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, plans, guidance, and other documents; and interviewed officials responsible for planning the Minuteman III follow-on and the warhead life-extension program.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified capability requirements and potential basing options for the Minuteman III follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Department of Energy (DOE) has begun a parallel study of options to extend the life of its warhead, but neither department plans to estimate the total system costs for the new missile and its warhead. GAO's work on cost estimating has found that a reliable cost estimate is critical to any program by providing the basis for informed decision making. The Nuclear Weapons Council--the joint activity of DOD and DOE for nuclear weapons programs--is responsible for coordinating budget matters related to nuclear weapons programs between the departments, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize nuclear weapons life-extension programs with delivery-system modernization efforts, but has not asked either department to provide estimates of the total system cost. In the absence of such a request, neither department is developing total cost estimates. Further, DOD's plan to study ICBM follow-on options does not include the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the missile and warhead efforts to help ensure that the study considers an enterprise-wide perspective. Without timely cost estimates and updates on the status of the ICBM follow-on study, the council may be unable to provide guidance and direction on the study, or consider its implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons modernization efforts.
DOD and DOE have prepared a long-term plan that incorporates interoperable warheads into the stockpile, and although they have begun studying the feasibility of designing such a warhead, the Navy has had limited participation thus far. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended the Nuclear Weapons Council study the development of an interoperable warhead that could be deployed on both Air Force and Navy ballistic missiles, and the council has requested the Air Force, Navy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to commit resources to the study. Although the Air Force and NNSA have been examining warhead concepts, the Navy has not fully engaged in the effort because (1) other, ongoing modernization programs are higher Navy priorities, and (2) it has concerns about changing the design of the warhead. The Navy's further participation is uncertain because it has not identified the resources needed to continue with the program once the study is completed, if the interoperable warhead is adopted. Consequently, the Navy will be poorly positioned to perform the more-detailed analyses needed to validate the approved design, potentially resulting in program delays. The Nuclear Weapons Council guidelines governing nuclear weapons refurbishments, and the corresponding DOD instruction, do not require the Air Force and Navy to align their programs and resources before beginning joint-service warhead studies. For example, DOD's instruction states that the military departments are to develop procedures for certain joint DOD-DOE activities, but it is unclear about aligning their programs and resources with each other. If the guidance and DOD instruction are not updated, the services may not be prepared to participate in future joint-service studies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations to provide complete cost estimates to the Nuclear Weapons Council and improve synchronization between DOD and DOE; to identify long-term Navy funding to support the interoperable warhead life-extension program; and to issue or revise existing DOD and Nuclear Weapons Council guidance. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations, and DOE concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between the two departments. |
gao_GGD-98-82 | gao_GGD-98-82_0 | Certain labor union and industry organizations compile data on standardized national PLAs they sponsor, but they have little or no data on PLAs negotiated locally. However, according to officials at 11 of the 13 agencies, including DOD and NASA, PLAs could be used on their construction projects without the agencies’ knowledge because contractors are not required to report collective bargaining matters to the government. PLAs on projects of the other three agencies were negotiated and signed by the contractors and unions. Other Public Sector Projects Use PLAs
Although we could find no centralized, complete source of data on the use of PLAs in the nonfederal public sector, our research disclosed examples of states, counties, and other nonfederal public entities using PLAs on construction projects with and without federal funding. Private-Sector Projects Use PLAs
Although no complete central source of information exists, according to labor experts and union officials, most PLAs are used in the private sector. Agencies’ Procedures and Criteria for Use of PLAs
“The heads of executive departments and agencies covered by this memorandum, in consultation with the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council, shall establish, within 120 days of the date of this memorandum, appropriate written procedures and criteria for the determinations set forth in section 1.”
Six of the 13 federal agencies we reviewed issued some level of guidance on PLA use, generally by the due date. OMB eventually assumed responsibility for assisting the agencies in developing procedures, although the agencies still have the primary responsibility; and on March 12, 1998, OMB sent a draft generic PLA guidance document to officials at DOD, GSA, DOE, and the Department of Labor for comment. According to OMB, this provision was added so that agencies could comply with the Subcommittee’s request. Agencies’ Responses to Subcommittee Request
None of the six agencies’ guidance for the use of PLAs clearly provide for responding to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation’s request to federal agencies that it be notified of any planned use of PLAs. Therefore, 12 of the 26 PLAs we identified on federal construction projects likely would not have been reported to the Subcommittee because the PLAs were initiated by contractors and not required by the agencies. Performance Comparisons Between Federal PLA and Non-PLA Projects Difficult to Make
Proponents and opponents of the use of PLAs said it would be difficult to compare contractor performance on federal projects with and without PLAs because it is highly unlikely that two such projects could be found that were sufficiently similar in cost, size, scope, and timing. Therefore, drawing definitive conclusions on whether or not the PLA was the cause of any performance differences would be difficult. Top Thirteen Federal Agencies Ranked by Fiscal Year 1996 Construction Obligations
Fiscal year 1996 construction obligations Total amount of obligations ($000)
Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which project labor agreements (PLA) are used in the federal government, agencies’ responses to the June 5, 1997, Presidential Memorandum encouraging federal agencies to use PLAs, and agencies’ plans for responding to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation’s continuing request to be notified of planned PLA uses, we contacted the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 13 federal agencies that accounted for more than 98 percent of the total construction obligations in fiscal year 1996, as reported in the Federal Procurement Data System (see app. In addition, we performed literature and internet searches to identify specific projects with PLAs and to develop general subject matter background. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has no database showing information on its use of PLAs, but sources outside the agency indicate that PLAs were used in the construction of NASA facilities at Cape Canaveral in the 1960s. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the use of project labor agreements (PLA) on federal construction contracts and related matters, focusing on the: (1) number of federal construction and other projects where PLAs were used and the extent to which PLAs have been used on projects sponsored by nonfederal organizations, including public projects with some federal funding; (2) procedures and criteria for using PLAs established by federal agencies, as required by a Presidential Memorandum that encourages federal agencies to use PLAs on construction contracts over $5 million; (3) federal agency procedures established to comply with a letter from the Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, Subcommitte on Oversight and Investigations, to federal agencies requesting them to notify his subcommittee of the planned use of PLAs; and (4) feasibility of comparing contractor performance under federal construction contracts with and without PLAs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the total number of PLAs in use is unknown because there is no complete or comprehensive database on the use of PLAs in the public or private sectors; (2) union and industry organizations maintain data on certain PLAs that they negotiated at the national level, but there were no comparable data on ad hoc PLAs negotiated between contractors and unions at the local level; (3) four of the 13 federal agencies GAO reviewed have construction projects covered by 26 PLAs that it could identify; (4) the four agencies are the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); (5) however, officials at 11 of the 13 agencies, including DOD and NASA, said PLAs could be used on agency construction projects without their knowledge because such agreements are generally made between contractors and unions; and collective bargaining matters are not required to be reported to the government; (6) available literature and union data show that PLAs exist on numerous other public and private construction projects and on other public projects with some federal funding; (7) also, labor experts and union officials say that the private sector is the biggest user of PLAs; (8) six of the 13 federal agencies GAO reviewed had issued various levels of guidance for PLA use as required by the Presidential Memorandum; (9) however, none specifically provided for notifying the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of any planned use of PlAs; (10) recently, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assumed responsibility for assisting the agencies in developing procedures and criteria for use of PLAs; (11) although OMB's draft procedures and criteria for implementing the Presidential Memorandum do not specifically refer to the Subcommittee's request to be notified by agencies planning to use a PLA, the draft would require the collection of the type of information requested by the Subcommittee; (12) according to OMB, it included this provision so that agencies could comply with the request; (13) PLA proponents and opponents that GAO contacted said they believe contract performance comparisons between federal construction projects with PLAs and those without PLAs would be difficult; (14) this is primarily because they believe it would be difficult to find projects similar enough to compare; and (15) in addition, GAO believes that even if similar PLA and non-PLA projects were found, it would be difficult to demonstrate conclusively that any performance differences were due to the use of the PLA versus other factors. |
gao_GAO-11-910T | gao_GAO-11-910T_0 | Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population
ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Performance Management
As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to, among other things, ICE’s competing priorities; however, these efforts could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United States. We reported in April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and utilizing the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing the assessment. We reported that by establishing such mechanisms, CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making decisions for strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and assessing performance against CTCEU’s goals. DHS Has Not Implemented a Reliable Exit System and Faces Reliability Issues with Existing Visa Overstay Data
DHS Has Not Yet Implemented a Comprehensive Biometric Exit System
DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to match available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States. In August 2007, we reported that while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities were operating at air, sea, and land ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and that DHS did not have a comprehensive plan or a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. DHS conducted two pilots in 2009, and we reported on them in August 2010. We reported on limitations with the pilots, such as the reported scope and approach of the pilots including limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, that curtailed their ability to inform a decision for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered by unreliable data. Specifically, CBP does not inspect travelers exiting the United States through land ports of entry, including collecting their biometric information, and CBP did not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. If the benefits outweigh the costs, a mechanism to provide nonimmigrants with a way to turn in their arrival and departure forms could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data for identifying overstays. As a result, DHS’s methodology counted overstays who left the country, but did not identify overstays who have not departed the United States and appear to have no intention of leaving. For example, agency officials stated that they have met to assess the costs and benefits of creating lookouts for those categories of overstays. Additional Steps Needed to Address Risks in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver Programs
Visa Security Program
As we reported in March 2011, the Visa Security Program faces several key challenges in implementing operations at overseas posts. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has actions under way to address it. In addition, ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security Program to additional high-risk visa-issuing posts, but ICE had not fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. The expansion of the Visa Security Program may be limited by a number of factors—including budget limitations and objections from Department of State officials at some posts—and ICE had not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of Visa Security Program review at those posts that do not have a program presence. Visa Waiver Program
As we reported in May 2011, DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval. According to officials, DHS assesses, among other things, counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, by a Nigerian citizen with a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns about the security of the visa process. Further, unauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission--overstays--could pose homeland security risks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has certain responsibilities for security in the visa process and for addressing overstays. DHS staff review visa applications at certain Department of State overseas posts under the Visa Security Program. DHS also manages the Visa Waiver Program through which eligible nationals from certain countries can travel to the United States without a visa. This testimony is based on GAO products issued in November 2009, August 2010, and from March to May 2011. As requested, this testimony addresses the following issues: (1) overstay enforcement efforts, (2) efforts to implement a biometric exit system and challenges with the reliability of overstay data, and (3) challenges in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the estimated overstay population, but strengthening planning and assessment of overstay efforts could improve enforcement. Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the lead agency responsible for overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States because of, among other things, ICE's competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate, which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported that by developing a time frame for assessing needed resources and using the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts. Moreover, in April 2011, GAO reported that CTCEU tracked various performance measures, but did not have a mechanism to assess the outcomes of its efforts. GAO reported that by establishing such a mechanism, CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making decisions. DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to match available information (e.g., fingerprints) provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States and faces reliability issues with data used to identify overstays. GAO reported that while the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program's biometric entry capabilities were operating at ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and DHS did not have a comprehensive plan for biometric exit implementation. DHS conducted pilots to test two scenarios for an air exit solution in 2009, and in August 2010, GAO concluded that the pilots' limitations, such as limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, curtailed DHS's ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit solution. Further, in April 2011, GAO reported that there is not a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. Such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete departure data for identifying overstays. GAO identified various challenges in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs related to planning and assessment efforts. For example, in March 2011, GAO found that ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security Program to additional high-risk posts, but ICE had not fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. Further, ICE had not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of Visa Security Program review at those high-risk posts that do not have a program presence. In addition, DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior reports that, among other things, call for DHS to strengthen management of overstay enforcement efforts, mechanisms for collecting data from foreign nationals departing the United States, and planning for addressing certain Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs' risks. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-11-27 | gao_GAO-11-27_0 | FCC created the third component of the current Rural Health Care Program, the pilot program, in September 2006 after acknowledging that the primary Rural Health Care Program was “greatly underutilized.” FCC explained that “although there are a number of factors that may explain the underutilization” of the program, it was “apparent that health care providers continue to lack access to the broadband facilities needed to support…advanced telehealth applications.” The pilot program funds 85 percent of the costs of deploying dedicated broadband networks connecting rural and urban health care providers, including the cost of designing and installing broadband networks that connect health care providers in a state or region, as well as the costs of advanced telecommunications and information services that ride over that network. FCC Has Not Performed the Analysis Necessary to Ensure That the Primary Rural Health Care Program Meets the Needs of Rural Health Care Providers
Participation in the Program, Although Increasing, Has Not Met FCC Projections and over Half of All Program Funds Are Used in Alaska
Annual disbursements from the primary Rural Health Care Program have increased from 1998 through 2009, yet they have never approached FCC’s original projections for participation. Thus, as figure 4 illustrates, total program expenditures in 12 years of disbursements have not yet reached the single year funding cap of $400 million. No needs assessment has been conducted to show that the program is, in fact, underutilized. Despite these and other issues, we were also told that many of the current program participants are dependent on the benefits they receive from the primary Rural Health Care Program. FCC’s Poor Planning and Communication during the Design and Implementation of the Pilot Program Caused Delays and Difficulties
FCC’s Limited Collaboration with USAC, Federal Agencies, and Other Knowledgeable Stakeholders Affected Pilot Program Design
FCC missed multiple opportunities to collaborate with USAC, federal agencies, and other knowledgeable stakeholders when designing the pilot program. Pilot Participants Have Experienced Delays and Difficulties, in Part, Because FCC Did Not Fully Establish Requirements Prior to Calling for Applications and Did Not Provide Effective Program Guidance
Pilot Participants Have Experienced Delays and Difficulties for Many Reasons
FCC called for applications to participate in the pilot program before it fully established pilot program requirements. Most importantly, the entire pilot program itself has been delayed. In addition, when asked to consider their current understanding of the costs and administrative requirements of participating in the pilot program, 52 of 57 respondents reported that the pilot program’s benefits will outweigh the costs of participating in the program. However, FCC has reversed these two key practices. However, again, without first setting specific performance goals defining what the programs are specifically intended to accomplish, FCC cannot be sure that it has adopted the most appropriate performance measures. FCC has sought public comment on performance goals and measures for the program on two previous occasions that did not result in effective performance goals and measures for the program: In June 2005, FCC issued a NPRM seeking comment on whether specific performance goals were needed and on ways to establish useful outcome, output, and efficiency measures for each of the universal service programs, including the Rural Health Care Program. Furthermore, FCC has proposed two new programs under the Rural Health Care Program in its 2010 NPRM (the Health Broadband Services Program and the Health Infrastructure Program), even though the National Broadband Plan states that FCC does not have the data to make critical policy decisions on how to better use its funds. However, since the Rural Health Care Program’s inception, FCC has not provided the program with a solid performance management foundation. FCC has not conducted a comprehensive needs assessment to determine the needs of rural health care providers, has no specific goals and measures for the program to guide its management decisions, and has not evaluated how well the program is performing. Develop and execute a sound performance evaluation plan for the current programs, and develop sound evaluation plans as part of the design of any new programs before implementation begins. In its written comments, FCC did not specifically agree or disagree with our recommendations but discussed planned and ongoing actions to address them. (2) How have FCC’s design and implementation of the pilot program affected participants? and (3) What are FCC’s performance goals and measures for the Rural Health Care Program, and how do these goals compare with the key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures? Interviews to Assess How Well the Primary Rural Health Care Program Addressed Health Care Provider Needs
To assess how well the primary Rural Health Care Program addressed the needs of rural health care providers, we interviewed FCC and USAC officials to determine how the program was designed to address rural health care provider needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Telemedicine offers a way to improve health care access for patients in rural areas. The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Rural Health Care Program, established in 1997, provides discounts on rural health care providers' telecommunications and information services (primary program) and funds broadband infrastructure and services (pilot program). GAO was asked to review (1) how FCC has managed the primary program to meet the needs of rural health care providers, and how well the program has addressed those needs; (2) how FCC's design and implementation of the pilot program affected participants; and (3) FCC's performance goals and measures for both the primary program and the pilot program, and how these goals compare with the key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures. GAO reviewed program documents and data, interviewed program staff and relevant stakeholders, and surveyed all 61 pilot program participants with recent participation in the program.
What GAO Found
FCC has not conducted an assessment of the telecommunications needs of rural health care providers as it has managed the primary Rural Health Care Program, which limits FCC's ability to determine how well the program has addressed those needs. Participation in the primary program has increased, and some rural health care providers report that they are dependent on the support received from the program. For example, a provider in Alaska has used program funds to increase the use of telemedicine, which has reduced patient wait times and travel costs. FCC has been successful in disbursing over 86 percent of all committed funds. However, FCC has disbursed only $327 million in total over the 12 years of the primary program's operation-- less than any single year's $400 million funding cap. FCC has frequently stated that the primary program is underutilized and has made a number of changes to the program, including the creation of the pilot program. Currently, FCC is proposing to replace portions of the primary program with a new broadband services program. However, without a needs assessment, FCC cannot determine how well the current program is targeting those needs--and whether the program is, in fact, underutilized--or ensure that a new program will target needs any better. FCC's poor planning and communication during the design and implementation of the pilot program caused delays and difficulties for pilot program participants. FCC did not consult with the program's administrator, other federal agencies, or relevant stakeholders prior to announcing the program, nor did it request public comment on its design. In addition, FCC called for applications to participate in the pilot program before it fully established pilot program requirements. FCC added additional program requirements after the pilot program began, and survey respondents indicated that program guidance was not provided in an effective manner. Despite these difficulties, most participants were positive about the assistance provided by program officials and reported that the benefits they anticipate receiving from the pilot program outweigh the costs of participating. However, the entire program has been delayed and projects have struggled to meet requirements that were not clearly defined at the beginning of the program. FCC has not developed specific performance goals for the Rural Health Care Program and has developed ineffective performance measures. The performance measures are limited for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that FCC has set no specific performance goals to which to link them. In addition, FCC has not evaluated the performance of the primary Rural Health Care Program and has no evaluation plan for the pilot program. Without reliable performance information, FCC does not have the data that it needs to make critical policy decisions about the overall Rural Health Care Program. If FCC does not correct these deficits in performance management, it may perpetuate the same performance management weaknesses in its stewardship of the new rural health care programs that it has proposed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the FCC Chairman assess rural health care providers' needs, consult with knowledgeable stakeholders, develop performance goals and measures, and develop and execute sound performance evaluation plans. In its comments, FCC did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but discussed planned and ongoing actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-14-63 | gao_GAO-14-63_0 | Background
GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to the telecommunications services and solutions that they need to meet mission requirements. Networx Provides Contract Vehicles for Agencies to Acquire Telecommunications Services
Networx is the latest in a series of programs GSA has offered to agencies to provide telecommunications services. These contracts were termed “crossover contracts,” and were with AT&T and Qwest, among others. Complex Acquisition Process and Weaknesses in Project Planning Contributed to Networx Transition Delays, Resulting in Increased Costs and Missed Savings
Several factors contributed to delays in transitioning from FTS2001 to Networx. Weaknesses in project management also contributed to the delays. Complex Acquisition Process Compounded by Limited Agency Expertise
The complexity of the acquisition process was related to duplicative and overlapping contract vehicles, the large number of potential service options for a given requirement, and challenges related to implementing the fair opportunity process, among others. Specifically, GSA estimated that the transition cost increased by $66.4 million, or 44 percent, over the $151.5 million planned in 2004. In addition to the added transition costs incurred as a result of the delays, agencies likely paid about $329 million more for similar services by staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer. Applying GSA’s calculated savings rate to the amount spent on FTS2001 services, we estimate that agencies could have saved about $329 million. GSA collected, analyzed, and validated lessons learned, and partially archived and shared them. However, it has yet to prioritize and apply lessons learned. However, the complexity of the process for transitioning to Networx, which was compounded by a decline in telecommunications expertise at the agencies as well as weaknesses in project planning, contributed to delays in agencies’ transition to Networx. To its credit, GSA has studied the Networx transition and documented lessons learned. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve planning and execution of the next telecommunications transition, we recommend that the Administrator of General Services take the following actions: in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, examine potential government-wide telecommunications expertise shortfalls and use the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach, and ensure that project planning guidance to agencies on the future transition calls for establishing transition plans with detailed time lines that take into account priorities relative to agencies’ mission-critical systems, contingency plans, and identified risks, and are updated to reflect the current status and endpoint of the transition. In addition, we recommend the Administrator take the following three actions related to GSA’s lessons-learned process: populate and maintain on an ongoing basis the agency’s transition lessons-learned database with the lessons GSA has identified and make it available for user searches by those involved in developing the next transition strategy; prioritize the lessons, taking into particular consideration the factors we reported as contributing to delays, and determine the resources needed to apply them; and ensure that the lessons are applied, based on priority and available resources, to the next transition strategy. In written comments, SSA stated that it did not agree that our statement that agencies tended to transition easier items first to demonstrate progress before they transitioned items that needed a long lead time applied to SSA. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences the federal government experienced as a result of the delayed transition, and (2) to what extent the General Services Administration (GSA) is documenting and applying lessons learned as it prepares for the next telecommunications contract transition. For example, using this savings rate, it determined that in January 2010, agencies could have saved $22.4 million that month. To determine the extent to which GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned, we compared GSA’s lessons learned process with key activities we previously identified as best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to the telecommunications services and solutions needed to meet their mission requirements. As agencies' telecommunications needs have evolved, so too have GSA's contracts to help support them. Its latest contracts, signed in 2007 and collectively called Networx, provide transport; Internet protocol; wireless; and management and application services, among others. In fiscal year 2012, agencies spent over $1.4 billion on Networx services. However, the transition from the previous telecommunications contracts, known as FTS2001, has not been easy, taking almost 3 years longer than planned.
GAO's objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences due to the delay, and (2) to what extent GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned as it prepares for the next telecommunications contract transition. GAO examined lessons learned activities and supporting documents, cost and missed savings estimates, performed case studies at two agencies with large delays, and interviewed agency and service provider officials.
What GAO Found
Complex acquisition processes and weaknesses in project planning contributed to the delays experienced on the Networx transition, resulting in cost increases and missed savings. In particular, the complexity of the acquisition process was related to duplicative contract vehicles, the large number of service options, and changes related to the process for ensuring fair competition among service providers, among others. These issues were reported by the General Services Administration (GSA) to have been compounded by a decline in contracting and technical expertise within the agencies. GAO has identified skills gaps in the federal workforce as a government-wide high-risk area and highlighted the need for agencies to work with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to close them. Weaknesses in agencies' project planning also contributed to the delays. For example, agencies tended to transition easier items first, to demonstrate progress, before they transitioned items that needed a long lead time such as data networks and international services. As a result of the delays, GSA's estimated cost to complete the transition increased by $66.4 million, 44 percent over the baseline estimate. In addition to the extra transition costs, agencies may have paid more for similar services by staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer than planned. Specifically, in April 2010, GSA estimated that agencies could have saved 28.4 percent of their spending on FTS2001 by using Networx contracts instead. Based on this rate of savings, GAO estimates that agencies could have saved about $329 million if they had transitioned to Networx on time.
The extent to which GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned in preparation for the next telecommunications transition varies. GSA has fully or partially satisfied five of six key practices necessary for a robust lessons learned process. To its credit, GSA has collected, analyzed, and validated lessons learned from the Networx transition. However, it has not fully shared these lessons with its customer agencies or prioritized them to ensure that resources are applied to areas with the greatest return on investment. GSA plans to finalize its next telecommunications acquisition strategy in December 2013 and begin the next transition when it awards new contracts in February 2017. Fully addressing key lessons learned practices should help GSA and agencies better plan for and execute the next telecommunications transition.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, in preparing for the next transition, GSA, in coordination with OPM, examine potential government-wide expertise shortfalls, and that it provide agencies guidance on project planning and fully archive, share, and prioritize lessons learned. GSA and OPM agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-354 | gao_GAO-16-354_0 | The U.S. Retirement System
In the United States, income in retirement may come from multiple sources, including (1) Social Security retirement benefits, (2) payments from employer-sponsored defined benefit (DB) plans, and (3) retirement savings accounts, including accounts in employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans; and individual retirement accounts (IRA). Increasing Life Expectancy Adds to Challenges for Retirement Planning
The projected continuing increase in life expectancy for both men and women in the United States contributes to longevity risk in retirement planning. To help address the long-term financial challenges facing the Social Security retirement program, various changes have been made over the years. In addition, a wide range of options to adjust Social Security further have been proposed. To help address individuals’ difficultly in estimating their life expectancy and the resources needed to avoid outliving their savings, the federal government, plan sponsors, and others have developed certain tools to aid with retirement planning. Life Expectancy Disparities Negatively Affect Retirement Resources for Lower- Income Groups
Lower-income individuals have shorter-than-average life expectancy, which means that they can expect to receive Social Security retirement benefits for substantially fewer years than higher-income individuals who have longer-than-average life expectancy. Lower-Income Groups’ Life Expectancy Has Not Increased as Much as Higher-Income Groups’ Life Expectancy
People with lower incomes can expect to live substantially fewer years as they approach retirement than those with higher incomes, on average, according to studies we identified and reviewed. Differences in Life Expectancy Result in Reduced Projected Lifetime Social Security Benefits for Lower-Income Groups
Lower-income individuals generally rely on Social Security as their primary source of retirement income, so their retirement security is affected most by how that program is structured. Lower Projected Lifetime Benefits Result in Reduced Progressivity
Social Security’s formula for calculating monthly benefits is progressive— that is, it provides a proportionally larger monthly earnings replacement for lower-earners than for higher-earners. 6). Specifically, we calculated the effect of increasing all retirement ages by 2 years and found that the overall projected lifetime benefit is reduced more for lower-income men than for higher-income men, given their different life expectancy. SSA provided comments, reproduced in appendix IV, agreeing with our finding that it is important to understand how the life expectancy in different income groups may affect retirement income. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: List of Selected Studies on Life Expectancy Differences, by Income
To examine the effect of life expectancy on the retirement resources for different groups, especially those with low incomes, we analyzed 11 studies that estimated life expectancy or mortality for different income groups and 9 studies that described the effect of these differences regarding Social Security retirement benefits, and in some cases, the studies also included Social Security disability benefits. Appendix II: Scenario Calculation Methodology and Additional Examples
To examine the effect of life expectancy on the retirement resources for different groups, especially those with low incomes, we developed scenarios to illustrate how disparities in average life expectancy by income group affect the average amount of lifetime Social Security retirement benefits received. We assessed the reliability of the data we used by reviewing relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable agency officials. We found the data to be reliable for the purposes used in this report. GAO-14-310. GAO-12-445. | Why GAO Did This Study
An increase in average life expectancy for individuals in the United States is a positive development, but also requires more planning and saving to support longer retirements. At the same time, as life expectancy has not increased uniformly across all income groups, proposed actions to address the effects of longevity on programs and plan sponsors may impact lower-income and higher-income individuals differently. GAO was asked to examine disparities in life expectancy and the implications for retirement security.
In this report, GAO examined (1) the implications of increasing life expectancy for retirement planning, and (2) the effect of life expectancy on the retirement resources for different groups, especially those with low incomes. GAO reviewed studies on life expectancy for individuals approaching retirement, relevant agency documents, and other publications; developed hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the effects of differences in life expectancy on projected lifetime Social Security retirement benefits for lower-income and higher-income groups based on analyses of U.S. Census Bureau and Social Security Administration (SSA) data; and interviewed SSA officials and various retirement experts.
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. In its comments, SSA agreed with our finding that it is important to understand how the life expectancy in different income groups may affect retirement income.
What GAO Found
The increase in average life expectancy for older adults in the United States contributes to challenges for retirement planning by the government, employers, and individuals. Social Security retirement benefits and traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans, both key sources of retirement income that promise lifetime benefits, are now required to make payments to retirees for an increasing number of years. This development, among others, has prompted a wide range of possible actions to help curb the rising future liabilities for the federal government and DB sponsors. For example, to address financial challenges for the Social Security program, various options have been proposed, such as adjusting tax contributions, retirement age, and benefit amounts. Individuals also face challenges resulting from increases in life expectancy because they must save more to provide for the possibility of a longer retirement.
Life expectancy varies substantially across different groups with significant effects on retirement resources, especially for those with low incomes. For example, according to studies GAO reviewed, lower-income men approaching retirement live, on average, 3.6 to 12.7 fewer years than higher-income men. GAO developed hypothetical scenarios to calculate the projected amount of lifetime Social Security retirement benefits received, on average, for men with different income levels born in the same year. In these scenarios, GAO compared projected benefits based on each income groups' shorter or longer life expectancy with projected benefits based on average life expectancy, and found that lower-income groups' shorter-than-average life expectancy reduced their projected lifetime benefits by as much as 11 to 14 percent. Effects on Social Security retirement benefits are particularly important to lower-income groups because Social Security is their primary source of retirement income.
Social Security's formula for calculating monthly benefits is progressive—that is, it provides a proportionally larger monthly earnings replacement for lower-earners than for higher-earners. However, when viewed in terms of benefit received over a lifetime, the disparities in life expectancy across income groups erode the progressive effect of the program. |
gao_GAO-13-647T | gao_GAO-13-647T_0 | Interior’s Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Resources
In July 2012, we reported on changes Interior made to its oversight of offshore oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Specifically, we reported that
On October 1, 2011, Interior officially established two new bureaus, separating offshore resource management oversight activities, such as reviewing oil and gas exploration and development plans, from safety and environmental oversight activities, such as reviewing drilling permits and inspecting drilling rigs. New safety and environmental requirements and policy changes designed to mitigate the risk of a well blowout or spill initially required Interior to devote additional resources and time to reviewing certain oil and gas exploration and development plans and drilling permits for oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico. Our analysis of drilling permit approval time frames found that approval times initially increased after the new requirements went into effect, but as both Interior staff and oil and gas companies became more familiar with these requirements, the review times decreased. Interior’s inspections of offshore Gulf of Mexico oil and gas drilling rigs and production platforms from January 1, 2000, through September 30, 2011, routinely identified violations. However, Interior’s database was missing data on when violations were identified, as well as when they were corrected for about half of the violations issued. In September 2008, we reported that Interior collected lower levels of revenues for oil and gas production in the deepwater of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico than all but 11 of 104 oil and gas resource owners in other countries, as well as in some states whose revenue collection systems were evaluated in a comprehensive industry study.significant changes in the oil and gas industry over the past several decades, we found that Interior had not systematically reexamined how the U.S. government is compensated for extraction of oil and gas in over 25 years. Furthermore, we reported, in July 2009, on numerous problems with Interior’s efforts to collect data on oil and gas produced on federal lands and waters, including missing data, errors in company-reported data on oil and gas production, and sales data that did not reflect prevailing market prices for oil and gas. We made a number of recommendations to Interior to improve controls on the accuracy and reliability of royalty data. Interior generally agreed with our recommendations and has implemented the majority of them. We also reported, in March 2010, that Interior was not taking the steps needed to ensure that oil and gas produced from federal lands and For example, we found that neither waters was accurately measured. Interior generally agreed with our recommendations; it has already implemented many of them and continues to work on the remainder. Interior generally agreed with our recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. Interior’s Oil and Gas Management on the High Risk List
In February 2011, we added Interior’s management of federal oil and gas resources to our list of federal programs and operations at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or needing broad-based transformation. We added Interior to the list because the department: (1) did not have reasonable assurance that it was collecting its share of revenue from oil and gas produced on federal lands; (2) continued to experience problems in hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil and gas operations on federal lands and waters; and (3) was engaged in a broad reorganization of both its offshore oil and gas management and revenue collection functions, leading to concerns about whether Interior could provide effective program oversight while undergoing such a broad reorganization. In the February 2013 update to our High Risk list,federal oil and gas management high-risk area to focus on revenue collection and human capital challenges because Interior had completed its reorganization. While Interior recently began implementing a number of GAO recommendations, including those intended to improve the reliability of data necessary for determining royalties, the agency has yet to implement a number of other recommendations, including those intended to help the agency (1) provide reasonable assurance that oil and gas produced from federal leases is accurately measured and that the public is getting an appropriate share of oil and gas revenues and (2) address its long- standing human capital issues. In conclusion, Interior’s management of federal oil and gas resources is in transition. Our past work has found a wide range of weaknesses in Interior’s oversight of federal oil and gas resources, ultimately resulting in its inclusion on our High Risk List in 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interior issues permits for the development of new oil and gas wells on federal lands and waters; inspects wells to ensure compliance with environmental, safety, and other regulations; and collects royalties from companies that sell the oil and gas produced from those wells. In recent years, onshore and offshore federal leases produced a substantial portion of the oil and gas produced in the United States. In fiscal year 2012, Interior collected almost $12 billion in mineral revenues including those from oil and gas development, making it one of the largest nontax sources of federal government funds. Previous GAO work has raised concerns about Interior's management and oversight of federal oil and gas resources.
This testimony focuses on (1) Interior's oversight of offshore oil and gas resources, (2) Interior's collection of oil and gas revenues, and (3) Interior's progress to address concerns that resulted in its inclusion on GAO's High Risk List in 2011. This statement is based on prior GAO reports issued from September 2008 through February 2013.
GAO is making no new recommendations. Interior continues to act on the recommendations that GAO has made to improve the management of oil and gas resources. GAO continues to monitor Interior's implementation of these recommendations.
What GAO Found
Interior's oversight of offshore resources . In July 2012, GAO reported on changes to the Department of the Interior's oversight of offshore oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon incident. Specifically, GAO reported that Interior had established two new bureaus, separating resource management oversight activities from safety and environmental oversight activities. GAO also reported that new requirements and policy changes designed to mitigate risk of a well blowout or spill had initially required additional resources and increased permit approval times, but that approval times decreased as Interior staff and oil and gas companies became more familiar with the new requirements. GAO also found that Interior's inspections of offshore Gulf of Mexico drilling rigs and production platforms routinely identified violations, but that Interior's database was missing data on when violations were identified and corrected. GAO made 11 recommendations aimed at improving Interior's oversight activities. Interior generally agreed with the recommendations and plans to implement them.
Interior's collection of oil and gas revenues. In September 2008, GAO reported that Interior collected lower levels of revenues for oil and gas production in the deep water of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico than all but 11 of 104 oil and gas resource owners in other countries and some states. In July 2009, GAO reported on problems with Interior's efforts to collect data on oil and gas produced on federal lands, including missing and erroneous data. In March 2010, GAO reported that Interior was not taking needed steps to ensure that oil and gas produced from federal lands was accurately measured and was not consistently meeting its goals for oil and gas production verification inspections. GAO made numerous recommendations aimed at improving Interior's revenue collection policies, including oversight of production verification activities and controls on the accuracy and reliability of royalty data. Interior generally agreed with these recommendations and has implemented many of them.
Interior's oil and gas management on GAO's high risk list . In February 2011, GAO added Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources to its list of federal programs and operations at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or needing broad-based transformation. GAO added this high risk area because Interior (1) did not have reasonable assurance that it was collecting its share of revenues; (2) continued to experience problems hiring, training, and retaining sufficient staff to provide oversight and management of oil and gas operations; and (3) was engaged in a broad agency reorganization that could adversely impact its ability to effectively manage oil and gas during the crisis following the Deepwater Horizon incident. In February 2013, after Interior completed its reorganization, GAO narrowed the oil and gas high-risk area to focus on revenue collection and human capital challenges and is currently examining these issues. While Interior has begun to implement many of GAO's recommendations, it has yet to fully implement a number of others, including recommendations intended to (1) provide reasonable assurance that oil and gas is accurately measured, and that the public is getting an appropriate share of revenues, and (2) address its long-standing human capital issues. |
gao_NSIAD-93-198 | gao_NSIAD-93-198_0 | 1.1.) Later, OT&E focuses on the system’s effectiveness and suitability. Deficiencies discovered during developmental and operational testing affect a system’s cost, schedule, and performance. Because of these concerns, we initiated this review to identify (1) the extent to which software-related problems affect the performance of defense acquisition programs during OT&E, (2) pervasive barriers in the acquisition process that limit the effectiveness of test and evaluation of software-intensive systems, and (3) DOD’s efforts to resolve software test and evaluation problems. OT&E Often Identifies Immature Software-Intensive Systems
To ensure no surprises during OT&E, defense systems are expected to be subjected to rigorous DT&E. DOD has yet to develop and implement the management processes and tools required to improve the reliability of its data. The individual military services have tried to improve their software development processes, but a DOD-wide, coordinated approach is lacking. Senior OSD officials told us that they believe the creation of a single OSD-level office for software would, in part, help to resolve long-standing software problems. Because of the acquisition community’s bias toward hardware, DOD has not adequately ensured that software was fully mature and had undergone thorough and rigorous DT&E before systems were certified as ready for OT&E. Recommendations
To realize lasting improvements in test and evaluation of software-intensive systems and to enhance the life-cycle affordability of such programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue and implement a software test and evaluation policy that defines testing requirements for software maturity, regression testing, and the use of temporary software fixes during testing; strengthen controls to ensure that operational testing does not begin until results of development test and evaluation demonstrate an appropriate level of software maturity; require program management officials to define exit criteria for certifying a systems’ readiness for operational testing at the beginning of full-scale development (i.e., milestone II); and require the services to develop a common core set of management metrics for software (i.e., cost, schedule, and quality) for major defense programs early in the development cycle to be approved at milestone II. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve its software acquisition processes and test and evaluation of software-intensive systems, focusing on: (1) how software-related problems affect defense acquisition programs during operational test and evaluation (OT&E); and (2) barriers that limit OT&E effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD software-intensive systems often fail to meet their performance expectations, experience cost overruns and schedule delays, and are not ready for OT&E because they are not subject to rigorous developmental testing and evaluation and software development is often not fully mature when OT&E begins; (2) DOD has not adequately addressed barriers that inhibit software acquisition and OT&E effectiveness; (3) DOD has not adequately addressed the importance of software development, lacks a consistent policy that defines and coordinates software maturity and operational testing readiness, has not adequately defined and managed software requirements, and lacks reliable cost, schedule, and performance data; (4) DOD has not implemented previous recommendations to ensure that quality software is adequately developed and tested and software-intensive systems are effective; (5) although the military services have tried to improve their software development processes, they lack a DOD-wide coordinated strategy; and (6) the creation of a single executive-level office for software development and testing would help to resolve long-standing software problems. |
gao_GAO-07-855T | gao_GAO-07-855T_0 | In assessing penalties, the Mine Act requires both the Commission and MSHA to consider six statutory factors: 1. the mine operator’s history of previous violations, 2. the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the mine, 3. whether the mine operator was negligent, 4. the effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business, 5. the gravity of the violation, and 6. the demonstrated good faith of the mine operator charged in quickly remedying the situation after being notified of a violation. Underground Coal Mines Face Challenges in Preparing Mine Workers and Rescue Teams for Emergencies
Underground coal mine operators face significant challenges preparing for emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. However, MSHA does not provide all mine operators with critical information on how to provide training in simulated emergency environments such as smoke- filled mines or information on resources that are available for providing such training. For example, the extent of the required training at each mine could affect how mine operators designate rescue teams. MSHA Reviews Mines’ Training Plans and Inspects Training Records but Does Not Adequately Monitor Instructors or Training
MSHA has the authority to oversee certain aspects of miner training to help ensure that miners work safely and are prepared for potential emergencies, but its oversight of training is hindered by several factors. As a result, MSHA cannot ensure that instructors are keeping their mining knowledge and skills up to date, including their knowledge of emerging safety and health issues and new training tools. As a result, MSHA cannot determine how well miners are learning the skills taught by MSHA- approved trainers and recommend corrective measures as necessary. MSHA and NIOSH Lack a Formal Agreement to Guide Mine Safety Coordination
MSHA and NIOSH have complementary roles in improving the safety and health of coal miners, but coordination between the two agencies is largely informal and inconsistent due to a lack of a formal agreement or policies to guide their efforts. In addition, MSHA and NIOSH face other challenges that require them to work more closely together, particularly in developing and approving safety technologies under tight time frames. MSHA Has Improved Its Hiring Process, but Its Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Adequately Project or Address Its Future Workforce Needs
While MSHA has taken significant steps to improve its hiring process, the agency’s human capital plan does not include a strategic approach for addressing the large number of retirements expected over the next 5 years. In 2004, MSHA began using the Federal Career Intern Program (FCIP) to hire new mine inspectors, which has resulted in a number of improvements to the hiring and recruitment process, such as hiring new inspectors more quickly. MSHA reported that this screening process has helped the agency maximize its resources, since the exams identify applicants who do not have the basic skills needed to become a successful inspector at an early stage of the hiring process. Most Penalties Assessed by MSHA Are Paid without Opposition, but Many of Those Appealed Are Reduced Significantly
Most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators without opposition, but a small percentage of more serious and higher- dollar penalties are appealed, and many of those appealed are reduced significantly. Between 1996 and 2006, MSHA proposed 506,707 penalties for safety and health violations, and the average penalty was $234 per violation. Between 1996 and 2006, approximately 6 percent (31,589) of the penalties proposed by MSHA for violations of underground coal mine safety and health standards were contested by mine operators, and about half of the contested penalties were reduced. As a result, they have considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty amount. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the Department of Labor's Office of the Solicitor, the states, and the mining industry share responsibility for ensuring mine safety. In two reports released today, GAO examined the challenges underground coal mines face in preparing for emergencies, how well MSHA oversees mine operators' training efforts, how well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate to enhance the development and approval of mine safety technology, MSHA's coal mine inspector recruiting efforts, and how civil penalties are assessed.
What GAO Found
Underground coal mine operators reported facing significant challenges in preparing for emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. While mine operators recognize the importance of providing training in an environment that simulates an emergency, many of them reported challenges such as limited access to special training facilities and the cost of providing such training. In addition, mine operators reported that they anticipate challenges in implementing new mine rescue team requirements, such as conducting training annually at each mine the rescue team services. MSHA approves mine operators' training plans and inspects their training records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by several factors. For example, MSHA does not have current information on its instructors and does not ensure that they keep their knowledge and skills up to date. In addition, MSHA does not adequately monitor instructors or evaluate training sessions, and does not assess how well miners are learning the skills being taught. MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and health of coal miners, but they do not have a current memorandum of understanding to guide their coordination efforts. As a result, most of the coordination that occurs is initiated by individual staff members or by outside parties. Such informal coordination may not be sufficient given the pending retirements of many MSHA and NIOSH engineers and scientists and other challenges both agencies face. In 2004, MSHA began a new process for hiring mine inspectors, which has led to a number of improvements, such as being able to identify applicants who possess the basic skills needed to be successful inspectors and decreasing the time it takes to hire new inspectors. However, MSHA's human capital plan does not include a strategic approach for addressing the large number of retirements expected in the next 5 years. While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving more serious and higher dollar penalties are appealed, and those appealed are often reduced significantly. MSHA uses a standard formula to propose penalties, but the other entities involved in the appeals process use considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty amount. Approximately 6 percent of the 506,707 penalties proposed by MSHA between 1996 and 2006 were appealed by mine operators. About half of the penalties for the appealed violations were reduced by an average of 49 percent, regardless of the level of gravity of the violation initially cited by MSHA or the degree of the mine operator's negligence initially cited. |
gao_GAO-04-411 | gao_GAO-04-411_0 | Background
Investigations and arrests are core functions of all federal law enforcement agencies. Results
Guidance and Procedures for Counting Investigations and Arrests Are Generally Consistent among Agencies
The guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or “cases” as they are sometimes referred to, are generally consistent among the six agencies we reviewed. Agencies pursue investigations into crimes that have a nexus to their respective missions, such as drug trafficking for DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for INS. Once the agents have made the decision to open a case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and details of the case are then entered into the agencies’ case management tracking systems and counted. We also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be generally consistent among all six agencies. In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the agencies’ data tracking systems and officially counted. In general, the officials said that statistics serve as indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications, testimonies, and for some agencies, are considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations. Officials at the agencies we reviewed said that investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered when reporting agency results or when making personnel decisions. Multiple Agencies Count the Same Investigations and Arrests in Their Individual Agency Databases and Reports
All of the agencies we reviewed counted the same investigations and arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative and arresting activities. Agency officials told us that they believe that this practice is appropriate, because in their opinion, many investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which they participated, the officials said that agencies would be less likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered. However, USPIS provided technical comments which we have incorporated, as appropriate. The agencies selected were the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service from the Department of Justice (Justice); the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). To identify the guidance and procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting and reporting investigation and arrest statistics, we reviewed agency mission statements, policies, and applicable manuals concerning investigations and arrests. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-273) requires GAO to report on how investigation and arrest statistics are reported and used by federal law enforcement agencies. This report provides information on (1) the guidance and procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting investigations and arrests, (2) how investigation and arrest statistics are used, and (3) whether multiple agencies are counting and reporting the same investigations and arrests. GAO selected six agencies for review: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Marshals Service, the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
What GAO Found
Guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or cases, are generally consistent among the six agencies GAO reviewed. Agencies pursue investigations into crimes that have a nexus to their missions, such as drug trafficking for the DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for the former INS. Once agents have made the decision to open a case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and details of the case are then entered into the agencies' case management tracking systems. GAO also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be generally consistent among all six agencies. In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the agencies' data tracking systems and officially counted. In general, agencies use investigation and arrest statistics as indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications, and testimonies. In some cases, these data are considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations. However, investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered. ll of the agencies GAO reviewed counted the same investigations and arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative and arresting activities. This practice seems appropriate because many investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which they participated, agencies would be less likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and USPIS reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with GAO's findings. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-660T | gao_GAO-01-660T_0 | Background
Three recent bills have been introduced to change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism and homeland security. 525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments for dealing with domestic terrorist attacks. Both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focus on the larger issue of homeland security that includes threats other than terrorism, such as military attacks. The two proposed locations for the focal point are in the Executive Office of the President or in a Lead Executive Agency. In addition, H.R. H.R. H.R. In addition, the three bills provide the focal point with different, but often similar, duties to improve the management of federal programs. To the extent that these three bills—or some hybrid of them all—address the problem areas we have identified above, we believe that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved. Developing a consensus on these matters and providing the focal point with legitimacy and authority through legislation, is an important task that lies ahead. Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses three bills that would change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism.
What GAO Found
The three bills--H.R. 525, H.R. 1158, and H.R. 1292--vary in scope. H.R. 525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments for domestic terrorist attacks. Both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focus on the larger issue of homeland security, which includes terrorism and additional threats such as military attacks. The bills are similar in that they all advocate a single focal point for programs to combat terrorism. However, some bills place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President and others place it with a lead executive agency. In addition, the three bills provide the focal point with different, but often similar, duties to improve the management of federal programs. To the extent that these three bills--or some hybrid of them--address these problem areas, GAO believes that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved. It will be important to develop a consensus on these matters and provide the focal point with legitimacy and authority through legislation are important tasks that lie ahead. |
gao_GAO-10-1038T | gao_GAO-10-1038T_0 | Background
VA policy specifies how VAMCs can purchase expendable medical supplies and RME. VA has two inventory management systems, which VAMCs use to track the type and quantity of supplies and equipment in the facilities. VA’s purchasing and tracking policies include the following three requirements for VAMCs: 1. The committee, which typically includes administrative staff and clinicians from various departments, reviews the proposed purchases to evaluate the cost of the purchase as well as its likely impact on veterans’ care. 3. VAMCs must enter information on all expendable medical supplies that are ordered on a recurring basis and all RME that is valued at $5,000 or more and has a useful life of 2 years or more into the appropriate inventory management system, either GIP or AEMS/MERS. GAO’s Preliminary Work Identified Examples of Inconsistent Compliance with VA’s Purchasing and Tracking Requirements at Five Selected VAMCs
At the five VAMCs we visited, our preliminary work identified examples of inconsistent compliance with the three purchasing and tracking requirements we selected for our review. In some cases, noncompliance with these requirements created potential risks to veterans’ safety. Officials at two of the five VAMCs we visited stated that VAMC committees reviewed and approved all of the expendable medical supplies the VAMCs purchased for the first time. Officials from these three VAMCs told us that certain expendable medical supplies—for example, new specialty supplies—were purchased without VAMC committee review and approval. Specialty supplies, such as those used in conjunction with dialysis machines, are expendable medical supplies that are only used in a limited number of clinical departments. Without obtaining that review and approval, however, the VAMCs purchased these supplies without evaluating their cost effectiveness or likely impact on veterans’ care. As a result, these purchases may have been made without assurance that they were cost effective and safe for use on veterans and that the VAMC had the capability and trained staff to reprocess these items correctly. Signatures of purchasing and approving officials. At one of the five VAMCs we visited, VAMC officials discovered that one staff member working in a dialysis department purchased specialty supplies without obtaining the required signature of an appropriate approving official. However, the staff member ordered an incorrect item, which was permeable to blood, allowing blood to pass into the machine. At the time of our site visits, officials from one of the five VAMCs we visited told us that information about expendable medical supplies that were ordered on a recurring basis was entered into GIP, as required. This lack of information can pose a potential risk to veterans’ safety. In addition, in the event of a manufacturer or FDA recall or patient safety alert related to a specialty supply, VAMCs may have difficulty determining whether they possess the targeted expendable medical supply. According to VAMC officials and the VA Office of the Inspector General, in response to a patient safety alert that was issued on the auxiliary water tube in December 2008, officials from the VAMC checked their inventory management systems and concluded—incorrectly—that the tube was not used at the facility. However, in March 2009, the VAMC discovered that the tube was in use and was not being reprocessed correctly, potentially exposing 2,526 veterans to infectious diseases, such as HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C.
In addition, officials from VA headquarters told us that when information about certain RME is entered into AEMS/MERS, it is sometimes done inconsistently. VA Reports It Plans to Change Its Oversight of Purchasing and Tracking
During our preliminary work, we discussed with VA headquarters officials examples of steps VA plans to take to improve its oversight of VAMCs’ purchasing and tracking of expendable medical supplies and RME. For example, VA plans to change its oversight of the use of purchase cards. VA headquarters officials stated that VA plans to shift greater responsibility for these reviews from the VAMCs to the VISNs, effective October 1, 2010. VA headquarters officials stated that SAM will help improve VA’s ability to monitor information about expendable medical supplies and RME across VAMCs. VA provided us with an implementation plan for SAM, which stated that this new system would be operational in March 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA clinicians use expendable medical supplies--disposable items that are generally used one time--and reusable medical equipment (RME), which is designed to be reused for multiple patients. VA has policies that VA medical centers (VAMC) must follow when purchasing such supplies and equipment and tracking--that is, accounting for--these items at VAMCs. GAO was asked to evaluate VA's purchasing and tracking of expendable medical supplies and RME and their potential impact on veterans' safety. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work and provides preliminary observations on (1) the extent of compliance with VA's requirements for purchasing and tracking of expendable medical supplies and RME and (2) steps VA plans to take to improve its oversight of VAMCs' purchasing and tracking of expendable medical supplies and RME. GAO reviewed VA policies and selected three requirements that GAO determined to be relevant to patient safety. At each of the five VAMCs GAO visited, GAO reviewed documents used to identify issues related to the three requirements and interviewed officials to gather further information on these issues. The VAMCs GAO visited represent different surgical complexity groups, sizes of veteran populations served, and geographic regions. GAO also interviewed VA headquarters officials and obtained and reviewed documents regarding VA headquarters' oversight. GAO shared the information in this statement with VA officials.
What GAO Found
During its preliminary work at the five selected VAMCs, GAO found inconsistent compliance with the three VA purchasing and tracking requirements selected for review. Noncompliance with these requirements created potential risks to veterans' safety. (1) Requirement for VAMC committee review and approval. At two of the VAMCs, officials stated that the required designated committee review and approval occurred for all of the expendable medical supplies and RME that the VAMCs had not previously purchased. These reviews are designed to evaluate the cost of the purchase as well as its likely impact on veterans' care. However, at the remaining three VAMCs, officials stated that the required committee review and approval of the expendable medical supplies, such as those used in conjunction with dialysis machines, did not always occur. As a result, these purchases were made without evaluating the likely impact on veterans' care. (2) Requirement for signatures of purchasing and approving officials. At one of the VAMCs, VAMC officials discovered that a staff member in a dialysis department ordered an expendable medical supply item for use in dialysis machines, without obtaining the required signature of an approving official. That staff member ordered an incorrect item, the use of which presented a risk of exposing veterans to infectious diseases, such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus. (3) Requirement for entering information in VA's inventory management systems. Officials from one of the five VAMCs told GAO that information about expendable medical supplies that were ordered on a recurring basis was entered into the appropriate inventory management system, as required. At the remaining four VAMCs, officials told GAO that information about certain expendable medical supplies--those used in a limited number of clinical departments such as dialysis departments--was not always entered into the system. This lack of information can pose a potential risk to veterans' safety; in the event of a recall of these items, these VAMCs may have difficulty determining whether they possess the targeted item. VA reports that it plans to improve its oversight of VAMCs' purchasing and tracking of expendable medical supplies and RME. For example, VA headquarters officials stated that, effective October 1, 2010, VA plans to shift greater responsibility for reviews of purchase card transactions from the VAMCs to the Veterans Integrated Service Networks, which are responsible for overseeing VAMCs. VA headquarters officials also told GAO that VA is developing a new inventory management system, which it expects will help improve VA's ability to track information about expendable medical supplies and RME across VAMCs. VA expects this new system to be operational in March 2011. |
gao_GAO-07-924T | gao_GAO-07-924T_0 | The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 required the former INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s eligibility to work, one of which was the Basic Pilot Program. Employer use is voluntary, and the services are not widely used. Mandatory EEV Would Require an Increase in Capacity at USCIS and SSA
Mandatory electronic employment verification would substantially increase the number of employers using the EEV system, which would place greater demands on USCIS and SSA resources. As of May 2007, about 17,000 employers have registered to use the program, 8,863 of which were active users, and USCIS has estimated that employer registration is expected to greatly increase by the end of fiscal year 2007. If participation in the EEV program were made mandatory, the program may have to accommodate all of the estimated 5.9 million employers in the United States. The mandatory use EEV can affect the capacity of the system because of the increased number of employer queries. USCIS has estimated that a mandatory EEV could cost USCIS $70 million annually for program management and $300 million to $400 million annually for compliance activities and staff. According to SSA officials, the cost of a mandatory EEV would be driven by the increased workload of its field office staff due to resolving SSA tentative nonconfirmations. USCIS and SSA Are Exploring Options to Reduce Delays in the EEV Process
In prior work, we reported that secondary verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the employment verification process. The majority of EEV queries entered by employers—about 92 percent—confirm within seconds that the employee is authorized to work. About 7 percent of the queries are not confirmed by the initial automated check and result in SSA-issued tentative nonconfirmations, while about 1 percent result in DHS-issued tentative nonconfirmations. EEV May Help Reduce Employee Document Fraud, but Cannot Yet Fully Address Identity Fraud Issues
In our prior work, we reported that EEV enhances the ability of participating employers to reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility and assists participating employers with identification of false documents used to obtain employment. However, the current EEV program is limited in its ability to help employers detect identity fraud, such as cases in which an individual presents borrowed or stolen genuine documents. In March 2007, USCIS began piloting a photograph screening tool as an addition to the current EEV system. USCIS expects to expand the program to all employers participating in EEV by the end of summer 2007. Although mandatory EEV and the associated use of the photograph screening tool offers some remedy, further actions, such as reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and making them more secure, may be required to more fully address identity fraud. While Most Employers Complied with EEV Procedures, the Program Is Vulnerable to Employer Fraud That Diminishes Its Effectiveness and Misuse That Adversely Affects Employees
EEV is vulnerable to acts of employer fraud, such as entering the same identity information to authorize multiple workers. Employees queried through EEV may be adversely affected if employers violate program obligations designed to protect the employees, by taking actions such as limiting work assignments or pay while employees are undergoing the verification process. Concluding Observations
Although efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process and a credible worksite enforcement program and other immigration reforms may be dependent on it, a number of challenges face its successful implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The opportunity for employment is one of the most powerful magnets attracting illegal immigration to the United States. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 established an employment eligibility verification process, but immigration experts state that a more reliable verification system is needed. In 1996, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) began operating a voluntary pilot program, called the Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) program, to provide participating employers with a means for electronically verifying employees' work eligibility. Congress is considering various immigration reform proposals, some of which would require all employers to electronically verify the work authorization status of their employees at the time of hire. In this testimony GAO provides observations on the EEV system's capacity, data reliability, ability to detect fraudulent documents and identity theft, and vulnerability to employer fraud as well as challenges to making the program mandatory for all employers. This testimony is based on our previous work regarding the employment eligibility verification process and updated information obtained from DHS and SSA.
What GAO Found
A mandatory EEV program would substantially increase the number of employers using the system. As of May 2007, about 17,000 employers have registered to use the current voluntary EEV program, about half of which are active users. If participation in EEV were made mandatory, the approximately 5.9 million employers in the United States may be required to participate. Requiring all employers to use EEV would substantially increase the demands on DHS and SSA resources. DHS estimated that increasing the capacity of EEV could cost it $70 million annually for program management and $300 million to $400 million annually for compliance activities and staff. SSA officials estimated that expansion of the EEV program through this fiscal year would cost $5 million to $6 million and noted that the cost of mandatory EEV would be much higher and driven by increased workload of its field office staff that would be responsible for resolving queries that SSA cannot immediately confirm. DHS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays in the EEV process. The majority of EEV queries entered by employers--about 92 percent--confirm within seconds that the employee is work authorized. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed by SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed by DHS. Resolving these nonconfirmations can take several days, or in a few cases even weeks. DHS and SSA are considering options for improving the system's ability to perform additional automated checks to immediately confirm work authorization, which may be important should EEV be mandatory. EEV may help reduce document fraud, but it cannot yet fully address identity fraud issues, for example, when employees present borrowed or stolen genuine documents. The current EEV program is piloting a photograph screening tool, whereby an employer can more easily identify fraudulent documentation. DHS expects to expand the use of this tool to all participating employers by September 2007. Although mandatory EEV and the associated use of the photograph screening tool offer some remedy, limiting the number of acceptable work authorization documents and making them more secure would help to more fully address identity fraud. The EEV program is vulnerable to employer fraud, such as entering the same identity information to authorize multiple workers. EEV is also vulnerable to employer misuse that adversely affects employees, such as employers limiting work assignments or pay while employees are undergoing the verification process. DHS is establishing a new Compliance and Monitoring program to help reduce employer fraud and misuse by, for example, identifying patterns in employer compliance with program requirements. Information suggesting employers' fraud or misuse of the system could be useful to other DHS components in targeting limited worksite enforcement resources and promoting employer compliance with employment laws. |
gao_GAO-12-820 | gao_GAO-12-820_0 | Background
Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP beneficiaries receive health care from a variety of providers and in different settings. Medical facilities (such as medical centers, clinics, and medical practices) and durable medical equipment suppliers were the most frequent subjects of criminal fraud cases in 2010. Hospitals and medical facilities were the most frequent subjects of civil fraud cases, including cases that resulted in judgments or settlements. Approximately 10,200 Subjects Were Investigated for Health Care Fraud in 2010
According to 2010 data, 10,187 subjects were investigated for health care fraud—of which, 7,848 were subjects of criminal fraud cases, and 2,339 were subjects of civil fraud cases. Data from 2010 shows that HHS-OIG investigated health care fraud cases for nearly 8,900 subjects, many more than were opened by the USAOs and DOJ’s Civil Division. The 2005 data show that medical facilities and durable medical equipment suppliers were the provider types with the most subjects investigated in cases, as was also the case with 2010 data. Most of the 7,848 subjects who were investigated for criminal fraud in 2010 were not pursued—meaning that HHS-OIG did not refer the subject’s case to DOJ for prosecution. Although 2010 Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP expenditures on durable medical equipment services was 1.3 percent of total spending in those programs, approximately 19 percent of subjects that were found guilty or pled guilty or no contest were durable medical equipment suppliers. Hospitals and Medical Facilities Were the Most Frequent Subjects of Civil Fraud Cases, Including Cases That Resulted in Judgments or Settlements
According to 2010 civil case data for health care fraud, 2,339 subjects were investigated in civil cases. Nearly 2,200 Individuals and Entities Were Excluded from Program Participation by HHS-OIG, about 60 Percent of Whom Were in the Nursing Profession
HHS-OIG excluded individuals and entities from participating in federal health care programs for a variety of reasons in 2010. About 60 percent of the individuals and entities excluded were those in the nursing profession, such as nurses and nurses’ aides. The next-largest provider type excluded was pharmacies or individuals affiliated with pharmacies, though they only represented about 7 percent of the 2010 exclusions. In 2010, pharmaceutical manufacturers were to pay more than 60 percent of the total amount of civil judgments and settlements. More Than 40 Percent of Subjects in Fraud Cases Were Home Health Care Providers and Health Care Practitioners
Of the 2,742 subjects of health care fraud in Medicaid and CHIP referred to MFCUs for investigation, more than 40 percent were affiliated with two provider categories: home health care providers (26.6 percent) and health care practitioners (14.8 percent). Home Health Providers Accounted for Nearly 40 percent of Criminal Convictions and About 45 Percent of Subjects Sentenced for 2010
In 2010, 692 subjects were indicted or charged in criminal health care fraud cases handled by 10 MFCUs; of those, nearly 40 percent were home health care providers—which includes home health care agencies, and home health care aides. Agency Comments
GAO provided a draft of the report to DOJ and HHS. DOJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology for Analyzing Data Obtained from the Federal Agencies
To identify subjects of health care fraud cases in Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)—including referrals, investigations, prosecutions, and outcomes—by provider type, and to examine changes in the distribution of provider types in 2005 and 2010, we obtained data on health care fraud cases from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Executive Office of U.S. In the USAO and Civil Division data, there were 2,470 subjects—1,484 of which were investigated in civil cases, and 986 that were investigated in criminal cases—for which we did not identify a duplicate case in the HHS- OIG data, and did not contain information on the provider type. Appendix II: Methodology for Selecting State Medicaid Fraud Control Units and Analyzing Submitted Data
To identify subjects of Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) fraud cases investigated or prosecuted, or both, by Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU) by provider type, and to examine changes in the distribution of provider types investigated and prosecuted for fraud in 2005 and 2010, we collected data from 10 state MFCUs. We also interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the HHS- OIG’s Office of Evaluation and Inspections, and the National Association of MFCUs to obtain information on fraud cases handled by the MFCUs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare and Medicaid--which are administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency of HHS--as high-risk programs partly because their size and complexity make them vulnerable to fraud. Several federal agencies conduct health care fraud investigations and related activities, including HHS-OIG and DOJ's Civil Division, and the 93 U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO). In fiscal year 2011, the federal government devoted at least $608 million to conduct such activities. Additionally, state MFCUs investigate health care fraud in their state's Medicaid and CHIP programs.
GAO was asked to provide information on the types of providers that are the subjects of fraud cases. This report identifies provider types who were the subjects of fraud cases in (1) Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP that were handled by federal agencies, and changes in the types of providers in 2005 and 2010; and (2) Medicaid and CHIP fraud cases that were handled by MFCUs. To identify subjects of fraud cases handled by federal agencies, GAO combined data from three agency databases--HHS-OIG, USAOs, and DOJ's Civil Division--and removed duplicate subject data. GAO also reviewed public court records, such as indictments, to identify subjects' provider types because the USAOs and DOJ Civil Division data did not consistently include provider type. To describe providers involved in fraud cases handled by the MFCUs, GAO collected aggregate data from 10 state MFCUs, which represented the majority of fraud investigations, indictments, and convictions nationwide.
What GAO Found
According to 2010 data from the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), 10,187 subjects--individuals and entities involved in fraud cases--were investigated for health care fraud, including fraud in Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). These subjects included different types of providers and suppliers--such as physicians, hospitals, durable medical equipment suppliers, home health agencies, and pharmacies--that serve Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP beneficiaries. For criminal cases in 2010, medical facilities--including medical centers, clinics, or practices--and durable medical equipment suppliers were the most-frequent subjects investigated. Hospitals and medical facilities were the most-frequent subjects investigated in civil fraud cases, including cases that resulted in judgments or settlements.
Subjects of criminal cases: Many of the 7,848 criminal subjects in 2010 were medical facilities or durable medical equipment suppliers, representing about 40 percent of subjects of criminal cases. Similarly, in 2005, medical facilities and durable medical equipment suppliers accounted for 41 percent of criminal case subjects. Data from 2010 show that most of the subjects were in cases that were not referred by HHS-OIG to DOJ for prosecution (85 percent). Of the subjects whose cases were pursued, most were found guilty or pled guilty or no contest.
Subjects of civil cases: Over one-third of the 2,339 subjects of civil cases in 2010 were hospitals and medical facilities. In 2010, about 35 percent more subjects were investigated in civil fraud cases than in 2005. Nearly half of the subjects of 2010 cases were pursued. Among the subjects whose cases were pursued, 55 percent resulted in judgments or settlements.
Additionally, data from HHS-OIG show that nearly 2,200 individuals and entities were excluded from program participation for health care fraud convictions and other reasons, including license revocation and program-related convictions. About 60 percent of those individuals and entities excluded were in the nursing profession. Pharmacies or individuals affiliated with pharmacies were the next-largest provider type excluded, representing about 7 percent of those excluded.
According to data GAO collected from 10 state Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU), over 40 percent of the 2,742 subjects investigated for health care fraud in Medicaid and CHIP in 2010 were home health care providers and health care practitioners. Of the criminal cases pursued by these MFCUs, home health care providers comprised nearly 40 percent of criminal convictions and 45 percent of subjects sentenced in 2010. Civil health care fraud cases pursued by these MFCUs in 2010 resulted in judgments and settlements totaling nearly $829 million. Pharmaceutical manufacturers were to pay more than 60 percent ($509 million) of the total amount of civil judgments and settlements.
GAO provided a draft of the report to DOJ and HHS. DOJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-123 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-123_0 | DOD has acted. During 1994 and 1995, it established the Joint Service Integration Group to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts and develop a modernization plan and the Joint Service Materiel Group to develop research, development, acquisition, and logistics support plans. However, DOD has not succeeded in fielding other needed equipment and systems designed to address critical battlefield deficiencies identified during the Persian Gulf Conflict and earlier. For example, in 1986, DOD studies found that its forces were inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks. Army studies conducted from 1991 to 1995 showed serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills. There are two fundamental reasons for this. We found that these units often lacked needed equipment and training. Lack of Equipment
Medical units supporting early-deploying Army divisions we visited often lacked critical equipment needed to treat casualties in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. Vaccine Stocks and Immunization Plans
DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents, and an immunization policy established in 1993 that DOD so far has chosen not to implement. Problems Stem From Lack of Emphasis on Preparation for Chemical/Biological Warfare
The primary cause for the deficiencies in chemical and biological defense preparedness is a lack of emphasis up and down the line of command in DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its assessment of U.S. forces' capability to fight and survive chemical and biological warfare.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) none of the Army's crisis-response or early-deployment units have complied with requirements for stocking equipment critical for fighting under chemical or biological warfare; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) has established two joint service groups to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts, develop a modernization plan, and develop support plans; (3) although DOD has begun to field a biological agent detection system, it has not successfully fielded other needed equipment and systems to address critical battlefield deficiencies; (4) ground forces are inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks related to biological and chemical warfare, and there are serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills; (5) medical units often lack the equipment and training needed to treat casualties resulting from chemical or biological contamination; (6) DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents and has not implemented an immunization policy established in 1993; and (7) the primary cause for these deficiencies is a lack of emphasis along the DOD command chain, with DOD focusing its efforts and resources on other priorities. |
gao_GAO-04-849 | gao_GAO-04-849_0 | Concerns about PCA Appear to Drive Industry Interest in Secondary Capital
The credit union industry’s recent interest in using alternative forms of capital appears to be associated primarily with three concerns about PCA for credit unions. Finally, several credit union officials are concerned that the PCA tripwires for credit unions are too high, given the conservative risk profile of most credit unions. In contrast, the proposed abbreviated NWRP did not address the credit union’s net worth after the end of the term of the plan. However, taking into account that (1) corporate credit unions and natural person credit unions are not comparable given their member base, and (2) there are far fewer corporate credit unions compared with the total number of federally insured credit unions, those 18 corporate credit unions with member paid-in capital and 30 with membership capital do not provide a representative or sufficient sample that can be used as a model to demonstrate how secondary capital could be used for all federally insured credit unions. While Many View Risk- Based Capital as an Enhancement to PCA for Credit Unions, Key Structural Issues Remain Unresolved
The debate about the potential use of risk-based capital for all credit unions revolves around key structural issues, including (1) the extent to which risk-based ratios would be used to augment, versus replace, the current PCA net worth (leverage) requirements and (2) how key risk components and weights that are appropriate to the unique characteristics of credit unions would be defined. Moreover, each proposal lacked details of key components upon which to base any assessment of their merits. The market-risk capital ratio augments the definitions of qualifying capital in the credit risk requirement by adding an additional capital component (tier 3). Available indicators suggest that the credit union industry as a whole has not been overly constrained as a result of the implementation of PCA. Allowing credit unions to use secondary capital instruments to meet their regulatory net worth requirements would raise a number of issues and concerns. While allowing credit unions to sell secondary capital instruments to investors outside of the credit union industry would provide market discipline, this would raise concerns about the potential impact on the member-owned, cooperative nature of credit unions. Some have proposed limiting potential investors to credit union members, other credit unions, and corporate credit unions; however, in-system investors could impose less discipline and raise systemic risk concerns if it were to create a situation where weaker credit unions brought down stronger credit unions due to secondary capital investments. Other issues relate to the specific form of the capital instruments, and how they would be incorporated into the regulatory net worth requirement for credit unions. The credit union industry itself appeared divided on the desirability or appropriate structure of secondary capital instruments. Conceptually, the potential use of a risk-based capital system for all credit unions appears less controversial. In recognition of the limitations of risk-based capital systems, the bank and thrift regulators use both risk-based and nonrisk weighted (leverage ratio) capital requirements for PCA purposes. Moreover, our analysis of aggregated credit union data indicated that credit unions have been able to maintain a rate of growth that has exceeded that of banks and thrifts in the three full calendar years that PCA has been in place for credit unions. We are aware that NCUA is constructing a more detailed risk-based capital proposal that incorporates both risk-based and leverage requirements; however, due to the lack of formalized details, we could not perform a meaningful assessment of the proposal. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the passage of the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 (CUMAA), many in the credit union industry have sought legislative changes to the net worth ratio central to prompt corrective action (PCA). The current debate centers on the issue of allowing federally insured credit unions to include additional forms of capital within the definition of net worth. In light of the issues surrounding the debate, GAO reviewed (1) the underlying concerns that have prompted the credit union industry's interest in making changes to the current capital requirements, (2) the issues associated with the potential use of secondary capital in all federally insured credit unions, and (3) the issues associated with the potential use of risk-based capital in all federally insured credit unions.
What GAO Found
The credit union industry's interest in making changes to the current capital requirements for credit unions appears to be driven by three primary concerns: (1) that restricting the definition of net worth solely to retained earnings could trigger PCA actions due to conditions beyond credit unions' control; (2) that PCA in its present form acts as a restraint on credit union growth; and (3) that PCA tripwires, or triggers for corrective action, are too high given the conservative risk profile of most credit unions. Despite these concerns, available indicators suggest that the credit union industry has not been overly constrained as a result of the implementation of PCA. As a group, credit unions have maintained capital levels well above the level needed to be considered well-capitalized and have grown at rates exceeding those of other depository institutions during the three calendar years that PCA has been in place for credit unions. Allowing credit unions to use secondary capital instruments to meet their regulatory net worth requirements would raise a number of issues and concerns, with perhaps the most important issue centering on who would purchase the secondary capital instruments. While outside investors would provide market discipline, this would raise concerns about the potential impact on the member-owned, cooperative structure of credit unions. Inside investors, however, could impose less discipline and raise systemic risk concerns if it resulted in a situation where weaker credit unions could bring down stronger credit unions due to secondary capital investments. Other issues relate to the specific form of the capital instruments for credit unions. The credit union industry itself appeared divided on the desirability or appropriate structure of secondary capital instruments. Conceptually, the use of risk-based capital to address the concerns some in the credit union industry expressed about PCA is less controversial. Though two risk-based capital proposals were put forward, neither has garnered industry consensus and both lacked details of key components upon which to base any assessment of their merits. Risk-based capital is intended to reflect the unique risk profile of individual financial institutions; however, there are other factors that can affect an institution's financial condition that are not easily quantified. In recognition of the limitations of risk-based capital systems, bank and thrift regulators use leverage and risk-based capital requirements in tandem. GAO is aware that NCUA is constructing a more detailed risk-based capital proposal that incorporates both risk-based and leverage requirements; however due to the lack of formalized details, GAO could not perform a meaningful assessment of the proposal. |
gao_HEHS-99-92 | gao_HEHS-99-92_0 | While some regional offices may review materials that certain organizations distribute nationwide, generally each regional office is responsible for reviewing the materials to be distributed within its geographic jurisdiction. 1.) 2.) Another MCO provided conflicting information about its prescription drug benefit. To help beneficiaries make informed choices, BBA requires HCFA to provide beneficiaries with summary plan information before the annual November enrollment period. However, other MCOs did not disclose important restrictions in any member literature. By establishing an MCO’s Medicare contract—a document that is not usually available to beneficiaries—as the only document required to fully explain the plan’s benefit coverage, HCFA cannot ensure that beneficiaries are aware of the benefits to which they are entitled. 4). For example, it was difficult to determine whether the three plans offered by one MCO covered nonemergency ambulance transportation, because each plan’s materials used different terms to describe the benefit. Weaknesses in HCFA’s Review Process Allowed Problems in Plan Materials to Go Uncorrected
Although HCFA approved all the member literature we reviewed, weaknesses in three critical elements of the agency’s review process allowed errors to go uncorrected and important information to be omitted. Additionally, HCFA’s lack of consistent standards has contributed to inconsistent reviews and extra work and may have increased the chance of errors slipping through the review process undetected. HCFA reviewers are instructed to use the BIF to check that plan member literature accurately reflects the contracted benefits and member fees. Because BIFs are often incomplete, reviewers sometimes rely on benefit summary sheets provided by MCOs to verify the accuracy of plan materials. The lack of mandatory format and terminology standards for key member literature, such as benefit summary brochures and member policy booklets, increases the amount of time and effort needed to review and approve plans’ member literature. However, MCOs did not always correct the errors HCFA identified during the review process. We reviewed one plan’s summary of benefits that incorrectly commingled 1997 and 1998 benefit information. Some plans distributed inaccurate or incomplete information or provided the information after beneficiaries had made their enrollment decisions, when it was less useful. In contrast, each FEHBP plan must provide prospective enrollees with a single, comprehensive brochure to facilitate comparisons and informed enrollment choices. Recommendations to the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration
In October 1996, we recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the HCFA Administrator to (1) require standard formats and terminology for important aspects of MCOs’ marketing materials, including benefits descriptions, and (2) require that all literature distributed by organizations follow these standards. Fully implement HCFA’s new contract form for describing plans’ benefit coverage, the PBP, for the 2001 contract submissions to facilitate the collection of comparable benefit information and help ensure full disclosure of plans’ benefits. However, requiring MCOs to provide an FEHBP-like brochure, in addition to other plan materials, would preserve the MCOs’ flexibility and provide Medicare beneficiaries with more complete and comparable information than they may currently receive. Finally, we compared the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and Medicare’s standards for plans’ member literature. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Medicare Choice program, focusing on: (1) the extent to which managed care organizations' (MCO) member literature provides beneficiaries with accurate and useful plan information; and (2) whether the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) review process ensures that beneficiaries can rely on MCOs' member literature to make informed enrollment decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although HCFA had reviewed and approved the materials GAO examined, all 16 MCOs in GAO's sample from four HCFA regions had distributed materials containing inaccurate or incomplete benefit information; (2) almost half of the organizations distributed materials that incorrectly described benefit coverage and the need for provider referrals; (3) one MCO marketed (and provided) a prescription drug benefit that was substantially less generous than the plan had agreed to provide in its Medicare contract; (4) moreover, some MCOs did not furnish complete information on plan benefits and restrictions until after a beneficiary had enrolled; (5) other MCOs never provided full descriptions of plan benefits and restrictions; (6) although not fully disclosing benefit coverage may hamper beneficiaries' decisionmaking, neither practice violates HCFA policy; (7) as GAO has reported previously, it was difficult to compare available options using member literature because each MCO independently chose the format and terms it used to describe its plan's benefit package; (8) in contrast, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program's (FEHBP) plans are required to provide prospective enrollees with a single comprehensive and comparable brochure to facilitate informed enrollment choices; (9) the errors GAO identified in MCO's member literature went uncorrected because of weaknesses in three major elements of HCFA's review process; (10) limitations in the benefit information form (BIF), the contract form that HCFA reviewers use to determine whether plan materials are accurate, led some reviewers to rely on the MCOs themselves to help verify the accuracy of plan materials; (11) additionally, HCFA's lack of required format, terminology, and content standards for member literature created opportunities for inconsistent review practices; (12) according to some regional office staff, the lack of standards also increased the amount of time needed to review materials, which contributed to the likelihood that errors could slip through undetected; (13) HCFA's failure to ensure that MCOs corrected errors identified during the review process caused some beneficiaries to receive inaccurate information; and (14) HCFA is working to revise the BIF and develop a standard summary of benefits for plans to use--steps that will likely improve the agency's ability to review member literature and other marketing materials--but other steps could be taken to improve the usefulness and accuracy of plan information. |
gao_GAO-07-193 | gao_GAO-07-193_0 | FEMA also did not assign responsibility to OSHA, or any other federal agency, for coordinating the safety and health of nonfederal workers, except workers employed by federal contractors. No One Collected Information on the Total Number of Response and Recovery Workers Deployed to the Gulf Coast, but 10 Federal Agencies Collected Data on Their Workers
No one, including OSHA, was assigned responsibility for collecting data on the total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf and no one collected it, but 10 federal agencies were able to provide estimates of the number of federal workers they deployed to the Gulf for specific points in time. However, only six of them tracked the number of workers employed by their contractors. These agencies estimated that their contractors had over 5,100 workers in the Gulf Coast area on December 1, 2005, the month with the largest total number. Some agencies provided their logs to OSHA, but the data they provided were incomplete and unreliable, according to OSHA officials. Eleven Worker Fatalities Related to Hurricane Katrina Reported
OSHA and other agency officials identified 11 fatalities of workers involved in response and recovery work for Hurricane Katrina from September 2005 through June 2006, 9 of which occurred as a result of work-related accidents. OSHA staff also assessed air, water, soil, and noise hazards at many worksites. In addition, lack of awareness by other agencies about OSHA’s role in a disaster further hindered its efforts. OSHA Was Only Partially Successful in Providing Training, Distributing Protective Gear, Serving Nonfederal Workers, and Providing Mental Health Services
Some of OSHA’s Training Was Delayed, and Some Agencies Did Not Request Needed Training from OSHA Because They Did Not Realize It Was Available
Because OSHA and FEMA disagreed about the process for issuing the mission assignment authorizing OSHA to receive reimbursement for its safety and health training to workers, FEMA did not issue it until more than 3 weeks after the hurricane hit the Gulf Coast. However, OSHA did not coordinate with them to ensure that all workers in the Gulf area who needed mental health services received them, and OSHA had difficulty obtaining these services. As a result, OSHA’s efforts were focused on providing assistance to federal agencies and workers. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the ability to meet workers’ safety and health needs in the event of a future disaster, the Secretaries of the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security should direct the Administrators of OSHA and FEMA to clearly define the criteria to be used in deciding when OSHA will be responsible for carrying out its duties under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan, including the types and magnitude of disasters in which OSHA will be involved, and clearly define OSHA’s and FEMA’s roles under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex, including resolving the issue of how the need for long-term medical monitoring of workers involved in the response to future disasters will be met; and proactively work to provide information to federal, state, and local agencies about OSHA’s role in a disaster and the assistance it can provide under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex, including seeking opportunities for OSHA to participate in emergency preparedness exercises at federal, state, and local levels. In addition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor should direct OSHA to establish a process for collecting data on injuries and illnesses sustained by workers who respond to disasters as defined in the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan, such as requiring employers to record injuries and illnesses on logs maintained at each disaster work site and periodically submit them to OSHA during the response; use the information collected on injuries and illnesses to identify safety and health hazards and analyze injury and illness trends; and develop, implement, and monitor an incident personal protective equipment program as defined in the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex. 2. Although OSHA provides more detailed information about its action during the response to Hurricane Katrina, our report mentions many of these same activities. 3. We agree that OSHA, nor any other federal agency, was responsible for collecting information on the number of workers deployed to the Gulf area in response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricane Katrina and Rita. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns about the safety and health of workers involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina included their exposure to contaminated floodwaters and injuries from working around debris. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for coordinating federal efforts to protect the safety and health of workers involved in the response to large national disasters. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO initiated a number of Katrina-related reviews. For this review, GAO examined (1) what is known about the number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina; (2) the extent to which OSHA tracked injuries and illnesses sustained by these workers; and (3) how well OSHA met the safety and health needs of workers. To address these issues, GAO reviewed reports; analyzed data; interviewed federal, state, and local officials; and conducted site visits.
What GAO Found
No one, including OSHA,was responsible for collecting information on the total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina and no one collected it, but 10 federal agencies provided estimates showing that, on October 1, 2005, the agencies had about 49,000 federal workers in the Gulf Coast area. In addition, six of these agencies estimated that their contractors had about 5,100 workers in the area on December 1, 2005, but the other four either did not track the number of workers employed by their contractors or did not employ contractors. Although OSHA was responsible for tracking the injuries and illnesses that federal response and recovery workers sustained during the response to Hurricane Katrina, the agency's efforts to collect it were delayed and it was unable to collect usable information. According to OSHA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must assign and fund specific responsibilities for each disaster. However, FEMA did not direct OSHA to collect injury and illness data until more than 3 weeks after the hurricane struck. OSHA attempted to collect the data, but the information federal agencies provided were incomplete and unreliable. OSHA and other agencies did track fatalities. They reported nine worker fatalities attributed to work-related accidents: three employees of federal contractors and six nonfederal workers or volunteers. OSHA provided assistance to many response and recovery workers who responded to Hurricane Katrina, but not all workers' safety and health needs were met. OSHA quickly established operations in the Gulf area; intervened in thousands of potentially hazardous situations; and assessed air, water, soil, and noise hazards at many work sites. However, disagreements between OSHA and FEMA about which agency was in charge of providing safety and health assistance to federal agencies and workers and how it would be provided delayed some of OSHA's efforts. Also, some agencies' lack of awareness about the role OSHA plays in a disaster further hindered its ability to provide assistance. As a result, OSHA did not fully meet workers' safety and health needs, particularly their need for training and protective equipment. OSHA also did not coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure that workers had needed mental health services, and OSHA was not assigned responsibility for coordinating the needs of nonfederal workers, including state and local agency workers; many immigrants; and volunteers. |
gao_GAO-04-162 | gao_GAO-04-162_0 | Travel Times for Most Chattanooga-Area Veterans to VA Hospitals in Murfreesboro and Nashville Exceeded VA’s Guidelines
Almost all (99 percent) of the 16,379 Chattanooga-area enrolled veterans, as of September 2001, faced travel times that exceeded VA guidelines for travel to the nearest VA hospitals in Murfreesboro and Nashville. Travel Times to Obtain Outpatient Primary Care Frequently Exceeded VA Guidelines
In fiscal year 2001, more than half (about 8,400) of the 16,379 Chattanooga- area enrolled veterans faced travel times that exceeded VA’s 30-minute travel guideline for accessing care at VA’s nearest primary care clinic. Draft CARES Plan Would Enhance Access for Some Veterans but Diminish Access for Others
VA’s draft CARES plan includes a proposal to shorten Chattanooga-area veterans’ travel times by purchasing inpatient care from non-VA hospitals in Chattanooga. We estimate that 14 percent of the Chattanooga-area veterans’ workload would be affected by the shift, given that an estimated 54 percent of the total workload would be handled in Nashville, compared to 40 percent in fiscal year 2002. Opening New Clinics Would Shorten Travel and Appointment Waiting Times for Outpatient Primary and Specialty Care
The draft CARES plan calls for opening new community-based clinics and other changes that would reduce travel and waiting times for enrolled veterans residing in the 18-county Chattanooga area. In fiscal year 2001, about 8,400 Chattanooga-area enrolled veterans faced travel times for primary care that exceeded VA’s 30-minute guideline. The remaining 5,700 enrolled veterans would continue to face travel times longer than VA’s 30-minute guideline. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that as part of his deliberations concerning whether additional access improvements for Chattanooga-area veterans beyond those contained in the draft CARES plan are warranted, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs explore alternatives such as purchasing inpatient care locally for a larger proportion of Chattanooga- area veterans’ workload, particularly focusing on those veterans who may experience longer travel times as a result of the proposed shift of inpatient workload from Murfreesboro to Nashville; expediting the opening of the four proposed community-based clinics; and providing primary care locally for more of those veterans whose access will remain outside VA’s travel guideline, despite the opening of the four clinics. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess how Chattanooga-area veterans’ access to inpatient hospital and outpatient primary and specialty care compared to the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) established travel time and appointment waiting time guidelines and (2) determine how VA’s draft Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) plan could affect Chattanooga-area veterans’ access to such care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans residing in Chattanooga, Tennessee, have had difficulty accessing Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care. In response, VA has acted to reduce travel times to medical facilities and waiting times for appointments with primary and specialty care physicians. Recently, VA released a draft national plan for restructuring its health care system as part of a planning initiative known as Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES). GAO was asked to assess Chattanooga-area veterans' access to inpatient hospital and outpatient primary and specialty care against VA's guidelines for travel times and appointment waiting times and to determine how the draft CARES plan would affect Chattanooga-area veterans' access to such care.
What GAO Found
Almost all (99 percent) of the 16,379 enrolled veterans in the 18-county Chattanooga area, as of September 2001, faced travel times that exceeded VA's guidelines for accessing inpatient hospital care. During fiscal year 2002, only a few Chattanooga-area veterans were admitted to non-VA hospitals in Chattanooga--constituting about 5 percent of inpatient workload. In addition, over half (8,400) of Chattanooga-area enrolled veterans faced travel times that exceeded VA's 30-minute guideline for outpatient primary care. Also, waiting times for scheduling initial outpatient primary and specialty care appointments frequently exceeded VA's 30-day guideline. VA's draft CARES plan would shorten travel times for some Chattanooga-area veterans but lengthen travel times for others. Under the plan, the amount of inpatient care VA purchases from non-VA hospitals in Chattanooga would increase from 5 percent to 29 percent, thereby reducing those veterans' travel times to within VA's guidelines. The plan also proposes to shift some inpatient workload from VA's Murfreesboro hospital to its Nashville hospital. As a result, an estimated 54 percent of inpatient workload for Chattanooga-area enrolled veterans will be provided in Nashville compared to 40 percent in fiscal year 2002, thereby lengthening some veterans' travel times by about 20 minutes. The plan also proposes opening four new community-based clinics, which would bring about 2,700 more Chattanooga-area enrolled veterans within VA's 30-minute travel guideline for primary care, leaving about 5,700 enrolled veterans with travel times for such care that exceed VA's guideline. These clinics likely would not open before fiscal year 2011, given priorities specified in the plan. |
gao_GAO-10-678 | gao_GAO-10-678_0 | FAA can also issue airworthiness directives. Although Large Commercial Airplanes Have Experienced Few Icing-Related Accidents Since 1998, the Many Reported Icing Incidents Suggest That Icing Is an Ongoing Risk to Aviation Safety
According to NTSB’s aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 one large commercial airplane was involved in a nonfatal accident after encountering icing conditions during flight and five large commercial airplanes were involved in nonfatal accidents related to snow or ice on runways. Although there have been few accidents, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents. FAA Largely Met Its Own Inspection Requirements Related to Icing
As part of its Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), FAA assesses large carriers’ ground deicing programs to ensure that they meet relevant safety regulations. In fiscal years 2005 through 2009, FAA initiated enforcement actions against large commercial carriers in 274 cases following one or more violations of icing-related regulations. Other government entities that have taken steps to increase aviation safety in icing conditions include NTSB, which has issued numerous recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA, which has contributed to research related to icing. In addition, the private sector has deployed various FAA- required technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers and ice detectors, and operated ground deicing and runway clearing programs at airports. Over the last decade, FAA made progress on the implementation of the objectives specified in its multiyear plan by issuing or amending regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance to provide icing-related safety oversight. Improving the timeliness of FAA’s winter weather rulemaking efforts. FAA said that, in conjunction with the aviation industry, it needs to begin focusing on winter operations holistically because there are many vital elements to safe operations in winter weather conditions, including airport surface conditions, aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in- flight icing and icing certification, dissemination of airport condition information, air traffic handling of aircraft in icing conditions, and air traffic arrival and departure sequencing. Further, aviation stakeholders have identified challenges that if addressed, could improve safety. Among others, these challenges include improving the timeliness of FAA’s winter weather rulemaking efforts, ensuring the availability of adequate resources for icing-related R&D, and developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations. FAA has not formally updated its 1997 Inflight Aircraft Icing Plan, meaning the stakeholders do not have a consolidated and readily accessible source of information on the key in-flight icing actions FAA has under way or planned. A plan that addresses both in-flight and ground icing issues, as well as the challenges stakeholders identified for this report, would help FAA measure its ongoing and planned efforts against its goals for improving safety. Furthermore, a comprehensive plan could help identify gaps or other areas for improvement and assist FAA in developing an integrated approach to winter operations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help facilitate FAA’s and other stakeholders’ efforts to address challenges to improving safety in icing and winter weather conditions, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, FAA, to develop a comprehensive plan, in consultation with public and private stakeholders, to guide these efforts. In response, the Department of Transportation agreed to consider our recommendation and provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We reviewed (1) the extent to which large commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated runways, (2) the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) inspection and enforcement activities related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA and other aviation stakeholders to improve safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions, and (4) the challenges that continue to affect aviation safety in icing and winter weather operating conditions. To review the extent to which large commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing and contaminated runways, we analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Ice formation on aircraft can disrupt the smooth flow of air over the wings and prevent the aircraft from taking off or decrease the pilot's ability to maintain control of the aircraft. Takeoff and landing operations can also be risky in winter weather. Despite persistent efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and others to mitigate icing risks, icing remains a serious concern. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which commercial airplanes have experienced accidents and incidents related to icing, (2) FAA's inspection and enforcement activities related to icing, (3) the efforts of FAA and others to improve safety in winter weather, and (4) the challenges that continue to affect aviation safety in winter weather. GAO analyzed data obtained from FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and others. Further, GAO obtained information from FAA and NTSB officials and representatives of key aviation industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
According to NTSB's aviation accident database, from 1998 to 2009 large commercial airplanes were involved in six nonfatal accidents related to icing (including in-flight and runway). However, FAA and others recognize that incidents are potential precursors to accidents. Although large commercial airplanes have experienced few icing-related accidents in the last decade, the several hundred icing-related incidents involving these airplanes contained in FAA and NASA databases suggest that they face ongoing risks from icing. Based on multiple inspections, FAA assesses each large carrier's ground deicing program to ensure that it meets relevant safety regulations. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA largely met its own requirements for inspecting carriers' ground deicing programs. When a carrier violates a safety regulation, FAA can take enforcement action against the carrier. For fiscal years 2005 to 2009, FAA initiated enforcement actions against large commercial carriers in 274 cases for violations of icing-related regulations. FAA and other aviation stakeholders have undertaken many efforts to improve safety in icing conditions. For example, in 1997, FAA issued a multiyear plan for improving the safety of aircraft operating in icing conditions and has since made progress on the objectives specified in its plan by issuing regulations, airworthiness directives, and voluntary guidance. However, FAA has not formally updated its 1997 in-flight icing plan, meaning the stakeholders do not have a consolidated and readily accessible source of information on the key in-flight icing actions FAA has under way or planned. NTSB has issued numerous recommendations as a result of its aviation accident investigations, and NASA has contributed to research related to icing. In addition, the private sector has deployed various FAA-required technologies on aircraft, such as wing deicers, and operated ground deicing and runway clearing programs at airports. GAO's interviews with government and industry stakeholders identified challenges related to winter weather operations that, if addressed, could improve safety. Among others, these challenges include improving the timeliness of FAA's winter weather rulemaking efforts, ensuring the availability of resources for icing-related research, and developing a more integrated approach to effectively manage winter operations. With respect to an integrated approach, FAA said it needs to begin focusing on winter operations holistically because there are many vital elements to safe operations in winter weather, such as airport surface conditions, aircraft ground deicing, aircraft in-flight icing and icing certification, and air traffic handling of aircraft in icing conditions. A plan that addresses both in-flight and ground icing issues, as well as the challenges stakeholders identified for this report, would help FAA measure its ongoing and planned efforts against its goals for improving safety. Furthermore, a comprehensive plan could help identify gaps or other areas for improvement and assist FAA in developing an integrated approach to winter operations.
What GAO Recommends
To help facilitate FAA's efforts to address challenges to improving safety in winter weather conditions, GAO recommends that FAA develop a plan focused on winter operations holistically that includes detailed goals and milestones. In response, the Department of Transportation agreed to consider GAO's recommendation and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-180 | gao_T-AIMD-99-180_0 | Progress Has Been Made
As of March 31, 1999, the Department of Education reported that all of its 14 mission-critical systems—including the 11 student financial aid delivery systems—were Y2K compliant and in operation. Our review of three of these systems found adequate test documentation. However, the department has not yet closed out four of its systems as completing the Y2K compliance process in accordance with Education-specific guidance; other systems issues also remain outstanding, although they are generally considered low-risk. Testing of data exchanges and end-to-end testing of key business processes are continuing according to the department's schedule, as is the refinement of business continuity and contingency plans. Future Tasks Facing Education
While much of the work on renovating and validating mission-critical systems has been completed, and the risk of student financial aid delivery system failures has been significantly reduced, the department needs to continue making Y2K a top priority. Accordingly, it needs to focus particular attention on the following activities. Expeditiously resolving open issues delaying certification of the remaining four mission-critical systems still pending formal closeout. Continue resolving and tracking open issues, including environmental or functional changes made to existing systems; in doing so, ensure the involvement of IV&V contractors. Ensuring that the new Recipient Financial Management System has been adequately tested for Y2K compliance as each phase is implemented between now and August. Continue end-to-end testing of critical business processes involving Education's internal systems and its external data exchange partners. Ensure that results are monitored for completeness and any problems that may arise are addressed promptly—including concerns raised by the IV&V contractors. Continue outreach activities with schools, guaranty agencies, and other participants in the student financial aid community to share successes and lessons learned to help further reduce the likelihood of Y2K failures. Continue refining and testing the student financial aid business continuity and contingency plans, encouraging the involvement of postsecondary institutions, guaranty agencies, and other external trading partners. In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Education has made progress toward making its programs and supporting systems Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Education's efforts to ensure that its computer systems supporting critical student financial aid activities will be able to process information reliably through the turn of the century, focusing on: (1) the progress Education has made to date in making its information systems year 2000 compliant; and (2) the future tasks facing the department.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of March 31, 1999, Education reported that all of its 14 mission-critical systems--including the 11 student financial aid delivery systems--were year 2000 compliant and in operation; (2) GAO's review of three of these systems found adequate test documentation; (3) however, the department has not yet closed out four of its systems as completing the year 2000 compliance process in accordance with Education-specific guidance; other systems issues also remain outstanding, although they are generally considered low-risk; (4) testing of data exchanges and end-to-end testing of key business processes are continuing according to the department's schedule, as is the refinement of business continuity and contingency plans; (5) while much of the work on renovating and validating mission-critical systems has been completed, and the risk of student financial aid delivery system failures has been significantly reduced, the department needs to continue making year 2000 a top priority; and (6) accordingly, it needs to focus particular attention on the following activities: (a) expeditiously resolving open issues delaying certification of the remaining four mission-critical systems still pending formal closeout; (b) continue resolving and tracking open issues, including environmental or functional changes made to existing systems; in doing so, ensure the involvement of independent verification and validation (IV&V) contractors; (c) ensuring that the new Recipient Financial Management System has been adequately tested for year 2000 compliance as each phase is implemented between now and August; (d) continue end-to-end testing of critical business processes involving Education's internal systems and its external data exchange partners; (e) ensure that results are monitored for completeness and any problems that may arise are addressed promptly--including concerns raised by the IV&V contractors; (f) continue outreach activities with schools, guaranty agencies, and other participants in the student financial aid community to share successes and lessons learned to help further reduce the likelihood of year 2000 failures; and (g) continue refining and testing the student financial aid business continuity and contingency plans, encouraging the involvement of post secondary institutions, guaranty agencies, and other external trading partners. |
gao_GAO-08-1092 | gao_GAO-08-1092_0 | In addition to the five registered and operational BSL-4 labs, there are more labs currently under construction or in the planning stages. Results of Security Assessment
CDC regulations do not mandate that specific perimeter security controls are present at all BSL-4 labs, resulting in a significant difference in perimeter security between the nation’s five labs. However, there are no specific perimeter security controls that must be in place at every BSL-4 lab. While three labs had all or nearly all of the key security controls we assessed, two labs demonstrated a significant lack of these controls. Although the presence of the security controls we assessed does not automatically ensure a secure perimeter, having most controls provides increased assurance that a strong perimeter security system is in place and reduces the likelihood of unauthorized intrusion. Lab A: The physical security controls of Lab A presented a strong visible deterrent from the outside, with 14 of the 15 key security controls in place. Lab B: Lab B was the only one of the five BSL-4 labs that had all 15 security controls. Lab D: Although Lab D did not have an armed guard presence outside the lab or vehicle screening, it presented strong physical security controls in all other respects, with 13 of the key 15 controls we assessed. DSAT approved the security plans for the two labs lacking most key security controls, and approved these labs to participate in the Select Agent Program as BSL-4 labs. Conversely, during our assessment, we noted that the three BSL-4 labs with all or nearly all of our 15 key controls were subject to additional federal security requirements outside the purview of the Select Agent Regulations. The CDC should work with USDA to coordinate its efforts, given that both agencies have the authority to regulate select agents. We are encouraged that HHS plans to study this matter further, and suggest that, as part of this study, HHS reconsider whether the lack of many specific perimeter security controls at two of the nation’s five BSL-4 labs is acceptable. Appendix I: Perimeter Security Controls
To perform our perimeter security assessment of biosafety level (BSL) 4 labs, we identified 15 key perimeter security controls, based on our expertise and research of commonly accepted physical security principles, that contribute to a strong perimeter security system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biosafety labs under the U.S. Bioterrorism Act are primarily regulated and must be registered with either the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the Select Agent Regulations. Currently, all operational biosafety level (BSL) 4 labs are registered with the CDC and thus are regulated by the CDC, not USDA. BSL-4 labs handle the world's most dangerous agents and diseases. In fact, of the four BSL designations, only BSL-4 labs can work with agents for which no cure or treatment exists. GAO was asked to perform a systematic security assessment of key perimeter security controls at the nation's five operational BSL-4 labs. To meet this objective, GAO performed a physical security assessment of the perimeter of each lab using a security survey it developed. GAO focused primarily on 15 physical security controls, based on GAO expertise and research of commonly accepted physical security principles.
What GAO Found
Select Agent Regulations do not mandate specific perimeter security controls that need to be in place at each BSL-4 lab, resulting in significant differences in perimeter security between the nation's five labs. While three labs had all or nearly all of the key security controls GAO assessed--features such as perimeter barriers, roving armed guard patrols, and magnetometers in use at lab entrances--two labs demonstrated a significant lack of these controls. Specifically, one lab had all 15 security controls in place, one had 14, and another had 13 of the key controls. However, the remaining two labs had only 4 and 3 key security controls, respectively. Although the presence of the security controls GAO assessed does not automatically ensure a secure perimeter, having most controls provides increased assurance that a strong perimeter security system is in place and reduces the likelihood of unauthorized intrusion. For example, the two labs with fewer security controls lacked both visible deterrents and a means to respond to intrusion. One lab even had a window that looked directly into the room where BSL-4 agents were handled. In addition to creating the perception of vulnerability, the lack of key security controls at these labs means that security officials have fewer opportunities to stop an intruder or attacker. The two labs with fewer security controls were approved by the CDC to participate in the Select Agent Program despite their weaknesses. During the course of our review, GAO noted that the three labs with all or nearly all of the key security controls GAO assessed were subject to additional federal security requirements imposed on them by agencies that owned or controlled the labs, not because of the Select Agent Regulations. |
gao_GAO-14-593 | gao_GAO-14-593_0 | 3). Specifically, DOE-sponsored FFRDCs received about 79 percent of the nearly $84 billion in total funding for FFRDCs sponsored by these agencies for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, according to our analysis of agency reports of contractor and agency data provided in response to our survey of FFRDC sponsors. As shown in table 1, DOE obligated about 34 percent of its available budget authority toward the FFRDCs it sponsored, while DOD and NSF dedicated less than 1 percent and 4 percent, respectively, based on obligations as a percent of budget authority from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012. For fiscal years 2008 through 2012, FFRDCs sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF received approximately $15 billion of the nearly $84 billion in total funding from sources other than their sponsoring agency—specifically from other federal agencies (about $13 billion) and nonfederal entities, such as state or local governments, and private entities (about $1.9 billion). Many FFRDCs Sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF Spent Over Half of Their Total Funding on Compensation, and These Agencies Have Processes to Review FFRDC Contractor Compensation
Many FFRDCs sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF spent over half of their total funding on compensation for fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and sponsoring agencies have processes to review compensation annually to ensure that FFRDC contractors were not reimbursed in excess of the cap amount set in federal law. DOE, DOD, and NSF Have Processes to Review Compensation Reimbursements for Senior Executives and other FFRDC Contractor Employees
DOE, DOD, and NSF have processes to annually review compensation reimbursements for senior executives against the federal statutory cap and conduct general reviews of compensation for other employees. DOE has additional processes in place to review compensation for all FFRDC contractor employees. In May 2014, DOE updated its policy on senior executive compensation to require documentation of all the laboratory directors’ pay and nonpay benefits subject to the cap in addition to the reviews described above. DOE, DOD, and NSF Use Multiple Reviews to Assess FFRDC Performance
DOE, DOD, and NSF assess FFRDC performance through three types of reviews—comprehensive reviews, annual performance reviews, and other review activities such as day-to-day oversight. DOE, DOD, and NSF Conducted Comprehensive Reviews of the Use and Need for FFRDCs That Vary in Level of Detail
DOE, DOD, and NSF conducted comprehensive reviews of the use and need for the FFRDCs they sponsored and, in keeping with the flexibilities the FAR provides, these reviews varied in level of detail. The FAR requires sponsoring agencies to conduct a comprehensive review at least every 5 years on the use and need for an FFRDC prior to extending the contract or agreement, and it describes five elements it should include: (1) an examination of the special technical needs and mission requirements performed by the FFRDC, (2) a consideration of alternative sources, (3) an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the FFRDC in meeting the sponsor’s needs, (4) an assessment of the adequacy of the FFRDC management in ensuring a cost-effective operation, and (5) a determination that the sponsoring agreement or contract complies with other FAR requirements concerning FFRDCs. Working with the DCAA. NSF officials said that they do not have employees collocated or on-site at the FFRDCs to perform oversight. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to DOE, DOD, and NSF for their review and comment. Technical comments provided by DOE, DOD, and NSF were incorporated, as appropriate. We chose to review FFRDCs sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), and NSF because these three agencies sponsor the largest numbers of FFRDCs—16, 10, and 4, respectively. To learn about FFRDC funding and compensation we surveyed the agency sponsors for the 30 FFRDCs in our scope, spoke to agency officials and contractor representatives, and reviewed agency policy and guidance documentation. Appendix II: Funding and Contract Data for FFRDCs Sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF
To learn about funding and compensation at federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC) we surveyed the agency sponsors for the 30 FFRDCs sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), and National Science Foundation (NSF) and collected information on their operators. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies sponsor 40 FFRDCs for research and development tasks that are integral to their missions. DOE, DOD, and NSF sponsor the largest number of FFRDCs—16, 10, and 4 centers, respectively. Federal agencies sponsor FFRDCs by contracting with nonprofit, university-affiliated, or private industry operators. Federal statute and regulations provide for reimbursements for compensation for FFRDC contractor employees and require that sponsoring agencies evaluate the use and need for their FFRDCs.
GAO was asked to review the management and oversight of FFRDCs. This report (1) describes funding for FFRDCs sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF for fiscal years 2008 through 2012; (2) examines compensation for FFRDC employees and these agencies' processes for review of compensation; and (3) determines how these agencies assess FFRDC performance. GAO surveyed the agency sponsors for the 30 FFRDCs, analyzed agency policies and reviews of these FFRDCs, and interviewed agency officials and contractor representatives.
What GAO Found
The 30 federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC) sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DOD), and National Science Foundation (NSF) received nearly $84 billion in total funding for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Of these 30 centers, the 16 sponsored by DOE received about 79 percent of this funding according to GAO's analysis of sponsoring agencies' responses to a GAO survey on FFRDC funding and compensation. During this time, DOE obligated about 34 percent of its budget to the FFRDCs it sponsored, and DOD and NSF devoted less than 1 percent and 4 percent of their budgets, respectively. FFRDCs sponsored by these agencies received approximately $15 billion of their total funding from sources other than the sponsoring agency—specifically other federal agencies, nonfederal entities such as state or local governments, and private entities.
Many FFRDCs sponsored by DOE, DOD, and NSF spent over half of their total funding on employee compensation, and the three agencies had processes in place to review such compensation. For example, the agencies reviewed senior executive compensation to ensure that they do not reimburse FFRDC contractors in excess of the cap set in statute. All three agencies also have processes in place to document the total reimbursed compensation for senior executives against the cap, although DOE changed its policy during the course of GAO's work. In May 2014, DOE updated its policy on executive compensation to require documentation of compensation subject to the cap—a requirement that was not in place prior to this date. DOE officials noted that this change was due, in part, to the recent action by Congress in December 2013 to reduce the cap from $952,308 to $487,000.
DOE, DOD, and NSF assess performance of FFRDCs through three types of reviews: (1) comprehensive reviews—which the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires at least every 5 years, (2) annual performance reviews, and (3) other review activities such as day-to-day oversight. DOE, DOD, and NSF conducted timely comprehensive reviews of the use and need for the FFRDCs they sponsored in most cases and, in all cases, the agencies recommended the continuance of the FFRDCs they sponsor. The FAR describes five elements the review should include, and DOE, DOD, and NSF generally included these elements, with varying levels of detail in keeping with the flexibilities the FAR provides. These agencies also have procedures to annually review and document the performance of the FFRDCs they sponsor, and many of these reviews use surveys of federal officials who interact with the centers. In addition, officials from DOE, DOD, and NSF told GAO that they engage in other day-to-day oversight activities to help them assess FFRDC performance, such as observing work and meeting with contractor employees.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOE, DOD, and NSF reviewed a draft of this report and did not provide formal comments. Technical comments provided by DOE, DOD, and NSF were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-699 | gao_GAO-13-699_0 | Further, there are tax incentives for contributions to IRAs. Eligibility is based on a worker’s adjusted gross income (AGI) and contributions made to qualified pension plans and IRAs. Additionally, the President’s budgets for fiscal years 2010 Under the 2012 automatic IRA legislative proposal, certain employers who do not maintain a qualified pension plan would be required to make available an automatic IRA arrangement to eligible employees. Based on our analysis of the SCF data, we estimate that in 2010 approximately 43 percent of households working in the private sector did We also estimate that the median AGI of all not have a DC plan or IRA.households that did not have a DC plan or IRA was $32,000, compared to $75,000 for those that did—a difference of about 43 percent. In addition, households without DC plans or IRAs have lower median marginal tax rates than households with DC plans or IRAs. Only 15 percent of married households and 11 percent of single households without a DC plan or IRA had a DB plan. For example, an estimated 5 percent of married households in the first earnings quartile had a DB plan, compared to an estimated 27 percent and 31 percent of married households in the third and fourth earnings The shift away from DB plans and the limited quartiles, respectively.number of households that have them highlights the importance of other retirement savings vehicles such as DC plans or IRAs. Our evidence suggests that in addition to some households not having a DC plan or IRA, these households also may have limited additional assets to draw upon in their retirement years. For the purposes of this report, household retirement annuities include all annual retirement income received from DC or DB plans and represent income that the household receives in retirement. For both Saver’s Credit scenarios, low- and middle-earning households could For households in the lowest receive the largest benefit from the credit.earnings quartile, we projected that the median increase in annuity under the existing Saver’s Credit would be $155 per year, while the median increase in annuity under a refundable credit would be $876 per year. Automatic IRAs Could Increase Retirement Income for Households at All Earnings Levels
Automatic IRAs Could Increase the Number of Lower-Earning Households with Retirement Savings and Modestly Increase Retirement Income
Automatic IRAs provide a new opportunity to increase the number of households saving for retirement at all earnings levels. We project that 7 percent of all households had no retirement annuities from DB or DC plans but could receive annuity income from automatic IRAs. Specifically, we projected that the median dollar increase in a household’s annuity was $1,046 (see fig. Retirement annuities could increase if the household participated in automatic IRAs, was eligible to receive the refundable Saver’s Credit but not the existing Saver’s Credit, received a larger credit under the refundable Saver’s Credit, or some combination of these events. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury for review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze the extent to which workers with lower earnings can benefit from tax incentives for retirement savings and automatic IRAs, we examined (1) the earnings and tax rates of households that do not have DC plans or IRAs, (2) the effects of the Saver’s Credit on retirement income, and (3) how automatic IRAs could affect retirement income, especially for low- and middle-income workers. Section 2: Analysis of Incomes and Tax Rates of Households That Do Not Take Advantage of Incentives to Save for Retirement
Methodology
To analyze the earnings and tax rates of households that do not take advantage of the tax incentives for retirement saving, we used the 2010 SCF. Workers could be covered by DB plans. Existing Saver’s Credit. | Why GAO Did This Study
Participants in DC plans and IRAs may receive tax incentives for their contributions and lower-earning households may qualify for the Saver's Credit, an additional tax incentive for their contributions. However, less than half of the workforce participates in an employer-sponsored plan and upper-income workers have been more likely to take advantage of associated tax incentives. In recent years, proposals have been put forth to modify the Saver's Credit and create automatic IRAs, under which employers who do not sponsor a plan would generally be required to offer their employees the opportunity to save in an IRA through payroll deduction. These proposals would have fiscal impacts for the federal government.
GAO was asked to review tax incentives for contributions to DC plans and automatic IRAs. GAO examined (1) the earnings and tax rates of households that do not have DC plans or IRAs, (2) the effects of the Saver's Credit on retirement income, and (3) the effects of automatic IRAs on retirement income, especially for low- and middle-income workers. GAO examined the characteristics of households that do not take advantage of these tax incentives using data from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, simulated the effects of the Saver's Credit and automatic IRAs, and reviewed related proposals.
GAO is making no recommendations. GAO received technical comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury, and incorporated them as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Households without employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) pension plans or individual retirement accounts (IRA) had lower incomes and tax rates than households with those plans, and are also likely to have limited additional resources to draw upon in retirement, according to GAO estimates. The median adjusted gross income for households without DC plans or IRAs was $32,000, compared to $75,000 for those that did have them. The median marginal tax rate for households without DC plans or IRAs was 15 percent, compared to 25 percent for households with those savings vehicles. A defined benefit (DB) pension plan could provide a monthly benefit during retirement years for those without a DC plan or IRA; however, in 2010 only 15 percent of married households and 11 percent of single households without a DC plan or IRA had a DB plan.
The existing Saver's Credit tax incentive could result in small increases in a household's retirement annuity--that is, the household's annual retirement income received from DC or DB plans. GAO estimates that, on account of this credit, the median annuity increase for households in the lowest earnings quartile ($929-34,377) would be $155. If, however, the Saver's Credit was refundable (i.e., could generate a tax refund in excess of tax paid), it could result in larger increases in households' annuities across all earnings levels, and the median increase for households in the lowest earnings quartile would be $876 per year.
Implementing automatic IRAs, unless waived by participants, could expand retirement coverage and modestly increase retirement annuities for households at all earnings levels. Specifically, 7 percent of all households could receive retirement annuities from automatic IRAs even though these households had no DB or DC plans, according to GAO's projections. Workers with DB or DC plans could also benefit from automatic IRAs at certain points in their lifetime if their jobs do not offer such plans. Moreover, low-income workers could see a sizable increase in their annuities under automatic IRAs and the existing Saver's Credit--the projected median dollar increase for these households' annual retirement annuity would be $479. |
gao_GAO-11-720 | gao_GAO-11-720_0 | Background
Physicians can be profiled on the health care they provide to Medicare beneficiaries using measures in two performance dimensions: the resources used to provide care to beneficiaries and the quality of that care. CMS has established goals and made progress in developing its Physician Feedback Program. The per episode method measures the resource use associated with treating a specific episode of an illness in a beneficiary—for example, a stroke or a hip fracture. CMS has implemented the program in phases by distributing feedback reports to an increasing number of physicians in selected metropolitan areas. CMS Tested Various Approaches but Still Faces Several Methodological Challenges in Developing Physician Feedback Reports
CMS faces challenges in selecting resource use and quality performance measures that make feedback reports meaningful, reliable, and actionable. While CMS has tested different approaches to developing feedback reports, challenges remain in making methodological decisions that will enable CMS to accomplish its program goals. Other Key Methodological Decisions Involve Trade- offs, and CMS Has Tested Different Approaches to Inform These Decisions
Determining risk adjustment factors. CMS faces trade-offs in deciding which factors to use for risk adjustment, which accounts for differences outside the physician’s control, such as beneficiary health status. A higher minimum increases the reliability of the information, but decreases the number of physicians eligible to receive a report. In Phase I, CMS conducted a statistical reliability test to determine the minimum number of episodes a physician needed to be eligible for a feedback report. Selecting peer groups for comparisons. CMS’s Plans for Improvement May Not Fully Address Challenges in Distributing Reports to Physicians
The majority of sampled physicians were not eligible to receive a Phase II report after CMS’s methodological decisions were applied. Further, CMS faced multiple challenges with the electronic distribution of feedback reports to eligible physicians, and as a result, few physicians accessed their reports. CMS officials plan to use a new distribution method for Phase III reports. Few Sampled Physicians Were Eligible to Receive a Feedback Report; Significantly Increasing Eligibility Will Continue to Be Challenging
Over 80 percent of CMS’s initial sample of 9,189 physicians were ineligible to receive a Phase II feedback report after CMS’s methodological decisions, such as minimum case size requirements, were applied. Major challenges with Phase II distribution were CMS’s difficulty obtaining physicians’ contact information, methods of electronic distribution that were burdensome for physicians, and lack of a strong incentive for physicians to review the reports. Moreover, CMS conducted limited follow-up with profiled physicians to obtain their input on the feedback reports. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to develop feedback reports that are more reliable, credible, accessible, and applicable to a greater number of Medicare physicians, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following four actions: Use methodological approaches that increase the number of physicians eligible to receive a report, such as multiple provider attribution methods, which could also enhance credibility of the reports with physicians, and distributing feedback reports that include only resource use information, if quality information is unavailable. Identify factors that may have prevented physicians from accessing their reports and, as applicable, develop strategies to improve the process for distributing reports and facilitating physicians’ access to them. These actions include refining the attribution methodology to increase the number of physicians receiving feedback reports in Phase III, analyzing the number of cases required to reliably measure quality and make credible comparisons, developing new strategies for distributing feedback reports, and obtaining input from individual physicians and physician groups about the information contained in the feedback reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a program to give physicians confidential feedback on the resources used to provide care to Medicare beneficiaries. In response, HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has established and implemented the Physician Feedback Program by distributing feedback reports to an increasing number of physicians that provided data on resources used and the quality of care. MIPPA mandated that GAO conduct a study of this program. To address this mandate, GAO identified (1) methodological challenges CMS faces in developing feedback reports and approaches CMS has tested to address them and (2) challenges CMS faces in distributing feedback reports and CMS's plans to address them. GAO interviewed CMS officials and representatives from the program contractor and reviewed relevant documentation.
What GAO Found
CMS faces challenges incorporating resource use and quality measures for physician feedback reports that are meaningful, actionable, and reliable. CMS had difficulty measuring the resources used by physicians to treat specific episodes of an illness, such as a stroke or a hip fracture, and the quality measures it used in the program's most recent phase applied to a limited number of physicians. CMS must also make decisions to address several other methodological challenges with developing feedback reports: how to account for differences in beneficiary health status, how to attribute beneficiaries to physicians, how to determine the minimum number of beneficiaries a physician needs to treat to receive a report, and how to select physicians' peer groups for comparison. These decisions involve trade-offs; for example, a higher minimum case size requirement increases the reliability of the information in the reports, but it decreases the number of physicians eligible to receive one. While CMS has tested different approaches to measuring and comparing physician performance, methodological difficulties remain in developing feedback reports. CMS also faced challenges distributing feedback reports to physicians that its plans for improvement may not entirely address. In the most recent phase of the program, about 82 percent of physicians in CMS's sample were not eligible to receive a report after CMS's methodological decisions were applied. CMS plans to make a number of methodological changes in the next phase, but significantly increasing eligibility will continue to be challenging. The electronic distribution of feedback reports also presented multiple challenges that resulted in few physicians accessing their electronic reports in the most recent phase. Factors that may have contributed to this low access rate include CMS's difficulty in obtaining accurate contact information, burdensome methods for electronic distribution, and lack of a strong incentive for physicians to review their reports. CMS conducted limited follow-up with physicians for whom feedback reports were produced. CMS plans to use a new distribution method in a four-state region in the next reporting phase.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that CMS use methodological approaches that increase physician eligibility for reports, statistically analyze the impact of its methodological decisions on report reliability, identify and address factors that may have prevented physicians from reading reports, and obtain input from a sample of physicians on the usefulness and credibility of reports. CMS concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-775 | gao_GAO-10-775_0 | Life settlement brokers represent policy owners for a fee or commission and may solicit bids for policies from multiple life settlement providers with the goal of obtaining the best price. No comprehensive data exist on the size of the life settlement market, but estimates and other data indicate that the market grew rapidly from its inception around 1998 until the recent financial crisis. Life settlements traditionally have involved high-dollar- amount policies insuring older Americans. SEC also has asserted jurisdiction over certain types of investments in life settlements of nonvariable, or traditional, life insurance policies, but their status as securities is unclear because of conflicting decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Eleventh Circuit. Regulatory Inconsistencies May Pose Challenges for Policy Owners, Investors, and Life Settlement Intermediaries
Inconsistencies in the regulation of life settlements may pose a number of challenges. In addition to the lack of uniformity, policy owners in some states could complete a life settlement without knowing how much they paid their brokers or whether they received a fair price for their policies, unless such information voluntarily was provided to them. We recently developed a framework for assessing proposals for modernizing the financial regulatory system. These two elements have not been fully achieved under the current regulatory structure of the life settlement market. NAIC and not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our matter for congressional consideration but raised related concerns. What challenges are policy owners, investors, and life insurance companies facing in connection with the life settlement market? Federal and state securities regulators oversee the securities markets, in part to protect investors. The life settlement market is organized largely as an informal network of specialized intermediaries that facilitate the sale of existing life insurance policies by their owners to third-party investors. Estimates of the total face value of policies settled in 2008 ranged from around $9 billion to $12 billion. As of February 2010, 38 states have enacted insurance laws and regulations specifically to regulate life settlements.1 State insurance regulators generally focus on regulating the front-end transaction to protect policy owners, such as by imposing licensing, disclosure, reporting, and other requirements on brokers and providers. Variable life policies are securities; thus, settlements involving these policies are securities subject to its jurisdiction. According to NASAA and our own independent research, all but two states regulate investments in life settlement as securities under their securities laws. Twelve states and the District of Columbia have not enacted laws governing life settlements, and disclosure requirements can differ among the other states. Some individual investors may face challenges obtaining adequate information about life settlement investments. Due to conflicting decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Eleventh Circuit on whether investments in viatical settlements are securities and differences in state laws, individuals in different states investing in the same type of life settlement investment may be afforded different regulatory protections and receive different disclosures about their investment. Some life settlement brokers and providers may face challenges because of inconsistencies in the life settlement laws across states. Summary (continued)
As Congress considers how best to reform the regulatory structure of the financial services sector, it may wish to consider taking steps to help ensure that policy owners involved in life settlement transactions are provided a consistent and minimum level of protection. Life Settlement Market Organized Largely as an Informal
Policy owners may sell their policies directly to investors in some cases, but owners and investors commonly use intermediaries, including agents, life settlement brokers, and life settlement providers, to assist them with their life settlement transactions (see fig. Providers sell policies to investors. State and Federal Regulators Oversee Various Aspects of the
Life settlements typically comprise two transactions: (1) the sale of a policy by the owner to a provider, which itself is the life settlement contract, and (2) the sale of the policy or an interest in the policy or its proceeds by providers to investors. Although life settlements can provide policy owners with a valuable option, policy owners can face challenges with these transactions, such as
assessing whether a life settlement is suitable or the best option for knowing whether they are being offered a fair price for their policy, because little information about the market value of policies is publicly available; understanding the potential risks or implications associated with life settlements, including that the proceeds may be taxable or the transaction could limit their ability to obtain insurance in the future; or protecting themselves from potential abuse, such as excessive broker commissions. Policy owners in some states may be afforded less protection than policy owners
in other states due to regulatory inconsistencies and, thus, face greater challenges obtaining information needed to protect their interests. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the late 1990s, life settlements have offered consumers benefits but also exposed them to risks, giving rise to regulatory concerns. A policy owner with unneeded life insurance can surrender the policy to the insurer for its cash surrender value. Or, the owner may receive more by selling the policy to a third-party investor through a life settlement. These transactions have involved high-dollar-amount policies covering older persons. Despite their potential benefits, life settlements can have unintended consequences for policy owners, such as unexpected tax liabilities. Also, policy owners commonly rely on intermediaries to help them, and some intermediaries may engage in abusive practices. As requested, this report addresses how the life settlement market is organized and regulated, and what challenges policy owners, investors, and others face in connection with life settlements. GAO reviewed and analyzed studies on life settlements and applicable state and federal laws; surveyed insurance regulators and life settlement providers; and interviewed relevant market participants, state and federal regulators, trade associations, and market observers.
What GAO Found
The life settlement market is organized largely as an informal network of intermediaries facilitating the sale of life insurance policies by owners to third-party investors. Policy owners may sell policies directly to investors in some cases, but owners and investors commonly use intermediaries. Life settlement brokers represent policy owners for a fee or commission and may solicit bids for policies from multiple life settlement providers with the goal of obtaining the best price. Life settlement providers buy life insurance policies for investors or for their own accounts. No comprehensive data exist on market size, but estimates indicate it grew rapidly from its inception around 1998 until the recent financial crisis. Estimates of the total face value of policies settled in 2008 ranged from around $9 billion to $12 billion. State and federal regulators oversee various aspects of the life settlement market. Life settlements typically comprise two transactions: the sale of a policy by its owner to a provider, and the sale of a policy by the provider to an investor. As of February 2010, 38 states had insurance laws specifically to regulate life settlements. State insurance regulators focus on regulating life settlements to protect policy owners by imposing licensing, disclosure, and other requirements on brokers and providers. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), where its jurisdiction permits, and state securities regulators regulate investments in life settlements to protect investors. One type of policy (variable life) is considered a security; thus, settlements involving these policies are under SEC jurisdiction. SEC also asserted jurisdiction over certain investments in life settlements involving nonvariable, or traditional, life insurance policies, but their status as securities is unclear because of conflicting circuit court decisions. All but two states regulate investments in life settlements as securities under their securities laws. Inconsistencies in the regulation of life settlements may pose challenges. Policy owners in some states may be afforded less protection than owners in other states and face greater challenges obtaining information to protect their interests. Twelve states and the District of Columbia do not have laws specifically governing life settlements, and disclosure requirements can differ among the other states. Policy owners also could complete a life settlement without knowing how much they paid brokers or whether they received a fair price, unless such information was provided voluntarily. Some investors may face challenges obtaining adequate information about life settlement investments. Because of conflicting court decisions and differences in state laws, individuals in different states with the same investments may be afforded different regulatory protections. Some life settlement brokers and providers may face challenges because of inconsistencies in laws across states. GAO developed a framework for assessing proposals for modernizing the financial regulatory system, two elements of which are consistent consumer and investor protection and consistent financial oversight for similar institutions and products. These two elements have not been fully achieved under the current regulatory structure of the life settlement market. Congress may wish to consider taking steps to help ensure that policy owners involved in life settlements are provided a consistent and minimum level of protection. SEC agreed with our matter for congressional consideration, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners did not agree or disagree with it but raised related concerns. |
gao_GAO-10-810 | gao_GAO-10-810_0 | In order to receive federal funds for its managed care program, a state is required to submit its rate-setting methodology and rates to CMS for review and approval. The regulations do not include standards for the type, amount, or age of the data that states mayuse in setting rates. Actuarial Principles and Practices for Medicaid Managed Care Rate Setting
CMS’s regulations require that actuarially sound rates be developed in accordance with generally accepted actuarial principles and practices. CMS Has Been Inconsistent in Reviewing States’ Rate Setting for Compliance with the Actuarial Soundness Requirements
In the six CMS regional offices we reviewed, we found inconsistencies in CMS’s review of state’s rate setting, including significant gaps in the agency’s oversight of two states’ compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements. These reports did not include actuarial certifications, and Tennessee officials confirmed that the state’s rates had not been certified by an actuary, which is a regulatory requirement. As a result, according to CMS officials, Tennessee received, and is continuing to receive, approximately $5 billion a year in federal funds for rates that we determined had not been certified by an actuary or assessed by CMS for compliance with the requirements. Variation in Practices among CMS Regional Offices Contributed to Inconsistent Oversight
Variation in a number of regional office practices contributed to the inconsistency in CMS’s oversight of states’ rate setting. Regional offices varied in the extent to which they tracked state compliance with the requirements, the extent to which they withheld federal funds, their criteria for doing full and partial reviews of rate setting, and what they considered to be sufficient evidence for meeting the requirements. As a result of our review, CMS took a number of steps that may address some of the variation in regional office practices. CMS’s Limited Efforts Do Not Ensure the Quality of the Data Used to Set Rates
CMS’s efforts to ensure the quality of the data used to set rates were generally limited to requiring assurances from states and health plans, which did not provide the agency with sufficient information to ensure data quality. In our interviews with regional office officials, we found that, when reviewing states’ descriptions of the data used for rate setting, CMS officials focused primarily on ensuring the appropriateness of the data used by states to set rates rather than their reliability. With limited information on the quality of data used to set rates, CMS cannot ensure that states’ managed care rates are appropriate and risks misspending billions of federal and state dollars. States have information on the quality of data used for rate setting— information that CMS could obtain. During the course of our work, CMS took steps to address some of the variation in regional office practices that contributed to inconsistencies in overseeing state compliance, such as requiring regional office officials to use the checklist in reviewing all states’ rate- setting submissions. As a result of the weaknesses in CMS’s oversight, billions of dollars in federal funds were paid to one state for rates that were not certified by an actuary, and billions more may be at risk of being paid to other states for rates that are not in compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements or are based on inappropriate and unreliable data. CMS could, among other things, require states to provide CMS with a description of the actions taken to ensure the quality of the data used in setting rates and the results of those actions; consider relevant audits and studies of data quality done by others when reviewing rate setting; and conduct or require periodic audits or studies of the data states use to set rates. HHS agreed with our two recommendations related to improving the consistency of CMS’s oversight, namely that CMS implement a mechanism for tracking state compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements and clarify guidance for CMS officials on conducting rate-setting reviews. HHS also agreed with our recommendation that CMS make use of information on data quality in overseeing states’ rate setting. Appendix II: Methodology for Selecting States to Contact
To describe state views of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’s (CMS) oversight of state compliance with the Medicaid managed care actuarial soundness requirements and state efforts to ensure the quality of the data used to set rates, we selected 11 of the 34 states with comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs and interviewed officials from those states’ programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid managed care rates are required to be actuarially sound. A state is required to submit its rate-setting methodology, including a description of the data used, to the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. The Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 required GAO to examine the extent to which states' rates are actuarially sound. GAO assessed CMS oversight of states' compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements and efforts to ensure the quality of data used to set rates. GAO reviewed documents, including rate-setting review files, from 6 of CMS's 10 regional offices. The selected offices oversaw 26 of the 34 states with comprehensive managed care programs; the states' programs varied in size and accounted for over 85 percent of managed care enrollment. GAO interviewed CMS officials and Medicaid officials from 11 states that were chosen based in part on variation in program size and geography.
What GAO Found
CMS has been inconsistent in reviewing states' rate setting for compliance with the Medicaid managed care actuarial soundness requirements, which specify that rates must be developed in accordance with actuarial principles, appropriate for the population and services, and certified by actuaries. Variation in CMS regional office practices contributed to this inconsistency in oversight. For example, GAO found significant gaps in CMS's oversight of two states. 1) First, the agency had not reviewed Tennessee's rate setting for multiple years and only determined that the state was not in compliance with the requirements through the course of GAO's work. According to CMS officials, Tennessee received approximately $5 billion a year in federal funds for rates that GAO determined had not been certified by an actuary, which is a regulatory requirement. 2) Second, CMS had not completed a full review of Nebraska's rate setting since the actuarial soundness requirements became effective, and therefore may have provided federal funds for rates that were not in compliance with all of the requirements. Variation in a number of CMS regional office practices contributed to these gaps and other inconsistencies in the agency's oversight of states' rate setting. For example, regional offices varied in the extent to which they tracked state compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements, their interpretations of how extensive a review of a state's rate setting was needed, and their determinations regarding sufficient evidence for meeting the actuarial soundness requirements. As a result of our review, CMS took a number of steps that may address some of the variation that contributed to inconsistent oversight, such as requiring regional office officials to use a detailed checklist when reviewing states' rate setting. However, additional steps are necessary to prevent further gaps in oversight and additional federal funds from being paid for rates that are not in compliance with the actuarial soundness requirements. CMS's efforts to ensure the quality of the data used to set rates were generally limited to requiring assurances from states and health plans--efforts that did not provide the agency with enough information to ensure the quality of the data used. CMS's regulations do not include standards for the type, amount, or age of the data used to set rates, and states are not required to report to CMS on the quality of the data. When reviewing states' descriptions of the data used to set rates, CMS officials focused primarily on the appropriateness of the data rather than their reliability. With limited information on data quality, CMS cannot ensure that states' managed care rates are appropriate, which places billions of federal and state dollars at risk for misspending. States and other sources have information on the quality of data used for rate setting--information that CMS could obtain. In addition, CMS could conduct or require periodic audits of data used to set rates; CMS is required to conduct such audits for the Medicare managed care program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS implement a mechanism to track state compliance with the requirements, clarify guidance on rate-setting reviews, and make use of information on data quality in overseeing states' rate setting. HHS agreed with our recommendations and described initiatives underway that are aimed at improving CMS's oversight. |
gao_GAO-09-684T | gao_GAO-09-684T_0 | DOD and OPM Have Made Significant Progress in Reducing Delays in the Clearance Process for DOD Personnel
Since 2005, DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD’s initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. We found that these clearance decisions were completed within 87 days, on average, and well within IRTPA’s requirements. We also analyzed the executive branch’s 2009 annual report to Congress, which presented an average of the fastest 90 percent of initial clearance decisions in anticipation of IRTPA’s December 2009 requirements. Opportunities Exist to Improve Executive Branch Reporting to Congress
Annual Reports Could Benefit from Greater Transparency in Clearance Timeliness Reporting
IRTPA requires that the executive branch report annually on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting statutory requirements for security clearances, including timeliness, and also provides broad discretion to the executive branch to report any additional information considered appropriate. Under the timeliness requirements in IRTPA, the executive branch can exclude the slowest clearances and then calculate the average of the remaining clearances. By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the average of the fastest 90 percent of the initial clearance decisions made in fiscal year 2008 and excluding mention of the slowest clearances, the executive branch did not provide congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons why delays continue to exist. The 2009 report does not contain any data on quality but proposes two measures of investigative report quality and identifies plans to measure adjudicative quality. For example, we recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD adjudicative files. Initial Reform Efforts Partially Reflect Key Practices for Organizational Transformation and Essential Factors for Clearance Reform, but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework
Initial joint reform efforts partially reflect key practices for organizational transformation that we have identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with related outcome-focused performance measures to show progress, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. While the personnel security clearance joint reform reports, which we reviewed collectively, begin to address essential factors for reforming the security clearance process, which represents positive steps, the Joint Reform Team’s information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability that is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. In addition, the Joint Reform Team’s reports do not contain any information on initiatives that will require funding, determine how much they will cost, or identify potential funding sources. The reform effort’s success will be dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. In our May 2009 report, we recommended that OMB’s Deputy Director of Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems with the security clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies responsible for developing and implementing components of the information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings from the reformed process and provide them to decision makers in Congress and the executive branch. In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
Due to concerns about long standing delays in the security clearance process, Congress mandated reforms in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that the executive branch report annually to Congress. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to delays and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts much of the government's clearance investigations. In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and DOD established a Joint Reform Team to coordinate governmentwide improvement efforts for the process. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees these efforts. Based on two recent GAO reports, this statement addresses (1) progress in reducing delays at DOD, (2) opportunities for improving executive branch reports to Congress and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. GAO independently analyzed DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, assessed the executive branch's 2006-2009 reports to Congress, and compared three joint reform reports to key transformation practices. GAO previously recommended that OMB improve the transparency in executive branch reporting and establish a strategic framework. OMB concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that OPM and DOD made initial decisions on these clearances within 87 days, on average. Opportunities exist for the executive branch to improve its annual reports to Congress. For example, the executive branch's 2009 report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time it took to make all initial clearance decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under the current IRTPA requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent of clearances and then calculate timeliness based on an average of the remaining clearances. GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances and found that 39 percent took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to quality, although IRTPA grants the executive branch latitude in reporting, the 2006-2009 reports provided little information on quality. However, the 2009 report identified quality measures that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process. For example, GAO recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. Greater attention to quality could increase instances of reciprocity--an entity's acceptance of another entity's clearances. Initial joint reform efforts reflect key practices for organizational transformation that GAO has identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but the Joint Reform Team's reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with outcome-focused performance measures, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Further, GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include (1) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (2) consolidating information technology, and (3) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. Also, the joint reform reports do not contain information on funding requirements or identify funding sources. The reform effort's success will depend upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. Further, it is imperative that OMB's Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council, which oversees joint reform team efforts. |
gao_GAO-06-43 | gao_GAO-06-43_0 | Most Workers at Five Sites Received Some Reemployment Assistance, but Generally Less Than a Third Entered Training
At all five sites, the majority of affected workers visited a one-stop center and received some services, but at four of five sites only about a third or less received training and long-term income support. In four of the five sites we studied, workers who did not go to a one-stop center most commonly reported that they needed to find a job right away and did not think they had time to visit a one-stop center, or did not need help finding a job. Most Workers at Each Site Visited a One-Stop Center and Received One-on-One Assistance
Over 70 percent of workers at each site visited a one-stop center, according to our survey (see fig. States used a variety of federal funds to provide reemployment services to trade-affected workers. Workers’ Characteristics
Older workers were less likely than younger workers to enter training. Most Workers at Four of Five Sites Were Reemployed or Retired after Being Laid Off
The majority of workers at four of the five sites had either found a job or decided to retire at the time of our survey. At three of the sites, 60 percent or more of the workers had found jobs (see fig. The Majority of Workers in Most Sites Earned Less in Their New Jobs, Replacing about 80 Percent or More of Their Pre-Layoff Wages
The majority of reemployed workers in four sites earned less in their new jobs than prior to being laid off, but at the fifth site—Weyerhaeuser in Washington—slightly more than half the reemployed workers earned the same or more than their prior wage. 12). A Small Proportion of Workers in the Five Sites Received Health Insurance or Wage Insurance Benefits, but Many Workers Were Unaware of These Benefits
A small proportion of workers in the five sites received the health insurance benefit (HCTC) or the wage insurance benefit (ATAA), but many workers told us they were unaware of these benefits. Of the workers who were aware of the benefit but did not use it, about half or more at each site said they did not need it because they had other health insurance, or it was too expensive. Likewise, few older workers received the ATAA benefit. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) the extent to which workers accessed federally funded reemployment services and the mix of services received, (2) the employment outcomes these workers achieved, and (3) the extent to which workers used the new health insurance and wage insurance benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, and the factors affecting their participation. Workers over age 55 were less than half as likely to receive training as workers under age 40. | Why GAO Did This Study
Little is known nationally about the extent to which workers laid off as a result of international trade use the variety of federally funded reemployment services available to them. GAO was asked to study the experiences of workers affected by a small number of trade-related layoffs. GAO examined (1) the extent to which workers accessed federally funded reemployment services and the mix of services received, (2) the employment outcomes these workers achieved, and (3) the extent to which workers used the new health insurance and wage insurance benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, and the factors affecting their participation.
What GAO Found
At all five trade-related plant closures that GAO studied, about three-quarters or more of the workers received reemployment assistance through a one-stop center, and they most often received one-on-one services such as job search assistance, according to our survey estimates. About a third or less of the workers at most sites received training and long-term income support, with workers over age 55 less likely to enter training than younger workers. Workers who did not visit a center most often said they needed to find a job right away and did not think they had time to visit a center, or did not think they needed help finding a new job. At the time GAO conducted its survey, most of the workers had either found a new job or retired. At three sites, over 60 percent of the workers were reemployed. At another site, only about 40 percent were reemployed, but another third had retired. And at the final site, about a third were reemployed, but this site had the highest proportion of workers who entered training and most of them were likely still in training. The majority of reemployed workers at four of five sites earned less than they had previously--replacing about 80 percent or more of their prior wages--but at one site over half the reemployed workers matched their prior wages. Few workers at each site received either the health insurance benefit or the wage insurance benefit available to some older workers. No more than 12 percent of workers at each site received the health insurance benefit, and at four of five sites, fewer than half the workers who visited a one-stop center were aware of it. Many workers did not use it because they had other coverage or because the cost of available health insurance was too high. No more than one in five of the older workers at each site received the wage insurance benefit, and at two sites, fewer than half the older workers who visited a center were aware of it. |
gao_GAO-05-440T | gao_GAO-05-440T_0 | Data collected include information on students, exchange visitors, schools, and exchange visitor programs. In June 2004, we reported that several performance indicators showed that SEVIS performance was improving. In June 2004, we reported that performance reports showed that some, but not all, key system requirements were being measured, and that these measured requirements were being met. However, unless DHS formally monitored and documented all key system performance requirements, we concluded that the department could not adequately assure itself that potential system problems were identified and addressed early, before they had a chance to become larger problems that could affect the DHS mission objectives that SEVIS supports. Trends in Reported System Problems Indicated Improved Performance
Another indicator of how well a system is performing is the number and significance of reported problems or requests for system enhancements. According to representatives of educational organizations, overall SEVIS performance at the time of our report had improved since the system began operating and its use was required, and the program’s outreach and responsiveness were good. At the time of our report, DHS had taken a number of steps to identify and solve system problems, including problems identified by educational organizations. These included releases of new versions of SEVIS and increases in Help Desk training and staffing. DHS Continues to Take Steps to Address Our Recommendations
To help strengthen SEVIS performance and address educational organizations’ concerns, our report recommended that DHS ● assess the extent to which defined SEVIS performance requirements are still relevant and are being formally managed; ● provide for the measurement of key performance requirements that are not being formally measured; ● assess educational organization Help Desk concerns and take appropriate action to address these concerns; and ● provide for the expeditious implementation of the results of the SEVIS fee rulemaking process. According to program officials, a number of steps have been taken relative to our recommendations, and other steps are under way. Program officials also reported that they are taking steps to address Help Desk concerns. Further, representatives from two organizations stated that they were still experiencing problems with incorrect Help Desk responses. Last, representatives from all six organizations stated that there have been declines in international students and exchange visitors coming to the United States. Recent Report Cites U.S. Decline in International Graduate Students, While Recognizing Recent Efforts to Improve Visa Processing for Science Students and Scholars
A recent Council of Graduate Schools report indicates that foreign graduate student applications, admissions, and enrollments are declining. In addition, while 2005 data on admissions and enrollments were not yet available, the report cited a 5 percent decline in applications between 2004 and 2005. According to the report, the declines in 2004 and in 2005 were most prominent for students from China and India. The Council of Graduate Schools also recognized recent federal actions to improve the student visa process. These actions are directly related to our work on the State Department’s Visas Mantis program—an interagency security check aimed at identifying those visa applicants who may pose a threat to our national security by illegally transferring sensitive technology. In February 2005, we reported that Visas Mantis processing times had declined significantly. We also found that the number of Mantis cases pending more than 60 days has dropped significantly. For example, the Association of American Universities identified the extension of Mantis clearances as “a common-sense reform that removes an unnecessary burden that caused enormous inconvenience for thousands of international students and discouraged many more from coming here to study.”
In closing, indications are that SEVIS performance has improved and continues to improve, as has visa processing for foreign science students and scholars. This commitment is important because educational organizations continue to report some persistent system problems, primarily with respect to Help Desk responsiveness in making certain “data fixes.” These problems can create hardships for foreign students and exchange visitors that can potentially have unintended consequences relative to these foreign students and exchange visitors applying to and enrolling in U.S. learning institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is an Internet-based system run by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to collect and record information on foreign students, exchange visitors, and their dependents--before they enter the United States, when they enter, and during their stay. GAO has reported (GAO-04-690) that although the system had a number of performance problems during the first year that its use was required, several SEVIS performance indicators were positive at that time (June 2004). Nonetheless, some problems were still being reported by educational organizations. In addition, concerns have been raised that the number of international students and exchange visitors coming to the United States has been negatively affected by the U.S. visa process. Accordingly, the Congress asked GAO to testify on its work on SEVIS and related issues. This testimony is based on its June 2004 report, augmented by more recent GAO work, reports that we issued in February 2004 and 2005 on student and visiting scholar visa processing, and related recent research by others.
What GAO Found
Indications are that SEVIS performance has improved and continues to improve. In June 2004, GAO reported improvement based on several indicators, including reports showing that certain key system performance requirements were being met, trends showing a decline in new requests for system corrections, and the views of officials representing 10 educational organizations. DHS attributed this performance improvement to a number of actions, such as installation of a series of new software releases and increased Help Desk staffing and training. However, GAO also reported that several key system performance requirements were not being formally measured, so that DHS might not be able to identify serious system problems in time to address them before they could affect the successful accomplishment of SEVIS objectives. Further, some educational organizations were still experiencing problems, particularly with regard to Help Desk support. GAO also reported that educational organizations were concerned about proposed options for collecting SEVIS fees. Accordingly, it made recommendations aimed at improving system performance measurement and resolving educational organizations' Help Desk and fee concerns. Since June 2004, DHS reports that it has taken steps to address GAO recommendations, and in particular it has taken a number of actions to strengthen Help Desk support. Moreover, educational organizations generally agree that SEVIS performance has continued to improve, and that their past fee collection concerns have been alleviated. However, these educational organizations still cite residual Help Desk problems, which they believe create hardships for students and exchange visitors. Most of these organizations, however, do not believe that SEVIS is the reason for the declining number of international students and exchange visitors coming to the United States. These declining numbers were cited in a recent report by the Council of Graduate Schools, which describes declines in foreign graduate student applications, admissions, and enrollments between 2003 and 2004, and further declines in these applications between 2004 and 2005. The report attributes the decline to increased global competition and changed visa policies. In this regard, GAO recently reported on the State Department's efforts to address its prior recommendations for improving the Visas Mantis program (under which interagency security checks are performed to identify applicants who may pose a threat to national security by illegally transferring sensitive technology). According to this report, a combination of federal agency steps resulted in a significant decline in Visas Mantis processing times and in the number of cases pending more than 60 days. The Council of Graduate Schools' report also recognizes the recent Visas Mantis program changes as positive steps. |
gao_GAO-09-34 | gao_GAO-09-34_0 | VR&E Has Strengthened Its Focus on Employment through the Five-Track Employment Process, but Has Not Updated Its Incentive Structure to Align with Its Mission
In response to recommendations from the 2004 Task Force, VR&E has implemented the Five-Track Employment Process and strengthened the program’s focus on employment. The delineation of program services into five tracks is designed to accommodate the different needs of veterans, such as those who need immediate employment as opposed to those who need training to meet their career goal. Specifically, the program offers a monthly subsistence allowance those veterans who are enrolled in education or training, but not to those who receive employment services only. VR&E Has Collaborated with Other Organization s and Added Staff, but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Workforce Planning
Over the last few years, VR&E has increased its capacity to serve veterans by engaging in a number of collaborative initiatives with other organizations and by adding staff to its central and regional offices. Despite these staff increases, the VR&E regional offices still reported staff and skill shortages on our survey. In addition, VR&E officials said they have not fully determined the critical skills and competencies needed by counselors and employment coordinators to achieve the program’s goals. These omissions could lead to some misinterpretation of the program’s performance. Reports Do Not Show Separate Success Rates for Veterans Seeking Employment and Independent Living
Although the VR&E program works with two different groups of veterans, most of whom are focused on employment with a smaller number seeking independent living, VA reports an overall rehabilitation rate for all participants. For example, reporting separate rates would show that those participants seeking employment—the majority of people in the program—have a lower success rate than the overall rate currently reported. VA noted the change in its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, but did not do so for its subsequent fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 Performance and Accountability Reports, or for its fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 budget submissions to Congress. Prior to the calculation change, VR&E was having limited success improving its rehabilitation rate and achieving its performance goals (see fig. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review examined (1) how the implementation of the Five-Track Employment Process has affected the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program’s focus on employment, (2) the extent to which VR&E has taken steps to improve its capacity, and (3) how program outcomes are reported. To address these objectives, we: reviewed agency documents and relevant recommendations from key reports, such as the 2004 VR&E Task Force; analyzed data from the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Corporate WINRS and Benefits Delivery Network (BDN) data systems; interviewed VA and VR&E staff knowledgeable about VR&E planning and operations, and others such as disability experts, members of the 2004 Task Force, veteran service organization representatives, and staff from agencies and organizations that collaborate with VR&E; visited four VA regional offices and conducted interviews with VR&E officers and staff to observe and gather information on workforce planning and how services are provided to veterans; and conducted a survey of VR&E officers at all 57 regional offices to follow up on several key issues relevant to our research objectives. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Veterans Affairs' Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program was reviewed by a VR&E Task Force. It recommended numerous changes, in particular focusing on employment through a new Five-Track service delivery model and increasing program capacity. Since then, VR&E has worked to implement these recommendations. To help Congress understand whether VR&E is now better prepared to meet the needs of veterans with disabilities, GAO was asked to determine (1) how the implementation of the Five-Track Employment Process has affected VR&E's focus on employment, (2) the extent to which VR&E has taken steps to improve its capacity, and (3) how program outcomes are reported. GAO interviewed officials from VR&E, the 2004 Task Force, and veteran organizations; visited four VR&E offices; surveyed all VR&E officers; and analyzed agency data and reports.
What GAO Found
By launching the Five-Track Employment Process, VR&E has strengthened its focus on employment, but program incentives have not been updated to reflect this emphasis. VR&E has delineated its services into five tracks to accommodate the different needs of veterans, such as those who need immediate employment as opposed to those who need training to meet their career goal. However, program incentives remain directed toward education and training. Veterans who receive those services collect an allowance, but those who opt exclusively for employment services do not. While VR&E officials said they believed it would be helpful to better align incentives with the employment mission, they have not yet taken steps to address this issue. VR&E has improved its capacity to provide services by increasing its collaboration with other organizations and by hiring more staff, but it lacks a strategic approach to workforce planning. Although there have been staff increases, many of VR&E's regional offices still reported staff and skill shortages. The program is not addressing these workforce problems with strategic planning practices that GAO's prior work has identified as essential. For example, VR&E officials have not fully determined the correct number of staff and the skills they need to serve current and future veterans. VA does not adequately report program outcomes, which could limit understanding of the program's performance. Specifically, it reports one overall rehabilitation rate for veterans pursuing employment and those trying to live independently. Computing each group's success rate for fiscal year 2008, GAO found a lower rate of success for the majority seeking employment and a higher rate of success for the minority seeking independent living than the overall rate. GAO also found that VR&E changed the way it calculates the rehabilitation rate in fiscal year 2006, without acknowledgments in key agency reports. VA noted the change in its fiscal year 2006 performance report, but did not do so for its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 reports, or for its fiscal year 2008and 2009 budget submissions. Such omissions could lead to misinterpretation of program performance over time. |
gao_GAO-09-993 | gao_GAO-09-993_0 | In working to reform foreign assistance, the Director’s office, State/F, has taken a number of steps to integrate State and USAID foreign assistance processes. Unlike USAID, State DRL manages its democracy grant program centrally. Data Show Largest Allocations for USAID Democracy Assistance
State/F information systems show allocations of approximately $2.25 billion in GJD funding to operating units in fiscal year 2008, with about 85 percent of this amount allocated for State and USAID field-based operating units, primarily country missions. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State DRL funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and most NED funding for democracy programs went to China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total allocation, was allocated to field-based operating units, primarily country missions. However, in response to our request for information on USAID democracy assistance funding, State/F and USAID compiled data provided by USAID missions on GJD funding allocated to USAID for most country-based operating units for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. Annualized funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID; more than $350,000 for State DRL; and more than $100,000 for NED. However, USAID and State DRL officials are often not aware of NED democracy assistance projects, and although NED is not required to report on all of its democracy assistance projects, State DRL officials and USAID mission officials said that information on all NED’s active projects would be useful in ensuring coordinated assistance. State DRL officials responsible for planning and managing democracy grants in 7 of the 10 sample countries also told us that they were not aware of NED’s current projects, and State DRL officials responsible for managing projects in 5 of these 7 countries said that receiving timely information on NED’s projects would improve coordination and help reduce the possibility of duplicative programming. NED officials told us that, although there is no mechanism for routine information sharing on NED projects, NED provides information to State and USAID when asked. USAID Uses Standard and Custom Indicators to Assess and Report Democracy Assistance Results and Provides Some Independent Evaluations of Impacts
USAID uses standard indicators to report quantitative information on immediate results of its democracy assistance programs and develops additional custom indicators to assess specific projects. In addition, USAID sometimes commissions longer-term independent evaluations of program impact. Some USAID mission officials we met with noted that they conducted few independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring impact in the area of democracy assistance. The number of evaluations undertaken by USAID has declined. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe democracy assistance funding provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Labor and Human Rights (State DRL), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in fiscal year 2008; (2) examine USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their democracy assistance activities to ensure complementary programming; and (3) describe USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance activities. In total, we collected detailed information on U.S. democracy programs in 10 countries. We reviewed selected quarterly and final performance reports of USAID-funded democracy projects in the 10 countries, which are required of USAID’s implementing partners. We did not review State DRL and NED practices for assessing results and evaluating impact, because their programs are small and short term relative to USAID’s and because they generally do not conduct independent evaluations of their activities’ impact. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal years 2006- 2008, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which has primary responsibility for promoting democracy abroad, implemented democracy assistance projects in about 90 countries. The Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (State DRL) and the private, nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy (NED) also fund democracy programs in many of these countries. Partly to lessen the risk of duplicative programs, State recently initiated efforts to reform and consolidate State and USAID foreign assistance processes. GAO reviewed (1) democracy assistance funding provided by USAID, State DRL, and NED in fiscal year 2008; (2) USAID, State DRL, and NED efforts to coordinate their democracy assistance; and (3) USAID efforts to assess results and evaluate the impact of its democracy assistance. GAO analyzed U.S. funding and evaluation documents, interviewed USAID, State, and NED officials in the United States and abroad, and reviewed specific democracy projects in 10 countries.
What GAO Found
Data available from State show total democracy assistance allocations of about $2.25 billion for fiscal year 2008. More than $1.95 billion, or about 85 percent of the total allocation, was provided to field-based operating units, primarily country missions. Although complete data on USAID funding per country were not available, USAID mission data, compiled by State and USAID at GAO's request, show that in a sample of 10 countries, most democracy funds are programmed by USAID. In the 10 countries, annual funding per project averaged more than $2 million for USAID, $350,000 for State DRL, and $100,000 for NED. In fiscal year 2008, more than half of State funding for democracy assistance went to Iraq, followed by China, Cuba, Iran, and North Korea, and NED funding for democracy programs was highest for China, Iraq, Russia, Burma, and Pakistan. USAID and State DRL coordinate to help ensure complementary assistance but are often not aware of NED grants. To prevent duplicative programs, State DRL obtains feedback from USAID missions and embassies on project proposals before awarding democracy assistance grants. State DRL officials generally do not participate in USAID missions' planning efforts; some State and USAID officials told GAO that geographic distances between State DRL's centrally managed program and USAID's country mission-based programs would make such participation difficult. Several USAID and State DRL officials responsible for planning and managing democracy assistance told GAO that they lacked information on NED's current projects, which they believed would help inform their own programming decisions. Although NED is not required to report on all of its democracy assistance efforts to State and there currently is no mechanism for regular information sharing, NED told GAO that it has shared information with State and USAID and would routinely provide them with information on current projects if asked. USAID uses standard and custom indicators to assess and report on immediate program results; USAID also conducts some, but relatively infrequent, independent evaluations of longer-term programs. The standard indicators, developed by State, generally focus on numbers of activities or immediate results of a program, while custom indicators measure additional program results. USAID commissions a limited number of independent evaluations of program impact. USAID mission officials told GAO that they did not conduct many independent evaluations of democracy assistance because of the resources involved in the undertaking and the difficulty of measuring impact in the area of democracy assistance. In response to a 2008 National Research Council report on USAID's democracy evaluation capacity, USAID has reported initiating several steps--for example, designing impact evaluations for six missions as part of a pilot program. |
gao_GAO-02-396 | gao_GAO-02-396_0 | To participate in the program, communities must adopt and enforce floodplain management ordinances to mitigate the effects of flooding on new or existing homes in special flood hazard areas (SFHA). In contrast, FEMA officials believe that many lenders frequently are not complying with the requirements, which is an opinion based largely on noncompliance estimates computed from data on mortgages, flood zones, and insurance policies; limited studies on compliance; and anecdotal evidence indicating that insurance is not in place where required. Nevertheless, they believe that the preponderance of information available to them indicates that lenders are not fully ensuring compliance with flood insurance purchase requirements. These data, in the aggregate, do not suggest that noncompliance is widespread at the time of loan origination in highly flood-prone areas. These structures have different purchase requirements than other residential properties. Mortgage, Flood Determination, and Insurance Policy Data Needed to Fully Assess Compliance, but Challenges Exist
Property-specific data on mortgages, flood zone determinations, and flood insurance policies—obtained both at loan origination and at various points during the life of the loan to ensure the insurance remains in force—would be needed to fully assess compliance. The regulators and GSEs, on the one hand, and FEMA, on the other, have differing viewpoints of the viability of and need for obtaining these data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials and bank regulators disagree about whether lenders are fully complying with the flood insurance purchase requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). What are the bases for the differing perspectives on lender noncompliance? What does other readily available data indicate about the level of noncompliance? These procedures require that for the flood insurance component of the examinations the regulators assess whether an institution performs required flood determinations for home mortgage loans, including mobile homes affixed to a permanent foundation; if the institution requires flood insurance in the correct amount when it makes, increases, extends, or renews a covered loan; if the institution provides the required notices to the borrower whenever flood insurance is required as a condition of the loan; if the institution requires flood insurance premiums to be escrowed when other items, such as hazard insurance and taxes, are required to be escrowed; and if the institution complies with the forced placement provisions in cases where flood insurance on the loan is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the regulation. For larger institutions, examiners review a nonprojectable sample of loans. | What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) run National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has combined flood hazard mitigation efforts and insurance to protect homeowners against losses from floods. The program provides an incentive for communities to adopt floodplain management ordinances to mitigate the effect of flooding upon new or existing structures. Virtually all communities in the country with flood-prone areas now participate in the NFIP, and over four million U.S. households have flood insurance. Nevertheless, the President's proposed budget for 2003 characterizes the NFIP as "moderately effective," because many at-risk properties remain uninsured. The proposed budget establishes a goal to increase flood insurance policies in force by five percent in 2003 and would increase funding for flood zone mapping activities to better identify at-risk properties. Although the assessment and goal described in the proposed budget apply to the entire NFIP, the success of a particular component of the program--the mandatory purchase requirement--has been the subject of debate for many years. The federal bank regulators overseeing lending institutions that hold or service mortgages on properties that must have flood insurance believe that there is a high level of compliance. However, others have questioned whether the requirements are being met. The different types of evidence collected by bank regulators and government-sponsored enterprises on the one hand, and FEMA on the other, are the bases for their opposing perspectives on lender noncompliance with flood insurance purchase requirements. Federal organizations overseeing lenders use bank examinations and loan portfolio reviews to examine a nonstatistical sample of loans for compliance. These organizations uncovered few significant violations, leading them to believe that lenders are complying with flood insurance purchase requirements. In contrast, FEMA relies on its own noncompliance estimates from data it generates itself, from other entities, limited studies it conducted, and anecdotal evidence from public officials and others with knowledge of the program to gauge noncompliance. These data indicate that lenders are not adequately complying with the requirements. GAO's analysis of readily available data does not suggest a major noncompliance problem at loan origination in highly flood-prone areas. Property-specific data on mortgages, flood zone determinations, and flood insurance policies--compiled at loan origination and at various points during the life of the loan--would be needed to fully measure compliance. These data are needed to ensure that homeowners purchase, maintain, and do not terminate required flood insurance. |
gao_GAO-16-179T | gao_GAO-16-179T_0 | Background
VA’s Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) has overall responsibility for the verification program. VA uses contractors to support its verification program and federal employees oversee the contractors and review and approve verification decisions. Our most recent work on this program in 2013 found that VA had made significant changes to address previously identified program weaknesses, but that it still faced challenges establishing a stable and efficient program to verify firms on a timely and consistent basis. Therefore, we recommended that VA (1) refine and implement a strategic plan with outcome-oriented long-term goals and performance measures, and (2) integrate efforts to modify or replace the program’s data system with a broader strategic planning effort to ensure the system addresses the program’s short- and long-term needs. VA Took Steps to Improve Its Verification Program and Communication with Veterans
Based on our preliminary observations, VA has improved its timeliness for application processing, followed its policies for verifying businesses, continued to refine quality controls for the program, and improved communications with veterans. For instance, CVE reported its processing times have improved by more than 50 percent since October 2012, going from an average processing time of approximately 85 days to 41 days in fiscal year 2015. For example, CVE has developed detailed written work instructions for each part of the verification process, and developed a quality manual that documents the requirements of its quality management system. Additionally, CVE implemented an internal audit and continuous improvement process. As of September 2015, CVE had taken action on and closed 364 of 379 (96 percent) internal audit recommendations made from June 2014 through August 2015. CVE also conducted post-verification site visits to 606 firms in fiscal year 2015 to check the accuracy of verification decisions and help ensure that firms continued to comply with program regulations. We will continue to monitor these issues and report our final results early next year. Our preliminary work revealed that since our 2013 report, VA has made several changes to improve veterans’ experiences with the verification program and reduced the percentage of firms that receive denials from 66 percent in 2012 to 5 percent in 2015, according to agency data. Three of the four verification assistance counselors we spoke with stated that VA’s new policies to allow veterans to withdraw or submit changes to their application represented a positive change. They also said VA was interacting more with veteran service organizations and veterans at conferences for veteran-owned small businesses and town hall meetings. However, three of the four verification assistance counselors noted that resources on VA’s website for the verification program can be difficult to locate and representatives from one veteran service organization said VA does not provide adequate documentation of the program standards for applicants. VA Has Addressed Some Program Challenges, but Preliminary Findings Indicate That VA Lacks a Comprehensive Operational Plan
Despite the significant improvements VA has made to its verification program, it continues to face challenges establishing a more cost- effective, veteran-friendly verification process, and acquiring an information technology system that meets the agency’s needs. The efforts that VA has either made or currently has underway include restructuring the verification process, revising verification program regulations, changing the program’s organizational structure, and developing a new case management system—some of which have been ongoing since our January 2013 report. While these efforts are intended to help address some of the challenges associated with the verification program, VA lacks a comprehensive operational plan with specific actions and milestone dates for managing these efforts and achieving its long-term objectives for the program. VA intends to restructure part of the verification process in an effort to make it more veteran-focused and cost-effective. In August 2015, VA began a pilot for a new verification process that makes a case manager the point of contact for the veteran and the coordinator of staff evaluating the application. Officials stated that VA plans to finalize the new process in October 2015 and fully transition to the new process by April 2016. We plan to include additional information on this study in our upcoming report. Since 2011, CVE has had three different directors, the last two of which have been acting directors. VA has faced delays in replacing the verification program’s outdated case management system. If the pilot is successful, VA plans to issue a solicitation and award a contract for development of a full system by April 2016 and fully transition to the new system by September 2016. But, the plan does not have an integrated schedule that includes specific actions and milestone dates for achieving program changes or discuss how the various efforts described above might be coordinated. Useful practices and lessons learned from organizational transformation show that organizations should set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one. We are continuing to assess the issues discussed in this statement and as we finalize our work for issuance early next year, we will consider making recommendations, as appropriate. I would be happy to answer any questions at this time. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA must give contracting preferences to service-disabled and other veteran-owned small businesses and verify the ownership and control of firms seeking such preferences. GAO found in 2013 ( GAO-13-95 ) that VA faced challenges in verifying firms on a timely and consistent basis, developing and implementing long-term strategic plans, and enhancing information technology infrastructure. This testimony discusses preliminary observations on (1) VA's progress in establishing a timely and consistent verification program and improving communication with veterans, and (2) the steps VA has taken to identify and address verification program challenges and long-term goals.
This statement is based on GAO's ongoing review of VA's verification program. GAO reviewed VA's verification procedures and strategic plan, reviewed a random sample of 96 verification applications, and interviewed VA officials, and representatives from two veterans' organizations, and four verification assistance counselors.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's preliminary observations, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made significant improvements to its verification process and communication with veterans since GAO's 2013 report. VA reported it reduced its average application processing times by more than 50 percent—from 85 days in 2012 to 41 in 2015. GAO reviewed a randomly selected sample of verification applications and found that VA followed its procedures for reviewing applications. VA continued to refine its quality management by developing written work instructions for every part of the verification process, and implemented an internal audit process. As of September 2015, VA had taken action on and closed 364 of 379 (96 percent) of internal audit recommendations. The agency also conducted post-verification site visits to 606 firms in fiscal year 2015 to check the accuracy of verification decisions and help ensure continued compliance with program regulations. Since 2013, VA has made several changes to improve veterans' experiences with the program. For example, VA revised procedures to allow veterans additional opportunities to withdraw their applications or submit additional information and has partnered with federally supported assistance centers to provide assistance to veterans applying for verification. Correspondingly, the percentage of firms that received denials has dropped from 66 percent in 2012 to 5 percent in 2015. Veterans' organizations and verification counselors with whom GAO spoke noted improvements in VA's communications and interactions with veterans, although most verification counselors we spoke with suggested the program's website and letters to veterans could be clearer.
VA has multiple efforts underway to make its verification program more cost-effective and veteran-friendly, but GAO's preliminary results indicate that it lacks a comprehensive operational plan to guide its efforts. For instance, VA intends to restructure part of its verification process and in August 2015, began a pilot that gives veterans one point of contact (a case manager, who would be aware of the specifics of the application throughout the verification process). VA plans to fully transition to this new process by April 2016. VA also plans to change the program's organizational structure and hire a director for the program, which has had three different directors, the last two of which have been acting directors, since 2011. Finally, VA plans to replace the program's outdated case management system, but has faced delays due to contractor performance issues. Efforts are under way to develop and evaluate a pilot system by January 2016 and fully transition to the new case management system by September 2016. VA has developed a high-level operating plan that identified objectives for the office overseeing the verification program—the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU). But the plan does not include an integrated schedule with specific actions and milestone dates for achieving the multiple program changes under way or discuss how these various efforts might be coordinated within OSDBU. GAO's work on organizational transformations states that organizations should set implementation goals and a timeline to show progress. Such a plan is vital to managing multiple efforts to completion and achieving long-term program objectives, particularly when senior-level staffing for the verification program has lacked continuity. GAO continues to assess these issues and will report its results early next year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations at this time; as it finalizes its work for issuance early next year, it will consider making recommendations, as appropriate. GAO obtained comments from VA and incorporated them as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-636T | gao_GAO-15-636T_0 | The SAB is authorized to, among other things, review the adequacy of the scientific and technical basis of EPA’s proposed regulations. Unlike CASAC, which was established by amendments to the Clean Air Act, the SAB was established under ERDDAA, and since 1980, has been required to provide scientific advice to designated congressional committees when requested. Our Preliminary Observations Indicate That EPA’s Procedures for Processing Congressional Requests to the SAB Do Not Ensure Compliance with ERDDAA
Our preliminary observations indicate that EPA’s procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the SAB do not ensure compliance with ERDDAA because the procedures are incomplete and do not fully account for the statutory access designated congressional committees have to the SAB. Specifically, EPA policy documents do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and members of the SAB panel are to handle a congressional committee’s request for advice from the SAB. The SAB charter briefly noted how congressional committees could access SAB advice, stating; “While the SAB reports to the EPA Administrator, congressional committees specified in ERDDAA may ask the EPA Administrator to have SAB provide advice on a particular issue.” (GAO italics) Beyond what the charter states, however, no EPA policy specified a process the Administrator should use to have the SAB review a congressional request and provide advice. However, under the agencies are to clearly document federal standards of internal control,internal controls and the documentation is to appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Specifically, officials told us that EPA considers whether the questions are science or policy driven, whether they are important to science and the agency, and whether the SAB has already undertaken a similar review. However, these criteria are not documented. In addition, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees, regardless of EPA’s judgment. As EPA has not fully responded to the committee’s two 2013 requests to the SAB, by clearly documenting its procedures for reviewing congressional requests to determine which questions should be taken up by the SAB and criteria for evaluating requests, the agency can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process these and other congressional committee requests consistently and in accordance with both FACA and ERDDAA. Furthermore, the charter states that, when scientific advice is requested by one of the committees specified in ERDDAA, the Administrator will, when appropriate, forward the SAB’s advice to the requesting congressional committee. Such specificity would be consistent with federal standards of internal control that call for clearly documenting internal controls. We will continue to monitor these issues and, as we finalize our work in this area, we will consider making recommendations, as appropriate. We plan to issue our final results in June 2015. CASAC Has Provided Certain Types of Advice Related to Air Quality Standards
CASAC has provided certain types of advice related to the review of NAAQS. The Clean Air Act requires CASAC to review air quality criteria and existing NAAQS every 5 years and advise EPA of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. According to a senior EPA official, CASAC has carried out its role in reviewing the air quality criteria and the NAAQS but has never provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects of strategies to implement the NAAQS because EPA has never asked it to. In a June 2014 letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC indicated that, at the agency’s request, it would review the impacts (e.g., the economic or energy impacts) of strategies for attaining or maintaining the NAAQS but stressed that such a review would be separate from reviews of the scientific bases of NAAQS. According to a senior EPA official, the agency has no plans to ask CASAC to provide advice on adverse effects. | Why GAO Did This Study
EPA formulates rules to protect the environment and public health. To enhance the quality and credibility of such rules, EPA obtains advice and recommendations from the SAB and CASAC—two federal advisory committees that review the scientific and technical basis for EPA decision making. ERDDAA requires the SAB to provide both the EPA Administrator and designated congressional committees with scientific advice as requested. Amendments to the Clean Air Act established CASAC to, among other things, provide advice to the Administrator on NAAQS.
This testimony reflects GAO's preliminary observations from its ongoing review that examines (1) the extent to which EPA procedures for processing congressional requests to the SAB ensure compliance with ERDDAA and (2) the extent to which CASAC has provided advice related to NAAQS.
GAO reviewed relevant federal regulations and agency documents, and interviewed EPA, SAB, and other relevant officials.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this testimony, but as it finalizes its work in this area, GAO will consider making recommendations, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) procedures for processing congressional requests for scientific advice from the Science Advisory Board (SAB) do not ensure compliance with the Environmental Research, Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978 (ERDDAA) because these procedures are incomplete. For example, they do not clearly outline how the EPA Administrator, the SAB staff office, and others are to handle a congressional committee's request. While the procedures reflect EPA's responsibility to exercise general management controls over the SAB and all its federal advisory committees under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), including keeping such committees free from outside influence, they do not fully account for the specific access that designated congressional committees have to the SAB under ERDDAA. For example, EPA's policy documents do not establish how EPA will determine which questions would be taken up by the SAB. EPA officials told GAO that, in responding to congressional requests, EPA follows the same process that it would apply to internal requests for questions to the SAB, including considering whether the questions are science or policy driven or are important to science and the agency. However, EPA has not documented these criteria. Under the federal standards of internal control, agencies are to clearly document internal controls. Moreover, under ERDDAA, the SAB is required to provide requested scientific advice to select committees. By clearly documenting how to process congressional requests received under ERDDAA, including which criteria to use, EPA can provide reasonable assurance that its staff process responses consistently and in accordance with law. Furthermore, EPA's charter states that, when scientific advice is requested by one of the committees specified in ERDDAA, the Administrator will, when appropriate forward the SAB's advice to the requesting congressional committee. EPA policy does not specify when it would be “appropriate” for the EPA Administrator to take this action. Such specificity would be consistent with clearly documenting internal controls. GAO will continue to monitor these issues and plans to issue a report with its final results in June 2015.
The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) has provided certain types of advice related to the review of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), but has not provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects related to NAAQs. Under the Clean Air Act, CASAC is to review air quality criteria and existing NAAQS every 5 years and advise EPA of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects that may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance of NAAQS. An EPA official stated that CASAC has carried out its role in reviewing the air quality criteria and the NAAQS, but CASAC has never provided advice on adverse social, economic, or energy effects related to NAAQS because EPA has never asked CASAC to do so. In a June 2014 letter to the EPA Administrator, CASAC indicated it would review such effects at the agency's request. According to a senior EPA official, the agency has no plans to ask CASAC to provide advice on such adverse effects. |
gao_GAO-04-231T | gao_GAO-04-231T_0 | Background
Interoperability problems existed among public safety agencies for many years prior to the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and New York City. Reports on incidents have documented a number of problems in public safety wireless communications. For over 15 years the federal government has been concerned about public safety spectrum issues, including communications interoperability issues. A variety of federal agencies have been involved in defining the problem and identifying potential solutions. In addition, Congress has taken several actions over the past two decades to address the availability and use of the public safety wireless spectrum. The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in greater public and governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capacity to respond to emergencies, including those resulting from terrorist incidents. The First Challenge: Identifying and Defining the Interoperability Problem
In discussing the issue of interoperable communications, it is important to recognize that interoperable communications is not merely a technological issue or an end in itself. It is rather a key means of achieving a desirable objective—the effective response to and mitigation of events or incidents that require the coordinated actions of emergency responders. Traditionally, first responders have been considered to be fire, police and emergency medical service personnel. Second Challenge: Establishing National Goals and Requirements
When the interoperability problem has been sufficiently defined and bounded, the next challenge will be to develop national interoperability performance goals and technical standards that balance consistency with the need for flexibility in adapting them to state and regional needs and circumstances. Third Challenge: Need to Define Intergovernmental Roles
As noted above, the federal government has a long history in addressing federal, state, and local government public safety issues–in particular interoperability issues. AGILE is the Department of Justice program to assist state and local law enforcement agencies to effectively and efficiently communicate with one another across agency and jurisdictional boundaries. This role is being defined by states and local governments as they address problems they recognize exist in their communications systems and by the FCC and the NTIA. The Fundamental Barrier to Success: The Absence of Effective Coordinated Planning and Collaboration
The barriers to successfully addressing the three challenges we have outlined are multifaceted. No one first responder group, jurisdiction, or level of government can successfully address the challenges posed by the current state of interoperable communications. Effectively addressing these challenges requires the partnership, leadership, and collaboration of all first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government—local, state, federal, and tribal. | Why GAO Did This Study
The inability of first responders--police officers, firemen, hazardous materials teams, emergency medical service personnel, and others--to communicate effectively with one another as needed during an emergency is a long-standing and widely recognized problem in many areas across the country. When first responders cannot communicate effectively as needed, it can literally cost lives--of both emergency responders and those they are trying to assist. At the request of the Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, we are examining the barriers to improved interoperability and the roles that federal, state, and local governments can play in improving wireless interoperability communications.
What GAO Found
Interoperability problems existed among public safety agencies for many years prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Reports on incidents have documented a number of problems in public safety wireless communications. For over 15 years the Federal Government has been concerned about public safety spectrum issues, including communications interoperability issues. A variety of federal agencies have been involved in defining the problem and identifying potential solutions. In addition, Congress has taken several actions over the past two decades to address the availability and use of public safety wireless spectrum. The events of September 11 have resulted in greater public and governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capacity to respond to emergencies, including those resulting from terrorist incidents. The interoperability issues that the nation faces today did not arise overnight and they will not be successfully addressed overnight. Federal, state, and local governments face several major challenges in addressing interoperability in their wireless communications. The first challenge is to clearly identify and define the problem. For example, it is important to recognize that interoperable communications is not an end in itself, but it is rather one component for achieving an important goal--the ability to respond effectively to and mitigate incidents that require the coordinated actions of first responders. The second challenge is whether and how to establish national interoperability performance goals and standards and balance them with the flexibility needed to address differences in state, regional and local needs and conditions. The third challenge is defining the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other entities in defining the problem, implementing any national goals and standards, and assessing alternative means of achieving those goals and standards. The fundamental barrier to successfully addressing these challenges has been the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary and intergovernmental planning. No one first responder group or governmental agency can successfully "fix" the interoperability problems that face our nation. It will require the partnership, leadership, and coordinated planning of everyone involved. |
gao_GGD-95-98 | gao_GGD-95-98_0 | We interviewed agency program and budget officials and reviewed agency planning and budget documents that they provided to accomplish our other objectives to describe the agencies’ plans, funding, actions to implement other improvements the agencies made to economic statistics, and fiscal year 1995 budget requests for additional economic statistical improvements. The most serious problem noted by the working group was in measuring output and quality improvements to goods and services in a rapidly changing economy. Agencies Made Plans and Requested and Received at Least Partial Funding for Most ESI Recommendations
The federal agencies responsible for implementing the ESI recommendations made plans to implement most of them. Agencies’ Plans to Address ESI Recommendations Were Still in Progress
As of May 1994, the agencies’ plans were in various phases of completion. Agencies Requested Funding for Further Improvements in Fiscal Year 1995
According to agency officials, because ESI was never intended to address all the problems in economic statistics and because many of the plans for the ESI recommendations were not completed, further efforts were needed to improve the quality of economic statistics. As of December 31, 1994, $18 million in appropriations had been approved for the fiscal year. Senior policy officials expressed their views of what is still needed to address problems in economic statistics. Similarly, NBER’s 1989 Conference on Research on Income and Wealth focused on problems with economic statistics, particularly problems with measuring international transactions. Continue BLS and Census efforts to improve and modernize the current population survey and the current employment statistics program. Agency Plans
BLS did not make specific plans for this recommendation. Fiscal Year 1995 Funds Requested and Received for Economic Statistical Improvements
BEA, Census, BLS, and NASS requested more than $38 million and received more than $18 million in additional funding in fiscal year 1995 for economic statistical improvements. 6.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the actions taken by federal agencies to implement the Economics Statistics Initiative (ESI), focusing on: (1) the Council of Economic Advisers' (CEA) recommendations that comprise ESI and the context of their development; (2) the agencies' ESI implementation plans and the associated budget resources requested and received for fiscal year (FY) 1990 through FY 1994; (3) ESI implementation actions through May 1994; (4) other completed or ongoing major program improvements outside of ESI; and (5) FY 1995 budget resources requested and received for economic statistical improvements and the agencies' views on what is needed to make further statistical improvements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) CEA made 38 near-term ESI recommendations to address well-known problems in economic statistics, particularly in measuring output and quality improvements to goods and services in a rapidly changing economy; (2) the federal agencies responsible for ESI implementation made plans to implement most of the ESI recommendations and requested more than $95 million and received about $50 million from FY 1990 through FY 1994 to implement their plans; (3) as of May 1994, most of the agencies' implementation plans were still in progress and agencies cited budget limitations for delaying their development; (4) some agencies considered other ongoing nonESI efforts to improve economic statistics responsive to ESI and did not make new plans; (5) the agencies believed further efforts were needed to improve economic statistics, since ESI was never meant to address all the problems with economic statistics and many ESI plans were not completed; (6) the agencies have requested $38 million for additional statistics improvements in FY 1995 and, as of December 1994, $18 million in appropriations had been approved; and (7) senior policy officials believe that more funding and better leadership is needed to further improve economic statistics. |
gao_GAO-09-413T | gao_GAO-09-413T_0 | Providing census results. Role of IT in the Decennial Census
Automation and IT are to play a critical role in the success of the 2010 census by supporting data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Several systems will play a key role in the 2010 census. These activities were originally to be conducted using IT systems and infrastructure developed by the FDCA program. Dress Rehearsal Includes Testing of Certain Systems and Operations
In preparation for the 2010 census, the Bureau planned what it refers to as the Dress Rehearsal. Bureau Is Making Progress in Key System Testing, but Lacks Plans and Schedules
Through the Dress Rehearsal and other testing activities, the Bureau has completed key system tests, but significant testing has yet to be done, and planning for this is not complete. However, significant activities remain to be completed. In addition, the Bureau has not established a master list of interfaces between key systems, or plans and schedules for integration testing of these interfaces. With the limited amount of time remaining before systems are needed for 2010 operations, the lack of comprehensive plans and schedules increases the risk that the Bureau may not be able to adequately test system interfaces, and that interfaced systems may not work together as intended. Bureau Has Conducted Limited End-to-End Testing as Part of the Dress Rehearsal, but Has Not Developed Testing Plans for Critical Operations
Although several critical operations underwent end-to-end testing in the Dress Rehearsal, others did not. As of December 2008, the Bureau had not established testing plans or schedules for end-to-end testing of the key operations that were removed from the Dress Rehearsal, nor has it determined when these plans will be completed. Bureau Lacks Sufficient Executive-Level Oversight and Guidance for Testing
As stated in our testing guide and IEEE standards, oversight of testing activities includes both planning and ongoing monitoring of testing activities. However, these products do not provide comprehensive status information on the progress of testing key systems and interfaces. Further, the assessment of testing progress has not been based on quantitative and specific metrics. The lack of quantitative and specific metrics to track progress limits the Bureau’s ability to accurately assess the status and progress of testing activities. The Bureau also has weaknesses in its testing guidance. In summary, while the Bureau’s program offices have made progress in testing key decennial systems, much work remains to ensure that systems operate as intended for conducting an accurate and timely 2010 census. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Decennial Census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides vital data that are used, among other things, to reapportion and redistrict congressional seats and allocate federal financial assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges, including weaknesses in the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) management of its information technology (IT) systems and operations. In conducting the 2010 census, the Bureau is relying on both the acquisition of new IT systems and the enhancement of existing systems. Thoroughly testing these systems before their actual use is critical to the success of the census. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, on the status and plans of testing of key 2010 decennial IT systems.
What GAO Found
Although the Bureau has made progress in testing key decennial systems, critical testing activities remain to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 census. Bureau program offices have completed some testing of individual systems, but significant work still remains to be done, and many plans have not yet been developed (see table below). In its testing of system integration, the Bureau has not completed critical activities; it also lacks a master list of interfaces between systems and has not developed testing plans and schedules. Although the Bureau had originally planned what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, starting in 2006, to serve as a comprehensive end-to-end test of key operations and systems, significant problems were identified during testing. As a result, several key operations were removed from the Dress Rehearsal and did not undergo end-to-end testing. The Bureau has neither developed testing plans for these key operations, nor has it determined when such plans will be completed. Weaknesses in the Bureau's testing progress and plans can be attributed in part to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance. Bureau management does provide oversight of system testing activities, but the oversight activities are not sufficient. For example, Bureau reports do not provide comprehensive status information on progress in testing key systems and interfaces, and assessments of the overall status of testing for key operations are not based on quantitative metrics. Further, although the Bureau has issued general testing guidance, it is neither mandatory nor specific enough to ensure consistency in conducting system testing. Without adequate oversight and more comprehensive guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems and properly prioritizing testing activities before the 2010 Decennial Census, posing the risk that these systems may not perform as planned. |
gao_NSIAD-95-14 | gao_NSIAD-95-14_0 | These studies have repeatedly presented a number of the same issues and recommendations. The April 1994 PAT report entitled Blueprint for Change: Report of the Process Action Team on Military Specifications and Standards is the foundation for DOD’s current milspec reform program. This program is based on essentially the same recommendations contained in earlier reports addressing milspec reform. However, the PAT report goes further than previous efforts, as it includes more details for implementation, and additional steps were taken in June 1994, when DOD issued its implementation plan. For this recommendation, the report identifies six tasks for implementation, such as appointing the Executives by a specified date and developing a separate budget line item for the funding they control; a risk to successful implementation, the concern that adequate resources might be unavailable; a barrier, the failure of past DOD leadership to demonstrate long-term commitment to the milspecs improvement program; benefits, such as helping foster cultural change, and disadvantages, such as creating another DOD power base; estimated costs of about $269 million for the entire milspecs improvement program over 6 fiscal years starting in 1994; and time frames for the tasks. According to OSD officials, the implementation plan is simply the first step in a long-range, iterative process. Program Focuses on Changing the Acquisition Culture
The major focus of the current milspec reform program is on changing DOD’s acquisition culture. The Secretary of Defense, in signing the memorandum to implement the reform program, stated that the current senior leadership is committed to ensuring that acquisition reform changes will be accepted and institutionalized. Currently, the funding and personnel responsible for developing and maintaining milspecs used by DOD are decentralized with OSD providing overall policy and guidance. Specifically, we observed that (1) data on the benefits of implementing the recommended actions were generally not available, (2) opportunities for advancing acquisition reform goals had not been prioritized, and (3) indicators were not adequate to measure progress toward intended goals. DOD officials acknowledged the need for further work in these areas as implementation proceeds. Identifying monetary savings could be critical to achieving acceptance of the reform program by officials throughout the acquisition community. 1. 2. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement acquisition reforms, focusing on whether its current program: (1) advances military specifications and standards reform; and (2) gives adequate attention to key issues and concerns.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's current milspec reform program builds on previous studies; (2) although many of the recommendations are essentially the same as those in earlier reports, the current program goes further than previous efforts because it includes more details for implementation; (3) while the implementation strategy is still being refined, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense stated that the June 1994 implementation plan is the first step in a long-range, iterative process; (4) major buying commands and centers are to present plans by November 1994 that should provide further implementation details; (5) the current milspec reform effort focuses on changing the acquisition culture and contains several actions intended to accomplish this change, including: (a) ensuring long-term, top-management support; (b) providing training to the affected workforce; (c) securing adequate funding and personnel resources; and (d) establishing incentives for desired behavior; (6) these actions have been used successfully by some commercial companies to promote cultural change; (7) to achieve the major cultural change desired, DOD will need acceptance and support of the milspec reform program throughout the military acquisition community, including both DOD's and contractors' offices; (8) achieving this acceptance and support could become more difficult without: (a) improved data on the benefits of implementing the recommended actions; (b) better focus on areas with the greatest opportunities for benefits; and (c) adequate indicators, referred to by DOD as metrics, to measure progress toward intended goals; and (9) DOD officials have acknowledged difficulties in these areas and indicated that actions would be taken to address these shortcomings as program implementation continues. |
gao_GAO-02-355 | gao_GAO-02-355_0 | USPS reported a deficit of $1.68 billion for fiscal year 2001 and has budgeted a deficit of $1.35 billion for fiscal year 2002. Currently, USPS’s liabilities exceed its assets. Currently, cash flow from USPS operations is insufficient to fully fund its operational and capital investment needs and repay its debts. Transformation Required to Make USPS Financially Viable
A comprehensive transformation of the Postal Service is needed to ensure its financial viability and fulfill its mission in the 21st century in the dynamic communications and delivery sectors. Furthermore, USPS faces legal and practical constraints related to restructuring its infrastructure, including closing or consolidating postal facilities and realigning its workforce as its operations change. USPS’s basic business model, which assumes that rising mail volume will help cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, is increasingly problematic as mail volume either stagnates or further declines while costs continue to rise. Limited Progress Made to Increase Productivity
USPS has had long-standing difficulty in its efforts to increase postal productivity. Comments from the U.S. | What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) continues to experience deficits, severe cash-flow problems, rising debt, and liabilities that exceed its assets. USPS also lacks enough income to fund needed investments in safety, maintenance, expansion, and modernization and to cover its liabilities. USPS reported a $1.68 billion deficit in fiscal year 2001, up from $199 million a year earlier. The pressure to increase rates will mount as USPS contends with growing long-term obligations, including employee retirement and health benefits. Although USPS assumes that rising mail volume will cover rising costs and mitigate rate increases, this business model is increasingly problematic because of the potential for declining or stagnating mail volume. USPS has had little success in sustaining productivity increases. USPS' financial viability is also hindered by structural, legal, and practical constraints that make it difficult to close or consolidate postal facilities or realign the postal workforce. USPS must undertake a comprehensive transformation to address its financial, operational, and human capital challenges. USPS also needs to produce more timely and accessible financial information. |
gao_GGD-99-119 | gao_GGD-99-119_0 | DOD delivers most of the health care needed by active duty personnel and military retirees through its military hospitals and clinics. The DOD Subvention Demonstration
The BBA established a 3-year demonstration of Medicare subvention, to start on January 1, 1998, and end on December 31, 2000. A VA subvention demonstration would serve certain higher-income, Medicare-eligible veterans (effectively, Priority Group 7 veterans): for a limited time period, such as 3 years; in a limited number of locations; and in compliance with Medicare rules that HCFA applies to the private sector, although HCFA could waive rules that were inappropriate or irrelevant to VA. direct VA to maintain reserves against the risk that appropriated funds would be needed to pay for the care of veterans enrolled in the subvention demonstration. It is not yet known what effect DOD’s extensive use of contractors will have on DOD costs for Senior Prime. That would make contractor quality, relationships, and costs a pivotal and uncertain feature of a potential DOD subvention program. A reconciliation after the end of the year to determine final Medicare payments can result in DOD returning a portion of those interim payments if the LOE for all sites for the entire year is not reached. Proposed VA Demonstration Can Benefit From DOD Experience
One of the key issues for VA under the proposed demonstration would be how to market subvention and persuade veterans in subvention sites to enroll in the demonstration. Two models are possible for the demonstration—fee for service and managed care. If a VA subvention demonstration were to include both managed care and fee-for-service sites, a phased implementation, with one type of delivery system being successfully implemented before the other started, would allow both HCFA and VA to focus their resources. VA and HCFA have tentatively agreed to rules that are consistent with the DOD rules and still contain many of the elements that have made it difficult for DOD to manage the demonstration. Good data, consistent across sites, would also be needed to manage and evaluate the demonstration. Concluding Observations
Subvention holds significant potential for giving military retirees and veterans an additional option for health care coverage, for giving DOD and VA additional funds, and for saving Medicare money. If a VA demonstration were authorized, VA would clearly need sufficient time to plan and initiate it. VA could also increase its chance of successfully establishing the demonstration if it took advantage of DOD’s experience. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Medicare subvention demonstration program, focusing on: (1) the early phases of implementing the DOD demonstration; (2) issues raised by that experience for DOD subvention; and (3) lessons from the DOD demonstration for a possible Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) demonstration.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) subvention holds the potential to benefit military retirees and veterans, DOD and VA, and Medicare; (2) although it got off to a slow start, DOD has initiated its subvention demonstration and is now serving Medicare-eligible military retirees at six sites; (3) several key operational issues remain; (4) these include development of more understandable payment rules, viable for the longer term, and development of data to manage the demonstration and support its evaluation; (5) most important, the demonstration's final results, in terms of access to health care, quality of patient care, and costs to DOD, Medicare, and retirees, will not be known until the evaluation is completed, several months after the end of the demonstration in December 2000; (6) DOD's early experience with subvention does offer insights if proposals are acted on to permit Medicare subvention for VA; (7) in particular, it would need to consider, in collaboration with the Health Care Financing Administration, how to determine its baseline costs and payment rules, as well as the need for good data for implementation, management, and controlling costs; (8) moreover, VA would need to make its regular enrollment of veterans who wish to use VA health care services interface smoothly with subvention demonstration enrollment; (9) VA would also need to be concerned about potential crowding-out of other, higher-priority veterans by subvention enrollees; and (10) GAO's early work on DOD subvention suggests that VA would have a greater chance of success if it has sufficient time to plan and establish the demonstration, and if the value and feasibility of implementing fee-for-service and managed care subvention models simultaneously were reconsidered. |
gao_GAO-13-688 | gao_GAO-13-688_0 | PEPFAR supports the national HIV response in more than 30 countries. PEPFAR Has Helped Countries Expand Treatment Programs and Increase Their Efficiency and Effectiveness
Our recent reports have concluded that PEPFAR has helped partner countries expand treatment programs and increase program efficiency and effectiveness. PEPFAR’s per-patient treatment costs have declined significantly, facilitating substantial increases in the number of people on ARV treatment. PEPFAR has also worked with U.S. implementing agencies, international donors, and partner countries to increase the efficiency and reliability of ARV drug supply chains. Declining Per-Patient Treatment Costs
According to OGAC, PEPFAR’s per-patient treatment costs declined from about $1,053 to about $339 from 2005 to 2011, based on budget calculations. Of the 23 PEPFAR country teams directly providing treatment services, 20 provided data on this indicator in their fiscal year 2012 reports to OGAC, and 10 of the 20 reported retention rates at or above 80 percent for facilities where PEPFAR implementing partners directly support treatment services. More Efficient and Reliable Drug Supply Chains
Our work shows that PEPFAR has worked with U.S. implementing agencies, international donors, and partner countries to increase the efficiency and reliability of ARV drug supply chains. Better Information Management Is Key to Helping Countries Improve and Expand Treatment Programs
Our recent work has found that, as PEPFAR partner countries assume greater responsibility for managing their treatment programs, better information management remains crucial to helping countries improve and expand treatment programs. Our reviews of PEPFAR treatment costs, results, and ARV drug supply chains have revealed some limitations in the completeness, timeliness, and consistency of key program information. We also found important information lacking in PEPFAR program evaluations, plans, and results reporting. More Complete and Timely Cost Data Could Help Countries Manage Costs and Plan Treatment Expansion More Effectively
Despite substantial declines in per-patient treatment costs, it is important that countries continue to improve the efficiency of their programs to expand to meet the needs of the estimated 23 million people eligible for ARV treatment under recent WHO guidelines. More Consistent, Complete, and Timely Information on Treatment Results Could Enhance the Quality of Treatment Programs
OGAC has reported on PEPFAR treatment program results primarily in terms of (1) numbers of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR, (2) percentages of eligible people receiving treatment, and (3) percentages of people alive and on treatment 12 months after starting treatment. For PEPFAR and partner countries to continue expanding treatment programs to serve up to 23 million eligible people, further improving drug supply chains is critical, particularly the efficiency of elements managed by partner countries. To help ensure that drug supply chains in PEPFAR partner countries function efficiently and mitigate the risks of shortages and wasted and lost drugs, we recommended that State direct OGAC to require PEPFAR country teams to (1) develop and implement plans to help partner countries improve inventory controls and record keeping and (2) track the progress partner countries are making in measuring ARV drug consumption, waste, and loss. More Systematic and Rigorous Program Evaluations Could Better Inform PEPFAR Stakeholders about How to Improve Programs
OGAC, CDC, and USAID have evaluated a wide variety of PEPFAR program activities, demonstrating a clear commitment to evaluation. Thus, we concluded that OGAC could provide better context for understanding PEPFAR’s achievements and challenges by comparing program results with targets and discussing efforts to ensure the quality of reported information. We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of State and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Program Planning and Reporting. Global HIV/AIDS: A More Country-Based Approach Could Improve Allocation of PEPFAR Funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
PEPFAR, first authorized in 2003, has supported significant advances in HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care in over 30 countries, including directly supporting treatment for about 5.1 million people; however, millions more people still need treatment. Congress reauthorized PEPFAR in 2008authorizing up to $48 billion over 5 yearsdirecting OGAC to continue expanding the number of people receiving care and treatment through PEPFAR while also making it a major policy goal to help partner countries develop independent, sustainable HIV programs. As a result, PEPFAR began shifting efforts from directly providing treatment services toward support for treatment programs managed by partner countries. GAO completed a series of reports between 2011 and 2013 covering PEPFAR treatment program costs, results, and supply chains for ARV drugs, and PEPFAR program evaluations and planning and reporting. GAO was asked to summarize the key themes of these reports relating to (1) PEPFARs successes in expanding and improving treatment programs and (2) information management challenges to further improving and expanding treatment programs.
What GAO Found
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has expanded treatment programs and increased their efficiency and effectiveness.
According to the Department of State's (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), from 2005 to 2011, PEPFAR's per-patient treatment costs declined from about $1,053 to about $339. PEPFAR's increasing use of generic products and declining antiretroviral (ARV) drug prices have been a key source of savings. Programs also benefited from economies of scale and program maturity.
PEPFAR and partner countries have achieved substantial increases in the number of people on ARV drug treatment and have increased the percentage of eligible people receiving treatment. According to OGAC, treatment retention rates are at or above 80 percent at PEPFAR-supported treatment facilities in 10 partner countries.
PEPFAR has also worked with U.S. implementing agencies, international donors, and partner countries to increase the efficiency and reliability of ARV drug supply chains.
PEPFAR implementing agencies have evaluated a wide variety of PEPFAR program activities, demonstrating a clear commitment to program improvements.
Better information management is crucial to helping countries improve and expand treatment programs to meet the needs of the estimated 23 million people eligible for ARV treatment under 2012 international guidelines. GAO's reviews of PEPFAR treatment costs, results, and ARV drug supply chains have revealed limitations in the completeness, timeliness, and consistency of key program information. GAO also found important information lacking in PEPFAR program evaluations, plans, and results reporting. GAO has made a series of recommendations to improve the quality of this information in order to make PEPFAR programs more efficient and effective. The potential benefits that could be realized if GAO's recommendations are implemented include the following:
More complete and timely cost data could help countries manage costs and plan treatment expansion more effectively.
More consistent, complete, and timely information on treatment results could enhance the quality of treatment programs, including patient, clinic, and program management.
Plans to help countries improve inventory management and record keeping and tracking their progress could help supply chains operate more efficiently.
A more systematic and rigorous approach to planning and conducting program evaluations could result in evaluations that better inform PEPFAR stakeholders about how to improve programs.
OGAC could provide better context for understanding PEPFAR's achievements and challenges by comparing program results with targets and discussing efforts to ensure the quality of reported information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made 13 recommendations to State to improve PEPFAR treatment programs, program evaluations, and reporting of program results. State generally agreed with these recommendations and has begun implementing some of them. |
gao_GAO-16-58 | gao_GAO-16-58_0 | Weaknesses in Controls Identified, Some of Which Should Be Addressed by the Department’s New Travel System, but Others May Remain
We tested the outcomes of compliance with key travel policies and implementation of related internal controls in nine areas and found indications that controls functioned effectively in four areas but that weaknesses existed in five other areas. Two of these weaknesses should be addressed by the design of the new travel system. Required Receipts Provided to Justify Reimbursement. Prior Approval of Lodging Costs Higher Than Standard Per Diem. To test the extent to which this control was functioning during the period of our review, we analyzed a generalizable sample of 105 travel vouchers for trips from October 2011 through June 2013 and estimated that 94 percent of travel authorization documents and 76 percent of travel voucher documents were approved by an official with the authority to do so. Areas in Which Outcomes Indicated That the Division Did Not Always Comply with Policy or Controls Did Not Always Function as Intended
We identified weaknesses in two controls and one area of policy that, absent the attention of management or compensating controls, may remain even under the new travel system. Thus, strengthening controls to promote prior authorization of travel in accordance with Division policies even when travel needs occur at the last minute—such as requiring an e-mail to be sent to one’s supervisor in advance of the travel rather than obtaining verbal approval—could help the Division better ensure that travel is necessary and that travel funds are available to cover the trip. Prior Approval of Noncontract Airfares
We reviewed travel documents for eight selected travel vouchers to test whether there was documentation of prior approval for use of noncontract airfares (a control), as required by travel rules, and found that none of the Division travel vouchers we analyzed included such approvals. From our review of a generalizable sample of 105 travel vouchers for Division travel occurring during this time frame, we estimate that approximately 42 percent of all vouchers were not submitted within 5 working days, thus not complying with DOJ policy. Most Travel Card Purchases Indicated Controls Functioned Effectively, but Implementation of Delinquent Account Controls Was Not Documented
Most purchases made on Division travel cards aligned with evidence of official travel and appeared appropriate for travel, indicating that the Division complied with key policies we tested and that controls related to travel card use were effective, but we found one area of weakness that may remain (see table 3). To test the Division’s compliance with its policy regarding appropriate use of travel cards, we reviewed all purchases that appeared on Division employee travel charge card records from October 2011 through June 2013 and matched approximately 97 percent of travel card purchases to evidence of official travel, and almost all purchases appeared appropriate for government travel.We could not match 3 percent of purchase transactions corresponding to 1,488 transactions to evidence of official travel. This purchase did not align with evidence of official travel. The Division has increased oversight of travel charge cards since the start of our audit to better ensure appropriate use of the travel cards. The new controls the Division introduced, if effectively implemented, could address the limitations we observed. Also, late travel voucher submissions make managing travel funds difficult. However, without documentation of communications with delinquent account holders, the Division does not have an institutional record to determine whether staff are implementing this key control, and therefore, if delinquencies continue, the Division will not be able to readily identify whether the underlying cause is lack of implementation of this control or whether there is a need to strengthen controls or implement different processes. To help ensure that noncontract airfare use is properly authorized and justified in accordance with travel rules, the Division should evaluate whether the configuration of its new travel system has implemented controls to address previous shortcomings in obtaining and documenting required approvals, and that travelers booking airfares outside of the system are documenting this decision. If implemented effectively, this new process should address our recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division (Division) implemented internal controls and complied with travel policy in key areas: (1) authorization and reimbursement of travel and (2) use of travel charge cards. The data we analyzed included all trips associated with investigations resulting in a court case (which we refer to as “cases” in this report) and completed investigations not resulting in a court case (which we refer to as “closed investigations”). We excluded travel information related to ongoing investigations that could result in ongoing litigation. DOJ implemented a new travel system in August 2013, and at the time of our request there were not a sufficient number of trips to evaluate the implementation of controls in the new system. | Why GAO Did This Study
The sensitive nature of taxpayer-funded travel necessitates that federal agencies have strong internal controls in place to help ensure that travel complies with rules and regulations.
GAO was asked to review the Division's travel controls. This report examines the extent to which the Division effectively implemented internal controls and complied with travel policy in key areas, including appropriate (1) authorization and reimbursement of travel and (2) use of travel charge cards.
GAO analyzed Division travel data for all trips associated with investigations resulting in a court case and completed investigations not resulting in a court case (“closed investigations”), and travel charge card use from October 2011 through June 2013, the most recent data available at the time of GAO's data request. GAO did not analyze travel data associated with ongoing investigations. GAO also analyzed a generalizable sample of travel documents for 105 of the 3,157 trips within the period of its review. GAO also reviewed relevant federal and agency-specific travel rules and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
GAO tested the implementation of internal controls and compliance with key policies in nine areas of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Civil Rights Division (Division) travel authorization and reimbursement process for the period from October 2011 through June 2013 and found indications that controls functioned effectively in four of those areas. Weaknesses existed in the remaining five areas. Two of these weaknesses should be addressed by the design of a new travel system the Division began using in August 2013. Although the new travel system was in use during GAO's review, the Division had used the new system for too few trips for GAO to analyze its data. The four areas of travel in which the Division complied with policy and controls were generally functioning effectively included appropriate levels of per diem reimbursement, presence of required receipts, prior approval of higher-than-per-diem lodging, and appropriate length of trip for certain oversight activities (related to ensuring compliance with fair-housing laws). GAO identified weaknesses in three areas including the following:
GAO found that 16 percent of travel authorizations did not include documentation of approval prior to travel, contrary to DOJ policy, which could hinder the effective management of travel funds. Although unanticipated travel may require flexibility for travelers, strengthening controls to promote prior written authorization could help the Division better ensure that travel is necessary and funds are available.
GAO estimated that 14 percent of Division airfares were on noncontract carriers, and none of the eight highest cost vouchers in GAO’s sample had documentation of prior approvals as required by DOJ policy. The new DOJ travel system has controls designed to document approval of noncontract airfares but not if travelers book flights outside the system. The department has not yet evaluated whether this is occurring, yet doing so would confirm whether the new configuration of controls are functioning as intended.
GAO estimated that 42 percent of Division travel vouchers were not submitted within required time frames per DOJ policy, which could result in difficulties in managing travel funds.
Most Division travel charge card use appeared appropriate indicating effectively functioning controls and compliance with certain travel policies—for instance, more than 97 percent of purchases on Division travel cards aligned with evidence of official travel and appeared appropriate. GAO found three weaknesses related to travel card controls. First, cash advance transactions did not always comply with travel policies, as 19 percent of transactions did not align with evidence of official travel. Second, travel cards were not closed timely in 29 percent of cases reviewed. The Division has implemented new procedures since the start of GAO's audit, implementing new controls whose design should address these two issues. Third, the Division did not maintain documentation of communication with delinquent cardholders, a key component in addressing delinquent accounts. Without this documentation, the Division will not be able to determine whether staff are implementing this control, and thus, if delinquencies persist, it will be hindered in determining if the underlying cause is lack of implementation of this control or the need to strengthen controls or implement different processes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the Division strengthen controls related to prior authorization of travel and timely submission of vouchers, evaluate whether new controls for noncontract airfares are functioning properly, and improve how it documents oversight of delinquent travel card accounts. The agency concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-95-68 | gao_RCED-95-68_0 | Specifically, NIST reported that as a result of ATP total U.S. research on advanced technologies for printed wiring boards has quadrupled, participants have pursued research they otherwise could not have participants have forged new relationships with companies and government or academic laboratories, and the number of joint R&D ventures in private industry has increased. However, some of these measures may not indicate the economic success of ATP. NIST’s evaluation efforts include engaging the advice and services of the nation’s leading economists in impact assessment and evaluation. However, our analysis indicates that these results are overstated or lack adequate support. NIST currently has a study under way to determine that information. We examined (1) the short-term results that NIST says indicate the impact of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and (2) the measures that NIST expects will indicate ATP’s long-term economic success. 2. 3. In addition to straightforward tracking of technical milestones, these indicators include: . | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Advanced Technology Program (ATP), focusing on: (1) its short-term results; and (2) NIST future plans for evaluating ATP.
What GAO Found
GAO found that as a result of ATP: (1) total U.S. research on advanced technologies for printed wiring boards has quadrupled; (2) participants have pursued research that they otherwise could not have pursued and have forged new relationships with companies, government, and academic laboratories; and (3) the number of joint research and development ventures in private industry has increased. GAO also found that: (1) the short-term results that NIST identified have limitations and some are overstated or lack adequate support; (2) although NIST plans to evaluate the number of technical milestones completed and joint ventures formed, these indicators may not reflect the long-term success of ATP; and (3) other NIST evaluation efforts under way include engaging the advice and services of leading economists in impact assessment and evaluation, but the results of such efforts are unknown. |
gao_GAO-07-27 | gao_GAO-07-27_0 | Scope and Methodology
To assess IRS’s 2006 filing season performance in the key filing season activities—paper and electronic processing, plus telephone, Web site, and face-to-face assistance—compared to goals and past performance, and report on the status of the TAB, we reviewed and analyzed IRS reports, testimonies, budget submissions, and other documents and data, including workload data and data related to IRS’s current suite of balanced performance measures and annual goals; analyzed staffing data for paper and electronic processing, telephone assistance, and walk-in assistance; tested for statistically significant differences between annual performance measures based on sample data; observed operations at IRS’s Atlanta and Cincinnati paper processing centers, the Atlanta Call Site and Joint Operations Center, and 4 of IRS’s 400 walk-in locations; reviewed legislation, policies, and procedures; reviewed information from organizations that evaluate Internet performance; reviewed related TIGTA reports and interviewed TIGTA officials about IRS’s performance and initiatives; reviewed prior GAO reports and followed up on our recommendations made in prior filing season and related reports; interviewed IRS officials about current operations, performance relative to 2006 performance goals and prior filing season performance, trends, and significant factors and initiatives that affected or were intended to improve performance; and interviewed representatives of the few larger private and nonprofit organizations that prepare tax returns including H&R Block and trade organizations that represent both individual paid tax preparers and tax preparation companies including the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Opportunities Exist to Generate Savings by Encouraging Electronic Filing; Processing Performance Continued to Improve
The growth rate of electronic filing is important because electronic filing eliminates costs associated with processing paper returns. Two other factors that contributed to this year’s slower growth in electronic filing were (1) changes in the Free File program, which reduced the number of taxpayers eligible to file electronically for free this year, and (2) termination of the TeleFile program, which had allowed taxpayers to file their returns electronically via telephone. Mandates Have Demonstrated Success in Increasing Electronic Filing, but IRS Lacks the Authority to Impose Mandates for Individual Taxpayers
For the first time, in the 2006 filing season IRS mandated that corporations with assets over $50 million file their corporate tax returns electronically. State mandates have increased the electronic filing of federal individual income tax returns. By not requiring electronic filing by paid preparers, IRS is missing an opportunity for generating savings and efficiencies. CADE is only partially completed, and IRS estimates that over $500 million more is required to fully implement the individual tax return processing part of the system. Access to IRS’s Telephone Assistors Was Comparable to Last Year and Accuracy Improved, but IRS Has Excess Space at Its Call Sites
Taxpayers’ access to IRS’s telephone assistors and the accuracy of answers are both key indicators of IRS’s filing season performance because of the volume of calls and labor costs associated with answering them. IRS could eliminate underutilized space by consolidating or closing call sites. Continuing Past Trends, Fewer Taxpayers Used IRS Walk-in Sites and More Used Volunteer Sites, but Data on Services Provided Remains Incomplete for Both
Shifting taxpayers from IRS walk-in sites to community sites staffed by volunteers is part of IRS’s strategy for reducing the costs of providing taxpayers with face-to-face assistance, while providing taxpayers with additional, and perhaps more convenient, options. Phase II research and review is in progress and is expected to be released by early 2007. It also contains demographic information on the population of individual taxpayers. Finally, IRS developed the following five strategic themes for improving taxpayer service: 1. 3. However, IRS lacks the statutory authority to expand its use of mandates. Requiring certain paid tax preparers to file individual returns electronically could increase electronic filing and generate savings for IRS. In addition, IRS continues to implement CADE. However, IRS is not reporting on one of the chief benefits already realized from CADE, issuing refunds faster. The Congress could benefit from knowing this information as it makes decisions about funding the completion of CADE. Appendix VI: Comments from the Internal Revenue Service | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spent about 38 percent of its $10.8 billion budget on processing returns and providing taxpayer assistance. GAO was asked to (1) assess IRS's 2006 filing season performance processing paper and electronically filed tax returns and providing telephone, Web site, and face-to-face assistance relative to 2006 goals and prior years' performance; (2) identify potential cost savings or other improvements; and (3) report on the status of IRS's Taxpayer Assistance Blueprint (TAB). To address these issues, GAO collected relevant information from IRS and other sources, reviewed performance measures and past filing season assessments, and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
IRS improved most filing season services in 2006, continuing improvements since 2001. IRS also generated efficiencies from increased electronic filing and benefits for taxpayers through systems modernization. IRS's processing of individual tax returns and refunds improved by most measures, but the growth rate of electronic filing continued to slow in part because of changes to the Free File Program, which reduced the number of taxpayers eligible to use it and the elimination of a program that allowed taxpayers to file via the telephone. Access to IRS's telephone assistors was comparable to last year. The accuracy of responses to telephone inquiries was 90 percent or over in 2006. Use of IRS's Web site increased substantially and IRS reconfigured the site to improve service. Continuing past trends, fewer taxpayers used IRS walk-in sites and more used less-costly volunteer sites. Also, IRS completed Phase I of the TAB, which identified strategic themes for improving taxpayer service; TAB Phase II is expected to be completed by early 2007. With the slowing growth rate in electronic filing, IRS is missing an opportunity to generate additional savings. Federal and state mandates for electronic filing have demonstrated success in increasing electronic filing; however, IRS currently lacks the authority to mandate electronic filing for certain income tax returns such as individual returns filed by paid tax preparers. Using IRS estimates, savings from such a mandate could be on the order of $60 million per year. IRS has another opportunity to generate savings because of excess space at its call sites. However, IRS lacks a strategy for eliminating that space by consolidating call sites. To replace its aging legacy computer system, IRS continues to implement a modernized system for processing tax returns and refunds. However, IRS does not report information on the chief benefit realized to date, faster refund issuance. Such information could be useful for the Congress when making decisions about funding the completion of the individual tax return processing part of the system, estimated by IRS to require at least another $500 million. |
gao_GGD-98-74 | gao_GGD-98-74_0 | To assess the Bureau of the Census’ progress in minimizing risks, we reviewed the status of key activities that the Bureau plans to test as part of its dress rehearsal for the next decennial census: address list development, local outreach and promotion, staffing, and statistical sampling. Accurate addresses are essential for delivering questionnaires, avoiding unnecessary and expensive follow-up efforts at vacant or nonexistent residences, and establishing a universe of households for sampling and statistical estimation. Accurate maps are critical for counting the correct portions of the population in their correct locations—the cornerstone of congressional reapportionment and redistricting. Because of these procedural weaknesses, the Bureau is “reengineering” how it builds the MAF by physically verifying all addresses and by encouraging earlier local government reviews of address lists and maps created from the Postal Service and the Bureau’s 1990 address file. Although this reengineered approach may address several problems, the Bureau will not be testing this new approach before the 2000 Census. The Postal Service’s Address File May Not Be Sufficiently Accurate or Complete to Meet the Bureau’s Needs
To reduce cost and improve the accuracy of the 2000 Census, the Bureau, in developing the MAF for city-style addresses for the census, originally planned to combine the Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File (DSF), which includes all mail delivery points recognized by the Postal Service, with the address file created during the 1990 Census. Although Bureau canvassing could improve the quality of the address lists and maps to a certain extent, because the Bureau’s reengineered approach provides for an earlier LUCA, canvassing will not occur in areas having city-style addresses until after local governments have completed their review of addresses and maps. Of that amount, about $100 million is for the Y&R paid-advertising campaign. As a result, the Bureau may have difficulty achieving its goal of a 66.9 percent mail response rate in 2000. The Bureau Has Developed Several Initiatives to Address Potential Staffing Difficulties but Could Still Encounter Problems in 2000
The Bureau estimates that, under its current design, it will need to fill about 295,000 office and field positions to carry out various activities for the 2000 Census. Nevertheless, the demand for temporary census workers thus far has been small, and more generally, the Bureau’s experience gained during the dress rehearsal does not and cannot provide an adequate test of the effectiveness of the Bureau’s staffing strategy for the 2000 Census. The Bureau Plans to Use Statistical Methods to Reduce Its Nonresponse Follow-Up Workload
In 1990, the Bureau sent Census questionnaires to most households in the United States, asking that household members complete the questionnaire and mail it back to the Census Bureau. It noted that the methodology is proven and has been used in previous censuses and tests. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of key activities that the Bureau of the Census plans to test as part of its dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) address list development, local outreach and promotion, staffing, and statistical sampling are all still facing the developmental and implementation changes that led GAO in 1997 to raise concerns about the high risk of a failed census in 2000; (2) this situation has arisen in part because Congress and the administration have yet to reach agreement on key aspects of the census design; (3) an accurate address list and associated maps are essential for ensuring that households receive census questionnaires and for establishing the universe of housing units for sampling and statistical estimation procedures; (4) accurate maps are critical for locating households for congressional reapportionment and redistricting; (5) the Bureau's initial plan for creating the address list and maps for the 2000 Census called for: (a) combining addresses provided by the Postal Service with the Bureau's 1990 Census address file and mapping database; and (b) submitting these addresses and maps to local governments for their review; (6) the Bureau has since concluded that the resulting address file might not meet its goal of being 99 percent complete; (7) in September 1997, the Bureau announced plans to reengineer its process for creating the address file for the 2000 census, in part by hiring temporary staff to physically verify the accuracy of all addresses by canvassing streets; (8) this reengineered approach has not been tested because of a lack of resources, and will not be tested because the Bureau does not have sufficient time to do so; (9) as part of its reengineering effort, the Bureau plans to seek earlier local government review of addresses from the Postal Service and the Bureau's 1990 Census file; (10) the Bureau's approach still will not address some of the problems encountered by local officials in their reviews; (11) to boost the questionnaire mail response rate and thus reduce its costly nonresponse follow-up workload, the Bureau plans to partner with local governments, schools and other community organizations to promote the census and has initiated a paid advertising campaign that is being developed by a private contractor; (12) the Bureau estimates that it will need to recruit over 2.6 million applicants to fill about 295,000 office and field positions; (13) the dress rehearsal does not and cannot provide an adequate test of the effectiveness of the Bureau's staffing strategy for the 2000 Census; and (14) several missteps by the Bureau in drawing a sample for the Integrated Coverage Measurement have raised GAO's concerns about the Bureau's quality control procedures. |
gao_GAO-11-722 | gao_GAO-11-722_0 | DOD was not required to collaborate with DNI in developing the 2004 strategy. Space S&T Strategy Addresses Most Statutory Requirements, but Lacks Robust Detail
Our comparison of the strategy against the statutory reporting requirements found that the strategy addresses eight statutory requirements and DOD has plans to address two other statutory requirements. While the requirements were met, additional information that could enable DOD to successfully implement the strategy was not included. Specifically, in relation to the strategy’s goals, it does not establish a newly developed implementation plan for the achievement of the goals. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for implementation where DOD components essentially implement the strategy as a routine element of their existing program planning and budgeting procedures while employing processes that are specifically tailored to each component’s mission function. However, officials explained that research components and research laboratories would do these activities as part of the normal DOD budgetary process. Though prioritization is not a statutory requirement, given the breadth and scope of space S&T development activities and issues we have identified in the past with respect to a lack of coordination and prioritization, it is important, and indeed a best practice, that goals be prioritized. Fundamental Challenges Facing the Space S&T Community and Best Practices Not Addressed
While the content of the space S&T strategy meets statutory requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges facing the space S&T community. These challenges include human capital shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. Establish Process for Revising Goals in the Future: Criteria to establish and revise goals could help to improve performance and results. Coordination Efforts in Strategy Development Were Limited and Implementation Efforts Are too Early to Assess
Although most organizations involved with the space S&T strategy participated significantly in developing its short- and long-term goals, participation among some organizations in developing other aspects of the strategy was more limited. DOD and DNI officials told GAO that their interpretation of the 2009 statute directing development of the strategy was that it did not require that the intelligence community be involved to the full extent in some aspects of the strategy. Together, the intelligence community and these other agencies conduct a significant amount of space S&T development. By limiting their involvement, DOD may have missed an opportunity to leverage these activities and optimize its own S&T spending. Also, since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms planned to implement the strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To optimize government investment in space S&T and address key challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (who would direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering and the DOD Executive Agent for Space) and the Director of National Intelligence make the following three improvements to enhance the next version of the space S&T strategy: Develop a specific implementation plan that provides a detailed process for achieving the strategy’s goals. Include information on required human capital; required funding; prioritization; ways to measure progress against the goals; and process(es) for revising goals to address the challenges in space S&T. We also met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss and collect information on the methods, approaches, and analyses used to support the content of the strategy. To determine the extent of coordination efforts used to develop and implement the strategy, we discussed the coordination methods used in the strategy’s development with officials from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering (formerly the Director, Defense Research and Engineering); Office of the Director of National Intelligence (including National Reconnaissance Office officials); Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Missile Defense Agency; Army Materiel Command; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Army Space and Missile and Defense Command; Naval Research Laboratory; Office of Naval Research; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Research Laboratory; and the Department of Energy. We also reviewed other relevant high-level space strategic plans including the National Security Strategy, the National Security Space Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Space Policy, the Defense Science and Technology Strategy, the DOD Research and Engineering Strategic Plan, and the DOD Space Science and Technology Strategy (2004). | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the United States spends billions of dollars on space-based systems to support national security activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and issue a space science and technology (S&T) strategy every 2 years addressing S&T goals and a process for achieving these goals, among other requirements. As GAO is required to assess the strategy, this report addresses (1) the extent to which the strategy meets the statutory requirements, (2) if other approaches could be used to enhance the usefulness of the strategy, and (3) the extent of coordination efforts used in developing the strategy. GAO reviewed the strategy for sufficiency with statutory requirements and met with DOD and DNI officials to discuss the analyses and coordination used to support the content of the strategy. GAO also compared the strategy to strategic planning best practices to see if there are ways it could be improved.
What GAO Found
The space science and technology strategy addresses eight statutory requirements, and DOD plans to address the two remaining requirements. While the statutory requirements were addressed, additional information that could have enhanced the strategy was not always included. For example, in relation to the strategy's goals, a newly developed implementation plan for the achievement of the goals was not established. Instead, the strategy describes a plan for implementation where DOD components implement the strategy as a routine element of their existing budgetary process. Also, the strategy's new goals were established without any prioritization, and while this was not required, given the breadth and scope of space S&T development activities, it is important that goals be prioritized. For the statutory requirements involving strategy implementation, officials explained that while the requirements to identify S&T projects with associated funding and schedule information were not addressed in the strategy, components and research laboratories conduct these activities as part of the normal DOD budgetary process. While the content of the strategy addresses statutory requirements, it does not address fundamental challenges facing the space S&T community. These challenges have been identified in high-level studies and prior GAO reports and include human capital shortages, growing fiscal pressures, and the difficulty in transitioning space S&T to acquisition programs. In this assessment, GAO identified some strategic planning best practices that, if used, could improve future strategy versions by addressing these fundamental challenges and thereby potentially enhancing the usefulness of the strategy. These practices include identifying required human capital; identifying required funding; prioritizing initiatives; establishing ways to measure progress; and establishing processes for revising goals in the future. Organizations involved in development of the strategy participated in creating its short- and long-term goals; however, their participation in developing other aspects of the strategy was more limited. DOD and DNI officials told GAO that their interpretation of the 2009 statute directing development of the strategy was that it did not require that the intelligence community be involved to the full extent in some aspects of the strategy. Moreover, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together with the intelligence community, conduct a significant amount of space S&T. Although NASA and NOAA participation is not required, DOD may have missed an opportunity to leverage these agencies' activities and optimize its own S&T spending by involving them in strategy development. GAO was also required to evaluate the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms planned to implement the strategy. However, because the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to make such an evaluation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and DNI develop a more specific implementation plan; include additional information and prioritization, ways to measure progress, and processes for revision when establishing strategic planning goals; and enhance coordination among the DOD S&T community, the intelligence community, NASA, and NOAA. DOD concurred with the recommendations and DNI had no comment. |
gao_GAO-04-603 | gao_GAO-04-603_0 | Until 1999, USPTO was required to keep in confidence submitted patent applications, and applicants had no enforceable patent rights before the issue date of the patent. If, for example, such an application was abandoned 9 months after it was published, then USPTO’s database would show that the application was abandoned in 15 months-–the number of months that had passed since the application had been filed in the U.S.-– rather than the 27 months that had passed since the application had been first filed anywhere. The 1999 act allows all inventors not intending to seek patent protection abroad to request that USPTO publish the application only when it issues the patent. Our analysis of USPTO’s database indicates that of the approximately 805,000 applications USPTO received, applicants certified they would apply for a patent only in the United States in about 80,000 applications. Although about 88,000 applications originally included this certification in their applications, about 8,000 applicants later rescinded this certification. In about 275,000 applications, the applicants indicated they had applied for a patent in another country. USPTO’s database does not provide the information needed to determine definitively whether the applicants for the remaining 450,000 applications intended to apply for a patent only in the United States or in both the United States and abroad. Some Differences Exist between Published and Unpublished Applications
We found four differences between the published and unpublished applications filed with USPTO between November 29, 2000, and November 28, 2003. First, USPTO published, or plans to publish, applications filed by inventors qualifying as large entities at a somewhat higher rate (85 percent) than those filed by inventors qualifying as small entities (74 percent). Of the approximately 456,000 applications USPTO published, about 70 percent are still pending, about 22 percent were issued patents, and 8 percent were considered abandoned. Similarly, of the approximately 117,000 applications USPTO did not publish, about 56 percent are still pending, about 25 percent were issued patents, and 19 percent were considered abandoned. For a summary of these differences, see table 1. In these cases, USPTO does not publish the application because the issued patent will itself be published and become public information. As a result, the median length of time for unpublished patents is less. Fourth, for applications considered abandoned, the median length of time between filing and abandonment was longer for published applications (about 18 months) than for those not published (about 8 months). Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the patent applications affected by the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, we analyzed data obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) Patent Application Location and Monitoring system (PALM). For the remaining 56 percent of the cases, USPTO’s database does not provide the information needed to determine whether the applicants have filed or intend to file in the United States alone or also in another country. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) receives over 300,000 patent applications each year. Before the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, USPTO was required by law to keep the information on patent applications confidential until a patent was granted. The act modified this requirement and mandated that USPTO publish most patent applications 18 months after filing. One exception to this requirement is available to patent applicants filing only in the United States. These applicants can request that their application not be published. The act required GAO to provide information on how patent applications have been affected by the 18-month publication provisions. GAO was required to determine (1) the number of patent applications filed only in the United States, and (2) whether certain differences exist between published and unpublished patent applications. Specifically, GAO examined differences relating to whether the applicant was a large or small entity, the percentage of patents issued by USPTO and applications abandoned by the applicants, and the length of time between filing an application and when USPTO issued a patent or the application was abandoned.
What GAO Found
Of the approximately 805,000 patent applications USPTO received between November 29, 2000, and November 28, 2003, about 88,000 were filed by applicants certifying they would apply for a patent only in the United States. Subsequently, 8,000 of these applicants rescinded this certification. For about 275,000 applications, the applicants indicated they had already applied for a patent abroad. For the remaining 450,000 applications, USPTO's database does not provide the information needed to determine whether the applicants intend to file in the United States alone or also abroad. GAO found four differences between the published and unpublished patent applications that USPTO received between November 29, 2000, and November 28, 2003. USPTO has published or plans to publish applications from about 85 percent of the applicants qualifying as large entities compared with only about 74 percent of those qualifying as small entities. USPTO issued patents to about 22 percent of the applications it had published and considered about 8 percent abandoned, although resolution for most of the approximately 456,000 published patent applications is still pending. For applications it did not publish, USPTO issued patents to about 25 percent and considered about 19 percent abandoned, although resolution for most of these approximately 117,000 applications is also still pending. The median length of time for the agency's review of an issued patent was about 20 months for those applications that had been published and about 15 months for those not published. The median length of time between filing and abandonment of an application was about 18 months for published applications and about 8 months for those not published. |
gao_GAO-03-593 | gao_GAO-03-593_0 | DOE plans to permanently dispose of the high-level portion of the separated waste in a geologic repository developed pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. DOE’s Initiative for Accelerating Cleanup Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings Uncertain
DOE’s new initiative, implemented in 2002, attempts to address the schedule delays and increasing costs DOE has encountered in its efforts to treat and dispose of high-level waste. However, even the $29 billion estimate may not be reliable. Adjusting the savings estimate to present value in 2003 results in a savings of $2.8 billion in 2003 dollars. Key Legal and Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential Savings from DOE’s Accelerated Cleanup Initiative
DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to achieving the cost and schedule reductions proposed in its new initiative. On the legal side, DOE’s proposals depend heavily on the agency’s authority to apply a designation other than “high-level waste” to the low-activity portion of the waste stream, so that this low-activity portion does not have to be disposed of as high-level waste. DOE’s authority to make such determinations is being challenged in court. At the Savannah River and Hanford sites, for example, DOE is identifying ways to increase the amount of waste that can be placed in its high-level waste canisters to reduce treatment and disposal costs. DOE Is Considering Additional Potential Opportunities to Reduce Costs
DOE is continuing to identify other proposals for reducing costs under its accelerated cleanup initiative. DOE Has Opportunities to Improve Management of the Program by Addressing Previously Identified Weaknesses
In addition to DOE’s efforts to identify site-specific proposals for saving time and money, DOE is also undertaking management improvements using teams to study individual issues. Furthermore, specific components of this initiative face key legal and technical challenges. Much of the potential for success rests on DOE’s continued ability to dispose of large quantities of waste with relatively low concentrations of radioactivity on-site by applying its incidental waste process. Any technical problems with these processes will likely result in costly delays. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOE’s accelerated cleanup initiative is effective and that cleanup of high-level waste proceeds in a timely and cost-effective manner, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Energy seek clarification from the Congress regarding DOE’s authority for designating waste as incidental to reprocessing if the current challenge becomes an extended legal process, in order to help DOE determine what strategy it needs to move its initiative forward and realize potential savings; reassess the potential risks, costs, and benefits of constructing an integrated pilot-scale waste separation facility at the Hanford site to more fully test separation technologies before completing construction of a full-scale facility; and ensure that DOE’s high-level waste projects (1) include a current and rigorous analysis of the risks, costs, and benefits associated with the decisions being implemented, in accordance with OMB guidance; (2) incorporate new technologies consistent with best practices and DOE guidance so that risks and costs are more effectively managed; and (3) are carefully evaluated as to the appropriateness of using a fast-track approach to designing and constructing complex nuclear facilities, and that the potential risks and costs associated with this approach are explicitly identified and considered. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees one of the largest cleanup programs in history--the treatment and disposal of 94 million gallons of highly radioactive nuclear waste from the nation's nuclear weapons program. This waste is currently at DOE sites in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE began an initiative to reduce the estimated $105-billion cost and 70-year time frame of this cleanup. GAO was asked to determine the status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges DOE faces in implementing it, and any further opportunities to reduce costs or improve program management.
What GAO Found
DOE's initiative for reducing the costs and time required for cleanup of high-level wastes is still evolving. DOE's main strategy for treating high-level waste continues to include separating and concentrating much of the radioactivity into a smaller volume for disposal in a geologic repository. Under the initiative, DOE sites are evaluating other approaches, such as disposing of more waste on site. DOE's current savings estimate for these approaches is $29 billion, but the estimate may not be reliable or complete. For example, the savings estimate does not adequately reflect uncertainties or take into account the timing of when savings will be realized. DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to realize these savings. A key legal challenge involves DOE's authority to decide that some waste with relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be disposed of on site. This authority is being challenged in court, and a prolonged challenge or an adverse decision could seriously hamper DOE's ability to meet its accelerated schedules. A key technical challenge is that DOE's approach relies on laboratory testing to confirm separation of the waste into high-level and low-activity portions. At the Hanford Site in Washington State, DOE plans to build a facility before integrated testing of the separation technology--an approach that has failed on other projects in the past, resulting in significant cost increases and schedule delays. DOE is exploring proposals, such as increasing the amount of high-level waste in each disposal canister, which if successful could result in billions of dollars in additional savings. However, considerable evaluation remains to be done. DOE also has opportunities to improve program management by fully addressing recurring weaknesses GAO has identified in DOE's management of cleanup projects. |
gao_GAO-04-246 | gao_GAO-04-246_0 | According to data from the NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service, the United States imported about 4.2 billion pounds, or more than 80 percent, of its seafood in 2002, as shown in the figure. FDA’s Imported Seafood Safety Program Shows Some Improvement, but Deficiencies Persist
Since our January 2001 report, FDA has made improvements to three of the four approaches it uses for ensuring the safety of imported seafood— importer inspections, foreign inspections, and port-of-entry inspections. FDA has not implemented either of the recommendations we made in our 2001 report regarding establishing equivalence agreements with exporting countries or communicating deficiencies found during inspections to FDA’s port-of-entry personnel. Additionally, FDA continues to experience long delays in issuing warning letters or detaining imported seafood at U.S. ports of entry after investigators find serious deficiencies. As we reported in 2001, in the absence of equivalence agreements, U.S. seafood importers are required to maintain written product specifications and take at least one of six affirmative steps to document foreign firms’ compliance with U.S. requirements. Most FDA Regulatory Actions Are Not Timely
To ensure that FDA takes prompt regulatory action when its investigators find food safety violations during importer and foreign firm visits, we recommended in our 2001 report that FDA communicate deficiencies to port-of-entry personnel so that they can examine potentially contaminated imported seafood before it can enter the United States. However, FDA took an average of 157 calendar days to issue these warning letters. Finally, we found that FDA does not prioritize enforcement actions when violations that pose the most serious public health risk occur or have an automated system for tracking the time involved in documenting, reviewing, and processing enforcement actions. Options Are Available for Enhancing FDA’s Imported Seafood Safety Program, but They Present Challenges
Several options could help FDA overcome some of the problems we identified with its current regulatory approach for ensuring the safety of imported seafood. To strengthen FDA’s current imported seafood program and ensure the safety of seafood consumed in the United States, the Commissioner of FDA should take the following five actions: make it a priority to establish equivalence or other similar types of agreements with seafood-exporting countries, starting first with countries that have high-quality food safety systems; develop and implement a system to track the time involved in documenting, reviewing, and processing regulatory and enforcement actions, such as issuing warning letters and detaining unsafe products, so that FDA can identify the reasons for the delays and take actions to address them; give priority to taking enforcement actions when violations that pose the most serious public health risk occur; consider the costs and benefits of implementing an accreditation program for private laboratories; and explore the potential of implementing a certification program for third- party inspectors, which would involve reviewing FDA’s legal authorities and considering the costs and benefits, including developing and implementing the standards, controls, and oversight necessary to provide FDA with reasonable assurance that third-party inspectors are qualified and independent. FDA also said that establishing these agreements is extraordinarily resource intensive. FDA also raised some concerns about inferences that could be drawn from the report. In addition, we interviewed and/or received documents from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service, Seafood Inspection Program, and National Sea Grant Program. However, the scope of this review did not include exploring whether Agriculture could make inspection or other resources available to augment FDA’s seafood inspection program. Panelists specifically discussed these changes, including (1) a shift in focus from inspecting foreign countries’ entire food safety systems for equivalence to inspecting more foreign firms for HACCP compliance, (2) a slight increase in the number of port-of-entry examinations and laboratory testing of imported seafood, and (3) an increase in testing for aquaculture drug residues. Panelists stated that such agreements should not imply that FDA must find a foreign government’s seafood safety system “equal” to that of the U.S. system. GAO Comments
1. However, we continue to believe, as supported by our panel of nationally recognized food safety experts, that equivalence agreements or less comprehensive alternatives, such as compliance agreements or memorandums of understanding represent a more effective long-term approach for ensuring the safety of imported seafood and would allow FDA to leverage its staff resources by shifting some of its regulatory burden to exporting countries. Also see comment 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 80 percent of the seafood that Americans consume is imported. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring that imported seafood is safe and produced under sanitation and safety systems comparable to those of the United States. Since GAO reported in 2001 that FDA's seafood inspection program did not sufficiently protect consumers, additional concerns have arisen about imported seafood containing banned substances, such as certain antibiotics. In this review, GAO was asked to evaluate (1) FDA's progress in implementing the recommendations in the 2001 report and (2) other options to enhance FDA's oversight.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's January 2001 report, FDA's imported seafood safety program has shown some improvement. FDA inspects more foreign firms, and its inspections show that more U.S. seafood importers are complying with its requirements. FDA also slightly increased the number of seafood products it tests at U.S. ports of entry to just over 1 percent. However, FDA still has not established equivalence agreements with seafood exporting countries as GAO recommended in its 2001 report. Equivalence agreements that commit U.S. trading partners to maintain comparable food safety systems are an efficient way to ensure imported seafood safety. Unlike the U.S. Department of Agriculture, FDA is not legally required to certify that countries exporting food products to the United States have equivalent food safety systems. According to a panel of nationally recognized experts that GAO convened to address this and other issues, establishing these types of agreements would shift some of FDA's burden for ensuring seafood safety to foreign governments. This shift, in turn, would allow FDA to focus its limited resources on seafood products from countries with less advanced food safety systems. FDA also made little progress regarding the recommendation GAO made in 2001 that FDA communicate to U.S. port-of-entry personnel serious deficiencies identified during inspections so that potentially contaminated imported seafood is examined before it enters the United States. GAO found that FDA continues to experience long delays between finding deficiencies and taking action. For example, GAO's review of foreign firm inspection records found that it took an average of 348 days for FDA to alert port-ofentry personnel about serious safety problems identified at six foreign firms. Moreover, GAO found that FDA does not prioritize enforcement actions when violations that pose the most serious public health risk occur or have an automated system to track the time involved in documenting, reviewing, and processing enforcement actions. FDA officials acknowledged some of the problems that GAO identified regarding FDA's current imported seafood inspection program, but they also raised concerns about limited inspection resources and competing priorities, such as the recent need to implement provisions of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. GAO identified several options that FDA could consider to augment its resources and enhance its current program, including (1) commissioning seafood inspectors from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Seafood Inspection Program, (2) using state regulatory laboratories and/or private laboratories to augment FDA's testing of imported seafood, and (3) developing a program to use third-party inspectors to augment its program. |
gao_GAO-12-692 | gao_GAO-12-692_0 | The PHS is comprised of most operating divisions within HHS—including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—as well as some staff divisions within the Office of the Secretary. EPA has not made appointments using section 209(f). HHS Has Increased Its Use of Title 42, but More Reliable Data Could Improve HHS’s Oversight
During 2010, HHS had 6,697 employees who were appointed under sections 209(f) or (g). NIH relied on Title 42 authority for a substantial portion—44 percent—of its total research and clinical practitioner workforce. Title 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of functional areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. More than one-fifth of all Title 42 employees at HHS, however, earned a base salary above Executive Level IV ($155,500 in 2010). These officials said appointment agility enables the agency to hire scientists, doctors, and other consultants to quickly fill knowledge, skill, and ability gaps so that medical research can move forward and to respond to medical emergencies. Some erroneous cases included individuals we later found were hired under appointing authorities other than sections 209(f) or (g), including appointing authorities under 42 U.S.C. HHS Did Not Consistently Adhere to Sections of Its Title 42 Policy and Lacks Guidance for Some Authority Provisions
Section 209(f) Hiring and Conversions
HHS did not consistently adhere to certain sections of its policy for hiring and converting employees under section 209(f). However, it is not clear that the policy will address important issues such as documenting the basis for compensation. The section 209(g) policy was still in development as of May 2012. First, EPA reported that Title 42 provides the flexibility to be competitive in recruiting top experts who are also sought after by other federal agencies, private industry, and academia. EPA officials also stated Title 42 provides the appointment flexibility needed to align experts with specific skills to changing scientific priorities. Although EPA has preappointment ethics clearance procedures as noted above, it does not have postappointment procedures in place to ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements to which they have previously agreed. As part of its effort to implement new section 209(f) guidance, systematically document how policy requirements were fulfilled when hiring or converting 209(f) employees. As part of its ongoing effort to develop agencywide policy for appointing and compensating employees hired under section 209(g), ensure the policy requires and provides guidance for documenting the basis for employee compensation. HHS agreed with our first recommendation to ensure section authority is consistently entered in appropriate automated personnel systems. EPA disagreed with the recommendation that it develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment and consider adding steps to the ethics clearance process that require Title 42 employees to provide proof of compliance with ethics agreements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have (1) used authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) to appoint and set pay for employees since January 2006, and (2) followed applicable agency policy, guidance, and internal controls for Title 42 appointments and compensation. To address the first objective, we obtained and analyzed personnel data from HHS and EPA to describe Title 42 appointment and compensation trends at HHS and EPA since 2006, including the number of Title 42 employees; the types of occupations and positions held by Title 42 employees; compensation rates, including the number of Title 42 employees earning more than certain federal salary levels; the number of nonsalary payments (e.g., performance bonuses and retention incentives) provided to Title 42 employees and their purpose; and the number of civil servants that have been converted to Title 42 appointments and compensation changes associated with those conversions. For EPA, we selected 10 of the 17 Title 42 employees for case file reviews based on a cross section of (1) labs and centers within EPA to understand if Title 42 was implemented uniformly across the agency; (2) Title 42 candidate sources such as the private sector, academia, and conversions to determine if differences existed in recruitment and pay setting; (3) length of service as a Title 42 employee to understand the effect of recent appointment and compensation guidance; and (4) compensation characteristics. | Why GAO Did This Study
HHS and EPA have been using special hiring authority provided under 42 U.S.C. §§209(f) and (g)referred to in this report generally as Title 42 or specifically as section 209(f) or section 209(g)to appoint individuals to fill mission critical positions in science and medicine and, in many cases, pay them above salary limits usually applicable to federal government employees. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which HHS and EPA have (1) used authority under sections 209(f) and (g) to appoint and compensate employees since 2006, and (2) followed applicable agency policy, guidance, and internal controls for appointments and compensation. GAO analyzed agency Title 42 data, interviewed agency officials, and conducted file reviews.
What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) use of special hiring authorities under 42 U.S.C. §§ 209(f) and (g) has increased in recent years. Nearly all HHS Title 42 employees work in one of three HHS operating divisions: the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Title 42 employees at HHS serve in a variety of areas, including scientific and medical research support and in senior, director-level leadership positions. At NIH, one-quarter of all employees, and 44 percent of its researchers and clinical practitioners, were Title 42 appointees. HHS reported that Title 42 enables the agency to quickly fill knowledge gaps so medical research can progress and to respond to medical emergencies. HHS further reported Title 42 provides the compensation flexibility to compete with the private sector. In 2010, 1,461 HHS Title 42 employees earned salaries over Executive Level IV ($155,500 in 2010). HHS does not have reliable data to manage and provide oversight of its use of Title 42 because the section authority used to hire Title 42 employees is not consistently recorded into personnel systems. Moreover, HHS did not consistently adhere to certain sections of its 209(f) policy. For example, the policy states that 209(f) appointments may only be made after non-Title 42 authorities have failed to yield a qualified candidate, but GAO found few instances where such efforts were documented. HHS has recently issued updated 209(f) policy that addresses most of these issues. HHS is developing agencywide policy for appointing and compensating fellows under 209(g), but it is not clear the policy will address important issues such as documenting the basis for compensation. Since 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used section 209(g) to appoint 17 employees. Title 42 employees lead scientific research initiatives and some manage or direct a division or office. According to EPA officials, Title 42 provides the flexibility to be competitive in recruiting top experts who are also sought by private industry, academia, and others. Also, Title 42 provides the appointment flexibility needed to align experts with specific skills to changing scientific priorities. Fifteen of EPAs 17 Title 42 employees earned salaries over Executive Level IV in 2010. EPA appointment and compensation practices were generally consistent with its guidance; however, EPA does not have postappointment procedures in place to ensure Title 42 employees meet ethics requirements to which they have previously agreed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends HHS (1) ensuresection authority209(f) or 209(g)be consistently entered in appropriatepersonnel systems, (2) systematically document how policy requirements were fulfilled when hiring or converting 209(f) employees, and (3) ensure agencywide 209(g) policy currently in development provides guidance for documenting the basis for employee compensation. GAO recommends EPA develop and document a systematic approach for ensuring Title 42 employees are compliant with ethics requirements after appointment. HHS agreed with GAOs recommendations, while EPA disagreed, citing certain actions already taken. GAO acknowledges EPAs plans to address these issues, but maintains the recommendation is needed to ensure implementation. |
gao_GAO-03-457 | gao_GAO-03-457_0 | Background
For years, auditors have reported long-standing weaknesses in DOD’s ability to promptly pay its bills and accurately account for and record its disbursements. Cited Metrics Were Generally Based on Improved Definitions and Methodologies
In general, the definitions and methodologies for gathering the data used by DOD Comptroller officials to calculate the cited improvement percentages at the ending measurement date were either consistent with or better than those used at the beginning measurement date or for prior reporting on payment recording errors, commercial payment backlogs, and travel card payment delinquencies. However, recalculation of the metrics after correcting for these factors still showed positive—although less dramatic—improvement trends. Our recalculation shows an overall 46 percent reduction in payment recording errors between October 2000 and October 2001 rather than the 57 percent reduction reported by the Comptroller; however, the reductions are still significant and the trend is still overwhelmingly positive. Travel Card Delinquencies
For the travel card metrics, consistent definitions and methodologies were used to gather the data and calculate the improvement percentages cited by the DOD Comptroller for January 2001 and December 2001. For individual and centrally billed travel card delinquencies, we were able to obtain independent verification from a source outside DOD that supported the Comptroller’s metrics. Although we could not audit the reported metrics for all of the measured areas, we verified that DFAS and other DOD organizations have made numerous policy, procedure, and systems changes that would support an overall trend toward improved performance. As a result of these and other actions, DOD has been able to sustain reduced delinquency rates between October 2002 and December 2002, as illustrated in figure 5 below. While some of the cited metrics could be effective indicators of short-term financial management progress, assuming they could be verified, others are not necessarily good indicators, particularly if taken alone. However, improved delinquency rates do not necessarily indicate improved financial management of centrally billed travel cards or commercial payments. In fact, by placing too much emphasis on paying bills promptly, DOD staff may be tempted to shortcut important internal control mechanisms that are meant to ensure that the goods and services being paid for were properly authorized and actually received. Recommendations
DOD systems do not provide the transaction-level support needed to verify the accuracy and completeness of many of its selected metrics. Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether (1) the cited performance measures were applied and calculated in a manner consistent with previous reporting on payment delinquencies and recording errors, (2) the cited improvement data were properly supported and represent real improvements in performance, and (3) the metrics are effective indicators of short-term financial management progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has historically been unable to accurately account for and record its disbursements. In March 2002, the DOD Comptroller cited metrics that showed dramatic reductions in payment recording errors (57 percent between October 2000 and October 2001), backlogs of commercial payments (41 percent between April and October 2001), and travel card payment delinquencies (34 percent for those individually billed and 86 percent for those centrally billed between January and December 2001). As a result, the Congress asked us to determine whether the cited reductions were (1) calculated using consistent definitions and methodologies, (2) properly supported, and (3) effective indicators of short-term financial management progress.
What GAO Found
The DOD Comptroller's metrics showing significant reductions in payment recording errors and in commercial and travel card payment delinquencies were, in general, based on definitions and methodologies that were either consistent with or better than those used for prior reporting on these issues. Although the methodology used to calculate two of the cited measures resulted in overstating the rates of improvement, our recalculation after correcting for the methodology errors still showed positive--although less dramatic--improvement trends. While we were able to verify the reductions in travel card delinquencies because the underlying data were available from an independent source, we could not verify the accuracy of the specific improvement percentages reported for payment recording errors and commercial payment delinquencies. DOD's archaic and nonintegrated systems either do not contain the transaction-level detail to support the completeness and accuracy of the metrics or they make it extremely onerous and time consuming for the staff to gather and reconcile the needed detail. However, we were able to verify that DOD has made numerous policy, procedure, and systems changes that support an overall trend toward improved performance in these areas. If they could be verified, some of the cited metrics could be effective indicators of short-term financial management progress. However, if considered alone, delinquency rates are not necessarily good indicators for centrally billed travel cards or commercial payments. Placing too much emphasis on paying bills promptly may tempt DOD staff to bypass important internal controls meant to ensure that the goods and services being paid for were properly authorized and actually received. Despite shortcomings, the cited metrics have focused DOD's attention on highly visible financial management problems. As shown below, recent metrics issued by the DOD Comptroller indicate continuing improvements. |
gao_GAO-02-749 | gao_GAO-02-749_0 | The basic or root causes of improper payments can typically be traced to a lack of or breakdown in internal controls. A comparison of the fiscal years 2001 and 2000 improper payment information reported in agency financial statements revealed several significant differences in the programs reporting improper payments and the amounts reported. They provide information on the purpose and effectiveness of federal programs and on the resources spent in conducting them. We found that, although 10 of the 15 agencies discussed improper payments in their fiscal year 2002 performance plans, none comprehensively addressed improper payments for all four of the plan elements required by GPRA. These responsibilities should include, but not be limited to developing detailed action plans to determine the nature and extent of possible improper payments for all agency programs and/or activities spending federal funds; identifying cost-effective control activities to address the identified risk assigning responsibility for specific areas of improper payment-related activities to appropriate program or activity officials; establishing improper payment goals or targets and measuring performance against those goals to determine progress made and areas needing additional actions; developing procedures for working with OMB and the Congress to address barriers encountered that inhibit actions to reduce improper payments; and periodically reporting, through publicly available documents, to the agency head, OMB, and the Congress on the progress made in achieving improper payment reduction targets and future action plans for controlling improper payments. Office of Management and Budget
We recommend that the Director of OMB take the following actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses (1) the amount of improper payments reported in agencies' fiscal year 2000 financial statements, (2) the extent to which agencies' fiscal year 2002 performance plans address improper payments, (3) the extent to which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has implemented previous GAO recommendations in this area, and (4) other actions that might encourage agencies to better report improper payments. Of the 15 agency performance plans GAO reviewed, only 4 comprehensively addressed any of the Government Performance and Results Act requirements for evaluating the effectiveness of federal programs and the resources spent on them.
What GAO Found
GAO found that improper payments often result from a lack of, or breakdown in, internal controls. This report also contains recommendations for agencies to assign responsibilities to minimize improper payments and for OMB to assist agencies in identifying and implementing corrective actions. |
gao_RCED-98-43 | gao_RCED-98-43_0 | The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau) and the Department of the Army’s Corps of Engineers (the Corps) generate electricity at hydropower plants located at major federal water projects. Three agencies that market federal electricity—the Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western—are responsible for $7 billion of this debt. In response, the Chairmen of the House Committee on Resources and the Subcommittee on Water and Power asked GAO to focus on these three PMAs and to (1) examine whether the government operates them and the related electric power assets in a businesslike manner that recovers the federal government’s capital investment in those assets and the costs of operating and maintaining them and (2) identify options that the Congress and other policymakers can pursue to address concerns about the role of these three PMAs in restructuring markets or to manage them in a more businesslike fashion. The PMAs generally follow these laws and regulations; however, in some cases federal statutes and DOE’s rules also prohibit or are ambiguous about the recovery of certain costs. As we reported in September 1997, for fiscal years 1992 through 1996, as a result of its involvment in the electricity-related activities of Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western (the three PMAs), the federal government incurred “net costs” of $1.5 billion—the amount by which the full costs of providing electric power exceeded the revenues from the sale of power. In addition, the availability of many federal power plants to generate electricity is below that of nonfederal plants because, among other factors, the federal plants are aging and because the federal planning and budgeting practices, including those used by the Bureau and the Corps, do not always ensure that funds are available so that repairs can be made when they are needed. The resulting declines in performance decrease the marketability of federal power. The net cost to the Treasury and the performance problems of the federal power plants—when combined with competitive pressures on electricity suppliers to decrease their rates at a time when some federal hydropower project’s environmental costs need to be recouped by the PMAs—create varying degrees of risk that some of the federal investment at certain federal generation and transmission projects and rate-setting systems will not be repaid. For example, although the recovery of most of the federal investment in the three PMAs’ hydropower-related facilities is relatively secure, up to $1.4 billion of the federal investment for projects or rate-setting systems pertaining to these PMAs, out of a total federal investment of about $7.2 billion, is at some risk of nonrecovery. The Federal Hydropower Assets Need Repair
The availability of federal power plants to generate power is below that of other power plants. Divest the federal hydropower assets. Some representatives of the PMAs’ preference customers have advocated defederalizing the PMAs and the federal generating assets as a way of improving their operating efficiency and availability. Some of Southeastern’s, Southwestern’s, and Western’s customers are concerned that a sale would significantly raise their rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various issues concerning the role of certain power marketing administrations (PMA) and other federal agencies in restructuring electricity markets, focusing on: (1) whether the government operates them and the related electric power assets in a businesslike manner; and (2) options that Congress and other policymakers can pursue to address concerns about the PMAs' role in restructuring markets and about their management.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although federal laws and regulations generally require that the PMAs recover the full costs of building, operating, and maintaining the federal power plants and transmission assets, in some cases federal statues and the Department of Energy's rules are ambiguous about or prohibit the recovery of certain costs; (2) as GAO reported in September 1997, for fiscal years 1992 through 1996, the federal government incurred a net cost of $1.5 billion from its involvement in the electricity-related activities of the Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western Area Power Administrations; (3) the $1.5 billion was the amount by which the full costs of providing electric power exceeded the revenues from the sale of power; (4) the availability of federal power plants to generate electricity is below that of nonfederal plants because the federal plants are aging and because the federal planning and budgeting processes, as implemented, do not always ensure that funds are available to make repairs when needed; (5) the resulting declines in performance decrease the marketability of federal power; (6) to mitigate these funding delays, the Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers, PMAs and their preference customers have negotiated or are negotiating agreements whereby customers pay for needed repairs in advance; (7) the net cost to the Treasury and the decreased generating availability of the federal power plants--when combined with the competitive pressures on all electricity suppliers to decrease their rates and the need to recoup some federal hydropower projects' environmental costs--create varying degrees of risk that some of the federal investment in certain hydropower plants and facilities will not be repaid; (8) although the recovery of most of the federal investment in Southeastern's, Southwestern's, and Western's hydropower-related facilities is relatively secure, up to $1.4 billion out of about $7.2 billion of the federal investment in the electricity-related assets of these PMAs is at some risk of nonrecovery; and (9) three general options are available for the Bureau, the Corps, Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western to address their roles in emerging restructured electricity markets: (a) the Bureau and the Corps could continue generating and the PMAs could continue marketing power as in the past; (b) the current ownership structure could be maintained while improving how the federal assets are managed and operated; and (c) the federal government could divest the PMAs; the PMAs and the generating assets; or the PMAs, the generating assets, and the dam reservoirs. |
gao_GAO-11-311 | gao_GAO-11-311_0 | Debt Protection Products Have Largely Displaced Credit Insurance
Ten years ago, the largest credit card issuers rarely offered debt protection products and instead offered credit insurance, but today most issuers sell primarily debt protection products and rarely offer credit insurance to new customers. In 2009, cardholders paid approximately $2.4 billion in fees for debt protection products, according to data from the nine largest credit card issuers. Credit Insurance and Debt Protection Products Function Similarly from a Consumer’s Perspective
Credit card credit insurance and debt protection products are largely similar from the perspective of the consumer, although, as discussed later in this report, the two products are regulated differently. OCC’s supplemental examination procedures direct examiners to also review the products’ features and terms and conditions and the accuracy of the issuers’ marketing materials. The regulators said that for this reason their examinations of these products focused on compliance with applicable laws and regulations, such as those related to disclosure requirements, and did not address the costs and benefits of the products from a consumer’s perspective. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act’s prohibition of unfair or deceptive acts or practices also can apply to credit insurance. Peace of mind. Regulators have reported relatively few consumer complaints and have cited few formal violations related to these products as a result of bank examinations. But, as we have seen, the fees associated with these products can be substantial, with the annual cost often exceeding 10 percent of the cardholder’s average monthly balance. Moreover, among the nine largest issuers in 2009, consumers got back 21 cents in tangible financial benefits for every dollar they paid in fees for these products. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, transfers supervisory and enforcement authority for credit card debt protection products––among other consumer financial products and services—from the federal banking regulators to the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Taking such steps for credit card debt protection products would be consistent with the bureau’s mission and would help ensure that the products represented a fair value to consumers. Credit card debt protection products can be difficult for consumers to assess. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection take the following two actions: factor into its oversight and regulation of credit card debt protection products, including its rulemaking and examination processes, a consideration of the financial benefits and costs to consumers, and incorporate in its consumer financial education efforts ways to improve consumers’ understanding of credit card debt protection products and their ability to assess whether or not the products represent a good choice for them. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our reporting objectives were to review (1) the market for and key characteristics of debt protection products and credit insurance for credit cards, (2) federal and state regulation of these products, and (3) the advantages and disadvantages of these products for consumers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Debt protection and credit insurance products can cancel or suspend part or all of a credit card debt under specific circumstances, such as loss of life, disability, or involuntary unemployment. In response to a mandate in the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, this report reviews these products' market share and characteristics, federal and state oversight, and advantages and disadvantages to consumers. For this report, GAO analyzed data it had requested on these products from three major credit insurers and the nine largest credit card issuers. These nine issuers represented 85 percent of the credit card market. GAO also reviewed the products' terms and conditions, related marketing materials, and applicable federal and state regulations.
What GAO Found
In 2009, consumers paid about $2.4 billion on 24 million accounts for debt protection products, according to data from the nine largest credit card issuers. Debt protection products have largely displaced credit insurance in the credit card market, although the two products are similar from a consumer's perspective. Issuers market debt protection products when consumers call their customer services lines, by direct mail, e-mail, and telemarketing, and with new credit card applications, and market the products broadly rather than to specific subpopulations. Debt protection products are banking products that are largely federally regulated, while credit insurance is an insurance product regulated by the states. Unlike state oversight of credit insurance, federal banking oversight of debt protection products does not directly address the relative financial benefits and costs of the products to consumers; instead, it focuses on compliance with disclosure requirements and prohibitions of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection will soon assume supervisory and enforcement authority for financial products, including credit card debt protection products. Ensuring that these products represent a fair value to consumers would be consistent with the new agency's mission. Debt protection products and credit insurance can offer consumers several advantages. The products can protect a cardholder's credit rating in times of financial distress, can provide peace of mind, and are widely available and easy to purchase. Regulators have reported relatively few consumer complaints and have cited few formal violations related to debt protection products. However, fees for these products can be substantial, with the annual cost often exceeding 10 percent of the cardholder's average monthly balance. In the aggregate, cardholders received 21 cents in tangible financial benefits for every dollar spent in debt protection product fees among the nine largest issuers in 2009. These products can be difficult for consumers to understand, but federal agencies offer few educational resources to aid consumers in assessing them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (1) factor into its oversight of credit card debt protection products, including its rulemaking and examination process, a consideration of the financial benefits and costs to consumers, and (2) incorporate into its financial education efforts ways to improve consumers' ability to understand and assess these products. The bureau agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1007 | gao_GAO-07-1007_0 | The Army Corps of Engineers is the Army’s construction agent and is charged with contracting for infrastructure construction for the Army. The Army Has Developed Plans but Faces Complex Implementation Challenges
The Army has developed plans to accommodate growth of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic bases as a result of BRAC 2005, overseas rebasing, and force modularity actions, but it faces several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans and risks late provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support arriving personnel. First, Army plans are still evolving, and officials at the gaining bases we visited did not agree with Army headquarters on personnel movements at their bases. Third, competing resource demands could lead to redirection of resources that would have been used for infrastructure improvements to other priorities, as has happened in the past. If this process delays these moves, it could jeopardize meeting the statutory deadline. For example, construction of the new Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, could be delayed because the installation is required to account for endangered species protection actions in its construction plans. Army Corps of Engineers Is at Risk of Not Meeting Construction Costs and Timing Goals
To meet the expected large volume and costs of facilities construction associated with BRAC and the concurrent implementation of overseas rebasing and modularity, most of which must be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011, the Army Corps of Engineers has developed a strategy, known as military construction transformation, intended to reduce (1) construction costs by 15 percent and (2) construction time by 30 percent. These communities are in the process of identifying and obtaining funding sources to finance these additional infrastructure requirements, and they have several ways to finance these needs, including seeking federal assistance. Nonetheless, given the evolving nature of the Army’s growth projections, these communities have generally been hindered in their ability to identify all of the costs for implementing infrastructure expansion. These communities’ schools, housing, transportation, and other infrastructure needs depend on the number of new personnel to be assigned to their local bases. However, the Army’s plans for relocating its personnel and families were evolving at the time of our review. State-level or regional task forces have also been formed in some states to assist communities surrounding bases in managing the growth. For example, Fort Benning officials projected that student enrollment would increase by about 10,000 through fiscal year 2011 as compared to a November 2006 DOD report that estimates 600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better facilitate infrastructure planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) determine why there are differences between headquarters and gaining bases with respect to the number of arriving and departing personnel and (2) ensure that Army headquarters and base officials are collaborating to agree on Army personnel movement plans so that base commanders and surrounding communities can effectively plan for expected growth. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at its major gaining bases because of the combined effects of implementing the 2005 round of base realignment and closures (BRAC), overseas rebasing, and Army force modularity actions, we analyzed infrastructure-related planning documentation and discussed planning and related funding efforts with officials from various Army headquarters-level offices, four regional Installation Management Command offices, and nine installations. In examining the plans and identifying challenges that could place the Army at risk of not providing the necessary infrastructure to accommodate incoming personnel in a timely manner, we focused our efforts on key elements of the planning process, including planned personnel restationing actions and synchronization of multiple actions affecting particular installations, infrastructure requirements to include quality of life facilities, and military construction plans and expected costs. To determine how communities surrounding the Army’s gaining bases were planning for and funding the necessary infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their families, we contacted community leaders during our installation visits and discussed their relationships with installation officials and steps they were taking to address community infrastructure issues as a result of expected increased defense-driven personnel growth and non-Department of Defense (DOD) growth in their communities. Defense Infrastructure: DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50 percent in some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because of the effect of implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC), overseas force rebasing, and force modularity actions. This growth creates the need for additional support infrastructure at these bases and in nearby communities. Military construction costs of over $17 billion are expected for new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure costs as well. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. It addresses (1) the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at its gaining installations and (2) how communities are planning and funding for infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their families. GAO analyzed personnel restationing numbers, discussed planning efforts with Army and community officials, and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and nearby communities.
What GAO Found
The Army has developed plans to accommodate the growth of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic bases, but it faces several complex implementation challenges that risk late provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support incoming personnel. First, Army plans continue to evolve, and Army headquarters and each of the nine gaining bases we visited were relying on different numbers of personnel movements and were not fully aware of the causes for the variances. For example, Fort Benning officials expected more than 6,000 additional soldiers and military students than Army headquarters planned. Because consistency in the relocation numbers is important for properly determining not only base infrastructure support needs but those of nearby communities as well, inconsistent numbers could lead to an improperly sized facilities' infrastructure. Second, the Army faces challenges in synchronizing personnel movements with planned newly constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. Any significant delays in implementing planned actions could place the Army at risk of not meeting BRAC statutory deadlines. Third, competing priorities could lead the Army to redirect resources planned for needed infrastructure improvements and operations to such priorities as current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as has happened in the past. However, such redirection of resources could undermine the Army's ability to complete infrastructure improvements in time to support personnel movements and to meet planned timelines. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented volume of construction, implement a new construction strategy designed to save construction costs and time, and complete infrastructure improvements within available resources and planned timelines. The Army recognizes these challenges and is refining its implementation plans to overcome these challenges. While communities surrounding growth bases GAO visited have generally proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been hindered in fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements and associated costs by the evolving nature of the Army's plans and different interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army officials at Fort Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 school-age children, the Department of Defense's (DOD) November 2006 figures project only about 600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Communities surrounding growth bases have their own unique infrastructure improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) the community's current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the community's own capacity to finance additional infrastructure requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of GAO's review even though the evolving nature of the Army's planning prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements. |
gao_GAO-03-169 | gao_GAO-03-169_0 | Age and Pay Grade Are Correlated to Delinquency and Charge-off Problems
A number of factors contributed to the Army’s high delinquency rates. We found that the Army’s delinquency and charge- off problems are primarily associated with young, low- and midlevel enlisted military personnel with basic pay levels ranging from $11,000 to $26,000. We have also seen increased management attention and focus on reducing delinquencies at the Army command level. During fiscal year 2001, of the over 4,200 account holders who wrote NSF checks, close to 1,200 Army personnel had their accounts charged off. In the same period, more than 200 personnel whose accounts were eventually charged off may have committed bank fraud by writing three or more NSF checks to Bank of America. The cardholder is now in the salary offset program. In this instance, records indicated that the cardholder was reimbursed for official travel, but did not pay the travel card bill. Weak Overall Control Environment and Ineffective Travel Card Program Controls
A weak overall control environment and ineffective internal controls over the travel card program contributed to the potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card and the Army’s high rates of delinquency and charge-offs. The APC deactivated the cardholder’s account in March 2002. Conclusions
The intent of the travel card program was to improve convenience for the traveler and to reduce the government’s costs of administering travel. Specifically, actions to date have focused on dealing with accounts that are seriously delinquent, which are “back-end” or detective controls rather than “front-end” or preventive controls. Our assessment covered the reported magnitude and impact of delinquent and charged-off Army travel card accounts for fiscal year 2001 and the first 6 months of fiscal year 2002, along with an analysis of causes and related corrective actions; an analysis of the universe of Army travel card transactions during fiscal year 2001 to identify potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card; the Army’s overall management control environment and the design of selected Army travel program management controls, including controls over (1) travel card issuance, (2) APCs’ capacity to carry out assigned duties, (3) limiting card activation to meet travel needs, (4) transferred and orphan accounts, (5) procedures for terminating accounts when cardholders leave military service, (6) segregation of duties to ensure that no one individual can control all aspects of a travel transaction, and (7) access to Bank of America’s travel card database; and tests of statistical samples of transactions to assess the implementation of key management controls and processes for four Army units’ travel activity, including (1) travel order approval, (2) accuracy of travel voucher payments, (3) timely submission of travel vouchers by travelers to the approving officials, and (4) timely processing and reimbursement of travel vouchers by the Army and DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's individually billed travel card program is different from the purchase card program in that the cardholder is directly responsible for all charges incurred on his or her travel card account, and the monthly bill is sent to the cardholder for payment. The cardholder is responsible for submitting a properly documented voucher and is reimbursed by the Army for all valid expenses related to official government travel. The intent of the travel card program was to improve convenience for the traveler and to reduced the government's costs of administering travel. GAO found substantial delinquencies and charge-offs of Army travel-card accounts during fiscal year 2001, and delinquencies continued into the first half of fiscal year 2002. GAO's analysis shows a correlation between delinquency problems and the travel cardholder's age and pay grade.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Army's delinquency and charge-off problems are primarily associated with young, low- to mid-level enlisted military personnel. In addition, a weak internal control environment compounded by instances of delays in processing travel reimbursements to Army military and civilian personnel contributed to the high delinquency rates. The Army and the Department of Defense have taken action to address and focus command- and installation-level attention on management of delinquent travel card accounts. However, these actions are primarily focused on treating the symptoms or "back-end" problems rather than the "front-end" or preventive controls. GAO's work identified numerous instances of potentially fraudulent and abusive activity related to the travel card. During fiscal year 2001, 1,200 of the over 4,200 Army account holders who had written at least one nonsufficient funds (NSF) check to pay their travel card bill had their accounts charged off. In the same period, more than 200 cardholders whose accounts were eventually charged off may have also committed bank fraud by writing three or more NSF checks to the Bank of America. GAO's audit found that weaknesses in the Army's overall control environment, including a number of specific controls that were either flawed in their design or in their implementation, are the root source of the Army's inability to prevent or effectively detect the numerous instances of potentially fraudulent and abusive travel card related activity previously detected. |
gao_GGD-96-59 | gao_GGD-96-59_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the adequacy of the Postal Service’s procurement program, the Chairman of the former House Post Office and Civil Service Committee asked us to determine (1) if previously reported problems with several Postal Service purchases were due to any underlying causes that should be addressed through a legislative solution, and if not, (2) whether additional procedural safeguards could be employed by the Service to minimize future occurrences of such problems. Insufficient Attention to Some Practices Contributed to Risk of Contractual Problems
The problems encountered in the seven purchases we reviewed had various causes, but certain practices recurred. The study also found that contracting officers were not sufficiently independent because many of them reported directly to those officials who required the contracted products or services. The study recommended that the Postal Service establish a single purchasing executive, reporting to the Postmaster General, with management authority over the three separate purchasing groups. According to the Office of Government Ethics, the Postal Service’s control of its ethics environment has been of concern. Recognizing the need for additional review and other processes to reduce errors, the purchasing office plans to adopt additional higher levels of review, including requirements for contracting officers to document the policy and business rationales for the particular purchasing decisions. The consolidation of the three independent purchasing units under a single responsible purchasing executive should help ensure more consistent management of major purchases, as should the other plans to improve the purchasing process and the training and ethics awareness of purchasing personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether changes are needed in the Postal Service's purchasing program, focusing on whether: (1) certain problem purchases were due to some underlying causes that should be addressed through legislation; and (2) the Service should implement additional procedural safeguards to minimize future occurrences of such problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the problems encountered during the seven purchases reviewed were due to Postal officials' poor judgment, circumventions of existing internal controls, and failure to resolve conflicts of interest; (2) many contracting officers could not exercise independent judgment, since they reported directly to those officials who required the products or services; (3) the Service has taken action to increase oversight and accountability over its purchasing process and to safeguard against such future occurrences; (4) in response to recommendations by the Office of Government Ethics, the Service has outlined actions it is taking to improve its ethics program which should help prevent the recurrence of such purchasing problems; (5) a formal ethics education and training program for contracting officers and personnel is underway; (6) the Service has established one purchasing executive with management authority over the three separate Postal purchasing groups; and (7) the Service plans to adopt a requirement for more explicit documentation of and rationale for contracting officers' business and policy actions. |
gao_GAO-08-527T | gao_GAO-08-527T_0 | USPTO’s Annual Hiring Estimates Are Determined by Funding and Institutional Capacity and Are Unlikely to Reduce the Patent Application Backlog
In each of the last 5 years, USPTO has identified its annual hiring estimates primarily on the basis of available funding levels and its institutional capacity to train and supervise new patent examiners, and not on the basis of the number of patent examiners needed to reduce the existing backlog or review new patent applications. Although this process is consistent with workforce planning strategies established by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and has enabled the agency to better match its hiring estimates to its institutional capacity, USPTO’s ability to reduce the patent application backlog simply through its hiring efforts is unlikely. For example, in identifying its fiscal year 2002 hiring estimate, USPTO determined that funding availability would limit the number of patent examiners the agency could hire, and established its estimate on the basis of the number of patent examiners the agency had hired in the most recent year. Although new patent examiners can review the prior art relating to patent applications, only supervisors can authorize a new patent examiner’s decision to approve or reject a patent application. Attrition Has Significantly Offset Hiring over the Last 5 Years, and Agency Management and Patent Examiners Disagree about the Reasons for Attrition
Although USPTO is hiring as many new patent examiners as it has the annual funding and institutional capacity to support, attrition has continued to increase among patent examiners—one patent examiner has been lost for nearly every two hired over the last 5 years. The attrition of patent examiners who were at the agency for less than 5 years is a significant loss for USPTO for a variety of reasons. First, attrition of these staff affects USPTO’s ability to reduce the patent application backlog because these less experienced patent examiners are primarily responsible for making the initial decisions on patent applications—the triggering event that removes applications from the backlog. According to USPTO management, personal reasons are the primary reasons that cause patent examiners to leave the agency. Specifically, approximately 67 percent of patent examiners, regardless of their tenure with the agency, said that the agency’s production goals were among the primary reasons they would consider leaving USPTO. We and others have reported in the past that the assumptions underlying the agency’s production goals were established over 30 years ago and have not since been adjusted to reflect changes in science and technology. The percentage of patent examiners working while on paid leave was significantly higher for those with longer tenure at the agency. As one respondent to our survey explained, “Vacation time means catch up time.” Another respondent summed up the situation as follows: “I know that the production goals are set to keep us motivated in order to help get over the backlog but if a majority of examiners cannot meet those goals without relying on unpaid overtime or annual leave then something is wrong with the system.” According to our survey results, 59 percent of patent examiners identified the amount of unpaid overtime that they have to put into meeting their production goals as a primary reason they would choose to leave USPTO, and 37 percent identified the amount of time they must work during paid leave in order to meet their goals as a primary reason to leave the agency. When we asked USPTO management about the agency’s policy for unpaid overtime to meet production goals, the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations told us, “As with many professionals who occasionally remain at work longer to make up for time during the day spent chatting or because they were less productive than intended, examiners may stay at the office (or remote location) longer than their scheduled tour of duty to work.”
Retention Incentives and Flexibilities Provided over the Last 5 Years Generally Align with the Primary Reasons Patent Examiners Identified for Staying at USPTO
From 2002 to 2006, USPTO offered a number of different retention incentives and flexibilities, as table 1 shows. More specifically: Special pay rate. Because the agency’s production goals appear to be undermining USPTO’s efforts to hire and retain a qualified workforce, we recommended in 2007 that the agency comprehensively evaluate the assumptions it uses to establish patent examiner production goals and revise those assumptions as appropriate. The Department of Commerce agreed with our findings, conclusions, and recommendation and agreed that the agency’s hiring efforts are not sufficient to reduce the patent application backlog. It stated that USPTO is implementing initiatives to increase the productivity of the agency that will result in a more efficient and focused patent examination process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) helps protect U.S. competitiveness by granting patents for new ideas and innovations. Increases in the volume and complexity of patent applications have extended the time for processing them. Concerns continue about the agency's efforts to attract and retain qualified patent examiners who can meet the demand for patents and help reduce the growing backlog of unexamined patent applications. In 2007, GAO reported on (1) USPTO's process for making its annual hiring estimates and the relationship of these estimates to the patent application backlog; (2) the extent to which patent examiner hiring has been offset by attrition, and the factors that may contribute to this attrition; and (3) the extent to which USPTO's retention efforts align with examiners' reasons for staying with the agency. GAO recommended that USPTO comprehensively evaluate the assumptions it uses to establish its production goals. USPTO agreed to implement this recommendation once it determines the effect of recent initiatives designed to increase the productivity of the agency through a more efficient and focused patent examination process. This testimony is based on GAO's 2007 report, which was based in part on a survey of 1,420 patent examiners. See, GAO, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Hiring Efforts Are Not Sufficient to Reduce the Patent Application Backlog, GAO-07-1102 .
What GAO Found
USPTO primarily determined its annual hiring estimates on the basis of available funding levels and institutional capacity to train and supervise new patent examiners, and not on the basis of the number of patent examiners needed to reduce the existing backlog of patent applications or review new patent applications. USPTO's process for identifying its annual hiring estimates is generally consistent with accepted workforce planning strategies. However, because this approach does not consider how many examiners are needed to reduce the existing backlog or address the inflow of new applications, it is unlikely that the agency will be able to reduce the growing backlog simply through its hiring efforts. Although USPTO is hiring as many new patent examiners as its budget and institutional capacity will support, attrition is significantly offsetting the agency's hiring efforts, and agency management and patent examiners disagree about the causes of attrition. Specifically, from 2002 through 2006, one patent examiner left USPTO for nearly every two hired--70 percent of those who left had been at the agency for less than 5 years. This represents a significant loss to the agency because new patent examiners are primarily responsible for the actions that remove applications from the backlog. According to USPTO management, patent examiners primarily leave the agency because of personal reasons, such as finding that the job is not a good fit. In contrast, 67 percent of patent examiners identified the agency's production goals among the primary reasons they would consider leaving the agency. These goals are based on the number of applications patent examiners must complete during a 2-week period. However, the assumptions underlying these goals were established over 30 years ago and have not since been adjusted to reflect changes in the complexity of patent applications. Moreover, 70 percent of patent examiners reported working unpaid overtime during the past year in order to meet their production goals. The large percentage of examiners working overtime to meet production goals and who would choose to leave the agency because of these goals may indicate that these goals do not accurately reflect the time needed to review applications and are undermining USPTO's hiring efforts. The retention incentives and flexibilities USPTO has provided over the last 5 years generally align with the primary reasons patent examiners identified for staying with the agency. Between 2002 and 2006, USPTO used a variety of retention flexibilities, such as a special pay rate, performance bonuses, and a flexible work place to encourage patent examiners to stay with the agency. According to USPTO management, their most effective retention efforts were those related to compensation and an enhanced work environment. GAO's survey of patent examiners indicates that most patent examiners generally approved of USPTO's retention efforts, and ranked the agency's salary and other pay incentives as well as the flexible work schedule among the primary reasons for staying with the agency. |
gao_NSIAD-99-34 | gao_NSIAD-99-34_0 | The impact of overall planning and budget guidance is not necessarily traceable to specific installations or sites. For fiscal year 1995, Congress appropriated $400 million less than DOD requested for cleanup at operational installations and formerly used defense sites and rescinded another $300 million from the amount that had been appropriated. For fiscal year 1996, Congress appropriated $200 million less than DOD requested. Fiscal Year 1995 Allocation
Environmental Security’s November 1994 guidance to the defense components emphasized cleanup of sites that are the highest priority to stakeholders (those having interest in cleanup activities, such as the community surrounding the installation) and regulators’ considerations included by (1) involving stakeholders in decision-making, (2) taking interim remedial actions (early response action that is identified and implemented at any time during the study or design phases of cleanup) instead of continuing studies, (3) giving priority to higher relative risk sites, (4) deferring studies that are not essential for safety or compliance with agreements, (5) reviewing expense data, (6) considering innovative technologies and generic remedies, and (7) funding field locations according to their fair share. Reported Cleanup Schedule Delays Due to Funding
DOD’s annual reports to Congress for fiscal years 1995 and 1996 show that an increasing number of installations reported that their cleanup schedules were affected by fund limits. Installations with the largest budget increases and decreases reported schedule delays with about equal frequency, and not all of the installations with the largest decreases reported schedule delays due to funding. Funding at Installations Visited
Although DOD developed information on the effect of receiving less funding than it requested, the actual changes were often different than envisioned. Conclusions
DOD uses its planning, programming, and budgeting process for making funding decisions, and DOD components ultimately make site-specific decisions. When DOD received less funds than requested or rescissions occurred, Environmental Security provided written or oral guidance for DOD components’ actions. Cleanup schedule delays occurred at installations when the funding received was more or less than planned. Scope and Methodology
To describe the Department of Defense’s (DOD) process for allocating funds, we reviewed DOD’s April 1994 management guidance that addressed how DOD handles funding responsibilities for the defense restoration program, and a March 1998 update to this guidance. Corps districts allocate funds for site cleanup and oversee action. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) process for allocating approved environmental cleanup budgets when funds received are less than requested or budget rescissions occur; and (2) reported cleanup schedule delays due to lack of funding.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD develops and allocates approved budgets through its departmentwide planning, programming, and budget process; (2) the components used DOD guidance to establish priorities and distribute funds to the various installations, but the impact of that guidance is not necessarily traceable to specific installations or sites; (3) during fiscal years (FY) 1993 to 1997, Congress took three actions that significantly affected funding for DOD cleanup activities; (4) in FY 1995, Congress appropriated $400 million less than DOD requested and then rescinded an additional $300 million of the amount appropriated; (5) Congress appropriated $200 million less than DOD had requested for FY 1996; (6) in each case, DOD components adjusted funding priorities in light of the congressional actions and DOD guidance; (7) while specific guidance varied, both written and verbal guidance encouraged priority for sites of high risk and discouraged cleanup studies that were not essential; (8) data contained in DOD's annual reports to Congress and in DOD components' records do not show a direct relationship between installations receiving less or more funding than planned and those reporting cleanup schedule delays due to funding; (9) for example, during FY 1995 and FY 1996, about half of the Army installations with the largest decreases in funding reported cleanup schedule delays--a frequency similar to Army installations with the largest increases in funding; (10) during this period, GAO also found that actual funding changes under the DOD process often varied from that initially envisioned because of such reasons as inherent uncertainty during cleanup planning; and (11) for example, DOD initially identified a potential decrease in funding for two sites at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, whereas the Army allocated a slight overall funding increase to that installation, which has 205 cleanup sites. |
gao_GAO-17-383T | gao_GAO-17-383T_0 | As I mentioned above, PPACA also changed, as of 2014, how insurers determine health insurance premiums and how consumers shop for health insurance plans. As part of this, PPACA required that health plans be marketed based on information that helps consumers compare the relative value of each plan. Specifically, plans must be marketed by specific categories—including four “metal” tiers of coverage (bronze, silver, gold, and platinum)—that reflect out-of-pocket costs that may be incurred by an enrollee. These changes occurred at the same time that PPACA required the establishment of health insurance exchanges for each state, through which consumers could compare and select from among QHPs. Health-Insurance Markets Remained Concentrated in Most States in 2014, While Issuer Participation Generally Decreased from the Prior Year
In 2016, we examined enrollment in private health-insurance plans in the years leading up to and through 2014, the first year of the exchanges established by PPACA, and found that in each year, markets were concentrated among a small number of issuers in most states. Enrollment through the exchanges was generally more concentrated among a few issuers than was true for the individual and small group markets overall in 2014. Consumers in the Individual Market Had Access to More Plans in 2015 than 2014, with Varying Premiums in Both Years
In 2015, we reported that individual market consumers generally had access to more health plans in 2015—a year after the initial implementation of key PPACA provisions—than in 2014. Consumers in most of the counties analyzed in the 28 states for which we had sufficiently reliable data for plans offered either on or off an exchange had six or more plans from which to choose in three of the four health plan metal tiers (bronze, silver, and gold) in both 2014 and 2015. In our 2015 report, we also found that premiums varied among states and counties, the lowest cost plans were typically available on an exchange, and in most states premiums increased from 2014 to 2015. Specifically, we found that:
The range of premiums available to consumers in 2014 and 2015 varied among the states and counties we analyzed. In most states, the costs for the minimum and median premiums for silver plans increased from 2014 to 2015. While our 2015 report examining the numbers of health plans and ranges of health plan premiums available to individuals in 2014 and 2015 was our most recent examination of these two issues, HHS has examined more recent data. Available Data Show That Most Early QHP Enrollees Expressed Satisfaction with Their Plans in 2014 through 2016, Despite Some Concerns
In 2016, we reported that most enrollees who obtained their coverage through the health insurance exchanges were satisfied overall with their QHP during the first few years that exchanges operated, according to national surveys of QHP enrollees. For example, most QHP enrollees who obtained their coverage through the exchanges reported overall satisfaction with their plans in 2014 through 2016, according to three national surveys that asked this question. The surveys reported that QHP enrollees' satisfaction with their plans was either somewhat lower than, or was similar to, that of those enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance in 2015 and 2016. To varying degrees, QHP enrollees expressed satisfaction with specific aspects of their plan, including their coverage and choice of providers, and with plan affordability. We also interviewed stakeholders—including experts, state departments of insurance, and others—and reviewed literature for our 2016 report. These interviews and the literature revealed some concerns about QHP enrollee experiences that were similar to longstanding concerns in the private health insurance market. | Why GAO Did This Study
PPACA contained provisions, many of which took effect in 2014, that could affect how issuers determine health insurance coverage and premiums and how they market their plans. For example, PPACA prohibits issuers from denying coverage or varying premiums based on consumer health status or gender. PPACA also requires health plans to generally be marketed based on metal tiers (bronze, silver, gold, and platinum), which allows consumers to compare the relative value of each plan. It also required the establishment of health insurance exchanges in each state, through which consumers can compare and select from among participating health plans.
This testimony describes (1) private health-insurance market concentration and issuer participation from 2011 through 2014, the year by which key PPACA provisions took effect, (2) health plans and premiums available to individuals in 2014 and 2015, and (3) the experience of enrollees that obtained coverage through the exchanges from 2014 through 2016. It is based on three GAO reports issued in 2015 and 2016. For these reports, GAO examined data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS); reviewed published research; and interviewed stakeholders, including experts and officials from CMS and five states—Colorado, Indiana, Montana, North Carolina, and Vermont—that varied in geography and whether the state or CMS offered the exchange.
What GAO Found
GAO issued three reports in 2015 and 2016 on the early impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) on private health insurance markets.
Market Concentration
In a 2016 report, GAO examined enrollment in private health-insurance plans in the years leading up to and through 2014, the first year of the exchanges established by PPACA, and found that in all years analyzed, markets were concentrated among a small number of issuers in most states.
Beginning in 2014, enrollment in PPACA exchange plans was generally more concentrated among a few issuers than was true for the overall markets.
Plan Availability and Premiums
In a 2015 report, GAO examined the availability of health plans for individual market consumers and found that they generally had access to more health plans in 2015 than in 2014.
In both years, most consumers in 28 states for which GAO had sufficiently reliable data had 6 or more plans from which to choose in three of the four health plan metal tiers (bronze, silver, and gold).
The range of premiums available to consumers varied considerably by state, and in most states the costs for the minimum and median premiums for silver plans increased from 2014 to 2015. In both years, the lowest cost plans were typically available on an exchange.
More recent analyses by the Department of Health and Human Services found that in 2017 all consumers continued to have multiple plan options, and that premiums for exchange plans increased more in 2017 compared to the annual increases for these plans since 2014.
Enrollee Experiences
In a 2016 report, GAO examined national survey data to examine satisfaction of exchange enrollees. GAO found that, from 2014 through 2016, most enrollees who obtained their coverage through an exchange reported being satisfied overall with their plans.
In 2015 and 2016, the satisfaction that exchange enrollees reported with their plans was either somewhat lower than or similar to that of enrollees in employer-sponsored plans.
Exchange enrollees reported varying degrees of satisfaction with specific aspects of their plans, including coverage and plan affordability.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature GAO reviewed revealed some concerns about exchange enrollee experiences that were generally consistent with longstanding concerns in the private health insurance market—including concerns about affordability of out-of-pocket expenses and difficulties understanding coverage terminology. |
gao_T-RCED-97-80 | gao_T-RCED-97-80_0 | In response to continually growing losses and a widening gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies, Amtrak developed its Strategic Business Plan. This plan (which has been revised several times) was designed to increase revenues and control cost growth and, at the same time, eliminate Amtrak’s need for federal operating subsidies by 2002. However, the relative gap between total revenues and expenses has not significantly closed, and passenger revenues (adjusted for inflation)—which Amtrak has been relying on to help close the gap—have generally declined over the past several years (see apps. At the end of fiscal year 1994, the gap between Amtrak’s operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $75 million. It is important to note that Amtrak’s increased debt levels could limit the use of federal operating support to cover future operating deficits. For example, many of the productivity improvements (such as reducing the size of train crews) that Amtrak had planned in fiscal year 1996 were not achieved. We reported in June 1996 that Amtrak will need billions of dollars to address its capital needs, such as bringing the Northeast Corridor up to a state of good repair. A significant capital investment will also be required for other projects as well. For example, additional capital assistance will be required to introduce high-speed rail service between New York and Boston. It is likely that as Amtrak assumes increased debt (including capital lease obligations) to acquire equipment and as the number of cars in Amtrak’s fleet that exceed their useful life increases, even less of Amtrak’s future capital grants will be available to meet capital investment needs. Achieving Operating Self-Sufficiency by 2002 Will Be Difficult
Amtrak’s ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2002 will be difficult given the environment within which it operates. Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its goal of eliminating federal operating subsidies. In addition, providing funds from a dedicated source—such as the federal Highway Trust Fund—may not give Amtrak as much money as it expects. Amtrak is also subject to the competitive and economic environment within which it operates. Such trade-offs in the future could limit further increases in Amtrak’s yield and ultimately revenue growth. Finally, Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions necessary to further reduce costs. During fiscal year 1995, Amtrak was successful in reducing and eliminating some routes and services. Although the business plans have helped reduce net losses, Amtrak continues to face significant challenges in accomplishing this goal, and it is likely Amtrak will continue to require federal financial support—both operating and capital—well into the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed preliminary information from its ongoing work looking at Amtrak's progress in achieving operating self sufficiency, focusing on: (1) Amtrak's financial condition and progress toward self-sufficiency; (2) Amtrak's need for, and use of, capital funds; and (3) some of the factors that will play a role in Amtrak's future viability.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak's financial condition is still very precarious and heavily dependent on federal operating and capital funds; (2) in response to its deteriorating financial condition, in 1995 and 1996 Amtrak developed strategic business plans designed to increase revenues and reduce cost growth; (3) however, GAO has found that, in the past 2 years, passenger revenues, adjusted for inflation, have generally declined, and in fiscal year (FY) 1996, the gap between operating deficits and federal operating subsidies began to grow again to levels exceeding that of FY 1994, when the continuation of Amtrak's nationwide passenger rail service was severely threatened; (4) at the end of FY 1996, the gap between the operating deficit and federal operating subsidies was $82 million; (5) capital investment continues to play a critical role in supporting Amtrak's business plans and ultimately in maintaining Amtrak's viability; (6) such investment will not only help Amtrak retain revenues by improving the quality of its service but will be important in facilitating the revenue growth predicted in the business plans; (7) in 1995 and 1996, GAO reported that Amtrak faced significant capital investment needs to, among other things, bring its equipment and facilities systemwide and its tracks in the Northeast Corridor into a state of good repair and to introduce high-speed rail service between Washington and Boston; (8) Amtrak will need billions of dollars in capital investment for these and other projects; (9) it will be difficult for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2002 given the environment within which it operates; (10) Amtrak is relying heavily on capital investment to support its business plans, which envision a significant increase in capital funding support--possibly from a dedicated funding source, such as the Highway Trust Fund; (11) while such a source may offer the potential for steady, reliable funding, the current budget environment may limit the amount of funds actually made available to Amtrak; (12) Amtrak is also relying greatly on revenue growth and cost containment to achieve its goal of eliminating federal operating support; and (13) the economic and competitive environment within which Amtrak operates may limit revenue growth, and Amtrak will continue to find it difficult to take those actions necessary, such as route and service adjustments, to reduce costs. |
gao_GAO-03-227 | gao_GAO-03-227_0 | Local governments helped the Bureau as well, often investing considerable resources. The Bureau of the Census Twice Changed Plans for Reporting Service-Based Enumeration Data
Under the Bureau’s original plan for releasing Service-Based Enumeration data in Summary File-1 (SF-1), the emergency and transitional shelter count was one of several categories of noninstitutional group quarters data that were to be reported separately. Other people counted in the Service- Based Enumeration, including people counted at targeted nonsheltered outdoor locations, soup kitchens, and regularly scheduled mobile food vans, were to be combined and reported under the category “other non- institutional group quarters.” This category also included residential care facilities providing protective oversight, shelters against domestic violence, staff dormitories for nurses and interns at military and general hospitals, and living quarters for victims of natural disasters. Although the Bureau disseminated separate counts of people found at emergency shelters, preidentified street locations, and similar sites, the counts proved to be incomplete. As a result, when designing the 2000 census, the Bureau attempted to both improve the count and take precautions to ensure that the Service-Based Enumeration count would not be misconstrued as a count of the homeless. The Bureau Changed Its Dissemination Plans Because of Data Quality Concerns
In January 2001, 5 months before the SF-1 release, the Bureau reversed its April 1999 decision to release emergency and transitional shelter data separately because of “data quality concerns.” Instead, as shown in figure 1, the Bureau planned to combine the emergency and transitional shelter data with the “other non-institutional group quarters.” This category contained data on a variety of living arrangements including facilities for natural disaster victims. For example, as part of an extensive effort to help the Bureau develop a list of targeted nonsheltered outdoor locations, the city provided senior Bureau staff with a helicopter tour over some outdoor locations where people without conventional housing lived. Ultimately, the Bureau left a number of data users unsatisfied. Census Bureau Had Few Documented Guidelines Governing the Release of Census Data
A cause of the Bureau’s shifting position on reporting the components of Service-Based Enumeration appears to be its lack of documented, clear, transparent, and consistently applied guidelines governing the release of data from the 2000 Census. Had these guidelines been in place during the decennial census, they could have informed the Bureau’s decision on whether to release the Service-Based Enumeration data, how to characterize these data, and help defend the decision after it was made. Conclusions
Although Service-Based Enumeration was designed to address the challenges the Bureau encountered during the 1990 Census in obtaining a complete count of people without conventional housing, the Bureau’s experience during the 2000 Census suggests that tallying this population group remains problematic. However, the Bureau, by first planning to release the data one way, then changing the decision, and ultimately releasing the data anyway—all for reasons that were not clearly articulated to the Bureau’s stakeholders— raised questions about the Bureau’s decision-making on data quality issues. Ensure that these guidelines are documented, transparent, clearly defined, and consistently applied. However, the Bureau did not cite any written guidelines to support its position. However, we found that the Bureau did not effectively communicate its decisions with its partners or the public. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of the Census partnered with local governments, advocacy groups, and other organizations to help it enumerate people without conventional housing. Counting this population--which includes shelter residents and the homeless--has been a longstanding challenge for the Bureau. A number of organizations put substantial resources into an operation the Bureau called Service-Based Enumeration. In return, some expected the Bureau to provide data that would help them plan and deliver employment, health, and other services. However, the Bureau did not release the data as planned, which raised questions about the Bureau's decision-making on data quality issues. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined the Bureau's decision-making process behind its change in plans.
What GAO Found
The Bureau's original plan for releasing Service-Based Enumeration data was outlined in an April 1999 internal memorandum that called for the separate release of data on people counted at "emergency and transitional shelters." The Bureau planned to combine other components of Service-Based Enumeration, including people counted at soup kitchens, regularly scheduled mobile food vans, and certain outdoor locations, into a single category. Driving the Bureau's decision was its experience during the 1990 Census when it released separate counts of people found at shelters, on the street, and similar locations that proved to be incomplete. The Bureau also tried to ensure that the Service-Based Enumeration figures could not be used as a "homeless" count, because it was not designed to provide a specific count of the homeless. Instead, the operation was part of a larger effort to count people without conventional housing. In January 2001, the Bureau changed its earlier decision because a statistical procedure used to refine the emergency and transitional shelter data proved to be unreliable, which lowered the quality of the data. In response, the Bureau combined the shelter data with a category called "other non-institutional group quarters," a category that also includes data on people enumerated in several other group locations such as facilities for victims of natural disasters. In the fall of 2001, the Bureau produced a heavily qualified special report on the shelter data. A key cause of the Bureau's shifting position on reporting these data appears to be its lack of well documented, transparent, clearly defined, and consistently applied guidelines on the minimum quality necessary for releasing data. Had these guidelines been in place at the time of the census, the Bureau could have been better positioned to make an objective decision on releasing these figures. Additionally, the Bureau could have used the guidance to explain to data users the reasons for the decision, eliminating any appearance of censorship and arbitrariness. Because the Bureau did not always adequately communicate its plans for releasing the data, expectation gaps developed between the Bureau and entities that helped with Service-Based Enumeration. |
gao_GGD-95-63 | gao_GGD-95-63_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The primary objective of our review was to determine if the financial safety and soundness of NCB is effectively monitored by the present oversight arrangement. Although NCB is a federally chartered, private institution that is cooperatively owned by its stockholders, it has much weaker financial links to the government. Thus, because NCB is a small institution that does not accept insured deposits, and the government’s potential loss due to NCB’s outstanding debt to the Treasury is limited to $183 million, the reasons why the government regulates financial institutions do not apply to NCB. At the same time, the government declared that it does not guarantee obligations incurred by NCB. The creditors impose discipline on NCB as a requirement of extending credit, and NCB appears to be responsive to this market discipline. NCB Recently Adopted a New Plan for Repaying the Debt
Another section of the act (section 116(a)(3)(C)), also added in the 1981 amendments, states that “after December 31, 1990, the Bank shall maintain a repayment schedule for class A notes which will assure full repayment of all class A notes not later than December 31, 2020.”
NCB adopted a plan in February 1993 to accumulate a portion of the funds needed to repay the debt. We believe, however, that prudent and responsible financial management on the part of the government would call for Treasury, as NCB’s government creditor, to protect the public’s investment in NCB by approving and monitoring NCB’s plans to repay its debt. The National Consumer Cooperative Bank Act does not, however, require Treasury to approve or monitor NCB’s plan to repay the debt. Treasury should also, through FCA, monitor NCB’s performance against the plan and require revisions as needed. GAO Comments
1. GAO Comments
1. 2. 2. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the safety and soundness of the National Consumer Cooperative Bank (NCB), focusing on whether NCB is: (1) fiscally sound; and (2) able to repay its debt to the Department of the Treasury.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NCB is a private, cooperatively-owned financial institution with limited ties to the government; (2) although NCB is overseen by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), its discipline and most of its funds come from private-sector lenders; (3) the government does not guarantee any obligations incurred by NCB and NCB creditors do not believe that the government would intervene if NCB became financially unstable; (4) there is no need for additional regulatory oversight because the safety and soundness of NCB appears to be effectively monitored by FCA; (5) NCB has a direct financial link to the government through its debt to the Treasury; (6) as of December 1993, the government's potential financial liability was about $183 million; (7) federal law requires NCB to repay the principal amount of its debt no later than October 31, 2020; (8) in February 1993, NCB adopted a plan to accumulate a portion of the funds needed to repay its debt; (9) Treasury should be legally required to approve or monitor the NCB repayment plan; and (10) Treasury's involvement in the NCB repayment plan would help ensure that NCB maintains its repayment schedule, meets its debt requirements, and protects the taxpayers' interest. |
gao_GAO-12-743 | gao_GAO-12-743_0 | In contrast, Wisconsin does not calculate rated capacity but instead uses design capacity and operational capacity. Rated Capacity Grew Less than 7 Percent, Contributing to Crowding
BOP’s 9.5 percent population growth from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 among inmates housed in BOP facilities exceeded the increase in its rated capacity, which grew less than 7 percent (from 119,510 beds to 127,795). BOP Projects Continued Population Growth
BOP’s 2020 long-range capacity plan assumes continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal years 2011 through 2020, with about 15 percent growth in the number of inmates BOP will house. BOP’s Population Growth Has Negatively Affected Inmates, Staff, and Infrastructure, but BOP Has Acted to Help Mitigate These Effects
According to BOP and our observations, the growth of the federal inmate population and related crowding have negatively affected inmates housed in BOP institutions, institutional staff, and the infrastructure of BOP facilities, and have contributed to inmate misconduct, which affects staff and inmate security and safety. Additionally, BOP headquarters officials and union representatives we spoke with expressed concerns about future effects of increased inmate population growth. BOP Has Worked to Increase Inmate and Staff Safety and Security and Has Reported Utilizing Resources More Efficiently
BOP has taken actions to manage a growing population within its facilities—and its approaches were similar to those in selected states we reviewed. As previously discussed, because escalating tensions in crowded facilities can cause increased security concerns, BOP utilizes Special Housing Units to segregate inmates involved in disciplinary infractions. States Have Taken Broader Actions Intended to Reduce Prison Populations than Those Taken at the Federal Level
While BOP and the five selected states have taken a variety of similar actions to manage the growing number of inmates they incarcerate, these states have been able to take broader actions than BOP to reduce their prison populations because these states have legislative authority that BOP does not have. Modifying Criminal Statutes and Sentencing
Two of the five states we reviewed have changed their sentencing statutes or guidelines. However, as policy makers weigh whether and how to address crowding in the federal system, options that will be important to consider include (1) reducing the size of the projected inmate population by reforming sentencing laws, allowing alternatives to incarceration, and/or providing BOP greater sentencing flexibility; (2) increasing capacity in the federal system by constructing new prisons, contracting for additional private capacity, and adding additional staff; or (3) taking some combination of both approaches. BOP provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated where appropriate. What was the growth in the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) population from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, and what are BOP’s projections for inmate population and capacity? 2. What is known about the effects of a growing federal prison population on operations (i.e., inmates, staff, and infrastructure) within BOP facilities, and to what extent has BOP taken actions to mitigate these effects? 3. We chose these prisons on the basis of varying security levels and to ensure geographic dispersion. Further, to determine the extent to which BOP has taken actions to mitigate the effects of a growing federal prison population, we analyzed BOP’s statutory authority to identify provisions that affect BOP’s ability to mitigate the effects of the growth of the prison population. Additionally, to further address the third question, we assessed the extent to which actions implemented in the five states to reduce their prison populations would be possible under current federal law for BOP to implement. As a result of the growth in the inmate population in BOP-run facilities relative to the increased rated capacity, crowding in BOP-run institutions increased from 36 to 39 percent systemwide from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. BOP’s 2020 long-range capacity plan projects continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal years 2012 through 2020. All of the drug treatment and drug education programs had waiting lists from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Prisoner Releases: Trends and Information on Reintegration Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
BOP operates 117 federal prisons to house approximately 178,000 federal offenders, and contracts with private companies and some state governments to house about another 40,000 inmates. BOP calculates the number of prisoners that each BOP run institution can house safely and securely (i.e., rated capacity). GAO was asked to address (1) the growth in BOPs population from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 and BOPs projections for inmate population and capacity; (2) the effects of a growing federal prison population on operations within BOP facilities, and the extent to which BOP has taken actions to mitigate these effects; and (3) actions selected states have taken to reduce their prison populations, and the extent to which BOP has implemented similar initiatives.
GAO analyzed BOPs inmate population data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, BOPs 2020 long-range capacity plan, and BOP policies and statutory authority. GAO visited five federal prisons chosen on the basis of geographic dispersion and varying security levels. The results are not generalizable, but provide information on the effects of a growing prison population. GAO selected five states based on actions they took to mitigate the effects of their growing prison populationsand assessed the extent to which their actions would be possible for BOP. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. BOP provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justices Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 9.5 percent population growth from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 exceeded the 7 percent increase in its rated capacity, and BOP projects continued population growth. Growth was most concentrated among male inmates, and in 2011, 48 percent of the inmates BOP housed were sentenced for drugs. From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, BOP increased its rated capacity by about 8,300 beds as a result of opening 5 new facilities and closing 4 minimum security camps, but because of the population expansion, crowding (or population in excess of rated capacity) increased from 36 to 39 percent. In 2011 crowding was most severe (55 percent) in highest security facilities. BOPs 2020 long-range capacity plan projects continued growth in the federal prison population from fiscal years 2012 through 2020, with systemwide crowding exceeding 45 percent through 2018.
According to BOP, the growth in the federal inmate population has negatively affected inmates, staff, and infrastructure, but BOP has acted within its authority to help mitigate the effects of this growth. BOP officials reported increased use of double and triple bunking, waiting lists for education and drug treatment programs, limited meaningful work opportunities, and increased inmate-to-staff ratios. These factors, taken together, contribute to increased inmate misconduct, which negatively affects the safety and security of inmates and staff. BOP officials and union representatives voiced concerns about a serious incident occurring. To manage its growing population, BOP staggers meal times and segregates inmates involved in disciplinary infractions, among other things.
The five states in GAOs review have taken more actions than BOP to reduce their prison populations, because these states have legislative authority that BOP does not have. These states have modified criminal statutes and sentencing, relocated inmates to local facilities, and provided inmates with additional opportunities for early release. BOP generally does not have similar authority. For example, BOP cannot shorten an inmates sentence or transfer inmates to local prisons. Efforts to address the crowding issue could include (1) reducing the inmate population by actions such as reforming sentencing laws, (2) increasing capacity by actions such as constructing new prisons, or (3) some combination of both. |
gao_GAO-16-771 | gao_GAO-16-771_0 | An EHR is a digital version of a patient’s paper medical record or chart. The Privacy Rule establishes national standards for safeguarding protected health information (PHI). Electronic Health Information Can Offer Substantial Benefits but Faces a Variety of Security and Privacy Threats
Electronic Health Information Provides Many Benefits to Patients and Providers
The use of health information technology, including EHR systems, has the potential to allow health care providers and others to share health care information electronically, which may lead to improved health care quality and reduced costs. Based on these data, over 113 million individual health care records were compromised in 2015 due to hacking or other incidents. The following are examples of recent large data breaches involving health care information. HHS Security and Privacy Guidance Does Not Fully Address Important Controls Outlined in Federal Guidance
To encourage covered entities and business associates to implement effective security and privacy protections, HHS established guidance for compliance with the HIPAA requirements regarding the security and privacy of protected health information. However, it does not address controls in other risk assessment subcategories, such as penetration testing and developing risk responses. Yet, without follow up, OCR cannot determine whether corrective actions have actually been made to address identified problems or whether covered entities have responded to technical assistance with improvements to their electronic health information protections. However, OCR has not yet established benchmarks or performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the audit program when it becomes operational. Specifically, OCR does not notify CMS of investigative cases it has completed in which it has determined that risks assessments were not conducted. However, HHS’s guidance does not address how covered entities should tailor their implementations of key security controls identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to their specific needs, and thus may not be as effective as it could be. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the effectiveness of HHS guidance and oversight of privacy and security for health information we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services take the following actions: update security guidance for covered entities and business associates to ensure that the guidance addresses implementation of controls described in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework; update technical assistance that is provided to covered entities and business associates to address technical security concerns; revise the current enforcement program to include following up on the implementation of corrective actions; establish performance measures for the OCR audit program; and establish and implement policies and procedures for sharing the results of investigations and audits between OCR and CMS to help ensure that covered entities and business associates are in compliance with HIPAA and the HITECH Act. HHS stated that it concurred with three of the five recommendations in the draft report and would take actions to implement them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the expected benefits and cyber threats to electronic health information; (2) determine the extent to which the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) security and privacy guidance for electronic health records reflect and align with federal guidance; and (3) assess the extent to which HHS oversees compliance with HHS information security and privacy requirements at covered entities. We identified these experts and stakeholders through interviews with agency officials and other stakeholders. We also obtained key documents from a representative sample of Security, Breach Notification, and Privacy Rules investigations conducted by HHS’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) that were closed between January 1, 2015, and December 10, 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a digital version of a patient's medical record or chart, an EHR can make pertinent health information more readily available and usable for providers and patients. However, recent data breaches highlight the need to ensure the security and privacy of these records. HHS has primary responsibility for setting standards for protecting electronic health information and for enforcing compliance with these standards.
GAO was asked to review the current health information cybersecurity infrastructure. The specific objectives were to (1) describe expected benefits of and cyber threats to electronic health information, (2) determine the extent to which HHS security and privacy guidance for EHRs are consistent with federal cybersecurity guidance, and (3) assess the extent to which HHS oversees these requirements. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant reports, federal guidance, and HHS documentation and interviewed subject matter experts and agency officials.
What GAO Found
The use of electronic health information can allow providers to more efficiently share information and give patients easier access to their health information, among other benefits. Nonetheless, systems storing and transmitting health information in electronic form are vulnerable to cyber-based threats. The resulting breaches—involving over 113 million records in 2015—can have serious adverse impacts such as identity theft, fraud, and disruption of health care services, and their number has increased steadily in recent years, from 0 in 2009 to 56 in 2015 (see figure).
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has established guidance for covered entities, such as health plans and care providers, for use in their efforts to comply with HIPAA requirements regarding the privacy and security of protected health information, but it does not address all elements called for by other federal cybersecurity guidance. Specifically, HHS's guidance does not address how covered entities should tailor their implementations of key security controls identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to their specific needs. Such controls include developing risk responses, among others. Further, covered entities and business associates have been challenged to comply with HHS requirements for risk assessment and management. Without more comprehensive guidance, covered entities may not be adequately protecting electronic health information from compromise.
HHS has established an oversight program for compliance with privacy and security regulations, but actions did not always fully verify that the regulations were implemented. Specifically, HHS's Office of Civil Rights investigates complaints of security or privacy violations, almost 18,000 of which were received in 2014. It also has established an audit program for covered entities' security and privacy programs. However, for some of its investigations it provided technical assistance that was not pertinent to identified problems, and in other cases it did not always follow up to ensure that agreed-upon corrective actions were taken once investigative cases were closed. Further, the office has not yet established benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of its audit program. These weaknesses result in less assurance that loss or misuse of health information is being adequately addressed.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that HHS update its guidance for protecting electronic health information to address key security elements, improve technical assistance it provides to covered entities, follow up on corrective actions, and establish metrics for gauging the effectiveness of its audit program. HHS generally concurred with the recommendations and stated it would take actions to implement them. |
gao_GAO-07-58 | gao_GAO-07-58_0 | Since 1990, we have designated NASA’s contract management as a high- risk area. This contract type accounted for 48 percent of obligated contract dollars and 7.7 percent of contract actions from fiscal years 2002 through 2004. NASA Has Not Always Followed the Preferred Approach Laid Out in Its Award- Fee Guidance
Although the revisions in NASA’s regulations and guidance on award-fee contracts address many weaknesses previously identified, the contracts that we reviewed did not always demonstrate use of award fees by the centers in the way that NASA prefers as outlined in its guidance. Also, although the FAR and NASA’s award-fee guide calls for a consideration of the costs and benefits of using cost-plus-award-fee contracts because of the cost and administrative burden involved, we found no examples of a documented analysis of costs and benefits. Further, NASA has not evaluated the overall effectiveness of award fees in promoting program outcomes and does not have metrics in place for measuring their effectiveness in achieving program outcomes. Award-Fee Payments at Times Did Not Reflect Program Outcomes
While NASA officials expressed satisfaction with the results of the contracts, in some cases there appeared to be a disconnect between the fee paid and program results. NASA officials expressed satisfaction with contract results, which was further evidenced by its evaluations of contractor performance against criteria established in the award-fee plan. While NASA’s evaluations would indicate generally good performance, such performance did not always translate into desired program outcomes. That disconnect raises questions as to the extent NASA is achieving the effectiveness it sought through the establishment of guidance on the use of award-fees. The contractor for the Earth Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS) Core System (ECS) was paid 97 percent of the available award fee—$103.2 million—despite a delay in the completion of the contract by more than 2 years and an increase in the cost of the contract from $766 million to $1.2 billion. NASA’s satisfaction with the results of these contracts is evidenced by the level of fee paid on all of the contracts we reviewed and is based on NASA’s evaluation of compliance with criteria contained in its award-fee plans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) guidance addresses the problems previously identified with the use of award-fee contracts and (2) whether NASA follows its guidance in using award fees to achieve desired outcomes. The contracts we selected were the top 10 dollar value contracts active from fiscal years 2002 through 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cost-plus-award-fee contracts accounted for almost half of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration's (NASA) obligated contract dollars for fiscal years 2002-2004. Since 1990, we have identified NASA's contract management as a high-risk area--in part because of a lack of emphasis on end results. Congress asked us to examine (1) the extent NASA's guidance on award fees addresses problems previously identified with the use of award-fee contracts and (2) whether NASA follows its guidance in using award fees to achieve desired outcomes. We reviewed the top 10 dollar value award-fee contracts active from fiscal years 2002 through 2004.
What GAO Found
NASA guidance on the use of cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts provides criteria to improve the effectiveness of award fees. For example, the guidance emphasizes outcome factors that are good indicators of success in achieving desired results, cautions against using numerous evaluation factors, prohibits rollover of unearned fee, and encourages evaluating the costs and benefits of such contracts before using this contract type. However, NASA does notalways follow the preferred approach laid out in its guidance. For example, some evaluation criteria contained input or process factors, such as program planning and organizational management. Moreover, some contracts included numerous supporting subfactors that may dilute emphasis on any specific criteria. Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation and NASA guidance require considering the costs and benefits of choosing a CPAF contract, NASA did not perform such analyses. In some cases there appears to be a significant disconnect between program results and fees paid. For example, NASA paid the contractor for the Earth Observing System Data and Information System Core System 97 percent of the available award fee despite a delay in the completion of the contract by over 2 years and an increase in the cost of the contract of more than 50 percent. NASA officials expressed satisfaction with the results of the contracts we reviewed, and this was further evidenced by the extent of fee paid. NASA's satisfaction was based on its evaluations of contractor performance against criteria established in the award-fee plan. While NASA's evaluations would indicate generally good contractor performance, that performance did not always translate into desired program outcomes. That disconnect raises questions as to the extent NASA is achieving the effectiveness it sought through the establishment of guidance on the use of award fees. NASA has not evaluated the overall effectiveness of award fees and does not have metrics in place for conducting such evaluations. |
gao_RCED-96-203 | gao_RCED-96-203_0 | Electricity-Related R&D Funding Is Declining Due to Budget Reductions and Deregulation Prospects
Electricity-related R&D funding was generally reduced in 1996 by the federal government, the electric utility industry, and most states that we reviewed. 3). Utilities Are Shifting Away From Long-Term, Advanced-Technology R&D
According to many utility R&D managers, their companies are also shifting the focus of their R&D away from long-term, advanced-technology R&D, like the advanced gas turbine and new fuel cells, to short-term projects that will be profitable and provide a competitive edge in the near term. R&D Managers Propose Alternative Funding Mechanisms
Utility R&D managers and industry, DOE, and state government officials who expressed concerns about the funding of electricity-related R&D suggested alternative funding sources. They are (1) a state-administered surcharge on all retail sales of electricity within the state and (2) a nationwide non-bypassable wires charge that could provide an alternative funding source for EPRI. Under this proposal, a small charge would be assessed on all electricity entering the transmission grid, whether it be interstate or intrastate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) what changes have occurred in the amount of electricity-related research and development (R&D) funding and the primary reasons for these changes and (2) what has been the impact of these changes on the types of R&D being funded. Projects in these six technologies are beginning to be delayed, scaled down, or canceled as a result of funding reductions, according to DOE, state, and industry officials that we contacted. DOE’s budget requests for big and small turbines increased from fiscal year 1995, but approval for smaller increases is expected. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) changes in the amount of funding for electricity-related research and development (R&D); and (2) the impact of these changes on the types of R&D being funded.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Department of Energy (DOE) funding for electricity-related R&D increased between fiscal years (FY) 1993 and 1995, but began to decrease by FY 1996 due to budget constraints and congressional appropriation committees' recommendations; (2) the electric utility industry began to reduce R&D funding in 1993, and R&D managers expect the decreases to continue as the industry prepares for deregulation and increased competition; (3) some state programs are also experiencing funding reductions, primarily due to decreases in contributions from utilities, oil overcharge revenues, DOE funding, and state appropriations; (4) proprietary data and industry restructuring make it difficult to assess the current level or project future levels of industry spending on electricity-related R&D; (5) many utilities are shifting their R&D focus from collaborative, long-term projects to proprietary, short-term projects to gain a competitive edge; (6) some R&D projects are being delayed, scaled down, or cancelled as a result of the funding reductions; and (7) DOE, industry, and state government officials who expressed concerns about electricity-related R&D funding suggested such alternative funding sources as a state-administered surcharge on all retail sales of electricity and a national wires charge on all electricity entering the transmission grid. |
gao_GAO-10-446 | gao_GAO-10-446_0 | TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft, but Remaining Challenges Highlight the Need for a Contingency Plan
TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program—the CCSP—to allow screening to take place at various points along the air cargo supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo. For example, shipper participation in the CCSP has been lower than targeted by TSA. In addition, there is currently no technology approved or qualified by TSA to screen ULD pallets or containers, and TSA is working to complete qualification testing of several air cargo screening technologies to provide reasonable assurance of their effectiveness. TSA is conducting outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders. Lower-Than-Targeted Levels of Shipper Participation in the CCSP Could Affect TSA Progress in Meeting the Screening Mandate
Although TSA is relying on the voluntary participation of industry stakeholders to meet the screening mandate, some stakeholders have not participated in the program at targeted levels. At these rates, it is questionable whether TSA’s screening system will achieve 100 percent screening of domestic cargo by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data reported by the industry. In contrast, TSA’s policies and procedures require all cargo flown on domestic flights to be screened at 75 percent, effective May 1, 2010. Developing a contingency plan that addresses the participation and technology challenges that could impede the screening program’s success, and identifies alternate or additional security measures to implement in case the program is unable to effectively facilitate the screening of sufficient amounts of cargo prior to reaching air carriers at the airport, could better position TSA to meet the requirements in the air cargo screening mandate. TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo
TSA has made progress toward meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of inbound air cargo that has undergone screening. This approach focuses on harmonizing its security standards with those of other nations. TSA Faces Several Challenges in Meeting the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Inbound Cargo
While TSA has taken steps to increase the percentage of inbound cargo that has undergone screening, the agency faces several challenges in meeting the mandate. However, these estimates are based on the current screening requirements of certain countries and are not based on actual data collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments, on what percentage of cargo is actually being screened. While TSA officials have stated that the agency does not expect to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline, TSA has not provided estimates of when the mandate will be met or when steps toward its achievement will be completed. For example, TSA might benefit from developing a contingency plan should it become clear that participation levels are not sufficient to achieve the screening mandate without disruptions to the flow of commerce. Establishing milestones for completion of a staffing study to determine the number of inspectors needed to oversee CCSP participants could provide results that should better position TSA to obtain these inspection resources and help ensure that air carriers and CCSFs comply with TSA requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance efforts to secure the air cargo transportation system and establish a system to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft, we are recommending that the Administrator of TSA take the following five actions: Establish milestones for the completion of TSA’s staffing study to assist in determining the resources necessary to provide CCSP oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights annually. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). GAO reviewed TSA's policies and procedures, interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size, among other factors.
What GAO Found
TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but faces challenges in doing so that highlight the need for a contingency plan. TSA has, for example, increased required domestic cargo screening levels from 50 percent in February 2009 to 75 percent in May 2010, increased the amount of cargo subject to screening by eliminating many domestic screening exemptions, created a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain, conducted outreach to familiarize industry stakeholders with screening requirements, and tested air cargo screening technologies. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. For example, shipper participation in the voluntary screening program has been lower than targeted by TSA. In addition, TSA has not completed a staffing study to determine the number of inspectors needed to oversee the screening program. Because it is unclear how many industry stakeholders will join the program, TSA could benefit from establishing milestones to complete a staffing study to help ensure that it has the resources it needs under different scenarios. Moreover, TSA faces technology challenges that could affect its ability to meet the screening mandate. Among these, there is no technology approved by TSA to screen large pallets or containers of cargo, which suggests the need for alternative approaches to screening such cargo. TSA also does not verify the self-reported data submitted by screening participants. Several of these challenges suggest the need for a contingency plan, in case the agency's current initiatives are not successful in meeting the mandate without impeding the flow of commerce. However, TSA has not developed such a plan. Addressing these issues could better position TSA to meet the mandate. TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of screened inbound cargo--including working to understand the screening standards of other nations and coordinating with them to mutually strengthen their respective security efforts. Nevertheless, challenges remain and TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. TSA officials estimate that air carriers are meeting the current mandated screening level of 50 percent of inbound cargo based on estimates rather than on actual data as required by law. Thus, TSA cannot verify if mandated screening levels are being met. In addition, the agency has not determined how it will eventually meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo; developing such a plan could better position TSA to assess its progress toward meeting the mandate. |
gao_HEHS-97-73 | gao_HEHS-97-73_0 | First, finding permanent placements for children removed from their families is critical to ensure their overall well-being. Statutory and Policy Changes Require States to Hold First Permanency Hearing Sooner
The prolonged stays of children in foster care have prompted states to enact laws or policies to shorten to less than the federally allowed 18 months the time between entry into foster care and the first permanency hearing at which permanent placement is considered. As shown in figure 1, 23 states have enacted such laws, with a majority of these requiring the hearing to be held within 12 months. An additional three states, while not enacting such statutes, have policies requiring permanency hearings earlier than 18 months. According to officials in Ohio’s Office of Child Care and Family Services, this requirement was included in an effort to expedite the permanency planning process and reduce the time children spend in foster care. States Make Changes in Permanency Planning Process With Some Positive Results for Foster Care Children
Although the states we reviewed did not systematically evaluate the impact of their initiatives, they implemented a variety of operational and procedural changes to expedite and improve the permanency process. These states reported that these actions have improved the lives of some children by (1) reuniting them with their families more quickly, (2) expediting the termination of parental rights when reunification efforts were determined to be unfeasible—thus making it possible for child welfare agencies to begin looking for an adoptive home sooner—or (3) reducing the number of different foster care placements in which they lived. The final 25 percent will not be paid until reunification or a permanent placement is achieved. This record methodically guides caseworkers through all the steps necessary to make a permanent placement decision. When contemplating changes, state officials had to take into consideration the intricacies of the foster care process; the inherent difficulty that caseworkers and court officials face when deciding if a child should be returned home; and the need in some cases to change the culture of caseworkers and judges to recognize that, in certain cases, termination of parental rights should be pursued. These included (1) long-term involvement of officials in leadership positions; (2) involvement of key stakeholders in developing consensus and obtaining buy-in concerning the nature of the problem and the solution; and (3) the availability of resources to plan, implement, and sustain the project. We also found that a critical feature of these initiatives was often absent: Many of them lacked evaluations designed to assess the impact of the effort. Efforts are under way, however, to improve the availability of information on foster children. Scope and Methodology
To identify states that have enacted laws or implemented policies establishing requirements regarding the timing of the first permanency hearing that are more stringent than those under federal law, we reviewed pertinent state legislation and policies of 50 states and the District of Columbia. To determine what changes states and localities have made to achieve more timely permanent placements and factors that contributed to their success, we first reviewed literature on foster care and permanency planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed states efforts to improve the permanency planning process and reduce the time a child spends in foster care, focusing on what: (1) statutory and policy changes states have made to limit the time allowed to determine permanent placements for foster children; (2) changes states or localities have made in their operations in an attempt to achieve more timely permanent placements and what the impact of those changes has been; and (3) factors officials believe helped them meet the challenges of achieving more timely permanent placements.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) signaling the importance of a permanent placement to the well-being of children, 23 states have enacted laws establishing requirements regarding the timing of the permanency hearing that are more stringent than those under federal law; (2) federal law requires a hearing within 18 months after the child's entry into foster care; (3) an additional three states, while not enacting such statutes, have imposed similar requirements as a matter of policy; (4) statutory or policy changes alone, however, are not sufficient to resolve the final placement of foster children more quickly; (5) the states GAO reviewed have made changes in their operations to facilitate reunifying children with their families, expedite terminating parental rights when reunification efforts have failed, or modify the role and operations of the court both to streamline the process and to make well-informed permanent placement decisions; (6) while these initiatives focus on certain stages of the permanency planning process, such as when a child first enters foster care, two states are implementing major changes to their overall foster care systems; (7) although initiatives are in place, most of these states have not systematically evaluated the impact of them, and data concerning these efforts were limited; (8) however, most states did report that many of these initiatives contributed to reducing the time spent in foster care or decreasing the total number of placement changes while a child is in foster care; (9) state officials identified a number of factors that helped them meet the challenges involved in making changes; (10) in some cases, child welfare officials and staff had to undergo significant culture change, modifying long-held views about the merits of pursuing termination of parental rights versus family reunification; (11) they found that changing the way they approached making decisions about the well-being of children and their families was a lengthy process; (12) to implement these initiatives successfully, program officials believed that it was necessary to have the long-term and active involvement of key officials at all levels, including the governor, legislators, and agency officials as well as caseworkers, service providers, attorneys, and judges; (13) this participation was essential to define the problem and reach consensus; and (14) doing so required considerable coordination efforts and an extended commitment of resources. |
gao_GAO-02-353 | gao_GAO-02-353_0 | Once the data were gathered, IRS identified 73 study questions that could indicate whether or not a plan was in compliance. The analysis did not attempt to distinguish instances of noncompliance according to the severity of the violation. IRS’s estimates of noncompliance among 401(k) plans were inaccurate primarily because only 27 of the 73 questions that it identified as compliance indicators conclusively demonstrated a plan’s noncompliance. Consequently, the 44 percent of plans reported to have one or more compliance violations is at best an upper-bound estimate of the extent of noncompliance found in this study because the reported results are not limited to those items with sufficient information to identify noncompliance. To obtain information on the extent and types of noncompliance among these plans, IRS plans to conduct compliance studies similar to the one conducted on 401(k) pension plans. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Determining the Steps IRS Took to Conduct the 401(k) Study
To determine what IRS did to estimate the prevalence and types of 401(k) plan noncompliance with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, we reviewed the final 401(k) compliance study report that IRS posted to its Web site. A. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) studied 401(k) plan compliance with Internal Revenue Code requirements for tax-qualified plans.
What GAO Found
GAO found that IRS's estimates of noncompliance were inaccurate. The study, which audited a sample of 401(k) plans, did not provide information on the severity of the compliance violations identified and did not determine the number of plan participants or the amount of assets associated with noncompliance errors. Only 27 of the 73 study questions identified as compliance indicators conclusively demonstrated whether a plan was compliant or not. Consequently, the 44 percent reported to have one or more instances of noncompliance is at best an upper limit on the extent of noncompliance found. IRS has chosen specific types of private pension plans to study in a manner similar to the one conducted on 401(k) pension plans. The data that IRS collects will be analyzed to determine the prevalence and types of noncompliance among the plans studied. |
gao_HEHS-96-83 | gao_HEHS-96-83_0 | Use of ABMT for Breast Cancer Has Become Widespread Even Though Its Effectiveness Is Uncertain
Although most experts believe the clinical research has not yet established that ABMT is superior to conventional therapy, and for which patients, insurance coverage of the treatment has become relatively common and use of the treatment is diffusing rapidly. Similarly, NCI, at a congressional hearing, said that while ABMT has shown promise in some clinical studies, the results of the NCI randomized clinical trials were needed before conclusions could be reached about whether and for whom the treatment is more beneficial than conventional therapy. Seven of the 12 insurers cited the clinical evidence as one of the primary reasons that they decided to cover ABMT. As of June 1995, at least seven states had enacted legislation that, under certain parameters, requires that insurers provide coverage for ABMT for breast cancer. One of these three said it would not cover the treatment if it were not for the mandate. ABMT Coverage by Federally Funded Health Insurance Programs
Programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) have varying policies regarding coverage of ABMT for breast cancer. CHAMPUS, the Department of Defense’s health care program for active duty and retired military personnel, and their dependents and survivors, considers ABMT for breast cancer experimental but provides coverage through a demonstration project in which beneficiaries may receive ABMT by enrolling in one of three NCI randomized clinical trials. Under most circumstances, insurers that cover ABMT do not require that the patient enter a randomized trial, and many patients are reluctant to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed insurance coverage of autologous bone marrow transplantation (ABMT) for breast cancer, focusing on: (1) the factors insurers consider when deciding whether to cover treatment; (2) the effectiveness of the treatment; and (3) the consequences of the increased use and insurance coverage of the treatment while it is still in clinical trials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the use of ABMT has become widespread and many insurers cover ABMT; (2) sufficient data do not exist to establish that ABMT is more effective than traditional chemotherapy; (3) despite the lack of data, many insurers cover ABMT because the research results of its effectiveness are promising, its use is widespread, and they fear costly litigation battles with their customers; (4) as of June 1995, seven states had enacted a law that mandates insurance coverage for ABMT and seven other states have similar laws pending; (5) of the federally funded health insurance programs, Medicaid coverage for ABMT varies by state, Medicare does not cover ABMT for solid tumors such as breast cancer, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services covers ABMT through a demonstration project in which beneficiaries may receive the treatment by enrolling in a randomized clinical trial; and (6) the widespread use of ABMT prior to conclusive data about its effectiveness may jeopardize patients unresponsive to the treatment, raise health care costs, and deter participation in randomized clinical trials. |
gao_GAO-16-768 | gao_GAO-16-768_0 | State Has Established a Process for Collecting and Publishing ForeignAssistance.gov Data
State Is Collecting and Publishing ForeignAssistance.gov Data for 10 Agencies
Since 2013, State has collected and published data from 10 of the 22 agencies identified in the bulletin. Most of the 10 agencies reporting data for ForeignAssistance.gov identified limitations in their information technology (IT) systems as a key impediment in collecting and reporting data, while most of the 12 agencies not yet reporting data identified lack of staff time as a key impediment that they anticipate facing. In addition, although ForeignAssistance.gov discloses that published data are incomplete, we found that the website is not fully transparent about these data limitations. Our comparison of funding data on ForeignAssistance.gov to funding data published on the Foreign Aid Explorer website showed that ForeignAssistance.gov did not reflect more than $10 billion in disbursements and about $6 billion in obligations provided by the 10 agencies in fiscal year 2014. The memorandum indicates steps to improve transparency in publishing information, which include identifying high- value information not yet available for online publication. State officials told us that they rely on agencies to report data limitations. However, if State does not provide agencies with guidance to identify data limitations that State can clearly disclose on ForeignAssistance.gov, it may undermine the website’s goal of improving public knowledge and accountability of U.S. foreign assistance. ForeignAssistance.gov Data Are Not Updated Annually with Verified Foreign Assistance Data
As of May 2016, State had not updated ForeignAssistance.gov data with verified—complete and accurate—annual foreign assistance data to improve the quality and ensure consistency in the reporting of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the majority of the agencies’ data were not yet of sufficient quality, OMB officials noted that a review to graduate agencies from USAID’s verification process was premature. State and USAID officials told us that they are unable to update ForeignAssistance.gov with USAID’s verified data because of differences between the two datasets. Since State, USAID, and OMB recognize that a key step outlined in the bulletin to ensure data quality may not be feasible, and in the absence of the 2-year review on data verification or guidance on how to address the quality of the data on ForeignAssistance.gov, data will likely remain inconsistent across the range of U.S. foreign assistance reporting. To improve the quality of the data published on ForeignAssistance.gov and help ensure consistency in published information, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of OMB and the USAID Administrator, take the following two actions: undertake a review of the efforts to date on ensuring data quality and develop additional guidance that takes into consideration current challenges to updating ForeignAssistance.gov with verified data. As noted in the report, OMB Bulletin No. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review the collection and reporting of data for ForeignAssistance.gov, this report examines (1) the Department of State’s (State) data collection and publishing process for ForeignAssistance.gov; (2) key impediments, if any, that agencies face in collecting and reporting data for ForeignAssistance.gov; and (3) the data published on ForeignAssistance.gov. To conduct this work, we analyzed key guidance documents relating to the data collection process: the 2012 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. To examine State’s data collection process for ForeignAssistance.gov, we conducted semistructured interviews with officials of 22 U.S. agencies— the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, the Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Export-Import Bank of the United States; the Federal Trade Commission; the Inter-American Foundation; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; the Peace Corps; the U.S. African Development Foundation; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency—concerning four areas of the data collection process, including (1) data collection and validation processes; (2) guidance provided by State on the data collection process; (3) resource needs to collect data, such as infrastructure, staff, and training; and (4) impediments that agencies may face in collecting and reporting data for ForeignAssistance.gov. We also interviewed OMB on its monitoring role for ForeignAssistance.gov. | Why GAO Did This Study
The overarching goal of ForeignAssistance.gov is to enable a variety of stakeholders—including U.S. citizens, civil society organizations, the U.S. Congress, federal agencies, partner countries, and other donors—to research and track U.S. government foreign assistance investments in an accessible and easily understood format.
GAO was asked to review the collection and reporting of ForeignAssistance.gov data. GAO examined (1) State's data collection and publishing process; (2) key impediments, if any, that agencies face in collecting and reporting data to State; and (3) the data published on ForeignAssistance.gov. GAO reviewed agency documents, assessed ForeignAssistance.gov data for completeness by comparing them to USAID's Foreign Aid Explorer data on U.S. foreign assistance for fiscal year 2014, and conducted semistructured interviews with the 22 agencies on their data collection and verification processes. GAO also interviewed OMB officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2013, the Department of State (State) has collected and published quarterly data on ForeignAssistance.gov from 10 agencies that provide the majority of U.S. foreign assistance and more recently has initiated a process to prepare the12 remaining agencies to collect and report data. The 2012 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No. 12-01 outlined requirements for collecting and publishing data from 22 agencies and designated State as the lead agency for implementing ForeignAssistance.gov.
GAO's survey showed that most of the 10 agencies reporting data for ForeignAssistance.gov identified limitations in their information technology systems and data availability as key impediments in collecting and reporting data, while most of the 12 agencies not yet reporting data identified lack of staff time as a potential key impediment.
GAO found that the data on ForeignAssistance.gov were incomplete and that State was not fully transparent about such limitations on the website. In addition, State has not updated ForeignAssistance.gov with verified annual data to ensure quality. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2014 data showed that ForeignAssistance.gov did not report over $10 billion in disbursements and about $6 billion in obligations provided by the 10 reporting agencies, compared to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-verified data (see fig.). A 2009 OMB memorandum requires agencies to improve transparency in published information, which includes identifying high-value information not yet available online. However, State, as the publisher of this information, does not provide agencies with guidance to identify data limitations that it can clearly disclose on the website and noted that it relies on agencies to report these. The absence of clear information on data limitations may undermine the goal of ForeignAssistance.gov to improve public knowledge and accountability of U.S. foreign assistance. Moreover, State, as the lead agency, has not updated ForeignAssistance.gov with verified data even though OMB Bulletin No. 12-01 indicates that these data should be updated annually using USAID-verified data. State and USAID officials told GAO that they are unable to update ForeignAssistance.gov with verified data because of differences in their datasets. OMB also noted that a review to assess whether agencies had sufficient internal data quality controls did not take place, although it was required by the bulletin. In the absence of a review or additional guidance to address the quality of the data on ForeignAssistance.gov, data will likely remain incomplete.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the transparency and quality of the data on ForeignAssistance.gov, State (1) should provide guidance to agencies on identifying data limitations and clearly disclose those limitations on the website; and (2) in consultation with the OMB Director and the USAID Administrator, undertake a review of efforts to ensure data quality and develop guidance on improving the quality of ForeignAssistance.gov data. State, OMB, and USAID concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-437 | gao_GAO-04-437_0 | Background
Description of Biobased Products
Biobased products are industrial and consumer goods composed wholly, or in significant part, of biological products, renewable domestic agricultural materials (including plant, animal, and marine materials), or forestry materials. However, USDA did not complete the list because the 2002 farm bill set out new biobased purchasing requirements for USDA to implement. USDA Delay in Issuing Biobased Purchasing Guidelines Has Slowed Other Agencies’ Efforts
While USDA was faced with an ambitious task, its actions and consequently those of other agencies to implement the farm bill requirements for purchasing biobased products have been limited. USDA issued proposed guidelines in the Federal Register on December 19, 2003, more than a year later than the farm bill requirement for final guidelines. In addition, as new biobased products are developed and enter the market, these items will also need to be designated. Thus, new items will be designated, as necessary. However, USDA officials said the model procurement program, when complete, will contain considerably more guidance on recommended procurement practices. USDA expects to issue the final version of these proposed guidelines by April 2004, but it does not expect to have adequate information for designating more than a few items before the end of calendar year 2004. When we asked New Uses officials in May 2003—a year after farm bill enactment and 6 months after the legislation deadline for USDA’s completion of the biobased procurement guidelines—for their written management plan to implement the farm bill requirements, they indicated that they did not have a plan. Without a comprehensive plan for implementing the farm bill requirements assigned to the New Uses office, including clearly defined tasks and milestones, it is difficult for USDA to set priorities, use resources efficiently, measure progress, and provide agency management a means to monitor this progress. Stakeholders Generally Agree That Some Testing of Biobased Products Is Necessary, but They Question the Need For Life-Cycle Analysis
Most federal agencies, testing organizations, commodity associations, and manufacturers we spoke with generally believe that testing biobased products for content and performance is appropriate, but they question the usefulness and costs of life-cycle analysis. USDA’s work has been slowed by the lack of a comprehensive management plan outlining the tasks, milestones, resources, coordination, and reporting needed for its completion. We believe that USDA should be more proactive in this regard and make clear the staff and financial resources to be made available for completing this work and the priority to be assigned to this work. Specifically, we agreed to examine (1) actions that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other agencies have taken to carry out the farm bill requirement to purchase biobased products; (2) additional actions that may be needed to enhance implementation of this requirement; and (3) views of agencies, manufacturers, and testing organizations on the need for and costs of testing biobased products. GAO Comments
1. In addition, we reported that EPA’s efforts to fulfill the legislative provisions for the purchase of recycled products lacked priority and adequate staffing and resources, and because of the agency’s slow progress in identifying recycled products for preferred procurement, other federal procuring agencies had made little progress in developing their own affirmative programs for the purchase of these products. 15. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government spends more than $230 billion annually for products and services to conduct its operations. Through its purchasing decisions, it has the opportunity to affirm its policies and goals, including those related to purchases of biobased products, as set out in the 2002 farm bill. A biobased product is a commercial or industrial product, other than food or feed that is composed of, in whole or part, biological products, renewable domestic agricultural materials, or forestry materials. GAO examined (1) actions the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and other agencies have taken to carry out farm bill requirements for purchasing biobased products, (2) additional actions that may be needed to implement the requirements, and (3) views of stakeholders on the need for and costs of testing biobased products. GAO interviewed officials from USDA, major procuring agencies, testing entities, interested associations, and 15 manufacturers of biobased products.
What GAO Found
USDA and other federal agencies' actions to implement the farm bill requirements for purchasing biobased products have been limited. USDA issued proposed procurement guidelines in December 2003--more than 1 year past the deadline for final guidelines; however, these guidelines do not fully address the farm bill requirements for designating items for purchase and recommending procurement practices. USDA expects to issue final guidelines by April 2004 and a blueprint for the model procurement program by September 2004; but it anticipates that designation of existing items will take years to complete, possibly until 2010. In addition, new items will enter the market requiring further designations. Meanwhile, purchasing agencies do not yet have a basis for planning their own procurement programs and, as a result, have made only limited purchases of biobased products. USDA could accelerate its implementation of the farm bill requirements by developing a comprehensive management plan for this work and by making the work a higher priority. The lack of a management plan describing the tasks, milestones, resources, coordination, and reporting needed to complete this work has slowed USDA in issuing the procurement guidelines. For example, USDA developed a list of milestones only after GAO requested such a list; even then, this list was informal, primarily reflecting the thinking of a few officials. Without a plan, USDA will find it difficult to set priorities, use resources efficiently, measure progress, and provide agency management a means to monitor this progress. According to stakeholders, USDA should make this work a higher priority to speed its completion. Without a sense of priority, USDA's efforts to fulfill farm bill requirements have not had adequate staff and financial resources. Stakeholders GAO spoke with generally believed that USDA's proposals for testing a biobased product's content and performance are appropriate and that manufacturers should bear at least some of the costs. However, stakeholders generally questioned the need for doing life-cycle analysis of a product's long-term costs and environmental impacts. |
gao_GAO-10-257 | gao_GAO-10-257_0 | The LCS seaframe’s combat capability will be provided by one of three interchangeable mission packages. Currently the Navy plans to buy 64 mission packages for three mission areas—24 for mine countermeasures, 16 for antisubmarine warfare, and 24 for surface warfare. The Navy’s Operating and Support Cost Estimates Do Not Fully Reflect Best Practices and May Change Due to Program Uncertainties
The Navy Estimated Operating and Support Costs for the LCS Program
The Navy has estimated operating and support costs that include most elements of the LCS program. The lack of cost estimates that fully meet best practices, such as including an analysis to assess the likelihood that costs will be greater than estimated, raises questions about the credibility of the estimates that have been produced to date and limits the ability of decision makers to make fully informed program and investment decisions, such as: accurately assessing the affordability of LCS within the broader portfolio of Navy and DOD programs, identifying the resources needed over the long term to support the planned investment in the LCS force structure, assessing the long-term cost implications of alternative acquisition strategies such as which seaframe the Navy will buy for the remainder of the 55-ship class, and analyzing the costs of options for what to do with the two seaframes of the design that is not selected. The Navy Has Made Progress but Faces Risks in Implementing Its Plans to Operate and Support LCS
The Navy Faces Risks in Implementing Its Personnel Plans over the Long Term
Although the Navy is conducting studies to determine personnel requirements for LCS, it has not fully identified the number of ship and shore support personnel required to support LCS over the long term and faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel over the long term. Our analysis of a sample of LCS positions showed that the number of training days required before an LCS sailor reports to the crew is significantly longer than for sailors in comparable positions on other ships—an average of 484 days versus 126 days for an amphibious transport docking ship and 103 days for a destroyer. The 2008 National Defense Strategy describes the need to assess and mitigate risk in the execution of defense programs critical to national security, including risks relating to the department’s capacity to execute future missions and manage personnel, training, and maintenance. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new LCS operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance, and has established some groups to manage the details of how to implement the concepts, such as the cross-functional teams and the Oversight Board. In contrast, having a thorough risk assessment of the new operational approaches to personnel, training, and maintenance would provide decision makers with information to link the effectiveness of these new operational concepts with decisions on program investment, specifically the pace of procurement. As a result, the Navy’s decision to operate the LCS with a core crew of only 40 sailors drove the need to develop new operational concepts. If the operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance cannot be implemented as desired, the Navy may face operational limitations, may have to reengineer its operational concept, or may have to make significant design changes to the ship after committing to building almost half of the class. Moreover, doing so could help the Navy avoid costly retrofits if ship design changes are needed in order to implement its new concepts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following six actions: In order to assess the long-term affordability of the LCS program and enhance decision making ability for the LCS program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following actions: before deciding which seaframe to buy, produce a complete estimate of the long-term operating and support costs which fully reflects cost estimating best practices for each seaframe and use these updated estimates in deciding which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program; use an updated estimate as a basis for analyzing the costs and benefits of options regarding the two seaframes built but not selected for long-term production, and use the results of this analysis in making the decision of how to use, or whether to retire, these seaframes; annually update the cost estimate for the long-term operating and support costs of the seaframe and each mission package using cost estimating best practices and submit the results to DOD as well as to Congress as part of the LCS Selected Acquisition Report; perform complete and updated force structure analyses on the LCS mission packages to help determine the appropriate purchase quantities over the life of the program, and use these updated quantities for the mission package cost estimate; and perform an updated seaframe force structure analysis when key underlying assumptions affecting seaframe quantities change, such as crewing policy, overseas homeports, or presence requirements, and use this updated analysis to adjust quantities and to update the seaframe cost estimate. We also reviewed prior GAO products and DOD guidance on risk management to assess the extent that Navy plans included assessments of program risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Navy plans to spend about $28 billion to buy 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and at least 64 interchangeable mission packages to perform one of three missions--mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare--in waters close to shore. The Navy has been developing two different LCS seaframes and plans to select one for production in 2010. Due to the small 78-person crew size--40 core crew, 23 for aviation detachment, and typically 15 for mission packages--the Navy is developing new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) estimated LCS long-term operating and support costs and (2) developed plans to operate and support LCS. To do so, GAO compared Navy cost estimates to DOD guidance and GAO best practices; and analyzed Navy plans to implement its concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance and the extent these plans included assessments of program risk.
What GAO Found
The Navy estimated operating and support costs for LCS seaframes and mission packages in 2009, but the estimates do not fully reflect DOD and GAO best practices for cost estimating and may change due to program uncertainties. GAO's analysis of the Navy's 2009 estimates showed that the operating and support costs for seaframes and mission packages could total $84 billion (in constant fiscal year 2009 dollars) through about 2050. However, the Navy did not follow some best practices for developing an estimate such as (1) analyzing the likelihood that the costs could be greater than estimated, (2) fully assessing how the estimate may change as key assumptions change, and (3) requesting an independent estimate and comparing it with the program estimate. The estimates may also be affected by program uncertainties, such as potential changes to force structure that could alter the number of ships and mission packages required. The costs to operate and support a weapon system can total 70 percent of a system's costs, and the lack of an estimate that fully reflects best practices could limit decision makers' ability to identify the resources that will be needed over the long term to support the planned investment in LCS force structure. With a decision pending in 2010 on which seaframe to buy for the remainder of the program, decision makers could lack critical information to assess the full costs of the alternatives. The Navy has made progress in developing operational concepts for LCS, but faces risks in implementing its new concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that are necessitated by the small crew size. Specifically, the Navy faces risks in its ability to identify and assign personnel given the time needed to achieve the extensive training required. GAO's analysis of a sample of LCS positions showed an average of 484 days of training is required before reporting to a crew, significantly more than for comparable positions on other surface ships. Moreover, the Navy's maintenance concept relies heavily on distance support, with little maintenance performed on ship. The Navy acknowledges that there are risks in implementing its new concepts and has established groups to address how to implement them. However, these groups have not performed a risk assessment as described in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. The Strategy describes the need to assess and mitigate risks to executing future missions and managing personnel, training, and maintenance. If the Navy cannot implement its concepts as envisioned, it may face operational limitations, have to reengineer its operational concepts, or have to alter the ship design. Many of the concepts will remain unproven until 2013 or later, when the Navy will have committed to building almost half the class. Having a thorough risk assessment of the new operational concepts would provide decision makers with information to link the effectiveness of these new concepts with decisions on program investment, including the pace of procurement. |
gao_GAO-03-555 | gao_GAO-03-555_0 | Although HUD Generally Uses the Same Core Factors to Assess Applications, Applicants Must Now Meet More Stringent Requirements
HUD has generally evaluated applications for HOPE VI revitalization grants on the basis of four core rating factors. Until Fiscal Year 2002, HUD Did Not Declare Applicants Ineligible because of Past Performance
Although HUD’s annual selection process had considered the performance of applicants who had received HOPE VI grants in prior years, it was not until the fiscal year 2002 NOFA that past program performance became a mandatory threshold requirement for an applicant to be eligible for a HOPE VI revitalization grant. Status of Work Varies Greatly, and Most Grantees Have Not Met Grant Agreement Deadlines
The status of work at HOPE VI sites varies, with construction completed at 15 of the 165 sites that received revitalization grants through fiscal year 2001. Many factors affect the status of work at HOPE VI sites, including the development approach, housing authority management, and relationships with residents and the surrounding community. Overall, 27 percent of the total planned units were complete as of December 31, 2002. Overall, grantees have expended about $2.1 of the $4.5 billion (47 percent) in HOPE VI revitalization funds awarded. Additionally, grantees completed construction within the deadline on only 3 of the 42 grants for which the time allowed for construction—54 months from grant execution for grants awarded since fiscal year 1996—had expired. Additionally, despite grantees’ inability to meet key deadlines, HUD has not developed a formal enforcement policy, which is an important part of oversight. While Grant Managers Oversee Grants, Field Office Staff Share HOPE VI Oversight Responsibilities
Both HUD headquarters and field office staff are responsible for overseeing HOPE VI revitalization grants. Instead, the agency determines if action should be taken against a grantee on a case-by-case basis. As of March 2003, HUD had declared nine grants to be in default and issued warning notices regarding three other grants. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve its selection and oversight of HOPE VI grants, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development continue to include past performance as an eligibility requirement in each year’s notice of funding availability; clarify the role of HUD field offices in HOPE VI oversight and ensure that the offices conduct required annual reviews of HOPE VI grants; and develop a formal, written enforcement policy to hold public housing authorities accountable for the status of their grants. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) process for assessing HOPE VI revitalization grant applications and for selecting grantees, (2) the status of work at sites for which grants have been awarded and compliance with grant agreement deadlines, (3) HUD’s oversight of HOPE VI grants, and (4) the amount of program funds that HUD has budgeted for technical assistance and the types of technical assistance it has provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the HOPE VI program to revitalize severely distressed public housing. In fiscal years 1993 to 2001, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) awarded approximately $4.5 billion in HOPE VI revitalization grants. The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban\ Affairs, asked GAO to examine HUD's process for assessing grant applications, the status of work at sites for which grants have been awarded, and HUD's oversight of HOPE VI grants.
What GAO Found
HUD has generally used the same core rating factors to assess HOPE VI grant applications--need, capacity, quality, and leveraging. However, HUD has, over time, increased the requirements that housing authorities must meet for each of these factors in order to make better selection decisions. Although authorities' historical program performance had been considered under various rating factors, it was not until fiscal year 2002 that past performance became a threshold requirement that an applicant must meet to be eligible for a grant. The status of work at HOPE VI sites varies greatly, with construction complete at 15 of the 165 sites. As of December 31, 2002, grantees had completed 27 percent of the total planned units and spent approximately $2.1 of the $4.5 billion in HOPE VI revitalization funds awarded. However, the majority of grantees have not met their grant agreement deadlines. For example, the time allowed for construction has expired for 42 grants, yet grantees completed construction within the deadline on only 3 grants. Several factors affect the status of work at HOPE VI sites, including the development approach used and changes made to revitalization plans. HUD's oversight of HOPE VI grants has been inconsistent, due partly to staffing limitations and confusion about the role of field offices. Both headquarters and field office staff are responsible for overseeing HOPE VI grants. However, HUD field offices have not systematically performed required annual reviews. Additionally, despite grantees' inability to meet key deadlines, HUD has no formal enforcement policies. Instead, the agency determines if action should be taken against a grantee on a case-by-case basis. Although HUD has declared 9 grants to be in default and issued warnings regarding 3 grants, it has not done so for other grants in a similar situation. |
gao_GAO-05-566 | gao_GAO-05-566_0 | IRS’s Budget Request Continues to Shift Priority from Taxpayer Service to Enforcement, but the Short- and Long-term Impacts on Taxpayers Are Unclear
IRS’s fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects a continuing shift in priorities by proposing reductions in taxpayer service and increases in enforcement activities. Because of budget constraints and the progress IRS has made improving the quality of taxpayer services, this is an opportune time to reconsider the menu of services IRS offers. IRS Is Proposing Reductions in Taxpayer Service and BSM and Increases in Enforcement
IRS is requesting $10.9 billion, which includes just over a 1 percent decrease for taxpayer service, a 2 percent decrease for BSM, and nearly an 8 percent increase for enforcement, as shown in table 1. Table 3 provides further detail on how IRS is proposing to reduce funding and resources for taxpayer service. This opens up the possibility of maintaining the overall level of taxpayer service but with a different menu of service choices. Since our testimony before this subcommittee on last year’s budget request, IRS has deployed initial phases of several modernized systems under its BSM program. BSM Program Has History of Cost Increases and Schedule Delays and Is High Risk
The BSM program has a long history of significant cost increases and schedule delays, which, in part, has led us to report this program as high- risk since 1995. 3). IRS has also identified, and is addressing, other major management challenges in areas such as requirements, contract, and program management. It is too early to tell what effect the budget reductions will ultimately have on the BSM program. However, the significant adjustments that IRS is making to the program to address these reductions are not without risk, could potentially impact future budget requests, and will delay the implementation of certain functionality that was intended to provide benefit to IRS operations and the taxpayer. The BSM program is based on visions and strategies developed in 2000 and 2001. The age of these plans, in conjunction with the significant delays already experienced by the program and the substantive changes brought on by budget reductions, indicate that it is time for IRS to revisit its long- term goals, strategy, and plans for BSM. According to this official, IRS is redefining and refocusing the BSM program, and he expects this effort to be completed by the end of this fiscal year. In our assessment of IRS’s fiscal year 2003 budget request, we reported that the agency did not develop its information systems operations and maintenance request in accordance with the investment management approach used by leading organizations. The recent release of IFS included an activity- based cost module, but IRS does not currently have historical cost data to populate this module. Although progress has been made in implementing best practices in the development of the IT operations and maintenance budget, until these actions are completely implemented IRS will not be able to ensure that its request is adequately supported. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been shifting its priorities from taxpayer service to enforcement and its management of Business Systems Modernization (BSM) from contractors to IRS staff. Although there are sound reasons for these adjustments, they also involve risks. With respect to the fiscal year 2006 budget request, GAO assessed (1) how IRS proposes to balance its resources between taxpayer service and enforcement programs and the potential impact on taxpayers, (2) status of IRS's efforts to develop and implement the BSM program, and (3) the progress IRS has made in implementing best practices in developing its Information Technology (IT) operations and maintenance budget.
What GAO Found
IRS's fiscal year 2006 budget request of $10.9 billion is an increase of 3.7 percent over last year's enacted levels. This includes an 8 percent increase for enforcement, and a 1 percent and 2 percent decrease for taxpayer service and BSM. However, the potential impact of these changes on taxpayers in either the short- or long-term is unclear, because IRS has not provided details of proposed taxpayer service reductions, and although it is developing long-term goals, they are not yet finalized. Because of the proposed reductions and new and improved taxpayer services in recent years, this is an opportune time to examine the menu of services IRS provides. It may be possible to maintain the overall level of service to taxpayers by offsetting reductions in some areas with new and improved service in other areas such as on IRS's Web site. Taxpayers and IRS are seeing some payoff from the BSM program, with the deployment of initial phases of several modernized systems in 2004. Nevertheless, the BSM program continues to be high-risk, in part, because projects have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays and the program faces major challenges in areas such as human capital and requirements management. As a result of budget reductions and other factors, IRS has made major adjustments. It is too early to tell what effect these adjustments will have on the program, but they are not without risk and could potentially impact future budgets. Further, the BSM program is based on strategies developed years ago, which, coupled with the delays and changes brought on by budget reductions, indicates that it is time for IRS to revisit its long-term goals, strategy, and plans for BSM. Because of these challenges, IRS is redefining and refocusing the BSM program. Likewise, IRS has made progress in implementing best practices that would improve its budget development and support for its IT operations and maintenance request. In particular, the recent release of a modernized financial management system included a cost module. However, at this time, historical data is not yet available for IRS to use this module in formulating its IT operations and maintenance request. |
gao_GAO-03-55 | gao_GAO-03-55_0 | Three agencies are developing specific acquisition workforce plans. VA purchases goods and services, such as medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and information technology. All four of these agencies have also developed training and career development programs that are aimed at ensuring their acquisition workforces have the skills to accomplish the agencies’ missions. Also, acquisition rules and regulations are changing, making it difficult for agencies to predict what will be required of their acquisition workforce in years to come. Compounding the uncertainty of the future environment is the changing role of the acquisition professional from merely a purchaser or process manager to a business manager. In order to make this transition, acquisition workers will need to acquire an entirely new set of skills and knowledge, according to the agency officials with whom we spoke. For example, in addition to having a firm understanding of contracting rules and processes, acquisition workers will need to be adept at consulting and communicating with line managers, and they will need to be able to analyze business problems, identify different alternatives in purchasing goods or services, and assist in developing strategies in the early stages of the acquisition. NASA and VA are developing their own management information systems to capture this data. Status of Overall Workforce Strategic Plans ✔ Agency has published/drafted human capital strategic plan ✔ Defined vision/objectives ✔ Identified competencies needed ✔ Identified competencies present ✔ Gap analysis Status of Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plans □ Transition plans □ Evaluate/adjust □ Separate human capital strategic plan for acquisition workforce □ Defined vision/objectives □ Identified competencies needed □ Identified competencies present □ Gap analysis □ Transition plans □ Evaluate/adjust Efforts Treasury is implementing initiatives to ensure that the acquisition workforce does have the skills and competencies needed currently and in the future. Challenges HHS officials said they faced the following challenges in trying to address their future acquisition workforce needs: the lack of standardized equivalencies for acquisition training courses taken at other government agencies to help determine skill levels and competencies, a lack of data to identify/characterize the workforce, and a need to improve focus on the agency mission and develop competencies for effective acquisitions to support that mission. DOD has analyzed its current workforce and made projections for the future. The civilian agencies we studied may face some of the same challenges as they press forward with their own planning efforts. Scope and Methodology
To determine civilian agencies’ efforts to address their future workforce needs, we interviewed the procurement executives and other acquisition officials at GSA, NASA, DOE, VA, HHS, and Department of Treasury, and we reviewed documents that they provided. These six agencies accounted for about 72 percent of the federal dollars contracted by civilian (non- DOD) agencies in fiscal year 2001. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional committees; the secretaries of Defense, Army, Air Force, Navy, Energy, Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Veteran’s Affairs; and the administrators of the General Services Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is dramatically changing the way it purchases goods and services--by relying more on judgment and initiative versus rigid rules to make purchasing decisions. At the same time, agencies are dealing with reductions in the civilian acquisition workforce. GAO was asked to determine what efforts federal civilian agencies are making to address their future acquisition workforce needs.
What GAO Found
GAO looked at the efforts six civilian agencies are undertaking to address their future acquisition workforce needs. Together, these agencies account for about 72 percent of civilian agency contracting dollars. All of these agencies are taking steps to address their future acquisition workforce needs. Three--the Departments of Energy and Veterans Affairs (VA) and the General Services Administration--are developing specific plans to strengthen their acquisition workforces, and three others--the Departments of Treasury and Health and Human Services and the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA)--are including their acquisition workforces in their overall plans to strengthen human capital. All are implementing new or strengthening existing career development and training programs. NASA and VA are also developing new information management systems. The agencies, however, are facing considerable challenges to making their human capital strategic plans and training programs a success. Principally: most acquisition professionals will need to acquire a new set of skills focusing on business management. Because of a more sophisticated acquisition environment, they can no longer be merely purchasers or process managers. Instead, they will also need to be adept at analyzing business problems and assisting with developing strategies in the early stages of the acquisition. Beyond this immediate transformation, it is difficult for agencies to forecast what will be needed in terms of numbers of workers, skills, and expertise in the years to come. Rules, regulations, and agency missions are always changing, and budgets are constantly shifting. Many agencies simply lack good data on their workforces, including information on workforce size and location, knowledge and skills, attrition rates, and retirement rates. This data is critical to mapping out the current condition of the workforce and deciding what needs to be done to ensure that the agency has the right mix of skills and talent for the future. In overcoming these challenges, agencies can learn from the Department of Defense (DOD), which has made progress in acquisition workforce strategic planning and has addressed some of the same issues. DOD officials learned that the strategic planning effort was going to take a long time and that effective leadership and guidance, along with technology and sound methodology, were required to accurately forecast workforce needs. |
gao_GAO-08-249T | gao_GAO-08-249T_0 | The dams were constructed during a 20-year period from 1946 to 1966. Our reviews for tribes at three reservations—Fort Berthold, Standing Rock, and Cheyenne River—were conducted before Congress authorized their additional compensation. Damages Caused to the Tribes at Seven Reservations as a Result of Dams on the Missouri River
The reservoirs created by the dams on the Missouri River permanently flooded over 350,000 acres of land on seven reservations, ranging from over 150,000 acres flooded on the Fort Berthold Reservation to less than 600 acres flooded on the Santee Reservation (see table 1). In addition to the valuable river bottom land that was lost, the tribes lost any natural resources and structural improvements on the land. The natural resources lost included timber, wildlife, and native plants and berries. The structural improvements lost included such things as homes and ranches. In some cases, entire towns were lost. In addition to the direct damages, Congress has recognized that the tribes also suffered indirect or intangible damages for the loss of assets of unknown value. These losses included spiritual ties to the lands (for example, cemeteries and tribal monuments); tribal claims to a homeland; and benefits derived from living along the Missouri River. Compensation Provided to the Tribes on the Missouri River for the Damages Caused by the Dams
The tribes at the seven reservations that lost land due to the flood control projects on the Missouri River originally received compensation for their damages between 1947 and 1962, and they subsequently requested and received additional compensation between 1992 and 2002 (see table 2). For the tribes at the five reservations that we have reported on in the past, the original compensation was based on detailed assessments by the U.S. government and the tribes of the damages caused by the dams and, in some cases, protracted settlement negotiations over how much the tribes should be compensated for their losses. The results of the settlement negotiations were that the U.S. government and the tribes were unable to reach an agreement. We used the inflation rate and an interest rate to adjust the difference to reflect a range of current values, using the inflation rate for the lower end of the range and the interest rate for the higher end. The three largest additional compensation payments—Cheyenne River, $290.7 million in 2000; Fort Berthold, $149.2 million in 1992; and Standing Rock, $90.6 million in 1992—were all within the ranges we calculated. The four smaller additional compensation payments were calculated using a different approach. Rather, the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes’ consultant asserted that since the tribes suffered the same type of damages as the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, they should be provided with additional compensation commensurate, on a per-acre basis, with the additional compensation provided to the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in 1992. In our 2006 report, where we reviewed the additional compensation claims by the Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes, we found that the additional compensation provided to the Crow Creek Sioux tribe in 1996 was slightly above the range we calculated and the additional compensation provided to the Lower Brule Sioux tribe in 1997 was within the range we calculated. The additional compensation authorized in 2002 for the Yankton Sioux and Santee Sioux tribes was also partially based on a per-acre calculation. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1946 to 1966, the government constructed five dams as flood control projects on the Missouri River in North Dakota and South Dakota. The reservoirs created behind the dams flooded portions of seven Indian reservations--Fort Berthold, Cheyenne River, Standing Rock, Lower Brule, Crow Creek, Yankton, and Santee. The tribes at these seven reservations received compensation when the dams were built as well as additional compensation over the years that followed. Since 1991, GAO has issued three reports on additional compensation claims for tribes at five reservations: (1) 1991--Fort Berthold and Standing Rock (GAO/RCED-91-77); (2) 1998--Cheyenne River (GAO/RCED-98-39); and (3) 2006--Crow Creek and Lower Brule (GAO-06-517). In these reports, GAO proposed that one recommended approach to providing additional compensation would be to calculate the difference between the tribe's final asking price and the amount that was appropriated by Congress and then adjust the difference using the inflation rate and an interest rate to reflect a range of current values. This testimony is based on GAO's three prior reports, and summarizes the damages estimated by the Department of the Interior and the compensation authorized by Congress, for dams constructed on the Missouri River.
What GAO Found
The reservoirs created by the dams on the Missouri River permanently flooded over 350,000 acres of land on seven Indian reservations, ranging from over 150,000 acres flooded on the Fort Berthold reservation to less than 600 acres flooded on the Santee reservation. In addition to the valuable river bottom land that was lost, the tribes also lost any natural resources and structural improvements on the land. The natural resources lost included timber, wildlife, and native plants. The structural improvements lost included such things as homes and ranches. In some cases, entire towns were lost. In addition to the direct damages, Congress has recognized that the tribes also suffered indirect or intangible damages for the loss of assets of unknown value. These losses included spiritual ties to the lands (for example, cemeteries and tribal monuments); tribal claims to a homeland; and benefits derived from living along the Missouri River. The tribes at the seven reservations that lost land due to the flood control projects on the Missouri River originally received compensation for their damages between 1947 and 1962, and they subsequently requested and received additional compensation between 1992 and 2002. For the tribes at the five reservations that we have reported on in the past, the original compensation was based on detailed assessments by the U.S. government and the tribes of the damages caused by the dams and, in some cases, protracted settlement negotiations. The U.S. government and the tribes were ultimately unable to reach settlement agreements, and Congress decided the compensation amounts. In each case, the original compensation authorized was less than what the tribes had requested, leading the tribes to request additional compensation. The three largest additional compensation amounts--Cheyenne River, $290.7 million in 2000; Fort Berthold, $149.2 million in 1992; and Standing Rock, $90.6 million in 1992--were all within the ranges calculated in GAO's 1991 and 1998 reports. Congress did not ask GAO to review the methodologies used to calculate the four smaller additional compensation amounts, all less than $40 million, before enacting the bills in 1996 (Crow Creek), 1997 (Lower Brule), and 2002 (Yankton and Santee). The Crow Creek Sioux and Lower Brule Sioux tribes were authorized additional compensation commensurate, on a per-acre basis, with the additional compensation provided to the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in 1992. Similarly, the additional compensation authorized in 2002 for the Yankton Sioux and Santee Sioux tribes was also partially based on a per-acre calculation. |
gao_GAO-06-179T | gao_GAO-06-179T_0 | U.S. Appropriations Primarily Support Iraqi Reconstruction While Iraqi Funds Support Iraqi Government Operations
The United States is the primary contributor to rebuilding and stabilization efforts in Iraq. These funds were used for activities that included infrastructure repair of the electricity, oil, and water and sanitation sectors; infrastructure repair, training, and equipping of the security and law enforcement sector; and CPA and U.S. administrative expenses. 1). Some International Funds Have Been Provided for Reconstruction, but Pledges are Mostly Loans
International donors have provided about $2.7 billion in multilateral and bilateral grants, of the pledged $13.6 billion, for reconstruction activities; however, most of the pledged amount is in the form of loans that largely have not been accessed by the Iraqis. According to Iraq’s National Development Strategy, the 2005 Iraqi budget planned for nearly $28 billion in expenditure. In addition to subsidy expenditures, Iraq has planned for capital investment levels of 21 percent from 2005 to 2007. However, Iraq may need more funding than currently available to meet the needs and demands of the country. The condition of the infrastructure was further exacerbated by post-2003 conflict looting and sabotage. In addition, initial assessments assumed reconstruction would take place in a peace-time environment and did not include additional security costs. Security, Measurement, and Sustainability Challenges in Rebuilding and Stabilizing Iraq
The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. First, the unstable security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and engage in rebuilding efforts. Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq’s inability to sustain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. Strength of the Insurgency Has Made It Difficult to Transfer Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces and Engage in Rebuilding Efforts
Over the past 2 years, significant increases in attacks against the coalition and coalition partners have made it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and engage in rebuilding efforts in Iraq. GAO’s forthcoming classified report on Iraq’s security situation will provide further information and analysis on the challenges to developing Iraqi security forces and the conditions for the phased draw down of U.S. and other coalition forces. Security Situation Has Affected Rebuilding Efforts
The security situation in Iraq has affected the cost and schedule of reconstruction efforts. Limited Performance Data and Measures and Inadequate Reporting Present Difficulties in Determining Progress and Impact of Rebuilding Effort
State has set broad goals for providing essential services, and the U.S. program has undertaken many rebuilding activities in Iraq. As of June 2005, approximately $52 million of the $200 million in completed large-scale water and sanitation projects either were not operating or were operating at lower capacity due to looting of key equipment and shortages of reliable power, trained Iraqi staff, and required chemicals and supplies. In September 2005, we recommended that the Secretary of State address the issue of sustainability in the water and sanitation sector. Finally, the United States must ensure that the billions of dollars it has already invested in Iraq’s infrastructure are not wasted. We will continue to examine the challenges the United States faces in rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States, along with coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and decades of neglect by the former regime. This enormous effort is taking place in an unstable security environment, concurrent with Iraqi efforts to complete a constitutional framework for establishing a permanent government. The United States' goal is to help the Iraqi government develop a democratic, stable, and prosperous country, at peace with itself and its neighbors, a partner in the war against terrorism, enjoying the benefits of a free society and a market economy. In this testimony, GAO discusses (1) the funding used to rebuild and stabilize Iraq and (2) the challenges that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts. This statement is based on several reports GAO has issued to the Congress over the past three months. In July, we issued two reports on (1) the status of funding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and (2) the use of private security providers in Iraq. We issued two additional reports in September on (1) U.S. reconstruction efforts in the water and sanitation sector and (2) U.S. assistance for the January 2005 Iraqi elections. Finally, we expect to issue shortly a report on U.S. efforts to stabilize the security situation in Iraq (a classified report). This statement includes unclassified information only.
What GAO Found
The United States is the primary contributor to efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Since 2003, the United States has made available about $30 billion for activities that include the construction and repair of infrastructure, procurement of equipment, and training and equipping of Iraqi security forces. International donors have pledged $13.6 billion in reconstruction funds (from 2004 through 2007), of which about $2.7 billion was provided in multilateral and bilateral grants through August 2005. However, most of the pledged amount''about $10 billion--is in the form of loans on which the Iraqi government largely has not yet drawn. Iraqi funds have primarily supported the country's operating budget, with some focus on capital improvement projects. For 2005, Iraq planned for about $28 billion in expenditures--largely supported by oil proceeds--to fund salaries, pensions, ministry operations, and subsidies. It is likely that Iraq may need more funds than currently available due to the severely degraded infrastructure, post conflict looting and sabotage, and additional security costs. The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. First, the security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against the coalition and the coalition's partners. Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. The United States has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but limited performance measures present challenges in determining the overall progress and impact of U.S. projects. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq's ability to maintain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. For example, as of June 2005, U.S.-funded water and sanitation projects representing about $52 million of approximately $200 million spent on completed projects were inoperable or were operating at lower than normal capacity. The United States has made a significant investment in the rebuilding and stabilization of Iraq. To preserve that investment, the United States must address these critical challenges. |
gao_GAO-02-973 | gao_GAO-02-973_0 | The Bureau Lacks Full Cost Information to Support Managerial Decisions
The Bureau does not distribute all the costs it incurs to its specific projects and activities. Policy and Administration costs are not distributed to project purposes because the Bureau’s focus is on cost recovery and legislation specifically designates these costs to be nonreimbursable as provided by 43 U.S.C. Therefore, complete information on the costs of the Bureau’s activities is not available to aid managerial decision making. Reclamation law provides that the Bureau recover the costs of certain reimbursable activities, including irrigation, M&I water supply, and power generation. However, it does not distribute all of the Policy and Administration costs to its responsibility segments. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In previous work at the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, we identified certain reimbursable project costs that were not being recovered by the Bureau. Determining Whether the Bureau Allocates All Costs to Projects and Programs
We reviewed relevant legislation, accounting standards, and documents, including financial management laws such as the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996; reclamation law; Federal Financial Accounting Standards; a 1998 Bureau report to the Congress on operations and maintenance activities and overhead; a 1999 Bureau cost accounting report; and Department of the Interior and Bureau of Reclamation policies, accounting manuals, and other cost accounting guidance. | What GAO Found
In a previous report (GAO/AIMD-00-127, May 2000), GAO identified reimbursable project costs that were not being recovered by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation. In this report, GAO reviewed the Bureau of Reclamation's managerial cost accounting and cost recovery practices. The Bureau does not currently identify and distribute all of the costs it incurs to its specific projects and activities. These costs are not distributed because the Bureau considers them nonreimbursable and because its cost accounting system is used to capture costs related to reimbursable purposes such as irrigation, municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply, and power generation. While GAO recognizes that the Bureau does not have the authority to recover certain costs, such as those funded through the Policy and Administration appropriation, all of the costs should nevertheless be distributed to the relevant activities to provide information useful in managerial decision making. Because not all costs are distributed, information on the full cost of projects and activities is not readily available to the Congress, program managers, and others to facilitate decision making and the allocation of the federal government's resources. |
gao_GAO-11-588 | gao_GAO-11-588_0 | We recommended that PBGC develop a strategic approach to contracting by conducting a review of its future human capital needs and to link contracting decisions to PBGC’s long- term strategic plan. 1). PBGC’s Workload
PBGC’s workload has increased in the last 20 years as the cumulative number of plans terminated and trusteed, number of participants eligible for or receiving benefits in those plans, and amount and complexity of plan assets taken over by PBGC have grown. 2). 3). Decisions to Contract Based More on Past Practice than Strategic Assessment
PBGC has come to rely heavily on contracting to conduct much of the core work of the agency, yet PBGC does not make decisions to use contractors in accordance with an agency-wide strategic plan or focus. Our 2008 report on PBGC’s contracting activities found that PBGC was falling short in this area. According to agency officials, even though PBGC requires its departments to evaluate the costs and benefits of continuing to perform the work through contractors each time a contract expires, some types of work have been performed by contractors for 10 years or more with no assessment as to whether the use of contractors is the most economical and effective way of getting the work done. In addition, between fiscal years 2008 and 2010, BAPD requested a conversion of contractor dollars for 20 FTEs. In light of PBGC’s extensive reliance on contractors, the agency may be at risk for the same types of problems mentioned earlier, particularly a lack of adequate management control and contract oversight—problems which could impede PBGC’s ability to manage increasing workloads, contractor costs, and program outcomes. Additionally, PBGC’s extensive reliance on its contractor workforce may be placing the agency at risk of not building institutional knowledge among its federal workforce in those areas in which the agency has come to rely on contractors. In addition, PBGC has increased its use of competitively awarded contracts and fixed price contracts. PBGC also has established more rigorous certification and training requirements for its COTRs. These decisions are the principal means that PBGC has for allocating cost and performance risk between the agency and its contractors. Since 2008, PBGC has made progress in increasing its use of this method of contracting, and has implemented new guidance and training to help expand its use further. In addition, PBGC has increased its incorporation of performance metrics across various types of contracts. Such linkage is important to ensuring contract work is well integrated into PBGC’s strategic plan, just as PBGC does with work performed in house. Additional Training on Performance-Based Contracting Under Way
To help address the barriers to using the performance-based contracting method that stem from fear of change, lack of understanding of performance-based contracting methods, or fear of loss of control over the contracting process, our 2008 report recommended that PBGC provide comprehensive training on performance-based contracting for PBGC’s Procurement Department staff, managers, and acquisition-related workforce. Conclusions
With nearly three-fourths of its budget allocated to contracts, PBGC relies heavily on contracting to achieve its corporate mission. To this end, we reiterate our prior recommendations in this area, which have yet to be implemented. In addition, to encourage expanded use of performance-based contracting with performance metrics linked to the agency’s mission and goals, we recommend that the Director of PBGC ensure that the rationale for not using a performance-based service acquisition approach is documented, consistent with the FAR; and ensure that the performance metrics for major service contracts are linked to specific corporate strategic goals to the maximum extent practicable. Appendix II: Summary of PBGC Actions Taken to Improve Contracting in Response to Previous Recommendations
PBGC has taken a number of steps to strengthen its contracting process in response to contract-related recommendations from previous GAO reports, as well as reports from PBGC’s Office of Inspector General (IG). I), and past GAO work. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Improvements Needed to Address Financial and Management Challenges. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Governance Structure Needs Improvements to Ensure Policy Direction and Oversight. Federal Contracting: Observations on the Government’s Contracting Data Systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures the pension benefits of more than 44 million U.S. workers and retirees in more than 27,500 private defined benefit plans. In response to growing workloads over the last 20 years, PBGC has come to rely heavily on contractors to perform its work. With the influx of plan terminations during the recent economic downturn, GAO was asked to examine: (1) how PBGC decides between contracting for services and performing services in house; (2) the steps PBGC has taken to strengthen its internal controls over the contracting process; and (3) PBGC's implementation of a performance-based approach in its recent contracts. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed federal and PBGC contracting policies; interviewed PBGC officials and selected contractors; examined a small judgmental sample of eight recent contracts selected based on type, amount, and location; and assessed PBGC's actions in response to past GAO and PBGC Inspector General (IG) recommendations.
What GAO Found
PBGC's contracting decisions are based primarily on historical practice within each of its departments rather than strategic assessment. Nearly three-fourths of PBGC's budget is allocated to contractors, yet PBGC does not have a strategic agency-level plan for contracting. PBGC often justifies extensive use of contractors based on the need to manage fluctuating workloads; however, historical data appear to indicate that PBGC has more contractor workers than needed to respond to workload fluctuations. Some of its contractor use is justified based on needed expertise or lower cost. However, because PBGC does not routinely conduct cost-benefit or risk analyses as part of its contract decision-making process, the efficiency and effectiveness of its contracting is unknown, and PBGC's long-term extensive reliance on contractors may be placing the agency at risk of eroding management control in core functions. At the same time, PBGC has adopted new policies and procedures to improve contractor oversight and ensure that federal contracting requirements are met, addressing past GAO and PBGC IG recommendations in this area. For example, PBGC has issued new standard operating procedures and is conducting training for staff involved in the agency's contracting activities. In addition, PBGC has increased the use of competitive and fixed price contracts, which provide more integrity to the contracting process by limiting government cost and performance risk. In addition, PBGC has implemented new guidance and training to improve staff knowledge and understanding of performance-based contracting and has expanded its use. Between fiscal years 2008 and 2010, PBGC increased the use of performance-based contracts from 2 to 12 percent. PBGC also increased its incorporation of performance metrics across various types of contracts to ensure performance is measured in terms of outcomes. Thus, past GAO and IG recommendations in this area have been partially addressed. However, unlike work performed in house, PBGC does not require performance metrics for its contract work to be linked to agency mission and goals, which is important to ensuring such work is well integrated into its strategic plan.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that PBGC improve its strategic approach to contracting by developing an inventory of contract resources, assessing risk in areas heavily reliant on contractors, documenting its consideration of performance-based contracting, and linking contractor performance to agency goals. PBGC agrees with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-333 | gao_GAO-08-333_0 | Using purchase cards for acquisitions and payments over the micropurchase limit of $2,500 represented about 3 percent of purchase transactions and accounted for more than 44 percent of the dollars spent from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. Key Internal Controls Were Ineffective
Internal control weaknesses in agency purchase card programs exposed the federal government to fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases and loss of assets. Lack of proper authorization. As depicted in table 1, our statistical sampling of executive agency purchase card transactions also found that 34 percent of transactions failed independent receipt and acceptance, that is, goods or services ordered and charged to a government purchase card account were not received by someone other than the cardholder. Table 2 provides failure rates from our prior work related to proper approval and independent receipt and acceptance for certain individual agencies. Additionally, in 30 percent of the transactions, cardholders failed to provide sufficient evidence of independent receipt of the goods or services. The total value of the items was over $2.7 million, and the purchase amount of the missing items was over $1.8 million. The lost or stolen items included computer servers, laptop computers, iPods, and digital cameras. We then evaluated each photograph to determine whether the photograph represented the accountable or pilferable item we selected for testing. Further, when we asked for inventory records as an acceptable alternative, the Army could not provide us evidence showing that it had possession of the 16 server configurations. As part of the plea agreement, the cardholder agreed to pay restitution of $642,000. Further, in November 2007, the cardholder was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment followed by 36 months supervised release. Although the vehicles appeared to have been shipped overseas for a legitimate government need, our investigative work found that these purchases were made in violation of USDA purchase card policies and with the implicit agreement by FAS policyholders as follows: According to written communications at FAS, the requester for one of the cars had a “large chunk of money that needed to be used before the end of the fiscal year (2006).” The requester requested that the vehicle be purchased in the United States, and then shipped overseas because it was not possible to finalize the purchase during fiscal year 2006 if the agency was to purchase the vehicle in the country where the office was located. A-123. Forest Service Purchase Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses Resulted in Instances of Improper, Wasteful, and Questionable Purchases. Specifically, we (1) determined the effectiveness of internal controls intended to minimize fraudulent, improper, and abusive transactions by testing two internal control attributes related to transactions taken from two statistical samples and (2) identified specific examples of potentially fraudulent, improper, and abusive transactions through data mining and investigations. We also selected a second sample from the population of over 600,000 transactions totaling nearly $6 billion that exceeded the $2,500 micropurchase threshold. Internal Control Testing
Our audit of key internal controls focused on whether agencies provided adequate documentation to substantiate that (1) purchase card transactions were properly authorized and (2) goods and services acquired with purchase cards were independently received and accepted. While we identified fraudulent, improper, and abusive transactions, our work was not designed to identify and we cannot determine the extent of fraudulent, improper, or abusive transactions occurring in the population of governmentwide purchase card transactions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past several years, GAO has issued numerous reports and testimonies on internal control breakdowns in certain individual agencies' purchase card programs. In light of these findings, GAO was asked to analyze purchase card transactions governmentwide to (1) determine whether internal control weaknesses existed in the government purchase card program and (2) if so, identify examples of fraudulent, improper, and abusive activity. GAO used statistical sampling to systematically test internal controls and data mining procedures to identify fraudulent, improper, and abusive activity. GAO's work was not designed to determine the overall extent of fraudulent, improper, or abusive transactions.
What GAO Found
Internal control weaknesses in agency purchase card programs exposed the federal government to fraud, waste, abuse, and loss of assets. When testing internal controls, GAO asked agencies to provide documentation on selected transactions to prove that the purchase of goods or services had been properly authorized and that when the good or service was delivered, an individual other than the cardholder received and signed for it. Using a statistical sample of purchase card transactions from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, GAO estimated that nearly 41 percent of the transactions failed to meet either of these basic internal control standards. Using a second sample of transactions over $2,500, GAO found a similar failure rate--agencies could not demonstrate that 48 percent of these large purchases met the standard of proper authorization, independent receipt and acceptance, or both. Breakdowns in internal controls, including authorization and independent receipt and acceptance, resulted in numerous examples of fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchase card use. These examples included instances where cardholders used purchase cards to subscribe to Internet dating services, buy video iPods for personal use, and pay for lavish dinners that included top-shelf liquor. GAO identified some of the case studies, including one case where a cardholder used the purchase card program to embezzle over $642,000 over a period of 6 years from the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service firefighting fund. This cardholder was sentenced to 21 months in prison and ordered to pay full restitution. In addition, agencies were unable to locate 458 items of 1,058 total accountable and pilferable items totaling over $2.7 million that GAO selected for testing. These missing items, which GAO considered to be lost or stolen, totaled over $1.8 million and included computer servers, laptop computers, iPods, and digital cameras. For example, the Department of the Army could not adequately account for 256 items making up 16 server configurations, each of which cost nearly $100,000. |
gao_GAO-10-12 | gao_GAO-10-12_0 | Scanning Rates at Larger SFI Ports Have Been Far Short of 100 Percent
While CBP has been able to scan a majority of U.S.-bound cargo containers from three comparatively low-volume ports participating in the SFI program, at two higher volume ports—which constitute approximately 17 percent of containers arriving in the United States—it has been able to scan no more than 5 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, on average, most of which were scanned after they were determined to be high risk by CBP officers as part of the CSI program, according to CBP officials. However, as of yet, CBP has not made arrangements to expand operations at these ports. CBP officials maintain that this strategy, combined with a plan to gather additional cargo container information, would enhance container security. The strategic trade corridor strategy selected by the Secretary focuses cargo container scanning efforts on a limited number of ports where CBP has determined SFI will help mitigate the greatest risk of potential WMD from entering the United States. According to DHS and CBP officials, they have not developed a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning by July 2012 because challenges encountered thus far in implementing the SFI program indicate that implementation of 100 percent scanning worldwide by the 2012 deadline will be difficult to achieve. DHS Plans to Grant Blanket Extensions to Ports Unable to Meet the 2012 Deadline
DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet the July 2012 deadline for full-scale implementation of the 9/11 Act’s scanning requirement and will need to grant extensions to those foreign ports unable to meet the scanning deadline in order to maintain the flow of trade and comply with the 9/11 Act prohibition on allowing containers that have not been scanned to enter the United States. CBP Has Not Developed an Estimate of Complete U.S. CBP officials stated that they have not developed a more comprehensive cost estimate because DHS has not specified a clear path forward for the program. If participation is diminished, this could constitute a cost (e.g., reduced implementation and effectiveness of other programs), which would be one element to consider in any cost-benefit analysis. The scanning requirement differs from existing container security programs because it requires CBP to scan all containers before performing analysis to determine their potential risk level. The 100 Percent Scanning Requirement May Hinder the Continued Operation of CBP’s Existing Container Security Programs
Our work has indicated that the 100 percent scanning requirement is a departure from existing container security programs built on bilateral partnerships with foreign governments and the private sector. Foreign terminal operators have also expressed concerns regarding the lack of a clear path forward for the SFI program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position DHS to implement the cargo container scanning provisions of the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts, improve container security programs, and better inform Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the CBP Commissioner, in consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State as appropriate, take the following actions: conduct a feasibility analysis of implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement of all U.S.-bound cargo containers in light of the challenges faced at the initial SFI ports; develop more comprehensive cost estimates for achieving the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, consistent with best practices for implementing, operating, and maintaining U.S. government programs; conduct a cost-benefit analysis (to include all significant economic costs) of different alternatives for achieving the 100 percent scanning requirement, to include as appropriate, other alternatives short of achieving 100 percent scanning, to enhance container security, and to address the impact that 100 percent scanning may have on other container security programs; and provide the results of the feasibility analysis, U.S. program cost estimates, and cost-benefit analysis outlined above to Congress, along with various cost-effective alternatives to implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, as appropriate. It also noted that its report determined that these conditions would not likely exist at all ports shipping to the United States. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) what progress U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made toward implementing 100 percent scanning at the initial ports participating in the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) program; (2) what planning efforts CBP has made to address the requirement to scan all U.S.-bound cargo containers by July 2012; (3) the estimated costs to date of the SFI program, and to what extent future implementation costs have been estimated; and (4) what challenges, if any, CBP faces in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement with its existing container security programs. To assess CBP’s progress implementing SFI at individual ports, we compared data on the number of containers scanned to the total volume of U.S.- bound containers at each SFI port, to the requirement set forth in the 9/11 Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for, among other things, the security of cargo containers shipped to the United States. In fiscal year 2008, 611 ports shipped a total of 9.8 million containers to the country. The 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers to be scanned by 2012, and CBP has begun implementing the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to address this requirement. GAO was requested to assess CBP's efforts to implement the 9/11 Act requirement. This report addresses (1) CBP's progress at the initial ports participating in the SFI program, (2) CBP plans to implement SFI, (3) the extent to which CBP has estimated costs and conducted a cost-benefit analysis of 100 percent scanning, and (4) any challenges to integrating 100 percent scanning with existing container security programs. GAO reviewed operating procedures for the SFI ports and analyzed cost data. GAO also visited six of the seven original SFI ports and spoke to officials from CBP, foreign governments, and private industry.
What GAO Found
CBP has made limited progress in scanning containers at the initial ports participating in the SFI program, leaving the feasibility of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. Since the inception of the SFI program, CBP has not been able to achieve 100 percent scanning at any participating port. While CBP has been able to scan a majority of the U.S.-bound cargo containers at the comparatively low volume ports, it has not achieved sustained scanning rates above five percent at the comparatively larger ports. CBP has not developed a plan to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo by 2012, but has a strategy to expand SFI to select ports where it will mitigate the greatest risk of WMD entering the United States. CBP does not have a plan to scan cargo containers at all ports because, according to agency officials, challenges encountered thus far in implementing SFI indicate that doing so worldwide will be difficult to achieve. However, CBP has not conducted a feasibility analysis of expanding 100 percent scanning, as required by the SAFE Port Act. Such an analysis could help both CBP and Congress determine the most effective way forward to enhance container security. Recognizing that its strategy will not meet the requirement to scan all U.S.-bound cargo containers, DHS plans to issue a blanket extension to all foreign ports by July 2012 to be in compliance with the 9/11 Act. DHS officials acknowledged that they may revisit this plan before the July 2012 deadline. CBP, while identifying some SFI program costs, has not developed a complete estimate of U.S. program costs because of the lack of a decision on a clear path forward. CBP has also not conducted any cost-benefit analysis which would include other economic costs, including those borne outside the United States, which would be important to any analysis of alternatives to achieving the 100 percent scanning requirement. While uncertainties exist, a cost estimate and cost-benefit analysis, consistent with federal best practices, could assist DHS and CBP in better communicating the magnitude of the costs and benefits to Congress and in designing a clear path forward for enhancing cargo container security. CPB faces a number of potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement into its existing container security programs. The 100 percent scanning requirement is a departure from existing container security programs in that it requires that all containers be scanned before CBP determines their potential risk level. Senior CBP officials and international trading partners say this change differs from CBP's current risk-based approach based on international supply chain security standards. Our work also indicates that the 100 percent scanning requirement could present challenges to the continued operation of existing container security programs--depending upon how the SFI program is implemented and 100 percent scanning is achieved. Some foreign governments have stated they may adopt a reciprocal requirement that all U.S. origin containers be scanned, which would present additional challenges at domestic U.S. ports. |
gao_GAO-04-77 | gao_GAO-04-77_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine whether Treasury and its key bureaus have effectively implemented information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their systems and data and (2) determine whether Treasury has effectively implemented its departmentwide information security program. To assess Treasury’s departmentwide information security program, we reviewed and evaluated the department’s information security policies in effect at the time of our review; analyzed data presented in Treasury’s GISRA report for fiscal year 2002 and FISMA report for fiscal year 2003; examined and assessed reports and other documents related to the department’s information security program, and interviewed Treasury officials regarding their processes and procedures for overseeing, monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the implementation of information security across the department. Weak security controls can expose information systems and information to an increased risk of unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, and destruction. Some bureaus have consistently reported implementing effective controls over their information systems and/or limiting the negative effect control weaknesses could have on the preparation of financial statements and internal controls. Key Bureaus Have Ineffective Security Controls
Strengthening information systems controls at other bureaus is one of the management challenges currently facing the Department of the Treasury. Service continuity. Treasury bureaus have not consistently assessed their systems for risk. Most Treasury bureaus did not test the security controls on each of their inventoried systems during fiscal year 2003. Treasury Has Begun to Implement Key Elements of a Departmentwide Information Security Program, but Challenges Remain
The information security weaknesses and inconsistent security practices identified at the bureaus exist, in part, because Treasury’s departmentwide security program, while evolving, is not yet fully institutionalized across the entire department. As illustrated in figure 6, an analysis of security metric data in Treasury’s fiscal year 2002 GISRA report and its fiscal year 2003 FISMA report shows that the majority of Treasury systems do not meet key information security requirements, and Treasury’s reported performance in meeting certain of these requirements has decreased. In addition, implementation of certain information security requirements has decreased from fiscal year 2002. For the 11 bureaus that reported performance measures for both years, the percentage of Treasury systems implementing five of the six requirements decreased in fiscal year 2003, while it increased for one. Financial Management Service: Significant Weaknesses in Computer Controls Continue. Information Security: Software Change Controls at the Department of Treasury. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Treasury relies heavily on information systems--and on the public's trust in its work. Information security is therefore critical to Treasury operations. In support of its annual audit of the government's financial statements, GAO assessed the effectiveness of (1) Treasury's information security controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the department's systems and data and (2) Treasury's implementation of its departmentwide information security program. In assessing the adequacy of Treasury's information security program, GAO focused on the effectiveness of its departmentwide policies and processes, rather than on bureau-specific directives and guidance.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Treasury and its key bureaus have not consistently implemented information security controls to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information systems and data. Several bureaus have reported effective controls over their systems. However, longstanding information security weaknesses in access and software change controls, segregation of duties, and service continuity have been consistently identified at certain key Treasury bureaus, such as IRS and the Financial Management Service. Weaknesses at these bureaus place the sensitive information managed by the bureaus at increased risk of unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. Moreover, bureaus have not consistently implemented key information security requirements. An analysis of performance data for the 11 Treasury bureaus that reported on these requirements for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 reveals that most Treasury systems did not meet certain key information security requirements in fiscal year 2003 and that the percentage of systems that meet certain requirements has decreased from fiscal year 2002. The information security weaknesses and inconsistent implementation of security controls at Treasury bureaus exist, in part, because Treasury's departmentwide security program, while evolving, has not yet been fully institutionalized across the entire department. During fiscal year 2003, Treasury launched or expanded several initiatives to implement key elements of its program. However, additional actions are needed to effectively and consistently implement information security controls throughout the department. |
gao_GAO-12-97 | gao_GAO-12-97_0 | For example, virtually all of these collaborations grew out of efforts to address critical workforce needs of multiple employers, typically in a specific sector, rather than focusing on individual employers. Additionally, the partners in these initiatives made extra effort to understand and work with employers so they could tailor services such as jobseeker assessment, screening, and training to address specific employer needs. Partners remained engaged in these collaborative efforts because they continued to produce a range of results for employers, jobseekers and workers, and the workforce system and other partners. For example, in Greensboro, North Carolina, the board staff provided expedited services for an aircraft company by designing a web-based recruitment tool and customized assessment process within 48 hours and quickly screening over 2,400 initial applicants, according to a board official. In some cases, employers cited an increased supply of skilled labor. In Cincinnati, Ohio, according to an independent study, employers who participated in the health care initiative realized about $4,900 in cost savings per worker hired. Workforce Boards Overcame Some Challenges to Address Diverse Employer Needs and Developed Their Own Measures to Track Employer Engagement
Although all of the boards were successful in their collaborative efforts, they identified some challenges they needed to overcome. Staff from most, but not all, of the boards also said that WIA performance measures do not directly reflect their efforts to work with and engage employers. However, we found that many of the boards developed a number of their own performance measures to assess their services to employers. Some Boards Were Challenged to Develop Comprehensive Strategies to Address Diverse Employer Needs with WIA Funds
Some boards identified challenges in using WIA funds to address employers’ need for workers at various skill levels. In Chicago, staff track measures such as the number of new employers served every year and the hiring rate among jobseekers that they had referred to employers. Labor Has Taken Steps to Support Local Collaborative Efforts and Address Some Challenges but Has Not Made Information on Leveraging Resources Readily Available
To help boards form partnerships with employers, colleges, and other partners, Labor has conducted webinars and shared information on the uses of and opportunities for funding such collaborations. Conclusion
At a time when the nation continues to face high unemployment in the wake of the recent recession, it is particularly important to consider ways to better connect the workforce investment system with employers to meet local labor market needs. However, while Labor has also collected relevant information on effective strategies that local boards and partners have used to leverage resources, it has not compiled this information or made it readily accessible. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better support the capacity of the local workforce investment system to collaborate with employers and other partners, the Secretary of Labor should compile information on workforce boards that effectively leverage WIA funds with other funding sources and disseminate this information in a readily accessible manner. Labor agreed with our findings and recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on (1) the factors that facilitated innovative collaborations among workforce boards, employers, and others; (2) the major challenges to collaboration; and (3) the actions Labor has taken to support local workforce boards in their collaborative efforts. To identify these selected sites, we asked officials from the five key federal agencies and national experts representing 20 organizations to identify what they viewed as the most promising and innovative local initiatives in which local workforce boards collaborated effectively with employers and other partners to achieve positive results. In each profile, we provide an overview of the initiative and describe some of the factors that facilitated collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the United States continues to face high unemployment in the wake of the recent recession, federally funded workforce programs can play an important role in bridging gaps between the skills present in the workforce and the skills needed for available jobs. The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) sought to strengthen the connection between workforce programs and employers, but GAO's prior work has found that collaboration remains a challenge. With WIA currently awaiting reauthorization, GAO reviewed (1) factors that facilitated innovative collaborations among workforce boards, employers, and others; (2) major challenges to collaboration; and (3) actions the Department of Labor (Labor) has taken to support local collaborative efforts. GAO examined 14 local initiatives identified by experts as among the most promising or innovative efforts in which local workforce boards collaborated effectively with employers and other partners to achieve positive results. GAO interviewed representatives of the 14 initiatives and officials from five federal agencies. GAO also reviewed reports on the initiatives and relevant federal laws, regulations, and other documents.
What GAO Found
Workforce board officials and their partners in the 14 initiatives cited a range of factors that facilitated building innovative collaborations. Almost all of the collaborations grew out of efforts to address urgent workforce needs of multiple employers in a specific sector, such as health care, manufacturing, or agriculture, rather than focusing on individual employers. Additionally, the partners in these initiatives made extra effort to understand and work with employers so they could tailor services such as jobseeker assessment, screening, and training to address specific employer needs. For example, in Greensboro, North Carolina, board staff provided expedited services for an aircraft company that just moved to the area by designing a web-based recruitment tool and customized assessment process within 48 hours and screening over 2,400 initial applicants. In all the initiatives, partners remained engaged in these collaborative efforts because they continued to produce a wide range of reported results, such as an increased supply of skilled labor, job placements, reduced employer recruitment and turnover costs, and averted layoffs. For example, in Cincinnati, Ohio, employers who participated in the health care initiative realized almost $5,000 in estimated cost savings per worker hired, mainly due to lower turnover and recruitment costs, according to an independent study.
While these boards were successful in their efforts, they cited some challenges to collaboration that they needed to overcome. Some boards were challenged to develop comprehensive strategies to address diverse employer needs with WIA funds. For example, some boards' staff said that while their initiatives sought to meet employer needs for higher-skilled workers through skill upgrades, WIA funds can be used to train current workers only in limited circumstances, and the boards used other funding sources to do so. Staff from most, but not all, boards also said that WIA performance measures do not reflect their efforts to engage employers. Many of these boards used their own measures to assess their services to employers, such as the number of new employers served each year or the hiring rate for jobseekers they refer to employers.
Labor has taken various steps to support local collaborations, such as conducting webinars and issuing guidance on pertinent topics, and contributing to a new $37 million grant program to facilitate innovative regional collaborations. Many of the boards we reviewed cited leveraging resources as a key to facilitating collaboration. However, while Labor has collected information on effective practices for leveraging resources, it has not compiled this information and made it easy to access.
What GAO Recommends
To better support the capacity of the local workforce investment system to collaborate with employers and other partners, Labor should compile information on workforce boards that effectively leverage WIA funds with other funding sources and disseminate this information in a readily accessible manner. Labor agreed with our findings and recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-366 | gao_GAO-03-366_0 | We also reviewed the Bank Group entities’ 2002 and 2001 audited financial statements and the external auditors’ opinions on the financial statements and identified the accounting principles and auditing standards used, inquired of World Bank management and obtained information on the audit committee, external audits, and the extent of the external auditor giving opinions on internal control over financial reporting, operations, and compliance matters, analyzed and compiled relevant financial information from the Bank Group entities’ annual reports and their audited financial statements, reviewed the banks’ terms of reference to identify the scope of the audit committee’s oversight and compared them to relevant guidance on widely accepted internal control frameworks, reviewed widely accepted internal control frameworks, such as Internal Control—Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission and Guidelines for Internal Control Standards developed by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, and discussed various options for reporting on internal control with representatives from the international accounting firm responsible for the financial statement audits of the Bank Group entities. However, the Bank Group’s external financial statement audits do not, and are not intended to, provide specific assurance about the internal control over the Bank Group’s operations and whether the funds are spent for their intended purposes. Bank Group Has Taken Important Steps on Internal Control but Reporting Could Be Expanded
Management of the Bank Group entities has acknowledged the importance of internal control and has (1) implemented a structured internal control framework, (2) conducted the internal control assessments necessary to provide its external auditor with a formal assertion on the effectiveness of the Bank Group’s internal control over external financial reporting, and (3) contracted with its external auditor to provide an opinion, in conjunction with the financial statement audits, on whether managements’ assertions on internal control over external financial reporting are fairly stated. However, Bank Group management does not include in its assertion internal control over operations and compliance with key provisions of bank charters and policies, and it has not asked the external auditor to give opinions on those internal controls. Given the inherent risks in the banks’ activities, further assurance on these additional categories of internal control—operations and compliance—would provide an added level of assurance to the Bank Group and its member countries that funds were used for their intended purposes. The Bank Group also has other options for providing assurance over internal control over operations and compliance. During our review, we were told that the Bank Group does not yet have plans to have a comprehensive assessment of these controls. A major function of the Bank Group’s audit committee is to nominate an external auditor to conduct audits of the Bank Group’s financial statements and determine the scope of the auditors’ work and the reports to be submitted by the auditors. The Bank Group’s audit committee currently has the external auditor provide an opinion on management’s assertion on the Bank Group’s internal control over external financial reporting. The audit committee is well- positioned to assign an internal party or provide an external entity the task of providing a thorough assessment of such controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress passed Public Law 106-429 because it was concerned about the sufficiency of external audits of the financial operations of the World Bank Group, a set of multilateral development banks. This law provides that GAO report on the sufficiency of such audits of each Bank Group entity. GAO addressed (1) the extent that the external auditor was providing assurance on internal control over financial reporting, operations, and compliance with key provisions of bank charters and policies in conjunction with financial statement audits and (2) the role the Bank Group's audit committee plays in providing oversight of external financial statement audits and internal control.
What GAO Found
The Bank Group has taken important steps in strengthening its assessment and reporting on internal control, including (1) implementing a structured internal control framework, (2) conducting the internal control assessments necessary to provide its external auditor with an assertion about the effectiveness of the Bank Group's internal control over external financial reporting, and (3) contracting with its external auditor to provide an opinion, in conjunction with the financial statement audit, on whether management's assertion on internal control over external financial reporting is fairly stated. However, Bank Group management does not include an assertion on internal control over operations and compliance matters, and it has not asked the external auditor to give an opinion on those internal controls. During our review, we were told that the Bank Group does not yet have plans to conduct a comprehensive assessment of those controls. The Bank Group's external financial statement audits do not, and are not intended to, provide specific assurance about the internal control over the Bank Group's operations and whether the funds are spent for their intended purposes. Given the inherent risks in the banks' activities, additional assurance on these other categories of internal control--operations and compliance--would provide an added level of assurance to the Bank Group and its member countries that funds were used for their intended purposes. The Bank Group has established an audit committee that provides oversight of external financial statement audits and internal control. A major function of the committee is to nominate an external auditor and determine the scope of the auditor's work and the reports to be submitted by the auditor. The audit committee also has the external auditor give an opinion, in conjunction with the financial statement audit, on management's assertion on the Bank Group's internal control over external financial reporting. The audit committee has the authority to expand the external audits to include the auditor giving opinions on internal control over operations and compliance matters. Alternatively, the audit committee is also well-positioned to assign to an internal party or provide an external party the task of providing a thorough assessment of such controls. |
gao_GAO-09-458T | gao_GAO-09-458T_0 | Undercover Tests Reveal Inadequate Investigations and Poor Complaint Intake Process
The results of our undercover tests illustrate flaws in WHD’s responses to wage theft complaints, including delays in investigating complaints, complaints not recorded in the WHD database, failure to use all available enforcement tools because of a lack of resources, failure to follow up on employers who agreed to pay, and a poor complaint intake process. With respect to complaints, WHD policy states that those involving hazardous conditions and child labor are its top priority, but a review of WHD records at the end of our work showed that the case was not investigated or entered into WHD’s database. Case Studies Show That WHD Inadequately Investigated Complaints
Similar to our 10 fictitious scenarios, we identified 20 cases affecting at least 1,160 workers whose employers were inadequately investigated by WHD. One of the complainants also confirmed to the WHD investigator that the employer was distributing this document. WHD’s Complaint Intake Process, Conciliations, and Other Investigative Tools Do Not Provide Assurance of a Timely and Thorough Response to Wage Theft Complaints
WHD’s complaint intake processes, conciliations, and other investigative tools are ineffective and often prevent WHD from responding to wage theft complaints in a timely and thorough manner, leaving thousands of low wage workers vulnerable to wage theft. In addition, WHD’s poor record-keeping makes WHD appear better at resolving conciliations than it actually is. Once complaints were recorded in WHD’s database and assigned as a case to an investigator, they were often adequately investigated. For example, WHD’s southeast region, which handled 57 percent of conciliations recorded by WHD in fiscal year 2007, has a policy of not recording investigative work performed on unsuccessful conciliations in the database. According to WHD officials, non-conciliations should be initiated within 6 months of the date the complaint is filed. Our case studies discussed above and in appendix II also include examples of complaints not investigated for over a year, cases closed based on unverified information provided by the employer, businesses with repeat violations that were not fully investigated, and cases dropped because the employer did not return telephone calls. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To review the effectiveness of WHD’s complaint intake and conciliation processes, GAO investigators attempted to file 11 complaints about 10 fictitious businesses to WHD district offices in Baltimore, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama; Dallas, Texas; Miami, Florida; San Jose, California; and West Covina, California. GAO investigators obtained undercover addresses and phone numbers to pose as both complainants and employers in these scenarios. To identify case studies of inadequate WHD responses to complaints, we data-mined WHISARD to identify closed cases in which a significant delay occurred in responding to a complaint (cases taking more than 6 months to initiate or 1 year to complete), an employer could not be located, or the case was dropped when an employer refused to pay. Appendix II: Additional Case Studies of Inadequate WHD Investigations
Table 5 provides a summary of ten additional case studies of inadequate Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The mission of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) includes enforcing provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which is designed to ensure that millions of workers are paid the federal minimum wage and overtime. Conducting investigations based on worker complaints is WHD's priority. According to WHD, investigations range from comprehensive investigations to conciliations, which consist primarily of phone calls to a complainant's employer. In July 2008, GAO testified on 15 case studies where WHD failed to investigate complaints. This testimony highlights the findings of a follow-up investigation performed at the Committee's request. Specifically, GAO was asked to (1) test WHD's complaint intake process in an undercover capacity, (2) provide additional case study examples of inadequate WHD responses to complaints, and (3) assess the effectiveness of WHD's complaint intake process, conciliations, and other investigative tools. To test WHD's complaint intake process, GAO posed as complainants and employers in 10 different scenarios. To provide case study examples and assess effectiveness of investigations, GAO used data mining and statistical sampling of closed case data for fiscal year 2007. GAO plans to issue a follow-up report with recommendations concerning resource needs and the recording of complaints. GAO also confirmed key findings with WHD officials.
What GAO Found
GAO found that WHD frequently responded inadequately to complaints, leaving low wage workers vulnerable to wage theft. Posing as fictitious complainants, GAO filed 10 common complaints with WHD district offices across the country. The undercover tests revealed sluggish response times, a poor complaint intake process, and failed conciliation attempts, among other problems. In one case, a WHD investigator lied about investigative work performed and did not investigate GAO's fictitious complaint. At the end of the undercover tests, GAO was still waiting for WHD to begin investigating three cases--a delay of nearly 5, 4, and 2 months, respectively. Similar to the 10 fictitious scenarios, GAO identified 20 cases affecting at least 1,160 real employees whose employers were inadequately investigated. For example, GAO found cases where it took over a year for WHD to respond to a complaint, cases closed based on unverified information provided by the employer, and cases dropped when the employer did not return phone calls. GAO's overall assessment of the WHD complaint intake, conciliation, and investigation processes found an ineffective system that discourages wage theft complaints. With respect to conciliations, GAO found that WHD does not fully investigate these types of complaints or compel employers to pay. In addition, a WHD policy instructed many offices not to record unsuccessful conciliations in its database, making WHD appear better at resolving conciliations than it actually is. WHD's investigations were frequently delayed by months or years, but once complaints were recorded in WHD's database and assigned as a case to an investigator, they were often adequately investigated. |
gao_GAO-17-370 | gao_GAO-17-370_0 | Drogue refueling is available via the centerline drogue system in the middle of the aircraft, or via a wing air refueling pod (WARP) located on each wing. Boeing was awarded a fixed price incentive (firm target) contract for development. Barring any changes to KC-46 requirements by the Air Force, the development contract specifies a ceiling price of $4.9 billion for Boeing to develop the first 4 aircraft, at which point Boeing must assume responsibility for all additional costs. Program Is Tracking to Cost and Performance Targets, but Aircraft Delivery Will Be Delayed
The KC-46 program is meeting total acquisition cost and performance targets, but has experienced some recent schedule delays. This is about $7.3 billion less than the original estimate of $51.7 billion or about 14 percent less. The Air Force has been able to decrease its cost estimate over the past 4 years primarily because it has not added or changed requirements and therefore there were fewer engineering changes than expected. Program officials also report that the program does not yet have actual flight test data to validate many of the other key and technical performance capabilities, such as those for operational availability and mission capability mentioned above. Key Schedule Milestones Have Slipped at Least One Year
Since our last report in April 2016, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved the KC-46 program to enter low-rate initial production in August 2016, one year later than originally planned. Those problems have been overcome, but time was lost working through them. Boeing and KC-46 program officials modified the program schedule in January 2017 to reflect the work remaining, including obtaining Federal Aviation Administration confirmation that the aircraft’s parts all match their design drawings. Overall, the current schedule reflects a 14-month delay in Boeing delivering the first 18 aircraft with 9 WARP sets under the terms of the development contract, referred to as 18 fully capable aircraft in table 2. Instead of meeting an August 2017 date, the program office now estimates that Boeing will deliver the first 18 aircraft by February 2018 and the 9 WARP sets separately by October 2018. Electromagnetic Effects Testing Schedule: First, there is risk that Boeing will not be able to complete required electromagnetic effects testing on the KC-46 in May 2017, as currently planned. According to program officials, Boeing is moving away from the test once approach and towards sequential testing as a mitigation strategy. Program officials, however, believe that the transition to a new testing approach will require weeks of test plan rewriting, and that obtaining approval for the design of all parts, including the WARPs, from the Federal Aviation Administration will continue to pose risk to test completion as currently planned. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. Appendix I: KC-46 Key Performance Parameters and System Attributes and Status of Technical Performance Capabilities
The program office has 14 key performance parameters and system attributes that are critical to the KC-46 aircraft’s military capability and 7 technical performance capabilities that track progress to meeting contract specifications. Related GAO Products
KC-46 Tanker Aircraft: Challenging Testing and Delivery Schedules Lie Ahead. | Why GAO Did This Study
The KC-46 tanker modernization program, valued at about $44 billion, is among the Air Force's highest acquisition priorities. Aerial refueling—the transfer of fuel from airborne tankers to combat and airlift forces—is critical to the U.S. military's ability to effectively operate globally. The Air Force initiated the KC-46 program to replace about a third of its aging KC-135 aerial refueling fleet. Boeing was awarded a fixed price incentive contract to develop the first four aircraft, which are being used for testing. Among other things, Boeing is contractually required to deliver a total of 18 aircraft and 9 wing air refueling pod sets by August 2017. This is defined as required assets available. The program plans to eventually field 179 aircraft in total.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a provision for GAO to review the KC-46 program annually through 2017. This is GAO's sixth report on this issue. It addresses (1) progress made in 2016 toward achieving cost, performance, and schedule goals and (2) development risk remaining. GAO analyzed key cost, schedule, development, test, and manufacturing documents and discussed results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, the Federal Aviation Administration, and Boeing.
What GAO Found
The KC-46 tanker modernization program is meeting cost and performance targets, but has experienced some recent schedule delays.
Costs: As shown in the table below, the program's total acquisition cost estimate has decreased about $7.3 billion, or 14 percent, since the initial estimate. This is primarily because there have been no requirements changes and there have been fewer engineering changes than expected.
(then-year dollars in millions)
Performance: The program office estimates that the KC-46 will achieve its key and technical performance capabilities, such as completing a mission 92 percent of the time. As noted below, though, much testing remains.
Schedule: The program fixed design problems and was approved for low-rate initial production in August 2016, a year late. Boeing (the prime contractor) will not meet the original required assets available delivery schedule due to ongoing Federal Aviation Administration certifications of the aircraft, including the wing air refueling pods, and flight test delays. As shown, the remaining schedule was modified to allow Boeing to deliver the first 18 aircraft and pods separately by October 2018, 14 months later than first planned.
GAO's analysis shows there is risk to the current delivery schedule due to potential delays in Federal Aviation Administration certifications and key test events. Boeing must also complete over 1,700 test points on average for each month from February to September 2017, a level that is more than double what it completed in the last 11 months. Program officials agree that there is risk to Boeing's test completion rate until it obtains Federal Aviation Administration approval for the design of all parts, including the pods, but test mitigation strategies are underway.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-597T | gao_GAO-09-597T_0 | Over half of these funds are for highway infrastructure investments. States Are Using Existing Plans to Identify Transportation Projects and Described Considering Recovery Act Requirements in Selecting Projects
As of April 16, DOT reported that nationally $6.4 billion in Recovery Act highway infrastructure investment funding apportioned to the states had been obligated—meaning that DOT and the states had executed agreements on projects worth this amount. For the locations that we reviewed, approximately $3.3 billion in highway funding has been obligated with the percent of apportioned funds obligated to the states and the District of Columbia, ranging from 0 to 65 percent. As required by the Act, states have used existing planning processes and plans to quickly identify and obligate funds for projects. Several selected states have generally focused on initiating preventive maintenance projects, because these projects require less environmental review or design work and can be started quickly. For example, the New Jersey Department of Transportation selected 40 projects and concentrated mainly on replacement projects that require little environmental clearance or extensive design work, such as highway and bridge painting and deck replacement. Some states also reported targeting funds toward projects with an emphasis on job creation and consideration of economically distressed areas. According to Colorado Department of Transportation officials, they are emphasizing construction projects rather than projects in planning or design phases, in order to maximize job creation. The Illinois Department of Transportation reported that it is planning to spend a large share of its estimated $655 million in Recovery Act funds for highway and bridge projects in economically distressed areas. States Are Modifying Systems to Track Recovery Act Funds but Are Concerned about Tracking Funds Distributed Directly to Nonstate Entities
States’ and localities’ tracking and accounting systems are critical to the proper execution and accurate and timely recording of transactions associated with the Recovery Act. Officials from all 16 states and the District of Columbia told us they have established or are establishing methods and processes to separately identify (i.e., tag), monitor, track, and report on the use of the Recovery Act funds they receive. Officials from many of the 16 selected states and the District of Columbia told us that they had concerns about the ability of subrecipients, localities, and other nonstate entities to separately tag, monitor, track, and report on the Recovery Act funds they receive. Given that governors have certified the use of funds in their states, officials in many states also expressed concern about being held accountable for funds flowing directly from federal agencies to localities or other recipients. Officials in several states indicated that either their states would not be tracking Recovery Act funds going to the local levels or that they were unsure how much data would be available on the use of these funds. States’ Plans to Assess Impact of Recovery Act Funds Are in the Initial Stages
States vary in how they plan to assess the impact of Recovery Act funds. Some states will use existing federal program guidance or performance measures to evaluate impact, particularly for ongoing programs, such as FHWA’s Surface Transportation Program. A number of states have expressed concerns about definitions of jobs created and jobs retained under the Act, as well as methodologies that can be used for the estimation of each. Given questions raised by many state and local officials about how best to determine both direct and indirect jobs created and retained under the Recovery Act, we recommended in our first bimonthly report that OMB continue its efforts to identify appropriate methodologies that can be used to assess jobs created and retained from projects funded by the Recovery Act, determine the Recovery Act spending when job creation is indirect, and identify those types of programs, projects, or activities that in the past have demonstrated substantial job creation or are considered likely to do so in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $48.1 billion in additional spending at the Department of Transportation (DOT) for investments in transportation infrastructure, including highways, passenger rail, and transit. This statement provides a general overview of (1) selected states' use of Recovery Act funds for highway programs, (2) the approaches taken by these states to ensure accountability for these funds, and (3) the selected states' plans to evaluate the impact of the Recovery Act funds that they receive for highway programs. This statement is based on work in which GAO examined the use of Recovery Act funds by a core group of 16 states and the District of Columbia, representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available through the Act. GAO issued its first bimonthly report on April 23, 2009.
What GAO Found
According to DOT, as of mid-April, the 17 locations that GAO reviewed had obligated $3.3 billion of the over $15 billion (21 percent) in highway investment funds that DOT had apportioned to them. These funds will be used in about 900 projects. States are using existing statewide plans to quickly identify and obligate funding for Recovery Act transportation projects. Several states have generally focused on rehabilitation and repair projects, because these projects require lessenvironmental review or design work. For example, the New Jersey Department of Transportation selected 40 projects and concentrated mainly on projects that require little environmental clearance or extensive design work, such as highway and bridge painting and deck replacement. Some states also reported targeting funds toward projects with an emphasis on job creation and consideration of economically distressed areas. For example, Colorado Department of Transportation officials are emphasizing construction projects, such as highway bridge replacements, rather than projects in planning or design phases, in order to maximize job creation. The Illinois Department of Transportation reported that it is planning to spend a large share of its estimated $655 million in Recovery Act funds for highway and bridge projects in economically distressed areas. States are modifying systems to track Recovery Act funds but are concerned about tracking funds distributed directly to nonstate entities. Officials from all 16 of the states which GAO is reviewing and the District of Columbia stated that they have established or are establishing ways to identify, monitor, track, and report on the use of the Recovery Act funds. However, officials from many of these states and the District of Columbia have concerns about the ability of subrecipients, localities, and other non-state entities to separately monitor, track, and report on the Recovery Act funds these nonstate entities receive. Officials in several states also expressed concern about being held accountable for funds flowing directly to localities or other recipients and indicated that either their states would not be tracking Recovery Act funds going to the local levels or that they were unsure how much data would be available on the use of these funds. Our April 23rd report recommended that the OMB evaluate current reporting requirements before adding further data collection requirements. States vary in their responses to determining how to assess the impact of Recovery Act funds. For programs such as the Federal-aid Highway Surface Transportation Program, some states will use existing federal program guidance or performance measures to evaluate impact. However, a number of states have expressed concerns about definitions of "jobs retained" and "jobs created" under the act, as well as methodologies that can be used for the estimation of each. Given these concerns, GAO recommended in its first bimonthly report that the OMB continue to identify methodologies that can be used to determine jobs retained and created from projects funded by the Recovery Act. |
gao_GAO-07-839 | gao_GAO-07-839_0 | Under this contract, the Corps awarded 10 task orders to the contractor worth a total of $2.5 billion. Nearly 80 percent of the questioned costs related to the costs paid for fuel and fuel delivery. Delayed Negotiations Shaped DOD’s Decision to Pay the Contractor for Nearly All of the Costs Questioned on the RIO I Contract
DOD considered DCAA’s audit findings and conducted additional analysis before deciding to pay the RIO I contractor nearly all of the $221 million in costs that DCAA questioned, and to remove $112 million from the amount used to establish the contractor’s fixed and award fees. DCAA considers $26 million of the costs questioned on the RIO I contract to be sustained, which DCAA defines as cost reductions directly attributable to its questioned cost findings. Consequently, removing $112 million from the amount used to establish the fee pool resulted in an effective lowering of the fees the contractor received by about $5.8 million (see table 1 for details). Delays in Negotiations Influenced the Contracting Officer’s Decision to Pay Questioned Costs
All 10 RIO I task orders were negotiated more than 180 days after the work commenced, and all were negotiated after the work had been completed. Changing Requirements, Funding Challenges, and Inadequate Contractor Proposals Contribute to Negotiation Delays and Increase Risk to the Government
Several factors contributed to the delay in negotiations, including DOD’s changing requirements, DOD’s funding challenges, and inadequacies in several of the contractor’s business systems. The Sustention Rates on the DCAA Audits of the RIO I Contract and the Sustention Rates on DCAA Audits of Other Iraq Contract Actions Both Varied Widely
We compared the sustention rates for the 11 RIO I audit reports to the sustention rates for 100 DCAA audits of other Iraq contract actions, and found a similar pattern in the distribution and range of sustention rates for both groups. The contractor was notified of its award fee scores in January 2005, after completion of all work on the contract. This process was in contrast to the rationale for award fee evaluations explained in federal regulations: Evaluation at stated intervals during performance, accompanied by partial payment of the fee generally corresponding to the evaluation periods, can induce the contractor to improve poor performance or to continue good performance. The Percentage of Award Fee Earned on the RIO I Contract Fell within the Range of Award Fees Earned on a Sample of Other Iraq Reconstruction Contracts
To put the RIO I award fee into context, we also analyzed the award fees earned on other selected Iraq reconstruction contracts and found that the percentage of award fee earned on the RIO I contract was within the range of award fees earned on these other contracts. According to DOD officials, efforts to hold award fee boards during the period of performance were stymied in part by the logistical conditions in Iraq. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) audit findings on the Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO I) contract and the factors that contributed to DOD’s decision of how to address those findings, we reviewed negotiation memorandums and 22 DCAA audit reports, including 11 final audit reports, for the 10 RIO I task orders. We also interviewed Corps, DCAA, and other government officials as well as contractor representatives. To determine the extent to which DOD paid award fees for the RIO I contract and followed its planned process for making that decision, we collected and reviewed key documents related to the award fee process, including the award fee provisions of the RIO I contract, the award fee determining official’s decision, the award fee plan, and minutes from the award fee board meeting. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) awarded the $2.5 billion Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO I) contract to Kellogg Brown & Root in March 2003 in an effort to reestablish Iraq's oil infrastructure. The contract was also used to ensure adequate fuel supplies inside Iraq. RIO I was a cost-plus-award-fee type contract that provided for payment of the contractor's costs, a fixed fee determined at inception of the contract, and a potential award fee. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reviewed the 10 RIO I task orders and questioned $221 million in contractor costs. We were asked to determine (1) how DOD addressed DCAA's RIO I audit findings and what factors contributed to DOD's decision and (2) the extent to which DOD paid award fees for RIO I and followed the planned process for making that decision. To accomplish this, we reviewed DOD and DCAA documents related to RIO I and interviewed Corps, DCAA, and other officials.
What GAO Found
DOD considered DCAA's audit findings on the RIO I contract and performed additional analysis before deciding to pay the contractor nearly all of the $221 million in costs that DCAA questioned. DOD did, however, remove about $112 million of the questioned costs from the amount used to establish the contractor's fee pool, which resulted in an effective lowering of the fee received by the contractor by approximately $5.8 million. Lack of timely negotiations contributed significantly to DOD's decision on how to address the questioned costs--all 10 task orders were negotiated more than 180 days after the work commenced. As a result, the contractor had incurred almost all its costs at the time of negotiations, which influenced DOD's decision to pay nearly all of the questioned costs. The negotiation delays were in part caused by changing requirements, funding challenges, and inadequate contractor proposals. In our previous work, we have found that negotiation delays can increase risk to the government. Overall, DCAA considers $26 million of the costs questioned on the RIO I contract to be sustained, which DCAA defines as cost reductions attributable to its audit findings. We compared the sustention rates on DCAA's 11 RIO I contract audits to the sustention rates for 100 DCAA audits of other Iraq contract actions, and found that the sustention rates varied widely for both groups. DOD's Army Corps of Engineers paid $57 million in award fees on the RIO I contract, or 52 percent of the maximum possible, and on individual task orders the fee awarded ranged from 4 to 72 percent of the fee available. While the award fee plan required regular award fee boards during the life of the contract, DOD did not conduct a formal board until nearly all work on the contract was complete. As a result, DOD was not able to provide the contractor with formal award fee feedback while work was ongoing, which federal regulations state should be done in order to motivate a contractor to either improve poor performance or continue good performance. DOD officials told us the workload of RIO staff members and logistical difficulties stemming from the challenging conditions in Iraq hindered efforts to hold evaluation boards during the period of performance. DOD also was unable to give us enough documentation for a full assessment of its compliance with other parts of its plan--it did not, for example, provide the scores the award fee board assigned to the contractor on the individual award fee criteria, so we could not see if the award fee board had followed contract criteria and weighting in evaluating performance. We compared the percentage of award fees earned on the RIO I contract to the fees earned on a group of other selected Iraq reconstruction contracts and found that the percentage of award fees earned on RIO I fell within the lower range of fees earned on the other contracts. |
gao_GAO-10-383 | gao_GAO-10-383_0 | Agencies Had Obligated a Total of $194 Billion of Division A Funds as of December 31, 2009
The 27 agencies that we reviewed reported that they had obligated a total of about $194 billion of the approximately $309 billion in Division A Recovery Act funds by the end of 2009; $173 billion as of September 30, 2009; and $106 billion as of June 30, 2009. By December 31, the percentage of funds obligated ranged from nearly 100 percent for the National Endowment for the Arts ($50 million) to 18 percent for the Social Security Administration ($183 million). Although expenditure data provide some indication of when funding was spent, officials from several agencies told us that payment for federal projects generally occurs after work on a given project is completed. As a result, although work may have been substantially completed, the expenditure data would not reflect this fact because the recipient would not have submitted an invoice for payment. For example, Davis- Bacon, Buy American, and National Historic Preservation Act requirements slowed some project selection and starts. On the other hand, officials from some agencies and certain programs within other agencies said they were able to implement Recovery Act projects quickly for two main reasons. Some Agencies Reported That Certain Federal Requirements Affected the Timing of Project Selection and Starts
Officials from some agencies cited certain federal requirements that had affected their ability to select or start some Recovery Act projects. As figures 1 and 2 show, federal, state, and local agency officials identified several factors affecting their ability to select or start projects. Officials in 4 of the 27 federal agencies—the Departments of Commerce and Energy and Housing and Urban Development, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency—cited these requirements as affecting project timing, and officials from another 2 federal agencies said Davis-Bacon requirements may affect the timing of projects. In particular, Energy’s Weatherization Assistance Program became subject to the Davis-Bacon requirements for the first time after having been previously exempt from those requirements. Thus, the Department of Labor had to determine the prevailing wages for weatherization workers in each county in the United States. Specifically, 7 out of 16 states and the District of Columbia decided to wait to begin weatherizing homes until Labor had determined county-by-county prevailing wage rates for their state. States used only a small percentage of their available funds in 2009, mostly because state and local agencies needed time to develop the infrastructures required for managing the significant increase in weatherization funding and for ensuring compliance with Recovery Act requirements, including Davis-Bacon requirements. According to officials from 5 of the 27 federal agencies—the Departments of Commerce, Education, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency—these provisions had affected their ability, or their grantees’ ability, to select or start some Recovery Act projects. At the state level, 2 states and 1 local entity said that Buy American provisions had affected the timing of Recovery Act projects. According to officials from 2 of the 27 federal agencies—the Departments of Commerce and Transportation—NHPA requirements affected some Recovery Act project selection and starts, and officials at another 6 federal agencies stated that the NHPA may affect the timing of project implementation. Factors Other than Federal Requirements Have Also Affected the Timing of Project Selection and Starts
Officials also told us that factors other than federal requirements have affected the timing of project selection or starts. Seasonal issues or weather. These preapproved loans accounted for more than 75 percent of the funding made available through the Recovery Act. We also provided a copy of the relevant sections to GAO teams responsible for reviewing Recovery Act work in the states mentioned in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) aims to stimulate the economy. It provided $787 billion in spending and tax provisions; more than a third of the money was slated for projects and activities, including construction and certain research projects. To implement a project using federal funds, agencies and funding recipients must comply with federal laws and regulations. GAO was asked to identify key federal requirements that apply to Recovery Act projects and to assess the extent to which (1) selected agencies have obligated and spent funds for Recovery Act projects and (2) federal requirements and other factors have affected, or are expected to affect, project selection and start dates. GAO requested data from 27 agencies that received appropriations under the act. We also spoke with officials responsible for implementing Recovery Act projects in 16 states and the District of Columbia, which together are estimated to receive about two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available under the act. We also spoke with organizations representing state and local officials and the private sector, as well as private sector contractors. Although GAO is not making recommendations in this report, these findings may be helpful in considering and designing legislation with similar objectives.
What GAO Found
As of December 31, 2009, the 27 federal agencies GAO reviewed had obligated a total of $194 billion (63 percent) of the approximately $309 billion that was appropriated by the Recovery Act for projects and activities, according to data provided by agency officials. By this date, the percentage of funds obligated ranged from nearly 100 percent for the National Endowment for the Arts ($50 million) to 18 percent for the Social Security Administration ($183 million). As of that same date, the agencies reported they had spent 20 percent ($61 billion) of their appropriated funds. However, according to agency officials, the amount reported as spent may not accurately reflect the amount of work done on a given project because payment for federal projects generally occurs after work is completed, and the recipient may not yet have submitted an invoice for payment. Some federal agency officials reported that certain federal requirements and other factors affected their ability to select and start Recovery Act projects. These include the following: (1) Davis-Bacon requirements. Four federal agencies--the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development, and the Environmental Protection Agency--told us that Davis-Bacon requirements affected the timing of some of their Recovery Act projects. For example, the Department of Energy's Weatherization Assistance Program became subject to the Davis-Bacon requirements for the first time after having been previously exempt from those requirements. Thus, the Department of Labor had to determine the prevailing wages for weatherization workers in each county in the United States, a task it completed on September 3, 2009. Seven out of 16 states and the District of Columbia that GAO has been reviewing said that they had waited to begin weatherizing homes until the Department of Labor had determined county-by-county prevailing wage rates for their state. States used only a small percentage of their available funds in 2009, mostly because state and local agencies needed time to develop the infrastructures required for managing the significant increase in weatherization funding and for ensuring compliance with Recovery Act requirements, including Davis-Bacon requirements. (2) Buy American requirements. Five federal agencies--the Departments of Commerce, Education, Homeland Security, and Housing and Urban Development, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency--told us that Buy American provisions had affected their ability, or their grantees' ability, to select or start some Recovery Act projects. (3) The National Historic Preservation Act. Two federal agencies--the Departments of Commerce and Transportation--told us that this act affected the selection and start of projects. Federal agency officials also stated that factors other than federal requirements affected their ability to quickly select or start projects. These include (1) challenges associated with starting entirely new programs, (2) states' budgeting issues, such as difficulties in providing matching funds, (3) higher staff workloads because of the act, (4) seasonal issues or weather, and (5) lack of clarity on the meaning of "shovel-ready." |
gao_GAO-08-899T | gao_GAO-08-899T_0 | In addition, the program was experiencing major technical problems with the VIIRS sensor and expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost 2 years. Major Restructuring Activities Have Been Completed, but Key Remaining Activities Could Affect Funding and Schedule
The program office has completed major activities associated with restructuring NPOESS, but key supporting activities remain— including obtaining approval of key acquisition documents—and delays in completing these activities could affect the program’s funding and schedule. During the past year, the program redefined the program’s deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. In addition, even though DOD has had a role in delaying these documents, the Department has stated it would not release fiscal year 2009 funds to the program if these acquisition documents are not completed by the new due date. Without executive approval of key acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment necessary to effectively manage a tri-agency program. Program Has Made Progress, but Key Milestones Have Been Delayed and Risks Remain
Over the last year, the NPOESS program has made progress by completing planned development and testing activities on its ground and space segments, but key milestones for delivering the VIIRS sensor and launching NPP have been delayed by about 8 months. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, in resolving interagency disagreements on the appropriate level of system security, and in revising estimated costs for satellite operations and support. This late delivery will in turn delay the satellite’s launch from late September 2009 to early June 2010. The $12.5 billion estimated life cycle cost for NPOESS includes a rough estimate of $1 billion for operations and support. The program office is aware of program risks and is working to mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program’s overall schedule and cost. Agencies Have Undertaken Preliminary Steps to Restore Key Sensors, but Lack Timely Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006 restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were degraded or removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to restore selected sensors in order to mitigate near-term data gaps. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans to mitigate the loss of these sensors on a long-term basis. Until such plans are developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Specifically, there are as yet no firm plans for obtaining most of this data after 2015. GAO Made Recommendations To Ensure That Future Climate Needs are Addressed and to Complete Restructuring Activities
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather, environmental, and climate observations, in our accompanying report we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to establish plans on whether and how to restore the climate and space sensors removed from the NPOESS program by June 2009, in cases where the sensors are warranted and justified. In summary, over the past year, program officials have completed major activities associated with restructuring the NPOESS program and have made progress in developing and testing sensors, ground systems, and the NPP spacecraft. However, multiple risks remain. In addition, the agencies made decisions to restore two sensors to the NPP satellite and one to the first NPOESS satellite in order to mitigate near-term data gaps. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--which has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing its complexity, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to summarize a report being released today that evaluates progress in restructuring the acquisition, assesses the status of key program components and risks, and assesses the agencies' plans for obtaining the data originally planned to be collected by NPOESS sensors, but eliminated by the restructuring.
What GAO Found
The NPOESS program office has completed most of the major activities associated with restructuring the acquisition, but key activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not yet finalized selected acquisition documents. Without executive approval, the program lacks the underlying commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In addition, given that DOD has stated it would not release fiscal year 2009 funds to the NPOESS program if key acquisition documents are not completed by August 2008, delays in completing these documents could affect the program's funding and schedule. In the past year, the NPOESS program has made progress in completing development and testing activities associated with the spacecraft, sensors, and ground systems. However, key milestones have been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of a complex imaging sensor called the Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite. This late delivery caused a corresponding 8-month delay in the expected launch date of the NPOESS Preparatory Project demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early June 2010. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating them on the spacecraft, resolving interagency disagreements about the appropriate level of system security, and revising outdated operations and support cost estimates--which program officials say could increase the lifecycle cost by about $1 billion. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006 restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to mitigate near-term data continuity needs by restoring two sensors to the demonstration satellite and one sensor to the first NPOESS satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans on whether and how to replace sensors on a long-term basis as no plans have been made for sensors or satellites after the first satellite of the program. Until such a plan is developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring these sensors. Almost 2 years have passed since key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space data. |
gao_GAO-11-230 | gao_GAO-11-230_0 | For example, DOE is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel from the Navy through the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, which is jointly operated by DOE and the Navy. DOE currently stores its inventories of nuclear waste at five DOE sites. Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Could Threaten DOE’s and the Navy’s Ability to Fulfill Agreements with Colorado and Idaho
The five states with DOE sites storing nuclear waste have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding how nuclear waste will be managed. DOE and the Navy may be faced with significant penalties for missing these removal milestones. For example, under the Idaho Settlement Agreement, the federal government may be liable to pay the state $60,000 for each day past January 1, 2035, that DOE and the Navy have not removed their spent nuclear fuel from the state. Under the Colorado state agreement, DOE may be liable to pay the state $15,000 for each day after January 1, 2035, that DOE fails to remove its spent nuclear fuel. Under the Idaho Settlement Agreement, the state may also have the ability to suspend any further DOE or Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to DOE’s Idaho site until the agreement’s obligation for removal of spent nuclear fuel is met. They stated that the 25 years remaining to remove spent nuclear fuel from Idaho may not be enough time to establish an alternative repository, but they noted that the Idaho Settlement Agreement does not require the spent nuclear fuel to be sent to the Yucca Mountain repository, only that it be removed from Idaho. Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Would Not Affect Near-Term Operations at DOE Sites but Would Likely Extend On-Site Storage of Nuclear Waste
According to DOE and Navy officials, a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would not generally affect their nuclear waste operations in the near term. EM estimates that it could need an additional $918 million (2010 dollars) to extend storage if the opening of a permanent repository were delayed from 2020 to 2040. It is difficult to accurately estimate these increased on-site storage costs because of three key factors. Additional Information on Storage Facilities and Any Unique Storage Needs Would Be Required for DOE to Plan for Longer Storage
EM officials told us that DOE can extend storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste on DOE sites for some time but will need additional information on storage facilities to plan storage beyond the time set forth in the current site plans. EM officials said EM currently has no research plan for very long- term storage for the wastes at DOE sites. DOE and the Navy Have Not Developed Plans to Mitigate the Impact of Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository on Nuclear Waste Storage
EM and Navy officials told us they will not make any mitigation plans until those plans can be informed by the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations, which are expected by January 29, 2012. For some years after the commission’s recommendations are available, however, DOE and the Navy could experience difficulties planning how to mitigate the impact of a termination because uncertainties about the alternative to the Yucca Mountain repository may take time to resolve. In addition, because it is not clear how specific the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations will be, it may take DOE additional work and time to use these recommendations to develop a new nuclear waste management policy. A termination of Yucca Mountain, however, may threaten DOE’s and the Navy’s ability to meet state commitments. For example, it is not known how long the lives of existing facilities can be extended or what will happen to the waste or the storage containers during long-term on-site storage. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help prepare for longer storage of nuclear waste at DOE sites, we recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, and other DOE officials as appropriate, to take the following two actions: Assess the condition of existing nuclear waste storage facilities and the resources and information needed to extend the facilities’ useful lifetimes. Identify any gap between past and ongoing research into long-term nuclear waste storage and any additional actions needed to address DOE’s unique waste storage needs. DOE disagreed with parts of the draft report that stated there would likely be a delay in removing waste from DOE sites and increased costs as a result of DOE's decision to terminate the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for storing and managing a total of about 13,000 metric tons of nuclear waste--spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste--at five DOE sites in Colorado, Idaho, New York, South Carolina, and Washington. Also, a joint DOE-Navy program stores spent nuclear fuel from warships at DOE's Idaho site. DOE and the Navy intended to permanently dispose of this nuclear waste at a repository planned for Yucca Mountain in Nevada. However, that plan is now in question because of actions taken to terminate the site. This report assesses (1) agreements DOE and the Navy have with states at the five sites and the effects a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository would have on their ability to fulfill these agreements; (2) the effects a termination would have on DOE's and the Navy's operations and costs for storing the waste; and (3) DOE's and the Navy's plans to mitigate these potential effects. GAO reviewed state agreements and DOE plans, visited waste facilities, and interviewed federal and state officials.
What GAO Found
Five states have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding the storage, treatment, or disposal of nuclear waste stored at DOE sites. Only agreements with Colorado and Idaho include deadlines, or milestones, for removing waste from sites that may be threatened by a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository program. Under the agreements, DOE and the Navy are expected to remove their spent nuclear fuel from Idaho, and DOE is to remove its fuel from Colorado, by January 1, 2035. If a repository is not available to accept the waste, however, DOE and the Navy could miss these milestones. As a result, the government could face significant penalties--$60,000 for each day the waste remains in Idaho and $15,000 for each day the waste remains in Colorado--after January 1, 2035. These penalties could total about $27.4 million annually. Navy officials told GAO, however, their greater concern is that Idaho might suspend Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the state until the Navy meets its agreement to remove spent nuclear fuel, a suspension that would interfere with the Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear warships. Terminating the Yucca Mountain repository would not affect DOE's or the Navy's nuclear waste operations on DOE sites in the near term, according to DOE and Navy officials. But it would likely extend on-site storage and increase storage costs, which could be substantial. For example, an EM analysis estimates that EM could need an additional $918 million to extend storage, assuming a 20-year delay in a repository's opening. Since it is not known when an alternative to Yucca Mountain will be available, it is difficult to estimate the total additional storage costs stemming from terminating the repository. Although EM officials told GAO that DOE can extend storage of nuclear waste on DOE sites for some time, additional information is needed to plan for longer storage. For instance, DOE does not know how long the lives of existing storage facilities can be extended beyond estimates in current site plans. In addition, although research is being planned for long-term storage of commercial spent nuclear fuel beyond 120 years, DOE has no plan for comparable research focusing on its unique long-term waste storage needs. DOE and the Navy have not yet developed plans to mitigate the potential effects of longer storage resulting from a termination of the Yucca Mountain repository. EM and Navy officials said they are waiting for recommendations from a Blue Ribbon Commission that DOE created in 2010 to clarify future nuclear waste management alternatives. Even after the commission's recommendations are available, however, DOE could face difficulties in planning how to mitigate the impact of a termination of the repository. For example, because it is not clear how specific the commission's recommendations will be, it may take time to develop the recommendations into a new nuclear waste management policy. Further, some recommendations may not lead to a solution soon enough to meet existing waste removal milestones. DOE and the Navy said it was too early to change existing plans since no final disposition path for the waste has been determined.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess existing nuclear waste storage facilities and the resources and information needed to extend their useful lifetimes and (2) identify any additional research needed to address DOE's unique needs for long-term waste storage. DOE agreed with the recommendations, but objected to some of GAO's findings, which GAO continues to believe are sound. |
gao_GAO-07-1046 | gao_GAO-07-1046_0 | Background
Purpose and Organization of FCC
Established by the Communications Act, FCC is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The Telecommunications Act, which substantially revised the Communications Act, established that FCC should promote competition and reduce regulation to secure lower prices and higher- quality services for American telecommunications consumers and should encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. The law prescribes uniform standards for rulemaking, requires agencies to inform the public about their rules, and provides opportunities for public participation in the rulemaking process. FCC’s ex parte rules also establish the Sunshine Period, which begins when FCC releases the Sunshine Agenda of items scheduled for a vote at a public meeting and ends when those items are released to the public after the vote or are removed from the agenda before the meeting. FCC’s Rulemaking Process Includes Multiple Steps with Opportunities for Public Participation
FCC’s rulemaking process includes multiple steps as outlined by law with opportunities for the public to participate during each step. After FCC releases an NPRM, it develops and analyzes the public record to support a rule, leading to a final rule for the commission to adopt. Anyone may participate in the development of the public record through electronic filings and meetings with FCC officials. FCC may also propose rules in response to petitions for rulemaking filed by outside parties. The chairman decides when the commission will vote on final rules and whether the vote will occur during a public meeting or by circulation, which involves electronically circulating written items to each of the commissioners for approval. Reconsideration and Appeal
Stakeholders unsatisfied with an FCC rule may file a petition for reconsideration with the commission or petition for federal judicial review. FCC Generally Followed the Rulemaking Process for Selected Rules, but Unequal Access to Nonpublic Information May Give Some Stakeholders an Advantage
FCC generally followed the rulemaking process in the four case studies we reviewed. Specifically, each rulemaking included an NPRM and a notice and comment period. Other stakeholders with whom we spoke told us that they cannot learn when rules are scheduled for a vote until the agenda is publicly available. At that time, FCC rules prohibit stakeholders from lobbying, or making presentations to, FCC. Table 1 describes each of our case studies. Stakeholders may file a complaint with FCC if they believe that other stakeholders have not provided complete ex parte filings. FCC rules prohibit the disclosure of this information to anyone outside of FCC. The newspaper attributed this information to unnamed “FCC sources.”
Several Factors May Contribute to Dockets and Rulemakings Remaining Open
The complexity and number of issues within a docket and the priority the commission places on an issue may all factor into how long dockets, and the rulemakings within these dockets, remain open. The commission determines which rulemakings are a priority and when to open and close a docket; therefore, the commission determines how a rulemaking and a docket progress. Specifically, a docket may remain open because it is broad and is intended to include multiple rulemakings or because the commission has not voted to close the docket even though the docket includes completed rulemakings. Some rulemakings may remain open because they involve complex, technical issues or because competing priorities can force FCC officials to work on one rulemaking as opposed to another. Stakeholders generally told us that they are not concerned about the number of open dockets. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure a fair and transparent rulemaking process, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission: Take steps to ensure equal access to information, particularly in regard to the disclosure of information about proposed rules that are scheduled to be considered by the commission, by developing and maintaining (1) procedures to ensure that nonpublic information will not be disclosed and (2) a series of actions that will occur if the information is disclosed, such as referral to the Inspector General and providing the information to all stakeholders. To determine the extent to which FCC followed its rulemaking process, we selected for case study four rules that were completed between 2002 and 2006. As a result, we analyzed 98 dockets. We reviewed and analyzed the rulemaking records and interviewed FCC officials and stakeholders involved in the rulemakings to determine why the dockets and rulemakings remained open. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 established that FCC should promote competition and reduce regulation to secure lower prices and higher-quality services for American consumers. FCC implements its policy aims through rulemaking, whereby the agency notifies the public of a proposed rule and provides an opportunity for the public to participate in the rule's development. These rulemakings are documented within a public docket that contains the rulemaking record. In response to a congressional request on FCC rulemaking, GAO (1) described FCC's rulemaking process; (2) determined, for specific rulemakings, the extent to which FCC followed its process; and (3) identified factors that contributed to some dockets and rulemakings remaining open. GAO reviewed recent FCC rules, interviewed FCC officials and stakeholders, and conducted case studies of rulemakings.
What GAO Found
FCC's rulemaking process includes multiple steps as outlined by law, with several opportunities for public participation. FCC generally begins the process by releasing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and establishing a docket to gather information submitted by the public or developed within FCC to support the proposed rule. Outside parties may meet with FCC officials but must file a disclosure in the docket, called an ex parte filing, that includes any new data or arguments presented at the meeting. FCC analyzes information in the docket and drafts a final rule for the commission to adopt. The FCC chairman decides which rules the commission will consider and whether to adopt them by vote at a public meeting or by circulating them to each commissioner for approval. Stakeholders unsatisfied with a rule may file a petition for reconsideration with the commission or petition for review in federal court. FCC generally followed the rulemaking process in the four case studies of completed rulemakings that GAO reviewed, but several stakeholders had access to nonpublic information. Specifically, each of the four rulemakings included steps as required by law and opportunities for public participation. Within the case studies, most ex parte filings complied with FCC rules. However, in the case studies and in discussions with other stakeholders that regularly participate in FCC rulemakings, multiple stakeholders generally knew when the commission scheduled votes on proposed rules well before FCC notified the public. FCC rules prohibit disclosing this information outside of FCC. Other stakeholders said that they cannot learn when rules are scheduled for a vote until FCC releases the public meeting agenda, at which time FCC rules prohibit stakeholders from lobbying FCC. As a result, stakeholders with advance information about which rules are scheduled for a vote would know when it is most effective to lobby FCC, while stakeholders without this information would not. The complexity and number of rulemakings within a docket and the priority the commission places on a rulemaking contribute to dockets and rulemakings remaining open. The commission determines when to open and close a docket and which rulemakings are a priority; therefore, the commission determines how a docket and rulemaking progress. Dockets and the rulemakings within them may remain open because the dockets are broad and include multiple rulemakings, or because the commission has not yet voted to close the dockets even though they include completed rules. Within dockets, some rulemakings may remain open because they involve complex, technical issues or because competing priorities can force FCC officials to work on one rulemaking as opposed to another. Stakeholders generally said they are not concerned about the number of open dockets. |
gao_RCED-96-116 | gao_RCED-96-116_0 | All of the personnel savings would have occurred in FSA, most of it at the county office level. 2195, USDA could have reduced FSA personnel by 1,823 staff years and saved approximately $332 million between 1997 and 2002, using USDA’s assumptions about personnel costs. FSA would also have needed to inform participants how these provisions would affect their operations and payments. Program Activities Affected by Personnel Reductions
Most of the personnel reductions resulting from H.R. Under H.R. H.R. While the freedom-to-farm provisions under the proposed Balanced Budget Act would have achieved savings similar to those under H.R. 2195, USDA would have achieved greater personnel savings under the act because it included changes in areas not addressed by H.R. 2195. The act would have resulted in a net reduction of 2,719 staff years, which represents about a 13-percent decrease in FSA’s total staff from the fiscal year 1995 level. As the table shows, the proposed Balanced Budget Act included additional provisions that would have had the net effect of reducing FSA’s workload by 896 staff years beyond the savings resulting from the act’s freedom-to-farm provisions. Similarly, USDA would have incurred additional costs of $14 million for the increased workload of 126 staff years resulting from the Balanced Budget Act’s provisions, as discussed above. 2195 and the agricultural provisions of the proposed Balanced Budget Act of 1995, we used the fiscal year 1995 levels of personnel in farm support programs and of workload as a baseline. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the personnel reductions that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) could have achieved if Congress had implemented the freedom-to-farm provisions of H.R. 2195 and the proposed Balanced Budget Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) under H.R. 2195, the freedom-to-farm provisions would have reduced the Farm Service Agency's (FSA) personnel by 1,823 staff years and saved approximately $332 million; (2) most of the personnel savings under H.R. 2195 would have occurred at the county level and would affect such program activities as commodity payment, record keeping, compliance, and reimbursable farm-measurement; (3) the proposed Balanced Budget Act would have achieved greater personnel savings than H.R. 2195 because it included changes not addressed by H.R. 2195; (4) personnel reductions under the proposed Balanced Budget Act would have decreased FSA staff by 13 percent, a net reduction of 2,719 staff years; (5) the Balanced Budget Act would have had the net effect of reducing FSA workload by 896 staff years; (6) as a result of the personnel reductions, USDA would have incurred separation costs of $28 million for a workload of 126 staff years; (7) these costs would have lowered USDA net savings to $304 million; and (8) the Balanced Budget Act would also afford USDA additional organizational changes, more savings, and an opportunity to focus on how it delivers its services. |
gao_GAO-16-527T | gao_GAO-16-527T_0 | Air Force Has Not Accurately Identified the Number of UAS Pilots Required to Accomplish Its Mission
We found in April 2014 that the Air Force had not accurately identified optimum personnel requirements, or the crew ratio, for the number of UAS pilots it requires. The Air Force Has Taken Steps to Recruit More UAS Pilots, but May Face Retention Challenges and Continues to Rely on Pilots Trained on Manned Aircraft to Meet Requirements
We found in April 2014 that the Air Force faced challenges recruiting UAS pilots and had not achieved its recruiting goals for UAS pilots in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. At the same time, issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force’s attention. The Air Force Is Planning to Use Enlisted Personnel to Operate the Global Hawk but has not Evaluated the Possible Use of DOD Civilians
In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had not evaluated whether using alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian personnel as UAS pilots is a viable option to help it meet and sustain required UAS pilot staffing levels. However, as of March 2016, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots, as we recommended. Without also evaluating DOD civilian personnel, the Air Force may lack valuable information on whether additional options exist for meeting personnel requirements. However, as we noted in May 2015, fully implementing all four recommendations we made in our April 2014 report pertaining to management of Air Force UAS pilots should better position the Air Force to address the UAS pilot shortages that contribute to training challenges. However, In May 2015, we found that the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels due to shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force, which Air Force officials stated in turn impacted the Air Force’s ability to produce new pilots. The Air Force Monitors UAS Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed Factors Related to Those Rates
In April 2014, we found that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low promotions rates. As of January 2016, the Air Force had not taken any steps to implement our recommendation and when we sought additional information in March 2016, the Air Force did not respond in time for this statement. Army Has Not Fully Addressed Challenges Related to UAS Pilots Completing Required Training and the Use of Less Experienced Instructors
The Army has not fully addressed challenges related to UAS pilots completing their required training and its use of less experienced instructors, which could affect training quality. These officials stated that they review Army unit status reports to determine if a unit is prepared to deploy. To provide greater visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units have completed required training to leaders responsible for deployment decisions, we recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots in UAS units and the Army concurred. While the steps that Army has taken to date should address our recommendation, its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know their impact. In order to increase the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.These prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours— are important because they help ensure that UAS pilots volunteering to become instructors to help ensure that instructors are fully trained and ready to instruct UAS pilots. As a result, we found that Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform UAS missions. To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest caliber of training, we recommended, in May 2015, that the Army take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by waiving course prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to become instructors and the Army concurred. He stated that if the services coordinated on training their UAS pilots the department as a whole may be able to train its UAS pilots more effectively and efficiently. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, the size, sophistication, and cost of the Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown considerably, as has the demand for trained UAS pilots.
This testimony discusses, among other things, DOD's progress in (1) taking actions to strengthen the management of Air Force UAS pilots and (2) addressing challenges the Army faces to ensure that its UAS pilots complete their required training and receive high-quality training.
GAO's statement is based on information from its reports issued in April 2014 on the Air Force UAS pilots and May 2015 on Army and Air Force UAS pilot training. For those reports, GAO reviewed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots and other relevant documents, examined nongeneralizeable training records of Air Force UAS units, conducted nongeneralizeable focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected to cover a range of ranks and other factors at 6 installations, and interviewed DOD and military services officials. GAO obtained updates from DOD and military services officials for this statement.
What GAO Found
In April 2014, GAO reported on several issues the Air Force faced in managing its UAS pilots, and while the Air Force has taken some actions since then, it has not fully implemented GAO's recommendations to strengthen its management.
Personnel Requirements : GAO reported that the Air Force had not accurately identified the number of UAS pilots required to accomplish its mission nor had it established a minimum number of pilots needed. As of March 2016, the Air Force had not updated personnel requirements and until it does, the Air Force will not know if it is assuming unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the mission and ensuring pilot safety.
Recruiting and Retaining : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges recruiting UAS pilots and might also face retention challenges in the future. The Air Force has taken steps to recruit more UAS pilots and offers a monthly assignment incentive pay to help retain pilots, but issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force's attention.
Alternative Sources : GAO reported that the Air Force had not evaluated the use of alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian personnel to help it sustain required UAS pilot staffing levels. In 2015, the Air Force announced it would test using enlisted personnel but has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots and thus may lack information on potential options for meeting personnel requirements.
Training : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges training its UAS pilots due to UAS pilot shortages, which impacted its ability to produce new pilots. Fully implementing GAO's recommendations pertaining to management of UAS pilots would better position the Air Force to address its training challenges.
Promotions : GAO reported that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low promotion rates. Until the Air Force does this analysis, it is unclear whether its actions to raise promotion rates are appropriate.
The Army has initiated steps to address challenges related to UAS pilots completing their required training and its use of less experienced instructors, which could affect training quality. In May 2015, GAO found that Army unit status reports did not require UAS pilot training information, and thus the Army did not know the extent pilots had been trained and were ready to deploy. GAO recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include UAS pilot readiness information. In March 2016, officials stated that the Army had taken steps to implement the recommendation, but its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know their impact. Also, the Army had waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending a course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. As a result, Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the highest caliber of training to prepare them for UAS missions. GAO recommended in May 2015 that the Army mitigate risks posed by waiving prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots, and in March 2016, Army officials stated that they have addressed the underlying causes that led it to waive the prerequisites, but they did not provide information for GAO to be able to determine whether they were continuing to waive these prerequisites.
What GAO Recommends
In April 2014 and May 2015, GAO made ten recommendations to DOD to improve the Air Force's management of UAS pilots, address Army UAS pilot training challenges, and enhance DOD coordination of UAS pilot training. DOD initiated action on most of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-235 | gao_GAO-09-235_0 | These requirements included an assessment of the critical skills that will be needed in the future DOD civilian employee workforce to support national security requirements and effectively manage the department over the next decade, the critical competencies that will be needed in the future DOD civilian employee workforce to support national security requirements and effectively manage the department over the next decade, the skills of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce, the competencies of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce, the projected trends in that workforce based on expected losses due to retirement and other attrition, and gaps in the existing or projected DOD civilian employee workforce that should be addressed to ensure that the department has continued access to the critical skills and competencies needed to support national security requirements and effectively manage the department over the next decade. While DOD’s 2008 Update Shows Progress, It Only Partially Addresses Each of the Fiscal Year 2006 Legislative Requirements
DOD has made progress in implementing the eight requirements in the FY 2006 NDAA as compared to its first plan; however, as seen in table 1, the 2008 update only partially addresses each of the eight requirements. Furthermore, DOD’s 2008 update only included gap analyses for about half of the 25 identified enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. For example, DOD identified—through the department’s functional and human resource leadership—25 enterprisewide mission-critical occupations but did not provide an assessment of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that covered a 10-year period. DOD’s Recently Established Program Management Office Does Not Have a Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be Addressed
OSD officials stated that they are working to more fully address all of the legislative requirements, and in November 2008 OUSD (P&R) officially established a program management office—whose responsibility is to, among other things, specifically monitor and review DOD’s enterprisewide mission-critical occupation assessments, workforce trends, and gap analyses. DOD’s 2008 Update of Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Generally Addresses 2007 Legislative Requirements for DOD’s Senior Leader Workforce
Of the nine requirements stipulated in the FY 2007 NDAA, DOD’s update and related documentation addresses four and partially addresses the remaining five. Assessment of DOD’s Needs for Senior Leaders
DOD’s 2008 update notes that the department has not completely addressed this requirement and has ongoing work to do so through a baseline review of senior leadership positions. The update does not, however, address specific strategies for deploying senior leaders. As noted before, without such a plan, DOD and its components may not be able to design and fund the best strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet their workforce needs. Although DOD Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Plan, the Update Does Not Include Strategies to Address These Factors
While DOD’s update identified a number of factors that could affect civilian workforce plans, such as the effect of decisions made during BRAC and the conversion of military positions to civilian positions, it did not specifically incorporate strategies to address these factors. For example, we previously identified the need to develop a civilian workforce strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of contractors. The update mentioned that the department may consider using government employees to perform, among other things, a new mission requirement or an activity performed by a contractor when an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost providers. GAO’s body of work has shown that DOD faces long-standing challenges with increased reliance on contractors to perform core missions. We continue to believe that, without strategies that address DOD’s reliance on contractors—a key part of DOD’s workforce—the department may not have the right people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action
To continue the progress DOD has made with its human capital strategic planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following three actions: task the newly established program management office, which is responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, to develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources; task the newly established executive management office, which is responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources; and incorporate, in future updates to its strategic human capital plan, strategies for addressing factors that could significantly affect DOD’s civilian workforce plans—including contractor roles and the effect contractors have on requirements for DOD’s civilian workforce. Our review was structured to assess the extent to which DOD’s update addressed the FY 2006 and FY 2007 NDAA requirements and key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. The department noted that our report said DOD does not have and does not plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly formed civilian workforce readiness program office and that this statement was not correct. 2. The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Having the right number of civilian personnel with the right skills is critical to achieving the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission. With more than 50 percent of its civilian workforce (about 700,000 civilians) eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD may be faced with deciding how to fill numerous mission-critical positions--some involving senior leadership. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 requires DOD to develop a strategic human capital plan, update it annually through 2010, and address eight requirements. GAO previously found that DOD's 2007 plan did not meet most requirements. The 2007 NDAA added nine requirements to the annual update to shape DOD's senior leader workforce. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD's 2008 update addressed (1) the 2006 human capital planning requirements, (2) the 2007 senior leader requirements, and (3) key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. GAO analyzed the update, compared it with the requirements, and reviewed factors identified in the update and prior GAO work.
What GAO Found
While DOD's 2008 update to its strategic human capital plan, when compared with the first plan, shows progress in addressing the FY 2006 NDAA requirements, the update only partially addresses each of the act's requirements. For example, DOD identified 25 critical skills and competencies--referred to as enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, which included logistics management and medical occupations. The update, however, does not contain assessments for over half of the 25 occupations, and the completed assessments of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations do not cover the required 10-year period. Also, DOD's update included analyses of "gaps," or differences between the existing and future workforce for about half of the 25 occupations. Finally, DOD's update partially addressed the act's requirements for a plan of action for closing the gaps in DOD's civilian workforce. Although DOD recently established a program management office whose responsibility is to monitor DOD's updates to the strategic human capital plan, the office does not have and does not plan to have a performance plan--a road map--that articulates how the NDAA requirements will be met. Until such a plan is developed, DOD may not be able to design the best strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet its civilian workforce needs. DOD's 2008 update and related documentation address four of the nine requirements in the FY 2007 NDAA for DOD's senior leader workforce and partially address the remaining five. For example, the update identifies a plan of action to address, among other things, changes in the number of authorized senior leaders. However, the update noted that DOD had conducted only initial leadership assessments as a first step in identifying some of its needs, capabilities, and gaps in the existing or projected senior leader workforce and stated that the final assessments would not be completed until the summer of 2009. Although DOD recently established an executive management office to manage the career life cycle of DOD senior leaders, as well as the FY 2007 NDAA requirements, this office has not and does not plan to develop a performance plan to address the NDAA-related requirements. While DOD's 2008 update identified some key factors that could affect civilian workforce plans, such as base closures and legislation requiring the use of government employees for certain functions, it does not include strategies for addressing these factors. For example, the update noted that DOD may consider using government employees to perform, among other things, an activity performed by a contractor when an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost providers, but DOD does not provide a strategy for doing so. Further, GAO's body of work has noted a similar factor not discussed in DOD's update--DOD's extensive reliance on contractors and its long-standing challenges in developing a civilian workforce strategy to address the use of contractors and the appropriate mix of contractors and civilians. Without strategies that address key factors like the use of contractors, DOD may not have the right number of people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future. |
gao_T-RCED-98-128 | gao_T-RCED-98-128_0 | In fiscal year 1996, the states returned about $121.6 million, or about 3.3 percent, of that year’s $3.7 billion WIC grant for reallocation to the states in the next fiscal year. Some of the reasons cited by the WIC directors for not spending all available funds related to the structure of the WIC program. Some of these states prohibit agency expenditures that exceed their available funding. As a result, they were unable to certify and serve a number of eligible individuals and did not spend the associated grant funds. WIC Access for Working Women
On the basis of our nationwide survey of randomly selected local WIC agencies, we reported in October 1997 that these agencies have implemented a variety of strategies to increase the accessibility of their clinics for working women. The most frequently cited strategies—used by every agency—are scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis and allowing other persons to pick up participants’ WIC vouchers. We estimated that about 66 percent of local WIC agencies have taken steps to expedite clinic visits for working women. Containing Program Costs
In September 1997, we reported that the states have used a variety of initiatives to control WIC costs. These two practices are (1) contracting with manufacturers to obtain rebates on WIC foods in addition to infant formula and (2) limiting authorized food selections by, for example, requiring participants to select brands of foods that have the lowest cost. Our survey also collected information on the practices that the states are using to ensure that program participants meet the program’s income and residency requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its completed reviews of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), focusing on the: (1) reasons that states had for not spending all of their federal grant funds; (2) efforts of WIC agencies to improve access to WIC benefits for working women; and (3) various practices states use to lower the costs of WIC and ensure that the incomes of WIC applicants' meet the program's eligibility requirements for participation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) states had unspent WIC funds for a variety of reasons; (2) in fiscal year 1996, these funds totalled about $121.6 million, or about 3.3 percent of that year's $3.7 billion WIC grant; (2) some of these reasons were associated with the way WIC is structured; (3) virtually all the directors of local WIC agencies report that their clinics have taken steps to improve access to WIC benefits for working women; (4) the two most frequently cited strategies are: (a) scheduling appointments instead of taking participants on a first-come, first-served basis; and (b) allowing a person other than the participant to pick up food vouchers or checks, as well as nutrition information, and to pass these benefits on to the participant; (5) the states are using a variety of cost containment initiatives that have saved millions of dollars annually for WIC and enabled more individuals to participate in the program; and (6) some of these initiatives include obtaining rebates on WIC foods, limiting participants' food choices to lowest-cost items, and limiting the number of stores that participate in WIC. |
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